ivil Appeal No 3382 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 195
1989245
1989 of Delhi High Court in WP No 2915 of 1988
DD Thakur VC Mahajan NS Das Bahl DN Puri Mukul Mudgal Ms A Subhashini K Vasudev section Mathur Syed Ali Ahmad Syed Tanweer Ahmed section Balakrishnan MKD Nambodiri PP Tripathi and Ms Sangita Garg for the ap pearing parties
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA J
Special leave granted
This Civil appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Delhi High Court dated 19th May 1989 as clarified by order dated 24th May 1989 in Writ Petition No 29 15 of 1988
The facts in brief necessary for the decision of this appeal are that some land was proposed by the Central Government to be allotted for the resettlement of displaced persons
In October 1959 the Rehabilitation Ministry Employ ees  Cooperative House Building Society Ltd New Delhi Respondent No 1 hereinafter referred to as the Society was formed and incorporated
After completing necessary formalities an allotment of 60 acres of land was made by the Central Government in favour of the Society which however was subsequently cancelled on 7th May 1979
The Society challenged the aforesaid order of cancellation before the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No 654 of 1979 which was allowed by a Single Judge of that Court on 1st September 1980
This judgment Was challenged by the Delhi Development Authority before the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No 254 of 1980 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 5th January 1981
Aggrieved by these orders the Delhi Development Authority filed Special Leave Petition Civil No 3762 of 1981 before this Court in which the parties entered into a compromise inter alia providing that an area of 45 acres of land in 842 place of 60 was to be allotted to the Society and that membership of the society was to be restricted to persons who were members as on 1st September 1980 in accordance with the bye laws of the SoCiety as then prevailing
1st September 1980 was the date on which Writ Petition No 654 of 1979 giving rise to Special Leave Petition Civil No 3762 of 1981 had been allowed by the High Court
In pursu ance of the compromise learned counsel for the Delhi Devel opment Authority prayed for and was granted leave on 6th May 1982 to withdraw the said special leave petition
In consequence the order of the High Court stood modified in the light of the compromise entered into between the par ties
The Society thereafter proceeded to make allotment of land to its members and draw of lots was held by the Society on 14th December 1988
This draw of lots was challenged by the appellants before the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No 29 15 of 1988 in which the orders appealed against were passed
In order to appreciate the nature of dispute which was raised in this writ petition with reference to the draw of lots it is necessary to advert to some more facts
Appellants 1 and 2 even though employees of Rehabilita tion Ministry stood posted in its subordinate offices out side Delhi
It appears that even though only such persons who were employed and posted in the Rehabilitation Ministry in Delhi itself were intended to be eligible for membership of the Society appellants 1 and 2 were enrolled as members of the Society on 22nd November 1972 and 11th January 1974 respectively
Likewise certain other persons who were not employees of Rehabilitation Ministry but were employees of departments which were under the charge of the MinisterMinister of State of the Rehabilitation Ministry were also enrolled as its members by the Society
With regard to such members who even though employees of the Rehabilitation Ministry Were posted outside Delhi the  Union Cabinet in 1977 accepted a suggestion to enable Cen tral Government employees serving outside Delhi to become members of cooperative housing societies in Delhi
In pursu ance thereof the Lt Governor of Delhi passed a consequen tial general order on 9th June 1977 directing that the condition with regard to bona fide residents of Delhi will stand relaxed to the extent that in case the Government servant during the term of employment and with a view to settle in Delhi after retirement has become a member of a Cooperative House Building Society he will not be debarred from the membership of the Society simply on the 843 ground that he was not a resident of Delhi at the time of enrolment
In pursuance of this general order the appellants and some other similar persons who had been enrolled as members by the Society became eligible to be members of the Society and subsequently their membership was approved
As regards those persons who were employed in other departments under the charge of MinisterMinister of State of the Reha bilitation Ministry the Society by its Resolution dated 14th December 1980 proposed an amendment of the bye laws so as to enable such persons also to become eligible for member ship of the Society
The proposed amendment which was to be inserted as bye law 51a iii was sent by the Society to the Registrar for approval
The Registrar however refused to approve and register the proposed amendment
Aggrieved the Society preferred an appeal before the Lt Governor of Delhi Which was allowed on 19th August 1985
The Lt Governor directed the bye laWs to be so amended as to pro vide for eligibility of employees of a Ministry of which Department of Rehabilitation had been a part
In pursuance of the aforesaid direction the amended bye law 51aiii was registered and incorporated into the bye laws by the Registrar on 10th March 1986
At this place Section 12 of the Delhi Cooperative Socie ties Act 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act may be referred to which provides that an amendment of the bye laws of a cooperative society shall unless it is expressed to come into operation on a particular day come into force on the day on which it is registered
Nothing to the contrary having been provided in this behalf the amended bye law 51aiii was in view of section 12 of the Act to come into operation from both March 1986 on which date the said amended bye Law was registered as stated above
