Appeal No 27 of 1968
Appeal by special leave from the order dated October 27 1967 of the Chief Labour Commissioner Central and Appellate Authority New Delhi in No IE 1  11 766 HR Gokhale B Parthasarathy OC Mathut JB Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain for the appellant
RK Garg SC Agarwala and Anil Kumar Gupta for the respondent
The Judgment of JM SHELAT and CA VAIDIALINGAM JJ was delivered by SHELAT J BHARGAVA J delivered a dissenting Opinion
Shelat J
This appeal by special leave is by the employer and raises the question as to the scope of sec
102 of the  20 of 1946 as amended by Act 36 of 1956 referred to hereinafter as the Act
134 The Standing Orders of the Appellant company were certified on August 7 1962 by the Regional Labour Commissioner Central under section 4 of the Act
Both the company and the workmen filed appeals against the said order which were disposed of by the Appellate authority under section 6
Sometime thereafter the respondent union applied for certain modifications some of  which were certified by the Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated December 28 1963
The Appellant company filed an appeal against the said order which was disposed of by the Chief Labour Commissioner in April 1964
On April 25 1965 the respondent union made a further application for modifications
The Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated September 2 1965 allowed certain modifications but rejected the rest
The union thereupon appealed against the said order
After hearing the parties the Chief Labour Commissioner passed his impugned order dated October 27 1967 ordering certification of certain modifications
Though the Appellant company objected at first to all the modifications counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four modifications only
The first modification challenged is in Standing Order 9 clause awhich as unamended read as follows The railway under the terms of employment has the right to terminate the services of a permanent Workman on giving him one month s notice in writing or one month s pay may be paid in lieu of notice
 The union claimed that the management should give reasons even when they terminated the services of an employee by a discharge simpliciter
The modification allowed directed reasons to be recorded in writing and communicated to the workman if he so desires at the time of discharge but not if the management considers it inadvisable
The second modification is in Standing Order 12 clause A which in its unamended form read as follows When any of the penalties specified in Order 9 is imposed upon a workman an appeal shall lie to the authority next above that imposing the penalty
An appeal shall lie to the Managing Agents only on original orders passed by the General Manager    The union s plea was that some time limit was necessary for the disposal of the appeals as the managing agents who are the appellate authority against the orders of the General Manager took months to dispose of such appeals thereby delaying the workman from raising an industrial dispute in time and seek timely relief
The modification allowed was that every such appeal shall be disposed of by the appellate authority within 60 days from the date of its receipt
The third modification is in Standing Order 11  vii which read as follows 135 Removal from service A workman shall be liable to be removed from service in the following circumstances a Inefficiency
The modification allowed was as follows In case of inefficiency due to physical unfitness the workman whom the management considers suitable for some alternative employment shall be offered the same on reasonable emoluments having regard to his former emoluments
 The modification contains it will be noticed four limitations 1  it applies only to cases of removal on the ground of physical unfitness 2 the consideration of suitability for an alternate employment is left to the management 3  the existence of alternative post and 4 the question as to what reasonable emoluments should be is left to the management
The fourth modification is in Standing Order 11 vii c which in its unamended form was as follows
Every person against whom departmental enquiry is being made shall be supplied with a copy of the findings in connection with his dismissal and removal from ser vice
The workman shall also be supplied with a copy of the proceedings of the enquiry committee as soon as possible after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings in his case and be allowed to defend his case through union s representative
 The modification allowed was as follows In case the management propose to remove the workman from service they shall serve on the workmen separate show cause notice to that effect
 Counsel for the company challenged the impugned order in its two facets the scope of the power of modification under section 102 and on merits on the ground that the modifications did not stand the test of reasonableness and fairness
On the first question his contention was that the jurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the Act to certify modifications of the existing standing orders are limited to cases where a change of circumstances is established
In the course of his argument counsel however qualified the contention by conceding that if at the time of the last certification certain circumstances were for one reason 136 or the other omitted from consideration they would constitute a Valid reason for modification and the modification would be granted even though in such a case a change of circumstances has not occurred
He next contended that in any case though section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply principles analogous to res judicata would apply to an application for modification unless such application is occasioned by new circumstances having arisen or is based on new facts
Briefly the argument was that the object of the Act is to have conditions of service of workmen in an establishment defined with precision and therefore to have standing orders dealing with such conditions certified
For industrial harmony and peace it is necessary that those conditions are stable and do not remain undefined or fluctuating
In pursuance of this object the Act confers finality to such certified standing orders or modifications thereof under section 6
The contention was that if modifications were allowed without any restraint there would be multiple applications specially as individual workman have been given the right to apply for modifications
Therefore the word final  in section 6 it  was argued must be so read as to mean that an application for modification under s 102 can only be maintainable if it is justified on the ground of a change of circumstances having occurred after the fast certification which of course according to the concession made by counsel also would include cases where certain circumstances were not taken into account at the time of the last certification
The relevant provisions of the Act requiring consideration in this appeal are sections 4 6 10 11 and 12
Section 4 provides that standing orders shall be certified under the Act if a a provision is made therein for every matter set out in the Schedule and b they are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act
The section further provides that it shall be the function of the certifying officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the  provisions of the standing orders
Section 6 provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer passed under section 52 may appeal to the appellate authority and the appellate authority whose decision shall be final shall by an order confirm the standing orders in the form certified under section 5 2 or amend or add thereto to render them certifiable under the Act
Section 10 whose interpretation is in question provides by sub section 1 as follows Standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not except on agreement between the employer and the workmen be liable to modification until the expiry of 6 months from the date on which the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation 137 Sub section
2 runs as follows Subject to the provisions of sub section 1 an em ployer or workman may apply to the certifying officer to have the standing orders modified  
Sub section
3 provides that the foregoing provisiOnS of the Act shall apply in respect of an application for modification as they apply to the certification of the first standing orders
Section 11 empowers the certifying officer and the appellate authority to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in an order passed by them or errors arising from any accidental slip or omission
Lastly section 12 provides that no oral evidence having the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradicting standing orders as finally certified under the Act shall be admitted in any court
Counsel conceded and did so rightly that there is no express provision in any one of these sections restricting the right to apply for modification or the power of the authorities to allow modification only on proof of a change of circumstances
The only limitations to the power are the reasonableness or fairness which of course must be established and the expiry of six months after the date of the standing orders or their last modifications coming into operation
