ivil Appeal Nos
93177  20078
Appeals by Certificate from the Judgment and Decree dated 1476 and from the Judgment and Decree dated 1961975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in AS NO 7173 and Appeal No 259 of 1972
B Kanta Rao for the Appellants
C Sitaramiah and B Parthasarthi for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRAMASWAMY J
Civil Appeal Nos 931 of 1977 and 200 of 1978 relate to the same dispute though arose from two suits and separate judgements
The Bench that heard Civil appeal No 931 of 1977 directed on January 24 1991 to list Civil Appeal No 200 of 1978 for common disposal
Civil Appeal No 200 of 1978 arose out of OS No 118 of 1968 on the file of the Court of Add
Subordinate Judge
Guntur and Appeal No 259 at 1972 dated June 19 1975 of the AP High Court
The suit for possession and mesne profits was laid by the descendants of Nori Lakshmipathi Somayaajulu of Vatticherukuru Guntur Taluq and District for short NLS 
The dispute relates to the tank known as Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu s Western Tank  Vooracheruva   Village Tank
It consists of 100 acres of which roughly 30 acres is covered by water spread area marked A  Schedule B  Schedule consists of 70 acres silted up area
The tank was dug in Fasli 1190 1700 AD Zamindar Raja Mainikya Rao made a grant of the land for digging the tank and its preservation maintenance and repairs
It is the descendants  case that it is a private tank enjoyed by the grantee  NLS as owner and thereafter the descendants and perfected the title by prescription
It was found as a fact by the High Court and the descendants are unable to persuade us from the evidence to differ from the findings that the tank is a public tank   dug by 541 the village
The descendants  plea and evidence adduced in support thereof that it is their private tank was negated by both the courts
The Trial Court found that the tank is a public trust  the appellants would be hereditary trustees and could be removed only by taking action under section 77 of the AP Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1966 for short the Endowments Act 
It also held that the descendants acquired title by adverse possession
Accordingly the suit for possession was decreed relegating to file a separate application for meesne profits
On appeal the High Court reversed the decree and held that the tank is a public tank and the tank and the lands stood vested in the Gram Panchayat under AP Gram Panchayat Act 2 of 1964 for short the Act 
Since the Gram panchayat was in possession from July 7 1965 though dispossessed the descendants forcibly and as the suit is not under section 6 of the but one based on title it called for no interference
It dismissed the suit
This Court granted leave to appeal under Article 136
Civil Appeal No 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit for possession in OS No 57 of 1966 on the file of the court of Subordinate Judge at Guntur filed by the Gram Panchayat against the descendants
The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and was confirmed by the High Court in AS No 71 of 1973 and the High Court granted leave under article 133 on Dec 10 1976
The pleadings are the same as in the other suit
In addition the descendants further pleaded in the written statement that the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession of the tank on July 7 1965
They also acquired title by grant of ryotwari patta under section 3 of the AP Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act Act XXXVII of 1956 for short the Inams Act 
The Gram Panchayat had no manner of right to interfere with their possession and enjoyment
They also pleaded and adduced evidence that they were leasing out the fishery rights and grass and trees grown on the land
The income was being utilized for the repairs of tank
The Trial Court and the High Court found that the lands were endowed to NLS for the maintenance of the tank and the descendants obtained ryotwari patta under Inams Act and are entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment as owners subject to maintain the tank
Accordingly the suit was dismissed
On appeal in AS No 71 of 1973 by judgment dated April 1 1976 the High Court confirmed the decree on further finding that by operation of section 14 of the Inams Act Civil Suit was barred
Thus both the appeals are before this Court
542 In Civil Appeal No 200 of 1978 Shri Seetharamaiah learned Senior Counsel for the descendants NLS have no exclusive personal right title or interest in the tank and the appurtenant total land of 100 acres
In view of the entries of the Inams Fair Register for short IFR  it is a public trust and not a public tank
Unless recourse is had to remove them from trusteeship under section 77 of the Endowments Act the appellants cannot be dispossessed
Since admittedly NLS and the descendants were enjoying the property till date of dispossession presumption of the continuance of the enjoyment anterior thereto as owners could be drawn
The High Court thereby committed error of law in holding that the lands stood vested in the Gram Panchayat under the Act and that it is a public tank
In Civil Appeal No 931 of 1977 it was further contended that since the grant of Ryotwari patta under the Inams Act had became final section 14 thereof bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit
Shri BKanta Rao learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat contended that the finding of the High Court that the tank and the appurtenant land namely the plaint schedule property as public tank  is based on evidence that the tank was dug by the villagers and that they have been using for their drinking purposes and the cattle is a finding of fact
By operation of sections 85 and 64 of the Act the land and the tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat
Entries in the IFR establishes that the grant of the land was for preservation maintenance and repairs of the tank
Therefore the grant should be in favour of the institution namely the tank
The pattas obtained by the descendants should be for the benefit of the tank though granted in individual names
By operation of section 85 of the Act the descendants acquired no personal title to the property
Ryotwari patta is only for the purpose of land revenue
The Gram Panchayat acquired absolute right title and interest in the land
The Civil Suit is not a bar on the facts in this case
Before appreciating the diverse contentions the facts emerged from the findings in both the appeals could be gathered thus
Admittedly the Zamindar
Raja Manikya Rao granted 100 acres of land in Inam village to dig the tank and the grant was for its preservation and maintenance the grant was in favour of NLS
In 1700 AP ie 1190 Fasli the tank was dug by the villagers and ever since the villagers have been using the fresh water tank for their drinking purposes and of the cattle and perfected their right by prescription
In course of time the tank was silted up and in and around 30 acres the water spread area fresh water is existing
No repairs were effected by the descendants
The rest of the land was silted up
Grass and trees have been 543 grown thereon and was being enjoyed
On July 7 1965 the Gram Panchayat took unilateral possession of the tank and ever since was exercising possession supervision and control over it
After expiry of three years from the date of dispossession the descendants filed OS No57 of 1966 for possession based on title
Earlier thereto the Gram Panchayat field the suit for possession
Under the Inams Act Ryotwari patta under section 3 was granted to the descendants in individual capacity and on appeal the Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur confirmed the same
It became final as it was not challenged by filing any writ petition
Both the suits now stood dismissed
The counsel on other side have taken us through the evidence and we have carefully scanned the evidence
From these facts the first question emerges is whether the tank and the appurtenant land stood vested in Gram panchayat
Section 64 of the Act reads thus Vesting of common property or income in Gram Panchayat Any property or income which by custom belongs to or has been administered for the benefit of the villagers is common or the holders in common of village land generally or of land of a particular description or of lands under a particular source of irrigation shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid  
