Appeal No 389 of 1966
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 25 1964 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Review Application No 23 D of 1963
CB Agarwala Uma Mehta M L Kapur and K K Sinha for the appellant
CJ This is an appeal by a tenant who had rented a shop No 2687 in Kinari Bazar Delhi from the respondent on Rs 1350 P per month
In those premises he was selling Usha sewing machines and fans
It appears that the level of the shop was too high from the road and his clients were troubled in going to his shop and so he lowered the level and thereby altered the premises to suit his convenience
The landlord thereupon filed a suit against him for his eviction under section 131k of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
The suit was filed on November 13 1957
The trial court ordered on February 19 1959 ejectment and payment of Rs 145 as arrears of rent
An appeal against the order of the trial court was dismissed by the appellate authority on November 16 1959
A revision application was then filed by the tenant on March 25 1960
During the course of that revision he invoked the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1956 which had come into force on February 9 1959 and relied upon section 14 1 j of the new Act read with section 57
Previously he had not relied upon the new Act although the Act had been in force during the pendency of the previous proceedings
The High Court acting under section 141j and sub section
10 of the same section gave him the alternative of paying compensation in the sum of Rs 500 which it appears that the landlord himself had assessed as the damages caused by the act of the tenant
The landlord later filed an application for review of the order and pointed out that the new Act was not applicable to the case in view of the first proviso of section 57 sub
section 2
The High Court thereupon granted the review and reversed its earlier order and ordered the eviction of the tenant
In this appeal it is contended that the High Court was in error in passing the order on review and that the previous or was the correct order in the light of the provisions of the Act of 1958
We have therefore to consider which of the two orders of the High Court is the correct order and whether the review was properly granted or not
As is very frequent in our country Rent Control Acts are changed from time to time causing numerous difficulties in their interpretation and application
Here too we have a succession of Acts which were passed to say nothing of the a amendments which were made in the body of each of the Acts as they came
We are concerned first with the Act of 1952 namely
The Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
Section 131k of that Act gave a right to the landlord to evict a tenant who whether before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises or notwithstanding previous notice had used or dealt with the premises 8 57 in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust while giving him a lease of the land on which the promises were situated
We are not concerned with the latter part but with the first part where the tenant before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises
Whether the lowering of the floor was causing substantial damage to the premises is a question into which we need not go because the concurrent finding of the courts of fact is that it did so
This question was not raised before us
Therefore if section 13 1k of the Delhi land Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 applied the eviction of the tenant was the proper order to make in view of the finding that he had caused substantial damage to the premises
However the matter comes to the Court because of the passing of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 which came into force on February 9 1959
Section 571 of that Act provided that the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 in so far as it was applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi was being repealed
While repealing it a special saving was however made by sub section
2 of the same section in favour of all suits and other proceedings which were then pending under the repealed Act and it was provided that those suits and proceedings should be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if that Act had continued to be in force and the new Act had not been passed
This would have really been a very proper provision to make to separate the operation of the two Acts but the Legislature went still further and added two provisos
We are concerned only with the first of the two provisos on which much dispute has arisen in this case
That proviso reads as follows  Provided that in any such suit or proceeding for the fixation of standard rent or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises to which section 54 does not apply the court or other authority shall have regard to the provisions of this Act  This proviso contains a proviso within itself which excepts the case of premises to which section 54 of the Act does not apply
That section provides as follows Nothing in this Act shall affect the provions of the  or the or the Delhi Tenants Temporary Protection Act 1956
 The effect of the proviso which we have quoted above is variously described by counsel on opposite sides According to Mr CB 858 Agarwala who argued for the tenant the words to which sec tion 54 does not apply govern the words any such suit or proceeding and not the words any premises
The High Court in the order passed on review was of the opinion that these words governed the words any premises
In our opinion this is the correct view to take of the matter
To begin with it must be noticed that the proviso speaks of two things namely the fixation of standard rent and the eviction of a tenant from any premises
The words from any premises cannot be connected with the phrase for the fixation of standard rent because then the preposition would have been of any Premises or for any premises and not from any premises
 This means that the first phrase has to be read as complete in itself beginning from the words for the fixation and ending with the words standard rent
The second phrase then reads or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises
The words from any premises go very clearly with the words eviction of a tenant and not with the words any suit or proceeding
The question then arises where does the phrase to which section 54 does not apply connect itself  According to Mr Agarwala that phrase must be connected with the words in any such suit or proceeding
Since the suits contain two kinds of matters namely fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant from any premises we have to turn to the provisions of the statutes to which section 54 refers namely the  the and the Delhi Tenants Temporary Protection Act 1956
The first two do not deal at all with the fixation of fair rent and the third speaks of fair rent but it does not provide for its fixation
It would be pointless to use the language any suit or proceeding to which section 54 does not apply  in relation to fixation of standard rent
It follows therefore that the phrase to which section 54 does not apply really governs premises 
Read in that way all the three Acts fall in line
because they provide for premises and not for fixation of standard rent
the and the Delhi Tenants Temporary Protection Act 1956 all deal with premises and property and therefore the phrase to which section 54 does not apply is connected with the words premises
That is the view which the High Court has taken and we think rightly
The pro so did not apply and the matter had to be governed by the old Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 which had bee repealed
It was contended before us that this legislation was intended to soft action against tenants still further and that the policy 8 59 of the law had been to give more and more protection to the tenants and we must therefore read the statute in consonance with that policy
This would be an argument to consider if the language of the statute was not quite clear
But the language is clear enough to show that the proviso applies only to those cases in which section 54 cannot be made applicable
It is admitted fore us that this area is subjected to the 
If that is so then on the terms of the proviso on which much reliance is placed by Mr Agarwala the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 cannot be taken into consideration
They are to be taken into consideration only in those cases to which the Acts mentioned in section 54 do not apply that is to say in respect of premises not governed by those statutes
Since this shop is governed by one of the statutes the proviso has no application
The High Court s  view was therefore right
In the circumstances the appeal fails and win be dismissed with costs
RKPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant under section 13 1 k of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 on the ground that the appellant had caused damage to the premises
The trial court ordered ejectment in February 1959 and the appellate authority dismissed an appeal in November 1959
The Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 came into force in February 1959
In a revision application before the High Court the appellant invoked the provisions of the 1958 Act and relied upon section 141 j read with section 57 of the new Act
The High Court acting under section 141j and sub section 10 of the same section gave the appellant the alternative to pay compensation for the damages caused
The landlord then filed an application for review of the High Court order pointing out that the new Act was not applicable to the case in view of the first proviso of section 572
The High Court granted the review and reversed its earlier orders
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that by virtue of the first proviso of section 572 the High Court was bound to have regard to the provisions of the 1958 Act even in proceedings pending and governed by the 1952 Act
HELDDismissing the appeal The language of the first proviso to section 572 clearly shows that the proviso applies to those cases only in which Section 54 cannot be made applicable
The area in the present case is admittedly subjected to the  which is one of the enactments mentioned in section 54
Accordingly the terms of the proviso would have no application in this case
857 G 859 B The High Court had rightly held that the phrase to which section 54 does not apply governs the word premises and is not connected with the words in any such suit or proceedings
858A B