ON Criminal Appeal No 72 of 1959
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 2nd April 1959 of the Bombay High Court at Rajkot in Confirmation Case No 2 of 1959 and Crl
Appeal No 32 of 1959 arising out of the judgment and order dated February 18 1959 of the Court of the Sessions Judge of Madhya Saurashtra at Rajkot in Sessions Case No 18 of 1958
174 Jai Gopal Sethi B L Kohli and K L Hathi for the appellants
H J Umrigar D Gupta for R H Dhebar for the respondent
November 10
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K DAS J
This is an appeal by special leave
The two appellants are Mepa Dana and Vashram Dana
The learned Sessions Judge of Rajkot tried them along with ten other persons for various offences under the Indian Penal Code including the offence of murder punishable under section 302 read with sections 149 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code
Of the twelve persons whom he tried the learned Sessions Judge acquitted seven
He convicted five of the accused persons
The two appellants were sentenced to death having been found guilty of the offence under section 302 read with section 149 as also section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code the other three convicted persons were sentenced to imprisonment for life
No separate sentences were passed for the minor offences alleged to have been committed by them
All the convicted persons preferred an appeal to the High Court of Bombay
There was also a reference by the Sessions Judge under section 374 Code of Criminal Procedure for confirmation of the sentence of death passed on the two appellants
The appeal and the reference were heard together and by Its judgment pronounced on April 2 1959 the High Court affirmed the conviction of four of the convicted persons namely the two appellants and two other convicted persons who were accused nos
1 and 11 in the trial court
The High Court allowed the appeal of accused No 8 and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against him
It is worthy of note here that as a result of the judgment pronounced by the High Court the number of convicted persons came down to four only
We are emphasising this circumstance at this stage because one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants with 175 regard to their convictions for the offence punishable under section 302 read with section 149 centres round this fact
We bad earlier stated that the number of persons whom the learned Sessions Judge tried was twelve only
However the prosecution case which we shall presently state in a little greater detail was that there were altogether thirteen accused persons who constituted the unlawful assembly and committed the offences in question in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or in furtherance of the common intention of all
One of them however was a juvenile and was tried by a Juvenile Court under the Sau rashtra Children Act 1956
That is why the number of accused person before the learned Sessions Judge was twelve only
The case record before us does not disclose the result of the trial in the Juvenile Court though it has been stated on behalf of the appellants that that trial ended in an acquittal
It is necessary now to state what the prosecution case against the twelve accused persons was
There is a village called Nani Kundal within police station Babra in the district of Madhya Saurashtra
In that village lived one Shavshi who had four sons called Kurji Harji Mitha and Virji
One Dana Bharwad described as accused No 1 in the trial court also lived in the same village
He had three sons called Amra Mepa and Vashram
We have already stated that Mepa and Vashram are the two appellants before us
In the beginning of the year 1958 Amra was murdered and Harji and Mitha were tried for that murder by the learned Sessions Judge of Rajkot
He however acquitted them on May 14 1958
This caused dissatisfaction to Dana and his two sons Mepa and Vashram
On July 141958 Harji Mitha and Virji went to a place west of the village where they had a cluster of huts
This place was north of another cluster of huts belonging to Dana
When the aforesaid three brothers were engaged in some agricultural operations they were attacked by a mob of persons led by the two appellants who were armed with axes
Harji was pounced upon and felled by blows
He managed to get up and ran towards the 176 village
Simultaneously Mitha and Virji also ran more or less in the same direction
The three brothers were however pursued
Kurji the fourth brother and other relatives of Shavshi ran towards the place of occurrence
Kurji was the first to arrive and the prosecution case was that Kurji was struck down by the two appellants and other members of the unlawful assembly
He died then and there
Harji was then assaulted for the second time and he also fell down and died then and there
Lastly Mitha was surrounded and assaulted
He also fell down and died there
The mother of the four brothers Kurji Harji Mitha and Virji as soon as she came to know of the death of three of her sons arrived at the place of occurrence
She then went to the shop of one Kalidas a leading resident of the village
There she met one Arjan who was a village chowkidar
Arjan was informed of what had happened and he went to village Barwala where a police out post was situated
He informed one Anantrai who was in charge of that out post
Anantrai prepared an occurence report which he sent to the officer in charge of Babra Police Station
This was the first information of the case
Babra is situate at a distance of about thirteen or fourteen miles from village Nani Kundal and the Sub Inspector of Police arrived at the village at about 10 45 pm
Thereafter an investigation was held and the thirteen accused persons were sent up for trial
