ivil Appeal No 1372 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 2911986 of the Rajasthan High Court in Spl
Appeal No 336 of 1984
J Sorabjee Roxena Swamy Sushil Kr
Jain and LC Agarwala for the Appellant
Anil Dev Singh Hemant Sharma CVS Rao Mrs Sushma Suri NP and Ms A Subhashini NP for the Respond ents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH CJ
The question for consideration in this appeal is whether an establishment which is manufactur ing carpets is subject to the Act XIX of 1952 here inafter referred to as the Act 
The appellant is a part nership firm carrying on the business of 419 manufacturing and selling carpets in the State of Rajasthan at three factories belonging to it
When steps were taken to direct the appellant to comply with the provisions of the Act by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner the appel lant contested the applicability of the Act on the ground that the establishment owned by it was not manufacturing textiles  included in Schedule I to the Act
The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner after giving opportunity of being heard to the appellant passed an order on 27th July 1979 holding that the business of manufacturing carpets carried on by it made the Act applicable to the appellant as carpets were textiles
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant filed a petition under section 19A of the Act before the Central Government
The Central Government passed an order on 4th May 1981 holding that the appellant s establishment was engaged in the manufacture of textiles  and accordingly the order of the Regional Provident Commis sioner was upheld
The appellant thereafter filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Rajasthan High Court Jaipur Bench
The High Court by its order dated 15th October 1984 dismissed the writ petition
The appel lant then appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court and the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the appeal on 29th January 1986
This appeal by special leave is filed against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan
The only point urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the products namely carpets which are being manufactured by the appellant did not come within the meaning of the expression textiles  described in Schedule I to the Act and hence the Act was in applicable
Clause a of sub section 3 of section 1 of the Act pro vides that subject to the provisions contained in section 16 the Act applies to every establishment which is a facto ry engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which 20 or more persons are employed
The relevant part of Schedule I to the Act reads thus Any industry engaged in the manufacture of any of the following namely Cement
Cigarettes
Electrical mechanical or general engineering products
Iron and Steel
Paper
Textiles made wholly or in part of cotton or wool or jute or silk whether natural or artificial   420 Clause d of the Explanation contained in Schedule I to the Act reads thus d the expression textiles includes the products of carding spinning weaving fin ishing and dyeing yarn and fabrics printing knitting and embroidering
 It is not disputed that was material with which the carpets are made is wool which is one of the materials mentioned in the Schedule namely textiles made wholly or in part of cotton or wool or jute or silk whether natural or artificial
The activity of manufacturing carpets is generally understood as the weaving of carpets and the man who is engaged in such activity is popularly known as a carpet weaver 
Weaving means to form a fabric by interlac ing yarn on a loom
It also means the method or pattern of weaving or the structure of a woven fabric
The warp means yarn arranged length wise on a loom
The fabric which is woven includes the weft which means yarn woven across the width of the fabric through the length wise yarn
Thus the activity of the weaving involves passing of the weft through the warp
While doing so even if there are any knots in the yarn still the activity is weaving
The mere fact that there is knotting of the yarn the fabric which is ultimately produced does not cease to be a textile fabric
The fact that the Handicrafts Board has issued certificate under the Import Trade Control Policy Handbook of Rules that carpet is a product of handicrafts does not in any way improve the matter
Even then the carpets do not cease to be textiles
That certificate is not enough since we are very clear that the activity of making carpets though it involves knotting in substance amounts to weaving and the carpet is a fabric which is woven
Thus it comes within the meaning of the expression textiles as explained in clause d to the Explanation of Schedule I to the Act
We are therefore on the view that the establishment in question comes within Schedule I to the Act
In Porritts  Spencer Asia Ltd vs State of Haryana  this Court held that the concept of textiles  is not a static concept
It has having regard to newly developing materials methods techniques and process es a continually expanding content and new kinds of fabric may be invented which may legitimately without doing any violence to the language be regarded as textiles
The word textiles  is derived from Latin texere  which means to weave and it means woven fabric
When yarn whether cotton silk woollen rayon 421 nylon or of any other description made out of any other material is woven into a fabric what comes into being is a textile  and is known as such
Whatever be the mode of weaving employed woven fabric would be textile 
