ivil Appeal No 695 of 1975
From the Judgment and Order dated 2131974 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No 2598 of 1972
G Viswanatha lyer and N Sudhakar for the Appellant
360 V Krishnamurthy for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI J
This appeal by special leave is filed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras whereby it remitted the matter to the Authorised Officer for dispos al in accordance with law and in the light of the observa tions made therein
The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under The appellant land owner held lands in Kanyakumari District in excess of 30 standard acres as on 6th April 1960
He filed a return in Form No 2 as required by the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Fixation of Ceiling on Land Act 1961 Act 58 of 1961 hereinafter called the Act 
An enquiry was initiated by the Authorised Officer Land Re forms under Section 92b of the Act
The appellant raised several objections but they were overruled
The Authorised Officer came to the conclusion that the family of the appellant could be reckoned to be of five members be tween 6th April 1960 and 2nd October 1962 and accordingly the land owner was entitled to 30 standard acres while his wife and daughter could hold 10 and 771 standard acres respectively as stridhana lands
The appellant was directed to state which lands he wished to be included in his holding and identify the lands which fell surplus failing which the Authorised Officer said he would be constrained to select the surplus lands
The appellant was given five days time to make the option
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Authorised Officer the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 781 to the Lands Tribunal
The appellant complained that the Authorised Officer had wrongly added the lands of his minor sons unmarried daughter and wife gifted to them long before 1960 in his holdings for determining if his total holdings exceeded the ceiling limit fixed under Section 52 of the Act
According to him the lands covered under the registered gift deed ought to have been excluded from his holding under the Explanation to Section 314 as a gift stood on par with a partition
As a limb of the same argu ment the appellant contended that subsequent to the filing of the appeal the Act was drastically amended by Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Reduction of Ceiling on Land Act 1970 Act 17 of 1970 hereinafter called the Amending Act  whereby under Section 32 the date of commencement of this Act  came to be fixed as 15th February 1970 and the notified date  came to be fixed as 2nd October 1970 under Section 331 of the Act
Consequently argued 361 the appellant his rights and liabilities with regard to the fixation of ceiling area were required to be worked out on the basis of the state of affairs existing on the revised date of commencement of the Act ie 15th February 1970 fixed by virtue of the amendment in the Act
He also relied on the fact that his eldest son who was a minor on th April 1968 had attained majority on 1st January 1970 in the High Court judgment the date is 1st October 1970 ie before the commencement of the Act on 15th February 1970 and also before the notified date ie 2nd October 1970 and hence his land could not be included in his holding as was done by the Authorised Officer
It was also pointed out that his son had created a trust in respect of a portion of the land which would be exempt from the operation of the Act by virtue of Section 732b of the Act
It was therefore submitted that his eldest son Laxminarayanan was a necessary party and the proper course would be to set aside the im pugned order of the Authorised Officer and remand the matter for a de novo consideration after notice to his son
The second submission made was that on 10th April 1968 when the impugned order was made the appellant s wife was pregnant she had since delivered a daughter and had gifted to her 571 acres of Vadaseri land on 1st October 1970 and later an additional 506 acres of the land from the same village which developments had to be taken into account as subse quent events touching the determination of the appellant s ceiling area
Thirdly it was pointed out that the appellant had transferred 2 acres 48 cents of section No 2221 082 cents of section No 2208 A and 1 acre 66 cents of Vadaseri lands to a third party on 26th April 1970 for services rendered to him
Similarly a portion of section No 2224 admeasuring 031 cents was sold to yet another third party on 23rd April 1969 for valuable consideration and it was necessary to give effect to these transactions which were subsequent to the impugned order
It was lastly contended by the appellant that his property bearing section Nos 1387 A and 1363 A which was subject to mortgage had to be sold on 1st July 1968 a development subsequent to the impugned order which too had to be noticed in fixing the ceiling area
These transac tions it was said were protected by Section 21A of the Act
It was therefore submitted that since an appeal was a continuation of the original proceedings it was obligatory on the part of the appellate authority to examine the impact of these subsequent developments and refix the ceiling area
