ivil Appeal No 1360 of 1974
From the judgment and Order dated 14121973 of the Delhi High Court in suit No 64 of 1969
Ms Suruchi Agarwal and TVSN Chari for the Appellants
HK Puri and Mrs Urmila Sirur for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR ASANANDJ
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 14121973 in Suit No 6469 delivered in a reference made by a learned Single Judge for opinion of the Full Bench
The questions referred by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench revolved around the scope and effect of the provisions of Sections 54 and 59B of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 hereinafter referred to as the 1922 Act  and Sections 137 and 138 of the Income Tax Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the 1961 Act  as amended from time to time in 1964 and 1967 in the context of the claim of privilege by the Income Tax Department for the production of the 551 documents relating to assessment of an assessee summoned by the Civil Court
The following three questions were referred to and considered by the Full Bench 1
What is the position of law relating to privilege prior to 1964 2
What is the position of law relating to privilege after 1964  and 3
What is the effect of the production of certified copies relating to income tax assessment records and how far certified copies can be admitted in evidence  The circumstances under which these questions arose briefly put are as follows 2
The plaintiff Trilok Chand Jain instituted a suit for recovery of Rs 13972286 against the defendants Ms Dagi Ram Pindi Lal and Smt
Budh Wanti Gulati wo Shri Pindi Lal Gulati the appellants herein
During the course of proceedings in the suit when evidence was being recorded the plaintiff obtained summons from the court requiring the Income Tax Department to produce in the court records relating to the Income Tax Assessment of the defendants Ms Dagi Ram Pindi Lal for the assessment years 1964 65 to 1971 72
The Income tax officer to whom the summons were issued sent the record in a sealed cover through an Inspector along with a letter dated November 11972 claiming that the said record was privileged under Section 137 of the 1961 Act
The plaintiff also applied for and obtained summons requiring the Income tax Officer to produce the Income tax record relating to Ms Borizeon Industrial Products P Ltd and Bishamber Nath Kaul
That record was also sent by the Income Tax Officer in a sealed cover alongwith a letter in which it was submitted that no disclosure of information regarding income tax pertaining to an income tax assessee could be made
The plaintiffs it appears in the meanwhile filed in the court a number of certified copies of the accounts of the defendants which he had been able to obtain from the income tax authorities and sought permission of the Court to tender the certified copies in evidence
Arguments were addressed by the parties before the learned Single Judge on the question of privilege as claimed by the Income Tax officer
Being of the opinion that the question of privilege as claimed by the Income Tax officer was important and likely to arise in 552 the course of trial of suits in future also a reference was made by the learned Single Judge to the Full Bench
In dealing with the three questions supra referred to it the Full Bench considered different situations
It considered the first question in the following four situations a Where the documents records etc
in respect of which privilege is claimed were filed by an assessee or a third party before April 11962 with effect from which date the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 was repealed in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961 62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income tax Act1922 b Where the documents records etc were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 11962 but before April 11964 in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961 62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income_tax Act1922 c Where the document records etc were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 11962 but before April 11964 in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961 62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income tax Act 1961and d Where the documents records etc were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 11962 but before April 11964 in respect of assessment years 1962 63 and 1963 64 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Income tax Act 1961 and sustained the claim of privilege by the Income Tax Department in each one of the situations
The Full Bench while considering the second question dealt with the following situations a Where the documents records etc
in respect of which privilege is claimed were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1 1964 in respect of assessment years up to and including assessment year 1961 62 in proceedings for the said 553 assessment years taking place under the Indian Income tax Act 1922 b Where the documents records etc
were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1 1964 in respect of assessment years up to and including year 1961 62 in proceedings for the said assessment years taking place under the Indian Income tax Act 1961 c Where the documents records etc were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1 1964 in respect of assessment years 1962 63 and 1963 64 in proceedings for the said assessments years taking place under the Income tax Act 1961 and d Where the documents records etc were filed by an assessee or a third party after April 1 1964 in respect of assessment years 1964 65 onwards
