Special Leave Petition Civil No 9096 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 21287 of the Kerala High Court in WA No 933 of 1987
PS Potti and EM Anam for the Petitioner
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH J
A piece of land measuring ten and a half cents situated at Kozhippathi Village of Chittur Taluk Palghat District State of Kerala originally belonged to Indrani wife of the petitioner and it now belongs to the petitioner
Under a preliminary notification issued under section 31 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 2421981 the said piece of land along with some other lands was PG NO 650 proposed to be acquired for a certain public purpose
Both Indrani and the petitioner filed objections to the proposed acquisition
After overruling the objections the State Government published a declaration under section 6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 1911984
On 2491984 the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 passed by Parliament came into force in the State of Kerala and some other parts of India to which it applies
By section 9 of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 a new section ie section 11 A was introduced into the Land Acquisition Act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act  which reads thus 11 A Period within which an award shall be made The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement
Explanation In computing the period of two years referred to in this section the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded
 The Land Acquisition Officer ie the Sub Collector of Palghat who was exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act made an award in respect of the land of the Petitioner on 2391986 which was filed in the office of the Collector on 2491986
The notice of the award was served on the petitioner on 3091986
The petitioner and his wife challenged the acquisition proceeding in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Kerala in OP No 1536 of 1987
The learned Single Judge who heard the said petition overruled the objections of the petitioner and his wife and dismissed the petition
Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge the petitioner and his wife preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court in WA No 933 of 1987
The said Writ Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court
Aggrieved by the decision of PG NO 651 the Division Bench the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India seeking special leave to appeal against the judgments of the Division Bench of the High Court
The two grounds on which the acquisition proceeding was challenged by the petitioner and his wife before the High Court were i that the award not having been made within a period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 that is 2491984 as required by the proviso to section 11 A of the Act the acquisition proceeding should be deemed to have lapsed and ii that the land acquisition proceeding was liable to be quashed on the ground that there was inordinate delay in making the award
The contention of the petitioner and his wife before the High Court was that the notice of the award having been served on him on 30th September 1986 it must be held that the award was actually made on 30th September 1986 and since more than two years had elapsed from 2491984 from the date on which the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 came into force by the time the notice of award was served on him the acquisition proceeding should be declared as having lapsed by virtue of the proviso to section 11 A of the Act
In support of his contention the petitioner relied upon a decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another 1962 1 SCR 676 in which this Court had taken the view that for purposes of calculating the period of limitation prescribed for making an application requesting the Collector to refer the question relating to the valuation of the land acquired under the Act to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Act the date on which the notice of the award was served on the owner of the land should be treated as the date of the award and that the period of limitation should be counted from the date of the service of the said notice
Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have declined to accept the said contention and we think rightly
Before the insertion of the new section
ie section 11 A of the Act there was no provision corresponding to it in the Act which provided for the period within which an award should be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer that is the Collector under the Act
Since in a large number of cases there used to be abnormal delay in making the award Parliament stepped in and introduced section Il A to the Act which is set out above
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill introducing the Land Acquisition Amendment Act PG NO 652 1984 by which section 11 A was introduced into the Act it was stated that the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them
It was further stated in it that it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act within which the Collector should make his award under the Act
If no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse
Pursuant to the above object section 11 A of the Act was enacted
It provides that the Collector shall make an award under section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse
In the case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 the award shall be made within two years from such commencement
We are not concerned with the rest of the provisions of section 11 A of the Act in this case
The crucial words which require to be interpreted are the Collector shall make an award appearing in section 11 A and the words the award shall be made  in the proviso to section 11 A
The statute prescribes the maximum period of two years for making an award from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act and further attaches a condition that if the award is not made within the said period the proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse
Similarly in the case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act l984 the award shall be made within two years from such commencement and if the award is not so made the proceeding for acquisition shall lapse
Thus it is seen that the consequence of not making an award within the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration or from the date of the commencement of the Act as the case may be is that the entire project for which the land is acquired will have to be abandoned or if it is intended to proceed with the project for which the land had been originally notified for acquisition it would become necessary for the Government to restart the proceedings once again with the publication of a fresh preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act or the corresponding provision in any local statute in force in a State
If the date of the communication of the notice of the award to the person interested in the land is treated as the date of making the award then the maximum period prescribed under section 11 A of the Act for making the award would get reduced by the period for serving the notice of the award on the owner of the land
