Appeal No 1934 of 1978
From the Judgment and Order dated 21121977 of the Allaha bad 11 High Court in Civil Misc
Writ Petition No 227 of 1977
Ms Rachna Gupta for the Appellant
SC Manchanda and KP Bhatnagar for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
The Income tax Act 1961 replaced the Indian Income tax Act 1922 wef 141962
The repeal of the earlier Act necessitated the enactment of transitional provisions to facilitate the change over
Perhaps the sim plest course would have been to provide that the new Act would apply to all proceedings for the assessment year 1962 63 and thereafter
The legislature however evolved a more complicated procedure
While section 2971 of the new Act declared that the Indian Income tax Act 1922 stood repealed by the new Act sub section 2 of the above sec tion made detailed and meticulous provisions in clauses a to m as to whether the new Act or the old Act will govern in the various situations dealt with therein
These provi sions have led to a lot of litigation and the controversy in this appeal also arises out of one such provision
We are concerned here with the scope of proceedings for reassess ment in respect of assessment years prior to 1962 63 and the answer to the question before us turns on the provisions of the following two sections of the 1961 Act Section 297 2971 xxx xxx xxx 2 Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 11 of 1922 hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act  xxx xxx xxx xxx d where in respect of any assessment year after the year ending on the 31st day of March 1940 i a notice under section 34 of the re pealed Act had been issued before the com mencement of this Act the proceedings in pursuance of such notice may be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed 12 ii any income chargeable to tax had es caped assessment within the meaning of that expression in section 147 and no proceedings under section 34 of the repealed Act in re spect of any such income are pending at the commencement of this Act a notice under section 148 may subject to the provisions contained in section 149 or section 150 be issued with respect to that assessment year and all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly
 Section 150 1501 Notwithstanding anything contained in section 149 the notice under section 148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making an assessment or reassessment or recom putation in consequence or or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order passed by any authority in any proceed ing under this Act by way of appeal reference or revision underlining ours We may proceed now to set out how the question arises in the present case The appeal arises out of an order of the High Court in a writ petition filed by one Mahadeo Prasad Bais since deceased represented by his legal representa tives challenging reassessment proceedings initiated against him for the assessment years 1953 54 to 1963 64
The appeal is however restricted to the assessment years 1953 54 to 1961 62
Upto assessment year 1948 49 the appel lant was being assessed as the Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family consisting of himself his mother his wife and three sons
For the assessment year 1949 50 and subsequent years upto 1961 62 he had filed a return in his individual capaci ty on the footing that there had been a total partition of the family within the meaning of Section 25A of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 and that he was assessable in respect of the income from the properties of the family allotted to him at the partition
In the alternative he claimed partial partition of some of the joint family propertiesf Both these claims were initially negatived and the entire income was assessed in the hands of the Hindu Undivided Family
The returns filed by the appellant in his individual capacity were finalised by holding that there was no income assessa ble in his individual capacity
The Hindu Undivided Family went up in appeals and ultimately the Tribunal accepted the claim of partial partition in respect of some of the proper ties with effect from different dates
This conclusion of the Tribunal was also affirmed by the High Court in the decision reported as Mahadeo Prasad Bais vs Income tax Officer which related 
13 to the assessment years 1956 57 to 1958 59
Consequent on these decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court the income from some of the erstwhile family properties stood excluded from the assessment of the Hindu Undivided Family and became liable to be included in the hands of the present appellant
The assessment for 1949 50 and subsequent years upto 1961 62 on the family had been completed and the ap peals and reference disposed of under the Indian Income tax Act 1922
The original assessments made on the appellant as an individual for the assessment years 1953 54 to 1961 62 had been completed under the Indian Income tax Act 1922
In these assessments no income from the erstwhile joint family properties had been included as the officer was of the view as in 1949 50 that it was assessable in the hands of the family
There were no proceedings initiated or pending under Section 34 of the 1922 Act in respect of these assessment years as on 141962
Quite sometime after the High Court had decided the reference for 1949 50 in the case of the family the Income tax Officer thought of steps to include the income assessable in the hands of the appellant conse quent on the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court which he had failed 10 assess earlier
He therefore served on the appellant on 1931977 notices for reassessment as required by section 2972dii under section 148 of the 1961 Act
The appellant resisted these proceedings inter alia on the ground that the notices were barred by limita tion
The department however contended that though nor mally reassessment proceedings had to be initiated within a period of four eight or sixteen years as the case may be under the then provisions of Section 149 of the 1961 Act the reassessment proceedings in this case were saved by the provisions of Section 1501 of the 1961 Act set out earli er
This contention of the department has been accepted by the High Court in the decision under appeal before us which is reported in The issue involved in this appeal is basically a short one turning on the language of section 1501
Before con sidering the interpretation of this section we may howev er point out that on this question there appears to be a conflict of judicial opinion between the several High Courts
The Allahabad High Court in the decision presently under appeal 1980125 ITR 49 and the Calcutta High Court in ITO vs Eastern Coal Co Ltd have taken the view that a reassessment in such circumstances is saved by the provisions of Section 1501 of the 1961 Act
An earlier Allahabad decision in CIT vs Kamalapat Moti lal 1977110 ITR 769 and an earlier Bombay decision in Ambaji Traders vs 1TO 1976105 ITR 273 took a simi lar view on the analogous provision contained in section 1533 of the 1961 Act but a contrary view was taken by the latter 14 High Court in the latter case reported as CIT vs
TP Asrani Both sets of decisions have placed reliance on certain observations of this Court in differing contexts
But it will be best to have a look at the statuto ry provisions first in the context of the facts of the present case
To start with there is no dispute that reassessment proceedings were rightly initiated under section 148 of the Act
It is also common ground that on the language of sec tion 148 as it stood at the relevant time no notice under section 148 could have been issued in March 1977 for the assessment years in question
The Revenue can successfully support the validity of this notice only by reference to section 150 1
Two questions then arise i Are the provisions of section 150 1 attracted  ii If yes do they save the impugned proceedings  The answer to the first question is furnished by section 297 2 d ii the very clause which authorises the issue of the notice of reassess ment under section 148
