Appeal No 111 of 1971
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 30 8 1968 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No 16557 Sachin Chaudhuri and Narayana Nettar for the Appellant
K Sen KN Bhatt and KRD Karanath for the Re spondent through LRs
338SCI76 892 The Judgment of AN Ray CJ and PN Shinghal J was delivered by Shinghal JMH Beg J gave a separate Opin ion
SHINGHAL J
This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment of the High Court
of Mysore dated August 30 1968 upholding the order of District Judge South Kanara dated November 9 1956
By that order the District Judge set aside the decision
of the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments Madras hereinafter referred to as the Board that the institution known as Sri Manjuna tha temple at Dharmasthal Puttur Taluk South Kanaka district was a temple  as defined in clause 12 of sec tion 9 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1926 Madras Act II of 1927 hereinafter referred to as the Act
The Commissioner under the Madras Hindu Religious and Char itable Endowments Act feels aggrieved because the impugned judgment has the effect of taking the temple out of the control provided by the Act
The respondent in this appeal was the supplemental petitioner before the District Judge and was brought on record on the death of Manjayya Heggade who was the original petitioner in the petition under sub section 2 of section 84 of the Act
The controversy relates to the Manjunatha temple in Dharmasthal which is now the name  of a village in Belthan gady taluk of South Kanara district of Tamil Nadu
The original name of the village was Mallarmadi
The locality in which the temple is situated was called Kukya Kudume but it came to be known as Dharmasthal after the visit of Sri Vadiraja Swamiar of Sode Mutt Udipi in the 16th century to which reference will be made in a while
It is not in dispute that even according to the Heggade Dharmasthal has a number of institutions including the following main institutions 1
Nelleyadi Beedu 2
Chandranatha Basthi 3
Manjunatha temple 4
Ammanvaru temple and 5
Heggadeship
These institutions have been shown in exhibit A 59 which is said to be a rough sketch of the Dharmasthal
It is also not in dispute before us that Daivas were first estab lished in Nolleyadi Beedu by an ancestor of Heggade who was a Jain and were worshiped there
Heggade began to give charity to persons of all religions and the institution became well known and travellers began to visit it in large numbers
It is the common case of the parties that Sri Vadiraja Swamjar of Sode Mutt Udipi who was a Sanyasi happened to pass that way and was invited by Heggade to stay there
The Swamiar however refused to accept food there on the ground that it was Bhuta Kshetra
Heggade felt very sorry as the great Sanyasi was starving in his house
It is said that Heggade thereupon arranged to instal the idol of Sri Manjunatha in the garbagriha
 The Swamjar was ap peased and performed the first pooja in that temple which thereafter came to 893 be known as Dharmasthal
This is said to have happened in the sixteenth century and is at any rate said to be the origin of the Manjunatha temple in the Dharmasthal campus
The Board started proceedings under section 841 of the Act to decide whether Sri Manjunatha temple was a temple as defined in clause 2 of section 9 of the Act
Heggade urged before the Board inter alia that all the institu tions in Dharmasthal formed a single unit representing a private institution that it had been rounded by his ances tors on their own private land that there was no dedication to the Hindus and they could not claim any right of worship that Dharmasthal was Jain in character that it was a charitable but not a religious institution that his status was not akin to that of a mere trustee and that Heggadeship was intimately and inseparately connected with the Dharmasthal institution and Manjunatha temple
The Board made an enquiry and reached the conclusion that Manjunatha temple was a separate entity and was the most important institution and that it was not the private property of the Heggade
I also held that it was not a Jain institution but was a Hindu temple and that it was a religious and not merely a charitable institution for its charity was connected with the temple
The Board also held that the public had used the temple freely ever since its foundation
It accordingly decided that Manjunatha was a temple as defined in the Act even though its trusteeship vested in Heggades who were Jains
As has been stated an application was made by Manjayya Hegde to the District Judge under sub section 2 of sec tion 84 of the Act for setting aside the Board s decision
It was specifically pleaded in that application that the entire institution known as Dharmasthal was a composite institution and that his ancestors always claimed that the Manjunatha Devaru its properties and deities belonged to them personally and that its patta  stood in their names from time immemorial
On that basis it was pleaded further that as the properties were outside the scope of the enquiry under section 84 of the Act the Act did not apply and the Board had no jurisdiction to hold an enquiry under section 84
 A counter affidavit was flied on behalf of the Board in which it was pleaded that Manjunatha temple of Dharmasthal was an independent entity being a separate temple owning its own property and having separate income
 It was pleaded further that there were properties in the name of the deity of the Manjunatha in Mysore State and other places
The District Judge did not frame any issued but formulated some points for determination including the points whether Manjunatha Devaru was only a part of the institution known as Dharmasthal and not a separate insti tution in itself and whether the provisions of the Act did not apply to it  He recorded the evidence and heId that Manjunatha temple was one of the 3 or 4 shrines maintained from the income of the institution known as Dharmasthal Heggade was a component part of the institution
the temple stood on the private land of Heggade the Manjunatha shrine was a Hindu institution but it was so mixed up and connected with other Jain institutions that it was practically impos sible to separate it and that Dharmasthal was a happy blending of charity and religion
The District Judge held further that the Manjunatha shrine was the private 894 temple of the Heggade it had not been dedicated to the Hindu public and it was not used by the public as of right
The District Judge did not decide whether the shrine of Ammanvaru and other deities was a Jain institution
He accordingly held that though the Manjunatha shrine may be a Hindu shrine it was private property of the Heggade and the provisions of the Act were not applicable to it
The Dis trict Judge accordingly set aside the order of the Board dated March 9 1949
The Commissioner filed an appeal to the High Court against that judgment of the District Judge dated November 9 1956
One of the main questions presented for determina tion before the High Court was whether all the institu tions of Dharmasthal formed a single composite institution
It was not in dispute before the High Court that apart from the question of Manjunatha temple being an adjunct to the composite Dharmasthal institution the temple was not an institution at all
Even the Heggade did not deny the exist ence of Manjunatha temple as an institution and took the specific plea in his affidavit dated July 22 1949 that the Manjunatha Deity is a private institution belonging to the Heggade
 The High Court examined the crucial question whether Manjunatha was a temple within the definition of the Act and whether it was a Religious Endowment under section 911
It held that the Manjunatha temple was an adjunct to the composite institution of Dharmasthal and according to the customs and usages of the institution that temple could not be separated from the rest of the institution that Dharmasthal was both a religious and charitable institution that Manjunatha was a deity worshipped both by the Hindus and the Jains in accordance with their respective faiths and that it was neither an exclusively Hindu deity nor an exclusively Jain deity
The High Court referred to the pleadings and the evidence and held that the institution was rounded by a Jain its administration remained exclusively Jain since its inception and that as Jains also worshipped along with Hindus it could not be inferred that there was an implied dedication to the Hindus exclusively
The High Court thus hold that the temple was not a temple as defined in the Act and it was therefore not necessary to examine the question whether it was a private temple of the Heggade
In the result the High Court took the view that the Act did not apply to the institution and the Board had no jurisdic tion over it
It therefore dismissed the appeal with costs
The Commissioner has obtained special leave and this is how the appeal has come up here for consideration
As the controversy in this case relates to the applica bility of the Act to the Manjunatha temple it will be convenient to examine its relevant provisions
