Appeals Nos
429 439 591 592 597 689 694 724 725 and 727 of 1962 and 15 139 140 159 267 to 269 331 334 337 340 342 343 347 352 389 746 and 748 of 1963
Appeals from the judg ments and order dated December 19 1958 March 7 1959 March 11 1959 April 22 1959 April 24 1959 in Writ Appeals Nos 135 122 of 1957 etc
T V R Tatachari for the appellants in CA Nos
429 to 434 and 694 of 1962 and CA No 26963
M C Setalvad P Kodandaramayya E V Bhagarathi Rao and T V R Tatachari for the appellants in CA Nos 438 and 43962
M C Setalvad and R Ganapathi Iyer for the appellants in C A Nos 436 437 724 725 and 72762
458 K Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal for the appellants in C As
Nos 591 582 597 and 68962 and 140 267 and 26863
K Jayaram and R Thiagarajan for the appellants in CA Nos
139 159 330 334 337 340 342 343 347 and 35263
K R Chaudhuri for the appellants in CA Nos 15 and 389 of 63
A Vedavalli and A V Rangam for the appellant in C As
746 and 748 of 63
D Narsaraju T Anantha Babu M V Goswami and B R G K Achar for the respondents in C As
435437 724 725 and 72762
D Narsaraju T Anantha Babu Yogeshwar Prasad and B R G K Achar for the respondents in C As
Nos 429434 438 439 and 69462 and 269 of 63
D Narsaraju T Anantha Babu M section K Sastri and B R G K Achar for the respondents in CA Nos 591 597 and 68962 and 140 267 and 26863 and respondent No 1 in CA No 59262
JVK Sharma and TSatyanarayana for respondent No 2 in CA No 59262
D Narsaraju T Anantha Babu R Gopalakrishnan and BR
G K Achar for the respondents in C As
Nos 15 139 331 334 337 340 342 343 347 352 159 389 and 746 748 63
March 25 1964
The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR C J
The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the construction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Temporary Powers Act 1949 No 29 of 1949 hereinafter called the Act 
The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two notified orders issued by the respondent State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January 1955 and 30th January 1955 respectively and it is the contention of the appellants that the said notified orders are outside the purview of section 3
The appellants in all these appeals are supplied electricity by the respondent for many years past and several individual agreements have been passed between them and the respondent during the period 1946 to 1952 prescribing the terms and conditions on which the said supply would be made to them
One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply of electricity had to be charged 459 against the consumers
The impugned orders have purported to increase this rate and the appellants contend that the respondent had no authority to change this important term of the contract to their prejudice by taking recourse to section 31 and issuing notified orders in that behalf
That in substance is the nature of the controversy between the parties before us
It appears that the Government of Madras and subsequently its successor the respondent had a single power grid system for the whole State comprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore
The entire energy was integrated into one power system
The Government of Madras entered into agreements with several consumers in the State including the appellants for the supply of energy in bulk at the specified rates which were called tariffs for the years 1951 and 1952
These agreements were to be in operation for ten years
It is common ground that these agreements did not contain any provision authorising the Government to increase the rates during their operation
The charges fixed were calculated at graded regressive rates according to increasing slabs of consumption units and the overall unit rates including the demand charge were not to exceed 66 annas without prejudice to the monthly minimum payment and the guaranteed consumption
The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively enhancing the agreed rates
These enhanced rates were specified in Schedules A and B attached to the said orders
According to these orders these increased tariffs were to take effect from the date on which meter readings were to be taken in the month of February 1955 and were to operate for the future
The increase in the rates effected by these orders was thus to operate not retrospectively but prospectively
The impugned orders indicate that the main reason which inspired the said orders was the knowledge that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated nearly 15 years before had become completely uneconomic the charges of labour and the price level of all material had enormously increased and that in evitably meant continuously growing loss to the Government
The Accountant General made queries in respect of this recurring loss and drew pointed attention of the State Government to the deficits in the working of the Power System
Accordingly the question of revision of tariffs was considered in the State of Madras but was not decided because reorganisation of the States was then in contemplation
After the respondent State wits born its Chief Engineer sumbitted proposals for 460 revisions of tariffs in all the areas covered by the relevant schemes
That is how the impugned notified orders came to be issued by the respondent
The appellants were naturally aggrieved by these orders because they added to their liability to pay the rates for the supply of electricity by the respondent to them
Accordingly a large number of consumers moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court under article 226 of the Constitution and challenged the validity of the two impugned orders
The learned single Judge who heard these writ petitions upheld the appellants  plea and came to the conclusion that the impugned orders were not justified by the authority conferred on the respondent by section 3 of the Act and were unauthorised illegal and inoperative
In the result the writ petition filed by some of the appellants before us were allowed and an appropriate order was issued against the respondent restraining it from enforcing the revised tariff rates
