Appeal No 428 of 1959
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 25 1959 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No 47 D of 1955 arising out of the judgment and order dated November 28 1955 of the said High Court in Writ Petition No 306 D of 1954
N C Chatterjee J B Dadachanji section N Andley Rameshwar Nath and P L Vohra for the appellant
C K Daphtary
Solicitor General of India R Gapapathy Iyer R H Dhebar and T M Sen for respondents Nos 1  2
G section Pathak section section Shukla and Mrs E Udayaratnam for respondent No 3 1960
January 19
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J
This appeal upon a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court raises the question whether an order of the Central Government under r 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1949 hereinafter called the Rules framed under section 6 of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act No 53 of 1941 hereinafter called the Act is quasi judicial or administrative
The brief facts necessary for this purpose are these
The appellant was granted a mining lease by the then Ruler of Gangpur State on December 30 1947 shortly before the merger of that State with the State of Orissa on January 1 1948
This lease was annulled on June 29 1949
Thereafter the appellant was granted certificates of approval in respect of prospecting licences and mining leases
Eventually the appellant applied on December 19 1949 for mining leases for manganese in respect of five areas in the district of Sundergarh Orissa
He was asked on July 4 1950 to submit a separate 777 application for each area which he did on July 27 1950
Some defects were pointed out in these applications and therefore the appellant submitted fresh applications on September 6 1950 after removing the defects
In the meantime the third respondent also made applications for mining leases for manganese for the same area on July 10 1950
These applications were not accompanied by the deposit required under r 29 of the Rules
Consequently the third respondent was asked on July 24 1950 to deposit a sum of Rs 500 which it did on August 3 1950
It was then found that the third respondent s applications were defective
It was therefore asked on September 5 1950 to send a separate application in the prescribed form for each block and thereupon it submitted fresh applications on September 6 1950
Eventually on December 22 1952 the State of Orissa granted the mining leases of the five areas to the appellant taking into account r 32 of the Rules which prescribed priority
It was held that the appellant s applications were prior and therefore the leases were granted to him
Thereafter on April 21 1953 possession of the areas leased was delivered to the appellant
It seems however that the third respondent had applied for review to the Central Government under r 52 of the Rules
This review application was allowed by the Central Government on January 28 1954 and the Government of Orissa was directed to grant a mining lease to the third respondent with respect to two out of the five areas
The appellant s complaint is that he came to know in February 1954 that the third respondent had applied to the Central Government under r 52 for review
He thereupon addressed a letter to the Central Government praying that he might be given a hearing before any order was passed on the review application
He was however informed on July 5 1955 by the Government of Orissa of the order passed by the Central Government on January 28 1954 by which the lease granted to him by the State of Orissa with respect to two areas was cancelled
Consequently he made an application under article 226 of the 778 Constitution to the Punjab High Court praying for quashing the order of January 28 1954 on the ground that it was a quasi judicial order and the rules of natural justice had not been followed inasmuch as he had not been given a hearing before the review application was allowed by the Central Government thus affecting his rights to the lease granted by the State of Orissa
The writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court and it was held that the order was not a quasi judicial order but merely an administrative one and that there being no lis the appellant was not entitled to a hearing
In the result the writ petition failed
The appellant went up in Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court which upheld the order of the learned Single Judge
The appellant then applied for a certificate to permit him to appeal to this Court which was granted and that is how the matter has come up before us
Shri N C Chatterji appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that the Central Government was acting in a quasi judicial capacity when it passed the order under r 54 of the Rules and therefore it was incumbent upon it to hear the appellant before deciding the review application and inasmuch as it did not do so it contravened the principles of natural justice which apply in such a case and the order is liable to be quashed
In support of this learned counsel relies on Nagendra Nath Bora and another vs The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam and others 1 and submits that rr 52 to 55 of the Rules which are relevant for the purpose clearly show that the proceeding before the Central Government is a quasi judicial proceeding in view of the following circumstances appearing from these rules 1 Rule 52 gives a statutory right to any person aggrieved by an order of the State Government to apply for review in case of refusal of a mining lease 2 It also prescribes a period of limitation namely two months 3 Rule 53 prescribes a fee for an application under r 52
These circumstances taken with the circumstance that a lis is 1  779 created as soon as a person aggrieved by an order is given the right to go up in review against another person in whose favour the order has been passed by the State Government show that the proceeding before the Central Government at any rate at the stage Of review is quasi judicial to which rules of natural justice apply
Mr G section Pathak appearing for the third respondent on the other hand contends that the view taken by the High Court is correct and that the order of January 28 1954 is a mere administrative order and therefore it was not necessary for the Central Government to hear either party before passing that order
