Criminal Appeal No 60 of 1963
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 24 1962 of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No 1379 of 1962
BC Misra and OP Rana for the appellant
1 P Goyal for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appeal of the State against the judgment of the Sessions Judge allowing the appeal of the respondent and acquitting him
The respondent obtained permits under the Iron and Steel Control Order 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Control Order for about 28 tons of iron including 6 tons of rods 1512 tons of joints and 2 tons of GC Sheets
He is alleged to have purchased these articles on the basis of the above permits between July 1957 and March 1958
The permits were obtained on three applications made by the respondent
Only two applications are in the printed record
The first application is dated May 23 1957 and is addressed to the Provincial Iron and Steel Controller Kanpur through the District Magistrate Deoria
In this application the respondent stated that he was a political sufferer and he was constructing a public temple for which he required five tons of MS Round and eight tons of Girder
He further stated that the requirements were nor available at Deoria and as such the application should be considered and forwarded to the Controller for consideration and orders
It appears that this application was forwarded duly recommended by the District Supply Officer
Deoria and ultimately a permit was given to him by the Controller
He made another application dated September 7 1957
In this application he again stated that he was a political sufferer and he was constructing a public temple and dharamshala for which he required certain quantities of iron
He further stated that the requirements were not available at Deoria and as such the application should be forwarded to the Controller
This application was also recommended and forwarded and ultimately a permit was given to him
On January 2 1958 the accused made another application exhibit Ka 9 not available in the printed record and a permit was given to him by the District Supply Officer himself
We may mention that the original permits are not printed in the record and therefore we have not been able to see for ourselves as to what are the exact conditions contained in the permits
It is the case of the prosecution that the respondent after obtaining the materials sanctioned to him under the permits did not construct any temple or dharamshala building at Barhaj Bazar or at any other place
We may mention that Barhaj Bazar is the place where he lives and the applications which are in the record also mention this address
163 Before the Magistrate who tried the case the respondent was put the following question It is alleged that the iron obtained under the permits mentioned in questions 2 3 and 4 was not utilised for the purpose for which it was taken
What have you to say in this respect The respondent s reply was No Whatever iron 1 got I used it in the temple situate in mauza Tinbari PS Madhubam district Azamgarh which is my place of residence as well
 Before the Magistrate the accused had admitted to have purchased about 17 tons of iron
The Magistrate held it proved that the accused had atleast purchased one ton more from one Mishri Lal PW 7
Thus he came to the conclusion that the accused had purchased at least 18 tons of iron
He further held that on the evidence it was clear that only 34 ton of rods had been utilised in the building constructed at Tinhari but as the building had been constructed between 1943 52 no portion of the iron obtained by the accused had been utilised for the purpose for which it was procured
He further held that the accused had disposed of the iron wrongfully at Kanpur and did not even bring the same to Barhaj Bazar or Tinhar
Accordingly he held that the respondent had contravened the provisions of cl 7 of the Control Order
The respondent filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge
The Sessions Judge held that barring a very small quantity of iron the remaining quantity that was received by the respondent had not been utilised in the temple or dharmashala at Tinhari
Differing from the Magistrate he held that it was not proved by any evidence that the respondent had actually sold the excess quantity at Kanpur
He then observed that in the absence of any such evidence the possibility of the appellant retaining the iron at some other place is not completely excluded
 Then construing d 7 of the Control Order he observed that in the aforesaid section there is no mention that the iron purchased should be utilised at any particular place or within a particular period
The condition in the various permits granted to the appellant was simply this that he should utilise the iron in creecting a temple or dharamshala in the town of Barhai
It may be noted that the main purpose was the construction of a temple and dharamshala the place where it was to be constructed does not appear to have much significance
Further no time limit is given during which the entire quantity of iron should be utilised
 Accordingly he held that there had been no contravention of cl 7 of the Control Order
The State appealed to the High Court
Srivastava J dismissed the appeal holding that there had been no contravention of cl 7 of the Control Order
According to him two essentials are necessary before there can be contravention of el 7 In the 164 first place the iron and steel should be used  secondly it should be used otherwise than in accordance with the conditions contained or incorporated in the document which was the authority for the acquisition He held that the first condition had not been fulfilled because it had not been proved that the respondent had used the iron which he had obtained on the basis of the permit
It appears that the findings of the learned Sessions Judge as well as the Magistrate that he had not used or utilised the remaining portions of the iron and steel at all were not questioned before him
According to him if the remaining quantity of iron was still unutilised or unused then the respondent could not be said to have done anything contrary to cl 7
He further held that the second condition had also not been fulfilled because the permit itself contained only one condition printed on its back
This condition was that the materials required against the permit will be used only for the purpose for which it was asked for and has been given According to him it is not permissible to refer to the application made for the permit because the only document that can be looked at is the permit
He was however prepared to concede that it is also open to the officer to mention in the permit that it is being granted for the purpose mentioned in the application
That may be a short cut for avoiding the trouble of entering in the permit the details of the purpose
In that case it may be permissible to refer to the application
 In spite of this concession he concluded that when even that is not done in fact no condition is mentioned in the permit at all about the manner in which the iron or steel is to be utilised it cannot be said that a condition of the permit has been broken because the assurance given in the application has not been carried out Mr BC Misra learned counsel for the appellant
has urged before us that on the facts found by the learned Sessions Judge
cl 7 of the Control Order has been contravened
He says that the word use in el 7 includes kept for eventual use for another purpose He says that if one stores iron and steel
one uses it and the word use does not imply consumption only
Relying on Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes Eleventh Edition p 266
he says that we should give a wide construction to the word  use in cl 7
Clause 5 and the relevant portion of cl 7 of the Control Order are as follows 5 Disposals
No person who acquires iron or steel under clause 4
or no producer shall dispose of or agree to dispose of or export or agree to export from any place to which this Order extends any iron or steel except in accordance with the conditions contained or incorporated in a special or general written order of the Controller
165 7
Use of Iron and Steel to conform to conditions governing acquisition
