CIVIL APPEALS Nos 118 to 121 of 1952
Appeals under article 133 1 c of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th August 1950 of the High Court of Judicature Punjab at Simla Khosla and Kapur JJ in Civil Miscellaneous Nos 256 260 261 and 262 of 1950
Dr Balkshi Tek Chand T N Sethi with him for the appellants
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India Porus A Mehta with him for the respondents
January 22
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEA J
These four consolidated appeals which have come before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab under article 133 1cof the Constitution are directed against one common judgment of a Division Bench of that court dated the 10th August 1950 by which the learned Judges dismissed four analogous petitions presented on behalf of the different appellants claiming reliefs under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of certain income tax investigation proceedings commenced against them under Act XXX of 1947
It appears that a partnership firm carrying on business under the name and style of KS Rashid  Son was started on the 5th of May 1934 the partners being three in number to wit KS Rashid Ahmed Saeed Ahmed his son and Mrs Zafar Muhammed his mother Mrs Zafar Muhammed died on the 7th of January 1946 and as a result of her death the partnership stood dissolved
Immediately on the day following 740 that is to say on the 8th of January 1946 a new firm was started bearing the same name with the two surviving partners of the original firm and one Saeeda Begum a daughter of KS Rashid as the third partner
On the 31st of December 71947 the Central Government referred the cases of this firm as well as of the individuals constituting it to the Income taxInvestigation Commission for enquiry and report under section 5of Act XXX of 1947 presumably on the ground that there had been substantial evasion of payment of income tax in these cases
The authorised official appointed under section 5 43 of the Act who figures as respondent No 2 in all these appeals in due course started investigation in these cases and the appellants  complaint is that contrary to the provisions of the Act he extended his investigations to a period subsequent to the 31st March 1943 up to which date the income tax assessment in all these cases was completed
A petition embodying this complaint was made to the authorised official on the 8th of April 1949 but no order was passed on the petition as the Commission was expecting an early change of law in this respect
The law was amended by an Ordinance dated the 5th of July 1949 but the appellants still contended that the amendment was neither retrospective in its operation nor did it enable the authorised official to carry on his investigation beyond the 31st March 1943
The account books however were shown to the official under protest
On the 17th September 1949 three applications were filed before the Commission one with regard to the affairs of Mrs Zafar Muhammed stating that no investigation could take place in regard to her as she was already deadthe second with regard to the affairs of Saeeda Begum on the ground that she being a new partner and not having been assessed before was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission while the third application was to the effect that the new firm which came into existence on the 8th of January 1946 could not have its affairs enquired into at all under the provisions of the Act
After that in June 1950 four miscellaneous petitions were filed being CM Gases Nos
259 to 262 741 of 1950 on behalf of the appellants before the High Court of Punjab and the prayers made therein were of a three fold character
It was prayed in the first place that a writ of prohibition might be issued to the Commission and the authorised official directing them not to proceed with the investigation of cases referred to the Commission under section 5 of Act XXX of 1947
The second prayer was for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the proceedings already commenced
The third and the alternative claim was that the proceedings before the Commission might be revised under article 277 of the Constitution and suitable orders passed as the justice of the case would require
Upon these petitions rules were issued on the 25th of July 1950 after a report from the Investigation Commission had been called for
On behalf of the respondents who resisted these petitions certain preliminary points were raised in bar of the petitioners claim
It was contended in the first place that the petitioners being assessees belonging to UP their assessments were to be made by the Income tax Commissioner of that State and the mere fact that the location of the Investigation Commission was in Delhi would not confer jurisdiction upon the Punjab High Court to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution
The second objection was that the Act itself being of a special nature which created new rights and liabilities the remedies provided for in the Act itself for any breach or violation thereof were the only remedies which could be pursued by the aggrieved parties and article 226 or 227 of the Constitution would not be available to the petitioners
The third ground taken was that the court could not give relief to the petitioners because of sections 53 and 9 of Act XXX of 1947
These contentions found favour with the learned Judges who heard the petitions and although they did not express any final opinion on the third point raised they dismissed the applications of the petitioners on the first two grounds mentioned above
It is against these orders of dismissal that the present appeals have been taken to this court and Dr Tek Chand who appeared on behalf of the appellants has assailed the 742 propriety of the decision of the High Court both the points
So far as the first point is concerned which relates to the question of jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court to issue writs of certiorari or prohibition in these cases the learned Judges based their decision entirely upon the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in the well known case of Ryots of Garabandho vs  Zamindar of Parlakitnedi1