It permits the issue of the notice under section 148 subject to the provisions contained in section 149 or section 150
Though the words subject to may be appropriate in the context of section 149 and section 150 2 which place restrictions on the issue of the notice us 148 they are somewhat inappropriate a propos section 150 1 which relaxes the conditions for issue
But there is no doubt that the statute clearly intends that the benefit of enlargement of the time limited under section 149 should be available in respect of the notice issued under section 148 read with section 297 2 d ii
The answer to the second question is furnished by section 150 1itself
It removes the bar of time when the reassessment proceedings are initiated in consequence of or to give effect to a finding contained in an order passed by any authority in any proceeding by way of appeal reference or revision
There is no difficulty here for the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court for the several years between 1949 50 and 1961 62 were passed in proceedings by way of appeals and reference and there is no dispute that the reassessment proceedings have been initiat ed to give effect to findings in such orders
There is however a catch in applying the terms of section 1501  to this case
There is no doubt that the whole idea of the sub section was to lift the embargo placed on initiation of reassessment proceedings and to remove the time limit where the notice of reassessment is issued with a view to give effect to a direction or finding contained in an appellate order or an order passed on revision or on reference
Unfor tunately however in expressing its above intention the legislature has worded the exemption from time limit so as to cover only cases where the finding or direction is con tained in an order passed by any such authority in any such proceeding under this Act ie the 1961 Act
In the present case the assessments for 1949 50 and subsequent years in the case of the family were made under the old Act and were the subject matters of appeal to the 15 Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Tribunal and of refer ence to the High Court under the provisions of the 1922 Act
In other words the finding in consequence of which the assessments presently under consideration are being sought to be reopened is a finding contained in orders passed not under this Act  but in orders passed under the 1922 Act
Literally applied therefore the language of section 150 1 does not help the department to overcome the bar of limitation otherwise imposed by Section 149
Pressing for the literal construction of the sub sec tion it is contended for the appellant that there are good reasons why this construction should be accepted 1 To accept the contention of the depart ment would mean the virtual deletion of the words under this Act from section 150 1 2 It seems clear that the above words have not been inadvertantly used in the statute
If one turns 10 s153 3 which is an extension of section 150 1  removing the time ban for the completion of reassessments initiated for the same purpose the legislature goes further than section 150 1 and makes specific refer ence to particular provisions of the new Act 3 The provisions of section 150 1 will not become redundant if read in the manner con tended for by the assessee
While no doubt the proceedings are initiated in all cases cov ered by section 297 2 d ii under the new Act the orders for giving effect to a finding or direction in which such proceedings are initiated may belong to either category they may be orders passed under the old Act or they may be orders passed under the new Act
The terms of section 150 1 will be effective in the latter category of cases and 4 The provisions contained in Ss 150 1 and 153 3 are provisions exempting the applicability of a normal rule of limitation otherwise applicable to actions for reassess ment and such provisions should be construed strictly
On the other hand it is contended for the department that the object of the provision being very obvious namely that where reassessment proceedings are initiated to give effect to orders on appeal reference or 16 revision there should be no time limit tying down the hands of the Revenue as such orders are seldom likely to be passed within the limits of time mentioned in section 149 we should give effect to the clear intention of the legislature and should not frustrate its object
It is therefore necessary to examine the provisions of section 297 2 d ii and section 150 1 a little more closely and examine which of the two interpretations is preferable
Taking up the appellant s interpretation first it has no doubt the attractiveness of simplicity
It is a strict and literal interpretation of section 150 1
This apart learned counsel drew our attention to the fact that the decided cases have referred to certain decisions of this Court in this context
We do not however think that the decisions of this Court in Jain vs Mahendra and Govinddas vs ITO 1976103 ITR 123 cited by appellant s counsel arc of any assistance to them
In the former case a notice us 34 had been issued before 141962 but it had been quashed as without jurisdiction as it was barred by time
The question was whether the proceedings initiated by the notice can be said to have been pending as on 141962
The Court answered the question in the affirma tive
It held that for purposes of section 297 2 d ii all that had to be seen was whether proceedings under section 34 of the 1922 Act were factually pending on 141962
That the notice issued before that date was barred by time and was held so later was immaterial
The notice had in fact been quashed by the High Court in a writ only much later on 631963 and so proceedings under section 34 were pending as on 141962
We are unable to see how this decision is of any help here
In the second case the claim by the assessee a Hindu undivided family that there had been a partial parti tion on 15111955 as a result of which the share income from two firms had ceased to be the income of the family from that date was accepted by the Income tax Officer
Subsequently the assessments of the two firms for the assessment years 1950 51 to 1956 57 had been reopened and reassessments were made on them enhancing their income
Consequently action was also taken to reopen the assessments of the family which for the relevant previous years had a share in the firms  income
These assessments were initiat ed under the new Act in accordance with the provisions of section 297 2 d ii
The assessee had no grievance thus far
But while completing the reassessment the officer in addition to reassessing the family also took advantage of the provisions enacted in Ss 1716 and 7 of the 1961 Act which had no counter part in the 1922 Act and passed orders apportioning the tax assessed on the family amongst its members
This was objected to by the assessee
The department referring to the language of section 297 2 d ii that all the provisions of this Act shall apply ac cordingly contended that the ITO could legitimately invoke the provisions of Ss 171 6 and 7 as well while 17 making the reassessments
This contention was negatived
The Court observed These words merely refer to the machinery provided in the new Act for the assessment of the escaped income
They do not import any substantive provisions of the new Act which create rights or liabilities
The word ac cordingly in the context means nothing more than for the purpose of assessment and it clearly suggests that the provisions of the new Act which are made applicable are those relating to the machinery of assessment
 It will be at once clear that this line of approach can have no validity in the context of section 297 2 d ii
Here there is no need to guess or speculate on which provi sions of the new Act are to apply
The section itself in so many words provides that Ss 148 149 and 150 will apply to the initiation of a reassessment proceeding under section 297 2 d ii and this cannot be negatived by the last few words of that clause
