Appeal No 2313 of 1966
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 13 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No 853 of 1966
MC Setalvad D Narasaraju Anwar Ullah Pasha R V Pillai and M M Kashatriya for the appellant
Niren De Addl
Solicitor General P Ram Reddy section Ramachandra Reddy and T VR Tatachari for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidyalingam J
This appeal by special leave granted by this Court is directed against the order dated October 13 1966 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing Writ Petition No 853 of 1966 filed by the appellant under article 226 of the Constitution
The appellant filed the said writ petition under the following circumstances
The appellant was the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University having been appointed as such by order dated April 30
1964 passed by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh in 216 his capacity as Chancellor of the said University
The appointment of the appellant under the said order as Vice Chancellor there is no controversy was for a term of five years from the date of taking charge and the appointment itself was made under sub section
1 of section 12 of the Osmania University Act 1959 Andhra Pradesh Act No IX of 1959
There is again no controversy that the appellant took charge as Vice Chancellor in terms of the said order on April 30 1964 and as such he became entitled to hold office for the full period of five years which will expire at the end of April 1969
The Osmania University was established in 1918 and the ad ministration of the University was then governed by a Charter of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad promulgated in 1947
With effect from November 1 1956 the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist and the Telengana region of that State became part of Andhra Pradesh
In 1959 the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University Act 1959 earlier referred to
That Act itself was one to amend and consolidate the law relating to the Osmania University
It is only necessary to note at this stage that under section 121 of the said Act it was provided that the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a Committee as constituted under sub section
2 but if the Chancellor does not approve any of the persons so selected he may call for a fresh panel from the Committee
Section 13 again provided for the term of office salary and allowances etc
 of the Vice Chancellor
Under sub section
1 the term of office of the Vice Chancellor was fixed for a term of five years and there was also a further provision to the effect that he shall be eligible for reappointment
By section 51 of the said Act the Osmania University Revised Charter of 1947 was repealed but nevertheless it was provided that the person holding office immediately before the commencement of the Act as Vice Chancellor was to be the Vice Chancellor on such commencement of the Act and was to continue to hold the said office in circumstances mentioned therein
There is again no controversy that the appellant who was already the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University from 1957 was again appointed in 1959 as Vice Chancellor for a period of five years under this Act and he was similarly appointed for a further term of five years on April 30 1964 as Vice Chancellor as mentioned earlier
During the middle of 1965 certain amendments were sought to be introduced in the Act by providing for removal of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor from office under certain circumstances
There was also a proposal to reduce the term of office of the Vice Chancellor from 5 years to 3 years from the date of his appointment and for provisions being made 217 enabling the Government to give directions to the University relating to matters of policy to be followed by it
The amendments sought to be introduced in the Act appear to have come in for considerable criticism from several quarters and these have been elaborately dealt with in the order under attack
According to the appellant he was one of those who very strenuously opposed the proposed amendments on the ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government
According to the appellant again the various criticisms made by him and others were taken note of by the Inter University Board by the Education Minister of the Union and others
It is the further case of the appellant that it was felt by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that he was responsible for the agitation that was being made against the proposed amendments
But ultimately the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University Amendment Act 1966 Act 11 of 1966 amending the Osmania University Act of 1959 in certain particulars
The said amendments are to the effect that the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from office except as provided for in section 122 of the amended Act
The term of office was also fixed at 3 years under the amended section 13
Another provision relating to the power of Government to give instructions to the University was also introduced as section 7A but the appellant continued as Vice Chancellor
The Osmania University Act was again amended by the Osmania University Second Amendment Act 1966 Act XI of 1966
Under this amendment section 13A was enacted
In brief that section was to the effect that the person holding the office of the ViceChancellor immediately before the commencement of the amending Act of 1966 was to hold office only until a new Vice Chancellor was appointed under sub section
1 of section 12 and it also provided that such appointment shall be made within 90 days after such commencement
There was a further provision that on the appointment of such new Vice Chancellor and on his entering upon his office the person holding the office of Vice Chancellor immediately before such appointment shall cease to hold that office
Section 7 A which had been introduced by Act II of 1966 was deleted
Section 33 A was enacted making special provision as to the re constitution of the Senate Syndicate Academic Council and Finance Committee of the University
