vil Appeal No 1 147 of 1975
From the Judgment and Order dated 28121973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in WP No 4818 of 1973
With Civil Appeal Nos
1054 55 of 1976 1503 and 1546 of 1977 TS Krishnamurthy Iyer C Sitaramiah K Madhava Reddy Chella Sitaramani K Ram Kumar Mrs J Ramachan dran Mrs Anjani TVSN Chari AV Rangam Jagan Rao and AVV Nair for the appearing parties
316 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA J
This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No 48 18 of 1973 wherein the writ petition filed by the AppellantPeti tioner was dismissed
In the writ petition before the High Court the petition er sought mandamus directing the respondent to pay forthwith to the petitioner compensation for the lands surrendered by her under the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Hold ings Act 1961
A further direction was sought prohibiting the third respondent from proceeding with the revision under section 191 of the Act as amended by Act No I of 1972 wef 19172
Necessary facts are that the petitioner s husband owned extensive lands in Gadwal
After the Act came into force the Revenue Divisional Officer Gadwal issued a notice under section 32 of the Act directing the petitioner s husband to file a declaration of his holdings
The petitioner s husband accordingly filed the declaration
Thereafter he died in 1969 leaving behind the petitioner and three minor children
The Revenue Divisional Officer held an enquiry under section 6 of the Act and by his order dated 25171 he held that the petitioner s husband legal representatives were holding 2972 family holdings in excess of the ceiling area which they were entitled to hold
A notice was then issued to the petitioner under section 72 on 25  71 requiring the petitioner to file a state ment indicating the land which she proposes to surrender
The petitioner thereupon filed a detailed statement of lands she proposes to surrender on 19371
The Revenue Divisional Officer on being satisfied after an enquiry that the lands proposed to be surrendered satisfy the requirements of sec
71 and 2 of the Act passed an order on 31371 under section 73 of the Act approving the surrender of 7 1316 acres an equivalent of 2972 family holdings by the petitioner
Thereafter the petitioner filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer for fixation of compensation in respect of lands surrendered by her under section 10 of the Act
The Revenue Divisional Officer fixed the compensa tion of Rs64426509 in respect of lands surrenderd by her
317 The Revenue Divisional Officer published a notification containing particulars of the lands surrendered by the petitioner and the compensation payable therefor in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 7771 according to section 11 of the Act
Instead of paying the compensation as determined the District Revenue Officer Mahboobnagar issued a notice dated 21372 proposing to revise the orders of the Revenue Divi sional Officer dated 15471 fixing compensation of the lands surrendered by the petitioner
This notice is purport ed to have been issued under section 19 clause 1 of the Act as amended
The petitioner filed an objection contending that the 3rd respondent had no jurisdiction to revise the order fixing compensation which was passed before as on the day the Divisional Officer issued notice the order sought to be revised had become final
In spite of this the 3rd respond ent has not disposed of the revision proceedings and it because of this writ petition was filed before the High Court
Learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that once under section 7 the land which is in excess of the ceiling limit is determined and a statement of surrender is filed by a holder which is accepted by the Revenue Division al Officer under clause 3 of section 7 the land vests in the State and thereafter the authorities have no jurisdic tion to attempt to revise the compensation or any order which has already been passed under the Act
Whereas on behalf of the State it was contended that clause 3 of section 7 uses the word deemed to have been surrendered which clearly indicates that although by an order passed by Revenue Divisional Officer the proposal made by the holder about the surrender of land is accepted and it is finalised but still it is only deemed surrender as even after this land does not vest in the State but it only vests as has been contemplated under section 8 which clearly lays down that the land which is deemed to have been surrendered under section 7 only vests in the State when it is taken over after payment of compensation in accordance with sec tion 8
The High Court accepted the contention of the State and it took the view that unless taking over is completed under sec
8 the land does not vest in the State and therefore it could not be said that the proceedings under this Act has come to an end and at this stage when the land has yet not vested in the State if the authorities have jurisdiction 318 to revise the compensation it could not be said that the authorities have done something beyond their jurisdiction
The main argument before the High Court and before us on behalf of the appellant is that once under the scheme of the Act an order is passed by the competent authority under section 7 sub clause 3 so far as the holder is concerned he has surrendered the surplus land and what remains under the scheme of section 10 and 11 is only the question of deter mining of compensation and once that is determined there is no option to the authorities but to pay compensation to the person Who has surrendered the holding in accordance with the scheme of section 7 of the Act