It appears that realising this difficulty the Society wrote to the Registrar on 3rd February 1987 to move the Lt Governor for relaxing the provisions of Section 12 of the Act
A reminder was sent by the Society on 26th March 1987 to approve the aforesaid amended bye law with retrospective effect
The Registrar seems to have moved the Government accordingly and necessary order in this behalf appears to have been passed by the Lt Governor the terms whereof are to be found in a Notification dated 27th October 1987 issued by  the Office of the Registrar Cooperative Societies which reads as hereunder OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES New Delhi the 27th October 1987 844 NOTIFICATION No F 46200711585Bye lawsCoop5398 In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 88 of the Delhi Coop erative Societies Act 1972 the Lt Governor Delhi has been pleased to exempt the Rehabili tation Min
House Building Society Ltd New Delhi from the provision of Section 12 of the said Act in respect of the amended bye laws No 51a iii of  the said socie ty as registered on 10386 will have retro spective effect from 1011968 instead of 1021986
By Order on behalf of LG Delhi
GP Sewallia Spl
Coop The effect of the order of the Lt Governor indicated in the aforesaid Notification was that employees of other departments under the charge of MinisterMinister of State of Rehabilitation Ministry became eligible to the membership of the Society with effect from 10th January 1968
There was a third category of members which too had given rise to the disputes raised in Writ Petition No 29 15 of 1988
One of the conditions for being eligible to be a member of the Society was that the person sought to be enrolled as a member of the Society had to file an affidavit that he or she did not own a residential house or plot either in his or her name or in the name of his or her spouse parents or dependent relations
15 persons had not in their affidavits filed along with their applications for membership given full particulars in this behalf
It appears that subsequent ly this lacuna having come to its notice the Society kept their membership in abeyance and gave them an opportunity to file fresh affidavits giving full particulars which they did and on that basis their membership was regularised
In the writ petition giving rise to this appeal Shri SC Saxena Secretary of the Society had filed an affidavit which contained three lists
List A  contained the names of 572 persons whose membership had been cleared both by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and the Ministry of Home Affairs Department of Rehabilitation in accordance with the dates of their enrolment
List B  contained the names of 26 members who were employees of the Ministries in Delhi New Delhi which were under the charge of the MinisterMinis ter of State of Rehabilitation Ministry
List C  on the other hand contained the names of such persons who were employees in the subordinate 845 offices of the MinistryDepartment of Rehabilitation and were posted outside Delhi but wanted to settle in DelhiNew Delhi after retirement
The appellants as noticed earlier fell in the category of members shown in List C 
Their membership had in pursuance of the order of the Lt Gover nor dated 9th June 1977 referred to above been approved by the Society in the meeting of its Managing Committee held on 17th November 1979
In the same meeting by another Resolu tion the membership of the 15 persons referred to above as persons falling in the third category was also regularised on the basis of the fresh affidavits filed by them
As regards those members whose names were mentioned in List B  aforesaid it has been pointed out by the High Court in the judgment appealed against that there is no dispute that the membership of these 26 persons mentioned in List B  was either approved by the General Body in the meeting held on 8th July 1970 or approved by the Managing Committee on 22nd March 1974 or by the Administrator on or before 9th June 1976
 As regards members mentioned in List B  the grievance of the appellants before the High Court was that the order of the Lt Governor expressed in the Notification dated 27th October 1987 was ultra vires his powers in so far as it made the amended bye law 51aiii effective retrospec tively from 10th January 1968
As regards 15 persons of the third category referred to above the grievance of the appel lants before the High Court on the other hand was that they having filed fresh affidavits after the appellants had been enrolled as members could not be given seniority over the appellants in the matter of drawing of lots
These conten tions having been repelled by the High Court by the orders appealed against the appellants have preferred this civil appeal in which subsequently various interlocutory applica tions for impleadment and other directions were made which too are being considered hereinafter along with the appeal
In the appeal the real question which arises for consid eration is about the seniority of the members of the Society which constitutes the basis for allotment of plots at the time of drawing of lots
As regards the seniority of the 15 members who have been referred to above as members falling in third category namely those who had been accepted as members of the society but subsequently whose membership was kept in abeyance on some defects being notices in their affidavits and who on an opportunity being given in this behalf filed fresh affidavits giving full particulars and were on the basis of such affidavits treated as regular members the appellants  grievance has been as noticed earlier that they having filed fresh affidavits after the appellants had 846 been enrolled as members could not be given seniority over the appellants
The High Court in the orders appealed against has pointed out that the cases of these 15 persons were scrutinised by the screening committee Who recommended that they should be treated as regular member of the society and share certificates be issued to them
