ivil Appeal Nos
224  734 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 17687 of the Calcut ta High Court in Ref
No 183 from CR Case No 2938 4081  Civil Order No 253781 CR Case No 7581 Civil Order No 36282  CR No 3803 of 1980
Dr Shankar Ghosh Badar Durrez Ahmed Parijat Sinha AK Sarkar AK Sahay for the Appellants
Kuldip Singh Additional Solicitor General A K Gan guli CV Subba Rao A Subba Rao and Hemant Sharma for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH J
These appeals by certificate pre ferred against the common order dated 1761987 of the High Court of Calcutta in Full Bench Reference 1 of 1983 raise a short and interesting question of some general importance whether the choice of the forum for the cognizance of suits envisaged in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act 1890 As substituted by Section 14 of the Indian Railways Amendment Act 1961 Act 39 of 1961 is limited by Section 80 itself or whether provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Section 19 of the  as the cases may be in regard to places of suing are also applicable to the suits referred to in the said Section 80
The question in other words is whether the said Sec tion 80 is a complete self contained exhaustive Code in regard to the place of suing respecting suits constituting a special law for such suits excluding by necessary implica tion the operation of provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency 443 Small Cause Courts Act 1882
The Full Bench resolving the earlier conflicts of Judicial opinion in the High Court on the points has held Section 80 as containing within it a self contained scheme for suits envisaged by it and that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of the stand excluded from operation
The Full Bench however has left open the question whether Section 80 also over rides clause 12 of the letters patent
In the original proceedings from which CA 224 of 1988 arises appellant instituted Money Suit No 35 of 1978 against the Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub Judge at Alipore Distt 24 Parganas West Bengal seeking recovery of Rs 13200 respecting an alleged short delivery of a consignment booked with the Respondent on 9441975 Ex Ernakulam to Ranchi a station under the South Eastern Railway Administration
Respondent contested the suit on grounds inter alia that having regard to the said Section 80 the Court at Alipore had no jurisdiction
The trial Court by its order 225
1981 having rejected this objection as to jurisdiction Respondent preferred CR 2938 of 1981 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court to have that order revised
The matter was re ferred to a Full Bench culminating in the order now under appeal
In CA 734 of 1988 appellant instituted a Suit No 3831 of 1985 in the Court of the Small Causes Calcutta for the recovery of a sum of Rs657350p
on account of snort deliveries of two consignments booked with the Respondent on 2741984 and 2471984 respectively Ex Saugar in Central Railway to Ramkrishtopur in Eastern Railway
Similar objec tion as to jurisdiction having been urged the trial Court rejected that objection and decreed the suit
This was assailed before the High Court by the Respondent
The Full Bench by its common order has held that the trial Court had no jurisdiction and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court
In order that the contentions of Dr Shankar Ghosh urged in support of these appeals are apprehended in their proper perspective it becomes necessary to refer to and notice the legislative history of the provision
Section 14 of the Indian Railways Amendment Act 1961 substituted the old Section 80 by a new provision
The old Section reads Section 80 suit for compensation for injury to through booked traffic 444 Notwithstanding anything in any agreement purporting to limit the liability of Railway Administration with respect to traffic while on the Railway of the another Administration a suit for compensation for loss of the life of or personal injury to a passenger or for loss destruction or deterioration of animals or goods where the passenger was or the ani mals or goods were booked through over the Railways of two or more Railway Administra tions may be brought either against the Railway Administration from which the passen gers obtained his pass or purchased his tick et or to which the animals or goods were delivered by the consignor thereof as the case may be or against the Railway Adminis tration on whose Railway the loss injury destruction or deterioration occurred The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by the amending Act provides 80
Suits for Compensation A suit for com pensation for loss of the life of or personal injury to a passenger or for loss destruc tion damage deterioration or non delivery of animals or goods may be instituted
a if the passenger was or the animals or goods were booked from one station to another on the railway of the same railway administration against that railways adminis tration b if the passenger was or the animals or goods were booked through over the railway of two or more railway administration against the railway administration from which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or to which the animals or goods were delivered for carriage as the case may be or against the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies or the loss injury destruction damage or deterioration occurred and in either case the suit may be instituted in a Court having jurisdic tion over the place at which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or the animals or goods were delivered for car riage as the case may be or 445 over the place in which the destination sta tion lies or the loss injury destruction damage or deterioration occurred
 The changes brought about in the scheme of the provisions are quite marked
The old Section did not deal with liabil ity for claims in respect of goods carried by a single Railway
