ivil Appeal No 764 of 1954
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated May 9 1963 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No 2272 of 1959
AV Viswanatha Sastri BRL lyengar SK Mehta and KL Mehta for the appellants
CB Agarwala SS Khanuja and Ganpat Rai for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar CJ
The short question of law which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the revisional order passed by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 7 F of the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 hereinafter called the Act is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that before passing the said order the State Government did not hear the two respondents Ram Chand and Kailash Chand who were affected by it
This question arises in this way
The respondents are the present tenants of the premises bearing municipal No 863 situated at Jumna Kinara Road Agra commonly known as Putaria Mahal
Their predecessors were let into possession as tenants by the appellants Lala Shri Bhagwan and Shrimati Gopal Devi on an agreement that they would pay a monthly rent of  Rs 58 4 0 and that the tenancy would commence from the Sudi 1 of each Hindi month and end on Badi 15 of the next month
The two appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer hereafter called the Officer under section 3 of the Act for permission to file a suit in ejectment against the predecessors in interest of the respondents
The Officer granted permission by his order passed on September 1 1951
The respondents then moved  the Additional District Magistrate who had been authorised by the District Magistrate to hear appeals against the decision of the Officer
The appellate authority declined to confirm the permis 220 sion granted to the appellants and remanded the case to the Officer for a fresh hearing
On re hearing the matter the Officer changed his view and rejected the appellants  application for permission on August 9 1952
The appellants then moved the appellate authority again and prayed that the original order granting permission to them to sue the respondents should be restored
On December 9 1952 the appellate authority ordered that permission should be granted to the appellants for suing the respondents in ejectment
The respondents then moved the Commissioner of Agra in revision
On February 4 1953 the revisional authority allowed the revisional application and set aside the appellate order granting permission to the appellants
That took the appellants to the State Government under section 7 F of the Act
On May 7 1953 the State Government directed the Commissioner to revise his order on the ground that it thought that the need of the appellants was genuine
Acting in pursuance of this direction the Commissioner passed an order on July 28 1953 by which he cancelled his previous order and confirmed the order passed by the appellate authority granting permission to the appellants to sue the respondents in ejectment
This order was clearly the result of the direction issued by the State Government under s7 F of the Act
After this order was passed the appellants sued the respondents in ejectment in the court of the Civil Judge Agra
The claim made by the appellants for ejectment of the respondents was resisted by them on several grounds and on the contentions raised by the respondents the trial court framed six issues
One of the issues was whether the permission granted to the appellants to sue the respondents was valid
It is with this issue that we are concerned in the present appeal
The trial Judge found in favour of the appellants on this issue and recorded his conclusion in their favour even on the other issues which had been framed by him
In the result the trial court passed a decree in favour of the appellants on August 31 1957
The respondents challenged this decree by preferring an appeal in the court of the First Additional Civil Judge Agra
In their appeal they disputed the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial court on all the issues including the issue about the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants before filing the present suit
The appeal court confirmed all the findings recorded by the trial Judge with the result that the respondents  appeal was dismissed on the 30th May 1959
The respondents then went to the Allahabad High Court by way of second appeal
The learned single Judge of the said High Court who heard the said appeal was called upon to consider the question as to whether the permission granted to the appellants was valid
That in fact was the only issue which was raised before him
The other issues which had been found in favour of the appellants were not raised before the learned Judge
On the issue as to the validity of the sanction obtained by the appellants the learned 221 Judge came to the conclusion that the said sanction was invalid inasmuch as the State Government in exercising its authority under s7 F of the Act had not given an opportunity to the respondents to be heard
He took the view that in exercising its authority under section 7 F the State Government was required to decide the matter in revision in a quasi judicial manner and it was absolutely essential that the principles of natural justice should have been followed by the State Government before reaching its decision and an opportunity should have been given by it to the respondent to place their case before it
It appears that this question had been considered by Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in the past and the consensus of judicial opinion appears to have been in favour of the view that the revisional order which the State Government is authorised to pass under section 7 F is not a quasi judicial order but is a purely administrative order and so it is not necessary that the State Government should hear the parties before exercising its jurisdiction under the said section
The learned single Judge was persuaded by the respondents to consider whether the said decisions were right and he came to the conclusion that the view taken in the said decisions was not right
The judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he had reached this conclusion on re examining the question in the light of some decisions of this Court to which his attention was invited
After he had reached this conclusion and had dictated a substantial part of his judgment his attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar vs State of Bombay and others1 which was then not reported
The learned Judge considered the blue print of the judgment to which his attention was invited and thought that the said judgment confirmed the view he had already taken about the nature of the proceedings and the character the jurisdiction contemplated by section 7 F Having held that the State Government was bound to give an opportunity to the respondents to place their version before it before it exercised its authority under section 7 F the learned Judge naturally came to the conclusion that the impugned order passed by the State Government under section 7 F was invalid and that inevitably meant that under section 3 of the Act the suit was incompetent
