Appeals Nos
1186 1188 of 1972
Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order fated 12 1315th October 1971 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application Nos 555 556 of 1967 and 72 of 1968
K section Cooper M K Shah P H Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare for the appellants
B N Lokur Rameshwar Nath for respondent No 1
Subodh Markendeya for Respondent No 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA J
Whether the principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of a premises under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 for short the Act if so whether on the facts of the case the principle has been rightly invoked is the two fold question that falls for decision in these three appeals by special leave directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
The material facts are as under A big compound measuring 11150 sq
yards at 156 Tardeo Road Bombay belonged to Raja Bahadur Moti Lal Mills Ltd Bombay appellant No1
The Mills were shifted from these premises in the year 1930
In 1932 the whole of this estate including the structures standing on
a part of it was let out to Sound Studios Ltd Between the years 1932 and 1940 some part of it was sub let by Sound Studios to Sheraj Ali who was the proprietor of Ms Famous 579 Cine Laboratory and another part to Neon Signs India Ltd and the rest of the estate continued to be with Sound Studios
Thereafter Sound Studios went out of the picture and the whole estate was let out to National Studios Ltd on October 23 1940 at a monthly rent of Rs 1700 for a period of two years
In July 1941 National Studios surrendered their lease and Sheraj Ali became a direct tenant under appellant 1 in respect of the premises in his possession called for the sake of identification 9831 whole and 9832 Ground floor
On December 1 1941 and again in November 1942 Sheraj Ali took on rent additional portions of this estate so that his original rent which was Rs 400  was first increased to Rs 600and then to Rs 700 and thereafter in November 1942 to Rs 875 
By November 1947 Sheraj Ali was paying Rs 1200 per month as rent for the premises demised to him including some new structures which had been built
Sheraj Ali had taken a loan from Ms Govind Ram Bros Ltd Respondent 1 on the security of his Film Studio Equipments
He failed to repay the loan
Thereupon Respondent 1 instituted a suit for recovery of the amount and obtained a decree from the High Court
on February 271948
As a result of the High Court s decree the right title and interest of Sheraj Ali in the mortgaged property were assigned to Respondent 1
Respondent 1 in consequence took a fresh lease on March 191948 from appellant No 1 of the properties called for identification 9831 to 98312 which were in the tenancy of Sheraj Ali  at a contractual rent of Rs 1228 pm
On the same date Respondent 1 executed another lease in respect of three rooms in the same premises marked for identification as 984 in favour of appellant 1 on a monthly rent of Rs 750 Respondent 1 failed to pay the contractual rent regularly which fell into arrears which were not cleared despite the pressing demands made by the Receiver
On March 13 1954 the Receiver wrote to Respondent 1 threatening to take legal proceedings for the recovery of the rent
This Receiver who is now appellant No 2 had been appointed by the High Court in Suit No 454 of 1949 instituted by appellant 1 against the Insurance Company On April 14 1954 two applications were filed in the Court of Small Causes by Respondent 1 for fixation of standard rent in respect of the premises comprised in the said two leases one application RAN 98354 relates to properties 9831 to 98312 and the other RAN 984 to premises 984
It was alleged in the applications that since on September 1 1940 the entire estate including the properties in question
had been let out on a monthly rent of Rs 1700  standard rent of the premises it question should be fixed on the basis of apportionment In particular it was pleaded that fair rent of Rs 9831 to 98312 should be 18th of Rs 1200 which was later corrected as 1700 
On the same basis it was alleged in the second application that fair rent of premises 984 should be Rs 75 p m 580 The appellants resisted these applications and averred in R A N 98354 that several entirely new structures had been built and substantial alterations made in most of these structures between the years 1940 and 1948 as a result whereof the property had lost its identity and consequently fair rent could not be fixed on apportionment basis
On June 11 1958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of the Standard Rent Application RA N 983154 for adding an alternative ground based on the value of the land and cost of construction so that in the event of the court holding on the preliminary issue in favour of the appellants the standard rent could be fixed on the basis of the valuation of the land and the construction
This application was disallowed
On July 301958 Respondent 1 made an application for amendment of his R A N 984 of 1954 on lines similar to that in R A N 98354
It was also dismissed by an order dated July 31 1958
At the stage of arguments on December 4 1958 Respondent 1 moved another application for amendment and addition of the plea that they were the owners of the structures in premises 98310 9831 and 98312
The second amendment was not sought to be made in the other application R A N 98411954 relating to property 984
This prayer was also declined