The appellant however contended that as third parties would have to be heard before deciding the issue the proper course was to direct the Authorised Officer to consider the matter afresh in its entirety
The appellate authority negatived all the contentions and dismissed the appeal with costs
362 Thereupon the appellant approached the High Court by way of a revision application
Before the High Court the contention in regard to the subsequent transactions was confined to the documents executed between 15th February 1970 the date of commencement of the Act and 2nd October 1970 the notified date
That included the two settlement deeds dated 1st October 1970 made in favour of the unmar ried daughters and the sale deed dated 26th April 1970 executed in favour of a third party
The contention was not pressed in respect of the transaction evidenced by the sale deed dated 23rd April 1969 in favour of a third party
This contention found favour with the High Court
The High Court took the view relying on an earlier Division Bench judgment in CRP No 1197 of 1971 Fakir Mohmad vs The State of Tamil Nadu that even in respect of proceedings which commenced prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act an affected person can take advantage of the provisions contained in Section 21A
It was held that while Section 2 of the Amending Act reduced the ceiling area to half bene fit was conferred by Section 2 IA and hence both the provi sions had to be read together
It was therefore held that the three documents could not be ignored in fixing the ceiling area unless it is found that the documents were executed to defeat the provisions of the Act in which case the transactions may be declared void under Section 22 of the Act
In this view of the matter the High Court directed the Authorised Officer to make further inquiries regarding the said three transactions and pass appropriate orders
The High Court however rejected the rest of the contentions by which exclusion was sought viz i on the conjoint reading of Section 108 and Section 314 insofar as it concerned Laxmmarayanan as a member of the appellant s fami ly ii in regard to lands which were locked in litigation iii in regard to lands in the possession of mortgagees and iv the lands which are covered under Section 73vii of the Act
In this view that the High Court took the matter was remitted to the Authorised Officer in regard to the aforesaid three transactions
The appellant feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his other contentions by the High Court has preferred this appeal by special leave
The main grievance of the appellant is that the High Court fell into an error in limiting the benefit of Section 21 A to three transactions only and by directing an enquiry under Section 22 overlooking the fact that it was not subject to Section 22
He further contends that the High Court was wrong in thinking that the conten tion in regard to the sale deed dated 22nd April 1969 was not pressed
In brief the contention is that the High Court failed to appreciate the impact of the 363 amendments introduced by the Amending Act on the two settle ments of 1st October 1970 and the sale deed of 26th April 1970 and erred in holding that the relief under Section 21A must be determined after an enquiry under Section 22 of the Act
This was the main thrust of the submissions made at the hearing of this appeal
The Act Act 58 of 1961 was notified on 2nd October 1962 but the date of its commencement was fixed as 6th April 1960
The present proceedings had commenced under the said Act
Th Act was amended by Act 17 of 1970 whereby the ceiling area was reduced from 30 standard acres for a family not exceeding five member to 15 standard acres and the date of commencement of the Act was shifted to 15th February 1970 and the notified date to 2nd October 1970
There can be no doubt that after the passing of Act 17 of 1970 the family s holding had to be determined with reference to the notified date ie 2nd October 1970
See BKV Radhamani Ammal vs Authorised Officer Land Reforms Coimbatore The Act was enacted to provide for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and matters connected therewith
Section 5 fixes the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members at 15 standard acres after the amendment made in the provision by virtue of Section 22a of the Amending Act
Section 7 lays down that on and from the date of commencement of the Act no person shall except as otherwise provided by the Act be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area
The family of the appellant consisted of himself his wife two minor sons and an unmarried daughter at the date of commencement of the Act and on the notified date as they stood before the Amending Act
One son had become a major wef
1st January 1970
In the High Court judgment the date is stated to be 1st October 1970
That will not make any difference so far as the submission is concerned
We may first notice Sections 21A and 22 of the Act as amended by the Amending Act
They read as under 21A