It has further been found by the High Court that these 15 persons were admitted as members of the society either by the Managing Committee or the General Body or the Administrator prior to 17th November 1979 and that the record indicated that their membership was kept in abeyance because of full information not being furnished in their affidavits
It has held that since the membership of 26 persons falling in category C  including the appellants was for the first time approved by the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 17th NOvember 1979 and the 15 persons referred to above had been admitted as members prior to 17th November 1979 and in the meeting held on 17th November 1979 their membership was only regu larised the 26 persons of Category C  including the appel lants would obviously be junior tO the 15 members referred to above
In our opinion the view taken by the High Court in this behalf does not suffer from any such error which may justify interference under Article 136 of the Constitution
Indeed no serious argument was addressed on this point on behalf of the appellants
Now we advert to the main submission made on behalf of the appellants with regard to the validity of the Order of the Lt Governor indicated in the notification dated 27th October 1987 giving the amended Bye law No 51aiii retrospective effect from 10th January 1968
Before dealing with this plea however it is necessary to point out that during the pendency of the special leave petition giving rise to this appeal the Lt Governor issued another notifi cation dated 29th August 1990 the relevant portion of which reads as hereunder DELHI ADMINISTRATION DELHI COOPERATIVE DEPARTMENT OLD COURT S BUILDING PARLIAMENT STREET NEW DELHI Dated the 29th August 1990 NOTIFICATION No F 46200711585Bye lawsCoopThe Lt Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi is pleased to rescind his notifica tion No 27th October 1987 issued under Section 88 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act 1972 by which the Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd was exempted from the provisions of Section 12 of the said Act in respect of the amended bye law No 51aiii of the said Society
with retrospective effect from 1011968 instead of 1821986
By order and in the name of the Lt Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi
AC KHER Spl
Cooperation Delhi Administration Delhi
 By Order dated 30th August 1990 and a subsequent Order dated 7th April 1991 passed by this Court the parties were permitted to challenge the validity of this notification and IA No 131991 has been filed by Shri BR Puri and six others in this behalf
It has been urged by learned counsel for the appellants that if the subsequent notification dated 29th August 1990 is held to be valid the orders appealed against passed by the High Court deserve to be set aside on that ground alone inasmuch as they are based on the earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 which has been rescinded
In the alterna tive it has been urged that if the notification dated 29th August 1990 is held to be invalid the orders appealed against yet deserve to be set aside inasmuch as the earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 which forms the basis of these orders is ultra vires
Since the validity of the notification dated 29th Au gust 1990 would to a large extent depend upon the true nature and import of the earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 we propose to consider the question of the validity of the notification dated 27th October 1987 first
As noticed earlier it was in pursuance of the order passed by the Lt Governor on 19th August 1985 that the amended bye law 51aiii was registered and incorporated in the Bye laws by the Registrar on 10th March 1986
This order had been passed by Lt Governor in an appeal filed by the Socie ty against the order of the Registrar refusing to register the aforesaid amendment and rejecting the proposal made in this behalf by the Society
This appeal had obviously been filed under Section 761b of the Act and was entertained 848 and decided by the Lt Governor in view of the provision contained in this behalf in Section 762c of the Act
It cannot be disputed that the jurisdiction which the Lt Governor exercised in entertaining and deciding the appeal was of a quasi judicial character
For allowing the appeal the Lt Governor in his order dated 19th August 1985 gave the following reasons The rest of the proposed amendments which are based on model bye laws with certain modifications are designed to regularise such of the members as were not the employees of the Department of Rehabilitation but were employees of the Ministries of which the Department of Rehabilitation had been a part from time to time under one MinisterMinister of State
As these persons whose number is stated to be not large became members of the society many years ago and their names also figured as has been stated by the counsel for the appellant in the list of members which was supplied by the society to the Department of Rehabilitation and which formed the basis for the allotment of land to the society by the Ministry of Rehabilitation it would be neither fair nor just to leave them in the lurch now by depriving them of their member ship when they cannot become members of any other society
 It would thus appear that what weighed with the Lt Governor apart from the other considerations stated in his order was that the proposed amendment to the bye laws was designed to regularise such of the members   whose number is stated to be not  large and who became members of the Society many years ago and that it would neither be fair nor just to leave them in the lurch now by depriving them of their membership when they cannot become members of any other society
If these were the considra tions which  weighed with the Lt Governor in allowing the proposed amendment it can hardly be denied that the purpose of the order was not to give effect to the amended bye law from the date on which it was registered as contemplated by Section 12 of the Act which date in the instant case came to be 10th March 1986 but from the date on which the first person under this category was enrolled as a member for otherwise the purpose of the order Was bound to be frustrat ed and the order would in that event be hit by the doctrine of brutum fulmen