Substantially the defence of the appellants was that they had been falsely implicated out of enemity and had nothing to do with the murder of the three brothers Kurji Harji and Mitha
The case of Dana accused No 1 was that on the day in question his son Mepa was pursued and attacked by Harji Mitha and Kurji
Thereupon Dana went there to save his son Mepa and received an injury on his left band
He then ran away from the scene of occurrence
He disclaimed any knowledge of the attack on Kurji Harji and Mitha
The prosecution examined ten eye witnesses
Of these seven were relatives of Shavshi and three 177 namely Nagji Bhura and Dada were independent persons
The learned Sessions Judge accepted substantially the evidence of the ten eyewitnesses but decided not to act on the testimony of the relatives of Shavshi unless there was other independent corroborative evidence or circumstance
Proceeding on that basis the learned Sessions Judge found that the three independent witnesses Nagji Bhura and Dada corroborated the evidence of the relatives with regard to four of the five accused persons namely the two appellants and accused nos
1 and 11
As against accused No 8 the learned Sessions Judge relied upon the evidence relating to the discovery of an axe which was stained with human blood as a corroborative circumstance
In the result he convicted the two appellants and accused nos
1 8 and 11
The High Court was not satisfied with the evidence against accused No 8
As to the common object or common intention of the persons who constituted the unlawful assembly it said From the prosecution evidence there is no doubt whatsoever that more than five persons were operating at the scene of offence though the identity of all the persons has not been established except the accused nos
1 2 3 and 11
There is no doubt on the prosecution evidence that more than five persons ie as many as ten to thirteen persons took part in this offence
Therefore there is no doubt that these persons had formed themselves into an unlawful assembly
From the prosecution evidence it is clear that the common object of these persons was to commit murders and that these persons entertained common intention to murder the victims
There is also evidence to show that all these persons carried heavy axes
Therefore there is no doubt that the offences under sections 147 148 302149 and 30234 of the Indian Penal Code had been committed and that the accused nos 1 23 and 11 are liable to be convicted for these offences
 We proceed now to state the arguments which have been advanced before us on behalf of the appellants
The main argument is that the conviction of the 23 178 appellants for the offence of murder with the aid of either section 149 or section 34 Indian Penal Code is bad in law and cannot be sustained
Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that his clients are liable to be convicted and punished for the individual acts of assault which are proved against them but in the circumstances of this case they cannot be convicted of the offence of murder
This argument learned counsel had developed in two different ways
He has pointed out that the prosecution put up a definite case that thirteen named persons formed an unlawful assembly the common object of which was to kill the three brothers earlier named twelve of them were tried by the learned Sessions Judge who acquitted seven and the High Court acquitted one more
This brought the number to four but the High Court found that there were more than five persons that is as many as ten to thirteen persons who took part in the offence
This finding so learned counsel has submitted amounts to this the four convicted persons formed an unlawful assembly  with the necessary common object either with some of the acquitted persons or with certain unspecified persons who were never put on trial on the same indictment and about whom no indication was given by the prosecution either in the charge or in the evidence led
His contention is that in view of the finding of the High Court which resulted in the number of convicted persons falling below the required number of five it was not open to the High Court to make out a case of a new unlawful assembly consisting of the four convicted persons and certain unspecified persons nor could any of the acquitted persons be held in spite of the acquittal to be members of an unlawful assembly for their acquittal is good for all purposes and the legal effect of the acquittal is that they were not members of any unlawful assembly
Thus learned counsel has contended that the conviction of the appellants for the offence of murder with the aid of section 149 Indian Penal Code is bad in law
This is the first of the two ways in which he has developed his argument
179 His second argument wider in scope and embraces both sections 149 and 34 Indian Penal Code and it is this
He has pointed out that though the finding is that the two appellants assaulted Harji and Kurji with their axes there is no finding as to who gave the fatal blows to these brothers
Kurji had as many as four ante mortem injuries three on the neck and head and one on the arm
His death was due to a depressed fracture of the right temporal bone and a fissured fracture of the parietal and occipital bones
Harji had has many as thirteen ante mortem injuries including a fracture of the skull
So far as Mitha was concerned he had sustained a fracture of the frontal bone of the left side of his head a crushed fracture of the nose and socket of the left eye and a fracture of the maxillar bones on both sides in other words Mitha s skull was practically smashed in