Section 85 reads thus Vesting of water works in Gram Panchayat 1 All public water courses springs reservoirs tanks cisterns fountains wells ponds an other water works including those used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescriptive right to their use whether existing at the commencement of this Act or afterwards made laid or erected and whether made laid or erected at the cost of the Gram Panchayat or otherwise for the use or benefit of the public and also any adjacent land not being private property appertaining thereto shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be subject to its control  
Provided that nothing in this sub section shall apply to any work which is or is connected with a work of irrigation or 544 to any adjacent land appertaining to any such work
2 Subject to such restrictions and control as may be prescribed the Gram Panchayat shall have the fishery rights in any water work vested in it under sub section 1 the right to supply water from any such work for raising seed beds on payment of the prescribed fee and the right to use the adjacent land appertaining thereto for planting of trees and enjoying the usufruct thereof or for like purpose
3 The Government may by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazettee define or limit such control or may assume the administration of any public source of water supply and public land adjacent and appertaining thereto after consulting the Gram Panchayat and giving due regard to its objections if any  
emphasis supplied A bird s eye view of the provisions brings out vividly that any property or income which belongs to or has been administered for the benefit of the villagers in common or the holders in any of the village land generally or of land of a particular description or of lands under particular source of irrigation shall vest in the Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the benefit of the villagers or holders aforesaid
The lands or income use for communal purpose shall either belong to the GRam Panchayat or has been administered by the Gram Panchayat
It is not the case of the Gram Panchayat nor any finding recorded by the courts below to the effect
So section 64 is not attracted though the villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the water from the tank for their use and of their cattle
All public water courses springs reservoirs tanks cisterns etc
and other water works either existing on the date of the Act or made thereafter by the Gram Panchayat or otherwise including those use by the public ripened into prescriptive right for the use and benefit of the public and also adjacent or any appurtenant land not being private property shall vest in the gram Panchayat under section 851 and be subject to its control
The proviso is not relevant for the purpose of this case
Under sub s 2 the Gram Panchayat shall have fishery rights therein subject to any restriction or control prescribed by the Govt
by rules
The Gram Panchayat also shall have the right to use the adjacent land appertaining thereto for planting trees and enjoying the usufruct thereof or for like purposes
Sub section 3 gives over riding power to 545 the Govt by a notification published in the AP Gazettee to define or limit the control or supervision by the Gram Panchayat or the Govt
may assume administration of any public source of water supply and public land adjacent and appertaining thereto
The only condition precedent thereto is prior consultation of the Gram Panchayat and to have due regard to any objections
If raised by the Gram Panchayat and issue notification published in the Gazette resuming the water sources or the land etc
The word vest  clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statute or rule
In Chamber s Mid Century Dictionary at p 1230 defined vesting   in the legal sense to settle secure or put in fixed right of possession to endow to descend devolve or to take effect as a right 
In Black s Law Dictionary 5th Edition at p 1401 the word vest  to give an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment to accure to to be fixed to take effect to clothe with possession to deliver full possession of land or of an estate to give seisin to enfeoff
In Stroud s Judicial Dictionary 4th Edition Vol 5 at p 2938 the word vested  was defined in several senses
At p 2940 in item 12 it is stated thus as to the interest acquired by public bodies created for a particular purpose in works such as embankments which are vested in them by statue see Port of London Authority vs Canvey Island Commissioners in which it was held that the statutory vesting was to construct the sea wall against inundation or damages etc
and did not acquire fee simple
Item 4 at p 2939 the word vest  in the absence of a context is usually taken to mean vest in interest rather than vest in possession 
In item 8 to vest  generally means to give the property in  
Thus the word vest  bears variable colour taking its content from the context in which it came to be used
Take for instance the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act
By operation of sections 16  17 thereof the property so acquired shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances
Thereby absolute right title and interest is vested in the Government without any limitation divesting the pre existing rights of its owner
Similarly under section 56 of the  the estate of the insolvent vests in the receiver only for the purpose of its administration and to pay off the debts to the creditors
The receiver acquired no personal interest of his own in the property
The receiver appointed by the court takes possession of the properties in the suit on behalf of the court and administer the property on behalf of the ultimate successful party as an officer of the court and he has no personal interest in the property vested thereunder
In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union vs Delhi 546 Improvement Trust 1957 SCR p 1 the question was whether the Delhi Improvement Trust was vested of the Nazul land belonging to the Government with absolute right when the property was entrusted under the scheme for construction of the markets etc
It was held by this court that placing the property at the disposal of the trust did not signify that the Government had divested itself of its title to the property and transferred the same to the trust
The clauses in the agreement show that the Government had created the Trust as its agent not on permanent basis but as a convenient mode of having the scheme of improvement implemented by the Trust subject to the control of the Government
The word vesting  in section 85 would signify that the water courses and tanks lands etc
used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescriptive right to their use are vested in the Gram Panchayat and placed them under the control and supervision of the Gram Panchayat
It confers no absolute or full title
It was open to the Government even after vesting to place restrictions upon the Gram Panchayat in the matter or enjoyment and use of such tanks and appurtenant lands etc
Sub section 3 of section 85 expressly makes the matter clear
It empowers the Government to assume the administration of any such tank or lands or to define or limit the control which is vested in the Gram Panchayat
Gram Panchayat being a statutory body is bound by the restrictions imposed by sub S3 3 The assumption of management by the Govt
would be subject to the prescriptive right of the villagers if any
The Division Bench in Gram Panchayat mandapaka  Ors
V Distt
Collector Eluru  Ors AIR 1981 AP 15 considered the meaning of the word vesting and correctly laid the law in its interpreting section 85 of the Act
Anna Narasimha Rao  Ors
V Kurra Venkata Narasayya  Ors 1981 1 AWR p 325 relied on by Shri Kanta Rao though supports his contention that the vesting of the tanks etc
in the Gram panchayat was with absolute eights and the village community rights would over ride against rights of the Government in our view the law was not correctly laid down
