ition Crl No 648 of 1987 etc
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India DS Tewatia Mukul Mudgal Rakesh Khanna PK Jain RP Singh CVS Rao Prem Malhotra SK Sabharwal Mahabir Singh Mrs Urmila Kapoor and N Sudhakaran for the appearing parties
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA J
These are a batch of writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution raising the common claim of entitlement to the benefit of Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act 1926
In each of these writ petitions the petitioner has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to life imprisonment
The State of Haryana has challenged the claim of the petitioner in each of these writ petitions
Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of this Court in Hava Singh vs State of Haryana  Anr 1987 4 SCC 207 in support of the claim advanced in the writ petitions
A two Judge Bench of this Court in that case referred to Section 5 of the Act and E held On a conspectus of the aforesaid decision as well as on a consideration of the facts and circumstances the only conclusion follows that the petitioner who has already undergone actual imprisonment for seven years is entitled to be released from detention and from imprisonment
Paragraph 516 B of the Punjab Jail Manual is not applicable in this case as the petitioner who was an adolescent convict below twenty one years of age was sent to the Borstal Institute at Hissar for detention in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Punjab Borstal Act 1926
He being convicted by the Sessions Judge the maximum period of detention as prescribed by the Act is seven years
We have already said hereinbefore that such an inmate of the Borstal Institute cannot be transferred to jail on the ground that he has attained the age of twenty one years as the said Act does not provide for the same
The only provision for transfer to jail is in the case of incorrigible inmate or inmates convicted of major Borstal Institution offence
 PG NO 143 Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on another two Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs Vallabhapuram Ravi  That was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act 1925 5 of 1926 and the question for consideration was the same as here with reference to the provision of Section 8 of that Act
The two Judge Bench held that the provisions of the Borstal Schools Act applied to the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Both these cases were referred to in Subhash Chand vs State of Haryana  Ors  by a three Judge Bench
It referred to Hava Singh s case supra at length
The three Judge Bench in its judgment referred to the definition of offence  under Section 24 of the Punjab Borstal Act which defined offence  to mean an offence punishable with transportation or rigorous imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code other than a an offence punishable with death The Court found that Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code provides whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine and proceeded to say again one of the punishments for the offence of murder to death and therefore the offence of murder would be covered within Section 24ia of the Punjab Act and to such a conviction the Punjab Borstal Act would have no application
Support for such a view is available from several decisions of different High Courts
The Court ultimately held In Hava Singh s case the definition was not placed for consideration before the Court and therefore the conclusion which has been reached is not correct
The Punjab Borstal Act does not have application to an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC
This being a decision of a larger Bench we are bound by it
PG NO 144 In the Webster 6 Third New International Dictionary the follow ing meaning has been given to the word punishable  Deserving of or liable to punishment capable of being punished by law or right
Aiyar s the Law Lexicon Reprint Edition 1987 gives the meaning of punishable  thus The word punishable  as used in statutes which declare that certain offences are punishable in a certain way means liable to be punished in the way designated
 In Bouvier s Law Dictionary the meaning of the word punishable  has been given as liable to punishment 
In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition  the following meaning has been given The word punishable  in a statute stating that a crime is punishable by a designated penalty or term of years in the state prison limits the penalty or term of years to the amount or term of years stated in the statute
 The word punishable  is ordinarily defined as deserving of or capable or liable to Punishment punishable within statute providing that defendant may have ten peremptory challenges if offence charged is punishable  with death or by life imprisonment means deserving of or liable to punishment capable of being punished by law or right may be punished or liable to be punished and not must be punished Corpus Juris Secundum gives the meaning as Deserving of or liable to punishment capable of being punished by law or right said of persons of offences
The meaning of the term is not must be punished  but may be punished  or liable to be punished 
In the absence of a definition of punishable  we have referred to these for gathering the exact meaning of the word
In the sense given to the word as above there can be no doubt that the offence of murder is punishable with death even though the punishment awarded is not death but imprisonment for life
PG NO 145 An earlier decision of this Court in Kunwar Bahadur  Ors
vs State of Uttar Pradesh 1980 Supp
SCC 339 where a two Judge Bench dealt with the provisions of the United Provinces Borstal Act 7 of 1938 was also relied upon
The judgment is a short one
Detailed reference to the provisions of the United Provinces Act has not been made but Section 7 of the Act was referred to and it was observed Under this Section where a prisoner is sentenced for transportation ie life imprisonment and is below the age of 21 years he should be sent to Borstal School where he cannot be detained for more than five years The law thus contemplates that for such an offender the sentence of five years will be equivalent even to a higher sentence of life prisonment
Obviously in the United Provinces Act there is no definition of offence  as available in the Punjab Act
Therefore the decision in Kunwar Bahadur s case supra is not really material for our purpose Punishable  carries a meaning liable to be punished  as indicated by the three Judge Bench
Since the offence under Section 302 is punishable with death the provisions of the Punjab Borstal Act would not cover an offence under Section 302 of IPC and the benefit would not therefore be available to an accused convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC
During the hearing of the matters learned counsel for the petitioners had maintained that the provisions of the Punjab Act should be suitably amended to bring about uniformity in the law on the subject
