ivil Appeal Nos
2486 87 N of 1978
From the Judgment and Order dated 1731978 of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal Nos 293 and 361 of 1972
PH Parekh for the Appellant
section Padumanabhan Amicus Curiae RA Perumal and G Narasimhulu for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RM SAHAI J
Litigation between two sisters by way of cross suits one for permanent injunction by the appellant basing her claim on gift deed executed in 1954 by her mother a Hindu widow of the entire estate inherited by her from her husband and another for declaration and partition by respondent assailing validity of the gift deed and claiming reversioner s right after death of the mother in 1968 has reached this Court by grant of special leave against judgment of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal raising a legal issue of seminal importance as to nature of right and title of female donee of Hindu widow s estate after coming into force of Hidnu Succession Act hereinafter refferred to as the Act
Facts are simple
Stakes also are not substantial but the issue is of far reaching consequence
Could a Hindu widow alienate by gift the entire estate inherited from the husband in favour of one of the female reversioners prior to enforcement of Act 20 of 1956
In case answer to issue is in the affirmative then what was the nature of right that the donee got under law Did she become an owner of a widow s 605 estate a limited owner an owner with some right or title so as to acquire rights of absolute ownership under section 14 of Act or a trespasser and if trespasser then whether she acquired rights by adverse possession by perfecting her rights against the donor only or it was essential to prescribe rights against reversioners as well Shorn of details and various issues raised in the suits suffice it to mention that even though the trial court found the gift deed to have been duly attested and executed after obtaining permission from the appropriate authority the claim of appellant for permanent injunction was decreed not on Section 14 of the Act as the widow who had executed the gift deed in 1954 was incompetent to alienate widow s estate by gift permanently  under Hindu Law but on adverse possession and estoppel
The appellate court while affirming the finding on section 14 of the Act allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit as adverse possession against the widow is not adverse against reversioners and the next reversioner is entitled to recover the possession of the property or his share in it within 12 years from the date of the death of the widow 
It was further held that the appellant could not acquire any right by estoppel under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act against the reversioners by reason of the widow s conduct 
In view of the concurrent findings of two courts below on section 14 of the Act the High Court appears to have been invited to adjudicate only on the question if the appellate court was justified in reversing the finding on adverse possession wich it disposed of treating it as finding of fact and observing that possession of appellant must be deemed to be on behalf of other co sharers in the absence of any evidence before ouster of the other sisters 
Wheher the High Court was justified in not examining the question of adverse possession is not necessary to be gone into as the appellant can succeed only if the finding recorded by the first appellate court that the appellant could not acquire any rights against reversioners during lifetime of the widow is found to be erroneous in law
But before doing so the claim of the appellant that she became an absolute owner under section 14 of the Act reiterated once again in this Court may be examined as it is a question of law
A full bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt
Chinti vs Smt
Daultu AIR 1968 Delhi 264 held that possession of a female donee in pursuance of gift deed executed by her mother could not be characterised as illegal or of trespasser therefore she being a female Hindu possessed  of the property on the date came into force became an absolute owner under section 14 of the Act
When more or less similar 606 matter came up before Patna High Court in Sulochana Kuer vs Doomati Kuer AIR 1970 Patna 352 the court held that a Hindu woman s estate as such is not capable of transfer either by sale or gift
The mere concept of such an estate is not transferred on the transfer of properties attaching to the estate
In Anath Bandhu vs Chanchala Bala AIR 1976 Calcutta 303 the Calcutta High Court specifically dissented from the Delhi decision and held that Section 14 wanted to benefit those female Hindus who were limited owners in then existing Hindu Law before the commencement of the Act
In the present case the limited owner Motibala having transferred the limited interest to Chanchala before the passing of the Act it cannot be said that Chanchala s limited interestif any ripened into absolute interest in terms of section 14 of the Act
A full bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Parmeshwari vs Santokhi AIR 1977 Punjab 141 too did not agree with Delhi High Court
It went into the background of legislation the original form of the bill ambit of the explanation anomalies that would result if even female alienee was deemed to be a limited owner and held  that section 14 of the Act was not intended to benefit the alienees of a limited Hindu owner
Similar view was taken by Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Court in AIR 1957 AP 280 and AIR 1958 Madras Gaddam Venkayama vs Gaddam Veeryya and Marudakkal vs Arumugha
