Appeal No 51 of 1964
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 3 1962 of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No 1958 of 1959
Bishan Narain and Sadhu Singh for the appellant
J P Goyal and Raghunath Singh for respondents Nos 1 a to 1 d
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava J
This appeal arises out of a suit brought for possession of some land which was admittedly owned at one time by one Labhu
Labhu died in the year 1917 and on his death his widow Smt
Harnam Kaur who filed the suit as plaintiff came into possession of the land
She continued in possession of the land until the year 1954 when on an application made by the collaterals of Labhu the Naib Tehsildar by his order dated 26th June 1954 effected mutation in favour of these collaterals
These collaterals were defendants 1 to 4 Mangal Singh Amer Singh Santa Singh and Ishar Singh
These collaterals on the basis of the order of the Naib Tehsildar dispossessed Smt
Harnam Kaur
Harnam Kaur s appeal against the order of the Naib Tehsildar was dismissed by the Collector
The claim of these collaterals was that Smt
Harnam Kaur had entered into karewa marriage with one of these collaterals Ishar Singh
defendant No 4 and consequently she had lost her right to hold the land of her first husband Labhu
Harnam Kaur denied that she had entered into any karewa marriage with Ishar Singh and on the basis of this denial instituted the suit claiming possession of that land
She pleaded that the four defendants had no right to this land and had wrongfully dispossessed her so that they were mere trespassers
This suit was instituted on 1st March 1956
After the institution of the suit the No 30 of 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act came into force on 17th June 1956
The suit was at that time pending and it continued to remain pending until the year 1958 when Smt
Harnam Kaur died
Thereupon Smt
Rattno applied to be substituted as plaintiff in place of Smt
Harnam Kaur as her legal representative
This application was allowed though 456 it was opposed by defendants 1 to 3
In the trial of the suit defendants 1 to 3 took the plea that Smt
Harnam Kaur the original plaintiff had lost her right to the land because of her karewa marriage with Ishar Singh defendant No 4
Defendant No 4 however admitted the claim of Smt
Hamarn Kaur in his written statement denied that he had dispossessed her and also denied the allegation of her karewa marriage with him
In these circumstances two main questions came up for decision by the trial court
The first question was whether Smt
Hamam Kaur had entered into a karewa marriage with Ishar Singh defendant No 4 so as to lose her right to the disputed land as widow of the previous mal e owner Labhu  The second question that arose was whether Smt
Rattno who was substituted as the legal representative of Smt
Hamam Kaur was entitled to succeed to the property of Smt
Hamam Kaur  This second question depended on whether Smt
Harnam Kaur had or had not become full owner of the land under section 14 of the Act
The trial court held that Smt
Hamam Kaur had contracted karewa marriage with Ishar Singh defendant No 4 and had lost her rights
The further finding of the trial court was that Smt
Hamam Kaur had been dispossessed before the Act came into force and consequently section 14 of the Act did not apply with the result that Smt
Rattno could not claim succession to Smt
Hamam Kaur under that provision of law
On these findings the trial court dismissed the suit
On appeal the Additional District Judge Patiala recorded the finding that Smt
Hamam Kaur had not entered into karewa marriage with Ishar Singh defendant No 4 and further that section 14 of the Act was applicable to the present case as the land in suit was possessed by Smt
Harnam Kaur so as to make her full owner of this land under that provision of law
On these findings the first appellate Court decreed the suit against defendants 1 to 3 with costs in both courts after making a comment that Ishar Singh  defendant No 4 was a profoma defendant
Defendants 1 to 3 thereupon came up in second appeal to the High Court of Punjab and impleaded as respondents Smt
Rattno as well as Ishar Singh
The High Court dismissed the appeal and thereupon defendants 1 to 3 have come up to this Court in appeal under special leave granted to them
In this appeal also defendants 1 to 3 impleaded both Smt
Rattno and Ishar Singh as respondents
During the pendency of this appeal one of the defendants appellants died and his legal representatives were brought on the record as appellants
Rattno also died and her legal representatives were impleaded as respondents
Further Ishar Singh
defendant No 4 who was a respondent in this appeal also died
The application to bring his legal representatives on record was dismissed by the order of this Court dated 14th September 1965 457 in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No 1589 of 1965
In view of this order a preliminary objection was raised at the time of hearing of this appeal by learned counsel for the respondents who had been impleaded as legal representatives of Smt
Rattno that the appeal had abated on account of the failure of the appellants to implead the legal representatives of Ishar Singh respondent
It however appears that on the pleadings of parties and the nature of the dispute that came to be settled by the lower courts it cannot be held that this appeal must abate as a whole or must fail because of its abatement against Ishar Singh on his death
We have already mentioned that though the plaintiff Smt
Harnam Kaur had come forward with the allegation that she had been dispossessed by all the four defendants 1 to 4 Ishar Singh defendant No 4 in his written statement repudiated this claim
He put forward the plea that he had not dispossessed the plaintiff and further supported the claim of the plaintiff by pleading that there had been no karewa marriage between them The suit was dismissed by the trial court
It was decreed by the first appellate Court only against defendants 1 to 3 treating Ishar Singh as a profoma defendant
In these circumstances it is obvious that when the case came up before the High Court the dispute was confined between Smt
Rattno legal representative of the original plaintiff on the one side and defendants 1 to 3 on the other
