Civil Appeal No 212 of 1981 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 26th August 1980 of the Delhi High Court in CR No 790 of 1979
WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL NO 2948 OF 1982 From the judgment and order dated the 17th December 1981 of the Delhi High Court in CR No 873 of 1981
V M Terkunde PM Parekh Ms Indu Malhotra Ms Kailash Mehta  Vimal Dave for the AppellantPetitioners
Bikarmjit Nayer and DD Sharma for the Respondent in GA
21281
617 TS Kawatra  NK Agarwala for the Respondent in SLP No 2948 of 1982
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI J
This Appeal by special leave is directed against an order passed by the Delhi High Court on August 26 1980 affirming an order of eviction of the appellant made by the Rent Controller
The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and the appeal involves a pure point of law which is already convered by decisions of this court to which we shall presently refer
The tenant Ravi Dutt Sharma was inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945
The landlord Ratan Lal Bhargava applied under section 19 1 a of the Slum Clearance Act  Slum Act  for short before the Competent Authority for permitting him to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed on July 28 1973
An appeal against this order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner on October 4 1974
Thereafter Respondent filed a suit for eviction of the tenant under section 14 1 e read with section 25 B of the Delhi Rent Control Act Rent Act  for short on April 13 1979
Under the provisions of the Rent Act as amended in 1976 it is incumbent upon the defendant tenant to apply for leave to defend a suit for eviction before entering contest
The tenant applied for such leave but the same was rejected and an order of his eviction was passed on September 14 1979
A revision by the tenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has led to the appeal to this Court
In the special leave petition Smt
Puspa Rani filed a suit for eviction against her tenant Swaran Kumar and others which also was allowed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrom has been dismissed by the High Court
Hence the petition for special leave against judgment of the High Court has been filed and that was directed to be heard along with the Civil Appeal
It is unnecessary to give the facts involved in the case in which special leave has been asked for because the point of law for consideration is one and the same
618 Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act
It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the competent Authority under the Slum Act
Under section 19 1 a of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit is not maintainable
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 referred to as the Amending Act  for short a new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenant one of which was covered by section 14 1 e and the other by section 14 A
In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by section 141 e of the special procedure provided in Chapter III A introduced by the Amending Act
It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of section 14 1 e of the Rent Act personal necessity and in such cases a procedure different from the procedure followed in other cases had been prescribed
Section 25 A and 25 B sought to simplify the procedure by insisting on the tenant to obtain permission to enter defence
In other words so far as suits for eviction on the ground of personal necessity were concerned the case for eviction was put at par with suits under Order 37 Code of Civil Procedure where the Court was satisfied that the tenant had an arguable case leave to defend would be granted otherwise the order of eviction would be passed straightway
Learned counsel for the tenants then argued that sections 25A and 25 B were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and therefore the procedure substituted under Chapter III A particularly in SS
25A and 25 B should be invalidated
On the other hand counsel for the landlords contended that by virtue of the Amending Act a new procedure has been added in respect of evictions under section 141 e as also the newly added 14A and sections 25A and 25B have been brought into the Statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature by providing a Special procedure and 619 also making provision that the new procedure would override the existing law to the contrary
In order to appreciate this contention it may be necessary to give an extract of Statement of objects and reasons of the Amending Act There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 with a view to conferring a right of tenancy on certain heirssuccessors of a deceased statutory tenant to that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bonafide for his personal occupation
Further Government decided on the 9th September 1975 that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December 1975
Government considered that in the circumstances the Act requires to be amended urgently
 The dominant object of the Amending Act was therefore to provide a speedy expeditions and effective remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by sections 14 1e and 14A and for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act
It is common experience that suits for eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme Court
In many cases experience has indicated that by the time the eviction decree became final several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared and if there was further delay in securing eviction and the family of the landlord had by then expanded in the absence of accommodation the members of the family were virtually thrown on the road
It was this mischief which the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new procedure in Chapter III A
The legislature in its wisdom thought that in cases where the landlords required their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity they should be treated as a separate class along with the landlords covered by section 14 A and should be allowed to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction within the quickest possible time
It cannot therefore be said that the classification of such landlords would be 620 an unreasonable one because such a classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the Amending Act and the purposes which it seeks to subserve
