Appeal No 108 56
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated May 27 1953 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No 176 of 1949 against the judgment and decree dated December 20 1948 of the District Judge Ludhiana arising out of the Judgment and decree dated February 6 1948 of the Subordinate Judge 11 Class Ludhiana in Suit No 918 of 1946
Gopal Singh for the appellants
C B Aggarwala and K P Gupta for the respondents
May 6
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J
The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the respondents I and 2 Sher Singh and Labh Singh for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the first appellant Jai Kaur in respect of 8 1 10 Bighas of land which she had inherited from her husband Dev Singh in favour of her two daughters the 2nd  3rd appellants before us  shall be null and void against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs  and defendant Nos 4 to 6 after the death of defendant No 1 ie Jai Kaur and shall not be binding upon them
The plaintiffs  case was that these lands left by Dev Singh were all ancestral lands qua the plaintiffs and according to the customary law which governs the Jats belonging to Grewal got to which these parties belong daughters do not succeed to property left by sonless fathers and so the gift by Dev Singh s widow in favour of her daughters would be null and void as against the plaintiffs and others who would be entitled on Jai Kaur s death to succeed to the estate as reversioners
In the alternative the plaintiffs contended that even if the land in suit was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs then also the deed of gift would be null and void as against their reversionary interests inasmuch as even as regards nonancestral property daughters do not succeed among the Grewal Jats
The main contention of defendants 1 to 3 the appellants before us was that the suit land was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendants 977 Nos 4 to 6 and that according to the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got daughters exclude collaterals as regards non ancestral property and a widow is competent to make a gift of such property in favour of her daughters
It was pleaded on behalf of the two daughters that they being preferential heirs in respect of the land in suit as against the plaintiffs the gift is tantamount to acceleration of succession and is valid in every way
The Trial Judge held that 2B 2B14 B out of the land in suit was ancestral and the gift was invalid to that extent because as regards ancestral property a daughter does not succeed in the presence of collaterals
As regards the remainder of the suit land which he held was non ancestral the learned Judge was of opinion that the gift was merely an acceleration of succession as under the customary law governing the parties daughters exclude collaterals as regards succession to non ancestral property
Accordingly he gave the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for as regards 2 B 2B 14 B out of the land in suit and dismissed it as regards the remaining portion of the land in suit
The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge Ludhiana against this decree and cross objections were filed by the defendants Nos 1 to 3
The Trial Court s finding about a portion of the land being ancestral and the rest non ancestral was not disputed before the appeal court
On the question of custom the learned District Judge agreed with the Trial Judge s view that among the Grewal Jats of Ludhiana the daughter excluded collaterals as regards non ancestral property
He held therefore agreeing with the Trial Judge that as regards the non ancestral property the deed of gift was merely an act of acceleration of succession and was therefore valid and binding
The appeal was accordingly dismissed and so also were the cross objections which appear not to have been pressed
On second appeal the learned judges of the East Punjab High Court accepted the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that a special custom was proved to be in force among the Grewal Jats under which the daughter does not inherit even as regards 978 non ancestral property
In that view they held that even as regards the non ancestral property the gift by Jai Kaur would be valid only during her lifetime and allowed the appeal
Against this decree of the High Court defendants Nos 1 to 3 Jai Kaur and her two daughters the donees have filed this appeal on the strength of special leave granted by this Court
Two questions arise for consideration in this appeal
The first is whether under the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got in Ludhiana to which the parties belong the daughter or the collaterals are the preferential heirs as regards non ancestral property
If the answer to this question be that daughters have preference over collaterals the plaintiffs here the other question which arises is whether this gift is such acceleration of succession in favour of the daughters as is permissible under the law
On the question of custom the appellants rely on the statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan s Digest of Customary Law Thirteenth Edition that in regard to the acquired property of her father the daughter is preferred to collaterals
It is not disputed that nonancestral property is  acquired property  within the meaning of this statement by Rattigan
Against this the plaintiffs respondents rely on the answers to question No 43 relating to Hindu Grewal Jats of Ludhiana as appear in the Riwaji am prepared at the revised settlement of 1882
