Appeal No 738 of 1963
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 16 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No 105 of 1957
57 B Sen M N Shroff and I N Shroff for the appellants
G section Pathak and C P Lal for respondents 1 a 1c
K L Hathi and R N Sachthey for respondents No 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar J
This appeal arises out of a suit filed on August 10 1956 by Shri Lal Saheb Bhargavendra Singh now deceased and represented by his legal representatives against the Union of India the State of Vindhya Pradesh now merged in the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Collector of Satna for a declaration that he was entitled to receive an allowance of Rs 650 per month from the Union of India
There was another claim but that depended on the declaratory relief claimed and need not therefore be referred to further
Shri Lal Saheb was the brother of the Ruler of the former Indian State of Nagod and he contended that the Ruler had by a law passed on March 7 1948 provided for an allowance for him at the rate of Rs 650 per month and that law was binding on the defendants who had by an executive order illegally altered the amount of the maintenance
It was on this basis that the claim was made
The suit was dismissed by the trial Court but was decreed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on appeal by the plaintiff
Hence this appeal
Certain events that took place after March 7 1948 when the allowance was fixed have now to be stated
On March 18 1948 the Ruler of Nagod along with the Rulers of various neighbouring ruling States formed a new State called the United State of Vindhya Pradesh into which the component States were merged thereby losing their sovereign status
Thereafter the United State merged in India by an agreement and pursuant thereto the Government of India took over its administration on January 1 1950
Its territories then became the Indian province of Vindhya Pradesh The United State ceased to exist
On the promulgation of the Constitution on January 26 1950 the Province of Vindhya Pradesh became a Part C State of Independent India and later from November 1 1956 it was merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh
By the agreement constituting the United State all laws in force in the constituent States were continued in force and likewise the laws of the United State were by a statutory order continued in force when it merged in India
Article 372 of the Constitution continued in force all laws which were in force in the territories of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
58 Each succeeding State could of course alter the laws which were so continued in force in spite of the change of sovereignty by a law duly made by it
Neither the United State nor the Indian Province or States which successively administered the territories of the State of Nagod had made any law concerning any allowance to be paid to Shri Lal Saheb
The Rajpramukh the head of the United State and the President of India had passed orders from time to time fixing his allowance at amounts lower than that at which it had been fixed by the Ruler of Nagod on March 7 1948
These were however executive orders and not laws
They could not reduce the amount of allowance to Shri Lal Saheb fixed by the Ruler of Nagod on March 7 1948 if he had done so by a law
All this is not in controversy
The only question in this appeal is whether the order of the Ruler of Nagod of March 7 1948 was a law
If it was it is not in dispute that the claim made in the suit must be upheld
The High Court observed that this Court had in various cases ending with the case of Madhaorao Phalka vs State of Madhya Pradesh 1 held that the line between the legislative executive and judicial functions of absolute Rulers like the Ruler of Nagod was not at all clear cut and an attempt to place an order of such a Ruler in one class or the other was of no practical importance
In this view of the judgments of this Court the High Court said that it was futile to contend that the order of March 7 1948 was an executive act of the Ruler and had not the force of law
The High Court therefore held that the allowance had been fixed by law and decreed the suit
The question whether an order of a Ruler is law or not arises because an absolute Ruler combined in himself the capacities of the supreme executive judicial and legislative authorities in the State any particular action of his might have been in one or other of these capacities
Therefore it becomes necessary to decide when the question arises as it has done
in the present case in what capacity the Ruler acted when he made a particular order
At times the question has presented some difficulty
This Court had to discuss this question in many cases but with respect we think the High Court was under a misconception about the effect of the decisions in those cases
It would be unprofitable to discuss these cases for their result may be quoted from the judgment in the recent case of Narsing Pratap Deo vs State of Orissa 2  The true legal position is that whenever a dispute arises as to whether an Orders passed by an absolute monarch represents a legislative 1  2 A I R 1798
59 act  all relevant factors must be considered before the question is answered the nature of the order the scope and effect of its provisions its general setting and context the method adopted by the Ruler in promulgating legislative as distinguished from executive orders these and other allied matters win have to be examined before the character of the order is judicially determined
 It is therefore not correct to say as the High Court did that this Court has held that every order of the Ruler is a law made by him
The question whether it is so or not has to be determined in each case independently
We then proceed to discuss whether the order of the Ruler of Nagod was law
The question arises because as earlier stated the covenant constituting the United State certain statutory orders made from time to time and lastly article 372 of the Constitution said that the existing laws would be so continued
Now these are instruments dealing with sovereign States and rights
They are instruments based on legal ideas and notions founded on modern jurisprudence
It would therefore be legitimate to hold that the word law was used in them in a sense acceptable to modern jurisprudence
The contention that the order of March 7 1947 being a law could be set aside only by a law duly passed by the succeeding States emphasises this view
A law made by these succeeding States the last of which is the Union of India is fully a law as understood in modem jurisprudence
A law which is to be set aside by such a law must therefore have been contemplated as a law of the same kind
This aspect of the matter has to be kept in mind in approaching the question
Many tests may be suggested for determining whether a parti cular thing would be considered law in modem jurisprudence
In the decisions of this Court on the point several of them have been referred to
It may be that they are not all applicable to every case
It may also be that it is not possible to give an exhaustive list of all these tests
None the less however the question is capable of decision in each case
The order of the Ruler of Nagod which is said to be a law is addressed to the Chief Minister of the State and directs him to do certain things