On the contrary as pointed out earlier they place it beyond all doubt that the provisions of the 1961 Act have to be applied to the reassessment on the basis that Ss 148 to 150 apply
This case also does not there fore advance the case of the assessees
It is next contended by the appellant s counsel that the very issue before us had been considered in the decision of this Court in Seth Gujarmal Modi vs CIT and this concludes the issue in his favour
The second headnote at page 261 seems to bear out this contention
It reads   
Since the Appellate Assistant Com missioner s order was not passed under the 1961 Act the department could not take any support from section 150 1 of the Act A perusal of the decision shows indeed that this was the ground on which a separate contention urged on behalf of the department on the basis of section 150 1 was repelled
It is no doubt seen from the facts of the case that it was a case of reassessment under section 297 2 d i of the Act and the Court specifically held that reassessment pro ceedings should have been initiated under section 34 of the 1922 Act and not under section 148 of the 1961 Act
In view of this conclusion no question of drawing any support from section 150 1 could at all arise
Still an argument was addressed and was repelled on the basis of the words under this 18 Act used in section 150 1 thus upholding the literal construction argument now addressed on behalf of the asses see
We shall consider this decision later after considering the department s contentions
As against the above contentions Sri Manchanda submits that the provisions of section 150 1 should be applied not blindly but with necessary modifications to suit the situa tion
In support of this plea he relies strongly on the last few words of section 297 2 d ii
It is urged that the expression all the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly should be so construed as to enable the Revenue to invoke reassessment proceedings on the footing that the orders on appeal or reference were ones passed under this Act within the meaning of section 150 1
Sri Manchanda cited two decisions in support of his contention
In Third ITO vs Damodar Bhat the question was whether proceedings under section 226 3 of the new Act would apply with respect to a tax liability incurred under the 1922 Act
The answer to this question in the affirmative turned on the language of section 297 2 j
which provided that any tax or other dues payable under the 1922 Act may notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922 Act be recovered under the Act
The contrary interpretation accepted by the High Court in that case would have had the effect of nulli fying the provisions of section 297 2j
Again in Jain Bros v
Union of India   it was held that penalty could be imposed under section 271 1 of the 1961 Act in respect of returns filed before 141962 and assessments completed after 141962 but under the 1922 Act
This was because of section 297 2 g the special transitory provision in this behalf which provided that any proceeding for the initiation of a penalty in respect of any assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1962 or any earlier year which is completed on or after the 1st day of April 1962 may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed under this Act
 Here again section 297 2 g had been enacted to provide for the exact situation in question and to have held to the contrary would have rendered the provisions of section 297 2 g meaningless and redundant
The position is no doubt a little different here
The provisions of section 150 1 have been specially made applicable and operative in respect of the notice under section 148 issued in pursuance of section 297 2 dii and as pointed out earlier the application of the provisions of section 297 2dii gives rise to two sets of situations to one of which the language of section 1501 would squarely apply and so the interpretation sought for by the appellant does not render the words of section 150 1 redundant
Despite this point of difference in the two situations we think that the principle of the above decisions that the mutatis mutandis rule should be invoked in interpreting 19 section 297 2 has application here also
Not to do so would no doubt not make section 1501 redundant but it will bring about an unintended and inequitable situation
It is clear that section 150 1 will operate to lift the time bar in cases where the reassessment is initiated under section 148 to give effect to an order passed under the 1961 Act
Equal ly where assessments had been reopened under section 34 of the 1922 Act before 141962 to give effect to orders passed under the 1922 Act and are continued after that date by virtue of section 297 2 d i the provisions of the second proviso to section 34 3 of that Act would preclude the operation of the normal rule of limitation for reassess ments
In this situation it will be a great anomaly to reach the conclusion that the time limit will operate in cases where proceedings under section 148 are initiated to give effect to an order on appeal revision and reference merely because such order is one passed under the 1922 Act
Neither reason nor rhyme can explain how the statue could have intended such anomaly or why it should be so interpret ed as to result in a discriminatory treatment only to this class of cases
An interpretation which will result in such anomaly or absurdity should be avoided
It is also necessary to remember that section 297 2 is a provision enacted with a view to provide for continuity of proceedings in the context of repeal of one Act by a fresh one broadly containing analogous provisions and the transitory provisions should as far as possible be construed so as to effect such conti nuity and not so as to create a lacuna
For these reasons we think that it will be appropriate to so read the words of section 297 2dii as to permit the applicability of section 150 or section 153 with the necessary modifica tions
To paraphrase the last words of section 2972dii should be read to mean that where the proceedings initiated under section 148 subject to the relaxations and limitation of Ss 149 and 150 all the provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly that is to say in the same manner as they would apply in case of proceedings normally initiated under these provisions
Since reassessment proceedings so initiat ed to give effect to orders on appeal revision or reference will not be subject to a time limit the proceedings like wise initiated under section 2972dii read with section 148 will also not be subject to any limitations save to the extent mentioned in section 1502
We would like to add that even if section 1501 is to be read literally and considered as posing a hurdle as contended for by the appellant we think this result can be overcome by a liberal interpretation of section 2972k
This clause reads any agreement entered into appointment made approval given recognition granted direc tion instruction notification 20 order or rule issued under any provision of the repealed Act shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act be deemed to have been entered into made granted given or issued under the corresponding provision aforesaid and shall continue in force accordingly This is principally a provision intended to save admin istrative steps taken under the 1922 Act by deeming them to be steps taken under the 1961 Act
Strictly construed the words order issued also would seem prima facie to carry only a similar connotation
But we see no objection for our present purposes in the way of our construing these words liberally and consequently deeming the orders passed and issued by the Tribunal and the High Court in this case for the assessment year 1949 50 and subsequent assessment years as orders passed or issued under the corresponding provi sions of the new Act
Once this deeming is made there is no difficulty in the way of accepting the Revenue s contention
