Civil Appeal No 537 of 1978
From the Judgment and Order dated 13101977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C 
250 of 1977 
PP Rao K Ram Kumar and Mrs Janki Ramachandran for the Appellant 
AS Nambiar and B Parthasarthi for the Respondent
The Judgment ot  the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN J
This appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court lies within a narrow compass
The respondentlandlord filed a petition under Section 103 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act 1960 for short the Act  to seek the eviction of the tenantappellant from premises bearing No 1 1 250 Chikkadpalli Hyderabad
The appellant is running a pan shop and a hire cycle shop in the front room of the premises and residing in the rear portion
Besides the leased premises the respondent owns the adjoining building bearing No 11249
In the said building the respondent was running a grocery shop in the ground floor and residing in the second and third floors subsequently constructed by him
It would appear that the respondent has since changed PG NO 436 over his business to retail sale of liquor
On the ground of requirement of additional space for the grocery shop the respondent sought the eviction of the appellant
The Rent Controller held that the respondent was not entitled to an order of eviction either under Section 193aiii or Section 103c because the leased premises was a separate building and did not form part of the building in which the respondent was carrying on his business
In the appeal preferred by the respondent the Chief Judge City Small Cause Court Hyderabad took a different view of the matter and held that even though the leased premises had a separate municipal door number it can be treated as forming part of the building in the respondent s occupation because both the buildings are owned by the second respondent and besides the two buildings are separated only by a single wall
For reaching such a conclusion the Appellate Authority followed the ratio laid down in Balaiah vs Lachaiah AIR 1965 AP 435
As the Appellate Authority further found that the requirement of additional space by the respondent was a bona fide one the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and ordered the eviction of the appellant
A civil revision filed by the appellant to the High Court did not meet with success and hence the appellant has preferred this appeal
Though the proceedings before the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority were conducted on the footing that the respondent was entitled to seek the appellant s eviction under Section 103aiii as well as under Section 103c it was conceded before us by Mr Nambiar learned counsel for the respondent that the tenant s eviction was sought for only under Section 103c vi requirement of additional space for the respondent s business
In such circumstances the only factor for determination is whether the respondent can seek the appellant s eviction from the tenanted building the ground he requires additional accommodation for his business
Before we proceed to deal with the question it is necessary to state a few facts
Originally a row of buildings comprised in door numbers 1 1 248 to 1 1 251 were owned by one R Kistiyah and after him by one Rambai
The said Rambai sold the buildings in the row to different persons
The respondent and his brother were two of such purchasers and they purchased premises No 1 1 248 and l 1 249
Subsequently in a partition between them premises No 1 l 249 was allotted to the respondent and premises No l 1 248 was allotted to his brother
After the partition was effected the respondent constructed  two storeys over his building by erecting concrete pillars on both sides of hiS building
At that time the suit premises bearing No 1 1 250 was owned by an advocate by name Sri section Sitaram Rao
PG NO 437 When the concrete pillars were erected Sitaram Rao complained of encroachment by the respondent and eventually the dispute was resolved by the respondent himself purchasing Sitaram Rao s house viz No 1 1 250
After constructing the two floors the respondent shifted his residence to those floors and utilised the entire ground floor for his business
he appellant who was a tenant of the suit premises even before the respondent purchased it attorned his tenancy to the respondent
Under the Act a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant from a non residential building under Section 103aiii if he is not already occupying a non residential building which is either his own or to the possession of which he is entitled or under Section 103c by way of additional accommodation if the non residential building occupied by him is not sufficient for the purpose of the business he is carrying on
Since we are concerned in this appeal only with Section 103c we need extract only that clause which reads as under 103c
A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non residential may not withstanding anything in clause a apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion or the remaining part v he building to put the landlord in possession thereof if he requires additional accommodation for residential purpose or for purpose of a business which he is carrying on as the case may be   Emphasis supplied
From a reading of clause c it is obvious that provision has been made under that clause only to seek the eviction of a tenant occupying another portion or the remaining portion of the building in which the landlord is also residing or carrying on his business in one portion
Section 103c of the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act 1960 which is identically worded as Section 103c of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Rent Eviction and Control Act came to be construed in a different context by this Court in Balaganesan Metals v MN Shanmugham Chetty JT It was held in that case that a landlord occupying only a part of a building for residential or non residential purposes may seek the eviction of a tenant ocCupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building if he requires additional accommodation for his residential or non residential needs and that it is not necessary that there must be identical user of the leased portion by the tenant if the landlord wants to seek his eviction for his residential ar business needs
