ivil Appeal No 2494 of 1978
From the Judgment and Order dated 912
1977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No 465 of 1976
A Subba Rao for the Appellant
AS Nambiar B Parthasarthy G Prabhakar and K Ram Kumar for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KN SAIKIA J
This appeal by special leave is from the common Judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismiss ing two writ appeals and a writ petition
The Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area District Municipalities Act 1920 hereinafter referred to as the old Act  was applicable to Vijayawada Municipality of Andhra Pradesh and property tax was levied under that Act
The Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act 1965 hereinafter referred to as the new Act  came into force on 241965
Section 211 of the new Act defined council to mean a municipal council constituted under this Act
 Section 3911 of the new Act repealed the old Act
Section 389 of the new Act provided 389
Act to be read subject to Schedule IX in regard to first reconstitution of a council etc
 In regard to the first constitution of a council for any local area under Section 3 or to the first reconstitution in accordance with the provisions of this Act of a council in existence at the commencement thereof and otherwise in first giving effect to the provisions of this Act this Act shall be read subject to the rules in schedule IX
 384 The Schedule IX to the new Act contained the transitional provisions in the rules therein
Rule 12 thereof dealt with levy of taxes etc
and said 12
Levy of taxes etc
Any tax cess or fee which was being lawfully levied by or on behalf of any council at the com mencement of this Act and which may be lawfully levied under this Act shall notwithstanding any change in the method or manner of assessment or levy of such tax cess or fee be levied by or on behalf of the council at such rate as may be prevailing at such commencement or at such other rate as may be determined by the council from time to time by a resolu tion for the year in which this Act is brought into force and unless the Government by general or special order other wise direct for subsequent years also
 The result was that tax lawfully levied and continued to be levied under the old Act had to be continued unless the council by resolution determined such other rate from time to time and unless the Government by general or special order otherwise directed under the transitional provisions
On 189
1969 the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued GO Ms No 749 MA in exercise of its powers under the afore said Rule 12 of Schedule IX directing that all Municipal Councils shall with effect from 1470 levy the Property tax as per the provisions of the new Act
But due to certain administrative difficulties the revision could not be com pleted before 14
1970 and the Government therefore issued GO Ms No 293 MA dated 184
1970 directing the Municipal Council to levy the property tax as per the provi sions of the new Act from 110 1970
By another GO Ms No 81 MA dated 3011971 the Government directed the Municipal Council of vijayawada to continue to levy the property tax under the provisions of the old Act as certain rate payers had filed writ petition in the High Court and obtained stay
However by GO Ms No 675 MA the GO Ms No 81 was rescinded and the Vijayawada Municipal Coun cil was directed to collect revised taxes under the provi sions of the new Act with effect from 110 1970
This latter GO Ms No 675 was in its turn rescinded by GO Ms No 255 MA dated 15673 whereby the Government or dered that the Vijayawada Municipal Council shall continue to levy the property tax under the provisions of the old Act and that GO was to be deemed to have come into force from 1101970
As a result the Vijayawada Municipality continued to levy and enhance the property tax under the provisions of the old Act
It 385 may be mentioned that under section 82 of the old Act property tax was levied on the basis of gross annual rental value whereas under section 87 of the new Act the basis of assessment in owner occupied building was the capital value thereof to be determined in the prescribed manner
The GO Ms No 255 dated 15673 was challenged by house property owners in the High Court in two writ peti tions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking writ in the nature of mandamus or order or direction re straining the Vijayawada Municipal Council from enforcing it and declaring the same illegal and void
It was inter alia contended before the learned Single Judge that by earlier GOs
the Government having directed that taxes should be levied under the new Act the transitional power under rule 12 had been already exercised and the power to levy any tax under the old Act therefore ceased and it was not open to the Government to rescind the previous orders and re direct taxes to be levied under the old Act
That contention was accepted observing The language of the Rule is clear that once the Government by a general or special order otherwise directs the power to levy tax under the old Act is exhausted
 Even so it was held that in view of the provisions in section 41 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Fourth Amendment Act 23 of 1975 which validated the actions taken those could not be challenged as invalid