We think that the circumstances justify a slight straining of the language of this clause and applying it so interpret ed to the problem before us so as to avoid a meaningless anomaly
Thus construed the statute can be said not to have misfired in its application to the situation in the present case
We should before we conclude refer to the decision of this Court in the Gujar Mat Modi case
As we have pointed out earlier the principal conclusion reached in that case was that proceedings under section 148 could not have been initiated as the case fell under the provisions of section 2972di
It was therefore unnecessary to deal with the contention based upon section 150
Moreover this part of the decision was only based on a prima facie reading of section 1501 and contains no discussion of the various aspects that need consideration and have been touched upon above
We do not therefore think that the above decision can be treated as conclusive on the issue before us which for the reasons discussed above we think should be an swered differently
We affirm the conclusion of the High Court and dismiss the appeal
No costs
YL Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Mr NL Patel was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nadiad in October 1988
He soon found that the local Police was not cooperating with the courts in efficting service of summons warrants and notices on accused persons as a result of which the trials of cases were delayed
He made complaint against the local police to the District Superintendent of Police and forwarded a copy of the same to the Director General of Police but nothing concrete hap pened
On account of these complaints Mr SR Sharma Police Inspector Nadiad was annoyed with the Chief Judicial Magistrate and he withdrew constables posted in the CJM Court
In April 1989 the CJM filed two complaints with the Police against the Police Inspector and other Police Offi cials Nadiad for delaying the process of the Court
On 25th July 1989 the CJM directed the police to register a crimi nal case against 14 persons who had caused obstruction in judicial proceedings but subsequently since unqualified apology was tendered the CJM directed the Police Inspector to drop the cases
The Police Inspector reacted strongly to the CJM s direction and he made complaint against the CJM to the Registrar of the High Court through the District Super intendent of Police
On account of the aforesaid facts there was hostility between the Police of Nadiad and the CJM
939 On 25th September 1989 the Police Inspector met the CJM in his chambers to discuss a case where the Police had failed to submit the charge sheet within 90 days
During discussion the Police Inspector invited the CJM to visit the police station to see the papers and assured him that he would mollify the sentiments of the police officials
At 835 pm on the said date the Police Inspector sent a Police Jeep to the CJM s residence and he went to the Police Station
According to the CJM when he arrived in the Police Station he was forced to consume liquor and on his refusal he was assulted handcuffed and tied with rope by Police Inspector Sub Inspector Head Constable and Constable and that he was sent to Hospital for Medical Examination under handcuffs
A photographer was arranged to take his photo graph which was published in the newspapers
The Police Inspector disputed these allegations and according to him the CJM entered his chamber at the Police Station in a drunken state shouting and abusing him and since he was violent he was arrested handcuffed and sent to Hospital for Medical Examination
He himself wanted to be photo graphed and that is why the photographs were taken by the press photographer
As the incident undermined the dignity of courts in the country Judicial Officers Judges and Magistrates all over the country were in a state of shock they felt insecure and humiliated
A number of Bar Associations passed Resolutions and went on strike
The Delhi Judicial Service Association the All India Judges Association Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh and many others approached this Court by means of telegrams and petitions under Article 32 for saving the dignity and honour of the judiciary
The CJM also filed an application for quashing the two FIRs lodged against him and for directing the trial of his complaint as State case an award of compensation
On 2991989 this Court took cogni zance of the matter by issuing notices to the State of Gujarat and other Police Officers
Since there was serious dispute between the parties with regard to the entire incident the Court appointed the senior puisne Judge of the Allahabad High Court to inquire into the incident and to submit a report to the Court
The inquiry was held on behalf of the Court and not under the provisions of the Commission of Inquiry Act
A detailed report was submitted to this Court and the Court directed copies to be delivered to the concerned parties and permit ted the parties and the contemners to file their objections before this Court
940 The Learned Commissioner s Report establised the follow ing facts and circumstances that the CJM found that the Police of Nadiad was not effective in service of summons and had adopted an attitude of indifference to the court s orders and as complaints were forwarded to the authorities by the CJM there was confrontation between the local police and the magistracy
When the CJM visited the police station pursuant to the Police Inspector s request to discuss the matter he was forced to consume liquor and on his refusal he was assaulted
He was tied up with a rope by the Police personnel and handcuffed deliberately in defiance of the state s Police Regulations and Circulars and the decision of this Court in Prem Shankar Shukla vs Delhi Administration
 A panchnama showing the drunken state of the CJM was pre pared by the Police Inspector and signed by two panchas a Mamlatdar and a Fire Brigade Officer
A press photographer was brought on the scene the police personnel posed with the CJM for the press photographer and the same was pub lished in newspapers
A request made by the CJM to the Civil Hospital doctors to contact and inform the District Judge about the incident was not allowed
On examination at the hospital the body of the CJM was found to have a number of injuries
His blood was taken and chemical examination conducted
The Chemical Examiner submitted a report holding that the blood sample contained alcohol
At the initial stage only one case was registered against the CJM by the Police under the Bombay Prohibition Act but when lawyers met the Police Inspector for securing release of the CJM on bail the offence being bailable the Police Inspector registered another case under Sections 332 and 506 IPC in order to frustrate the attempt
The District Superintendent of Police did not take immediate action in the matter but created an alibi that he had gone elsewhere and stayed in the government Rest House there the register of the Rest House however indicating that the entry regarding the stay was manipulated subsequently by making an interpolation
On behalf of the contemners Police Officers it was contended that 1 this Court had no jurisdiction or power to indict the Police Officers even if they are found to be guilty as their conduct does not amount to contempt of this Court
Articles 129 and 215 demarcate the respective areas of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts respectively and this Court s jurisdiction under Article 129 is confined to the contempt of itself only and it has no jurisdiction to indict a person for contempt of an infe rior court subordinate to the
High Court
2 Even if the Supreme Court is a court of record it has no power to take action for the contempt of a Chief Judicial Magistrate s court as neither the constitution nor any statutory provi sion confer any 941 such jurisdiction or power on this Court
So far as the High Court is concerned it has power of judicial and administra tive superintendence over the subordinate courts and Section 15 of the Contempts of Courts Act 1971 expressly confers power on the High Court to take action for the contempt of subordinate courts