These decisions were challenged by the respondent by preferring several Letters Patent Appeals
The Division Bench which heard these Letters Patent Appeals took a different view it held that on its fair and reasonable con struction section 3 did confer authority on the respondent to issue the impugned orders and so the challenge made to the validity of the said orders could not be sustained
That is why the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the respondent were allowed and the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed
It is against these orders that the appel lants have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the said High Court
After the Division Bench had pronounced its decision on this point several other writ petitions were filed by other consumers and naturally the single Judge who heard them followed the decision of the Division Bench and dismissed the said writ petitions
The consumers who were aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge were then allow ed to come to this Court directly by special leave because the points which they wanted to raise were exactly the same as were raised by the other consumers who had come to this Court against the principal decision of the Division Bench
The present group of appeals thus consists of matters which have been decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as those which have been decided by a learned single Judge and they all raise the same common question about the construction of section 3 of the Act and the validity of the impugned notified orders
Before addressing ourselves to the question of construing section 3 it is necessary to recapitulate the legislative history of the Act
It will be recalled that during the Second World 461 War the Government of India passed the Defence of India Act No 35 of 1939 on the 29th of September 1939
By virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government by section 2 of the said Act several Rules came to be framed by Central Government known as the Defence of India Rules
Amongst these Rules was Rule 812 which clothed the Central Government with power to issue orders which may appear to the Central Government to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India or the efficient prosecution of the war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community
These Rules were in operation during the continuance of the war
After the war came to an end it was realised that the eco nomic situation in the country continued to be serious and for the proper regulation of economic affairs it was thought necessary to continue the orders issued under the Defence of India Rule 812 because shortage of supply of essential articles was very much in evidence then
The purpose of continuing the orders was to ensure the supply of essential articles to the community at large at reasonable prices and to secure their equitable distribution
In due course the Defence of India Act came to an end in 1946 but the Central Legislature thought it necessary to pass another Act to take its place and that was the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act 1946 No 24 of 1946
On the same lines the Madras Legislature passed an Act in 1946 No 14 of 1946
Later it was replaced by Act No 29 of 1949 with which we are concerned in the present appeals
After the respondent State was created under the Scheme of Reorganisation of States it passed Act No 1 of 1955 and this Act received the assent of the President on the 21st of January 1955
By this Act the Legislature of the respondent State virtually adopted the Madras Act
As a result the impugned orders are in substance referable to section 3 of the Madras Act
Before we part with this topic it may be mentioned that when the Madras Act was passed its Schedule gave a list of the essential articles as defined by section 2a and these articles were 12 in number
When the Andhra Legislature passed Act No 1 of 1955 and adopted the Schedule of essen tial articles for its purpose the number of these articles was reduced to two they are charcoal and electrical energy
The Andhra Act was originally intended to be in operation until the 25th January 1956 but it was later continued from time to time
It is common ground that when the impugned orders were passed section 3 of be Act was in operation and the present appeals have been argued on the basis that the said section is constitutionally valid so that the main point which calls for our decision is the construction of the said section
462 Mr Setalvad for the appellants contends that in construing section 3 we ought not to concentrate on the words used in section 3 in isolation but must look at the said section along with the other provisions of the Act
The rule of harmonious construction he urges requires that we must so construe all the provisions of the Act as to avoid any conflict or repugnancy between them
So construed section 3 according to him cannot be said to confer power on the respondent to enhance the tariff rate chargeable against the appellants in respect of the supply of energy made by the respondent to them
The whole scheme of the Act indicates clearly that the power to regulate the supply of an essential article which has been conferred on the State Government has to be applied in regard to transaction between citizens and citizens and cannot be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplies
It would be odd he suggests if the State Government is given the power to issue a notified order regulating the rates at which it should supply energy which it itself produces
Therefore the dealings by the State Government in the matter of supply of energy to the consumers should be deemed to be outside the provisions of section 3 and that would make the impugned orders invalid
The question as to whether the State Government would be bound by the provisions of legislative enactments passed by the State Legislature has sometimes led to difference in judicial opinion but the decision of this Court in the Director of Rationing and Distribution vs The Corporation of Calcutta and Ors1 must be taken to have settled this question
