ivil Appeal No 3604 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 1991986 of the Rajasthan High Court in SBCSA No 163 of 1986
SK Jain and 1
Makwana for the Appellant
Rajinder Sachar Rameshwar Nath BPS Mangat and Suresh Vohra for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN J
In this appeal by special leave arising from a judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan in a second appeal the question for consideration is whether the appel lant will not be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 13 A of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Evic tion Act 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Act as has been held by the High Court
It is worthy of mention even here that though the suit for eviction filed by the respond ent was pending on the date the ordinance came to be promul gated the appel 195 lant had no knowledge of the filing of the suit and he came to be served with notice in the suit only after some months after the Ordinance came to be promulgated
The High Court has based its conclusions on two factors viz 1 no appli cation under Section 13 A had been made by the appellant in the suit filed by the respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of commencement of the Ordinance and 2 the suit had been filed before the Amending Ordinance No 26 of 1975 was issued and hence the proceedings would be governed by the provisions of the unamended Act
The facts are not in controversy and are briefly as under
Since 1961 the appellant was a lessee of the respond ent in respect of a shop
The agreed rent was Rs25 per mensem and in addition he had also to pay the house tax to the municipality
The rent was increased to Rs30 per mensem with effect from 111963
On the ground the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for the period 12
1966 to 311266 the respondent filed a suit on 1711967 for eviction
The appellant filed an application under Section 134 of the Act as it stood prior to amendment for determination of the arrears of rent and the interest payable thereon
The Trial Court determined the arrears of rent and the interest payable thereon and on the appellant depositing the same the suit was dismissed in terms of Section 137 of the Act
Thereafter the appellant went on depositing the rent in court
However the respondent filed another suit on 21575 alleging that the appellant had again committed default in payment of rent and should there fore be evicted
The appellant was served with a notice calling upon him to appear in Court on 10276
Since a copy of the plaint was not sent along with the notice the appel lant was furnished a copy of the plaint on 10276 and he was granted time till 30376 to file his written statement
In his written statement the appellant refuted his liability to be evicted on the ground of default in payment of rent
In addition by way of abundant caution he filed a petition under Section 133 and 134 of the amended Act praying that if in the course of depositing the rent during the long period of eight years from 1967 to 1975 there had been any omission due to over sight in depositing the monthly rent the Court may determine the amount of shortfall and the interest payable thereon and permit him to deposit the same in Court
Even before the appellant was served with notice in the suit the Act came to be amended on 2991975 by Amending Ordinance No 26 of 1975 later replaced by an Act
The Ordinance provided for a new section viz Section 13 A being added to the Act
Section 13 A is in the following terms 196 13 A Special provisions relating to pending and other matters
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of this Amending Ordinance or in any other law
a No court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent if the tenant applies under clause b and pays to the landlord or deposits in court within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause b in every such proceeding the court shall on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the amending ordinance notwithstanding any order to the contrary determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6 per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the court and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid the proceeding shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default c the provisions of clauses a and b shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or applications for revisions preferred or made after the commencement of the amending ordinance against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause b for the expression from the commencement of the amending ordinance the expression from the date of the presenta tion of the memorandum of appeal or applica tion for revision shall be substituted d omitted
e omitted
f omitted
 197 The Trial Court after hearing both the parties passed orders on the application filed earlier by the appellant under Sections 133 and 134 of the Act and called upon the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs335 towards arrears of rent and interest before 2871976 after giving credit to the sum of Rs 1290 already deposited by him
The appellant complied with the order of the Court by depositing the said amount within the prescribed time
Even so the Trial Court passed a decree for eviction against the appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent and the Appellate Court confirmed the decree
In the second appeal preferred to the High Court the appellant s counsel contended that the Trial Court ought to have treated the appellant s application under Section 133 and 134 as one under Section 13 A and given the benefit of the Section to the appellant and dismissed the suit for eviction
The High Court in spite of accepting the position that though the suit was pending when the Amending Ordinance was promul gated the appellant could not have filed a petition under Section 13A within thirty days from the date of the Ordi nance coming into force as the suit summons came to be served on him only later nevertheless declined to interfere because in its view the Act has not provided for any relief to tenants
placed in the situation in which the appellant was placed
The High Court has further held that the Act contains a lacuna but it can be remedied only by the Legis lature and not by the Courts and as such the appellant cannot claim the benefit of Section 13A of the Act