It is not in dispute that the proceedings were taken under Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1961 and after the declaration was filed the ceiling area was determined in accordance with section 6
It is also not in dispute that in accordance with section 7 sub clause 2 a notice was served on the petitionerappellant for filing a statement indicating the land which she proposes to surren der and it is after the statement was filed by the appellant that an order in accordance with sub clause 3 of section 7 was passed
Section 7 reads 1 If the extent of the holding of a person is not more than the ceiling area determined under section 6 he shall be entitled to retain such holding but if it is more than the ceiling area he shall be liable to sur render the extent of land in excess of the ceiling area
2 The Revenue Divisional Officer shall serve on every person who is liable to surrender land in excess of the ceiling area under sub section 1 a notice specifying therein the extent of land which he has to surrender and requiring him to file a statement in such manner and within such period as may be pre scribed indicating therein the land which he proposes to surrender
3 If the person on whom a notice is served under sub section 2 files the statement referred to in that subsection within the prescribed period and Revenue Divisional Officer is satisfied after making an inquiry in the prescribed manner that the proposed surrender of the land is in accordance with the provisions of sub sections 1 and 2 he shall pass an order approving the surrender and the 319 said land shall thereupon be deemed to have been surrendered by such person
4 If the person on whom a notice is served under subsection 2 does not file the state ment referred to in that sub section within the prescribed period or filed such statement within the prescribed period but does not specify therein the entire extent of land which he has to surrender the Revenue Divi sional Officer may himself select in the former case the entire extent and in the latter case the balance of the extent which such person has to surrender and pass an order to that effect and thereupon the said land or the balance of land as the case may be shall be deemed to have been surrendered by such person
The scheme of this section indicates that when the extent of holding of a person is determined under section 6 and if while determining it under section 6 it is found that he is holding more than the ceiling area he shall be liable to surrender the extent of the land which is in excess of the ceiling area
Sub clause 2 of this section contemplates that the Revenue Divisional Officer will serve a notice on all such persons who are liable to surrender the land in excess of the ceiling area and this notice will specify the extent of the land which he has to surrender and a direction that the person concerned will file a statement indicating the land which the holder proposes to surrender
Sub clause 3 of the this section contemplates that after the notice under sub clause 2 is served and the person concerned files his statement within the prescribed period the Revenue Divisional Officer if he is satisfied from the statement filed in response to a notice under clause 2 about the land which the holder proposes to surrender he shall pass an order approving the surrender of the land
Sub clause 4 contemplates a situation where after a notice is served under clause 2 the holder does not file a statement as contemplates under clause 3
It is therefore clear that so far as the surplus land which a holder will surrender is concerned it is finally determined when an order under clause 3 of section 7 is passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but it is signifi cant that in spite of the finality of these proceedings the legislature uses the phrase thereupon deemed to have been surrendered by such person
It is significant that instead of using the 320 phrase have been surrendered the legislature uses the term deemed to have been surrendered and it is clear from these words that something more remains to be done
Section 8 reads as under 8 Where any land is deemed to have been surrendered under section 7 by an owner the Revenue Divisional Officer may by order take over such land on payment of compensation under section 10 and such land shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner by as signment to landless poor persons
This provides for vesting of the land deemed to have been surrendered by the owner
This terminology used in the heading of the section itself indicates that even after determination of the surplus land which is deemed to have been surrendered  vesting only takes  place when something more is done and that is what is provided in this section
This section authorises the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land on payment of compensation compensation which is determined us 10 and land which is deemed to have been surrendered us 7 and it is only after this taking over under section 8 that under the scheme of this section the land vests in the State and thereafter it is provided that such land shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner by assignment to landless poor persons
A perusal of the scheme of the section therefore clearly indicates that after an order is passed under sub clause 3 of sec