The effect of the majority decision rendered in that case is to recognise the validity of the rule of interpretation of statutes enunciated by the Privy Council in Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay 2 and that rule is that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication
In applying this rule it is obviously necessary that the Court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considernig all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute between the parties
If after reading all the relevant provisions of the statute the Court is satisfied that by necessary implication the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced against the State that conclusion must be adopted
If there are express terms to that effect there is of course no difficulty
In dealing with this vexed question sometimes it is necessary also to enquire whether the conclusion that the State is not bound by the specific provision of a given statute 1  273 IA 271
463 would hamper the working of the statute or would lead to the anomalous position that the statute may lose its effi cacy and if the answer to either of these two questions indicates that the obligation imposed by the statute should be enforced against the State the Court would be inclined to infer by necessary implication that the State in fact is bound by the statute
Where however the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute the same rule of construction may have to be applied
Where the statute may be for the public good and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature was to make the relevant provisions applicable to the State
This position is also established by the decision of the Privy Council in Province of Bomboy1 and it still continues to be a law in this Country
Incidentally we may add that where the Crown seeks to take advantage of a statute and urges that though it is not bound by the statute it is at liberty to take advantage of it English Law does not easily entertain such a plea though there are observations made in some judicial pronouncements to the contrary
As Halsbury points out it has been said that unless it is expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so the Crown may take advantage of a statute not withstanding that it is not bound thereby
 Having made this statement Halsbury has added a note of caution by saying that there is only slender authority for this rule and since both the rule and such authority as does exist have also been doubted the rule cannot perhaps be regarded as settled law2
To the same effect is the comment made by Maxwell when be quotes with approval the view expressed by Sir John Simon that the decisions which recognise the right of the Crown to take advantage of a statutory provision start with a passage in an unsuccessful argument of a law officer which was not even relevant to the case before the court but which has been taken out by a text writer and repeated for centuries until it was believed that it must have some foundation3
Therefore in construing section 3 of the Act we cannot permit the respondent to rely upon the artificial rule that since 1 73 TA 271
2 Halsbury s Laws of England Vol 36 p 432 para 654
3 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 11th Ed
p 136 464 the respondent claims a benefit under section 3 that construc tion should be adopted which supports such a claim
Thus the position is that when we construe section 3 we must adopt the usual rule of construction we must not read section 3 in isolation but must consider it in its proper setting and must have due regard for the other provisions of the Act and its general scheme and purpose
Reverting then to Mr Setalvad s main argument it may be conceded that when the Act was passed in 1949 mainly and primarily the power conferred by section 3 on the State Government must have been intended to regulate the supply of essential articles made by one citizen to another
The State had not then entered commercial activities on a large scale and when section 31 contemplated notified orders issued for the purpose of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of essential articles the legislature could not have in its mind supply of essential articles made by the State itself
That is one point in favour of Mr Setalvad s construction
If we examine the scheme of the Act it may also have to be conceded that some of the provisions may not be applicable to the State
Take for instance the provision of section 4 which relate to the powers of requisitioning and acquisition of properties and the subsequent two sections that deal with payment of compensation and release from requisition respectively these provisions may not be applicable to the State
Take again the control of agriculture which is contemplated by section 7 it would not be applicable to the State
Section 12 which deals with penalties may also be inapplicable to the State and so would section 13 be inapplicable because it deals with abetment and assistance of contravention of the provisions of the Act
Therefore the general scheme of the Act and some of its provisions seem to suggest that the State may not have been within the contemplation of the Act
But it is obvious that the rule of harmonious construction on which Mr Setalvad has solely rested his case can be invoked successfully by him only if the words used in section 3 are capable of the construction which he suggests
If the said words are capable of two constructions one of which supports the appellants  case and the other that of the res pondent it would be legitimate to adopt the first construc tion because it has the merit of harmonising the provisions of section 3 with the general scheme and purpose of the Act
On the other hand if the words used in section 31 are not reason ably capable of the construction for which the appellants contend then it would be unreasonable and illegitimate for the Court to limit the scope of those words arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony between the 465 assumed object and the scheme of the Act