Defendants 1 to 3 sought vacation of the decree for possession which had been granted against them in favour of Smt
Rattno
lshar Singh against whom the suit had not been decreed at all thus became an unnecessary party
In these circumstances even if Ishar Singh had not been impleaded as respondent in the High Court the relief claimed by defendants 1 to 3 in that Court against Smt
Rattno could have been granted without bringing into effect any contradictory decrees
In the appeal in this Court also in these circumstances Ishar Singh was an unnecessary party and consequently the failure to implead his legal representatives as respondents in the appeal after his death does not affect the right of defendants 1 to 3 to claim the relief for which they have come up to this Court in appeal
The preliminary objection therefore fails and is rejected
On merits we are of the opinion that the decision given by the High Court against the defendant appellants must be upheld
The first appellate Court which was the final Court for deciding question of fact clearly recorded a finding that the karewa marriage alleged to have been entered into by the plaintiff Smt
Harnam Kaur with Ishar Singh defendant No 4 was not proved
That finding of fact was binding on the High Court and was rightly accepted by it
It is no longer open to the appellants to challenge that finding of fact in this Court
On this finding it has to be held that the rights to the land to which Smt
Hamam Kaur had succeeded as widow of Labhu were not lost by her 458 until her death and that her dispossession by defendants 1 to 3 in the year 1954 was illegal
They had no right to this land in  preference to Smt
Hamam Kaur
It was however urged on behalf of the appellants that when Smt
Hamam Kaur died she was not in actual possession of this land
She had been dispossessed in the year 1954 and at the time of her death in 1958 this suit instituted by her for possession of that land was still pending
In the suit her own pleading was there that the land was in actual possession of defendants 1 to 3 as trespassers and in such circumstances it should be held that the land was not possessed by Smt
Hamam Kaur at any time after the Act came into force so that section 14 of the Act never became applicable and she never became full owner of that land
It may be mentioned that there was no dispute in the High Court nor was it disputed before us that if it be held that section 14 of the Act had become applicable and Smt
Hamam Kaur became full owner of this land her rights would pass on her death to Smt
Rattno and subsequently on the latter s death to the present respondents in this appeal
The only question for decision in this appeal therefore is whether it can be held that this property was possessed by Smt
Harnam Kaur as envisaged by section 14 of the Act so that she became full owner of this land
Section 141 of the Act is as follows 14
1 Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
Explanation
In this sub section property includes both movable and immovable property acquired includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act
 The dispute in the case has arisen because this section confers the right of full ownership on a Hindu female only in respect of property possessed by her whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and in the present case admittedly the plaintiff had been dispossessed in the year 1954 and was not able to recover possession from the defendants apppellants until her death in the year 1958
It was urged on behalf of the appellants that in order to attract the provisions of section 14 1 of the Act it must be shown that the female Hindu was either in actual 459 physical possession or constructive possession of the disputed property
On the other side it was urged that even if a female Hindu be in fact out of actual possession the property must be held to be possessed by her if her ownership rights in that property still exist and in exercise of those ownership rights she is capable of obtaining actual possession of it
It appears to us that on the language used in section 141 of the Act the latter interpretation must be accepted
It is significant that the Legislature begins section 141 with the words any property possessed by a female Hindu and not any property in possession of a female Hindu
If the expression used had been in possession of instead of possessed by the proper interpretation would probably have been to hold that in order to apply this provision the property must be such as is either in actual possession of the female Hindu or in her constructive possession
The constructive possession may be through a lessee
mortgagee licensee etc
The use of the expression possessed by instead of the expression in possession of  in our opinion was intended to enlarge the meaning of this expression
It is commonly known in English language that a property is said to be possessed by a person if he is its owner even though he may for the time being be out of actual possession or even constructive possession
The expression possessed by is quite frequently used in testamentary documents where the method of expressing the property which is to pass to the legate often adopted is to say that all property I die possessed of shall pass to  
In such documents wills etc where this language is used it is clear that whatever rights the testator had in the property would pass to the legate even though at the time when the will is executed or when the will becomes effective the testator might not be in actual physical or constructive possession of it
The legate will in such a case succeed to the right to recover possession of that property in the same manner in which the testator could have done
Stroud in his Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases Vol 3 at p 2238 has brought out this aspect when defining the scope of the words possess and Possessed
When dealing with the meaning of the word possession Stroud defines  possession as being in two ways either actual possession or possession in law
He goes on to say that actual possession is when a man enters in deed into lands or tenements to him descended or otherwise
Possession in law is when lands or tenements are descended to a man and he has not as yet really actually and in deed entered into them
