iminal Appeal No 32 of 1982
From the Judgment and Order dated 1101981 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Misc
Main No 304 of 1980
SL Chowdhary and Pradeep Misra for the Appellant
Rakesh K Khanna and RP Singh for the Respondent
The following order of the Court is delivered Even though the dispute between the parties came to this Court from an initial order passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court realising that the dispute was between close relatives in respect of their interests in certain properties which were also the subject matter in a Civil Suit No 43478 Remand of the Court of Sub Judge First Class Delhi advised the parties to have the same resolved through an Arbitrator
On the parties agreeing this Court passed an order on September 5 1986 recording the agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration and appointed Mr Justice VD Misra retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh as the Sole Arbitrator
The parties had agreed to deposit a sum of Rs 3000 each with the Arbitrator to meet with his expenses and remuneration subject to further directions that may be made in that behalf
It was further directed that the learned Arbitrator will render a speaking award within four months
In view of the said agreement the appeal was allowed and the High Court s impugned order was set aside
It appears that thereafter one of the parties namely Jagdish Chander Bhatia did not deposit the expenses with the Arbitrator and raised objection in regard to the arbitration proceedings on the plea that the property in dispute was proposed to be resumed by the Union of India
In the meantime it appears that the sole Arbitrator passed away and in his place Mr Justice MS Gujral retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Sikkim was appointed the Sole Arbitrator
This Court did not approve of the conduct of Jagdish Chander Bhatia in not depositing the amount and in trying to avoid adjudication of the dispute through arbitration
After this 54 order was passed on October 12 1990 by which a further sum of Rs 8000 was directed to be deposited with the Arbitrator subject to the Arbitrator deciding who should bear the cost the newly appointed Arbitrator entered upon the reference and submitted his award on November 14 1991
This concluding part of his Award reads as under House No 17 would entirely belong to Lachhman Das Bhatia whereas House No18 would be jointly owned by Lachhman Das and Jagdish Chander
Lachhman Das would have 7650 share whereas Jagdish Chander would have 2350 share in House No18
As House No17 has entirely been given to Lachhman Das Bhatia in all fairness Jagdish Chander Bhatia should give vacant possession of House No17 to Lachhman Das Bhatia
 The parties were directed to bear their own costs of the arbitration proceedings except that Jagdish Chander Bhatia had to pay Rs 4000 to Lachhman Das Bhatia as his share of the Arbitrator s fees which he had initially failed to deposit
Against this award Jagdish Chander Bhatia hereinafter called the objector  has filed objections under Section 30 of the which provision reads as under An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds namely a that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings b that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35 c that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid
 It was conceded by the learned counsel for the Objector that clause b would not be attracted
His main submission was that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself in that he did not take into consideration several documents which were placed on record before him which support the Objector s case and hence the Award was invalid
He therefore partly relied on clauses a and c for setting aside the Award
55 The documents to which the learned counsel for the objector invited our attention are to be found in Vol2 of the paper book placed before us
These documents are 31 in number and they mainly relate to the rights and interests of the parties in properties situate in that part which now belongs to the Dominion of Pakistan
Since they were refugees they had made certain claims under the law governing rehabilitation of displaced persons in respect of the properties left behind by them
These documents show that the claim was sanctioned in the name of Punnu Ram Lachhman Das in respect of the properties left behind by the family
On the strength of that claim House No18 was purchased in the said name
The Arbitrator however came to the conclusion as is evident from the discussion from paragraph 26 and onwards of the Award that the property in question was purchased for Rs 12850 from the funds contributed by Punnu Ram and Lachhman Das the former paying Rs 9233 and the latter Rs 3617
This is the conclusion reached by the Arbitrator as is evident from paragraph 37 of the Award
The share of the Objector was held to be 17th in the share of Punnu Ram since deceased
It was on this finding recorded by the Arbitrator that he passed the ultimate order extracted above
The arbitrator has made a speaking award setting out his reasons for the conclusions reached by him
He has thus complied with the direction of this Court given earlier
