ivil Appeal Nos 227 and 228 1976
From the Judgment and Order dated 8 1 1976 of the Patna High Court in CWJC No 1053 and 1054 of 1975
252 LM Singhvi Sri Narain and KJ John for the appellants
LN Sinha Sol
UP Singh and Shambhu Nath Jha for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG CJ
These appeals are before us after certifica tion of the cases raising identical questions of law as fit for appeal to this Court dealt with by one judgment and orders of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court on two writ petitions
The petitions were directed against orders of the State Government passed in 1974 revising the rate of royalty payable by the petitioners appellants under a lease of 1970 and after that cancelling the lease by a letter of  15th March 1975
The petitioners  case was that the revision of the rate of royalty payable by the petitioners for the lease to collect and exploit sal seeds from the forest area was illegal during the subsistence of the lease and thereafter cancellation of the lease itself was illegal for various reasons
Primarily the case of the petitioners is that of a breach of contract for which the State would be liable ordinarily to pay damages if it had broken it
If the petitioners could establish some right either contrac tual or equitable to continue in possession the State could be prevented by appropriate proceedings from ousting the petitioners from the forest land from which the peti tioners have been gathering sal seeds
The petitioners had also set up mala fides on the part of the Conservator of Forests in enhancing the royalty unreasonably and then cancelling the lease allegedly acting under the influence of friends and associates of the Forest Minister of Bihar
The relevant clause relating to revision of royalty in the written contract reads as follows  The rate of royalty will be revised every three years  cycle in consultation with the lessee and the decision will be binding on the lessee
Apparently there is no restriction under the terms of the contract upon the amount by which the royalty could be increased by a revision after a three years  cycle under this clause
The lessee is only entitled under the con tract to be consulted before a revision
But the decision of the Governmental authorities to enhance is binding upon him after that
Hence if this was the only term of the contract on this question the petitioners could not complain of unreasonable enhancement in the revised rate of royalty
Under clause 4 of the lease the lessee had to establish a factory within the State of Bihar for processing of sal seeds and extraction of oil therefrom within period of five years from the date of the agreement failing which the agreement itself was to terminate
The questions which apparently arose appertained to action alleged by the State to fall within the terms of the agreement between the par ties regulated by the duly signed contract which was presum ably executed in compliance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution
Prima facie therefore the appel lants can only get their 253 remedies if they can obtain any at all through ordinary suits for damages or for injunctions to restrain breaches of contract provided they could show how the contracts were broken or were going to be broken
The writ petitions however raise questions relating not only to action lying within the sphere regulated by the law of contract but according to the petitioners by constitutional provisions relating to the exercise of the executive powers of the State Government contained in Arti cle 298 which reads as follows  298
The executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose Provided that a the said executive power of the Union shall in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament may make laws be subject in each State to legislation by the State and b the said executive power of each State shall in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws be subject to legislation by Parliament
It is urged vehemently by Dr LM Singhvi appearing on behalf of the petitioners appellants that the State acting in its executive capacity through its Government or its officers even in the contractual field cannot escape the obligations imposed upon it by Part III of the Constitution
The only article however in Part III of the Constitution relied upon by Dr Singhvi is Article 14 which says 14
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India
It can be and has been urged on behalf of the State that Governmental authorities when acting in the contractual field could not be controlled by Article 14 of the Consti tution at all
When the State had entered into contracts with citizens who carry on their trade and pay the royal ties
In accordance with the agreements reached between the State and citizens it does not exercise any special governmental or statutory powers
In such cases the State as well as the citizen with whom it contracts are both equally subjected to the law of contract
It has been urged on behalf of the respondent State that there has been nO breach of contract in the cases before us
The State is according to the learned Solicitor General appearing for the State of Bihar not claiming to be above the law of contract governing all parties which subject themselves to the law of contract
The dispute whether there is or there is not a breach of contract should according to the con tention on behalf of the State be determined by ordinary civil courts as in every case 254 between ordinary litigants who cannot invoke the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution simply because there is a dispute whether an agreement has been broken or not
Equal subjection of all parties including the State to the same procedural requirements when such disputes are to be adjudicated upon means that the State should be placed on the same footing as an ordinary liti gant
It should neither enjoy special benefits and privi leges nor be subjected to special burdens and disadvan tages
This should it is urged follow from a strict application of Article 14 if the State were to be as a party to a contract and a litigant placed on the same footing as other parties who enter into such contracts
It is true that the special provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution are there to protect public interest so that the contracts by or on behalf of the Government have to comply with the special requirements of form
