ivil Appeal No 321 of 1962
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated August 4 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Referred Case No 29 of 1957
M Rajagopalan and KR Choudhri for the appellant
The respondent did not appear
April 10
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J
This appeal has been filed by special leave of this Court against the judgment of 4 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which the appellant who is an Advocate was held guilty of professional misconduct and had been suspended from practice for five years
The facts relating to the misconduct charged were briefly these The three respondents before us and one other Kagga Veeraiah were plaintiffs m OS 432 of 1951 on the file of District Munsiff Guntur in which a claim was made for possession of certain lands
The appellant was the Advocate for these plaintiffs
The suit was dismissed by the Trail Court and an appeal was filed therefrom to the Subordinate Judge Guntur and pending the disposal of the appeal there was a direction by the Court that the crops standing on the suit land be sold and the proceeds deposited into Court
In pursuance of this order a sum of about Rs 1600 was deposited into Court on December 19 1951
The appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed by the Subordinate Judge
The  unsuccessful defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court but meanwhile the plaintiffs made an application for withdrawing the amount deposited in Court
By virtue of interim orders passed by the Court they were granted liberty to withdraw the sum pending disposal of the second appeal in the High
Court filed by the defendants on furnishing security of immovable property
The security was furnished and
the withdrawal was ordered
A cheque petition EA 250 of 1952 was accordingly filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque was issued in favour of the Advocate the appellant before us for Rs 14524  this being the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of poundage etc
It was admitted that this cheque was cashed by the appellant on April 23 1953
The appellant did not dispute that
he cashed this cheque on behalf of his clients or that the latter were entitled to be paid this sum and the charge of professional misconduct against the 5 appellant was that the Advocate had not made this payment in spite of demands but that on the other hand he falsely claimed to have paid them this sum
To resume the narrative of the matters leading to these proceedings the second appeal before the High Court was disposed of in August 1955 and by the judgment of that Court the appeal was allowed and the plaintiff s suit dismissed
The plaintiffs had therefore to refund the sum to the defendants in the suit
On February 8 1956 the plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the sum complaining that the cheque had been cashed by him but that its proceeds had not been paid over
On April 14 1956 the appellant replied to this notice claiming to have paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt and statingthat the receipt happened to be in the bundle of case papers which had been returned to them
But even before the receipt of this reply the three respondents before us filed a complaint under sections 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act alleging the non payment of the money and charging the Advocate with professional misconduct in respect of it and praying for an enquiry into his conduct
The appellant was an Advocate and hence the complaint was treated as one under section 10 2 of the 
The explanation of the Advocate was called for
and thereafter the District
Judge Guntur was directed
to hold an inquiry into the allegations of professional misconduct against the appellant and forward his report to the High Court
An elaborate inquiry was thereafter held by the learned District Judge who after considering the evidence submitted a report recording his conclusion that the appellant s case was not unbelievable and that on that ground he was entitled to the benefit of doubt
The matter then came up before the High Court for consideration on this report
Some point 6 appears to have been made before the Court that certain material witnesses had not been examined
Agreeing with the submission they directed the District Judge to summon and examine them and this was accordingly done their evidence was recorded and submitted to the High Court
The matter was thereafter heard by a Bench of 3 Judges and the learned Judges being of the opinion that the charge against the appellant viz that he did not pay over the amount of the cheque to his clients was clearly made out held him guilty of professional misconduct and imposed the punishment of suspension from practice as stated earlier
The appellant then applied and obtained leave of this court special leave under article 136 to challenge the correctness of these findings and that is how the matter is before us
Before proceeding further we desire to indicate the nature of the jurisdiction of this Court in such matters and in broad outline the principles which it would observe in dealing with them
The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal as these expressions are used in articles 133 and 134 of the Constitution
In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court and the Advocate owes a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his clients
In another aspect it is a statutory power and we would add a duty vested in the Court under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act to ensure that the highest standards of professional rectitude are maintained so that the Bar can render its expert service to the public in general and the litigants in particular and thus discharge its main function of co operating with the judiciary in the administrance of justice according to law
This task which is at once delicate and responsible the statute vest in the High Court and therefore the primary responsibility of ensuring it rests with it 7 This Court is in consequence most reluctant to interfere with the orders of High Courts in this field save in exceptional cases when any question of principle is involved or where this Court is persuaded that any violation of the principles of natural justice has taken place or that otherwise there has been a miscarriage of justice
Where however none of these factors are present it is not the practice of this Court to permit the canvassing of the evidence on the record either for reappraising it or to determine whether it should be accepted or not
The findings of the High Court therefore on questions of fact are not open before us and this Court would only consider whether on the facts found the charge of professional misconduct is established
Learned Counsel for the appellant urged before us several grounds in support of the appeal but we consider that none of them merits serious attention
