Civil Appeals Nos
615 61773618 2073 and 1850 to 1852 of 1972
From the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd June 1962 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No 15756 Regular Appeal B No 1657  RA B 6 of 1958
UR Lalit SS Javali DP Singh  Ravi Parkash for the Appellants in CA
1850 5272 R 5 in CA
61573 R 2 in CA
61673 R 6 in CA
61773 and R 3 in CA
Nos 618 2073
BD Bal RB Datar  Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant in CA Nos 615 61773 R 5 in CA
1850 5272  for R 1 in CA
618 62073
ST Desai K N Bhat  Nanjappa Ganesh for Appellant in CA
618 62073 RR 2 and 3 in CA
1850 to 185172 RR
2317  18 in CA
185272 RR 23 in CA
61673 RR 10  11 in CA
61673  for RR 1 2 45 in CA
61773
SB Bhasame KA Naik  MRK Pillai for R 1 in CA
1850 5272 CA 615 1673 R 14 in CA
61773 and R 2 in CA
618 62073
KR Nagaraja  Alok Bhatacharya for R 12 in CA
1850 5272 CA
61573 R 9 in CA
61773 R 13 in CA
61773 and R 10 in CA 618 620 of 1973
345 PR Ramasesh for RR 13 15 a to c in CA
185272 RR 15  17 in CA
61773 and RR 11 14 a c and d in CA
61873
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN J
These nine consolidated appeals on certificate are directed from a common judgment and decree of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore dated June 22 1962 which affirmed subject to a modification the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge Senior Division Dharwar dated July 5 1956 substantially dismissing the plaintiff s claim for declaration of title to and possession of certain watan properties and decreeing instead his alternative claim for partition and separate possession of his one sixth share therein
The principal question in controversy in these appeals is whether sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act 1950 for short Act No 60 of 1950  and sections 4 and 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act 1955 for short Act No 22 of 1955  which provided for abolition of watans and alienations in the merged territories resumption of watan land and its re grant to the holder for the time being which brought about a change in the tenure or the character of holding as watan land affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law
The suit out of which these appeals arise was instituted by the appellant Nagesh Bisto Desai as plaintiff claiming against his two brothers Ganesh Bisto Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai defendants Nos2  3 mother Smt
Akkavva alias Parvathibai defendant No 4 brother Bhimaji Martand Desai defendant No5 who had gone in adoption to Martand member of a junior branch and father s brother  son Khando Tirmal Desai defendant No 1 a declaration that the properties described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate situate in the district of Dharwar in the State of Karnataka formed an impartible estate and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture and that the plaintiff being the present holder of the office of Desai was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that the other members of the family had no right title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenace and residence for exclusive possession of the family residential house at Kundgol known as Wada described in Schedule B part 2 from the defendants Nos 2 to 5 for exclusive possession of insignia of honour described in Schedule E and one third share in the family movables described 346 in Schedule D Alternatively in the event of the Court holding that the properties described in Schedule B C and D were properties belonging to the joint Hindu family the plaintiff claimed partition and separate possession of his one sixth share therein
It will be convenient in the first place to refer briefly to the history of the estate to set out the pedigree showing the descent from a common ancestor and to show how the present case arose
The plaintiff s suit is brought on the allegation that the Deshgat family of Kundgol Paragana of which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 4 are members is a very ancient and respectable one in the State of Jamkhandi which later merged in the then Province of Bombay and is now in the State of Karnataka
The lands and cash allowances described in Schedule B para i and iii are the emoluments of the district hereditary office of Desai
Abkari is the compensation given to the Desai family by the British Government when it took over the control of today and liquor in Hanchinal Inam Village from the Deshgat family
This amount together with the cash allowance and the service lands appurtenant to the office of Desai and the houses and open sites form the impartible estate called the Kundgol Deshgat Estate which was partly located within the territory of former feudatory State of Jhamkhandi and party in the territories of the then British India
The first inam was granted at the time of Thimappa in 1575
All the properties constituting the Deshgat were acquired under grants made by the Sultans and Rulers of Bijapur during the period from 1575 AD to 1694 AD with a couple of other grants received from the Chief of Jamkhandi during the period from 1120 AD to 1826 AD
The watan has remained with the family which held the hereditary office of Desai for over four centuries
In 1904 service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted by the imposition of a judi or quit rent
Properties described in Schedules F and G have been in possession of the two junior branches descended from Gundopant and Lingappa from 1825 AD and 1854 AD respectively and are being enjoyed by them even now
The plaintiff s father Bistappa the last holder of the office of Desai died on July 27 1931 leaving behind him his widow Smt
Akkavva and four sons Nagesh Bhimrao Ganesh and Gopal
Out of them Bhimarao had gone in adoption to Martand
member of a junior branch
Upon his father s death the plaintiff Nagesh Bisto Desai was recognised to be the watandar
The plaintiff s cousin is Khandappa The subjoined genealogical table gives the relationship of the parties belonging to the senior branch descended from Thimappa
347 GENEALOGICAL TABLE Thimppa     Khanderao Pantoji Gundopant   Thimappa Nilkant       Ramappa Nagappa Mallappa    Bistappa  adopted     Imnagappa Bistappa Mortand  went in adoption   Bhimraw  Adopted Deft5   Bistappadied 1931 Trimallappa Smt
Akkevva Deft 4   Khandappa  Deft 1     Nagesh Bhimrao Ganesh  Smt
Indirabai Gopal  pantiff went adoption Deft 2 Deft 9 Deft3 to Martand Smt
Kashibai Deft 10 348 It appears that after the death of the plaintiff s father in 1931 in the mutation proceedings that followed the plaintiff first made a claim that the watan being impartible according to the custom of the family he became the exclusive owner of the entire watan properties
Although his brothers Ganesh Bisto Desai and Gopal Bisto Desai defendants 2 and 3 had at first consented to mutation of the watan in his name they later resiled from that position and the strongest opposition came from the plaintiff s uncle Tirmal father of Khando
In consequence of this the plaintiff accepted before the revenue authorities that the properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and refrained from making any claim on the footing of the properties being impartible
In 1945 the plaintiff s brother Bhimarao defendant No 5 who had gone in adoption to Martand started asserting a claim to 7 Mars of land and right of residence in the family Wada and this had the support of the plaintiff s mother Smt
Akkavva
The defendant No 5 Bhimarao in assertion of his claim brought Special Suit No 51 of1949 in the Civil Court at Kundgol on the basis of the properties being impartible
In June 1946 the plaintiff leased out some home farm lands to defendants 6 7 and 8 and this gave rise to proceedings under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
