Civil Appeal NO 900 of 1987 From the Judgment and order dated 1221987 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No 676 of 1978
Dr YS Chitale Anil Mitra PH Parekh D Chandfachud SC Ghosh and RK Dhil1on for the Appellants
K Parasaran Attorney General for Union of India
498 KN Bhat A Subba Rao and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
I had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned Brother Ranganathan J
It is however necessary to add a few sentences
I was reluctant to take up this matter as it arises out of a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta
That decision was occasioned by a reference made by the Chief Justice of that High Court on a reference made by me to the Chief Justice sitting singly in that Court
In the High Court I had not expressed any view on the contentions urged
In those circumstances both the parties requested me to take up the matter
It was in these circumstances that I became a party to this judgment
I agree with my learned Brother that the appeal should be dismissed and the order he proposes to make as to costs
It is not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the case to refer in detail to the reasons
I would however make it clear that I prefer the view of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of LS Nair vs Hindustan Steel Ltd Bhilai AIR 1980 MP 106
I would prefer this view in preference to that of the F Iearned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No 45879 Elliot Waud Hill P Ltd vs Life Insurance Corpn
Further it is necessary to reiterate that in this case we have proceeded on the short question canvassed before the Division Bench of the High Court out of which this appeal arises ie whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Govt
is ultra vires or beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the Act to such premises
It is only this question which was mooted before the High Court and required consideration by us under Article 136 of the Constitution
It is therefore not necessary to express any view on any other aspect of the matter
Furthermore as has been emphasised by my learned Brother there was no dispute as to whether the premises in the present appeal is a public premises
Therefore the question whether the premises in question or of this type is a public premises is not an aspect into which we were required to go
499 For the purpose of this appeal once it is held that the Public Premises Eviction
Of Unauthorised occupants Act 1971 is intra vires the Parliament no further issue between the parties survive because no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court and also in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution no other issue can be canvassed
It is therefore not necessary in my opinion to consider whether the provisions of 1971 Act even if intra vires would prevail upon the provisions of the State legislation
Hence for the purpose of this appeal it is unnecessary to express any view on the amplitude and scope of Article 254 of the Constitution
Indu Bhusan Bose vs Rama Sundari Devi  Anr  is a decision of five learned Judges of this Court affirming the Calcutta view which held that the legislation in question in that case was to be found in Entries 6 7  13 of List III of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and neither in Entry 18 of II Schedule nor in Entry 3 of II Schedule of the Constitution
It rejected the Bombay view expressed in 4
C Patel vs Vishwanath Chadda ILR Respectfully it has to be taken that the legislation in question must be understood in its pith and substance and so understood the Act in question in the instant case is in respect of transfer of property other than agricultural land and as such falls in Entry 6 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution
It is clear from the said decision and the subsequent decision reaffirming the same view in V Dhanapal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal  that the subject matter of housing accommodation and control thereof falls within the purview of concurrent list
In that view of the matter it cannot in my opinion be canvassed that the 197 1 legislation in question was beyond the competence of the legislature
With these observations I agree with respect with my learned Brother that the appeal should be dismissed without any order as to cost section RANGANATHAN J The first appellant is a private limited company
The company is occupying a portion of premises No 18 Russel Street Calcutta
The premises belong to the United Commercial Bank a statutory corporation constituted under the Banking Companies Acquisition  Transfer of Undertakings Act 1970
The appellant company claims to be the tenant of the Bank but this is not admitted by the respondent Bank
The Bank alleges that the appellant company when somewhat differently constituted had been allowed to occupy a portion of the Bank s premises as licensee in consideration of 500 certain accountancy and secretarial services which it was required to render to the Bank
It appears that sometime in 1975 the respondent Bank issued a notice of eviction to the appellant company under Section 136 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Act 
Subsequently however the Bank issued a notice dated 421977 to the appellants under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised occupants Act 1971 hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act  which is an Act of Parliament
The appellants thereupon filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court being Matter No 676 of 1978
Though several contentions appear to have been raised in the writ petition the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 12th February 1987 which is the one presently under appeal records that the only question which has been mooted and agitated before us is whether the impugned Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises to the extent it has been extended to premises belonging or taken on lease by a corporation established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government is ultra vires as it was beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to extend the applicability of the said Act to such premises Though the appellants are interested only in denying the legislative power of Parliament in so far as it purports to extend the applicability of the 1971 Act to premises belonging to or taken on lease by what may be described as public sector corporations the contention as urged is somewhat broader
The argument goes to the extent of urging that only the State legislatures and not Parliament is competent to legislate on the topic of landlordtenant relationships in respect of land and buildings
This has been the principal contention addressed to us by Dr Chitale appearing on behalf of the appellants
The 1971 Act received the assent of the President on 23rd August 1971 but it is deemed to have come into force on the 16th day of September 1958 for certain historical  reasons which are not relevant for our purposes
The Act provides for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters
section 2c defines premises  to mean any land or any part of a building and to include garden grounds and outhouses appurtenant to the building or fittings affixed thereto 
The expression public premises  has been defined in Section 2e of the Act
This definition is in three parts
Sub clause  1 of clause e takes in premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government as well as premises placed by that Government under the control of either House of Parliament for providing residential 501 accommodation to the members of the staff of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament
Sub clause 3 of clause e takes in premises belonging to certain local authorities in the Union Territory of Delhi
Sub clause 2 of clause e brings in premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of various kinds of bodies such as Universities Institutes of Technology Board of Trustees of Major Port Trusts and the Bhakra Management Board
It takes in any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a Government company or its subsidiary
It also takes in and this is what we are concerned with here premises of any corporation not being a company as defined in section 3 of the or a local authority established by or under a Central Act and onwed or controlled by the Central Government
There is no dispute that the premises in question in the present appeal is public premises within the meaning of the Act
The Act contemplates the appointment of an Estate officer who is a high placed officer of the Government or of the relevant statutory authority in respect of public premises controlled by that authority
The Act enables the Estate officer to call upon unauthorised occupants of public premises meaning persons occupying such premises without authority or continuing in occupation after the authority to do so has expired or has been determined for any reason to show cause why they should not be evicted and to proceed to evict them if need be after considering the cause if any shown by the persons concerned in response to a notice served on them
It also contains powers to remove unauthorised constructions demolish unauthorised constructions dispose of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants require payment of rent or damages in respect of public premises and so on
An order passed by the estate officer under the provisions of the Act is appealable the appellate authority being the District Judge or such other judicial officer of not less than 10 year s experience as a District Judge and subject to the above right of appeal the orders passed by the estate officer are final
Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain any suits or proceedings in respect of inter alia the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises
This broadly is the outline of the 1971 Act
Before proceeding to deal with the contentions urged before us it is necessary to refer to two more enactments which have a bearing on the topic of discussion before us
It has been mentioned earlier that the Bank had served a notice on the appellants under the 1956 Act
This Act which received the H 502 assent of the President on 30th March 1956 is on the pattern of the lease and rent control legislation prevalent in various States