The High Court has expressed its view in the following terms Section 13 A of the Rent Control Act does not envisage and does not provide for a contingen cy as in the present case where the suit was pending but the defendant had no notice of the pendency of the suit and could not have availed of the benefit of Section 13 A of the Rent Control Act on account of restriction placed under Clause b for filing an applica tion us 13 A within one month from the date of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance
It is true that Section 13 A is a beneficial legislation to help the tenants but the Court cannot substitute or add something to the Act
It will be for the legislature to amend section 13 A of the Rent Control Act so as to cover up contingency arising in the present case
Language of Amended Section 13 A is not ambiguous and therefore there is no question of interpreting so as to extend the rule of beneficial construction in order to cover up cases like the present one
 198 The High Court has further held that since the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for a second time he will not be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 137 of the Act once again
The High Court has expressed its view on this aspect of the matter in the following terms It is also not disputed that defendant had taken benefit of Section 137 of the Old Rent Control Act in an earlier suit filed by the plaintiff on the ground of default in payment of rent
Since the suit had been filed before coming into force of the Amending Ordinance of 1975 or the Amending Act of 1976 the provi sions of the Old Rent Control Act before amendment will apply as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in Kishan Lal Sharma supra
 The two grounds on which the High Court had dismissed the appellant s second appeal are the subject matter of attack in this appeal
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court after having found that though the suit was admittedly pending when the Amending Ordinance was promul gated the appellant had no notice of the pendency of the suit at the relevant time and as such he could not possibly have filed an application within one month s time from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance should not have denied the benefit of Section 13 A to the appellant on the ground the Section does not provide for an application being made beyond a period of thirty days from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance
On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the Section is clear in its terms and as such the High Court was perfectly justified in holding that the appellant cannot claim benefits under Section 13A of the Act
It was his further contention that since the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for a second time he will not be entitled to claim benefit under Section 13A even if the delay in filing the application beyond the prescribed period of thirty days is to be overlooked
In view of the conflict ing arguments of the learned counsel two questions fall for consideration viz 1 whether the appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of Section 13A because he had not filed an application within thirty days from the date of commence ment of the Ordinance and 2 even otherwise whether by reason of the earlier default in payment of rent for the period 1 2 1966 to 31 12 1966 the appellant is disentitled under the Act to claim the benefit of Section 13A 199 So far as the first question is concerned the High Court has failed to see that the object of enacting Section 13A by the Legislature was to confer benefit on all tenants against whom suits for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent were pending
To achieve the object Section 13 A has been given overriding effect
Sub clause 1 of Section 13 A mandates all courts not to pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent if the tenant makes an application as per clause b and pays to the landlord or deposits in court within the prescribed time the total amount of rent in arrears together with interest and full costs of the suit
It is no doubt true sub clause b lays down that in every such proceeding the Court shall on the application of a tenant made within thirty days from the date of the com mencement of the amending Ordinance determine the amount of rent in arrears as well as the amount of interest at six per cent per annum and the costs of the suit and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within a time not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the Court
Sub clause b further provides that on such payment being made the proceedings shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default
The intention of the Legislature to confer the benefit of Section 13A to all tenants provid ed actual eviction had not taken place could further be seen by the terms of sub clause c
Under sub clause c the provisions of sub clause a  b have been made ap plicable mutatis mutandis to all appeals or applications for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the Amending Ordinance and the only stipulation contained is that the tenant preferring an appeal or an application for revision should apply to the Court within a period of thirty days from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal or the application for revision for giving him the benefit of Section 13A
Such being the case it would be unreasonable and inequitable to hold that the Legislaturehad intended to confer the benefit of Section 13A only to those tenants who had received notice of the suit filed against them before the Ordinance came into force and not to those tenants against whom proceedings were pending in the sense they had been instituted but who had no notice of the pendency of the suit
In this case it is common ground that though the suit was filed by the respond ent on 21 5 1975 the appellant had no notice of the suit on 2991975 when the Ordinance was promulgated or even before the expiry of thirty days after the Ordinance was promulgat ed
Such being the case the appellant even if he had known of the promulgation of the Amending Ordinance on 29 9 1975 could not have known that a suit for eviction had been filed against him on the ground of default in payment of rent and that he should file an applica 200 tion under Sec