Under AP Land Encroachment Act 1905 Talengana Area Land Revenue Act relevant Abolition Act like AP Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 Inams Abolition Act etc
give absolute rights of vesting in the State over the forest land tanks rivers mines poramboke land etc
free from all encumbrances and the pre existing rights in the other land stood abolished and will be subject to the grant of Ryotwari patta etc
It is also settled law that grant of Ryotwari patta is not a title but a right coupled with possession to remain in occupation and enjoyment subject to payment of the land revenue to the State
Therefore we 547 agree with the High Court that the tank is public tank and not a public trust and that under section 851 and section 64 the vesting of the tanks the appurtenant land and the common land is only for the purpose of possession supervision control and use thereof for the villagers for common use subject to the over riding title by the Government and its assumption of management should be in terms of sub section
3 of section 85 of the Act and subject to the prescriptive right in the water water spread tank for common use
Admittedly NSL or the descendants used the plaint schedule property till July 7 1965
The question then is what rights the descendants acquired therein
Admittedly within six months from the date of dispossession no suit under section 6 of the was laid
Therefore though the Gram Panchayat was not justified to take law into its own hand to take unilateral possession without due course of law since the suit filed by the descendants was based on title the descendants in Civil Appeal No200 of 1978 have to establish their better title
Their claim was based on the Ryotwari patta granted under section 3 of the Inams Act
Therefore entries in IFR bear great evidenciary value to ascertain their rights
In Arunachalam Chetty vs Venkatachalpathi Garu Swamigal AIR 1919 PC
p 62 at 65 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the effect of the columns in the IFR and held thus  It is true that the making of this Register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax free
But it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this Register was a great act of State and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes
It is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioners through officials made enquiry on the spot heard evidence and examined documents and with regard to each individual property the government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the land was tax free but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself
While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases yet the board when such is not available cannot fail to attach the utmost importance as part of the history of the property to the information set forth in the Inam Register  
548 Construction of the relevant entries in the IFR is a question of law
Col 2 the general class to which the land belongs described as Dharmadayam  endowment for a charitable institution   Col 7 description of tenure for the preservation and repairs   of Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu Western Tanks at Vatticherkuru Col 9 tax free Col 10 nature of the tenure permanent Col 11 guarantor of the land Raja Manikya Rao in 1190 Fasli 1700 AD Col 13 name of the original grantee Nori Lakshmipathi Somayajulu  Col 21 to be confirmed under usual conditions of service and Col 22 confirmed
In the survey and settlement record of the year 1906 of the same columns have been repeated
The land in the tank were classified as Village Poramboke  and the tank as village tank 
In the village map also the same remarks were reiterated
Therefore the entries in the IFR are great acts of the State and coupled with the entries in the survey and settlement record furnishes unimpeachable evidence
On construction of these documents it would clearly emerge that the original grant was made for the preservation and maintenance of the tank and tax free Inam land was granted for that purpose through it was in the name of the individual granted
We are of the view that the grant was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank
In KV Krishna Rao vs Sub Collector Ongole  this court held under the Inam Act that the tank is a charitable institution
Thereby we conclude that the grant was for the institution
Under section 3 of the Inams Act the enquiry should be whether 1 a particular land is Inam land 2 Inam land in a Ryotwari Zamindar or Inam Village and 3 is held by any institution
In view of the finding that the grant was for the preservation and maintenance of tank the Inam land in an inam village was held by the institution namely the tank
Ryotwari patta shall therefore be in favour of the institution
Undoubtedly the ryotwari patta was granted in favour of the descendants
In Nori Venkatarama Dikshitulu  Ors
vs Ravi Venkatappayya  Ors 1959 2 AWR357 in respect of the tope dedicated to the public benefits in the same village namely Vatticherukuru one of the question that arose was whether the patta granted in the individuals  names would be their individual property or for the endowment
The Division Bench held that though the pattas were obtained in the individuals  name the trustees of an institution cannot derive personal advantage from the administration of the trust property
It was held that the grant of patta was for the maintenance of the trust
We approve that the law was correctly laid down
In Krishan Nair Boppudi Punniah  Ors
vs Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy Varu by its trustees  Ors
 1963 1 AWR 214 549 relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah on the basis of the entries in IFR the finding was that the grant was in favour of the individual burdened with service and not to an institution
Therefore the ratio therein does not assist us to the facts in this case
Moreover in view of the stand taken by Shri Sitaramaiah that the lands are not the private property of NLS or his descendants but held by them as trustees the grant of Ryotwari patta to the individuals by necessary implication as a corollary is of no consequence
The question then is whether the enjoyment of the usufruct by the descendants would clothe them with any right as owners of the land
In view of the concurrent finding that descendants did not acquire title by prescription the passage in Tagore Law Lecture Hindu Religious Endowment and Institutions  at p 6 relied on by Shri Sitaramaiah to the effect dedication of tanks and trees  as private property also renders no assistance to the descendants
Undoubtedly a presumption of an origin in lawful title could be drawn as held in Syed Md Mazaffaralmusavi vs Bibi Jabeda  Ors AIR 1930 PC 1031 that the court has so often readily made presumption in order to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forth coming
It is not a mere branch of the law of evidence
It was resorted to because of the failure of actual evidence
The matter is one of presumption based upon the policy of law
It was also further held that it is not a presumption to be capriciously made nor is it one which a certain class of possessor is entitled to de jure
In a case such as the one in question where it was necessary to indicate what particular kind of lawful title was being presumed the Court must be satisfied that such a title was in its nature practicable and reasonably capable of being presumed without doing violence to the probabilities of the case
It is the completion of a right to which circumstances clearly point where time had obliterated any record of the original commencement
The longer the period within which and the remoter the time when first a grant might be reasonably supposed to have occurred the less force there is an objection that the grant could not have been lawful
In Bhojraj vs Sita Ram  Ors AIR 1936 PC 60 it was further held that the presumption not to supplement but to contradict the evidence would be out of place
A presumption should be allowed to fill in gaps disclosed in the evidence
But the documentary evidence in the IFR and the survey and settlement records furnish the unerring evidence
Though the original grant was not produced the grant was for the institution and not to the individuals
