Criminal Appeal No 258 of 1981
869 From the Judgment and Order dated 12th Feb 1981 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc
Criminal Case No 617 of 1980
Appellant in person
Uma Nath Singh for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section RATNAVEL PANDIANJ
The appellant Mr Pritam Pal Dhingra is a practising Advocate in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur having joined the Bar on 421979
Earlier to joining the Bar he was serving in the Army and retired on 231265
Thereafter he was re employed in the Defence Accounts Department on 721966 as UDC Auditor
On 29276 the appellant served three months  notice of resignation upon the departmental authorities for the reasons mentioned in the said notice and also requested to pay him the contributory provident fund benefits for his 10 years service though the date of his superannuation in the said post was 3091986
The Department not only refused to accept his resignation but also did not relieve him even after the expiry of three months
According to the appellant there was neither any departmental enquiry pending nor contemplated against him during those three months ie between 29276 and 31576
However a charge sheet dated 211276 for imposing a major penalty on a complaint by Jt
CDA Vehicle Factory was served on him to which he submitted his written statement
Then he served a final quit notice wef 8177
Though on the basis of the show cause notice an enquiry was started nothing came out of it
Therefore the appellant moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing Writ Petition MP No 786 of 1978 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sworn on 271178 requesting several prayers inclusive of issuance of directions to the respondent therein the departmental authorities to accept his resignation so as to enable him to take any other profession of his liking and to declare the retention of his service against his will after 3151976 as illegal and malafide and to re imburse pay and allowances for the period of his enforced absence after the expiry of three months notice period etc
The High Court issued show cause notice to the respondents 1 to 3 in the Writ Petition
The respondent No 3 thereafter accepted the resignation dated 29276 of the appellant wef 15179 by 870 which time the appellant claims to have completed 31 years of combined military and civil service ie from 291147 to 15179
Meanwhile the departmental enquiry initiated against him was dropped
Then the appellant submitted supplemental applications praying that his resignation should be converted into one of voluntary retirement and that his military services should be counted with civil service and that he should be given all service benefits like pension gratuity etc
as well as consequential benefits on account of the delay in acceptance of his resignation
Two applications being IANo 90879 and IA No 424678 were filed by the appellant they being one for amendment of the petition and the other for taking some additional grounds
Both applications were allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court comprising of Mr Justice JS Verma as he then was and Mr Justice UN Bachawat as the counsel for the respondents had no objection and granted one week time for incorporating the amendments in the petition
At the request of the counsel for the respondent Shri RP Sinha the Court granted two weeks time to file the additional return by order dated 16379
The case was listed for further hearing on 2479 on which date the writ petition was dismissed
The appellant then on 16479 moved an application to review the order dated 2479
The application was registered as MCC No 209 of 1979
This application was too dismissed on 23479 with the following observation The grievance of the petitioner in this review petition is that the writ petition MP No 78678 was dismissed in motion hearing without hearing the petitioner
The substance of the order dismissing the Writ Petition in motion hearing as stated earlier indicates that this averment made by the petitioner is not correct
We also distinctly recollect that the petitioner was heard fully on the question of admission and it was only thereafter that the petition was dismissed by dictating that order in the Court in the presence of the petitioner
We would therefore reiterate that this grievance of the petitioner that he was not heard at the time of motion hearing is wholly incorrect
The submissions made by the petitioner in support of this review application are 1 that there is error apparent on the face of the record because the writ petition was dismissed in motion hearing without hearing the petitioner 2 that sum 871 marily dismissal of the writ petition was arbitrary because after notice had been issued to the respondents 1 to 3 show cause why the petition be not admitted it was incumbent on the Court to admit the writ petition and hear both sides at length before passing any order and 3 that on account of above position the petitioner was not given a fair deal before dismissing the writ petition in motion hearing
As earlier stated the petitioner was heard fully at the end of motion hearing and so also the counsel for respondents Nos 1 to 3 Shri RP Sinha
The main averment on the basis of which all the aforesaid submissions are based ie lack of full opportunity to the petitioner is therefore wholly non existent
We are constrained to observe that in making these submissions the petitioner who is now enrolled as an Advocate has not been fair to the Court
The petitioner who is now enrolled as a lawyer was expected to exhibit at least the minimum decorum and sense of responsibility which is expected from a members of this noble profession
We are pained to observe that the petitioner took a very unreasonable attitude and exhibited a behaviour which could not be appreciated even by the member of the Bar who were present when this order was being dictated in the Court room after the hearing
