Appeals Nos 231 and 232 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 21 1957 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos 675 and 676 of 1957
R Ganapathy Iyer section B Adityan and G Gopalakrishnan for the appellant
A N Sinha and P K Mukherjee for respondent No 1 1958
November 24
 J These appeals raise a question of considerable importance as to the scope of an enquiry in an election petition wherein election is called in question under section 1001c of the Representation of the People Act 1951 43 of 1951 on the ground that a nomination paper had been improperly  rejected
625 The facts are that during the general elections which were held in 1957 six persons including the appellant Veluswami Thevar the second respondent  Chellapandian and the fourth respondent Arunachalam were nominated for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Madras from Alangulam Constituency in the District of Tirunelveli At the time of the scrutiny which was on February 1 1957 Chellapandian raised an objection to the nomination of Arunachalam on the ground that he was the Head Master of the National Training School Tiruchendur which was a Government aided school and that he was therefore disqualified under section 7 cls
d and e of the Representation of the People Act 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act as holding an office of profit under the Government
In upholding this objection the returning officer observed  Sri section Arunachalam is not present at the time of scrutiny of nominations nor any authorised agent of his could take notice of the objection and file a reply  In view of the objection which has not been cleared by Sri section Arunachalam by satisfying me that he is not holding an office of profit in a concern in which the State Government has financial interest the objection is upheld and Sri section Arunachalam is disqualified under Sections 7d and e of Act 43 of 1951
Accordingly his nomination is rejected
 The five nomination papers were accepted two of the candidates subsequently withdrew from the election the other three went to the polls and on March 10 1957 the appellant who secured the largest number of votes was declared elected
On April 18 1957 Raja Nainar the first respondent who was not a candidate but a voter filed E P No 109 of 1957 praying that the election of the appellant be declared void on the ground that the rejection of the nomination paper of Arunachalam was improper because he had ceased to be a Head Master at the time of his nomination and that further the institution was a private one
The appellant filed a written statement in which he pleaded that Arunachalam was 79 626 not qualified to be chosen not merely on the ground put forward by Chellapandian before the returning officer but also on the grounds that he was interested as a partner in contracts for the execution of works for the Government and that further he had entered into an agreement with the District Board Chittoor to serve as a teacher in that Board and that his nomination paper was therefore rightly rejected
Raja Nainar then came out with the application 1
A No 5 of 1957 out of which the present proceedings arise to strike out the additional grounds of disquali fication raised in the statement of the appellant on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enquire into any ground of disqualification which was not taken before the returning officer and that accordingly the new grounds put forward by the appellant should be struck out
By its order dated August 17 1957 the Tribunal held that the question to be decided by it was whether there was a valid nomination paper and that to decide that it could go into grounds other than those which were put forward before the returning officer and in that view dismissed the application
The correctness of this order was challenged by Raja Nainar in two Writ Petitions Nos 675 and 676 of 1957 preferred under article 226
Therein he repeated his contention that it was not competent to the Tribunal to enquire into any but the grounds which had been put forward before the returning officer and prayed that a writ of certiorari be issued to quash the order in 1
A No 5 of 1957 and a writ of prohibition to restrain the Tribunal from enquiring into the new grounds raised by the appellant
These applications were heard by a Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajagopalan and Rajagopals Ayyangar JJ who upheld the contention of the petitioner and stated their conclusion in these terms  We are clearly of opinion that the enquiry before the Tribunal must be restricted to the objections which the returning officer had to consider and decide but not necessarily to the material placed 627 before the returning officer at the stage of the summary enquiry
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the truth and validity of those objections on relevant material even if that material be other than that placed before the returning officer
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to investigate the truth or validity of the objections which were not put forward before the returning officer and which he had therefore no occasion to consider
Once again we have to point out that we are discussing only the position of a candidate whose nomination was rejected and not for instance that of a returned candidate  A further objection was also taken before the learned judges that as the decision of the Election Tribunal was open to appeal under section 116A of the Act the court should in exercise of its discretion under article 226 decline to entertain writ petitions against interlocutory orders