It regulates inter alia the matter of eviction of tenants of buildings situated in Calcutta and certain important cities and localities of the State where there is scarcity of housing accommodation
It is not necessary to set out the provisions of this Act except one
Under the second proviso to section 13 the Act is not to apply to a any premises belonging to any local authority b any premises belonging to or requisitioned by Government and c any tenancy created by Government in respect of any premises taken on lease by Government
The premises in the present case does not fall within any of these categories and according to the appellants before us the provisions of 1956 Act were squarely applicable and should have been resorted to by the Bank for evicting them
This is one
The other relevant statute is the West Bengal Public Land Eviction of Unauthorised occupants Act 1962 hereinafter referred to as the 1962 Act 
This legislation is on the same pattern as the 1971 Act a pattern which appears to have been in existence in various States conferring special powers on statutorily named officers to evict unauthorised occupants of public premises
The definitions of land  public land  and unauthorised occupation  contained in sections 22 27 and 28 are so wide as to leave no doubt that the premises belonging to the Bank would be within the scope of the said Act and that proceedings for eviction of the appellants could also be initiated by the Collector under that Act
It thus appears that the procedure for the eviction of the petitioners will be governed by the 1971 Act as well as either or both of the State Acts and the question is which of these will prevail The appellants urge that a legislation of this type will fall within the legislative field exclusively open to the State legislatures and that the 1971 Act is ultra vires Parliament in so far as it purports to affect the appellants  rights
It will be convenient at this stage to set out all the relevant entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution that may have a bearing on the discussion before us along with the corresponding entries under the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935
These are CONSTITUTION 1935 ACT List I Union List List I Federal List ENTRY 3 ENTRY 2 Delimitation of cantonment Naval military and air force works 503 areas local self government local self government in cantonment in such areas the consti areas the constitution and powers tution and powers within within such areas of cantonment such areas of cantonment authorities the regulation of house authorities and the regula accommodation in such areas and the tion of house accommodation delimitation of such areas
including the control of rents in such areas
ENTRY 10 ENTRY 32 Works lands and buildings vested Property of the Union and in or in the possession of His the revenue therefrom but Majesty for the purposes of the as regards property situated Dominion not being naval military in a State   subject to or air force works but as regards legislation by the State save property situate in a Province in so far as Parliament by law subject always to Provincial otherwise provide
legislation save in so far as Dominion law otherwise provides and as regards property in an Acceding State held by virtue of any lease or agreement with that State subject to the terms of that lease or agreement
ENTRY 43 ENTRY 33 Incorporation7 regulation Corporations that is to say the and winding up of trading incorporation regulation and corporations including winding up of trading corporations banking insurance and including banking insurance and financial corporations hut financial corporations but not not including co operative including corporations owned or societies
controlled by an Acceding State and carrying on business only within that State or co operative societies and of corporations whether trading or not with objects not confined to one unit ENTRY 44 but not including universities
Incorporation regulation and winding up of corpora tions whether trading or not with objects not confined to one State but not including universities
504 LIST II STATE LIST LIST II PROVlNClAL LIST ENTRY 18 ENTRY 21 Land that is to say rights Land that is to say rights in or over land land tenun in or over land land tenures including the relation of including the relation of landlord and tenant and the landlord and tenant and the collection of rents transfer collection of rents transfer and alienation of agricultural alienation and devolution of land land improvement a agricultural land land agricultural loans improvement and agricultural colonization
loans colonization courts of Wards encumbered and attached estates treasure trove
List 111 CONCURRENT LIST LIST 111 CONCURRENT LIST ENTRY 5 ENTRY 7 Marriage and divorce infants Wills intestacy and succession and minors adoption wills save as regards agricultural intestacy and succession land
joint family and partition all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immedia tely before the commencement of this Consti tution subject to their personal law
ENTRY 6 ENTRY 8 Transfer of property other Transfer of property other than agricultural land than agricultural land regis registration of deeds and tration of deeds and documents
documents
ENTRY 7 ENTRY 10 Contracts including part Contracts including partnership ship agency contracts of agency contracts of carriage carriage and other special and other special forms of forms of contracts but not contractsbut not including including contracts relating contracts relating to agricultural land
to agricultural land
505 One thing may be made clear at the outset
The present argument may not have been open to the appellants if the premises of the bank could be said to be premises belonging to the Union Government
In that case the legislation to the extent it governs such premises can be said to fall under entry 32 of List I as one covering the property of the union
Though the premises being situated in Calcutta any legislation under that entry in regard thereto would be subject to State legislation the State legislation can only govern save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides
Parliament having provided otherwise by the 1971 Act that Act will it can be said prevail over the 1956 and 1962 Acts
It is however common ground before us that though the Bank is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the Government it has a distinct personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union
The position indeed is beyond the pale of controversy after the decisions of this Court in Bacha
FGuzdarv
C r T   State Trading Corporation of India Ltd vs CTO1964 4 SCR 99 AP State Road Transport Corporation vs ITO 1964 7 SCR 17 Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union vs State  Vidarbha Housing Board vs I T O1973 and Western Coalfields Ltd vs Special Area Development Authority  It is therefore not possible for the respondents to support the legislation qua the premises in question under Entry 32 of List I Entry 32 of List I being out of the way Dr Chitale appearing on behalf of the appellants contends that the legislation squarely falls under Entry 18 of List II
He points out that judicial decisions have given the word land  in Entry 18 a very wide interpretation so as to comprehend not only land of all types rural or urban agricultural or non agricultural vacant or built up but also buildings  put up thereon
Since the entry specifically includes the relationship of landlord and tenant there can be no doubt that tenancy legislations pertaining to land and buildings derive their authority from Entry 18
He referred in this context inter alia to Manohar vs C Desai AIR 1951 Nag 33 A C Patel vs Vishwanath Chadda ILR  Raman Doss v State AIR 1954 ALL 707 Darukhanawala vs Khemchand ILR  M Karuna vs State AIR 1955 Nag
153 Kevalchand vs Dashrathlal ILR  Sukumar Dutta vs Gauriskanker  Raval  Co vs Ramackandran AIR 1967 Mad 57 and a detailed and comprehensive judgment of Parekh J in Elliot Waud and Hill P Ltd vs LIC 1980 Bom
CR 590 Which we are informed is pending consideration on appeal before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court
We do not however propose to discuss 506 these cases at length firstly because there is a contrary line of decisions also vide Mangtulal vs Radheshyam AIR 1953 Pat
14 Milap Chand vs Dwarakadas AIR 1954 Raj 252 Nawal Mal vs Nathu Mal AIR 1962 Raj 193 Rama Sundari vs Indu Bhushan AIR 1967 Cal 355 LS Nair vs Hindustan Steel Ltd AIR 1980 MP 106 and Bapalal  Co vs Thakur Das AIR 1982 Mad 309 and the judgment presently under appeal and secondly because a question as to the interpretation of Entry 18 or its predecessor Entry 21 of the Provincial List under the Government of India Act 1935 hereinafter referred to as the 1935 Act  had arisen before the Federal Court and the Privy Council and some of the above judgments have also been considered in certain earlier decisions of this Court
It would therefore be appropriate to refer to these decisions 1 The earliest of the decisions relevant in this context is the decision of the Federal Court in United Provinces vs Atiga Begum That case was concerned with the interpretation of Entry 21 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935
It raised the issue of the validity of the United Provinces Regularisation of Remissions Act 14 of 1938
In view of an unprecedented fall in the prices of agricultural produce the United Provinces Government directed a remission in the rents payable by tenants to their landlords
But this remission was declared by the High Court to be unauthorised and inoperative as being in contravention of the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926
The Provincial Legislature therefore passed the impugned Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in courts
This Act was held by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court to be ultra vires the Legislature
The Provincial Government appealed to the Federal Court
The Federal Court held that the legislation was clearly governed by Entry 21
The learned Chief Justice observed The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out with scientific definition
It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to make it exclusive of every other item in that List and Parliament seems to have been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import
