Appeal No 766 of 1976
Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated 29 11 75 of the Industrial Tribunal Orissa in Industrial Dispute Case No 575 and Special Leave Petitions Civil Nos 1844A and 184576 LN Sinha Sol
Gen Govind Das Mrs section Bhandare M section Narasimhan A K Mathur and AK Sharma for the Appel lant
J P Goyal and Shree Pal Singh for the Respondent
Gobind Das PH Parekh and Miss Manju Jatly for the petitioner In SLP Civil Nos 1844A and 184576
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI J
The Appellant the Paradip Port Trust is a major port governed by the provisions of the and is managed by Board of Trustees consti tuted under the provisions of the said Act
Under section 5 of the said Act the Board of Trustees is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power subject to the provisions of the Act to acquire hold or dispose of property and may sue or be sued in the name of the Board
An industrial dispute was raised by the Paradip Shramik Congress representing the workmen with regard to the termination of the service of one Nityananda Behera a temporary teacher in the Paradip Port Trust High School
The dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal Cen tral Bhubaneswar Orissa under section 10 1  d of the briefly the Act
The respondents hereinafter to be referred to as the Union appeared before the Tribunal through the Adviser and General Secretary of Paradip Shramik Congress
The appel lant sought to be represented before the Tribunal through Shri T Misra Advocate who was a Legal 539 Consultant of the Trust
The appellant filed their au thority in Form F  under rule 36 of the Orissa Industrial Dispute Rules in his favour
The appellant subsequently filed also a Power of Attorney executed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees in favour of Shri T Misra who was admittedly a practising Advocate of the Orissa High Court
An objection was taken by the Union to the representa tion of the Paradip Port Trust hereinafter to be described as the employer by Shri T Misra Advocate and the Union refused to give their consent to his representation as required under section 364 of the Act
The Tribunal after hearing the parties upheld the objec tion of the Union
The Tribunal examined the terms and conditions of the appointment of Shri T Misra as Legal Consultant of the employer and held as follows  His duties and the restrictions on his practice which have been extracted above and the terms as to his professional fees etc indicate that the relationship of the first party and Shri Misra is clearly that of a client and his lawyer and not that of employer and employee
Hence Shri Misra cannot be said to be Officer of the first party
 The Tribunal further held Merely by execution of a power of attorney the restrictions attached to a legal practitioner contained in sub section 4 of the Act cannot be circumvented
I would accordingly bold that Shri Misra who is a legal practitioner cannot represent the first party before this Tribunal even if he holds a power of attorney executed in his favour by the first party The appellant has obtained special leave of this Court against the above order of the Tribunal
We have heard the Solicitor General on behalf of the appellant and Shri Goyal for the respondents
Along with the above appeal two Special Leave petitions Nos
1844 A and 1845 of 1976 are also posted for hearing for admission and we have heard Mr Gobind Das at great length
The two Special Leave Petitions are by the management of Keonjhar Central Cooperative Bank Ltd One application is relating to rejection by the Tribunal of the Bank s prayer for representation before the Tribunal through its Advocate Shri BB Rath on the ground of objection by the Union under section 364 of the Act
The second application relates to the order of the Tribunal allowing Shri AC Mohanty Advocate and Vice President of the Keonjhar Central Cooperative Bank Employees Union under section 361 of the Act notwithstanding the objection of the management
Industrial law in India did not commence with a show of cold shoulder to lawyers as such
There was an unimpeded entrance of legal practitioners to adjudication halls before tribunals when the Act first came into force on April 1 1947
Three years later when the Labour Appellate Tribu nals were constituted under the Industrial Disputes Appel late Tribunal Act 1950 a restriction was imposed on the parties 3 1234SCI76 540 in engagement of legal practitioners before the Appellate Tribunal without consent of the parties and leave of the Tribunal
When this was introduced in the appellate forum the same restriction was imposed for the first time upon representation of parties by legal practitioners before the Industrial Tribunals as well see Section 34 of the Indus trial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act 1950
In view of the recent thinking in the matter of preferring legal aid to the poor and weaker sections of the people it may even be possible that the conditional embargo under section 364 may be lifted or its rigour considerably reduced by leaving the matter to the Tribunals permission as has been the case under the English law
Restriction on parties in respect of legal representa tion before Industrial Courts is not a new phenomenon
It was there in England in the Industrial Courts Act 1919 9  10 Geo 5 c 69 and
does not appear to be altered even by the Industrial Relations Act 1971
Section 9 of the English Act provides that except as provided by rules no person shall be entitled to appear on any such proceedings by counsel or solicitor