7 although the proceedings for surrender of the surplus land and the selection of the land which is sought to be surrendered is complete but still it is not surrender but it is only deemed to have been surrendered which clearly indicates that so far as the holder is concerned he has finally got determined the lands which he will surrender as surplus which in due course will vest in the State for distribution to other landless persons but it is also clear from the language of section 8 and also from the language used in sub clause 3 of section 7 that unless the land which is deemed to have been surrendered is taken over by payment of compensation determined under section 10 it does not vest in the State
The scheme of section 8 therefore indicates that vesting in the State that is taking over by the Revenue Divisional Officer and payment of compensation has to be simultaneous with and an order under section 8
It there fore appears that after proceeding for determination of surplus under section 7 is completed proceedings for deter mination of compensation will start as is provided in sec tion 10 and it is only when compensation is also finally determined that under section 8 321 taking over will take place after the compensation is paid
It is therefore clear that after the proceedings have been completed in accordance with section 7 sub clause 3 and even after the compensation has been determined but action under section 8 has not been taken it could not be said that the land vests in the State
The competent authorities can revise the orders passed if an amendment has taken place in between
It is apparent that in spite of proceedings having come to an end under sub clause 3 of section 7 and that the compensation has been determined still the land remains with the holder who is enjoing the benefits out of the land until action under section 8 is completed
Under these circumstances therefore the contention advanced by the appellant that when the proceedings are concluded under subclause 3 of section 7 the surrender is complete and the land vests in the State cannot be accepted as admittedly action under section 8 has not been taken
On the basis of some orders which appear to have been passed under section 10 it was contended that taking over is complete but in these orders only language of section 10 is reproduced
Section 10 reads as under Compensation for lands taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer 1 The compensa tion payable for any land taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer under section 8 or section 9 shall be an amount calculated at the rates specified in the Second Schedule
Where there are any structures of a permanent nature or trees on such land the value of such struc tures or trees shall be determined by the Revenue Divisional Officer in the manner pre scribed and paid to the person who is entitled thereto
2 The compensation payable under sub section 1 shall be paid either in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds as the Government may deem fit
The bonds shall be issued on such terms and carry such rate of interest as may be prescribed But admittedly no order could be produced under section 8
It is clear that orders under section 8 can only be passed after compensation as determined under section 10 is paid
322 Therefore no advantage could be taken from these orders under section 10
It was also alleged on behalf of the State that against these orders under section 10 it were the appellants some of them who filed writ petitions in the High court challenging the compensation and thus question of determination of compensation itself remained pending
Consequently in our opinion the High Court was right in rejecting the writ petitions filed by the appellants
We therefore see no reason to entertain this appeal
It is therefore dismissed
No order as to costs
For the reasons stated above Civil Appeal Nos
105476 1055 76 150377 and 154677 are allowed
No order as to costs
PSS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The Expenditure Tax Act 1987 envisaged a tax at 10 ad valorem on chargeable expenditure incurred in the class of hotels wherein room charges for any unit of residential accommodation were Rs400 per day per individual
Section 5 of the Act defined chargeable expenditure to include expend iture incurred in or payments made in such class of hotels in connection with the provision of any accommodation residential or otherwise food or drink whether at or outside the hotel or for any accommodation in such hotel on hire or lease or any other services envisaged in that Sec tion
The petitioners who were engaged in or associated with the hotel industry challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on grounds of 919 lack of legislative competence and violation of Articles 14 and 191g of the Constitution