The preamble of the Act states inter alia that it is meant to provide for the better administration and gover nance of certain Hindu religious endowments described in it
Section 2 makes it clear that the Act applies to all Hindu public religious endowments
Private religious endowments are therefore outside its scope
Then there is an Explanation to the following effect 895 Explanation for the purpose of this Act Hindu public religious endowments do not include Jain religious endowments
 The effect of the section therefore is to exclude not only private religious endowments but also Jain religious endowments and it is around the provisions of section 2 that the controversy in this case has centred
The exclusion of Jain religious endowments has been emphasised by section 3b which empowers the Local Government to remove the exclusion and extend the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to Jain religious endowments subject to such restrictions and modifications as may be considered proper
As no such extension has been notified the Act does not cover Jain religious endowments
It is confined to Hindu religious endowments and will not be applicable where there is no such endowment at all
The expression Religious endowment or Endowment has been defined in clause ii of section 9 as follows 11 Religious endowment  or Endow ment  means all property belonging to or given or endowed for the support of maths or temples or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the premises of maths or temples but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts or offerings to the head of a math or to the archaka or other employee of a temple
 It follows that all property belonging to or given or endowed for the support of a temple or for the performance of any service or charity connected with the temple will constitute its endowment including the premises of the temple
It would therefore be necessary to examine whether there is evidence to prove any such endowment in respect of Sri Manjunatha temple
In this connection it will be neces sary to examine which property if any was endowed to the temple and by whom and which if any could be said to be the premises of the temple to the exclusion of all other temples  The expression Temple has been defined by clause 12 of section 9 in these terms  12 Temple  means a place by whatev er designation known used as a place of public worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of religious worship
 The definition thus emphasises that only those temples will fall within the purview of the Act which are places of public religious worship and are dedicated to or for the benefit of or are used as of right by the Hindu community
It may be mentioned in this connection that as has been stated the District Judge has held that although the Manju natha temple may be a Hindu temple it is the private temple Of the Heggade and is not a temple expressly dedicated to Hindus or a temple which could be 896 said to have been used or resorted to by the Hindu public as of right
The High Court has on appeal held on the other hand that Manjunatha is neither an exclusively Hindu deity nor an exclusively Jain deity and that it is not therefore a temple as defined in the Act
It has therefore not examined the other question whether it is a public or a private temple
As regards the property of the temple the High Court has held that it is an adjunct to the composite institution consisting of Hindu and Jain Gods and Daivas worshipped by Hindus and Jains
Counsel for the parties have argued at length on the questions whether Manjunatha temple is an exclusively Hindu temple and whether it is a place of public religious worship dedicated to or used as of right by the Hindu community as a place of religious worship
There is considerable evidence for deciding these questions but even if it were assumed that the answer to these questions should be in the affirma tive that would not be decisive of the controversy for the other question would still remain whether it is an endowment It will be recalled  that by virtue of section 2 the Act applies only to Hindu public religious endow ments
 The definition of Religious endowment and Endowment in clause 11 of section is common
Accordingly the questions which arise for consideration in this connection are whether the temple has property belonging to or given or endowed for its support or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith
It has not been disputed before us and is in fact beyond controversy that there is considerable movable and immovable property of the Dharmasthal as a whole ie the entire complex or campus consisting of Nelleyadi Beedu Chandranath Basthi Manjuna tha temple Ammanvaru temple and the Heggadeship
But the question is whether there is any such property exclusively of the Manjunatha temple so as to constitute a Hindu reli gious endowment for purposes of section 2 of the Act  It will be recalled that it is not in dispute here that it were the Daivas who were first established in Nelleyadi Beedu and were worshipped there by an ancestor of Heggade who was a Jain
The High Court has in fact found that it has been clearly established by the evidence on the record that the institution was rounded by a Jain and that ever since its inception its administration has remained in the hands of a Jain namely the Heggade
So when Vadiraja Swamjar of Sode Mutt Udipi came there as mentioned earli er there was only worship of Jain Daivas and of no God
This is to be found in the report exhibit A 108 of T Narayan Nambiyar in the matter of the Manjunatha temple which was taken in evidence and has been relied upon by the High Court
It was at the instance of the Swamiar that the idol of Manjunatha was brought and installed in the garbagriha and it was he who performed the first pooja 
It was therefore the Swamjar who was responsible for the installa tion of the Manjunatha idol which was a lingam  in a campus where there were shrines of Devas like Nelleyadi Beedu the Chandranatha Basthi and several other buildings
It could not therefore be said that the mere installation of the idol of Manjunatha brought into existence any such property as 897 could be said to belong to that deity or given or endowed for the support of its temple or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith
There is on the other hand evidence to show that all the buildings and institutions of the Dharmasthal which was the composite name of the entire campus or complex consist ing of the buildings mentioned in plan exhibit A 59 were situ ated in the land belonging to the Heggade and of which he held a patta 
This is evident from exhibit A 103 which is a certified copy of the statement of Kumara Heggade dated July 31 1820 which appears to have been read in evidence with the consent of the parties
To the same effect is the statement of U Seetharamayya dated October 12 1954 who was acquainted with Dharmasthal since 1908
As it is the Manjunatha temple does not have even a separate prakaram
The shrine of Ammanvaru is in close proximity of the Manju natha temple and within the same prakaram
It has not been disputed before us that as has been stated by U Seetharamayya PW 2 its important deities are Kalarahu Kalarhayi Kumaraswami and Kanya Kumari some of which at any rate are the same as the Jain deities worshipped in Nelleyadi Beedu and Badinade both of which are admittedly Jain institutions
Moreover Kanya Kumari in Ammanvaru shrine cannot be said to be Parvati the consort of Shiva for M Govinda Psi RW 12 who claims to have studied Hindu and Jain religions and was examined on behalf of the Board has stated that Parvati and Kanya Kumari are not identical
The shrine of Annappa Daiva is also situated within the common prakaram
The existence of the shrines of Ammanvaru and Annappa Daiva in the same prakaram as the Manjunatha temple therefore shows that Manjunatha temple cannot even claim to have any exclusive premises of its own so as to constitute an endowment within the meaning of clause 11  of section 9 of the Act
The High Court has found it as a fact that the shrine of Manjunatha is an adjunct to the composite institution of Dharmasthal and according to the customs and usages of the said institution the shrine of Sri Manjunatha cannot be separated from the rest
In arriving at this conclusion the High Court has taken into consideration those facts which have been established by the evidence on the record
It will be sufficient to make a brief reference to the follow ing 14 facts which have been mentioned by the High Court i All the shrines in Dharmasthal were rounded by the Heggade who was a Jain
ii All the shrines are situated in close proximity on wrag lands of which the patta  is in the name of Heggade
iii The rituals of all the shrines are interconnected
iv All places of worship participate in the installa tion of the Heggade Exs
A 58 and A 108
v The pooja  is reciprocal eg whenever there is an important ceremony in Maniunatha shrine special pooja  has to be performed in Chandranatha Basthi which is a Jain institution exhibit A 108