The Sub Divisional Magistrate Kundgol passed an order restraining defendants 2 3 and 5 from disturbing the possession of defendants 6 7 and 8 and this order was kept in force by the former State of Jamkhandi till merger in the former State of Bombay in August 1948
The State Government revoked the order with effect from December 15 1948 as a result of which the defendents 6 7 and 8 brought suits for injunction
Due to discord in the family the plaintiff left the ancestral residential house at Kundgol and started residing in his bungalow
The plaintiff has admittedly been regranted all the watan land under sub section
1 of section 4 of Act No 60 of 1950 and section 7 of Act No 22 of 1955 as if it were an unalienated land being the holder of the watan to which it appertained and he is deemed to be an occupant thereof within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879
The defendants filed separate written statements and repudiated the plaintiff s claim of impartibility
They denied that the suit 349 properties formed an impartible estate and that succession to the estate was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture
The defendant No 1 asserted that there had been at least three partitions in the family
According to him the allotment of the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa represented allotment of shares on partition
He pleaded that all the properties described in Schedules B C D and E were joint family properties and claimed one half share therein
The defendants Nos 2 and 3 in their written statement also asserted that the properties described in Schedules F and G to the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were shares allotted to them on partition
The defendant No 4 supported the case pleaded by her sons defendants Nos 2 and 3
The defendant No 5 however pleaded that there had never been a partition in the family and that the entire properties that is to say the properties described in the plaint Schedules B to G continued to be joint family properties wherein he claimed one fourth share
The remaining defendants also denied that the suit properties were impartible
The learned trial Judge rejected the plaintiff s claim that he was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the aforementioned properties being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate and that other members had no right title or interest therein except as to maintenance as junior members and held instead that properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were therefore partible
He further held that the properties described in Schedules F and G in possession of the junior branches of Gundopant and Lingappa were not allotted to them as their share on partition and therefore had to be put into the hotchpotch
He accordingly passed a preliminary decree for partition declaring the plaintiff s share to be one twentyfourth of the entire estate and to other minor reliefs
On appeal the High Court upheld the judgment of the trial Judge holding that the suit properties were not impartible and were therefore liable to partition but it set aside 350 the direction with regard to Schedules F and G properties on the finding that the two branches of Gundopant and Lingappa had separated from the joint family
It accordingly modified the decree of the learned trial Judge and held that the plaintiff was entitled to one sixth share in the properties described in Schedules B to E Arguments in these appeals have been confined to the question as to whether as a matter of law even if it were assumed that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving that the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was an impartible estate and that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture the incident of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand extinguished by Act No 60 of 1950 and Act No 22 of 1955 and it is no longer open to the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom of impartibility or the rule of lineal primogeniture
The questions that fall for determination in these appeals are firstly whether the impartibility of the tenure of a paragana watan appertaining to the office of a Hereditary District Paragana officer in respect of which a commutation settlement has been effected regulating succession to the property by reason of family custom or a local custom being the incidents of such watan stands abolished by virtue of section 3 of Act No 60 of 1950 or section 4 of Act No 22 of 1955 and secondly whether the watan lands lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan under section 3 of Act No 60 of 1950 or s4 of Act No 22 of 1955 and re grants thereof were exclusive to the plaintiff under section 4 of Act No22 of 1955 by reason of his status as the watandar and therefore they belonged to the plaintiff and were not capable of partition There is no merit in any of these submissions
It is argued that impartibility of the tenure was not an incident of the grant but the watan was impartible by custom and succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture
Our attention is drawn to the averment contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint The Kundgol Deshgat Estate along with the estates of two other District Hereditary offices of Nadgir and 351 Deshpande of Kundgol is impartible by custom and succession to it is governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture
This custom is ancient invariable definite and reasonable
It is both a family custom and also a local custom prevailing in the families of Paragana Watandar of Kundgol       It is urged that in case of an impartible estate the right to partition and the right of joint enjoyment are from the very nature of the property incapable of existence and therefore the courts below were in error dismissing the plaintiff s claim for a declaration that being the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties
It is further urged that even assuming that impartibility of the estate or the rule of primogeniture regulating succession were an incident of the watan the suit properties lost the character of being joint family property with the resumption of the watan and the re grants of the suit lands were exclusively to the plaintiff under sub section
1 of s 4 of Act No 60 of 1950 and sub section
1 of section 7 of Act No 22 of 1955 by reason of his status as the watandar and therefore they exclusively belonged to the plaintiff and they were not capable of being partitioned
There is no merit in the submission
The decision of these appeals must turn on the question whether the impartibility of the estate and the rule of lineal primogeniture by which succession to it was governed makes the suit properties the self acquired or exclusive properties of the plaintiff and therefore cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds between the members of the joint family
In Martand Rao vs Malhar Rao1 the Privy Council ruled as follows  If an impartible estate existed as such from before the advent of British Rule any settlement or regrant thereof by the British Government must in the absence of evidence to the contrary and unless inconsistent with the express terms of the new settlement be presumed to continue the estate with its previous incidents of impartibility and succession by special custom
 It also held in that case  352 When there is a dispute with respect to an estate being impartible or otherwise the onus lies on the party who alleges the existence of a custom different from the ordinary law of inheritance according to which custom the estate is to be held by a single member and as such not liable to partition
In order to establish that any estate is impartible it must be proved that it is from its nature impartible and decendible to a single person or that it is impartible and descendible by virtue of a special custom Any such special custom modifying the ordinary law of succession must be ancient and invariable and must be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence
 The courts below in their well considered judgments have considered minutely and elaborately the whole of the evidence both oral and documentary led by both the parties on the question of custom and have come to a definitive finding that the evidence is of little or no assistance to establish the alleged custom pleaded by the plaintiff as to the impartibility of the estate or the rule of lineal primogeniture
They have held in favour of the defendants on this basic issue and substantially dismissed the plaintiff s suit claiming full and exclusive title
That part of the judgment has rightly not been assailed before us and the argument has proceeded on the footing that even if the Kundgol Deshgat Estate were an impartible estate and that succession to it was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture the incidents of impartibility of the watan as well as the rule of lineal primogeniture stand extinguished by Act No 60 of 1950 and Act No 22 of 1955
It has always been the accepted view that the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan properties the exclusive property of the person who is the watandar for the time being
In order to understand the arguments on this point it is necessary to deal with the incidents of a Deshgat watan
In the Bombay Presidency it has always been treated to be the joint family property
It may be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Adrishappa vs Gurshindappa1 the headnote of which is that  353 Deshgat watan or property held as appertaining to the office of Desai is not to be assumed prima facie to be impartible
The burden of proving the impartibility lies upon the Desai and on his failing to prove a special tenure or a family or district or local custom to that effect the ordinary law of succession applies
 In a suit for partition of property forming part of a Deshgat estate brought by the younger brothers against their eldest brother who held the hereditary district office of Desai partly within the State of Jamkhandi and partly within the territory of British India the defence was that the watan was held by him as an impartible estate and that he was entitled being the watandar to be in full and exclusive possession thereof subject to a right by custom that a brother should receive maintenance out of the income derived from it
The Court of first instance having found that there was no invariable rule against the partition of a Deshgat watan the High Court refused to allow effect to be given to what had not been proved to be the established governing rule of the family class or district sufficient to establish the impartibility of the estate and held that the watan in question was subject to the general Hindu law including the presumption as to the right to partition belonging to the members of the family to which it had descended
The Judicial Committee upheld the decision of the High Court holding that there was no general presumption in favour of the impartibility of an estate of this kind as to shift the burden of proof the burden of proof was upon the Desai who seeks to show that the property devolved upon him alone in contravention of the ordinary rule of succession according to the Hindu law and that no sufficient evidence had been given by the watandar either of family custom or of district custom to prevent the operation of the ordinary rule of law whereby the property would be partible
In Vinayak Waman Joshi Rayarikar vs Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar  Ors1 the Court of first instance held that by custom a Deshgat Inam had become impartible and hence dismissed the suit for partition
On appeal the High Court reversed upon the view that the mere fact that the management remained in the hands of the eldest branch was not sufficient to 354 establish the plea that the estate was impartible
While affirming the decision of the High Court the Privy Council followed its earlier decision in Adrishappa s case supra and agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that  Neither by the terms of the original grant nor of the subsequent orders of the ruling power nor by family custom nor by adverse possession if such there could be in a case like this the eldest branch of the family acquired a right to perpetual management of the village or in consequence to resist its partition
 It is a trite proposition that property though impartible may be the ancestral property of the joint Hindu family
The impartibility of property does not per se destroy its nature as joint family property or render it the separate property of the last holder so as to destroy the right of survivorship hence the estate retains its character of joint family property and devolves by the general law upon that person who being in fact and in law joint in respect of the estate is also the senior member in the senior line
As observed by Sir Dinshaw Mulla in his celebrated judgment in Shiba Prasad Singh vs Rani Prayag Kumari Debi  Ors 1 The keynote of the whole position in their Lordships view is to be found in the following passage in the judgment in the Tipperah case 2 Where a custom is proved to exist it supersedes the general law which however still regulates all beyond the custom Impartibility is essentially a creature of custom
In the case of ordinary joint family property the members of the family have 1 the right of partition 2 the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity 3 the right of maintenance and 4 the right of survivorship
The first of these rights cannot exist in the case of an impartible estate though ancestral from the very nature of the estate
The second 355 is incompatible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Kuari s1 case and the first Pittapur case2 and so also the third as held in the second Pittapur case3 To this extent the general law of the Mitakshara has been superseded by custom and the impartible estate though ancestral is clothed with the incidents of self acquired and separate property
But the right of survivorship is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility
This right therefore still remains and this is what was held in Baijnath s case4 To this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property and its devolution is governed by the general Mitakshara law applicable to such property
Though the other rights which a coparcener acquires by birth in joint family property no longer exist the birth right of the senior member to take by survivor ship still remains
Nor is this right a mere spes succession is similar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death of a Hindu widow to her husband s estate
It is a right which is capable of being renounced and surrendered
Such being their Lordships  view it follows that in order to establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which there is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint it is necessary to prove an intention express or implied on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate
 Since the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh s case supra it is well settled that an estate is impartible does not make it the separate and exclusive property of the holder  where the property is ancestral and the holder has succeeded to it it will be part of the joint estate of the undivided family
The incidents of impartible estate laid down by the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh s case supra and the law as there stated have been reaffirmed in the subsequent decisions of the Privy 356 Council and of this Court  Collector of Gorakhpur vs Ram Sundar Mal  Ors1 Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab
vs Krishna Kishore2 Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra Patil 3 Chinnathavi Alias Veeralakshmi vs Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker  Anr4
Mirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur  Ors
vs Shri Pushavathi Viseswar Gajapathi Raj  Ors5 Rajah Velugoti Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu  Ors
