ivil Appeal No 3504 of 1991
the Judgment and Order dated 5101990 of the Bombay High Court in WP No 210 of 1990
Dhruv Mehta SK Mehta and Aman Vachher for the Appellants
Jitender Sharma for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA J
Special leave is granted
The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limita tion
The accident took place on 2211989
The Motor Vehi cles Act 1939 was repealed by section 2171 of the which came into force on 171989
The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on 2271989
The claim petition of the appellant however was filed belatedly on 1531990 with a prayer for condonation of delay
The Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of subsection 3 of section 166 of the new  the delay of more than six months could not be condoned
The application was accordingly dismissed
The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the High Court
915 3
It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old was in force the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act and his petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act
The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident
The difference in the two Acts which is relevant in the present case is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay
In view of the proviso to sub section 3 of section 166 of the new Act the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months which expired on 2211990
If the new Act is held to be applicable the appellant s petition filed in March had to be dismissed
The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force the proceeding is governed by the old Act where there was no such restriction as in the new Act
The ques tion is as to which Act is applicable the new Act or the old
It has been contended by the learned counsel that under the old Act the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of section 6 of the 
Reliance has been placed on clauses c and e
The relevant portion of the section reads thus 6
Effect of repeal Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enact ment hitherto made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not a  b  c affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or e affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in 916 respect of any such right privilege obliga tion liability penalty forfeiture or pun ishment as aforesaid and any such investigation legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted continued or enforced and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repeating Act or Regulation had not been passed
 We are unable to agree
Clause e is not attracted because by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all
His right to claim compensa tion by filing the claim within the same period of limita tion has been preserved
And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the old Act
So far the applicability of clause c is concerned the question depends on whether the appellant had got an accrued right or privilege under the old law which he could not have been deprived of by the repealing legisla tion
Even independent of the  it is firmly established that unless a new statute expressly or by necessary implication says so it will not be presumed that it deprives a person of an accrued right
On the other hand a law which is procedural in nature and does not affect the rights has to be held to be retrospectively applicable
The question is whether the appellant has been deprived of an accrued right or privilege in the present case 7
It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired
The answer is in the negative
The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to by reason of the accident was certainly en forceable as a right
So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned it is adjectival in nature and has to be governed by the new Act subject to two conditions
If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation the same cannot be held to govern the case otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right
The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy
This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustra tion we would like to mention New India Insurance Co Ltd vs Smt
Shanti 917 Misra  The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966
A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages
In March 1967 the Claims Tribunal under section 110 of the was con stituted barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribing 60 days as the period of limitation
The re spondent filed the application in July 1967
It was held that not having filed a suit before March 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal
So far the period of limitation was concerned it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action
In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal and that the time of about four months taken by the respondent in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the provisoto section 110A3
The learned counsel strenuously contended that the present case must be considered as one where an accrued right has been affected because the option to move an application for condonation of delay belatedly filed should be treated as a right
This cannot be accepted
There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensa tion and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application
Liberty to apply for a right is not in it selt an accrued right or privilege
To illustrate the point we may refer to some cases
In Director of Public Works and Another vs Ho Po Sang and Others  a Crown lessee in respect of certain premises which were in occupation of tenants and sub tenants entered into an agreement with the appellant Director for developing the site by erecting buildings
The erection of the new buildings necessitated the demolition of the existing buildings
Under the provisions of an Ordinance a Crown lessee was entitled to recover vacant possession of the premises if he obtained a re building certificate from the Director
On the application of the Crown lessee a proceeding for grant of the certificate was started and the Director issued a notice under the Ordinance indicating his intention to grant the re building certificate
Before the certificate could be finally issued the relevant provision of the Ordinance entitling the lessee to recover vacant possession of the premises was repealed
The lessee claimed the right to vacant possession by relying on certain provi sions dealing with rules of interpretation similar in terms to section 6 of our 
The plea 918 was rejected on the ground that although the lessee was entitled to make an application for vacant possession before the Ordinance was repealed it did not amount to an accrued right or privilege capable of being preserved after the repeal of the Ordinance as the right was dependent on the actual issuance of a certificate
In an earlier case of Abbott vs Minister of Lands the appellant was entitled to make purchases of Crown land adjoining his holding by virtue of certain statutory provisions which were repealed before he could effectively enforce his right
Besides raising other grounds in respect of his claim he argued that the right which he had under the repealed enactment was a right accrued and of which he could not be deprived of by the repeal
Reject ing the plea it was observed that the mere right existing in a class of persons to take advantage of an enactment cannot in absence of any act done by the claimant towards availing himself of that right be deemed a right accrued
In Isha Valimohammad  Anr
vs Haji Gulam Mohammad  Haji Dada Trust 1975 1 SCR 720 the respondents let out the premises in question to the appellants in 1951 in a place where by the Saurashtra Rent Control Act sub letting by a tenant was prohibited
The appellants sub let the premises at a time when the Act was in force
In 1963 the Act was repealed and the Bombay Rent Act was made applica ble under which there was no such prohibition against sub letting
In a suit for eviction filed subsequently the High Court assumed that a notice under the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to terminate the tenancy which had not been done before the repeal but still held that since the respondents had an accrued right within the meaning of section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act the provisions whereof were similar to those in section 6 of the  the respondents were entitled to a decree