Thus according to Delhi Court a donee of even entire Hindu widow s estate became absolute owner under section 14 of the Act whereas according to Patna Calcutta Punjab Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts rights of a female donee under Hindu Law prior to coming into force of the Act did not get enlarged under section 14 of the Act and it did not preclude reversioners from assailing validity of the gift deed
To ascertain which view accords more to the objective sought to be achieved by the Act it appears necessary to extract section 14 which reads as under 1 Any property possessed by a female Hinduwhether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
Explanation In this sub section property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner what 607 soever and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act
2 Nothing contained in sub section 1 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property
Needless to emphasise that the section was a step forward towards social amelioration of women who had been subjected to gross dis crimination in matter of inheritance
Even when the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act XVIII of 1937 was enacted it succeeded partially only
While providing for inheritance and devolution to widow and even widow of predeceased son the Act could not go beyond creating limited interest or a Hindu woman s estate
Absolute ownerships or female heir by effacing inequality and putting male an female heirs at par in matter of inheritance was achieved by the Succession Act
A female Hindu inheriting property under the Act also became a stock of descent
In Eramma vs Verrupana  this Court observed The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called limited estate  or widow s estate  in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman who under the old law would have been only a limited owner a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder
But did the legislature intend to extend same benefit namely enlarge the estate held on the date the Act came into force by any or every female Hindu into full and absolute estate irrespective of whether she was a limited owner or not
According to learned counsel for appellant the answer should be given in affirmative
He urged that since the age long traditional limitation on inheritance and disposition by a female was removed and the section was widely worded by using broad and comprehensive expressions such as and property possessed  acquired before or after the commencement of the Act  and each of these expressions have received expansive of the Act  and each of these expressions have received expansive interpretations by the Court there was no reason not to give similar interpretation to the word female Hindu
The learned counsel submitted that there was no warrant to confine scope of the section to limited owners
He argued that if the argument of the respondent was accepted it shall result in substitution of the word  female Hindu  with limited owner  which 608 would be contrary to legislative intention the social philosophy on which the section was founded and the principle of interpretation
Relying on the explanation to the section it was urged that it not only explained meaning of the word property  but it left no room for doubt that a female Hindu possessed of any property which satisfied the extended meaning on the date the Act came into force became an absolute owner
It was further argued that the expression limited owner  has been used in the section not to whittle down the otherwise simple and plain meaning of the words female Hindu  by introducing narrow concept of widows  estate or limited owner but to put beyond doubt the nature and status of rights of females after the Act
Support was also drawn from the marginal note of the section and it was urged that the words property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property  was yet another indication to interpret the word female Hindu  widely so as to include in its ambit a donee from a limited owner
That the section is not very happily worded does not admit of any doubt
It was commented upon by this Court in V Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy  and it was observed that the section was a classic instance of statutory provision which by reason of its inapt draftsmanship has created endless confusion for litigants
May be so but the answer to the issue must emerge from the section its background purpose of its enactment and the reason for use of such wide expression
Nothing turns on the marginal note as it is usually not restored to for construing meaning of a section particularly when the language is plain and simple
It is well settled that a section has to be read in its entirely as one composite unit without bifurcating it or ignoring any part of it
Viewed from this perspective the section undoubtedly comprises of two parts one descriptive specifying the essential requirements for applicability of the section other consequences arising out of it
One cannot operate without the other
Neither can be read in isolation
Both are integral parts of the section
Mere provision that any property possessed by a female Hindu on the date the Act came into force shall be held by her would have been incomplete and insufficient to achieve the objective of removing inequality amongst male and female Hindus unless it was provided that the otherwise limited estate of such a female would become enlarged into full or absolute estate
Any other construction would result in not only ignoring the expression and not as a limited owner  which would be against principle of interpretation but also against the historical background of enactment of the section
