Civil Appeal Nos
1837 1841 of 1977
From the Judgment and Order dated 28101976 of the Karnataka High Court in Misc
First Appeal Nos 557 to 561 of 1975
Dr Anand Prakash Ms Kitty Kumaramangalam and CV Subba Rao for the Appellant
309 GB Pai Dr Shankar Ghosh DN Mishra and Ms Mridula Ray for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court rejecting the claim of the appellant Corporation for covering the factories the respondents under the provisions of the the Act
Section 14 excluses seasonal factory from the scope of the Act
The seasonal factory is defined under Section 212 of the Act which is extracted hereunder Seasonal factory means a factory which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the following manufacturing processes namely cotton ginning cotton or jute pressing
decortication of groundnuts the manufacture of coffee indigo lac rubber sugar includ ing gur or tea or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the aforesaid processes
 The factories of the respondents were excluded from the operation of the Act since they were declared to be the seasonal factories within the meaning of the above stated definition
There is no dispute on this aspect
By Amending Act 44 of 1966 which came into force with effect from 28th January 1968 the definition of seasonal factory has been amended
The definition as amended reads Seasonal factory means a factory which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the following manufacturing processes namely cotton ginning cotton or jute pressing
decortication of groundnuts
the manufacture of coffee indigo lac rubber sugar includ ing gur or tea or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the aforesaid processes and includes a factory which is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year a in any process of blending packing or re packing of tea or coffee or 310 b in such other manufacturing process as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify The expressions manufacturing process and power shall have the meaning respective ly assigned to them in the 
After the said amendment the Employees  State Insur ance Corporation called upon the respondents to pay the contributions payable under the Act and threatened to take coercive steps to recover the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act and prosecute them
Challenging the validity of the demand made the respondents approached the Employees  Insurance Court inter alia contending that the amendment to the definition of the expression seasonal factory brought out by the Amending Act 44 of 1966 has not altered the position of the seasonal factory as obtained prior to the amendment and Section 14 of the Act would still continue to exclude such factory from the operation of the Act
The Employees  Insurance Court accepted the respondent s plea
The Karnataka High Court has also agreed with the view taken by the Employees  Insurance Court
The Corporation has now appealed to this Court
The sole question for consideration is whether the respondents  factories in view of the amendment to the definition of seasonal factory  have lost the benefit of exclusion from the Act
The High Court on this aspect has observed that the purpose of the amendment was to enlarge and not to restrict the statutory concept of seasonal factory  and the position of respondents establishments as seasonal factories under and for the purpose of the Act remained unaltered even after the amendment
The view taken by the High Court seems to be justified
The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which later became the Act 44 of 1966 indicates that the proposed amend ment was to bring within the scope of the definition of seasonal factory  a factory which works for a period of not exceeding seven months in a year a in any process of blending packing or repacking of tea or coffee or b in such other manufacturing process as the Cenrtral Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify
The amendment therefore was clearly in favour of the widening the definition of seasonal factory 
The amendment is in the nature of expansion of the original definition as it is clear from the use of the words include a factory 
311 The amendment does not restrict the original definition of seasonal factory but makes addition thereto by inclusion
The word include in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension and not with restriction The word include  is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occur ring in the body of the statute and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpreta tion clause declares that they shall include
See i Stroud s Judicial Dictionary 5th ed
3 p 1263 and ii CIT Andhra Pradesh vs Ms Taj Mahal Hotel Secun derabad  iii State of Bombay vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha  Ors  at 875
In view of these well accepted statutory construction the decision of the High Court does not call for interfer ence
In the result the appeals and the special leave petition fail and are dismissed with costs
SB Appeals and petition dismissed


Summary:
The Petitioners foreign nationals engaged in Christian missionary work have been staying in India continuously for a long time since pre independence period
They continued to stay on the basis of resi 149 150 dential permits renewed from time to time