In the absence of any such express restriction we should then ask ourselves whether there is in any of these sections anything which would indicate such a restriction by necessary implication
In that connection the only word which can point to such a restriction according to
counsel is the word final  in sec
6 so that the contention reduces itself to this that by making the order of the appellate authority final under sec
6 Parliament intended by necessary implication that the bar of finality can only be removed if new circumstances arise which necessitate or justify modification
But the intention of the legislature as observed by Lord Watson in Salomon vA Salomon  Co Ltd1 is a common but very slippery phrase which popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant although there has been an omission to enact
It is well settled that the meaning which words ought to be understood to bear is not to be ascertained by any process akin to speculation and the primary duty of a court is to find the natural meaning of the words used in the context in which they occur that context including any other phrase in the Act which may throw light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used the words in dispute
In Rv Wimbledon Justices2 Lord Goddard said Although in construing an Act of Parliament the court must always try to give effect to the intention of the Act and must look 1   38
2 2 Sup
Cl69 10 138 not only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there  Similarly in Rv
Mansel Jones1 Lord Coleridge said that it was me business of the courts to see what Parliament had said instead of reading into an Act what ought to have been said
So too in Latham vs Lafone2 Martin B said I think the proper rule for construing this statute is to adhere to its words strictly and it is my strong belief that by reasoning on long drawn inferences and remote consequences the courts have pronounced many judgments affecting debts and actions in a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the Act never dreamed of In the light of these principles we ought therefore to give a literal meaning to the language used by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or its literal sense gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which would defeat the purpose of the Act
The Act was passed because the legislature thought that in many industrial establishments the conditions of service were not uniform and sometimes were not even reduced to writing
This led to conflicts resulting in unnecessary industrial disputes
The object of passing the Act was thus to require employers to define with certainty the conditions of service in their establishments and to require them to reduce them to writing and to get them compulsorily certified
The matters in respect of which the conditions of employment had to be certified were specified in the schedule to the Act
As the Act stood prior to its amendment in 1956 sec
3 required the employer to submit to the certifying
officer draft standing orders proposed by him for adoption in his establishment
Section 4 provided that standing orders shall be certifiable if a provision is made therein for every matter set out in the Schedule and b that they were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act
The section however expressly provided that it shall not be the function of the certifying officer or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the standing orders
Under section 5 the certifying officer was required to send a copy of the draft standing orders to the union if any or in its absence to the workmen in the manner prescribed together with a notice calling for objections by them if any and to give opportunity to the employer and the workmen of being heard and then to decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft standing orders was necessary to render them certifiable under the Act
Section 6 provided for an appeal by any person aggrieved by the order passed under section 5
The appellate authority whose decision was made final had the power to confirm or amend or add to the standing orders passed by the certifying officer to render them certifiable under the Act
Though the 1889 23QBD 2932
2 1867 LR 2 exhibit 115121
139 order passed by the appellate authority was made final under section 6 sec 10 provided for modification
Sub section 1 of section 10 provided that standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not except on agreement between the employer and the workmen be liable to modification until expiry of six months from the date on which they or the last modification thereof came into operation
Sub section
2 read as follows An employer desiring to modify his standing orders shall apply to the Certifying Officer in that behalf Sub section 3 provided that the foregoing provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of an application under sub sec
2 as they apply to the certification of the first standing orders
As the Act stood prior to 1956 there was thus a prohibition against the certifying officer going into the question of reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing orders submitted to him by the employer
His only function was to see that the draft made provisions for all matters contained in the Schedule and that it D was otherwise certifiable under the Act
Therefore though the workmen through the union or otherwise were served with the copy of the draft and had the right to raise objections the objections could be of a limited character namely that the draft did not provide for all matters in the Schedule or that it was not otherwise certifiable under the Act
Even in an appeal under section 6 the E only objections they could raise were limited to the two aforesaid questions
The workmen thus could not object that the draft standing orders were not reasonable or fair
Under section 10 the right to apply for modification was conferred on the employer alone and in view of sub section 3 the only consideration which the certifying authority could apply to such modification was the one which he F could apply under sections 4 and 6
Therefore no question whether the modification was fair or reasonable could be raised
It is thus clear that the workman had very little say in the matter even if he felt that the standing orders or their modifications were either not reasonable or fair
They could of course raise an industrial dispute
But that remedy was hardly satisfactory
Such a dispute had to be first sponsored by a union or at least a substantial number of workmen it bad next to go through the process of conciliation and lastly the appropriate Government may or may not be prepared to refer such a dispute to industrial adjudication
Even if it did the entire process was a protracted one
In 1956 parliament effected radical changes in the Act widening its scope and altering its very complexion
Section 4 as amended by Act 36 of 1956 entrusted the authorities under the Act with the duty to adjudicate upon fairness and reasonableness of the standing orders
The enquiry when such standing  orders 140 are submitted for certification is now two fold 1  whether the standig orders are in consonance with the model standing orders and 2 whether they are fair and reasonable
The workmen therefore can raise an objection as to the reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing orders submitted for certification
By amending section 102 both the workmen and the employer are given the right to apply for modification and by reason of the change made in section 4 a modification has also now to be tested by the yardstick of fairness and reasonableness
The Act provides a speedy and cheap remedy available to the individual workman to have his conditions of service determined and also for their modifications
By amending sections 4 and 1 O Parliament not only broadened the
scope of the Act but also
gave a clear expression to the change in its legislative policy
Parliament knew that the workmen even as the unamended Act stood had the right to raise an industrial dispute yet not satisfied with such a remedy it conferred by amending sections 4 and 10 the right to individual workmen to contest the draft standing orders submitted by the employer for certification on the ground that they are either not fair or reasonable and more important still the right to apply for their modification despite the finality of the order of the appellate authority under section 6
Parliament thus deliberately gave a dual remedy to the workmen both under this Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act
This fact has in recent decisions been recognised by this Court
of Bangalore Woollen Cotton  Silk Co Ltd vs Their Workmen1 Buckingham  Carnatic Co Ltd vs Workmen2 and Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd vs The Workmena
It will be pertinent while examining the question whether there is a restriction as suggested by counsel to the right to apply for modifications to bear in mind the change in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments of sections 4 and 10
It will be noticed that section 10 does not state that once a standing order is modified and the modification is certified no further modification is permissible except upon proof that new circumstances have arisen since the last modification
