ivil Appeal No 584 of 1982
From the Judgment and Order dated 2191979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No 2247 of 1979
AB Rohtagi and MS Mann for the Appellant
Harbans Lal and Ashok K Mahajan for the Respondents
The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by K RAMASWAMY J I wholly agree with my learned brother Saikia J with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions
He has succinctly stated the facts of the case and the relevant provisions of law and they need no reiteration
I would add only few points which I deem relevant to be dealt with
As regards the applicability of the limitation of six months period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt
under Section 42 of the Act assailing legality or propriety of the scheme prepared or confirmation thereof or repartition made in pursuance thereof it could be angulated from yet another perspective
Indisputably Section 42 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1960 incorporating after the words any order passed Scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made
Rule 18 was made in exercise of the rule making power by the subordinate legislation
After the amendment of Section 42 was made to exercise the revisional power by the State Govt
against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made correspondingly no amendment to Rule 18 was made bringing within its ambit scheme prepared or con firmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof
It is unnecessary to go into the question whether Rule 18 was declared to be intra vires or not
We proceed on the footing that Rule 18 is ultra vires and applies to the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt
under Section 42
The omission to amend the Rule is an indication of the legislative animation that the limitation of six months prescribed under the Rule 18 would be confined to be ap plicable only to any order passed by any officer under the Act
Thereby by necessary implication the prescription of the limitation of six months for filing revision petition against the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof would stand excluded
It is no 580 doubt true as contended for respondents that the Consolida tion Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it or modified or repartition made when it is objected to by the affected party has to consider the objections and as a part thereof by necessary implication has to assign reasons and the record must contain reasons
But the legislature made a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme pre pared or confirmation thereof or repartition affected in pursuance thereof
He is not free to take arbitrary deci sion
Assigning reasons are sine quo non for application of the mind though he does not appear to communicate the rea sons therefore
But to an order passed assigning reasons in its support and communication thereof are necessary concomi tants and this was made manifest when Section 19 20 and 21 are looked into
As regards the exercise of the power under Section 19 and 20 the statute does not envisage passing any orders
But when exercise of the power in Sub sec
20 of 21 the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limitation against those orders to the appellate forums
This also is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42
It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amena ble to the revisional jurisdiction under section 42
The State Govt would consider the legality or propriety of the reasons or the grounds on which the scheme was initially prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof
But that does not mean that it is an order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under Rule 18 would get attracted to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof
Thus I have
little hesitation to hold that the prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by any officer under the Act it would not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti tion made in pursuance thereof
It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre scribed for exercise of the revisional power under Section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made it would be exercised within a reasonable time
What is a reasonable time is always a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case
When legisla ture chose not to fix a particular period of limitation by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particu lar period
The long lapse of time may be a fact for the revisional authority to take into 581 account in the light of the facts and circumstances obtain able in an appropriate case
No absolute or precise period of limitation could be predicated or laid
Take for instance the facts of this case
the previous Sarpanch is a benefici ary from the impugned order and has chosen not to take steps to have the scheme impugned by filing a revision under Section 42 of the Act
The Gram Panchayat being a juristic person could not by itself except through the executive authority take
any action against the scheme prepared by the Consolidation Officer to assail its legality or proprie ty by filing the revision
The revision petition was filed soon after the new Sarpanch came into office
Take another instance of a case where the officer concerned and the person benefitted in confabulation have made a scheme and repartition affected in pursuance thereto and kept it in dark to the knowledge of the person affected by the scheme prepared or the partition made
Until the person affected had actual knowledge it is not possible to become award of it
The limitation begins to run from the date of the knowl edge of the fraud so played
It is always open to the af fected person to come forward and say that for the first time he became aware of the scheme prepared or partition made in pursuance thereof only when his rights are sought to be interfered with or exercise of the enjoyment of the property is interdicted