 However rule 8 of the Industrial Court Procedure Rules 1920 allows persons to appear by counsel or solicitor with permission of the court
The Act envisages Investigation and settlement of indus trial disputes and with that end in view has created various authorities at different levels all independent of one another
The word adjudication occurs only with reference to labour courts industrial tribunals and national tribu nals
These bodies are manned by Judges of High Courts or by officers with appropriate Judicial and labour law experi ence
The conciliation proceedings held by a Board or a Conciliation Officer are mainly concerned with mediation for promoting settlement of industrial disputes
It is reason able to suppose that the presence of legal practitioners in conciliation may divert attention to technical pleas and will detract from the informality of the proceedings imped ing smooth and expeditious settlement
Legal practitioners entrusted with their briefs cannot be blamed if they bring forth their legal training and experience to the aid and benefit of their clients
But labour law operates in a field where there are two unequal contestants
The Act there fore takes care of the challenge of the situation in which the weaker party is pitted against the stronger before adjudicating authorities
That appears to be one of the reasons for introducing consent of the parties for represen tation by legal practitioners
Employers with their purse naturally can always secure the services of eminent coun sel
The question that arises for consideration will turn on the interpretation of section 36 of the Act which may be quoted 361 A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in an proceed ing under this Act by a any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member 541 b any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause a is affiliated c where the worker is not a member of any trade union by any member of the executive or other office hearer of any trade union connected with or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and autho rised in such manner as may be prescribed
2 An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any pro ceeding under this Act by a an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member b an officer of a federation of associa tions of employers to which the association re ferred to clause a is affiliated c where the employer is not a member of any association of employers by an officer of any association of employers connected with or by any other employer engaged in the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed
3No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any concili ation proceedings under this Act or in any proceed ings before a Court
4 In any proceeding before a Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be
 Section 36 provides for representation of parties before the Tribunals and the Labour Court
Under section 361 a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by three classes of officers mentioned m a b and c of that sub sec tion
Similarly under section 362 an employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by three classes of officers mentioned in a b and c of that sub section
By sub section 3 a total ban is imposed on representation of a party to a dispute by a legal practitioner in any concili ation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court of enquiry
Then comes section 364 which introduces the requirement of prior consent of the opposite party and 542 leave of the Tribunals and of the Labour Court as the case may be for enabling a party to be represented by a legal practitioner
Under the scheme of the Act the parties to an industrial dispute are employers and employers employers and workmen and workmen and workmen section 2K
The definition of appropriate Government under section 2a of the Act lays bare the coverage of industrial disputes which may be raised concerning amongst others several types of corporations mentioned therein companies mine oil field cantonment board and major port
The definition of employer under section 2g which is a purposive but not an exhaustive definition shows that an industrial dispute can be raised in relation to an industry carried on even by the Government and by local authorities
It need not be added that indus try is also carried on by private owners private companies and partnerships
Employers and workmen will therefore be drawn from numerous sources
Leaving aside for the present industrial disputes between employers and employers and workmen and workmen such disputes almost always are between employers and workmen
Prior to the insertion of section 2A in the Act by the Amendment Act 35 of 1965 a dispute raised only by a single individual workman did not come under the category of an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2k
Left to himself no remedy was available to such an aggrieved individual workman by means of the machinery provided under the Act for adjudication of his dispute
Such an individual dispute for example relating to the discharge or dismissal of a single workman however became an industrial dispute only if a substantial body of workmen or a union of workmen espoused his cause
The trade union of workmen therefore comes to be recog nised as a live instrument under the Act and has an active role to play in collective bargaining