What is necessary is no more than the meaning of yarn and weaving would mean binding or putting yarn together by some process so as to form a fabric
A textile need not be of any partic ular size or strength or weight
The use to which it may be put is also immaterial and does not bear on its character as a textile
The fact that the dryer felts  are used only as absorbents of moisture in the process of manufacture in a paper manufacturing unit cannot militate against dryer felts  falling within the category of textiles if otherwise they satisfy the description of textiles
It is not necessary to refer to the other decisions cited before us in this case
The non inclusion of knotting in the Explanation to Schedule defining textiles  is therefore immaterial
No other point was pressed before us in this case
We there fore hold that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner the Government of India and the High Court were right in holding that the establishment of the appellant came within the scope of the Act and the appellant was liable to comply with the requirements of the Act in all respects
The ap peal therefore fails and it is dismissed
GN Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant firm an unsuccessful applicant for a license for vending foreign liquor in New Delhi for the year 954 1955 moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the order granting the license to a rival applicant and impleaded the Chief Minister the Excise Commissioner the Secretary and the Under Secretary Finance of the State of Delhi as it then was as parties to the application
Its case in substance was that the applications made for the grant of the licence were never placed before the Chief Commissioner who alone was the competent authority to grant it under Ch
5 r i of the Delhi Liquor License Rules 1935 framed under section 59 Of the Punjab Excise Act Punj 1 of 1914 as extended to Delhi and no order granting the license was ever made by him
The said opposite parties respondents although repeatedly called upon by the High Court to do so did not produce the entire records and filed evasive affidavits and eventually produced a letter written by the Under Secretary Finance to the Excise Commissioner intimating that the Chief Commissioner had made the order for granting the license to the rival applicant and maintained that the order had in fact been made by the Chief Commissioner
The High Court under a misapprehension of fact and of the true nature and effect of that letter written by the Under Secretary Finance to the Excise Commissioner held that the order had in fact been passed by the Chief Commissioner
The production of the entire records in the 1425 Supreme Court made it clear and the respondents also conceded that the applications were never placed before the Chief Commissioner nor any order granting the said license was ever made by him
What had happened was that upon an order made by the Chief Minister on the file in accordance with a note put up by the Under Secretary Finance the latter wrote a letter to the Excise Commissioner in reply to a previous one of his that the license might be granted to the said rival applicant
That letter on which the High Court had relied was in the following terms With reference to your letter No 295C54 dated the 31st August 1954 on the above subject I am directed to say that the Chief Commissioner is pleased to approve under Rule 5 1 of Delhi Excise Manual Vol
11 the grant of L 2 license to Messrs Gainda Mall Hem Raj New Delhi in place of the L 2 License surrendered by Messrs Army  Navy Stores New Delhi
Necessary license may kindly be issued to the party concerned under intimation to this Secretariate 
There was nothing on the record to show that the Chief Commissioner had ever concurred in the order made by the Chief Minister on the file
Held that the attempt of the official respondents to by pass the Court must be strongly deprecated and the order of the High Court must be reversed
When a superior Court issues a rule on an application for a writ of certiorari it is incumbent upon the inferior Court or the quasi judicial body to whom the rule is addressed to produce the entire records along with the return so that the superior Court may satisfy itself that the inferior Court or the quasijudicial body has not exceeded its lawful jurisdiction
Non production of such records as in the instant case must defeat the purpose which the writ has in view
Held further that in view of the undisputed practice that such a license once granted by the Chief Commissioner was almost automatically renewed by the Collector year to year it could not be said that the writ application and the appeal had become infructuous on the expiry of the period of the license in dispute and it was only proper that the appeal should be heard on merits
In the facts and circumstances of the case it was impossible to hold that the letter of the Under Secretary embodied the order of the Chief Commissioner or that the Court could not be asked to go behind it
The letter was clearly a communication of the sanction and could not be equated with the sanction itself
Although an Under Secretary was competent to authenticate an order made by the Chief Commissioner the letter in question did not purport to be made in the name of the Chief Commis sioner and therefore the letter could not be treated as a properly 1426 authenticated order to which the presumption raised by article 166 of the Constitution could properly attach
Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs The State of Bombay  held inapplicable