However taking into account the fact that the petitioner is a new entrant in the Bar we have chosen not to take serious notice of the conduct of the petitioner in the hope that the petitioner having now become a member of the Bar will try to follow the high traditions of the Bar which he has chosen to join
There is no merit in this Review application
It is summarily dismissed
 On being aggrieved by the above order of dismissal dated 2479 the appellant filed Special Leave Petition No 570 of 1979 before this Court but was not successful as the SLP was dismissed on 25779
The appellant on being disturbed by the dismissal of his Writ Petition moved a Contempt Petition on 16480 under Section 16 of the hereinafter referred to as the Act  making some 872 serious allegations against the two Hon ble Judges of the High Court who dismissed his Writ Petition on 2479 and thereafter the Review Petition on 23479 and also impleaded Shri RP Sinha as the third respondent in that petition
According to the appellant the contempt petition was registered as MCC No 136 of 1980 and placed before a Division Bench on 2941980 which after hearing the appellant summarily dismissed contempt petition
While it was so the Registry of the High Court examined the allegations made in the affidavit filed by the appellant in MCC No 13680 under Rule 5 of Rules regarding contempts framed by the High Court Notification No 8958 Nagpur dated the 24th October 1953 and placed the matter before the learned Chief Justice of the said High Court who on that motionreference passed an order on 251980 to place the matter before a Division for further action
The Division Bench before which the matter was placed took cognizance of criminal contempt and directed issue of notice on 13580 to the appellant directing to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt of Court to which the appellant filed his reply raising certain preliminary objections stating that the notice was bad for the reasons namely 1 The Section of the Act under which cognizance had been taken was not specifically mentioned 2 Though the offending portions are marked the notice does not show sufficient cause as to why the words and expressions used therein have been construed as contemptuous 3 The procedure followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules framed by it and 4 No consent of the Advocate General has been obtained
The appellant on the basis of the above objections prayed to discharge the rule of contempt
On 11780 when the case came up for hearing the learned Advocate General filed his reply to the preliminary objection and served a copy of the same to the appellant
On the same day the High Court passed an order reading thus  
The Government Advocate further gives notice to the respondent that the contempt proceedings are under article 215 of the Constitution
Let the respondent take inspection of the original record in case he would like to know the offending portions marked both 873 underlined and side marked and let him file his reply on merits within 15 days
 Admittedly the appellant inspected the Court records relating to this matter
Even thereafter when the appellant persistently requested as under what Section of the Act he has been charged he was informed that the proceedings were under the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of India
For the proper understanding of the issue in question we feel that it would be necessary to reproduce the offending words and passages as appearing in the contempt petition
They are as follows 7
That on 2479 when the case came up for hearing the judicial process required that it was the non applicant Shri RPSinha who should have been heard in the first instance and he should have been asked by the Court whether he has filed the addition return but on account of misfortune of the petitioner and misconduct of the Presiding Judge Justice Shri JS Verma that he while coming out of the chamber and occupying the seat in the temple of justice called out the petitioner and told him that after the acceptance of the resignation the petition had become infructuous as such he was dismissing it summarily
The petitioner was shocked to witness the most illegal and unconstitutional legal process adopted by the Hon ble Judge        
When the petitioner started arguing his case that his Fundamental Rights were infringed the Hon ble Presiding Judge not only stopped the petitioner from arguing his case but threatened him for dire consequences in case the petitioner argued any more
This amounts to desacrilege the sanctity of his own Court by the Judges
     9
The Review Petition was heard by the same Bench in utter disregard of judicial cannon since no person against whom serious allegations have been levelled against can be a Judge in his own case
The Review Petition was also 874 rejected summarily repeating the false averments more in explicit terms that they heard the petitioner as well as the counsel for the respondents thus super imposing the seal of truth over the falsehood
GROUNDS 1
The petitioner charges the Hon ble Court especially Justice JS Verma for adopting a most illegal and unconstitutional judicial process in utter disregard of cannons and principles of adjudication for showing rude behaviour towards the petitioner
The amounts to desacrilege the sanctity of his Court
That when the attention of Justice Verma was drawn on 2479 that he was violating the legal process he misbehaved with the petitioner without any valid reason which amounts to misconduct of the Judges
That again on 2341979 when the Review Petition was being argued he threatened the applicantpetitioner for dire consequences for no valid reasons
That the High Court is a Temple of Justice and the Judges who occupy the seat of justice are just like Dharamraj