Therefore immediately within a reasonable time thereafter he is to file a revision before the State Govt
Having had the knowledge of the impugned action if he stood by without taking any further action it is always open to the other party to bring it to the notice of the State Govt
of the ground or the circumstances under which the revision petitioner when he became aware of the scheme prepared or the repartition made and he deliberately chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt
is satisfied of the same unless satisfactory explanation for the delay is given the State Govt
may decline to interfere with the impugned action or may decline to entertain the revision petition itself
Thus it could be seen that each case has to be angulated on its own given facts and circumstances as to the reasonable period of limitation within which the revi sional power is to be filed
Even though more than 5 years time had elapsed from the date of the preparation of the scheme till date of the filing of the revision under Section 42 there is sufficient ground in this case for the new Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months from the date of the original scheme and the State Govt
is well justified in exercising the power under Section 42
The High Court is unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the Consolidation Officer
Accordingly the appeal is al lowed
No costs
582 KN SAIKIA J
This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandi garh dated 2191979 in Civil Writ Petition No 2247 of 1979 allowing the petition and setting aside the order of the Director Consolidation of Holdings dated 821979
The appellant Gram Panchayat hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat  was the owner of 1200 Bighas of land in village Kanonda Tehsil Bahadurgarh District Rohtak
A Scheme of consolidation of holdings hereinafter referred to as the Scheme  of the village was confirmed on 1511974 under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation Act 1948 50 of 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
The Panchayat there fore moved an application under section 42 of the Act on 2091977 for setting aside the Scheme objecting to the utilisation of the land of value of 2 two annas and allotments made to the other rightholders for their benefit
On 241
1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was made for information of all the villagers concerned but the rightholders were absent and ex party proceedings were taken against them
The Panchayat s case was that under the said Scheme the Panchay at land was consolidated repartitioned and allotted to persons who did not have any right to hold the land
Be sides the land of Dharat containing two wells and a big house being religious place of worship was also partitioned under the Scheme and consequently the Panchayat has been reduced to a landless person financially weakened and rendered incapable of rendering service in the village
After hearing the parties the Director in his order dated 82
1979 observed that it was evident from the perus al of the record that the Scheme of Consolidation of the village was confirmed on 151
1974 whereas the application had been filed on 209
1977 and as such the application had been filed too late
After the expiry of six months period the application was time barred
However he said in his order In this case only to benefit some land own ers the land of the value of two annas has been allotted due to which the deserving persons have been left over and they have not been given even Abadi plots
Apart from this the Panchayat had no other land to cultivate due to which the Panchayat is unable to devel op the agricultural schemes and in these circumstances of the matter I condone the delay in filing the present application
 583 He accordingly set aside the Scheme and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer under section 212 of the Act with some directions
Against that order the respondents moved the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No 2247 of 1979 urging inter alia that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had condoned the delay without there being any ground for the same and that in doing so he had acted illegally and with material irregu larity
The High Court held that from the observations of the Director it was evident that the delay was condoned on extraneous considerations as no reason whatsoever was given by the applicant in the application filed before him under section 42 of the Act as to why it was filed after the period of limitation
In that view of the matter holding that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had acted illegally and with material irregularity in condoning the delay the High Court by the impugned order dated 21979 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 821979
Mr AB Rohtagi the learned counsel for the appel lant submits that the High Court erred in setting aside the Director of Consolidation s order applying to the confirma tion of the Scheme the period of limitation of six months as prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings Consoli dation and Prevention of Fragmentation Rules 1949 herein after referred to as the Rules  inasmuch as that rule speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme and that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings Jullundar  taking the view that the bar of limitation under Rule 18 does not apply to those petitions under section 42 in which the legality or validity of a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab and Har yana 148 and that Full Bench decision has since been followed in Mr Rohtagi further submits that on merits also there was ample justification for the Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as Panchayat lands were taken into consolidation and repartitioned and allotted to persons who had no right to obtain the land thereby impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapa ble of giving any help to the villagers