The question and the answer are in these words Question  Under what circumstances can daughters inherit  If there are sons widows or near collaterals do they exclude the daughter  If the collaterals exclude her is there any fixed limit of relationship or degree within which such Dear kindred must stand Answer  In our tribe the daughter does not succeed under any circumstances
If a person dies sonless his collaterals succeed him
There is no fixed limit of relationship for purposes of excluding her
979 If there are no collaterals of the deceased the owners of the Thulla or Patti or village would be owners of his property The authoritative value of Rattigan s compilation of customary law is now beyond controversy having been recognised in the judicial decisions of the Punjab courts too numerous to mention which have also received the approval of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Therefore it is not and cannot be disputed that under the general customary law of the Punjab daughters exclude collaterals in succession to non ancestral property
The value of entries in the Riwaj i am has also however been repeatedly stressed
That they are relevant evidence under section 35 of the Evidence Act is clear and the fact that the entries therein the the result of careful research of persons who might also be considered to have become experts in these matters after an open and public enquiry has given them a value which should not be lightly underestimated
There is  therefore an initial presumption of correctness as regards the entries in the Riwaj i am and when the custom as recorded in the Riwaj i am is in conflict with the general custom as recorded in Rattigan s Digest or ascertained otherwise the entries in the Riwaj i am should ordinarily prevail except that as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a recent decision in Mt Subhani vs Nawab 1 that where as in the present case the Riwaj i am affects adversely the rights of females who had no opportunity whatever of appearing before the revenue authorities the presumption would be weak and only a few instances would suffice to rebut it
In the present appeal the oral
testimony given on behalf of either party is practically valueless to show an  instance in favour of the custom pleaded by them
If therefore the Riwaj i am does show as urged by the plaintiffs a custom of daughters being excluded by collaterals in respect of non ancestral property it is clear that Riwaji i am would prevail
The real controversy in this litigation is however on the question whether the entries in the Riwaj i am on which 1 AI R 1941 PC 21
980 the plaintiffs rely refer at all to non ancestral property or not
This controversy has engaged the attention of the courts in Punjab for a number of years beginning with 1916
In that year in Mst
Raj Kaur vs Talok Singh 1 Sir Donald Johnstone the Chief Justice held that the Riwaj i am as compiled did not cover self acquired property and that where the Riwaj i am talked about succession to land without discrimination between ancestral and self acquired the rule laid down could usually only be taken to apply to ancestral property
A similar view was taken by Shadilal and Wil be force JJ in Budhi Prakash vs Chandra Bhan 2 
The view taken in these cases was followed by other judges of the High Court in Narain vs Mst
Gaindo 3  and Fatima Bibi vs Shah Nawaz 4
In Sham Das vs Moolu Bai 5 the learned judges LeRossignol and Fforde JJ also laid down the same principles without any reference to the previous decisions in these words  It is true in the Riwaj i ain no distinction is made between ancestral and acquired property but it is a well recognised rule that unless there are clear indications to the contrary such an entry in a record of custom refers only to the succession to ancestral property  After this view had been followed in several other decisions a different line was struck in Jatan vs Jiwan Singh 6
That was a case between Grewal Jats and the contest lay between collaterals of the last male holder and his married daughter with respect to his non ancestral property
The learned judges were of opinion that the Question No 43 in the Riwaj i am related to both ancestral and non ancestral property and so the answer to the question recorded in Riwaj iam proved that as regards the non ancestral property also the daughter was excluded by collaterals
In coming to this conclusion they laid stress on the fact that in two previous decisions Ishar Kuar vs Raja Singh 7 and Pratap Singh vs Panjabu 8 the questions and answers in the Riwajiam as regards daughter s 1 AIR 1916 Lah
3 AIR 1918 Lah
304 5 AIR 1926 Lah
210 7 2 ATR 19T8 Lah
4 AIR 1921 Lah
6 AIR 1933 Lah
8 981 right to succession were interpreted as covering nonancestral property also and if it was contemplated that a daughter should succeed to self acquired property one would have expected that fact to be mentioned in the answer
It was in view of the conflicting views which had thus arisen on the question whether Question No 43 in the Riwaj i ani in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary related to ancestral property only or to both ancestral and non ancestral property that a reference was made by Mr Justice Abdur Rahman in Mt Hurmate vs Hoshiaru 1 to a Full Bench of the High Court