This quasi judicial order passed by the Lt Governor has become final and 849 it was really to give effect to this order that the order of the Lt Governor referred to in the notification dated 27th October 1987 was passed
In the normal course it would not be just and proper to interfere with such an order under Article 136 of the Constitution
Learned counsel for the appellants has however strenu ously urged that the notification dated 27th October 1987 is ultra vires the powers of the Lt Governor
He pointed out that Section 88 of the Act under Which the said notifi cation was issued does not authorise the issue of a notifi cation such as the notification dated 27th October 1987
Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel in this behalf we find it difficult to agree with them
Section 88 of the Act may usefully be reproduced here
It reads 88
Power to extempt cooperative societies from provisions of the Act
The Lt Governor may by general order to be published in the
Delhi Gazette exempt any cooperative society or any class of cooperative societies from any of the provisions of this Act or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such societies or class of societies with such modifications as may be specified in the order
 The notification dated 27th October 1987 has already been quoted above
Its perusal indicates that by its earlier part the Lt Governor has exempted the society from the provision of Section 12 of the Act
This was clearly permis sible on a plain reading of Section 88
By its later part the notification provides that the amended bye law 51aiii will have retrospective effect with effect from 101
 The word Which seems to have been omit ted after as registered on 10386 and before will have retrospective effect
It is clear not only from the context of the notification but also from its Hindi version a photo stat copy whereof has been produced before us
Transliterat ed in Roman Script it reads Dilli ke up Rajyapal Dilli Sahkari Samitiyan Adhiniyam 1972 ki dhara 88 ke Antargat pradatt Shaktiyon ka prayog karte hue the Rehabilita tion Ministry Employees Cooperative Society Ltd naee Dilli ko ukta Adhiniyam ki dhara 12 me diye gaye pravidhan
ke anusar ukta Samiti ko bye laws me dhara 51a tatha iii me sanshodhan dinank 10386 ki apeksha 10168 se lagu hone ki chhut dete hain According to the Hindi version the Society has been permit ted 850 to enforce the amended bye law 51aiii with effect from 10168
Section 12 contemplates unless it is expressed to come into operation on a particular day
The notification really permits to express 10168 as the particular day on which the amended bye law aforesaid is to come into opera tion
Suppose the notification dated 27th October 1987 had said At the end of Section 12 of the Act add provided that the amendement of the bye law made by the Rehabilitation Ministry
Employees Cooperative House Building Society Ltd  New Delhi shall come into force on 10168
Could it be said that this would be beyond the power con ferred by Section 88 of the Act The answer would have to be in the negative on a plain reading of Section 88
Except for the unhappy language used therein the notification dated 27th October 1987 does not seem to have been issued by the Lt Governor in excess of the powers conferred on him by Section 88 of the Act
In such matters substance has to prevail over the form
We have been informed by learned counsel for the appplicants in IA No 13 of 1991 that 10th January 1968 mentioned in the notification dated 27th October 1987 is the date on which the first member failing in category B  referred to above had applied for enrolment
As indicated above this was really the purpose of the quasi judicial order dated 19th August 1985 passed by the Lt Governor in the appeal filed by the Society and the notification has obviously been issued to subserve that purpose
In so far as we have taken the view that the word which seems to have been omitted in the Notification dated 27th October 1987 and it has to be read there we may point out that in Surjit Singh vs Kalra  it has been held in paragraph 19 of the Report True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted or adopting a construc tion which deprives certain existing words of all meaning it is permissible to supply the words Craies Statute Law 7th edn p 109
Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores vs
B Mohan Lal Sowcar  where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful
An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the 851 statute
See Sirajul Haq Khan vs Sunni Central Board of Waqf Learned counsel forthe appellants then urged that a delegated legislation could not be given retrospective effect unless it was specifically provided for
He relied on the following passages from Wade on Administrative Law Fifth Edition It follows likewise that the courts must determine the validity of delegated legisla tion by applying the test of ultra vires just as they do in other contexts
Delegated legis lation in no way partakes of the immunity which Acts of Parliament enjoy from challenge in the courts for there is a fundamental difference between a sovereign and a subordi nate law making power
Acts of Parliament have sovereign force but legislation made under delegated power can be valid only if it con forms exactly to the power granted page 748
Whether delegated legislation can have retrospective operation without express Parliamentary sanction is a question upon which there is scant authority
It is natural to presume that Parliament is unlikely to confer a power which it uses only most spar ingly itself page 751
Just as with other kinds of admin istrative action the courts must sometimes condemn rules or regulations for unreasonable ness
In interpreting statutes it is natural to make the assumption that Parliament could not have intended powers of delegated legisla tion to be exercised unreasonably so that the legality of the regulations becomes dependent upon their content page 752