Mr Harbans Lal learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Full Bench decision that the limitation under rule 18 does not cover an order confirming a scheme is not tenable inasmuch as confirmation of a scheme is only by an order as contemplated under rule 18 and an applica tion challenging that order of confirmation has there 584 fore to be made within six months thereof and that even assuming that there was no bar of limitation an application had to be made within a reasonable time which according to learned counsel would be about two years  and that by any standard the appellant s application under section 42 was belated and could not have been allowed
Lastly counsel submits that there were three earlier applications dismissed by the Director under section 42 of the Act including one by the Panchayat itself and the Director had no power to review his own order
The questions to be decided therefore are whether for the purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confir mation of a scheme would be an order as envisaged in the rule if it was not an order whether the Director was justified in setting aside the scheme and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer and whether the Direc tor s order was one of review of his earlier order and as such beyond his jurisdiction
To decide the first question we may conveniently refer to the provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules
Section 42 of the Act empowers the State Government to call for proceedings under the Act
It says 42
Power of State Government to call for proceedingsThe State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed scheme prepared or confirmed or repar tition made by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit Provided that no order or scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed with out giving the parties interested notice  to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration
 From a perusal of this section there arises no doubt that under it the State Government may for the stated purpose call for proceedings wherein any order is passed scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act
Under the proviso the State 585 Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme or repartition without giving the interested parties opportuni ty of being heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration
There is therefore no doubt that this section envisages proceedings wherein order is passed scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made
These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under this section
Rule 18 deals with limitation for application under section 42 and it reads 18
Limitation for application under section 42 An application under section 42 shall be made within six months of the date of the order against which it is filed Provided that in computing the period of limitation the time spent in ob taining certified copies of the orders and the grounds of appeal if any filed under sub section 3 or sub section4 of section 21 required to accompany the application shall be excluded Provided further that an applica tion may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore if the appli cant satisfies the authority competent to take action under section 42 that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period
 From a perusal of this rule there arises no doubt that for applying this rule the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application and in computing the period of limitation of six months the time spent in ob taining the certified copy is to be excluded
While the Division Bench comprising PC Jain and Tewa tia JJ of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the instant case applied the period of limitation to the confirmation of the scheme and in that view of the matter set aside the Director s order the Full Bench comprising PC Jain Acting CJ Tewatia and Tiwana JJ
held A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules would show that it provides limitation only for petitions filed against orders 586 passed
There is no reference in the Rules to a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made
The fact that in section 42 of the Act the words scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made  have been added as a result of amendment cannot justify the conclusion that in Rule 18 of the Rules these words have also to be read
 We respectfully agree with this view
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as we find it and the words of the rule are simple precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense
Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word order  namely that in section 42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made while in rule 18 it would include them
The Full Bench therefore rightly held that rule 18 of the Rules does not apply to those proceedings in which the legality or validity of the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is chal lenged
The Full Bench rightly approved the decision in Haqiqat Singh vs Addl
Director Consolidation of Holdings AIR 1981 Punjab  Haryana 204 wherein it was held that a reading of section 42 as well as the scheme of the Act unmistakably pointed out that the statute made a clear distinction between order passed by an officer under the Act and the performance of duties by the authorities under the Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of scheme of consolidation and re partition made in pursuance thereof