As a matter of fact the legislature has not incorporated any words in the sub sec
restricting the right to apply for modification except of course the time limit of six months in sub section
Section 6 no doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the certifying officer under section 5 is final but that finality is itself subject to the right to apply for modification under section 102
Even so it was urged that the finality of the order under section 6 was indicative of a condition precedent to the jurisdiction under sec
102 to entertain an application for modification on a new set 1 2 CA No 674 of 1968 decided oft 25th July 1968
3 CA No l631 ofl966 decided on 31st July 1967
141 circumstances having arisen in the meantime
The question is whether such is the position
The finality to the order passed under section 6 really means that there is no further appeal or revision against that order and no more
This view finds support from section 12 which lays down that once the standing orders are finally certified no oral evidence can be led in any court which has the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradicting such standing orders
Section 6 when read with section 12 indicates that the finality given to the certification by the appellate authority is against a challenge thereof in a civil court
But the finality given to the appellate authority s order is subject to the modification of those very standing orders certified by him
As already stated section 10 itself does not lay down any restriction to the right to apply for modification Apart from the right to apply for modification under the Act the workmen can raise an industrial dispute with regard to the standing orders
There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act restricting the right to raise such a dispute only when a new set of circumstances has arisen
If that right is unrestricted can it be possible that the very_ legislature which passed both the Acts could have while conferring the right on the workmen individually restricted that right as suggested by counsel  To illustrate a new industrial establishment is set up and workmen are engaged therein
Either there is no union or if there is one it is not yet properly organised
The standing orders of the establishment are certified under the Act
At the time of certification the union or the workmen s representatives had raised either no objections or only certain objections
If subsequently the workmen feel that further objections could have been raised and if so raised the authority under the Act would have taken them into consideration does it mean that because new circumstances have since then not arisen the workmen would be barred from applying for modification  Let us take another illustration
Where after the standing orders or their modifications are certified it strikes a workman after they have been in operation for some time that a further improvement in his conditions of service is desirable would he be debarred from applying for a further modification on the ground that no change of circumstances in the meantime has taken place Where the standing orders provide 10 festival holidays if counsel were right the workmen can never apply for an addition in their number as they would be faced with the contention that the festivals existed at the time of the last certification and there was therefore no change of circumstances
The Act is a beneficent piece of legislation and therefore unless compelled by any words in it we would not be justified in importing in section 10 through inference only a restriction to the right conferred by
it on account of a supposed danger of multiplicity 153 for the purpose of ensuring that conditions of service which the employer laid down became known to the workmen and the liberty of the employer in prescribing the conditions of service was only limited to the extent that the Standing Orders had to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and as far as practicable in conformity with Model Standing Orders
The Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority were debarred from adjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders
Then as noticed in the case of Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co Ltd1 the Legislature made a drastic change in the policy of the Act by amending section 4 and laying upon the Certifying Officer the duty of deciding whether the Standing Orders proposed by the employer were reasonable and fair and also by amending section 102 so as to permit even a workman to apply for modification of the certified Standing Orders while in the original Act the employer alone had the right to make such an application
It is however to be noticed that the preamble of the Act was not altered so that the purpose of the Act remained as before
While the Act was in its unamended form if the workmen had a grievance they could not apply for modification of certified Standing Orders and even at the time of initial certification they could only object to a Standing Order on the ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act or Model Standing Orders
After amendment the workmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing Orders at the time of first certification on the ground that the Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and even subsequently to apply for modification of the certified Standing Orders after expiry of the period of six months prescribed under section 10 1  of the Act
These rights granted to the workmen and the powers conferred on the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority however still had to be exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the object of the Act as it continued to remain in the preamble which was not altered
Before the amendment of the Act if the workmen had any grievance on the ground of unfairness or unreasonableness of the Standing Orders proposed by the employer their only remedy lay under the Industrial Disputes Act
By amendment in 1956 a limited remedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring on the Certifying Officer the function of judging the reasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders
These amendments cannot however affect the alternative remedy which the workmen had of seeking redress under the Industrial Disputes Act if they had grievance against any of the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying Officer See Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Company Ltd vs Their Workmen and Another2 and the 1  2 2 Sup
C1169 11 143 of applications
The policy of section 10 is clear that a modification should not be allowed within six months from the date when the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation
The object of providing the time limit was that the standing orders or their modifications should be allowed to work for sufficiently long time to see whether they work properly or not
Even that time limit is not rigid because a modification even before six months is permissible if there is an agreement between the parties
The ground for urging that a restriction should be read in section 10 was the apprehension that since workmen individually have the right to apply for modifications there would be multiple applications which an employer would have to face
Secondly that an application without a change of circumstances would be tantamount to a review by the same authority of his previous order of certification
It was said that if no restriction is read in section 10 it would mean that the same authority
on satisfaction of the fairness and reasonableness of a standing order or its last modification had certified it would be called upon to review his previous decision on reasonableness and fairness
Such a review it was argued is permissible only on well recognised grounds namely discovery of new and important matter or evidence a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason
An application for modification would ordinarily be made where 1 a change of circumstances has occurred or 2 where experience of the working of the standing orders last certified results in inconvenience bardship anomaly etc
or 3 where some fact was lost sight of at the tme of certification or 4 where the applicant feels that a modification will be more beneficial
In category 1 there would be no difficulty as a change of circumstances has taken place
But in cases falling under the rest of the categories there will be no change of circumstances
Does it mean that though the implementation of the standing orders has resulted
in hardship
inconvenience or anomaly no modification can be asked for because there is no change of circumstances  As to multiplicity of applications we think that there is no justification for any such apprehension
unless there in a justification for modification the authorities under the Act would reject them on the ground that they are frivolous and therefore neither fair nor reasonable
Lastly as to such an application being a review of the last certifying order an application under section 10 is not a review
An application for review would be made in the proceedings in which the  judgment or order sought to be reviewed is passed That would not be s0 in the case of an application under section 102 Such an application is independent of the proceedings in which the  lastcertifying order was passed and is made in the 143 exercise of an independent right conferred upon the applicant by section 02