Such maximum period may vary from one PG NO 653 case to another
Even in the same land acquisition case if a notice of the award is to be served on two or more persons interested in the land the maximum period for making the award may vary from person to person interested in the property depending upon the date of service of notice of the award on each one of them
If the person interested in the land is an unwilling person who is interested in defeating the land acquisition proceeding it is likely that it may not be possible to serve him with the notice of the award at all within the prescribed time and if he can avoid the service of said notice until the period of two years is over from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act or the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 as the case may be insofar as his interest in the land is concerned the proceedings for the acquisition would lapse thus affecting seriously the public interest
It would also lead to absurd and inconvenient results since the acquisition proceeding may be valid against some persons and may become invalid in the case of some others
It is no doubt true that in Raja Harish Chandra s case supra while construing section 18 of the Act this Court held by giving an extended meaning that the date of the award for purposes of calculating the period of limitation should be the date on which the notice of the award is served on the owner of the land
The said interpretation was given by this Court on the principle that if a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order
Under section 18 of the Act the person on whom the notice of the award is served has to make an application before the Land Acquisition Officer within six weeks from the date of the award if such person was present or represented before the Land Acquisition Officer at the time when he made his award and in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under section 122 or within six months from the date of the award whichever expires first
In a case where a person interested in the land is not present at the time when the award is made by the Collector he is entitled to make an application under section 18 of the Act seeking a reference of the case to the Civil Court for the determination of the proper compensation within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 122 of the Act or within six months from the date of the Collector s date whichever expires first
Since the process of service of notice issued under section 122 would occupy PG NO 654 some time this Court was of the view that it would lead to injustice if the period of limitation prescribed by section 18 of the Act was computed from the date on which the award was actually made and not from the date on which the notice under section 122 of the Act was served on the person interested in the land as it would result in the reduction of the period of six weeks by the time required for serving the notice on the person interested in the land
There is no doubt a difference between the meaning given by this Court in Raja Harish Chandra s case supra to the words date of the award in section 18 of the Act and the interpretation of the High Court of the words the Collector shall make an award  or the award shall be made  in section 11 A of the Act but such a distinction had to be maintained because the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 11 A of the Act are different from the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 18 of the Act and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in the two cases are also different
In the former case the period of limitation is prescribed for preventing official delay in making the award and the consequent adverse effect on the person or persons interested in the land but in the latter case the period of limitation is prescribed for providing a remedy to the persons whose lands are acquired to seek a reference to the civil court for the determination of proper and just compensation
Secondly while in the former case violation of the rule of limitation would result in the acquisition proceeding becoming ineffective in the latter case such a violation will not have any effect on the validity of acquisition proceeding
Thirdly while in the former case the period of limitation prescribed represents the outer limit within which an award can be made in the latter case we are concerned with the point of time at which the time to make an application under section 18 of the Act will begin to run against the person interested in the land
The provisions of section 11 A have to be construed bearing in mind these points of difference
It is well known that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute depends upon the context in which they are found and the purpose behind them
Under section 11 A of the Act the Collector is empowered to make an award before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act and in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of its commencement
If an award is not made within the prescribed period of two years in either case it is open to the person PG NO 655 interested in the land to approach the Collector and tell him that the acquisition proceeding should be dropped unless the Collector is able to produce before him an award made by him within the period of two years
He may also in such a case question the continuance of the acquisition proceeding in court
Thus no prejudice will be caused to the person interested in the land
At the same time it would not be open to a person interested in the land to get rid of the acquisition of proceeding by avoiding service of notice issued by the Collector within the prescribed period
We are of the view that under section 11 A of the Act the words the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of the date on which the notice of the award is served upon the persons interested in the land
To make an award  in this section means sign the award 
That is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words to make an award 
An extended or a different meaning assigned to the words the date of the award  by this court in Raja Harish Chandra s case supra cannot be applied in this case since such an extended or different meaning is neither warranted by equity nor will it advance the object of the statute
Similarly under the proviso to section 11 A of the Collector the Collector is empowered to make an award within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 irrespective of the date on which the notice of award is served on the person concerned
We do not find any analogy between section 11 A and section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question is concerned
The High Court was therefore right in rejecting the above contention of the petitioner
We find very little substance in the other contention of the petitioner namely that the award was liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay since it had been made at the end of two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984