It concerned itself with goods etc carried by more than one Railways or what in the concerned jargon is called through booked traffic and provided that a suit inter alia for loss destruction damage deterioration or nondelivery could be brought against the Railway Administra tion with which the booking had taken place or against the Railway Administration of the delivery station
The old section spoke nothing of the places where such suits could be laid
The choice of the forum was regulated by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant provisions of the  as the case may be
This Court in Union of India vs Ladu Lal Jain  observed that the principal place of Railway Administra tion can be said to be the place where the Railways can be said to carry on business for purposes of clause a of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure
It was held The principle behind the provisions of Cls
a and b of section 20 is that the suit be instituted at a place where the defendant be able to defend the suit without undue trouble   
Union of India carries on the busi ness of running railways and can be sued in the Court of the subordinate Judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the head quarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated
 This was said in a case governed by the old Section
Does the position continue to hold good even after the new Sec tion 80 was substituted in place of the old the new Section 80 substituted by Act 39 of 1961 however brought about far reaching changes in its scheme the notable amongst them being three
The new Section made specific reference to a certain class of suits having regard to their subject matter to be dealt with under that Sec tion
Secondly the new Section also dealt with identity of the Railway Administrations which were made liable to the claim 446 and thirdly the section specifically provided the places where such suits may be instituted
Referring generally to the scope of the changes brought about by the 1961 amendment to Chapter VII of the Railways Act 1890 this Court in Union of India vs The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate Poona  observed The history and the object with which the radical provisions of the new Act were intro duced bear testimony to change of the nature of the liability of the railway administra tion We therefore agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that under the new Act the liability of the Railway has been increased so as to take upon itself the responsibility of a common carrier The new comprehensiveness of the scheme of the amend ments was one of the circumstances that commended itself to the High Court to persuade it to hold that the new Section 80 in Chapter VII constituted a complete and self contained special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envis aged by that Section derogating from the generality of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Courts and that with the enactment of the new Section 80 there was an implied repeal of those other provisions re specting such suits
The High Court took due notice of the fact that the new Section did not expressly provide that in respect of suits envisaged by it the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the  as the case may be shall no longer be applicable
The High Court took due note of the situation emerging from this omission
It noticed the new Section 80 no doubt did not ex pressly provide that the said provision of Section 80 of the Act would override all other laws
But Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act is in the nature of the special provision applicable only to suits for compensation against the Railways The point is whether by enacting  the suit may be instituted in the Courts having jurisdiction over the places mentioned in the last part of Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act 1890 the said Section of the Railways Act by 447 implication overrides section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 and Section 18 of the  The High Court took into consideration what according to it was the real intention in enacting the new Section 80 and was persuaded to the view that the Section brought about an implied repeal of the other provisions as to the juris diction of Courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to these suits
It was observed By mentioning the Courts in which the suits for compensation may be filed Section 80 of the Railways Act purports to deal with matters which have been dealt with in Section 20 of the Code and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act
These two sets of laws deal with the same subject of territorial jurisdiction of Courts
We are therefore required to ascertain whether in respect of suits for compensation against the Railways the intention was to override the general law We have already indicated that Section 80 of the Railways Act was a particular or special legislation
Section 80 of the Railways Act purports to deal with the subject of places for instituting particular class of suits which was previously covered by Section 20 of the Code which was a general enactment
Two statutes cover the same field ie territo rial jurisdiction
Mentioning for the first time in Section 80 of the Railways Act of the places where suits for compensation may be instituted was itself introductive of a new law implying a negative
When the same subject of territorial jurisdiction has been dealt with in the subsequent legislation ie Section 80 of the Railways Act the prior laws Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of the  on the same subject were not intended to subsist In other words Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act by requiring something special to be done repealed by necessary implication the former general statute relating to territorial jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the suits for compensation against the Railways were concerned Any other construction according to the High Court would lead 448 to anomalies and render Section 80 a surplus age
High Court said If it was to be held that clause c of Section 20 of the Code still applied to suits for compensation against the Railways then the cause of action for the purpose of juris diction of Courts would arise not only at the three places mentioned in Section 80 of the Act but at several other places
