Civil Appeals Nos 14 and 15 of 1955
Appeals by special leave from the decision dated September 30 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Lucknow in Civil Appeals Nos
111 198 of 1953 and III 321 of 1953
section section Dhawan G C Mathur and C P Lal for the appellants and respondent No 2 Unions in both the Appeals
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India and section P Varma for the respondent No I in C A No 14 of 1955
N C Chatterjee and Radhey Lal Aggarwala for the respondent No 1 in C A 15 of 55
November 20
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J
These two appeals by special leave have been heard together as they arise out of a single judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Lucknow dated September 30 1953 passed in seven appeals before it
As the question for consideration in the appeals before this Court is the same this judgment will govern both the appeals before us
Civil Appeal Nos
14 and 15 of 1955 arise out of Appeal Nos 111 198 of 1953 and 111 321 of 1953 respectively before the Labour Appellate Tribunal
The question for consideration before the Labour Appellate Tribunal was whether the awards from which the seven appeals had been filed before that Tribunal were valid in law and made with jurisdiction
It is this very question which arises in the appeals before us
Before dealing with the question raised in these appeals it is necessary to state certain facts
On March 15 1951 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh made a General Order consisting of numerous clauses under 974 powers conferred on him by cls
b c d and g of section 3 and section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Act XXVIII of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act in supersession of the general Order No 781 LXVIII dated March 10 1948
The Order of March 15 1951 was numbered 615 LL XVIII 7 LL of 1951 hereinafter referred to as Order No 615
Under cl 16 of Order No 615 the decision of the Tribunal or Adjudicator was to be pronounced within 40 days excluding holidays but not annual vacations observed by courts subordinate to the High Court from the date of reference made to it by the State Government concerning any industrial dispute
The proviso to it authorised the State Government to extend the period for the submission of the award from time to time
On February 18 1953 this clause was amended and the time of 40 days was altered to 180 days
On December 17 1952 the judgment of this Court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co Ltd vs Gutta Mill Workers  Union 1 was pronounced
In consequence of this decision the Act was amended by the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Amendment Ordinance 1953 Ordinance No 1 of 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh
The Ordinance came into force on May 22 1953
By the provisions of section 2 of the Ordinance section 6 A was introduced into the Act
Section 2 of the Ordinance states After section 6 of the U P hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act the following shall and be deemed always to have been added as section 6 A 6 A Enlargement of time for submission of awards
Where any period is specified in any order made under or in pursuance of this Act referring any industrial dispute for adjudication within which the award shall be made declared or submitted it shall be competent for the State Government from time to time to enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or enlarged may have expired 11953 section C R 439
975 Section 3 of the Ordinance states  Removal of doubts and validation For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that  1any order of enlargement referred to in section 6A made prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under the Principal Act or any order passed thereunder which would have been validly and properly made under the Principal Act if section 6 A had been part of the Act shall be deemed to be and to have been validly and properly made thereunder 2no award whether delivered before or after the commencement of this Ordinance in any industrial dispute referred prior to the said commencement for adjudication under the Principal Act shall be invalid oil the ground merely that the period originally specified or any enlargement thereof had already expired at the date of the mkaing declaring or submitting of the award and any action or proceeding taken direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon such award be good and valid in law as if section 6 A had been in force at all material dates 3every proceeding pending at the commencement of this Ordinance before any court or tribunal against an award shall be decided as if the provisions of section 6 A bad been in force at all material dates
 The following chart will show the date of reference the date on which the period of 40 days expired the dates and the periods of enlargement the date of submission of the award and the date of filing of the appeal in the seven appeals before the Labour Appollate Tribunal 124 976 Date on which 40 Appeal No Date of days available for Date  Period reference the initial sub of enlargement mission of the if any award expired   111 18653 13 2 1953 3 4 1953 Nil 6 4 1953 5 5 1953 111 18753 28 1 1953 18 3 1953 Nil 13 4 1953 5 5 1953 111 32153 28 1 1953 18 3 1953 Nil 26 6 1953 18 7 1953 111 18353 28 1 1953 18 3 1953 Nil 13 4 1953 4 5 1953 111 32353 9 2 1953 29 3 1953 Nil 22 6 1953 20 7 1953 111 20953 15 1 1953 5 3 1953 13 3 1953 9 4 1953 8 5 1953 up to 31 3 1953 17 4 1953 111 19853 19 8 1952 10 10 1953 i 4 11 1952 13 5 1953 up to 11 11 1952 ii 26 12 1952 up to 31 12 1952 iii 13 1 1953 up to 31 1 1953 iv 11 2 1953 up to 10 3 1953  Date of submission of the award
 Date of filing of the appeal
125 977 The Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the award in appeal No 111 198 of 1953 was made not only on the expiry of the period of enlargement but also long after the expiry of 180 days from the date of reference
In the case of the other appeals the awards were made on the expiry of 40 days but within 180 days of the reference
Appeals Nos 111 321 and 323 of 1953 were filed after the commencement of the Ordinance and the others before its commencement
In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co Ltd Civil Appeal No 14 of 1955 the Governor by an order dated August 19 1952 referred the dispute between the said Mills and its workmen to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer Kanpur for adjudication on the issue stated therein in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615