Reference was made to similar passages even from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes and Vepa P Sarthi s Interpretation of Statutes
Certain decisions of this Court were
also cited in support of the above propositions Relying on Partap Singh vs State of Punjab  it was further urged that mala fides vitiates an order
Even though there can be no dispute with the legal propositions enunciated above we find it difficult to apply them in the instant Case to nullify the notification dated 27th October 1987
Firstly the power exercised by the Lt Governor as indicated earlier was within the ambit 852 of and permissible under Section 88 of the Act Secondly keeping in view the facts of the instant case and the pur pose of amending bye law 51aiii we find that the notification is neither unreasonable nor can any mala fide be attributed in issuing the same
In Kruse vs Johnson  it was held that in determining the validity of bye laws made by public representative bodies such as county councils the Court ought to be slow to hold that a bye law is void for unrea sonableness
A bye law so made ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation be tween different classes or unjust or made in bad faith or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of those subject to it
In view of this legal posi tion the notification dated 27th October 1987 deserves to be upheld as in our opinion it does not fall within any of the exceptions referred to in the case of Kurse vs Johnson supra
Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the notification dated 27th October 1987 had the effect of defeating the purpose of the Act and was conse quently bad
Reliance was placed on Registrar of Cooperative Societies Trivandrum and Anr
vs K Kunhambu  Ors
   at p 267 where with reference to Section 60 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1932 it was held Section 60 empowers the State Government to exempt a registered society from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provision shall apply to such society with specified modifications
The power given to the Government under Section 60 of the Act is to be exercised so as to advance the policy and objects of the Act according to the guidelines as may be gleaned from the preamble and other provisions which we have already pointed out are clear
 We are of the view that the said Notification cannot be held to be bad on this score as well for the simple reason that the bye law 51aiii introduced by amendment consequent upon the quasijudicial order of the Lt Governor passed in appeal on 19th August 1985 has not been challenged on the ground that it was beyond the power conferred by the Act
What has been challenged is the retrospective operation thereof
As seen above if the amended bye law was not made retrospective its very purpose was to stand defeated
So far as the Notification dated 27th October 1987 is concerned it really subserves the purpose of the amended bye law made under the Act 853 and does not defeat it
Lastly it was urged by learned counsel for the appel lants that at worst the effect of the Notification is that the amended bye law 51aiii would be deemed to be there with effect from 10168 but from that fact alone the re spondents could not become members unless their membership was approved as contemplated by Rule 24 of the Delhi Co operative Societies Rules 1973
Suffice it to point out so far as this submission is concerned that with regard to members whose names were mentioned in List B  of the affi davitfiled by Shri SC Saxena before it the High Court as already noticed earlier has held in the judgment ap pealed against that there is no dispute that the membership of these 26 persons mentioned in List B  was either ap proved by the General Body in the meeting held on 8th July 1970 or approved by the Managing Committee on 22nd March 1974 or by the Administrator on or before 9th June 1976
 If the Notification dated 27th October 1987 is valid it had by legal fiction the effect of making persons mentioned in List B  aforesaid eligible for membership of the Society with effect from 10th January 1968 and the approval of the membership of these persons on various dates as pointed out by the High Court could not be held to be invalid simply because those dates happened to be prior to the date on which bye law 51aiii was actually incorporated in the bye laws of the Society
As pointed out by Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co Ltd vs Finisbury Borough Council 1952 Appeal Cases 109 at p 132 if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real you must sure ly unless prohibited from doing so also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed must inevitably have fol lowed from or accompanied it and that when the statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corol laries of that state of affairs
Learned counsel for the appellants however urged that the aforesaid principle of legal faction cannot be invoked to put life in a still born action and relied on the deci sion of this Court in B Shama Rao vs The Union Territory of Pondicherry  Having gone through the decision we are of the view that it is clearly distinugisha ble
The facts of that case were that the legislative assem bly for the Union Territory of Pondicherry passed the Pondi cherry General Sales Tax Act 10 of 1965 which was pub lished on June 30 854 1965
Section 1 2 of the Act provided that it would come into force on such date as the Pondicherry Government may by notification appoint and section 21 provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1959 as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the Pondi cherry Act shall be extended to Pondicherry subject to certain modifications one of which related to the constitu tion of the Appellate Tribunal
The Act also enacted a Schedule giving the description of goods the point of levy and the rates of tax
The Pondicherry Government issued a notification on March 1 1966 appointing April 1
1966 as the date of commencement
Prior to the issue of the notifi cation the Madras legislature had amended the Madras Act and consequently it was the Madras Act as amended up to April 1 1966 which was brought into force in Pondicherry
