l Appeal No5 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 26 1956 of the former Nagpur High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No 66 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated April 14 1956 of the said High Court in Misc
Petition No 6 of 1956
M C Setalvad Attorney General of India B Sen D B Padhya and I N Shroff for the appellants
R V section Mani for the respondent
April II
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SK DAS J
This is an appeal by special leave
The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co Ltd hereinafter referred to as the Company a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh its Manager and Assistant Manager
The respondent Shreepathi Rao joined the service of the Company as a typist on a salary of Rs 30 per month in July 1936
He rose in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs 120 10 225
Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic salary of Rs 245 per month
On November 28 1955 an explanation was called for from him with regard to the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity called high tension consumers  without having certain  notes for the information of consumers  printed at the back of the bills
The respondent submitted his explanation on the next day marking a copy thereof to one of the directors of the Company
On December 21955 he was again asked to explain why he marked a copy of his explanation to one of the directors
The respondent submitted an explanation in respect of this matter also
On the same date he was again asked to explain as to how and why certain  double adjustments  had been made in the accounts of 1954 relating to the consumers  department of the Company the allegation being that a sum of Rs 105894 7 7 which represented the amount of bills of the Central Railway had been deducted twice in the accounts
The respondent submitted an explanation on December 3 1955 in which he said that the charge was vague and that after 1949 he was not in any way concerned with the preparation of summaries and annual statements of accounts of the consumers department
On December 5 1955 an order of suspension was made against the respondent which stated that the order was to take immediate effect and to remain in force until further orders pending some investigation against the respondent
Two days later on December 7 1955 a memorandum was served on the respondent terminating his services with effect from January 311956
The memorandum so far as it is relevant for our purpose read We hereby give you notice under Standing Order 161 that your services will stand terminated as from 31st January 1956
The Company s Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose reasons  for terminating your services
 On December 19 1955 a notice was served on the Company on behalf of the respondent wherein it was stated that the order of suspension dated December 5 1955 and the order of termination dated December 7 1955 were illegal and ultra vires and a request was made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate the respondent within 24 hours failing which the respondent said that he would take legal action in the matter
On December 26 1955 the Company sent a reply to the notice denying the allegations and the company further stated that it had no desire to enter into a discussion with the respondent as to the propriety of the orders passed
On January 2 1956 the respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court 466 at Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue of appropriate writs or directions quashing the orders of suspension and termination dated December 5 1955 and December 7 1955 respectively and asking for certain other reliefs
This petition was heard by a learned single Judge on certain preliminary objections raised by the present appellants and by an order dated April 14 1956 he upheld the preliminary objections and dismissed the petition
The preliminary objections taken were these it was urged that the service of the respondent was terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company approved by the relevant authorities under the provisions of the XX of 1946 hereinafter referred to as the central Act and also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947 C P and Berar Act XXlll of 1947 hereinafter called the local Act and if the respondent had any grievance against the said Standing Orders his only remedy was to get the Standing Orders amended as provided for in the relevant Act but he had no right to move the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders passed against him or for reinstatement etc
Alternatively it was urged that if the Standing Orders did not apply in the case of the respondent as was the respondent s case then the Ordinary law of master and servant applied and the only remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal
On these preliminary objections the learned Judge held 1 that the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders and therefore his case was not governed by the Standing Orders 2 that the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was contractual and not statutory and the remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal and 3 as for amendment of the Standing Orders so as to include the respondent and persons in his category the only remedy open to the respondent was to take action under the relevant Act by approaching a recognised union to move in the matter
467 On the dismissal of his petition the respondent preferred an appeal under el
10 of the Letters Patent
This appeal was heard and allowed by a Division Bench on September 26 1956 on the findings that 1 the Standing Orders did not apply to the respondent though he was an employee within the meaning of that expression in section 2 1 of the local Act  2 the conditions of the respondent s service were governed by the provisions of the local Act and on a breach thereof the respondent had a right to move the High Court for appropriate orders under article 226 of the Constitution and 3 as the termination of the service of the respondent was without statutory authority it must be vacated
The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal quashed the orders of suspension and termination of service and declared that the respondent continued to bean employee of the Company on terms which were applicable to him on the date of his suspension namely December 5 1955
There was also a direction to the Company to pay back wages to the respondent
The appellants herein then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the Division Bench dated September 26 1956
The present appeal has been brought in pursuance of the order granting special leave to the appellants
The first and foremost question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Standing Orders of the Company apply to the respondent