3 Under Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule Parliament has legislative competence to make a law curtailing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Section 15 of the Contempts of Courts Act 1971 curtails the inherent power of this Court with regard to contempt of subordinate courts
Inherent powers are always preserved but they do not authorise a court to invest itself with juris diction when that jurisdiction is not conferred by law
4 Assumption of contempt jurisdiction with regard to contempt of subordinate and inferior courts on the interpretation of Article 129 of the Constitution is foreclosed by the deci sions of the Federal Court in KL Gauba vs The Honable the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court o  judicature at Lahore  Anr AIR 1942 FC 1
This Court being the successor to the Federal Court was bound by the decisions of the Federal Court under Article 3742 of the Constitution
5 In our country there is no court of universal jurisdiction as the jurisdiction of all courts including the Supreme Court is limited
6 Article 1421 does not contemplate any order contrary to statutory provisions
7 The findings recorded by the Commission cannot be taken into account as those findings are hit by Article 203 of the Constitution
The Attorney General urged that the power to punish contempt is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in a Court of record that a superior court of record has inher ent power to punish for contempt of itself and it necessari ly includes and carries with it the power to punish for contempt committed in respect of subordinate or inferior courts that a superior court of record having power to correct the order of an inferior court has power to protect that court by punishing those who interfere with the due administration of justice of that court
It was further urged that the recognises and preserves the existing contempt jurisdiction and power of the court of record for punishing for contempt of subordi nate or inferior courts that the Act has not affected or restricted the suo motu inherent power of the Supreme Court being a court of record which has received constitutional sanction under Article 129 that since this Court has taken cognizance of the contempt matter arising out of the inci dent which is the subject matter of trial before the crimi nal court this Court has ample power under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass any order necessary to do justice and prevent abuse of process of the court and that there is no limitation on the power of this Court under Article 142 942 in quashing a criminal proceeding pending before a subordi nate court
The basic questions that arose for consideration of the Court were a whether the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt of subordinate or inferior courts under Article 129 of the Constitution b whether the inherent jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court is restricted by the  c whether the incident interfered with the due administration of justice and constituted contempt of court and d what punishment should be awarded to the contemners found guilty of contempt
Disposing of the writ petitions Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions and contempt petitions this Court
HELD 11 Contempt of court is an act or commission calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice
It includes civil and criminal contempt
991D Bowen LJ in Helmore vs Smith at 455 referred to
12 The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice or which would lower the authority of court
The public have a vital stake in effec tive and orderly administration of justice
The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury but to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted prejudiced obstructed or interfered with Offutt vs
US   referred to
991F 13 The power to punish contempt is vested in the Judges not for their personal protecting only but for the protec tion of public justice whose interest requires that decen cy and decorum is preserved in Courts of Justice
Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law and shielded in the discharge of their duties
Any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in court or outside the court by attacking the presiding officers of the court would amount to criminal contempt and the courts must take serious cognizance of such conduct
993B 943 The object and purpose of punishing contempt for interference with the administration of justice is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of the Judge or the Magis trate but the purpose is to preserve the authority of the courts to ensure an ordered life in society
991H Attorney General vs Times Newspapers 1974 AC 273 at p 302 referred to
15 The Chief Judicial Magistrate is head of the Magis tracy in the District who administers justice to ensure protect and safaguard the rights of citizens
The subordi nate courts at the district level cater to the need of the masses in administering justice at the base level
By and large the majority of the people get their disputes adjudi cated in subordinate courts
It is in the general interest of the community that the authority of subordinate courts is protected
If the CJM is led into a trap by unscrupulous Police Officers and if he is assaulted handcuffed and roped the public is bound to lose faith in Courts which would be destructive of the basic structure of an ordered society
If this is permitted Rule of Law shall be supplant ed by Police Raj
992D E 16 The conduct of Police Officers in the instant case in assaulting and humiliating the CJM brought the authority and administration of justice into disrespect affecting the public confidence in the institution of justice
992G 17 The incident is a clear interference with the admin istration of justice lowering its judicial authority
Its effect was not confined to one District or State it had a tendency to affect the entire judiciary in the country
The incident high lights a dangerous trend that if the Police is annoyed with the orders of a presiding officer of a court he would be arrested on flimsy manufactured charges to humiliate him publicly as has been done in the instant case
992F 18 The facts of the instant case demonstrate that a presiding officer of a court may be arrested and humiliated on flimsy and manufactured charges which could affect the administration of justice
In order to avoid any such situa tion in future it is necessary to lay down guidelines which should be followed in the case of arrest and detention of a Judicial Officer
1000F 19 In view of  the paramount necessity of preserving the independence of judiciary and at the same time ensuring that infractions of law are  properly investigated the following guidelines are to be 944 followed a If a judicial officer is to be arrested for some offence it should be done under intimation to the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be
b If facts and circumstances necessitate the immediate arrest of a judicial officer of the subordinate judiciary a technical or formal arrest may be effected
c The fact of such arrest should be immediately communicatedto the District and Sessions Judge of the concerned District and the Chief Justice of the High Court
d The Judicial Officer so arrested shall not be taken to a police station without the prior order or directions of the District  Sessions Judge of the concerned District if available
e Immediate facilities shall be provided to the Judicial Officer for communication with his family members legal advisors and Judicial Officers including the District  Sessions Judge
f No statement of a Judicial Officer who is under arrest be recorded nor any panchnama be drawn up nor any medical test be conducted except in the presence of the Legal Advi sor of the Judicial Officer concerned or another Judicial Officer of equal or higher rank if available
g There should be no handcuffing of a Judicial Officer