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 or in any other provision of this Act and in any other law for the time being in force where after the 15th day of February 1970 but before the 2nd day of October 1970
a any person has effected by means of a registered instru ment a partition of his holding or part thereof or 364 b any parent or grand parent has voluntarily transferred any land on account of natural love and affection to any minor son unmarried daughter minor grand son or unmarried grand daughter in the male line or c any person has voluntarily transferred any land i to any educational institution or ii hospital
of a public nature solely for the purposes of such institu tion or hospital such partition or transfer shall be valid Provided that in the case of transfer to such educational institution or hospital the land transferred absolutely vests in the institution or hospital and the entire income from such land is appropriated for the insti tution or hospital 22
Where on or after the date of the commencement of this Act but before the notified date any person has trans ferred any land held by him by sale gift other than gift made in contemplation of death exchange surrender set tlement or in any other manner whatsoever except by bequest or has effected a partition of his holding or part thereof the authorised officer within whose jurisdiction such land holding or the major part thereof is situated may after notice to such person and other persons affected by such transfer or partition and after such enquiry as he thinks fit to make declare the transfer or partition to be void if he finds that the transfer or the partition as the case may be defeats any of the provisions of this Act
 Section 21A begins with a non obstante clause and limits its application to partition or transfer mentioned in clauses a to c effected between 15th February 1970 and 2nd October 1970
The settlement deeds both dated 1st October 1970 and the sale deed dated 26th April 1970 fall within the two termini points fixed by Section 21A but the sale deed dated 23rd April 1969 is clearly outside the scope of Section 21A and therefore it seems the learned counsel for the appellant in the High Court rightly did not press the claim in regard to the 365 land covered under the said document
However the learned counsel for the appellant before us pointed out that while the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 21A insofar as the two settlement deeds of 1st October 1970 and the sale deed of 26th April 1970 are concerned it fell into an error in holding However if those transfers are meant to defeat any of the provisions of the Act then the Authorised Officer may declare the said transfers to be void under Section 22 of the Act thereby totally overlooking the opening words of Section 2 IA which are intended to override Section 22
The further observations of the High Court based on decision in Naganatha Ayyar vs Authorised Officer 197 11 MLJ 274 make it clear that the High Court misread the observations of Ramanujam J when it said Ramanujam J pointed out that all transfers effected between the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date cannot be declared to be void as defeating the provi sions of the Act
It has been pointed out that only if the transfers are really not transfers but sham and nominal transactions or bogus transactions they would be defeating the provisions of the Act and that only then they can be declared to be void under Section 22 of the Act
The above observations are somewhat confusing
A sham nominal or bogus document may not necessarily be one intend ed to defeat any provision of the Act
A partition or trans fer evidenced by such a document would be of no avail to seek the benefit of Section 21A regardless of Section 22
Section 21A which begins with the words notwithstanding anything contained in Section 22 clearly overrides Section 22 and therefore the transactions referred to in Section 21A cannot be the subject matter of enquiry under Section 22
Section 21A refers to only three types of transfers viz i transfer of holding by a registered partition deed ii transfer of land to specified individuals on account of natural love and affection and iii transfer in favour of an educational institution or hospital of a public nature solely for the purposes of such institution or hospital provided the transferred land vests absolutely in the insti tution or hospital and the entire income from such land is appropriated for the institution or hospital
Even though the transactions referred to in Section 21A cannot be de clared void under Section 22 as defeating any of the provi sions of the Act the Authorised Officer would be entitled dehors Section 22 of the Act to find out if the instruments of transfer or partition though answering the description of transactions under Section 21A are in fact genuine 366 transactions and not sham nominal or bogus ones
Similarly the Authorised Officer would be entitled to determine if the instruments of transfer even if genuine answer the descrip tion of documents referred to in Section 21 A and if not he would be justified in invoking Section 22 of the Act