898 vi All prasadam  is normally given only from Amman varushrine and not from Manjunatha temple P Ws 3 4 and 5
vii The festivals including that relating to makara shankranti of all the shrines are common PW2 and exhibits A 69 and A 70
viii All offerings are made and received for the entire institution and not for any particular deity Exs
A 69 A 70 and A 108 and the public do not make any distinc tion in making the offerings and whatever is given is for Dharmasthal as a whole exhibit A 108
ix On Heggade s death pooja  is  stopped in all institutions until  purification exhibit A 108
x Hoilus or complaints are made to Dharmasthal as a whole  and prasadam  is given to the complainants from Ammanvaru shrine Ex A 72
xi Chandranatha Basthi which is a Jain institution is closely interlinked with aH the other institutions in Dharmasthal
xii The paraphernalia of Daivas who are Jain dei ties is kept in Manjunatha and Ammanvaru shrines exhibit A 108
xiii There is extraordinary unity of interest between the Heggade and Dharmasthal Exs
A 107 and A 103 and no distinction is made between the office of Heggade and the deities exhibit A 104
xiv The deities which had been installed before the installation of the lingam  in the Manjunatha temple con tinued to enjoy their previous importance exhibit A 105 and Dharmasthal could not be said  to have been dedicated to Manjunatha but to the earlier deities
To the above may be added the following further facts i The entire income of all the institutions consti tutes one common fund from which the expenses of all the shrines and the Heggade are met Report exhibit B 2 of RW 3
ii The vast charity which is undertaken was in exist ence even before the installation of the lingam  in Manju natha shrine PW 3
iii While the lingam  was installed in Manjunatha temple by Vadiraja Swamjar of Sode Mutt Udipi as an exclu sively Hindu God in its present garbagriha which exclu sively contains that lingam  and has no non Hindu God the Jain Daivas have continued to be worshipped side by side in the adjacent Ammanvaru shrine
Even in the presence of the Swamiar the Heggade was present at the time of worship and offered Kanikam  RW 9
Whosoever went to Dharmasthal whether a Hindu or a Jain worshipped Manjunatha and the other deities and Daivas alike exhibit A 108
iv It may be that Brahmins perform pooja  in Manjuna tha temple but that is done in the presence of the Heggade RW 11 who also worships Manjunatha and controls all the institutions as one integral Dharmasthal
v The Jain shrine of Anna Daiva is also within the same prakaram  in which the temples of Manjunatha and Ammanvaru are  situated
899 It therefore appears that the High Court was justified in taking the view that Manjunatha temple is part and parcel of the composite institution known as Dharmasthal and is so inseparably connected with it that it is its integral part
It cannot therefore be held that the Manjunatha temple is an endowment within the meaning of clause 11  of section 9 of the Act for it has not been proved that any property belongs to it or has been given or endowed for its support or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith or that it has any such premises of its own as could be said to form its own endowment
It would follow from what has been said above that even if the Manjunatha temple is assumed to be a place used as of right for public religious worship by Hindus it could come under the purview of the Act only if it could be estab lished that it was a religious endowment  within the meaning of section 2 but this has not been proved to be so
On the other hand it appears that the present institution of Dharmasthal was originally a Jain religious and charitable institution to which property was endowed by the ancestors of the present Heggade who was himself a Jain
It was that endowment which spread and gained more and more importance over the years because of the offerings made largely by Hindu and Jain devotees and worshippers
But it has not been established that there is any endowment which could be said to belong exclusively to Manjunatha temple
Even if any such endowment was made by some one in the name of Manjuna tha temple as stated by KC Nambayar RW 3 it was taken to be an endowment for the entire institution known as Dharmasthal and was treated as such
The Manjunatha temple cannot therefore be said to be a Hindu religious endowment within the meaning of section 2
The provisions of the Act are not applicable to it and the Board clearly erred in holding otherwise
It has been argued by Mr Chowdhary for the appellant that generally speaking Hindus include Jains
According to him the underlying assumption in the Act is that Jains are also Hindus and that the fact that Jains also worship in a Hindu temple will not detract from the fact that it is a Hindu temple as it is not necessary that a Hindu temple should be a place exclusively for Hindu public religious worship
Reference in this connection has been made to The All India Sai Samaj Registered by its President D Bhima Rao Mylapore vs The Deputy Commissioner for Hindu Reli gious and Charitable Endowments Administration Depart ment Madras 34 and others  1  The State of Madras by the Secretary Revenue Department Madras and another vs The Urumu Seshachalam Chettiar Charities Tiruchirapalli by its Board of Trustees and others2 and section Kannan and others vs The All India Sai Samaj Registered by its President D Bhima Rao Mylapore3
It will be sufficient to say that what section 912 of the Act requires by way of definition of a temple  is that for purposes of the Act a temple  should be dedicated for public religious worship as of right and it would not detract from its character as such if Jains also worship there
The argument of Mr Chowdhary is however 1 2 3 900 futile because as has been mentioned the provisions of the Act will not be attracted to the Manjunatha temple in the absence of any evidence to prove the existence of an endow ment for it
It has next been argued by Mr Chowdhary that unless the temple of Manjunatha could be shown to be a Jain endowment it would come within the definition of temle  in the Act
This argument has only to be stated to be rejected because as has been shown there is no evidence to show that there is any endowment for the Manjunatha temple as such and the temple is a part and parcel of Dharmasthal which came to be endowed in the facts and circumstances mentioned above
An ancillary argument has been made that an infer ence of Hindu endowment for the benefits of the public should be drawn from the facts that the deity belongs to the Hindu Trinity the architecture of the temple is that of a Hindu temple the rituals are performed by Brahmins ac cording to Hindu form of worship and honey is used for abhisheka which is contrary to the Jain form of worship
We have already assumed that the temple possesses the char acteristics which make it a Hindu temple but even so there is no justification for the argument that there is any endowment for it as such
Then it has been argued by Mr Chowdhary that Manjunatha temple is not an adjunct to the composite institution of Dharmasthal for it is the most important temple in the campus
It has been urged that mere common management and control cannot justify the argument that Manjunatha temple is an inseparable part of the Dharmasthal It is not neces sary to examine this argument once again for we have given our reasons for taking a contrary view
Another argument of Mr Chowdhary is that formal dedica tion of the endowment to the temple of Manjunatha was not necessary and that its user by the Hindus as of right would be enough to prove the initial dedication
Reliance for the argument has been placed on BK Mukherjee on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts
third edition page 27 which makes a mention of the rituals to be observed when a donor wants to consecrate a temple and establish a deity in it
It may be that in a given case it may be difficult to prove the original dedication because of the lapse of con siderable time but in the present case it would not be possible to conclude that there was any such dedication because there is nothing to show how Vadiraja Swamiar who installed the lingam  in Manjunatha temple could be said to be a donor when the property did not belong to him In the view we have taken we find no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs
BEG J I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother Shinghal
But I would like to indicate my own reasons in this case for reaching this conclusion
The following facts appear from the petition filed on 22nd July 1949 by the Heggade or trustee of the Manjunatha temple and from affidavits and other documents filed either in support or in opposition to it in the Court of the District Judge of South Kannara in proceed 901 ings under Section 842 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927 hereinafter referred to as the Act  In 1926 the Manjunatha temple was exempted by a Government notification from the operation of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1923