In the case of Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills Civil Appeal No 15 of 1955 the Governor by his order dated January 28 1953 referred the dispute between the said Mills and its workmen on the issue mentioned therein to the Regional Conciliation Officer Lucknow for adjudication in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615
In both these orders of reference no date was specified within which the Regional Conciliation Officers of Kanpur and Lucknow were to submit their awards
All that was stated in these orders was that they shall adjudicate the dispute in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615
It is only by reference to cl 16 of Order No 615 that it is possible to say that the decisions of these Conciliation Officers were to be pronounced within the time specified in the Orders of reference and that would be 40 days from the date of reference
In the case of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills there were several periods of enlargement of time but in the case of the Kamlapat Motilal Sugar Mills there was no enlargement of time as will appear from the above mentioned chart
Under section 3 of the Act the State Government for the purposes mentioned therein could by general or special order make provisions for appointing Industrial Courts and for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided 978 in the order
Order No 615 was a general order made by virtue of these provisions
Clause 10 of that Order authorized the State Government to refer any dispute to the Industrial Tribunal or if the State Government considering the nature of the dispute or the convenience of the party so decided to any other person specified in that behalf for adjudication
Clause 16 specified the time within which the decision of the Tribunal or the Adjudicator had to be pronounced provided the State Government could extend the period from time to time
Section 61 of the Act specifically stated that when an authority to which an industrial dispute had been referred for award or adjudication had completed its enquiry it should within such time as may be specified submit its award to the State Government
It would appear therefore that the Act required the submission of the award to be made within a specified time which time in the absence of a special order of reference of an industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication under section 3 of the Act would be determined by the provisions of a general order made by the Government in that behalf
An order of reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication without specifying the time within which the award had to be submitted would be an invalid order of reference
In fact the orders of reference in the cases under appeal specified no time within which the award had to be submitted
All that they directed was that the dispute shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615
If these orders of reference are read along with cl 16 of Order No 615 then it must be deemed that they specified the time within which the award had to be submitted as 40 days from the dates of reference
The proviso to cl 16 of Order No 615 empowering the State Government to extend the period from time to time within which the award had to be submitted was found to be an invalid provision having regard to section 61 of the Act by this Court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co Ltd vs Gutta Mill Workers  Union 1
If the matter had stood there I  979 only the awards having been submitted beyond forty days from the dates of reference would be invalid as the periods of extension granted from time to time by the State Government for their submission could not be taken into consideration
The Act however was amended by the Ordinance and section 6 A was added to the Act and according to the provisions of section 2 of the Ordinance section 6 A of the Act must be deemed to have formed a part of the Act at the time of its enactment
Section 61 and section 6 A of the Act must therefore be read together
Section 61 of the Act specifically stated that the award must be submitted within a specified date in an industrial dispute referred for adjudication after the completion of the enquiry
Under section 6 A however the State Government was empowered from time to time to enlarge the period even though the period originally fixed or enlarged might have expired
The orders of reference in these appeals as stated above specified 40 days within which the awards had to be submitted
The State Government could however enlarge the periods within which the awards had to be submitted under section 6 A by issuing other orders in the case of each reference extending the time within which the awards had to be submitted
Admittedly no such order was in fact passed in the case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No 15 of 1955 and in the case which is the subject of Civil Appeal No 14 of 1955 although orders extending the time for the submission of the award were made and the last order extended the time to March 10 1953 yet the award was submitted on May 13 1953
The awards in these cases were therefore made in the one case beyond the time specified in the order of reference and in the other beyond the extended period within which the award had to be submitted
It was urged on behalf of the appellant the State of Uttar Pradesh that as cl 16 of Order No 615 had been amended whereby 180 instead of 40 days had been provided as the period within which an award had to be submitted the orders of reference in the cases before as must be construed as specifying 980 180 days within which the awards had to be submitted
In other words cl 16 although amended on February 18 1953 was retrospective in operation
Order No 615 is a general order under which conciliation boards and industrial tribunals may be set up to deal with industrial disputes
It is true that el
16 enjoins that the decisions by the tribunal or the adjudicator must be pronounced within a specified number of days but this is a general direction
An order of reference is a special order
It could have stated the manner in which the industrial dispute was to be adjudicated and it could also have specified the time within which the decision had to be pronounced
