ivil Appeal No 263 of 1983
From the Judgment and Order dated 411983 of the Punjab and 281 Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No 3243 of 1982
MK Ramamurthi and SK Agarwal for the Appellants
SK Mehta Aman Vachher Atul Nanda and KL Verma for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
The appeal concerns the scope and construction of Section 13 sub section 2i proviso of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 called shortly as The Act 
The point at issue relates to the validity of the arrears of rent deposited by the tenant under the proviso
Milkhi Ram the respondent in this appeal is the landlord of the premises consisting of a shop at Ludhiana
In Febru ary 1958 the shop was taken on rent by Amar Chand
The rent agreed was Rs45 per month
In December 1975 Amar Chand died
His brother Diwan Chand succeeded to the tenancy rights
In November 1976 he also died leaving behind his widow Pushpa Devi and his minor son Yashpal
They are appel lants 1 and 2 in this appeal
The landlord brought an action for eviction under section 13 of the Act on the ground of arrears of rent sub letting etc
His case was that appel lants 1 and 2 inducted Saligram appellant No 3 as a sub tenant and delivered exclusive possession of the shop prem ises
The eviction was also sought on the ground that the tenant has made alterations resulting in material impairment in the value and utility of the premises
The appellant s case was that the shop was taken on lease by Amar Chand as partner of the firm Ms Amar Chand in which Amar Chand Diwan Chand and Saligram were all partners in the business from the very commencement of tenancy
They denied that Saligram was inducted as subtenant
They also refuted the allegations as to material alterations affecting the value and utility of the premises
Before the Rent Controller the respondents on the first date of hearing tendered the arrears of rent with interest and cost determined by the Controller
The amount was ren dered evidently under the proviso to Section 13 sub section 2i of the Act
Mr Satpal Singh the common counsel for all the respondents tendered the amount alongwith his state ment which reads as follows I tender Rs2025 as arrears of rent from 1121975 to 282 318
1979 Rs240 as interest and Rs25 as costs as as sessed on behalf of all the respondents total amounting to Rs2290
 The landlord did not accept the amount but made the following endorsement 1 do not accept the tender as it is neither legal nor valid
The respondent No 3 Saligram is a sub tenent The Rent Controller at that stage did not state whether the objection of the landlord was legal and justified
Since the eviction was also based on other grounds he allowed the parties to lead evidence on all the questions
After consid ering the evidence adduced by the parties the Controller found no substance in the allegations that the tenant has made any material alteration impairing the utility of the building
On the question of original tenancy agreement he found that the original tenant was not in the partnership firm of which Amar Chand was partner but Amar Chand took the premises in his personal name and the tenancy was there fore personal to him
He also accepted the case of unautho rised sub letting and held that respondent No 3 was a sub tenant inducted into the premises without consent of the landlord
On the validity of the amount tendered on behalf of all respondents including Saligram it was held that the tender was not legal and valid since Saligram was not a tenant
In other words he held that the rent tendered by counsel for and on behalf of all the respondents was not a legal tender in terms of Section 13 sub section 2i proviso and the undisputed tenant alone ought to have ten dered the rent
With these findings the Controller accepted the eviction petition and directed the tenant s eviction from the premises
The appeal preferred by the tenant was disposed of on a preliminary point that is on the validity of the amount deposited by the common counsel for the parties on the first date of hearing of the case
The appellate authority held that the amount deposited on behalf of the three respondents was not valid since Saligram was a stranger
On this aspect the appellate authority had little discretion in view of the two decisions of the Punjab  Haryana High Court Ram Gopal  Ors
vs Ram Prakash and Ors 1963 RLR 1112 and Punjab Rajasthan Goods Carriers  Ors
vs Onkar Mal 1977 RLR 1 195
In both the cases the High Court has held that the tenant as defined under the Act could deposit or tender the amount under the proviso and not a stranger
Following those decisions the appellate authority confirmed 283 the eviction and dismissed the appeal without examining whether Saligram was also a tenant or whether the original tenancy was in favour of the partnership firm of which Amar Chand was a partner
The order Of the appellate authority has been confirmed by the High Court by dismissing the tenant s revision in limine
The tenant alongwith Saligram by obtaining leave have preferred this appeal
Since the validity of the deposit made by the tenant under the proviso to sub section 2i of Section 13 is in question and which in turn depends upon the principle laid down by the High Court in the said two authorities it is convenient at this stage to have those cases properly analy sed