In the case of some of these categories such as Local Government Education Water Agriculture and Land the general word is amplified and explained by a number of example or illustrations some of 507 which would probably on any construction have been held to fall under the more general word while the inclusion of others might not be so obvious
Thus Courts of Wards and treasure trove  might not ordinarily have been regarded as included under the head Land if they had not been specifically mentioned in item no 21
I think however that none of the items is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it
I deprecate any attempt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general descriptions it will be sufficient and much wiser to determine each case as and when it comes before this Court
 The Court then proceeded to hold that if the Provincial Legislature could legislate in respect of collection of rents it must also have the power to legislate with respect to any limitation on the power of a landlord to collect rents that is to say with respect to the remission of rents as well as to their collection
2 The next decision on certain observation in which Dr Chitale placed considerable reliance is that of the Privy Council in Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72
In that case the question was whether the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act an Act of the Punjab Legislature was void as being ultra vires of the Punjab Legislature
The Act applied to mortgagees in possession of certain lands
The expression land  was defined as land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture and included inter alia the sites of buildings and other structures on such lands
 The object of the impugned Act was the relief of mortgagors by giving them restitution of the mortgaged premises on conditions more favourable than those under the mortgage deed and by providing for a procedure before the Collector which was more summary than that before the ordinary Courts
The contention before the Privy Council on behalf of the Punjab Province was that the provisions of the impugned Act were traceable to item 21 supplemented it need be by item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List of the 1935 Act
The appellants on the other hand contended that the impugned Act went beyond the limits of the Legislative powers of the Province under list II and could not be supported by invoking the 508 powers of the Province under List III ie Entries 4 7 8 and 10 corresponding to Entries 13 5 6 and 7 of List III under the Constitution
It was pointed out that certain provisions of the impugned Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Code of Civil Procedure
The Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the legislation was clearly covered by Entry 21 in List III
In so holding they observed The key to item 21 is to be found in the opening word land
That word is sufficient in itself to include every form of land whether agricultural or not
Land indeed is primarily a matter of provincial concern
The land in each Province may have its special characteristics in view of which it is necessary to legislate and there are local customs and traditions in regard to land holding and particular problems of provincial or local concern which require provincial consideration
It would be strange if the land in a province were to be broken up into separate portions some within and some outside the legislative powers of the province
Such a conflict of jurisdiction is not to be expected
Item 21 is part of a constitution and would on ordinary principles receive the idest construction unless for some reason it is cut down either by the terms of Item 21 itself or by other parts of the constitution which has to be read as a whole
As to Item 21 land the governing word is followed by the rest of the item which goes on to say that is to say
These words introduce the most general concept rights in or over land Rights in land must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights
Rights over land would include easements or other collateral rights whatever form they might take
Then follow words which are not words of limitation but of explanation or illustration giving instances which may furnish a clue for particular matters thus there are the words relation of landlord and tenant and collection of rents
 These words are appropriate to lands which are not agricultural equally with agricultural lands
Rent is that which issues from the land
Then the next two sentences specifically refer to agricultural land and are to be read with item 7 8 and 10 of List 3
These deal with methods of transfer or alienation or devolution which may be subject to federal legislation but do not concern the land itself a sphere in which the provincial and federal powers are con 509 current subject to the express exception of the specific head of agricultural land which is expressly reserved to the provinces
The remainder of Item 21 specifies important matters of special consequence in India relating to land
The particular and limited specification of agricultural land proves that land is not used in Item 21 with restricted reference to agricultural land but relates to land in general
Item 2 is sufficient to give express powers to the provinces to create and determine the powers and jurisdiction of Courts in respect of land as a matter ancillary to the subject of item 21
It is next necessary to consider the terms of the impugned Act which it is said is ultra vires of the Province and compare them with the terms of the constitution just quoted
But before that is done it may be observed that there is no express provision in the constitution referring by name to mortgages though mortgages are of particular importance in India as a subject of ordinary business life and of litigation and of legislation
But a constitution does not generally deal with particular transactions or types of transactions and mortgages of land would in their Lordships  judgment as a matter of construction properly fall under Item 21 in so far as they are mortgages of land though in certain aspects they include elements of transfer of property and of contract
But they form a type of transaction which may properly be regarded as sui generis incidental to land and included within Item 21 except in so far as they fall within Items 8 and 10 of List 3 which again contain an express exception in the case of agricultural land
Their Lordships cannot accept the view that so important a subject as mortgages was left out of the Constitution and merely left to the Governor General s powers under section 104 Constitution Act as a residual subject
So far as land at least is concerned Item 21 would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject
The impugned Act as already explained has the main purpose of giving relief to mortgagors by enabling them to obtain restitution of the mortgaged lands on terms less onerous than the mortgage deeds require
It is limited to existing mortgages of land as defined in section 3 effected prior to 861901
That definition restricts it to land occupied or 510 let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture
The addition of the word pasture has been relied on as extending the scope of the Act beyond agriculture but pasture is certainly land within Item 21 or Item 3
It may have been mentioned ex abundanti cautela but in any case it is sufficiently allied to agriculture generally to be treated as a species of agricultural land or at least as land occupied or let for purposes subservient to agriculture and as such within the general scope of an Act dealing with agricultural land
Section 3 of the Act goes on it is true to give a number of specific types of land which are included but they are all governed by the controlling words of subs1 which limits the whole Act to agricultural land in the sense already stated
Thus head b of sub s 1 of section 3 must be read as referring to an estate or holding in the only class of land with which the Act deals
The same is true of all the other heads in the sub section dues rent water rights occupancy trees all come within the category of rights in or over land within Item 21 List 3 and all are governed by the same controlling reference to agriculture or agricultural purposes
This reading of the section is supported by the qualification of trees as trees standing on such land that is agricultural land
Section 7 and 8 of the impugned Act embody its main substantive provisions for the refief of mortgagors and need not be repeated here
The rest of the Act deals with ancillary matters like procedure which fall within the powers given by Item 2 and also by Item 21
If as their Lordships think the impugned Act is limited to agricultural land items 7 8 and 10 of List III do not affect the position at all since agricultural land is excluded in these entries
But in any event the Act does not deal with wills or transfer of property at all it does certainly deal with mortgages but as their Lordships have already stated mortgage though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution are properly to be classed not under the head of contracts but as special transactions ancillary to the entry of land 3 The next decision of this court to which our attention is drawn is the decision of this court in Atma Ram vs State of Punjab 1959 Suppl
1 SCR 748
The poini in controversy in this decision 511 was the constitutional validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 10 of 1953 as amended by Act 11 of 1955 which sought to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters
The impugned Act admittedly dealt with holdings as defined in the Punjab Revenue Act 1887
It limited the area which might be held by a land owner for the purpose of self cultivation and released surplus area to be utilised for resettling ejected tenants
Section 18 conferred upon tenants the right to purchase from the land owners the lands held by them and thus themselves to become the land owners at prices which would be below the market value
The land owners affected by the impugned Act contended that under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the State Legislature was incompetent to enact a law limiting the extent of land to be held by a land owner and that the provisions of the impugned Act contravened their fundamental rights
On the question of the legislative competence the Court made the following observations At the outset it is necessary to deal with the question of legislative competence which was raised on behalf of some of the petitioners though not on behalf of all of them