On 28th June 1945 the Board which had been set up under Section 10 of the Act of 1927 informed the Heggade that it was examining the position afresh whether the exemption which had been granted in 1926 should be withdrawn
After due enquiry the Board had moved the Government on 26th October 1945 to cancel the exemption and it was cancelled by the Government on both December 1945 under the provisions of Act 2 of 1927
On 7th February 1946 the Heggade had made an application to the Government to review the cancellation
Thereupon the Government directed the Board to enquire into the whole question again
That enquiry before the Board took place on 27th July 1946
The Board gave its decision on 9th March 1949 holding that the temple was covered by the provisions of the Act
It was in circumstances stated above that the Heggade had made an application before the District Judge after the coming into force on May 15 1946 of the amending of Act 10 of 1946
The whole proceeding before the District Judge took place as a fresh and original trial in the course of which detailed oral and documentary evidence was produced in support of the respective cases by the two sides to the dispute which were the Heggade of the Jain Dharamas thala of which the temple was said to be a part and the Board of Commissioners under the Act probably substituted by the Commissioner after the repeal of the Act and its substitution by other enactments on the subject
There was no argument before us on the question whether the proceedings were governed by the provisions of the Act before its amendment in 1946 or its provisions as they stood after the amendment
But it appears to me that the case proceeded on the footing that the amended Act which had come into force before the Heggade had petitioned to the District Judge governed the rights of the parties and the scope of the enquiry
The question whether the Institution known as Dharmasthala included the Manjunatha temple or whether Manjunatha temple could be said to have a separate legal entity of its own as an Institution seems to me to be covered by the provisions of Section 84 as they stood both before the amendment in 1946 and after it was amended in 1946
An appeal to the High Court however lay under the amended provisions only There was no objection to the appeal to the High Court on the ground that the unamended provisions did not contain such a right
Here I may for the purpose of clarifying the exact scope of the enquiry out of which the case now before us by special leave has arisen reproduce the provisions of Section 84 of the Act both before and after its amendment in 1946
The unamended provisions of Section 84 read as follows 841 If any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act or whether a temple is an excepted temple such dispute shall be decided by the Board
902 2 Any person affected by a decision under sub section 1 may within one year apply to the Court to modify or set aside such decision but subject to the result of such application the order of the Board shall be final
After the amendment by Act X of 1946 Section 84 reads as follows 841 If any dispute arises as to a whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in this Act b whether trustee is a hereditary trustee as defined in this Act or not or c whether any property or money endowed is a specific endowment as  defined in this Act or not
Such dispute shall be decided by the Board and no Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any such dispute
2 Any person affected by a decision under sub section 1 may within six months apply to the Court to modify or set aside such decision
3 From every order of a District Judge on an application under sub section 2 an appeal shall lie to the High Court within three months from the date of the order
4 Subject to the result of an applica tion under subsection 2 or of an appeal under Sub section 3 the decision of the Board shall be final
Substituted by Madras Act X of 1946
The case of the Heggade or the managing trustee was far from consistent
He took up the following positions firstly that the temple was private and not a public temple and was exempt from the provisions of the Act for that reason secondly that the temple was a Jain institution or an integral part of it and therefore excluded from the purview of the Act and thirdly that the temple even if it was to be deemed to be a Hindu temple as a place at which the Hindu public could worship as of right was really not separable from the larger Jain institution so that irrespective of the character of worship or the beliefs of the worshippers at the temple it was not an institution which could be viewed separately from the Dharamasthala or be held to be just a Hindu temple as an institution 
The Board considered the Heggade s case to be that the Institu tion is a unique institution where a Hindu temple was round ed and managed by a Jain family
A subtle distinction was thus made between the temple as a place of worship and as a part of a larger Jain institution
Although I am doubtful of the correctness of this distinction on facts yet for the reasons given below I do not consider this to be a fit case for interference with the findings of the High Court accepting the correctness of this distinction on the par ticular facts of the case before us
903 It seems to me that the question whether the Manjunatha temple could be described as a Hindu temple as defined by the Act could be conclusively answered by a reference to a number of admissions of the Heggade and his witnesses
Indeed the exemption of the temple from the provisions of the Act by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 31 of the Act could be sought by the Heg gade only on the assumption that the temple constituted a Hindu religious endowment which ought to be exempted from the operations of the provisions of the Act
If it was exempt by virtue of a statutory provision from the provi sions of the Act as a Jain institution there was no need for an order to exempt it
The scope of proceedings which have come up before us seems to go no further than resolu tion of certain disputes
They may however involve making of certain declarations
The origin of the temple was said to be given in a document containing a statement of 1806 by the then Dharmasthala Heggade produced by the managing Heggade which runs as follows There was formerly a woman called Amoo Devi Ballalthi placed there by the favour of God to perform the ceremonies
The God s name was Durga Amba Kallarkie but was subsequently changed to Kanya Kumari
God appeared to the woman in a dream and revealed himself to her telling her he would remain in her house and she should therefore procure a bed and a light for him to perform ceremonies also that she should build another house near to his to perform ceremonies in and that her children and heirs should accordingly succeed her
Under this arrangement the temple shall ever flourish
As related before the God in the shape of a woman revealed himself to Ballalthy and the Ballalthy acted accordingly
In the 1396 Sahvahanam the Peer of Udipi Wadirajas wamy arrived at Dharmasthala where the Bal lalthy ordered him to prepare his dinner and on the next day to leave the place
The Peer replied This is the residence of Devil
I must establish God in it before I eat my din ner
On this the Ballalthy consulted he God in her sleep who appeared and encouraged her desired her to give the Peer whatever was required and told her he would establish the Kuddera God there saying you will tell this to the Peer who on hearing it will eat his dinner 
When I bring the God from Kuddera you will have a place prepared on the left hand side for his residence and a Brahmin appointed to perform ceremonies
On the same evening the Manjunatha Kudder God was brought and a house built and he was lodged in it on the next morning this was all seen
The Ballalthi informed the Peer of this
He accordingly came and after dining departed
Sometime afterwards the Ballalthy built a house on the right hand side and made it the residence of the God and Brahmins were ap pointed to perform ceremonies to both
The old God viz that of the Ballalthy some time afterwards told the Ballalthy he had appointed the devil Kulataya to preside over the offerings and therefore she must build a house for him 904 to expend all the religious offerings proper ly should any dispute arise proper investi gations were to be made Some delay being made in the collection of the offerings by Kulataya Annappa another Devil was fixed for whom another residence was built and four people were chosen to superintend the chari ties which the offerings admitted of 
As the Board observed it appeared that Sri Manjunatha idol was installed on the occasion of Vadirajaswamy of Udipi s visit to the Dharmasthala
This was taken to be the introduction of the worship of God as opposed to that of the Devil
Sri Manjunatha was the installed God
It was as serted that this was in accordance with Jain beliefs