Therefore the colour of title though enabled them to enjoy the usufruct for personal use once the tank and the appurtenant land was found to be public tank the descendants acquired no personal right over it
The decision in Bhupathiraju 550 Venkatapathiraju  Ors
vs The President Taluq Board Naraspur  Ors 191319IC727Mad DB relied by Shri Sitaramaiah the finding was that the grant was to the plaintiffs  family subject to conditions of service
Their right to take the usufruct of the trees therein was held to be for the benefit of the grantee
In that view its ratio cannot be applied to the facts in this case
In M Srinivasacharyulu  Ors
vs Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao  Ors one of the contentions raised was that since the produce was being enjoyed by the trustees for over many years for personal use it must be construed that the trust was for personal benefit of archakas
It was repelled holding that it would be a dangerous proposition to lay down that if the trustees of the religious trusts have for many years being applying the income to their own personal use the trust deed must be construed in the light of such conduct
The decree of the trial court that the enjoyment was for the institution was upheld
The finding in Civil Appeal No 931 of 1977 that since the endowment was the dashabandam the descendants are entitled to the Ryotwari patta cannot be upheld
Dashabandam grant of land burdened with the service of a public nature was made at a time when maintenance of water sources and water courses to the benefits of the villagers was left to the villagers
In Ravipati Kotayya  Anrv
Ramansami Subbaraydu  Ors it was held that in the case of dashabandam inams situated in Ryotwari villages the government has the right of resumption on default of service
The lands burdened with dashabandam service which is service of public nature are inclinable as being against public policy
We therefore hold that the descendants though enjoyed the income from the properties did not effect the repairs and neglected the maintenance and upkeep of the tank
They rendered the tank disused and abandoned
By operation of s85 of the Act the lands and tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat for control management and supervision
Undoubtedly a hereditary trustee is entitled to be the Chairman of a Board of Trustees if any constituted under the Endowment Act or else be in exclusive possession and management of the public trust registered thereunder until he is removed as per the procedure provided therein
Since the tank always remained a public tank and not being a public trust the Endowment Act does not apply
therefore the question of initiating action under section 77 of the Endowment Act for removal of the descendants as trustees does not arise
In the suit of the descendants the High Court did not consider the effect of grant of ryotwari patta under Inams Act and in the suit of the 551 Gram Village Panchayat the effect of vesting under s85 of the Act on the grant of ryotwari patta was not considered
Only section 14 ie the bar of civil suit was focussed
Consequently both the suits were dismissed by different division benches
The question is whether the suit is maintainable
All communal lands porambokes tanks etc in inam villages shall vest in the government under s2A of Inams Act free from all encumbrances
Section 3 determines the inam lands whether held by the individual or the institution provides procedure for determination and s34 gives right of appeal
Section 4 converts those lands into ryotwari lands and accords entitlement to grant of ryotwari patta
Section 5 gives power to restitute the lands to the tenants in occupation though were ejected between specified dates
Section 7 gives power to grant ryotwari patta to the tenants to the extent of two thirds share in the land and one third to the land holder
If it was held by the institution two third share would be to the institution and one third to the tenants
Section 3 grants right of permanent occupancy to the tenants in inam lands held by institutions
Section 9 prescribes procedure for eviction of the tenants having right of permanent occupancy
Section 10 A provides right to ryotwari patta to tenants in Ryotwari or Zamindari village with the right of permanent occupancy even in the lands held under customary right etc
Section 12 fastens liability on the ryotwari pattadars to pay land assessment
Section 13 gives exclusive power of jurisdiction to Tehsildar the Revenue court and the collector to try the suit as per the procedure as of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 14 of the Inams Act reads thus 14
 Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts No suit or other proceedings shall be instituted in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any decision of the Tahsildar the Revenue Court or the Collector under this Act except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation fraud or collusion of parties
Section 14 A and Section 15 provides that 14 A Revision 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the Board of Revenue may at any time either suo moto or on application made to it call for and examine the records relating to any proceedings taken by the Tahsildar the Revenue Court or the Collector under this act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the regularity of 552 such proceeding or the correctness legality or propriety of any decision made or order passed therein and if in any case it appears to the Board of revenue that any such decision or order should be modified annulled reserved or remitted for consideration it may pass order accordingly
2 No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under sub section 1 unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation
Act to override other laws Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Act the provision of this act and of any orders and Rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law
The Constitution intends to herald an egalitarian social order by implementing the goals of socio economic justice set down in the Preamble of the Constitution
In that regard the Constitution created positive duties on the State in Part IV towards individuals
The Parliament and the State legislatures made diverse laws to restructure the social order created rights in favour of the citizens conferred power and jurisdiction on the hierarchy of Tribunals or the authorities constituted thereunder and given finality to their orders or decisions and divested the jurisdiction of the established civil courts expressly or by necessary implication
The Inam Act is a step in that direction as part of Estate Abolition Act
Therefore departure in the allocation of the judicial functions would not be viewed with disfavour for creating the new forums and entrusting the duties under the statutes to implement socio economic and fiscal laws
We have to consider when questioned why the legislature made this departure
The reason is obvious
The tradition bound civil Courts gripped with rules of pleading and strict rules of evidence and tardy trial four tier appeals endless revisions and reviews under CPC are not suited to the needed expeditious dispensation
The adjudicatory system provided in the new forums is cheap and rapid
The procedure before the Tribunal is simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure of pleadings trial admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts according to law
Therefore there is abundant flexibility in the discharge of the functions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness
In order to find out the purpose in creating the Tribunals under 553 the statutes and the meaning of particular provision in social legislation the Court would adopt the purposive approach to ascertain the social ends envisaged in the Act to consider scheme of the Act as an integrated whole and practical means by which it was sought to be effectuated to achieve them
Meticulous lexographic analysis of words and phrases and sentences should be subordinate to this purposive approach
The dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the Court is to reflect the contemporary needs and the prevailing values consistent with the constitutional and legislative declaration of the policy envisaged in the statute under consideration