So it could not possibly be held that preparation or confir mation of a scheme and the repartition carried would fail within the scope of order  as used in rule 18 of the rules
The rule did not come into play when a petitioner challenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation of the repartition made in pursuance there of
The amendment made this position clear
In a subsequent decision reported in Joginder Singh and Ors
vs The Director Consolidation of Holdings decided on August 8 1988 where the direct hold ers had not challenged any order of the consolidation au thorities but had attacked the validity of the scheme and the repartition it was rightly held that the bar of limita tion of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted to the facts of that case
Mr Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require reconsideration
We do not agreed
We have perused the provisions of the Act and rule 18
The Act provides for the compulsory consolidation of and for prevention of fragmen tation of agricultural holdings in the 587 State of Punjab and for the assignment or reservation of land for common purposes of the village
It appears that prior to the Act there were two methods of consolidation in vogue in the Province one through the Revenue Department and the other through the Cooperative Department but the progress of consolidation was very slow and lengthy and the Act sought to remedy those defects
Section 19 of the Act provides for publication of draft scheme and on such publi cation any person likely to be affected by such scheme shall within 30 days of such publication communicate in writing to the Consolidation Officer any objections relating to the scheme
The Consolidation Officer shall after considering the objections if any received submit the scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary togeth er with his remarks on the objections to the Settlement Officer Consolidation
Thus in this section we do not find any provisions for any order being passed
Section 20 deals with confirmation of the scheme
Under sub section2 thereof if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section 1 of section 19 and also if no written or oral objections to the draft scheme are received under subsection 3 of that section by the Settlement Officer Consolidation he shall confirm that scheme
Under sub section 3 if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section 1 of section 19 or if any written or oral objections are received by the Settle ment Officer Consolidation before the confirmation of the draft scheme by him the Settlement OfficerConsolidation may after taking the objections into consideration together with the remarks thereon of the Consolidation Officer and also after considering the written or oral objections either confirm the scheme with or without modifications or refuse to confirm it
In case of such refusal the Settlement Offi cer Consolidation shall return the draft scheme with such directions as may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer for reconsideration and resubmission 
Under sub section 4 upon the consideration of the scheme under sub section 2 or 3 the scheme as confirmed shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned
Thus this section also does not envisage passing of any order with reference to any person affected by the scheme
It may be true as Mr Harbans Lal submits that the confirmation may be done in the form of an order
However the word order  has not been used by the legislature in this sec tion
Section 21 deals with repartition
Under sub section 1 of this section the Consolidation Officer shall after obtaining the advice of the land owners of the estate or estates concerned carry out repartition in accordance with the scheme of consolidation of holdings 588 confirmed under section 20 and the boundaries of the hold ings as demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra which shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned
There is no provision of passing of any order  under this sub section
Under subsection 2 any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objec tion within 15 days of the publication before the Consolida tion Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such orders as he considers proper confirming or modifying the repartition
Thus this sub section envisages passing of orders on the objections after hearing the objectors
Sub section 3 provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer under sub section 2 may within one month of that order file an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation who shall after hearing the appellant pass such order as he considers proper
This sub section also clearly envisages passing of an order on appeal by an aggrieved person as above
Subsection 4 provides that any person aggrieved by the order of Settle ment Officer Consolidation under sub section 3 whether made before or after the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation Second Amendment and Validation Act 1962 may within 60 days of that order appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolida tion and under sub section 5 any appeal against an order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation pending under sub section 4 immediately before the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings Consolidation and Prevention of Frag mentation Second Amendment and Validation Act 1962 either before the State or any officer to whom the powers of the State Government in this behalf have been delegated shall be decided by the Assistant Director of Consolidation
Thus the above sub sections clearly envisage passing of orders by the respective authorities
We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules
It would be clear that though section 42 envisaged orders preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a pro ceeding where an order was passed