In an application for modification the issue before the authority would be not as to the reasonableness or fairness of the standing orders or their last modification but whether the modification now applied for is fair and reasonable
Therefore the contention that a change of circumstances is a condition precedent to the maintainability of an application under section 102 or that an application for modification without proof of such a change amounts to review by the same authority of its previous order is not correct 
It was then argued that assuming that a modification without a change of circumstances is permissible though section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to industry matters sound policy dictates that principles analogous to res judicata must be applied and it must be held that unless circumstances have changed an application for modification would be barred
For this counsel relied on Burn  Co vs Their Employeesx
There the demand was for wage scales fixed in an award by the Mercantile Tribunal instead of the scales in accordance with the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
In a dispute previously raised by labour an award was made in 1950 which accepted the wage scales according to the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and rejected the demand for the scales according to those awarded by the Mercantile Tribunal which were more favourable
It was in these circumstances that this Court expressed the view that an award fixing wage scales should have fairly long range operation and should not be unsettled unless a change of circumstances has occurred justifying fresh adjudication
But with the constant spiralling of prices the principle would appear to have lost much of its efficacy
The trend in recent decisions is that application of technical rules such as res judicata
acquiescence estoppel etc
are not appropriate to industrial adjudication
In Guest Keen Williams Private Ltd vs
PJ Sterling2 a modification of a standing order relating to the age of superannuation was sought by raising an industrial dispute
It was contended that the reference of that dispute was barred by acquiescence and laches
That contention was rejected the Court observing that industrial tribunal should be slow and circumspect in applying technical principles such as acquiescence and estoppel
In Workmen of Balmer Lawrie  Co vs Balmer Lawrie  Co3 also it was observed that the question as to revision of wage scales must be examined on the merits of each individual case and technical considerations of res judicata should not be allowed to hamper the discretion of industrial adjudication therefore
doubtful whether principles analogous to res judicata can properly be applied to industrial adjudication
1 SCR781 789
2 1960 l SCR 348
2  144 On merits Mr Gokhale argued that the four modifications to which he objected were neither fair nor reasonable and that therefore we should set them aside The question is whether in an appeal under article 136 we would be justified in interfering with conclusions as to reasonableness and fairness by authorities empowered by the Act to arrive at such conclusions
In Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co Ltd vs State of Uttar Pradesh  Ors1 this Court prevented counsel for the employer from canvassing such a question on the Found that the matter of fairness and reasonableness was left by the legislature to the authorities constituted under the Act
In Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd vs The Workmen  Ors2 this Court repeated what it had earlier stated in Bengal Chemical  Pharmaceutical Workers vs Their Workmen3 that though article 136 is couched in widest terms it is necessary to exercise discretionary jurisdiction of this Court only in cases where awards are made in violation of the principles of natural justice or axe made in a manner causing grave injustice to parties or raise an important principle of industrial law requiring elucidation by this Court or disclose exceptional or Special circumstances which merit consideration by this Court
As aforesaid the modifications objected by the appellant company are 1  giving reasons and communicating them to the workman concerned even in eases of discharge simpliciter 2 insertion of lime limit of 60 days in the disposal of appeals 3 insertion in standing order 11 of a clause that where a workman is re
moved on the ground of inefficiency due to physical unfitness the management should offer to such a workman alternative employment on reasonable emoluments and 4 insertion of the clause requiring a_ second show cause notice at time stage when the decision of suitable punishment is to be made
So far as modifications 2 and 3 are concerned clearly no principle is involved and there would be no justification for us to interfere with the conclusion of the appellate authority on the question of their being fair and reasonable
As regards the first modification the contention was that an employer has under the law of master and servant the right to terminate the services of his employee by a discharge simpliciter after giving a month s notice or a month s wages in
lieu thereof and is not required to give reasons for such an order
The Industrial Disputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right by requiring him to give reasons to the employee concerned and industrial adjudication has so far recognized such a right
To impose such a fetter by a change in orders is therefore not warranted by any statute and therefore cannot be said to be either fair or reasonable
It must however be borne
in mind that the right to contract in industrial SCR 863
2   supp
2 SCR 136 140
145 matters is no longer an absolute right and statutes dealing with industrial matters abound with restrictions on the absolute fight to contract
The doctrine of hire and fire for instance is now completely abrogated both by statutes and by industrial adjudication and even where the services of an employee are terminated by an order of discharge simpliciter the legality and propriety of such an order can be challenged in industrial tribunals
These restrictions on the absolute right to contract are imposed evidently because security of employment is
more and more regarded as one of the necessities for industrial peace and harmony and the contentment it brings about a prerequisite of social justice
During the last decade or so statutes have been passed such as the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act 1953 which require a reasonable cause for dispensing with the services of an employee by an order of discharge simpliciter
If reasons for discharging an employee are furnished to the employee concerned he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why his services are dispensed with but it becomes easy for him in appropriate cases to challenge the order on
the ground that it is either not legal or proper which in the absence of knowledge of those reasons it may be difficult if not impossible for him to do
In these circumstances if the authorities under the Act have come to the conclusion that such a modification is fair and reasonable we would hardly be justified in interfering with such a decision
As regards the modification requiting a second show cause notice neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice
In none of the decisions given by courts or the tribunals such a second show cause notice m case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary
The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under article 311
Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article
To import such a requirement from article 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary
or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants
In our view there is no justification on any principle for such equation Besides such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible
In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside
The appeal therefore is partly allowed to the extent aforesaid and the impugned order to that extent is set aside
There vill be Bhargava J
The management of the Shahdara Delhi Saharnpur Light Railway Co Ltd hereinafter referred to as 146 the Company has riffled this appeal by special leave against an order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner Central under section 6 of the hereinafter referred to as the Act as an appellate authority granting partially an application made under section 10 of the Act presented on behalf of the respondent Shahdara Saharanpur Railway Workers  Union
The first draft Standing Orders submitted by the Company to the Certifying Officer under section 4 of the Act were certified by him on 78 8 1962 after deciding objections that had been filed on behalf of the workmen In appeal the Chief Labour Commissioner Central New Delhi modified those Standing Orders to some extent by his order dated 12th February 1963
Subsequently these certified Standing Orders were modified by the order dated 28th December 1963 passed by the Certifying Officer and the appeal against his orders of modification was dismissed on the 23rd April 1964