In Denna vs Union of India  this Court held that the Law is a dynamic science the social utility of which consists in its ability to keep abreast of emerging trends in social and scientific advance and its willingness to readjust its postulates in order to accommodate those trends
Law is not static
The purpose of Law is to serve the needs of life
The law should therefore respond to the clarion call of social imperatives evolve in that process functional approach as means to subserve social promises set out in the Preamble directive principles and the fundamental Rights of the Constitution
It is seen that the Inam s Act is an integral part of the scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Estates Aboilition and Conservation into Ryotwari Act 26 of 1984 for short Estate Abolition Act  to cover the left over minor Inams
It determined the pre existing rights of the Inamdars and the religious institutions envisages grant of ryotwari patta afresh to the concerned and seeks to confer permanent occupancy rights on the tenants
It also regulates the relationship between institutions and its tenants
It created appellate and revisional and forums and declared finality to the orders passed by the tribunals and expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or inconsistent therewith the Inams Act shall prevail
The exception engrafted was that a suit would lie to challenge the decision obtained by fraud misrepresentation and collusion by parties
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 provides that whenever a question arises before the Civil Court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication the Court naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate
In cases where exclusion of the Civil Court s jurisdiction is expressly provided for the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question 554 and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive
Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication such consideration would be very important and in conceivable circumstances might become even decisive
The jurisdiction of a Tribunal created under statute may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon existence of some particular fact
Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the Tribunal has to try and the determination whether it existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to consider
At the inception of an enquiry by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction when a challenge is made to its jurisdiction the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not
There may be Tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends but subject to that the Tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with regard to collateral fact give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise had
Except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction when the statute not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly
If it has jurisdiction to do right it has jurisdiction to do wrong
It may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order would become final
The questions to be asked therefore are whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Inam Act to decide for itself finally whether the institution or the Inamdar or the tenant is entitled to ryotwari patta under sections 34 and 7 and whether the Tribunal is of a limited jurisdiction and its decision on the issue of patta is a collateral fact
The consideration as to exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Court is no longer res integra
This Court in bead roll of decisions considered this question in diverse situations
In Kamala Mills Ltd vs State of Bombay  the questions arose were whether an assessment made in violation of the Bombay Sales Tax Act could claim the status of an assessment made under that Act and whether the nature of the transactions was a decision of collateral fact
A Bench of seven Judges of this Court held that if it appears that a statute creates a special right or liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that 555 behalf would be considered whether all questions of said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not
It was held that the Court was satisfied that the Act provided all the remedies associated with actions in Civil Courts and the remedy for refund of the tax illegally collected was provided and it was not collateral
Section 20 prohibits such a claim being made before an ordinary Civil Court and held that the civil suit was not maintainable
The leading decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State vs Mask  C0
 1940 LR 67IA222 Raleigh Investment Co Ltd vs Governor General in Council LR 74 IA 50 and the ratio in Firm and Illuri Subbayya Cheety  Sons vs State of Andhra Pradesh  were approved
In Desika Charyulu vs State of AP  AIR 1964 SC 807 a Constitution Bench was to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal created under the Estates Abolition Act to determine whether Shotrium Village was an inam estate was exclusive and the Civil Court s jurisdiction to try the dispute was barred
Despite the fact that no express exclusion of the Civil Court s jurisdiction was made under the Act it was held that very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the questions on which the applicability of the Act depends was sufficient in most cases to infer that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same was barred
Accordingly it was held that the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal by necessary implication was exclusive and that the Civil Courts are barred from trying or retrying the question once over
The decisions of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal were held final and conclusive
In Dhulabhai  Ors
vs State of Mp  Anr  another Constitution Bench reviewed the entire case law on the question of maintainability of civil suit and laid down seven propositions
Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant which read thus 1 Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court s jurisdiction must he held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts normally do in a suit
Such provision however does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure
556 2 Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive
In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not
 It was held therein that the civil suit was not maintainable to call in question of assessment made under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act
In hatti vs Sunder Singh 19712 SCR 163 the tenant had a declaratory relief before the authorities under Delhi land Reforms Act that he was Bhoomidar
When it was challenged in the civil suit as not being binding this Court held that the civil suit was not maintainable
In Muddada Chayana vs Karam Narayana and Anr
  under section 561 c of the Estates Abolition Act the dispute whether who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is shall be decided by the Settlement Officer
Whether it is liable to be questioned in the Civil Court
Chinnappa Reddy J who had intimate knowledge as an Advocate and the Judge on the subject reviewed the law and held that the Act is a self contained code in which provision was also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate was notified by specially constituted tribunals
On the general principles it was held that the special tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide dispute entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication
Dealing with the object of the Act it was held at p 207 C D that the Act intended to protect ryots and not to leave them in wilderness
When the Act provides machinery in section 561c to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was it was not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning and by confining the provision to the bounds of sections 55 and 561a and b on the ground of contextual interpretation
Interpretation of a statute contextual or otherwise must further and 557 not frustrate the object of the statute