vs Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu  Ors6 and Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo vs Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo  Ors7 In Collector of Gorakhpur vs Ram Sundar Mal s Case supra it was observed that though the decision of the Board in Sartaj Kuari s case and the First Pittapur s case appeared to be destructive of the doctrine that an impartible zamindari could be in any sense joint family property this view apparently implied in these cases was definitely negatived by Lord Dunedin when delivering the judgment of the Board in Baijnath Prasad Singh s case
In Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab vs Krishna Kishore s case dealing with an impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904 it was held that the right of junior members of the family for maintenance was governed by custom and was not based on any joint right or interest in the property as co owners
In Anant Bhikappa Patil s case supra it was observed that an impartible estate is not held in coparcenary though it may be joint family property
It may develove as joint family property or as separate property of the last male holder
In the former case it goes by survivorship to that individual among those male members who in fact and in law are undivided in respect of the estate who is singled out by the special custom eg lineal male primogeniture
In the latter case jointness and survivorship are not as such in point the estate devolves by inheritance by the last male holder in the order prescribed by the special custom or according to the ordinary law of inheritance as modified by the custom
357 In Chinnathavi s case
supra it was observed that the dictum of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh case supra that to establish that an impartible estate has ceased to be joint family property for purposes of succession it is necessary to prove an intention express or implied on the part of the junior members of the family to give up their chance of succeeding to the estate
The test to be applied is whether the facts show a clear intention to renounce or surrender any interest in the impartible estate or a relinquishment of the right of succession and an intention to impress upon the zamindari the character of separate property
In Mirza Raja Gajapathi s case supra it was observed that an ancestral impartible estate to which the holder has succeeded by the custom of primogeniture is part of the joint estate of the undivided Hindu family
Though the other rights enjoyed by the members of a joint Hindu family are inconsistent in the case of an impartible estate the right survivorship still remains
In Rajah Velugoti Kumara Krishna s case supra it was observed that the only vestige of the incidents of joint family property which still attaches to the joint family property is the right of survivorship which of course is not inconsistent with the custom of impartibility
In Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo s case supra the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh s case were reiterated
In the course of argument great reliance was placed on the two decisions of this Court in Mirza Raja Ganapathi s case supra and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna s case supra for the proposition that the junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no right of partition having regard to the very character of the estate that it is impartible
To our mind the contention cannot be accepted
Both the decisions in Mirza Raja Ganapathi s case supra and Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna s case supra turned on the provision of the Madras Estates Abolition  Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 and the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904
There are express provisions made in sections 45 to 47 of the Abolition Act for the apportionment of compensation to the junior members of zamindari estates and subs 2 of section 45 thereof provides for payment of the capitalised value of the compensation amount to them on the basis of extinction of the estate
The scheme of the Abolition Act therefore contemplates the continued existence of the rights of the holder of an impartible estate vis a vis the junior 358 members of such an estate
The facts involved in those cases were also entirely different
In Mirza Raja Ganapathi s case supra it was a suit for partition for Vizianagram Estate an ancient impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904
The claim of the junior members regarding buildings which had been incorporated in the impartible estate as also their claim with regard to jewels treated as state regalia and therefore impressed with the family custom of impartibility was negatived
It was held that despite the fact that Vizinagram Estate had been notified to be an estate within the meaning of s3 of the Madras EstateAbolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 the extinguishment of the proprietary right title and interest of the zamindar did not affect his right or title to the impartible properties outside the purview of that Act and governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904 but as regards other properties falling within the zamindari including lands were held to be partible
With regard to the buildings it was held that the buildings in question were not partible by virtue of sub section
4 of section 18 of the Act as the buildings falling within the section vested in the person who owned them immediately before the vesting
The expression the person who owned in sub section
4 of section 18 of the Act was held to refer to the land holder and not to any other person
Further the buildings were outside the limits of the zamindari estate and therefore not covered by section 3 of the Abolition Act
The claim with regard to jewels failed because they were part of the impartible estate
In Raja Velugoti Kumara Krishna s case supra it was a suit for partition by the junior members of Vankatgiri Estate an ancient impartible estate governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904
The suit was principally confined to the claim for a share to the Schedule B properties
The contention was that the impartibility was continued under that Act but ceased when the estate vested in the State Government under section 3 of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 and this had the effect of changing character of the properties in the B Schedule and making them partible
It was said that the junior members had a present right in the impartible estate and were entitled to share in the properties once it lost its character of impartibility
The Court had to consider the effect of the Abolition Act on the rights and obligations of the members of the family and held 359 that the Abolition Act has no application to properties which are outside the territorial limit of the Venkatgiri Estate
The claim that failed was in relation to properties which did not form part of a zamindari estate  within the meaning of section 1 16 and therefore did not come within the purview of section 3 of the Abolition Act but continued to be governed by the Madras Impartible Estates Act 1904
The contention that the plaintiff holding the District Hereditary Office of Desai and being the watandar of the Kundgol Deshgat Estate was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof to the exclusion of the other members of the joint Hindu family runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act 1874 for short the Watan Act  and is against settled legal principles
The plaintiff s rights to such watan properties whatever they were subject to the rights of the other members of the family
The terms Watandar  is defined in section 4 of the Watan Act
It reads  Watandar means a person having a hereditary interest in the Watan
