Crl No 116 of 1990
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
RK Garg ND Garg Rajiv Kr
Garg and PC Choudhary for the Petitioner
UR Lalit and Ms Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA J
The short question arising for decision by us is the true meaning of Sub section 2 of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and its effect
For an Offence of murder committed on 1791978 the petitioner Ranjit Singh was convicted under Section 302 IPC by the Sessions Judge on 6 31979 and sentenced to life imprisonment which was confirmed by the High Court of Punjab  Haryana
While the petitioner was on parole after his conviction and sentence for first murder he was tried for the second murder committed On October 25 1980 and convicted under Section 303 IPC
This conviction was altered to one under Section 302 IPC and for the second murder also the petitioner was sentenced by this Court on 309
1983 to life imprisonment instead of death sentence
This Court while disposing of the
petitioner s appeal in this manner directed as under 746 We feel that life imprisonment would be the proper sentence that should be imposed upon the appellant
We accordingly reduce the sentence of death imposed upon him and sen tence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life
However since the present murder was committed by him within a span of one year of his earlier conviction and that too when he was released on parole we are clearly of the view that the instant sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to him should not run concur rently with his earlier sentence Of life imprisonment
We therefore direct that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him the present sentence should commence thereafter
 The petitioner has now filed this Writ Petition under Arti cle 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a suitable writ or direction to correctthe above direction given in the 0order dated September 30 1983 to bring it in consonance with Section 4272 Cr PC and consequently for his re lease on the ground that both life sentences had to run concurrently in accordance with Section 4272 Cr
PC and he is entitled to relief because he has undergone fourteen years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time of filing the Writ Petition on February 19 1990
This is how the question of construction of Section 4272 Cr
PC arises in the present case
Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is as under 427
Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence 1 When a person already undergoing a sentence of im prisonment is sentenced on a subsequent con viction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life such imprisonment  or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is whilst undergoing such sentence sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order the latter sen tence shall commence immediately
747 2 When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sen tenced on a subsequent conviction to
impris onment for a term or imprisonment for life the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous Sentence    Shri RK Garg learned counsel for the petitioner strenu ously urged that this Court s above quoted direction in the judgment dated 3091983 passed in Criminal Appeal No 418 of 1982 while affirming the conviction under Section 302 IPC for the second murder and imposing the punishment of life imprisonment for it also amounts to directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment are tO run consecutively and not concurrently which is in direct conflict with Sub section 2 of Section 427 Cr
PC He urged that the life span of a person Could be only one and therefore any subsequent life sentence must run concurrently and not consecutively which is the clear mandate of Section 4272
On this basis it was urged that this Court s direction in the above manner on the petitioner S conviction for the second offence of murder is contrary to Section 4272 of the Code 01 Criminal Procedure 1973
This is the basis of the reliefs claimed on behalf of the petitioner
In reply Shri UR Lalit
appearing
on behalf of respondents con tended that the direction of this Court properly construed is not contrary to Section 4272 Cr
PC and therefore the question of issuing any writ or directions claimed by the petitioner does not arise
We may straightaway mention that the question of grant of relief under Article 32 of the Constitution does not arise on the above facts
The petitioner s incarceration is the result of a valid judicial order and therefore  there can be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which alone can be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the COnstitution
The only question it ap pears therefore is about the correct construction of the direction given by this Court in its judgment dated 3091983 in Criminal Appeal No 418 of 1982 in the fight of the true meaning of Section4272 Cr
The meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for life is no longer res integra It was held by a Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State of Maharashtra and Others  that a sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation Or imprisonment for the whole of the remain ing period of the convicted person s natural life
It was further held 748 Unless the said sentence is commut ed or remitted by appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison
 The contention that a sentence of life imprisonment was to be treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term was expressly rejected
This view was followed and reiterat ed in Maru Ram vs Union of India  Ant 1981 1 SCR 1196 while considering the effect of Section 433A introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 with effect from 18121978
The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised one of its conclusions as under We follow Godse s case supra to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath and whatever the length of remissions earned the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Govern ment
 Another conclusion in Maru Ram was that the mandatory mini mum of 14 years  actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and short sentencing statutes made by the various States will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December 1978 when Section 433A came into force but Section 433A would apply to those sentenced by the trial court after 18121978 even though the offence was committed prior to that date
From these decisions it is obvious that the mandatory minimum of 14 years 
actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A is applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprisonment since the conviction by the trial court even for the first murder was after 18121978 the second offence itself being committed after 18121978
There is no dispute that the mandatory minimum of 14 years  actual imprisonment as required by Section 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment has not been served out by the petitioner and therefore irrespective of the points raised in this petition on the basis of Section 4272 Cr
PC the petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the Government
This alone is sufficient to refuse any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution
The question now is of the meaning of Section 4722 Cr PC and its effect in the present case in view of the above quoted direc 749 tion Of this Court in its judgment dated 3091983
Sub section 1 of Section 427Cr
PC provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment
In other words Sub section 1 of Section 427 Cr
