ivil Appeal Nos 123124 of 1985
From the Judgment and Order dated 2191984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in RSA No 1716 of 1978 and RSA No 1898 of 1978
Shanti Bhushan Vishnu Mathur Mrs Roxna Swamy and Rajinder Singh for the Appellants
TA Ramachandran and Ramesh K Keshwani for the Re spondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA J
These appeals arise out of the judgment of Punjab  Haryana High Court dated 2191984 in Regular Second Appeal Nos
171678 and 169878 wherein the learned Judge dismissed the two second appeals and maintained the judgment of the appellate court ie Additional District Judge granting a decree for half share of the property each in favour of Smt
Pan Bai and Smt
Sohan Bai the two daugh ters of deceased Smt
Mam Kaur
In order to clearly understand the facts the pedigree of the family would be relevant 1015 Hari Singh Sanehi Singh Hazari Singh Smt
Mam Kaur Jawana Singh Lakhi Singh Smt
Pan Bai Smt
Sohan Bai Munshi  Plaintiff in Plaintiff in Singh  Ranjit Singh suit out of suit out of five others and6 other sons which RSA No which RSA Nodefendants Defendants 7 1698 of 1978 17 16 of 1978 Nos1to 6 to 13 has arisen has arisen Hazari Singh owned agricultural lands the dimensions and its identity is not in dispute before us and he died in November 1918 leaving behind his widow Smt
Mam Kaur who inherited the property
Hazari Singh had left behind two daughters ie Smt
Pan Bai Plaintiff in the suit out of which second appeal before the High Court was No 169878 and Smt
Sohan Bai who was also a plaintiff in suit out of which second appeal before the High Court was No 17 1678
In 1944 it is alleged that Smt
Mam Kaur adopted Ranjit Singh grandson of Sanehi Singh and son of Lakhi Singh
This Ranjit Singh had six other brothers and it is alleged that in 1945 Smt
Mam Kaur gifted all the lands which she had inherited from her husband by an oral gift to Ranjit Singh
As regards the two events ie adoption and gift there is some controversy in respect of the respective dates
It appears and it was contended by the counsel for the appel lants that adoption was first and gift was only a consequen tial act to accelerate the succession whereas learned coun sel for the respondents contended that gift was first where as adoption was subsequent
But it is not disputed that the gift also is nothing more than an oral gift and the same is about adoption
Munshi Singh and his five brothers filed a suit for declaration challenging this gift and adoption made by Smt
Mam Kaur in favour of Ranjit Singh
By judgment and decree dated 24 71947 the suit was decreed and it was held that the adoption of Ranjit Singh was invalid and the gift also was held to be invalid and a declaration was granted in respect of the gift so far as it affected the reversionary rights
Against this judgment Ranjit Singh preferred an appeal but this was also dismissed
On 4th June 1963 Smt
Mam Kaur sold away the entire lands to Ranjit Singh and his brothers for an amount of Rs50000
Thereafter 1016 to claim pre emption a suit was filed by Smt
Pan Bai and the other suit was filed by Munshi Singh and his five broth ers on the ground that as reversioners they have a superior right to pre emption
In these preemption matters ultimately the Court held that Smt
Pan Bai had a superior right as compared to Munshi Singh and his brothers and therefore and earlier date was given to Smt
Pan Bai to deposit the sale amount and seek pre emption failing which her suit was to be dismissed and a later date was given to Munshi Singh and his brothers to deposit the sale amount and opt for pre emption
Similar condition of dismissal of the suit for failure of depositing the amount was imposed
So far as Smt
Pan Bai is concerned she did not deposit the amount and therefore her suit for pre emption was dismissed where as Munshi Singh and others deposited the amount and obtained a decree of preemp tion which was executed and they obtained possession and in this manner they stood substituted in the sale
In January 1965 Smt
Mam Kaur died and Smt
Sohan Bai filed a suit bearing No 40365 seeking a decree for posses sion of half of the share on the plea that in view of the declaratory decree dated 247
1947 which was confirmed on appeal that on the death of Smt
Mam Kaur succession had to be traced to Hazari Singh ie Sohan Bai s father and she being the direct heir of Hazari Singh was entitled to half share in the land
It was also pleaded that Smt
Mam Kaur had already parted with her widow s estate by gift deed made by her in 1945 in favour of Ranjit Singh and therefore she had no subsisting title which she could transfer by way of sale by the sale deed dated 4963 and thus by this sale deed as she herself had no title she could not convey any title in favour of Ranjit Singh and his brothers
Sohan Bai s suit was decreed but on appeal it was remanded
In the mean time Smt
Pan Bai also filed a similar suit which was numbered 20368 to claim possession of the remaining half share on the same ground as was filed by Smt
Sohan Bai
The two suits were consolidated and the trial court by its judgment dated 2nd January 1973 decreed Smt
Sohan Bai s suit but dismissed the suit filed by Smt
Pan Bai on the ground that as Smt
Pan Bai had filed a suit claiming on the basis of pre emption earlier she was estopped from disputing the validity of sale made by Smt
Mam Kaur
Against this judgment of the trial court losing parties filed their appeals before the Additional District Judge who by his judgment and decree dated 25978 maintained the decree in the suit of Sohan Bai and reversed the trial court judgment in the suit of Smt
