ivil Appeal No 3693 of 1982
From the Judgment and Order dated 2911982 of the Patna High court in CWJC No 4087 of 1981
Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant
Ex Parti for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PUNCHHI J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 29 1 1982 passed in Civil Writ Number 4087 of 1981 dismissing the Writ Petition of the appellant in limine
The appellant Bihar State Road Transport Corporation is a 669 State Transport Undertaking
Under the provision of the hereafter referred to as the Act  the State Transport Authority invited applications for the grant of stage carriage permits for the route named Bhukunda Chaibasa via Patratu Pithoria Kanke Ranchi Chakradharpur part of which that is Ranchi Chaibasa is covered under a notified scheme dated 1 4 1960 duly in force under the provisions of the Act
On applications received in response to the invitation the Corporation filed its objections before the State Transport Authority claiming that no private operator could be permitted to operate on the said route as part of it being Ranchi Chaibasa was by itself a notified route and the grant of permits on the route in question would contravene a notified scheme
The objection of the Corporation was rejected by the State Transport Authority in its meeting held on 23rd and 24th January 1979 taking the view that the overlapping Ranchi Chaibasa route was restrictedly notified for direct services only and as such there could be no legal objection to the grant of permits on the Bhukunda Chaibasa route
It accordingly granted permits to respondents 3 and 4 herein
Appellant s appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal Biharwas dismissed and the view of the State Transport Authority was upheld
The Appellate Tribunal in support of its view placed reliance on a division bench of the Patna High Court in Ms Marwari Motor Service vs Chotanagpur Regional Transport Authority and others AIR 1973 Patna Vol 60 273 in which such an objection as raised herein was negatived
The appellant s writ petition against the orders of the State Transport Appellat Tribunal Bihar was dismissed in limine giving cause to the appellant to approach this Court for appropriate relief
The notified scheme dated 1 4 1960 afore referred to where under the Ranchi Chaibasa route was declared a nationalised route was the brain child of the Appellant Corporation itself
Initially a draft scheme was published in the Bihar Gazette on 13 1 1960 under the provisions of Section 68 C of the Act
Objections were invited to the proposed scheme and after considering the objections received the State Government approved the scheme with some modifications under section 68 D2 of the Act
The approved scheme was then notified under section 68 D3 of the Act in the Bihar Gazette on April 1 1960
The relevant extract of the scheme is reproduced below The Bihar State Road Transport Corporation shall run and operate stage carriage services relating to routes or portions thereof specified below to the complete exclusion of other persons except those who on the dates specified 670 below hold permanent permits to run stage carriages in those routes and are hereby allowed to operate them until the dates of expiration of the existing permits
Nature of Name of route Name of Date from which No service service services as proposed to be plied 1
Stage Ranchi Muri All 1st April 1961 carriage or portions services thereof 2
Ditto Hazaribagh Ditto 1st April 1960 Ranchi or portions thereof 3
Ditto Barhi Bagodar Ditto Ditto Dumri Gobind pur or portions thereof 4
Ditto Giridih Dumri Ditto Ditto or portions thereof 5
Ditto Giridih Jamua Ditto 1st April 1961 Kedarma or portions thereof 6
Ditto Jamua Chakai Ditto Ditto or portions thereof 7
Ditto Ranchi Chaibasa Ditto 1st April1960 direct service It is evident from the Entry in serial No 7 that the name of the route is Ranchi Chaibasa and in this Entry alone that the bracketed words direct service  finds mention whereas in the remaining serial nos
1 to 6 the main routes or portions thereof are contrastingly 671 mentioned
In Marwari Motor Service s case supra the then writ petitioner stood already given a stage carriage permit for the route Hazaribag Hazaribag Road and when its renewal was objected to by the corporation on the ground that it would overlap Hazaribag Bagodar notified route the words direct service  occuring in the relevant entry of the notification under the notified route was required to be interpreted
The contention of the said writ petitioner before the High Court was that though private operators stood ousted on the Hazaribag Bagodar route it could not be ousted from operating on a longer or shorter route even though overlapping wholly or partially on the Hazaribag Bagodar route
The corporation refuted the argument by contending that no private operator could be permitted to operate on any portion of the route even if he had tended to operate on a longer or a shorter route
Confronted with this situation the Patna High Court ventured in the absence of any direct binding judicial precedent to solve the question by adopting the interpretation given to the bracketed words direct service by the Transport Minister of the Bihar Government to mean the exclusion of private operators for direct transport services only and not to the exclusion of private operators thereon overlapping on longer or shorter routes
Another factor which appealed to the High Court was that though the scheme had come into force in 1960 and Hazaribag Bagodar route had been nationalised still the then writ petitioner had thereafter been kept granted route permits on the Hazaribag Hazaribag Road route despite overlapping on the nationalised routes