If however violent resistance to arrest is offered or there is imminent need to effect physical arrest in order to avert danger to life and limb the person resisting arrest may be over powered and handcuffed
In such case immediate report shall be made to the District  Sessions Judge concerned and also to the Chief Justice of the High Court
But the burden would be on the Police to establish the necessity for effecting physical arrest and handcuffing the Judicial Officer and if it be established that the physical arrest and hand cuffing of the Judicial Officer was unjustified the Police Officers causing or responsible for such arrest and handcuffing would be guilty of misconduct and would also be personally liable for compensation andor damages as may be summarily deter mined by the High Court
1000G 1001F 110 These guidelines are not exhaustive but are the minimum safeguards to be observed in case of arrest of a Judicial Officer
These should be implemented by the State Governments as well as by the High Courts
1001G 1 11 No judicial officer should visit a Police Sta tion on his own except in connection with his official and judicial duties and functions and this also with prior intimation to the District and Sessions Judge
1002B 21 The Supreme Court as the Apex Court is the protec tor and guardian of justice throughout the land therefore it has a right and also a duty to protect the courts whose orders and judgments are amenable to correction from com mission of contempt against them
This 945 right and duty of the Apex Court is not abrogated merely because the High Court also has this right and duty of protection of the subordinate courts
The jurisdictions are concurrent and not exclusive or antagonistic
967G H 22 Article 136 vests the Supreme Court with wide powers to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment decree determination sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India except a court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces
The Court s appellate power under Article 136 is plenary it may entertain any appeal by granting special leave against any order made by any Magistrate Tribunal or any other subordinate court
The width and amplitude of the power is not affected by the practice and prcedure followed in insisting that before invoking the jurisdiction under Article 136 the aggrieved party must exhaust remedy available under the law before the appellate authority of the High Court
Self imposed restric tions do not divest it of its wide powers to entertain any appeal against any order or judgment passed by any court or tribunal in the country without exhausting alternative remedy before the appellate authority or the High Court
The power of the Court under Article 136 is unaffected by Arti cles 132 133 and 134A in view of the expression notwith standing anything in this Chapter occurring in Article 136
968E 969A Durga Shankar Mehta vs Thakur Raghuraj Singh  Ors 1955 1 SCR 267 and Arunachalam vs PSR Sadhananthm  Anr   referred to
23 In addition to the appellate power the Supreme Court has special residuary power to entertain appeal against any order of any court in the country
The plenary jurisdiction of the Court to grant leave and hear appeals against any order of a court or Tribunal confers power of judicial superintendence over all the courts and Tribunals in the territory of India including subordinate courts of Magistrate and District Judge
The Court has therefore supervisory jurisdiction over all courts in India
970F 24 Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Article 215 contains similar provision in respect of High Court
Both the Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts of record having powers to punish for contempt in cluding the power to punish for contempt of itself 970G 946 25 The Constitution does not define Court Of Record
A Court of Record is a court where acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memo rial and testimony which rolls are called the record  of the court andare conclusive evidence of that which is recorded therein
970H 971 E  Wharton s Law Lexicon Words  Phrases Permanent Edi tion vol
10 p 429 Halsbury s Laws of England Vol
10 p 319
26 In India prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 High Court s jurisdiction in respect of contempt of subordinate and inferior courts was regulated by the principles of Common Law of England
The High Courts in the absence of statutory provision exercised power of con tempt to protect the subordinate courts on the premise of inherent power of a Court of Record
974F G Rex vs Aimon   Rainy vs The Justices of Seirra Leone 8 Moors PC 47 at 54 Surendra Nath Banerjee vs The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court at Fort William in Bengal ILR to Calcutta 109 Rex vs Parke 1903 2 KB 432 at 442 King vs Davies  King vs Editor of the Daily Mail  Attorney General vs BBC   Venkat Rao  Mohandas Karam Chand Gandhi 1920 22 Bombay Law Re porter 368 Abdul Hassan Jauhar s AIR 1926 Allahabad 623 Shantha Nand Gir vs Basudevanand AIR 1930 Allahabad 225 FB Mr Hirabai vs Mangal Chand AIR 1935 Nagpur 46 Harkishan Lal vs Emperor AIR 1937 Lahore 497 Mohammad Yusuf vs Imtiaz Ahmad Khan AIR 1939 Oudh 131 and Legal Remembrancer vs Motilal Ghosh ILR  referred to
27 The Kings Bench in England and High Courts in India being superior Court of Record and having judicial power to correct orders of subordinate courts enjoyed the inherent power of Contempt to protect the subordinate courts
The Supreme Court being a Court of Record under Article 129 and having wide power of judicial supervision over all the courts in the country must possess and exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the High Courts had prior to Contempt Legislation in 1926
Inherent powers of a superior Court of Record have remained unaffected even after Codifi cation of Contempt Law
976G 977A Sukhdev Singh Sodhi vs The Chief Justice and Judges of the PEPSU High Court  and RL Kapur vs State of Tamil Nadu   referred to
947 28 The was enacted to define and limit the powers of Courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation there to
There is no provision therein curtailing the Supreme Court s power with regard to contempt of subordinate courts Section 15 expressly refers to this Court s power for taking action for contempt of subordinate courts
The section prescribes modes for taking cognizance of criminal contempt by the High Court and Supreme Court
It is not a substantive provision conferring power or jurisdiction on the High Court or on the Supreme Court for taking action for the contempt of its subordinate courts
The whole object of prescribing procedural modes of taking cognizance in Section 15 is to safeguard to valuable time of the High Court and the Supreme Court being wasted by frivolous complaints of contempt of court
Section 152 does not restrict the power of the High Court to the cognizance of the contempt of itself or of a subordinate court on its own motion although apparently the Section does not say so
977A C 978G 979A SK Sarkar Member Board of Revenue UP Lucknow vs Vinay Chandra Misra   referred to
31 Under Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 246 Parliament is competent to enact a law relating to the powers of the Supreme Court with regard to contempt of itself 
Such a law may prescribe procedure to be followed and it may also prescribe the maximum punish ment which could be awarded and it may provide for appeal and for other matters
But the Central Legislature has no legislative competence to abridge or extinguish the juris diction or power conferred on the Supreme Court under Arti cle 129
The Parliament s power to legislate in relation to the law of contempt relating to the Supreme Court is limit ed therefore the does not impinge upon the Supreme Court s power with regard to the contempt of subordinate courts under Article 129
979C F 32 Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record and it further provides that the Supreme Court shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself The expression used in Article 129 is not restrictive instead it is extensive in nature