But the learned judge held that as the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain grounds other than those which were put forward before the returning officer writs could issue under article 226
In the result they quashed the order of the Election Tribunal in 1
A No 5 of 1957 and issued a writ of Mandamus directing it to dispose of the application afresh in accordance with law as laid down in the judgment
It is against this judgment that the present appeals have been preferred on leave granted by this Court under article 136 and the point that arises for decision is whether in an election petition questioning the propriety of the rejection of a nomination paper under section 1001c of the Act it is open to the parties to raise grounds of disqualification other than those put forward before the returning officer
It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the provisions of the Act hearing on this question
Section 32 of the Act provides that Any person maybe nominated as a candidate for election to fill a seat if he is qualified to be chosen to fill that seat under the provisions of the Constitution and this Act
 Under section 331 the candidate is to deliver to the returning officer a nomination paper completed in the 628 prescribed form and signed by the candidate and by an elector of the constituency as proposer
Section 33 4 enacts that  On the presentation of a nomination paper the returning officer shall satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls Provided that the returning officer shall permit any clerical or technical error in the nomination paper in regard to the said names or numbers to be corrected in order to bring them into conformity with the corresponding entries in the electoral rolls and where necessary direct that any clerical or printing error in the said entries shall be overlooked
 Section 35 provides inter alia that the returning officer shall cause to be affixed in some conspicuous place in his office a notice of the nomination containing descriptions similar to those contained in the nomination paper both of the candidate and of the proposer
Section 36 omitting what is not material is as follows 36
1  On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under section 30 the candidates their election agents one proposer of each candidate and one other person duly authorized in writing by each candidate but no other person may attend at such time and place as the returning officer may appoint and the returning officer shall give them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidates which have been delivered within the time and in the manner laid down in section 33
2 The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary inquiry if any as he thinks necessary reject any nomination on any of the following grounds a that the candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the following provisions that may be applicable namely 629 Articles 84 102 173 and 191 Part 11 of this Act or b that there has been a failure to comply With any of the provisions of section 33 or section 34 or c that the signature of the candidate or the pro
poser on the nomination paper is not genuine          5 The returning officer shall hold the scrutiny on the date appointed in this behalf under clause b of section 30 and shall not allow any adjournment of the proceedings except when such proceedings are interrupted or obstructed by riot or open violence or by causes beyond his control Provided that in case an objection is made the candidate concerned may be allowed time to rebut it not later than the next day but one following the date fixed for scrutiny and the returning officer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings have been adjourned
6 The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same ania if the nomination paper is rejected shall record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection
 Then we have section 1001c the construction of which is the main point for determination
It is as follows 100
1  Subject to the provisions of subsection 2 if the Tribunal is of opinion c that any nomination has been improperly rejected  the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void Now the whole controversy between the parties is as to what the expression  improperly rejected  in section 1001c means
According to the appellant when the nomination paper of a candidate who is under no such disqualification as is mentioned in section 362 has been rejected that is improper rejection within section 1001c
Acoording to the respondent when the 630 nomination paper of a candidate is rejected by the returning officer on the ground that he is subject to a specified disqualification the rejection is improper if it is found that that disqualification does not exist
If the former view is correct then the scope of an enquiry before the Tribunal must extend to all matters which are mentioned in section 362 and if the latter then it must be limited to determining whether the ground on which the returning officer has rejected the nomination is well founded
Now to decide what the expression  improperly rejected  in section 1001c precisely imports it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act bearing on the question and the setting of the above section therein
Under section 32 of the Act any person may be nominated as a candidate for election if he is duly qualified under the provisions of the Constitution and the Act