 The claim of privilege was sustained in all above situations also
Dealing with the effect of omission of Section 137 and substitution of section 138 1 a and b the High Court opined  that when a party to a proceeding in a Court applies for summoning any documents records etc
from the income tax authorities the Court may summon the said documents records etc
But on receipt of summons it is open to the Commissioner of Income tax to consider the matter as provided under section 138 1 b and decide whether it would be sic in the public interest to produce or furnish the documents records etc
summoned for and submit his view to the Court in answer to the summons
In case he is satisfied that the production etc
would not be in the public interest his decision is final and the Court to which the said decision is communicated cannot question the same EMPHASIS SUPPLIED The Full Bench however did not express any opinion on the third question
Learned counsel for the appellant has not questioned the findings of the Full Bench in so far as they relate to the claim of privilege in respect 554 of documents filed prior to the repeal of the 1922 Act or before the omission of Section 137 from the 1961 Act
She has questioned the findings of the Full Bench only as regards the power and jurisdiction of the Court to summon the documents after the repeal of the 1922 Act and after the deletion of Section 137 from the 1961 Act by the Finance Act 1964 as also the interpretation placed by the Bench on Section 138 1 b of the Act
The controversy before us has been confined to the finding of the High Court relating to the claim of privilege for the production of documents which were filed after the repeal of Section 137 with effect from 141964 in respect of assessment years 1964 65 onwards
Thus it is the finding on situation d of the second question as rendered by the Full Bench Which alone has been questioned and debated before us
The precise argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that after the repeal of Section 137 of the 1961 Act by Act V of 1964 there is no longer any impediment left in the way of a civil court to summon the production of documents filed by an assessee during the assessment proceedings before an Income tax Officer after 141964 in respect of assessment years 1964 65 onwards and that the finality attached to an order of the Commissioner with regard to claim of privilege under Section 138 1 b has no relationship to the power of the court to summon that record
For a proper appreciation of the question debated before us it would be desirable to refer to the relevant provisions of the 1922 Act and 1961 Act as amended from time to time and notice the changes brought about in the matter of claim of privilege by the Income Tax Department
Section 54 1 and 2 of the 1922 Act provided as follows 54
Disclosure of information by a public servant 1 All particulars contained in any statement made return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act or in any evidence given or affidavit or deposition made in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under this Chapter or in any record of any assessment proceeding or any proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand prepared for the purpose of this Act shall be treated as confidential and notwithstanding 555 anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act 18721 of 1872 no Court shall save as provided in this Act be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return accounts documents or record or any part of any such record or to give evidence before it in respect thereof
2 If a public servant discloses any particulars contained in any such statement return accountsdocuments evidence affidavit deposition or record he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months and shall also be liable to fine
By Section 9 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 1960 Section 59 B was inserted in the 1922 Act with effect from April 1 1960
It provided as under 59 B Disclosure of information regarding tax payable Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form and after payment of the prescribed fee for information as to the amount of tax determined as payable by any assessee in respect of any assessment made on or after the 1st day of April 1960 the Commissioner may notwithstanding anything contained in section 54 if he is satisfied that there are no circumstances justifying its refusal furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for
 Both the aforesaid provisions dealt with the confidential nature of the documents filed before the Income Tax authorities and the claim of privilege to disclose the same to anyone including a court of law
Section 54 1 declared that the various documents referred to therein shall be treated as confidential and prohibited a court from requiring any public servant to produce before it any such document or to give evidence before it in respect thereof notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Sub Section 2 of Section 54 made punishable the disclosure by a public servant of any information contained in those documents
the effect of introduction of Section 59 B by Taxation Laws Amendment Act 1960 was that it entitled a person to make an application to the Commissioner to obtain information thereafter as to the amount of tax determined as payable by an assessee in respect of any assessment made 556 on or before April 1 1960 and authorised the Commissioner to furnish or cause to be furnished the sought for information if he was satisfied that there were no circumstances justifying its refusal
This legal position continued to prevail till April 1 1960 when the 1922 Act was repealed by the 1961 Act
