Civil Appeal No 224 of 1979
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 6 12 1978 of the Delhi High Court in CW No 136178
P Parameswara Rao and R Nagarathnam for the Appellant
K Parasaran Sol
Genl V Gauri Shanker KL Hathi and Mrs Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI J
This appeal by special leave is directed against a Division Bench judgment dated December 6 1978 of the High Court of Delhi and arises under the following circumstances
The appellant was inducted as a tenant by one Mithanlal who was the owner of the premises in question and the rent payable at the time of the tenancy was Rs 55 per month
The premises were however purchased by the Life Insurance Corporation of India for short LIC at a court auction on July 19 1958 and the appellant in view of the same attorned to the new landlord namely the LIC
The Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act  came into force on February 9 1959 and on July 24 1969 the new landlord gave a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the appellant determining the tenancy
This notice however was subsequently withdrawn and after some correspondence with the appellant the rent was increased by the LIC from Rs 55 to Rs 125 per month
Sometime towards the end of July 1966 the LIC gave a fresh notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to determine the tenancy
Thereafter there were some parleys between the LIC and the appellant and ultimately the LIC agreed to accept the enhanced rent of Rs 300 per month from the appellant with effect from December 1 1976
On April 23 1977 the LIC gave another notice under section 106 superseding the previous notice and directing the appellant to vacate the premises on or before May 31 1977
As the appellant did not vacate the premises the LIC filed a complaint with respondent No 2 the Estate Officer LIC under the provisions of the hereinafter referred to as the Premises Act 
Thereafter the second respondent issued a notice to the appellant under section 41 of the Premises Act to show cause why the appellant be not evicted
The appellant appeared before the Estate Officer and raised certain preliminary objections which having been decided against him the appellant filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court against the order of the Estate Officer and reiterated the preliminary objections taken by him before 501 the Estate Officer
After considering the preliminary objections which mainly related to the question of jurisdiction of the Estate officer to proceed under the Premises Act the High Court overruled all the objections and dismissed the writ petition in limine though by a reasoned order
Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court
Before dealing with the contention raised by counsel for the respondent we might mention that the proceedings before the Estate officer under the Premises Act have only been stayed and not yet decided on merits because the appellant wanted the Estate officer to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue
In support of the appeal Mr Parmeshwar Rao submitted three main contentions before us
In the first place he submitted that the provisions of the Premises Act would have no application to the present premises because the appellant could not be described as an unauthorised occupant as he had entered into possession of the premises long before they were purchased by the LIC
It was argued that the condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction by the Estate officer was that the appellant must be an unauthorised occupant and if the possession of the appellant was lawful though the property changed hands subsequently the appellant could not be dubbed as an unauthorised occupant
In this connection reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Rajkumar Devindera Singh  Anr
vs State of Punjab  Ors We have gone through the decision cited before us and we find that the provisions of the Punjab Act which was the subject matter of interpretation by this Court in that case were substantially and materially different from section 22g of the Premises Act which defines unauthorised occupation
Mr Rao however strongly relied on the following observations made by this Court in the case supra If the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the Government it could not be said that the appellants entered into possession of public premises for at the time when they were in occupation of the property the property was not public premises
Then it was either the joint family property or the property of the Maharaja namely Yadavindra Singh
The property was not public premises before it was sold to the Government
 If these observations of this Court are torn from the context they may presumably support the argument of the appellant but we have to read these observations in the light of the specific provisions of the Punjab Public Premises and Land Eviction and Rent Recovery Act 502 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Punjab Act 
Relevant portion of section 3 of that Act may be extracted thus For purposes of this Act a person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of any public premises a where he has whether before or after the commencement of this Act entered into possession thereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment lease or grant Emphasis Ours It would be seen that before a person could be said to be in an unauthorised occupation the Act required the following conditions 1 that the occupant had entered into possession before or after the commencement of the Act
2 that he had entered into such possession otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment lease or grant
That Act therefore lays special stress on only one point namely the entry into possession
Thus if the entry into possession had taken place prior to the passing of the Act then obviously the occupant concerned would not be an unauthorised occupant
What made the occupancy unauthorised was his entry into possession at a particular point of time
It was in construing these provisions that this Court held that if the appellants in that case were in possession before the sale of the property to the Government their entry into possession could not be said to be unauthorised
These observations however would have absolutely no application to the instant case where section 22g defines unauthorised occupation thus unauthorised occupation  in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever To begin with it is manifest that section 22g does not use the word possession  or the words entry into possession  at any point of time at all
The section merely requires occupation of any public premises
Entry into possession connotes one single terminus viz the point of time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from the point of time when the person enters into possession or occupies the premises and continues until he leaves the premises