13 A1b within thirty days of the com mencement of the Ordinance
It would therefore be futile to expect compliance from him of the terms of Sec
13 A1b in the suit which was no doubt pending within thirty days from the date of the commencement of the Ordinance to claim the benefit of Section 13A A somewhat similar situation came to be noticed by this Court in BP Khemka Pvt
Ltd vs
BK Bhowmick  In that case the tenant made an application in the suit filed by the landlord for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent under Section 172 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for the court determining the amount of rent payable by him to the landlord
During the pendency of the proceeding the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Amending Ordinance which was later replaced by an Act came to be promulgated with effect from 26 8 1967
Sub sections 2A and 2B to Section 17 of the Act were insert ed and Section 5 of the Ordinance gave retrospective effect to the amendments and provided that the amendments made by the Ordinance shall have effect in respect of suits includ ing appeals which were pending on the date of the commence ment of the Ordinance
To avail the benefit of the amended provision the tenant preferred an application within one month and prayed for the payment of the arrears of the rent
The Trial Court determined the amount and the tenant paid the entire arrears but even so the Trial Court struck off the defence of the appellant on the ground that in paying the rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 there had been a delay of 44 days and 6 days respectively and hence there was a contravention of Section 171 of the Act
Thereafter the landlord s suit was decreed and the decree was confirmed by the Appellate Court
In the second appeal preferred by the tenant the High Court not only confirmed the decree for eviction but went a step further and held that the tenant was not entitled under the Act to file an application under Section 172Ab because he had not filed the application within the time specified under Sub section 1 of Section 17 of the Act viz one month from the service of the writ of summons on the defendant or where he appears in the suit or proceeding without the writ of summons being served on him within one month of his appearance
 The High Court expressed its View as under In our view the application under section 172Ab was not also maintainable
It is true that Section 172Ab was made applicable to pending suits by the Ordinance
But such applicability will be subject to the limitation imposed 201 by sub section 2B of Section 17 namely that an application under sub section 2Ab has to be made before the expiry of the time specified in sub section 1 of Section 17 for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in payment of rent
Under sub section 1 of Section 17 the time speci fied is one month from the service of the writ of summons on the defendant or where he ap pears in the suit or proceeding without the writ of summons being served on him within one month of his appearance
In the instant case the summons was served on the defendants on April 6 1967
The application under sec tion 172Ab having been filed on September 22 1967 it was barred by limitation  
In our view after the expiry of one month of the service of summons on the defendants they had no right to avail themselves of the provi sions of section 172A
Sub section 2B of section 17 having prescribed a time limit for an application under sub section 2A no other period of limitation can be substituted for the purpose of making an application for instalments
It is true that the Act is a remedial statute but that fact does not give the Court jurisdiction to alter the period of limitation as prescribed by the statute for the purpose of giving relief to the tenant
If the legislature had intended that the tenant in a pending suit would be entitled to make an application under section 172A within one month of the date of promulgation of the Ordinance it would have expressly provided for the same as it has done in other cases covered by section 17B and 17D In the appeal preferred by the tenant to this Court against the judgment of the High Court this Court disap proved the view taken by the High Court
In the judgment reference was made to the decisions in Madhav Raw Scindia vs Union of India AIR SC 197 1 530 and Dy
Custodian vs Offi cial Receiver  while setting out the prin ciple to be followed in the matter of construction of the provisions of an Act
It was observed that the provisions of an Act must be construed in such a manner that the construc tion should serve the purpose of achieving the aim and object of the Act and not in a way as would defeat the legislative intent behind the Act
After setting out the principle the fallacy contained in the view taken by the High Court was pointed out in the following manner The High Court was therefore in error in holding that 202 the application under Section 172Ab was itself not maintainable
If the High Court s view is to be accepted it would then amount to asking the appellant to perform the impossible ie asking the appellant to file an applica tion under section 172Ab which came into force on 268
1967 within one month from 64
1967 when the suit summons was served
 The view taken in BB Khemka supra would have rele vance in this case also because though the amending Ordi nance came to be promulgated on 29 9 1975 the appellant came to know of the filing of the suit only long after when notice was served on him to appear in Court on 10 2 1976
Therefore the question of filing an application under Section 13A would arise only when the appellant came to know of the filing of the suit and its pendency
In construing the terms of Section 13A the Court has to bear in mind the object underlying the introduction of the Section by the Legislature
It is a settled principle that the interpreta tion of the provisions of a statute should conform to the legislative intent as far as possible and the Courts should not take a narrow or restricted view which will defeat the purpose of the Act
So viewed the first question has to be answered in favour of the appellant
