ICTION Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984 and 572 573 of 1985
From the Judgment and Order dated 12101983 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP Nos
1659 1777 and 1659 of 1983
Writ Petition C Nos
11106 27 of 1984
PG NO 1053 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India UR Lalit DN Goburdhan and Pankaj Kalra for the Appellants
RN Sachthey DS Tewatia Anip Sachthey and Mahabir Singh for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT J
In these appeals and writ petitions the appellants and the petitioners have challenged the validity of the acquisition of their land by the State of Haryana under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act  for a public purpose namely for the development and utilisation of land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act 1977 by the Haryana Urban Development Authority for short HUDA
Although both in the appeals and in the writ petitions the validity of acquisition has been challenged we propose to deal with the appeals first
The appeals are directed against the judgments of the Punjab  Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petitions of the Appellants questioning the validity of the acquisition of their land and praying for the quashing of such acquisition
The first ground of attack to the acquisition as urged by Mr Lalit the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984 is the non publication of the substance of the notification under section 41 of the Act in the locality of the land sought to be acquired It is true that section 41 enjoins that the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality
It is however preeminently a question of fact
The allegation of the appellants as to the non publication of the notification under section 41 as made in the writ petition before the High Court was emphatically denied and disputed in paragraph 8 of the affidavit in opposition affirmed by the Land Acquisition Collector Paragraph 8 reads as follows 8
In reply to para 8 of the writ petition
it is submitted that the averments of the petitioners are wrong and denied
The publicity of the substance of the notification was made in concerned locality of village PG NO 1054 Dundahera on 6th July 1981 through Shri Chhattar Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beating of empty tin
The report exists in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No 519 dated 671981
Similarly the publicity was made in concerned locality of village Mulahera through Shri Surjan Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beat of empty tin Kanaster
A report to this effect exists in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No 520 dated 67 1981
The publicity was made on this very day on which the notification was issued
In response to this publicity 157 land owners filed objection applications which clearly shows that due publicity was made in the concerned locality and the averments of the petitioners are wrong baseless and hence denied
 It is apparent from the statement made in paragraph 8 that the substance of the notification under section 41 was published in the concerned localities of villages Dundahera and Mulahera
It is however urged on behalf of the appellants that it was not at all possible to make entries in the Roznamcha as to the publication of the notification under section 41 on the same day it was published in both the villages
It is submitted that on this ground the statement in paragraph 8 as to the publication of the substance of the notification in the localities should not be accepted and it should be held that there was no such publication is alleged
We are afraid we are unable to accept the contention
Apart from the statement that there was publication of the notification there is further statement in paragraph 8 that pursuant to such publication 157 land owners filed objections to the proposed acquisition
This fact has not been disputed before us on behalf of the appellants
Moreover Mr Tewatia learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana has produced before us the original objection petitions filed by the land owners
In each of these objection petitions there is a note at the end which reads as follows Note The above referred notification was announced by the beat of drum in the village Dundahera on 671981 vide Patwari s Roznamcha Report No 519 dated 671981 Similar notes as extracted above are there in the petitions of objections filed by the land owners of village Mulahera
In view of the facts stated above the allegation of the appellants that the substance of the notification under section 41 of the Act was not published in the localities of the two villages mentioned above is without any foundation whatsoever
The contention of the appellants in this regard is rejected
PG NO 1055 The next ground of attack to the acquisition comes from Mr Kalra the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos 572  573 of 1985
It is urged by the learned Counsel that the sole purpose of the acquisition is for a profiteering venture of the Government to acquire land of the helpless farmers at a nominal price of Rs 10 Rs 20 or Rs 50 per square yard and then to resale the same at a high profit
It is submitted that a welfare State should work for the poor and the down trodden of the society rather than to displace them from their land for the sake of making profit
Our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel to an application filed in this Court by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation for short HSIDC praying for impleading it as a party respondent in these appeals
In this application it has been stated inter alia by HSIDC that it plays an important role in the industrialisation of the State by providing concessional finance and offering land at no profit no loss basis along with infra structure facilities for setting up new industrial units in the State
Further it is stated that the land in Udhyog Vihar Phase lV land which is the subject matter of these appeals was acquired by HUDA and later sold to HSIDC at the approximate price of Rs 55000 per acre
In paragraph 5 of the application it is stated that on account of the price of the above land of Phase lV approximately Rs 174 crores was paid by the the HSIDC to HUDA
The said payment was made out of the amounts received from the intended allotteesentrepreneurs and also out to the fundsreserves of the HSIDC and that a sum of Rs 490 crores is estimated to be spent on the development of the industrial complex in question
Relying upon the above statements in the said application of HSIDC the learned Counsel for the appellants endeavours to substantiate his contention that the impugned acquisition is nothing but a profiteering venture of the Government
It is urged that the said statements in the application prove that the Government has made huge profit in the guise of development and utilisation of the land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon
In support of the contention Mr Kalra has placed reliance upon an observation of Mahajan J as he then was in the State of Bihar vs Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh  namely that it is a well accepted proposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State
The learned Counsel has also placed reliance on the observation in the minority judgment of Wanchoo J PG NO 1056 in Arnold Rodricks vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1966 SC 1788
In that case the enquiries purported to be held under section 5A and section 11 of the Act were challenged as illegal invalid and inoperative in law
In that connection the validity of the definition of Public purpose in clause f of section 3 of the Act as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953 also came to be considered
Clause 2 of the amended definition in clause f reads as follows f
the expression Public purpose includes 1          2 the acquisition of land for purposes of the development of areas from public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or any part by lease assignment or sale will be object of securing further development
 Wanchoo J observed as follows 33
The attack of the petitioners is on the second part of the addition in 1953 which provides for subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease assignment or sale with the object of securing further development
 It is urged that all these words means that after the development envisaged in the first part of the addition the State or the local authority would be free to dispose of the land acquired in whole or in part by lease assignment or sale apparently to private persons
This it is said means that the State or the local authority would acquire land in the first instance and develop it in the manner already indicated and thereafter make profit by leasing assigning or selling it to private individuals or bodies
It is also said that the object of securing further development which is the reason for sale or lease etc
is a very vague expression and there is nothing to show what this further development comprises of
It is true that when this part speaks of subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease assignment or sale it is not unlikely that this disposal will take place to private persons and thus in an indirect way the State would be acquiring the land from one set of individuals and disposing it of to another set of PG NO 1057 individuals after some development
If this were all there may be some force in the argument that such acquisition is not within the concept of public purpose as used in article 312
But this in our opinion is not all
We cannot ignore the words with the object of securing further development which appear in this provision
It would have been a different matter if the provision had stopped at the words lease assignment or sale but the provision does not stop there
It says that such lease assignment or sale must be with the object of securing further development and these words must be given some meaning
It is true that the words further development have not been defined but that was bound to be so for further development would depend upon the nature of the purpose for which the land is acquired
Of course it is possible that further development can be made by the State itself or by the local authority which acquired the land but we see no reason why the State or the local authority should not have the power to see that further development takes place even through private agencies by lease assignment or sale of such land
So long as the object is development and the land is made fit for the purpose for which it is acquired there is no reason why the State should not be permitted to see that further development of the land takes place in the direction for which the land is acquired even though that may be through private agencies
We have no doubt that where the State or the local authority decides that further development should take place through private agencies by disposal of the land so acquired by way of lease assignment or sale it will see that further development which it has in mind does take place
We can see no reason why if the land so acquired is leased assigned or sold the State or the local authority should not be able to impose terms on such lessees assignees or vendees that will enable further development on the lines desired to take place
We also see no reason why when imposing terms the State or the local authority may not provide that if the further development it desires the lessee assignee or vendee to make is not made within such reasonable time as the State or the local authority may fix the land will revert to the State or the local authority so that it may again be used for the purpose of further development which was the reason for the acquisition of the land
 PG NO 1058 We fail to understand how does the above observation help the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the acquisition has been made by the Government with a motive for profiteering in the guise of development and industrialisation
The observation of Wanchoo J relates to the definition of Public purpose under section 3f of the Act as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953
The amended provision specifically provides for the disposal of acquired land in whole or in part by lease assignment or sale but there is no such provision in the unamended section 3f of the Act with which we are concerned
Wanchoo J overruled the contention as to profiteering by the State or local authority as the amended provision made it very clear that such subsequent disposal of the acquired land will be for the purpose of securing further development
We do not think we are called upon to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the above observation and all that we say is that there is no such provision like the amended definition in section 3f of the Act with which we are concerned
In the circumstances
the observation has no manner of application in the instant case
In the writ petitions the point was taken as an abstract point of law
There was no attempt on the part of the appellants to substantiate the point by pleading relevant facts and producing relevant evidence
It is apparent that there was no material in the writ petitions in support of the contention of the appellants that the impugned acquisition was nothing but a profiteering venture
The contention was not also advanced before the High Court at the hearing of the writ petitions
The facts stated in he said application of the HSIDC do not in our opinion support the contention of the appellants
It is true that as stated in the said application HSIDC paid a sum of Rs 174 crores to HUDA but nothing turns out on that
The land was acquired by the Government for the purpose of development and industrialisation
The Government can do it itself or through other agencies
In the instant case the land was acquired at the instance of HUDA and thereafter HUDA had transferred the same to HSIDC
It is not that the land was transferred in the same condition as it was acquired