While we expect an award to be passed by the Collector as early as possible without delaying till the close of the period of two years prescribed by section 11 A of the Act we do not see any good reason to set aside a proceeding for acquisition on the ground of delay by applying our own standard of speed in the matter of making awards even where the period occupied is less than two years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act as such an approach may drive the Collector to make awards without giving adequate time to the claimants to adduce evidence in support of the valuation of the property PG NO 656 proposed to be acquired and without giving sufficient consideration to the material placed before him
It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in making the awards by applying varying standards to different cases even though the maximum time of two years has not been exceeded
The very fact that section 11 A has prescribed the period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 as the maximum period within which the award can be made suggests that the time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding
We therefore affirm the decision of the High Court and reject this Special Leave Petition
RSS Petition dismissed


Summary:
Section 9 read with Third Schedule item 7 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act 1963 granted exemption from sales tax to certain items including cotton fabrics
Cotton fabrics  was defined as having the same meaning as assigned to it in item 19 of the first Schedule to the 
This definition of cotton fabrics  in 1944 Act was amended in 1969 by the Finance Act 1969
In 1957 Parliament enacted the and Additional Duties of Excise Goods of Special Importance Act 1957 affecting the levy of sales tax and excise duty
Definition of cotton fabrics  occurring in the aforesaid Acts was also related to its definition under the 1944 Act
The respondent assessee was manufacturing PVC cloth an item of goods which was clearly covered by the amended definition but perhaps not by the original one
He claimed exemption from sales tax in respect of assessment years 1971 72 and 1972 73
On a reference made to the High Court under the 1963 Act it observed that the concept of cotton fabrics  in the seemed to be integrally linked with the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act the Act under which the levy of sales tax was governed prior to enforcement of the 1963 Act and that it would not be regarding the latter Act as unaffected by the growing concept of the term cotton fabrics  in the Central Excise PG NO 601 PG NO 602 and Salt Act and that unless the extended definition of the imported into the Sales Tax Act the latter Act would become unworkable and ineffectual
In the appeals by certificate to this Court it was submitted on behalf of the State appellant that the PVC cloth manufactured by respondent was not entitled to exemption from sales tax if the earlier definition of the 1944 Act before the amendment was to apply and that the 1963 Act has incorporated in its Third Schedule the definition of the 1944 Act as it stood at the time of its enactment and that this incorporation is unaffected by the subsequent changes made in the 1944 Act that the concept of cotton fabrics  in the 1944 and 1963 Acts were not integrally linked and that it is not appropriate to say that unless the extended definition of the former were imported into the latter the latter Act would become unworkable and ineffectual
On the question whether the exemption given to cotton fabrics  in item 7 should be restricted to cotton fabrics  as defined in the 1944 Act as it stood on 141963 or whether it would also cover goods falling under the said definition after its amendment in 1969
Dismissing the appeals this Court HElD  1  It would be correct to say that the 1963 Act brings in the definitions of the 1944 Act by way of reference or citation and not by way of incorporation
For a reading of the Act shows that the Act intended to confer exemption on a number of goods set out in the Schedule
Of these since items 5 to 7 are defined in the 1944 Act the Act referes to those definitions to ascertain the scope of these items
There are no express words used by the statute which will justify an inference that the intention was to incorporate those definitions standing on that date into the 1963 Act
613A C Secretary of State vs Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd 1931 58 IA 259 Collector of Customs vs Nathella Sampathu Chetty  another   Ram Sarup y State   Ram Kirpal vs States    Ne Central Jute Mills Co Ltd vs the Assistant Collector   Bhajva vs Gopikabai   Mahindra  Mahindra Ltd vs Union  and Western Coal Fields vs Special Area Development Authority   referred to
PG NO 603 2 Silk fabrics  as defined in item 20 of the 1944 Act was included in 1961 in the CST Act and the 1957 Act
The fact that cotton fabrics  though listed as item 12 in the Schedule to the 1944 Act was not brought into the list in section 14 till 1101958 or that silk fabrics  was dropped from the list in section 14 wef 1161968 though it continues in the Schedule to the 1944 Act does not alter the position that these three Acts are inter connected and that certain goods taken out from the Schedule to the 1944 Act were to be subjected to the special treatment outlined in the CST Act and the 1957 Act615A B 3 Though the 1963 Act referred only to the definitions in the 1944 Act the entries in the Schedule have to be juxtaposed into the broad pattern or scheme evolved by the 1956 57 enactments
Even assuming that the reference in the items of the Schedule to the definitions in the 1944 Act is by way of incorporation and not reference one cannot escape the conclusion that the circumstances are covered by the exceptions outlined in the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs Narasimhan  They certainly fall within the scope of exception a mentioned therein and also fall within exception c if unworkable and ineffectual  are read to take in also unrealistic and impractical 
616D E 3 The 1963 Act on a proper constructions does indicate a policy that certain items which arc subject to additional excise duty should be left out of sales tax levy except in cases where there is a specific indication or provision of the Act to the contrary
The Kerala State legislature cannot be said to have attracted the 1944 Act definition with their future amendments blindly and without application of mind
On the other hand it has been done in pursuance of a scheme a purpose and a policy
It cannot therefore
be said that there has been any abdication of its legislative functions by the Kerala Legislature
618F G B 
Shama Rao vs The Union Territory of Pondicherry   distinguished
Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Lnd
vs The Asslstant Commissioner of Sale s Tax and Ors  referred to
5 The High Court was right in the view it took viz that the scope of the exemption available under item 7 of the Third Schedule to the 1963 Act will vary according to the scope of the corresponding entry in the Schedule to the 1944 Act as it stands at the relevant time
So far as assessment years 1971 72 and 1972 73 are concerned the definition of cotton fabrics in item 19 of the Schedule to PG NO 604 the 1944 Act as amended by the Finance Act 1969 wef 141969 will apply
618H 619A B