As the orders of reference in the cases before us merely stated that they were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Order No 615 the disputes had to be adjudicated in the manner so provided and the orders of reference must accordingly be read as having specified 40 days as the time within which the awards had to be submitted
Subsequent amendment of cl 16 whereby 180 days instead of 40 days was provided as the time within which the award had to be submitted could not affect an order of reference previously made according to which the award had to be submimitted within 40 days
We cannot agree with the submission made on behalf of the appellant that cl 16 as amended must be given retrospective effect and the orders of reference previously issued must be regarded as specifying the time of 180 days for the submission of the awards
Section 61 of the Act is to the effect that the authority to which an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication must submit its award within such time as may be specified
This section read with section 6 A of the Act on a proper interpretation of their provisions makes it clear that the time within which the award shall be submitted is the period specified in the order of reference
Mere amendment of cl 16 would not therefore affect the period already specified in the order of reference
It seems to us therefore that the amendment to el
16 did not materially affect the position and the awards in the cases before us had to be submitted within 981 40 days from the dates of the orders of reference or within the enlarged time for the submission of the awards
What is the effect of section 3 of the Ordinance is a matter which now remains to be considered
This section purported to remove doubts and to validate orders of extension of time for the submission of an award
It also purported to validate certain awards
There is no difficulty in construing cl
1 of this section
It validates all orders of extension made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance as if section 6 A of the Act had been a part of the Act always
In other words orders of extension of time made under the general order promulgated under section 3 of the Act would be regarded as made under section 6 A Clause 3 of section 3 of the Ordinance also does not present any difficulty in construing its provisions
It directs that every proceeding pending before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance against an award shall be decided as if section 6 A of the Act had been in force at all material dates
Clauses 1 and 3 of this section merely re emphasise the provisions of section 6 A of the Act which in our opinion are clear enough even in the absence of the aforesaid clauses
It is cl
2 of section 3 of the Ordinance which requires careful examination
Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that el
2 was sufficiently wide in its terms to include all awards and not merely awards which bad become final as held by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
The words at the end of the clause  as if section 6 A had been in force at all material dates  were redundant and they should be ignored
Indeed according to him there was no need for the existence of el
3 in view of the provisions of cl
Clause 2 validated all awards whether made before or after the commencement of the Ordinance even if the period specified within which they were to be submitted or any enlargement thereof had already expired in so far as they could not be questioned merely on that ground alone and this would cover even a proceeding pending in any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance against an award 982 Mr N C Chatterjee appearing for respondent No 1 in Civil Appeal No 15 of 1955 contended that the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the correct view that cl
2 of section 3 of the Ordinance covered cases where the awards had become final
He further developed his argument in support of the decision of that Tribunal on the following lines
Such clarification as was sought to be made by section 3 of the Ordinance must be construed in relation to section 6 A of the Act and not independently of it
If an award were made outside the ambit of section 6 A then the whole of section 3 of the Ordinance could not apply to such a case
Section 31 of the Ordinance validated all orders of enlargement of time which were made prior to the commencement of the Ordinance
Such orders should be deemed to have been validly made as if section 6 A had been a part of the Act
Section 32 of the Ordinance was enacted to prevent the validity of an award being questioned when it had been submitted after the specified period for its submission or any enlargement thereof
The words  as if section 6 A had been in force at all material dates  merely connote that there must be an order of enlargement made by the Government in the exercise of its powers under section 6 A of the Act
Section 32 of the Ordinance had no application to a case where an award was made independently of the exercise of the powers of the Government under section 6 A Section 32 and 3 of the Ordinance were subservient to section 6 A of the Act
The Tribunal apparently took the view that there was repugnance between sub sections
2 and 3 of section 3 of the Ordinance and so it made an attempt to avert that repugnance by putting an artificial restriction on the scope of sub section
2 of section 3
In holding that section 32 applied only to awards that have become final the Tribunal overlooked the fact that this sub section referred to awards which may be made even after the commencement of the Ordinance and it is not easy to appreciate how finality could be said to attach to these awards on the date when the Ordinance was promulgated
The Tribunal also felt impressed by the argument that if section 6 A applied to appeals or 983 proceedings against awards pending at the date of the commencement of the Ordinance there was no reason why the same provision should not apply to appeals or proceedings which may be taken against the awards after the commencement of the Ordinance
In giving expression to this view however the Tribunal clearly overlooked the fact that section 3 3 is deliberately confined to proceedings against an award pending at the commencement of the Ordinance and no others