Dharamraj s are not supposed to utter falsehood atleast while occupying this sacred seat of Justice
The Hon ble Judges have not only uttered falsehood in their order dated 2479  Annexure B  but super imposed their false averments in their order dated 23479 in which they stated that they distinctly recollect that the petitioner as well as the counsel for the respondents were heard
The petitioner s charge that they do not remember as to what they heard   5
         6
The charge against Justice UN Bachawat the associate Judge is that he silently witnessed the proceedings throughout
He never uttered a single word or intervened when his senior faltered out and succumbed to the false averments 875 of the Presiding Judge as if was not an independent Judge but serving faithfully and obediently to his master
         8
That the petitioner avers that both the contemner Judges have acted and bad faith and have fouled the seat of justice by clear malafides act of theirs and as such no protection can be extended to them under cover a bonafide act done in good faith as Judges
That both the Judges have violated the sanctity attached to the seat of Justice and have committed a Contempt of their own Court
Both have acted malafidely in bad faith
PRAYER It is therefore prayed that Contempt Proceedings under Section 16 of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 may be initiated against Justice JS Verma and Justice UN Bachawat of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the aforesaid grounds
 The High Court after examining the above scandalising remarks made by the appellant in his contempt petition rejected the objections of the appellantcontemner holding that the cognizance of the criminal contempt was taken by it on suo moto that the contemner was informed that the Court was invoking its jurisdiction under Article 215 of Constitution of India to punish him for contempt that the does not confer any new jurisdiction by its authority that in a suo moto action by the High Court consent of the Advocate General was not necessary that non quoting of the provisions Section in the notice is immaterial and that the contemner had full notice of the charge of contempt levelled against him and concluded We see no defect in the notice served upon the contemner nor do we find defect in the procedure followed Then after referring to certain decisions of this Court in Perspective Publications vs State of Maharashtra   CK Daphtary vs OP Gupta  and Baradakanta Mishra vs Registrar of 876 Orissa High Court   the High Court made the following observation with reference to the facts of the case 16
The offending portions in paras 7 and 9 and repeated in grounds 123 and 48 and 9 attribute to Mr Justice JS Verma a improper motive b unfairness and undue basis in dealing with the case c being a Judge who administers justice in a cursory manner without giving thought to the points involved d of being intemperate in language impatient and unjust e who would arise false proceedings and when falsity has been brought his notice would have the audacity to stick to the falsehood
If the words have this import the inevitable effect is undermining the confidence of the public in the judiciary
The person who has indulged in scurrilous abuse of the Judge must suffer in punishment
 On the basis of the above observations the High Court recorded its finding thus 20
In our reading of the offending portions duly marked in paras 79 and grounds 123 and 48 and 9 of the application dated 1641980 in the context in which they have been written there are imputations of malafides bias and prejudice against Mr Justice JS Verma
The contempt involved in these passages is grossly scandalous
Coming to the allegations in Ground No 6 relating to Mr Justice Bachawat it was said that he silently witnessed the proceedings
He never uttered a single word or intervened when his senior faltered and succumbed to false averments of the Presiding Judge as if he was not an independent Judge but serving faithfully and obediently his master Finally the High Court held that the contemner Mr Pritam Lal is guilty of criminal contempt of not only scandalising the Court and lowering its authority but also substantially interfering with the due course of justice
Coming to the question of sentence the High Court taking note of the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think it necessary to 877 apologise but tried to justify the aspersions sentenced the contemner to suffer simple imprisonment for two months
Hence the present appeal
The Contemner Mr Pritam Lal appeared before us in person and advanced his arguments which are similar to the submissions made before the High Court inter alia contending that the impugned order of the High Court should be set aside with costs and suitable compensation on the ground of procedural irregularities in that 1 that the offending remarks have not been communicated to him as per Rules 5 and 9 framed by the High Court 2 that the cognizance of the criminal cotmpt has not been taken in conformity with Section 15 of the Act 3 that the procedure after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of the Act has not been followed and 4 that Article 215 of the Constitution of India does not prescribe any procedure to be followed
According to him he has not been given a fair and full hearing but on the other hand the learned Judges have browbeaten and unjustly convicted him ignoring the well settled principle that every person has got an inalienable right of making fair criticism
He has further added that the impugned order was pre conceived and pre judged one
In addition to the oral arguments he has filed detailed written arguments signed on 151188 citing a number of decisions which in our view do not have any relevance to the facts of the case