In the 1961 Act  provisions were made corresponding to sections 54 and 59 B of the 1922 Act in Sections 137 and 138
The relevant portions of Sections 137 and 138 of the Act provided as follows 137
Disclosure of information prohibited 1 All particulars contained in any statement made return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of this Act or in any evidence given or affidavit or deposition made in the course of any proceedings under this Act other than proceedings under Chapter XXII or in any record of any assessment proceedings or any proceedings relating to recovery of a demand prepared for the purposes of this Act shall be treated as confidential and notwithstanding anything contained in the  no Court shall save as provided in this Act be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return accounts documents or record or any part of any such record or to give evidence before it in respect thereof
2 No public servant shall disclose any particulars contained in any such statement return accounts documents evidence affidavit deposition or record
3   4   5   138
Disclosure of information respecting tax payable WHERE A person makes an application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form and pays the prescribed fee for information as to the amount of tax determined as payable by an assessee in respect of any assessment made either under this Act or the Indian income tax Act 1922
On or after the 1st day 557 of April 1960 the Commissioner may notwithstanding anything contained in Section 137 if he is satisfied that there are no circumstances justifying its refusal furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for
The provisions of Section 1371 of the 1961 Act were as is seen almost identical to the provisions of sub section 1 of Section 54 of the 1922 Act and Section 137 2 prohibited a public servant from disclosing the particulars contained in any of the documents mentioned in Section 137 1
The provisions of Section 138 of the 1961 Act were almost identical to the provisions of Section 59 B of the 1922 Act
With effect from April 1 1964 Section 137 of the 1961 Act was omitted from the Statute vide Section 32 of the Finance Act No V of 1964 and Section 138 was substituted by a new Section vide Section 33 of the Finance Act No V of 1964
The substituted Section 138 reads as under 138
Disclosure of information respecting assessees 1 Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form for any information relating to any assessee in respect of any assessment made either under this Act or the Indian Income tax Act 1922 on or after the 1st day of April 1960 the Commissioner may if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for in respect of that assessment only and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court of law
2 Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section 1 or any other law for the time being in force the Central Government may having regard to the practices and usages customary or any other relevant factors by order notified in the Official Gazette direct that no information or document shall be furnished or produced by a public servant in respect of such matters relating to such class of assessees or except to such authorities as may be specified in the order
The scope of Section 138 of the 1961 Act was as can be seen enlarged by the substituted provisions of Section 138
Under the original 558 Section 138 a person could make an application for information only as to the amount of tax determined as payable by an assessee under sub section 1 of the substituted Section 138 a person could make an application for any information relating to an assessment
Again under the original Section 138 before the necessary information could be furnished or cause to be furnished to an applicant the Commissioner was to be satisfied that there were no circumstances justifying refusal to furnish the information asked for under sub Section 1 of the substituted Section 138 the Commissioner was required to be satisfied that it was in the public interest to furnish the information asked for and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law Vide sub Section 2 of the substituted Section 138 the Central Government was also empowered to direct by an order notified in the Official Gazette that no information or document shall be furnished or produced by a public servant in respect of such matters relating to such class of assessees or except to such authorities as may be specified in the order
10 The substituted Section 138 was once again amended and substituted vide Section 28 of the Finance Act 1967 with effect from April 1 1967
The new sub section 1 of section 138 reads as follows 1a The Board or any other income tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in this behalf may furnish or cause to be furnished to i any officer authority or body performing any functions under any law relating to the imposition of any tax duty of cess or to dealings in foreign exchange as defined in section 2d of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 or iisuch officer authority or body performing functions under any other law as the Central Government may if in its opinion it is necessary so to do in the public interest specify by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf any such information relating to any assessee in respect of any assessment made under this Act or the Indian income tax Act 1922 as may in the opinion of the Board or other Income tax authority be necessary for the purpose of enabling the officer authority or body to perform his or its functions under that law