But we are told by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA and HSIDC that before transferring HUDA had made external developments incurring considerable cost and HSIDC in its turn has made various internal developments and in this way the land has been fully developed and made fit for industrialisation
Our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel for HUDA and HSIDC to the various external developments made by HUDA at a cost of Rs 166200 per acre before it was transferred to HSIDC and the cost that was incurred for external developments was included in the price
Thus there was no motive for HUDA to make any profit
PG NO 1059 The public purpose in question already noticed is development and industrialisation of the acquired land
The appellants have not challenged the said public purpose
In the absence of any such challenge it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the acquisition was merely a profiteering venture by the State Government through HUDA
The appellants will be awarded the market value of the land as compensation by the Collector
If they are dissatisfied with the award they may ask for references to the District Judge under section 18 of the Act
If they are still aggrieved they can file appeals to the High Court and ultimately may also come to this Court regarding the amount of compensation
The appellants cannot claim compensation beyond the market value of the land
In such circumstances we fail to understand how does the question of profiteering come in
Even assuming that HUDA has made some profit that will not in any way affect the public purpose for which the land was acquired and the acquisition will not be liable for any challenge on that ground
As has been already noticed although the point as to profiteering by the State was pleaded in the writ petitions before the High Court as an abstract point of law there was no reference to any material in support thereof nor was the point argued at the hearing of the writ petitions
Before us also no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC
In our opinion when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts the party raising the point if he is the writ petitioner must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent from the counter affidavit
If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit as the case may be the court will not entertain the point
In this context it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter affidavit
While in a pleading that is a plaint or a written statement the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it
So the point that has been raised before us PG NO 1060 by the appellants is not entertainable
But in spite of that we have entertained it to show that it is devoid of any merit
Equally untenable is the contention of the appellants that the acquisition is for HSIDC which is a company  within the meaning of section 3e of the Act and accordingly the acquisition is invalid for the non compliance with the provisions of Part III of the Act
In the notification under section 41 it has been clearly stated that the development and industrialisation of the acquired land would be made under the Haryana Development Authority Act 1977 by HUDA
It is therefore manifestly clear that HUDA was the acquiring authority and not HSIDC
It is for HUDA to develop the land fully either by itself or by any other agency or agencies
HUDA has transferred the land to HSIDC for the purpose of development and allotment to various persons
It is too much to say that as HUDA has transferred the acquired land to HSIDC the latter is the acquiring authority
We do not think that there is any substance in the contention and it is accordingly rejected
Now we may consider the contention made on behalf of the petitioners in the writ petitions Nos 11106 to 11127 of 1984
The first point that has been urged by Mr Goburdhan learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners is similar to that urged by Mr Lalit in Civil appeal No 1193 of 1984 namely non publication of the substance of the notification under section 41 of the Act in the locality
This contention need not detain us long for in the counter affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector it has been averred that the substance of the notification was published and out of 22 petitioners 16 filed their objections pursuant to the publication of the notification in the locality
A similar note as extracted above appears in all these objections
In the circumstances there is no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the substance of the notification under section 41 of the Act was not published in the locality
Next it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that before starting the proceedings for acquisition the Government had not applied its mind to its policy decision as contained in the circular No 2099 R III 8217113 dated 1851982 wherein it has been stated that in the matter of State s need for land for its development activities utmost restraint should be exercised in the acquisition of land
 It is submitted that as the land is agricultural it should not have been acquired in view of the said policy decision PG NO 1061 of the Government
We are unable to accept the contention
In a welfare State it is the duty of the Government to proceed with the work of development and take steps for the growth of industries which are necessary for the country s progress and prosperity and for solving the question of unemployment
It is true that agricultural land is necessary and should not ordinarily be converted to non agricultural use but keeping in view the progress and prosperity of the country the State has to strike a balance between the need for development of industrialisation and the need for agriculture
The allegation that before initiating the acquisition proceedings the Government has not applied its mind to the need for agricultural land is a very vague allegation without any material in support thereof
The contention is overruled
Lastly it is argued by Mr Goburdhan for the writ petitioners that the petitioners have been discriminated inasmuch as the land of other persons in the village has not been acquired
This contention is without any substance whatsoever
The Government will acquire only that amount of land which is necessary and suitable for the public purpose in question
The land belonging to the petitioners have been acquired obviously considering the same as suitable for the public purpose
The petitioners cannot complain of any discrimination because the land of other persons has not been acquired by the Government
The contention is devoid of any merit whatsoever
Before parting with these cases we may consider a short submission on behalf of the appellants as also the writ petitioners that as by the acquisition of their land they have become landless they should be allotted land by HSIDC after development so that they may start their businesses and earn their livelihood