The trial court Samson J by its judgment dated April 2 1959 found that the premises in question on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 and that the mode of determining rent by apportionment was not available to the tenants
In the result he dismissed the applications adding there is no sufficient material to ascertain the standard rent in any other way 
Against those orders Respondent 1 filed a revision petition under section 129 3 of the Act before the Revisional Court of Small Causes Bombay which accepted the same set aside the order of the trial judge allowed the amendment and remanded both the applications for fixation of fair rent to the trial court
Against this remand order dated August 8 1960 of the Revisional Court the appellants preferred two Civil Revisions to the High Court of Bombay
During the pendency of those Revisions the trial court allowed the amendment and proceeded to decide the entire matter afresh
These facts were brought to the notice of the High Court which however dismissed the revision petitions by a judgment dated February 3 1961 holding that the first Revisional Court had in fact remanded the entire matter for trial de novo after rightly allowing both the amendments
After the remand the trial court by its judgment dated April 25 1961 held that except 98310 98311 and 98312 which were new structures there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties 581 i e 9831 to 9839 that new structures 98310 98311 and 98312 belonged to Respondent 1 who was consequently liable to pay rent only for the land underneath that the cost of repairs of the properties 9838 and 9839 after they had been destroyed by fire was mainly borne by Respondent 1 the landlord s contribution being Rs 8500 only
Applying the principle of apportionment it fixed the standard rent of the properties 9831 to 98312 at Rs 400 pm subject to permitted increases after 1954
Regarding the premises 984in RAN98454 the trial court gave are turn on the investment of Rs40000 made by the landlord inclusive of the cost of structure and the value of land underneath at Rs 30 per sq yard as that of 1940 and fixed the standard rent at Rs 386 p m subject to permitted increases after 1946
Aggrieved by these orders of the trial court appellants and Respondent 2 filed two revision applications under section 129 3 to the Revisional Court of Small Causes which by its judgment dated September 30 1964 substantially upheld the findings of the trial court inter alia with the exceptions  i that the ownership of the new structures 98310 98311 and 98312 vested in Appellant 1 who was entitled to get a fair return on that investment ii that the value of the land married to the new structures 98310 98311 and 98312 and 98454 should be taken at Rs 50 per sq
yd i e as of 1948 and not as of 1940 as had been done by the trial court on remand
In the result the standard rent in RAN 983 was raised to Rs 981  and in RAN 984 to Rs411 pm
To impugn the decision dated September 30 1964 of the Revisional Court the parties preferred six Special Civil Applications under article 226227 of the Constitution to the High Court
By a common order a learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed these applications except that he corrected some arithmetical errors and in consequence fixed the standard rent of properties 9831 to 98312 at Rs 84107 and that of premises 98454 at Rs 46211 p m
It is against this decision dated 1213th October 1971 of the High Court that these appeals have been filed by special leave
The first contention of Mr Cooper learned Counsel for the appellants is that there is no provision in the Act which requires standard rent to be fixed on apportionment basis rather the definition of premises in section 58 b which speaks of part of a building let separately read with clause i of section 510 and clause c of section 11 1 with due emphasis on the article the  immediately preceding the word premises  in the said clauses indicates that the standard rent would be the rent for which the suit premises were first let separately on or after the basic date ie September 1 1940
If on the basic date proceeds the argument the premises in question did not form the subject of a separate single demise but had been let out together with other portions of larger premises its standard rent could not be determined on the footing of the rent payable for those different portions
Reliance 582 has been placed on Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji vs W G Ward1 and Bata Shoe Co  Ltd vs Narayan Das Mullick and Ors2 Counsel had further tried to distinguish Capital and Provincial Property Trust Ltd vs Rice3 and Bhikaji Ramchandra Paranjpe vs Vishnu Ramchandra Paranjpe4 referred to in the judgment of the High Court
On the other hand Mr Lokur learned Counsel for Respondent maintains that the principle of apportionment has always been accepted by the Bombay High Court as an appropriate guide in fixing standard rent under the Act of premises which on the basic date had been let out as part of a larger entity
It is pointed out that in Narayanlal Bansilal vs Venkatrao Anant Rai5 a Bench of the High Court while considering the question of standard rent in respect of another portion of the very property of the appellant Mills had invoked this principle
Before we deal with the contentions canvassed it will be proper to make a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act The material part of the definition of premises in s58 reads Premises means a any land not being used for agricultural purposes b any building or part of a building let separately