Therefore it is necessary to examine the words used in section 3 very carefully
Let us first read section 31 The State Government so far as it appears to them to be necessary or expedient for maintaining increasing or securing supplies of essential articles or for arranging for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices may by notified order provide for regulating or prohibiting the supply distribution and transport of essential articles and trade and commerce therein
Sub section 2 provides that without prejudice to the gene rality of the powers conferred by sub section 1 an order made thereunder may provide for objects specified in clauses a to k
The majority of these objects may not be appli cable to the State while conceivably some may be appli cable to it
Section 31 is obviously intended to secure supplies of essential articles and to arrange for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices
If electrical energy is one of the essential articles mentioned in the Schedule there can be no difficulty in holding that a notified order can be issued under section 31 for regulating the supply of the said energy and making it available at a fair price
Indeed it is not disputed and cannot be disputed that if electrical energy is produced by a private licensee and is then supplied to the consumers such a supply would fall within the mischief of section 31 and the terms on which it can and should be made to the consumers can be regulated by a notified order
There can also be no serious dispute that the terms of a contract entered into between a private supplier of electrical energy and the consumer could be modified by a notified order
Section 31 undoubtedly confers power on the State Government to vary and modify contractual terms in respect of the supply or distribution of essential articles
If that be so on a plain reading of section 31 it seems very difficult to accept the argument that the supply of electrical energy which is included in section 31 if it is made by a private producer should go outside the said section as soon as it is produced by the State Government
The emphasis is not on who pro duces and supplies but on the continuance of the equitable distribution and supply of essential articles at fair prices
If the object which section 31 has in mind is such equitable distribuiton and availability at fair prices of essential articles then that object would still continue to attract the provisions of section 31 even though the essential article may be produced by the State and may be supplied by it to the consumers
466 The words used in section 31 are so clear unambiguous and wide that it would be unreasonable to limit their scope arti ficially on the ground that by giving effect to the wide language of the section we might reach a result which is not completely harmonious or consistent with the assumed object and purpose of the Act
Indeed as we have just indicated if the purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price
Therefore we are not prepared to accede to Mr Setalvad s argument that section 31 does not confer on the respondent the power to modify the terms of agreements between it and the appellants
Mr Setalvad no doubt contended that in construing section 31 we may have regard to the fact that most of the clauses under section 32 would be inapplicable to the respondent State and so he virtually suggests that even though the words in section 31 may be wide their width should be controlled by the limited scope of the clauses prescribed by subsection 2
We are not prepared to accept this argument
After the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerjee1 it is well settled that the function of a clause like clause 2 of section 3 merely illustrative vide also Santosh Kumar Jain vs The State3
In other words the proper approach to adopt in construing clauses 1 and 2 of section 3 is to assume that whatever is included in clause 2 is also included in clause 1
That is not to say that if the words of clause 1 are wide enough to include cases not included in clause 2 they must for that reason receive a narrower construction
Therefore we must ultimately go back to clause 1 to decide whether the supply of electrical energy made by the respondent to the appellants can be regulated by a notified order issued under it or not and the answer to that question must in our opinion be in the affirmative
In this connection it may be pertinent to refer to section 32b which provides for controlling the prices at which any essential article may be bought or sold
It is not easy to see why this clause cannot take in articles which may be purchased or sold by the State
The clause is so worded that the transactions of sale and purchase of all essential articles would be included in it
It is true that where the State wants to sell its essential articles it may be able to regulate the prices and control them by means of an executive order but that is not relevant and material in construing the effect 1 72 IA 241 at p 248
2  467 of the words if the words take within their sweep essential articles sold by the State there is no reason why it should not be competent to the State to issue a notified order con trolling the prices in that behalf
In regard to the purchase of essential articles by the State the position is still clearer
If the State wants to purchase essential articles power to regulate the prices of such articles would seem to be clearly included in section 32b
In  deed during the course of his arguments Mr Setalvad did not seriously dispute this position
Therefore when the State wants to purchase essential articles it can regulate the price in that behalf by means of a notified order issued under section 31 and that shows that in the cases of both sale and purchase of essential articles by the State section 32b read with section 31 would clothe the State with the power to issue the relevant notified order