 In Wharton s Law Lexicon 14th Edn at p 777 the word possession is defined as being equivalent to the state of owning or having a thing in one s own hands or power Thus three different meanings are given one is the state of owning the second is having a thing in one s own bands and the third is having a thing in one s own 460 power
In case where property is in actual physical possession obviously it would be in one s own hands
If it is in constructive possession it would be in one s own power
Then there is the third case where there may not be actual physical or constructive possession and yet the person still possesses the right to recover actual physical possession or constructive possession that would be a case covered by the expression the state of owning
In fact elaborating further the meaning of the word possession  Wharton goes on to say that it is either actual where a person enters into lands or tenements descended or conveyed to him apparent which is a species of presumptive title where land descended to the heir of an abator intruder or disseisor who died seised in law when lands etc have descended to a man and he has not actuary entered into them or naked that is more possession without colour of right
 It appears to us that the expression used in section 141 of the Act was intended to cover cases of possession in law also where lands may have descended to a female Hindu and she has not actually entered into them
It would of course cover the other cases of actual or constructive possession
On the language of section 141 therefore we hold that this prorovision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu even though she is not in actual physical or constructive possession of that property
Section 141 came up for interpretation in various cases before a number of High Courts and was considered by this Court also in several cases
In none of those cases however did the question directly arise as to whether section 141 will be applicable if the female Hindu is out of actual physical or constructive possession and the property happens to have been wrongfully taken into possession by a trespasser
Most of those cases were cases where the female Hindu had either alienated her rights by a deed of transfer or had made a gift and it was only incidentally that in some of those cases comments were made on the question whether section 141 of the Act will be attracted or not in cases the female Hindu bad been dispossessed by a trespasser
So far as this Court is concerned the earliest case is that of Gummalpura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva and others1
Dealing with the scope of section 141 of the Act in that case this Court cited from a decision of Viswanatha Sastri J in Gaddam Venkavamma vs Gaddam Veerayya 2  and noticed the fact that in that case it was held that the word possessed is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in one s bands or power
It was also noticed that the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in that case had expressed the view that even if a trespasser were in possession of the land belonging to a female 1 1959 Supp 1 SCR 968
2 A IR 461 owner it might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the female owner provided the trespasser had not perfected his title
Since in that case this Court was not concerned with a situation where a trespasser had actually dispossessed the female owner the Court went on to hold We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges went
It is sufficient to say that possessed in section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one s hand or power
 Thus in that case decided by this Court the broad meaning of the word possessed  was accepted as even including cases where the state of owning the property exists
Learned counsel for the appellants when bringing to our notice the views expressed by this Court in that case also drew our attention to another part of the judgment where this Court remarked Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section retrospective but even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable
There is no question in the present case that Veerawa acquired the property of her deceased husband before the commencement of the Act
In order that the provisions of section 14 may apply to the present case it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time the Act came into force
 Learned counsel from these words tried to draw an inference that this Court had laid down that section 141 will only apply to cases where the property was possessed by the Hindu female at the commencement of the Act
We do not think that any such interpretation can be placed on the words used by this Court
Section 141 covers any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act
On the face of it property acquired after the commencement of the Act by a female Hindu could not possibly be possessed by her at the commencement of the Act
This Court when it made the comments relied upon by learned counsel was in fact concerned with a case of a female Hindu who had acquired the right to the property before the commencement of the Act but was alleged to be no longer possessed of it because of having adopted a son before the commencement of the Act
It was in these circumstances that the Court in that particular case was concerned with the question whether the female Hindu was possessed of the property in dispute or not at the time the Act came into force
The Court was not laying down any general principle that section
141 will not be attracted at all to cases where the female Hindu was not possessed of the property at the date of the commencement of the Act
In fact there are no words used in section 141 which would lead to the interpretation that the property must be possessed by the female Hindu at the date of the 462 commencement of the Act
It appears to us that the relevant date on which the female Hindu should be possessed of the property in dispute must be the date on which the question of applying the provisions of section 141 arises
If on that date when the provisions of this section are sought to be applied the property is possessed by a female Hindu it would be held that she is full owner of it and not merely a limited owner
Such a question may arise in her own life time or may arise subsequently when succession to her property opens on her death
