tion Civil No 1695 of 1987 Etc
Under Article   23 of the Consitution of India
Govind Mukhotey JD Jain and BB Sinha for the Petition ers
Dr YS Chitale Mahabir Singh KB Rohtagi and Sha shank Shekhar for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA J
The petitioners in these writ petitions are licenced dealers having factories and manufacturing units at Panipat in the State of Haryana and consume sheep hair for manufacturing woollen fabrics and blankets
In order to carry on their trade they purchase sheep hair to get yarn manufactured out of it for being used in its turn for manu facturing woollen fabrics and blankets
The only question urged in these writ petitions is as to whether sheep hair was an agricultural produce within the meaning of the said 295 term as defined under Section 2a of the Punjab Agricultur al Produce Markets Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act so as to attract the provisions of the said Act to it
The term agricultural produce according to its definition contained under Section 2a of the Act means all produce whether processed or not of agriculture horticulture animal husbandry or forest as specified in the Schedule to the Act
On its plain meaning therefore only such produce as is specified in the Schedule to the Act shall fall within the term agricultural produce
Section 38 of the Act confers power on the State Government by notification to add to the Schedule any other item of agricultural produce or amend or omit any item of such produce specified therein
The relevant items in the Schedule on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners in sup port of the contention that sheep hair was not an agricul tural produce are items 41
Wool Oon 75
Goat hair and 76
Camel hair
It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that even though Goat hair and Camel hair have been included in the Schedule Sheep hair had not been so included and consequently sheep hair was not an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act and the insistence of the authorities that the petitioners should obtain a licence and pay market fee with regard to their transaction in respect of sheephair was unjustified
With regard to item No 4 l namely Wool Oon it was urged firstly that wool is the manufactured item of sheep hair and not sheep hair itself and secondly the word wool  according to its dictionary meaning is the soft undercoat of various animals including sheep
Reference in this behalf has been made to the Dic tionary of Scientific and Technical Terms MC Graw Hill
According to it wool is a textile fibre made from raw wool characterised by absorbency resiliency and insulation
It further states that wool is the soft undercoat of various animals such as sheep angora goat camel alpaca llamma and vicuna
Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are not inclined to agree with the submission made by learned coun sel for the petitioners
Before dealing with the matter further it would be useful to notice at this place that item No 41 of the Schedule after the word wool  uses the word 0on  also within brackets which indicates as to what was really intended by the use of the word Wool 
Indeed in the Hindi version of the Act item No 41 of the Schedule uses the word 0on  only and does not at all use the word wool 
Now to the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners the first submission made by him that the word wool  contemplated manufactured item of 296 sheep hair and not sheep hair itself it believed even by the dictionary meaning of the said word relied on by him
Firstly the raw material out of which a textile fibre is made is also described as raw wool
Secondly not only the textile fibre but also the soft undercoat of various animals including sheep has itself been described as wool
It is therefore apparent that not only the textile fibre made out of raw wool but even the soft undercoat of the various animals including sheep according to the dictionary afore said would be wool
Encyclopaedia Britannica under the heading wool in vol
23 states Animal fibres are usually spoken of as hair with the exception of the coat of the sheep which is usually termed wool
A perusal of what has been stated under the heading wool therein would indicate that wool has almost invariably been used in the context of sheep hair
In Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd vs Union of India 1985 3 SCC page 284 after referring to several earlier decisions of this Court it was held that in determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article in a tariff schedule those words and expressions should be construed in the sense in which they are under stood in the trade by the dealer and the customer when goods are marketable
The same rule of interpretation was reiter ated in Collector of Central Excise Kanpur vs Krishna Carbon Paper Co 1989 1 SCC page 150
It was held It is well settled as mentioned before that where no definition is provided in the statute itself as in this case for ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to a dictionary is not always safe
The correct guide it appears in such a case is the context and the trade meaning XXXXX The trade meaning is one which is prevalent in that particular trade where the goods is known or traded
If special type of goods is subject matter of a fiscal entry then that entry must be understood in the context of that particu lar trade bearing in mind that particular word xxxxx It is a well settled principle of construc tion as mentioned before that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common par lance it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used unless contrary intention is clear ly expressed by the legislature
This princi 297 ple is well settled by a long line of deci sions of Canadian American Australian and Indian cases
Pollock J pointed out in Grenfell vs IRC 248 that if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense such a statute is not to be construed accord ing to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it but is to be con strud in its popular sense meaning of course by the words popular sense that which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it
The ordinary words in every day use are therefore to be construed according to their popular sense