Pan Bai and held that both the daughters were entitled to succeed to half share each in the property
Against this judgment the defendants in Smt
Sohan Bai s case filed a regular second appeal which was No 171678 1017 and defendants in Smt
Pan Bai s case filed regular second appeal which was No 169878 in the Punjab  Haryana High Court
Both these second appeals Were disposed of by the impugned judgment of the High Court
Most of the facts are not in dispute
The main contro versy raised in these appeals is that in the earlier suit the adoption and gift both were declared as invalid in a suit for declaration filed by the reversioners what will be its effect On the one hand counsel for the appellants contended that in fact adoption was followed by gift more or less in the nature of a step to accelerate the succession and when the court declared both to be invalid it clearly meant that the donee who was the adopted son Ranjit Singh was not left with any rights in the properties whereas on behalf of the respondents it was contended that adoption no doubt was declared invalid but so far as gift was concerned it was declared invalid in a suit for declaration by rever sioners to the limited extent that this gift will not affect the rights of the reversioners thereby meaning that so far as the life estate of Smt
Mam Kaur was concerned it was transferred by this gift deed but the right of the rever sioners to succeed on the death of Smt
Mam Kaur was pro tected as it was declared that this gift will not affect the rights of the reversioners
A controversy was also raised as to which adoption or gift was first in time and what is its effect Learned counsel for the appellants contended that as the adoption and gift both were declared invalid although a declaration was granted in a suit by reversioners but it clearly meant that nothing remained with the so called donee and therefore when Hindu Succession Act come into force because of Section 14 clause 1 Smt
Mam Kaur became the absolute owner and therefore she had a valid right to trans fer the property by sale
It was also contended that Ranjit Singh in whose favour the gift was alleged to have been made himself agreed to purchase this property alongwith his brothers this indicates that he accepted the position that Smt
Mam Kaur after coming into force of the Hindu Succes sion Act had acquired the absolute rights and she could convey the property by sale
In any event his accepting to purchase the property from Smt
Mam Kaur amounts to an admission that there was no right created in his favour by gift which was declared invalid and on this basis learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants are entitled to succeed and the High Court was not right in granting the decree on the basis of the claim of the two daughters who claimed to be the heirs of Hazari Singh
Alternatively it was 1018 also contended by learned counsel for the appellants that even if the gift in favour of Ranjit Singh is accepted it is clear that Smt
Mam Kaur had succeeded to the property as an heir of her husband and because of Hindu women s right to property Act 1937 Smt
Mam Kaur had a limited estate
As it is well settled that this limited estate in favour of Smt
Mam Kaur had all the rights which an heir could have in immovable property but in the case of female heirs the only limitation was in respect of alienation and alienation could only be of the rights that she could alienate and that amounts to only life interest
It is also well settled that the alienaee in this case Ranjit Singh will get the property till the life time of Smt
Mam Kaur and it is also well settled that if during the life time of Smt
Mam Kaur Hindu Succession Act came into force as the property in suit was in the hands of alienee ie Ranjit Singh he will not get the benefit of Section 141 and will not become the abso lute owner but on the death of Smt
Mam Kaur the property will revert back to the heirs of Smt
Mam Kaur s husband
It was also contended that in spite of the fact that a gift creating a life interest in favour of Ranjit Singh was in existence but Smt
Mam Kaur still had the residuary rights of disposing of the property after her death if during her lifetime the Hindu Succession Act came into force
As in the present case it did come into force the limited rights which remained with Smt
Mam Kaur became full rights on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act and therefore if Smt
Mam Kaur transferred by sale the property the sale would convey at least the residuary rights vested in her ie the right of absolute ownership at most subject to possession of the alienee during her lifetime and on this basis it was contended that the sale made by Smt
Mam Kaur is valid and therefore the view taken by the High Court is not correct
On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents contended that as the gift was valid the property was trans ferred in favour of the alienee ie Ranjit Singh although it was the life estate but with the Hindu Succession Act coming into force she could not be said to be possessed of the property as there were no rights in the property vested in Smt
Mam Kaur and even if the widest meaning is given to possessed of  still it could not be contended that she had any rights left with her
Therefore during her lifetime the alienee alone had the rights in property
The effect if any of the earlier decree was that on her death the property will revert back and in that event it will revert back to the heirs of her husband not to her heirs and in this view it was contended that the judgment passed by the High Court is correct