It was held that the civil suit was not maintainable and approved the Full Bench judgment of 5 judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T Munuswami Naidu vs R Venkata Reddy AIR 1978 AP 200
The same view was reiterated in O Chenchulakshmamma  Anr
D Subramanya Reddy  and held that the order of the Addl
Settlement Officer was final in so far as the dispute between the rival claimants to the ryotwari patta was concerned and not liable to be questioned in any court of law
In A Bodayya  Anr
L Ramaswamy dead by Lrs 1984 Suppl
SCC 391 while reiterating the ratio in both the judgments Desai J Speaking for a Bench of 3 Judges held that under Estate Abolition Act who the lawful ryot was decided
Self same question directly and substantially raised in the suit cannot be decided by the Civil Court as it had no jurisdiction to decide and deal with the same but Settlement Officer had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide and deal with it
In Doe vs Bridges at p 859 the oft quoted dictum of Lord Tenerden CJ reads that where an act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner In Premier Automobiles Ltd vs Kamlakur Shantaram Wadke and Ors  a Bench of three Judges after reviewing the case law held that if a dispute was not industrial dispute not does it relate to enforcement of any right under the Industrial Dispute Act the remedy lies only in the civil court
If the dispute arises out of the right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act the jurisdiction of the civil court is always alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy
If the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or obligation of the Actthe only remedy available to the suitor is to get an application adjudicated under the Act
In that view it was held that the civil suit was not maintainable
In State of Tamil Nadu vs Ramalinga Samigal Madam  strongly relied on by Shri Kanta Rao the question therein was whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted to redetermine the nature of the land rendered by the settlement officer under section II of the Estate Abolition Act Tulzapurkar J speaking for the Division Bench proceeded on three fundamental postulates namely that the decision of the Settlement authorities under section 11 of the Act was for I 558 revenue purposes  that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment and other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by the Government and therefore any decision impliedly rendered on the aspect of nature and character of the land on that occasion will have to be regarded as incidental to and merely for the purpose of passing the order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose
II only revision against the order and not an appeal and III that by Madras Amendment section 64 c was deleted
It was unfortunate that it was not brought to the notice of the court that the purpose of Estate Abolition Act was not solely for the purpose of collecting the revenue to the State
The Act had its birth from a long drawn struggle carried on by the ryots in Madras Presidency for permanent ryotwari settlement of tenures and grant of permanent occupancy rights and the Indian National Congress espoused their rights and passed resolution at Arvadi Session to make a legislation in that regard
The recovery of revenue was only secondary
In Syamala Rao vs
Sri Radhakanthaswami Varu a division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court to which one of us KRSJ was a member considered the historical background the purpose of the Act and the scheme envisaged therein in extenso and held that the preamble of the Estate Abolition Act was to repeal the permanent settlements the acquisition of the rights of the land holders in the Estates and introduction of the ryotwari settlement therein under section 14 by issuance of the notification the prexisting rights shall cease and determined shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances and declared that all rights and interests created in particular over the State shall cease and determine as against the Government  protected only dispossession of a person in possession of the ryoti land who was considered prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta
Section 11 envisaged to enquire into the nature of the land and whether ryotwari land immediately before the notified dates to be properly included or ought to have been properly included in the holding of the ryot
The enquiry under the Act was entrusted to the Revenue Authorities who have intimate knowledge of the nature of the lands and the entries in the revenue records of the holders etc
Act created hierarchy of the tribunals namely Asstt
Settlement Officer Settlement Officer Director of Settlements and Board of Revenue provided revisional powers to those authorities and ultimately the order is subject to the decision of the High Court under article 226
In that view it was held that by necessary implication the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted the decision of settlement authorities under section 11 was made final and no civil suit was maintainable
The legislature having made the Act to render economic justice to the ryots and 559 excluded the dispute between land holders and the ryots covered under sections 12 to 15 and the ryots inter se under section 561c from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court it would not be the legislative intention to expose the ryots to costly unequal civil litigation with the state of the dispute under section 11
It is not necessary in this case to broach further but suffice to state that unfortunately this historical perspective and the real purpose and proper scope and operation of Estate Abolition Act was not focussed to the notice of this court
In Jyotish Thakur  Ors
vs Tarakant
Jha  Ors
1963 Suppl 1 SCR 13 section 27 of regulation III of 1872 provides that in respect of transfer of ryoti interest in contravention of the regulation revenue courts shall not take cognizance of such a transfer
It was contended that by necessary implication the civil suit was not maintainable
In that context this Court held that provisions therein were not intended to be exhaustive to bar the relief in Civil Court
In Sri Athmanathawami Devasthanam vs K Gopalaswami Aiyangar  the question was whether the civil suit to recover damages and for ejectment of the ryoti lands belonging to the temple was barred
The findings were that the lands were ryoti lands and that the tenant acquired the occupancy rights but the lease was granted in excess of 5 years
It was contended that it was a transfer without permission of the Endowment department
While upholding that the lands were ryoti lands and the tenant acquired occupancy rights this Court disagreeing with the High Court held that there was no transfer and that the tenant is liable to pay the arrears of rent and the suit was maintainable
In Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple vs Induru Pattabhirami Reddy  the contention raised was that section 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 was a bar to maintain suit for rendition of accounts and recovery thereof against the ex trustees
This Court repelled the contention and held that the suit for rendition of accounts was not expressly or by necessary implication barred the jurisdiction of the civil court under section 93
In Shree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu vs State of Andhra Pradesh  it was conceded that the question whether Kalipathnam village is an Inam estate was to be adjudicated before the tribunals appointed under the Rent Reduction Act
It was contended that the tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide the validity of the notification reducing the rent by operation of section 81 thereof
It was held that there was no statutory prohibition to determine the nature of the land contemplated by the Rent Reduction Act
Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable
In Dr Rajendra Prakash Sharma vs Gyan Chandra  Ors1980 3 SCR 207 it was found that under s 7 of the  no proceedings were taken to 560 declare the suit house as on evacuee property
No notification under sub section
3 of 7 was published in the gazette