It was contended that the Act in its true nature and character was not one imposing an expenditure tax as known to law accepted notions of Public Finance and to legislative practice but was in pith and substance either a tax on luxuries falling within Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule or a tax on the consideration paid for the purchase of goods constituting an impost of the nature envisaged in entry 54 of List II and was clearly outside the legislative competence of the Union Parliament that the Act was violative of Article 14 as the basis on which the hotels were classified was arbitrary an unintelligible having no rational nexus with the taxing policy under the Act inasmuch as persons similarly situat ed and who incurred the same extent and degree of expendi ture on the same luxuries were differentiated on the sole basis that in one case the expenditure was incurred in a hotel where one of the rooms had a charge of Rs400 per day per individual marked for it while in the other though equally wasteful expenditure was incurred in a more luxuri ous restaurant the latter expenditure was exempt that even if more sophisticated and expensive food and drinks and other services envisaged in clauses a to d of Section 5 were provided in a hotel or catering establishment which fell outside the class the expenditure incurred thereon is unaffected by the law that the standards and measures for the computation of the chargeableexpenditure under the Act was vague and arbitrary that the expression other similar services  in clauses d of Section 5 was non specific and vague and that the Act was violative of petitioners  funda mental right under Article 191g as it imposed unreasona ble onerous restrictions on their freedom of business
The respondent Union of India sought to sustain the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the law under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule contending that the law in pith and substance was not one with respect to luxuries under Entry 62 List 1 and the tax on expenditure as the legislative had chosen to conceive it was referrable to residuary power that the economists  concept of such an expenditure tax was at best an idea of the manner of effectuation of fiscal programme and was no limitation on the legislative power that the legislative power recognised the demarcation of distinct aspects of the same matter as distinct topics of legislation and that the challenge to legislative competence overlooked the dichotomy of these distinct aspects the line of demar cation though sometimes thin and subtle being real that the measure adopted for the levy of the tax did not neces sarily determine its essential character and that the object on which the expenditure was laid out might or might not be an item of 920 luxury or the expenditure might constitute the price of the goods but what was taxed was the expenditure aspect which in itself was susceptible of recognition as a distinct topic of legislation
Dismissing the Writ Petitions this Court HELD RS Pathak CJ Sabyasachi Mukharji section Natara jan and MN Venkatachaliah Per Venkatachaliah J 11 A law imposing the expenditure tax is well within the legislative competence of Union Parliament under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I 940E F 12 The tax envisaged by the Expenditure Tax Act 1987 is essentially a tax on expenditure and not on luxuries or sale of goods falling within the State power
The distinct aspect namely the expenditure aspect of the transaction failing with the Union power must be distinguished and the legislative competence to impose a tax thereon sustained
947D E 21 If a legislature with limited or qualified jurisdic tion transgresses its powers such transgression may be open direct and overt or disguised indirect and covert
The latter kind of trespass is figuratively referred to as colourable legislation connoting that although apparently the legislature purports to act within the limits of its own powers yet in substance and in reality it encroaches upon a field prohibited to it requiring an examination with some strictness the substance of the legislation for deter mining as to what the legislature was really doing
939E F Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Ors
vs Bank of Commerce  referred to
22 Wherever legislative powers are distributed between the Union and the States situations may arise where the two legislative fields might apparently overlap
It is the duty of the Courts however difficult it may be to ascertain to what degree and to what extent the authority to deal with matters failing within these classes of subjects exists in each legislature and to define in the particular case before them the limits of the respective powers
It could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist and in order to prevent such a result the two provisions must be read together and the language of one interpreted and where necessary modified by that of the other
939F G 921 Union Colliery Co of British Columbia vs Bryden at 587 Lefroy Canada s Federal System referred to
23 The law with respect to  a subject might inciden tally affect  another subject in some way but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject
There might be overlapping but the overlapping must be in law
The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects
But the fact that there is an overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of the aspects
941E Governor General in Council vs Province of Madras at 193 and Laskin Canadian Constitu tional Law referred to
24 The consequences and effects of the legislation are not the same thing as the legislative subject matter
It is the true nature and character of the legislation and not its ultimate economic results that matters
944C 25 The scope of the present legislation cannot be considered by reference to legislative practice because firstly the question of legislative practice as to what a particular legislative entry could be held to embrace is inapposite while dealing with a tax which is suigeneris or non descript imposed in exercise of the residuary powers so long as such tax is not specifically enumerated in Lists II ing that the appropriate legislature had limited the notion of a tax of this kind within any confines