The appellant filed Writ Petition No 853 of 1966 in the High Court praying for the issue of a writ or order declaring section 5 of the Osmania University Second Amendment Act
1966 which introduced section 13A in the original Act as unconstitutional and void
In that writ petition he challenged the validity of the new Section section 13A on several grounds
In brief his plea was that by virtue 218 of his appointment as Vice Chancellor for 5 years on April 30 1964 he had acquired a vested right to hold that office for the full term and that such a vested right could not be taken away during the currency of the period by any legislative enactment
The legislature had no competence to enact the said provision inasmuch as section 13A could not be treated as legislation in respect of University education
The appellant had also pleaded that the provision virtually amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without giving him any opportunity to show cause against such removal
According to the appellant even assuming the Legislature was competent to enact the provision in question nevertheless section 13A is unconstitutional and void inasmuch as it offends article 14 of the Constitution
We do not think it necessary to advert elaborately to the various other grounds of attack levelled against the constitutional validity of the provision in question which have no doubt been dealt with by the High Court because for the purpose of disposing of this appeal in our opinion it is enough to refer to the grounds of attack taken by the appellant regarding the constitutionality of section 13A based upon article 14 of the Constitution
So far as this aspect is concerned according to the appellant section 9 of Act 11 of 1966 amended the Act of 1959 by incorporating new sub sections
1 and 2 in section 12
Under sub section
1 of section 12 the ViceChancellor is to be appointed by the Chancellor
Under sub section
2 the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis behaviour or incapacity and it also provided for such an order being passed only after due enquiry by a person who Is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor being given an opportunity of making his representation against the removal
Therefore in view of these provisions the Vice Chancellor could not be removed by the Chancellor without any cause without reason without enquiry and without an opportunity being given to him to show cause against removal
This provision applied to the appellant who was in office on the date of the passing of Act 11 of 1966 as well as Act XI of 1966
Nevertheless section 5 of Act XI of 1966 incorporated s13A in the principal Act
Under that section not only has power been conferred on the Chancellor but also a duty imposed so to say on him to remove the appellant who was the Vice Chancellor without any reason or justification or even giving an opportunity to him to show cause against such removal
No enquiry before ordering such removal is contemplated under this section
Further while a Vice Chancellor who is appointed after the passing of Act XI of 1966 cannot be removed from office except in accordance with the provisions of sub section
2 of section 12 the appellant who was already in office could be arbitrarily and 219 illegally removed under section 13A of the Act
There is no provi sion again similar to section 13A applicable to a Vice Chancellor appointed after the coming into force of the amending Act
Therefore according to the appellant the provisions contained in section 13A are clearly directed only against him as he was the person holding office prior to the amending Act and therefore it is a clear case of hostile discrimination
Further according to the appellant persons appointed as Vice Chancellors constitute a group and must be considered as persons similarly situated and they must be treated alike whereas by virtue of section 13A a differentiation is made between the appellant who was a Vice Chancellor on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act and other persons who are to be appointed as Vice Chancellors thereafter
This differentiation according to the appellant is again without any basis nor has such a classification any reasonable relation to the main object of the legislation
The appellant also relied on section 33A introduced by section 6 of Act XI of 1966 relating to the reconstitution of the Senate Syndicate Academic Council and the Finance Committee and pleaded that whereas those academic bodies or authorities were allowed to continue without any time limit and to function until they were reconstituted regarding the Vice Chancellor alone a period of 90 days had been fixed under the Amending Act within which the Chancellor was bound to appoint another Vice Chancellor
This again is a clear proof of discrimination against the appellant
The respondents controverted the stand taken on behalf of the appellant
Apart from supporting the competency of the Legislature to enact the measure in question they urge that article 14 of the Constitution has no application at all
According to the respondents inasmuch as the term of office of the Vice Chancellor had been reduced to three years as per Act 11 of 1966 it was thought fit by the Legislature to provide for the termination of the office of the Vice Chancellor who was holding that post at the commencement of Act XI of 1966 as also for the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor
It was under those circumstances that section 13A was incorporated in the Act of 1959 by section 5 of Act XI of 1966
They also referred to similar provisions which were incorporated in the two enactments relating to the two other Universities in the State viz the Andhra University and Sri Venkateswara University
The respondents further pleaded that Act 11 of 1966 placed the Vice Chancellor who was already appointed and who was functioning prior to that Act in the first category as a class apart from the Vice Chancellors who were to be subsequently appointed and who were to function after the passing of the said Amending Act in the second category both in the matter of the mode of appointment as well as the term of appointment