But once the State enters into the contractual sphere after the require ments of form contained in Article 299 have been complied with does it have to take its place in the eye of law side by side with ordinary parties and litigants or has it any special obligations or privileges attached to it even when it acts within this field  Dr Singhvi s argument that the State Government had some special obligations attached to it would have appeared more plausible if it could be shown that the State or its officers or agents had practised some discrimination against the petitioners appellants at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of contract so as to exclude them from consideration when compared with others on any unreasonable or unsustainable ground struck by Article 14 of the Constitution
It is true that the Article 14 of the Constitution imports a limitation or imposes an obligation upon the State s executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution
All constitutional powers carry corresponding obligations with them
This is the rule of law which regu lates the operation of organs of Government functioning under a Constitution
And this is exactly what was meant to be laid down by this Court in Erusian Equipment  Chemi cals Ltd vs State of West Bengal  Anr1 on which learned counsel for the appellants sought to rely strongly
It was held there at p 677  Under Article 298 of the Constitution the Executive power of the Union and the State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade and to the acquisition holding and dis posal of the property and the making of con tracts for any purpose
The State can carry on executive function by making a law or without making a law
The exercise of such powers and functions in trade by the State is subject to Part HI of the Constitution
Article 14 speaks
of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws
Equality of opportunity should apply to matters of public contracts
The State has the right to trade
The State has therefore the duty to observe equality
An ordinary individual 1  at 677
255 can choose not to deal with any person
The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination
The order of black listing has the effect of depriving a person of equal ity of opportunity in the matter of public contract
A person who is on the approved list is
unable to enter into advantageous rela tions with the Government because of the order of black listing
A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchases of materials has a legiti mate interest or expectation
When the State sets to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality
It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment  Chemicals Ltd s case supra involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consid eration of persons
with whom the Government could contract at all
At this stage no doubt the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers
But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the rela tions are no longer governed by the constitutional provi sions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se
No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitu tional provision when the State of its agents purporting to act within this field perform any act
In this sphere_ they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract
In the cases before us the contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power of obligation which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here
Even in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of compet ing claims before an entry into the field of contract facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 could arise
If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking de tailed evidence involving examination and cross examina tion of witnesses the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution
Such proceedings are summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described as perhaps not quite accurately pre rogative powers of the Court are invoked
We are certain that the cases before us are not such in which powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked
The Patna High Court had very rightly divided the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State units agents can be set up into three types
These were stated as follows  i Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where an assurance 256 or promise made by the State he has acted to his prejudice and predicament but the agree ment is short of a contract within the meaning of article 299 of the Constitution ii Where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the pan of State and iii Where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non statutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State
 It rightly held that the cases such as Union of India vs Ms AngloAfghan Agencies1 and Century Spinning  Manu facturing Co Ltd vs Ulhasnagar Municipal Council2 and Robertson vs Minister of Pensions3 belong to the first category where it could be held that public bodies or the State are as much bound as private individual are to carry out obligations incurred by them because parties seeking to bind the authorities have altered their position to their disadvantage or have acted to their detriment on the strength of the representations made by these authorities
The High Court thought that in such cases the obligation could sometimes be appropriately enforced on a Writ Petition even though the obligation was equitable only
We do not propose to express an opinion here on the question whether such an obligation could be enforced in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution now
is enough to observe that the cases before us do not belong to this category
The Patna High Court also distinguished cases which belong to the second category such as KN Guruswami vs The State of Mysore4  DF South Kheri vs Ram Sanehi Singh5 and Ms Shree Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd vs The State of Bihar6 where the breach complained of was of a statutory obligation
It correctly pointed out that the cases before us do not belong to this class either
It then very rightly held that the cases now before us should be placed in the third category where questions of pure alleged breaches of contract are involved
It held upon the strength of Umakant Saran vs The State of Bihar7 and Lekhrai Sathram Das vs
NM Shah8 and BK Sinha vs State of Bihar9 that no writ order can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases to compel the authorities to remedy are a breach of contract pure and simple
1  2 AIR 1971 SC 1021
3 1949 1 King s Bench 227
4  5 AIR 1973 SC 205
6 7 AIR 1973 SC 964
8  9 AIR 1974 Patna 230