 emphasis supplied Sub section 10 of the same Section defines standard rent in relation to any premises to mean a where the standard rent fixed by the court and the Controller respectively under the Bombay tent Restrictions Act 1939 or the Bombay Rents Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1944 such standard rent or b Where the standard rent is not so fixedsubject to the provisions of section 11 i the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of September 1940 or ii where they were not let on the first day of September 1940 the rent at which they were last let before that day or iii where they were first let after the first day of September 1940 the rent at which they were first let or iv in any of the cases specified in section 11 the rent fixed by the Court 1 2 AIR 1953 Cal
3 1952 Appeal Cases 142
4 5 583 Section 1 1 empowers the Rent Court to fix the standard rent at such amount as having regard to the provisions of this Act and the circumstances of the case the court deems just a where any premises are first let after the first day of September 1940 and the rent at which they are so let is in the opinion of the Court excessive or b where the Court is satisfied that there is no sufficient evidence to ascertain the rent at which the premises were let in anyone of the cases mentioned in sub clause i to iii of clause 4 of sub section 10 of section 5 or c Where by reason of the premises having been let at one time as a whole or in part and another time in parts or a whole or for any other reasons any difficulty arises in giving effect to this part or d Where any premises have been or are let rent free or at a nominal rent or for some consideration in addition to rent or e Where there is any dispute between the land lord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent
 Clause c read with the opening part of section 111 is crucial for our purpose
One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rents and to stabilise the same at prewar level
In achieving that object however it avoids a Procrustean or mechanical approach
While pegging the basic line to September 1 1940 it significantly subordinates standard rent by its very definition in section 5 10 b to the benignant jurisdiction of the Court under s11
And the key words of the latter provision into which the conscience of this anti rack renting statute is compressed are the circumstances of the case the Court deems just
These words inhibit a rigid and ossified determination of standard rent
They leave sufficient play at the joints investing the court with a wide discretion in the matter
According to the scheme of the Act while rent recoverable by the landlord may owing to permitted increases fluctuate the standard rent  always remains fixed or stationary
If on the basic date the suit premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject matter of a larger demise as in the instant case difficulty arises in giving effect to the statute
Clause c of section II 1 then comes into operation
To resolve the difficulty this clause and the related provisions are not to be construed in a narrow technical sense which would stultify or defeat their object
It is to be interpreted liberally in a manner which would advance the remedy  suppress the 584 mischief and foil subtle inventions and evasions  of the Act
Construed in accordance with this socially relevant rule in Hayden s case the meaning of the premises  having been let at one time as a whole spoken of in this clause can legitimately be deemed to cover  the larger premises which on the basic date had been let as a whole and of which the suit premises was a part let out subsequently
In any event the amplitude of the phrase or any other reason in the latter part of the clause is wide enough to embrace cases of this kind and confers a plenary curative power on the Court
True that unlike the English Rent Control Act of 1920 or the later English Acts the Bombay Act does not expressly speak of apportionment
But the language of its relevant provisions construed consistently with the scheme and in built policy of the Act is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis
As noticed already section II 1 gives a discretion to the Court to fix such amount as standard rent as it deems just
However in exercising this discretion the Court has to pay due regard to i the provisions of the
Act and ii the circumstances of the case
Apportionment or equal distribution of the burden of rent on every portion is a rule of justice and good sense
If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub division of that whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount
Therefore if in the circumstances of a given case the Court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment it can legitimately do so
This principle however is applicable where on the basic date that portion of which the standard rent is to be determined had not been let separately as on unit but the whole of which it is a part had been let on that date
Apportionment postulates that on account of its having been let on the basic date the whole had acquired a standard rent which has to be allocated to smaller units subsequently carved out of it
It is thus clear that the principle of apportionment is not alien to the spirit of the Act and has indeed been often invoked by the courts in fixing standard rent under this Act
In Narayanlal Bansilal s case supra a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court determined standard rent of another part of this very estate of the Mills in accordance with that principle