As regards the effect of Smt
Pan Bai s suit for pre emption 1019 leading to estoppel also contentions were advanced
Learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of decisions of this Court in Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapa dam Pillai and Ors  and Gopal Singh and Another vs Dile Ram dead by LRs and others contended that as the gift at best could be said to be effective during the lifetime of Smt
Mam Kaur she had a residuary right left in her which she could dispose of
Alternatively it was contended that gift in favour of Ranjit Singh was declared invalid and therefore she could be said to be possessed of the property in view of language of Section 141 of the Hindu Succession Act
It was also contended that in the sale deed Ranjit Singh himself was one of the purchasers and the sale deed indicates that at the time of sale Smt
Mam Kaur delivered possession to the purchasers
On these basis it was contended that it appears that Ranjit Singh had given the possession of the property back to Smt
Mam Kaur before this sale deed was executed
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that the decree declaring the gift bad was only a declaratory decree in favour of the reversioners that clear ly meant that so far as reversioners rights on the death of Smt
Mam Kaur are concerned they could not be affected by gift but it did not mean that Smt
Mam Kaur did not transfer her rights by gift in favour of Ranjit Singh
It was there fore contended that in view of decision in Kuldip Singh and others vs Surain Singh and Others which is a judgment of a Bench of three Judges of this Court Smt
Mam Kaur could not be said to be a person possessed of anything and therefore no benefit could be obtained by Section 141 so far as Smt
Mam Kaur is concerned and it was therefore contended that the judgment passed by the High Court could not be assailed
It was also contended that so far as the question of re conveyance by Ranjit Singh in favour of Smt
Mam Kaur is concerned the question has been examined on the basis of evidence by the two courts below and a positive finding has been arrived at by the courts that the evidence is not sufficient to come to the conclu sion that there was transfer of possession from Ranjit Singh to Smt
Mam Kaur before the sale deed was executed
It was also contended that the two decisions on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel are clearly distinguishable on facts as in these two judgments on the date the Hindu Suc cession Act came into force the widow was possessed of the property and therefore it was held that she acquired the rights as full owner
1020 So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant about the transfer of possession from Ranjit Singh back to Smt
Mam Kaur is concerned the learned courts below have come to a positive finding of fact that there was no transfer of possession in favour of Smt
Mam Kaur before the sale deed by her was executed and while coming to the con clusion the courts below have considered the effect of the recital in the sale deed executed by Smt
Mam Kaur and the fact that Ranjit Singh is one of the purchasers and having gone through the judgments in our opinion the conclusions could not be said to be erroneous and therefore the conten tions of the learned counsel for the appellants on that ground could not be accepted
As regards the question about the declaration of the gift to be invalid the judgment which granted the decree in favour of the reversioners clearly indicated that it was a decree of declaration saying that the gift had no effect on the rights of the reversioners
The words in the operative part of the judgment stated For the reasons aforesaid the plaintiffs succeed and are granted a decree for declara tion that Mst
Mam Kaur did not validly adopt Ranjit defdt
and that gift in favour of Ranjit defdt
shall not affect the right of the reversioners after the death or termina tion of the interest in the suit land of Mst
Mam Kaur
 In this view of the matter it is therefore clear that what was held was that the gift will not affect the rights of the reversioners on the death of Smt
Mam Kaur but it could not be disputed that so far as Smt
Mam Kaur during her lifetime is concerned as she had gifted away the property to Ranjit Singh and delivered possession she had no rights left with her
The contentions advanced by learned counsel in respect of residuary rights also is of no consequence as it is apparent that Smt
Mam Kaur who was enjoying the limited estate before the Hindu Succession Act came into force transferred her rights by gift and if a valid gift is ef fected it could not be contended that there were any residu ary rights left with her
In fact what residuary rights could be thought of were not the rights of the widow but the right of the reversioners to get as heirs of her husband on her death and on that basis it could not be said that she could be said to be possessed of any right in the property which she held as a limited owner on the date the Hindu Succession Act came into force
In Jagannathan Pillai s case the 1021 property was re conveyed in favour of the widow and this Court therefore observed The case of the widow who had temporarily lost the right in the property by virtue of the transfer in favour of the alienee or the donee cannot be equated with that of a strang er by forgetting the realities of the situa tion
Surely the Act was intended to benefit her