In other words the provisions of Section 80 of the Act relating to places where the suits for compen sation may be instituted would be in that event surplusage and unnecessary
In the view of the High Court the distinction be tween provisions in the New Section 80 on the one hand and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Small Cause Courts Act on the other assumed particular significance as qualifying the Court s jurisdiction in respect of a particular subject matter as distinct from those that relate to a Court s territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction
The High Court observed Section 80 of the Railways Act in effect limits the application of Section 20 of the Code by specifying the Courts which shall have jurisdiction over the suits whose subject matter is the claim for compensation against the Railways for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger or loss destruction damage deterioration or non delivery of animals or goods
We have already held that Section 80 of the Act in other words is in the nature of a special provision in respect of classes of suits mentioned in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act
Dr Shankar Ghosh assailing the soundness of the High Court s view urged that the proposition on which its con clusions rest if accepted would render what was intended as a mere an enabling entitlement to lose its character as such and become on the contrary a limiting factor and convert a right into a liability
Dr Ghosh said that the legislative intent was clear it did not render Section 80 over riding by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure
It expressly supplied says Dr Ghosh an enabling provision when it chose the expression   may be instituted
It is further con tended that the doctrine of implied repeal was clearly inapplicable to the situation
449 Dr Ghosh commended for acceptance the reasoning of the Assam and Madras High Courts in Assam Cold Storage vs Union of India AIR 1971 Assam 69 and Hindustan Machine fools vs Union of India AIR 1985 Madras 130 respectively in pref erence to the views of the Calcutta Bombay Delhi and Karnataka High Courts in Oghamal Chaudhury vs Union of India  Union of India vs Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd AIR 1981 Bombay 414 New India Assurance Co vs Union of India AIR 1981 Delhi 135 and Union of India vs CR Prabhanna AIR 1977 132 respectively
The thrust of the arguments of Dr Ghosh is that the construction placed by the High Court ignores the crucial aspect that while the old Section 80 did not render the destination railway as such liable to be sued if loss was not proved to have occurred there the new Section however renders the destination Railway also liable even though no loss occurred there
The provision in the new Section 80 enabling the suit to be instituted at the place of the destination Railway where no part of the cause of action might otherwise be shown to have arisen was it is urged a mere consequential provision to give effect to the substan tive provision that the destination Railway was also li able
Dr Ghosh emphasised the expression may be institut ed in Section 80 to reinforce his contention that Section 80 did really expand the rights of and not seek to restrict therein suitors
Learned counsel also emphasised that sec tion 80 did not contain any words expressly excluding clauses a and b of Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure in so far as suits contemplated by Section 80 were con cerned
The new Section 80 it is contended did not intend to impair the choice of the forum afforded by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that any contrary view offends settled principles of statutory construction guiding the matter
Learned counsel invited attention to the follow ing observations in Ajay Kumar Banerjee  Others etc
vs Union of India  Others etc
  at page 282 The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one
In other words a prior special law would yield to a later general law if either of the two fol lowing conditions is satisfied i The two are inconsistent with each other ii There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment
450 If either of these two conditions is ful filled the later law even though general would prevail
 and submitted that even if conversely the provisions of Section 80 are held to be a later special law the principle of implied repeal could not be invoked as there was no inconsistency between the two provisions and that on the contrary both set of provisions could co exist and prevail
Learned counsel invited our attention to and relied upon the following passage in Shah Babulal Khimji vs Jaya Ben D Kania and Another  We find ourselves in complete agreement with the arguments of Mr Sorabjee that in the instant case section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 does not in any way abridge interfere with or curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent
What Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 does is merely to give an additional remedy by way of an appeal from the orders of the Trial Judge to a larger Bench
 The learned counsel also placed reliance on the following observations of this Court in Municipal Council Palai vs
TJ Joseph and Others  at page 98 In order to ascertain whether there is repug nancy or not this Court has laid down the following principles in Deep Chand vs The State of Uttar Pradesh 1 Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions 2
Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law 3
Whether the two laws occupy the same field
Reliance was also placed on Section 21 A inserted by Section 4 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts West Bengal Amendment Act 1980 which provides 21A Act to override other laws including Letters Patent The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding 451 anything to the contrary in any other law including in particular the Letters Patent of the High Court to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court would run in the teeth of this express provision