What is germane for the purpose of interpretation of section 22g is whether or not the person concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the 503 Premises Act was passed
In the instant case it is not disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property even after the Premises Act came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as his landlord
In these circumstances therefore the case of the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of the definition of unauthorised occupation  as contemplated by section 22g
There is yet another aspect of the matter which distinguishes the present case from the language employed in the Punjab Act
Section 22g is an inclusive definition and consists of two separate limbs 1 where a person is in occupation in relation to any public premises without authority for such occupation and 2 even if the possession or occupation of the tenant continues after the lease is determined
In the instant case the lease was doubtless determined by the landlord by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act whose validity for purposes of deciding the question of law has not been questioned by the learned counsel for the appellant
Therefore there can be no doubt that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was determined
The second limb mentioned in section 22g is conspicuously absent from the provisions of the Punjab Act
For these reasons we overrule the first contention raised by the counsel for the appellant and we hold agreeing with the High Court that the appellant was undoubtedly in unauthorised occupation of the premises
The second contention put forward by Mr Rao was that in view of the provisions of the Rent Act which override the provisions of the Premises Act section 14 of the Rent Act completely bars recovery of possession of any premises except in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Rent Act
It was contended by Mr Rao that although the Premises Act was passed in 1971 it has been given retrospective effect from 16th September 1958 and therefore should be construed as a law having been passed in 1958 and as the Rent Act was passed in 1959 it overrides the Premises Act
We are however unable to agree with this argument
In the first place the Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came into force on the 23rd of August 1971 that is to say long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959
The mere fact that by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was actually passed that is to say August 23 1971
In these circumstances therefore the Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act
It was further contended by Mr Rao that the Rent Act being a special law as compared to the Premises Act it will override the Premises Act without going into the question as to which of the two Acts were prior in point of time
In support of his contention the 504 counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh  Anr
vs Kasturi Lal where this Court observed as follows When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation arise
Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration emphasis supplied It is true that in both the Acts there is a non obstante clause but the question to be determined is whether the non obstante clauses operate in the same field or have two different spheres though there may be some amount of overlapping
The observations cited above clearly lay down that in such cases the conflict should be resolved by reference to the object and purpose of the laws in consideration
In Shri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking  Industrial Co Ltd2 this Court made the following observations It is therefore desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts in a given case on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein
 In the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases we would test the position in the present case
So far as the Premises Act is concerned it operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals a particular set of juristic persons like companies corporations or the Central Government
Thus the Premises Act has a very limited application
Secondly the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves
That the authorities to which the Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the counsel for the appellant as even in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt Ltd  Anr
vs State of Punjab  Anr
such authorities were held to form a class and therefore immune from challenge on article 14 of the Constitution
Similarly the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Art 14 as held by this Court in 505 Maganlal Chhagganlal P Ltd vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  Ors1
Thus it would appear that both the scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act
The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in section 2 of the Premises Act
The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies
It would be seen that even under the Rent Act by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under section 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity
Thus section 25B itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act
On a parity of reasoning therefore there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act which has a very broad spectrum is a Special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act
It was also suggested by Mr Rao that in view of section 3a of the Rent Act which is extracted below it would appear that the intention of the legislature in passing the Rent Act was merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the Government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies or Corporations then section 3a should have been differently worded 3
Nothing in this Act shall apply a to any premises belonging to the Government
 This in our opinion does not advance the case of the appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes a special Act dealing with premises belonging to Central Government Corporations and other statutory Bodies the Rent Act stands superseded
We have to consider the provisions of the two Acts they having been passed by the same legislature viz Parliament and the rule of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases
For these reasons we overrule the second preliminary objection taken by the appellant
Lastly it was argued that apart from the Rent Act section 19 of the hereinafter referred to as the Slums Act  which also would have to be construed as a Special Act applying only to such places which are declared to be slums under the Act would override the provisions of both the 506 Rent Act and the Premises Act