The Full Bench reviewed the numerous decisions of the Punjab courts in this matter and also took into consideration the fact that Mr Gordon Walker who had prepared the Riwaj i am in 1882 had stated in the preface that no distinction between self acquired and inherited pro perty in land appeared to be recognised and the rules of succession restriction on alienation etc applied to both alike and after a careful consideration of all the relevant factors recorded their conclusion that  Question No 43 of the Customary Law of Ludhiana district relates to ancestral property only and can in no circumstances be so interpreted as to cover self acquired property as well  Mr Justice Din Mohammad who delivered the leading judgment observed  The raison d  entre of those cases which lay down that the manuals of Customary Law were ordinarily concerned with ancestral property only is quite intelligible
Collaterals are as stated by Addison J in 13 Lab
458 really speaking interested in that property only which descends from their common ancestor and this is the only basis of the agnatic theory
What a male holder acquires himself is really no concern of theirs
It is reasonable therefore to assume that when manuals of Customary Law were originally prepared and subsequently revised the persons questioned unless specific ally told to the contrary could normally reply in the light of their own interest alone and that as stated above was confined to the ancestral property only
The fact that on some occasions 1 AIR 1944 Lah 21 127 982 the questioner had particularly drawn some distinction between ancestral and non ancestral property would not have put them on their guard in every case considering their lack of education and lack of intelligence in general
Similarly the use of the terms  in no case  or  under no circumstances  would refer to ancestral property only and not be extended so as to cover self acquired property unless the context favoured that construction
 One would have thought that after this pronouncement by a Full Bench of the High Court the controversy would have been set at rest for at least the Punjab courts
Surprisingly however only a few years after the above pronouncement the question was raised again before a Division Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Mohinder Singh vs Kher Singh1
The learned judges there chose to consider the matter afresh and in fact disregarded the pronouncement of the Full Bench in a manner which can only be said to be unceremonious
Teja Singh J who delivered the leading judgment said that the Full Bench though noticing the cases of Ishar Kaur vs Raja Singh 2 and Pratap Singh vs Panjabu 3 had not said that those cases had been wrongly decided
It has to be noticed that the Full Bench in no uncertain terms expressed their conclusion that question No 43 of the Customary Law of the Ludhiana district related to ancestral property only and could in no circumstances be so interpreted as to cover self acquired property as well
In coming to that conclusion they had considered numerous decisions of the Punjab courts in support of the general proposition that unless there are clear indications to the contrary the questions relate to ancestral property considered the cases in which a contrary view had been taken including the three cases of Jattan vs Jiwan Singh 4 Ishar Kaur vs Raja Singh 2  and Pratap Singh vs Panjabu 3 and gave their own reasons why the view that unless there are clear indications to the contrary the manuals of customary law should be taken to refer to ancestral property only and after considering the 1 AIR 1949
East Punjab 328 3 2 4 AIR 1933 Lah
983 question and answer in question No 43 in the case before them as regards the Mohammadan Rajputs recorded their final conclusion
It is neither correct nor fair to say that the learned judges of the Full Bench did not hold Jattan s Case Pratap Singh s Case and Ishar Kaur s Case to have been wrongly decided in so far as these decisions held the question No 43 of the Customary Law of the Ludhiana dis trict to refer both to ancestral and non ancestral property
It is true that they did not say in so many words that these cases were wrongly decided but when a Full Bench decides a question in a particular way every previous decision which had answered the same question in a different way cannot but he held to have been wrongly decided
We had recently occasion to disapprove of the action of a Division Bench in another High Court in taking it upon themselves to hold that a contrary decision of another Division Bench on a question of law was erroneous and stressed the importance of the well recognised judicial practice that when a Division Bench differs from the decision of a previous decision of another Division Bench the matter should be referred to a larger Bench for final decision
If as we pointed out there considerations of judicial decorum and legal propriety require that Division Benches should not themselves pronounce decisions of other Division Benches to be wrong such considerations should stand even more firmly in the way of Division Benches disagreeing with a previous decision of the Full Bench of the same court
In our opinion the view taken by the Full Bench in Mt Hurmate vs Hoshiaru 1 is consonant with reasons and consistent with probability
The fact that the great majority of judges who brought to bear on the question an intimate knowledge of the ways and habits of the Punjab peasantry thought that when tribesmen were asked about succession to property they would ordinarily think that they were being asked about succession to ancestral property is entitled to great weight
It cannot we think be seriously disputed that at least in the early years 1 AIR 1944 Lah 21 984 when the Riwaj i am was in course of preparation most of the property in the countryside was ancestral property and  self acquisitions  were few and far between