There can be little doubt in our opinion that the main purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders of extension of time within which an award had to be submitted as well as to prevent its validity being questioned merely on the ground that it had been submitted beyond the specified time or any enlargement thereof
Apart from an order of extension of time the Ordinance purported to deal with at least three situations so far as the submission of an award was concerned
One was where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance and against which no proceeding was pending before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance another was where an award was submitted after the Ordinance came into force
These cases were dealt with by cl
2 of section 3 of the Ordinance
The third was the case where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance against which a proceeding was pending before a Court or a Tribunal before the Ordinance came into force
Section 33 of the Ordinance was so drafted that it should not interfere with judicial proceedings already pending against an award
It merely directed that such a proceeding must be decided as if section 6 A had been a part of the Act from the date of its enactment
Where however no judicial proceedings against an award were pending it was the intention of the Ordinance that the award shall not be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the specified period for its submission or any enlargement thereof
Although section 32 of the Ordinance is not happily worded and appears to have been the result of hasty legislation we think that upon a reasonable construction of 125 984 its provisions its meaning is clear and there is no real conflict between its provisions and the provisions of cl
3 of the section
The words  as if section 6 A had been in force at all material dates  have to be given some meaning and they cannot be regarded as redundant as suggested on behalf of the appellants
Grammatically they should be regarded as referring to any action or proceeding taken direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon an award
Section 6 A of the Act however has nothing to do With this and these words car not apply to that part of the clause
These words also cannot refer to a case where the award has been made beyond the specified period and in which there has been no order of enlargement of time as section 6 A of the Act does not apply to such a lase
The words in question therefor can only apply to that part of the clause which refers to an enlargement of time for the submission of the award which is the only purpose of section 6 A of the Act
In our opinion if section 32 of the Ordinance is read in this way an intelligible meaning is given to it which is consistent with section 6 A of the Act and not in conflict with section 33 of the Ordinance
The awards referred to in section 32 are awards against which no judicial proceeding was pending at the commencement of the Ordinance
In our opinion the provisions of section 32 and 3 are not in conflict with each other
We cannot accept the view of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that section 32 refers only to awards that had become final
Having construed the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance it is now necessary to deal specifically with the appeals before us
Appeal No III 19853 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal out of which Civil Appeal No 14 of 1955 arises was filed before the commencement of the Ordinance and by virtue of section 33 of the Ordinance the appeal had to be decided as if the provisions of section 6 A had been in force at all material dates
To such an appeal the provisions of cl
2 of section 3 of the Ordinance would not apply
This appeal would therefore be governed by cl
As in this case the award had been submitted on May 13 1953 985 and the last date of enlargement gave time for the submission of the award up to March 10 1953 the award was submitted beyond time and therefore was invalid as having been made without jurisdiction
In Civil Appeal No 15 of 1955 arising out of Appeal No 111 321 of 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal the appeal was filed before that Tribunal after the commencement of the Ordinance
The award was submitted long after the period namely 40 days within which it had to be submitted and there were no orders of enlargement of time
Section 32 of the Ordinance and not section 33 would therefore apply to this appeal
The award in this case consequently has been validated by virtue of the provisions of section 32 of the Ordinance and its validity cannot be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the period within which it should have been submitted
In the result Civil Appeal No 14 of 1955 is dismissed with costs and Civil Appeal No 15 of 1955 is allowed with costs and the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No 111 32153 before it is set aside
Appeal No 14 of 1955 dismissed
Appeal No 15 of 1955 allowed


Summary:
The appellant was committed to the Court of Session for trial of offences under section 52 Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and section 161 Indian Penal Code
Shortly thereafter the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 came into force
An Assistant Sessions judge tried the appellant and convicted him of the offences charged
The appellant contended that the trial was vitiated as the investigation had been made by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and that the Assistant Sessions judge had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was triable by a Special Judge
Held that the Assistant Sessions judge had jurisdiction to 777 try the case
Section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 transferred only cases pending before Magistrates to Special judges but did not transfer cases which had been committed to Court of Session before the Act came into force
Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla vs The State 1957 SCR 678 relied on
Held further that the conviction was not vitiated by the investigation having been made by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police
If the matter had been urged before the Courts at an early stage it would have had to take steps to get the illegality cured by ordering fresh investigations
But the appellant could not be permitted to raise the questions whether the objection regarding investigation had been taken at the earliest stage as the question had not been raised in the Courts below
HN Rishbud vs The State of Delhi  relied on