The contention of the learned counsel is that in the absence of any finding that the appellants or the convicted persons alone caused the aforesaid fractures by the blows given by them the appellants cannot be held constructively liable either under section 149 or section 34 Indian Penal Code for blows given by some unknown person when the prosecution made no attempt to allege or prove any such case
It is argued that even assuming that the convicted persons four in number had the necessary common intention of killing the three brothers none of them would be liable under section 34 Indian Penal Code for the acts of an unknown person or persons who might have given the fatal blows unless the prosecution alleged and proved that the criminal act was done in furtherance of the common intention of the convicted persons and those others whose identity was not known and where thirteen named persons are said to have committed a murder in furtherance of the common intention of all it is not open to the prosecution to say on acquittal of nine of those persons that the remaining four committed the murder merely on the finding that they bad a common intention but without any proof whatsoever that they or any of them gave the fatal blows
180 The two arguments overlap to some extent though the first is applicable specifically in respect of the charge under section 149 Indian Penal Code and the second to both sections 149 and 34 Indian Penal Code
We shall presently consider these arguments
But before we do so it is necessary to state that much confusion could have been avoided in this case if the two charges one under section 149 and the other under section 34were not mixed up the difference between the two sections has been pointed out in several previous decisions of this Court and though we consider it unnecessary to reiterate that difference we must state that the difference should have been kept in mind and the two charges should not have been rolled up into one as was done in the present case
We are satisfied however that no prejudice was caused and the appellants have had a fair trial
To go back to the arguments urged on behalf of the appellants it is necessary first to understand clearly what the finding of the final Court of fact is
We have earlier quoted that finding in the very words in which the learned Judges of the High Court expressed it
That finding stated 1 there was no doubt that more than five persons constituted the unlawful assembly though the identity of all the persons except those four who were convicted was not established  2 that the total number of persons constituting the unlawful assembly was ten to thirteen 3 that all the ten to thirteen persons had the common object and common intention of killing Kurji Harji and Mitha and lastly 4 that the killing was done in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly and in furtherance of the common intention of all and the appellants took a major part in the assault on two of the brothers Kurji and Harji
The question that arises now is this in view of these findings of the High Court can it be said that the High Court wrongly applied section 149 because the number of convicted persons was only four We think that the answer must be in the negative
We may say at once that the High Court does not find that the unlawful assembly con sisted of the four convicted persons and some of the 181 acquitted persons
That clearly is not the finding of the High Court because it says that  the identity of all the persons has not been established except that of accused nos
1 2 3 and 11
 The finding of the High Court really means that the four convicted persons and some other persons whose identity was not established totalling ten to thirteen in number constituted the unlawful assembly
Therefore it is unnecessary in the present case to embark on a discussion as to the legal effect of the acquittal of nine of the accused persons except to state that we may proceed on the footing that the acquittal was good for all purposes and none of those nine persons can now be held to have participated in the crime so that the remaining four persons may be held guilty under section 149 Indian Penal Code
That does not however conclude the matter
Nothing in law prevented the High Court from finding that the unlawful assembly consisted of the four convicted persons and some unidentified persons who together numbered more than five
We have advisedly said Nothing in law etc for whether such a finding can be given or not must depend on the facts of each case and on the evidence led
It is really a question of fact to be determined in each case on the evidence given therein
Learned counsel for the appellants has argued before us as though it is a matter of law that it was not open to the High Court to come to the finding to which it came because the prosecution case was that thirteen named persons constituted the unlawful assembly
We are unable to accept this argument as correct
We do not think that there was any such legal bar as is suggested by learned counsel though there may be cases where on the facts proved it will be impossible to reach a finding that the convicted persons less than five in number constituted an unlawful assembly with certain other unspecified persons not mentioned in the charge
That consideration apart any mere error omission or irregularity in the charge will not invalidate the finding in this case as a matter of law
So far as the finding can be said to have travelled beyond the letters of the 182 charge the appellants have not proved any prejudice and in the absence of prejudice no complaint can now De made of any defect in the charge
Learned counsel has then submitted that the finding of the High Court makes out a case of a new unlawful assembly which is different from that suggested by the prosecution case
We do not think that that view is correct either