The submissions that the Amendment Act was not retrospective and that the enhancement of the tax was not made following the procedure prescribed by law were also negatived holding that the procedure prescribed under the old Act was followed inasmuch as under the old Act the property tax was levied on the basis of only rental value whereas under the new Act it was on the basis either of the rental value or of the capital value and that under the old Act when tax was being levied on the basis of rental value there was no need to ascertain the capital value of the land and for enhancing the assessment all that the authority had to know was whether there had been an increase in the rent and Rule 6 of Schedule II which dealt with the value of the building for the purposes of property tax was inapplicable as the levy under the old Act on the basis of rental value and enhancement could be done accord ing to the procedure contained in Schedule VII Rule 10 of the old Act
It was not denied that special notice as re quired under the old Act was given
The writ petitions were accordingly dismissed
386 Two writ appeals were filed by the writ petitioners
Another writ petition having raised identical questions was heard with the two appeals by the Division Bench
The Divi sion Bench held that the finding of the Single Bench that having already given directions by the General Orders under the transitory provision of Schedule IX Rule 12 the Govern ment s power under that provision ceased and it had no power to rescind that order and direct that the taxes which were under the old Act must be continued to be collected was not challenged before it
The Division Bench held that the Fourth Amendment Act had entrusted to the Municipal Councils the power to tax under the old Act though that Act had been repealed
It held that though the actions of the Vijayawada Municipal Council pursuant to the General Order might have been invalid those were validated by section 41 of the Fourth Amendment Act
It was also held that the appellant could pursue their remedies by way of revision under the new Act
Thus the Division Bench having dismissed the two writ appeals as well as the writ petition by the impugned judg ment and also having refused the certificate the appellant has obtained special leave
Mr A Subba Rao the learned counsel for the appellant submits that under the old Act the basis for assessment of property tax was the annual rental value while under the new Act it was capital value
By the GO No 749 the Government having directed that property tax would be levied under the new Act the subsequent GOspassed after rescinding the said GO No 749 and redirecting assessment to be made under the old Act were invalid as was held by the Single Bench and that finding was not challenged before the Divi sion Bench
Consequently it is submitted during the period from 1969 to 1973 there was no valid law to enable the Municipal Council to levy taxes under the old Act and the actions under the GOs
are sought to be validated by the Fourth Amendment Act of 1975 but unless the substantive law relating to the method of assessment was also amended retro spectively the invalid actions could not be validated as that law could not be deemed to have been in existence by a legal fiction
Council submits that section 87 of the new Act relating to levy of Property Tax was amended so as to bring it in conformity with the corresponding provision of section 20 of the old Act which prescribed rental value as the basis for assessment
It is pointed out that section 3 of the Fourth Amendment Act did not contain any indication that the said amendment was retrospective so as to bring it on the statute book by a fiction prior to 1973 when the invalid assessment was made
The Fourth Amendment Act came into force only from 10th June 1975 which was the date of the Ordinance
The amendment of section 87 of the new Act 387 being not retrospective in its operation prior to 1973 it is submitted that the invalid assessments could not have been validated
Mr AS Nambiar the learned counsel for the respond ents submits that the old Act entitled the Municipality to collect the taxes which had been collected in accordance with law and after coming into force of the new Act accord ing to the intermediate GOs and that the impugned GO Ms No 255 dated 15673 having directed the taxes to be levied and collected in accordance with the old Act there was
no infirmity in the Judgments of the High Court
It appears that after the writ petitions were filed challenging GO Ms No 255 dated 15673 the Government issued the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Amendment Ordi nance 1975 Ordinance 1 of 1975 which became the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Fourth Amendment Act 1975 which was deemed to have come into force on the 10th June 1975
By the said Amendment act not only sections 85 and 87 of the new Act were amended but also certain intervening actions of the Municipal Council were sought to be validated
Section 85 dealt with levy of tax and sub section 1 thereof said Where the council by resolution determines that a property tax shall be levied such tax shall be levied on a11 build ings and lands within the municipal limits save those ex empted by or under this Act or any other law Sub section 2 provided Save as otherwise provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of sections 81  87 and in accordance with the rules made by the Government in this behalf these taxes shall be levied  