In the result the second appeal preferred by the respondents was allowed and the appellants  suit ordered to be dismissed
In the circumstances of the case the learned Judge directed that the parties should bear their own costs throughout
It is against this decision that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave and so the only point which falls for our decision is whether the revisional order passed by the State Government under section 7 F without giving an opportunity to the respondents to place their case before it is rendered invalid
When a legislative enactment confers jurisdiction and power on any authority or body to deal with the rights of citizens it 1 1964 ISCR 200
222 often becomes necessary to enquire whether the said authority or body is required to act judicially or quasi judicially in deciding questions entrusted to it by the statute
It sometimes also becomes necessary to consider whether such an authority or body is a tribunal or not
It is well known that even administrative bodies or authorities which are authorised to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner are required to reach their decisions fairly and objectively but in reaching their decisions they would be justified taking into account considerations cf policy
Even so administrative bodies may in acting fairly and objectively follow the principles of natural justice but that does not make the administrative bodies tribunals and does not impose on them an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice
On the other hand authorities or bodies which are given jurisdiction by statutory provisions to deal with the rights of citizens may be required by the relevant statute to act judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to them
An obligation to act judicially may in some cases be inferred from the scheme of the relevant statute and its material provisions
In such a case it is easy to hold that the authority or body must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice before exercising its jurisdiction and its powers but it is not necessary that the obligation to follow the principles of natural justice must be expressly imposed on such an authority or body
If it appears that the authority or body has been given power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens the very nature of the power would inevitably impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice
Whether or not such an authority or body is a tribunal would depend upon the nature of the power conferred on the authority or body the nature of the rights of citizens the decision of which fails within the jurisdiction of the said authority or body and other relevant circumstances
This question has been considered by this Court on several occasions
In the Associated Cement Companies Ltd Bhupendra Cement Works Surajpur vs PN Sharma and another1 both aspects of this matter have been elaborately examined and it has been held adopting the view expressed by the House of Lords in Ridge vs Baldwin and others1 that the extent of the area where the principles of natural justice have to be followed and judicial approach has to be adopted must depend primarily on the nature of the jurisdiction and the power conferred on any authority or body by statutory provisions to deal with the questions affecting the rights of citizens
In other words in that decision this Court has held that the test prescribed by Lord Reid in his judgment in the case of Ridge2 affords valuable assistance in dealing with the vexed question with which we are concerned in the present appeal
Let us therefore examine
the scheme of the Act and the 1  2  223 nature of the power and jurisdiction conferred on the State Government by section 7 F
The Act was passed in 1947 and its main object obviously was in the words of the preamble to continue during a limited period powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and non residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom
The preamble further provides that whereas due to shortage of accommodation in Uttar Pradesh it is expedient to provide for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and the rent of such accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom the Act was enacted
Indeed it is a matter of common knowledge that similar Acts have been passed in all the States in India
Section 3 of the Act provides that subject to any order passed under sub section
3 no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds
Then follow seven clauses a to g which set out the grounds on which a landlord can seek to evict his tenant even without the permission of the District Magistrate The scheme of section 3 therefore is that in order to protect the tenants from eviction the legislature has provided that the landlords could evict their tenants only if there was proof of the existence of one or the other of the seven grounds specified by clauses ato gin section 31
Having made this general provision section 31 makes an exception and enables the landlord to seek to evict his tenant even though his case may not fall under any of the seven clauses of section 31 provided he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate In other words if the District Magistrate grants permission to the landlord he can sue to evict the tenant under the general provisions of the Transfer of Property Act as for instance section 106
This clearly means that the District Magistrate is empowered to grant exception to the landlord from complying with the requirements of clauses a to g of section 31 and take the ease of the tenancy in question outside the provisions of the said clauses
That is the nature and effect of the power conferred on the District Magistrate to grant permission to the landlord to sue his tenant in eviction
Section 3 as it was originally enacted provided that no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds specified by clauses a to f
Clause g has been subsequently added
In 1952 clauses 2 3 and 4 were added to section 3 by the Amending Act 24 of 1952
It is as a result of these amendments that section 31 now provides that subject to any order passed under sub section
3 the permission granted by the District Magistrate would enable the landlord to sue his tenant in ejectment
It is now necessary to read
sub sections
2 3 and 4 which are as follows 2 Where any application has been made to the District 224 Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission the party aggrieved by his order may within 20 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order 3 The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub section 2 as far as may be within six weeks from the date of making it and he may if he is not satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or reverse his order or make such other order as may be just and proper 4 The order of the Commissioner under sub section 3 shall subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7 F be final
 The scheme of these three sub sections is that the District Magistrate should first consider whether the landlord should be allowed to sue without complying with clauses a to g of section 31