It includes a person holding watan property acquired by him before the introduction of British Government into the locality of the watan or legally acquired subsequent to such introduction and a person holding such property from him by inheritance
It includes a person adopted by an owner of a watan or part of a watan subject to the conditions specified in sections 33 to 35
If the words used in the definition are strictly and literally construed it would mean that before a person can be said to be a watandar he must have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and in the hereditary office because it is these two that constitute the watan
There is no basis whatever for such a strict construction
The definition is undoubtedly in two parts  the first sets out what watandar means and the other states what is included in it and the question arises whether the primary definition ie the meaning portion of it should be regarded as primary and the inclusive part as illustrative or both the parts should be regarded as constituting one whole definition the inclusive part being supplementary to the former
The controversy arising from the rival constructions 360 placed on the definition of watandar in section 4 of the Watan Act was set at rest by the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Vijayasingrao Bala Saheb Shinde Desai vs Janardanrao Narayanrao Shinde Desai1 Prior to that decision two conflicting constructions on the definition had been placed by two Division Benches of the Bombay High Court
In Kadappa vs Krishtappa2 an alienation of watan land by a watandar to his bhaubandh for maintenance was challenged and Rangnekar and Divatia JJ
held that the alienation was valid beyond the life time of the watandar inasmuch as it was to a watandar of the same watan in other words the alience who was a bhaubandh to whom a watan land had been transferred for maintenance regarded as a watandar though he had no interest in the hereditary office and the rights and privileges attached to it
It would therefore appear that in Kndappa s case supra the entire definition of watandar in section 4 was looked upon as one the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in the first part
In Smt
Tarabai vs Murtacharya3 Sir John Beaumont CJ and Wadia J however struck a discordant note
It was that a person who merely acquired a watan property without acquiring the office and without being under any obligation to perform services attached to the office was not a watandar within the meaning of the aforesaid definition in other words it held that the first part of the definition was exclusive and exhaustive the latter part being merely illustrative and the illustrations given in the latter part should fall within the ambit of the exclusive definition given in the first part that is to say the primary definition of a watandar in s4 was that he was a person having a hereditary interest in a watan ie the office and a property if any and the subsequent words were merely explanatory of the primary definition and did not curtail it
In view of this conflict the specific question referred to the Full Bench in Vijayasingrao s case supra was Whether the term watandar  as defined in section 4 of the Watan Act necessarily and always meant a person who had a hereditary interest not only in the watan property but also in the hereditary office
And on a consideration of the scheme and the relevant sections of the Watan Act and the two earlier decisions the Full Bench preferred the construction 361 placed on the term watandar  in Kadappa s case supra and concluded that a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to each office was also a watandar  within the meaning of the Watan Act
There can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to preserve the pre existing rights of the members of joint Hindu family
The word family  is defined in section 4 of the Watan Act to include each of the branches of the family descended from an original watandar  and the expression head of a family  is defined therein to include the chief representative of each branch of a family  Representative watandar  defined in section 4 meant a watandar registered by the Collector under section 25 as having a right to perform the duties of a hereditary office 
Section 5 of the Watan Act prohibited alienations of watan and watan rights
Clause a of sub section
1 of section 5
thereof referred to a watander in general and provided that it would not be competent to such a watandar to mortgage charge alienate or lease for a period beyond the term of his natural life any watan or any part thereof or interest therein to or for the benefit of any person who is not a watandar of the same watan without the requisite sanction
The expression watandar of the same watan  occurs in many sections of the Act
As already indicated the term watandar  as defined in section 4 includes the members of a joint Hindu family
It must follow as a necessary corollary that the expression watandar of the same watan  would include members of the family other than the watandar who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan property
It is necessary to emphasize that commutation of service had not the effect of changing the nature of the tenure
The effect of the Gordon Settlement came up for consideration in The Collector of South Satara  Anr
vs Laxman Mahadev Deshpande  Ors1 when the Court referred to the decision in Appaji Bapuji vs Keshav Shamrav2 and quoted the following passage from the judgment of Sargent CJ with approval What is termed a Gordon Settlement was an Arrangement entered into in 1864 by a Committee of which Mr 362 Gordon as Collector was Chairman acting on behalf of Government with the watandars in the Southern Maratha Country by which the Government relieved certain watandars in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of a judi  or quitrent charged upon the watan lands  the reports of Mr Gordon s Committee on the Satara and Poona Districts and their correspondence with Government can we think leave no doubt that the settlements made by that committee unless it was otherwise specially provided by any particular settlement were not intended by either party to these settlements to convert the watan lands into the private property of the vatandars with the necessary incident of alienability but to leave them attached to the hereditary offices which although freed from the performance of service remained intact
 The Court continued But the Commutation settlement does not confer an indefeasible title to the grantee for the right affirmed by the settlement under section 152 of the Watan Act is liable to be determined by lapse confiscation or resumption section 22 of the Watan Act
The State having created the watan is entitled to put an end to the watan ie to cancel the watan and to resume the grant 1 Bachharam Datta Patil vs Vishwanath Pundalik Patil1 Therefore if there be mere commutation of service the watan office ordinarily survives without liability to perform service and on that account the character of watan property still remains attached to the grant
But the State Government may abolish the office and release the property from its character as watan property
 The Court then dealt with the scheme of the Act No 60 of 1950 and observed that in the light of the incidents of the watan and the property granted for remuneration of the watandar that the relevant provisions of the Act had to be considered in regard to the right of the watandar to regrant of the watan lands
It was observed that on a combined operation of sub section
3 of section 3 and section 4 of the Act the holder of the watan land is entitled to regrant of the land in occupancy rights as an unalienated land
As to the effect of the 363 legislation it was observed that section 3 in terms provides for abolition of the watan extinction of the office and modification of the right in which the land is held
