Civil Appeal No 513 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 20 1957 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No 600 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated October 17 1956 of the District Judge Poona in Misc
Petition No 2 of 1956
H D Banaji section N Andley J B Dadachanji Rameshwar Nath and P L Vohra for the appellant
A V Viswanatha Sastri Sorab N Vakil B K B Naidu and I N Shroff for respondents Nos 1 and 2 1960
February 22
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
Respondents Nos
I to 4 are shareholders in the company which is the appellant in this case
They made an application against the appellant and its directors under section 153 C of the Companies Act 1913 before that Act was repealed on April 1 1956 as hereinafter mentioned for certain reliefs which it is not necessary to state
This Act will be referred to as the Act of 1913
This application had been made to the Court of the District Judge of Poona which Court had been empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913 by a notification issued by the Government of Bombay under section 31 of that Act
Before the application could be disposed of by the District Judge Poona the Act of 1913 was repealed and re enacted on April 1 1956 by the Companies Act of 1956 which will be referred to as the Act of 1956
On or about June 28 1956 the appellant made an application to the District Judge of Poona for an order dismissing the application under section 153 C of the 87 Act of 1913 on the ground that on the repeal of that Act the Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with it
The District Judge of Poona dismissed this application
The appellants appeal to the High Court of Bombay against this dismissal also failed
Hence the present appeal
Section 644 of the Act of 1956 repeals the Act of 1913 and certain other legislation relating to companies
Sections 645 to 657 of the Act of 1956 contain various saving provisions
Mr Banaji appearing for the appellant contended that the proceeding before the District Judge of Poona under section 153 C of the Act of 1913 had not been saved by any of these provisions
We do not consider it necessary to pronounce on this question for it seems to us clear that that proceeding can be continued in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913 in view of section 6 of the General Clauses Act
Section 658 of the Act of 1956 expressly provides that The mention of particular matters in sections 645 to 657 or in any other provision of this Act shall not prejudice the general application of s6 of the X of 1897 with respect to the effect of repeals Mr Banaji said that section 658 had been enacted ex abundante cautela
Be it so
Section 6 of the none the less remains applicable with respect to the effect of the repeal of the Act of 1913
Section 6 of the provides that where an Act is repealed then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of such right or liability and the legal proceeding may be continued as if the repealing Act had not been passed
There is no dispute that section 153 C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the shareholders of a company and put the company as also its directors and manag ing agents under certain liabilities
The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities
Section 6 of the would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities created by section 153 C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be 88 competent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913 unless of course a different intention would be gathered
Now it has been held by this Court in State of Punjab vs Mohar Singh 1 that section 6 applies even where the repealing Act contains fresh legislation on the same subject but in such a case one would have to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention
The Act of 1956 not only repeals the Act of 1913 but contains other fresh legislation on the matters enacted by the Act of 1913
It was further observed in State of Punjab vs Mohar Singh 1 that in trying to ascertain whether there is a contrary intention in the new legislation  the line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps live old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them
 The question then is whether the Act of 1956 indicates that it was intended thereby to destroy the rights created by section 153 C of the Act of 1913
Mr Banaji said that section 647 of the Act of 1956 indicates an intention to destroy the rights created by section 153 C of the Act of 1913
We find nothing there to support this view
That section only says that where the winding up of a company commences before the commencement of the Act of 1956 the company shall be wound up as if that Act had not been passed but section 5557 of the Act of 1956 will apply in respect of moneys paid into the Companies Liquidation Account
All that this section does is to make the provisions of the repealed Act applicable to the winding up notwithstanding the repeal
The provisions of section 5557 need not be referred to as they do not affect the question
Section 647 of the Act of 1956 therefore indicates no intention that the rights created by section 153 C of the Act of 1913 shall be destroyed
Nor is an argument tenable that since by section 647 the Act of 1956 expressly makes the repealed Act applicable to a winding up commenced under it it impliedly indicates that in other matters the repealed Act cannot be resorted to for in view of section 658 of the Act of 1956 1  89 the mention of a particular matter in section 647 would not prejudice the application of section 6 of the  in other words nothing in section 647 is to be understood as indicating an intention that section 6 of the is not to apply
On the other hand the parties are agreed that the provisions of section 153 C of the Act of 1913 have been substantially re enacted by the Act of 1956 and this would indicate an intention not to destroy the rights created by section 153 C Mr Banaji then drew our attention to section 10 of the Act of 1956 and section 24 of the 
Section 10 of the Act of 1956 corresponds to section 3 of the Act of 1913 and deals with the jurisdiction of Courts