Then on 25th April 1965 an application was presented under section 102 of the Act on behalf of the respondent seeking modifications in a number of Standing Orders as they stood after original certification and first modification
The Certifying Officer passed his orders on this application and against those orders the respondent filed an appeal before the Chief Labour Commissioner Central New Delhi
The Chief Labour Commissioner by his order dated 27th October 1967 allowed modifications in a number of Standing Orders
The present appeal is directed against this order and challenges the modifications granted in Standing Orders Nos 9a 12A 11ix 11vii and 13
The main ground urged by the Company before this Court in support of this appeal was that the Chief Labour Commissioner was not justified in directing modifications in the Standing Orders already certified in the absence of fresh material or fresh facts on the basis of which alone he was entitled to grant modifications under section 10 of the Act
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Company in the alternative also put forward the plea that on principles analogous to the rule of res judicata it should be held that the Chief Labour Commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant these modifications under section 10 in view of the previous decisions given when the Standing Orders were originally certified and modified for the first time
So far as the argument of learned counsel based on the applicability of principles analogous to the rule of res judicata is concerned learned counsel conceded that there is no direct ruling of any Court laying down that such principles are applicable when a Certifying Officer is dealing with an application for modification of Standing Orders under section 10 of the Act or when an appeal against such an order is being heard by the Appellate Authority under section 6 of the Act
Reliance was however placed on the decision of this Court in Burn  Co Calcutta vs Their Emplo 147 yees1 where this Court was dealing with the applicability of the principle analogous to the rule of res judicata to proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal dealing with a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act
In that case an earlier award had been given in an industrial dispute and the question arose whether in the subsequent dispute for adjudication the decisions given in the earlier award should be held as binding unless it was shown that there had been a change of circumstances
In the appeal before this Court it was urged that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in brushing aside the earlier award and in deciding the matter afresh as if it arose for the first time for determination and it was argued that when once a dispute is referred to a Tribunal and that results in an adjudication that must be taken as binding on the parties thereto unless there was a change of circumstances and as none such had been alleged or proved the earlier award should have been accepted as indeed it was accepted by the Adjudicator
This Court held  In the instant case the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed this argument with the observation that that was a rule of prudence and not of law 
If the Tribunal meant by this observation that the statute does not enact that an award should not be re opened except on the ground of change of circumstances that would be quite correct
But that is not decisive of the question because there is no provision in the statute prescribing when and under what circumstances an award could be re opened
Section 194 authorises the Government to move the Tribunal for shortening the period during which the award would operate if there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based 
But this has reference to the period of one year fixed under section 19 3 and if that indicates anything it is that that would be the proper ground on which the award could be re opened under section 196 and that is what the learned Attorney General contends
But we propose to consider the question on the footing that there is nothing in the statute to indicate the grounds on which an award could be reopened
What then is the position  Are we to hold that an award given on a matter in controversy between the parties after full hearing ceases to have any force if either of them repudiates it under section 196 and that the Tribunal has no option
when the matter is again referred to it for adjudication but to proceed to try it de novo traverse the entire ground once again land come to a fresh decision
That would be contrary 1 1956SCR 781 148 to the well recognised principle that a decision once rendered by a competent authority on a matter in issue between the parties after a full enquiry should not be permitted to be re agitated
It is on this principle that the rule of res judicata enacted in section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is based
That section is no doubt in terms inapplicable to the present matter but the principle underlying it expressed in the maxim interest rei publica ut sit finis litium  is rounded on sound public policy and is of universal application The rule of res judicata is dictated  observed Sir Lawrence Jenkins CJ in Sheoparsan Singh vs Ramnandan Prasad Singh1 by a wisdom which is for all time  And there are good reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions of Industrial Tribunals also
Legislation regulating the relation between Capital and Labour has two objects in view
It seeks to ensure to the workmen who have not the capacity to treat with capital on equal terms fair returns for their labour
It also seeks to prevent disputes between employer and employees so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the society might not suffer
Now if we are to hold that an adjudication loses its force when it is repudiated under section 196 and that the whole controversy is at large then the result would be that far from reconciling themselves to the award and settling down to work it either party will treat it as a mere stage in the prosecution of a prolonged struggle and far from bringing industrial peace the awards would turn out to be but truces giving the parties breathing time before resuming hostile action with renewed vigour
On the other hand if we are to regard them as intended to have long term operation and at the same time hold that they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based both the purposes of the legislature would be served
That is the view taken by the Tribunals themselves in The Army  Navy Stores Ltd Bombay vs Their Workmen2 and Ford Motor Co o India Ltd vs Their Workmena and we are of opinion that they lay down the correct principle and that there were no grounds for the Appellate Tribunal for not following them
As against this view expressed by this Court learned counsel for the respondent relied on the remarks made by this Court in 1 1916
LR 43 IA 91
2 119511  3  149 a subsequent case Workmen of Balmer Lawrie and Co vs Balmer Lawrie and Co 1
In that case the Court was dealing with the question of alteration in wage structure and had to consider the effect of an earlier award
The Court held When a wage structure is framed all relevant factors are taken into account and normally it should remain in operation for a fairly long period but it would be unreasonable to introduce considerations of res judicata as such because for various reasons which constitute the special characteristics of industrial adjudication the said technical considerations would be in admissible
As the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself has observed the principle of gradual advance towards the living wage which industrial adjudication can never ignore itself constitutes such a special feature of industrial adjudication that it renders the application of the technical rule of res judicata singularly inappropriate
If the paying capacity of the employer increases or the cost of living shows an upward trend or there are other anomalies mistakes or errors in the award fixing wage structure Or there has
been a rise in the wage structure in comparable industries in the region industrial employees would be justified in making a claim for the re examination of the wage structure and if such a claim is referred for industrial adjudication the Adjudicator would not normally be justified in rejecting it solely on the ground that enough time has not passed after the making of the award or that material change in relevant circumstances had not been proved
It is of course not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in the matter
The questio n as to revision must be examined on the merits in each individual case that is brought before an adjudicator for his adjudication Further support was sought by learned counsel from the remarks made by this Court in Associated Cement Staff Union and Another vs
Associated Cement Company and
Othersa
The judgment in this case was given only about a month after the judgment in the case of Workmen of Balmer Lawrie  Co 1 by the same Bench of this Court which held It is true that too frequent alterations of conditions of service by industrial adjudication have been generally deprecated by this Court for the reason that it is likely to disturb industrial peace and equilibrium
At the same time the Court has more than once pointed 1  2 150 out the importance of remembering the dynamic nature  of industrial relations