The question for consideration in that case was whether the High Court of Madras had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in respect of an order passed by the Collective Board of Revenue as an appellate authority in certain proceedings for settlement of rent between the Zamindar of Parlakimedi and the Ryots of certain villages within his estate situated in the district of Ganjam which was wholly outside the limits of the Presidency town of Madras
The question was answered in the negative
The Judicial Committee laid down that the three Chartered High Courts of Calcutta Madras and Bombay had powers to issue what were known as the high prerogative writs as successors to the Supreme Courts which previously exercised jurisdiction over these Presidency Towns but the exercise of the powers under the Charter was limited to persons within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the three High Courts and outside that jurisdiction it extended only to British subjects  as defined in the Charter itself
It was held that the Supreme Court of Madras had no jurisdiction under the Charter which created it to correct or control a country court of the the East India Company deciding a dispute between Indian inhabitants of the Ganjam district about the rent payable for land in that district and no such power was given by any subsequent legislation to its successor the High Court 
A contention seems to have been raised on behalf of the appellants that the jurisdiction to issue writs could be rounded on the fact that the office of the Board of Revenue which was the appellate authority in the matter of settlement of rents was located within the town of Madras 1 70 IA 129
743 and the order complained of was made in that town and reliance was placed in this connection upon the case of Nundo Lal Bose vs The Calcutta Corporation 1 where a certiorari was issued by the Calcutta High Court to quash an assessment made by the Commissioners of the town of Calcutta on a certain dwelling house
This contention was repelled by the Judicial Committee with the following observations The question is whether the principle of that case can be applied in the present case to the settlement of rent for land in Ganjam merely on the basis of the location of the Board of Revenue as a body which is ordinarily resident or located within the town of Madras or on the basis that the order complained of was made within the town
If so it would seem to follow that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be avoided by the removal of the Board of Revenue beyond the outskirts of the town and that it would never attach but for the circumstance that an appeal is brought to or proceedings in revision taken by the Board of Revenue
Their Lordships think that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance and that it would not have been within the competence of the Supreme Court to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the present by issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the strength of its location in the town
Such a view would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in the matter of the settlement of rents for ryoti holdings in Ganjam between parties not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction which it would not have had over the Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first instance
 It is on the basis of these observations of the Judicial Committee that the learned Judges have held that the mere location of the Investigation Commission in Delhi is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Punjab High Court to issue a writ in the present case
It is said that the petitioners are assessees within the U P State and their original assessments were made by the Income tax Officers of that State
1ILR II Cal
275 744 The subsequent proceedings which had to be taken in pursuance of the report of the Investigation Commission would have to be taken by the Income tax authorities in the UP and if a case had to be stated it would be stated to the High Court at Allahabad
Taking therefore as the Privy Council had said that the question of jurisdiction is one of substance it was held that no jurisdiction in the present case could be vested in the Punjab High Court for that jurisdiction could be avoided simply by removal of the Commission from Delhi to another place
This line of reasoning does not appear to us to be proper and we do not think that the decision in the Parlakimedi s case1 is really of assistance in determining the question of jurisdiction of the High Courts in the matter of issuing writs under article 226 of the Constitution
The whole law on this subject has been discussed and elucidated by this court in its recent pronouncement in Election Commission vs Venkata Rao2  where the observations of the Judicial Committee in Parlakimedi s case upon which reliance has been placed by the Punjab High Court have been fully explained
It is to be noted first of all that prior to the commencement of the Constitution the powers of issuing prerogative writs could be exercised in India only by the High Courts of Calcutta Madras and Bombay and that also within very rigid and defined limits
The writs could be issued only to the extent that the power in that respect was not taken away by the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure3 and they could be directed only to persons and authorities within the original civil jurisdiction of these High Courts
The Constitution introduced a fundamental change of law in this respect
As has been explained by this Court in the case referred to above while article 225 of the Constitution preserves to the existing High Courts the powers and jurisdictions which they had previously article 226 confers on all the High Courts new and very wide powers 1 70 IA 139
1  3 Vide in this connection Besant vs Tire Advocate General of Madras
46 IA 176
745 in the matter of issuing writs which they never possessed before