In the written submissions also he has again made certain outrageous and contemptuous remarks about the Judges of the High Court in attempting to justify his action which has led to the initiation of the proceedings of contempt of Court before the High Court
As rightly pointed out by the High Court these contentions in our opinion do not merit any consideration since every High Court which is a Court of Record is vested with all powers  of such Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself and has inherent jurisdiction and inalienable right to uphold its dignity and authority
Whilst Article 129 deals with the power of the Supreme Court as Court of Record Article 215 which is analogous to Article 129 speaks of the power of the High Court in that respect
Prior to the  it was held that the High Court has inherent power to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and 878 to adopt its own procedure provided that it gives a fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemner to defend himself
But the procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14 List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution
Though the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court can be regulated by legislation by appropriate Legislature under Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the Parliament has enacted the Act 1971 the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court is given a constitutional foundation by declaring to be Courts of Record  under Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution and therefore the inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot be taken away by any legislation short of constitutional amendment
In fact Section 22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts
It necessarily follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971
The above position of law has been well settled by this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi vs The Chief Justice and Judges and Judges of the PEPSU High Court  holding thus In any case so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned as distinct from one of a subordinate Court the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority
 It has been further observed The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure
All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself In RL Kapur vs State of Madras  a question arose did the power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arise under the so that under Section 25 of the  Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and 879 the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply
This question was answered by this Court in the following words The answer to such a question is furnished by Article 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the themselves
Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a court of record or whether the article confers the power as inherent in a court of record the jurisdiction is a special one not arising or derived from the  and therefore not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure
 After giving the above answer to the query raised this Court has reiterated the view held in the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi referred supra
The view expressed in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi and followed in RL Kapur been referred with approval in a recent decision in Delhi Judicial Service Association vs State of Gujarat   holding that the view of this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi is that even after the codification of the law of contempt in India the High Court s jurisdiction as a Court of Record to initiate proceedings and take seisin of the matter remained unaffected by the contempts of Courts Act 1926
 Beg CJ in Re section Mulgaokar  has explained the special power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 stating This Court is armed by Article 129 of the Constitution with very wide and special powers as a Court of Record to punish its contempts
 In Delhi Judicial Service Association case supra it has been pointed out as follows Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Article 215 contains 880 similar provisions in respect of a High Court
Both the Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts of record having powers to punish for contempt including the power to punish for contempt of itself
 Yet another question whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to such Proceedings has been negatively answered by this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi case supra stating thus We hold therefore that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable by the High Court
The High Court can deal with it summarily and adopt its own procedure
All that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the contemner is made aware of the charge against him and given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself
 See also Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others vs The State of Uttar Pradesh From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and trammelled by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the and their inherent power is elastic unfettered and not subjected to any limit
It would be appropriate in this connection to refer certain English authorities dealing with the power of the superior Courts as Courts of Record
The 1884 edition of Belchamber s Practice of the Civil Court says at page 241 that Every superior court of record whether in the United Kingdom or in the colonial possessions or dependencies of the Crown has inherent power to punish contempts without its precincts as well as in facie curiae   In 9 Halsbury s Law of England 4th Edition by Lord Hailsham at page 3 under the caption Criminal Contempt the following passage is found 881 The superior courts have an inherent jurisdiction to punish criminal contempt  It is further stated at page 3 itself that the power to commit by summary process is arbitrary and unlimited but that power should be exercised with the greatest caution