The Vice Chancellor 220 viz the appellant who was in office on the date of the passing of Act XI of 1966 according to the respondents therefore fell into a class all by himself and as such came under a third category and the legislature thought fit to take into account the special features relating to him and therefore made separate provisions regarding the termination of his office
Therefore a suitable provision was made by enacting section 13A in respect of the existing Vice Chancellor who was treated as a class by himself
The respondents also claimed that the Legislature was entitled to treat the Vice Chancellor who was then in office as a class by himself and make suitable provisions with regard to the termination of his office and therefore a legislation made for that purpose and on that basis was constitutionally valid
The charge of hostility towards the appellant or any attempt to effect discrimination was stoutly denied by the respondents
The respondents there fore urged that the classification of the appellant as a separate class was proper and such a classification had a reasonable nexus with the object of the amending legislation
The respondents further pleaded that the curtailment of the term of office of an existing Vice Chancellor by a statute enacted by a competent Legislature does not amount to removal  of the Vice Chancellor for sufficient and proved cause
The respondents also  urged that academic bodies or authorities like the Senate Syndicate and the Academic Council are not similarly situated like the Vice Chancellor either in the matter of appointment or constitution or in exercising functions under the statute and therefore the appellant according to them was not entitled to place any reliance
on section 33A introduced by section 7 of Act XI of 1966
For all these reasons they urged that article 14 of the Constitution was not violated by the Legislature in enacting section 13A
Before we refer to the findings recorded by the learned Judges of the High Court this will be a convenient stage to refer to the material provisions of the statutes concerned
We have already mentioned that the appellant was functioning as the Vice Chancellor of the Osmania University even from 1957 ie even before the Osmania University Act 1959 was passed
We have also indicated that the administration of the University was then governed by a Charter promulgated in 1947
The Osmania University Act 1959 Act IX of 1959 hereinafter called the Act was passed in 1959 and published in the State Gazette on February 2 1959
Section 3 of the Act provided that the University established by the Revised Charter promulgated by HEH the Nizam of Hyderabad on December 8 1947 and functioning at Hyderabad immediately before the commencement of the Act be reconstituted and declared to be a University by the name of Osmania University 
The said section also provided that the University would be a 221 residential teaching and affiliating University consisting of a Chancellor a Pro Chancellor a Vice Chancellor a Senate a Syndicate and an Academic Council
Section 121 provided for the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a committee as constituted under sub section
2 thereof But if the Chancellor did not approve any of the persons so selected he could call for a fresh panel from the committee
Sub section 2 provided for the constitution of the committee
Section 13 provided for the term of office salary allowances etc
 of the Vice Chancellor
Under sub section
1 the Vice Chancellor was to hold office for a term of 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment
There was a proviso to the effect that the ViceChancellor shall continue to hold office after the expiry of his term of appointment for a period not exceeding six months or until Ms successor is appointed and enters upon his office whichever is earlier
Sub section
6 provided for the filling up of the vacancy in the post of the Vice Chancellor when it fell permanently vacant and a Vice Chancellor so appointed as per sub sections
1 and 2 of section 12 was to hold office for a full term of 5 years
Section 51 I repealed the Osmania University Revised Charter 1947 but sub section
2 provided that notwithstanding such repeal the person holding office immediately before the commencement of the Act as Vice Chancellor shall on such commencement be the Vice Chancellor of the University and he was entitled to hold office until a Vice Chancellor is appointed in accordance with the Act
It will be noticed by the above reference to the material provisions of the Act that there was no provision for removal of a ViceChancellor and that the appointment of a Vice Chancellor was to be by the Chancellor as provided for in section 12
The term of office of the Vice Chancellor was 5 years and he was eligible for reappointment
The appellant who was already a Vice Chancellor functioning under the Charter of 1947 was entitled to continue and did continue as the Vice Chancellor by virtue of section 51 of the Act
He was also as already mentioned originally appointed as ViceChancellor for a period of 5 years under the Act in 1959
The Act was amended in certain particulars by the Osmania University Amendment Act 1966 Act II of 1966 hereinafter called the First Amendment Act
The First Amendment Act received the assent of the Governor on January 29 1966
Section 6 of the First Amendment Act introduced section 7A which we set out 222 7A Instructions by the Government
The Government may after consultation with the University give to the University instructions relating to matters of major educational policy such as pattern of University education medium of instruction and establishment of post graduate centres to be followed by it
2 In the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under this Act the University shall comply with the instructions issued under sub section 1
 Similarly section 9 incorporated new sub sections
1 and 2 in section 12 of the Act as follows 12
1 The Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor
2 The Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and after due inquiry by such person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor in which the Vice Chancellor shall have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal
 Section 10 while effecting certain other amendments to section 13
the Act incorporated a new sub section
1 as follows  13
1 Subject to the provisions of sub section 2 of section 12 the Vice Chancellor shall hold office for a term of three years from the date of his appointment and shall be eligible for re appointment to that office for another term of three years only Provided that the Vice Chancellor shall continue to hold office after the expiry of his term of appointment for a period not exceeding six months or until his successor is appointed and enters upon his office whichever is earlier
 It was this Amendment Act when it was in the Bill stage that appears to have been severely criticised by various authorities on the ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government
In that connection the appellant also appears to have made several statements criticising the provisions sought to be incorporated in the Act
It is also on record that counter statements were made on behalf of the Government meeting these criticisms regarding the proposed amendments
They have been dealt with by the High Court rather elaborately but we do not propose to go into those matters for the purpose of this appeal
223 By virtue of the amendments effected and referred to above it will be seen that the term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced from 5 years to 3 years
The manner of appointment of the Vice Chancellor has also been changed and a provision is contained for removal of the Vice Chancellor from his office but that can be done only in accordance with the provisions contained in section 122 of the Act
Section 7A gives power to the Government to give instructions to the University relating to matters of major educational policy and it is made obligatory on the University to comply with such instructions issued by the Government
As we have already stated the appellant was again appointed as Vice Chancellor for a period of 5 years on April 30 1964 and he was continuing in office when the First Amendment Act was passed
One of the claims that is made by the appellant in these proceedings is that he is entitled to the protection conferred by section 122 of the Act referred to above
There does not appear to be any controversy that any appointment of a Vice Chancellor was made after the passing of the First Amendment Act 
The Act was further amended by the Osmania University Second Amendment Act 1966 Act XI of 1966 to be referred to as the Second Amendment Act
It received the assent of the Governor on May 16 1966
Section 2 of the Second Amendment Act omitted section 7A of the Act
Section 5 of the Second Amendment Act which introduced new section 13A in the Act and which provision is the subject of attack in these proceedings is as follows  13A Special provision as to the appointment of a new Vice Chancellor
Notwithstanding anything in this Act the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before the commencement of the Osmania University Second Amendment Act 1966 shall continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor under sub section 1 of section 12 and enters upon his office and such appointment shall be made within ninety days after such commencement
On the appointment of such new Vice Chancellor and on his entering upon his office the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before such appointment shall cease to hold that office Again section 6 of the Second Amendment Act incorporated section 33A in the Act which is as follows  33A Special provision as to the reconstitution of the Senate Syndicate Academic Council and Finance Com mittee
Notwithstanding anything in this Act the members of the Senate the Syndicate the Academic Council and the Finance Committee constituted and functioning 224 before the commencement of the Osmania University Amendment Act 1966 shall continue to be such members and function only until a new Senate Syndicate Academic Council or Finance Committee as the case may be is reconstituted under this Act
On the reconstitution of such new Senate Syndicate Academic Council or Finance Committee the members of the Senate other than the life members thereof the members of the Syndicate Academic Council or Finance Committee as the case may be holding office immediately before such reconstitution shall cease to hold that office
 Even according to the respondents section 13A was incorporated for the purpose of terminating the services of the appellant as Vice Chancellor so as to enable the Chancellor to make a fresh appointment of a Vice Chancellor
We have referred to section 33A of the Act because the appellant s case was also to the effect that with regard to the Senate Syndicate Academic Council etc
 there is no provision similar to section 13A of the Act though they are also similarly situated like him
The findings of the learned Judges of the
High Court may now be briefly summarised  1
The Andhra Pradesh Legislature was competent to enact section 5 of the Second Amendment Act
The said section does not contravene article 191f of the Constitution
The appellant was holding the office of the ViceChancellor when the Act came into force and continued under section 512 thereof as Vice Chancellor until the Chancellor passed an order in 1959 appointing him once again under the Act
Section 131 as introduced by the First Amendment Act is not retrospective and the right of the appellant to continue as Vice Chancellor for the full term of 5 years stood unaffected and the new section 131 does not apply to him
The new section 122 as introduced by the First Amendment Act is not applicable to the appellant
Sections 122 and 13A of the Act do not cover the same field
Section 122 provides for removal by way of punishment and its operation is on a different field from that of section 13A where the cessation of office is due to a curtailment of the term