In Ram Gopal case the arrears of rent were tendered by Chetan Ram the tenant his son Ram Bhagat alongwith Banarsi Das and Dhani Ram who were said to be the strangers
The landlord refused to accept that amount on the ground that the tenant was Chetan Ram alone and as the amount was ten dered by persons other than Chetan Ram as well there was no proper tender
The trial court accepted the contention of the landlord
Before the High Court it was contended for the tenant that the tender was valid since one of the tenderers was the tenant himself and the mere fact that he has joined the other persons who are strangers would not make any difference
The tender must be deemed to be by the tenant and his associates should be ignored
The High Court did not accept the submission
By following some of the previous cases it held that under the proviso the payment or tender must be made exclusively by or on behalf of the tenant and on his account
The payment or tender made by the tenant alongwith the strangers and also on their account would be in contravention of the proviso and invalid
The High Court accordingly affirmed the order of eviction
Onkar Mal is also a case of eviction based on arrears of rent as one of the grounds
The action was brought against Gulab Chand and Bhanwar Lal the original tenants and Sohan Lal Jagan Nath and Balkar Singh alleged to be the sub tenants inducted into the premises without consent of the landlord
The undisputed tenant did not attend the court despite due service of notice and was proceeded ex parte
The alleged sub tenants in their written statement claimed that they shared the tenancy since they had entered into partnership with the tenant for carrying on theft business
They tendered the arrears of rent together with interest and costs of the proceedings on the first date of 284 hearing of the case
The question arose whether the tender was valid and whether the alleged sub tenants could deposit the arrears of rent on their own account and also on behalf of the undisputed tenant
The landlord however refused to accept the amount on the ground that those who deposited the arrears were not his tenants and they had no authority to tender the rent on behalf of Bhanwar Lal and Gulab Chand
The Rent Controller did not make any specific order on that contention
He proceeded to consider the question of sub letting
After considering the evidence produced by the parties he recorded a finding that there was sub letting by the tenant and consequently ordered eviction
The appellate authority and also the High Court concurred with that opin ion
The High Court further held that it is only the persons who fall within the definition of tenant  could tender the rent under the proviso and not a third party or sub tenant inducted into the premises without consent of the landlord
In the instant case the appellate authority being bound by those two authorities has rejected the amount tendered by counsel as being invalid
The correctness of that view has been challenged in this appeal
We may begin with the relevant provisions of the Act
The Act provides inter alia to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom
Section 13 sets out the grounds for eviction and prohibits eviction of tenants except in accordance with the provisions contained therein
Sub section 2 provides that a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf
Clause i to v set out the grounds of eviction
Clause i nonpayment of rent clause ii sub letting without the consent of the landlord or misusing the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased clause iii committing such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land clause iv tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupiers of buildings in the neighbourhood and clause v tenant not occupying the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause where the building is situ ated in a place other than a hill station
If the landlord establishes any one of these grounds against the tenant the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application
285 Although the Act makes default in payment of rent as a ground for eviction yet the efficacy of the ground is different
In this context
Section 13 sub section 2i is more important and it is therefore
fully extracted hereun der 132 A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf
If the Controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant is satisfied i that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable
Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of applica tion for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid
 This is a special provision made for the benefit of the tenant who has defaulted to pay the agreed rent
Various Rent Control Acts provide protection from evic tion to the tenant with provisions similar to the proviso in question
Reference may be made to Section 13 sub section 2i proviso of the Haryana Act ii Section 12 Sub section 3b of the Bombay Rent Act 1947 iii Section 14 sub section 2j proviso of the Himachal Pradesh Act
Mr Mehta learned counsel for the landlord respondent sought to justify the view taken by the High Court of Punjab in Ram Gopal and Onkar Mal Cases
His argument went on the literal construction or strict construction based on the word tenant  defined under section 2hi of the Act