We have already stated and it is not in dispute that the Standing Orders were approved by the certifying officer under the provisions of the central Act and by the Labour Commissioner under section 30 of the local Act
It is necessary to explain here the general scheme of the provisions of the two Acts under which the Standing Orders were approved
Under the central Act the expression  Standing Orders  means rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule and section 3 requires that within six months from the date on which the central Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five copies of the draft Standing Orders proposed by him 468 for adoption in his industrial establishment
Sub section 2 of section 3 lays down that provision shall be made in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment and where model Standing Orders have been prescribed the draft shall so far as practicable in conformity with such model
The Schedule refers to the matters which are to he provided by Standing Orders and item 8 of the Schedule relates to  termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workman We may state here that the central Act contains a definition of  workman  which at the material time in this case meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical labour for hire or reward but did not include any member of the armed forces
Sections 4 to 10 of the central Act deal with a conditions for certification of Standing Orders b certification of Standing Orders e appeals d date of operation of Standing Orders e register of Standing Orders f posting of Standing Orders and g duration and modification of Standing Orders
There are similar provisions in the local ActChapter IV of which deals with Standing Orders
Sub section 1 of section 30 of the local Act lays down Every employer in respect of any industry to which this Act has been made applicable under subsection 3 of section 1 shall within two months of the late of such notification submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval in such manner as may be prescribed a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1
 Item 8 of Schedule I of the local Act is again  termination of employment notice to be given by employer and employee 
The other sub sections of section 30 lay down the procedure to be followed for the approval of Standing Orders by the Labour Commissioner appeal by an aggrieved person etc
Sections 31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an amendment of the Standing Orders either at the instance of the employer or at the 469 instance of a representative of employees
It is worthy of note that sub section
1 of section 30 requires every employer to submit to the Labour Commissioner a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1
The local Act defines the expression  employee  and at the relevant time it meant any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry
It is worthy of note that the definition of  employee  in the local Act corresponds more or less to the definition of  workman  under the central Act
There are some minor differences in the definition of the two expres sions in the two Acts but with those differences we are not concerned in the present case
The Standing Orders with which we are concerned in the present case came into force on November 14 1951 and it is convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant Standing Orders
Standing Order No 2 defines certain expressions used in the Standing Orders
It states In these Orders unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context a  employees  means all persons male or female employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company either at Nagpur or at Wardha whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters
b  The Manager  means the person appointed as such and includes the Assistant Manager and in relation to Wardha establishment  the Resident Engineer 
c  Ticket  includes a Card pass or token
d  Workman  means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be  Workman  by the Management 
Standing Order No 3 classifies employees into certain categories and Standing Order No 4 deals with tickets
In substance it says that every workman permanent 6 470 or temporary shall have a ticket or card and an apprentice shall have an apprentice card the tickets or cards issued shall be surrendered when the workman is discharged or ceases to belong to the class of employment for which the card or ticket is issued
It is to be noticed that under the definition clause  workman  means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen by the management and Standing Order No 4 makes it clear that every workman permanent or temporary will have a ticket
Standing Order No 16 deals with termination of employment and cl
1 thereof relevant for our purpose must be quoted in full  For terminating the employment of a permanent employee a notice in writing shall be given either by the employer or the employee giving one calendar month s notice
The reasons for the termination of the services will be communicated to the employee in writing if he so desires at the time of discharge unless such a communication in the opinion of the Management may directly or indirectly lay the company and the Management or the person signing the communication open to criminal or civil proceedings at the instance of the employee or the Company s Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose the reasons and so orders in writing
 Now it is not in dispute that the respondent is a workman  within the meaning of the Central Act and an employee  as defined in the local Act
controversy before us is as to whether he is an employee  within the meaning of the Standing Orders
Admittedly no ticket has been issued to the respondent by the Company his ticket number cannot therefore be included in the departmental muster
The learned Judges of the High Court held that the inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster was an essential characteristic of an  employee  as defined for the purpose of the Standing Orders and the mere fact of employment in the Office Mains Department Stores Power House or Receiving Station of the Company was not enough to make a 471 person so employed an employee  within the meaning of the Standing Orders and as the respondent did not fulfil the necessary condition of having his name and ticket number included in the departmental  muster he was not an employee  as defined for the Standing Orders which did not therefore apply to him
On behalf of the appellants it is contended that regard being had to the context and the entire body of the Standing Orders the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct and on a proper construction inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster is not an essential characteristic of an employee  as defined for the Standing Orders