Under those circumstances it was held that section 46 did not bar the civil suit
In Anne Besant National Girls High School vs Dy
Director of Public Instruction  Ors
this Court held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine whether action or decision of an administrative authority was ultra vires the relevant rules of Grant in Aid Code and Rule 9 vii was held to be ultra vires
Accordingly the suit was held to be maintainable
In Raja Ram Kumar Bhargavadead by Lrs
vs Union of India 1988 2 SCR 352 two questions were raised firstly the validity of the assessment and secondly recovery of the tax paid under Excess Profit Tax Act 1940
On the first question it was held that the suit was not maintainable
On the second question without going into the technicalities of the maintainability of the suit this Court granted the relief
In Pabbojan Tea Co etc
vs The dy
Commissioner Lakhimpur etc1968 1 SCR 260 the questions were whether the workmen were ordinary unskilled labour or skilled labour whether the jurisdiction of the authorities under section 20 of the is exclusive and whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred
This court held that the authorities did not hold any inquiry nor received any evidence for determining that issue
No proper hearing was given to the parties to tender evidence
Section 20 is not a complete Code as there was no provision for appeal or revision against the orders passed under s203
There was no further scrutiny by any higher authority against the imposition of penalty
The Act in terms does not bar the employers from instituting a suit
In those circumstances it was held that the legislature did not intend to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court
The ratio in K Chintamani Dora  Ors
vs G Annamnaidu  ors
 also does not assist Gram Panchayat for the reason that the decree therein originally granted became final
Subsequently it was sought to be reopened in a later suit
Under those circumstances the civil suit was held to be maintainable notwithstanding the provisions contained under the Estate Abolition Act
Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these case are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the Gram Panchayat
The scope ambit and operation of the Inams Act was considered by P Jaganmohan ReddyJ as he than was in DV Raju vs BG Rao  Anr
and held that the paramount object of the legislature was to protect the tenant in occupation and is sought to be achieved by making effective orders of eviction made by the Civil Court either in execution or otherwise
It further prohibits the institution of any suit or proceeding in a Civil 561 Court under section 14 to set aside or modify any decision of the Tehsildar Collector or Revenue Court except where such decision has been obtained by misrepresentation fraud or collusion
Section 15 enjoins that the provisions of the Act and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of absolute jurisdiction on the Tehsilder Revenue Court or the Collector as the case may be notwithstanding any provision of law or any suit or decree of a Civil Court or for that matter even where evictions have taken place in pursuance of such decrees the evicted tenants can be restored to occupation provided the requirements for the protection of the possession of the tenants are satisfied
In that case the occupant in possession laid proceeding before the Tehsildar for injunction restraining the writ petitioner from ejecting him from the lands
The Tehsildar in exercise of the power under Rule 16 of the Rules granted injuction pending consideration of his right to Ryotwari patta
The order of injunction was challenged firstly on the ground of ultra vires of Rule 16 and secondly on the ground of jurisdiction
While upholding the order on both the grounds the learned Judge held that Tehsildar Revenue Court and the Collector have exclusive jurisdiction and the civil suit is barred
We respectfully approve it as correct law
The Inams Act did not intend to leave the decisions of the revenue courts under section 3 read with section 7 to retry the issue once over in the Civil Court
Undoubtedly the decision of the division Bench in P Pedagovindayy vs Subba Rao is in favour of the contention that the civil suit is maintainable
It is not good law
Thus the glimpse of the object of the Inames Act scheme scope and operation thereof clearly manifest that Inames Act is a self contained code expressly provided rights and liabilities prescribed procedure remedies of appeal and revision excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court notwithstanding anything contained in any law given primacy of Inams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument having force of law
The jurisdictional findings are an integral scheme to grant or refuse ryotwari patta under section 3 read with s7 and not collateral findings
It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under article 226
The decision of the Revenue Tribunal are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right title or interest through them
The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive
The civil suit except on grounds of fraud misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable
The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit 562 is not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under section 3 of the Inams Act
Under the Gram Panchayat Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession control and supervision over it though the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession
The need to grant decree for possession in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant
The suit of the descendants normally to be decreed on the finding that ryotwari patta under section 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully dispossessed
Since the grant of ryotwari patta though in the name of individuals was to maintain the public tank which stood vested under section 85 of the Act in the Gram Panchayat the descendants are divested of the right and interest acquired therein
Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable to be dismissed
Accordingly the decrees of dismissal of both the suits are upheld and the appeals dismissed
But in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs
VPR Appeals dismissed


Summary:
A Hindu widow executed a gift deed in 1954 of the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of the appellant one of her daughters
This led to the filling of two cross suits one by the appellant for permanent injunction basing her claim on the gift deed and the other by the respondent another daughter of the widow s for declaration and partition assailing the validity of the gift deed and claiming reversioners  right after death of the mother in 1968
The trial court decreed appellant s suit on adverse possession and estoppel but not on section 14 of the  as in its view the widow who executed the gift deed in 1954 was incompetent to alienate widow s estate by gift permanently
The appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court on section 14 of the Act but opined that the appellant could not acquire any right by estoppel under section 41 of Transfer of Property Act against the reversioners by reasons of the widow s conduct 
It allowed the appeal of the respondent and dismissed the suit of the appellant holding that adverse 600 possession against the widow was not adverse against reversioners and the next reversioner was entitled to recover the possession of the property or his share in it within 12 years from the date of the death of the widow
In second appeal the High Court treating the finding of the trial court on adverse possession as a finding of fact held that possession of the appellant must be deemed to be on behalf of the other co sharers in the absence of any evidence before ouster of the other sister
Aggrieved the appellant filed the appeals by special leave to this Court