He urged that the word tenant  referred to in the proviso must carry the same meaning as given to it under the definition and tenant  as defined thereunder is alone entitled to avail of the benefit of the proviso and no others
286 We recognise that Section 13 sub section 2i proviso refers to the tenant and his obligation to pay or tender the arrears of rent interest and costs if he wants to save himself from eviction
We also recognise that under section 2hi the word tenant  is defined to mean any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant unless with the consent in writing of the landlord  
But the law in the Court s keeping is just not a system of logical abstraction
Nor it is a bucket of ready made answers determined by any general formula or principle in advance
In a famous passage Mr Justice Holmes said All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme
Yet all in fact are limited by the neigh bourhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is rounded and which becomes strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached  
The boundary at which the conflicting inter ests balance cannot be determined by any general formula in advance but points in the line or helping to establish it are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side Hudson County Water Co V MeCarter  355 356
It true when a word has been defined in the interpretation clause prima facie that definition governs wherever that word is used the body of the Statute unless the context requires otherwise
The context as pointed out in the book Cross Statutory Interpretation 2nd ed
48 is both inter nal and external
The internal context requiers the inter preter to situate the disputed words within the section of which they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act
The external context involves determining the meaning from ordinary linguistic usage including any special tech nical meanings from the purpose for which the provision was passed and from the place of the provisions within the general scheme of statutory and common law rules and princi ples
The opening sentence in the definition of the Section states unless mere is anything repugnant in the subject or context
In view of this qualification the Court has not only to look at the words but also to examine the context and collocation in the light of the object of the Act and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by 287 the Legislature
Reference may be made to the observations of Wanchoo J in Vanguard Five and General Insurance Co Ltd vs Ms Fruser and Ross  Anr at 863 where the learned Judge said that even where the definition is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context
In that case the learned judge examined the construction of the word insur er  as used in Section 331 and 2 D of the  in the light of the definition of that word under Section 29 thereof
The by Section _9 defines an insurer  as a person carrying on the business of insurance 
The question arose whether sections 331 and 2 D did not apply to an insurer who had closed his business completely as the definition of the word insurer in section 29 postulates actual carrying on of the business
It was pointed out that in the context of sections 331 and 2 D and taking into account the policy of the Act and the pur poses for which the control was imposed on insurers the word Insurer  in the said sections also refers to insurers who were carrying on the business of insurance but have closed it
Great artistry on the Bench as elsewhere is therefore needed before we accept reject or modify any theory or principle
Law as creative response should be so interpreted to meet the different fact situations corning before the court
For Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity
It is not possible for the legislators to foresee the manifold sets of facts and con troversies which may arise while giving effect to a particu lar provision
Indeed the legislators do not deal with the specific controversies
When conflicting interests arise or defect appears from the language of the statute the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement the written word with force and life 
See the observation of Lord Denning in Seaford Estate Ltd vs Asher at 498
The apparent purpose of the proviso was to relieve the defaulting tenant from extreme penalty of eviction
There cannot be any doubt on this purpose
The provision seems to be analogous to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act 1892 which confers discretion to the Court to grant relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent
But the proviso goes a step further and leaves no such discretion to the controller or court even if the tenant is a constant de faulter
If the arrears and other amounts specified are paid or tendered on the first date of hearing the default as a ground for eviction disappears and the Controller is pre cluded from passing a decree for eviction
The 288 governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay in an action for eviction on default
At the same time the landlord is ensured payment of arrears interest and the costs that he has incurred without the necessity of going to civil court to recover it
This seems to be the will and intention of the legislature in the shape and scope or  the proviso