The assembly is the same assembly but what has has happened is that the identity of all the members of the unlawful assembly has not been clearly established though the number has been found to be more than five
We do not think that it is unusual for witnesses to make mistakes of identity when a large number of persons are concerned in committing a crime in any event it is a question of fact to be decided in each case and is not a question of law
Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the following observations in Archbold s Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice Thirty fourth edition pp 200 201
Where Several prisoners are included in the same indictment the jury may find one guilty and acquit the others and vice versa
But if several are indicted for a riot and the jury acquit all but two they must acquit those two also unless it is charged in the indictment and proved that they committed the riot together with some other person not tried upon that indictment Similar observations occur in Hawkins s Pleas of the Crown 2 Hawk
c 47 section 8 That on an indictment for a riot against three or more if a verdict acquit all but two and find them guilty or on an indictment for a conspiracy if the verdict acquit all but one and find him guilty it is repugnant and void as to the two found guilty in the first case and as to the one found guilty in the second unless the indictment charge them with having made such a riot or conspiracy simul cum aliis juratoribus ignotis for otherwise it appears that the defendants are found guilty of an offence 183 whereof it is impossible that they should be guilty for there can be no riot where there are no more persons than two nor can there be a conspiracy where there is no partner
Yet it seems agreed that if twenty persons are indicted for a riot or  conspiracy and any three found guilty of the riot or any two of the conspiracy the verdict is good
 We do not think that these observations help the appellants in the present case
They relate to the effect of a verdict of the jury at common law which may be either a general or b partial or c special
In a special verdict the facts of the case are found by the jury the legal inference to be derived from them being referred to the court
If therefore the jury find only one man guilty of conspiracy and two guilty of a riot they are really finding the defendants to use the phraseology of Hawkins  guilty of an offence whereof it is impossible that they should be guilty for there can be no riot where there are no more persons than two nor can there be a conspiracy where there is no partner
 Obviously the
observations refer to those cases where the verdict of the jury does not and cannot imply that there were more than one conspirator or more than two persons in a riot
This is made clear by the further statement that  if twenty persons are indicted for a riot or conspiracy and any three found guilty of the riot or any two of the conspiracy the verdict is good The legal position is clearly and succinctly put in Harris s Criminal Law Nineteenth edition p 474  When several persons are joined in one indictment the jury may convict some and acquit others
In some cases however the acquittal of one may render the conviction of the other or others impossible in conspiracy for example at least two of the prisoners must be convicted and in riot at least three unless those convicted are charged with having been engaged in the conspiracy or riot with some other person or persons not tried upon that indictment
 In Topan Das vs The State of Bombay 1 this Court proceeded on the same principle viz that according to 1 184 the definition of criminal conspiracy in section 120 AIndian Penal Code two or more persons must be partners to such an agreement and one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy for the simple reason that he cannot conspire with himself
That was a case in which four named individuals were charged with having committed criminal conspiracy but three were acquitted of the charge
The distinction between that case and the case under our consideration lies in this in Topan Das s case it was not possible to find after the acquittal of three persons out of the four charged that there was any partner to the conspiracy whereas in the case before us the finding is that there were ten to thirteen persons who constituted the unlawful assembly with the necessary common object but the identity of four only has been established
The point under discussion arose in the decisions of the Allahabad High Court viz Harchanda vs Rex 1 and Gulab vs State 2 the latter over riding the earlier decision
The decision in Gulab s case proceeded however on the footing that it was open to the appellate court to find that some of the acquitted persons had been wrongly acquitted although it could not interfere with such acquittal in the absence of an appeal by the State Government an aspect regarding which it is not necessary to say anything in this case
There are two other decisions one of the Federal Court and the other of this Court
In Kapildeo Singh vs The King 3 the prosecution case was that 60 or 70 men constituted the unlawful assembly but the appellant in that case was charged with thirteen others with having committed certain offences in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly
The appellant was found guilty but the thirteen others who were charged along with the appellant were acquitted as they were not properly identified
One of the contentions raised in the Federal Court was that in all fourteen persons having been charged with rioting and thirteen of them having been acquitted 1 All
2 All 726
3 185 it could not be hold that there was any unlawful assembly of five or more pet sons whose common object was to commit an offence