Tenants cannot complain of any discrimination because the Rent Act merely gave certain protection to them in public interest and if the protection or part of it afforded by the Rent Act was withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under the Transfer of property Act was still preserved no genuine grievance could be made
This was clearly held in the case of Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti1 The matter is no longer res integra and is covered by two decisions of this Court which are directly in point
The first one is the case of Sarwan Singh  Anr
vs Kasturi Lal 2 in which an identical point came up for consideration
It was held by this Court that sections 25 A 25 B and 25 C of the Rent Act introduced by the Amending Act were special provisions with reference to section 14 A thereof which superseded all existing Acts to the contrary
It was also pointed out that these newly added sections in the Rent Act were to apply only to a class of landlords and therefore the question of violation of Act
14 of the constitution did not arise
While considering various aspects of the aforesaid provisions Chandrachud J as he then was spokes for the Court thus When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law stimulating and inoisive problems of interpretation arise
Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration
For resolving such inter se conflicts one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law
That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one
Section 14 A and Chapter III A having been enacted with effect from December 11975 are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act which in its present form was placed on the statute book with effect 621 from February 28 1965 and in reference to section 39 of the same Act which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed
The legislature gave over riding effect to section 14 A and Chapter III A with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy
Therefore the later enactment must prevail over the former
Bearing in mind the language of the two laws their object and purpose and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non obstante clauses in the earlier l w we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 14 A and Chapter III A of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act
 C An analysis of the aforesaid decision clearly reveals that the now sections 14A 25A 25B and 25C had been introduced for the purpose of meeting a particular contingency aespelt out in the objects and reasons behind the new provisions
Once it is recoginsed that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Sulm Act stands withdrawn to that l extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections 14 1 e and 14A would not be governed or controlled by section 19 1 
a of the Slum Act
It was
however
submitted that section 14A of the Rent act dealt with a special contingency for which a different procedure had been provided in the matter of evicting tenants by the landlords in occupation of premisss allotted by the Central Government or any local 1 authority
This was to enable them to get their own residential accommodation so that they would be in a position to vacate the premises allotted to them by the Central Government
lt was contended that as the Central Government and persons in occupation as tenants of premises provided by Central Government were a class by themselves section 14 A could be taken as a special provision but 14 1 e of the Act could not be elevated to that pedestal
We are not able to accept this argument
It was open to the legislature to pick out one cl ass of landlords out of the several covered by section 14
1 e of the Rent act so long as they formed a class by themselves and legislature was free to provide the benefit of a special procedure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long the legisla 622 tion had an object to achieve and the special procedure had a reasonable naxus with such object to be secured
Despite the ingenious and attractive arguments of Mr Tarkunde it seems to us that the distinction made by the learned counsel between sections 14 1 e and 14 A is really a distinction without any difference
Moreover the newly added sections viz sections 14A 25A 25 B and 25 C do constitute parts of a special scheme and have the effect of making the Sulm Act inapplicable
In view of the pronouncement of this Court as referred to above it is impossible to accede to the contention advanced on behalf of the tenants
In Kewal Singh s case supra a decision to which one of us was a party Fazal Ali J this Court observed as follows The Act actually replaced the ordinance which was promulgated on 1st December 1979
The objects and reasons clearly reveal that the amendment has been made or simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation
It is a matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an immediate and imperative necessity for vacating the house given to  tenant he is compelled to resort to the time consulting and dilatory procedure of a suit which takes years before the landlord is able to obtain the decree and in most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely deprived of getting any relier
It appears to us that it was for these reasons that the legislature in its wisdom thought that a short an l simple procedure should be provided for
those landlords who generally want the premises for their bona fide necessity in that they may be able to get quick and expeditious relief 
The landlords having personal necessity have been brought together as a separate class because of their special needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreaso nable particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that the landlords should get this relief as quickly as possible Thus taking an overall picture of the situation the circumstances under which the landlord s needs have been classified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot be said by 623 any stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub sections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or that section 29 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers
In fact section 29 contains valuable and sufficient guidelines which completely exclude the exercise of uncanalised or arbitrary powers by the Rent Controller
The ratio of this case reinforces the rule laid down in Sarwan Singh s case supra and in Vinod Kumar Chowdhry vs Narain Delhi TanejaJ it was clearly pointed out that whenever there was any conflict between section 29A and any other provision of law