This argument of want of legislative competence goes to the root of the impugned Act and if it is well founded no other question need be gone into
It has been argued that Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution should not be read as authorising the State Legislature to enact a law limiting the extent of the land to be held by a proprietor or a landowner
Entry 18 is in these words  18
Land that is to say rights in or over land land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents transfer and alienation of agricultural land land improvement and agricultural loans colonization It will be noticed that the Entry read along with article 2463 of the Constitution has vested exclusive power in the State to make laws with respect to rights in or over land land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant  
The provisions of the Act set out above deal with the landlord s rights in land in relation to his tenant so as to modify the landlord s rights in the land and correspondingly to expand the tenant s rights therein
Each of the expressions rights in or over land and land 512 tenures is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of land tenures limiting the extent of land in cultivating possession of the land owner and thus releasing larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants
Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged the legislative competence of the state Legislature were hard put to it to enunciate any easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule
It was baldly argued that Entry 18 aforesaid was not intended to authorise legislation which had the effect of limiting the areas of land which could be directly held by a proprietor or a land owner
It is difficult to see why the amplitude of the words rights in or over land should be cut down in the way suggested in this argument
 In support of its conclusion the Court referred to the decisions United Provinces vs Mst
Atiqa Begum and Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72
We may next refer to the decision in Manaklal Chhotalal vs MG Makwana  Ors  The question here arose in the context of the Bombay Town Planning Act
A scheme drafted by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation after following the procedure prescribed under the Act was sanctioned by the State Government
As a result of this the petitioners were allotted a much smaller extent of land than they originally owned within the city of Ahmedabad and they were also directed to pay certain sums as their share of contribution
The petitioners challenged the competence of the State Legislature to enact the legislation in question
The Court upheld the legislation by reference to Entry 18 of List II as well as Entry 20 of List III Economic and Social planning
Reviewing the provisions of the Act in question the Court came to the conclusion that the legislation in question could be said to be a legislation in regard to land
Various aspects dealt with in the Act according to the Court could be considered to deal with land and accordingly competence of the State Legislature to enact the measure in question could be found in Entry 18
Indu Bhusan Bose vs Rama Sundari Devi  is a decision of five Judges of this Court and was rendered on an appeal from the Calcutta case cited earlier
The question for consideration 513 was whether the act of a rent controller in fixing fair rent for certain premises within the cantonment area of Barrackpore was valid
The claim of the respondent owner was that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of 1956 Act since regulation of house accommodation including the control of rents in cantonment areas was the subject matter of Entry 3 of the federal list under the 1935 Act
The State legislature it was therefore argued could not competently extend the 1956 Act applicable in other parts of the State to the cantonment areas
This plea was upheld
However one of the contention raised on behalf of the appellants was that the power of Parliament under Entry 3 of List I does not extend to regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant as that power vests in the State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries Nos 6 7 and 13 of List III
In support of this contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Bombay High Court in AC Patel vs Vishwanath Chada ILR 1954 Bombay 434 referred to earlier
In that case the Bombay High Court was concerned with the applicability of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act No 57 of 1947 to contonment areas
The Court first expressed the opinion that Act was referrable to Entry 21 of the List II of the 1935 Act
Relying upon the English Interpretation Act applicable to interpret the 1935 Act the Court held that the word land  in that entry would include buildings also so as to confer jurisdiction on the Provincial Legislature to legislate on relations between landords and tenants of buildings
Then the Court expressed the view that the legislation could not be said to be one dealing with house accommodation
The Supreme Court was however clear that the legislation was covered by the language of Entry 2 of the Federal List
However appropos the first aspect of the High Court s decision the Supreme Court observed We have felt considerable doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935 or in the corresponding Entry
18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
These Entries permit legislation in respect of land and explain the scope by equating it with rights in or over land land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents
It is to be noted that the relation of landlord and tenant is mentioned as being included in land tenures and the expression land tenures would not in our opinion appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation
That expression is 514 Only used with reference to relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands
In fact
leases in respect of non agricultural property are dealt with in the Transfer of Property Act and would much more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act read with Entry 10 in the same List or within the scope
Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry 7 in the same list leases and all rights governed by leases including the termination of leases and eviction from property leased would be covered by the field of transfer of property and contracts relating thereto
However it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion in this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas is clearly covered by the Entries in List I
In the Constitution the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws in respect of the matters contained in that Entry notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List II or List III
Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament and the State Legislature or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and II respectively
The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by the State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List 11 or Entries 6 and 7 of List 111 is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List I so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislature 
In the view we are unable to affirm the view of the Bombay High Court in A Patel s case which is based on the interpretation that Entry  in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government to India Act only permitted laws to be made for requisitioning of property acquiring of property and allocation of property only
 The Court then proceeded to consider the decision in Darukhanawala 515 v Khemchand ILR  Kewalchand vs Dashrathlal ILR  Babu Jagtanand Sri Satyanarayanji ILR 40 Patna at 625 and expressed the view that all these cases had placed a narrow interpretation on the expression regulation of house accommodation used in the relevant entry of the Union List
Having said this the Court concluded On the other hand the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal vs Nathu Lal ILR II Rajasthan 421 held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6 7 and 13 of List lll of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List ll and that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legis late on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I
That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us
We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld 6 Dr Chitale also placed considerable reliance on Union of India vs Valluri B Chaudhary  which dealt with the validity of the Urban Land Ceiling  Regulation Act 1976
Counsel for the appellant relied in particular upon the procedure adopted by Parliament in enacting this piece of legislation
The legislatures of eleven States considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parliament for the imposition of a ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole
They passed resolutions under article 2521 of the Constitution authorising Parliament to legislate on this topic
Parliament accordingly enacted the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976
In the first instance the Act covered the eleven States which had passed the above resolutions
Subsequently the Act was adopted by resolution passed by the legislatures of six more States
The primary object and purpose of the Act was the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations  the acquisition by the Government of such land in excess of the prescribed ceiling the regulation of construction of buildings on such land and matters connected therewith
All this was done with a view to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good in furtherance of the Directive Principles enunciated in article 39b and c of the Constitution
The controversy before the Court 516 turned mainly on the construction of Articles 251 and 252 of the Constitution and certain allied questions
Dr Chitale however laid em phasis on three important aspects of this legislation and decision
The first was the language of the resolutions passed by the States in this context which appear to have been on the same lines and one of which is set out in the judgment