There is the maxim ex pressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one thing is the exclusion of another
Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another
When certain persons or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred
When mention has been made only of Orders  the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are 589 excluded
Again Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretation
The best interpretation is made from the context
As we have seen while section 19 and 20 did not envisage passing of any order section 21 envisaged passing of orders
Section 42 deals with applications against or ders preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition
Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition 
We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench deci sion in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings supra
Mr Harbans Lal s submission that even if no limitation was prescribed the application of the Panchayat before the Director was inordinately delayed is not tenable
According to the learned counsel the period of two years would be reasonable period
We are unable to agree
In matters like Consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to reasonable period after which an appli cation could be made under section 42 of the Act
The legis lature itself did not do so
In the instant case the Pan chayat filed the application on 20th September 1977 before the Director of Consolidation under section 42 of the Act praying for the revocation of the Scheme and for directions for fresh valuation to be ordered and repartition effected through appropriate authorities stating that the Sarpanch was not given any Nishan Dehi or demarcation on the spot nor was issued any passbook and the petition was not filed earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only a month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in time
The original Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of the Panchayat land and he took no steps and the present Sarpanch took charge only a few months ago
There were lot of complaints about valuation and allotments to rightholders
Under the above circumstances when the Director himself considered it fit for granting the prayer it cannot be said that the application was unreasonably delayed
The next submission of Mr Harbans Lal is equally un tenable
It is true that in Harbhajan Singh vs Karam Singh and Anr   it has been held that there is no provision in the Act granting express power of Review to the State Government with regard to an order made under section 42 of the Act and in the absence of any such power the Director Consolidation of Holdings could not have reviewed his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchay at 590 under section 42 of the Act and if so done the review order of the Director would be ultra vires and without jurisdiction
In the instant case it has not been shown to us that the Panchayat earlier moved any application under section 42 on the same subject matter and the instant order of the Director amounted to a review of his own order
There is no material to hold that the instant order of the Direc tor is an order of review of his earlier order and Mr Rohtagi clearly denied that it was so
In the result we allow this appeal set aside the im pugned order of the High Court and restore that of the Director Consolidation
We however leave the parties to bear their own costs
Y Lal Appeal allowed


Summary:
The respondent company obtained sanction of a building plan from the New Delhi Municipal Committee for the con struction of a building on a plot held by it on lease
After incorporating certain changes the respondent company sub mitted a revised plan for sanction of the New Delhi Munici pal Committee but the same was rejected by an order Dated 18121987
A rectified plan was thereafter submitted by the re spondent to the New Delhi Municipal Committee for necessary sanction but as no orders were received the respondent filed a writ petition in High Court seeking a direction to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to deal with the same for grant of necessary sanction
During the pendency of the aforesaid writ proceedings the Delhi Urban Art Commission approved the plans as re quired under Section 12 of the Delhi Urban Art Commission Act 1973
The Chief Fire Officer also gave clearance to the building plans in relation to the Fire Safety Precautions
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition by an Order dated 2841989 holding that inspite of the clearance grant ed by the Urban Art Commission and the Chief Fire Officer New Delhi Municipal Committee s disinclination to accord the sanction was unjustified and directed the New Delhi Munici pal Committee to convey the formal sanction in respect of the building plans
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the New Delhi Municipal Committee that i in the matter of fire safety requirements the building plans were not in accordance with Building Bye Laws for the Union Territory of Delhi 1983 ii The clearance given by the Chief Fire Officer is not binding on the New Delhi Municipal Committee which can examine the question independently of such clear ance and iii the proposed building plan does not provide for a PodiumPedestrian Walk way as required under the approved Zonal Development Plan under Sec
92 of the Delhi Development Act 1957
Setting aside the High Court Order dated April 28 1989 this Court HELD 1
The requirements of Bye Laws 1648 arc not inflexible and in appropriate cases where the plans and designs incorporate fire safety measures which in judgment of the Corporation are 593 considered to provide for the safety in a measure better than those envisaged by the bye laws 1648 the Corporation would not be precluded from accepting them ie if a build ing design incorporate fire safety measures in a measure promoting fire safety precautions far better than those suggested by the Bye laws they should not fetter the hands of the licencing authority to accept them