On a perusal of the award it becomes clear that the Arbitrator did not go into the rights and interests of the parties including the HUF in the properties left behind in the Dominion of Pakistan
That was in our opinion not necessary because the fact that the claim was sanctioned in the name to the Punnu Ram Lachhman Das was never in dispute
The short question which the Arbitrator was required to consider was as regards the title of the properties which were the subject matter of the reference which included the property purchased for Rs 12850 on the strength of that claim
In dealing with that question the Arbitrator came to the conclusion that Punnu Ram and Lachhman Das had contributed the entire consideration of Rs 12850 and hence they were the owners of the property and on the death of Punnu Ram inheritance opened insofar as his share in the property was concerned and the Arbitrator came to the conclusion that the Objector was entitled to 17th out of the share of the deceased
Since the contribution made for payment of the price was not equal the Arbitrator allotted a larger share to Punnu Ram and consequently the Objector has got a share on the basis thereof
Practically all the documents included in Vol2 relate to the interest of the 56 parties and their HUF in the properties left behind in the Dominion of Pakistan
The learned counsel for the Objector then tried to take us into the rights and interests of the parties in those properties but we declined to go into the same as we thought that the Arbitrator was right that he was called upon to decide the interest of the parties in Houses Nos 17 and 18 alone which were the subject matter of the reference
We are therefore of the opinion that the Arbitrator had not misconducted himself by refusing to enumerate those documents in Vol2 in his award because he was bound by the scope of the reference which was limited to Houses Nos 17 and 18 and not the properties left behind in the Dominion of Pakistan by the parties
For this reason we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity on the face of the award which would entitle us to exercise jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 
This Court pointed out in Food Corporation of India vs Joginderpal Mohinderpal  Anr 1989 2 SCC 347 that an award of an Arbitrator can only be interfered with or set aside or modified within the four comers of the procedure provided by the statute
The Court must find out whether the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or there was any infirmity in the procedure such as the Arbitrator having travelled beyond the terms of the reference or there being an error apparent on the face of the award
It is not misconduct on the part of an Arbitrator to come to an erroneous conclusion on a disputed issue
In case of error apparent on the face of the award the award can be set aside only if there is any proposition of law on which the award is based which is in conflict with law
It must be demonstrated to the Court that the reasons given by the Arbitrator are so palpably erroneous in law that they have resulted in the Arbitrator taking a view which cannot be sustained in law
To put it differently the Court does not sit in appeal and does not re assess the evidence
Even if the Court feels that had it been left to it it would have assessed the evidence differently that would not be a valid ground for setting aside the award
In Hind Builders vs Union of India 1990 3 SCC 338 this Court pointed out that where on an interpretation of any contract or document two views are possible and the Arbitrator accepts one view while the other view is more appealing it would not be open to the Court to interfere with the Award
We therefore in the facts and circumstances of this case see so reason to interfere with the award of the Arbitrator
The Suit No 43478 pending in the Court of the Sub Judge Delhi 57 was disposed of by that Court and an appeal being Civil Appeal No 211 of 1979 Jagdish Chander Bhatia vs Lachhman Das Bhatia preferred on April 23 1979 against that decree is pending in the Court of the District Judge Delhi
We transfer that appeal to our file and make the Arbitrator s award the rule of the Court
The decree of the trial court is set aside and a decree in terms of the award will be drawn up in the appeal proceedings arising out of Suit No 43478
We however do not make any order as to costs in the present proceedings
NPV Appeal disposed of


Summary:
There was a dispute between the appellants and the first respondent regarding the possession of a house
On an application filed by the respondent under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code 1973 before the Sub Divisional Magistrate claiming ownership of the suit property the Magistrate passed a preliminary order under Section 145 of the Code and thereafter made an order of attachment under Section 146 directing that the attachment would continue till the competent civil court determined the rights of the parties
On a revision riled by the appellants the Sessions Judge granted an interim stay of Magistrate s order
Subsequently the Revision application was dismissed
Ile Magistrate passed a fresh attachment order under Section 146