Lastly learned counsel invited our attention to the following passage in Crawford on Statutory construction All laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing cases on the same subject it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature in passing a statute did not intend to inter fere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matterunless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable
Bowen vs Lease 5 Will 225
It is a rule says Sedwick that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one unless the two acts are irrecon cilably inconsistent p 633 And as we have already suggested it is essential that the new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old otherwise there is no indication
of the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the old law
Conse quently the latter enactment will be con structed as continuation of the old one 624 It was urged that repeal by implication is not to be pre sumed and that on the contrary there is always presumption against a repeal by implication
In order that there be a repeal by implication there should be a clear irreconcila ble conflict between the two sets of provisions and the later enactment should be an exhaustive code in itself in respect of the subject matter
On these submissions Dr Ghosh says that the view taken by the High Court is clearly unsustainable in law
The contention emphasised is that where a statute merely recognises a right pre existing in common law and provides a remedy such a remedy unless the statute ex pressly bans or excludes other remedies could only be an additional or concurrent one open to an election
It is true that where a statute does not itself bring into being a 452 new right not a pre existing right and also provides a remedy therefore so however that the right and the remedy cannot be said to have been brought into existence for the first time uno flatu such a remedy would not generally be held to be exclusive but only an additional and concurrent one along with the pre existing remedies unless there are express indications to the contrary in the statute itself
In Municipal Council Palai vs TJ Joseph   this Court considered the tests of repugnancy applied under Article 2542 of the Constitution relevant in the examination of circumstances bringing about an implied repeal
Strictly speaking the examination of the question whether an act of Parliament prevails against the law enact ed by a State under Article 254 does not really involve any question of repeal
In Zaver Bhai Amaidas vs State of Bom bay AIR 1954 SC 752 this Court applied the test conversely of the principle of implied repeal to cases of repugnancy under Article 2542
It was observed It is true as already pointed out that on a question under article 251 whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State no question of repeal arises but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests namely that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question trader article 2542 where the fur ther legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law
 The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions
Courts in applying this doctrine are supposed merely to give effect to the legisla tive intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments
But in a conceivable case the very existence of two provisions may by itself and without more lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter
In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary
It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously
Section 80 is a special provi 453 sion
It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject matters
The High Court has come to the conclusion that new Section 80 made a conscious departure on the law as to the place of suing in respect of suits of a particular subject matter envisaged by that Section
The High Court has held that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision in regard to the choice of fora for such suits
According to the High Court there was no need for the legislature to specify the places of suing which would otherwise be covered by Section 20 CPC unless the special prescription as to places of suing was considered to be necessary in deroga tion to the general law as contained in Sec
20 CPC or the provisions in the Small cause Courts Act
As to the words may be instituted occurring in that Section the High Court observed The use of the expression may be instituted  in Section 80 of the Railways Act was equiva lent to shall be instituted 
Section 80 conferred right to institute suits for compen sation against the Railways for breach of their obligations for carrying passengers animals or goods specified in Chapter VII of the Indian Railways Act
Both the obligation on the part of the Railways and the right of the consignor and the consignee to institute suits are now statutory in their nature
The clear intendment of the Legislature was that it would be obligatory for the plaintiffs to institute suits only in the Courts mentioned in Section 80 of the Railways Act for enforce ment of the claims for compensation against the Railways
After a consideration of the matter we are inclined to the view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision are sound and re quire to be preferred to the view expressed by the Assam and the Madras High Courts
The view of the Full Bench is to be preferred having regard to the weight and preponderance of the relevant interpretatory criteria
No appeal in our opinion could be made to Section 21A of the State Amendment to the Small Cause Courts Act either in as much as that provision cannot be understood to have been intended to cover a situation of the present 454 type
It does not exclude a special law applicable to and governing a distinct class of subject matter intended to be covered by that special law
In the result for the fore going reasons these appeals fail and are dismissed but in the circumstances without any directions as to costs
NPV Appeals dismissed


Summary:
