ivil Appeal No 4802 of 1989
From the Judgment and Order dated 791987 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No 24 of 1986
Anil Dev Singh C Ramesh CVS Rao and P Parmeshwa ran for the Appellants
SK Mehta Dhruv Mehta Aman Vachher Atul Nanda and SM Satin for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETrY J
Special Leave granted
This case raises yet another variant of a vexed ques tion
Does Section 232 of the Land Acquisition Act 1984 as amended by Act 68 of 1984 providing for higher solatium proprio rigore apply to award made subsequent to 24 Septem ber 1984 even though the acquisition commenced prior to the said date
The appeal also raises another important question as to the applicability of section 23IA providing addi tional amount of compensation to award made in such acquisi tion proceedings
The facts are not in dispute and may be stated as follows By notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 the Act  published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967 the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the respondent for estab lishing Naval Air Station Dabolim
On 23 February 1968 notification under section 6 was published in the Gazette
On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining compensation at the rate of 40 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent
The claimant had sought reference under section 18 of the Act and reference was duly made to the Civil Court District Judge
On 339 28th May 1985 the Court after investigation of the claim awarded compensation at Rs3 per square meter
The Court also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment of compensation
Not being satisfied the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of compensation and also solatium at 30 per cent
This claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984
The High Court accepted the appeal and granted the reliefs in the following terms The impugned award dated 28th May 1986 is modified
The appellant is entitled to the added benefits
In that he shall be entitled to have the compensation at the rate of 12 of the market value from the date of section 4 notification till the date of possession or the date of award whichever is earlier
The appellant is further entitled to interest at the rate of 9 for the first year from the date of taking over possession and thereafter at the rate of 15 per annum till the date of deposit or payment as the case may be
The appellant shall be entitled to further 15 per cent solatium in addition to the 15 per cent already granted to him
To the extent indicat ed above the award shall stand modified
 The High Court has thus granted three more reliefs to the claimant i Additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent of the market value from the date of notification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession ii interest at the rare of 9 for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subsequent years and iii solatium at 30 per cent on the market value
There is no grievance made in this appeal as to the second of the reliefs granted to the claimant
The claimant is entitled to the interest under section 28 of the Act
The challenge is only against the first and the third of the said reliefs
They were evidently given under the amended sections 23IA and 232 of the Act
We will first take up the question of solatium
On 30 April 1982 the corresponding Bill of the Amending Act 68 of 1984 namely Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 was introduced in Parliament
On 24th September 1984 it became law as the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984 when it received assent of the President
Before the amend ment Section 232 provided solatium at 15 340 per cent on the market value
After amendment by Act 68 of 1984 solatium was raised to 30 per cent on the market val ued
Section 232 now reads 232 In addition to the market value of the land as above provided the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition The question herein is whether the higher solatium is attracted to the present case
Section 232 has been given limited retrospectivity by supplying transitional provisions under section 302
Section 302 reads 30
Transitional provisions 1 xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx 2 The provisions of sub section 2 of Section 23 of the principal Act as amended by clause b of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the princi pal Act after the 30th day of April 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1984 in the House of the People and before the commence ment of this Act The scope of retrospective operation of Section 232 was first explained in Kamalajammaniavaru vs Special Land Acquisition Officer A two Judge Bench held that the award of 30 per cent solatium will apply only where the award appealed against was made by the Collector of Court during the period between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
This decision was rendered on 14 February 1985
Shortly thereafter there was another decision by a three Judge Bench in Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chand igarh  There a contrary view was ex pressed
It was held that even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30 April 1982 and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30 April 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date 30 per cent solatium under section 232 should be 341 allowed
In taking that view Bhag Singh overruled Kamala jammannavaru and approved of the opinion expressed in anoth er three Judge Bench in State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh But the recent Constitution Bench in Union of India vs Raghubir Singh  has overruled Bhag Singh and Mohinder Singh and reiterated the view ex pressed in Kamalajammanaivaru
Pathak CJ speaking for the Court in Raghubir Singh case rounded off his discussion thus at 782 We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of section 302 will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates
The word or  is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under section 302 is sought to be extended
If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates the benefit of section 302 will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates
If the pro ceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or Supreme Court it is at that stage when the benefit of section 302 will be applied
But in every case the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984 In stating thus the decision has set at rest the con troversy as to entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending Act
Section 232 was held to apply to awards made in between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
Obviously they must be awards in acquisition commenced prior to the said dates
The award may be of the Collector or Court
One or the other must receive thirty per cent solatium on the market value of the land
More important that the higher solatium could also be given by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeals against such award
But these decisions do not solve the problem presented here
The award with which we are concerned does not fall within the interregnum ie between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
To repeat the facts The acquisition com menced on 26 October 1967 when the notification under sec tion 41 of the Act was published
On 5 March 342 1969 the Collector made the award and on 28 May 1985 the reference court made the award
Both the awards thus appar ently fall outside the period prescribed under section 302
Counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid facts rules out the applicability of section 302 in the first place
Secondly he also ruled out the applicability of section 232
The first contention was based on the plain terms of Section 302 and the second on the ground that section 232 with its isolated splendour is not retrospective in operation
He thus submitted that the claimant s case could not be saved for higher solatium either under Transitional Provisions or by amended Section 232 of the Act and it was gone both ways
This submission reminds us of the words of Shakespeare in the Merchant of Venice where Luncelot tells Jessica Truely then I fear you are damned both by father and mother
When I shun scylla your father I fail into charybdis your mother
Well you are gone both ways The Merchant of Venice 35
The submission that Section 232 by itself has no retrospective operation seems to be justified
It is signif icant to note that section 232 forms part of a scheme of determining compensation for land acquired under the Act
It provides 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acqui sition
It thus operates on the market value of the land acquired
The market value of the land is required to be determined at the date of publication of the notification under section 41
It cannot be determined with reference to any other date
That has been expressly provided for under section 231 of the Act
In the instant case section 41 notification was published on 20 October 1967
The Amending Act 68 of 1984 came into force on 24 September 1984
The amended section 232 by itself is not retrospec tive in operation
It can not proprio vigore apply to awards in respect of acquisition proceedings commenced prior to 24 September 1984
If therefore section 302 does not cover the present case then amended Section 232 has no part to play
This in effect is the result of the plain meaning rule of interpreting Section 302 of the Amending Act 68 of 1984
But then it would seem very odd indeed and anomalous too to exclude the present case from the operation of sec tion 302
Section 302 is the Transitional 343 Provisions
The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provi sions in any Act or amendment is to clarify as to when and how the operative parts of the enactments are to take ef fect
The Transitional Provisions generally are intended to take care of the events during the period of transition
Mr Francis Bennion in his book on Statutory Interpretation 14 Edition p 442 outlines the purpose of such provisions 189
Transitional Provisions Where an Act contains substantive amending or repealing enactments it commonly also in cludes transitional provisions which regulates the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition
Where an Act fails to include such provisions expressly the Court is required to draw such inferences as to the intended tran sitional arrangements as in the light of the interpretative criteria it considers Parlia ment to have intended
 The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended
This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question
That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose without reference to its nature or purpose
A statute is neither a literary text nor a devine revelation Words are certainly not crystals trans parent and unchanged as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned
Town vs Eisher   425 1918
Learned Hand J was equally emphatic when he said
Stat utes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them Lenigh Valley Coal Co vs Yensavage 2 at 553 Section 302 provides that amended provisions of Sec tion 232 shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to any award made by the collector or Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 or to an appellate order therefrom passed by the High Court or Supreme Court
The purpose of these provisions seems to be that the awards made in that interregnum must get higher solatium in as much as to awards made subsequent to 24 September 1984
Perhaps it was thought that awards made after the commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984 would be taken care of by the amended Section 232
The case like the present one seems to have escaped attention by innocent lack of due care in the drafting
344 The result would be an obvious anomaly as will be indicated presently