944E G Walace Brothers and Company Ltd vs Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City and Bombay Suburban District 1948 LR 75 IA 86 Navinchandra Mafatlal vs CIT Bombay City 1955 1 SCR 829 Union of India vs HS Dhillon  at 61 Attorney General for Ontario vs Attorney General for Canada at 581 Croft vs Dunphy and Azam Jha Bahadur vs Expenditure Tax Offi cer  referred to
26 The subject of a tax is different from the measure of the levy
The measure of the tax is not determinative of its essential character or of the competence of the legisla ture
946F G Ms Sainik Motors vs State of Rajasthan  and Encyclopaedia Britannica on Luxury Tax Vol
14 p 459 referred to
922 31 Though taxing laws are not outside Article 14 however having regard to the wide variety of diverse eco nomic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal policy legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons subject matter events etc for taxation
A legislature does not have to tax everything in order to be able to tax something
if there is equality and uniformity within each group the law would not be discrimi natory
The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are accordingly less rigorous
948G H 32 In examining the allegations of a hostile discrimi natory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology but the real effect of its provisions
The classification must be rational and based on some qualities and character istics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and absent in the others left out of the class
Besides differentia must also have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law
However no precise or set formulae or doctrinaire tests or precise scientific principles of exclusion or inclusion are to be applied
The test could only be one of palpable arbitrari ness applied in the context of the felt needs of the times and societal exigencies informed by experience
949A C E 33 Classification based on differences in the value of articles or the economic superiority of the persons of incidence are well recognised
A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not
In order to ascertain whether persons are similarly placed one must look beyond the classification and to the purposes of the law
949E F Jaipur Hosiery Mills Ltd vs State of Rajasthan  Hiralal vs State of UP   State of Gujarat vs Sri Ambika Mills Ltd   GK Krishnan vs Tamil Nadu 1975 2 SCR 715 ITO vs N Takim Roy Limbe   Secretary of Agriculture vs Central Roig Refining Co   Ms Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs State of Bihar  and Wallace Mendelson Supreme Court Statecraft The Rule of Law and Men p 4 referred to
34 In the present case the bases of classification cannot be said to be arbitrary or unintelligible nor as being without a rational nexus with the object of the law
A hotel where a unit of residential accommodation is priced at over Rs400 per day per individual is in the legislative wisdom considered a class apart by virtue of the economic superiority of those who might enjoy its custom comforts and services
923 This legislative assumption cannot be condemned as irration al
Judicial veto is to be exercised only in cases that leave no room for reasonable doubt
Constitutionality is presumed
952B C 35 The words other similar services in Section 5d were intended to embrace services like but not identical with those described in the preceding words
The content of the expression other similar services following the preceding expressions by way of beauty parfour health club swimming pool or   has a definite connotation in the interpretation of such words in such statutory con tents
The matter is one of construction whether any partic ular service fails within the section and not one of consti tutionality
953E F 4
A taxing statute is not per se a restriction of the freedom under Article 191g
The policy of a tax in its effectuation might of course bring in some hardship in some individual cases
But that is inevitable so long as law represents a process of abstraction from the generality of cases and reflects the highest common factor
The mere excessiveness of a tax or even the circumstance that its imposition might tend towards the diminution of the earnings or profits of the persons of incidence does not per se and without more
constitute violation of the rights under Article 191g
954F G Per Ranganathan J Concurring 51 In the context of the social and economic conditions that prevailed in India it was a luxury for any person to stay in hotels charging high rents and providing various types of facilities amenities and conveniences such as telephone television air conditioner etc
An expenditure on something which is in excess of what is required for economic and personal well being would be expenditure on luxury although the expenditure may be of a nature which is incurred by a large number of people including those not economically well off
958G H Abdul Kadir  Sons vs State of Kerala   relied on
52 The legislature has particularly in a taxing stat ute a considerable amount of latitude and it cannot be held that in fixing the standards of indication of luxury the legislature has not applied its mind
In fact the figures have been amended from time to time and it has to be pre sumed that the legislature had good reason for fixing these standards
From the scheme of the legislations the state legislations fall 924 within the scope of Entry 62 List I and are therefore clearly within the competence of the State legislatures and are not liable to be challenged