When the Act had come into force the petitioner was served with a notice to register himself as a dealer and he thereupon filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the Act
After the petition was filed the Pondicherry Legisla ture passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Amendment Act  13 of 1966 whereby section 12 of the principal Act was amended to read that the latter Act shall come into force on the 1st day of April 1980 it was also provided that all taxes levied or collected and all proceedings taken and things done were to be deemed valid as if the principal Act as amended had been in force in all material times
On these facts it was held that the Act of 1965 was void and still born and could not be revived by the amendment Act of 1966
In this connection it was pointed out at page 660 In the present case it is clear that the Pondicherry legislature not only adopted the Madras Act as it stood at the date when it passed the Principal Act but also enacted that if the Madras legislature were to amend its Act prior to the date when the Pondicherry government would issue its notification it would be the amended Act which would apply
The legislature at that stage could not antic ipate that the Madras Act would not be amended nor could it predicate what amendment or amendments would be carried out or whether they would be of a sweeping character or whether they would be suitable in Pondicherry
In point of fact the Madras Act was amended and by reason of section 21 read with sec tion 12 of the Principal Act it was the 855 amended Act which was brought into operation in Pondicherry
The result was that the Pondi cherry legislature accepted the amended Act though it was not and could not be aware what the provisions of the amended Act would be
There was in these circumstances a total surrender in the matter of sales tax legisla tion by the Pondicherry Assembly in favour of the Madras legislature and for that reason we must agree with Mr Desai that the Act was void or as is often said still born 
 Such is obviously not the position in the instant case
In view of what has been discussed above no exception can be taken to the view of the High Court holding the said Notifi cation to be valid
The question of validity of the subsequent Notification dated 29th August 1990 whereby the earlier Notification dated 27th October 1987 was rescinded may now be consid ered
As noticed earlier the Lt Governor had passed the quasi judicial order on 19th August 1985 in an appeal flied by the society against the order of the Registrar declining amendment of the bye law concerned
Relevant findings of the Lt Governor along with the reasons there for have already been extracted above
We have already pointed out that what weighed with the Lt Governor in passing that order was that persons for whose benefit the bye law was sought to be amended had become members of the society many years ago that their names figured even in the list of members which was supplied by the society to the Department of Rehabilita tion and which formed the basis for allotment of land to the society and that it would be neither fair nor just to leave them in the lurch now by depriving them of their membership when they cannot become members of any other society
It was pointed out by the Lt Governor that the proposed amendment in the bye law was designed to regularise such of the members
From the tenor of this order there can be no manner of doubt that the order was passed with a view to ensure that the persons who had become members of the socie ty many years ago should get the benefit of the amended bye law by having their membership regularised
Such members could obviously get the benefit of the bye law only if it was made retrospectively effective
The order of the Lt Governor did not contemplate fresh enrolment of those per sons as members after the passing of that order and the bye law being amended in consequence thereof but it contem plated regularisation of their membership
This clearly indicated that those persons were sought to be treated as members as from the dates on which they had factually become members 856 of the society
We have also pointed out above that in our opinion in having the notification dated 27th October 1987 issued the Lt Governor only took steps to give effect to the quasi judicial order could be achieved
This being the true nature of the notification dated 27th October 1987 the Lt Governor cannot be said to have in any manner re viewed the quasi judicial order dated 19th August 1985
On the other hand the subsequent notification dated 29th August 1990 even though purported to rescind that earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 only it had keeping in view the nature and purpose of the notification dated 27th October 1987 really the effect of reviewing and nullifying the quasi judicial order passed by the Lt Governor on 19th August 1985
In a matter such as this it is the substance and the consequence of the notification dated 29th August 1990 which has to be kept in mind while considering the true import of that notification
It is settled law that a quasi judicial order once passed and having become final cannot be reviewed by the authority passing that order unless power of review has been specifically conferred
The qausijudical order dated 19th August 1985 as seen above had been passed by the Lt Governor under Section 76 of the Act
No power to review such an order has been conferred by the Act
In GV Rao vs Govt
of Andhra Pradesh and Ors
 1966 2 SCR p 172 an order had been passed by the Gov ernment under Section 62 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithies and Zila Parishads Act
1959 it was subsequently reviewed
The validity of this order of review was in ques tion in that case
No power of review had been conferred for review of an order passed under Section 62
What was howev er argued was that the Government was competent to review that order in exercise of power conferred by Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act 1891
