ivil Appeal No 1147 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 229
1989 of the AP Administrative Tribunal Hyderabad in Representation Peti tion No 3843 of 1989
TVSN Chari Mrs B Sunita Rao and Ms Manjula Gupta for the Appellants
K Madhava Reddy DRK Reddy Vimal Dave B Rajeshwar Rao and Mudu Vijai for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
This is an appeal by the AP Public Service Commission against the decision of the AP Administrative Tribunal dated September 22 1989
The appeal raises a question as to the scope of Rule 5 of the AP Police Service Rules 1966
The facts are not in dispute and may be stated as fol lows The Public Service Commission issued an AdvertisementNotification No 181983 inviting applications for selection in a Combined Competitive Examination to be held in November 1983 at Anantapur Guntur Hyderabad Kakinada Tirupathi Visakhapatnam and Warangal Centres for recruitment to the posts included in Grade I Services
The 465 Notification was published in the Gazette dated August 25 1983
The post of Deputy Superintendent of Police was one of the posts for which applications were invited
The respond ent applied to that post as well as to other posts
The minimum age prescribed for selection to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police was 21 years as on July 1 1983 as against 18 years for other posts
The respondent did not complete 21 years as on July 1 1983
He was short by 19 days and his case therefore was not considered for ap pointment to post of Deputy Superintendent of Police
He was however considered to other posts since it was a combined selection for Grade I Services
In 1984 the Public Service Commission conducted prelim inary examination for the eligible candidates
In 1985 final examination was conducted
In 1986 the candidates were called for interview
On 27 March 1987 the list of selected candidates was prepared for appointment to differ ent categories of posts
The respondent was selected as Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies
On 15 April 1989 ie about two years after the selec tion the respondent approached the Andhra Pradesh Adminis trative Tribunal contending inter alia that the date for attaining the minimum age prescribed under the Notification was contrary to Rule 5 of the AP Police Service Rules 1966
He claimed that such date ought to be the date of preparation of the list of selected candidates and not any date anterior to it
He accordingly sought a direction to the Public Service Commission to select him to the post of Deputy SUperintendent of Police since he had satisfied the required minimum age of 21 years as on the date of the select list
The Tribunal has accepted that contention and issued a direction to the State Government to create an additional post as a special case and appoint the respondent as Deputy Superintendent of Police if necessary by reducing the number of posts for recruitment for the next year
The decision of the Tribunal has been challenged in this appeal by the Public Service Commission since the view expressed therein is likely to affect the appointment of a large number of candidates
There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the AP Police Service Rules
It is therefore necessary to look first at that Rule
Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides 466 Rule 5
Qualifications A No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he i has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made
XXX XXX XXX The Rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police
Minimum age is 21 years
The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made
He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day
The Tribunal while construing this Rule has observed According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in for warding the list to the appointing authority
The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list
A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is pre pared
In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage
 If the word selection  is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified
But round phrases cannot give square answers
Before accepting that meaning we must see the consequences anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to
The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment
Indeed it consists of various steps like inviting applications scrutiny of applications rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates conducting examinations calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment
Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps
When such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date
If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons the candidates who are 467 eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs
The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must therefore be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications
It would be therefore unreasonable to con strue the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list
Nothing so bad would have been intended by the Rule making authority
The appeal therefore is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal
In the circumstances of the case however we make no order as to costs
PSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant landlord obtained a decree of eviction of respondent No 1 company from the suit premises
Aggrieved respondent No 1 filed a Writ Petition before the High Court
Dismissing the Petition the High Court granted eight weeks  time to respondent No 1 for vacating the suit prem ises subject to the filing of an undertaking that it will not part with the possession of or create third party interest in the suit premises in any manner whatsoever
After some correspondence respondent No 3 by an affidavit filed the required undertaking on behalf of respondent No 1 but without mentioning that the respondent No 1 had not already parted with possession of the suit premises or created any third party interest therein
Later counsel for respondent No 1 clarified that when the undertaking stated that respondent No I would not part with possession it meant that respondent No 1 was in possession
But in the meantime respondent No 2 Chairman of respondent No 1 Company filed a suit claiming a declaration that he was the lawful sub tenant and the decree for possession was a nulli ty and obtained an injunction thus preventing the appellant from executing the decree
Thereupon the appellant filed a petition for contempt before the High Court praying that the respondents should be punished under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act 1972
The High Court rejected the petition
381 In the appeal before this Court it was contended on behalf of the landlord appellant that the High Court was in error in holding that no contempt was established against the respondents that the undertaking clearly implied that respondent No 1 was in possession of the premises and was in a position to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the same after eight weeks which was also made clear from the clarification given by counsel for respondent No 1 that this assuranceundertaking was false as by that time re spondent No 2 had already filed a suit claiming sub tenan cy from respondent that the record disclosed that respond ents No 1 and 2 were acting in collusion with a view to defeat the decree obtained by the appellant and to prevent the execution of the decree and that the resolution of the respondent No 1 under which respondent No 2 was claiming sub tenancy was fabricated and antedated
It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that before a Court could take any action for contempt it must be strictly established that the contempt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt as an action for contempt was in the nature of a criminal proceeding
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 
I The Proceedings in the contempt are quasi criminal in nature and law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted and the requirements of that law must be strictly complied with before any person can be committed for contempt
However where there is patent dishonesty writ large on the face of the record the law does not require that this Court should sit back with folded hands and fail to take any action in the matter
In exercise of its juris diction under clause 1 of Article 142 of the Constitution this Court may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it
391G H C D 12 In the instant case respondent No 1 gave an under taking based on an implication or assumption which was false in its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent No 2
Respondent No 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of this undertaking
This implication or assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the counsel for respondent No 1
Respondent No 2 was equally responsible for instructing counsel to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge of both respondents Nos 1 and 2
Both respondent No 1 and respondent No 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant
In view of this it cannot be said that they are not guilty of contempt
382 Respondent No 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to con tempt and must be held to have committed contempt by giving the undertaking and instructing its counsel to give the clarification of the meaning of the undertaking knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit prem ises and was not in a position to give possession of the suit premises to the appellant in execution of the decree in favour of the appellant or otherwise
There is no doubt that respondent No 2 was a party to this breach of the undertaking being committed and in fact it was at his instance that respondent No 1 committed the breach of the undertaking
391H 392A B 391E F 13 Respondents No 1 and 2 cannot be allowed to thwart the execution of the decree and continue to remain in pos session of the suit premises
No doubt the claim set up by respondent No 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him to establish that he is a sub tenant of the suit premises and entitled to protection of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodg ing House Rates Control Act 1947 cannot be foreclosed
However by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit the appellant can no longer be deprived of the posses sion of the said premises pursuant to the decree obtained by her till the claim in the declaratory suit is established
392C E 14 The Court Receiver
High Court who has already been appointed should appoint the appellant as his agent in place of the existing agent and hand over possession of the suit premises to her on such terms and conditions as he may think fit
It would be open to respondent No 2 to apply for vacation or variation of the order in the event of his being able to establish his right to sub tenancy
392G 393C Noorali Babul Thanewala vs Sh
KMM Shetty and Ors
 JT  relied on