If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the Court could shape the law to remove the anomaly
If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurd ity or inconsistency the Court could discard such interpre tation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature
That could be done if necessary even by modification of the language used
See Mahadeolal Kanodia vs The Administrator General of West Bengal The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the Court decide
They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific cases
If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legis lature but not within the literal meaning of the statute then the court must strike the balance
The criticism that the literal interpretation of Section 302 if adhered to would lead to unjust result seems to be justified
Take for example two acquisition proceedings of two adjacent pieces of land required for the same public purpose
Let us say that they were initiated on the same day a day sometime prior to 30 April 1982
In one of them the award of the Collector is made on 23 September 1984 and in the other on 25 September 1984
Under the terms of Sec tion 302 the benefit of higher solatium is available to the first award and not to the second
Take another example the proceedings of acquisition initiated say in the year 1960 in which award was made on 1 May 1982
Then the amended Section 232 shall apply and higher solatium is entitled
But in an acquisition initiated on 23 September 1984 and award made in the year 1989 the higher solatium is ruled out
This is the intrinsic illogicality if the award made after 24 September 1984 is not given higher solatium
Such a construction of Section 302 would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided
We therefore hold that benefit of higher solatium under section 232 should be available also to the present case
This would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the pur pose of Section 302
In this view of the matter the higher solutium allowed by the High Court is kept undis turbed
This takes us to the second question which we have formulated at the beginning of the judgment Whether the claimant is entitled to additional amount of compensation provided under Section 23IA of the Act This is equally a fundamental question and seemingly not covered by any of the previous decisions of this Court
345 Section 23IA reads as follows In addition to the market value of the land as above provided the court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notifica tion under Section 4 sub section  in respect of such land to the date of award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier
Explanation In computing the period referred to in this sub section any period or periods during which the proceedings for the aquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded
 The objective words used in this sub section are similar to those that are used in Section 232
It enjoins a duty on the Court to award the additional amount at twelve per cent on the market value of the land for the period prescribed thereunder
But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 231 of the Act
It also operates on the market value of the land acquired
It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publica tion of notification under section 41
But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of section 23IA for certain cases
That will be found from Section 30 sub section la and b of the Transitional Provisions
They read as follows Section 30 Transitional Provisions 1 The provision of sub section IA of Section 23 of the principal Act as inserted clause a of section 15 of this Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to a every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April 1982 the date of intro duction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 in the House of the People in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date
346 b every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act
 Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 231A depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30 April 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date
Section 30 sub section 1a provides that additional amount provided under Section 23IA shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30 April 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date
If the Collector has made the award before that date then that additional amount cannot be awarded
Section 30 sub section 1b provides that section 23l A shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30 April 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before 24 September 1984
The final point to note is that Section 30 sub section 1 does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in section 30 sub section 2
In the case before us on 26 October 1967 the notifica tion under section 4 was issued
On 5 March 1969 the Collec tor made the award
The result is that on 30 April 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector
Therefore section 30 sub section 1a is not attracted to the case
Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30 April 1982 section 30 sub section 1b is also not applicable to the case
Here the case is really gone by both ways
It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis
The claimant is therefore not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23 I A
Before we part with the case it is important that we should refer to two authorities of the High Courts which have taken contrary view
As to the applicability of Section 23IA to pending cases the Karnataka High Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer Dandeli vs Soma Gopal Gowda AIR 1986 Karnataka 179 at 183 FB has expressed the view that for giving an addi tional amount calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the market value of the land no distinction could be made respecting lands acquired before or after the coming into force of the Amending Act