This argument appears to us to be without substance
The Slums Act was passed as far back as 1956 and the Premises Act was subsequent to the Slums Act and would therefore prevail over the Slums Act
Relevant portion of section 19 of the Slums Act may be extracted thus 19
1 Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority a institute after the commencement of the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Amendment Act 1964 any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area A perusal of section 19 of the Slums Act clearly shows that it is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the forum for evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in section 2 of the Premises Act
The Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act as amended in 1964 and again being a special Act having a very limited sphere must necessarily override the Slums Act on the same lines of reasoning as we have indicated in the case of the Rent Act
For these reasons therefore the last contention put forward by the counsel for the appellant is also overruled
The High Court had also overruled all these preliminary objections more or less on the same reasons as given by us though not in such details
It is however not necessary for us to remand the matter to the trial court for decision of the case on merits because the Solicitor General having agreed to give two years  time to the appellant to vacate the premises on filing the usual undertaking the appellant does not want to contest the proceedings before the Estate officer LIC and has undertaken to give vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent on August 1 1982
Meanwhile the appellant shall keep on paying the usual rent
The appellant shall also file an undertaking accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that it shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent on or before August 1 1982 and shall not induct any tenant on the premises
The undertaking shall be filed within three weeks from today
The subject matter of the appeal is accordingly disposed of finally
NVK Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The LIC respondent No 1 purchased a building at a court auction
The appellant was inducted as a tenant by the prior owner of the premises
The Ll
C gave notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act directing the appellant to vacate the premises
As the appellant did not vacate the premises the LIC filed a complaint with the Estate Officer LIC respondent No 2 under the provisions of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised occupants Act 1971 who issued a notice to the appellant under section 41 of the Act to show cause why the appellant be not evicted
Before the Estate Officer the appellant raised preliminary objections which related to th equestion of jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to proceed under the Premises Act
The Estate Officer decided the question against him and the High Court confirmed the order
In appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended 1 The appellant could not be described as an unauthorised occupant  within the meaning of section 22g of the 1971 Act because he had entered into possession of the premises long before they were purchased by the LIC 2i
The Premises Act of 1971 which had been given retrospective effect from the 16th September 1958 should be construed as a law having been passed in 1958 and so construed the Rent Act The Delhi Rent Control Act passed in 1959 over rides the Premises Act ii The Rent Act which is a special law would override the Premises Act and iii The intention of the Legislature in passing the Rent Act as seen from section 3a was merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the Government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate bodies or Corporations then section 3a would have been differently worded
Apart from the Rent Act section Section 19 of the which is also a Special Act applying only to such places which are declared to be slums under the Act would override the provisions of both the Rent Act and the Premises Act
499 Dismissing the Appeal  HELD 1a The appellant was undoubtedly in unauthorised occupation of the premises
503 D b Section 22g does not use the word possession  or the words entry into possession  at any point of time at all
The section merely requires occupation of any public premises
Entry into possession connotes one single terminus viz the point of time when a person enters into possession or occupies the property whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from the point of time when the person enters into possession or occupies the premises and continues until he leaves the premises
502 G H In the instant case the lease was determined by the landlord by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
Therefore there can be no doubt that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation of the premises once the lease was determined
503 Cl Raj Kumar Devendra Singh  Anr
vs State of Punjab and Ors  distinguished
2i The Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came into force on 23rd August 1971 that is long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959
The mere fact that by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises Act was actually passed that is August 23 1971
The Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act
503 G ii The scope and the object of the Premises Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act
The Rent Act is of much wider application inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in section 2 of the Premises Act
The object of the Rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies
Even under the Rent Act a special category has been carved out by section 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises for their personal necessity
Section 25B therefore becomes a special law within the Rent Act
Therefore the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act is a Special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act
505 B C Sarwan Singh  Anr
vs Kasturi Lal   Shri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking  Industrial Co Ltd  referred to
iii once the Premises Act becomes a Special Act dealing with the premises belonging to the Central Government Corporations and other statutory bodies the Rent Act stands superseded
505 F 3
Section 19 of the Slums Act shows that it is in direct conflict with the Premises Act which expressly provides for the forum for evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of premises which fell in section 2 of the Premises Act The Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act as amended in 1964 and again being a special Act having a very limited sphere must necessarily override the Slums Act
506 D