559 b Where a person makes an application to the Commissioner in the prescribed form for any information relating to any assessee in respect of any assessment made under this Act or the Indian Income tax Act 1922 on or after the 1st day of April 1960 the Commissioner may if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for in respect of that assessment only and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law
 The provisions of sub Section 1 of Section 138 as they originally stood were incorporated in clause b of the substituted sub Section 1 and a new provision was incorporated in clause a of sub Section 1 which empowered the Board or any other income tax authority specified by it by a general or special order in that behalf to furnish or cause to be furnished information relating to any assessee to such officer authority or body as is mentioned in the provision to enable him or it to perform its functions under the Act
Vide clause bof the substituted sub Section 1 of Section 138 finality has also been attached to an order of the Commissioner made on an application filed by any person seeking information relating to an assessee in respect of any assessment
The Commissioner has to make an order after being satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do to furnish or cause to be furnished such information and that decision of the Commissioner is immune from challenge in any court of law
The controversy as already noticed before us is limited to the jurisdiction or lack of it of a civil court to seek production of documents relating to assessments filed after April 1 1964 in assessment proceedings 1964 65 onwards after the omission of Section 137 of the Act
The Full Bench in the impugned judgment came to the conclusion that the omission of Section 137 did not make any difference and that the ban on the courts as contained in the repealed Section 137 continued to remain in force by virtue of the provisions of Section 138 1 and after 1967 by Section 138 1b of the Act even in respect of the documents filed in the assessment proceeding after April 1 1964 for assessments relating to the period 1964 65 onwards
The Full Bench also pressed into aid the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to 560 hold that the repeal of Section 137 did not remove the ban on the courts to summon any documents from the income tax authorities even in respect of documents which had been filed before the Income tax authorities after the repeal of Section 137 after April 1 1964
In our opinion the High Court fell in error in coming to that conclusion
It not only ignored the legislative intent manifest in the omission of Section 137 of the 1961 Act after the repeal of the 1922 Act but also ignored the powers of a court under the general law to summon such documents record etc
as is found relevant to a case pending before the court in the absence of any specific prohibition under any law for the time being in force
The High Court assumed that by Section 54 of the 1922 ACt and Section 137 of the 1961 Act the jurisdiction of the courts to call for documents from the income tax authorities had been taken away for all times to come notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922 Act or the omission of Section 137 specifically from the 1961 Act
The High Court appears to have lost sight of the position that under the Code of Civil Procedure the courts of law have always possessed the jurisdiction to call for the production of documents relevant to the case before the court from anybody having custody of those documents
Section 54 of the 1922 Act and after its repeal Section 137 of the 1961 Act had only placed fetters on the exercise of that jurisdiction in respect of the specified documents by the courts notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force
The exercise of the jurisdiction to seek production of documents had thus only been put under a cloud in so far as the record of assessment is concerned
With the repeal of the 1922 Act and omission of Section 137 of the 1961 Act the fetters on the exercise of that jurisdiction were removed with the result that the exercise of the jurisdiction to call for the production of documents relevant to the case pending before the court even from the income tax authorities revived
Neither Section 54 of the 1922 Act nor Section 137 of the 1961 Act had taken away for all times the jurisdiction of the courts to call for the record from the income tax authorities
Those provisions as already noticed had only put the exercise of that jurisdiction under a cloud and those fetters were coterminous with the life of Section 54 of the 1922 Act or Section 137 of the 1961 Act
The finality which has been attached to the order if the Commissioner under Section 138 1 b of the Act is applicable only in cases where application is made to the Commissioner by a party or any other person 561 for receiving documents or information
It has nothing to do with the powers of the courts to summon the production of assessment record of an assessee filed after 141964
The Privilege as to secrecy which the assessee had acquired under Section 54 of the 1922 Act remained unimpaired by the repeal of that Act or even by the omission of Section 137 of the 1951 Act in respect of record filed prior to 141964 and relating to the assessments prior to that date
That privilege did not extend after April 1 1964 to record filed before the income tax authorities for the assessment years 1964 65 onwards
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as well as Section 138 1 b of the 1961 Act cannot extend the ban on the exercise of the jurisdiction by the courts to summon the production of documents from the income tax authorities after April 1 1964 relating to assessment year 1964 65 in respect of the record filed after April 1 1964