Whereas if it is read in its entirety with one part throwing light on another then the conclusion is irresistible that a limited owner became a full owner provided she was 609 in possession of the property on the date of enactment of the Act
Property acquired by a female Hindu before the Act came into force comprised broadly of inherited property or stridhana property acquired by her from a male or female
Nature of her right in either class of property unlike males depended on the school by which she was governed as well as whether it came to her by devolution or transfer from a male or female
This invidious discrimination was done away with after coming into force of 1956 Act and the concept of Hindu widows  estate or limited estate or stridhana ceased to exist by operation of section 14 read with section 4 of the Act which has an overriding effect
A female Hindu who but for the Act would have been a limited owner become full owner
But the section being retrospective in operation the meaning of female Hindu prior to 1956 has to be understood in the light of Hindu Law as it prevailed then
The section enlarged the estate of those female Hindu who otherwise would have been limited owners
This result follows by reading the first part with the last which uses the expression held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner 
To put it differently a limited owner become a full owner provided she was a female Hindu who was possessed of any property acquired before the commencement of the Act
Therefore mere being female Hindu was not sufficient
She should have been of that class of female Hindus who could on existence of other circumstances were capable of becoming full owners
Further the Act being applicable by virtue of section 2 to not only Hindus by religion but also to Buddhists Jains or Sikhs and to any person who was not a Muslim Christian Parsi or Jew it was but necessary to use an expression of such wide connotation as female Hindu because by virtue of sub section 3 of the section the word Hindu  in any portion of the Act which includes section 14 the word had to be understood as including not only a person who was Hindu by religion but even others
However the objective being to remove disparity and injustice to which females were subjected under Hindu Law the section limits its operation to such female Hindus who were limited owners
Reference to the explanation by the learned counsel was also not very apposite
It was appended to widen the meaning of property by adding to it the inherited property and the property which came to be possessed by a female Hindu in manner mentioned in it
Its effect was that a female Hindu became absolute owner not only in respect of inherited property but even of property received by way of gift or on partition or in lieu of maintenance etc
provided she was a limited owner
And not that it enlarged the estate of even those who were not limited owner
Any other construction would militate against the otherwise clear meaning of sub section 1
610 Although this section has come up for interpretation by this Court on various occasions in different context but in none of these cases the Court had occasion to examine the ambit of expression female Hindu and whether it extended to females other than limited owner
Since in every case whether it was decided for or against it was the widow who was alive on the date the Act came into force and she being a limited owner the decision turned on if she was possessed  of the property so as to become full owner
For instance in Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva  Ors 1959 Supp 1 SCR 968AIR the widow was held to have acquired rights as the adoption made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to be in constructive possession and thus possession  of the property on the date the Act came into force
Mangal Singh vs Smt
Rattno  was another case where widow s constructive possession enured to her benefit as she having been dispossession by her collaterals in 1954 and filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Act came into force was held to be possession  of the property so as to entitle her to become full owner
Munna Lal vs Raj Kumar AIR 1962 SC 1495 was a case where the share of the widow was declared in preliminary decree
No actual division of share had taken place yet the court held that it was property possessed  by her on the date the Act came into force
In Sukhram vs Gauri Shankar  it was held that a widow was full owner in joint Hindu family property as she became entitled to the interest which her husband had by virtue of Hindu Women Right to Property Act
The Court ruled that even though a male was subject to restrictions qualienation on his interest in joint Hindu family property but a widow acquiring an interest by virtue of the Act did not suffer such restriction
V Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy  and Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai were cases where the widow was possessed  of the property in lieu of maintenance and therefore she was held to be full owner
In all these cases since the widow was in possession actual or constructive on the date the Act came into force she was held to be a female Hindu possessed  of the property and consequently her limited ownership stood converted into full ownership by operation of law
Even in Eramma vs Verupana supra and Kuldeep Singh vs Surain Singh 1988 Andhra law Times where the benefit was denied under section 14 the female Hindu were widows but they were not held to be possessed  of the property because their possession was not backed by even the remotest vestige of title