In 1985 an order was passed asking them to leave the country and they made representations to the authorities followed by further representations in 1986 for naturalisation further extension of stay
However by order dated 871987 their request was rejected and they were asked to leave the country by 31st July 1987
The petitioners challenged the said order in the writ petitions filed before this Court
It was contended by the petitioners that since they were staying in this country for a period of more than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Consti tution they should be held to have duly acquired Indian citizenship on the basis of Article 5e of the Constitution of India that their continuous stay in India has estab lished their case of domicile in India which cannot be rejected merely because were holding foreign passports that proceedings against them have been initiated under section 9 of the enabling them to defend their case that they were denied hearing and that in no event the Superintendent of Police who had signed the deportation order was authorised to do so
Dismissing the Writ Petitions this Court HELD 1
Every person must have a personal law and accord ingly every one must have a domicile
He receives at birth a domicile of origin which remains his domicile wherever he goes unless and until he acquires a new domicile
The new domicile acquired subsequently is generally called a domicile of choice
The domicile of origin is received by operation of law at birth and for acquisition of a domicile of choice one of the necessary conditions is the intention to remain there permanently
The domicile of origin is retained and cannot be divested until the acquisition of the domicile of choice
By merely leaving his country even permanently one will not in the eye of law lose his domicile until he acquires a new one
This proposition that the domicile of origin is retained until the acquisition of a domicile of choice is well established and does not admit of any exception
156D F Central Bank of India vs Ram Narain   relied on
Halsbury s Laws of England 4th Edn Vol 8 para 421 referred to
One of the necessary conditions mentioned in Article 5 of the 151 Constitution is that the person concerned must be having his domicile in the territory of India at the commencement of the Constitution
It is not established that they had such an intention for the sole reason that the Petitioners have been staying in India for more than a decade before the commencement of the Constitution and it cannot be deemed that they acquired domicile in India and consequently Indian citizenship
154E 31
For the acquisition of a domicile of choice it must be shown that the person concerned had a certain State of mind the animus manendi
If he claims that he acquired a new domicile at a particular time he must prove that he had formed the intention of making his permanent home in the country of residence and of continuing to reside there permanently
Residence alone unaccompanied by this state of mind is insufficient
156H 157A 32
The burden to prove that the petitioners had an intention to stay permanently in India lies on them
The available materials on the record leave no room for doubt that the petitioners did not have such intention
At best it can be said that they were uncertain about their permanent home
During the relevant period very significant and vital political and social changes were taking place in this country and those who were able to make up their mind to adopt this country as their own took appropriate legal steps
The petitioners preferred to stay on on the basis of their passports issued by other countries and obtained from time to time permission of the Indian authorities for their further stay for specific periods
None of the applications filed by the petitioners in this connection even remotely suggested that they had formed an intention of permanently residing here
157B D Mohd Ayub Khan vs Commissioner of Police Madras and Kedar Pandey vs Narain Bikram Sah   distinguished
Union of India vs Ghaus Mohammed   referred to
The fundamental right of the foreigner is confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does not include the right to reside and settle in this country as mentioned in Article 191e which is applicable only to the citizens of this country
The power of the Government in India to expel foreigners is absolute and unlimited and there is no provision in the Constitution fettering this discretion
The legal position on this aspect is not uniform in all the countries but so far the law which 152 operates in India is concerned the Executive Government has unrestricted right to expel a foreigner
158C E Hans Muller of Nurenburg vs Superintendent Presidency Jail Calcutta  Ors   relied on
So far the right to be heard is concerned there cannot be any hard and fast rule about the manner in which a person concerned has to be given an opportunity to place his case and it is not claimed that if the authority concerned had served a notice before passing the impugned order the petitioners could have produced some relevant material in support of their claim of acquisition of citizenship which they failed to do in the absence of a notice
158E F 6
The contention that the Superintendent of Police was not authorised to direct deportation of the petitioners is devoid of merit
Actually the order was not passed by the Superintendent of Police
It was the decision of the Central Government which was being executed by the Superintendent of Police
This is clear from the order
158G