This fact it is reasonable to think had the consequence of concentrating the attention of the tribesmen on the importance of having the tribal custom correctly recorded by the Settlement Officers and their agents as regards succession to ancestral property and of attracting little attention if any to matters regarding non ancestral property
Unless the questions put to these simple folk were so framed as to draw pointed attention to the fact that the enquiries were in respect of non ancestral property also they could not reasonably be expected to understand from the mere fact of user of general words in the questions that these referred to both ancestral and non ancestral property
As Din Mohammad J said in his judgment in the Full Bench even the fact that on some occasions the questioner had drawn some distinction between ancestral and nonancestral property could not have put them ie
 the persons questioned on their guard in every case considering their lack of intelligence in general
Their minds being obsessed with the idea that such enquiries would only refer to ancestral property they would direct their answers to matters in respect of ancestral property only and in using forceful terms like  in no case  and  under no circumstances these persons were really saying that  in no case would ancestral property devolve in a particular way and have a particular incidence and under no  cir cumstances  would ancestral property devolve in a particular way and have a particular incidence
These considerations we think outweigh the statement made by Mr Gordon Walker that no distinction between self acquired and inherited property in land appeared to be recognised and the rules of succession restriction on alienation etc applied to both alike
We think therefore that the view taken by the Full Bench and the many previous cases mentioned in the judgment of the Full Bench that questions and answers in the Riwaj i am refer ordinarily to 985 ancestral property unless there is clear indication to the contrary is correct
Question No 43 in the Ludhiana district appears to be the same for all the tribes
There is not the slightest indication there that the questioner wanted information about nonancestral property also
The answer given by the Grewal Jats to this question also gives no reason to think that the persons questioned were thinking in giving the answers of both ancestral and non ancestral property
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the entries in the Riwaj i am on which the plaintiffs respondents rely do not refer at all to non ancestral property and are therefore not even relevant evidence to establish the existence of a custom among Grewal Jats of Ludhiana district entitling collaterals to succession to non ancestral property in preference to daughters
Reliance was next placed on behalf of these respondents on the fact that the existence of such a custom was recognised in a number of judicial decisions viz Jattan vs Jiwan Singh 1 I shar Kaur vs Raja Singh 2 and Pratap Singh vs Panjabu 3
If these decisions in so far as they recognised the existence of such a custom had been solely or even mainly based on evidence other than entries in the Riwaji i am they might have been of some assistance
Examination of these cases however shows unmistakably that they were either wholly or mainly based on the entries in the Riwaj i am on the assumption that these entries referred to both ancestral and non ancestral property
This assumption having been established to be baseless these decisions are valueless to show that the custom as alleged by the plaintiffs respondents did exist as regards non ancestral property
Further the oral evidence produced in the present case is wholly insufficient to prove such a custom
It must therefore be held that the customary law among the Grewal Jats of Ludhiana district as regards succession to non ancestral property is the same as recorded generally for the Punjab in Paragraph 23 of Rattigan s Digest ie
 the daughter is preferred to 1 AIR 1933 Lah 553
2 3 986 collaterals and consequently the second and the third appellants were the next reversioners to that portion of Dev Singh s property which has been found to be non ancestral
This brings us to the question whether the gift of this portion by the first appellant to these reversioners gives them a good title beyond the widow s lifetime
We have to remember in this connection that as regards the ancestral property these daughters were not the reversioners and the further fact that out of the ancestral property the house was not included in the deed of gift
The position therefore is that out of the property in which the first appellant held a widow s estate she gave by the deed of gift a portion to the reversioners as regards that portion a portion to persons who were strangers to the reversion as regards that portion and a portion was retained by her
The doctrine of Hindu law according to which a limited owner can accelerate the reversion by surrendering her interest to the next reversioner is based on a theory of self effacement of the limited owner
That is why it has been laid down that in order that a surrender by a limited owner to a reversioner may be effective the surrender must be of the entire interest of the limited owner in the entire property