Section 122 applies only to the future Vice Chancellors and section 13A is solely applicable to the existing Vice Chancellor the appellant
225 lm0
Regarding the attack on section 13A on the basis of article 14 of the Constitution that there is an unreasonable discrimination the learned Judges were of the view that the said section did not suffer from any such infirmity
The learned Judges held that the impugned legislation had resulted in classifying Vice Chancellors under two categories a the appellant as the existing Vice Chancellor falling under the first category and b future Vice Chancellor to be appointed under the Act who falls under the second category
According to the High Court the object sought to be achieved by such classification as could be seen from the objects and reasons of the Second Amendment Act 1966 was to give effect to the reduced term of 3 years fixed under section 131 of the Act after the First Amendment
The Hi gh Court further held that the classification adopted by section 13A of putting the appellant as the existing ViceChancellor in a class by himself is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appellant from future ViceChancellors and that this differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act
In this connection the learned Judges also advert to the similar provisions enacted at about the same time in the Andhra University Act 1925 and the Sri Venkateswara University Act 1954
The High Court is also of the view that the Legislature must have taken into account the fact that the appellant has already put in more than 6 years of service as Vice Chancellor for treating him as a class by himself as distinct from future Vice Chancellors who are to be appointed and as such have not put in any service at all
The learned Judges have no doubt adverted to the fact that the appellant has got an eventful record of efficient service full of recognition and appreciation but the appellant cannot plead those circumstances when a competent legislature has passed a valid legislative measure under which he has to lose his office
Ultimately on these findings the High Court came to the conclusion that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act introducing section 13A in the Act is not vitiated by any infirmity as alleged by the appellant and finally dismissed the appellant s writ petition
The appellant has again raised no doubt most of the contentions that were taken before the High Court
But the main ground of attack that has been pressed before us by learned counsel for the appellant is the one based upon article 14 of the Constitution
The findings recorded and the views expressed by the High Court are sought to be sustained by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents
But we do not think it necessary to go into the larger controversy that has been raised by the appellant before the High Court in the view that we take that the appellant must succeed in respect of the attack levelled against the impugned 226 provision based upon article 14 of the Constitution
As to whether the criticism made by the appellant about the proposals to amend the Act was or was not responsible for the passing of the legislation in question does not assume much of an importance because the simple question is whether the provision section 13A as it now stands n the Act is violative in any manner of article 14 of the Constitution
If the answer is yes  it is needless to state that the provision will have to be struck down
Therefore we are confining our attention only to the provisions of the Act and we will refer to any other circumstance that is brought to our notice only for the limited purpose of considering the grounds of attack based upon article 14 of the Constitution
According to Mr Setalvad the appellant is entitled to take advantage of the provisions of section 122 of the Act
On the date of the passing of the First Amendment Act the appellant was admittedly a Vice Chancellor and he had been continuing as such
He cannot be removed from his office except in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of the Act
But in view of section 13A of the Act introduced by the Second Amendment Act the appellant is forced out of his office within 90 days of the passing of the Second Amend ment Act
The creation of two classes of Vice Chancellors viz Of Vice Chancellors appointed under the Act and the Vice Chancellor who was in office at the commencement of the Second Amendment Act is not on any rational basis
Person is appointed as ViceChancellors constitute a group and the impugned provision makes a differentiation between the person who is a Vice Chancellor then and other persons who are to be appointed Vice Chancellors thereafter for which differentiation there is absolutely no basis
Further even if it can be stated that there is any basis for the said classification nevertheless there should be a nexus or connection between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation which again is lacking in this case
Mr Setalvad further urged that while the services of a ViceChancellor appointed under the Act could be terminated only in accordance with the provisions contained in section 122 of the Act the appellant s services could be terminated under section 13A without adopting the procedure laid down in section 122 of the Act
There was also no provision in the Act Mr Setalvad pointed out making section 132 applicable to Vice Chancellors to be appointed in future
Though the term of office for a Vice Chancellor has been fixed under the Act even after the amendments as three years and that may apply to all the Vice Chancellors so far as the appellant is concerned his term has been reduced or restricted to 90 days under section 13A of the Act
Mr Setalvad again urges that even assuming that it is open to the Legislature in an appropriate case to make provisions applicable 227 to only one individual or a group of individuals nevertheless it is well established by this Court that the classification that is effected by the statute must be a classification founded on an intelligible differentia and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