And when the widow becomes possessed of the property having regained precisely that interest which she had temporarily lost during the duration of the eclipse Section 141 would come to her rescue which would not be the matter in the case of a stranger who cannot invoke Section 14 1
 In Gopal Singh s case this Court while examining the facts clearly stated as under It is pertinent to note that the compromise decree reads as follows I allow the appeal of the appellants and modify the judgment of the trial court to the extent that gift deed in respect of the land measuring 21 15 17 bighas comprising Khata Khatauni No 316 to 27 bighas situated in village Barsu Ballah is hereby rejected and declared ineffective
The aforesaid land along with the other land shall be divided in equal shares after the death of Sheru alias Bhushe hari and Dhari shall himself give due share to Hari Ram in accordance with the aforementioned order
 The operative portion of the compromise decree which was quoted by this Court in the judgment clearly indicated that as the gift deed was ineffective in respect of the lands mentioned therein the widow continued to enjoy the rights and benefits till the Hindu Succession Act came in force as it is observed The effect of the aforesaid was that the gift was ineffective and Smt
Bhushehari continued to enjoy the right and benefit she had during her limited ownership until 1956
Under these circumstances therefore these cases do not help the appellant
It is clear that in view of gift made in favour of Ranjit SinghMam Kaur on the date on which Hindu Succession Act came into 1022 force was not possessed of any fight in the property and therefore she could not get any advantage from the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act
This Court in Kuldip Singh s case clearly held It is clear from the questions reproduced above that on the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Mangal Singh and others supra it has to be held in the present case that the property in dispute cannot be held to be possessed by Smt
Mehtab Kaur because after gifting the property to Hamam Singh and parting with the possession of the property she was not left with any fights at all under which she could regain possession in her own life time
The gift executed by her was binding on her even though it may not have been binding on the reversioners
She could not therefore avoid the deed of gift and could not claim back possession from Hamam Singh or his successors in interest
Having thus completely parted with her fights she could not be held to be possessed of the property when the Act came into force and consequently she could not become full owner of it
 It is clear that on the date on which Smt
Main Kaur executed the sale deed in fact she had no title to the property nor she was in possession thereof
As regards the contention about Smt
Pan Bai on the basis of estoppel is concerned it is clear from the language of Section 115 of the Evidence Act that doctrine of estoppel can not be invoked merely because Smt
Pan Bai filed a suit for pre emption
Section 115 of the Evidence Act reads thus When one person has by his declaration act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing
 In view of this learned counsel did not seriously press the contention
Consequently we see no reason to entertain the appeal
The appeals are therefore dismissed and the decree passed by the learned courts below is maintained
In view of the circumstances of the case we pass no orders as to costs


Summary:
The common question that arose for decision by this Court in these groups of matters is whether payment of less salary to a senior than his junior in the same cadre having the same scale of pay is violative of the principle of equal pay for equal work enshrined in Article 39d read with Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution
The said ques tion in each group of matters arises thus The first batch in this bunch of appeals CAs 317 3087 etc relate to the case of Assistant Section Officers of Andhra Pradesh High Court
It may be pointed out that copy ists and Assistants are the two feeder channels to the post of assistant Section Officers
Prior to 1974 the Copyists were in the pay scale of Rs70 130 and were entitled to additional payment at Rs75P every 100 words they copy in excess of 42000 words
Consequent upon pay revision they were given the pay scale of Rs250 430 wef 111974 with out entitlement of remuneration in addition to pay
The Copyists represented that while revising their grade tile additional emoluments which they were getting prior to revision of pay has not been taken into consideration
On recommendation of the High Court the State Government agreed to fix the pay of the Copyists in the revised grade by adding to their basic pay Rs8334P that being the average remuneration that each Copyist was earning prior to 1174 and the Dearness Allowance admissible thereon
The pre revised scale of pay of Assistants was Rs90 192 which was revised to Rs250 430 from 111974
Even though the Scale of Pay of Copyists and Assistants was the same Copyists started drawing more salary on account of addition of Rs8334P aforesaid
Consequently on promotion to the Post of Assistant Section Officer the salaries of those 1001 promoted from the cadre of Copyists were fixed higher than those who were promoted from the cadre of Assistants
One Janakirama Rao a Copyist was promoted to the cadre of Assistant Section Officer in 1984