It was said that God spoke through the Heggade who acted as the oracle and used to answer questions put to him by devotees at special sessions arranged for this purpose
It was however clear that Hindus in general were not prohibited from worshipping at this temple
They had worshipped here long enough freely and publicly to acquire the right to worship as members of the Hindu public in general
This right I think could not now be denied to them whatever be its origin
After an elaborate discussion of the nature of beliefs and worship the Board had concluded  it is clear that Shri Manjunatha Temple Dharmasthala Puttur Taluk South Kanara District is a temple  as defined in Madras Act II of 1927 and we decide accordingly
When the matter went up before the District Judge under Section sub
section 2 of the Act the District Judge after discussing the evidence recorded his conclusion as follows Therefore it appears to me that taking into consideration all these circumstances the claim of the petitioner that this Shri Manju natha Shrine though it may be a Hindu one in his private temple seems to be well founded and it is not a temple which is either ex pressly dedicated to the Hindu public or which has been used or resorted to by the Hindu public as of right
It is difficult for me to understand where the District Court found the law which requires express dedication for use by the Hindu public or why he thought that the public had not acquired a right to worship
Its findings at any rate carried with them the implication that although there was a dedication it was for private purposes
I find it difficult to conceive of such a transaction
Dedication to a deity necessarily implies a cessation of individual human ownership
The dispute was then taken to the High Court of Mysore which reached the conclusion after a detailed discussion of the whole evidence If Sri Manjunatha  were a Hindu deity exclusively and not a deity worshipped by the Jains as well it is inconceivable that the name Manaya  should be found among 9 Jains also
In our opinion Sri Manjunatha is a deity worshipped 905 both by the Hindus as well as the Jains in accordance with their respective faiths and it is neither an exclusively Hindu deity nor an exclusively Jain deity
It then stated its views as follows Since the institution is not a Temple  as defined in the Act the further question whether it is a private temple of Nellyadi Beedu family as contended by the Neggade does not arise for determination
The proceedings before the Board and the Court below are under the Act
In view of our finding that the Institution is not a temple  under the Act the Board has no jurisdiction over the Institution
Having held that the Act has no application to the Institution and the Board has no jurisdiction over it as contended by the Heggade the Court below should have desisted from giving any finding on the ques tion whether it is a private temple of Nellya di Beedu family
We express no opinion on the said issue
The High Court s view seemed to be that there was a dedication but for mixed purposes Outside the Act
Jain beliefs as distinct from generally held and accepted Hindu beliefs the origin and nature of the endowments the estab lished practices and customs relating to management of the temple the receipt and disbursement of income of what was held to be a single institution called Dharmasthala had been taken into account by the High Court in order to decide whether the institution is a temple as defined in the Act or something more
Its opinion seemed to be that the real question to be decided here was not whether there was a temple as defined by the Act but whether the temple which existed there was an inseparable part and parcel of a Jain institution which was outside the Act or it was an insti tution which taken by itself was covered by the Act
If the temple was so to speak a mere appendage of the larger multi purposed institution all the parts of which were managed as a single entity the temple could not in the opinion of the High Court be the institution
Although I am prepared to accept the High Court s findings on questions of fact I do not find it possible to agree with the High Court s view that if a place of worship is open to both Jains and Hindus in general or has a mixed character it is not a temple within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 9 sub
section 12 of the Act
All that Section 9 sub
section 12 requires is that it should be a place of worship either dedicated for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or a section thereof as a place of religious worship
The word exclusively is not there at all so as to justify any exclusion of a place of worship from the definition of a temple on the ground that the place of worship is not confined to worship as a matter of right to either Hindus as members of the general public or to any section of Hindus
The Act does not define the term Hindu
This word has had a fairly wide connotation
In origin it indicated people living in the Indus region
It is only by subsequent usage and extension of meaning 906 that the word acquired a religious and therefore in this sense a more limited significance
But in some contexts the term
Hindu even today stands for Indians in gener al
In foreign countries all Indians are sometimes described as Hindus
Even as a term used for Indians professing a particular type of beliefs which are presumed to have an indigenous origin it is wide enough to include Jains and Sikhs
Hence this is the meaning given to the term Hindu in the Hindu Succession Act
In a statute deal ing with religious endowments the term even though not defined may be presumed to stand for people of this country with certain religious beliefs held or forms of religious worship practised by people of this country originally
But this would also embrace a very wide sector of the public
And in any event there is nothing whatsoever in the definition of temple by the Act to justify the infer ence that Jains or any other group of person must be exclud ed from worship before it can be a temple
For reasons given above I am unable to read into the defi nition of the word temple given in the Act the idea of excluding from the benefits of the Act temples open for worship to Hindus of all sects and beliefs
This means that a place of worship where Jains as a section of Indian citizens even when distinguished by their special doctrines and practices from the rest of the Hindus worship together with Hindus of other sects could not be a temple outside the Act
All that the Act requires is that Hindus in gener al or even a section of Hindus should be able to worship there as of fight
This requirement is in my opinion satisfied by Shri Manjunatha temple on the findings of the High Court which I accept not without hesitation as correct
The view I have taken above is however not enough in my opinion to dispose of an issue under section 841a of the Act
It has to to borne in mind that the issue to be decided under Section 841a of the Act is whether an institution is a math or temple as defined in the Act
It is not whether a particular place is a temple in the sense that it is set apart for worship by the Hindu public in general or a section of it
It is whether an institution itself is a temple as defined by the Act
The term temple has been defined in section 912 of the Act as follows  912 Temple  means a place by what ever designation known used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of religious worship
It therefore becomes necessary in order to decide a dispute under section 841a whether a particular place is a temple as contemplated by the Act
But that is not enough for the decision of the whole issue to be decided under Section 841a of the Act
For that purpose atten tion has to be also directed towards deciding the question whether the institution to be considered is a temple and nothing more
If the temple as a place of worship is an integral part of an institution so that it is not separable as an institution in itself the mere fact that there is a temple  as defined by the Act where 907 Hindu members of the public worship as a matter of right will not do In such a case the institution is not the templealthough a temple can by itself be an institution
The term institution is not defined in the Act of 1927 although in the more elaborate provisions of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act XXII of 1959 there is now definition of the term religious institution as well showing that this concept is wider than that of a temple
If therefore there is a distinction between the mean ings of temple merely as a place of worship as defined in Section 912 and a temple as an institution as there seems to me to be an authority deciding the issue whether it is an institution as contemplated by Section 841a of the Act will have to consider whether the history the beliefs lying at the inception and sought to he propagated the forms of worship meant to be kept alive the prevalent customs and practices the exact nature and process of the endowments connected with the institution the established rules for its management the objects to be carried out by those in charge of the endowment taken together would justify the inference that a particular temple as defined by the Act is also a separate or separable institution by itself or is just an integral and organically inseparable part of an institution or organisation outside the Act