He points out that the minerals for mining which the lease is granted under the Rules are the property of the State
No person applying for a mining lease of such minerals has any right to the grant of the lease
According to him the right will only arise after the lease has been granted by the State Government and the review application if any has been decided by the Central Government
He submits that even under r 32 which deals with priority the State Government is not bound to grant the lease to the person who applies first and it can for any special reason and with the prior approval of the Central Government grant it to a person who applies later
His contention further is that as at the earlier stage when the grant is made by the State Government the order granting the lease is a mere administrative order as it must be in these circumstances he asserts  the order passed on review by the Central Government must also partake of the same nature
In order to decide between these rival contentions it is useful to refer to rules 52 to 55 which fall for consideration in this case
These are the rules as they existed up to 1953
Since then we are told there have been amendments and even the Act has been replaced by the 
We are however not concerned with the Rules as modified after January 1954 or with the Act of 1957
Rule 52 inter alia provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the 780 State Government refusing to grant a mining lease may within two months of the date of such order apply to the Central Government for reviewing the same
Rule 53 prescribes a fee
Rule 54 may be quoted in extenso  Upon receipt of such application the Central Government may if it thinks fit call for the relevant records and other information from the State Government and after considering any explanation that may be offered by the State Government cancel the order of the State Government or revise it in such manner as the Central Government may deem just and proper
 Rule 55 then says that the order of the Central Government under r 54 and subject only to such order any order of the State Government under these rules shall be final
This Court had occasion to consider the nature of the two kinds of acts namely judicial which includes quasi judicial and administrative a number of times
In Province of Bombay vs Kushaldas section Advani 1 it adopted the celebrated definition of a quasi judicial body given by Atkin L J in R vs Electricity Commissioners 2 which is as follows  Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King s Bench Division exercised in these writs
 This definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be a quasi judicial act namely that the body of persons 1 must have legal authority 2 to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and 3 must have the duty to act judicially
After analysing the various cases Das J as he then was laid down the following principles as deducible therefrom in Kushaldas section Advani s case 1at p 725   i That if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense to decide 1  2 781 disputes arising out of a claim made by any party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine  the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi judicial act and ii that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject then although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially
 It is on these principles which are now well settled that we have to see whether the Central Government when acting under r 54 is acting in a quasi judicial capacity or otherwise
It is not necessary for present purposes to decide whether State Government when it grants a lease is acting merely administratively
We shall assume that the order of the State Government granting a lease under the Rules is an administrative order
We have however to see what the position is after the State Government has granted a lease to one of the applicants before it and has refused the lease to others
Mr Pathak contends that even in such a situation there is no right in favour of the person to whom the lease has been granted by the State Government till the Central Government has passed an order on a review application if any
Rule 55 however makes clear that the order of the State Government is final subject to any order by the Central Government under r 54
Now when a lease is granted by the State Government it is quite possible that there may be no application for review by those whose applications have been refused
In such a case the order of the State Government would be final
It would not therefore be in our opinion right to say that no right of any kind is created in favour of a person to whom the lease is 782 granted by the State Government
The matter would be different if the order of the State Government were not to be effective until confirmation by the Central Government for in that case no right would arise until the confirmation was received from the Central Government
But r 54 does not provide for confirmation by the Central Government
It gives power to the Central Government to act only when there is an application for review before it under r 54
That is why we have not accepted Mr Pathak s argument that in substance the State Government s order becomes effective only after it is confirmed r 54 does not support this
We have not found any provision in the Rules or in the Act which gives any power to the Central Government to review suo motu the order of the State Government granting a lease
That some kind of right is created on the passing of an order granting a lease is clear from the facts of this case also
The order granting the lease was made in December 1952
In April 1953 the appellant was put in possession of the areas granted to him and actually worked them thereafter
At any rate when the statutory rule grants a right to any party aggrieved to make a review application to the Central Government it certainly follows that the person in whose favour the order is made has also a right to represent his case before the authority to whom the review application is made