Once more in revision the Sessions Judge passed an order staying the fresh order of attachment
Thereafter the appellants riled a suit for permanent injuction and also an interim injunction
The trial court dismissed the application for interim injunction
On appeal the District Court issued an interim injunction against 1st respondent and her husband
Subsequently the 2 Criminal Revision preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the Sessions Judge also on the ground that the civil suit was preferred by the appellant
Once again the Magistrate passed another order attaching the property but this third order of attachment was stayed by the Sessions Judge for a period of 15 days
Thereafter on an application by the appellants for withdrawal of attachment on the ground that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace the Magistrate order withdrawal of attachment
The Revision filed by the 1st respondent against the Magistrate s order was dismissed by the Sessions Judge
On an application under Section 482 of the Code filed by Respondent No1 for quashing the order withdrawing the attachment and for directing the attachment to continue the High Court held that it was not open to the Magistrate to withdraw the attachment till the competent court had decided the matter finally and restored the attachment
Hence the appeal
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD  11
The determination by a competent court of the rights of the parties spoken in Section 1461 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 has not necessarily to be a final determination
The determination may be even tentative at the interim stage when the competent court passes an order of interim injunction or appoints a receiver in respect of the subject matter of the dispute pending the final decision in the suit
The moment the competent court does so even at the interim stage the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate has to come to an end
Otherwise there will be inconsistency between the order passed by the civil court and the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate
The proviso to sub section 1 of Section 146 itself takes cognizance of such a situation
When a civil court passes an order of injunction of receiver it is the civil court which is seized of the matter and any breach of its order can be punished by it according to law
Hence on the passing of the interlocutory order by the civil court there is no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute
Under Section 1462 the Magistrate can withdraw the order of attachment passed by him even during the pendency of the dispute in the civil court
When the civil court appoints a receiver the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate necessarily 3 gives way to the order of the civil court appointing the receiver
It is only when the civil court does not appoint the receiver that the Magistrate may make arrangements for looking after the property or even appoint a receiver himself However even when such a receiver is appointed and the civil court subsequently appoints a receiver of its own the Magistrate has to order the receiver appointed by him to hand over the possession of the subject in dispute to the receiver appointed by the civil court and discharge the receiver appointed by him
He has also to pass such other incidental or consequential orders as he thinks just
Such order may include an order of withdrawal of the attachment in view of the seizure of the matter by the civil court and the consequent want of apprehension of breach of the peace
It is therefore not correct to say that the property continues to remain under attachment of the Magisterial order till the rights of the parties are decided finally by the competent court of law
7G H 8A C D F 12
In tic present case the Appellate Civil Court has already passed an order of injunction against the 1st respondent and her husband by virtue of which the possession continues to be with the appellants
Therefore the Magistrate had not erred in withdrawing the attachment
The High Court has erred in holding that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate withdrawing attachment was without jurisdiction
8G H 6E 21
Section 397 3 bars a second revision application by the same party
It is now well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code
6D 22
In the instant case admittedly the 1st respondent had preferred a Criminal Application to the Sessions Court against the order passed by the Magistrate withdrawing the attachment
The Sessions Judge had dismissed the said application
Hence the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of 1st respondent
6CE 3
The Magistrate had committed an error in passing the subsequent orders of attachment when the first attachment was never finally vacated and had revived the moment the revision application flied against It was dismissed by the Sessions Judge
None of the parties including the Sessions Judge realised this error on the part of the Magistrate
The Sessions Judge had also committed a patent mistake in entertaining 4 revision application against the fresh orders of attachment and granting interim stays when he had dismissed revision application against the order of attachment earlier
6A B