It is rightly pointed out that if the possession of a ticket and a ticket number is taken as an essential characteristic of an  employee  then there is hardly any difference between an employee  and a workman  as defined in the Standing Orders because a workmen  means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen and under Standing Order No 4 all workmen must have tickets
If a person em ployed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an employee and if workmen are such categories of employees as have tickets the distinction between the two disappears and
it is difficult to understand why two definitions were necessary
On a consideration however of  the subject or context of the Standing Orders read in their entirety and in harmony with one another it becomes at once clear why two definitions are necessary and what is the distinction between the two classes  employees  and  workmen  in the landing Orders
The expression  employee  denotes a larger group namely all persons male or females who are employed in the Office Mains Department Stores Power House or Receiving Station of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha Workmen  denotes a smaller group viz such categories of employees as have been declared to be workmen and who must have a ticket
Such a distinction is clearly intelligible in an industrial establishment where for security and other reasons a system of tickets or passes is necessary for those who 472 work in the Power House or Mains Department or other places where essential machinery is installed while others such as the clerical staff may work in an office building where security demands are either nonexistent or much less insistent
This distinction means that all workmen  are employees  but all  employees  are not workmen  for the purpose of the Standing Orders and the inclusion of ticket numbers in the departmental musters will be applicable to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued but such inclusion is not an essential characteristic of an employee
Let us now see if such a distinction is consistent with the Standing Orders as a whole
Standing Order No 3 which classifies employees defines a probationer in cl
c and says that a probationer means an employee who is appointed in a clear vacancy on probation for a period not exceeding twelve months etc
Standing Order No 4 does not require the issue of a ticket to a probationer yet a probationer is an employee
It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make a distinction between employees  and  workmen  and there may also be employees who have no tickets
Some of the Standing Orders apply to workmen only e g Standing Orders 12 13 14 and 15
Other Standing Orders apply to all employees whether they are workmen or not
Standing Order No 16 falls in the latter category  it applies to all employees
Standing Order No 8 b we think makes the position still more clear
It says  Any employee who after marking his attendance or presenting his ticket card or token as the case may be is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours without permission or without any sufficient reason shall be liable to be treated as absent for the period of his absence
 If every employee has to have a ticket it is difficult to understand why this Standing Order should make a distinction between an employee who marks his attendance and another who presents his ticket card or token
Such a distinction is easily understandable when some employees do not possess a ticket card or token 473 so that they merely mark their attendance while those who possess a ticket card or token present it
It has been suggested that Standing Order No 4 is not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets it talks of an issue of a ticket to every permanent workman a card to every badli workman a temporary ticket to every temporary workman and an apprentice card to every apprentice
It does not prescribe the issue of a pass or token though the definition of a ticket  includes a pass or token
The suggestion further is that Standing Order No 2 a itself authorises the issue of tickets to other employees so that there may be one kind of tickets issued to workmen under standing Order No 4 and another kind of tickets to other employees under Standing Order No 2 a
On this view it is suggested that the alternatives mentioned in Standing Order No 8 b really amount to an option given to an employee either to mark his attendance or present his ticket
It is however difficult to understand the necessity of an option of this kind when every employee must have a ticket particularly when the exercise of such an option is likely to defeat the very purpose for which tickets are issued in an industrial establishment
We do not however think that the case of the respondent is in any way strengthened by holding that Standing Order No 2 a itself authorises the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen
Even on that construction the failure of the Company to issue tickets under Standing Order No 2 a will not deprive the employees of their real status as employees and of the benefit of the Standing Orders
The direction for the issue of tickets will in that view of the Standing Order be an enabling provision only and not an essential characteristic of an employee
Further Standing Order No 4 provides for the surrender of tickets issued thereunder but Standing Order No 2 a if it is construed as enabling the Company to issue tickets makes no provision for the surrender of tickets when the employee ceases to be an employee
This absence of any provision for surrender applicable to such tickets 474 clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contemplated by the Standing Order No 2 a itself
On behalf of the respondent however the main argument has been of a different character
It has been argued that there need not be one set of Standing Orders for all employees and the Standing Orders in question being confined to those employees to whom tickets had been issued the respondent who had no ticket was outside their purview and the result was that the Company had committed a breach of the statutory provision in section 30 of the local Act in the sense that no Standing Orders had been made in respect of the respondent and employees like him to whom tickets had not been issued
It hag been argued that therefore no action could be taken against the respondent either under the Standing Orders or even under the ordinary law of master and servant
We are unable to accept this argument as correct
We have pointed out that the Standing Orders themselves make a distinction between employees  and work men  and there may also be employees who have no tickets
To hold that the Standing Orders apply to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued will make employees synonymous with workmen a result negatived by two separate definitions given in Standing Order No 2
The central Act as well as the local Act contemplate the making of Standing Orders for all employees in respect of matters which are required to be dealt with by Standing Orders