Applying these two tests learned counsel urges that the impugned legislation must be
considered to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution
The learned Additional Solicitor General has urged that the term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to three years by the First Amendment Act
The Legislature in order to give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act has enacted section 13A
That section has necessarily to apply only to persons like the appellant who are holding
office at the time when these provisions came into force
Such a provision in the nature of things cannot apply to Vice Chancellors who are to be appointed in future under the Act
Therefore it is wrong to state that all Vice Chancellors
irrespective of the manner  or mode under which they are appointed in present or in future fall under the same category
Further the appellant has been a Vice Chancellor for nearly 7 years
The legislature the learned Solicitor points out having regard to these circumstances has chosen to treat the appellant the Vice Chancellor holding office on the date of the Second Amendment Act as a class by himself and has differentiated him from persons to be appointed ViceChancellor for the first time
Such a classification is reasonable and it has got a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act viz bringing about uniformity in the tenure of three years of office for all Vice Chancellors
The learned Solicitor points out further that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of section 122 of the Act
The Legislature was competent to enact the Measure in question and the object of the Legislature was to give effect to the amendment provisions as early as
possible
He pointed out that similar provisions were also made in two other enactments at about the same time viz in the Andhra University Act 1925 and the Sri Venkateswara University Act 1954
It may be that the Legislature could have adopted another method for replacing the present Vice Chancellor but that is a matter of policy which cannot be reviewed by the Courts so long as the Legislature had the competence to enact the measure and the provisions so enacted do not suffer from any other legal infirmities
We have given due consideration to the various contentions placed before us by Mr Setalvad learned counselfor the appellant and the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents but we are not inclined to agree with the contentions of the learned Additional Solicitor General
228 The principles to be borne in mind when a question arise under article 14 of the Constitution have been laid down in several decisions by this Courton a number of occasions
In Budhan Choudhry vs The State of Bihar1 Das J speaking for the Court said  It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation
In order however to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely i that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and ii that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question
 Therefore it will be seen that in order to accept a classification as permissible and not hit by article 14 the measure in question will have to pass the two tests laid down in the above decision
The observations extracted above have been quoted by Das C J in Ram
Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice section R Tendolkar2
It is no doubt true as pointed out by the learned Additional SolicitorGeneral that a statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or against several individual persons or things
But before such a provision can be accepted as valid the Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis of classification which appears on the face of the statute itself or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge
If no such reasonable basis of classification appears on the face of the statute or is deducible from the surrounding circumstances the law will have to be struck down as an instance of naked discrimination
It should also be borne in mind that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon the party who attacks the same as unconstitutional to Show that there is a clear transgression of the constitutional principles but as observed by Das CJ in Ram Krishna Dalmia s case2 at p 297 while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried 1  1049
2   296 229 to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation
 Having due regard to the principles referred to above we now proceed to consider as to whether the appellant has been able to establish that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act introducing s13A in the Act is discriminatory and as such violative of article 14 of the Constitution
We have already stated that the appellant was appointed under the Act for a further term of 5 years as Vice Chancellor on April 30 1964 and he was continuing in office as such at the time when the two Amending Acts were passed and normally
he would be entitled to continue in that post for the full term which will expire only at the end of April 1969
The First Amendment Act provided in section 12 of the Act that the Vice Chancellor is to be appointed by the Chancellor but section 122 specifically provided that the Vice Chancellor shall not be removed from his office excep t by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity and after due inquiry by such person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor
It was also provided that the ViceChancellor was to have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal
Prima facie the provisions contained in sub section
2 of section 12 must also apply to the appellant who did continue in office even after the passing of the First Amendment Act
No doubt the term of office of the Vice Chancellor was fixed at 3 years under section 131 of the Act
But no provisions were made in the First Amendment Act regarding the termination of the tenure of office of the Vice Chancellor who was then holding that post
There can be no controversy that section 13A introduced by section 5 of the Second Amendment Act deals only with the appellant