If the Framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court shall have power to punish for contempt of itself only there was no necessity for inserting the expression including the power to punish for contempt of itself
 979G 33 Article 129 confers power on the Supreme Court to punish for 948 contempt of itself and in addition it confers some addi tional power relating to contempt as would appear from the expression including
The expression including has been interpreted by courts to extend and widen the scope of power
The plain language of the Article clearly indicates that the Supreme Court as a Court of record has power to punish for contempt of itself and also something else which could fall within the inherent jurisdiction of a court of record
979H 980A 34 In interpreting the Constitution it is not permis sible to adopt a construction which would render any expres sion superfluous or redundant
980B 35 While construing Article 129 it is not permissible to ignore the significance and impact of the inclusive power conferred on the Supreme Court
980B 36 The conferment of appellate power on the Court by a statute section 19 of the does not and cannot affect the width and amplitude of inherent powers of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution
981E KL Gauba vs The Honable the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore  Anr AIR 1942 FC 1 distinguished
41 Article 3742 is in the nature of a transitory provision to meet the exigency of the situation on the abolition of the Federal Court and setting up of the Supreme Court
There is no provision in the said Article to the effect that the decisions of the Federal Court shall be binding on the Supreme Court
The decisions of the Federal Court and the Privy Council made before the commencement of the Constitution are entitled to great respect but these decisions are not binding on the Supreme Court and it is always open to this Court to take a different view
983F G Om Prakash Gupta vs The United Provinces AIR 1951 Allahabad 205 and State of Bombay vs Gajanan Mahadev Badley AIR 1954 Bombay 352 approved
The State of Bihar vs Abdul Majid  and Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango vs Narayan Devji Kango  Ors   referred to
949 KL Gauba vs The Hon ble the Chief Justice and Judges or the High Court of Judicature at Lahore  Anr AIR 1942 FC 1 and Purshottam Lal Jaitly vs The King Emperor  explained and distinguished
The Federal Court exercised limited jurisdiction as conferred on it by the Government of India Act 1935
The question regarding the inherent power of the Supreme Court as a Court of Record in respect of the contempt of subordi nate Courts was neither raised nor discussed in its deci sions
The Federal Court observed that if the High Court and the Federal Court both have concurrent jurisdiction in contempt matters it could lead to conflicting judgments and anamolous consequences
That may be so under the Government of India Act as the High Court and the Federal Court did not have concurrent jurisdiction but under the Constitution High Court and the Supreme Court both have concurrent juris diction in several matters yet no anamolous consequences follow
985H 986B 42 The Federal Court did not possess the wide powers as the Supreme Court has under the Constitution
There are marked difference in the constitution and jurisdiction and the amplitude of powers exercised by the two courts
In addition to civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court has wide powers under Article 136 over all the courts and Tribunals in the country
The Federal Court had no such power instead it had appellate power but that too could be exercised only on a certificate issued by the High Court
The Federal Court was a court of record under Section 203 but it did not possess any plenary or residuary appel late power over all the courts functioning in the territory of India like the power conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
Therefore the Federal Court had no judicial control or superintendence over subor dinate courts
986C E 43 Advent of freedom and promulgation of the Constitu tion have made drastic changes in the administration of justice necessitating new judicial approach
The Constitu tion has assigned a new role to the Constitutional Courts to ensure rule of law in the country
These changes have brought new perceptions
In interpreting the Constitution regard must be had to the social economic and political changes need of the community and the independence of the judiciary
The Court cannot be a helpless spectator bound by precedents of colonial days which have lost relevance
Time has come to have a fresh look to tile old precedents and to lay down law with the changed perceptions keeping in view the provisions of the Constitution
986F G 950 51 Courts constituted under a law enacted by the Par liament or the State Legislature have limited jurisdiction and they cannot assume jurisdiction in a matter not ex pressly assigned to them but that is not so in the case of a superior court of record constituted by the Constitution such a court does not have a limited jurisdiction instead it has power to determine its own jurisdiction
No matter is beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court of record unless it is expressly shown to be so under the provisions of the Constitution
In the absence of any express provision in the Constitution the Apex Court being a Court of record has jurisdiction in every matter and if there be any doubt the Court has power to determine its jurisdiction
If such determination is made by the High Court the same would be subject to appeal to this Court but if the jurisdiction is determined by this Court it would be final
988C E Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar  Ors
vs State of Maharashtra  and Ganga Bishan vs Jai Narain  referred to
52 Since the Supreme Court has power of judicial super intendence and control over all the courts and Tribunals functioning in the entire territory of the country it has a corresponding duty to protect and safeguard the interest of inferior courts to ensure the flow of the stream of justice in the courts without any interference or attack from any quarter
The subordinate and inferior courts do not have adequate power under the law to protect themselves there fore it is necessary that this Court should protect them
Under the constitutional scheme it has a special role in the administration of justice and the powers conferred on it under Article 32 136 141 and 142 form part of the basic structure of the Constitution
The amplitude of the power of the court under these Articles of the Constitution cannot be curtailed by law made by Central or State Legislature
987A C 53 The Supreme Court and the High Court both exercise concurrent jurisdiction under the constitutional scheme in matters relating to fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
Therefore this Court s jurisdic tion and power to take action for contempt of subordinate courts would not be inconsistent to any constitutional scheme
987D 54 The Apex Court is duty bound to take effective steps within the constitutional provisions to ensure a free and fair administration of justice through out the country
For that purpose it must wield the 951 requisite power to take action for contempt of subordinate courts
Ordinarily the High Court would protect the subor dinate courts from any onslaught on their independence but in exceptional cases extraordinary situation may prevail affecting the administration of public justice or where the entire judiciary is affected this Court may directly take cognizance of contempt of subordinate courts
987F 55 The Supreme Court will sparingly exercise its inher ent power in taking cognizance of the contempt of subordi nate courts as ordinarily matters relating to contempt of subordinate courts must be dealt with by the High Courts