It was first submitted that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and that this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant
Our attention was drawn to the terms of section 10 2 of the reading 10
2 Upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any Court or by the Bar Council or by any other person that any such Advocate has been guilty of misconduct the High Court shall if it does not summarily reject the complaint refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar Council or after consultation with the Bar Council to the Court of a District Judge hereinafter referred to as a District Court and may of its own motion so refer any case in which it has otherwise reason to believe that any such advocate has been so guilty and the argument was that the matter could not have been remitted for inquiry to a District Judge 8 unless the
statutory pre condition of consultation
with the Bar Council had taken place
It is not necessary to consider in this case whether this provision for consultation is mandatory or not but we shall assume that it is so
There was however no hint of this objection to the validity of the proceedings up to the stage of the appeal in this Court
The question whether there has or has not been a consultation is one of fact and if this point had been raised in the High Court we would have information as to whether there had been such consultation or not and if not why there was none
Even when the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of fitness under article 133 1c this objection was not suggested as a ground upon which the validity of the proceedings would be impugned
In these circumstances we are not disposed to entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact
The fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under section 10 2to the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted is not decisive on the point
There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would before the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case
It was next contended that the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court
We consider this objection frivolous in the extreme
It was argued by the appellant before the High Court that there was dissimilarity between the several signatures of the three respondents found in the petition sent by them and that to be found in the plaint etc of OS 432 of 1951 and that this was some proof that it was not the respondents who were 9 really responsible for the petition but that someone inimically disposed towards the appellant
The learned Judges of the High Court rejected this submission in these words For one thing we are unable to find any such dissimilarity
Even so that has not much of a bearing on the question whether the respondent appellant had discharged the burden viz of proving that he had made the payment to the petitioners
This argument would have had some force if the petitioners had not given evidence against the respondent
Further no such suggestion was put to any of the plaintiffs
 This is on the question of the dissimilarity of the signatures on which rests the argument that the respondents were not the complainants
Coming next to the point about the verification of the complaint the matter stands thus The three complainants the respondents before us originally filed a petition on March 6 1956 before the District Judge but this did not bear the attestation of a gazetted officer or other authority as required by the rules
This defect was made good by a fresh petition which they filed before the District Judge on April 16 1956
After the petition was signed by the three petitioners they added a verification in these terms We do hereby state that the facts stated above are true to the best of our knowledge information and belief and then they signed again
These three signatures they made before the District Judge who attested their signatures on the same day and when for 
warding this complaint to the High Court on 10 April 18 1956 the learned District Judge stated these facts and added The petitioners appeared before me on April 16 1956
I got them sign the petition in my presence and I attested the same
 It is thus clear that they made three signatures in token of their signing the petition the verification and a further affirmation before the District Judge who attested the same
Learned Counsel did not suggest before us that the District Judge was in error about the identity of the parties who appeared before him and affixed the signatures in three places in the complaint before him
It is because of these circumstances that we have stated that this objection was most frivolous
It is only necessary to add that seeing that the High Court is competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu under section 10 2 the point raised is wholly without substance
The next submission of learned Counsel was that as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation of money belonging to the clients the learned Judges of the High Court should have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded to deal with him under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act
In support of this submission learned Counsel referred us in particular to two decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader In re 1 and Emperor vs satish Chandra Singha 2
We do not consider that the case before us furnishes an occasion for any exhaustive review of the decisions upon the subject or formulating finally the principles which govern the exercise of the discretion by a Court to which a complaint is made under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act whether it should 1 1920 ILR47 Cal
C2 Cal 721
11 proceed under it or leave the complainant to launch a prosecution against the advocate and await the result of such criminal proceedings
We consider it sufficient to state this
The object of a proceeding in respect of professional misconduct differs totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court
Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar statutes arc taken in order toensure that the highest standards of professional conduct arc maintained at the bar
These proceedings though in a sense penal arc solely designed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure that a person does not continue in practice who by his conduct has shown that he is unfit so to do
It is not a jurisdiction which is exercised in aid of the Criminal law for the only question for the court to consider is whether the practitioner has so misconducted himself as no longer to be permitted to continue a member of an honourable and responsible profession
The object of Criminal proceedings on the other hand is to enforce the law of the land and to secure the punishment of an offender
No doubt if a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the subject matter of the complaint and the charge is held proved the conviction might be a ground for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils Act