In fact the stand taken on behalf of the respondents in the counteraffidavit filed before the High Court was to the effect that the Legislature had chosen to treat the Vice Chancellor holding office at the time of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act as a class by himself and with a view to enable the Chancellor to make fresh appointments section 13A of the Act was enacted
Therefore it is clear that section 13A applies only to the appellant
Though no doubt it has been stated on behalf of the respondents that similar provisions were incorporated at about the same time in two other Acts relating to two other Universities viz the Andhra University and the Sri Venkateswara University and though this circumstance has also been taken into account by the learned Judges of the High Court in our opinion those provisions 230 have no bearing in considering the attack levelled by the appellant on section 13A of the Act
This is a clear case where the statute itself directs its provisions by enacting section 13A against one individual viz the appellant and before it can be sustained as valid this Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances According to learned counsel for the appellant all Vice Chancellors of the Osmania University come under one group and can be classified only as one unit and there is absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under one class and the Vice Chancellors to be appointed in future under a separate class
In any event it is also urged that the said classification has no relation or nexus to the object of the enactment
Our attention has been drawn to the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Second Amendment Bill the material part of which is as follows The term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to three years under section 131 of the Osmania University Act as amended by section 10 of the Osmania University Amendment Act 1966
Section 13 A proposed to be inserted by clause 5 of the Bill enjoins that notwithstanding anything in the Act the person holding the office of the Vice Chancellor immediately before the commencement of the Osmania University Second Amendment Act 1966 shall continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor under section 121 as amended and enters upon his office and such appointment shall be made within ninety days after such commencement
 We are inclined to accept the contention of Mr Setalvad that there is no justification for the impugned legislation resulting in a classification of the Vice Chancellors into two categories viz the appellant as the then existing Vice Chancellor and the future Vice
Chancellors to be appointed under the Act
In our view the Vice Chancellor who is appointed under the Act or the Vice Chancellor who was holding that post on the date of the commencement of the Second Amendment Act form one single group or class
Even assuming that the classification of these two types of persons as coming under two different groups can be made nevertheless it is essential that such a classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes the appel 231 lant from the Vice Chancellor appointed under the Act
We are not able to find any such intelligible differentia on the basis of which the classification can be justified
It is also essential that the classification or differentia effected by the statute must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute
We have gone through the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Second Amendment Bill which became law later as well as the entire Act itself as it now stands
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Second Amendment Bill extracted above it is seen that except stating a fact that the term of office of the Vice Chancellor has been reduced to 3 years under section 131 and that s13A was intended to be enacted no other policy his indicated which will justify the differentiation
The term of office fixing the period of three years for the Vice Chancellor has been already effected by the First Amendment Act and therefore the differential principle adopted for terminating the services of the appellant by enacting section 13A of the Act cannot be considered to be justified
In other words the differentia adopted in section 13A and directed as against the appellant and the appellant alone not be considered to have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Second Amendment Act
While a Vice Chancellor appointed under section 12 of the Act can be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under section 122 the services of the appellant who was also a Vice
Chancellor and similarly situated is sought to be terminated by enacting section 13A of the Act
We do not see any policy underlying the Act justifying this differential treatment accorded to the appellant
The term of office of the Vice Chancellors has been no doubt reduced under the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice Chancellors
But so far as the appellant is concerned by virtue of section 13A of the Act he can continue to hold that office only until a new Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor and that appointment is to be made within 90 days
While all other Vice Chancellors appointed under the Act can continue to be in office for a period of three years the appellant is literally forced out of his office on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Second Amendment Act
There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the ViceChancellors who are appointed under the Act in the manner provided under section 13A of the Act
By section 13A the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under the proviso to sub section
1 of section 13 of the Act which benefit is available to all other ViceChancellors
The appointment of the appellant in 1959 and again in 1964 under section 121 of the Act as it stood prior to the two amendments by the Chancellor must have been no doubt from a panel of 232 names submitted by a committee constituted under section 122
The appointment of a Vice Chancellor after the passing of the First Amendment Act is to be made exclusively by the Chancellor under section 121 as the section now stands