257 Learned counsel for the appellants has however relied upon a passage from Lekhraj Sathram Das s case supra where this Court observed at p 231   until and unless in the breach is involved violation of certain legal and public duties or violation of statutory duties to the remedy of which the petitioner is entitled by issuance of a writ of mandamus mere breach of contract cannot be remedied by the Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
Learned counsel contends that in the cases before us breaches of public duty are involved
The submission made before us is that whenever a State or its agents or offi cers deal with the citizen either when making a transaction or after making it acting in exercise of powers under the terms of contract between the parties there is a dealing between the State and the citizen which involves performance of certain legal and public duties
 If we were to accept this very wide proposition every case of a breach of con tract by the State or its agents or its officers would call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
We do
not consider this to be a sound proposition at all
Learned counsel for the appellants cited certain author ities in an attempt to support his submission that the State and its Officers are clothed with special Constitutional obligations including those under Article 14 of the Consti tution in all their dealings with the public even when a contract is there to regulate such dealings
The authori ties cited were DF South Kheri vs Ram Sanehi Singh supra where all that was decided relying upon KN Gurus wamy vs The State of Mysore supra was that where the source of a right was contractual but the action complained of was the purported exercise of a statutory power relief could be claimed under Article 226 and Calcutta Gas Co Proprietary Ltd vs State of West Bengal  Ors1 where the real question considered was whether the petition er had a locus standi to question the validity of an enact ment Basheshat Nath vs The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi  Rajasthan and Anr2 which has nothing to do with any breach of contract but only lays down that Article 14 protects us from both legislative and administrative tyranny of discrimination State of MP  Anr
vs Thakur Bharat Singh3 which lays that even executive action must not be exercised arbitrarily but must have the authority of law to support it SS Sawhney vD Ramarathnam Assistant Pass port Officer
of India New Delhi  Ors
4 which repeats requirements of action which satisfy Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution where compliance with these provi sions is obligatory
2 1959 Suppl
1 SCR 528 at 551
3  4 2 4365CI77 258 We do not think that any of these cases could assist the appellants or is at all relevant
None of these cases lays down that when the State or the officers purport to operate within the contractual field and the only grievance of the citizen could be that the contract between the parties is broken by the action complained of the appropriate remedy is by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitu tion and not an ordinary suit
There is a formidable array of authority against any such a proposition
In Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalwani vs MM Shah Deputy Custodian cum Managing Officer Bombay  Ors supra this Court said at p 337 In our opinion any duty or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a con tract entered into by him as such public servant cannot be enforced by the machinery of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution
In Banchhanidhi Rath vs The State of Orissa  Ors1 this Court declared at p 845 If a right is claimed in terms of a contract such a right cannot be enforced in a writ petition In Har Shankar  Ors etc etc
vs The Dy
Excise  Taxation Commr
 Ors
2 a Constitution Bench of this Court ob served at p 265 The appellant have displayed ingenuity in their search for invalidating circumstances but a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy for impeaching con tractual obligations
Learned Solicitor General appearing for the State contended that there could be no aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution involved in a case where no comparison of the facts and circumstances of a particular petitioner s case with those of other persons said to be similarly situated is involved
In such a case he submitted there was no possibility of inferring a discrimination
In reply learned counsel for the appellants sought to direct our attention towards some allegations showing that there was discrimination between appellants and other parties gov erned by similar contracts in other areas
We doubt very much whether the doctrine of discrimination can be at all availed of against the State s section purporting to be taken solely within the contractual field when n6 aspect of any statutory or ConStitutional obligation appears either from incontrovertible facts or applicable legal provisions
Indeed it has been held fin CK Achutan vs State of Ker ala  Ors3 that no question of a violation of Article 14 arises even where one out of the several persons  is se lected by the State for a particular contractual transac tion
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there was a conflict between what was laid down here and the law declared by this Court in Erusian Equipment  Chemicals Ltd s case supra
We think that the two cases are distinguishable on facts
The propositions of law laid down in the two cases must be read in the context of facts established in each case
In any event AIR 1972 SC 843 at 845
2  at 265 3 1959 Suppl
1 SCR 787
259 the cases before us do
not raise any question of discrimi nation alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14
In the casesbefore us allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor established
Before any adjudication on the question wheth er Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be said to have been violated as between persons governed by similar contracts they must be properly put in issue and estab lished
Even if the appellants could be said to have raised any aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution and this Arti cle could at all be held to operate within the contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts which we gravely doubt such questions of fact do not appear to have been argued before the High Court
And in any event they are of such a nature that they cannot be satisfactorily decided without a detailed adduction of evidence which is only possible in ordinary civil suits to establish that the State acting in its executive capacity through its Offi cers has discriminated between parties identically situat ed