It starts by reciting that Shri Lal Saheb s financial position was deplorable and the Ruler felt it to be his duty to see that Shri Lal Saheb did not experience difficulties in his advancing years and as no permanent arrangement had been made for him till then the ruler was making the order
Then follows the operative part of the order which is in these terms SUP
CI66 5 60 Hence I order that the Kothi in which he is at present residing be given to Shri Lal Saheb for generation to generation and an allowance of Rs  650 Rupees six hundred and fifty per month be granted in addition to the same a tonga and a horse be given the expenses for which shall be borne by himself and Rs 5000 Rupees five thousand be granted to him so that he may be able to make improvements in agriculture and satisfy his debts partly
 We think it quite impossible that this order was a law
First it is a direction to the Chief Minister
It is an order by which the Ruler required the Chief Minister to do certain things
It has not been shown to us that a direction to an officer to be carried out by him has ever been held to be a law or can be such
It cannot be so according to notions of modem jurisprudence
Then we find that a copy of the order was sent under the direction of the Revenue Minister to Shri Lal Saheb and various parts of it to the different departments of the Nagod Administration respectively concerned with them obviously with the object that they might be carried out
This would indicate that even the Administration was not treating it as law for it would be difficult to imagine different parts of a law being communicated to different branches of the Administration
Further it appears that the Revenue Minister directed the Accounts Officer to make a report regarding the provision to be made for the sum of Rs 5000 mentioned in the order
This is not how a law is carried out
The order was also an instrument granting something to Shri Lal Saheb
Under it a kothi house a tonga carriage and horse and Rs 5000 in a lump were to be made available to Shri Lal Saheb
In regard to these the order was only a grant it gave him these things
A grant is of course not a law
That would follow from the decisions of this Court in Narsing Pratap Deo s case1 and State of Gujarat vs Vora Fiddali2
Now if the rest of the order was a grant it would be strange that one part of it only namely the part providing for the monthly allowance only was a law
Obviously this was also intended to be a grant the fact that the order provided for future payments cannot make it a law
The context is overwhelmingly against the view that it was a law
Again the recitals in the order put it beyond doubt that the Ruler was only discharging what he considered his moral obligation
After referring to Shri Lal Saheb s deplorable financial 1 ATR 2  61 position he said I take it to be my duty to see that Shri Lal should not experience difficulties in his old days
The Ruler was therefore providing for something out of his bounty and in discharge of his moral obligation
A law is never made for these reasons
It was said that the money was to be paid out of the State Exchequer
There is nothing to show however that it was so or that in Nagod the private funds of the Ruler were separate from the State Exchequer
But assume that the payment was to come from the State Exchequer
That cannot turn a directive or a grant into a law
Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Promod Chandra Dev vs The State of Orissa1 where a grant of an allowance was held to be law
That case is clearly distinguishable
There the nature and condition of allowances to be granted to persons entitled to them from the State had been laid down in Order 31 of the Rules Regulations and Privileges of Khanjadars and Khorposhdars
It was held that those rules regulations of Talcher etc
1937 were the laws of the State and that the grants made by the Ruler in accordance with those laws became the absolute property of the grantee
What bad happened there was that earlier lands had been granted to a certain Khorposhdar maintenance holder under Order 31 aforesaid and Subsequently these were commuted into payments of monthly amounts
It was in those circumstances that it was held that the maintenance was payable under a law
No such circumstances exist in the present case
We should fore concluding state that the Ruler of Nagod who made the order of March 7 1948 himself gave evidence stating that lie had passed the order under his legislative powers
This statement obviously does not conclude the matter
It was not relied upon in any of the Courts below
The internal evidence to which we have earlier referred shows that the order was not a Legislative act
For all these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the order of the Ruler of Nagod of March 7 1948 was not a law
It was not continued in force after the State of Nagod lost its sovereignty in the circumstances earlier mentioned
The order was an executive act of the Ruler providing for certain allowance to Shri Lal Saheb
It was therefore competent to the President 1 1962 Supp
1 section C R 405 62 acting in his executive capacity to reduce it to a sum of Rs 530 per month as he did by his order of September 24 1951 which was challenged in the suit
In the result we hold that the appeal must be allowed and we direct accordingly
There will be no order as to costs
Appeal allowed


Summary:
On 7th March 1948 the Ruler of a former Indian State out of his bounty and in discharge of his moral obligation passed an order providing for an allowance to his brother respondent herein
He directed the Chief Minister of the State to do certain things and the various parts of the order were sent to the different departments of the State Administration for carrying them out
The order also granted to the respondent a house conveyance etc
On 18th March 1948 the State along with other States formed the United State of Vindhya Pradesh the component States losing their sovereign status
Later the United State merged in India and on the promulgation of the Constitution the State became a Part of the Indian Union
On 24th September 1951 the President of India in his executive capacity reduced the amount of allowance
The respondent thereupon filed a suit for a declaration against the State and Central Governments that the allowance could not be reduced Because it was granted to him by a law passed by the former Ruler which law was continued in force by the covenant constituting the United State by certain statutory orders made from time to time and lastly by article 372 of the Constitution
The trial court dismissed the suit but the High Court on appeal decreed it
In the appeal to this Court by the State and Central Governments the question was whether the order of the former Ruler was a law
HELD  It wag not a law and was not continued in force after the State lost its sovereignty
The order was an executive act of the Ruler and it was competent to the President in his executive capacity to reduce the amount
66 H The nature of the order shows it cannot be a law according to notions of modern jurisprudence
It was a mere directive or grant and even if the money was paid out of the State Exchequer that fact would not turn the order into a law
60 C F Narsing Pratap Deo vs
State of Orissa   referred to
Promod Chandra Dev vs State of Orissa 1962 Supp 1 SCR 405 explained