The Standing Orders in question were not objected to as being defective or incomplete by workmen and they have been approved by the appropriate authority and they must be construed with reference to their subject or context
In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary it should be held that they apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made
We see no compelling reasons for holding that the Standing Orders do not apply to the respondent
In our view and having regard to the subject or context of the Standing Orders the words whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters  in Standing Order No 2 a do 475 not lay down any essential characteristic of employee and are applicable only in cases where tickets have been issued to an employee
The essential content of the definition of an employee is employment in the Office Mains Department eta of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha and that of a workman the necessary declaration by the Company which would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order No 4
There is also another relevant consideration which must be borne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question
Section 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory obligation on the employer to make Standing Orders in respect of all his employees and a breach of the statutory obligation involves a criminal liability
That being so the court would be justified if it can reasonably do so to construe the Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory obligation
We are not unmindful of the principle that in construing a statutory provision or rule every word occurring therein must be given its proper meaning and weight
The necessity of such an interpretation is all the more important in a definition clause
But even a definition clause must derive its meaning from the context or subject
In Courts vs The Kent Waterworks Company 1 the question for consideration was the interpretation of the appeal clause in an Act for Paving Cleansing Lighting etc of the Town and Parish of Woolwich 47 Geo
III Sess 2 cap
By the 16th section of the statute  the commissioners are to make rates upon all and every the person or persons who do or shall hold occupy possess etc any land within the parish 
The statute also gave a right of appeal to any person or persons aggrieved by any rate
 but the appeal clause required the person or persons appealing against a rate to enter into a recognisance the question was if this requirement was intended to exclude corporations from the purview of the ap
peal clause as corporations it was urged cannot enter into a recognisance
In interpreting the appeal clause Bayley J observed 1   476 But assuming that they cannot enter into a recognizance yet if they ire persons capable of being aggrieved by and appealing against a rate I should say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable of appealing and that the other part of the clause which requires a recognizance to be entered into applies only to those persons who are capable of entering into a recognizance but is inapplicable to those who are not The same principle of interpretation was applied in Perumal Goundan vs The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi 1 in construing the Explanation to O XXXIII r 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which says inter alia that  a person is a pauper  when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit 
The question was if the aforesaid provision applied to companies
It was held that it would be wrong to construe the provision to mean that only persons who possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers
We are of the view that the same rule of construction should apply in the present case and the words  whose names and ticket numbers are included in the depart
mental musters  occurring in Standing Order No 2a should be read as  whose names and ticket numbers if any are included in the departmental musters  and should apply in the case of those employees only who possess tickets and whose ticket numbers are capable of being entered in departmental musters they are not intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued and consequently whose names only are so entered
The learned Judges of the High Court were influenced by the circumstance that in an earlier case D C Dungore vs section section Dandige Miscellaneous Petition No 134 of 1954 decided by the same High Court on September 23 1955 the Company took tip the stand that the Standing Orders applied to employees to Whom tickets had been issued a stand different from and inconsistent with that taken in the present case 1 Mad
477 It may be pointed out however that 1
C Dungore of the earlier case was not an employee within the meaning of the relevant Act and there could be no Standing Orders in respect of his conditions of service
Moreover in the matter of construction of a statutory provision no question of estoppel arises and the learned Judges had pointed out that the respondent himself thought that the Standing Orders applied to all employees
We have rested our decision as to the applicability of the Standing Orders not on what the appellants or the respondent thought at one time or another but on a true construction of the Standing Orders themselves including the definition clause in Standing Order No 2a
We take the view that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent
This is really decisive of the appeal because if the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No 161 the writ application which the respondent made to the High Court must fail
The learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants addressed us on the scope and ambit of article 226 of the Constitution and he contended that even if the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed by his private employer the proper remedy was by mean of a suit and not by invoking the special writ jurisdiction of the High Court
These contentions raise important questions but we do not think that we are called upon to decide them in this case
Lastly it has been urged oil behalf of the respondent that even if we hold that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent we should remand the case to the High Court for a decision on merits of other points raised by the respondent because the question whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the High Court and no decision was given on other points
We asked learned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain for decision oil his writ application once it is held that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and 6 478 his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No 161
Learned Advocate then referred us to Standing Order No 18 which provides for penalties for misconduct and submitted that the provisions thereof have not been complied with by the appellants
He particularly referred to cl