However while conceding that apportionment is not foreign to the scheme purpose and policy of the Act we will like to emphasise the need for caution and circumspection in invoking it
It is not to be rigidly and indiscriminately applied as a cast iron rule of law regardless of time and circumstances or the equities of the case
A doctrinaire approach not consistent with a just and fair determination stultifies the whole salutary purpose of justice to both the landlord and the tenant
If necessary it can be adjusted adapted and attuned in the light of the particular circumstances of the case to satisfy the statutory requirement of 585 fixing the standard rent as at a just amount
Thus if after the material date the landlord has made investments and improvements in the promises it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and to give him a fair return on such investments
Further in appor tioning the rant the Court must consider other relevant circumstances such as size accessibility aspect and other Physical advantage enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question as compared with those of the rent of the property in which it is comprised see Bainbridge vs Contdon1
Where after the basic date the premises completely change their identity apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether
We have only illustrated not exhaustively enumerated the relevant circumstances and their implications
At this stage we may notice the decisions in Danrajgirji vs WC Ward supra and Bata Shoe and Co vs Narayan Dass supra relied upon by Mr Cooper
In the first a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was considering sections 21a and 131a of the Bombay Rent War Restriction Act II of 1918 which were to an extent similar to sections 58b and 10 and 111c of the 1947 Act
There the Port Trust had in March 241915 leased the building known as Watson s Annexe to one Dr Billimoria at a rental of Rs 2850 besides ground rent and taxes
Dr Billimoria sublet the premises in different flats to different tenants
The premises in the occupation of the defendant were sublet to him at a rental of Rs 75 in September 1915 ie before September 1 1916 which was the basic date under the 1918 Act
The tenancy of Dr Billimoria was terminated by a consent decree on July 31 1923 and thereafter the defendant held directly under the plaintiff
The question arose as to whether standard rental of the flat should be calculated on the basis of the actual rent of Rs 75  on the basis of the subletting or whether it should be determined by apportionment of the rent which Dr Billimoria was paying to the Port Trust on the basis of the first letting
Pratt J answered this question thus The Rent Act itself in the definition of the premises refers to a part of the building separately let as premises of which the standard rent has to be determined and such standard rent must be determined with reference to those premises in the manner spe cified by s 21a of the Act
The standard rent therefore must be ascertained on the admitted basic rent of Rs 75 
Again if the head lease instead of being as here the lease of one building consisting of flats had been a lease of a large number of buildings constituting a large estate it would be almost impossible to make a correct apportionment of the rent
I do not think it was the intention of the Rent Act that landlords and tenants should be driven to do a difficult and expensive process of valuation
and calculation before their rent could be ascertained
 1 M45Sup
CI75 586 We see force in the argument as also textual and pragmatic support
But these considerations do not preclude the Court from importing the flexible factors of fairness suggested by the circumstances of the case
Indeed section 11 as explained earlier obliges the Court to do it
Moreover the interpretation of premises adopted by the learned judge was a little too literal narrow and divorced from the purpose and content of the provisions relating to fixation of standard rent
Nor was it in accord with the scheme and object of the 1918 Act
The court s jurisdiction to consider as a strong circumstance proper apportionment of rent is not taken away in our view
It may be noted that just like the opening clause of section 5 of the 1947Act which defines premises standard rent etc the corresponding section 21 of the 1918 Act also started with the qualifying words In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context
While applying these definitions to particular cases and provisions of the Acts these words should not be lost sight of
The argument in favour of adopting the restricted interpretation ignores this rider to the definitions provided by the Legislature in these statutes
We do not intend to over burden this judgment with a discussion the decision in Bata Shoe  Co s case supra
Suffice it to say that is a decision under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act 17 of 1950 which stands on its own facts
It cannot be accepted as laying down a rule of universal application
It is vulnerable more or less on the same grounds on which the decision in Dhanrajgirji s case can be assailed
We reject the narrow interpretation of the relevant provisions of Ss 2 and II canvassed for by the appellants for two reasons Firstly it will leave the door wide open for evasion of this statute by what Abbot C J in Fox vs Bishop of Chester1 called shift or contrivance All that a greedy landlord need do to squeeze out more rent would be to divide his premises into several parts and let them out separately on exorbitant rents
