ivil Appeal No 1201 of 1990 From the Judgment and Order dated 5687 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CR No 55687
Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant
SS Javali YP Rao and Raju Ramachandran for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
Special leave granted
Food Corporation of India filed a suit for recovery of Rs2 lacs against the appellant and respondents 2 to 7 on the basis of an agreement between the parties
After service of notice the appellant entered appearance on December 10 1984
On January 4 1985 the appellant filed an application stating as follows That the photostat copy of the original agreement and other documents which have been produced by the plaintiff 355 in their evidence are not visible and clear and it is very difficult for the defendants to inspect and give the written statement
That it is very essential to get the original documents produced in the court which are in possession of the plain tiff so that the defendants may file the written statement
It is therefore respectfully prayed that the plaintiff may kindly be ordered to produce the original agreement and other documents which has been filed with the plaint
 On January 21 1985 the appellant moved the Court under Section 34 of the for stay of the proceeding of the suit on the ground that there exists an arbitration clause in the suit agreement covering the matter in dispute
The Food Corporation of India contended that the appellant had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit since an adjournment was taken for filing written statement
It was however admitted the existence of the arbitration agreement covering the matter in dispute in the suit
The Trial Court accepted the request of the appellant and stayed the suit inter alia observing  
This application did not contain any prayer for adjournment of the case for filing the written statement
The prayer contained in this application was that the plain tiff be directed to produce the original agreement and other documents so that the defendants may file the written state ment  
In the present case the prayer of the defendants that the plaintiff be directed to file the original agreement and other documents in the court before they could file the written statement cannot be said to be a step in the pro ceedings because it was not a prayer for adjournment of the case for filing written statement
 But the Additional District Judge in the appeal pre ferred by the Food Corporation of India has reversed the order of the trial court
He was of the view that a written request made by the defendants by their application dated January 4 1985 for an adjournment to enable them to file the written statement was a step in the proceedings and the trial court was not justified in staying the suit
Accord ingly he accepted the 356 appeal and vacated the stay order and directed the trial court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has dismissed the revision petition of the appellant
The High Court has also observed that the defendants having moved the application dated January 4 1985 for production of original documents and seeking an adjournment of the suit to enable them to file written statement would certainly be construed as a step taken in the proceedings
Section 34 of the has received the consideration of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Janki Saran Kailash Chandra 1974 1 SCR 31 ii Food Corporation of India vs Yadav Engineer  and more recently in General Electric Co vs Renusagar Power Co  It may be noted that the expression a step in the proceeding which would disentitle the de fendant from invoking section 34 of the is not every step taken by him in the suit
It should be a step to abandon the right to have the suit stayed
It should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit
The step must have been consciously taken with a view to submit to the juris diction of the Court for the purpose of adjudicating the controversy on the merits
In General Electric Co s case this Court after considering the previous decisions observed at 155 56  thus a step in the proceeding which would disentitle the defendant from invoking Section 34 of the should be a step in aid of the progress of the suit or submission to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of adjudication of the merits of the controversy in the suit
The step must be such as to manifest the inten tion of the party unequivocally to abandon the right under the arbitration agreement and instead to opt to have the dispute resolved on merits in the suit
The step must be such as to indicate an election or affirmation in favour of the suit in the place of the arbitration
The election or affirmation may be by express choice or by necessary impli cation by acquiescence
The broad and general right of a person to seek redressal of his grievances in a court of law is subject to the right of the parties to have the disputes settled by a forum of mutual choice
Neither right is insub stantial nor the right can be allowed to be defeated by any manner of technicality
The right to have the dispute adju dicated by a civil court cannot be allowed to be defeated by vague 357 or amorphouse mis called agreements to refer to arbitra tion 
On the other hand if the agreement to refer to arbitration is established the right to have the dispute settled by arbitration cannot be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds
 In the application filed by the defendants in this case they only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement
It was not stated that they would file the written statement
They never took any other step sub mitting to the jurisdiction of the court to decide the case on merits
The right to have the dispute settled by arbitra tion has been conferred by agreement of parties and that right should not be deprived of by technical pleas
The Court must go into the circumstances and intention of the party in the step taken
The Court must examine whether the party has abandoned his right under the agreement
In the light of these principles and looking to the substance of the application dated January 4 1985 we cannot form an opinion that the defendants have abandoned their right to have the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the written statement
In the result the appeal is allowed in setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring the order of the High Court
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
GN Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant filed two eviction petitions against the respondent
The first of these was under section 141e of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 on the ground of personal bona fide requirement
The same was decreed in favour of the appellant and the respondent was granted six months time to vacate the premises
This was in accordance with section 147 of the Act prohibiting the landlord from obtaining possession before the expiry of six months from the eviction order
The second eviction petition filed under Section 141a of the Act for non payment of rent was compromised between the parties and the respondent agreed to put back the appellant in possession of the said premises
The tenant delivered possession of the premises
When the possession was delivered six months period stipulated under Section 147 did not expire for executing the eviction decree obtained in the first suit
Owing to some reasons the appellant could not continue in the premises and wanted to let out the premises to a third party
At that point of time the erstwhile tenant filed an application under Section 192 of the Act claiming re entry into the premises
The Rent Controller rejected the application
On appeal the Rent Control Tribunal directed the appellant to put back the tenant in possession of the premises
A revision petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court
It was dismissed in limine
Appellant has preferred this appeal against the order of the High Court
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 1
Sub Section 2 of section 19 operates in favour of the tenant who has suffered an order of eviction under section 141e or under Sections 14 A to 14 D and 21
The tenant may move the Rent Controller for a direction against the landlord to put him in possession of the 316 premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit if the premises is not occupied by the landlord after recovering possession or not occupied within two months by the person for whose benefit the premises are held
The tenant has a further right to move the Controller for such reliefs if the landlord has at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession re let the premises to third party without obtaining permission of the Controller under sub section 1 of Section 19 or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person not bona fide
If the possession is recovered under any order other than those referred to in sub section 1 the tenant has no right to invoke the provisions of sub section 2 of section 19
318F H 319A B 2
In the instant case the possession was actually delivered to the appellant by the tenant as per the compro mise recorded in the suit based on arrears of rent under section 141a and delivery of such possession cannot therefore be referable to the decree for eviction under section 141e
In fact that decree for eviction in Suit No 28877 was not put into execution and it was perhaps found unnecessary to execute that decree since the tenant has surrendered possession of the premises as per the com promise in Suit No 33077 based on arrears of rent
The application filed by the tenant under sub section 2 of section 19 of the Act was therefore clearly not maintain able
319E F