Then it was faintly argued by Mr Setalvad that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by section 31 cannot include the power to increase the tariff rate it would include the power to reduce the rates
This argument is en tirely misconceived
The word regulate is wide enough to confer power on the respondent to regulate either by in creasing the rate or decreasing the rate the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain increase or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices
The concept of fair prices to which section 31 expressly refers does not mean that the price once fixed must either remain stationary or must be reduced in order to attract the power to regulate
The power to regulate can be exercised for ensuring the payment of a fair price and the fixation of a fair price would inevitably depend upon a consideration of all relevant and economic factors which contribute to the determination of such a fair price
If the fair price indicated on a dispassionate consideration of all relevant factors turns out to be higher than the price fixed and prevailing then the power to regulate the price must necessarily include the power to increase the price so as to make it fair
That is why we do not think Mr Setalvad is right in contending that even though the respondent may have the power to regulate the prices at which electrical energy should be supplied by it to the appellants it had no power to enhance the said price
We must therefore hold that the challenge to the validity of the impugned notified orders on the ground that they are outside the purview of section 31 cannot be sustained
That takes us to the next question as to whether the im pugned notified orders are invalid because they contravene 468 the provisions of article 191f and g of the Constitution
The impugned orders have been notified by virtue of the fore be treated as law for the purpose of article 19
We may also assume in favour of the appellants that the right to receive the supply of electricity at the rates specified in the agreements is a right which falls within article 191f or g
Even so can it be said that the impugned notified orders are not reasonable and in the interests of the general public  That is the question which calls for an answer in dealing with the present contention
It is true that by issuing the impugned notified orders the respondent has successfully altered the rates agreed between the parties for their respective contracts and that prima facie does appear to be unreasonable
But on the other hand the evidence shows that the tariff which was fixed several years ago had become completely out of date and he reports made by the Accountant General from time to time clearly indicate that the respondent was supplying electricity to the appellants at the agreed rates even though it was incurring loss from year to year
Therefore it cannot be said that the impugned notified orders were not justified on the merits
The prices of all commodities and labour charges having very much increased meanwhile a case had
certainly been made out for increasing the tariff for the supply of electrical energy
But it could not be possible to hold that the restriction imposed on the appellants  right by the increase made in the rates is reasonable and in the interests of the general public solely because the impugned orders have saved the recurring loss incurred by the respondent under the contracts
If such a broad and general
argument were accepted it may lead to unreasonable and even anomalous consequences in some cases
This question however has to be considered from the point of view of the community at large and thus considered the point which appears to support the validity of the impugned orders is that these orders were passed solely for the pur pose of assuring the supply of electrical energy and that would clearly be for the good of the community at large
Unless prices were increased there was risk that the supply of electrical energy may itself have come to an end
If the respondent thought that the agreements made with the appel lants were resulting in a heavy loss to the public treasury from year to year it may have had to consider whether the supply should not be cut down or completely stopped
It may well be that the respondent recognised its obligation to the public at large and thought that supplying electrical energy to the consumers who were using it for profit making purposes at a loss to the public exchequer would not be reasonable and legitimate and it apprehended that the legislature may well question the propriety or wisdom of such 469 a course and so instead of terminating the contracts de cided to assure the supply of electrical energy at a fair price and that is why the impugned notified orders were issued
We ought to make it clear that there has been no suggestion before us that the prices fixed by the impugned notified orders are in any sense unreasonable or excessive and it is significant that even the revised tariff has to come into operation prospectively and not retrospectively
Therefore having regard to all the circumstances in this case we are disposed to hold that the change made in the tariff by the notified orders must be held to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public
Mr Setalvad also attempted to challenge the validity of the impugned orders on the ground that they contravene article 14 of the Constitution
In support of this contention he invited our attention to the allegation made in Writ Petition No 923 of 1956
In that writ petition one of the petitioners stated that the rate prescribed under the agree ments had not changed and had remained stationary as far as consumers under the State Government s licensees were concerned
The affidavit appears to concede that certain other licensees had increased their rates but that increase it is claimed was negligible or nominal and so the argument was that the rates which are widely divergent between consumer and consumer constitute a contravention of article 14