These writ Petitions have been filed by the employees of the Supreme Court through their Welfare Associations pray ing in substance for enhancement of their present pay scales
Writ Petition No 801 of 1986 has been filed by the Welfare Association representing class II and class 111 employees whereas Writ Petition No 120186 has been filed by Welfare Association representing class IV employees and the third Writ Petition has been filed by retired employees
In order to deal with and make recommendations in regard to various representations highlighting grievances regarding service conditions made by the staff
of the Supreme Court the Chief Justice of India constituted a committee consist ing of five Judges of the Supreme Court
The committee was also asked to make recommendations whether the pay scales of different categories of the staff warranted 489 upward revision
The Committee after consideration of the issues raised made several recommendations but as regards the pay scale revision it recommended that the matter be referred to the Third Pay Commission then sitting
However in the meanwhile the High Court of Delhi allowed various Writ Petitions filed before it by the members of the staff of Delhi High Court belonging to different categories
The result of the Orders passed by the Delhi High Court was
that the staff of that High Court started drawing more pay in some categories of class IV class Il  III employees than the employees of the Supreme Court similarly placed
Taking cue from the orders of the Delhi High Court the petitioners have filed these petitions invoking in aid the principle of Equal pay for equal work
It is urged by the petitioners that the duties performed by the staff of the Supreme Court are similar rather more responsible arduous and onerous to those performed by the members of the staff of Delhi High Court hence they are entitled to pay like similar if not enhanced pay scales
It is urged that Special Leave Petition filed by the Government before this Court against the orders of the Delhi High Court having been dismissed by this Court the order of Delhi High Court has became final
In Writ Petition No 801 of 1986 by an interim order dated 25786 this Court directed that the officers and members of the staff of the registry should get the same pay and allowances which were then being enjoyed by the officers and the members of the staff of the Delhi High Court belong ing to the same category with effect from the date from which such scales of pay has been allowed to the officers and the members of the staff of the Delhi High Court
The Court also by the same order directed Respondent Nos 1 and 2 to take necessary steps to refer the question of revision of pay scales to the Fourth Pay Commission as suggested by the five Judges Committee
Some other interim orders were also passed giving higher pay to certain categories of employees as was done by Delhi High Court
The Fourth Pay Commission to which the question of revision of pay scales of the staff of Supreme Court was referred did not grant any enhancement
It did not even grant the benefit of higher pay given under the interim orders of this Court
After the report of Fourth Pay Commis sion the petitions have been listed for final hearing
Disposing of the Writ Petitions this Court 490 HELD Per M M Dutt J
When no reason is given but a Special Leave Petition is dismissed simpliciter it cannot be said that there has been a declaration of law by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution
505B Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs State of Bihar   Union of India vs All India Services Pensioner Association  A decision on an abstract question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right cannot operate as res judicata
Nor also can a decision on the question of juris diction be res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding but if the question of law is related to the fact in issue an erroneous decision on such a question of law may operate as res judicata between the parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding if the cause of action is the same
506G H 507A B Mathura
Prasad Rajoo Jaiswal vs Dossibai NB Jeejeeb hoy  and Thakore Sobhag Singh vs Thakur Jai Singh The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties
When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
So far as the parties are concerned they will always be bound by the said decision
In other words either of the parties will not be permitted to reopen the issue decided by such decision on the ground that such decision violates the equality clause under the Constitu tion
508H 509A B From Article 1462 it is apparent that it is primarily the responsibility of Parliament to lay down the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court but so long as Parliament does not lay down such conditions of service
the Chief Justice of India or some other Judge or officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India is empowered to make rules for the purpose
516B C The conditions of service that may be prescribed by the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India under Article 1462 will also necessarily include salary
allowances leave and pensions of the officers and servants of the Supreme Court
516D 491 The proviso to Article 1462 puts a restriction on the power of the Chief Justice of India by providing that the rules made under Article 1462 shall
so far as they
relate to salaries allowances leave or pensions require the approval of the President of India
516E The rules framed by the Chief Justice of India though it is a piece of subordinate legislation it is not a full fledged legislative act requiring assent of the President of India
517C Going strictly by Article 1462 of the Constitution the question of any reference to the Pay Commission does not arise
The Chief Justice of India has to frame rules with the aid and assistance of his own officers and other Judges
The Chief Justice of India may appoint a Committee of Judges or a Committee of experts for the purpose of assisting him in framing the rules relating to the conditions of service of the employees of the Supreme Court