The High Court in these circumstances made the following observations The correct meaning is that private operators who were operating directly on Hazaribag Bagodar route were excluded private operators having these two termini were not allowed to operate but private operators having only one terminus out of these two termini or passing through this route having different termini were not excluded in the approved scheme
Relying on the said ratio the Transport authorities overruled the objection of the Corporation
We have had the advantage of hearing Mr Ranjit Kumar learned counsel for the appellant only since no one appeared either on behalf of the State of Bihar nor for the permit holders respondents 3 and 4
The sole point for consideration is whether the view taken by the Patna High Court in Marwari Motor Service s case supras in any more rele 672 vant in view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Adarsh Travels Bus Service  Another vs State of UP  Others 1985 Supp 3 SCR 661
In Adarsh Travels s case supra this Court ruled that if the route has been nationalised under Chapter IV A of the  a private operator with a permit to ply stage carriage for another route which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route can ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector if he does not pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route and the question would really get the right answer on the terms of the scheme rather than on the provisions of the statute
The word route  was introduced to be defined in section 228A of the Act by amendment from March 2 1970 to mean the line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another
Spelling out the necessity for its so defining it was recorded The introduction of section 228A defining the expression route  appears to have been necessitated to dispel the confusion consequent upon the seeming acceptance by this Court in Nilkantha Prasad and Others vs State of Bihar 1962 Supp 1 SCR 728 of the suggested differences between route  and highway  by the Privy Council in Kelani valley Motor Transit Co Ltd vs Colombo Ratnapura Omnibus Co Ltd where it was said A highway is the physical track along which an omnibus runs whilst a route appears to their Lordships to be an abstract conception of line of travel between one terminus and another and to be something distinct from the highway traversed  there may be alternative roads leading from one terminus to another but that does not make the route any highway the same  The present definition of route makes it a physical reality instead of an abstract conception and no longer makes it something distinct from the highway traversed
 In the light of the above observations Ranchi Chaibasa route is identified as the line of travel on which State Transport Undertaking on nationalisation is allowed to run its vehicles
The bracketed words direct service  occuring in serial No 7 when contrasted with entries in serial nos
1 to 6 reveal that the total route of Ranchi Chaibasa without leaving any portion stood nationalised signifying by its name that 673 Ranchi Chaibasa route is a straight and direct line of travel which would be traversed by a vehicle by the State Transport Undertaking between two termini rendering all kinds of services
Any further interpretation would frustrate the object of Chapter IV A whereunder the scheme is prepared
It was observed in Adarsh Travel s case supra as follows It is well known that under the guise of the so called corridor restrictions  permits over longer routes which cover shorter notified routes overlapping  parts of notified routes are more often that no misutilised since it is next to nigh impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route
Often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point at a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so called corridor restrictions  which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme
If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience the State Transport Undertaking and the Government will have to make sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public
 If the interpretation put by the Patna High Court in Marwari Motor Service s case supra to the bracketed words direct service  is to be kept valid it would frustrate the very purpose of nationalisation for any person in that event could operate on a nationalised route by adding thereto or substracting therefrom some kilometerage and keep one terminus as a point of start or a point of ending on an un notified route and put forward his willingness to submit himself to the discipline called corridor restrictions  which practice has been deprecated by this Court
For the views afore expressed we are of the view that Marwari Motor Service s case supra militates against the principles settled in Adarsh Travel s case supra and thus it should be left to be confined to the facts of that case and not any more a binding precedent
Having taken that view we come to the conclusion that the State Transport Authority and State Transport Appellate Tribunal were in error in rejecting the objections of the appellant and High Court too was in error in dismissing the writ petition in limine
Accordingly instead of remanding the matter to the High Court we allow this appeal and 674 quash the aforesaid three orders but without any order as to costs
Since there was no opposition we permit respondents 3 and 4 to keep plying vehicles on their permits subject of course to their being subsisting and valid till date uptill 31st March 1991 and not any further to avoid abrupt disruption of transport facilities
We also leave it open to the State Government to take such steps as are further necessary to avoid inconvenience to the travelling public and for that purpose it may coordinate with the appellant corporation by making suitable amendment and provisions in the scheme to further that cause