The decree was confirmed by the Supreme Court but not on the above ground
This Court held that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was not necessary and in that view it con firmed the decree of the High Court
With respect to the finding of the High Court regarding the respondents acquir ing an accrued right even on the assumption that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was necessary it was held that the right of a landlord to recover possession is not an accrued right before the issue of a notice if under any law it was necessary for the landlord to issue the notice to determine the tenancy
The principle laid down there supports our view
919 A question though not identical but somewhat similar Came up for consideration by this Court in Lalji Raja and Sons vs Firm Hansraj Nathuram  The appel lants had obtained a money decree against the respondents in a court in West Bengal in 1949 and got it transferred for execution to the court at Morena in the then State of Madhya Bharat
On the respondents objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the Madhya Bharat Court dismissed the execu tion petition
The matter was thereafter taken to the High Court and this Court but without any success
The decision partly rested on the ground that the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to the State of Madhya Bharat
Subsequently the Code was extended tO that area which had become a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and a fresh order was passed by the West Bengal Court transferring the decree to Morena Court
The judgment debtors challenged the jurisdiction of the court on various grounds
One of the points which was urged was that in view of section 20 clause b of the Code of Civil Procedure amendment Act 1951 by which the Code was extended to Madhya Bharat and other areas the Judgment debtors  right to resist the execution was protected
Reliance was placed on the proviso to the repeal clause in the section which declared that the repeal would not affect any fight privilege obligation or liabil ity acquired accrued or incurred under the repealed clause
The judgment debtors objection was over ruled by this Court
Relying on several English decisions including that in Abbott vs Minister for Lands  it was observed that the mere right existing at the date of the repeal of statute to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the meaning of the usual saving clause
In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act
It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 2271989 with a prayer to condone the delay
His right to claim cOmpensa tion was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another
Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise
So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned there was no change in the position under the new Act
In this background the appellant s fur ther default has to be considered
If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year the position could be different
Having actual ly initiated the proceeding when the old Act 920 covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away
The present case is different
The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay
Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit
In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condona tion of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law
Obviously the ground for condonation set up as sufficient cause  also relates to the time after the re peal
The benefit of the repealed law could not therefore be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal Sufficient cause  as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from cause of action  for the claim itself
The question of condonation of delay must therefore be governed by the new law
We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned
The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs
GN Appeal dis missed


Summary:
Respondent No 1 is a Cooperative House Building Society registered under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act 1972
It was formed in October 1959 with a view to procure land which the Central Government proposed to allot for the resettlement of displaced persons
The members of the Socie ty fail in three categories viz i employees of the Ministry of Rehabilitation New Delhi ii employees of the MiniStries in DelhiNew Delhi which were under the charge of the MinisterMinister Of State of Rehabilitation Ministry and iii employees working in the subordinate offices of the MinistryDepartment of Rehabilitation who were posted outside DelhiNew Delhi and wanted to settle in Delhi after their superannuation
It may be mentioned that the members in the third category were enrolled as members pursuant to the amended bye law 51a iii at the Society s Managing Committee s meeting held on 17111979
At the said meeting the cases of 15 other members were also regularised as the affidavits furnished by them earlier were on scrutiny found defective which they had replaced by filing fresh affida vits
The Society proceeded to make allotment of land to its members and draw of lots was held on 14121988
The draw of lots was challenged by the appellants before the Delhi High Court on the ground that they are senior to 15 persons aforementioned and others
The appellants also challenged the validity of the Notification dated 27th October 1987 insofar as it made the amended bye law 51aiii effec tive retrospectively
The High Court having dismissed the petition the appellants have filed this appeal after ob taining special leave and the question involved for deter mination in the appeal inter alia relates to the seniority of the members of the society which constitutes the basis for allot 840 ment of plots at the time of drawing of lots
DiSmissing the appeal this Court HELD The notification dated 27th October 1987 indi cates that by its earlier part the Lt Governor has exempted the society from the provision of Section 12 of the Act
This was clearly permissible on a plain reading of Section 88
By its later part the notification provides that the amended bye law 51a iiii will have retrospective effect with effect from 1011968
 The word which seems to have been omitted after as registered on 10386 and before will have retrospective effect
It is clear not only from the context of the notification but also from its Hindi version
849E F What weighed with the Lt Governor in passing the order dated 1081985 was that persons for whose benefit the bye law was sought to be amended had become members of the society many years ago that their names figured even in the list of members which was supplied by the Society to the Department of Rehabilitation and which formed the basis for allotment of land to the society and that it would be neither fair nor just to leave them in the lurch now by depriving them of their membership when they cannot become members of any other society
It was pointed out by the Lt Governor that the proposed amendment in the bye law was designed to regularise such of the members 855E F The notification dated 2981990 purports to rescind the earlier notification dated 27th October 1987 only and does not speak in clear terms that the quasi judicial order dated 1981985 was also being rescinded
On the facts and circum stances this hardly makes any difference inasmuch as even though the quasi judicial order dated 19th August 1985 has not been expressly nullified it has certainly for all practical purposes been nullified by necessary implication
This could not be done and the notification dated 29th August 1990 is ultra vires on this ground alone
857B C A quasi judicial order once passed and having become final cannot be reviewed by the authority passing that order unless power of review has been specifically conferred
856C The quasi judical order dated 19th August 1985 had been passed by the Lt Governor under Section 76 of the Act
No power to review such an order has been conferred by the Act
856D 841 Partap Singh vs State of Punjab   Kruse vs Johnson  Registrar of Cooperative Societies Trivandrum  Anr
K Kunhambu  Ors  at p 267 and State of Kerala  Ors
KG Madhhvan Pillai  Ors  referred to