These wider aspects which may not appear to be relevant at first sight seem quite necessary to consider when we close ly examine the nature of the issue contemplated by Sec tion 841a of the Act and decided by the High Court
In the case before us the findings of the High Court show that the institution or organisation of which Manjuna tha temple is an inseparable part is predominantly Jain in character
On such a finding it would be exempt from the operation of the Act by reason of the explanation to section 2 excluding Jain religious endowments from the benefits of the Act
It may be that very good grounds could be given for holding that the temple is a separable or separate entity dedicated by user for worship by Hindus in general without restriction of worship by Jains only as a matter of right
But as two views seer to be reasonably open on the question whether it is such a separate or separable insti tution or entity I do not consider it fit to be reopened by us under Article 136
A consideration of the property which belongs to or is endowed for the support of maths or temples or for perform ance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the premises of maths or temples may also become necessary so as to determine the character of an endowment as a part of the institution and the process by which it took place
The institution endowed on the findings of the High Court being more than or wider than the Manjunatha temple is not just a Hindu temple although a temple by itself could be such an institution if it were a separable entity
The origin and process of dedication is not always found embodied in a document
Where the dedication itself is evidenced by a document its objects such as they may be can be determined by interpreting the document which makes the task of the authorities deciding the question generally easier
There are however many cases in 8 1338SCI76 908 which dedication or endowment of property for a particular purpose has to be inferred from immemorial user of a property in a particular manner or from the conduct of a party such as permission to build a road for use by the public or permission to bury the dead on a piece of land
The last
mentioned type of case may also give rise some times to an estoppel against the owner of the land
Cases where an inference of dedication results from what may be considered immemorial user or a kind of permissible user giving rise to an estoppel because others have spent money or done some act on the strength of a licence or permission to use the land for a particular purpose are not uncommon in our country
They should not as Lord Macnaghten hinted in Bholanath Nundi vs Midnapore Zemindary Co Ltd1 be complicated by resorting to the peculiar English notions of dedication when he said It appears to their Lordships that on proof of the fact of enjoyment from time immemorial there could be no difficulty in the way of the Court finding a legal origin for the right claimed
Unfortunately however in the lower Courts the question was over laid and in some measure obscured by copious references to English authorities and by the application of principles or doctrines more or less refined rounded on legal conceptions not altogether in harmony with Eastern no tions
After quoting the passage set out above Lord Radcliffe in Lakshmindhar Misra  Ors
vs Rangalal  Ors
2 pointed out atp 58 about such dedications in English law But dedication is only known to English law as something equivalent to an irrevocable licence granted by the owner of soil to the use of the public
Dedication of a piece of land to a limited section of the public such as the inhabitants
of a village is a claim unknown in law and evidence limited to such special user would not justify a finding of dedication see Poole vs Huskinson  63 RR 782 Hildrath vs Adam son   125 RR 794
Berrnondsey vs Brown It was explained in Lakshmidhar Misra s case supra that the doctrine of lost grant originated in English law as a technical device to enable title to be made by prescription despite the impossibility of proving immemorial user
Prescription by a conventionwas deemed to start in 1189 when Normans conquered England
The real basis of such rights in English law seemed to be prescription
In this very case differences were pointed out between a dedication and a customary right enjoyed by people of a locality to use a particular piece of land on certain occa sions
It was indicated here that a dedication by pre sumed lost grant in English law unlike
customary rights which 1 31 IA 75
2 AIR 1950
PO 56
909 may become attached to land postulates a grantee and the creation of an estate
Although certain essential or basic prerequisites of a valid trust in English law such as the three reasonable certainties laid down by Lord Eldon in Knight vs Knight1 that of the obligation to be carried out that of the subject matter or of property affected by it and that of the object to be served or the persons to be benefited are required in this country too for valid endow ments no less than they are in England yet valid dedica tions can be inferred under our law__ without showing compliance with at least some of the technical requirements of English law
Dedications in Hindu law do not require acceptance of property dedicated for a religious or a public purpose
In Monohar Ganesh V Lakhmiram2 a rule of Hindu law coming down from ancient times was thus stated A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception of morality
Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country
Such dedication may  be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time
The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other
circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication
Although religious ceremo nies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication yet they are not indispensable see BK Mukherjee on the Hindu Law of Religious
and Charitable Trusts Third Edn
1970 p 80
The question of an implied dedication by user by the public is particularly important in cases like the one before us where a claim that a trust is private or sectarian in nature is set up against a wider claim on behalf of the general public
In Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar3 this Court said the distinction between a private and a public trust is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof
While in the former the bene ficiaries are persons who are ascertained or capable of being ascertained in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment
In BK Mukherjea s Tagore Law Lectures on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts 1970 3rd edition we find the following passage at page 143 1  2 1  263 3  910 In cases where no express dedication is proved the character of the endowment must always be a legal inference from proved facts
As in the case of highways long user is
undoubtedly a material element from which an inference of dedication may arise
If the public have been in the habit of worshipping in the temple in an open and unconcealed manner for a long period of time and were never denied any access to it that would be a strong evidence of dedication
With regard to period of user no hard and fast rule has been laid down There is no minimum which must be fulfilled and there is no maximum which compels the inference 
Each case would depend upon its own circumstances
Besides user by the public conduct of the founder and his descendants is also relevant and if they in fact held out the temple to be a public temple a very strong presumption of dedica tion would arise
Cases are also cited there where reliance had been placed upon circumstances such as the structure or the location of a temple outside a private residence or dwelling so as to be exposed to public view and  worship by members of the gener al public to infer dedication for the public
In Pujari Lakshmana Goundan vs Subramaniya1 the question for determination was whether a Hindu temple round ed between 1841 and 1856 had been dedicated for use by the public by its founder who had executed no deed showing this
But the founder Lakshmana Goundan was shown to have in stalled an idol at his house and allowed Brahmins and Hindus to worship the idol as if it was a public place of worship
The Hindu public was admitted free of charge though only on certain days in the week in the greater part of the temple and in one part only on payment of a fee and in the inner shrine not at all
It appears that the income from offer ings and fees was spent by the Pujari founder on the temple and the idol as well as on himself
Nevertheless their Lordships of the Privy Council held that Lakshmans Goundan having held out and represented u the Hindu public that the temple was for their benefit the inference was irre sistible that had dedicated the temple for use by the public