959D 957C 61 In interpreting the scope of the legislative entries in the three lists it has to be kept in mind that while on the one hand it is desirable that each entry in each of the lists should receive the broadest interpretation it is equally important on the other that the three lists should be read together and harmoniously
959E F 62 The power of the State legislature to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II is subject to the exclusive power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I Hence if a matter is covered by an entry in the Union List no restrictions can be read into the power of Parliament to make laws in regard thereto
959G H 960A 63 The legislative entries are so arranged that the power to enact laws in general and the power to impose taxes are separately dealt with
Under Article 2461 the Parlia ment has exclusive powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters including power to impose taxes enumerated in List I 960B C MPV Sundararamier  Co vs The State of Andhra Pra desh Another  at pp
1479 and 1490 referred to
It cannot be held that the tax cannot be considered to be an expenditure tax because it is not on expenditure generally but is restricted to specific types of expendi ture
There is no legal judicial economic or other concept of expenditure tax that would justify any such restrictive meaning
If conceptually the expenditure incurred by a person can be a subject matter with reference to which a tax can be levied such taxation can be restricted only to certain items or categories of expenditure and its base need not necessarily be so wide as to cover all expenditure incurred by an assessable entity
Selection of objects and goods for taxation is the essence of any tax legislation and any limitation is an unlimited curtailment of this selective power of taxation of Parliament
960H 961A B F 81 There is not much of legislative practice which would justify importing any limitation on the concept of a tax on expenditure under entry 97 of List I Once it is granted that the tax need not exhaust the entire universe of the subject matter the extent of the subject matter 925 that should be covered or selected for imposing tax should be entirely left to Parliament subject only to any criteria of discrimination or unreasonableness that may attract the provisions of Part 1II of the Constitution
962D E F G State of Madras vs Gannon Dunkerley Co   Navinchanda Mafat Lal vs CIT 1955 1 SCR 829 Naynit Lal vs AAC   Harikrishna Bhargava vs Union  and Bhagwandas Jain vs Union of India   referred to
82 Legislative lists cannot be interpreted on the assumption that there is a deemed entry Taxes on Expendi ture added to List I as a result of the decision in Azam Jha s case  Entries cannot be added to the legislative Lists on the basis of decisions of this Court
In Azam Jha s case the pith and substance of the Act con sidered did not fail under any of the entries in List II or III
However in the instant case the legislation coveres only certain types of expenditure
The decision in Azam Jha s case cannot help in determining whether the Expendi ture Act 1987 should be construed as imposing tax on expend iture or and on luxuries
964A C Azam Jha Bahadur vs Expenditure Tax Officer  distinguished
Merely because the 1987 Act as well as the State Acts levy taxes which have ultimate impact on persons who enjoy certain luxuries the pith and substance of both cannot be considered to be the same
The object of a tax on luxury is to impose a tax on the enjoyment of certain types of bene fits facilities and advantages on which the legislature wishes to impose a curb
The idea is to encourage society to cater better to the needs of those who cannot afford them
Such a tax may be on the person offering the luxury or the person enjoying it
It may be levied on the basis of the amount received for providing or the amount paid for or expended for enjoying the luxury
Conceivably it could be on different bases altogether
The object of an expenditure tax is to discourage expenditure which the legislature considers lavish or Ostentatious
The object of the first would be to discourage certain types of living or enjoyment while that of the second would be to discourage people from incurring expenditure in unproductive or undesirable chan nels
If a general Expenditure Tax Act like that of 1957 had been enacted no challenge to its validity could have been raised because it incidentally levied the tax on ex penditure incurred on luxuries
The fact that there will be some overlapping then or that here there is a good deal of such 926 overlapping because the States have chosen to tax only some types of luxuries and the Centre to tax atleast for the time being only expenditure which results in such luxuries should not be allowed to draw a curtain over the basic difference between the two categories of imposts
968E H 969A B This distinction is not obliterated merely because of the circumstances that both legislatures have chosen to attack the same area of vulnerability one with a view to keep a check on luxuries  and the other with a view to curb undesirable expenditure 
969C Kerala State Electricity Board vs Indian Aluminium Co  In the Central Provinces  Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act 1938  Province of Madras vs Boddu Paidanna  Sons  GG in Council vs Province of Madras  Ralla Ram vs East Punjab  Bhagwan Dass Jain vs Union   Hingir Rampur Coal Co Ltd vs State of Orissa  and Sainik Motors vs State of Rajasthan   referred to
AHF Lefroy Canadian Constitution and Laskin Canadi an Constitutional Law referred to