Section 362 authorises the returning officer to reject any nomination paper on the ground that he is either not qualified that is under sections 3 to 7 of the Act or is disqualified under the provisions referred to therein
If there are no grounds for rejecting a nomination paper under section 362 then it has to be accepted and the name of the candidate is to be included in a list
Vide section 368
Then we come to section 1001c and section 1001d1 which provide a remedy to persons who are aggrieved by an order improperly rejecting or improperly accepting any nomination
In the context it appears to us that the improper rejection or acceptance must have refer ence to section 362 and that the rejection of a nomination paper of a candidate who is qualified to be chosen for election and who does not suffer from any of the dis qualifications mentioned in section 362 would be improper within section 1001c and that likewise acceptance of a nomination paper of a candidate who is not qualified or who is disqualified will equally be improper under s1001d1Section 32 confers a substantive right on a candidate to be chosen to the legislature subject only to the limitations enacted in articles 84 102 173 and 191 of the Constitution and sections 3 to 7 of the Act and sections 36 and 100 provide the machinery for the exercise and enforcement of that right
It is a sound 631 rule of construction that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and in such manner as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective
Readings section 1001c in the context of the whole enactment we think that an enquiry before the Tribunal must embrace all the matters as to qualification and disqualification mentioned in section 362 and that it cannot be limited to the particular ground of disqualification which was taken before the returning officer
It was contended for the respondent that the proceedings before the Tribunal are really by way of appeal against the decision of the returning officer and that therefore the scope of the enquiry in the election petition must be co extensive with that before the returning officer and must be limited to the ground taken before him
It was argued that a decision could be said to be improper only with reference to a ground which was put forward and decided in a particular manner by the returning officer and that therefore the expression  improperly rejected  would in its true connotation restrict the scope of the enquiry before the Tribunal to the ground taken before the returning officer
We are unable to agree with this contention
The jurisdiction which a Tribunal exercises in hearing an election petition even when it raises a question under section 1001c is not in the nature of an appeal against the decision of the returning officer
An election petition is an original proceeding instituted by the presentation of a petition under section 81 of the Act
The respondents have a right to file written statements by way of reply to it issues have to be framed and subject to the provisions of the Act the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the trial of the petition
All the parties have the right to adduce evidence and that is of the essence of an original proceeding as contrasted with a proceeding by way of appeal
That being the character of the proceedings the rule applicable is that which governs the trial of all original proceedings that is it is open to a party to put forward all grounds in support of or negation of the claim subject only to such limitations as may be found in the Act
632 It should be noted in this connection that if a petition to set aside an election on the ground of improper rejection of a nomination paper is in the nature of an appeal against the decision of the returning officer then logically speaking the decision of the Tribunal must be based only on the materials placed before the returning officer given with respect to the ground which was urged before him and no fresh evidence could be admitted before the Tribunal except in accordance with 0 41 R 27
The learned judges in the court below however observe that though the enquiry before the Tribunal is restricted to the particular ground put forward before the returning officer it is not restricted to the material placed before him and that all evidence bearing on that ground could be adduced before the Tribunal
This in our view is quite correct
The enquiry which a returning officer has to make under section 36 is summary in character
He may make  such summary enquiry if any as he thinks necessary  he can act suo motu
Such being the nature of the enquiry the right which is given to a party under section 1001c and section 1001d1 to challenge the propriety of an order of rejection or acceptance of a nomination paper would become illusory if the Tribunal is to base its decision only on the materials placed before the returning officer
It was contended for the respondent that even with reference to the ground taken before the returning officer no evidence other than what was placed before him could be brought before the Tribunal and he relied on the following observations of the learned judges in Charanjit Lal vs Lehri Singh 1   Whether a nomination has been improperly rejected or not has to be considered in relation to the state of evidence before the returning officer at the time of the scrutiny
The testimony of the returning officer shows that he rejected the nomination because it did not appear to him that on the question of age the candidate Shri Pirthi was qualfied to stand for election   1 A I R 1958 punj