With regard to this contention it was observed at pp
837 838   The essential question in a case under section 147 is whether there was an unlawful assembly as defined in section 141 I P C of five or more than five persons
The identity of the persons comprising the assembly is a matter relating to the determination of the guilt of the individual accused and even when it is possible to convict less than five persons only section 147 still applies if upon the evidence in the case the court is able to hold that the person or persons who have been found guilty were members of an assembly of five or more persons known or unknown identified or unidentified
In the present case there is such a finding and that concludes the matter
 We consider that these observations apply with equal force in the present case and we do not think that the distinction sought to be made by learned counsel for the appellant on the basis that in Kapildeo s case 1 the prosecution allegation was that there were 60 or 70 men in the unlawful assembly makes any difference in the legal position
The same view was expressed again by this Court in Dalip Singh vs State of Punjab 2  Before section 149 can be called in aid the court must find with certainty that there were at least five persons sharing the common object
A finding that three of them may or may not have been there  betrays uncertainty on this vital point and it consequently becomes impossible to allow the conviction to rest on this uncertain foundation
This is not to say that five persons must always be convicted before section 149 can be applied
There are cases and cases
It is possible in some cases for Judges to conclude that though five were unquestionably there the identity of one or more is in doubt
In that case a conviction of the rest with the aid of section 149 would be good
But if 1 24 2  150
186 that is the conclusion it behoves a court particularly in a murder case where sentences of transportation in no less than four cases have been enhanced to death to say so with unerring certainty
 The same view was reiterated in Nar Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh 1
We have stated earlier what the finding in the present case is it is a clear finding a finding with certainty that the number of persons who constituted the unlawful assembly was more than five though the identity of four only has been established and the killing was done in prosecution of the common object of the entire unlawful assembly Therefore we see no serious difficulty in applying section 149 Indian Penal Code in the present case
As to the application of section 34 Indian Penal Code we consider that the legal position does not admit of any doubt or difficulty
Four persons have been convicted of murder on the finding that all of them and some others had the common intention of killing three brothers the appellants took part in the assault in furtherance of the common intention and it is riot disputed that the common intention was achieved by murdering the three brothers Kurji Barji and Mitha
The number of convicted persons is more than one and it does not fall below the required number
What then is the difficulty in applying section 34 Indian Penal Code Learned counsel says We do not know who gave the fatal blows 
We accept the position that we do not know which particular person or persons gave the fatal blows but once it is found that a criminal act was donein furtherance of the common intention of all each of such persons is liable for the criminal act as if it were done by him alone
The section is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them
The principle which the section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a crime  once such participation is established section 34 is at once 1 A IR 459 187 attracted
In the circumstances we fail to see what difficulty there is in applying section 34 Indian Penal Code in the present case
In the course of his arguments learned counsel has suggested that some of the acquitted persons might have given the fatal blows and as they have been acquitted the appellants cannot be constructively liable for their acts
We do not think that this a correct way of looking at the matter
We are proceeding in this case on the basis that the acquittal is good for all purposes and we cannot bring in the acquitted persons for an argument that they or any of them gave the fatal blows
It is necessary to refer now to two decisions of this Court with regard to the application of section 34 Indian Penal Code
Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on Wasim Khan vs The State of Uttar Pradesh 1
In that case the High Court found that the appellant along with two others committed the offences of robbery and murder but the two co accused were acquitted
It was observed that on the finding of the High Court the appellant could be convicted by the application of section 34 even though the two co accused of the appellant were acquitted
That was a case in which the number came down to one by the acquittal of the two co accused
The present case is a much stronger case in the matter of the application of section 34 because the number of convicted persons who participated in the criminal act in furtherance of common intention of all is four
In Prabhu Babaji Navle vs The State of Bombay2 the appellant along with four others was charged under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code four others were acquitted
The question was if the appellant could be convicted under section 34 after the acquittal of four others
Here again the number fell to one that is below the required number
It was observed If these four persons are all acquitted the element of sharing a common intention with them disappears and unless it can be proved that he shared a common intention with actual murderer or 1 1956 SCR 191