They contained the following paragraphs Whereas this Assembly considers that there should be a ceiling on Urban Immovable Property And whereas the imposition of such a ceiling and acquisition of urban immovable property in excess of that ceiling are matters With respect to which Parliament has no power to make law for the State except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution of India underlining added The second was the preamble to the legislation in question
After setting out the long title to the Act and the object and purpose of the legislation in terms already described the preamble to the Act contains the following para And whereas Parliament has no power to make laws for the State with respect to the matters aforesaid except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 of the Constitution
 The third was the following passage from the judgment We are afraid this contention cannot be accepted
It is not disputed that the subject matter of Entry 18 List II of the Seventh Schedule ie land covers land and buildings  and would therefore necessarily include vacant land
The expression urban immovable property  may mean land and buildings  or buildings or land 
It would take in lands of every description ie agricultural land urban land or any other kind and it necessarily includes vacant lands underlining added Stopping here for a brief review of the above decisions it will be seen that except for Indu Bhushan s case which will be discussed later the other rulings are not helpful in deciding the issue before us
Atiqa Begum and Atma Ram concerned a legislation that clearly pertained to 517 land in fact land governed by systems of land tenure prevalent in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab
In Allah Rakhia the impugned Act was limited to agricultural land and since the items in the concurrent list excluded such land was covered by Entry 21
In Maneklal the legislation primarily concerned land though not agricultural land for as observed in State vs Peter  at p 292 land is at the base of all development
It is not quite certain that the provisions of the Act also affected buildings but if indeed any buildings were affected that was only incidental
As pointed out by the Court the primary target of the legislation was only urban land the ways and means of developing it and proper utilisation of land situate within the municipal limits
These decisions no doubt establish two propositions  1 The opening word land  in entry 18 is not restricted to agricultural land as are the latter portions of it
It would cover all types of land rural or urban agricultural or non agricultural vacant fallows or pastures
2 The words which follow land  only make it clear that the legislative entry takes in not merely the tangible immovable property one normally describes as land but also all kinds of intangible rights or interests in or over land in the broad sense explained above
The phrases which follow the words rights in or over land in the entry are illustrative and are not restrictive
They only make it clear that the legislative entry takes in not merely the tangible immovable property one describes as land but also all kinds of intangible rights or interests in or over land in the broad sense explained above
But none of the decisions contain any support for the further proposition that the legislative entry should be so interpreted as to cover houses and buildings as well as the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard thereto or the collection of rents therefrom
We are unable to agree with Dr Chitale that this further proposition emerges from the decision in Union of India vs Valluri B Chaudhary  The Urban Land Ceiling Act also was a legislation primarily intended to deal with vacant lands
If one scans the provisions of the Act it is clear that the theme of the Act was only to place a ceiling on vacant lands in cities or what we call urban agglomerations and to ensure equitable distribution of such urban vacant lands
The pith and substance of the legislation was with regard to urban land and its provisions in respect of buildings were incidental to the main objective of the urban land ceiling
In this context it is perhaps not without significance that as against the proposal of the States for a ceiling on urban immovable
property  Parliament restricted the legislation to vacant land
In the light of these circumstances the declaration in the preamble to the Act is basically correct that the pith and substance of the legislation was land  and this is exclusively within the State s legislative domain by 518 virtue of Entry 18 of List II
We do not also agree with the counsel that the passage extracted from the judgment reflects a decision of the Court that land includes lands and buildings 
It proceeds on a concession to that effect
That apart the context of the above observation is also interesting
The Court was dealing with a contention that the resolution of the States had authorised Parliament to impose a ceiling on urban immovable property and that the legislation imposing a ceiling on urban land was on a different subject and thus contrary to the resolution
The Court rejecting this argument pointed out that since urban immovable property  was a wider expression which also included land  there was no contradiction between the resolution and the legislation
It is in this context that a reference on admission regarding the scope of Entry 18 finds a place in the passage
Neither was the scope of the entry in issue in the case nor can the isolated sentence on admission be treated as a decision by the court
We now come to Indu Bhushan s case
While the counsel for the respondents would have it that this ruling has concluded the present issue in their favour Dr Chitale contends that this is not so
He points out that the court has been careful to say that it is not expressing any final opinion regarding Entry 21
It has at another place referred to the framing of house tenancy legislation either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries 6 7 and 13 of List III which also indicates that the Court had not made up its mind as to whether this type of legislation will fall under List II or List III
It is submitted also that an analysis of the Calcutta and Rajasthan decisions approved by it would show that they had not at all been considering any conflict between entries in Lists II and III and were concerned only with the interpretation of Entry 2 in List I and Entry 21 of List II
Dr Chitale therefore urges that Indu Bhushan cannot be taken as a decision that house tenancy legislation cannot come under Entry 18 of List II
We are not however persuaded that Indu Bhushan s case is capable of being brushed aside so easily
It is true that ultimately the decision in that case turned on the wider interpretation of Entry 2 of List I favoured by the Supreme Court in preference to the narrower one preferred by Bombay
Nevertheless the judgment contains a specific discussion of the terms of Entry 21
This is because the Bombay High Court had first discussed the terms of this entry and expressed an opinion thereon
The Supreme Court considered the High Court s interpretation of the entry and disagreed therewith
The view of the Supreme Court on the entry has been set out in some detail and cannot be ignored
Not only this in the last para of its judgment the Court has 519 reaffirmed the earlier discussion and interpretation
We have extracted earlier this concluding para of the judgment
In our view the effect of this para cannot be explained away by trying to analyse the Calcutta and Rajasthan decisions to see what they had actually decided
The important thing is how the Supreme Court understood what the two High Courts had decided
This is set out in the two sentences of the last paragraph of the judgment which have been underlined in the extract set out earlier
The Supreme Court then specifically affirmed this to be the correct ratio
We are therefore of the opinion that Indu Bhushan must be taken to have expressed a view that premises tenancy legislation in so far as it pertains to houses and buildings is referable not to entry 18 of List II but to entries 6 7 and 13 of List III
As pointed out by the learned Attorney General Indu Bhushun has been understood as above in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi vs Maman Chand  The decision of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court in V Dhanpal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal   also re inforces the same line of thinking
The question for consideration in this case was whether in respect of a tenancy governed by Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act it was necessary for the landlord to issue a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy before he could obtain an order of eviction against the tenant
This question was answered in the negative
In the course of its discussion the Supreme Court observed as follows Under the Transfer of Property Act the subject of leases of Immovable Property is dealt with in Chapter V Section 105 defines the lease the lessor the lessee and the rent
Purely as a matter of contract a lease comes into existence under the Transfer of Property Act
But in all social legislations meant for the protection of the needy not necessarily the so called weaker section of the society as is commonly and popularly called there is appreciable inroad on the freedom of contract and a person becomes a tenant of a landlord even against his wishes on the allotment of a particular premises to him by the authority concerned
Under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act a lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument
None of the State Rent Acts has abrogated or affected this provision
Section 520 108 deals with the rights and liabilities of lessors and lessees
Many State Rent Acts have brought about consider able changes in the rights and liabilities of a lessor and lessee largely in favour of the latter although not wholly
The topic of Transfer of Property other than agricultural land is covered by Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
The subject being in the Con current List many State Rent Acts have by necessary implication and many of them by starting certain provisions with non obstante clause have done away with the law engrafted in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act except in regard to any matter which is not provided for in the State Act either expressly or by necessary implication
 The above passage clearly proceeds on the view that the subject matter of housing accommodation falls within the purview of the Concurrent List