633 There a nomination paper had been rejected by the returning officer on the ground that the candidate did not appear to possess the age qualification required by article 173
The correctness of this order was challenged in an election petition
Evidence was taken as to the age of the candidate in this petition and eventually it was held that the order of the returning officer was right
In the order of rejection the returning officer also stated  The nomination is rejected as the age is not mentioned in the nomination paper
Neither the candidate nor the proposer or any person duly authorised on his behalf is present to testify to his age
 Now the argument before the High Court was that the failure to mention the age in the nomination paper was a formal defect which should have been condoned under section 364 of the Act
The learned judges held that the defect was not merely one of failure to mention the age but of want of the requisite qualification in age and that that could not be cured under section 364
In this context the observations relied on could not be read as meaning that no evidence could be adduced even in respect of a ground which was urged before the returning officer as in fact evidence was taken before the Tribunal and a finding given and if they meant what the respondent suggests they do we do not agree with them
It is to be noted that in many of the cases which came before this Court as for example Durga Shankar Mehta vs Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others 1 the finding of the Tribunal was based on fresh evidence admitted before it and the propriety of such admission was never questioned
And if the true position is as we have held it is that it is open to the parties to adduce fresh evidence on the matter in issue it is difficult to imagine how the proceedings before the Tribunal can be regarded as in the nature of appeal against the decision of the returning officer
In support of his contention that it is only the ground that is urged before the returning officer that 1 1955 1 SCR 267
80 634 can be raised before the Tribunal Mr Sinha learned counsel for the respondent relies on the provision in section 366 that when a nomination paper is rejected the returning officer should record his reasons therefor
The object of this provision it is argued is to enable the Tribunal to decide whether the order of the returning officer is right or not and by implication it confines the scope of the enquiry before the Tribunal to the ground put forward before the returning officer
This contention is in our opinion unsound
Now when a nomination paper is accepted section 366 does not require that any reason should be recorded therefor
If the contention of the respondent is right it would follow that acceptance of a nomination paper can never be questioned
But that would be against section 1001d1 and it must therefore be held that an acceptance can be questioned on all the grounds available under section 362
Section 1001d1 deals with improper acceptance of a nomination paper and if the word  improper  in that provision has reference to the matters mentioned in section 362 it must have the same connotation in section 1001c as well
The word  improper  which occurs in both section 1001c and section 1001d1 must bear the same meaning in both the provisions unless there is something in the context to the contrary and none such has been shown
There is another difficulty in the way of accepting this argument of the respondent
A candidate may be subject to more than one disqualification and his nomination paper may be questioned on all those grounds
Supposing that the returning officer upholds one objection and rejects the nomination paper on the basis of that objection without going into other objections notwithstanding that under section 362 he has to decide all the objections is it open to the respondents in the election petition to adduce evidence on those objections  According to the respondent it is not so that if the decision of the returning officer on the objection on which he rejected the nomination paper is held to be bad the Tribunal has no option but to set aside the election under section 1001c even though the candidate was in fact disqualified and his nomination paper was rightly rejected
Mr Sinha for the respondent concedes that the result would be anomalous but he says that the Law of Election is full of anomalies and this is one of them and that is no reason for not interpreting the law on its own terms
It is no doubt true that if on its true construction a statute leads to anomalous results the Courts have no option but to give effect to it and leave it to the legislature to amend and alter the law
But when on a construction of a statute two views are possible one which results in an anomaly and the other not it is our duty to adopt the latter and not the former seeking consolation in the thought that the law bristles with anomalies
Anomalies will disappear and the law will be found to be simple and logical if it is understood that when a question is raised in an election petition as to the propriety of the rejection of a nomination paper the point to be decided is about the propriety of the nomination and not the decision of the returning officer on the materials placed before him and that decision must depend on whether the candidate is duly qualified and is not subject to any disqualifications as provided in section 362 It remains to deal with one more contention advanced on behalf of the respondent and that is based on the following observations in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others 1  Under this provision R 474 the Tribunal is constituted a court of appeal against the decision of the returning officer and as such its jurisdiction must be co extensive with that of the returning officer and cannot extend further