The makers of the Constitution thus observed Patanjali Sastri CJ in delivering the judgment of the court having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up which they called fundamental rights evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and finding that the prerogative writs which the courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition were peculiarly suited for the purpose they conferred in the State s sphere new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions orders or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights the power to issue such directions etc for any other purpose  being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of King s Bench in England
 There are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under article 226 of the Constitution one is that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction that is to say the writs issued  by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction
The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High COurt is empowered to issue writs must be within those territories and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories
It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is to be determined
The observations of the Judicial Committee in Parlakimedi s case1 have strictly speaking no direct bearing on the point
It is true as the Privy Council said in that case that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance but the meaning and implication of this observation could be ascertained only with reference to the context of 1 701
A 129
11 95 SC 159 746 the facts and circumstances of that case
As was pointed out by this court in the case referred to above1 Their Lordships considered in the peculiar situation they were dealing with that the mere location of the appellate authority alone in the town of Madras was not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction whereas both the subject matter viz the settlement of rent for lands in Ganjam and the Revenue Officer authorised to make the settlement at first instance were outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court
If the Court in Madras were recognised as having jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari to the appellate authority in Madras it would practically be recognising the court s jurisdiction over the Revenue Officer in Ganjam and the settlement of rents for lands there which their Lordships held it never had
That was the substance  of the matter they were looking at
 In our opinion therefore the first contention raised by Dr Tek Chand must be accepted as sound and the view taken by the Punjab High Court on the question of jurisdiction cannot be sustained
So far as the second point is concerned the High Court relies upon the ordinary rule of construction that where the legislature has passed a new statute giving a new remedy that remedy is the only one which could be pursued
It is said that the Taxation on Income Investigation Commission Act 1947 itself provides a remedy against any wrong or  illegal order of the Investigating Commission and under section 8 5 of the Act the aggrieved party can apply to the appropriate Commissioner of Income tax to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order and thereupon the provisions of sections 66 and and 66 A of the Indian Income tax Act shall apply with this modification that the reference shall be heard by a Bench of not less than three Judges of the High Court
We think that it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion in this case as to whether section 8 5 of the Act is to be regarded as providing the only remedy available to the aggrieved party and that it excludes altogether the remedy provided for 1 AIR z953 SC 310 214  747 under article 226 of the Constitution
For purposes of this case it is enough to state that the remedy provided for in article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere
So far as the present case is concerned it has been brought to our notice that the appellants before us have already availed themselves of the remedy provided for in section 85 of the Investigation Commission Act and that a reference has been made to the High Court of Allahabad in terms of that provision which is awaiting decision
In these circumstances we think that it would not be proper to allow the appellants to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution at the present stage and on this ground alone we would refuse to interfere with the orders made by the High Court
Dr Tek Chand argues that the Income tax authorities have not referred all the matters to the High Court which the appellants wanted them to do
But for this there is a remedy provided in the Act itself and in case a proceeding occasions a gross miscarriage of justice there is always the jurisdiction in this court to interfere by way of special leave
In the result we dismiss the appeals but in the circumstances of the case make no order as to costs  Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The Punjab High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ under article 226 of the Constitution to the Income tax Investigation Commission located in Delhi and investigating the case of the petitioner under 5 of the Taxation on Income Investigation Commission Act 1947 although the petitioners were assessees within the UP State and their original assessments were made by the Income tax authorities of that State
Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts new and very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs which they never possessed before
There are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of such powers by a High Court one is that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction that is to say the writs issued by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction
The other is that the person or authority to whom 739 the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be within those territories and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories
The remedy provided in article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary one and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere
Ryots of Garabandho vs Zamindar of Parlakimedi 70 IA 129 and Election Commission v Saka Venkata Subba Rao  referred to