When he decides the question one way or the other
the party aggrieved by the decision has been given a right to apply to the Commissioner to revise the said order within the limitation prescribed by sub section
That takes the proceedings before the Commissioner and he exercises his revisional jurisdiction and reaches his own decision in the matter
Sub section 4 provides that the revisional order passed by the Commissioner shall subject to the order passed by the State Government under section 7 F be final
That takes us to section 7 F Section 7 F reads thus The State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under section 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under section 7 A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice
 As we have already indicated the question we have to decide in the present appeal is what is the nature of the proceedings taken before the State Government under section 7 F and what is the character of the jurisdiction and power conferred on the State Government by it are the proceedings purely administrative and can the State Government decide the question and exercise its jurisdiction without complying with the principles of natural justice In dealing with this question we have first to examine the nature of the power conferred on the District Magistrate himself
There is no doubt that what the District Magistrate is authorised to do is to permit the landlord to claim eviction of his tenant though 225 he may not comply with section 31 clauses a to g and that clearly means that the order which the District Magistrate may pass while
granting sanction to the landlord has the effect of taking away from the tenants the statutory protection given to them by the scheme of section 31
A landlord can normally evict his tenant by complying with the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
Section 31 imposes a statutory limitation on the said power by requiring the proof of one or the other of the seven grounds stated in clauses a to g of section 31 before he can seek to evict his tenant
That limitation is removed by the sanction which District Magistrate may grant and so it is plain that the order which the District Magistrate passes under section 32 affects the statutory rights of the tenants
That is one aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored
The second aspect of the matter is that the party who may feet aggrieved by  the order passed by the District Magistrate is given the right to move the Commissioner in revision within the prescribed period of limitation and this provision necessarily implies that the District Magistrate should indicate his reasons why he makes a particular order under section 32
Unless the District Magistrate indicates though briefly the reasons in support of his final order the Commissioner would not be able to exercise his jurisdiction under section 33
How could the Commissioner consider the question as to whether the order passed by the District Magistrate is correct or is legal or is proper
unless he knows the areq
sons on which the said order is based Thus the provision for a revisional application to the Commissioner also indicates that the District Magistrate has to weigh the pros and cons of the matter and come to a certain conclusion before he makes the order
The rule naturally imports the requirement that the parties should be allowed to put their versions before him
The District Magistrate cannot reasonably weigh the pros and cons unless both the landlord and the tenant are given an opportunity to place their versions before him Therefore we are satisfied that the jurisdiction conferred on the District Magistrate to deal with the rights of the parties is of such a character that principles of natural justice cannot be excluded from the proceedings before him
This conclusion is very much strengthened when we consider the provisions of section 33
This clause specifically requires the Commissioner to hear the application made under sub section
2 within the specified period
This requirement positively enacts that the proceedings before the Commissioner are quasi judicial
This clause further provides that the Commissioner has to be satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of the order under revision
He can also examine the question as to the regularity of the proceedings held before the District Magistrate
In our opinion it is impossible to escape the conclusion that these provisions unambiguously suggest that the proceedings before the District Magistrate as well as before the Commissioner are quasi judicial in character 226 Further the revisional power has to be exercised and a revisional order has to be passed by the Commissioner to serve the purpose of justice because the clause provides that the Commissioner may make such other order as may be just and proper
Thus we are satisfied that when the District Magistrate exercises his authority under s 32 and the Commissioner exercises his revisional power under section 33 they must act according to the principles of natural  justice
They are dealing with the question of the rights of the landlord and the tenant and they are required to adopt a judicial approach
If that be the true position in regard to the proceedings contemplated by sub section
32 and sub section
33 it is not difficult to hold that the revisional proceedings which go before the State Government under section 7 F must partake of the same character
It is true that the State Government is authorised to call for the record suo motu but that cannot alter the fact that the State Government would not be in a position to decide the matter entrusted to its jurisdiction under section 7 F unless it gives an opportunity to both the parties to place their respective points of view before it
It is the ends of justice which determine the nature of the order which the State Government would pass under section 7 F and it seems to us plain that in securing the ends of justice the State Government cannot but apply principles of natural justice and offer a reasonable opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdiction under section 7 F We have already referred to the general policy of the Act
In that connection we may mention two other sections of the Act
Section 14 provides that no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him so long as this Act remains in force except on any of the grounds mentioned in section 3
This section emphatically brings out the main object of the Act which is to save the tenants from eviction
That is why it prescribes a bar against the execution of the decrees which may have been passed for the eviction of tenants before the Act came into force unless the landlords are able to show one or the other ground mentioned ins 3
A similar provision is made by section 15 in regard to pending suits
It lays down that in all suits for eviction of tenants from any accommodation pending on the date of commencement of this Act no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 3
The provision also emphasises the importance attached by the Act to the protection of the tenants from eviction