It would have strengthened the landlord s contention in Dhanpal Chettiar s case to urge that the terms of the house control legislation being traceable to List II and not to List III the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act could not affect the same at all
If Indu Bhushan had been understood as having left the question open it is difficult to imagine that before the larger Bench of the Court counsel would not have raised the issue again
The discussion and ratio of Dhanpal Chettiar fall into place only on the view that by that time it was taken as settled law that State House control legislations were referable to the legislative powers conferred by the Concurrent List
So much in regard to precedents
But leaving precedents aside let us proceed to consider the terms of the legislative entry itself treating the observations in Indu Bhushan as merely of persuasive value
We agree that entry 18 should be given as wide a constriction as possible consistent with all the other entries in all the three legislative lists
The entry deals with four main topics land transfer and alienation of agricultural land land improvement and agricultural loans and colonisation
The second and third of these clearly pertain to agricultural land
Perhaps the last also does because usually by colonisation we mean conversion into buildings and industrial sites of what was previously agricultural land but may be it is wider and includes colonisation of vacant non agricultural land as well
Any way as the decisions have unanimously held there is no reason why the first topic viz land should be narrowly interpreted
It should be understood as including all types of land rural or urban agricultural or non agricultural arid cultivated fallow or vacant
But what is land  This can 521 be gathered from the other words of the entry which attempt a paraphrase
They say in effect that legislation in regard to land  will comprise of legislation in regard to three things that is to say i rights in or over land ii land tenures including the relationship of landlord and tenant and iiicollection of rents
In our opinion the true import of the word land  can be gathered if we try to ascertain the proper interpretation and ambit of these three phrases particularly the first two among them in the context of other entries in the Union List
Doing so is it possible to interpret this entry as encompassing within its terms legislation on the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings That is the question
After careful consideration we have reached the conclusion that the answer to this question has to be in the negative for a number of reasons 1
As pointed out in Megh Raj there was good reason for placing land  in the Provincial List
Land indeed is primarily a matter for provincial concern
It is well known that land in each Province had its special characteristics
There were local customs and traditions in regard to landholding and particular problems of local concern which required provincial consideration
There are no such special features that require placing buildings also in the State list
The problem of scarcity of house accommodation is a general feature all over the country thanks to India s post independent industrial development involving large influxes of population into towns big and small from the villages
Urban housing problems are almost the same throughout the country despite minor differences here and there and uniform nationwide legislation in regard thereto atleast on same common aspects is also a necessary desideratum
In other words the subject is appropriate for an entry in the Concurrent List
Such a need for a uniform legislation by the Centre was felt even in respect of vacant urban land where unlike agricultural land there are no special features which need varying provincial treatment despite its being on the State List
It is all the more imperative in respect of public premises ie buildings belonging to the Union or to public sector corporations which have all India operations
It is therefore only appropriate that buildings  should be an item in the Concurrent Legislative List
522 2
A scrutiny of the Legislative lists would show that the Constitution uses different expressions in different places appropriate to the context and these entries indicate an awareness on the part of the Constitution of the distinction between various kinds of property
Entries 32 87 and 88 of List I and Entry 6 of List III use the word property  a word of the widest connotation which takes in not merely land buildings and other immovable properties but also all kinds of rights and interests in tangible and intangible properties
There are Entries 35 and 49 of List II which make specific reference to lands and buildings 
The expression land  is used therefore obviously where reference to land only is intended
Even the width of this expression is cut down and reference is confined only to agricultural land  as in Entries 47 and 48 of List II 6 and 7 of List III and even 18 of List II
In this scheme of the entries it would be inappropriate to interpret the word land  in Entry 18 as including buildings also
The Bombay case in interpreting Entry 21 of the 1935 Act was bound to take into account the terms of section 3 of the English Interpretation Act 1889 which specifically defined land  in the widest sense as including all messages tenements and hereditaments houses and buildings of any tenure
The assistance of the Interpretation Act cannot be invoked to interpret the entries in the Constitution
The entry in question specifically refers to the relationship of landlord and tenant but this is in the part of the entry which reads land tenures including the relationship of landlord and tenant
The words land tenures are not followed by a comma in some of the editions though the 1935 Act and some of the other editions and text books on the Constitution have a comma in between
But this makes no difference
The words tenant and tenure have a common derivation and the expression tenure  no doubt comprehends within it the relationship of landlord and tenant
But this had to be specified and clarified because in India the expression land tenures as pointed out in Indu Bhushan has acquired a special significance
It connotes various types of holdings of land involving the King or the Government the zamindar the inamdar and various other types of holders lessors sub lessors lessees and sub lessees under or through them and evolved at various stages of Indian history by various rulers nawabs and chieftains Hindu Muslim and British differently in different parts of the country
Sir Baden Powell has written a vast treatise on such law systems prevalent in India
The Constitution in section 31A contains a clue that expression like estate and land tenures have a special meaning in relation to land connoting the relationship among 523 its owner holder and other intermediary for the time being be it on tenancy or otherwise and the collection of rents therefrom
Section 31A also describes some of these relationships
The system had developed so many complications and nuances that a determined liquidation of all these special types of relationships had to be achieved by special provisions in the chapter on fundamental rights
Viewed in this background the words relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents cannot impart a wider meaning to the words land and land tenure used in the entry
While on the one the hand the words in Entry 18 have to be given the widest meaning possible it has to be borne in mind that the entries in the various lists have to be read together and construed in such a manner as to give a meaning and content to all of them
We need hardly say that the Constitution should be so interpreted as to reconcile all concerned and relevant entries See Hoechst Pharmaceuticals vs State  and the Dhillon case  If we give the word land a meaning so as to include buildings and also give the words rights in or over land a wide interpretation as we have to in view of the discussion and ratio in Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72 this entry will be seen to cover almost all kinds of not only transfer but also alienation and devolution of or even succession to lands and buildings
The interpretation thus placed will affect not merely leases and therefore a small part of the contents of the item regarding transfer of property  it will apply equally to sales mortgages charges and all other forms of transfer of all kinds of interests in land and buildings and this make such a substantial inroad into the scope of Entry 6 in the concurrent list as to denude it of all application except to property other than land and buildings
The word property used in Entry 6 will thus lose even its normal meaning not to speak of its being given the widest meaning possible appropriate to a legislative entry
It will mean that though transfer of property other than agricultural land is in the Concurrent List the State will have exclusive power to legislate in respect of transfer of all property in the nature of land and buildings in other words for the words transfer of property other than agricultural land we will be substituting transfer of property other than lands and buildings
It will mean that though wills intestacy and succession are in item 5 of the Concurrent List the State can legislate exclusively in respect of devolution of land and buildings of all description
It will render Entry 35 of List 11 a surplusage in so far as it refers to lands and buildings
We do not think that such an interpretation should be favoured
The more harmonious interpretation would be that any sub 524 ject matter that involves the element of transfer or alienation of any property other than agricultural land or of devolution on testamentary or intestate succession of any property or contract other than one in relation to agricultural land will fall in the Concurrent List and not in the State List even though it may relate to land or buildings
Another feature of the entries in the Lists also lends support to our view
Reference has been made to Entry 3 of List I by which inter alia Parliament has been given exclusive power to enact lease and rent control legislation in cantonment areas
Entry 5 of List II is the corresponding entry regarding local self government in areas of States excluding cantonment areas