To put it differently when any party seeks the benefit of Section 21A he must show if a doubt arises that i the instrument on which he relies is a genuine one and not a sham nominal or bogus one and ii it answers the descrip tion of the documents referred to by Section 21A
If the document is not found to be genuine the Authorised Officer will not act on it if it is genuine the Authorised Officer will determine if it is one referred to in Section 21A and if not he will resort to Section 22 of the Act
On this consideration the sale deed dated 26th April 1970 in favour of a third party clearly falls outside the purview of Sec tion 21A and the Authorised Officer will be entitled to embark on an enquiry under Section 22 of the Act if the instrument is otherwise genuine
In regard to the two set tlements in favour of unmarried daughters also the Autho rised Officer will have to consider if the settlements answer the description of the documents referred to in Section 21A even if they are genuine
If he answers both these points in the affirmative he need not test the docu ments on the additional requirement of Section 22 but if he comes to the conclusion that the documents do not fall within Section 21A he would be required to test their validity on the touchstone of Section 22 of the Act
We have thought it necessary to clearly define the scope of the enquiry before the Authorised Officer on remand to clear the doubt if any arising from the observations of the High Court and to avoid unnecessary complications
The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is based on the plain language of Section 102 read with the definition of family  in Section 314 of the Act
The appellant s son Laxminarayanan is stated to have attained majority on 1st January 1970 ie before the date of commencement of the Act on 15th February 1970 and the notified date of 2nd October 1970
Even if the date stated by the High Court is correct he attained majority before 2nd October 1970
On his attaining majority he ceased to be a member of the appellant s family
Under Section 102 the Authorised Officer has to take into account only those members of the family as are covered by the definition of Section 314 of the Act
Although Laxminarayan was undoubt edly a member of the appellant s family on the date on which the Authorised Officer first determined the ceiling area the submission of the appellant s counsel is that he having ceased to be a minor son he cannot be included in the appellant s family when 367 the Authorised Officer reconsiders the ceiling area on remand
The High Court negatived this contention and in our opinion rightly
The submission overlooks the provision contained in Section 3 of the Amending Act by which the date of commencement of the Act and the notified date were re vised
Section 3 reads as under Saving 1 Subject to the provisions of sub section 2 any action taken including any order made notification issued deci sion or direction given proceeding taken liability or penalty incurred and punishment awarded under the provi sions of the Principal Act before the date of the publica tion of this Act in the Fort St George Gazette may be continued or enforced after the said date in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act as if this Act had not been passed
2 Nothing in sub section 1 shall be deemed to entitle any person whether or not such person is a party to any proceeding mentioned in sub section 1 to hold after the 15th day of February 1970 land in excess of the ceiling area under the Principal Act as modified by Section 2 and the provisions of the Principal Act as modified by Section shall after the said date apply to such person
 The proceedings in this case had started and concluded before the Authorised Officer long before the Amending Act saw the light of the day
Under Section 31 of the Amending Act any action taking including any order made decision or direction given proceeding taken etc under the provi sions of Act before the date of publication of the Amending Act can be continued and enforced after the said date in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if the Amending Act had not been passed
This is however subject to sub section 2 which carves out an exception to sub section 1 insofar as the reduction of the ceiling area from 30 stand ard acres to 15 standard acres is concerned
The High Court was therefore right in rejecting this contention
Lastly it was submitted that lands which were converted into orchards of topes before 1st July 1959 are exempt from the provisions of the Act by virtue of Section 73vii of the Act
The High Court has rejected this contention on the following finding 368 In the present case certain lands are claimed to be topes and exemption is claimed regarding the same
But there is nothing to show that the said lands had been converted into topes prior to first day of July 1959
Since the factual foundation is not laid we cannot entertain this contention
These were the only contentions urged before us
In view of the above discussion we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs
Y Lal Appeal dis missed


Summary:
The respondent landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellants under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 on the grounds of arrears of rent sub letting and making material alterations impair ing the utility of the building