 The argument is that if the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is co extensive with that of the returning officer then the enquiry before it must be confined to the grounds which were urged before the returning officer
Now the observations quoted above were made statedly with reference to R 47 and assuming that they apply to an enquiry under section 1001c the question still remains what is the jurisdiction of the returning officer in hearing objections to nomination papers 31   1132
636 His jurisdiction is defined in section 362 and the Tribunal must therefore have jurisdiction to decide all the questions which can be raised under that section
The fact that a particular ground which could have been raised was not in fact raised before the returning officer does not put an end to his jurisdiction to decide it and what he could have decided if it had been raised could be decided by the Tribunal when raised
Mr Ganapathy Iyer learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decisions of the Election Tribunals on the question whether grounds other than those raised before the returning officer could be put forward in an enquiry in an election petition
They held with one solitary exception that it is permissible and indeed it is stated in Mengh Raj vs Bhimandas 1 as settled law that the rejection of a nomination paper can be sustained on grounds not raised before the returning officer
If the legislature which must be taken to have knowledge of the law as interpreted in those decisions wanted to make a departure from it it would have said so in clear terms and in the absence of such an expression it would be right to interpret section 1001c as not intended to alter the law as laid down in those decisions
It is now necessary to refer to the decisions which have been cited before us
In Durga Shankar Mehta s case 2 the election was to a double member constituency
The appellant who obtained the largest number of votes was declared elected to the general seat and one Vasantarao to the reserved seat
The validity of the election was challenged on the ground that Vasantarao was below the age of 25 years and was therefore disqualified to stand
The Election Tribunal upheld that objection and set aside the entire election
The decision was taken in appeal to this Court and the point for determination was whether the election of the appellant was liable to be set aside on account of the disqualification of Vasantarao
It was held that the matter fell within section 1002c as it then stood and not under section 1001c and that the election of the appellant could not be declared void
1  31O 2 19551 1 SCR 267
637 This is not a direct pronouncement on the point now in controversy and that is conceded
In Vashist Narain Sharma vs Dev Chandra and others 1 a question was raised as to what would be  improper acceptance  within the meaning of section 100 but in the view taken by this Court no opinion was expressed thereon
The question now under consideration came up directly for decision before the High Court of Rajasthan in Tej Singh vs Election Tribunal Jaipur 2 and it was held that the respondent to an election petition was entitled to raise a plea that the nomination of the petitioner rejected on one ground by the returning officer was defective on one or more of the other grounds mentioned in section 362 of the Act and that such a plea if taken must be enquired into by the Election Tribunal
In Dhanraj Deshlehara vs Vishwanath Y Tamaskar 3 it was observed by a Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that in determining whether a nomination was improperly rejected the Election Tribunal was not bound to confine its enquiry to the ground on which the returning officer rejected it and that even if the ground on which the returning officer rejected the nomination could not be sustained the rejection could not be held to be improper if the Tribunal found other fatal defects in the nomination
An unreported judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Badrivishal Pitti vs J V Narsing Rao 4 has been cited before us and that also takes the view that in an enquiry before the Election Tribunal it is open to the parties to support an order of rejection of a nomination paper on grounds other than those which were put forward before the returning officer
We are in agreement with these decisions
As the question has also been raised as to the propriety of interfering in writ petitions under article 226 with interlocutory orders passed in the course of an enquiry before the Election Tribunal we shall express our opinion thereon
The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against orders of the Tribunal is 1  2 1954 9 ELR193 3 4 Special Appeal No 1 Of 1957
638 undoubted but then it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided the court may properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under article 226
It should be remembered that under the election law as it stood prior to the amendment in1956 election petitions were dismissed on preliminary grounds and the correctness of the decision was challenged in applications under article 226 and in further appeals to this Court with the result that by the time the matter was finally decided the life of the legislatures for which the election was held would have itself very nearly come to an end thus rendering the proceedings infructuous