Had it been the intention to confer legislative power on the State Legislature in regard to housing and rent control accommodation in the States one would have expected a repetition in Entry 5 of List Il or at least in entry 18 of List II of the words of entry 3 of List I
We do not think that the omission of those crucial words in Entry S or 18 can be attributed to more inadvertance
We have earlier referred to Dr Chitale s reference to the Urban Land Ceiling Act 1971 and pointed out how the preamble to the Act does not support counsel s interpretation of Entry 18
We may point out on the other hand that quite a few though not all State Legislations on house and rent control including the 1956 Act have been enacted after obtaining the President s assent
This indicates a legislative recognition that such legislation stems from the Concurrent List and not the State List
The learned Attorney General sought to derive some support for his contention also from the wording of Entry 32 of List I which deals with the property of the Union  an expression wide enough to comprehend all kinds of property essentially lands and buildings
It does three things at the same time a it enables Parliament to legislate exclusively with respect to all property belonging to the Union b it however subjects such power in so far as property situated within the territory of any State is concerned to any legislation of the State in regard thereto c it nevertheless authorises Parliament to provide otherwise by law
525 This language is somewhat analogous to that of article 2542 and is consistent with a special provision for an item which otherwise would primarily be covered by the Concurrent List on which both Parliament and State Legislature can legislate
It may be usefully contrasted with Entries like Nos 23 and 24 of List ll where the language of the entry clearly grants primacy to Parliamentary legislation in regard to a part of the field occupied by an entry in the State List
There is some force in this contention which effectively is that if land and buildings were so clearly covered by Entry 18 of List II either the wording of entry 32 would have been made subject to List Il of Entry 18 in this regard like nos
23 and 24 would have been made subject to List 1 9
It is also a relevant consideration that while the interpretation suggested by appellants completely denies power to Parliament to legislate on the subject matter under consideration the interpretation preferred by us does not exclude the States  power to legislate with respect to the topic
It recognises a concurrent power in Parliament and State Legislatures
For the reasons discussed above we are of opinion that all the legislations coming up for consideration in the present case are referable to entries in the Concurrent List and the topic of legislation is not referable to Entry 18 List II
The provisions of the 1971 Act in so far as they are made applicable to the premises of the respondent bank are therefore intra vires and valid
Once it is held that the 1971 Act is intra vires Parliament no further issue between the parties would seem to survive for consideration for as we have already pointed out no other contention was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court
However there was some discussion before us as to whether the provisions of the 1971 Act even if intra vires would prevail against the provisions of the State legislations
In this context Dr Chitale invited our attention to Jain Ink Manufacturing Co vs LIC  where this Court held that the provisions of the 1971 Act will prevail against the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1956 and the Delhi Slum Areas Improvement  Clearance Act 1956 on the grounds that it was both a later Act and a special Act
He submitted that the decision in the case is the subject matter of reference to a larger Bench and that we should therefore defer our decision in the present case to await the result of the reference
We do not think this is called for
In our opinion that decision has no reference to the issues before us
In that 526 case all the three legislations were Parliamentary legislations Delhi being a Union Territory and the question was regarding the inter se overlap among the three Acts touching upon the same subject matter viz eviction of a tenant by a landlord
Here the legislations which are said to occupy this same field are one of Parliament of 1971 and two of the State of West Bengal of 1956 and 1962 all passed in exercise of the powers conferred with respect to matters contained in the Concurrent List
The resolution of a conflict if any between the two will have to be in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution
This article reads Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States 1 If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List then subject to the provisions of clause 2 the law made by Parliament whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State or as the case may be the existing law shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void
2 Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provisions repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter then the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent
prevail in that State Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to amending varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State
It will be convenient before applying the provisions of the article to the facts of the present case to refer to the elucidation of the scope of its provisions by decisions of this Court
In Zaverbhai Amaidas vs State 1955 SCR 799 the question whether a provision in Central Act 527 XXIV if 1946 as amended by the Act LII of 1950 would prevail against a provision in Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947
Both legislations were referable to the Concurrent List and the State law had been passed after obtaining the assent of the Governor General
Referring to article 2542 the Court said This is in substance a reproduction of section 1072 of the Government of India Act the concluding portion thereof being incorporated in a proviso with further additions
Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature Canada in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature in a situation similar to that under section 1072 of the Government of India Act it was observed by Lord Watson in Attorney General for Outario vs Attorney General for the Dominion that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within competence would over ride Provincial legislation covering the same field the Dominion Parliament had no authority conferred upon it under the Constitution to enact a statute repealing directly any Provincial statute
That would appear to have been the position under section 1072 of the Government of India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Concurrent List
Now by the proviso to Article 254 2 the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament
and under that proviso Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not under section 1072 of the Government of India Act and enact a law adding to amending varying or repealing a law of the State when it relates to a matter mentioned in the Concurrent List
The position then is that under the Constitution Parliament can acting under the proviso to article 2542 repeal a State law
But where it does not expressly do so even then the State law will be void under the provision if it conflicts with a later law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by Parliament
 Later the Court observed It is true as already pointed out that on a question under article 254 1 whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State no question of repeal arises but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests namely that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical 528 with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question under Article 2542 whether the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law
We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay Act No XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against Section 7 of the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act No XXIV of 1946 as amended by the Act No LII of 1950
 It is sufficient to cite certain observations from one more judgment on this aspect Hoechst Pharmaceuticals vs State  which had to consider an alleged conflict between a provision of a State sales tax law and a provision of an order made under the Essential Commodities Act of Parliament
The case dealt with several points with which we are not here concerned
Expatiating on the scope of Article 254 the Court observed article 254 of the Constitution makes provision first as to what would happen in the case of conflict between a Central and State law with regard to the subjects enumerated in the Concurrent List and secondly for resolving such conflict
article 2541 enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between a Union and a State law in the concurrent field the former prevails over the latter
1 lays down that if a State law relating to a concurrent subject is repugnant  to a Union law relating to that subject whether the Union law is prior or later in time the Union law will prevail and the State law shall to the extent of such repugnancy be void
To the general rule laid down in cl
1 cl
2 engrafts an exception viz that if the President assents to a State law which has been reserved for his consideration it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union both laws dealing with a con current subject
In such a case the Central Act will give way to the State Act only to the extent of inconsistency between the two and no more
In short the result of obtaining the assent of the President to a State Act which is inconsistent with a previous Union law relating to a concur rent subject would be that the State Act will prevail in that State and override the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only
The predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legis 529 lates under the Proviso to cl
The proviso to article 2542 empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law either directly or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the same matter 
Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does not expressly repeal a State law even then the State law ill become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made