Such an evasion may amount to a fraud upon the statute
Secondly such a construction so manifestly subversive of one of the primary objects of the Act would be wholly beyond the intendment of the Legislature
For reasons aforesaid we would negative the first contention of Mr Cooper as an inflexible proposition and answer the first part of the question posed in the affirmative to the extent indicated
it takes us to the second part of that question namely whether the principle of apportionment was correctly applied to the fact of the case  Mr Cooper contends that the first trial court Samson J had rightly found that the premises in question on account of extensive alterations and constructions undergone a complete change after the basic date and therefore standard rent could not be determined by apporoining the rent of the whole among the parts
It is maintained that 1 824  at 655
587 this finding of Samson J was wrongly set aside by the High Court and must be deemed to be still holding the field
Objection is also taken to the amendments allowed by the trial court on remand
In the alternative it is argued that even the courts below found that properties 98310 98311 98312 and 98454 were admittedly new structures and extensive repairs and replacements had been made in the remaining suit premises which had been destroyed or severely damaged by fire in 1948 49
On account of these substantial alterations and reconstructions the premises in question had lost their identity and consequently the principle of appointment was not applicable
The first part of the contention based on the judgment of Samson J is groundless
The judgment of the first trial court was set aside in toto by the Revisional Court and further by the High Court and the case was remanded for de novo trial to the trial court which thereafter decided the case afresh after allowing the applicant to amend his RA NS
It is too late in the day any way to argue on the assumption that the findings still survive
The question whether a certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one of fact
The courts below have found that excepting properties 98310 9831198312 and 98454 which were admittedly new structures contracted near about 1948 the rest of the properties namely 9831 to 9839 had not lost their identity
The courts therefore worked out the economic rent of these new structures by capitalising their value and gave the landlord a fair return on Ms investments and fixed their standard rent mainly on that basis
It was with regard to the unchanged old properties 9831 to 9839 that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of appointment
Even so it allowed the landlord fair return over Rs 14448 being the cost of flooring ceiling and other fixtures fixed to property 9836
Now it is not disputed that on the basic date September 1 1940 these properties in question were parts of a larger entity comprised in a single lease or tenancy in favour of Sound Studios at a monthly rent of Rs 1700 
The courts below have therefore taken into account this basic circumstance along with the other relevant facts of the case
We do not find anything so wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by them which would warrant an interference by this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution
Not that apportionment must be applied in all cases as a rule of law but that if applied along with other considerations dictated by a sense of justice and fairplay cannot be condemned by this Court as illegal
We therefore overrule this contention also
Lastly it is contended that the courts below have seriously erred in evaluating the land under the suit properties at Rs 30 per sq
on the basis of an instance exhibit R 6 of the year 1942 while they should have taken into account the value of the land as in the year 1948
it is added that some photostat co pies of sale deeds pertaining to the rele vant year were produced by Mr Deweja architect examined by the Landlord and the Revisional Court wrongly rejected them As unproved
it is maintained that in 1948 the market value of the site underneath the 288 structures was Rs 120 per sq
in support of his contention that the value of the land at the date of the letting is the appropriate value to be taken into account Counsel has cited Bukmanibai Khunji Cooverji vs Shivnarayan Ram Ashre
We are unable to accept this contention also
The courts below in capitalising the structures 98310 to 98312 and 98454 did take into account the value of the land married to those properties at the rate of Rs 50 per sq
yd which according to their estimate after adding Rs 30 per sq
yd for escalation would be the market value of that land in the year 1948
Since the rent of the old unchanged properties 9831 to 9839 was fixed mainly on apportionment basis the courts did not think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into computation in fixing the standard rent
Moreover there was no evidence on the record to show that the value of the land in question in the year 1948 was Rs 120 per sq
We therefore do not think it necessary to examine Cooverji s case cited by the Counsel
We however do not rule out the propriety of paying regard to escalations in land value as put forward by Mr Cooper but do hold that this Court will be loath to re investigate factual conclusions not shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust
Such is not the case here