Mr Setalvad fairly conceded that these allegations are vague and indefinite and no other material has been pro duced either by the petitioner who has made this affidavit or by any of the other petitioners who moved the High Court for challenging the validity of the impugned orders
In fact we do not know what the rates charged by other licensees are and have been and how they compare with the rates prescribed by the original contracts as well as the rates enhanced by the impugned notified orders
We ought to add that the Division Bench of the High Court appears to be in error when it assumed that the respondent was the sole supplier of electrical energy in the State of Andhra
It is true that the bulk of the energy is supplied by the respon dent but there are some other private licensees which are licensed to supply electrical energy to the consumers and in that sense at the relevant time the respondent was not a monopolist in the matter of supply of electricity
This Court has repeatedly pointed out that when a citizen wants to challenge the validity of any statute on the ground that it contravenes article 14 specific clear and unambiguous alle gations must be made in that behalf and it must be shown that the impugned statute is based on discrimination and that such discrimination is not referable to any classification 470 which is rational and which has nexus with the object in tended to be achieved by the said statute
Judged from that point of view there is absolulety no material on the record of any of the appeals forming the present group on which a plea under article 14 can even be raised
Therefore we do not think it is necessary to pursue this point any further
The result is the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs
One set of hearing fees
Appeals dismissed


Summary:
Electricity was supplied to the appellants by the respon dent state for many years past and several individual agreements were passed between them prescribing the terms and conditions for the supply
One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply had to be charged
These agreements did not contain any provision authorising the State to increase the rates during their operation
The respondent state issued two notified orders enhancing the agreed rates
The orders indicated that the main reason which inspired the increase was that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated several years before had become completely uneconomic and meant continuously growing loss to the State
A large number of consumers challenged the validity of the two orders in the High Court under article 226
The writ petitions were allowed and the respondent was restrained from enforcing the revised rates
These decisions were challenged by the respondent by appeals in the High Court which took a different view and dismissed the writ petitions
On appeals to this Court it was contended inter alia that the respondent had no authority to increase the rate changing this important term of the contract by taking recourse to section 31 of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Temporary Powers Act that the power to regulate the supply of essential articles had to be applied in regard to transactions between citizens and citizens and could not be applied to an essential article which the State itself supplied that the power to regulate conferred on the respondent by section 31 could not include the power to increase the tariff rate that the notified orders were invalid as they contravened the provisions of article 191f and g and that of article 14 of the Constitution
Held i The challenge to the validity of the notified orders on the ground that they were outside the purview of section 31 of the Act could not be sustained
The State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication
In applying this rule the court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Legislature by considering all the relevant provisions of the statute together and not concentrating its attention on a particular provision which may be in dispute
Where the question is not so much as to whether the State is bound by the statute but whether it can claim the benefit of the provision of a statute the same rule of construction 457 may have to be applied  Where the statute may be for the public good and by claiming the benefit conferred on it by its provisions the State may allege that it is serving the public good it would still be necessary to ascertain whether the intention of the legislature Was to make the relevant provisions applicable
Director of Rationing and Distribution vs Corporation of Calcutta  and Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay 1945 46 LR 73 IA 271 applied
ii In construing section 3 of the Act of the usual rule of con struction must be adopted section 3 must not be read in isolation but must be considered in its proper setting and due regard must be had for the other provisions of the Act and its general scheme and purpose
iii The purpose of the Act is to secure the supply of essential articles at fair prices it would be irrelevant as to who makes the supply what is relevant is to regulate the supply at a fair price
iv It is well settled that the function of a clause like cl
2 of section 3 is merely illustrative
In other words the proper approach to adopt in construing cls
1 and 2 of section 3 is to assume that whatever is included in cl
2 is also included in cl
King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerjee 72 IA 241 and Santosh Kumar Jain vs State   applied
v The word regulate  is wide enough to confer power on the State to regulate either by increasing the rate or de creasing the rate the test being what is it that is necessary or expedient to be done to maintain increase or secure supply of the essential articles in question and to arrange for its equitable distribution and its availability at fair prices
vi Having regard to all the circumstances in this case the change made in the tariff were reasonable and in the in terests of the general public
vii There was absolute no material on the record of the appeals on which a plea under article 14 of the Constitution could even be raised