The case before us falls in the second category because Smt
Harnam Kaur was a limited owner of the property before the commencement of the Act and the question that has arisen is whether Smt
Rattno was entitled to succeed to her rights in this disputed property on her death which took place in the year 1958 after the commencement of the Act
The next case in which section 14 was considered by this Court was Brahmdeo Singh and Another vs Deomani Missir and Others1 In that case the female Hindu who had succeeded to the property as the widow of her husband Ramdeo Singh had transferred the property under two sale deeds
It was held that the sale deeds were not for legal necessity and the question arose whether in those circumstances when the Act came into force it could be held that the widow was possessed of that property
This Court after citing the judgment in the case of Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami2 held that the conflict of judicial opinion on this question had already been resolved in that earlier case where the Court had observed  The provisions in section 14 of the Act were not intended to benefit alienees who with their eyes open purchased the property from a limited owner without justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when the vendor had only a limited interest of a Hindu woman
 The Court further dealt with the contention that the possession of the alienees is the possession of the widow herself who is still alive and held  We are unable to accept this contention as correct
It is well settled that an alienation made by a widow or other limited heir of property inherited by her without legal necessity and without the consent of the next reversioners though not binding on the reversioners is nevertheless binding on her so as to pass her own interest ie life interest to the alienee
 It was thus made clear in that case that the property was held not to be possessed by the widow because the alienation made by her being binding on her she had no longer any legal right left in that property even in the sense of being in the state of owning it
The case thus explains why in cases of alienation or a gift made by a widow even though that alienation or gift may not be bind 1 Civil Appeal No 130 of 1960 decided on October 15 1962
2 1959 Supp 1 SCR 968
463 ing on a reversioner the property will not be held to be possessed by the widow because the alienation or the gift would be binding on her for her life time and she at least would not possess any such rights under which she could obtain actual or constructive possession from her transferee or donee
Having completely partted with her legal rights in the property she could not be said to be possessed of that property any longer
The third case of this Court brought to our notice is that of section section Minna Lal vs section section Rajkumar and Others1
In that case a Digamber Jain of the Porwal sect died in 1934 leaving behind his widow his son and three grand sons
His son died in 1939
In 1952 a son of one of the grandsons filed a suit for partition of the joint family properties while the widow was still alive
While the suit was still pending the widow died
Amongst other questions arising in the partition suit one question that arose was whether the 14th share of the widow declared in the preliminary decree was possessed by her and whether on her death it descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Act
Dealing with this question this Court explained the scope of section 141 by stating that by section 141 the Legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest
It was held that by section 141 manifestly it was intended to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute estate
It was also noticed that under the Sastric Hindu law the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance and she was not entitled to claim partition
But the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Women s Right to Property Act 1937 made a significant departure in that branch of the law the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the time of his death and if the estate was partitioned she became owner in severalty of her share subject of course to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual or civil
 Applying these principles to the facts of that case it was remarked  In the light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose it would be difficult without doing violence to the language used in the enactment to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property
If under a preliminary decree the right in favour of a Hindu male be regarded as property the right declared in favour of a Hindu female must also be regarded as property
The High Court was therefore in our judgment in error in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai 1 1962 Supp
3 SCR 418
464 was not possessed by her nor are we able to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of section 14 of the Act
 In that case it will be noticed that the widow died while the suit for partition was still pending and she was not in actual physical or constructive possession of the property which was held to be possessed by her at the time of her death
Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed
That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force
On these facts the Court came to the finding that the disputed property was possessed by the widow and this finding was given despite the circumstance that she was not in actual possession or constructive possession of the property but had merely obtained the right to the property under the preliminary decree
The principle laid down in that case thus supports the broader meaning given to the expression possessed by indicated by us earlier
The last case of this Court brought to our notice is Eramma vs Veerupana and Others1
That was a converse case in which the female Hindu in fact did not possess any legal right or title to the property though she was actually in physical possession of it
It was held The property possessed by a female Hindu as contemplated in the section is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act