Thus so far as workmen are concerned union is alsmost always involved in the dispute from the inception
Since the dispute itself in a large number of cases takes the character of industri al dispute from participatory involvement of the trade union the Act confers an unbartered right upon the workmen to be represented by a member of the executive or by an office bearer of a registered trade union
It is there fore in the very scheme of things that a workman s absolute right to be represented by an office bearer of the union is recognised under the Act
Indeed it would have been odd in the entire perspective of an industrial dispute and the objects and purposes of the Act not to give due recognition to the union
But for a provision like section 361  of the Act there may have been difficulty under the general law in the way of the office bearers of the union represent ing workmen before the adjudicating authorities under the Act unless perhaps regulated by the procedure under sec tion 11 of the Act
To put the matter beyond controversy an absolute right is created in favour of the workmen under section 361 in the matter of representation
Having made such a provision for the workmen s representation the employer is also placed at par with the workmen in similar terms under the Act and the employer may also be represented by an officer of the association of employers of which the employer is a member
The 543 right is extended to representation by the office bearers of the federation of the unions and by the officers of the federation of employers
The provisions of section 361 and 362 confer on the respective parties absolute rights of representation by persons respectively specified therein
The rights of representation under section 361 and section 362 are unconditional and are not subject to the condi tions laid down under section 364 of the Act
The said two sub sections arc independent and stand by themselves
As stated earlier section 36 deals with representation of the parties
Neither the Act nor section 36 provides for appearance of the parties themselves when they are individu als or companies or corporations
The Tribunals and the Labour Courts being quasi judicial authorities dealing with rights affecting the parties cannot adjudicate their dis putes in absence of the parties
It is therefore incum bent upon the Tribunals and Labour Courts to afford reasona ble opportunity to the parties to appear before them and hear them while adjudicating industrial disputes
This position is indisputable
Section 36 therefore is not exhaustive in the sense that besides the persons specified therein there cannot be any other lawful mode of appearance of the parties as such
As indicated earlier section 36 does not appear to take count of companies and corporations as employers
It is however common knowledge that industri al disputes are raised in a predominantly large number of cases where companies or corporations are involved
Since companies and corporations have necessarily to appear through some human agency there is nothing in law to pre vent them from being represented in any lawful manner
As Salmond says  Every legal person therefore has corresponding to it in the world of natural persons certain agents or representa tives by whom it acts     Salmond on Jurispudence 12th Edition page 312 It is not intended under the Act that companies and corporations are confined to representation of their cases only through the officers specified in section 362 of the Act
They can be represented by their directors or their own officers authorised to act in that behalf in a lawful manner provided it is not contrary to any provision of the Act
This would not however mean that the companies and corporations and for the matter of that any party are free to engage legal practitioners by means of a special power of attorney to represent their interests before the Tribunals without consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal
Again although under section 362c there is provi sion for the contingency of an employer not being a member of an association of employers the device of representation provided therein would not fit in the case of a Government Department or a public corporation as an employer
These categories of employers known to the Act will be put to the most unnatural exercise of enlisting the aid of an outside 544 association albeit connected with the same type of indus try to defend their cases before Tribunals
Such an absurd intent cannot be attributed to the legislature in enacting section 36 which will be if that section is the be all and end all of the types of representations envisaged under the Act
The impossibility of the position indicated above a crucial pointer to section 36 being not exhaustive but only supplemental to any other lawful mode of represen tation of parties
The parties however will have to conform to the conditions laid down in section 364 in the matter of representation by legal practitioners
Both the consent of the opposite party and the leave of the Tribunal will have to be secured to enable a party to seek representation before the Tribunal through a legal practitioner qua legal practitioner
This is a clear significance of section 364 of the Act
If however a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practising advocate the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him
Similarly if a legal practitioner is an officer of an association of employers or of a federation of such associations there is nothing in section 364 to prevent him from appearing before the Tribunal under the provisions of section 362 of the Act