in Eramma s case supra the benefit was denied as Hindu Women s Right to Property Act being not applicable on the date the succession opened she could not be held to be possessed of the property
And in 611 Kuldeep Singh s case supra she had been divested of her interest as a result of transfer made by her
Contest in all these cases was between reversioner and the widow herself or the person claiming through her
Review of these decisions indicates that this Court has consistently taken the view as stated in Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai For the applicability of sub section two conditions must co exist namely i The concerned female Hindu must be possessed of property and ii Such property must be possessed by her as a limited owner
 mention is necessary to be made in this connection about observation in Gulwant Kaur vs Mohinder Singh  that the Court in Bai Vijia s case did not support to lay down that what was enlarged by sub section 1 of section 14 into a full estate was the Hindu woman s estate known to Hindu Law
When the Court uses the word limited estate  the words are used to connote a right in the property to which possession of the female Hindu may be traced but which is not a full right of ownership
Gulwant Kaur s case was concerned with acquisition of right by wife on entrustment of property in lieu of maintenance after 1956 when the concept of widows  estate or limited estate or even stridhana had ceased to exist
Therefore what was necessary was being possessed of property actual or constructive by female Hindu under some right or title
Whereas Bai Vijia s case was concerned with acquisition of right in property held in lieu of maintenance before 1956
Therefore a female Hindu could become absolute owner only if she was limited owner
Sub section of section 14 deals with right of female Hindu both before and after the Act came into force
Female Hindu could become absolute owner of property possessed by her on the date the Act came into force only if she was a limited owner whereas she would become absolute owner after 1956 of the property of which she would otherwise have been a limited owner
Reference may be made to Maharaja Pallai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai T Pilllai  where this Court while examining right of wife put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance was held to have become full owner under section 141 as she entered into possession after the death of her husband in 1955 and was in possession in 1956
612 The Court held that the right to utilise income for her maintenance must be presumed to have resulted in property being given to her in lieu of maintenance
On this finding the property being possessed on the date the Act came into force as contemplated in the explanation the widow being a limited owner became a full owner and the gift executed by her in favour of her daughter after 1956 was unexceptionable
The Court however while repelling the submission advanced on superficial conflict in Gulwant Kaur and Bai Vijia reiterated what was observed in Gulwant Kaur s case
As already discussed Gulwant Kaur s case related to acquisition of property after 1956 whereas in Bai Vijia it was acquired before 1956
The observations made in the two decisions must be understood in that context
Moreover in Gulwant Kaur s case the ratio was founded on Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai  a decision which shall be adverted to later
But it too was concerned with acquisition after 1956
And the bench while discussing scope of section 141 observed
that the limited estate or limited ownership of a Hindu female would enlarge into an absolute estate or full ownership of the property in question in th following fact situation Where she acquired the limited estate in the property before or after the commencement of the Act provided she was in possession of the property at the time of the coming into force of the Act on June 17 1956 
 None of these decisions namely Gulwant Kaur supra or Maharaja Pillai supra  or Jagannathan Pillai purported to lay down that the Section 141 contemplated enlargement of estate prior to 1956 of even those females who were not limited owners
According to Mulla s Hindu Law sixteenth edition paragraph 174 every female who took a limited or restricted estate was known as limited heir
And according to every school except Bombay every female who succeed as an heir whether to a male or female took a limited estate in the property
Even in Bombay a female who by marriage entered into Gotra family of the deceased male inherited a limited estate only
And in paragraph 176 it is stated that incident of estate taken by every limited owner was similar to incident of widow s estate
Mayne s Hindu Law 12th edition paragraph 671 too brings out the same by stating that the typical form of estate inherited by a woman from a male was compendiously known as the widow s estate
And the limitation which applied to such estate applied to all estate derived by a female by 613 descent from a male or female whether she inherited as daughter mother grandmother sister or as any other relation
Even stridhana property according to Mulla created limited interest in its successors except in Bombay in certain circumstances and a female inheriting stridhana took a limited interest in it and on her death it passed not to her heirs but to the next stridhan heirs of the female from she inherited
Thus on plain reading of the Section and its interpretation by this Court in various decisions a female possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force could become absolute owner only if she was a limited owner