On the allegations and affidavit evidence before us we cannot reach such a conclusion
Moreover as we have al ready indicated earlier the correct view is that it is the contract and not the executive power regulated by the Constitution which governs the relations of the parties on facts apparent in the cases before us
The real object of the appellants seems to be to hold up any adjudication on the cases before us by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them presumably on representations made to this Court that no aspect of enforcement of Article 14 of the Constitution was involved
We think that to accede to the prayer on behalf of the appellants to
adjourn the hearing of these cases until after the Emergency is lifted and
yet to continue the stay orders is to permit a circumvention of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 359 and to countenance a gross abuse of the processes of the Court
A rather desparate argument which has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellants is that they were entitled to an opportunity to
show cause against the cancellation of the leases
It was urged on the strength of AK Kraipak  Ors etc
vs Union of India  Ors
1 that the distinction made between administrative and quasi judicial action is thin and a vanishing one
This argument appears to
us to be wholly irrelevant inasmuch as a question of the distinc tion between an administrative and quasi judicial decision can only arise in the exercise of powers under statutory provisions
Rules of natural justice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties
When a contract is sought to be terminated by the Officers of the State purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power at all
In Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur vs Shiva kant Shukla2it was pointed out at p 1288 1 2  at 1288
260 The principles of natural justice which are so implied must always hang if one may so put it on pegs of statutory provisions or necessarily follow from them
They can also be said sometimes to be implied as necessary parts of the protection of equality and equal protection of laws conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution where one of the pillars of Dicey s principles of the Rule of Law is found embodied
Sometimes they may be implied and read the legislation dealing with rights protected by Article 19 of the Constitution
They could at times be so implied because restrictions on rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution have to be reasonable
The limitations imposed by rules of natural justice cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively
The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action com plained of is or is not in consonence with the terms of the agreement
As already pointed out by us even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discrimina tory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out  a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by accept able evidence
In that case the interim stay order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as a Residential Order under Article 359 of the Constitution is operative the enforcement of fundamental rights falling under Article 14 is suspended
In such cases even if a petition or suit is entertained and kept pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirect ly enforcing the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution
It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction or stay can be made out quite apart from a right covered by Article 14 of the Constitution or by any other fundamental right whose enforcement may have been suspended that an injunction or stay could be granted at all on suitable terms
As we have already said it was on such an assumption that this Court had apparently granted the interim stay which must now be discharged
Consequently we dismiss these appeals with costs throughout and discharge the stay orders
S R Appeals dismissed


Summary:
A contract called a lease to collect and exploit sal seeds from forest area was entered into in 1970 between the respondent State and the appellants in 1970
Clause 3 in the written contract executed in accordance with the provi sions of article 299 of the Constitution provided for the revision of the rate of royalty at the expiry of every three years in consultation with the lessee and was to be binding on the lessee
Under clause 4 of the lease the lessee
had to establish a factory within the State of Bihar for processing of sal seeds and extraction of oil therefrom within a period of five
years from the date
of the agreement failing which the agreement itself was to terminate
In 1974 the respondent State revised the rate of royalty payable by the appellants and after that can celled the lease by a letter dated 15th March 1975
The writ petitions challenging the said orders were dismissed by the Patna High Court
On appeals by certificates the appellants contended i the State acting in its executive capacity through its Government or its officers even in the contractual field cannot escape the obligation imposed upon it by Part III of the Constitution ii
Article 14 of the Constitution has been infringed and iii Principles
of natural justice have
been violated as no opportunity to show cause against the cancellation of lease was given
Dismissing the appeals the Court HELD 1 Article
14 of the Constitution imports a limitation or imposes an obligation upon the States execu tive power under article 298 of the Constitution
The rule of law which regulates
the operation are organs of Government functioning under the Constitution is that all constitution al powers carry  corresponding obligations with them
254 E F Erusian Equipment  Chemicals Ltd vs State of West Bengal and Anr
19752 SCR 674 at 677 referred to
2 The State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transaction en tered into in exercise of its constitutional powers only at the time of entry into the field of consideration of per sons with whom the Government could contract at all
But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se
255 C D 250 3  Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision is not violated when the State or its agents purporting to act within the contractual field perform
any act
In this sphere they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statu tory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract
In the instant case the contracts do not contain any statutory terms or obliga tions and no statutory  power or obligation which could attract the application of article 14 of the Constitution is involved