No doubt also if the practitioner is acquitted or discharged by a criminal court on the merits the facts would not be reinvestigated for the purpose of rounding a charge of professional misconduct on those very facts
The object of the two proceedings being thus different it is not any rule of law but merely a matter of discretion depending on the facts of each case as to whether the Court would straightaway proceed to enquire into the allegation of professional misconduct or leave it to the complainant to prosecute the practitioner and await the result of such a proceeding
It was not suggested by Counsel for the appellant that it was incompetent for or 12 beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with an enquiry in a case where the misconduct charged against the advocate or practitioner amounted to an offence under the ordinary criminal law
Neither of the cases relied on lay down any such proposition and is not of much assistance to the appellant in the present case
It is sufficient to extract the head note to the report of the decision in Chandi Charan Mitter x indicate that it bears no analogy to the case now on hand
The relevant portion of the head note reads Where the misconduct alleged has no direct connection with the conduct of the pleader in his practical and immediate relation to the court ordinarily there should be a trial and conviction for criminal misconduct before disbarment will be Ordered
 The charge against the practitioner in that case related to a matter which had nothing to do with his relationship to his clients or the court and in the circumstances it was held that the direction would be properly exercised if the initiation of professional misconduct proceedings awaited the result of the prosecution
It is obvious that the case before us is far different
Emperor vs Satish Chandra Singha 2 was also a similar case
The charge against the practitioner was of forging court records by interpolating some words in an original plaint
In the case now before us however the misconduct charged is intimately connected with and arises out of the duty which the Advocate owed to client
This distinction between misconduct which is intimately connected with the duties which the practitioner owes to his clients and cases where it is not so connected as bearing upon the exercise of the Court s discretion to proceed or not to proceed straightaway with an inquiry into the advocate s professional misconduct was emphasised by Lord 1 Cal 1115 2 1927IL R  13 Abinger in stephans 1 which dealt with case of professional misconduct against an attorney in England
The learned Judge said If the attorney has been guilty of something indictable in itself but not arising out of the cause in which he is engaged professionally the Court would not inquire into that with a view to striking him off the roll but would leave the party aggrieved to his remedy by a criminal prosecution
 There is thus a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner s duty to his client and other cases where it is not so
In the former class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a Criminal Court
So far as the facts of the present case are concerned the appellant got his client s money in his hands in the course of the proceedings of a suit in which he was engaged and the charge against him was that he failed to repay the money
In the circumstances we consider that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provision of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act
The next complaint of the learned Counsel was that there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant was conducted
This was said to consist in the fact that some evidence on behalf of the complainants the respondents before uswas permitted to be led after the appellant had examined himself and it was urged that thereby the complainants had been afforded opportunity of filling up any lacuna in their case
We consider that there is no substance in this objection
No complaint that the appellant was 14 prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of the order in which the evidence was adduced was made either before the District Judge who conducted the inquiry or before the High Court when the report of the District Judge was considered
We have ourselves examined the record and find that there is no basis for any suggestion that any  prejudice had occurred by reason of the order in which the witnesses were examined
It was then suggested that one of the plaintiffs Kagga Veeraiah had himself admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the learned Judges of the High Court were clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his clients
A few facts have to be mentioned to appreciate this contention as well as the answer to it
As stated earlier there were four plaintiffs in the suit OS 432 of 1951 and plaintiffs
1 to 3 are the complainants now respondents 1 to 3 before us
The fourth plaintiff was one Kagga Veeraiah
It was the case of the appellant that this money  was paid to all the four plaintiffs ie was paid to the plaintiffs when all the four of them were present
It was the case of the complainants that Kagga Veeraiah the 4th plaintiff died in 1957
It was m these circumstances that the appellant alleged that Kagga Veeraiah was alive and a man claiming to be Kagga Veeraiah was produced before the District Judge who examined him as court witness No 7
The man who was examined did depose that the money was paid to the plaintiffs in his presence and no doubt if that statement along with the identity of the deponent was accepted the appellant s defence would have been made out
The case of the complainants however was that the man examined as court witness No 7 was an impersonator
To prove the death of the 15 real Kagga Veeraiah an extract from the death certificate was produced in court by the complainants
The attention of court witness No 7 was drawn to the fact that in another proceeding 0 section 732 of 1955 to which Kagga Veeraiah was a party a memo was filed into Court stating that he was dead
The witness s explanation for this was that as he was not available the memo to that effect was filed
The witness was severely cross examined about his identity and in particular questioned about the details of the parties and other details regarding the subject matter of OS 432 of 1951 and his answers were most unsatisfactory to say the least
The Learned Judges of the High Court considered all this evidence and recorded two alternative findings 1 that the person examined as CW 7 was not Kagga Veeraiah but was an impersonator seemed to accord with the probabilities and 2 that even if CW 7 be in truth Kagga Veeraiah as he claimed they would not accept his evidence as there was not even a modicum of truth in his deposition  and they would unhesitatingly reject it