A signal example of a case of this kind is to be found in the decision reported in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and another vs Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and others 1
It is to remedy this defect that the legislature has now amended the law by providing a right of appeal against a decision of the Tribunal to the High Court under section 116 A and its intention is  obviously that proceedings before the Tribunal should go on with expedition and without interruption and that any error in its decision should be set right in an appeal under that section
In this view it would be a proper exercise of discretion under article 226 to decline to interfere with interlocutory orders
In the result we allow the appeals set aside the orders of the court below and dismiss the writ petitions
filed by the respondent with costs here and in the court below
Appeal allowed 1 1055 2 SCR 428


Summary:
The petitioner a voluntary Organization Interested In protecting environment approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India complaining of the widespread illegal mining activity going on in the area declared as a Tiger Reserve In Alwar District in the State of Rajasthan
It prayed that in the interest of ecology environment and rule of law the activity should stop
It was alleged that the area where the mining activity was carried on was declared as a tiger reserve under the Rajasthan Wild Animals and Birds Protection Act 1951 as a sanctuary and a National Park under the Wild Life Protection Act 1972 and as protected forest under the Rajasthan Forest Act 1953 and that these notifications prohibit all or any mining activity and yet the State Government had granted hundreds of licences for mining marble dolomite and other materials and that such section was contrary to law
This Court Issued notices to the State Government and the mineowners respondents In the Writ Petition
An interlocutory direction was also made that no mining operation be carried on in the protected 22 area
The Court also appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of a Former Judge of the State High Court to ensure due observance of the various Acts and Notifications that had been issued in respect of the protected area
The Committee was requested in particular to demarcate the area declared as protected forest under the notification dated January 1 1975 issued by the Rajasthan Government under Section 29 of the Rajasthan Forest Act
The Committee submitted its Report dated September 281992 stating that the committee had verified and cross checked the tracing maps furnished by the Forest Department with the maps furnished by the Revenue Department and found that both of them matched and that after looking into the Khasra numbers mentioned in the notification dated January 1 1975 and the other material placed before it by the parties the Committee identified the areas declared as protected forest
It stated that they were not in one contiguous block but were comprised in several blocks or areas
The 215 mines mentioned in Appendix A to the Report fall completely within the areas declared as protected forest while 47 mines mentioned in Appendix II to the Report fall partly inside and partly outside the areas declared as protected forest
There was no difference of opinion among the members of the committee regarding the location of the mines but only with respect to the question whether they should be directed to he closed
The Chairman recommended that the mining operations in all the 215 mines listed in Appendix A should be stopped forthwith and the mining operation in the 47 mines listed in Appendix B be stopped forthwith to the extent they fell within the area declared as protected forest
The three other Members of the Committee viz Collector Chief Conservator of Forest and Chief Wildlife Warden and Additional Director of Mines differed from the Chairman
They suggested that this Court should accede to the representation of the State Government Appendix IC  that the area covered by the mines should be allowed to be excluded from the protected forest in lieu of which the state Government undertook to provide an equal extent of the area for being included in the protected forest
The Sate Government s application to the Court was also to the same effect
It was stated therein that the protected forest area measures about 800 23 Sq
kilometers whereas the 262 mines mentioned in Appendixes A  and B  cover only an area of 208 Sq
kilometers and that in the interest of the economy of the State industry and workers an extent of 502 Sq
kilometers including the area covered by the said mines be allowed to be deleted from the protected forest the State Government offering to place an equal extent for the purpose of being declared as protected forest
The mine owners also riled objections to the Report of the Committee and requested that they he allowed to continue their mining operations
The Government of India which was directed to file an affidavit
riled the same and stated that the area declared as project tigertiger reserve was covered by notification issued under the Rajasthan Forest Act Environment Protection Act 1986 and the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act 1957