This is a matter for the State and the Legislature and it is for them to consider whether the provision should be suitably amended keeping the modern concept of punishment and treatment of adolescents in view
Each of the writ petitions is dismissed
There would be no order for costs PSS Petitions dismissed 


Summary:
Execution applications were filed by the Appellant under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 for obtaining possession of the portions in the occupation of the respondents Tenants
The appellant s case was that she obtained s motion of the Additional Rent Controller on 2627th February 1976 and thereafter leased out specified portions in her property to the respondents under separate leases for a limited period of two years commencing from March 1 1976
The rear portion in the ground floor was leased out to one tenant and the first and second floor were leased out to another tenant
Each tenant was to pay a sum of Rs850 per month
The execution applications were filed by the appellant against the two respondents as they failed to vacate the portion leased out to them at the end of the two year period
The two respondents put up a common defence contending that there was a single tenancy and not two tenancies they were jointly inducted into possession of the entire leased portion in the month of December 1975 under an oral lease and the tenancy was therefore not referable to the sanction given by the Additional Rent Controller on 2627th February 1976
They placed reliance on the payment of Rs1700 on 10th December 1975 as security deposit and three months advance payment of rent of Rs5100 by means of cheque on 29th December 1975
The Rent Controller after inquiry and consideration of the accepted the case of the respondents and held that an oral having been granted in favour of the respondents even in the month of December 1975 their tenancy rights were not governed by the sanction given by the Additional Rent Controller under section 2l and that sanction of the Rent Controller was vitiated by fraud in that it was by supressing the true facts from the notice of the Rent Controller
The execution applications were accordingly dismissed
PG NO 241 PG NO 242 In the appeals preferred to the Rent Control Tribunal it was held that even if the respondents had been inducted into possession in December 1975 under an oral tenancy they must be deemed to have impliedly surrendered their earlier tenancy the sanction granted by the Rent Controller on 2h27th February 1976
It was further held that the respondents ought to have brought to the notice of the Rent Controller without delay the fraud practised by the appellant and since they have failed to act promptly they were not entitled to seek nullification of the sanction of the Rent Controller
The Tribunal allowed the appeals held the execution applications were maintainable and directed respondents to deliver possession to the appellant in a month s time
Second appeals were filed by respondents to the High Court which were allowed
It was held that as the respondents were already given tenancy rights they would not be governed by the sanction given by the Rent Controller on 2627th February 1976 that the sanction order itself was unenforceable as it was vitiated by fraud and that no question of implied surrender of the earlier tenancy would arise when the Rent Controller gave sanction for limited tenancy rights
The High Court restored the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the execution appeals
Dismissing the appeals by the landlord the Court HELD 1
What section 21 envisages is the creation of tenancy rights after getting the sanction of the Rent Controller
Such being the case the landlord should make known to the Rent Controller if there is already a tenant in occupation of the premises the factum of his possession and the terms of the tenancy and satisfy the Rent Controller that notwithstanding a tenant being in occupation of the premises under an earlier tenancy he should be granted sanction under section 21 to confer limited tenancy rights in favour of the existing tenant himself or in favour of new tenant
249D E 2
Section 21 was not intended to obtain post facto  sanction of a tenancy that had already been created by supressing relevant information from the Rent Controller so as to enable the landlord to straight away recover possession of the leased property by filing an application under section 21 after the expiry of the period for which permission to lease had been granted by the Rent Controller
249E F PG NO 243 3
Besides what the parties say the Rent Controller has to apply his mind before granting sanction under section 21 because the order passed by him has legal consequences and will govern the rights of the parties to the tenancy that is to follow in terms of the sanction
251C SB Noronah vs Prem Kumari 1980 I SCR 281 JR Vohra vs Indian Export House Pvt Ltd  at 723 Inder Mohan Lal vs Ramesh Khanna 1987 IV SCC 1 at page 9 and Joginder Kumar Butan vs RP Oberai 1987 IV SCC page 20 at 29 referred to
A statement made in contravention of facts whether made by one or both the contracting parties cannot alter the truth of the situation or cure the lacuna of withholding of relevant information
249H In the instant case it is inconceivable that irrespective of the differences in the size and nature of the two portions the respondents would have consented to pay the same rate of rent to the appellant for the portions alleged to have been leased out to them
The tenancies Granted to the two respondents are for the same period ie from March 1 1976 to 28 February
If all these factors are taken note of the only conclusion that can be reached is that only a single tenancy in favour of both the respondents should have been created for the entire leased portion and not two tenancies one for the ground floor and the other for the first and second floor
The story of two tenancies put forward by the appellant is a make believe affair
248B D In the instant case when the appellant had already put the re spondent in possession of the property in December 1975 she could not have bona fide made a statement before the Rent Controller that she would not be requiring the premises for her own occupation from 1st March 1976 onward for a period of two years
The fact that respondent 910 appeared before the Rent Controller and gave statements in tune with the statement made by the appellant cannot improve the situation in any manner
249G H 5
The sanction obtained from the Rent Controller under Section 21 was vitiated by fraud and therefore a nullity
It could therefore not be said that by reason of the respondents having agreed to take limited ten tenancy rights under the order of Rent Controller for a period of two years commencing from March 1 1976 they must be deemed to have impliedly surrendered their earlier tenancy rights as envisaged under clause f of section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act252C E PG NO 244 Doe d Earl of Egrement vs Courtenay  referred