On the first date of hear ing before the Rent Controller the appellants tendered the arrears of rent but the respondent landlord refused to accept it on the ground that the tender of rent was not valid since it included rent on behalf of a disputed tenant
Accepting the case of unauthorised subletting the Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition holding that the rent tendered was not in terms of the proviso to sub section 2i of section 13 because only the undisputed tenant alone ought to have tendered the rent
The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on the preliminary point of validity of tendering of rent holding that the rent deposited by the appellants was not valid since one of the appellants was a stranger
The High Court confirmed the order of the appellate authority by dismissing the tenant s revision in limine
In the appeal to this Court on the question whether the word tenant  included a person claiming to be a tenant allowing the appeal this Court 279 HELD 1
When a word has been defined in the interpreta tion clause prima facie that definition governs wherever that word is used in the body of the Statute unless the context requires otherwise
The context is both internal and external
The internal context requires the interpreter to situate the disputed words within the section of which they are part and in relation to the rest of the Act
The exter nal context involves determining the meaning from ordinary linguistic usage including any special technical meanings from the purpose for which the provision was passed and from the place of the provisions within the general scheme of statutory and common law rules and principles
286E G Cross Statutory Interpretation 2nd ed
p 48 referred to
11 Even where the definition is exhaustive in as much as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or context
287B Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd vs Ms Fraser and Ross  Anr  followed
The opening sentence in the definition of Section 2 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 states unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or con text
In view of this qualifications the Court has not only to look at the words but also to examine the context and collocation in the light of the object of the Act and the purpose for which a particular provision was made by the Legislature
286G H 3
The apparent purpose of the proviso to Section 132i was to relieve the defaulting tenant from the extreme penalty of eviction
The provision is analogous to Section 114 of the which confers discretion on the Court to grant relief against forfeiture for non payment of rent
But the proviso goes a step further and leaves no such discretion to the controller or Court even if the tenant is a constant defaulter
If the arrears and other amounts specified are paid or tendered on the first date of hearing the default as a ground for eviction disappears and the Controller is precluded from passing a decree for eviction
The governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay an action for eviction on default
At the same time the landlord is ensured payment of arrears interest and the costs that he has incurred without the necessity of going to civil court to 280 recover it
The proviso affords a real and sanctified pro tection to tenant against eviction on the ground of default
It should not be given a hypothetical or literal construc tion but should be meaningfully construed
The legislative protection concerning the tenants should not be narrowly tailored
Indeed it should be given wider meaning and broader concept
287G H 288A D Court should try to understand the spirit of the text and not be bound by letter
288D Mangat Rai vs Kidarnath   followed
Hudson County Water Co vs Me Carter   referred to
Taking into account the intention of the legislature and the purposes for which the proviso was enacted it is clear that the obligation to tender the rent under the proviso to Section 132i on the first hearing date does not depend upon the existence of admitted jural relationship of landlord and tenant
When an action for eviction is brought by the landlord or the ground of default the provi so stands attracted
The benefit of the proviso could be availed of by the tenant and also by those who claim to be the tenant
289D E Ram Gopal  Ors
vs Ram Prakash  Ors 1963 RLR 1112 and Punjab Rajasthan Goods Carriers  Ors
vs Onkar Mal 1977 RLR 1195 overruled
Law as creative response should be so interpreted to meet the different fact situations coming before the Court
For Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine pres cience and perfect clarity
It Is not possible for the legislators to foresee the manifold sets of facts and controversies which may arise while giving effect to a particular provision
Indeed the legislators do not deal with the specific controversies
When conflicting interests arise or defect appears from the language of the Statute the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement the written word with force and life 
287E F Seaford Estate Ltd vs Asher  referred to