Section 2 of the Fourth Amendment Act amended section 85 of the new Act by substituting clauses a and b of sub section 2 excluding the proviso thereto by the following words At such percentages of the annual rental value of lands or buildings or both as may be fixed by the council
 Section 86 of the new Act provided as follows 86
Levy of property tax on a direction by Government 388 1 The Government may after consultation with the council by order published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette direct any council to levy the property tax referred to in sub section 1 of Section 81 or any class of such tax at such rate and with effect from such date not being earlier than the first day of the half year immediately following that in which the order is published as may be specified in the order
2 When an order under sub section 1 has been published the provisions of this Act relating to property tax shall apply as if the council had
on the date of publication of such order by resolution determined to levy the tax at the rate and with effect from the date specified in the order and as if no other resolution of the council under Section 81 determining the rate at which and the date from which property tax shall be levied had taken effect
3 A council shall not alter the rate at which the property tax of any class or such tax is levied in pursuance of an order under sub section 1 or abolish such tax except with the previous sanction of the Government
 Section 871 of the new Act provided 871 Every building shall be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises
  By section 3 of the Fourth Amendment Act in sub section 2 of section 87 of the new Act the following words were substituted namely 2 The annual rental value of lands and buildings Shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which they may reason ably be expected to let from month to month or from year to year less a deduction in the case of buildings of ten per cent of that portion of such annual rent which is attributa ble to the buildings alone apart from their sites and the adjacent lands occupied as an appurtenance thereto and the said deduction shall be in lieu of all allowance for repairs or on any other account whatever
389 Provided that in respect of any building and the land appur tenant thereto the fair rent of which has been fixed under section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act 1960 the gross annual rent shall be the annual amount of the fair rent so fixed
 Section 4 of the Fourth Amendment Act sought to validate the actions taken earlier by providing as under 41 Notwithstanding anything in the provisions of the principal Act or any order of the Government made under the rule 12 in Schedule IX to the Principal Act anyaction taken till the commencement of this Act by any municipal council to continue to levy and collect the property tax in accordance with the method or manner or assessment or levy as provided in the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area District Municipalities Act 1920 or the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Area District Municipalities Act 1956 as the case may be shall not be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid by reason only of the fact that such action was taken by the said municipal council during the period when the power in this behalf had not been validly entrusted to it in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act or the rules made thereunder and accordingly a The levy and collection of property tax made in pursu ance of such action shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been made in accordance with law and b no suit or other proceeding shall be instituted or continued in any court against the municipal council con cerned or any person or authority whatsoever on its behalf on the ground only that any such action or levy and collec tion was not taken or made in accordance with law
2 Notwithstanding anything in sections 85 and 87 of the Principal Act as amended by this Act the property tax levied in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act as it stood before the commencement of this Act by such of the municipalities as have come into existence after the commencement of the principal Act shall continue to
be levied and collected by or on behalf of the Municipal 390 Council of any such municipality for the year commencing on the 1st April 1975 
 Admittedly the validity of the Fourth Amendment Act had not been challenged in the High Court
In fact it was passed during the pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court
Mr Suba Rao s submission is that section 3 of the Fourth Amend ment Act having not been made retrospective section 4 of the Act could not have said that the levy and collection of property tax made in pursuance of such action for all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been made in accordance with law
It is true that only sub section 2 of Section 87 of the new Act was substituted as stated above by the Fourth Amendment Act
However
once the amendment substituted sub section 2 of section 87 it formed a part of that section
This amendment only provided the basis of assessment and it itself did not provide for the commencement of such calcula tion which however might be taken from the other provisions of the new Act or from the General Orders issued by the Government