Repelling this argu ment it was held The learned counsel for the State then con tended that the order dated April 18 1963 could itself be sustained under section 62 of the Act
Reliance is placed upon section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act 1891 whereunder if any power is conferred on the Government that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires
But that section cannot apply to an order made in exercise of a quasi judicial power
Section 62 of the Act confers a power on the Government to cancel or suspend the resolution of a Panchayat Samithi in the circumstances mentioned therein after giving an opportunity for explanation to the Panchay at Samithi
If the Government in exercise of that power cancels or confirms a resolution to the Panchayat 857 Samithi qua that order it becomes functus officio
Section 62 unlike section 72 of the Act does not confer a power on the Government to review its orders
Therefore there are no merits in this contention
 We are aware that the notification dated 29th August 1990 purports to rescind the earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 only and does not speak in clear terms that the quasi judicial order dated 19th August 1985 was also being rescinded
On the facts and circumstances of this case as emphasised above we are of the opinion that this circumstance hardly makes any difference inasmuch as even though the quasi judicial order dated 19th August 1985 has not been expressly nullified it has certainly for all practical purposes been nullified by necessary implication
This in our opinion could not be done and the notification dated 29th August 1990 is ultra vires on this ground alone
The matter can be looked at from another angle also
It cannot be disputed that as a consequence of the quasi judi cial order of the Lt Governor dated 19th August 1985 and the notification dated 27th October 1987 a substantive right was created in favour of the 26 persons whose names had been mentioned in list B  of the affidavit by Shri SC Saxena filed in the High Court
The challenge to that noti fication had already failed before the High Court and the matter was subjudice before this Court in special leave petition giving rise to this civil appeal when the notifica tion dated 29th August 1990 was issued
The notification dated 27th October 1987 had specifically been issued under section 88 of the Act
Even though the subsequent notification dated 29th August 1990 does not disclose the source of the power under which it had been issued learned counsel for the appellants traced its source to section 88 itself read with the powers to add to amend vary or rescind notifications orders rules or bye laws contained in section 21 of the 
In State of Kerala and Ors
vs KG Madhavan Pillai and Ors 1988 4 SCR p 669 it was held by the High Court that if in pursuance of an earlier order passed by the Government some person acquires a right en forceable in law the said right cannot be taken away by a subsequent order under general power of rescindment avail able to the Government under the and that the said power of rescindment had to be determined in the light of the subject matter context and the effect of the relevant provisions of the statute
The view taken by the High Court was upheld by this Court in paragraph 27 of the report
The notification dated 29th August 1990 would therefore be invalid on this ground also
In view of the foregoing discussion the civil appeal deserves to be dis missed
858 At this place we consider it proper to make a note that learned counsel for the applicants in IA 13 of 1991 had attacked the Notification dated 29th August 1990 on two other grounds also
One was that the said Notification was vitiated for breach of principles of natural justice it having taken away vested rights of the applicants created by the quasi judicial order of the Lt Governor dated 19th August 1985 and the Notification dated 27th October 1987 and the other that the effect of dismissal of an earlier Special Leave Petition by this Court on 19th March 1990 could not be nullified by the Notification dated 29th Au gust 1990 In the view we have taken we have not found it necessary to go into these questions
We now take up Interlocutory Applications made in the appeal
Some of these applications have already been dis posed of by various orders passed from time to time
The only applications which are surviving are IA No 189 IA Nos 4 and 589 IA Nos
6 and 889 and IA No 1391
The nature and purpose of IA No 1391 has already been indicat ed above Since the notification dated 29th August 1990 has been found by us to be ultra vires and the civil appeal is being dismissed this application deserves to be allowed
So does IA No 189 also which has been made by the same cate gory of members Who have made IA No 1391
The applicants in IA Nos 6 and 889 have taken the same stand as the appellants and their learned counsel has before us also adopted the arguments made by learned counsel for the appel lants
Since the appeal is being dismissed no further order on IA Nos 6 and 889 is necessary
The appellant in IA Nos 4 and 589 was really aggrieved by the interim order passed by this Court in the special leave petition on 19th July 1989 and since with the dismissal of the appeal the said interim order will automatically stand vacated no further order in these applications also is necessary
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed
Orders on the interim applications aforementioned shall be as already indicated hereinabove
They are disposed of accord ingly
In the circumstances of the case however the par ties shall bear their own costs
 YLal
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellants father and son A 1 and A 2 were tried under Sections 302 201 and 120 B IPC for causing murder of the wife of A2
The deceased was married to A 2 in 1961
Two sons and one daughter were born to them
Their matrimonial fife was not smooth
There were frequent quarrels
It was in the evidence that the deceased was not healthy both physically and mentally
She was also admitted in 821 mental hospital once
She used to confine herself to her room and she appeared to be somewhat mentally deranged