In Re Clements and the Republic of Costa Rica vs Erlanger at page 383 Lord Jessel MR said  this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised  Reference also may be bad to a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay vs P 1958 Bom
Law Reporter 60 Page 873 wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction which each Judge of the High Court possesses and uses as constituting a Court of Record is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself for punishment for contempt of Court whether it is ex facie the Court or otherwise and that for the exercise of that jurisdiction it is not necessary to refer either to the Letters Patent or the Rules framed by the Court thereunder and that it is a jurisdiction which is being exercised in the same manner as was exercised in the Court of King s Bench Division in England
In special feature of the procedure to be followed in a contempt proceeding is the summary procedure which is recognised not only in India but also abroad
It is an outstanding characteristic of the law of contempt both in England and Scotland that it makes use of a particular and summary procedure which is unknown to any other branch of those countries
In England this summary procedure began to be adopted by the common law Courts inspite of trial by jury and that the trial by jury for contempt has steadily declined and has now fallen entirely into disuse
In other words consequent upon the use of the summary procedure in England a person alleged to be in contempt does not enjoy the benefit of some of the safeguards of the ordinary criminal law such as those provided by the Judges  Rules in England and Wales and the right to trial by jury
882 Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of United States reads that A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the Judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the Court In Ex parte Terry   307   80 1888 and in Matsusow vs United States   339 5th Cir
1956 it has been ruled that If the contempt be committed in the face of the court the offender may be instantly apprehended and imprisoned at the discretion of the judges without any further proof or examination
 In the Contempt of Court by Oswald the following passage relating to the summary power of punishment is found The summary power of punishment for contempt has been conferred on the courts to keep a blaze of glory around them to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public
These powers are necessary to keep the course of justice free as it is of great importance to society
 In the year 1899 Lord Moriss in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Mc Leod vs St Aubin said The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered for the proper administration of justice This has long been the practice in India also
The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a summary power as held in the cases of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi CK Daphtary referred to above and in Hira Lal Dixit vs State of UP  Peacock CJlaid down the rule quite broadly in the following words in Re Abdool vs Mahtab 1867 8 WR Cr 32 at page 33 there can be no doubt that every court of record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt
 The above view is re stated in a number of decisions of this Court
In the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi it has been observed 883  the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts of record and section 1 2 of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its scope
 The position of law that emerges from the above decisions is that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India See DN Taneja vs Bhajan Lal  and therefore the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down
Nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules
The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself
If we examine the facts of the present case in the backdrop of the proposition of law the contentions raised by the appellant challenging the procedure followed by the High Court do not merit any consideration since the appellant has been served with a notice of contempt and thereafter permitted to go through the records and finally has been afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his explanation for the charge levelled against him
Incidently we may say that the submission of the contemner that the impugned order is vitiated on the ground of procedural irregularities and that Article 215 of the Constitution of India is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15 and 17 of the Act of 1971 cannot be countenanced and it has to be summarily rejected as being devoid of any merit
The remaining important question for consideration are whether the statements which we have extracted in the preceding part of this judgment made by the contemner amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity honesty and judicial impartiality of the learned Judges of the High Court and whether the contemner by his conduct as well as by making such 884 written scandalising statements and invective remarks have interfered and seriously disturbed the system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect and disrepute
There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular instances of conduct which has been held to constitute contempt of Court
We shall now refer to a few
Lord Russel of Killowen LCJ has laid down the law of Contempt in at 40 as follows Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority is a Contempt of Court
 The above proposition has been approved and followed by Lord Atkin in Andre Paul vs Attorney General AIR 1936 PC 141
Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General vs Butterworth  after making reference to Reg
vs Odham s Press Ltd ex parte AG said Whether or not there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty not to guilt This makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court and it is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere
In Morris vs The Crown Office at page 1081 Lord Denning MR said The course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with
Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society
 In the same case Lord Justice Salmon spoke The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented 885 Frank Further J in Offutt vs US  expressed his view as follows It is a mode of vindicating the magesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage In Jennison vs Baker at page 1006 it is stated The law should not be seen to sit by limply while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope Chinnappa Reddy J Speaking for the Bench in Advocate General Bihar vs MP Khair Industries  citing those two decisions in the ases of Offut and Jennison supra stated thus  it may be necessary to punish as a contempt a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of Justice
The public have an interest an abiding and a real interest and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice because unless justice is so administered there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing
The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and so it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression Contempt of Court may seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented prejudiced obstructed or interfered with Krishna Iyer J in his separate Judgment in re section Mulgaokar supra while giving the broad guidelines in taking punitive action in the matter of Contempt of Court has stated  if the Court considers the attack on the judge or judges scurrilous offensive intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits the strong arm of the law must in the name of public interest and public justice strike a blow on him who 886 challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream In the case of Brahma Prakash supra this Court after referring to various decisions of the foreign countries as well as of the Privy Council stated thus It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court s administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties
It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement it is enough if it is likely or trends in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law In Ashram MJain vs AT Gupta the facts were thus The petitioner who filed a special leave petition accompanying by an affidavit affirming the statement made in the said SLP indulged in wild and vicious diatribe against the then Chief Justice of the High Court of Maharashtra
When the SLP was heard this Court directed notice to be issued to the petitioner as to why he should not be committed for contempt under the 
After hearing the parties and then not accepting the unconditional apology of the petitioner this Court convicted the petitioner for contempt and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months
In that case Chinnappa Reddy J speaking for the Bench said The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of judges
It is not that judges need be protected judges may well take care of themselves
It is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected 887 Reference may be made to a recent decision of this Court in MB Sanghi vs High Court of Punjab and Haryana  In that case the appellant a practising advocate having failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad interim injunction pending filing of a counter by the opposite party made certain derogatory remarks against the learned Judge who instead of succumbing to such unprofessional conduct made a record of the derogatory remarks and forwarded the same to the High Court through the District Judge to initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court against the appellant
The High Court holding that the remarks made on the learned Sub Judge are disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of the judiciary found the appellant guilty of Section 2 c i of the 
The appellant therein though denied to have made the remarks however offered an unqualified apology
But the High Court without accepting the apology punished the appellant therein with a fine of Rs 1000
Ahmadi J of this Court in his separate judgment has observed The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud
And when a number of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmiks with a view to browbeating the judge into submission it is all the more painful
When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary
Veiled threats abrasive behaviour use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order
Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution
The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the presiding judicial officers with impunity
It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or 888 the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system After having made the above observation the learned judge concerned with the conclusion of Agarwal J dismissing the appeal and while doing so he expressed his painful thought as follows When a member of the bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is highly painful it pleases none but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of the individual judge and his office and the prestige of the institution
Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in the hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten its member for failure to maintain proper ethical norms
If timely action is taken by the Bar Councils the decline in the ethical values can be easily arrested