PG NO 438 In this case the controversy centres around the question whether a landlord can invoke Section 103c of the Act to seek the eviction of a tenant who is not occupying a portion of the building occupied by the landlord himself but is occupying another building belonging to the landlord
While the Rent Controller held that the two premises viz 11249 and 11250 are separate and independent the Appellate Authority has taken the view that by reason of the unity of ownership of the two buildings in the respondent and by reason of the two buildings being separated only by a single wall it can be said that the mulgi constitutes additional accommodation to the appellant and the fact that the two mulgies bear different municipal numbers should not make any difference
The High Court has not construed the scope of Section 103c but has sweepingly said that Whether both can be said to be same building or separate buildings it does not matter if  the respondent wants the premises bona fide as an additional accommodation whether it is a separate building or a portion of the same building he can require it on that ground
 counsel for Before us it was canvassed by Mr PP Rao learned counsel for the appellant that Section 103c would entitle a landlord to seek the eviction of his tenant for purposes of additional accommodation for himself only if the portion occupied by the tenant forms part of the same building occupied by the landlord and that Section 103c will not apply to a case where the landlord and the tenant re occupying different buildings even though the two buildings may be owned by the same landlord
Controverting this argument Mr Nambiyar learned counsel for the respondent contended that the premises occupied by the appellant though assigned a separate municipal door number cannot be treated as an independent and separate building because both the buildings are owned by the respondent and secondly the leased premises are separated from door number l l249 only by a single wall
On a consideration of the matter we find that the contention of Mr Nambiyar which has found acceptance with the Appellate Court and the High Court is not at all a tenable one
What Section 103c envisages is the oneness of the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different buildings one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant
The significant words used in Section 103c are the landlord who is occupying only a part of a PG NO 439 building and any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building
Surely no one can say that two adjoining buildings bearing different door numbers one occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant would make them one and the same building if they are owned by one person and separate buildings if they are owned by two different persons
A practical test which can be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form part of the same building or two different buildings would be to see whether one of the two buildings can be sold by the landlord and the purchaser inducted into possession of the premises sold without the landlord s possession and enjoyment of the premises in his occupation being affected
Viewed in that manner it can at once be seen that the leased premises in the appellant s occupation can be independently sold and the purchaser delivered possession without the respondent s possession of door No 1 1 249 being affected in any manner
As a matter of fact the previous history of the building shows that before it was purchased by the respondent it was owned by Sri Sitaram Rao and the respondent was owning only door No 1 1 249
Such being the case merely because the appellant has acquired title to door No l l 250 also it can never be said that the building under the tenancy of the appellant became part and parcel of the respondent s building No l 1 29
Similarly the fact that the two buildings are separated only by a single wall with no intervening space between them would not alter the situation in any manner because the identity of two separate buildings is not to be judged on the basis of the buildings being separated by a single wall or by two separate walls with intervening space in between them
Section 103c which occurred as Section 73c in the Madras Buildings I ease and Rent Control Act 1 4 has been properly construed by Chandrasekhara Sastri J in M Ramaswamy Naidu vs P Venkateswarlu Vol 11 19611 AWR page
The learned judge has stated that Section 73c applies only n a case where the landlord is occupying a part of a building and still requires the remaining part for the purpose ot  his own business as additional accommodation
 This decision has not been noticed by the Appellate Authority and the High Court and they have proceeded solely on the basis that as per the ratio in Balaiah vs Lachaiah supra the respondent is entitled to an order of eviction even under Section 103aiii for additional accommodation despite the fact that he is in occupation of a building of his own
Mr Nambiyar referred to the definition of the word building in Section 2iii of the Act and argued that if PG NO 440 for the purposes of the Act where the context warrants it different portions of the same building can be treated as separate buildings it should conversely be held that if adjoining building are owned by the same person and one of them is in the occupation of the landlord and the other by a tenant then for purposes of Section 103c the two buildings should be treated as an integrated and composite building
We are unable to accept this argument because firstly the terms of Section 2iii do not afford scope for such a construction and secondly the argument fails to take note of the purpose and object lying behind the definition of building in the manner in which the clause is worded