The abolition extinction and modification arise by operation of section 3 of the Act and not from the exercise of the executive power of confiscation or resumption by the State and it was then said Undoubtedly the power of resumption of a watan may be exercised under section 22 of the Watan Act and such a resumption may destroy the right of the holder both to the office and the watan land and in the absence of any provision in that behalf no right to compensation may arise
But where the abolition of the watan is not by executive action but by legislative decree its consequences must be sought in the statute which effectuates that abolition As to the effect of the resumption of the watan lands under sub section
3 of section 3 and their regrant under sub section
1 of section 4 of the Act it was observed It must be remembered that the power which the State Government always possessed by the clearest implication of section 22 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act 1874 of resumption is statutorily enforced by section 3 in respect of the Paragana and Kulkarni Watans
The State Government having the power to abolish a watan office and to resume land granted as remuneration for performance of the duties attached to the office was not obliged to compensate the watandar for extinction of his rights
But the Legislature has as a matter of grace presumably because of settlement between the holders and the Government under the Gordon Settlement provided by section 6 that cash compensation be awarded for loss of the right to cash allowance or remission of land revenue and has by section 4 conferred upon the holder of the watan land for loss of his right a right to regrant of the land as occupant and free from the obligation imposed by its original tenure as watan land 
But the operation of section 3 all Paraganas and Kulkarni watans falling within the Act are abolished the right to hold office is extinguished and the land granted as remuneration for performance of service is resumed
The holder of the land is thereafter liable to pay land revenue and is 364 entitled on payment of the occupancy price at the prescribed rate to be regranted occupancy rights as if it is unalienated land
The right so conferred is though not a right to cash compensation a valuable right of occupancy in the land
By the resumption of watan land and regrant thereof in occupancy right all the restrictions placed upon the holder of watan land are by the provisions of the Watan Act and the terms of the grant statutorily abolished
But the right of occupancy granted by section 4 adequately compensates the holder for loss of the precarious interest of a watandar because the land regranted after abolition of the watan is held subject only to the restrictions imposed by sub section
2 of section 4 and is freed from the incidents of watan tenure such as restriction on alienation beyond the life time of the holder devolution according to the special rule of succession and the liability to consideration or resumption
 It must therefore be observed that the commutation of service under sub section
1 section 15 of the watan lands by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of judi  or quit rent charged upon the watan land unless where it was otherwise provided for had not the effect of converting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of alienability but to leave them attached to the hereditary offices which although freed from the performance of services remained intact
Despite commutation of service the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liability to perform service and on that account the character of the watan lands still remained attached to the grant
By the end of the first half of the 19th century the watandars had lost much of their raison d etre
The British thought it expedient to dispense with their services and the watandars were given an offer to convert their watans into private property by the annual payment of a Nazrana but they were opposed to this
At their own request the Government agreed to continue their watans as unalienable after the service commutation settlements subject to payment of judi  or quit rent
After the service commutation settlements and the appointment of Mamlatdars the watandars had practically no function to perform but the watans were not discontinued till the Government decided upon their abolition
365 It is said that although co ownership of the joint family may exist in impartible property a distinction must be drawn between present rights and future rights of the members of a family
This is because of the peculiar character of the property
Thus while the junior members have future or contingent rights such as right of survivorship they have apart from custom or relationship no present rights as for instance a right to restrain alienation or to claim maintenance
It is upon this basis that the submission is that the courts below manifestly erred in passing a decree for partition of the watan property described in Schedules B and C appended to the plaint
We are afraid these submissions based upon the alleged impartibility of the watan properties or the applicability of the rule of lineal primogeniture regulating succession to the estate cannot prevail as these being nothing more than incidents of the watan stand abrogated by sub section
4 of section 3 Act No 60 of 1950 and section 4 of Act No 22 of 1955
It seems plain to us that the effect of Act No 60 of 1950 and Act No 22 of 1955 was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan land but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law
It will be convenient to deal first with the provisions of Act No 60 of 1950
Section 3 of the Act lays down that with effect from and on the appointed day notwithstanding anything contained in any law usage settlement grant sanad or order all watans shall be deemed to have been abolished and all rights to hold office and any liability to render service appertaining to the said watans shall stand extinguished
It further lays down that subject to the provisions of section 4 all watan land is hereby resumed and shall be deemed to be subject to the payment of land revenue under the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder as if it were an unalienated land
The term Code  as defined in section 2 b means the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879
All incidents pertaining to the said watans stand extinguished from the appointed day
Sub section
1 of section 4 of the Act insofar as material provides 4 1
A watan land resumed under the provisions of this Act shall  be regranted to the holder of the watan to which it appertained on payment of the occupancy price  and the holder shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code in respect of 366 such land and shall primarily be liable to pay land revenue to the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder all the provisions of the Code and rules relating to unalienated land shall subject to the provisions of this Act apply to the said land
 Clause 2 of Explanation to section 4 reads Explanation For the purposes of this section the expression holder shall include i all persons who on the appointed day are the watandars of the same watan to which the land appertained and xx xx xx The provisions of Act No 22 of 1955 are more or less similar
Likewise section 4 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any usage settlement grant etc with effect from the appointed day all alienations shall be deemed to have been abolished and all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such alienations and all other incidents of such alienation shall be deemed to have been extinguished
Section 7 of the Act provides that all land held under a watan is hereby resumed and shall be regranted to the holder in accordance with the provisions contained in sub sections 1 to 3 therein
Clause 1 of Explanation to section 7 reads Explanation For the purpose of this section the expression holder shall include 1 an alienee holding land under a watan and 2 xx xx xx xx Upon a plain reading of sub section