 We are in full agreement with the above view
Reverting to the facts of the case the offending criticism and the scandalising allegations made by the appellantcontemner are most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice shaking the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and calling for a more rapid and immediate punitive action
These calculated contemptuous remarks and the sweeping allegations which we have extracted above are derogatory in character not only to the dignity of the learned Judges casting aspersions on their conduct in the discharge of their judicial functions but also wounds the dignity of the Court
It is highly painful to note that the appellantcontemner who is none other than an Advocate practising in the same highest Court of the state after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person has escalatingly scandalised the Court by making libellous allegations which are scurrilous highly offensive vicious intimidatory malacious and beyond condonable limit
Even a cursory reading of the remarks made against the learned Judge of the High Court unambiguously show that the potentially prejudicial utterances and the outrageous allegations rumbustiously and invectively made by the contemner with malacious design of attempting to impair 889 the administration of justice have struck a blow on the judiciary and also seriously sullied the image dignity and high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High Court carries with it and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source and steam
In our opinion the incident in question is a flagrant onslaught on the independence of the judiciary destructive of the orderly administration of justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of Law
The maxim Salus populi suprema lex that is the welfare of the people is the supreme law adequately enunciates the idea of law
This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully judicially without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained
To punish an Advocate for Contempt of court no doubt must be regarded as an extreme measure but to preserve the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with and to keep the streams of justice pure serene and undefiled it becomes the duty of the Court though painful to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity
No one can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt if his act or conduct in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice
In view of the above heinous type of scandalising the Court we unhesitatingly confirm the finding of the High Court that the appellantcontemner has made himself guilty of criminal contempt
Coming to the question of sentence it appears from order of the High Court that the appellant had adopted a defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him even without thinking it necessary to apologise
Before this Court also the appellant has neither expressed any contrition nor has he any repentance for the vicious allegations made against the learned Judges of the High Court
But on the other hand he has exhibited a dogged determination to pursue the matter come what may
A reading of his memorandum of grounds and the written and signed arguments show that he was ventured into another bout of allegations against the High Court Judges and persisted in his campaign of vilification
His present conduct has aggravated rather than mitigating his offence
890 Therefore having regard to the sentencing policy that punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence we hold that the sentence of 2 months imprisonment in no way calls for interference and accordingly the sentence is confirmed
For the reasons aforementioned the Criminal Appeal is dismissed
NPV Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant on 12111990 was found carrying two gold pellets with foreign markings each weighing ten tolas without any valid permit
The order of detention under S31 of the conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974 was passed on 711991
The detention order was served on him on 2861991
The Writ Petition challenging the detention order inter alia on the ground of undue and reasonable delay in its execution was dismissed by the High Court
The detenu filed the appeal by special leave against the High Court s order as also the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court
Allowing the appeal and disposing of the writ petition this Court HELD 11 The order of detention cannot be sustained since the live and proximate link  between the ground of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped on account of the undue and unreasonable delay in securing the appellantdetenu and detaining him
The order of detention is liable to be set aside on this ground alone
p 1080A B 12 Though the two gold pellets the contrabands were seized from the appellant on 12111990 the order of detention was passed on 711991 and the detention order was executed after a period of 5 months and 11 days
pp 1078F 1079G H 1080A 1076 21 No sufficient cause is shown for not taking any action under s7 of the COFEPOSA Act
The explanation that though COFEPOSA section in the office of the Collectorate of Customs requested the State Government on 1941991 to initiate action under s71 b of the Act it was not done so because the seizing unit was asked to make one more attempt to trace out the appellant is not satisfactory and reasonable one
pp 1078G H 1079A B 22 No serious and sincere effort was taken by the arresting officers There was only exchange of correspondence between the Department and the arresting officers
It is incomprehensible as to why no effort was made to secure the appellantdetenu during the two days namely on 6th and 20th Feb91 when he appeared before the Assistant Collector of Customs
1079F G