Again an office bearer of a trade union or a member of its executive even though he is a legal practitioner will be entitled to represent the workmen before the Tribunal under section 361 in the former capacity
The legal practi tioner in the above two cases will appear in the capacity of an officer of the association in the case of an employer and in the capacity of an office bearer of the union in the case of workmen and not in the capacity of a legal practitioner
The fact that a person is a legal practitioner will not affect the position if the qualifications specified in section 361 and section 362 are fulfilled by him
It must be made clear that there is no scope for enquiry by the Tribunal into the motive for appointment of such legal practitioners as office bearers of the trade unions or as officers of the employers associations
When law provides for a requisite qualification for exercising a right fulfilment of the qualification in a given case will entitle the party to be represented before the Tribunal by such a person with that qualification
How and under what circumstances these qualifications have been obtained will not be relevant matters for consideration by the Tribunal in considering an application for representation under section 361 and section 362 of the Act
Once the qualifications under section 361 and section 362 are fulfilled prior to appearance before Tribunals there is no need under the law to pursue the matter in order to find out whether the ap pointments are in circumvention of section 364 of the Act
Motive of the appointment cannot be made an issue before the Tribunal
545 We may note here the difference in language adopted in section 361 and section 362
While section 361 refers to any member of the executive or other office bearer section 362 instead mentiones only an officer Now executive in relation to trade union means the body by whatever name called to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is entrusted section 2gg
Office bearer in relation to a trade union includes any member the executive thereof but does not include an auditor section 2III
So far as trade unions are concerned there is no difficulty in ascertaining a member of the executive or other office bearer and section 361 will create no difficulty in practical application
But the word officer in section 362 is not defined in the Act and may well have been as done under section 230 of the Companies Act
This is bound to give rise to controversy when a particular person claims to be an officer of the association of employers
No single test nor an exhaustive test can be laid down for determining as to who is an offi cer in absence of a definition in the Act
When such a question arises the Tribunal each individual case will have to determine on the materials produced before it wheth er the claim is justified
We should also observe that the officer under section 362 is of the association or of the federation of associations of employers and not of the company or corporation
The matter of representation by a legal practitioner holding a power of attorney came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal of India in the year 1951 see Kanpur Hoisery workers  Union vs
JK Hosiery Factor  Kanpur1
The provision for representation which applied to the Appellate Tribunal was section 33 of the repealed Industrial Disputes Appeallate Tribunal Act 1950
This section corresponds to section 36 of the with which are concerned
Although the Appel late Tribunal rejected the claim of the party to be repre sented by the legal practitioner on the basis of a power of attorney with which we agree the reasons for its conclu sion based solely on the ground of section 36 being exhaus tive do not meet with our approval
The Appellate Tribunal took the view that the Act intended to restrict the repre sentation of parties to the three clases of persons enumer ated in sub sections 1 and 2 of section 33
The Appel late Tribunal was of the view that sub sections1 and 2 of section 33 were intended to be exhaustive of the persons other than the party himself who might represent either of the party
Since holding of a power of attorney is not one such mode the claim of the legal practitioner failed ac cording to the Appellate Tribunal
The Rajasthan High Court in Duduwala  Co and others vs Industrial Tribunal and another2 took the same view
Our attention has been drawn to the decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts where in a contrary view has been taken with regard to the interpretation of section 36 as being exhaustive see Hall  Anderson Ltd vs
SK Neogi and another3 and Khadilkar K K General Secretary Engineering Staff Union Bombay vs Indian Hume Pipe Company LtdBombay and another 4
For the reasons already given by us we are 1 1952 I LLJ 384
2 AIR 3 1954 ILLJ 629
4 1967 ILLJ 139 546 of opinon that the views of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and that of the Rajasthan High Court in this aspect of the matter are not correct and the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts are right in holding that section 36 is not exhaus tive
The Solicitor General contends that and in section 364 should be read as or in which case refusal to con sent by a party would not be decisive in the matter
The Tribunal will then be able to decide in each case by exer cising its judicial discretion whether leave in a given case should be given to a party to be represented by a lawyer notwithstanding the objection of the other party