For all the foregoing reasons we would answer the question posed for decisionin the affirmative and dismiss these appeals with one set of costs
VPS Appeals dismissed 1196667 Bom
LR 692


Summary:
On September 1 1940 the basic date under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 the properties in dispute were parts of a larger entity comprised in a single lease
In March 1948 the respondent took a fresh lease of the properties in dispute Thereafter the respondent filed applications in the court of Small Causes for fixation of standard rent on the basis of apportionment
The trial court dismissed the applications holding that the premises on account of structural alterations had undergone such a change that they could no longer be identified with the property that existed in September 1940 that the mode of determining the rent by apportionment was not available to the tenant and that there was no sufficient material for ascertaining the standard  rent in any other way
This order was set aside in revision and the case was remanded to the trial court
After remand the trial court held that except with respect to three items of the premises in dispute which were new Structures there was no change of identity in the rest of the properties that the new structures belonged to the respondent who was consequently liable to pay rent only for the land underneath and on that basis applying the principle of apportionment fixed the standard rent
With respect to one item the trial court took into consideration the investment made by the landlord inclusive of the cost of structures estimated the value of the land underneath as in 1940 and fixed the standard rent on that basis
In revision it was held that the ownership of the three new structures also vested in the appellant that he was entitled to get a fair return on that investment also and that the value of the land should be taken as in 1948 and not in 1940 and the standard rent was fixed on that basis
Further revisions to the High Court were dismissed with some arithmetical corrections
In appeal to this Court HELD  The principle of apportionment is applicable to the fixation of standard rent of the premises in dispute and the principle had been rightly invoked and applied
584 F G a One of the primary objects of the Act is to curb exaction of extortionate rent
Section II 1 empowers the Court to fix the standard rent at such amount as having regard to the provisions of the Act and the circumstances of the case the Court deems just If on the basic date the premises were not let out separately but were a part of the subject matter of a larger demise then section 111c comes into operation
If the standard rent of a whole was a specific amount it stands to reason that the standard rent of a part or sub division of the whole should not ordinarily exceed that amount
Therefore if in the circumstances of a given case the court feels that for securing the ends of justice and giving effect to the provisions and policy of the Act it is reasonably necessary and feasible to work out the standard rent by apportionment it can legitimately do so
The language of the Act consistently with its scheme and in built policy is elastic enough to permit the fixation of standard rent on apportionment basis
At the same time caution and circumspection are necessary in applying the principle to the particular circumstances of a case
For example if after the material date the landlord has made investments and improvements in the premises it will be just and reasonable to take that factor also into account and give him a fair return on such investment
Similarly in apportioning the rent the Court must also consider other relevant circumstances and advantages enjoyed by the tenant of the premises of which the standard rent is in question as compared with the rest 578 of the Property in which it is comprised
Furtherwhere after the basic date the premises completely changed their identity apportionment as a method of determining just standard rent loses its efficacy and may be abandoned altogether583E 585C Narayanlal Bansilal vs Venkatrao Anant Rai 67 Bom
LR 352 Bainbridge vs Congdon and Fox vs Bishop of Chester  at 655 referred to
Dhanrajgirji Naraingirji vs W G Ward 1925 27 Bom
LR 877 and Bata Shoe  Co Ltd vs Narayan Das Mullick and Ors
not approved
b1 The findings of the trial court before remand had been set aside in the order of remand and there is nothing wrong or unfair or untenable in the method adopted by the lower courts after remand which would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of special jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution
587D G ii The question whether certain property has changed its identity after the basic date is largely one of fact
The factual conclusions arrived at by the revisional court and High Court are not shown to be perverse or manifestly unjust It was with regard to the unchanged old properties that the High Court and the Revisional Court mainly adopted the method of apportionment
Even so they allowed the landlord a fair return over the amount invested by him towards the cost of flooring ceiling and other fixtures
since the rent of the old unchanged premises was fixed mainly on apportionment basis the courts rightly did not think it necessary to take the value of their sites separately into computation in fixing the standard rent
588 B D iii As regards the new structures the courts below in capitalising their value did take into account the value of the land and took the market value of the land as in the year 1948
588B