RNJ Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant was the Master of the Merchant ship MV Eamaco when it sank in the high seas nearly 232 nautical miles away from India
The appellant was holder of a Master s certificate issued by the Director General of Shipping Calcutta
The ship was owned by a Singapore company and was flying Panamian flag
The first respondent filed a complaint in the Court of 14th Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore Madras against the appellant for initiation of enquiry proceedings under section 363 of the Merchant Shiping Act 1958 complaining about the negligence of the appellant while he was the Master of the ship and further stating that the shipping casualty had occurred due to sheer negligence and gross in competence of the Master when he failed to launch the life boats and life crafts which resulted in loss of the ship the cargo and valuable lives of sailors
The appellant filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition in the High Court under section 482 of the Cr
PC stating that the proceedings were by an abuse of process of the court and the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint against the appellant when there was no negligence on his part
The High Court rejected the petition and held that the Shipping Act was applicable to the instant case and the action of the petitioner amounted to sheer negligence and called for investigation and inquiry under the Act
The appellant has appealed to this Court
In this court it was inter alia contended on behalf of the appellant that i the negligence complained of having occurred in respect of a foreign ship flying foreign flag at a place 232 natuical miles away from India and as such outside the territorial waters of India the Act was 743 not applicable ii even if the Act was applicable it would not amount to a shipping casualty as envisaged in part XII of the Act and iii even assuming that Chapter XII applied the complaint could not have been filed by the appellant in the court of the 14th Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore under Section 363 of the Act
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the shipping casualty having occurred within the territorial waters of India which extended up to 200 nautical miles the Act would be applicable
It was further submitted that the certificate of competentence issued under the provisions of Part VI of the Act was a valuable certificate and if the holder of such a certificate of competency was alleged to have committed misconduct or acts of incompetency there was no reason why an inquiry into that misconduct or incompetency could not be orderd by the Central Government to a court competent to exercise jurisdiction under section 361 of the Act
Allowing the appeal setting aside the judgment of the High Court and quashing the complaint and the proceedings against the appellants this Court
HELD 1 The ship was not a ship owned wholly by persons each of whom was a citizen of India or by a company satisfying the description under clause b or c of sub section 2 of Section 2 of the Act
The ship being a Panamanian ship registered in Panama would come within the purview of the Act only while it was within India including its territorial waters
749C D 2 By a notification of the Government of India dated 15th January 1977 the exclusive economic zone of India had been extended upto a distance of 200 nautical miles into the sea from the shore and other maritime zones under the 40th Constitution Amendement Act 1976
750H 751A 3 The concepts of territorial waters continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are different concepts and the proclamation of exclusive economic zone to the limit of 200 nautical miles into the sea from the shore baseline would in no way extend the limit of territorial waters which extends to 12 nautical miles measured from the appropriate baseline
751B 4 Admittedly the ship at the time of the casualty was at a place beyond the territorial waters of India and even the exclusive economic zone of India
If this be the position the ship would not be covered by the provisions of section 2 of the Act and consequently the provisions of 744 the Act would not apply to the instant casualty
751C 5 The Act itself having not been applicable Chapter XII being a part of the Act will also not be applicable
751D 6 What is envisaged under section 361 is a formal investigation into a shiping casualty and not a preliminary inquiry
Similarly section 262 does not envisage inquiring into any charge of incompetency or misconduct otherwise than in the course of the formal investigation into a shipping casualty
753H 754B 7 Prima facie the complaint does not disclose the ingredients required under section 363 of the Act
It nowhere mentions that it was a transmission of the statement of a case to the court by the Central Government it also nowhere mentions that the reason to believe had been founded otherwise than in the course of a formal investigation into the shipping casualty
On the other hand in para 2 it says that the complainant is the Principal Officer who is competent person appointed under the Act to complain about the negligence of the accused
There is however no doubt that he is not so empowered under section 363
757GE F 8 The High Court correctly observed that section 363 enabled the Central Government to transmit a case to the court which had jurisdiction under section 361 to make an inquiry against master mate or engineer into the charges for incompetency or misconduct otherwise than in the course of formal investigation into shipping casualties but the High Court failed to notice that the complainant himself had no power under section 363
758C D