The right conferred on the tenant no to be evicted except on the specified grounds enumerated by clause a t9 g of section 31 is a statutory right of great significance and it is this statutory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the landlord obtains the sanction of the District Magistrate
That is 227 why we think the Act must be taken to require that in exercising their respective powers under section 32 and section 33 the appropriate authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi judicial manner
and are expected to follow the principles of natural justice before reaching their conclusions
We have already indicated that the Allahabad High Court had consistently taken the contrary view and held that the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under section 32 and section 33 are administrative and an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice cannot be imposed on the said authorities vide Narettam Saran vs State of UP1
Indeed
after the learned single Judge had held in the present proceedings that the view taken by the earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court was erroneous
a Division Bench of the said High Court considered the same question once again and re affirmed its earlier view vide Murlidhar vs State of UP2
We have carefully considered the reasons given by the learned Judges when they re affirmed the earlier view taken by the High Court of Allahabad on this point
With respect we are unable to agree with the decision in Murlidhar s2 case
In this connection we may refer to the decisions of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar s3 case on which the learned single Judge partly relied in support of his conclusion
In that case this Court was called upon to consider the question whether the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the State Government under section 79 of the Satan Act was purely administrative
and it came to the conclusion that in exercising the said revisional jurisdiction
the State Government is not acting purely as an administrative authority its decision is judicial or quasi judicial and so it is essential that the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice before reaching its conclusion under that section
The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Watan Act cannot
however be said to be exactly similar to the scheme of the Act with which we are concerned whereas section 3 of the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal deals with the statutory rights conferred on the tenants the relevant sections of the Watan Act dealt with the right of possession of the Watan property itself
That being so it cannot be said that the decision in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar s3 case can be deemed to have overruled by necessary implication the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in regard to the nature of the power conferred on the appropriate authorities by sections 3 and 7 F of the Act
Before we part with this appeal however we ought to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned single Judge had not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court 1 AIR 1954 All 232
2 1964 1964 All148
3 1964 1 SCR200
N 3 SCI 2 228 needed to be re considered and revised
It is plain that the said decisions had not been directly or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court indeed the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar s1 case
It is hardly necessary to emphasis that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge need to be reconsidered he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or in a proper case place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question
That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles of Judicial decorum and propriety
It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed
There will be no order as to costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellants applied to the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer under section 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 for permission to file a suit in ejectment against the predecessors in interest of the respondents who were the present tenants of certain premises in Agra
After a series of proceedings before the Officer and the appellate authority the latter eventually ordered that the permission applied for should be granted
The respondent then moved the Commissioner of Agra in revision and the order granting permission was set aside by him but upon an application made to it under section 7 F of the Act the State Government directed the Commissioner to revise his order
Accordingly the latter cancelled his previous order and confirmed the order granting permission passed by the appellate authority
The appellants  ejectment suit in which one of the issues was whether the permission granted to sue the respondents was valid was decreed in favour of the appellants and an appeal against this decree to the First Additional Civil Judge was dismissed
However on appeal to the High Court the single Judge differing from the view expressed in earlier decisions of the High Court that the revisional order which the State Government was authorised to pass under section 7 F is a purely administrative order came to the conclusion that the permission granted was invalid because the State Government vhen exercising its authority under section 7 F of the Act was required to decide the matter in a quasi judicial manner and by following principles of natural justice and should have given the respondents an opportunity of being heard
On appeal to this Court HELD  The revisional proceedings which go before the State Government under section 7 F are like the proceedings before the District Magistrate under section 32 as well as before the Commissioner under section 33 quasi judicial in character and all these three authorities must act according to the principles of natural justice
226 B C
The right conferred on the tenant not to be evicted
except on the specified grounds enumerated in cls
a to g of section 31 is a statutory right of great significance and it is this statutory right of which the tenant would be deprived when the landlord obtains  the permission of the District Magistrate
Therefore the Act must be taken to require that in exercising their respective powers to grant the permission the appropriate authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi judicial manner and to follow the principles of natural justice before reaching their conclusion
226H 227B
The Associated
Cement Companies Ltd vs Bhupendra Cement Works Surajpur
PN Sharma  and Ridge vs Baldwin  Ors   referred to
219 Narottam Saran vs State of UP AIR 1954 All 232 and Murlidhar vs State of UP
AIR 1964 All 148 disapproved
Laxman Purshottam Paimputkar vs State of Bombay 1964 1 SCR 200 considered
ObiterConsiderations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge need to be reconsidered he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or in a proper case place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question
That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety
228B D