Section 41 of the Fourth Amendment Act ex pressly validated any action taken till the commencement of that Act notwithstanding anything in the provisions of the new Act or in any Government Order made under rule 12 of Schedule IX of the new Act and the Municipal Council should continue to levy and collect the property tax in accordance with the method or manner of assessment or levy as provided in the old Act and those acts shall not be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid by reason only of the fact that such action was taken by the said municipal coun cil during the period when the power in this behalf had not been validly entrusted to it in accordance with the provi sions of the new Act or the rules made thereunder and that the levy and collection of property tax may in pursuance of such action shall for all purposes be deemed to be and to have always been made in accordance with law
From the above provisions of section 4 1  of the Fourth Amendment Act there is no doubt that the legislature intended to validate the actions taken under the general orders and under the old as well as the new Act
It may be interpreted that the impugned GO having been validated the tenure covered by it must also be held to have been covered by it so that there was really no interregnum in the process or procedure of assessment of property tax
Mr Subba Rao relies on Janapada Sabha Chhindwara vs The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd and Anr  In that case in 1935 the Independent Mining Local Board Chhindwara con 391 stituted under CP Local Self Government Act 1920 resolved to levy a cess on coal extracted within the area at 3 pies per ton
The sanction of the Local Government as required by section 512 of the Act was obtained for the levy
In 1943 the levy was enhanced to 4 pies in 1946 to 7 pies and in 1947 to 9 pies
The validity of the enhanced levy was chal lenged and this Court in appeal held that the increased levy would also require the previous sanction of the Local Government and such sanction not having been obtained the levy at a rate higher than 3 pies was illegal
The State legislature thereafter enacted the Madhya Pradesh Koyala Upkar Manyatakaran Adhiniyam 1964
Section 2a of that act defined Board to mean the independent Mining Local Board Chhindwara and its successor body the Janapada Sabha Chhindwara the appellant constituted under the CP and Berar Local Government Act 1948
Section 2b defined cess to mean a cess imposed by the independent Mining Local Board Chhindwara or its successor Section 31 of that Act provided that notwithstanding a judgment of any court cesses imposed assessed or collected by the Board in pursuance of the notifications specified in the Schedule shall
for all purposes be deemed to be and to have been validly imposed
assessed or collected as if the enactment under which they were issued stood amended at material times so as to empower the Board to issue the said notifications
In the Schedule were specified three notifications enhancing the rate of cess
On the question whether the enhanced levy was validated by the 1964 Act this Court held that the Act did not give legal effect to the imposition of cess at the enhanced rates
It was pointed out that the text or even the nature of the amendments was not disclosed though Section 512 of the 1920 Act could not be deemed to have been repealed by the 1964 Act because the latter Act in terms was limited in its application to the Independent Mining Local Board Chhindwara and its successor body and only in respect of the three notifications specified in the Sched ule
An Act so limited in its application to one Local Board and to specified notification could not repeal the sub section which applied to all Boards
Nor was there anything to indicate that notifications issued by the appellant Board without the sanction of the State Government must be deemed to have been issued validly
It was held that such an in tendment could not be implied without express language in a taxing statute
It was further observed that it was open to the legislature within certain limits to amend the provi sions of an Act retrospectively and to declare what the law shall be deemed to have been
But the Legislature in that case attempted to overrule or set aside a decision of the Court
It was not open to the Legislature to say that a judgment of a Court properly constituted and rendered in exercise of its powers in a matter brought 392 before it shall be deemed to be ineffective either as a precedent or between the parties
That case is therefore clearly distinguishable from the instant case on facts
Firstly in the instant case there is no question of any judgment of any Court having been overruled or set aside
The Single Bench Judgment was passed on 23376 that is after the Amendment Act which came into force on 10675
Secondly the language of Section 41 is very clear as to the intention of the legislature as to the contents of the amendment
What the amendment in the instant case did was to amend the new Act and also validate actions taken under the GO impugned in the case
What was prescribed by the im pugned GO was the same as was prescribed by the old Act which itself stood repealed by the new Act
The procedure thus prescribed was one under the GO and not under the old Act and Section 41 validated those actions without reviv ing the repealed old Act itself but by amending the new Act and validating the transitory measure taken by virtue of the Government s orders issued under the transitional provision Schedule IX of the new Act particularly Rule 12 thereunder