Section 2iii has been provided so as to make the provisions of the Act applicable to the whole of the building as well as to parts of it depending upon whether the entirety of the building has been leased out to a tenant or different portions of it have been let out to different tenants
There is therefore no room or scope for the respondent to invoke Section 2iii to contend that two different premises should be treated as a single and integrated building for the purposes of the Act if the two buildings adjoin each other and are owned by the same person but under different occupation ie one by the landlord and the other by the tenant
Mr Nambiyar then argued that if section 103c is to be construed as being applicable only when different portions of the same building are in the occupation of the landlord as well as one or more tenants it would result in a landlord like the respondent who is genuinely in need of additional accommodation being left with no remedy whatever for securing additional accommodation for his business needs
We find it unnecessary to go into the merits of this submission because however genuine the respondent s need for additional accommodation may be and whatever be the hardship resulting to him by non eviction of the appellant we cannot grant any relief to the respondent under the Act as it now stands
As per the Act the relief of eviction of a tenant can be given to a landlord only under two situations viz 1 where the landlord is not in occupation of a building of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to by an order of eviction under Section 103aiii and 2 where the landlord is in occupation of only a portion of his building and is bona fide in need of additional accommodation and another or the remaining portion of the building is in the occupation of a tenant or tenants by ordering his or their eviction under Section 103c
The Legislature has not provided for Section 103c being made applicable to a landlord where he owns adjoining buildings and is in occupation of only one of those two buildings and the tenant is in occupation of the other and the land lord s PG NO 441 bona fide in need of additional accommodation for his residential or business needs
If the hardship experienced by landlords similar to the respondent is to be alleviated then it is for the Legislature to remedy the situation by making suitable amendments to the Act and it is not for the Court to read Section 103c beyond its terms oblivious to the limitations contained therein and hold that a separate tenanted building adjoining the building in the owner s occupation would also form part of the latter building
In the light of our conclusions it follows that the judgment and order of the Appellate Authority and the High Court cannot be sustained and have to be set aside
In the result the appeal succeeds and the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the respondent s petition for eviction will stand restored
There will however be no order as to costs 
RSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
The respondent Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp a base material for the manufacture of synthetics or man made fabrics was assessed by the petitioner under the provisions of which provided for levy and collection of Water cess from the specified industries enumerated in Schedule I of the Act
On appeal the Appellate late Committee confirmed the order of assessment on the ground that the respondent was manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp which came under the category of Textile industry
The respondent filed a writ in the High Court challenging the levy Inter alia on the ground that it was not one of the industries mentioned in the Schedule
The High Court upheld this contention
Before this Court it was sought to be canvessed by the petitioner that Rayon Grade Pulp was covered either by Item No 7 of the Schedule which was chemical industry or item No 10 which was textile industry or item No11 which was paper industry
Dismissing the petition it was PG NO 380 PG NO 381 HELD I The Act being fiscal in nature must be strictly construed
The question as to what is covered must be found out from the language according to its natural meaning fairly and squarely read
385F 386B 2 In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said
There is no room for any intendment
There is no equity about a tax there is no presumption as to tax
Nothing is to be read in nothing is to be implied
385H 3 Whether a particular industry is an industry covered in Schedule I has to be judged normally by what that industry produces mainly its predominant purpose and process and not by any ancillary or incidental process carried on by it
386D 4 Chemical process would be involved to a certain extent more or less in all industries but an industry would be known as a chemical industry if it carries out predominantly chemical activities and is involved in chemical endeavours
386E 5 Taxing consideration may stem from administrative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualisation or neat logic and so the literal though pedestrian interpretation must prevail
386C 6 One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should accept literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity
387E 7 There is no absurdity in the literal meaning
Broadly and literally it can be said that the Rayon Grade Pulp is neither chemical industry nor textile industry nor paper industry
387G386H In Re Micklethwait 1885 II EX 452 456 Tenant vs Smith   St Aubyan vs AG 1951 2 All ER 473 Cape Brandy Syndicate vs IRC
 at 71 Gursahai Saigal vs CIT Punjab   CIT Madras vs MR
P Firm Muar   Controller of Estate Duty Gujarat vs Kantilal Trikamlal   IRC vs Duke of Westminster at 24 AV Fernandez vs The State of Kerala   Martand Dairy  Farm vs Union of India 1975 Supp
SCR 265 Lt Col Prithi Pal Singh Bedi vs Union of India  referred to
PG NO 382 Ms Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Ltd Mavoor vs The Appellate Committee for Water Cess Trivandrum AIR 1983 Kerala 110
overruled