That is why the Court has specially in the more recent decisions refused to apply to industrial adjudications principles of res judicata that are meant and suited for ordinary civil litigations
Even where conditions of service have been changed only a few years before industrial adjudication has allowed fresh changes if convinced of the necessity and justification of these by the existing conditions and circumstances
Where as in the present case in a previous reference the tribunal has refused the demand for change
 there is even less reason for saying that that refusal should have any such binding effect
It is important to remember in this connection that working hours remained unchanged for many years in this concern and during these years considerable changes have taken place in the country s economic position and expectations
With the growing realization of need for better distribution of national wealth has also come an understanding of the need for increase in production as an essential prerequisite of which greater efforts on the part of the labour force are necessary
That itself is sufficient reason against accepting the argument against any change in working hours if found justified on relevant considerations that have been indicated above
 These three decisions which have been brought to our notice prima facie indicate that the Court has expressed conflicting views  on the question of applying the principle underlying the rule of res judicata to proceedings for adjudication of industrial disputes by an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act
In the circumstances I have felt some hesitation in applying this principle in the present case as urged on behalf of the Company consider that in the present case it would be much more appropriate to examine the scheme of the Act itself to find out the intention of the legislature and to arrive at a decision on thin basis on the question whether a modification on an application under section 10 of the Act should only be allowed on the basis of facts or circumstances appearing subsequent to the previous certification of the Standing Orders or whether in dealing with the application for modification the Certifying Officer and the Appel late Authority can re examine the entire position even as it existed at the time of the previous orders and arrive at a differed decision
The scheme of the Act was examined by this Court in Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co Ltd vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others1 where this Court held 
1   The Act was passed on the 23rd April 1946 and the Standing Orders framed by the UP Government under section 15 of the Act were published on the 14th May 1947
The Central Act the Industrial Disputes Act No 14 of 1947  came into force on the I st April 1947 whereas the UP Act UP Industrial Disputes Act No 28 of 1947 came into force on the 1st February 1948
It will thus be seen that the Act came into force before either the Central Act or the UP Act was passed
The scheme of the Act originally was to require employers in industrial establishment to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them
The Legislature thought that in many industrial establishments the conditions of employment were not always uniform and sometimes were not even reduced to writing and that led to considerable confusion which ultimately resulted in industrial disputes
That is why the Legislature passed the Act making it compulsory for the establishments to which the Act applied to reduce to writing conditions of employment and get them certified as provided by the Act
The matters in respect of which conditions of employment had to be certified were specified in the schedule appended to the Act
This Schedule contains 11 matters in respect of which Standing orders had to be made
In fact the words Standing orders are defined by section 2g as meaning rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule
The Certifying officer appointed under the Act is defined by section 2c whereas Appellate Authority is defined by section 2a
Originally the jurisdiction of the Certifying officer and the Appellate Authority was very limited they were called upon to consider whether the Standing orders submitted for certification conformed to the Model Standing orders or not
Section 32 provides that these Standing orders shall be as far as practicable in conformity with such Model Standing orders
Section 15 which deals with the powers of the appropriate Government to make rules authorises by cl
2b the appropriate Government to set out Model Standing Orders for the purposes of this Act
That is how the original jurisdiction of the certifying authorities was limited to
examine the draft Standing Orders submitted for certification and cOmPare them with the Model
Standing Orders
152 In 1956 however a radical change was made in the provisions of the Act
Section 4 as amesded by Act 36 of 1956 has imposed upon the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority the duty to adjudicate upon the fairness or the reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders
In other words after the amendment was made in 1956 the jurisdiction of the certifying authorities has become very much wider and the scope of the enquiry also has become correspondingly wider
When draft Standing Orders are submitted for certification the enquiry now has to be two fold are the said Standing Orders in conformity with Model Standing Orders and are they reasonable or fair  In dealing with this latter question the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority have been given powers of a Civil Court by section 11 1 
The decision of the Certifying Officer is made appealable to the Appellate Authority under section 6 at the instance of either party
Similatly by an amendment made in 1956 in section 102 both the employer and the workmen are permitted to apply for the modification of the said Standing Orders after the expiration of 6 months from the date of their coming into operation
It will thus be seen that when certification proceedings are held before the certifying authorities the reasonableness or the fairness of the provisions contained in the draft Standing Orders falls to be examined
 It is in the fight of this scheme of the Act explained by this Court that the decision has to be arrived at as to how in what manner and under what circumstances the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority should grant modifications when an application under section 102 of the Act is validly made after the expiry of the period of six months laid down in section 10 1  of the Act
The purpose of the Act as it was originally passed in 1946 was merely to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them
give effect to this purpose section 3 of the Act gave the power exclusively to the employers to submit draft Standing Orders for certification
The Certifying Officer had to certify the Standing Orders if provision was made in them for every matter set out in the Schedule and the Standing Orders were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act
In addition sub section
2 of section 3 also laid down that the provision to be made was to
be as far as practicable in conformity with Model Standing Orders prescribed by the appropriate State Government
Thus the Act in its original form was designed only 153 for the purpose of ensuring that conditions A service which the employer laid down became known to the workmen and the liberty of the employer in prescribing the conditions of service was only limited to the extent that the Standing Orders had to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and as far as practicable in conformity with Model Standing Orders
The Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority were debarred from adjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders
Then as noticed in the case of Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co Ltd1 the Legislature made a drastic change in the policy of the Act by amending section 4 and laying upon the Certifying Officer the duty of deciding whether the Standing Orders proposed by the employer were reasonable and fair and also by amending section 102 so as to permit even a workman to apply for modification of the certified Standing Orders while in the original Act the employer alone had the right to make such an application
It is however to be noticed that the preamble of the Act was not altered so that the purpose of the Act remained as before
While the Act was in its unamended form if the workmen had a grievance they could not apply for modification of certified Standing Orders and even at the time of initial certification they could only object to a Standing Order on the ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act or Model Standing Orders
After amendment the workmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing Orders at the time of first certification on the ground that the Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and even subsequently to apply for modification of the certified Standing Orders after expiry of the period of six months prescribed under section 101 of the Act