Against this backdrop we have to construe the word tenant used in the proviso
Mr Ramamurthy learned counsel for the appellants urged for liberal construction of the word so as to include a person claiming to be a tenant
Reference was made to the observation of this Court in Mangat Rai vs Kidarnath There Fazal Ali J said that the proviso in question affords a real and sanctified protection to tenant against eviction on the ground of default
It should not be given a hypothetical or literal construction but should be meaningfully construed
We agree with this observation
The legislative protection concerning the tenants should not be narrowly tailored
Indeed it should be given wider meaning and broader con cept
We should try to understand the spirit of the text and not be bound by letter
The argument of counsel for the landlord however was that the proviso was intended to protect the tenant as defined under the statute and not a person claiming to be a tenant
The persons who are not tenants could not there fore be given the benefit of the proviso
This submission or the interpretation suggested by counsel does not provide a square answer for all problems coming before the court
If there are proceedings for eviction with persons claiming tenancy along with the undisputed tenant or to his exclu sion the acceptance of that submission may lead to arbi trary and unjust result
Take for instance the landlord brings an action for eviction on default against A and B where A is recognised as the tenant but not B B however claims that he shares the tenancy with A and joins A in tendering the arrears on the first date of hearing of the case
A also does not dispute that claim
But if the conten tion of the landlord that the tenant as defined under the Act is alone entitled to tender the amount is accepted the court could make an order of eviction by discarding the deposit
That would be repugnant to our notions of justice
Take another hypothetical case whose occurrence is more probable and which often arises for decision
The landlord brings an action for eviction against A on the ground of default and also on sub letting to B
But B denies sub letting and contends that he was 289 inducted into the premises with the consent of the landlord
A remains absent perhaps he is not interested in the prem ises
B however tenders the rent on his own account but the landlord refuses to accept it on the plea that B has no right to tender the rent since he is not a recognised ten ant
The acceptance of that view may result in ejectment of A and B before determining the controversy between the parties
Both of them may have to be thrown out without deciding the issue raised in the pleadings
We cannot have Sentence first verdict afterwards
That is possible only by the demand of Queen in Alice s Adventures in Wonderland By Lewis Carroll p 186
We must construe the proviso so as to effectuate the twin considera tions which we discussed earlier
We must eliminate the construction which is productive of injustice
arbitrary result and undesirable consequence
It is time for us to be explicit
Taking into account of the intention of the legislature and the purposes for which the proviso was enacted we are of the opinion that the obligation to tender the rent under the proviso on the first hearing date does not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant
When an action for eviction is brought by the landlord on the ground of default the proviso stands attracted
The benefit of the proviso could be availed of by the tenant and also by those who claim to be the tenant
The view to the contrary ex pressed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ram Gopal and Onkar Mal cases is likely to be of greater mischief to the tenants than a protection for them and is therefore overruled
In the result the appeal is allowed the judgment of the appellate authority as affirmed by the High Court is reversed
The matter stands remitted to the appellate au thority for disposal in the light of the observations made and in accordance with law
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
NVK Appeal allowed


Summary:
Sub section 1 of section 33 B of the provides that the appropriate Government may by order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein withdraw any proceedings pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal and transfer it for disposal to another Labour Court or Tribunal
Respondent No 4 a workman of the appellant company at Dhanbad was caught red handed while stealing certain goods
The domestic enquiry found him guilty of committing theft
Consequently
he was dismissed from service
The dispute arising therefrom was referred to the Labour Court Dhanbad under section 101c of the Act for adjudication
When the matter was pending consideration the respondent sought transfer of the case to the Labour Court at Patna on the plea that since he was residing at his village near Patna it would be difficult for him to attend the proceedings at Dhanbad
That application was made without intimation to the management
The Government however without giving opportu nity to the management transferred the case to Patna by a notification dated August 8 1988 issued under section 33B of the Act