In BK Mukharji s Lectures supra the facts of this case have been cited as an example of an application of the principle of estoppel
Our law reports abound with similar cases where dedication by founders or owners is inferred or presumed irrespective of their own religious persuasions from  the purposes for which a piece of proper ty has been used for long enough
In some cases the ele ments of an estoppel are present
But the basis of such dedications seems in many cases of this type to be strictly speaking nothing more than a presumption from certain  facts
Perhaps we could describe it in most cases of this sort as a deemed dedication although it must not be confused with a fiction
It is after all an inference from facts which must exist and lead to the con clusion deduced
1 911 In view of tiffs well established doctrine of
implied endowment of property by its long user for a particular religious or public purpose
 based on a presumed consent of the owner I do not think that the High Court could be held to have reached a wrong conclusion even if it has inferred that whatever be the origin of the Manjunatha temple it had become a separate institution with an endowment of its own consisting at least of the land over which the temple had been built the building and the idol installed with free access to it by the Hindu public in general which made offerings even though Jains also worship there
Neverthe less in view of the discussion of a good deal of evidence of the peculiar composite character of the institution known as Dharmasthala and bearing in mind our general rule of practice that we do not disturb findings of the final Court of fact where two views are possible I do not propose to differ from the conclusion reached by the High Court that the temple was not a separate institution
The Manjunatha temple on the findings of the High Court which we are upholding had become an accretion or growth on the body if one may so out it of the institution known as Dharmastha la even though it could be removed from that body by a surgical operation
It is not for us to say on the find ings before us whether a situation has arisen in which a surgical operation may be called for
Such an opinion can only be given upon the results of a more thorough investiga tion into the objects of the institution its properties the sources of its income and the manner in which they are utilised than we have before us
The question which troubles me however is whether a religious institution or even that part of it to which members of the public make contributions through their offering and gifts is to be left entirely uncontrolled by authorities specially appointed by the State in order to see that such income or donations are not misused or are uti lised for the purposes for which they are meant
It seems to me that religious beliefs professions and practices which have a powerful hold over the minds and feelings of the people particularly in our country should not be permitted to become mere cloaks for exploiting the credu lity of the simple minded and the ignorant and unsophisti cated
When a religious institution becomes a means of obtaining money or material benefits in the form of offer ings or donations or gifts as it generally does from members of the public a danger of its misuse can only be effectively averted
by appropriate supervision
It seems to me that this is the whole purpose of the Act The income from the public through a religious institution seems to me to bring in that secular aspect which justifies interference by State authorities through adequate supervi sion
However these are matters which so far as religious endowments such as the one before us held to be predomi nantly Jain for the reasons given by the High Court are concerned the State Government can take into account in deciding whether it 912 should exercise its powers under Section 32 of the Act to extend the benefits of the Act to them or if necessary to amend the Act
The District Court did not specifically frame or try any issue on the question whether any endowment existed at all
It had framed the following points for determination  1  Is the Sri Manjunatha Devaru only a part of the institution known as Dharmasthala and not a separate institution in itself
2 Is the Dharmasthala a charitable institution 3 Is the Dharmasthala and in particular the Manju natha Devaru not an exclusively Hindu place of worship  If not do not the provisions of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act apply 4 Is the Manjunatha Devaru a private place of wor ship
5 Is the order of the Board dated 9th March 1949 liable to be set aside The High Court also did not give the finding that no endowment whatsoever exists
The extent of property cov ered by any endowment was also not really investigated as to issue was flamed on it
Atleast the structure of the temple with the idol installed and the ground upon which the temple stands must be deemed to be dedicated even though these may not for purposes of management form separable units
The High Court took the view that the dispute falling under Section 842a could be disposed of by deciding issues or points numbered 1 and 3 only
The District Court had chosen to resolve the principal dispute that arose by deciding issue No4
Other questions were treated as merely subsidiary or even unnecessary to decide
I have tried to indicate above what seemed to me to be the real nature of the proceedings in the course of which a dispute covered by Section 841aof the Act arose and also the principles on which such a dispute should in my opin ion be resolved although I do not consider it necessary in exercise of the special powers of this Court under article 136 to interfere with the High Court s findings of fact because I think that the powers of the Government which is not even a party acting under Section 3 of the Act are not restricted by decisions given by Courts in resolving a dispute covered by Section 841 of the Act
All that the Government was bound to do under Section 3 of the Act was to consult the Board
The Madras Hindu Religious and Charita ble Endowments Act of 1959 which contains the law governing the subject today has section 2 relating to a general power to extend the provisions
of the Act to Jain public reli gious institutions and endowments as a mater of policy irrespective of the character of management whether good or bad and Section 3 for the extension of the provisions of the Act to particular
Jain religious 913 and charitable institutions in cases of mismanagement after due inquiry
These powers are not in any way affected by the dispute which has been brought before us under the provisions of an Act repealed long ago
For the reasons given above I concur with the order proposed by my learned brother Shinghal that this appeal be dismissed and parties be left to bear their own costs throughout
VPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Section 912 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1926 defines temple  as a place by whatever designa tion known used as a place of public worship and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of religious worship Section 911 provides that all property belonging to or given or endowed to the support of a temple or for the performance of any service or charity connected with the temple will constitute its endowment including the premises of the temple
Section 2 provides that the Act applies to all Hindu public religious endowments
The Section the Explanation to the section and section 3b shown that Hindu public religious endowments  do not include private endow ments and Jain religious endowments
Dharmasthal in which the temple in dispute was situate has a number of institutions which were under the management of a person known as Heggade who was a Jain
The Religious Endowments Board after an enquiry held that the Act ap plied to the temple
On application made under section 842 the District Judge held that it was a private temple and that therefore the Act did not apply to it
On appeal the High Court did not consider whether it was a private temple but held that the temple was an adjunct to the composite insti tution of Dharmasthal that according to the customs and usages of the institution the temple could notbe separated from the rest
of the institutions that Dharmasthal was both a religious and charitable institution that the deity in the temple was worshipped both by the Hindus and the Jains in accordance with their respective faiths that the deity was neither an exclusively Hindu deity not an exclu sively Jain deity that the institution
of Dharmasthal was rounded by the Jain that its administration remained exclu sively Jam since its inception that it could not be in ferred that there was an implied dedication to the Hindus exclusively and that therefore the temple was not a temple as defined in the Act and that the Act did not apply to it