It submitted that the Forest Conservation Act applies not only to reserve and protected forest but to all areas recorded as forest in Government records and that Mining was non forestry activity and therefore cannot be carried on in areas to which the Forest Conservation Act applies without prior approval of the Government of India
It was further stated that on May 71992 the Government of India had issued the final notification under Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act 1986 prohibiting all mining activity except with the approval of the Government of India and that since no permission was obtained under any of the said enactments with respect to the said 262 mines no mining operations can be carried on in the area unless and until the permission of the Central Government was obtained
On petitioner s behalf it was submitted that all the mining activity in the areas notified under the notification dated May 71992 should have stopped long ago and continuance of mining activity amounts to gross contempt and constitutes a clear violation of orders that the State Government appears to be colluding with the mineowners which is evident from the dissent expressed by officers of the State Government who were Members of the Committee to the straight forward and logical recommendation of the Chairman and that prohibition of mining flows from the provisions of the Forest 24 Conservation Act as well as the notification issued under the Environment Protection Act in May 1992
On behalf of the State Government It was submitted that the State Government and Its officers were not aware when they granted leaseslicences in respect of the listed mine that they fell within the area declared as protected forest and that the certificate issued by the Forest Department indicates that they did not fall within the protected forest area
It was thus a bonafide grant
It was further submitted that the State was prepared to abide fully by the orders of this Court 54 mines had been shut down and it was prepared to shut down all the listed mines if this Court so directs
A map prepared by the State officers showing the areas covered by tiger reserve sanctuary protected forest and the location of the listed mines was placed before the Court for consideration
On behalf of the mine owners in Mallana village it was submitted that demarcation of protected forest by the Committee was defective erroneous and unacceptable for the various reasons set out in the objections riled to the report that the map produced by the State Government delineating the tiger reserve was incorrect besides being an authenticated that the mine owners do not admit that their mines fell within the tiger reserve or within the protected forest areas and that closing down of hundreds of mines employing thousands of workers wherein a large amount of capital was invested would disturb the economy of the State besides affecting the supplies of marble and other minerals serving no public purpose
On behalf of the some of the other mine owners it was submitted that it was unsafe to act upon and to pass any orders based upon the map produced by the State Government that the declaration as tiger reserve by the Government of India was not under any statutory authority that the areas declared as protected forest was not coextensive with the area declared as tiger reserve and sanctuary and national park that none of the mines fell within the sanctuary or the National Park not even within project tiger and that the mine owners are as much interested In protecting the environment and ecology as the petitioner
25 Declaring that the relevant laws were violated and passing directions the Court HELD 1
This is not a case where the Court is called upon to shut down an activity being carried on lawfully in the name of higher considerations of ecology and environment
It is a simple case to ensure observance of enacted laws made by the State to protect the environment and ecology of the area
In such a case there is no need to be oppressed by considerations of balancing the interest  of economy and ecology
That has already been done by the Legislature and Parliament 37 D E
In the instant case the petitioner s grievance is against the executive
Charged with the delegation of implementing the laws of the land the executive is yet failing to do its duty by law and by people and that when faced with the might of money respect for law is dissolving into respect for gammon 37 E F
The State Government is empowered not only to declare any forest land as a protected forest but also any waste land as such
The idea evidently is not only to protect the existing forest but also to bring waste lands under schemes of afforestation
Once declared as protected forest the distinction between forest land and waste land disappears
The entire area becomes a protected forest
38 B 3
Reading Section 29 of the Rajasthan Forest Act as a whole it appears the normal rule is to make an enquiry into the rights of the state Government and of the private parties over the land proposed to be declared as protected forest in the first in stance prepare a record thereof and then declare it as a protected forest
But in case of urgency It is open to the State Government to Issue such notification forthwith subject of course to the existing rights of individuals and communities in the area concerned
38 F In the instant case the notification dated January 1 1975 issued by the Government of Rajasthan appears to be one issued under the proviso to sub section 3 of Section 29
38 G 4
Section 29 contemplates only one notification declaring an 26 area as a protected forest