It is in the circumstances apparent that as soon as r 52 gives a right to an aggrieved party to apply for review a lis is created between him and the party in whose favour the grant has been made
Unless therefore there is anything in the statute to the contrary it will be the duty of the authority to act judicially and its decision would be a quasi judicial act
The next question is whether there is anything in the Rules which negatives the duty to act judicially by the reviewing authority
Mr Pathak urges that r 54 gives full power to the Central Government to act as it may deem I just and proper  and that it is not bound even to call for the relevant records and other information from the State Government before deciding an application for review
That is undoubtedly 783 so
But that in our opinion does not show that the statutory Rules negative the duty to act judicially
What the Rules require is that the Central Government should act justly and properly and that is what an authority which is required to act judicially must do
The fact that the Central Government is not bound even to call for records again does not negative the duty cast upon it to act judicially for even courts have the power to dismiss appeals without calling for records
Thus r 54 lays down nothing to the contrary
We are therefore of opinion that there is prima facie a lis in this case as between the person to whom the lease has been granted and the person who is aggrieved by the refusal and therefore Prima facie it is the duty of the authority which has to review the matter to act judicially and there is nothing in r 54 to the contrary
It must therefore be held that on the Rules and the Act as they stood at the relevant time the Central Government was acting in a quasi judicial capacity while deciding an application under r 54
As such it was incumbent upon it before coming to a decision to give a reasonable opportunity to the appellant who was the other party in the review application whose rights were being affected to represent his case
In as much as this was not done the appellant is entitled to ask us to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of January 281954 passed by the Central Government
We therefore allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court quash the order of the Central Government passed on January 28 1954
It will however be open to the Central Government to proceed to decide the review application afresh after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to represent his case
The appellant will get his costs throughout from the third respondent who is the principal contesting party
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The question for decision in the appeal was the right of the revenue authorities of the State Government concerned to resume certain lands known as patelki huq inam  which lay in the jagir village of Nawabag situate in the ceded area of Berar
The lands were granted by the then sovereign authority by way of remuneration or emoluments for services to be rendered by the patel the grant was of ancient origin and was recognised as a  service inam  by the British Government
In the village of Nawabag there were four families of patels who went by the surnames of Dongre Rokade Raut and Ingle the members of which held the patel s office in rotation of ten years
There was a partition in the Rokade family as result of which the patelki inam  lands were divided and the lands in suit were allotted to the share of the appellant who never held the patel s office
During an enquiry for the preparation of the record of rights of the said jagir village it was held that the appellant was not entitled to hold the patelki inam  lands which were given as emoluments for service to the working patel and the Financial Commissioner finally held that the person actually working as patel was entitled to receive the full emoluments of his office and confirmed the order that the lands in possession of the appellant should be resumed and regranted to the working patel viz the respondent No 1
On the question of the true nature of the patelki huq inam two points arose 1 was it a grant by way of remuneration or emoluments of the patel s office by the use of the land or 2 was it a grant of land to the patelki family burdened with service and so long as the service was performed by any member of the family the lands were joint family lands subject to partition etc
among the members of the family
Held that the patelki inam  in this case was in its origin a grant by way of remuneration for patelki service by the sovereign authority it was separate from and independent of the jagir of Nawabag though the land lay within the jagir village
In its true character the patelki inam  was land given in lieu of wages or emoluments for the office of patel it could not be freely alienated and the Government could resume the land
Held further that where one of two or more patels of the village held office in turn by rotation that did not mean that 711 the patel ceases to be a patel when his turn was over he continued to be a patel and to enjoy his emoluments of office
Held also that there was nothing in the Inam Rules 1859 on the basis of which a person could claim as of right that he had a share in the patelki inam  lands as a member of the patel s family irrespective of whether he performed the service or not
A member of the patel s family was not entitled as of right to a share in the emoluments of the patel s office and Government had every right to resume patelki inam  lands and regrant them to the officiator in accordance with the provisions of the Patel and Patwaris Law 1900 and section 1900 of the Berar Land Revenue Code 1928
Held also that on the finding that the lands were given by way of emoluments for the patel s office no question of title by adverse possession arose against the Government in the circumstances of the case
Venkata Jagannadha vs Veerabhadrayya 1921 LR IA 224 referred to
Krishnarao vs Nilkantha and Others AIR 1922 Nag
52 Mir Subhan Ali vs Imami Begum 1925 21 Nag
L Reports 117 Lakhamgouda Basavaprabhu Sardesai vs Baswantrao and Others AIR 1931 PC 157 Jaiwantrao and Another vs Sahebyao 1933 29 Nag
L Reports 210 and Raje Shrinivasrao vs Raje Vinayakrao ILR discussed