The validity of Section 41 itself having not been chal lenged it was not open for the Courts to give
an interpre tation contrary to the clear and unequivocal language of the Section
The rule is that an amendment Act must be read as if the words of amendment had been written into the Act except where that would lead to an inconsistency
Shamarao V Parulekar vs The District Magistrate Thana Bombay at 689 Power of the legislature to pass a law includes the power to validate actions retrospectively of course within Constitutional limitations
It is apt to remember that the State s power to tax is derived from the Constitution and the municipality s power to tax is derived from the State Legislature which could delegate that power in the manner the Constitution permits to the municipal council an agent of the State Government and the munici pality cannot refuse to raise taxes as directed
The proper authority to determine what should and what should not constitute a public burden is the Legislature of the State
This is not only true for the State itself but it is also true in respect of each municipality of the State these inferior corporate bodies having only such authority in this regard as the legislature shall confer upon them
A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is specifi cally challenged and the principle is equally applicable to an enactment authorising levy of a tax for a public purpose
The power to tax is a sovereign power and is legislative in character and it has to be exercised within the Constitu tional limitations
The statutes relating to municipal taxes may be changed according to the existing legislative rules of State policy unless forbidden by the Constitution from doing so
Irregular assessment may 393 also be regularised with retrospective effect within
the same Constitutional limitations
Where the Court has not already declared invalid a taxing measure which was of doubtful validity it is permissible for appropriate legis lature to validate it by retrospective legislation
No legal fiction is involved in such a case
Mr Subba Rao s submis sion has therefore to be rejected
We find force in the submission of Mr Nambiar in this regard
The GO impugned before the High Court has been covered and validated by the above provisions the GO itself covered the period after the repeal of the old Act and till the date of commencement of the Fourth Amendment so that no interregnum was really there
The assessment made according to the provisions of the old Act were validated as actions taken by the council pursuant to the impugned GO and not under the provisions of the old Act which was al ready repealed
While referring to the old Act the GO did not revive the Act but only prescribed the same procedure as was found in the repealed Act as a transitory measure
The validity of section 41 of the Fourth Amendment Act having not been challenged before the High Court we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgments of the High Court
In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed but under the facts and circumstances of the case without any order as to costs
Y Lal Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant an employee of the respondent Sahkari Bank was put under suspension and served with a chargesheet during the pendency of the reference under section 4K of the UP
It was followed by a domestic inquiry leading to his dismissal
Thereupon he filed a complaint under section 6 F of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal and the same was treated as a dispute referred to it
The Tribunal found that principles of natural justice had not been followed in the domestic inquiry
However proceeding further it asked the management to justify the order of punishment on merits
The parties led their evi dence and the Tribunal recorded a finding that charges levelled were established
The High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the award
In the appeal by special leave it was contended for the appellant that after the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the domestic inquiry held by the employer was illegal question of justification of the punishment by fresh materi als could arise only if the management had applied for permission to justify the punishment and in the absence of such a prayer the Tribunal did not have the power to call upon the employer to do so and that in any event the appel lant was entitled to his salary from the date of his dis missal to the date of the award
Allowing the appeal in part the Court HELD 1
By asking the respondent to justify the punish ment by adducing additional evidence the Tribunal merely reminded the employer of his rights
There was no illegality in the course adopted which could vitiate the award
225F 412 Shankar Chakravarti vs Britannia Biscuit Co 1979 3SCR 1165 distinguished
If the order of punishment passed by the management is declared illegal and the punishment is upheld subsequent ly by a labour tribunal the date of dismissal cannot relate back to the date of the illegal order of the employer
225H In the instant case the Tribunal had initially found that the domestic inquiry was vitiated on account of viola tion of principles of natural justice
The appellant was therefore entitled to his salary from the date of his dismissal to the date of the award
225D  H Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd vs Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha   applied