255 D E 260 E F 4 The doctrine of discrimination cannot be availed of against the State s action purporting to be taken solely within the contractual field when no aspect of any statutory or constitutional obligation appears either from incontro vertible facts or of facts
The appellants  cases do not raise any question of discrimination alleged at the stage of entry into the contractual area which could attract the application of Article 14
258 F G 259 A CK Achuthan vs State of Kerala and Ors
1959 Supp
1 SCR 787 applied
Erusian Equipment  Chemicals vs State of West Bengal  Ant  distinguished
5 Before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 of the Constitution could possibly be held to have been violated as between persons governed by similar contracts they must be properly put in issue and estab lished
The question whether Article 14 could at all be held to operate within the
contractual field whenever the State enters into such contracts is such that it cannot be decided without a detailed adduction of evidence which is only possible in ordinary civil suits to establish that the State acting in its executive capacity through its offi cers has discriminated between parties identically situat ed
In the instant case allegations on which a violation of article 14 could be based are neither properly made nor estab lished
It is the contract and not the executive power regulated by the Constitution which governed the relations of the parties
259 A D 6 Proceedings under article 226 are summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described perhaps not quite accurately as preroga tive powers of the court are invoked
If the facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking de tailed evidence involving examination and cross examination of witnesses the case could not be conveniently or satis factorily decided in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution
Even in cases where the question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before an entry into the field of contract facts have to be investigated and found before the question of violation of article 14 could arise
The appellants  cases are not such in which powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked
255 E G Lekhraj Satnam Das Lalvani vs
MM Shah Deputy Custodi an cum Managing Officer   Banchhanidhi Rath vs The State of Orissa  Ors
AIR 1972 SC 843  845 and Har Shankar  Ors
vs The Dy
Excise  Taxation Corotar
 Ors 3   265 reiterated
DF South Kheri vs Ram Sangi Singh AIR 1973 SC 205 KN Guruswamy vs State of Mysore   Calcutta Gas Co Proprietary Ltd vs State of West Bengal  Ors  Basheshat Nath vs Commissioner of Income Tax 1959 Supp
1 SCR 528 State of MP vs Thakur Bharat Singh 19672 SCR 454 and SS Sawhney
D Ramarathnam Assistant Pass port Officer Govt
of India New Delhi  Ors  held not applicable
7 The Patna High Court had very rightly divided the types of cases in which breaches of alleged obligation by the State or its agents can be set up into three types i Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of an obliga tion of the State in cases where on an assurance or repre sentation of the State he has acted to his prejudice and detriment but the agreement is 251 short of a contract within the meaning of article 299 of the Constitution ii Where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State iii Where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is nonstatutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State
The High Court rightly held that the appellants cases should be placed in the third category where questions of pure alleged breaches of contract are involved and that no writ or order can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of con tract pure and simple 255 H 256 A B F G Umakant Saran vs The State of Bihar AIR
and Lekhraj Satram Das vs NM Shah   followed
BK Sinha vs State of Bihar AIR 1974 Patna 230 approved
Union of India vs Ms Anglo Afgan Agencies   Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd vs Ulhasnagar Municipal Council AIR 1971 SC 1021 Robertson vs Minister of Pensions 19491 KB 227 KN Guruswamy vs State of Mysore AIR   DF South Kheri vs Ram Sanghi Singh AIR 1973 SC 205 Ms Shrikrishna Gyanaday Sugar Ltd vs The State of Bihar  distin guished and held inapplicable
8 The object of the appellants is to hold up any adjudication on the cases by taking shelter behind Article 14 so that the stay orders obtained by them may continue
To accede to the prayer to adjourn the hearing of the cases until after the emergency is lifted and yet to continue the stay orders is to permit circumvention of the constitutional mandate contained in article 359 and to countenance gross abuse of the process of the court
259 D E 9 The interim stay or order or injunction could not be justified at all because so long as the Presidential Order under article 359 of the
Constitution is operative the en forcement of Fundamental Rights falling under Art14 of the Constitution is suspended
In such cases even if a petition or a suit is entertained and can be pending no stay order could be passed because that would amount to indirectly enforcing the Fundamental Rights conterred by article 14 of the Constitution
It is only where a prima facie case for an injunction of stay can be made out uqite apart from a right governed by article 14 of the Constitution or of any other Fundamental Rights whose enforcement may have been suspend ed that an injunction could be granted at all in suitable cases on suitable terms
260 C E Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur vs Shivkant Shukla   1288 1976 Supp
SCR 172 re ferred to
10 The appellants are not entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the cancellation of the leases
The question of distinguishing between an administrative and quasi judicial decision can only arise in the exercise of powers exercised under statutory provisions
Rules of natural justice are attached to the performance of certain functions regulated by statutes or rules made thereunder involving decisions affecting rights of parties
When a contract is sought to be terminated by the officers of the State purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between parties such action is not taken in purported exercise of an agreement between parties such action is not taken in purported exercise cannot operate upon powers which are governed by the terms of an agreement exclusively
The only question which normally arises in such cases is whether the action complained of is or is not in consonance with the terms of the agreement
259 F H 260 C