In all pending cases whether on reference or on appeal the Court is required to apply the provisions of Section 231A in determining compensa tion payable to claimants
For this conclusion the Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in 347 Bhag Singh case
The Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P Sardesai etc
vs Government of Goa Daman and Diu and Ant AIR 1987 Bom 214 at 217 FB has also accepted a similar line of reasoning
In fact the reasons are so much similar the cases look like twins
Both the High Courts have focussed attention on the terms and phraseology used in Section 30 sub section 1 namely   shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation has also been proceedings for acquisition   
The conclusion has also been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23lA
It was said that it enjoins a duty on the court to award the amount in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not be ignored
The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the conclusion
But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology used in Section 30 sub section 1 is quite similar to that used in Section 30 sub section 2
The scope of those words has already been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh has been overruled in Raghubir Singh
The view taken by the High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay therefore could no longer be cosidered as good law and the said decisions are accordingly overruled
In the result the appeal is allowed in part
The judg ment of the High Court is modified and the compensation award under Section 23IA is deleted
The judgment and decree in other respects are kept undisturbed  In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
Y Lal Appeal allowed


Summary:
This is a land lord s appeal
By an agreement in writing between the parties the second floor of the premises bear ing No 1910 Rajinder Nagar New Delhi was let out to the Respondent for a limited period of three years wef
June 8 1980 with the permission of the Rent Controller obtained under section 21 of the Act
The Respondent tenat having failed to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question after the expiry of the stipulated period the appellant moved an application before the Rent Controller for execution of his order by delivery of possession of the premises to him
The Respondent tenant filed an objection to the said application to which the appellant replied duly
The Rent Controller rejected the appellant s application taking the view that the permission granted under section 21 of the Act was invalid and thus the tenant could not be evicted on the expiry of 3 years
The Rent Controller there by upheld the tenant s objection that the landlord s son being aged only 19 or 20 years on the date of the expiry of the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age pre scribed by law for marriage being 21 years the ground that the premises were needed for the son s marriage was not tenable
The Rent Controller accordingly held that creation of limited tenancy amounted to fraud and misrepresantation by the landlord which rendered the permission invalid
The appellant s appeal to the Tribunal as also to the High Court having failed he has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave
The Tribunal and the High Court affirmed the view of the Rent Controller treating the grant of permission by the Controller to be mechanical and without application of mind
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD The object of enquiring into the validity of the Control 300 ler s permission under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a limited tenancy existed and the same was genuine and it is not meant to permit raising of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the very object of its enact ment
This view protects the honest tenants and only curbs the frivolous and vexatious pleas
310H 311A Controller s permission when granted to create a limited tenancy under sec
21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise
It is therefore for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceedings
Unless this is done the order remains enforceable
The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the pleas of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance its enforce ability cannot be doubted
31lB C All that has to be seen is whether the period of limited tenancy was indicated by the landlord with reference to a foreseeable future event and the estimate of time of its occurrence was not unreasonable
312B When the period of limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a future event the happening of which is reasonably certain at that time though the precise date of the future event cannot be predicted with precision the landlord s estimate of the period after which the event is expected to happen unless unreasonable must be accepted for this pur pose as genuine
This would satisfy the test of a genuine limited tenancy if there be no other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence adopted by the landlord
312C D The enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this behalf is not the same as that for determining existence of ground of bona fide need of the landlord for an order of eviction under section 14 of the Act and section 14 is expressly superseded by section 21
The scope of enquiry is limited only to the existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of the permission when its validity is chal lenged subsequently
312F The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having been proved by the respondent tenant even after objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy there was no ground to refuse restora tion of possession to the landlord
313C SB Naronah vs Prem Kumari Khanna   VS Rahi  Anr
vs Smt
Ram Chambeli   Smt
Dhanwanti vs DD Gupta 1986 3 SCC 1 Inder Mohan Lal vs 301 Ramesh Khanna   SK Lata vs RC Chhiba  Anr  and JR Vohra vs India Export Hlouse P Ltd  Anr
   referred to