This being the legal position it may now be seen if a Hindu widow could transfer or alienate widow s estate by way of gift prior to 1956 and if so to what extent
And in such alienation what right or interest was created in the alienee
Did she become a limited owner so as to become a full owner under Section 14 of the Act A Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow of predeceased son held limited interest known as Hindu women s estate prior to coming into force of 1956 Act under the Hindu Women s Right to Property Act 1937
Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu Law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose the holder of the estate was known as limited owner
The expression limited owner  thus could not be understood except as it was interpreted and understood in Hindu Law
Could the same be said of a female donee or alienee The Delhi High Court assumed that a female donee was a limited owner consequently of she was possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force and her possession was not without title  she became an absolute owner
Basis for the decision was construction of the word possessed  by this Court in Gummalapura Taggina s case supra wherein it was held that the word was used in widest connotation so that a widow even if in constructive possession was entitled to absolute ownership under Section 14 of the Act
Support was also drawn from converse case of Eramma supra this Court negatived the claim of widow under Section 14 as her possession on the date the Act came into force was not legal but that of a trespasser
What the High Court lost sight of was that the claim of widow in Gummalapura s case supra was upheld because the adoption made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to be in constructive possession on the date the ACt came into force
And Eramma s case supra was concerned with a widow who claimed to have inherited through son in State of Hyderabad where Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act did not apply on the date the son died
Consequently it was held that the 614 provisions of Section 14 of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property  
The High Court overlooked the vital observation made in earlier part of the judgment to the effect
In other words Section 141 of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who in absence of this provision would have been limited owner of the property will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this Section   Limited owner commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights
In relation to property absolute complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to posses actual or constructive power to enjoy that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying right to alienate transfer or dispose of etc
Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership
For instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation
Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument
The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu Law arose as a matter of law
A Hindu widow according to different schools Banaras Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only
Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council in Janki Ammal vs Narayanaswami 1916 p 43 I A p 207 to be her right is of the nature of a right to property her powers in that character are limited  
In Jaisri vs Raj Diwan Dubey it was observed by this Court that when a widow succeeds as heir to her husband the ownership in the property both legal and beneficial vests in her  
And the restriction on her power to alienate except for legal necessity is imposed not for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of estate  
Thus a Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband
Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity
In Kamala Devi vs Bachu Lal Gupta this Court after reviewing various authorities extended this principle to female donee
A gift made within reasonable limits in favour of daughter even two years after the marriage but in pursuance of promise made at time of the marriage was upheld and 615 the reversioners claim was repelled on permissible alienation under Hindu Law
But what right or title is acquired by the alienee if transfer is against legal necessity or contrary to law The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but voidable could be avoided by reversioners including Govt
taking by escheat Collector of Masulipatam vs Cavaly Vencata 1861 8 MIA 529
But the widow was held bound by the transfer
In Natwalal Punjabhai  Anr
vs Dadubhai Manubhai  Ors   the Court held as under The Hindu Law certainly does not countenance the idea of a widow alienating her property without any necessity merely as a mode of enjoyment as was suggested before us by Mr Ayyangar
If such a transfer is made by a Hindu widow it is not correct to say that the transferee acquires necessarily and in law an interest commensurate with the period of the natural life of the widow or at any rate with the period of her widowhood
Such transfer is invalid in Hindu Law but the widow being the grantor herself cannot derorate from the grant and the transfer cannot also be impeached so long as a person does not come into existence who can claim a present right to possession of the property Thus if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow s estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under section 14
And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner s interest
Her possession may be good against the world her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor of transferor
It was life interest loosely as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor
So far as the male alienees from limited owners that is female Hindu prior to 1956 are concerned it was held by this Court in Radhey Krishan Singh  Ors
vs Shiv Shankar Singh  Ors that the alienation could be challenged by the reversioner as there was nothing in the which has taken away such a right
A female alienee did not enjoy better or different status as the Hindu Law applied universally and uniformaly 616 both to male and female alienees
She did not become limited owner or holder of a limited estate as understood in Hindu Law
And the alienation without legal necessity could be assailed by the reversioner
No change was brought about in this regard by the Act
If the alienation was valid ie it was for legal necessity or permitted by law then the donee became an owner of it and the right and title in the property vested in her
But if it was contrary to law as in this case the gift being of entire widow s estate then it did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow
And the appellant cannot claim to have acquired title to the property under the gift deed
Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu Law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force
In fact such possession was not backed any title as against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration
Reliance was placed on observations in Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai  Ors  that To obviate hair splitting the legislature has made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property possessed by a Hindu female it will be of absolute ownership and not of limited ownership notwithstanding the position under the traditional Hindu Law   and it was submitted that the appellant satisfied the criteria to entitle her to claim that her estate irrespective of its nature Hindu Law got enlarged under section 14 of the Act
An observation without reference to facts discloses neither the law nor the ratio de cedindi which could be taken assistance of
Factually the issue was the effect of re transfer by the alienee in favour of the widow after 1956
And the answer was that When the transaction was reversed and what belonged to her was retransmitted to her what the concerned Hindu female acquired was a right which she herself once possessed namely a limited ownership as it was known prior to the coming into force of the Act which immediately matures into or enlarges into a full ownership in view of Section 141 of the Act on the enforcement of the Act
The resultant position on the reversal of the transaction would be that the right title and interest that the alienee had in the property which was under eclipse  during the subsistance of the transaction had re emerged on the disappearance of the eclipse  
Truely speaking the interpretation of sub section 1 of section 14 was no different from the other decisions as is clear from the extracts quoted earlier
It is thus clear that an alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire limited estate or widow s estate nor she was a limited owner who could get any benefit under section 14 of the Act
It was not even a life estate except loosely as the right to continue in possession was not related with her span of life but of the 617 transferor that is the Hindu widow
The decision of Delhi High Court therefore does not lay down the law correctly
The other view taken by Patna Calcutta and Punjab and Haryana Courts that sub section 1 of section 14 did not extend the benefit of full ownership to female alienees brings out the objective of the section appropriately and correctly
Nor is the decision in Badri Pershad vs Smt
Kanso Devi  of any assistance
It was a case where the widow entitled to the interest of her husband got certain property prior to 1956 as a result of arbitration with specific stipulation and she shall have only life interest
This was ignored asnd she was held rightly to be the absolute owner whose rights were governed by section 141 and not 142
Further did not obliterate Hindu Law
What has ceased to be operative after coming into force of the Act under section 4 is text or rule etc
for which privision is made in the Act
And under section 42 any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ceased to have effect if it was inconsistent with any provision of the Act
Therefore except to the extent provision has been made in section 14 that is enlargement of the estate of limited owner the Hindu Law in other regards remained opearative
There is no provision in the Act which deprives reversioners of their rights except to the extent mentioned in section 14
In Radha Rani vs Hanuman Prasad AIR 1966 SC 216 this Court overruled the decisions of the Allahabad and Patna High Courts that there were no reversioners or reversionary rights after 1956 and held it is open to reversioner to maintain a suit for declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female limited owner before the coming into force of was without legal necessity and was not binding upon reversioners  
Coming now to the issue of adverse possession the High Court was not justified in concluding that it was a question of fact
Possession under a gift deed which was found to be invalid as it was not permitted under Hindu Law was on general principle contrary to law and as such could be adverse
When did it become adverse to the donor and what circumstances constitute adverse possession against the donor is an aspect which does not arise for consideration as even assuming in favour of the appellant the question is if adverse possession against donor was sufficient to clothe her with right or title in the property so as to deprive the reversioners of their right to claim the property after the death of the widow In Radha Rani s case supra this Court held