Whether issued after a normal enquiry and record or without enquiry or record Section 29 contemplates only one notification and not two in any event
Therefore the notification issued is the valid and effective one
It is not a provisional or preliminary notification
It is not also the case of the mine owners that leases or licences in their favour were granted prior to January 1 1975
All of them were granted in the middle of or in the late eighties
The savings clause contained in the proviso to sub section3does not avail them
39 A B 5
The Committee appointed by this court to demarcate and identify the areas declared as protected forest was composed of high officials of the Government of Rajasthan
They had undertaken an elaborate and intensive exercise and have demarcated the areas declared as protected forest with the help of the official maps and records
There is no reason not to accept the said report
The several objections submitted by the mine owners cannot prevail over the official maps and records
They were represented before the commission at the time of the said exercise
The dissent note appended by the officers of the Government of Rajasthan was not with respect to the demarcation or identification of areas declared as protected forest but only with respect to the closure of the mines operating within those areas
The report of the committee is accepted
39 D F 6
Once an area is declared as a protected forest it comes within the purview of the 
Even the State Government cannot carry on any non forest activity in the said area without prior approval of the Central Government
That the mining activity amounts to non forest purpose is beyond dispute
Thus the grant of mining lease licenses their renewal by the State Govern ment without obtaining the prior approval of the Central Government in respect of the mines situated within the protected forest after January 1 1975 is contrary to law
39 G H 40 B 7
All the mines listed in Appendix A to the Committee s Report do fall within the areas declared as protected forest while the mines listed in Appendix B fall partly with in and partly out side such areas
41 B 27 8
According to rule 46 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral A  Concession Rules 1986 no mining lease could have been granted or renewed within the forest without clearance from the Central Government in accordance with the forest Conservation Act 1980 and the Rules made there under
Admittedly no such prior approval or clearance of central Government was obtained
The purpose of Forest Acts and Environmental Protection Act may not always be the same
Closure of the mines may not serve the environmental purpose but it may serve the forest purpose
40 B 10
It is appropriate that the merits of the proposal of the State Government to delete an extent of 502 Sq
kilometers from out of the protected forest be examined by the Ministry of Environment and Forest forests and a report submitted to this Court within three months
Orders will be passed thereafter on the application riled by the State of Rajasthan
40 E 11The notification issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act 1986 on May 7 1992 expressly prohibits the carrying on of mining operations except with the Central Government s prior permission in the areas covered under project tiger
The prohibition extends to existing mining leases in SanctuariesNational Park
All mining operations are pro hibited therein
41 C D 12
There can he no legitimate dispute with respect to the correctness of the map produced by Government of Rajasthan or with respect to the area declared as tiger reserve
Both the State Government and Central Government have delineated it
May be that the declaration as tiger reserve was without any statutory authority and is relatable to the executive power of the Union of India but the notification issued under Section 3 of the Environment Protection Act puts the stamp of statutory authority over it
The Central Government has specifically stated in its affidavits that no prior permission was obtained with respect to the mines located within the tiger reserve
On this ground the mining operations being carried on in the tiger reserve including the listed mines also appears to be 28 contrary to law
42 C D 13The situation is that the mining activity in the listed mines mining activities in 54 mines has already been stopped is illegal and has to stop
May be that this will have the effect of bringing to halt the activity involving a good amount of capital and a large number of workers
But in view of the inherent illegality attaching to them there is no option but to close them
They cannot be permitted to operate
If and when the Central Government recommends the plea of the State Government and any of the areas already declared as protected forest are deleted with the leave of this Court can the mining activity go on in these areas
43 D 14It is directed that the mining activity in the mines situated outside the protected forest areas but within the tiger reserve may continue for a period of four months
Within this period it shall be open to the concerned mine owners to approach the Department of Forest and Environment Government of India for permission to continue their mining operations
They can continue the mining operations in these mines only if the Central Government permits them and subject to the orders of the Central Government in that behalf
If no permission is obtained from the Central Government within the said period of four months the mining activity in the entire area declared as tiger reserve shall stop and cease on the expiry of four months
44 B C