The High Court also held that its property was also an adjunct to the composite institution consisting of Hindu Gods Jain Gods and Daivas worshipped by Hindus and Jains
Dismissing the appeal by special leave to this Court HELD Per AN Ray CJ and PN Shinghal J 1 Section 912 of the Act only requires that the temple should be dedicated for public religious worship as of right by Hindus but it would not detrace from its char acter of a temple as such if Jains also worship there
The pro visions of the Act will however not be attracted to it in the absence of and evidence to prove the existence of an endowment for it as the Act applies only to Hindu public religious endowments
899 H 900 A 2 The evidence in the case shows that the institution of Dharmasthal was originally a Jain religious and charita ble restitution to which property was endowed by the ances tors of the present Heggade who was himself a Jain
It was that endowment which spread and gained more and more impor tance over the years because of the offerings made largely by Hindu and Jain devotees and worshippers
A lingam was installed in the temple by a Hindu Sanyasi only in the 16th century but it has not been established that there is any endowment which could be said to belong exclusively to the temple
Even if any such 890 endowment was made by some one in the name of the temple it was taken to be an endowment for the entire institution known as Dharmasthal and was treated as such
The temple cannot therefore be said to be a Hindu religious endowment within the meaning of section 2 and the provisions of the Act are not applicable to it
896 F H 897 A 3 The evidence also shows that the temple is part and parcel of the composite institution known as Dharmasthal and is so inseparably connected with it that it is its integral part and it cannot therefore be held to be an endowment within the meaning of section 911
It has not been proved that any property belongs to the temple or has been given or endowed for its support or for the performance of any serv ice or charity connected therewith or that it has any such premises of its own as could be said to form its own endow ment
The mere installation of the idol in the temple could not be said to bring into existence any such property as could be said to belong to the deity or given or endowed for the support of its temple or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith
The temple does not have even a separate prakararn
The shrine of the adja cent shrine is in dose proximity of the temple and within the same prakaram
The existence of other shrines of Jain Daivas in the same prakaram as the temple therefore shows that this temple cannot even claim to have any exclusive premises of its own so as to constitute an endowment within the meaning of section 911 of the Act
897 A F 4 In a given case it may be difficult to prove the original dedication because of the lapse of considerable time and its user by Hindus as of right may be enough to prove an initial dedication
But in the present case it would not be possible to conclude that there was any such dedication because there is nothing to show how the Hindu Sanyasi who installed the lingam in the temple in the 16th century could be
said to be a donor when the property did not belong to him
900 F G 5 The facts that the temple was not shown to be a Jain endowment and hat it possesses the characteristics of a Hindu temple will not make any difference because there is no evidence to show that there is any endowment  to the temple as such and the temple is a part and parcel of Dharmasthal
900 A_B Per Beg J 1 In order to decide a dispute under section 841a it is necessary to
decide whether a particular place is a temple as contemplated by the Act
But that is not enough for the decision of the whole issue to be decided
For that purpose attention has also to be directed towards deciding the question whether the institution to be considered is a temple and nothing more
If the temple as a place of worship is an integral part of an institution so that it is not separable as an institution in itself the mere fact that there is a temple as defined by the Act where Hindu members of the public worship as a matter of right will not go
In such a case the institution is not the temple although a temple can by itself be an institution
There is thus a distinction between the meanings of temple  merely as a place of worship as defined in section 912 and a temple  as an institution
It is therefore necessary to consider the history the beliefs underlying at the inception and sought to be propagated the forms of worship meant to be kept alive the prevalent customs and practices the exact nature and process of the endowments connected with the institution the established rules for its management the objects to be carried out by those in charge of the endow ment and whether all these taken together justify the inference
that a particular temple as defined by the Act is also a separate or separable institution by itself or is just an integral and organically inseparable part of an institution or an organisation outside the Act 903 A B 906EH 907 A C 2 A consideration of the property which belongs to or is endowed for the support of temples or for performance of any service or charity connected therewith including the premises of temples may also become necessary so as to determine the character of an endowment as a part of the institution and the process by which it took place 907 F G 3 The origin and process of dedication is not always found embodied in document
Where the dedication itself is evidenced by a document its objects 891 such as they may be can be determined by interpreting the document
There are however many cases in which dedica tion or endowment of property for a particular purposes has to be inferred from immemorial or long user of a property in a particular manner or from the conduct of a party
Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country
Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication yet they are not indis pensable
907 G H 908 A B Bholanath Nandi vs Midnapora Zamindary Co Ltd 31 IA 75 Lakshmidhar Misra  Ors
vs Rangalal  Ors
AIR 1950 PC 56 Manohar Gandhi vs Lakhmiram ILR  263 Deoki Nandan vs Murlidhar 1956 SCR 756 and Puajri Lakshmana Goundan vs Subramaniya referred to
All that section 912 requires is that the place should be a place of worship either dedicated for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community or a section thereof as a place of religious worship
The word exclusively  is not there at all so as to justify any exclusion of a place of worship from the definition of a temple on the ground that Jains worship together with Hindus of other sects
But the issue to be decided is whether the institution  is a temple as defined in the Act
It is not whether a particu lar place is a temple in the sense that it is set apart for worship by the Hindu public in general or a section of it but it is whether an institution itself is a temple as defined by the Act
905 D G 906 F H 907 A D
5 In the present case the findings of the High Court show that the institution or organisation of which the temple is an inseparable part is predominantly Jain in character
In view of the well established doctrine of implied endowment of property by its long user for a par ticular religious or public purpose based on a presumed consent it could be said that the temple had become a separate institution with an endowment of its own consisting at least of the land over which the temple had been built the building and the idol installed with free access to it by the Hindu public in general which made offerings even though Jains also worship there
But in view of the general rule of practice under article 136 of the Constitution that this Court does not disturb findings of the final court of fact where two views are possible this Court would not differ from the conclusion reached by the High Court that the temple was not a separate institution
On such a finding it would be exempt from the operation of the Act by reason of the Explanation to section 2 excluding Jain religious endowments from the benefits of the Act
905 E H 907 D F 6In the present case neither the District Judge nor the High Court had given any findings whether any endowment whatsoever of the temple existed
The extent of property covered by an endowment was also not really investigated as no issue was framed on it
At least the structure of the temple with the idol installed and the ground upon which the temple stands must be deemed to be dedicated even though these may not for purposes of management form separable units
When a religious institution becomes a means of obtaining money or material benefits in the form of offer ings or donations or gifts as it generally does from members of the public a danger of its misuse can only be effectively averted by appropriate supervision
The powers of the Government under the relevant Act to extend the provisions of the Act to Jain public religious institutions which are not affected by the dispute brought before the Court are however adequate to deal with such situation
912 A H 913A