It is pointed out by the Solicitor General that great hardship will be caused to public corporations if the union is given a carte blanche to finally decide about that matter of representation by refusing to accord its consent to repre sentation of the employer through a legal practitioner
It is pointed out that public corporations and even Government running a transport organisation like the State transport cannot be expected to be members of any employers  associa tion
In their case section 362 will be of no avail
To deny them legal representation would be tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to represent their cases before the Tribunal
It is submitted that since such injustice or hardship cannot be intended by law the final word with regard to representation by legal practitioners before the Tribunal should rest with the Tribunal and this will be effectively implemented if the word and in section 364 is read as or
This it is said will also achieve the object of the Act in having a fair adjudication of disputes
We have given anxious consideration to the above submis sion
It is true that and in a particular context and in view of the object and purpose of a particular legislation may be read as or to give effect to the intent of the Iegislature
However having regard to the history of the present legislation recognition by law of the unequal strength of the parties in adjudication proceedings before a Tribunal intention of the law being to discourage repre sentation by legal practitioners as such and the need for expeditious disposal of cases we are unable to hold that and in section 364 can be read as or
Consent of the opposite part is not an idle alternative but a ruling factor in section 364
The question of hardship pointed out by the Solicitor General is a matter for the legislature to deal with and it is not for the courts to invoke the theory of injustice and other conse quences to choose a rather strained interpretation when the language of section 36 is clear and unambiguous
Besides it is also urged by the appellant that under section 30 of the  every advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise in all courts and before only tribunal section 30i and ii
This right conferred upon the advocates by a later law will be properly safeguarded by reading the word and as or in section 364 says counsel
We do not fail to see some difference in language in section 30ii from the provision in section 141 b of the  relating to the right of advocates to appear before courts and tribu nals
For example under section 141 b of the 547 Bar Councils Act an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise save as otherwise provided by or under any other law in any courts other than High Court and tribunal
There is however no reference to any other law in sec tion 30ii of the 
This need not detain us
We are informed that section 30 has not yet come into force
Even otherwise we are not to be trammelled by section 30 of the for more than one reason
First the is a special piece of legislation with the avowed aim of labour welfare and representation before adjudicatory authorities therein has been specifical ly provided for with a clear object in view
This special Act will prevail over the which is a general piece of legislation with regard to the subject matter of appear ance of lawyers before all courts tribunals and other au thorities
The is concerned withrepresentation by legal practitioners under certain conditions only before the authorities mentioned under the Act
Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant
As Maxwell puts it Having already given its attention to the particular subject and provided for it the legis lature is reasonably presumed not to intend to alter that special provision by a subsequent general enactment unless that intention be main fested in explicit language  or there be something in the nature of the general one making it unlikely that an exception was intended as regards the special Act
In the absence of these conditions the general statute is read as silently excluding from its operation the cases which have been provided for by the special one
1 Second the matter is not to be viewed from the point of view of legal practitioner but from that of the employer and workmen who are the principal contestants in an industrial dispute
It is only when a party engages a legal practi tioner as such that the latter is enabled to enter appear ance before courts or tribunals
Here under the Act the restriction is upon a party as such and the occasion to consider the right of the legal practitioner may not arise
In the appeal before us we find that the Tribunal after considering the materials produced before it held that Shri T Misra could not claim to be an officer of the corpora tion simply because he was a legal consultant of the Trust
The Tribunal came to this conclusion after examining the terms and conditions governing the relationship of Shri Misra with the Trust
He was neither in pay of the company nor under its control and enjoyed freedom as any other legal practitioner to accept cases from other parties
It is significant to note that one of the conditions of Shri Misra s retainer is that he will not appear in any suit or appeal against the Port until he has ascertained from the Chairman that his services on behalf of the Port will not be required