After giving our anxious consideration to this submission we direct that if any of the appellants or the petitioners who has become really landless by the acquisition of his land makes an application for the allotment of land the HSIDC shall consider such application and give him priority in the matter of allotment provided he fulfils the conditions for such allotment and plot is available
Another short submission has been made on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984
Our attention has been drawn to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants and affirmed by one Sat Prakash son of Mathura Prashad one of the appellants that in Khasra No 2162 and in Khasra No 22101 there are a temple a Piaou and a Dharamshala
It is submitted that the land comprising the temple Piaou and Dharamshala may be exempted from acquisition
We do not PG NO 1062 consider it necessary to give any direction in this respect
The appellants however will be at liberty to make a representation in that regard to the authority concerned
No other point has been urged in these cases
For the reasons aforesaid subject to the directions given on the short submissions all the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed
There will however be no order as to costs in any of them
HSK Appeals and Petitions are dismissed


Summary:
In exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act 1952 the Central Government by a notification dated December 11 1956 appointed a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into and report in respect of certain companies mentioned in the Schedule attached to the notification and in respect of the nature and extent of the control and interest which certain persons named in the notification exercised over these companies
By subsequent notifications the Central Government made all the provisions of sub sections
2 3 4 and 5 Of section 5 Of the Act applicable to the Commission and fixed a period Of 2 years from February 11 1957 as the period within which the Commission was to exercise its function and to make its report
The four persons named filed three applications under article 226 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court questioning the validity of the Act and of the notification and praying for writs for quashing the same
The High Court dismissed the applications and ordered that the said notification was legal and valid except as to the last part of cl 10 thereof which empowered the Commission to recommend the action which should be taken as and by way of securing redress or punishment or to act as a preventive in future cases
The petitioners as well as the Union of India filed appeals  Held that the Act wag  valid and intra vires and that the notification was also valid excepting the words  as and by way of securing redress or punishment  in cl 10 thereof which went beyond the Act
The Act was enacted by Parliament under entry 94 of List I and entry 45 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which relate to inquiries for the purposes of any of the matters in List I and in Lists 11 and III respectively
The inquiry which may be set up by a law made under these entries is not limited 280 in its scope and ambit to future legislative purposes only
Such a law may also be for administrative purposes and the scope of the inquiry under such a law will cover all matters which may properly be regarded as ancillary to such inquiries
The Act does not delegate to the Government any arbitrary or uncontrolled power and does not offend article 14 Of the Constitution
The discretion given to the Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry is guided by the policy laid down in the Act that the executive action is to be taken only when there exists a definite matter of public importance into which an inquiry is necessary
Kathi Raning Rawat vs State of Saurashtra 1952 section C R 435 applied
The Commission is merely to investigate record its findings and make its recommendations which are not enforceable proprio vigore
The inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called and consequently Parliament or the Government cannot be said to have usurped the functions of the judiciary
The notification was well within the powers conferred on the Government by section 3 Of the Act and did not go beyond the provisions of the Act
The conduct of an individual person or company or a group of individual persons or companies may in certain circumstances become a definite matter of public importance within the meaning Of section 3i and call for an inquiry
Besides section 3 authorises the Government to appoint a Commission
of Inquiry not only for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance but also for the purpose of performing such functions as may be specified in the notification
It has not been established that the petitioners and their companies have been arbitrarily singled out for the purpose of hostile and discriminatory treatment and subjected to a harassing and oppressive inquiry
In matters of this kind the Government has of necessity to act upon the information available to it
It is the best judge of the reliability of the source of the information and if it acts in good faith and honestly comes to the conclusion that the act and conduct of the petitioners and the affairs of their companies constitute a definite matter of public importance the Court will be slow to adjudge the action to be bad and illegal
The bare possibility that the powers may be misused or abused cannot Per se make the power bad
The power having been entrusted to the Central Government and not to any petty official abuse of power cannot be easily assumed
In determining whether there is any intelligible differentia on the basis of which the petitioners and their companies have been grouped together it is permissible to look not only at the facts appearing in the notification but also the facts brought to the notice of the Court upon affidavits
The facts in the present case 281 afford sufficient support to the presumption of constitutionality of the notification and the petitioners have failed to discharge the onus which was on them to prove that other people or companies similarly situated have been left out and that the petitioners and their companies have been singled out for discriminatory and hostile treatment
The recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry are of great importance to the Government in order to enable it to make up its mind as to what legislative or administrative measures should be adopted to eradicate the evil found or to implement the beneficial objects it has in view
There can be no objection to the Commission recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will in its opinion be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future
But the Commission cannot be asked to make recommendations for taking any action  as and by way of securing redress or punishment  in respect of wrongs already done or committed as this is the function of a Court of law
Even though the original notification appointing the Commis sion did not fix the time within which the Commission was to complete its report the Government could validly do so by a subsequent notification