The submission however of learned Counsel was that there was before the High Court the thumb impression of this witness to his deposition before the District Judge as CW 7 and the thumb impression of the 4th plaintiff in OS 432 of 1951 and that on a comparison of these two the court should have accepted the identity of CW 7 as Kagga Veeraiah the 4th plaintiff
It is really not necessary to pursue this matter or the details of the evidence relating to it because there is no ground at all for interfering with the appreciation by the learned Judges of the High Court of the credibility of this witness s deposition apart altogether from the question as to whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and if he was not whether CW 7 was Kagga Veeraiah
The admissions that this witness made and the ignorance that he displayed about the proceedings in the suit stamped him as a witness of untruth and the learned Judges correctly characterised his evidence 16 as devoid of even a modicum of truth
 The appellant cannot therefore rely on any admission on the part of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum which was admittedly in his hands
Lastly it was urged that the order directing the suspension of the appellant for a period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be established
We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold to make this submission
The appellant had got into his hands a considerable sum of money belonging to his clients and on the finding of the High Court had failed to pay it back when demanded
Not content with this he had put forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence by suborning witnesses
In the circumstances even if the learned Judges of the High Court had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll of advocates we would have considered it a proper punishment having regard to the gravity of the offence
The order now under appeal therefore errs if at all on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the request made on behalf of the appellant
The appeal fails and is dismissed


Summary:
The respondents and one other Kagga Veeraiah were plaintiffs in a suit for possession of certain lands and the appellant was their Advocate
Tim suit was dismissed and an appeal was preferred therefrom to the Subordinate Judge
Pending the disposal of the appeal the court directed the sale proceeds of the standing crops on the suit land to be deposited into court and a sum of Rs 1600 was so deposited
The plaintiff s appeal was allowed and the defendants preferred a second appeal to the High Court
Pending disposal of the second appeal plaintiff s application for withdrawing the amount was allowed by the court on furnishing security of immovable property
A cheque petition was filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque for Rs 14524 was issued in favour of the appellant
The appellant an Advocate admitted that he had received and
had cashed the cheque on behalf of his clients who were entitled to be paid this sum
The second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the plaintiff s suit was dismissed as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund the sum of the defendants in the suit
The plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for the proceeds of the cheque that had been cashed by him and not paid over to them
The appellant in reply claimed to have paid over the sum to them on their passing a receipt which happened to be in the bundle
of case papers returned to 2 them
The respondents filed a complaint under as 12 and 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act
The explanation of the Advocate was called for and the District Judge was directed to hold an enquiry and forward his report to the High Court
His report was that the appellant s case was not unbelievable and he was entitled to the benefit of doubt
The matter was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court who held him guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him for five years from practice
In this Court the appellant contended 1 that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant
2 That the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court
3 That as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation of moneys belonging to the clients the High Court should have left the complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have proceeded to deal with him under section 10 of the Bar Councils Act
4 That there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant was conducted
5 That one of the plaintiffs Kagga Veeraiah had himself admitted in his evidence that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the High Court was clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to his clients
Held 1 that the fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under section 102 of the Bar Councils Act to the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously been consulted is not decisive on the point
There would be a presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it would be for
the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove his case
Since this objection was not raised in the High Court even when the appellant applied for a certificate this Court will not entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact
2 The complaint petition had been signed by the respondents and properly verified and even otherwise since the High Court was competent to initiate these proceedings suo motu under section 102 of the Act the point raised is wholly without substance
3 There is a clear distinction between cases where the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner s duty to 3 his client and other cases where it is not so
In the former Class of cases the court would be exercising its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the charge as a piece of professional misconduct without driving the complainant to seek his remedy in a criminal court
80 far as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned it must be held that the High Court was fully justified in proceeding against the appellant under the provisions of section 10 of the Bar Councils Act
Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader In re
1115 and Emperor vs satish Chandra Singha Cal 721 distinguished
Stephens vs Hills   referred to
4 No complaint that the appellant was prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of the order in which the evidence was adduced was made either before the District Judge or before the High Court and there is nothing on the record to suggest that any prejudice had occurred to the appellant
5 The evidence of Kagga Veeraiah was correctly characterised by the High Court as devoid of truth and the appellant therefore cannot rely on any admission of this witness as evidence of the plaintiffs having received the sum
Having regard to the gravity of the offence there is no justification for reducing the period of suspension
The appeal therefore must be dismissed