Appeal No 2383 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 141988 of the Hima chal Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No 29 of 1988
NS Hegde and Ms Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant
469 Ms Asha Jain Madan for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RM SAHAI J
The short but interesting question of law that arises or consideration in this appeal directed against judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court is if possession given to competent authority under Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1972 for brevity Requisition Act  is vacation of premises without sufficient cause within second proviso to sub section 3 of Section 14 of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act 1987 deemed to have come into force with effect from 17th November 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
Sub section 3 of Section 14 is extracted below 3 A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession a in the case of a residential building if i he requires it for his own occupation Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without suffi cient cause within five years of the filing of the application in the said urban area It enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own occupa tion and he has no other building in the area concerned
This right however stands deferred under second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a build ing in his use without sufficient cause
The question is how the expression he has not vacated such building without sufficient cause  in the second proviso should be construed
It has two aspects one whether the proviso applies to volun tary vacation only or it extends to vacating under pressure of legal proceedings such as requisition order by competent Authority
Second even assuming that the expression vacate such building  is given wide interpretation does giving up possession in consequence of a requisition order amounts to vacation without sufficient cause Vacate normally means to go away to leave
The setting or context in which the word has been used does not indicate my different meaning
Nor it is 470 necessary to decide if it applies to voluntary vacation only as it was urged that even assuming that giving up possession in pursuance of requisition order is included in the proviso can it be said to be without sufficient cause Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes
It has been construed liberally in keeping with its ordi nary dictionary meaning of adequate or enough
That is any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be under stood as sufficient
cause
For instance economic difficulty in financial stringency or family reasons may compel a land lord to let out building in his occupation
So long it is found to be genuine and bona fide and would amount to vacat ing a building for sufficient cause
And the bar of second proviso stands lifted
In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pretence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of landlord to approach the controller for necessary direction to tenant to hand over possession to him
Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance of an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as not without sufficient cause 
A landlord has no option
He is required to vacate under constraint of law
Therefore the statutory restriction created by second proviso would not apply in such a case
Does it make any difference in law or the action of the landlord is rendered without sufficient cause as he did not file any objection in requisition proceedings either under mistaken advice or ignorance of law For this it is necessary to narrate facts in brief
The appellant is owner of Kennilworth houseSimla and its annexure He was in occupation of first floor of Kennilworth house
Second floor was let out to the District Judge who later was elevated to the Bench
For his occupa tion the entire house was requisitioned
The appellant did not file any objection
After vacating the building he applied for eviction to respondent from the annexe
His application was rejected as it would found to be in teeth of the second proviso
It was held that the order of requisi tion was passed because the appellant did not show any cause be filing any objection under sub section 2 of Section 3 of the Requisition Act even though proviso to the sub sec tion precluded any property or part from being requisitioned if it was in bonafide use by the owner
The explanation of the appellant that he was advised by his lawyer not to file an objection as the building was required for a High Court judge was not accepted
Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could not adversely reflect on sufficiency of cause under Rent Control Act
Reason for either arises in different circumstances
Vacating a building even under an incorrect order passed by a competent authority under Requis 471 tion Act would be for sufficient reason
The Rent Control authorities could not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act
Therefore it could not be a valid consider ation for holding that the building was vacated without sufficient cause
The courts below thus committed an error of law in applying second proviso to reject the application filed on behalf of the appellant
Even the finding on requirement of the appellant to occupy the building is not well founded
The inference drawn by the two courts below that the appellant being a rich man would not occupy the annexe or that he would use it occa sionally is not well founded
It being undisputed that the appellant has no other building in the urban area and it having been found that he vacated the other building for sufficient reason there was no fetter on the right of appel lant to seek eviction of the tenant
In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed
The orders of all the courts below are set aside
The applica tion of appellant shall stand allowed
He shall approach the Rent Control authorities for appropriate directions
Parties shall bear their own costs
TNA Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant a partnership firm consisted of nine partners
One Satya Narain was one of the partners
He submitted a tender to the respondents on July 25 1973 on behalf of the firm offering to supply 1000 quintals of Gram Dal at the rate of Rs185 per bag
Tender was accepted by the respondents
The appellant committed breach of the contract and as a result the respondents filed an applica tion under sec
20 of the before the District Court for making reference for arbitration in terms of the contract
The application was allowed and the dispute was re ferred for arbitration
Against the order of the Addl
District Judge an appeal was filed before the High Court and the High Court confirmed the order of the Additional District Judge
This appeal by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution is against the order of the High Court
The appellant contended that by operation of Sec192a of the Partnership Act 1932 there was no implied authority given to one of the partners to refer the dispute relating to the business of the firm for arbitration and therefore the reference made by the court pursuant to a contract entered into by one of its partner Satya Narain on behalf of the firm was without jurisdiction and that the original con tract did not contain arbitration clause
In a separate letter with a rubber stamp facsimile of the firm one of the partners agreed for reference to arbitration and there fore the reference did not bind the other partners
Dismissing the appeal this Court 543 HELD 1
The operation of Secs
18  191 is subject to the exceptions engrafted in sub sec
2 of Sec 19
192a provides that in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration
545B C 2
None of the partners have entered into the witness box to deny the validity of the contract nor raised any objection that they had not authorised the partner Satya Narain to enter into the contract nor that they were bound by any acts done by him
When the partner signed the tender at that time no other partners raised objection regarding the signing of the tender by the partner on behalf of the firm
In view of these facts it is clear that they ratified the contract
544 E F 3
The firm had entered into a binding contract with the corporation and contract contained the arbitration clause which binds the partners
544 G 4
The contract engrafts an arbitration clause and in terms thereof the dispute is to be referred to the arbitra tion
Therefore the reference made by the Addl
District Judge under Sec
20 of time is within the jurisdiction and in terms of the contract
545 D Gopal Das vs Brij Nath  Ors AIR 1926 Allahabad 238 Firm Radhakishan Chunnilal vs Firm Ashamal Ishardas AIR 1926 Lahore 92 Rajendra Prasad vs Pannalal Champalal  Ors AIR 1932 Calcutta 343 Mansabdar Khan vs MT Allah Devi  Or3 
 AIR 1934 Lahore 485 Sohanlal vs Firm Madhoram Ban warilal AIR 1952 Punjab 240 and Ms Alazappa Cotton Mills vs Indo Burma Trading Corporation  referred to