section 29 A was to override and prevail
Here again one of us Fazal Ali J observed The non obstante clause occurring in section 29A makes it quite clear that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Chapter III A on the one hand and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force on the other the former shall prevail
 It is therefore clear from the new provision in the Amending Act that the procedure indicated therein was intended to have over riding effect and all procedural laws were to give way
to the new procedure 
Applications under section 14 1 e therefore clearly fell within the protective umbrella of the new procedure in Chapter IIIA An identical view has been taken by the Delhi High Court tn the case of Smt
Krishnn Devi Nigam  Ors
vs Shyam Babu Gupta  Ors In this decision it has been clearly held that the provisions of section 29A cannot be controlled by the provisions of the Slum 4 Act
We fully approved and endorse the ratio laid down in that decision as it is in conformity with the consistent opinion of this Court
On a consideration therefore of the facts and circumstances of tho case and the law referred to above we reach the following conclusions 624 1 That sections 14A 25A 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non obstante clause these provisions would override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned 2 That there is no difference either on principle or in law between sections 14 l e and 14A of the Rent Act even though these two provisions relate to tenants under different situations 3 That the procedure incorporated in Chapter IIIA of the Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 4 That in view of the procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not therefore necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent Authority under section 19 1 a of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within section 191 e or 19A of the Rent Act We are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting aside the 
Order of eviction
The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs
As a result of our decision the special leave petition was to be dismissed
In both these cases time to vacate the premiss is extends till June 30 1984 subject to filing of the usual undertaking within four weeks from today failing which the landlords shall be free to ask for possession forthwith through the executing court
NVK Appeal  Petition dismissed


Summary:
The appellant tenant was inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945
The respondent landlord applied under section 19 1 a of the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act 1956 before the Competent Authority for permitting him to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed and the order was confirmed in appeal by the Financial Commissioner
Thereafter the respondent field a suit for eviction in April 1979 under section 14 1 e read with section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958
The tenant applied for leave to defend the suit but the same was rejected and an order of eviction was passed
A revision filed by the tenant in the High Court was dismissed
In the appeal to this Court as well as in the connected Special Leave Petition it was contended that 1 under section 19 1 a of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before institution of a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit was no maintainable and 2 sections 25A and 25B were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and therefore the procedure substituted under Chapter IIIA particularly sections 25A and 25B should be invalidated
Dismissing the Appeal and Special Leave Petition 615  HELD A1 The High Court was correct in rejecting the applications of the tenants for setting aside the order of eviction
624F B1 Sections 14A 25A 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non obstante clause these provisions override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned 624A 2 There is no difference either on principle or in law between sections 14 1e and 14A of the Rent Act even though these two provisions relate to eviction of tenants under different situations 624B 3 The procedure incorporated in Chapter IIIA of the Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 624C 4 In view of the procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not therefore necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent Authority under section 19 1a of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within s14 1e or 14A of the Rent Act
624D E C1 The dominant object of the Amending Act of 1976 was to provide a speedy expeditions and effect remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by sections 141e and 14A and for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act
Suits for eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme Court
In many cases by the time the eviction decree became final several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared
It was this mischief which the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new procedure in Chapter IIIA
It cannot therefore be said that the classification of such landlords would be an unreasonable one because such a classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the Amending Act of 1976 and the purposes which it seeks to subserve
619D F G 2 The new sections 14A 25A 25B and 25C had been introduced for the purpose of meeting a particular contingency as spelt out in the object and reasons behind the new provisions
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of sections 141e and 14A would not be governed or controlled by section 19 1 a of the Slum Act
621CD  616 3 It is open to the legislature to pick out one class of the landlords out of several covered by section 141e of the Rent Act so long as they formed a class by themselves and the legislature was free to provide the benefit of the special procedure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long as the legislation had an object to achieve and the special procedure had a reasonable nexus with such object to be secured
621F G 4 The new provision in the Amending Act were intended to have overriding effect and all procedural laws were to give way to the new procedure
623D Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti   Sarwan Singh  Anr
vs Kasturi Lal   Vinod Kumar Chowdhry vs Narain Devi Taneja  referred to
Krishna Devi Nigam  Ors
vs Shyam Babu Gupta  Ors approved