Section 6 C of the on which reliance was placed by the HIgh Court reads as under 6
Where this ACt or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not    c affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired or incurred under any enactment so repealed
 A plain reading of the Section shows that the repeal of any enactment unless a different intention appears shall not affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment
In respect of the documents filed after the repeal of Section 137 of the 1961 Act with effect from April 1 1964 relating to assessments for the period 1964 65 onwards no right privilege obligation or liability can be said to have been acquired accrued or incurred prior to the omission of section 137 of the Act
Therefore the ban contained in Section 137 of the 1961 Act on the exercise of the powers of a civil court to call for production of documents etc
could not be said to have continued to exist in matters arising subsequent to the omission of that Section with effect from April 1 1964 and that ban came to an end in respect of the period after April 1 1964
The general principle is that an enactment which is repealed is to be treated except as to transactions past and closed as if it had never existed
The assessee had acquired no right or 562 privilege under the repealed Act since the provision is only a procedural restriction and did not create any substantive right on the assessee in respect of assessments for the period after the omission of Section 137 of the 1961 Act
Thus reliance placed on the provisions of Section 6 of the to hold the continuation of the ban on the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts was misplaced
Dealing with the scope of Section 138 1 b of the Act the High Court held that the said provisions attached a finality to an order of the Income Tax Commissioner and applied to the cases where the record was summoned even by a court of law
The High Court opined The complete omission of the declaration of the confidential nature of the documents records etc
and the removal of the ban on courts and public servants no doubt suggests that the power of a court under the general law to summon such documents recordsetc
relevant to the case before it has been restored
But at the same time the legislature which empowered the Commissioner of Income tax to furnish the information if he is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do made the decision of the Commissioner final and un questionable in a Court of law
When two powers are thus vested in two legal authorities neither of them can be ignored and both of them have to be reconciled and given effect to 
In the case of the two powers under consideration it has to be noted that the power to summon which vests in a court is under the general law while the power of the Commissioner has been conferred upon him by a special law and has therefore to prevail over the former
In view of the same it has to be held that while it is open to a court to summon the documents records etc
from the Income tax Commissioner it is equally open to the Commissioner on receiving the summons to consider whether the productionfurnishing of the documents records etc
would be in the public interest and submit the same to the court in answer to the summons
 We are unable to subscribe to the above view
Clause b of sub Section 1 of Section 138 is limited in its scope and application
Under it any person can make an application to the 563 Commissioner for any information relating to an assessee in respect of any assessment made either under the 1922 Act or under the 1961 Act on or after the 1st April 1960 and the Commissioner of Income Tax has the authority to furnish or cause to be furnished the information asked for on being satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do and such an order of the Commissioner is final and cannot be called in question in any court of law
The Commissioner of Income Tax under this clause performs only an administrative function on his subjective satisfaction as to whether it is in the public interest to furnish the information or not to any person seeking such information and his decision in that behalf is final and the aggrieved person cannot question it in a court of law
By enacting this provision the legislature could not be said to have intended that the Commissioner of Income Tax would have the authority to sit in judgment over the requisition made by a court of law requiring the production of record of assessment relating to an assessee in a case pending before the court
When a court of law in any matter pending before it desires the production of record relating to any assessment after applying its judicial mind and hearing the parties and on being prima facie satisfied that the record required to be summoned is relevant for the decision of the controversy before it it passes a judicial order summoning the production of that record from the party having possession of the record
The Commissioner of Income Tax cannot therefore refuse to send the record as he certainly is not authorised to set at naught a judicial order of a court of law
He must obey the order of the court by sending the record to the court concerned indeed it is open to the Commissioner of Income Tax to claim privilege in respect of any document or record so summoned by a court of law under Sections 123 and 124 of the and even then it is for the court to decide whether or not to grant that privilege
