Criminal Appeal No 163 of 1967
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 6 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No 159 of 1966
GL Sanghi and PC Bhartari for the appellants
I N Shroff for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri J
This appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts
Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council Raipur under the Motor Transport Workers Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act and found that 50 transport workers including drivers conductors mechanics etc had been employed by the Council but the Council had not been registered as required under section 31 of the Act
He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer Labour Court who issued summons to the accused namely the Municipal Council and the Chief Municipal Officer Municipal Council Raipur
The accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections
Be fore the Magistrate two
points were taken 1 that the Municipal Council was not a motor transport undertaking  within section 2g of the Act and 2 that the Council was exempt under section 38 of the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or injured persons
and for maintenance of public order ie for transporting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges
The Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused persons
The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision before the Sessions Judge Raipur who agreeing with the findings of the Magistrate dismissed the revision
The State then filed a revision under section 439 Cr
PC Three points were debated before the High Court 1 whether a revision lay under section 439 Cr
The contention was that the accused had been acquitted and not discharged and therefore only an appeal under section 417
PC lay 2 that the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expression motor transport undertaking in section 2g and 3 that the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal Council are exempt under section 381 of the Act
917 The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that a revision lay under section 439 Cr PC because the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal
On the second point the High Court held that the Municipal Council fell within the definition of the expression motor transport undertaking
On tire third point the High Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not come within the exemption under section 38 of the Act
The same points have been debated before us by the learned counsel
Coming to the first point we agree with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal
It is true that it is a summons case and no formal charge is necessary to be framed under section 242 Cr
PC but even so
here when the accused appeared before anything was done the accused filed a preliminary objection and no particulars of the offence of which the accused was charged were even stated to him
Coming to the second point it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the
Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act
It is necessary to set out the relevant definition in section 2 of the Act
2g motor transport undertaking  means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by
road for hire or reward and includes a private carrier n all other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the  shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act
 The expression private carrier is defined in the  to mean an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport of who
uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub section 2 of section 42
 A transport vehicle is defined in the  to mean a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle and a goods vehicle is defined to mean any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods or any motor vehicle not so
constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers Goods is defined as follows Goods includes live stock and anything other than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle car 918 ried by a vehicle except living persons but does not include luggage or personal effects carried in a motor car or in a trailer attached to a motor car or the personal luggage of passengers travelling in the vehicle
 It seems to us that the accused fell within the definition of a private cartier inasmuch as the Council owned transport vehicles and used these vehicles solely for the carriage of goods which are its property
In this case we are not concerned with the second limb of the definition and the authority cited by the learned counsel for the accused Mohamed Zarful Islam vs Birendra Lall1 which dealt with the second limb is of no assistance to
The main argument which the learned counsel urges is that the word includes in the definition of the expression motor transport undertaking helps him because this shows that it is only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended to be included within the definition of motor transport undertaking
He says that a Municipal Council is not carrying on any business but is carrying on statutory obligations imposed upon it and therefore a Municipal Council cannot be called an undertaking
We are unable to accept this contention
First the Act provides for the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work
Such beneficial acts are not as a rule construed strictly
Secondly the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation
It seems to us that by using the word includes the
Legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression motor transport undertaking
The words private carrier have been given a specific meaning in the  and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis
Further section 38 of the Act which exempts certain transport vehicles also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be included within the expression motor transport undertaking
Relying on the decision of the House of Lords in Dilworth vs The Commissioner of Stamps2 and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs Mother Superior Convent School3 the learned counsel contends that sometimes the legislature uses the word includes to mean means and includes
This is undoubtedly so but we are unable to appreciate how this would help the appellants
1 AIR 1965 Bom
2 1899 AC 99
3 AIR 1958 MP 362
919 The learned counsel also suggests that we should limit the meaning of the words private carrier in the same manner as the Madhya Pradesh High Court limited the meaning of the word church occurring in section 24 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act
We are unable to see any analogy between the two definitions
The definition there is quite different and the High Court was of the view that the scheme of the Act itself shows that what was intended was to regulate not religious institutions but religious institutions impressed with the character of a public trust
 Coming to the last point we agree with the High Court that the words public order in section 381ii do not include the maintenance of public health
Section 38 reads 38
Exemptions 1 Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to or in relation to any transport vehicle i used for the transport of sick or injured persons ii used for any purpose connected with the security of India or the
security of a State or the maintenance of public order  
The learned counsel relies on the decision of this Court Ramesh Thappar vs The State of Madras 1
In Ratnesh Thappar s case the question before this Court was
whether the impugned Act Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949 in so far as it purports by section 91 a to authorise the Provincial Government for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order to prohibit or regulate tie entry into or the circulation sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents  is a law relating to any matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow the State
 Patanjali Sastri J as he then was observed Now Public Order  is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the government which they have established
 Later he observed  Public safety  ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger
In that sense anything which tends to prevent danger to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety 1  920 The learned counsel urges that public order includes public safety and the latter comprises public health
We see no force in this contention and Ramesh Thappar s case1 does not say so
In our view Public Order in this context means public peace and tranquillity
We agree with the High Court that the functions of the Municipal Council in carrying night soil and in distributing water do not fail within maintenance of public order
 In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed
VPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant Municipal Council owned transport vehicles and used those vehicles for the maintenance of public health in the Municipality by transporting the night soil and refuse of the town and by distributing water
It employed 50 transport workers
As it had not been registered as required under section 31 of the  a complaint was filed against it
On receiving the summons the Chief Municipal Officer appeared and even before the particulars of the offence were stated to him filed preliminary objections that the Municipal Council was not a motor transport undertaking  and that the transport vehicles owned by the Council were exempt under section 38 of the Act
The trial court dismissed the complaint and a revision to the Sessions Court was also dismissed
A further revision to the High Court under section 439 Criminal Procedure Code was allowed
In appeal to this Court it was contended that 1 the case being a summons case the dismissal of the complaint was an order of acquittal and not one of discharge and hence only an appeal lay under section 417 Cr
PC and not a revision under section 439 2 the appellant did not fail within the definition of the expression motor transport undertaking  in section 2g of the Act and 3 the transport vehicles owned by the appellant were exempt under section 38 of the Act because the transport vehicles were used for a purpose connected with the maintenance of public order 
HELD i Since the complaint was dismissed before anything was done it amounted to
an order of discharge and not an acquittal and so the revision was competent
917 C 2 The expression motor transport undertaking  in section 2g includes a private carrier  as defined in the 
The appellant fell within the definition of private carrier  inasmuch as the appellant owned transport vehicles and used them solely for the carriage of goods
It cannot be said that only an undertaking of a commercial nature was intended to be included within the definition of motor transport undertaking because a the is a beneficial Act and the Legislature intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression motor transport undertaking  and so the enactment should not be construed strictly b the words of the definition are plain and are not susceptible of any limitation and e section 38 which exempts certain transport vehicles proceeds on the basis that a private carrier carrying on activities which are not of a commercial character would also be included in the expression motor transport undertaking 
918 C F 916 3 The words public order  in section 38 mean public peace and tranquility  and do
not include public health 
Therefore the exemption under section 38 is not attracted
920 A B Ramesh Thappar vs State of Madras   explained