 That is to say although on a retainer and with fixed fees for appearance in eases there is no absolute ban to appear even 1 Maxwell on lnterpretation of Statutes 11th Ed P 169
548 against the Port
This condition is not at all consistent with the position of an officer of the Trust
We agree with the opinion of the Tribunal that Shri Misra cannot be held to be an officer of the Trust
A lawyer simpliciter cannot appear before an Industri al Tribunal without the consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal merely by virtue of a power of attor ney executed by a party
A lawyer can appear before the Tribunal in the capacity of an office bearer of a registered trade union or an officer of associations of employers and no consent of the other side and leave of the Tribunal will then be necessary
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs
Necessarily the Special Leave Petitions also fail and stand dismissed


Summary:
The appellant is a major port
An industrial Dispute was raised by the respondent workmen with regard to the termina tion of the services of one of the employees
The dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under section 101d of the 
The appellant sought to be represented through Shri T Mishra Advocate who was described as Legal Consultant of the appellant
Mr Misra admittedly is a practising advocate of the Orissa High Court
An objection was taken by the respondent to the representation of the appellant by Mr Misra
The respond ents refused to give their consent as required by section 364 of the Act
The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the relationship between the appellant and Mr Misra is that of a client and his lawyer and not that of an employer and employee
The Tribunal also held that merely by execution of a power of attorney the restrictions attached to a legal practitioner contained in subsection 4 by Section 36 cannot be circum vented
Dismissing the appeal HELD 1
The Industrial Law in India did not commence with a show of cold shoulder to lawyers
For the first time restriction was imposed in the year 1950 on the engagement of legal practitioners before the Appellate Tribunal without consent of the parties and leave of the Tribunal
The restrictions on legal representations before the Industrial Courts existed in England also
The act envisages investi gation and settlement of industrial disputes and with that end in view has created various authorities at different levels all independent of one another
It is reasonable to suppose that the presence of legal practitioners in concili ation may divert attention to technical pleas and will detract from the informality of proceedings impeding smooth and expeditious settlement
Legal practioners entrusted with their briefs cannot be blamed if they bring forth their legal training and experience to the aid and benefit of their clients
But Labour Law operation operates in a field where there are two unequal contestants
The Act therefore appears to be taking care of the challenge of the situation in which a weaker party is pitted against the stronger before adjudicating authorities
Under section 36 1 a workman who is a party to a dispute is entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by 3 classes of officers mentioned in sub clauses a b and c of that sub section
By sub section 3 a total ban is imposed a b and c of a party to a dispute by legal practi tioners in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a Court of enquiry
Under section 364 a parry who desired to be represented by a legal practitioner has to take prior consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal
539G H 540A E F 541H  542A 2
The rules of representation under section 361 and 2 are unconditional and are not subject to the conditions laid down in section 364
543A 3
Section 36 deals with the representation of the parties
Neither the Act nor section 36 provides for ap pearance of the parties themselves when they are individuals or Companies or
Corporations
The Tribunals and Labour Courts being quasi judicial authorities dealing with the rights affecting the parties cannot adjudicate their dis putes in the absence of the parties
It is therefore incum bent on the Tribunals and Labour Courts to afford reasonable opportunity to the parties to appear before them and hear them while adjudicating the industrial disputes
543B C 538 Section 36 is not exhaustive
It is not intended under the Act that Companies and Corporations are confined 10 representation of their cases only through the officers specified in section 362 of the Act
They can be repre sented by the Director their own officers
However they cannot engage legal practitioners by means of special power of attorney
543C F 4
If a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer of a Company or Corporation and is
in their pay and under their control and is not a practising advocate
the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the Company or the Corporation being represented by him
Similarly if a legal practitioner is an officer of an association of employers or an office bearer of a Trade Union there is nothing in section 364 to prevent him from appearing before the Tribunal
544 C D There is no scope for the enquiry by the Tribunal into the motive for the appointment of such legal practitioner as office bearer of the Trade Union or the Employers  Associa tion
544 F 5
The contention that and  should be read as or  in section 364 is negatived
Consent of the opposite party is not an idle alternative but a ruling factor in Section 364
546 E F