1 of section 4 of Act No 60 of 1950 and of section 7 of Act No 22 of 1955 it is clear that watan lands resumed under the provisions thereof have to be regranted to the holder of the watan and he shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of the Code in respect of such land
367 The expression holder  as defined in cl
i Explanation to section 4 of the former Act includes all persons who on the appointed day are the watandars of the same watan and cl
1 of Explanation to section 7 of the latter Act defines it to include an a lienee holding land under a watan
The term an alienee is defined in section 2 1 iii to mean the holder of an alienation and includes his co sharer
The Watan Act contemplated two classes of persons
One is a larger class of persons belonging to the watan families having a hereditary interest in the watan property as such and the other a smaller class of persons who were appointed as representative watandars and who were liable for the performance of duties connected with the office of such watandars
As already indicated it would not be correct to limit the word watandar only to this narrow class of persons who could claim to have a hereditary interest both in the watan property and in the hereditary office
Watan property had always been treated as property belonging to the family and all persons belonging to the watan family who had a hereditary interest in such watan property were entitled to be called watandars of the same watan within the Watan Act
That being so the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the watan land along with the watandar for the time being and therefore the regrant of the lands to the watandar under sub section
1 of section 4 of Act No 60 of 1950 and under section 3 of Act No 22 of 1955 must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family
It appears that the same view has been taken in a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Laxmibai Sadashiv Date vs Ganesh Shankar Date1
A controversy had arisen as to the purport and effect of the non obstante clause contained in section 4 of the Bombay Inferior Village Watans Abolition Act 1959
Malvankar J in Dhondi Vithoba vs Mahadeo Dagdu2 held that the effect of sub section
3 of section 4 read with section 5 of the Act was to bring about a change in the tenure or character of holding as Watan land but it did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under personal law
The learned Judge therefore held that even though the watan was abolished and the incidents thereof were extinguished and the land resumed under 368 section 4 the Act maintained the continuity of the interest in the lands of persons before and after the coming into force of the Act provided of course the holder pays occupancy price in respect of the land
In other words the property continues to be the joint family property or the property held by the tenants in common as the case may be
In Kalgonda Babgonda vs Balgonda1 a Division Bench of the High Court took a view to the contrary and observed The words all incidents appertaining to the said watans shall be and are hereby extinguished must include every kind of incident including the so called incident of a right to partition as claimed by the plaintiff in this case even if such right existed
Further the lands were resumed by the Government on that date in law and vested in the Government till the lands were re granted under section 5 or 6 or 9 of that Act
 xx xx xx xx It is not possible for us to consider it reasonable to held that although the lands were resumed by the Government and the holder himself had lost all his rights till the lands were re granted to him except the right of asking for re grant the incidents of the property under personal law appertaining to impartible property would survive the extinguishment of the tenure and resumption of the land by the State
 It was obviously wrong in reaching the conclusion that it did
In Laxmibai Sadashiv Date s case supra the Full Bench reversed the decision of the Division Bench and upheld the view taken by Malvankar J in Dhondi Vithoba s case supra observed It is undoubtedly true that section 4 starts with a non obstante clause but it is a well recognised canon of construction to give effect to non obstante clause having regard to the object with which it is enacted in a statute
The non obstante clause is contained at the inception of section 4 and the sole object of section 4 is to abolish alienation and rights and incidents in respect thereof
The right of a member of joint Hindu family to ask for partition of a joint family 369 property cannot be regarded as a right relating to grant of land as service inam or as an incident in respect thereof
xx xx xx xx The object of section 4 was not to affect in any manner rights created under the personal law relating to the parties and if the property belonged to joint Hindu family then the normal rights of the members of the family to ask for partition were not in any way affected by reason of the non obstante clause contained in section 4 These observations in our opinion are clearly in consonance with the true meaning and effect of the non obstanate clause
It still remains to ascertain the impact of sub s 2 of section 4 of Act No 60 of 1950 and sub section
3 of section 7 of Act No 22 of 1955 and the question is whether the occupancy of the land regranted under sub section
1 of section 4 of the former Act and sub section
2 of section 7 of the latter Act is still impressed with the character of being impartible property
All that these provisions lay down is that the occupancy of the land regranted under sub section
1 of section 4 of the former Act shall not be transferable or partible by metes and bounds without the previous sanction of the Collector and except on payment of such amount as the State Government may by general or special order determine
It is quite plain upon the terms of these provisions that they impose restrictions in the matter of making alienations
On regrant of the land the holder is deemed to be an occupant and therefore the holding changes its intrinsic character and becomes Ryotwari and is like any other property which is capable of being transferred or partitioned by metes and bounds subject of course to the sanction of the Collector and on payment of the requisite amount
It is the policy of the law to prevent the land working classes being driven into the state of landless proletariats so far as may be and accordingly it is provided by these provisions that alienations of such holdings or partition thereof shall be ineffective unless the sanction of the Collector has first been obtained
It is of the utmost importance that this important safeguard should be maintained in full force and effect so that the parties must exactly know what they have bargained for
The condition for the grant of sanction by the Collector as a pre requisite for a valid transfer of a holding or the 370 making of a partition by metes and bounds is to ensure that the actual tiller of the soil is not deprived of his land except for valid consideration or that the partition effected between the members of a family is not unfair or unequal
These provisions therefore do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a partition once the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled
In the result the appeals must fail and are dismissed
There shall however be no order as to costs
PBR Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The plaintiff s rather was the last holder of the office of Desai
After his death the plaintiff who was his eldest son was recognised as the watandar
In 1904 service appurtenant to the office of Desai was commuted by the imposition of judi  or quit rent