A person acquiring iron or steel in accordance with the provisions of el 4 shall not use the iron or steel otherwise than in accordance with any conditions contained or incorporated in the document which was the authority for the acquisition   We are unable to accede to the above contentions
There is no provision in the Control Order requiring that iron or steel acquired under the Control Order should be utilised within a specified time
If it had been the intention to include keeping or storing within the word use  there would have been some provision regarding the period during which it would be permissible to keep or store the iron for it is common knowledge that building operations take some considerable time and are sometimes held up for shortage of material or other reasons
Further the word use  must take its colour from the context in which it is used
In cl 7 the expression use in accordance with the conditions contained suggests something done positively eg utilisation or disposal
Mere non use  in our opinion is not included in the word use 
The passage relied on by the learned counsel in Maxwell is as follows Wide Sense given to words The rule of strict construction however whenever invoked comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined
Among them is the rule that the sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature
The paramount object in construing penal as well as other statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning or the more extensive of two meanings when best effectuating the intention
They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymological belongs or is popularly attached to them in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent or to use Sir Edward Coke s words to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy
 But this passage does not warrant the giving of a meaning to a word apart from the context in which it is used
There is no doubt that the legislative intent of the Control Order is that this essential commodity should be utilised in accordance with the conditions contained in the permit but no clause in this Control Order evinces a legislative intent that a mere non user is also prohibited and made punishable
166 The learned counsel referred to London County Council vs Wood1 but we do not derive any assistance from that case
The head note brings out the point decided in that case as follows The Highways and Locomotives Act 1878 provides by section 32 that A country authority may make by laws for granting annual licences to locomotives used within their country
 And by a by law made by the London County Council under that section it was provided that No locomotive shall be used on any highway within the county of London until an annual licence for the use of the same shall have been obtained from the council by the owner thereof Held that a steam roller which was not at the time being employed in road making but was merely passing through the county to a destination outside was being used within the country within the meaning of the section and the by law In the context the word used was with respect properly construed
Collins J held that the object of the Act was evidently to protect the highways and the effect of a steam roller upon the highways may be just the same whether it be engaged in mending the roads or not
In conclusion we hold that it has not been established that the respondent had used the iron acquired by him in contravention of cl 7 of the Control Order
The learned council further urges that the High Court erred in holding that the application cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the conditions appearing in the permit the condition being that the materials acquired against a permit will be used only for the purpose for which it was asked for and has been given He says that the expression the purpose for which it was asked for refers back to the application and the expression has been given refers back to the Order
There is some force in what he urges
We are unable to sustain the finding of the High Court that it is not permissible to refer to the application and the order to find out the purpose for which the iron was obtained
But even if we look at the applications which are in the printed record the purpose mentioned is only construction of a temple in the application dated May 23 1957 and temple and dharamshala in the application dated September 7 1957
These applications do not disclose that the respondent wanted to construct the temple and dharamshala at any particular place
It is urged that the sentence which occurs in both the applications namely that the requirements are not available at Deoria shows that the purpose for which the iron and steel was required was for construction 11897 2 QB 482
167 of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria
This argument is sought to be reinforced by asserting that a District Magistrate was not empowered to recommend applications for iron required for works to be constructed outside the District and therefore it must be held that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria
However no orders showing the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate in respect of this matter has been shown to us and we are unable to conclude from the applications that the purpose was construction of a temple and dharamshala in the district of Deoria alone
Accordingly we hold that the respondent has not contravened cl 7 of the Control Order
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondent obtained permits under the Iron and Steel Control Order 1956 on the representation that he wanted to purchase iron goods for the purpose of building a temple and a dharamshala
The permits were obtained from the authorities of District Deoria in UP
At the back of the permit a condition was printed tematerials required against the permit will be used only that hq for the purpose for which it was asked for and has been given
The respondent was tried for the contravention of cl  of the aforesaid order on the allegation that he had not used the goods purchased under the permits for the purpose for which they were issued
The trial Magistrate found him guilty
In appeal however the Sessions Judge acquitted him on the ground that the possibility of his retaining the iron at some other place was not entirely excluded
The High Court in appeal by the State confirmed the acquittal holding that it had not been proved that the respondent had used the iron which he had obtained on the basis of the permit
The High court further held that it was not possible to look into the application in order to see for what purpose the applicant took the permit and no condition actually printed at the back of the permit had been broken
By special leave the State appealed to the Supreme Court On behalf of the appellant it was urged 1 the word use in cl 7 of the order includes kept for eventual use for another purpose 2 The High Court erred in holding that the application cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the conditions appearing in the permit
HELD The respondent could not be held guilty of a contravention of cl 7 of the order
i No doubt the legislative intent of the Iron  Steel Control Order is that this essential commodity should be utilised in accordance with the conditions contained in the permit but no clause in the Control Order in question evinces a legislative intent that a mere non user is also prohibited and made punishable
165 H The word use  must take its colour from the context in which is used
In cl  the expression use in accordance with the conditions contained suggests something done positively eg utilisation or disposal
Mere non use is not included in the word use
165 D ii The High Court was wrong in holding that it is not permissible to look at the application to determine the purpose for which permit is obtained
However in the present case the applications did not disclose that the respondent wanted to build a temple or dharamshala at any particular place
From the mere fact that the applications were made to the authorities in Deoria District or the fact that in the applications it was mentioned that the goods were not available in Deoria District it did not necessarily follow that the goods were intended to be used in that District
166 H 162