618 In the case of an alienation by Hindu widow without legal necessity the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow
They could wait till her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property trating the alienation as a nullity   Therefore it is obvious that the appellant could not acquire any right by adverse possession against reversioner during lifetime of her mother
Her claim was rightly negatived
Before parting with this case we express our thanks to Sri Padmanabhan Senior Advoacate who on our request rendered valuable assistance
We are thankful to Sri Parekh and Sri Narasimhulu also for their assistance
The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed
But there shall be no order as to costs
RP Appeal dismissed


Summary:
On the basis of the results of the combined Civil Services Examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for appointment to several Services and the position in the combined merit list for the Indian Police Service and Police Services Group B  the appellant was appointed to the Delhi Andaman and Nicobar Police Servicealso Known as DANIP
Subsequently when certain vacancies arose in the Indian Police Service due to selected candidates not joining the Service and only the reserved category vacancies were filled up by the candidates who had been earlier appointed in DANIP Service the appellant who came to occupy top position represented to the authorities for filling the general vacancies also but his request was turned down Hence the appellant filed writ application before the High Court which was dismissed in limine 
In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended that since ultimately several vacancies in the general category of the IPS remained unfilled he was entitled to be appointed in one of them that since 54 vacancies were notified for general category and he was found qualified for the appointment the respondent could not refuse to fill up the vacancies and there was no justification to refuse to follow the procedure adopted in similar situation with respect to the reserved category in regard to the general category vacancies also and that in view of the relevant statutory rules the authorities were under a duty to continue with the process of filling up the vacancies until nonremained vacant and by keeping the posts unfilled they had acted arbitrarily
568 On behalf of the respondent Union of India it was contended that the tentative service allocation for IPS was completed before the commencement of the foundational course for the IPS and the process of final service allocation was closed after filling up certain vacancies which had arisen since the process for recruitment for the next year had already started and hence the additional vacancies arising later remained unfilled that the process followed in connection with the reserved category was not followed in regard to the general category vacancies on account of vital differences obtaining in the relevant conditions in the two categories and hence there was no discrimination or arbitrariness in keeping the general category vacancies unfilled
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 11 Even if vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit the successful candidates do not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed
Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies
However it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner
The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons
And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates as reflected at the recruitment test and no discrimination can be permitted
572A C State of Haryana vs Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others1974 1 SCR 165 Miss Neelima Shangla vs State of Haryana and Others  and Jitendra Kumar and Others vs State of Punjab and others  referred to
12 The appellant had not acquired a right to be appointed against the vacancy arising later on the basis of any of the rules namely Rule 4 of the Indian Police Service Cadre Rules 1954 Rules 346 and 7 of the Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules 1954 and Regulations 21a and c 8 and 13 of the Indian Police Service Appointment by Competitive Examination Regulations 1955These Provisions do not indicate that all the notified vacancies are to be filled up573G574B 13 From the materials placed before the Court it is fully estab 569 lished that there has not been any arbitrariness whatsoever on the part of the respondent in filling up the vacancies in question or other vacancies
The process of final selection had to be closed at some stage as was actually done
A decision in this regard was accordingly taken and the process for further allotment to any vacancy arising later was closed
It is not material if in pursuance of a decision already taken before closing the process of final selection the formal appointments were concluded later
What is relevant is to see as to when the process of final selection was closed
Mere completing the formalities dose not give any right to appointment
574E G 14 The decision to adopt a different policy with respect to filling up of the reserved vacancies is justified on account of the special circumstances
The decision to depart from the confirmed policy was taken after consideration by the authorities of the position in regard to unavailability of qualified candidates from year to year adversely affecting the desired strength of the reserved candidates in the services and cannot be condemned on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination
575B