Although there is no such provision in Article 1462 but that is implied and it may be said that the reference to the Fourth Pay Commission was made so that the report or the recommendations of the Fourth Pay Commission relating to the revision of the pay scales of the Supreme Court employees will be of some as sistance to the Chief Justice of India to frame rules
523D F What should go to the President of India for his approv al under the proviso to Article 1462 is not the report or the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Commission but the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India
In considering the rules framed by the Chief Justice of India relating to salaries allowances leave and pension it will not be the concern of the President of India how and in what manner the Chief Justice of India has laid down the rules
523F G All this can be done by the Chief Justice of India or by some other Judge or officer of this Court authorised by the Chief Justice of India
The Chief Justice of India may appoint a Committee of Judges to submit a report relating to all relevant matters and thereafter the Chief Justice of India may frame rules after taking into consideration the report of the Committee
It will be absolutely in the dis cretion of the Chief Justice of India or his nominee as to how and in what manner the rules will be framed
529D E Per Thommen J
The regulation of the conditions of service of the Supreme Court 492 employees is the constitutional responsibility and power of the Chief justice of India subject
of course to the two conditions postulated in clause 2 of Article 146
538E Rules were made in this regard by the Chief Justice of India with the approval of the President of India and they are contained in Part II of the Supreme Court Officers and Servants  Conditions of Service and Conduct Rules 1961 as amended upto 16th December 1985
No amendment of these Rules has been made subsequent to 1985 and consequently the Rules do not reflect the enhanced pay scales adopted on the basis of the interim Orders of this Court or the pay scales recommended by the Pay Commission
538C D Rules are liable to be declared invalid if they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised endor violative of the general principles of the law of the land or so vague that it cannot be predi cated with certainty as to what is prohibited by them or so unreasonable that they cannot be attributed to the power delegated or otherwise disclose bad faith
542F Union of India  Ant
vs Cynamide India Ltd  Anr 1987 2 SCC 720 734 SI Syndicate Ltd vs Union of India   PCS Mills vs Union of India   Shree Meenakshi Mills  vs Union of India   EP Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu   Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 SC 485 DS Nakara vs Union of India   Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs Wednesbury Corporation   Westminster Corporation vs London and North Western Railway 430 Barium Chemi cals Ltd vs Company Law Board  referred to
Until the rules are made by the Chief Justice or by a Judge or Officer of the Court authorised by him the ques tion of approval or disapproval by the President does not arise
In making the rules the Chief Justice would no doubt take into account the recommendations of the Pay Commission or of any other body of experts he may have consulted
He will also take into account the objections raised by the Government to the suggestions made by the Registrar General who of course
acted as an agent of the Chief Justice
But the refusal of the Government to accede to the proposals of the Registrar General is not a refusal of the President under Article 1462 1or such refusal or approval can arise only upon submission to him to duly framed rules
546G H 547A B 493 The approval of the President is not a matter of mere formality
It would of course be wrong to say that in no case can the President which means the Government refuse to accord approval
However
once the rules are duly framed by so high a constitutional dignitary as the Chief Justice of India it will only be in the truly exceptional cases that the President would withhold assent
547D E Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya vs State of Gujarat  State of Orissa vs Durga Charan Das   GV Ramanaiah vs The Superintendent of Central Jail
Rajahmundry
  Chandra Bansi Singh vs State of Bihar   Waman Rao vs Union of India   Minor P Rajendran vs State of Madras   State of MPv
Ram Raghubir Prasad Agarwal   Roshanlal Kuthiala vs RB Mohan Singh Oberai
  Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial  General Subordinate Service Associ ation vs State of Tamil Nadu   Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs Union of India AIR 1962 SC 1139 State of Punjab vs Joginder Singh
1963 Supp 2 SCR 169 Randhir Singh vs Union of India   Dhirendra Chamoli vs State of UP 1986 1 SCC 687 State of Andhra Pradesh vs
G Sreenivasa Rao 1989 1 IT 615 V Markendeya vs State of Andhra Pradesh   State of UP vs JP Chaurasia   Umesh Chandra Gupta vs Oil  Natural Gas Commission AIR 1989 SC 29 Tarsera Lal Gautam vs State Bank of Patiala AIR 1989 SC 30Narinder Chand Hem Raj vs Lt Governor Administrator Union Territory Hima chal Pradesh   State of Andhra Pradesh vs
T Gopalakrishnan Murthi   AK Roy vs Union of India   Gurumoorthy vs Accountant General Assam  Nagaland  K Nagaraj  Ors
vs State of AP  Anr
   548 RK Garg vs Union of India   687 Aeltemesh Rein Advocate Supreme Court of India vs Union of India  Ors
   State of U P  Ors
vs Renusagar Power Co  Ors   104 Kruse vs Johnson  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs Wednesbury Corporation   Mixnam Properties Ltd vs Chertsey UDC  Commissioners of Customs  Excise vs Cure  Deeley Ltd  Mceldowney vs Forde 1971 AC 632 Carltona Ltd vs Commissioners of Works  Ors  564 Point of Ayr
Collieries Ltd vs Lloyd George  Scott vs Glasgow Corporation
492 Robert Baird LD  Ors
vs City of Glas gow  Manhattan General Equipment Co vs Commissioner   134 Yates Arthur  494 Co Pty Ltd vs Vegetable Seeds Committee  Bailey vs Conole   Boyd Build ers Ltd vs City of Ottawa 1964 45 DLR 2nd 211 Re Burns 
Township of Haldimand and Lynch vs Tilden Produce Co   320 322 referred to