The instant case is of exceptional nature as the incident created a situation where functioning of the subordinate courts all over the country was adversely affected and the administration of justice was paralysed therefore this Court took cognizance of the matter
987G 988A 61 Though there is no provision like section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code conferring express power on the Supreme Court to quash or set aside any criminal proceeding pending before a criminal court to prevent abuse of process of the court but the Court has power to quash any such proceeding in exercise of its plenary and residuary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution if on the admitted facts no change is made out against the accused or if the proceedings are initiated on concocted facts or if the proceedings are initiated for oblique purposes
996E Once the Supreme Court is satisfied that the criminal proceedings amount to abuse of process of court it would quash such proceedings to ensure justice
996G State of West Bengal  Ors
vs Swapan Kumar Guha  Ors  and Madhavrao Jivajirao Scindia  Ors
vs Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre  Ors   referred to
62 The inherent power of the Supreme Court under Arti cle 142 coupled with the plenary and residuary powers under Articles 32 and 136 embraces power to quash criminal pro ceedings pending before any court to do complete justice in the matter before this Court
If the court is satisfied that the proceedings in a criminal case are being utilised for oblique purposes or if the same are continued on manufac tured and false evidence or if no case is made out on the admitted facts it would be in the ends of justice to set aside or quash the criminal proceeding
It is idle to sug gest that in such a situation this Court should be a help less spectator
997B C 952 63 The Court s power under Article 1421 to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a different quality
Any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitu tional power of this Court
Once this Court has seisin of a cause or matter before it has power to issue any order or direction to do complete justice in the matter
This constitutional power of the Apex Court cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law
997G 64 What would be the need of complete justice in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circum stances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute
Once this Court has taken seisin of a case cause or matter it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete jus tice in the matter
998D Prem Chand Garg vs Excise Commissioner UP Allahabad 1963 Supp 1 SCR 885 and AR Antulay vs
RS Nayak  Anr    referred to
In the instant case the foundation of the criminal trial of CJM NL Patel is based on facts which have been found to be false
It would be in the ends of justice and also to do complete justice in the cause to quash the crimi nal proceedings
998F 71 Article 203 of the Constitution declares that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
In order to avail the protection of Article 203 three conditions must be satisfied
Firstly the person must be accused of an offence
Secondly the element of compulsion to be a witness should be there and thirdly it must be against himself
All the three ingredi ents must necessarily exist before protection of Article 203 is available
If any of these ingredients do not exist Article 203 cannot be invoked
964E F Balkishan Devidayal vs State of Maharashtra   referred to
72 Mere issue of notice or pendency of contempt proceedings do not attract Article 203 of the Constitution as the contemners against whom notices were issued were not accused of any offence
A Criminal contempt is punishable by the superior courts by fine or imprisonment but it has many characteristics which distinguishes it from an ordinary offence
964G 953 73 The power to take proceedings for contempt of Court is an inherent power of a Court of record
The Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to such proceedings
Since the contempt proceedings are not in the nature of criminal proceedings for an offence the pendency of contempt pro ceedings cannot be regarded as criminal proceedings merely because it may end in imposing punishment on the contemner
A contemner it is not in the position of an accused
It is open to the Court to cross examine the contemner and even if the contemner is found to be guilty of contempt the Court may accept apology and discharge the notice of contempt whereas tendering of apology is no defence to the trial of a criminal offence
This peculiar feature distinguishes con tempt proceedings from criminal proceedings
In a criminal trial where a person is accused of an offence there is a public prosecutor who prosecutes the case on behalf of the prosecution against the accused but in contempt proceedings the court is both the accused as well as the judge of the accusation
966C E Debabrata Bandopadhyaya s case   referred to
74 In the instant case the contemners do no stand in the position of a person accused of an offence merely on account of issue of notice of contempt by this Court and the Commission which was acting on behalf of this Court had full authority to record the testimony of the contemners
There has therefore been no violation of Article 203 of the Constitution and the Commission s finding are not violated
966F G 81 In determining what punishment should be awarded to contemners found guilty the degree and the extent of part played by each of the contemners has to be kept in mind
998G 82 In the instant case Sharma the Police Inspector was the main actor in the entire incident and who had planned the entire episode with a view to humiliate the CJM in the public eye is the main culprit and therefore he deserves maximum punishment
The Sub Inspector took an active part in assaulting and tying the CJM at the behest of the Police Inspector
The Head Constable and Constable also took active part in handcuffing and tying the CJM with ropes but as subordinate officials they acted under the orders of the superior officers
The Mamlatdar was a friend of the Police Inspector he had no axe to grind against the CJM but he acted under the influence of the Police Inspec tor
So far as the DSP is concerned he actively abetted the commission of onslaught on the CJM
The contemners are held guilty of contempt and awarded punishment
998H 999B 954 83 The Police Inspector to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs2000
The Sub Inspector to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five months and pay a fine of Rs2000 and in default one month s simple imprisonment
Head Constable and Constable each to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and a fine of Rs500 and in default 15 days simple imprisonment
The Mamlatdar to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months and a fine of Rs1O00 and in default one month s simple imprisonment
The DSP is sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one month and a fine of Rs1O00 and in default simple imprisonment for 15 days
So far as the other respondents against whom notices were issued no adequate material on record holds them guilty
The contempt notices are therefore discharged
999C E 91 The Court expressed displeasure on the conduct of the DGP
As the head of the Police in the State he was expected to intervene in the matter and to ensure effective action against the erring Police Officers
He was totally indifferent to the news that a CJM was arrested handcuffed roped and assaulted
He took this news as a routine matter without taking any steps to ascertain the correct facts for effective action against the erring Police Officers
If the head of the State Police Administration exhibits such indif ference to a sensitive matter which shook the entire judi cial machinery in the State nothing better could be expect ed from his subordinate officers
The State Government should take action departmentally on the basis of the find ings recorded by the Commission
999F 1000A