Had the legislature intended that no document from the assessment record of an assessee should be produced in a court on being summoned by it without the approval of the Commissioner of Income Tax it would have said so in Section 138 of the Act itself
The repeal of Section 137 of the Act clearly discloses the legislative intent that it was felt by the legislature that it was no more necessary to keep the records of assessment by the Income Tax Department relating to an assessee as confidential from the courts and the bar with regard to the production of any part of the record was removed in so far as the courts are concerned
The finality which has 564 been attached to the order of the Commissioner under Section 1381b of the Act is thus restricted to the cases where the information etc
as contemplated by the Section is called for by any person other than a court of law by a judicial order
The High Court therefore fell in error in holding that the assessment records of an assessee filed before the income tax authorities even after April 1 1964 are immune from production in a court of law on summons for their production being issued by the court and that the disclosure of any information from the record even to the courts is subject to the veto powers of the Commissioner of Income Tax
Section 1381b does not affect the powers of the courts to require the production of assessment records or the disclosure of any information therefrom to it in a case pending before the court when the court by a judicial order requires the production of the record considered relevant by it for decision of a case pending before it
As a result of the above discussion we therefore find that the answer given by the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment to situation d of the second question supra as formulated by it is erroneous and we set it aside
Consequently we hold that after the repeal of Section 137 of the Act there is no longer any impediment left in the way of a court to summon the production of documents filed by an assessee before the income tax authorities after April 1 1964 relating to assessment proceedings for 1964 65 onwards and that the finality attached to an order of the Commissioner under Section 1381b has no relevance to the exercise of powers by a court to summon the production of documents in a case pending before the Court
Since the challenge before us had been confined to the answer given by the High Court to situation d of the second question as formulated by it and no other finding of the High Court was called in question we have refrained from expressing any opinion on the other findings recorded by the Full Bench of the High Court
The appeal consequently succeeds to the extent indicated above and is allowed
We however make no order as to costs
VPR Appeal allowed


Summary:
The deceased along with his father and brother was living in the house owned by the accused appellant s father
There was dispute between the accused and the complainant party regarding a piece of land which according to the accused the complainant party was forcibly occupying
On May 11 1969 at about 245 pm appellant s father had an altercation with deceased s brother
Thereafter he went to deceased s house and abused the complainant party and started dismantling the tin shed on the disputed land
The prosecution s case was that the deceased s brother was sent to police station to lodge a report
The deceased came at the spot and gave a push to appellant s father
He fell down
Getting up immediately shouted for appellant and asked him to bring the rifle and kill the complainant party
The appellant brought a gun and fired a shot hitting the deceased
The appellant fired the second shot which hit another
The deceased fell down and thereafter the deceased s father took out a lathi and gave beating to appellant s father
The deceased succumbed to the gunshot injury
Appellant was charged under Section 302 307 451 IPC and also under section 25 A of Arms Act
The father of appellant was charged under sections 109302 451 IPC and 29 of the Arms Act
The appellant and its father denied the commission of the 467 crime
Appellant s plea of alibi was rejected by the trial court
It also did not believe the prosecution case in toto
The appellant s father was acquitted of all the charges by the trial court
It convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life but he was acquitted of the other charges
The High Court allowed the State s appeal convicting the appellant under section 307 IPC and section 25 A Arms Act also
He was sentenced to five years and one year rigorous imprisonment respectively for the offences
The appellant filed this appeal before this Court by way of special leave
On the question whether on the facts of the case the appellant accused can claim right of private defence allowing the appeal this Court HELD1
It is established on the record that the appellant s father was being given lathi blows by the complainant party and it was at that time that gun shot was fired by the appellant to save his father from further blows
A lathi is capable of causing a simple as well as a fatal injury
Whether in fact the injuries actually caused were simple or grievous is of no consequence
It is the scenario of a father being given lathi blows which has to be kept in mind
In such a situation a son could reasonably apprehend danger to the life of his father and his firing a gun shot at that point of time in defence of his father is justified
The appellant fired the gun shot to defend the person of his father
470 E G 2
Using the licensed gun of his father under the circumstances of the case cannot be considered possessing an arm without a licence
The High Court grossly erred in setting aside the acquittal of the appellant under section 25 A of the Arms Act
471 A B