e of Standing Order No 18 and submitted that the order of suspension passed against the respondent was in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein
The short answer to this argument is that no penalty for mis conduct has been imposed on the respondent under Standing Order No 18
The Company paid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31 1956 which also showed that no order was passed by way of punishment for misconduct
The Company chose to terminate the service of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order No 16 and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for any alleged misconduct and it was open to the Company to do so
So far as Standing Order no 16
is concerned all the requirements thereof have been complied with
That being the position no other point remains for decision in the present case
The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed
The judgment and order of the High Court dated September 26 1956 are set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed
In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders we think it proper to say in this case that the parties must bear their own costs throughout
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant society was temporarily allotted the property in question by way of a lease by the Custodian of Evacuee Property in March 1949
In the allotment letter it was described as an industrial establishment  known as open compound
The inspection report dated January 9 1951 of the person who had delivered the possession to the society described the property as a plot  on which the allottee promised to start a factory
Sometime thereafter the society sought reduction of the assessment rent
The order of the Deputy Custodian thereon dated March 31 1955 granting the relief again described the property as a plot  with a self constructed shed
Subsequently the society through its letter dated January 21 1957 requested that the said indu strial plot  may be permanently allotted to it
However the Custodian chose to sell the property by auction on July 15 1960 in favour of the predecessor in interest of the re spondent
The society moved to have the said sale set aside and in its application dated October 15 1960 made to the concerned authority it mentioned the property as an indu strial plot 
That application was eventually rejected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on August 25 1961
In its revision petition before the Government of India the contention of the society was that the plot was allotted to the society for industrial purpose and they had erected a building and installed machinery thereon
The Government order rejecting the revision petition too started with a recital that the Custodian had allotted an open plot of land  to the society for industrial purposes and that the society had erected a temporary structure  on the plot and also installed some machinery
648 On February 15 1968 the appellant society filed an application under section 44 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 seeking permission to make repairs to the premises in ques tion
The owners resisted the said application on a prelimi nary objection that the petitioners were not tenants of any premises within meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act
The Controller found that what was allotted to the petitioner society was only a plot and that the shed was self con structed
The petitioner therefore being a tenant only with respect to an open site which did not come within the definition of a premises  as contemplated by the Act the petition under section 44 was not maintainable
The respondent instituted a suit against the society in 1977 seeking its eviction and possession stating that the property was only a plot of land and not premises  within the meaning of Delhi Rent Control Act and that the plain tiffs had terminated the tenancy of the defendants
All the three courts below held in his favour
In this appeal it was contended for the appellant socie ty that the property in question was a building  within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 the eviction from which could be sought by the landlord only from a Rent Controller on grounds specified in the Act and not by a suit in a civil court under the Transfer of Property Act read with the Codeof Civil Procedure that the references in the allotment letter to industrial premises  to the industri al establishment known as open compound  and to the facto ryworkshopindustrial establishment  clearly showed that what was allotted to the society was not a mere plot but an industrial premises
Dismissing the appeal HELD 1
The property allotted to the appellant society in respect of which it was a tenant initially under the Custodian and later under the plaintiff respondent was only a plot of land
The plaintiff was therefore justified in attempting to recover possession thereof by a suit for possession in a civil court
664F G 2
The letters addressed by the society to the Custodian and the Settlement Commissioner as well as the application for reduction of rent and the order thereon are valuable pieces of evidence both because they are anterior to the litigation between the parties and also because they re flected the representations of the society to and the findings of the very authority that allotted the said property
The society represented that it had been  allotted only a plot of land and that 649 the shed had been put up thereon by itself and this plea would not have been accepted by the Custodian had it not been correct
Both in the opening sentence as well as in the body of the order there is a clear finding to this effect
This is a very strong circumstance to show that what was allotted to the society was only a plot of land
Further more the findings of the Rent Controller in the application under section 44 of the Rent Control Act filed by the society right or wrong had attained finality as between the parties and it was not open to the society on principles analogous to res judicata to take a contrary stand in these proceed ings
659F H660A 3
The reference to industrial premises  in the allot ment letter cannot be construed as a reference to premises  within the meaning of the Rent Control Act
It was obviously a cyclostyled proforma allotting an item of evacuee property and except for the portion where it contained a description of the property in question viz open compound  it only contained terms applicable to allotment generally
661F H 4
The finding on the point of the courts below are concurrent findings on a question of fact
This Court under Article 136 of the Constitution does not normally reappraise the evidence or interfere with such concurrent findings of fact even if it is possible on the facts to come to a contrary conclusion
663G The decree for eviction not to be executed till February 28 1990 provided the persons in occupation of the premises file the usual undertaking
664G