That is a circumstance relied on by the respondent for differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice Chancellor from a Vice Chancellor to be appointed under the Act as amended
Another circumstance relied on is that the appellant has been a Vice Chancellor for 7 years
In our opinion these are not such vital or crucial factors which will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself because the powers and duties of a Vice Chancellor either under the Act prior to the amendment or under the Act after amendment continue to be the same
To conclude the classification of the appellant as a class by himself is not founded on any intelligible differentia which distinguishes him from other Vice Chancellors and it has no rational relation to the object of the statute and so section 13A is hit by article 14
The appellant has attacked section 13A as discriminatory relying upon a different provision made under section 33A in respect of the Senate Syndicate Academic Council and the Finance Committee
We have however not considered the question as to whether the appellant can be treated as falling under the same class as the other authorities mentioned in section 33A as we have accepted the appellant s contention based upon article 14 on other grounds
For the above reasons we accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant and hold that section 5 of the Second Amendment Act Act XI of 1966 introducing section 13A in the Act is discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution and as such has to be struck down as unconstitutional
The result is that the appeal is allowed and the appellant will be entitled to his costs in the appeal payable by the respondents here and in the High Court
RKPS Appeal allowed
M19Sup
CI66 2500 18 7 67 GIPF


Summary:
As a result of the Osmania University Amendment Act 11 of 1966 section 121 of the Osmania University Act 1959 was amended to provide for the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor alone in section 122 a provision was introduced whereby he could only be removed from office by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of mis behaviour or incapacity after enquiry by a person who was or had been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court and after the Vice Chancellor had been given an opportunity of making his representation against such removal Section 131 of the 1959 Act was also amended so as to reduce the term of office of the Vice Chancellor from 5 to 3 years
The 1959 Act was again amended later in 1966 by the Osmania University Second Amendment Act XI of 1966
Section 5 of this amending Act introduced a new section 13A into the 1959 Act whereby it was provided that the person then holding the office of Vice Chancellor could only hold that office until a new Vice Chancellor was appointed and that such new appointment must be made within 90 days of the commencement of the Act whereupon the old Vice Chancellor would cease to hold office
The appellant filed a writ petition claiming inter alia that section 5 of the second amending Act introducing the new section 13A was discriminatory as against him and therefore violative of article 14
The High Court dismissed the petition
In the appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the respondents that as the term of office had been reduced to 3 years by the first amending Act the legislature
 in order to give effect to this provision and to enable fresh appointments to be made under the Act had enacted section 13A which had necessarily to apply to a person like the appellant who was in office at the time when the provisions came into force
Such provisions could not in the nature of things apply to Vice Chancellors who were to be appointed in future the appellant was appointed from a panel submitted by a committee constituted under the unamended section 122 whereas future Vice Chancellors were to be appointed by the Chancellor alone furthermore the appellant had been the Vice Cancellor for 7 years
Having regard to these circumstances the legislature had chosen to treat the appellant as a class by himself and had differentiated him from persons to be appointed Vice Chancellors in the 215 future that such classification was reasonable and had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the second amending Act ie bringing about uniformity in the tenure of 3 years
of office fee all Vice Chancellor that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of section 122 and the legislature was competent to enact section 13A so as to give effect to the amended provisions as early as possible
HELD Section 5 of the second amending Act XI of 1966 introducing s 13A into the 1959 Act was discriminatory and therefore violative of article 14
232 E There was no intelligible differentia on the basis of which a classification of Vice Chancellors into two categories ie the appellant as the then existing Vice Chancellor and the future Vice Chancellors to be appointed under the Act could be justified
The term of office of three years for the Vice Chancellor had already been fixed by the first amending Act Therefore the differential principal adopted for terminating the appellant s service under section 13A in introduced by the second amending Act and directed as against the appellant alone could not be considered to have a rational relation to object sought to be achieved by the second amending Act
Budhan Choudhary vs The State of Bihar1955 1 SCR1045 1049 Ram Krishna Dalmia vs
Shri Justice SR Tendolkar   296 referred to
231 B D While a Vice Chancellor appointed under section 12 could be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under section 122 the services of the appellant who was also a Vice Chancellor and similarly situated were sought to terminated by enacting section 13A of the Act
There was no policy underelying the Act justifying this differential treatment
There was also no justification for the distinction whereby the appellant would appointed under the Act would continue in office for three years 231E G