It may be noticed that the Explanation to section 141 sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicated that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title however restricted the nature of her interest may be
The words as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner as given in the last portion of sub section 1 of section 14 clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full ownership
In other words section 14 1 of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who in the absence of this provision would have been limited owner of the property will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section
The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called limited estate or widow s estate in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman who under the old law would have been only a limited owner a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder
 In the concluding part it was held  It follows therefore that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser
In other words the provisions of section 141 of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property 1 AIR 1966 SC 1879
465 of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property
 This case also thus clarifies that the expression possessed by is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question
Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this section
This case also thus supports our view that the expression possessed by was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and while the Hindu female possesses the rights of ownership she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled
The section will however not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could in no manner exercise her rights of ownership in that property any longer
In this view that we have taken it does not appear to be necessary for us to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts which were cited before us by learned counsel for the appellants
The cases mentioned were  Sansir Patelin and Another vs Satyabatt Naikani and Another1 Ganesh Mahanta and Others vs Sukria Bewa and Others2 Harak Singh vs Kailash Singh and Another3 Ram Gulam Singh and others vs Palakdhari Singh and others4  Nathuni Prasad Singh and Another vs Mst
Kachnar Kuer  Others5 and Mst
Mukhtiar Kaur vs Mst
Kartar Kaur and Others4
All these were cases relating to situations where the widow had made some alienation of her rights in the property and none of them was concerned with a case where the female Hindu might have been dispossessed by a trespasser
The reasons given by the High Courts in those cases are therefore of no assistance in deciding the applicability of section 141 of the Act to a case of the nature before us
On the interpretation of section 141 of the Act that we have accepted above it must be held that the property involved in the present suit was possessed by Smt
Harnam Kaur when she died in the year 1958 and consequently Smt
Rattno and after her the present respondents must be deemed to have succeeded to those rights
We have already mentioned above that it was not disputed that if it is held that Smt
Hamam Kaur had become full owner of this property it would pass on her death to Smt
Rattno
As a result the decision given by the High Court must be upheld
The appeal is dismissed with costs
G C 1 AIR 1958 Orissa 75
3 AIR 1958 Patna 581
5 AIR 1965 Patna 160
Appeal dismissed
2 AIR 1963 Orissa 167
4 ATR 1961 Patna 60
6 AIR 1966 Pun


Summary:
A Hindu widow in the Punjab came into possession of her husband s land on his death in 1917
She continued in possession till 1954 when on an application made by certain collaterals of her late husband the Naib Tehsildar effected a mutation in favour of the collaterals
On the basis of the Naib Tehsildar s order the collaterals dispossessed the widow
She filed a suit for recovery of possession of the land
After the institution of the suit the  came into force
During the pendency of the suit in 1958 the widow died and her daughter was substituted as legal representative
The defendants pleaded that the widow had lost her right to the land because of her karewa marriage with one of the collateral and that the daughter could not succeed to the land as she was not in possession of the land on the coming into force of the so as to become full owner of the land under section 14 thereof
The trial court dismissed the suit but the first appellate court decreed it holding that there was no karewa marriage as alleged by the defendants and that section 14 was applicable to the case
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants who came to this court by special leave
HELD  i The finding of fact by the first appellate court that there was no karewa marriage was binding on the defendants and the High Court rightly accepted it
It was not open to the defendants to challenge the finding in this Court
457H ii The use of the expression possessed by instead of the expression in possession of in section 141 was intended to enlarge the meaning of this expression to cover cases of ion in law
On the language of section 141 the provision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu even though she is not in actual physical or constructive possession of the property
459C D 460D The section however will not apply to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could in no manner exercise her rights in that property any longer
465C On the facts of the case the plaintiff widow had acquired full rights of ownership of the land under s 14 of the 
On her death in 1958 the property passed to her daughter
The High
Court rightly dismissed the defendants appeal
465G Gimmalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veerayya  Ors 1959 Supp 1 SCR 968 and Brahmdeo Singh vs Deomani Missir CA No 1301960 dated 15 10 1962 distinguished
455 section section Munna Lal vs section section Rajkumar 1962 Supp 3 SCR 418 and Eramma vs Veerupana AIR 1965 SC 1879 applied
Gaddam Venkayamma vs Gaddanz Veerayya AIR 1957 AP 280 Sansir Patelin  Anr
vs Satyabati Naikani  Anr
AIR 1958 Orissa 75 Gajesh Mahanta vs Sukria Bewa AIR 1963 Orissa 167 Hapak Singh vs Kailash Singh  Anr
AIR 1958 Patna 581 Ram Gulam Singh vs Palakdhari Singh AIR 1961 Patna 60  Nathuni Prasad Singh vs Mst
Kachnar Kuer AIR 1965 Patna 160 and Mst
Mukhtiar Kaur vs Mst
Kartar Kaur  Ors AIR 1966 Pun 31 referred to