Under section 4 1 of the Bombay Pargana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act 1950 and section 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act 1955 all the watan lands were re granted to the plaintiff and he was deemed to be the occupant thereof within the meaning of the Bombay Land Revenue Code
The plaintiff appellant filed a suit against respondents who were members of a joint Hindu family holding properties described as Kundgol Deshgat Estate claiming a declaration that the estate formed an impartible estate governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture
The plaintiff claimed that as the present holder of the office of Desai he was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and that other members of the family had no right title or interest therein but were only entitled to maintenance and residence and in the alternative for partition and separation of 16 share therein
Denying all the plaintiff s claims the respondents pleaded that the entire properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were therefore liable to be partitioned
Rejecting all the claims of the appellant the Trial Court held that the properties belonged to the joint Hindu family and were therefore partible
On appeal the High Court subject to a modification upheld the decree of the court of first instance
The question at issue in the appeal to this Court was whether 1 even assuming that the estate was impartible and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture by custom as pleaded the incidents of impartibility as well as the rule of 342 lineal primogeniture being nothing more than an incident of the watan stood abrogated by section 34 of the 1950 Act and section 4 of the 1955 Act and as such it was not open to the plaintiff to make any claim on the basis of the alleged custom 2 with the resumption of the watan and the re grant of the watan lands to him the suit properties lost their character as being joint family property and had become under the provisions of the 1950 and 1955 Acts the plaintiff s exclusive property by reason of his status as watandar and as such were not capable of being partitioned
Dismissing the appeal  HELD It is well settled that property though impartible may be the ancestral property of the Joint Hindu Family
The impartibility of the estate does not per se destroy its nature as joint family property or render it the separate property of the last holder so as to destroy the right of survivorship hence the estate retains its character of joint family property and its devolution is governed by the rule of survivorship
To establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which there is an ancestral impartible estate has ceased to be joint it is necessary to prove an intention express or implied on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their succession to the estate
354 C D Martand Rao vs Malhar Rao 1928 55 IA 45 AIR 1928 PC 10 Adrishappa vs Gurushidappa 1880 7 IA 162 ILR 7 Cal
LR 1 PC Vinayak Waman Joshi Rayarikar vs Gopal Hari Joshi Rayarikar 1903 30 IA 77 ILR 7 Cal
WN 409 Shiba Prasad Singh vs Rani Prayag Kumari Debi 1932 59 IA 331 AIR 1932 PC 216  Collector of Gorakhpur vs Ram Sunder Mal 1934 61 IA 286 AIR 1934 PC 157 CIT vs Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore 1941 68 IA 155  Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra Patil 1943 70 IA 232 AIR 1943 PC 196 and Chinnathayi vs Kulasekara Pandiya Naicker    relied on
Mirza Raja Shri Pushavathi Viziaram Gajapathi Raj Manne Sultan Bahadur vs Shri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapathi Raj  and Rajah Velugoti Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu vs Rajah Velugoti Sarvagna Kumara Krishna Yachendra Varu  1969 3 SCC 281   distinguished
Neelkisto Deb Burmono vs Beerchunder Thakoor 1867 69 12 MIA 523 Rani Sartaj Kuari vs Rani Deoraj Kuari 1888 15 IA 51 ILR 1888 10 All 272 PC Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur vs Court of Wards 1899 26 IA 83 ILR  Raja Ram Rao vs Raja of Pittapur 1918 45 IA 148 AIR 1918 PC 81 Baijnath Prasad Singh vs Tej Bali Singh 1921 48 IA 195 AIR 1921 PC 62 and Bhaiya Ramanuj Pratap Deo vs Lalu Maheshanuj Pratap Deo  referred to 2
The plaintiff s contention runs counter to the scheme of the Bombay Hereditary offices Act 1874 and is against settled legal principles
The plain 343 tiff s rights to such watan properties whatever they were were subject to the rights of the other members of the family
359 C D In the former Bombay Presidency a Desghat watan had always been treated to be the joint family property and the grant of watan to the eldest member of a family did not make the watan property the exclusive property of the person who was the watandar for the time being
The definition of the term watandar as contained in section 4 of the Bombay Hereditary offices Act is in two parts the first sets out what watandar means and the other states what is included in it that is the entire definition of watandar must be looked upon as one the latter part being supplementary and additional to what is contained in first part
Thus a person who acquired watan property or held hereditary interest in it without acquiring the hereditary office and without being under an obligation to perform the services attached to such office was also a watandar within the meaning of the Watan Act
There can be no doubt that the Watan Act was designed to preserve to pre existing rights of the members of a joint Hindu family
The expression watandar of the same watan would include members of the family other than the watandar who were entitled to remain in possession and enjoyment of the watan property
359 G H 361 F Vijyasingrao Balasaheb Shinde Desai vs Janardanrao Narayanrao Shinde Desai  Kadappo Bapurao Desai vs Krishtappa Bachappa Desai 37 Bom
LR 599 AIR 1935 Bom
380 and Laxmibai Sadashiv Date vs Ganesh Shankar Date AIR 1977 Bom
350 approved
Tarabai Sriniwas Naik Guttal vs Murtacharya Anantacharya  overruled
The commutation of service under section 153 of the Watan Act by which the watandars were relieved in perpetuity from liability to perform the services attached to their offices in consideration of judi  or quit rent charged upon the watan land unless where it was otherwise provided for had not the effect of converting watan land into the private property of the watandars with the necessary incident of the alienability but to leave them attached to the hereditary offices which although free from the performance of services remain in tact
Despite commutation of service the office of watandars ordinarily survived without liability to perform service and on that account the character of the watan lands still remained attached to the grant
364 D F Collector of South Satara vs Laxman Mahadev Deshpande   relied on
Appaji Bapuji vs Keshav Shamrav ILR  referred to
Bachharam Datta Patil vs Vishwanath Pundalik Patil  1956 SCJ 721 referred to
344 5
The impartibility of the watan lands of the applicability or the rule of lineal primogeniture regarding succession to the estate by the alleged custom as pleaded being nothing more than an incident of the watan stood extinguished by s34 of the 1950 Act and s4 of the 1955 Act
The effect of these Acts was to bring out a change in the tenure or character of holding as watan lands but they did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under the personal law
That being so the members of a joint Hindu family must be regarded as holders of the watan land along with the watandar for the time being and therefore regrant of the lands to the watandar under section 41 of the 1950 Act and under section 3 of the 1955 Act must enure to the benefit of the entire joint Hindu family
365 C E 367 E 6
Section 42 of the 1950 Act and section 73 of the 1955 Act do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a partition once the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled
370 B Laxmibai Sadashiv Date vs Ganesh Shankar Date and Dhondi Vithoba Koli vs Mahadeo Dagdu Koli AIR 1973 Bom
323 approved
Kalgonda Babgonda Patil vs Balgonda Kalgonda Patil  overruled