A State law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws
Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together
 The present case is clearly governed by the primary rule in Article 2541 under which the law of Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent List prevails over the State law
article 2542 is not attracted because no provision of the State Acts which were enacted in 1956 and 1962 were repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law of Parliament or existing law
The fact that the 1956 Act was enacted after being reserved for the President s assent is therefore immaterial
Even if the provisions of the main part of Article 2542 can be said to be somehow applicable the proviso read with Article 2541 reaffirms the supermacy of any subsequent legislation of Parliament on the same matter even though such subsequent legislation does not in terms amend vary or repeal any provision of the State Legislation
The provisions of the 1971 Act will therefore prevail against those of the State Acts and were rightly invoked in the present case by the respondent Rank
Dr Chitale while initially formulating his contentions outlined an argument that the provision in the 1971 Act appointing one of the officers of the respondent bank as the Estate officers is violative of Article 14
We do not see any substance in this contention
In the very nature of things only an officer or appointee of the Government statutory authority or Corporation can be thought of for implementing the provisions of the Act
That apart personal bias cannot necessarily be attributed to such officer either in favour of the bank or against any occupant who is being proceeded against merely because he happens to be such officer
Moreover as pointed out earlier the Act provides for an appeal to an independent judicial officer against orders passed by the Estate officer
These provisions do not therefore suffer from any infirmity
In fact Dr Chitale did not pursue this objection seriously
530 No other contention was urged
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed
We would however make no order as to costs as it is the existence of a multiplicity of statutory provisions that enabled the appellant to come to Court
SL Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In the State of Haryana two identical schemes are simultaneously in operation with the object of imparting literacy functional and awareness to adult illiterates and to provide literacy to children keeping away from school
The first scheme known as the Adult and Nonformal Education Scheme is financed by the Central Government under its Rural Functional Literacy ProgrammeProject but is administered by the State Government
Under this scheme a number of Adult Education Centres have been opened to impart literacy to adult illiterates
The petitioners were appointed as Instructors at these centres on different dates
They are being paid a fixed salary of Rs200 per month
The petitioners are given a deliberate break of one day in their service after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated temporary in service
The second scheme known as the State Social Education Scheme has been framed by the State of Haryana
Under this scheme Social Education Centres have been opened in the State and teachers known as Squad Teachers appointed at these centres to impart literacy among the illiterates
The State regularised the services of the Squad Teachers working on ad hoc basis with effect from 111980 and sanctioned them pay scale of Rs420 700 the scale applicable to primary school teachers in the State
The Petitioners  grievance is that although they are performing the same nature of functions and duties as performed by the Squad Teachers they are denied the same scale of pay
The petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ order or direction to the respondents i to treat them in continuous service irrespective of the deliberate breaks in their service ii to grant them regular pay scales of the Primary School Teachers plus consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment and iii to treat the Department of Adult Education and Non formal Education as a permanent department and to regularise the 412 services of the petitioners in that Department
The claim of the petitioners is based on the doctrine of equal work equal pay 
The petitioners contend that i the two schemes are similar and the nature of duties and functions performed by instructors are similar to those performed by squad teachers ii the instructors as well as the Squad Teachers are both appointed by the District Adult Education officer and function under the supervision of the Directorate of Education iii the instructors are full time employees and take regular classes of students in the age group of 5 15 years for two and a half hours and of adult illiterates in the age group of 15 35 years for one and a half hours
In addition they have to motivate the children and the adults to join the Adult Education Centres
They are further required to submit regular survey reports
The respondents on the other hand urge that the functions and duties of the instructors and the squad teachers are quite different
The main points of distinction relied upon are that i the instructors are appointed part time while squad teachers are in full time employment ii the squad teachers are transferable while instructors are not iii the squad teachers are required to teach 7 hours daily while instructors are required to teach for four hours iv the social education scheme is permanent and squad teachers are working under a permanent scheme while the instructors are working under a temporary scheme and v the qualifications and the mode of recruitment of instructors are different while the instructors are appointed locally the squad teachers are selected by the Subordinate Service Selection Board after competing with candidates from any part of the country
It is emphasized that if a regular selection was held many of the Instructors may not have been appointed
Earlier this court had in Bhagwan Das vs State of Haryana 1987 4 SCC 634 upheld the claim of the Supervisors appointed to supervise the centres at which instructors have been working under the Adult and Non formal Education Scheme for the grant of the same scale of pay as has been sanctioned to the Head Squad Teachers of the Social Education Scheme
In partly allowing the writ petitions this Court  HELD 1 There is no difference in the nature of duties of the instructors and squad teachers and both of them carry out similar work under the same employer
The functions and duties of both classes of 413 persons are primarily directed to advance the cause of education to bring social awareness among the people in the rural areas and to create interest in various social economic and educational activities
Bringing adults to centres for educating them is a difficult task and to impart education to dropout children is not an easy job
One of the main duties of the instructors is to motivate the adults and dropout children to participate in the activities and to motivate them for taking education
The instructors teach four hours a day and thereafter they have to do survey work and motivation work
In addition to that the instructors are required to carry out additional duties which are assigned to them by the Department
Further the instructors are required to organise sports like kho kho kabadi and athletics and to participate in the local functions and to motivate affluent villagers to give donations for the adult education scheme
420C E 421D E 2 Having regard to their duties and functions it is difficult to uphold the respondents  plea that the instructors are part time employees as they work only for four hours
421E 3 If the two class of persons do same work under the same employer with similar responsibility under similar working conditions the doctrine of equal work equal pay  would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate one class with the other in paying salary
421F G 4 The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work
Article 39d contained in Part IV of the Constitution ordains the State to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal work  for both men and women
Though Article 39 is included in the Chapter of Directive Principles of State Policy but it is fundamental in nature
The purpose of the article is to fix certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination amongst the people doing similar work in matters relating to pay
421G 422B C 5 The doctrine of equal work equal pay  would apply on the premise of similar work but it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects
421F 6 A temporary or casual employee performing the same duties and functions is entitled to the same pay as paid to a permanent employee
422D 7 The plea that instructors are not transferable does not affect 414 the doctrine of equal pay for equal work
The instructors are appointed A locally because they are in a better position to motivate the adults and dropout children for participating in the scheme while an outsider may be handicapped in motivating the local residents
423C D 8 Minimum qualification for the Instructors as well as the Squad Teachers is Matric though many among both are graduates and some of them are trained teachers
Though the Instructors belong to the locality where they have been posted but they are appointed only after selection
The difference in mode of selection will not affect the application of the doctrine of equal work equal pay  if both the class of persons perform similar functions and duties under the same employer
423D E 9 The instructors are entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to squad teachers
The pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service on account of six months fresh appointments
The petitioners will be entitled to increments in the pay scale in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have taken place
These directions shall be implemented with effect from September 1 1985
424A C 10
The petitioners  claim for regularising their services in the departments cannot be accepted as admittedly the project of Adult and Non formal Education is temporary
424C D Bhagwan Dass vs State of Haryana 1987 4 SCC 634 Ranjit Singh vs Union of India   Dhiren Chamoli vs State of UP and Surinder Singh vs Engineer in Chief CPWD  Ors referred to