609H 610A 609C 11 Whether the plans submitted by Respondent distribut ing Refuge Area in each floor provide such a better and more reliable fire safety measures is a matter for the decision of the Corporation
610A 12 It is of course wise in the interests of uniformi ty of administration of these Bye laws and of elimination of possible complaints of  partisanship that the Corporation should insist upon adherence to the requirements of the Bye law 1648 on its own strict terms
That should not however denude the power of the Corporation to accept designs which in its judgment offer and incorporate fire safety precautions of higher measure
608H 609A 13 When fast and sweeping changes are overtaking the fundamental ideas of building design and construction and new concepts of building material emerging it would be unrealistic to impute rigidity to provisions essentially intended to promote safety in building designs
609A 2
The clearance from the Chief Fire Officer envisaged by Bye law 171 is an additional condition and not a limita tion on the power of the Corporation to satisfy itself that the building plans provide for adequate fire safety precau tion in accordance with its bye laws or in a better measure
The clearance by the Chief Fire Officer which is expected to involve and follow a technical assessment and evaluation obliges the Corporation to give due weight to it but having regard to the scheme and language of the bye laws the deci sion of the Chief Fire Officer is not binding on the Corpo ration
609E 21 The clearance of the plans by the Chief Fire Offi cer would not render it obligatory on the part of the Corpo ration ipso facto to treat the plans as necessarily comply ing with the requirements of relevant bye laws
While the clearance by the Chief Fire Officer is an indispensable condition for eligibility for sanction however such clear ance by itself is not conclusive of the matter nor binding on the Corporation which is entitled to examine the question independently of such clearance from the Chief Fire Officer
609G 610B 594 3
Bye law 16481 requires that Refuge Areas shall be provided on the external Walls by means of cantilever projections or in any other manner
The words in any other manner in Bye law 16481 are not intended to envis age a totally different idea of the location of Refuge Areas but prima facie intended to suggest some feasible alternative to the technical design of the construction of the Refuge Area whether it should be a cantilever projec tion or designed in some other way
The purpose of Refuge Areas include that in the event of an out break of fire in the building persons exposed to the hazard should be able to have immediate access to a place of safety which by its access to fresh air insulates them from heat and smoke and further that those persons could conveniently be extricated and rescued to safety by rescue operations
Therefore Refuge Areas must be located on walls which open into vacant space from which rescue operations are possible
610C 611B 610D G 31 The word external wall in bye law 16481 which is a provision intended to promote public safety health and well being must receive a purposive construction which promotes those objects and purposes
Having regard to the very purpose of providing for Refuge Areas the expression external wall must be held to be one which abuts a vacant space to which fighting and rescue equipment can have access and from which rescue operations are feasible
610D 610F 32 In the instant case the Refuge Areas are provided on the wails that open into an inner vacant space
Refuge Area located on a wail though abutting an inner vacant space would not by itself promote the object if the vacant space is such that no rescue operations are possible to be con ducted therefrom
If the fire fighting and rescue equipment cannot have access to such inner vacant space then in the context of the specific objectives of bye law 16481 the wail abutting such inner vacant space would not be an external wall for the purpose of the said bye law
The Corporation should decide this question and examine whether such rescue operations are feasible from the inner circular vacant space
This is an exercise individual to each case and to be judged on case to case basis
610C E H 611A 4
Though the Zonal Development Plans envisaged a raised pedestrian walk way on either side of Barakhamba Road and the provision for podia connecting the building with the walk way were accepted and an appropriate notification issued way back in 1966 no steps appear to have been taken to give effect to them in a uniform manner
In fact several authorities including a Committee constituted by the Lt Gover 595 nor of Delhi in 1983 and the Chief Fire Officer have advised against the implementation of the proposal
In such circumstances insistence to have such a pedestrian walk way for the building if such walk ways do not already obtain in other buildings on the Road requires reconsideration
Moreover the insistence for provision of such a walk way in an individual case without the integration and continuation of the walk way along the whole of the road would indeed be purposeless
611G H 612A B Respondent to effect such rectifications to the plans in regard to the Refuge Area as may be necessary the New Delhi Municipal Committee to consider and decide the ques tion of according sanction to the plans without insisting upon any fresh clearance from Delhi Urban Arts Commission or the Chief Fire Officer
Appeal to be kept pending and be taken for final disposal after the submission of the report from New Delhi Municipal Committee