Under section 10 the Central Government may empower a District Court to exercise jurisdiction under the Act not being the jurisdiction conferred among others by sections 397 to 407 nor in respect of the winding up of companies with a paid up share capital of not less than Rs 100000
Sections 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956 it is agreed contain  substantially the provis sions of section 153 C of the Act of 1913
It has also to be stated that the paid up capital of the appellant is more than Rs 100000 and the application under section 153 C of the Act of 1913 contained a prayer in the alternative for the winding up of the appellant
Section 24 of the provides that where any Act is repealed and re enacted with or without modifications then unless it is otherwise expressly provided any notification issued under the repealed Act shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re enacted continue in force and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re enacted unless and until it is superseded by a notification issued under those provisions
Mr Banaji points out that in view of section 10 of the Act of 1956 a District Court can no longer be empowered to deal with an application of the kind made to the District Judge of Poona as that application asks for reliefs similar to those contemplated by sections 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956 and also asks for the winding up of a company whose paid up capital exceeds Rs 100000 and power to deal with such an 90 application cannot now be given to a District Court
He therefore says that the notification issued under the Act of 1913 empowering the District Judge of Poona to deal with the application would be inconsistent in this respect with the provisions of the Act of 1956 and could not in view of section 24 of the be deemed to continue in force after the repeal of the Act of 1913
Hence it is contended that the notification has ceased to have any force and the District Judge of Poona has no longer any jurisdic tion to hear the application
It is also said that this shows that the Act of 1956 indicates that the rights acquired under the Act of 1913 would come to an end on its repeal
We are unable to accept these contentions
Section 10 of the Act of 1956 deals only with the jurisdiction of courts
It shows that the District Courts can no longer be empowered to deal with applications under the Act of 1956 in respect of matters contemplated by section 153 C of the Act of 1913
This does not indicate that the rights created by section 153 C of the Act of 1913 were intended to be destroyed
As we have earlier pointed out from State of Punjab vs Mohar Singh 1 the contrary intention in the repealing Act must show that the rights under the old Act were intended to be destroyed in order to prevent the application of section 6 of the 
But it is said that section 24 of the puts an end to the notification giving power to the District Judge Poona to hear the application under section 153 C of the Act of 1913 as that notification is inconsistent with section 10 of the Act of 1956 and the District Judge cannot therefore continue to deal with the applica tion
Section 24 does not however purport to put an end to any notification
It is not intended to terminate any notification all it does is to continue a notification in force in the stated circumstances after the Act under which it was issued is repealed
Section 24 therefore does not cancel the notification empowering the District Judge of Poona to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of l9l3
It seems to us that since under section 6 of the the proceeding in respect of the application under section 153 C 1 1955 I SCR 893 91 of the Act of 1913 may be continued after the repeal of that Act it follows that the District Judge of Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it
If it were not so then section 6 would become infructuous
For these reasons we think that the appeal must fail and it is therefore dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In pursuance Of section 32 of the Indian Railways Act 1890 IX of 1890 the Central Government had by means of a notification fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway
Inspite of this notification the appellant Railway Company did not levy any terminal charges in accordance with those rates up to a certain point of time and continued to charge at a rate which Was then prevalent and in which no terminal charges were included
Subsequently however the Railway Company issued a Local Rates Advice by which terminal charges were added to the prevalent rates with the result that the total charges payable to the Railway by the respondent mills rose considerably
It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under section 41 1 i of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal
The contention of the Railway Company inter alia was that as in increasing the charges the Administration had merely applied standardized terminal charges as notified by the Central Government no complaint could be made in respect thereof under section 41 1 i
The Tribunal by a majority held that this was not a case of application of a standardised terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question and they ordered a reduction of terminal charges from the total charges
On appeal by the Railway Held that the Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of terminal charges levied by the Railway or to reduce the same
The charges sought to be levied by the Railway Administration were terminal charges within the meaning of the 927 Railways Act and the proposed levy being in accordance with the Government notification under section 32 of the Act was nothing more than the application of standardised terminal charges
Irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any particular consignor of the stations sidings and other things mentioned in section 3 14 of the Railways Act  terminal charges  were leviable by reason of the mere fact that these things had been provided for by the Railway Administration Hall  Co vs London Brighton and South Coast Railway Co  considered