These rights granted to the workmen and the powers conferred on the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority however still had to be exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the object of the Act as it continued to remain in the preamble which was not altered
Before the amendment of the Act if the workmen had any grievance on the ground of unfairness or unreasonableness of the Standing Orders proposed by the employer their only remedy lay under the Industrial Dis putes Act
By amendment in 1956 a limited remedy was pro vided for them in the Act itself by conferring on the Certifying Officer the function of judging the reasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders
These amendments cannot however affect the alternative remedy which the workmen had of seeking redress under the Industrial Disputes Act if they had grievance against any of the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying Officer See Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Company Ltd vs Their Workmen and Another2 and the 1  2 2 Sup
CI69 11 154 Buckingham and Carnatic Co Ltd vs Their Workmen1
It is therefore clear that after the amendment in 1956 the workmen have now two alternative remedies for seeking alterations in the Standing Orders proposed or already certified
They can object to the proposed Standing Orders at the time of first certification or can ask for modification of the certified Standing Orders under section 102 on the limited ground of fairness or reasonableness
But for the same purpose they also have the alternative remedy of seeking redress under the Industrial Disputes Act in which case the scope of their demand would be much wider
If the proceedings go for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act the workmen can claim alterations of the Standing Orders not merely on the ground of fairness or reasonableness but even on other grounds such as further liberalisation of the terms and conditions of service even though the certified Standing Orders may be otherwise fair and reasonable
The remedy provided by the Act has therefore a limited scope only
In this background the effect of section 6 which lays down that when the Appellate Authority gives its decision confirming the Standing Orders either in the form certified by the Certifying Officer or after amending the Standing Orders by making modifications thereof or additions thereto his decision shall be final has further to be considered
On the face of it this provision means that if the Appellate Authority confirms the Standing Orders at the time of first certification that order is not to be subsequently questioned before any authority
There is of course the provision in section 102 permitting either an employer or a workman to apply for modification of the Standing Orders after the expiry of six months from the date of certification
It appears to me that on the language of section 6 it must be held that this request for modification under section 102 can only be made on the basis of fresh facts or fresh circumstances arising subsequent to the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority under section 6 confirming the Standing Orders for the first time
If on receiving an application for modification under section 102 the Certifying Officer is held to be authorised to reconsider the reasonableness or fairness of a Standing Order already certified and confirmed under section 6 the finality envisaged under that section in respect of the decision of the Appellate AuthOrity will be nullified
Cases may arise where on first application for certification of the Standing Orders an objection may be raised by the workmen and a modification sought on the ground that the proposed Standing Order is not fair or reasonable
Such an objection may be dismissed both by the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority
Six months after the certification a workman may apply for the same modification of the same Standing Order without any fresh facts or circumstances
If it be held that the power of the 1 Civil Appeal No 674 of 1968 decided on 25 7 1968
155 Certifying Officer on an application for modification is not limited at all and can be exercised even on the material which was originally before the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority the Certifying Officer may on the same material come to a conclusion different from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Authority at the first stage under section 6 of the Act
In that case the Certifying Officer may allow the modification which was previously rejected by the Appellate Authority
The wide interpretation urged by learned counsel for the workmen in this appeal that the power of a Certifying Officer on an application for modification is not limited at all can thus result in orders being made which completely negative the finality of the decision given by an Appellate Authority under section 6 at an earlier stage
In fact if tins interpretation is accepted and it is held that an order of modification can be made on the identical material which was available to the Appellate Authority at the time of its earlier order it would mean that merely because a period of six months has elapsed a Certifying Officer would be competent to re appraise the same facts and circumstances take a different view and set aside the order passed by his superior authority and thus in effect sit in judgment over an order made by a superior authority
of course a Certifying Officer being junior to the Appellate Authority may hesitate to do so but a successor Appellate Authority may very well hold views different from his predecessor and may come to a decision on identical material that a Standing Order held to be fair and reasonable by his predecessor at the stage of appeal under section 6 was not fair and reasonable and that a modification should be allowed on the ground of being fair and reasonable even though that modification was disallowed by his predecessor
It is also to be noted that the right to apply for modification is not confined to workmen alone but that right is granted to the employers also
There can therefore be reverse  cases where the draft Standing Order submitted by an employer may be modified by the Appellate Authority under section 6 and six months later the employer may again apply for modification so as to result in restoration of his original draft in the hope that the successor Appellate Authority would hold the opinion that the original draft Standing Order proposed by the employer was fair and reasonable and that the modification made by his predecessor under section 6 was not justified
Considering these circumstances I am of the view that when an application under section 102 of the Act is made the Certifying Officer can modify Standing Orders already certified only if the request is not made on the basis of the same material which existed at the earlier stage when the Standing Orders were certified
I am unable to accept an interpretation which will completely do away with the finality of orders made under section 6 of the Act by an Appellate Authority
156 This interpretation of course does not affect the right of the workmen to seek an amendment of the Standing Orders even if certified as reasonable and fair by the Appellate Authority under section 6 by appropriate proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act
In fact it appears to me that the power of a Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute under that Act relating to a Standing Order will of course be wide enough to permit the Tribunal to direct alteration of a Standing Order held to be reasonable and fair by the Appellate Authority under section 6 of the Act in case a dispute about it is referred to the Tribunal and that is the only remedy available if either the workman or the employer desires to have modification without any fresh grounds material or circumstances
The validity of the order of the Appellate Authority in the present appeal has to be judged on this basis
I have already mentioned earlier the various Standing Orders in respect of which modifications allowed by the Appellate Authority were sought to be challenged in this appeal
The objections in respect of some of these modifications which were originally challenged were not pressed by counsel during the hearing of the appeal and consequently those modifications need not be interfered with
At the stage of final hearing learned counsel only pressed for setting aside four modifications mentioned by the Chief Labour Commissioner in his
appellate order as items Nos 1 3 5 and 6 relating to modifications of Standing
Orders 9a 12A and 11vn
It may be mentioned that items 5 and 6 are both modifications in Standing Order 11 vii
In each of these cases the order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner now impugned shows that he did not rely on any fresh facts material or circumstances which were not available at the earlier stage when the Standing Orders were first certified or first modified
In effect therefore the present order amounts to passing orders different from earlier orders passed by the Appellate Authority on a reconsideration of the same material which was available to both the Authorities
In fact the modification at item No 1 in Standing Order 9a had been specifically disallowed in appeal by the Chief Labour Commissioner in his order dated 12th February 1963 when he first heard the appeal under section 6 and confirmed the certification of the original Standing Orders