On 18382 the dead body of the deceased was found in her room in the house of the accused
At that time admitted ly A 2 was not in the house and he was at Suratgarh
On being informed about the death A 1 sent for a doctor who examined the deceased and declared her to be dead
Thereaf ter A 1 informed PW S the father of the deceased
The brother of the deceased PW 6 told PW 5 that he had seen the dead body lying in the room and that it was giving rotten smell
PW 6 lodged a report before the Police
The investigation was taken up held the inquest exam ined the witnesses and sent the dead body for post mortem
The Doctor PW 2 who conducted the post mortem opined that the death was due to head injury and pressure in the neck region
After completion of the investigation the charge sheet was laid
22 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prose cution
The accused denied the offences
A 1 stated that he was away from 1431982 onwards and was at Jodhpur in his daughter s house
In support of his plea DW 1 the neighb out of A 1 s daughter and his grand danghter DW 2 namely the daughter of A 2 and the deceased were examined
A 2 stated that he was at Suratgarh from 1131982 onwards
Both of them denied the allegations of the pfrosecution
The trial court held that there was no evidence of conspiracy between the A 1 and A 2 for murdering the de ceased and the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were hardly sufficient to connect them with the murder and the accused were acquitted by the trial court
The State preferred an appeal before the Division Bonch of the High Court and the High Court convicted them under Section 120 B and Section 302 read with 34 of the IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life against which this appeal was preferred under Section 2a of the Supreme Court Enlargement of General Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1970
The appellants contended that the High Court acted an prejudice and suspicion and that there was absolutely no material to prove the conspiracy and muchless to connect the two accused in any manner with the murder
822 The respondent supported the findings of the High Court and also contended that the accused would at least be liable of having committed other offences
Disposing of the appeal by making modification in the sentence this Court HELD 1
The second accused was not present in the scene house where the occurrence took place from 11th to 20th March 1982 and that the first accused was at Jodhpur in his daughter s house from 14382 to 17382 and returned to Jaipur on 18382
Therefore they were not present in the house when the deceased died
The Medical Officer PW 2 could not say definitely as to whether the death has occurred before four days of his examination and there is absolutely no evidence either circumstantial or direct to hold that the death took place on 11382 itself as found by the High Court
The evidence of DW 2 who is none other than the daughter of the deceased and was very much in the house throughout categorically stated that her mother was alive on 15th March also
Apart from DW 2 the only other inmate of the house during the crucial period was the moth er in law of the deceased who was not even charge sheeted
The letter exhibit
P 15 written by the first accused does not in any manner incriminate them and the High Court has grossly erred in holding that A 1 and A 2 entered into conspiracy merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises drawn from theletter
PWs 4 9 and 10 have not supported the prosecu tion case and the remaining evidence does not in any manner implicate A 1 and A 2 and the other remaining inmate of the house the mother in law of the deceased was not even suspected
Therefore having given anxious and careful con sideration to the facts and circumstances of the case it is felt by the Court that the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the guilt of the appellants
835A E 2
Section 202 IPC punishes the illegal omission of those who under law are bound to give information in respect of an offence which he is legally bound to give particular ly being the head of the family
Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove 1 that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed 2 that the accused had intentionally omit ted to give information respecting that offence and 3 that the accused was legally bound to give that information
836G H 3
A 1 was at least under an obligation to give infor mation about the death of the deceased since the same was unnatural
From the 823 medical evidence it is clear that it was not a natural death and consequently the death should at least be noted as one of suicide
Even in the case of suicide an offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 is inherent
Therefore even in the case of a suicide there is an obligation on the person who knows or has reason to believe that such a suicidal death has occured to give information
835G 836A 4
In the instant case A 1 returned to his house where the dead body was lying on 18382 and the circumstances clearly go to show that he had knowledge that the deceased died of an unnatural death
Therefore he had knowledge or at least had reason to believe that an offence had been commit ted even if at that stage be thought that it was only a suicide
Therefore it was his bounden duty particularly as head of the family to inform the authorities
He omitted to do so
On the other hand he went about telling that the deceased was still alive and her condition was serious
But when PW 6 the brother of the deceased came to the house and enquired A 1 told him that the body would be Cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities
Therefore all the ingredients of Section 202 are made out against him and he clearly committed the offence punishable under this Section at
that stage
838B D 5
The fact that A 1 himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not absolve him of his complicity in respect of the offence punishable under Sec tion 202 IPC 838D Kalidas Achamma vs The State ofAP SHO Karimnagar I Town PS  Approved
Harishchandrasing Sajjansingh Rathod and Another vs State of Gujarat  Distinguished