On the basis of his last pay drawn as Copyist his pay as Assistant Section Officer was fixed higher than those who were promoted to the said post from the cadre of Assistants during the period 1982 84 under FR 22ai of Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules
The Seniors filed writ petitions in the High Court contending that the grant of higher pay to juniors in the same cadre is violative of the principle Equal pay for equal work
The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and directed that the Assistant Section Officers seniors to Janakirama Rao be paid the same salary as he was drawing
Division Bench held that grant of higher pay packet to junior person than his seniors under any circumstances is discriminatory
Hence these appeals by the State of Andhra Pradesh
Another batch of appeals is filed by Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam
One BV Krishnamurthy and 62 others working as Upper Division Clerks in the Devasthanam had filed writ petition in the High Court praying that the Devasthanam be directed to pay salary to them at par with one D Gopaliah UDC who was junior to them
Particulars of D Gopaliah and one of the petitioners may only be stated
Gopaliah joined as Lower Division Clerk in 1967 and was given Selec tion Grade in 1974
Family Planning incentive of Rs 11 was added to his salary in 1977
He was promoted as UDC in 1979 but was reverted in 1981
He was given further increase in pay as LDC on completion of 15 years service as provided in the Rules and in June 1987 he was drawing basic pay of Rs811
He was again promoted as UDC on 171983 and in that cadre on the basis of his pay in the lower grade his salary as per Rules was fixed at Rs861
On the other hand Krishnamurthi who joined as Lower Division Clerk in 1970 and promoted as UDC on 3111981 his salary was fixed at Rs615
On 1st July 1983 Krishnamurthy was drawing Rs635
In these circumstances Gopaliah though junior to Krishnamurthy started drawing more salary
Following his earlier decision the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions filed by Krishnamurthy and others similarly placed
Their Writ Appeals were dismissed
Hence these appeals by Devasthanam
The third group of appeals by the State of Andhra Pra desh CAs 29988  300 30188 are directed against the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal
The Writ Petitioners therein were Assistants working in differ ent departments of the State
They were all absorbed in the Pay  Accounts Office Hyderabad wef 12th July 1002 1978
One Swaminathan was also absorbed as Assistant in the said office wef 4th September 1978
In view of his length of service and grant of Selection grade he had been drawing higher salary in his parent Department
Accordingly on his joining Pay  Accounts Office his salary as per Rules was protected and he was fixed at higher basic pay than the Writ Petitioners
The Seniors raised contention before the Tribunal on the basis of Equal pay for equal Work
The Tribunal allowed the Writ Petitions holding that for whatever reason a junior is paid higher pay packet than his senior the prin ciple of Equal pay for equal work is violated and the senior is entitled to the same pay
In other cases also the same question junior drawing more salary than senior and the seniors claiming parity of pay is involved
Before this Court it was contended by the appellants employers that so long as there is rational basis for giving higher pay to junior in the same cadre the seniors can have no grievance
The last pay drawn in the lower cadre has to be the basis for fixation of salaries under the Fundamental Rules and following that basis the salaries have been rightly fixed
According to some appellants if all the consideration factors and incidents of service are identical then only the principle of Equal pay for equal work is attracted
If there is justification under the Rules or otherwise for giving a higher pay to the junior then the principle in the abstract sense is not attracted
Allowing the appeals this Court HELD Doctrine of Equal pay for equal work cannot be put in a straight jacket
Although the doctrine finds its place in the Directive Principles this Court in various judgments has authoritatively pronounced that right to equal pay for equal work is an accompaniment of the equal ity Clause enshrined in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitu tion of lndia
1008H 1009A Reasonable classification based on intelligible crite ria having nexus with the object sought to be achieved is permissible
1009B Equal pay for equal work does not mean that all the members of the cadre must receive the same pay packet irre spective of their 1003 seniority source of recruitment educational qualifications and various other incidents of service
When a single run ning pay scale is provided for a post in a cadre the Con stitutional mandate of equal pay for equal work is satis fied
Ordinarily grant of higher pay to a junior would ex facie be arbitrary but if there are justifiable grounds in doing so the seniors cannot invoke the equality doctrine
1009B C The differentia on grounds such as when persons re cruited from different services are given pay protection when promoters from lower cadre or a transferee from another cadre is given any pay protection when a senior is stepped at efficiency bar when advance increments are given for experiencepassing a testacquiring higher qualifications or as incentive for efficiency would be based on intelligible criteria which has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and which does not violate the mandate of equal pay for equal work
The orders appealed against were there fore reversed
1009D E