2 AIR 1956 SC 51
188 murderers he cannot be convicted with the aid of section 34
of course he could have been charged in the alternative for having shared a common intention with another or others unknown
But even then the common intention would have to be proved either by direct evidence or by legitimate inference
It is impossible to reach such a conclusion on the evidence in this case once the co accused are eliminated because the whole gravamen of the charge and of the evidence is that the appellant shared the common intention with those other four and not with others who are unknown This decision can be distinguished on two grounds 1 the number fell below the required number and 2 it was not possible to reach a conclusion in that case that the appellant shared the common intention with another or others unknown
In our case the number of convicted persons is four and each of them had the necessary common intention  secondly there is a clear finding that they shared the common intention with some others whose identity was not established
The decision in Prabhu Babaji Navle 1 does not therefore stand in our way
Lastly there is the question of sentence
Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the lesser sentence should be imposed and he has given three reasons in support of his submission 1 that Amra brother of the appellants was murdered earlier in the year 2 that the father of the appellants was also convicted but was not given capital punishment though he must have influenced the appellants and 3 there is no finding that the appellants caused the fatal injuries
We have examined the evidence and it shows clearly enough that the appellants played a leading part and so far as Kurji and Harji were concerned took a major part in assaulting them with heavy axes
The High Court also carefully considered the sentence imposed on the appellants and came to the conclusion that having regard to the enormity of the crime viz three premeditated and cold blooded 1 AIR 1956 SC 51 189 murders and the part played by the appellants it would not be justified in imposing the lesser sentence
We see no good reasons for differing from the High Court and interfering with the sentence
For the reasons given above the appeal fails and is dismissed
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Section 25Fb of the  provided No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until  b the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days  average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months 
 The dispute between the appellant company and its workmen related to the claim for gratuity made by the latter and it was the appellant s contention that in the scheme of gratuity framed by the Tribunal no gratuity should be paid to workmen who would be entitled to receive retrenchment compensation under section 25F of the 
Before section 25F was introduced in the Act by Act 43 of 1953 workmen were given the benefit of both retrenchment compensation and gratuity by industrial awards but the decisions were not always uniform
Ordinance V was promulgated on October 24 1953 by section 25Eb of which it was provided that before a workman was retrenched he must be paid at the time of retrenchment gratuity which shall be equivalent to 15 days  average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months
The 33 Ordinance was followed by Act 43 of 1953 which was deemed to have come into force on October 24 1953 and in the statement of aims and objects of the Act it was said  that a workman  shall not be retrenched until he has been given one month s notice in writing or one month s wages in lieu of such notice and also a gratuity  
Section 25Fb of the Act was in the same terms as section 25Eb of the Ordinance except that for the word CC gratuity  the expression  retrenchment compensation  was substituted
The appellant s case was that after section 25F was enacted there was no longer any scope for framing gratuity schemes in addition to the statutory retrenchment compensation for retrenched employees on the grounds 1 that both in section 25Eb of the Ordinance and the statement of aims and objects of the amending Act the word gratuity had been used and not retrenchment compensation 2 that in determining the amount of compensation payable to a retrenched workman the length of his past service had been taken into account and schemes of gratuity also provide for payment of gratuity on similar considerations and adopt a similar measure and 3 that a retrenched workman would get both retrenchment compensation and gratuity and so get more than what other workmen with corresponding length of service would get on their retirement
Held 1 that for construing S 25F of the  the words used in the statement about the aims and objects of the Act are not relevant and that the character of the payment prescribed by the section could only be determined by the expression  retrenchment compensation used therein  and 2 that in the absence of any provision in the excluding the claim or grant of gratuity the mere enactment of section 25F cannot oust the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals to entertain claims for gratuity schemes or make it improper or unjust to frame such schemes for all employees including those who are retrenched
The object of granting retrenchment compensation is to enable the workman who is given partial protection to tide over the period of unemployment and to keep his gratuity safe and unused so that it may be available to him after his retirement
The two claims complement each other and the fact that they appear to constitute a double benefit cannot affect their validity