The same view was reiterated by Story J in 200 Chests of Tea 1824 9 Whea ton US 435438 where he observed that the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists or geologists or botanists
 In our opinion the aforesaid rule of interpretation would apply even to the interpretation of the items of the Schedule to the Act keeping in view the nature and purpose of the enactment
Interpreting item No 41 WoolOon of the Schedule in this light there seems to be no mannner of doubt that the word wool  has been used therein only in the sense in which the word 0on  is understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer in the popular sense namely that which people conversant with the word 0on  would attribute to it
If anyone goes to the market to purchase wool 0on he would be offered only sheep hair and not goat hair or camel hair or for the matter of that the hair of any other animal
Indeed there is intrinsic evidence in the Schedule itself of the fact that in the English version the word Wool 0on  and in the Hindi version 0on  only at item No 41 has been used in the same popular sense namely that of sheep hair
This intention is apparent from the circum stances that care has been taken to specifically include goat hair and camel hair at items 75 and 76 of the Schedule
Had Wool 0on been used at item No 41 in the comprehensive sense as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petition ers it would have automatically included Goat hair and Camel hair also and the specific inclusion of Goat hair and Camel hair at items 75 and 76 would have been wholly unnec essary
Consequently their specific inclusion at items 75 and 76 is a clear indication of the awareness of the fact that the trade meaning of the word Wool 0on  which is prevalent in the popular sense would be sheep hair alone and as such unless goat hair and camel hair are included as specific items in the Schedule they will not be treated as agricultural produce
The word 298 Woo1 0on  has obviously been used at item No 41 of the Schedule in the aforesaid popular sense and not in the sense used in scientific and technical terminology which the traders and the consumers are not normally supposed to know
In view of the foregoing discussion we are clearly of the opinion that sheep hair falls under the item No 41 of the Schedule namely Wool 0on as contained in the English version and 0on only as contained in the Hindi version of the Act
Sheep hair is consequently an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act so that the various provisions therein with regard to agricultural produce are applicable to sheep hair also
In the result we find no merit in these writ petitions
They are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs
GN Petitions dis missed


Summary:
Sub clause 2 of section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1961 mandates the Revenue Divi sional Officer to serve a notice on every person liable to surrender land in excess of the ceiling area requiring him to file a statement indicating the land which he proposes to surrender
Sub clause 3 requires the Revenue Divisional Officer to pass orders on that statement approving the surrender and the said land shall thereupon be deemed to have been surrendered
Section 8 provides for the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over such land on payment of compensation under section 10
Section 10 lays down the mode of compensation
In the instant case proceedings under section 73 of the Act in respect of appellant s land having concluded the Revenue Divisional Officer had made an order under section 10 fixing the compensation
The District Revenue Officer howev er instead of making the payment issued a notice purport ing to be under section 191 as amended proposing to revise the said order
The appellant filed a writ petition contending that when the proceedings are concluded under sub clause 3 of section 7 the surrender is complete and the land vests in the State that what remains under the scheme of section 10 is only the question of determining compensation and once that is determined the authorities have no jurisdiction to revise the compensation
On behalf of the State it was contended that cl
3 of section 7 uses the words deemed to have been surrendered which indicates that although by an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the proposal about the surrender of land is finalised but still it is only 315 deemed surrender and that the land only vests in the State when it is taken over after payment of compensation in accordance with section 8
The High Court took the view that unless taking over is completed under section 8 the land does not vest in the State and therefore it could not be said that the proceedings under the Act had come to an end and at this stage if the authorities have jurisdiction to revise the compensation it could not be said that the authorities have done something beyond their jurisdiction
Dismissing the appeals the Court HELD The scheme of section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1961 indicates that the sur plus land which a holder will surrender is finally deter mined when an order under cl
3 is passed
However in spite of the finality of these proceedings the legislature instead of using the phrase have been surrendered in the said clause uses the term deemed to have been surrendered
 It is clear from these words that something more remains to be done and that is what is provided in section 8 by authorising the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land which is deemed to have been surrendered on payment of compensa tion determined under section 10
It is only after this taking over that the land vests in the State
319G 320A 320C D It is therefore apparent that orders under section 8 can only be passed after compensation as determined under section 10 is paid and so far action under section 8 has not been taken it could not be said that the land vests in the State
The competent authorities can revise the orders passed under section 10 if an amendment has taken place in between
321H 321B In the instant case action under section 8 had not been taken
The High Court was therefore right in rejecting the writ petitions
321H 322B