The exception made in favour of the retention of a small portion of the property for her maintenance does not affect the strictness of the requirement that a surren der to be effective must be of the entire interest in the entire property Vide Rangasami Gounden vs Nachiappa Gounden 1 and Phool Kaur vs Pem Kaur 2 In so far as there is gift to a stranger there is no effacement of the limited owner nor is there any effacement in respect of the property which is retained
We find it impossible to say therefore that there is such effacement of the limited owner in this case as would accelerate the daughter s rights by converting the future contingent right into a present vested right
On behalf of the appellants it is argued that there is certainly a total effacement in respect of the nonancestral property so that the right of the next reversioners the daughters in that property has 1 1918 LR 46 IA 72
2   987 been accelerated
We do not think we shall be justified in recognising this novel doctrine of the possibility of effacement of the limited owner vis a vis the next reversioner of the non ancestral property when there is no effacement vis a vis the reversioner of the ancestral property and vice versa
Effacement cannot be broken up into two or more parts in this manner and however much the limited owner may wish to efface herself only vis a vis those next reversioners whom she wants to benefit law does not recognise such  partial effacement 
The Hindu Law doctrine of surrender does not therefore make the gift of the non ancestral property to the daughters valid beyond the widow s lifetime
It is not suggested that there is any customary law by which such surrender can be made
Though therefore we have found disagreeing with the learned judges of the High Court that tinder the customary law governing the Grewal got of Jats to which the parties belong the daughters the second and the third appellants are preferential heirs to the non ancestral portion of the suit land we hold that their conclusion that this deed of gift in favour of the daughters is not valid even as regards the non ancestral property beyond the donor s lifetime is correct and must be maintained
As a last attempt Mr Gopal Singh counsel for the appellants wanted us to hold that under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act which became law in 1956 either the mother or the daughters have become full owners of this property and so the plaintiffs  suit should be dismissed
As the Hindu Succession Act was not on the statute book when the written statement was filed or at any time before the suit was disposed of in the courts below the defence under section 14 of that Act could not be thought of and was not raised
The necessary consequence is that evidence was not adduced with the facts material for the application of section 14 in view by either party
Mr Agarwala has on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents contended that as the record stands the mother had ceased to be in possession and could not get the benefit of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and that the 988 daughters in possession would not become full owners under section 14
We do not think it would be proper to consider these questions in the present suit in this haphazard manner when on the all important question of possession the appellants themselves do not wish to say whether the mother was in possession actually or constructively whether the daughters  possession was merely permissive or whether the daughters were in independent possession on their own behalf These and other questions of fact and the questions of law that have to be considered in deciding a claim by the first appellant or the other two appellants under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act should properly be considered in any suit that they may bring in future if so advised
We express no opinion on any of these questions
For the reasons which have been mentioned earlier we hold that the High Court rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the nonancestral property also and dismiss the appeal
In the circumstances of the case we order that the parties will bear their own costs throughout
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Under the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats of Grewal got in Ludhiana a daughter is a preferential heir to her father in respect of his self acquired property to his collaterals
Rattigan s Digest of Customary Law paragraph 23 which records the correct law on the point is not in conflict with Riwaji am 1882 Question NO 43 which refers only to ancestral property and not to self acquired property at all
Mt Hurmate vs Hoshiaru AIR 1944 Lah
21 approved
Mohinder Singh vs Kher Singh AIR 1949 East Punjab 328 disapproved
Mt Subhani vs Nawab AIR 1941 PC 21 referred to
Case law discussed
The doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a theory of complete self effacement by the widow in favour of the reversioner and in order that such surrender can accelerate the reversion it must be of the entire interest in the entire property
The law does not recognise a partial self effacement nor a division between ancestral and non ancestral property
The exception made in respect of a small portion of the property retained for the widow s maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the rule
Rangaswami Gounden vs Nachiappa Gounden 1918 LR 46 IA 72 and Phool Kaur vs Prem Kaur   referred to
Consequently in a case where a Hindu widow of the Jat Grewal got made a gift only of the self acquired property of her husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a surrender in law so as to accelerate the daughters  succession and the gift could not be valid beyond her lifetime