The writ petition filed by the management seeking to quash the notification was dismissed by the High Court on the view that no prejudice was being caused to the manage ment and no allegation of mala fide had been made against the presiding officer
Allowing the appeal by special leave the Court
HELD 11 The power to transfer a pending case under section 33B of the is not a mere administra tive but quasijudicial power and the appropriate Government cannot transfer a case on the basis of allegations of one party without giving a reasonable opportunity to the other party to represent its point of view
Such 291 allegations may not be valid or relevant or may not be true at all
That could be tested only if the other party has notice of the same
296A C Punjab Worsted Spinning Mills Chheharta vs State of punjab  Ors 1965 II LLJ 218 and Management of Sri Rani Lakshmi Ginning  Weaving Mills Ltd vs State of Madras  referred to
Jay Engineering Works Ltd vs Fourth Industrial Tribu nal Calcutta 1977 Lab IC 1739 Muthe Steels India Ltd vs Labour Court Hyderabad 1979 Lab IC 325 and Pioneer Ltd vs Labour Court Gorakhpur 1983 Lab IC 335 overruled
12 What is important in the modern administration is the fairness of procedure with elimination of element of arbitrariness for fairness is a fundamental principle of good administration
It is a rule to ensure that vast power in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised
The State power is used for proper and not for improper purposes
The authority is not misguided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration
Fairness is also a principle to ensure that statutory authority arrives at a just decision either in promoting the interest or affecting the rights of persons
The concept that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done  is the essence of fairness and is equally applicable to administrative authorities
Fairness is thus a prime test for proper and good administration
It has no set form or procedure
It does not necessarily re quire a plurality of hearings or representations and counter representations
It depends upon the facts of each case
297C 299C E Ridge vs Baldwin   AK Kraipak  Ors
vs Union of India  Keshav Mills Co Ltd vs Union of India   Pearlberg vs Varty  547 Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Com missioner   Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India 1978 2 SCR 621 Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs Union of India  Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu   Union of India vs Tulsi Ram 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131 Charan Lal Sahu  Ors
vs Union of India JT  Natural Justice by Paul Jackson 2nd ed
p 11 and Pannalal Binjraj  Anr
vs Union of India  referred to
13 In the instant case the State had withdrawn the pending reference from the Labour Court Dhanbad and trans ferred it to another Labour Court at the distant District of Patna on the represen 292 tation of the workman without getting it verified from the management
The State in fairness ought to have got it verified by giving an opportunity to the management which was a party to the pending reference
The management was not required to establish particular prejudice for want of such opportunity
The non observance of natural justice was itself prejudice to the management and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice was unnecessary
Denial of the opportunity to the management was thus a fatal flaw to the decision of the Government
300H 30 IA B D SL Kapoor vs Jagmohan  and Altco Ltd vs Sutherland  referred to
The expression may  in Sub section
1 of section 33B of the Act only makes it discretionary in so far as the appropriate Government taking a decision as to whether the power con ferred thereunder has to be exercised or not
But when once a decision has been taken to transfer a pending case then the requirement of giving reasons becomes mandatory
The authority would be under legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision
Failure to give reasons or giving reasons not germane would thus be fatal to the deci sion
295C D Associated Electrical Industries P Ltd vs Its Work men 1961 II LLJ 122 and Ajanta Industries vs Central Board of Taxes   referred to
22 In the instant case the Government has stated that the workman was having his residence at his village near Patna and it would be therefore inconvenient for him to attend the Labour Court regularly at Dhanbad
Most of the factors however do not point that way
The workman and his family members seem to be still residing in the colony quarter at Dhanbad
His two sons are studying in a school at a nearby village
The letter dated September 8 1988 of the Headmaster of the said school speaks of that fact
The letter from the Assistant Electrical Engineer in proof of the electricity supplied to the quarter occupied by the workman at Dhanbad is also relevant
As against these mate rials the workman has not produced any proof in support of his allegation that he has been residing in a village home near Patna
He has not denied the documents annexed to the special leave petition and not seriously disputed the factum of his residence in the colony quarter at Dhanbad
The Government was therefore misled by the representation of the workman
301E H 293 3
The notification dated August 8 1988 is quashed
The Labour Court Dhanbad shall proceed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible
302A