PC deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is  subse quently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life
In such a situation the first sentence being for a fixed term expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made
 Sub section 1 says that in  such a situation the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence
Obviously in cases  covered by Sub section 1where the sentence is for a fixed  term the subsequent sentence Can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently
Sub section 2 on the other hand pro vides for an offender alreadly undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life
It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayaka Godse and reiterated in Maru Ram that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder or the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remit ted by the appropriate authority
This being so at thestage of sentencing by the Court On a subsequent conviction the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and therefore there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of
impriosnment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in Sub 
section 1 of Section 427
As rightly contended by Shri Garg and not disputed by Shri Lalit the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life  span the sentence on a subse quent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sen tence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might
It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub section 2 of Section 427 since the general  rule enunciated in sub section 1 thereof is that without the Court s direction the subse 
quent sentence will
not run concurrently but consecutively
The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subse quent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is 750 provided for in Sub section 2 which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on Sub section
1 if there be no express direction of the Court to that effect
Sub section 2 is in the nature of anexCeption to the general rule enacted in Sub section 1 of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run concurrently
The meaning and purpose of Sub sections 1  2of Section 427 and the object of enacting Sub section is therefore Clear
We are not required to say anything regarding the practical
effect of remission or commutation of the sentences since that question does not arise in the present case
The limited controversy before us has been indicated
The only question now is of the meaning and effect of the above quoted direction in this Court s judgment dated 3091983 It is obvious that the direction of this Court must be con strued to harmonise with Section 4272 Cr
PC which is the statutory mandate apart from being the obvious truth
The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life has there fore to run concurrently with the read as sentenceof imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner
Thed exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction which re under We therefore direct that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is grant ed to him the present sentence should commence thereafter
 It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the proceeding portion has to be read
This last sentence in the direction means that in case any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the earlier
sentence
of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission or commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the sub
sequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be unaffected by the remission or commuta tion in respect of the earlier sentence alone
In other WordS the operation of the superimposed subsequent sen tence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out merely because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority
The consequence is that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence
is also granted tO the petitioner
It is in this manner that the direction is given for the two Sentences of life impri 751 sonment not to run concurrently
The ultimate direction contained in the last sentence is obviously for this purpose
So construed the direction of this Court in the judgment dated 3091983 in Criminal Appeal No 418 of 1982 fully harmonises with Section 4272 Cr
PC This is the clarification we make of this Court s judgment dated 309
1983 in Criminal Appeal No 4 18 of 1982
We have already stated that this petition for the issuance of a writ Under Article 32 of the Constitution is untenable
We have there  fore treated it as a petition for clarification of the judgment dated 3091983 in Criminal Appeal No 418 of 1982
Accordingly the petition is disposed of with this clarifi cation
RP Petition disposed of


Summary:
Three brothers executed four sale deeds on June 25 1968 to respondent
The 4th brother whose legal represen tatives are the appellants filed four suits of pre emption against the vendee respondent and those were decreed on terms of payment of pre emption money on or before August 30 1970
The plaintiff pre emptors appellants filed four appeals before the District Judge for the reduction of the pre emption money
On an application moved by the pre emptors the time for deposit of the amount fixed under the decree by the Trial Court was extended till further orders
The appeals were rejected under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as being insufficiently stamped and not properly presented
Before hand however on 26101970 the plaintiff pre emptors deposited the pre emption amount in the Trial Court
The pre emptors sought execution of the pre emption decrees
The vendee judgment debtor raised objections stat ing that the suits stood automatically dismissed for non deposit of the pre emption money within the time identically stipulated under the decrees
The objection was sustained by the TrialExecuting Court
704 The appeal to the Appellate Court at the instance of the preemptors was allowed permitting the execution to pro ceed
A Single Judge of the High Court in further appeal upheld the view of the District Judge but the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals upholding the objection made by the vendee respondent that there were no decrees which could be executed against which these appeals by special leave to this Court were filed
The appellants contended that the controversy could be determined on the anvil of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure by extending time by the Court as it was extend able when any period was fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Court even though the period originally fixed or granted had already expired that this Court should exercise its plenary power in the interests of justice to extend the time
Dismissing the appeals this Court HELD 1
There is no law of pre emption permitting a decree to be drawn in terms of Section 151 of the Punjab Pre emption Act
Were the Court to exercise at all the discretions on the subject the Court would in any event be completing the process of decreeing the suits the suits which have been held to fall down under Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure tantamounting to their dismiss al and that too on present day when such decrees cannot be passed
707C D 2
The objections of the vendee must remain sustained and the pre emptor appellants must fail in the event not getting their suits for pre emption decreed
Decretal money deposited by the appellants may be permitted to be withdrawn by them if not already withdrawn
707F G Atarn Parkash vs State of Haryana  Ors   followed
Jogdhayan vs Babu Ram  Ors  and Jagar Dhish Bhargava vs Jawahar Lal Bhargava and Others   referred to