Thus in respect of item No 1 what the present Chief Labour CommisSioner has done is to permit the modification because he considered it reasonable and fair even though on the same material his predecessor had disallowed this very modification on the basis that in his opinion the original
draft Standing Order was fair and reasonable
On the principle enunciated above it is clear that the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner allowing all these four modifications which is not based on any fresh facts material or circumstances is liable to be set aside
As a result I would partly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner Central permitting modifications mentioned by him in his Order at item Nos 1 3 5 and 6 relating to Standing Orders 9a 12A and Ilvii
In the circumstances of this case I would direct parties to bear their own costs of this appeal
VPS Appeal allowed in part


Summary:
Six months after the appelIant s Standing Orders as modified had come into operation the respondent applied for further modification of the Standing Orders under section 102 of the  as amended in 1956
The certifying officer allowed some of the modifications and on appeal by the respondent the Appellate Authority allowed some more modifications
In appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution the appellant objected to four modifications namely i that the appellant should give reasons and communicate them to the workmen even in cases of discharge simpliciter ii that appeals against penalties imposed should be disposed of within 60 days iii that when a workman is removed on the ground of inefficiency due to physical unfitness the appellant should offer to such workman alternative employment on reasonable emoluments and iv that a second show cause notice should be served on the workman at the stage of taking a decision on the suitable punishment
The grounds urged were 1 The authorities under the Act can certify modifications of existing Standing Orders under section 102 only when a change of circumstances is established because section 6 of the Act confers finality on certified Standing Orders or modifications thereof 2
On principles analogous to res Judicata the authorities had no jurisdiction to grant the modifications in the present case and 3 the modifications were not reasonable or fair
HELD 1 Per Shelat and Vaidialingam JJ A change of circumstances is not a condition precedent to the maintainability of an application for modification under section 102
Under the Act before its amendment in 1956 a workman could not object that the Standing Orders were not reasonable or fair
His only remedy was to raise an industrial dispute but that remedy was unsatisfactory since the dispute had to be sponsored by a union or at least a substantial number of workmen and even then the process was a protracted one
Parliament knew that the workmen had the right to raise an industrial dispute and also the defects in that remedy and so amended sections 4 and 10 of the Act by Act 36 of 1956
The amendment conferred on individual workman the right to object to draft Standing Orders submitted by an employer on the ground that they are either not fair or not reasonable and also gave the right to apply for their modification
Under section 6 a person aggrieved by the order of the certifying officer certifying or modifying Standing Orders may appeal to the Appellate Authority whose decision shall be final
But the finality only means that there is no further appeal or revision against the order and that the order cannot be challenged in a civil court
It can however
be modified under section 102
The only limitations on the power are a reason 132 ableness and fairness of the modification and b except on agreement between employer and the workmen six months must have elapsed from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation the object being that Standing Orders or the modifications should be allowed to work for some time to see if they are satisfactory
In an application for modification the issue before the authority would be not as to reasonableness or fairness of the existing Standing Orders
but whether the modification applied for is fair and reasonable
Such an application is an independent application and merely because it could be made on the ground that the existing Standing Orders are discovered to be unsatisfactory even without any change in circumstances it would not amount to a review of an earlier order
Further there will not be a multiplicity of applications because the workmen individually have the right to apply for modifications
For unless there is some justification for the modification the authorities under the Act would reject the applications
139 G H 140 C D 141 A C 142 A C G H 143 A C Bangalore Woollen Cotton  Silk Co Ltd vs The Workmen 1968 l LLJ 555 Buckingham and Carnatic Co Ltd v Workmen CA No 674 of 1968 dt
25th July 1968 and Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd vs The Workmen CA No 1631 of 1966 dt
31st July 1967 referred to
Per Bhargava J dissenting When an application under section 102 is made the certifying officer can modify Standing Orders already certified only if the request is not made on the basis of the same material which existed at the earlier stage when they were certified
155 G H Before the amendment in 1956 if the workmen had any grievance on the ground of unfairness or unreasonableness of the Standing Orders their only remedy lay under the Industrial Disputes Act
By amendment in 1956 a limited remedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring on the certifying officer the power of judging the reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders and of modifying them under section 102
Therefore after 1956 the workmen have two alternative remedies for seeking alteration in the Standing Orders proposed or certified
Under section 102 a request for modification can only be made on the basis of fresh facts or fresh circumstances arising subsequent to the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority under section 6 on the limited ground of reasonableness and fairness
The Industrial Tribunal however
can direct the alteration of a Standing Order held to be reasonable and fair without any fresh grounds material or change in circumstances if an industrial dispute in relation to it is raised and this is the only remedy available if a modification is desired without a change of circumstances
If it is held that even the certifying officer can reconsider the reasonableness or fairness of a Standing Order already certified and confirmed under section 6 the finality envisaged by the section would be nullified
After a period of six months had elapsed the certifying officer could set aside an order passed earlier by his superior or a succeeding Appellate Authority may interfere with his predecessor s order merely because the certifying officer or Appellate Authority considers the modification to be reasonable and fair even though there was no change in the circumstances
153 F G 154 A B D F 155 C F 156 A C 2 Per Shelat and VaidiaIingam JJ It is doubtful whether principles analogous to res judicata can property be applied to industrial adjudication
143 H Burn  Co vs Their Employees   Guest Keen Williams P Ltd vs Sterling  and Workmen of Balmer Lawrie  Co vs Balmer Lawrie  Co  referred to 133 Per Bhargava J This Court bas expressed conflicting views on the question of applying the principle underlying the rule of res judicata to industrial adjudication
150 E Burn  Co s case   Balmer Lawrie Co s case  and Associated Cement Staff Union vs Associated Cement Co referred to
3 Per Shelat and Vaidialingam JJ So far as modifications ii and iii are concerned in an appeal under article 136 this Court would not interfere with the conclusion of the authorities under the Act since no principle is involved
144 F As regards modification iv the authorities under the Act held that it was fair and reasonable and there is no justification for this Court to interfere with the decision
In Industrial matters at present the doctrine of hire and fire is completely abrogated because security of employment is one of the necessities for industrial peace and harmony
If reasons for discharging an employee are furnished tO him he not only has the satisfaction of knowing why his services are dispensed with but in appropriate cases he can challenge it as even when the services of an employee are terminated by an order of discharge simpliciter its legality and propriety can be challenged before an industrial tribunal
145 A E As regards modification iv the requirement of a second show cause notice is peculiar to cases coming under article 311 of the Constitution and neither the ordinary law nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice
Even in article 311 the requirement is now removed and so it is not necessary to import it into industrial matters
145 E F Per Bhargava J dissenting The order must be set aside because the four modifications were not based on any fresh facts material or change of circumstances
In fact modification i was specifically disallowed by the Appellate Authority at an earlier stage and merely because his successor considered it reasonable and fair it was permitted without any change in the circumstances
156 E F H