On the questions whether 1 a Hindu widow could alienate by gift the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of one of the female reversioners prior to enforcement of Act 30 of 1956 and if so what was the nature of right that the donee got under law and 2 the donee became an owner of the widow s estate a limited owner an owner with some right or title so as to acquire rights of absolute ownership under section 14 of the Act or a trespasser and acquired rights for adverse possession by perfecting her rights against the doner only or it was essential to prescribe rights against reversioners as well Dismissing the appeals this Court HELD 11 Prior to the coming into force of Act 30 of 1956 a Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow of predeceased son held limited interest known as Hindu women s estate under the Hindu Women s Right to Property Act 1937
However she had the right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose of the property or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband
Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity
Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu Law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose the holder or the estate was known as limited owner
613C D614F G 12 The expression limited owner  could not be understood except as it was interpreted and understood in Hindu Law
The term commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights
In relation to property absolute or complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to 601 possess actual or constructive power to enjoy that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying right to alienate transfer or dispose of etc
Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership
For instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation
Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument
The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu law arose as a matter of law
A Hindu widow according to different schools Benaras Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only
613D 614B D Janaki Ammal vs Karayanaswami 1916 p 43 IA p 207 and Jaisri vs Raj Diwan Dubey 1961 2SCR 559 referred to
13 Prior to 1956 any alienation made by a Hindu widow or widow s estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits could utmost create in the alienee temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioners  interest
The alienee s possession may be good against the world and her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor or transferor
It was life interest loosely as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor
Such transfer stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under section 14 and being voidable and not void could be avoided by reversioners including government taking by escheat but the widow was bounded by it
615A E F Kamala Devi vs Bachu Lal Gupta  Collector of Masuli Patam vs Cavoly Venoata 1861 8 MIA 529 Natwalal Punjabhai  Anr
vs Dadubhai Manubhai  Ors  and Radhey Krishan Singh  Ors
vs Shiv Shankar Singh  Ors  referred to
21 An alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire limited estate or widow s estate nor was she a limited owner who could get any benefit under section 14 of the Act
It was not even a life estate except loosely as the right to continue in possession was not related with her span of life but of the transferor that is the Hindu widow
616G H617A Smt
Chinti vs Smt
Daultu AIR 1968 Delhi 264 disapproved
602 Sulochana Kuer vs Doomati Kuer AIR 1970 Patna 352 Anath Bandhu vs Chanchala Bala AIR 1976 Calcutta 303 Parmeshwari vs Santokhi AIR 1977 Punjab 141 Gaddam Vankayama vs Gaddam Veerayya AIR 1957 AP 230 and Marudakkal vs Arumugha AIR 1958 Madras referred to
Badri Pershad vs Smt
Kanso Devi  held inapplicable
22 In the instant case the alienation by gift of entire widow s estate being contrary to law did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow
The appellant could not claim to have acquired title to the property under the gift deed
Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu Law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force
In fact such possession was not backed by any title as against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration
616B 3
As regards the adverse possession the High Court was not justified in concluding that it was a question of fact
Possession under a gift deed which was found to be invalid as it was not permitted under Hindu Law was on general principle contrary to law and as such could be adverse
The appellant could not acquire any right by adverse posession against reversioner during life time of her mother
Her claim was rightly negatived by the first appellate court
Even assuming that the alienee had perfected adverse possession against the donor it was not sufficient to clothe her with right or title in the property so as to deprive the reversioners of their right to claim the property after the death of the widow inasmuch as in the case of an alienation by Hindu widow without legal necessity the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow
They could wait till her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property treating the alienation as a nullity
617F H618A B Radha Rani vs Hanuman Prasad AIR 1966 SC 216 relied on
41 Being retrospective in operation section 141 deals with rights of female Hindus both before and after the Act came into force and the meaning of female Hindu prior to 1956 has to be understood in the light of Hindu Law as it prevailed then
The section enlarged the estate of those female Hindus who would otherwise have limited owners
This result flows by reading the first part with the last which uses the expression held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited 603 owner 
A limited owner became a full owner provided she was a female Hindu who was possessed of any property acquired before the commencement of the Act
Therefore mere being female Hindus was not sufficient
She should have been of that class of female Hindus who could on existence of other circumstances were capable of becoming full owners
Female Hindu could become absolute owner of property possessed by her on the date the Act came into force only if she was a limited owner whereas she would become absolute owner 1956 of the property of which she would otherwise have been a limited owner
609B E611F Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai   relied on
42 On a reading of section 141 the conclusion is irrisistible that a limited owner became a full owner provided she was in possession of the property on the date of enactment of the Act
Effect of Explanation appended to the section was that a female Hindu became absolute owner not only in respect of inherited property but even of property received by way of gift or on partition or in lieu of maintenance etc
provided she was a limited owner
And not that it enlarged the estate of even those who were not limited owner
Any other construction would militate against the otherwise clear meaning of sub section 1
608G H609F H 5
did not obliterate Hindu Law
What has ceased to be operative after coming into force of the Act under section 4 is text or rule etc
for which provision is the Act
And under section 42 any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ceased to have effect if it was inconsistent with any provision of the Act
Therefore except to the extent provision has been made in section 14 that is enlargement of the estate of limited owner the Hindu Law in other regards remains operative
There is no provision in the Act which deprives reversioners of their rights except to the extent mentioned in section 14617C D 6
Marginal note is usually not resorted to for construing meaning of a section particularly when the language is plain and simple
A section has to be read in its entirety as one composite unit without bifurcating or ignoring any part of it
608D E V Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy   referred to
Eramma vs Verrupana  Gummalapura Taggina 604 Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva  Ors 1959 Supp  1 SCR 968  Mangal Singh vs Smt
Rattno  Munna Lal vs Raj Kumar AIR 1962 SC 1495 Sukhram vs Gauri Shankar   Kuldeep Singh vs Surain Singh 1988 Andhra Law Times Gulwant Kaur vs Mohinder Singh   Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai T Pillai  and Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai
   referred to
Mulla s Hindu Law 16th Edn
para 174 and Mayne s Hindu Law 12th Edn para 671 referred to