In so far as the second question is concerned it is not as if the appellant had committed a second default in the strict sense of the term
The earlier suit was filed on 17 1 1967 and the appellant had made an application under Section 134 of the Act and had the amount of arrears and the interest payable thereon determined by the Court
There after he had been depositing the rent in Court regularly
However when the respondent filed a second suit on 21 5 1975 alleging that the appellant had again committed default in payment of rent the appellant had bonafide represented to the Court that he had been regularly depositing the rent and the house tax but it may be possible that there may have been some delay or omission here and there in the long period of eight years in the payment of rent and hence the Court may determine the amount of arrears if any and afford him opportunity to pay the arrears
This prayer was granted and the Court had determined the arrears and the interest payable thereon and the appellant deposited the amount so determined within the prescribed time
It cannot therefore be said that the appellant had knowingly and wilfully committed a second default
Even though it was found that some arrears had to be paid the appellant cannot be denied the benefit of Section 13A because the Section has been given overriding effect in so far as suits and other proceedings which were pending on 203 the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance and as such the proviso to sub section 6 of the Section 13 of the amend ed Act would not disentitle the appellant to claim the benefit of Section 13 A
The High Court was therefore in error in holding that since the suit had been filed before Sec 13A was introduced the appellant would be governed only by the provisions of the Act before its amendment
For these reasons the second question also has to be answered in favour of the appellant
In the light of our conclusion on the two questions falling for consideration in this appeal the judgment of the High Court as well as the judgments of the courts below cannot be sustained
Accord ingly the appeal is allowed and the suit filed by the respondent will stand dismissed
The appellant will however pay the full costs of the suit to the respondent as envis aged under Section 13 A if he has not already paid the same
No order as to costs in this appeal
YL Appeal allowed


Summary:
Respondent No 1 in the appeals instituted a suit for partition against his younger brothers and sisters and the heirs of his deceased brothers
The plaintiff was the eldest among the brothers and sisters
The 1st and 2nd Defendants were his brothers the 3rd Defendant his sister the 4th and 5th Defendants the widow and son respectively of the third brother
Defendant 6 was the widow of the fourth brother and Defendants 7 to 12 were his children while Defendant No 14 was the wife of Defendant No 1 and Defendants 13 15 16 and 17 were their children
The subject matter of the appeals related only to one item of property known as Naroda Chawl measuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas of land where 115 rooms and huts stood con structed out of which 114 rooms had been let out to ten ants and one room was retained for the caretaker
According to Defendants No 6 to 12 this property exclu sively belonged to defendant No 6 and was not liable to partition
The other defendants however supported the plain tiff s case that it belonged to the 233 joint family and was liable to partition
Defendants 6 to 12 pleaded that the plaintiff s father Bapalal orally gifted this property to his daughter in law Defendant No 6 in March 1946 and made a statement before the Revenue authorities on 
the basis of which her name was mutated and she was put in possession thereof that although she came in peaceful possession the management which in cluded realisation of rent was in the hands of Defendant No 1 that as some dispute arose in 1952 she assumed direct charge of the chawl and had remained in possession thereaf ter and that she had acquired good title therein by adverse possession before the suit was filed in 1960
The City Civil Judge who tried the suit held that there was a joint Hindu family and a business was carried on for the benefit of the family and the income therefrom was thrown into the common pool and all the properties including the disputed chawl were treated as belonging to the family
As the case of Defendant No 6 about the gift the mutation of her name and her exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit was found correct it was held that she had acquired title by adverse possession and the suit was dismissed with respect to the disputed chawl
The plaintiff appealed to the High Court
Some of the defendants also filed appeals in respect of the other items of property
All these appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment
The High Court reversed the finding of adverse posses sion in regard to the disputed chawl and granted a decree for partition
It held that Defendant No 6 remained in exclusive possession of the property only since 1952 the period was thus short of the time required for prescription of title
It further held that since the rents of the chawl from 1952 were collected by her husband and after his death by her son Defendant No 7 she was liable to render accounts till the death of her husband and she along with Defendant No 7 would be jointly liable for the period thereafter
Separate Appeals were preferred by Defendant Nos 6 and 7 to this Court
Allowing the Appeals setting aside the decision of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court
234 HELD 1
The principle that revenue entry furnishes presumptive evidence of title is inapplicable in the instant case
It cannot be denied that title to Naroda Chawl could not have passed to Defendant No 6 by virtue of the entry Ext
The value of the chawl even in 1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer was executed
Besides Ext
247 describes the plaintiff s father Bapalal and Defendant No 6 Chandrakanta as Kabjedar that is occu pant
In such circumstances the presumption which can be raised in favour of Defendant No 6 from this entry is with respect of her possession and possession only
238F G Gangabai and others vs Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desai and others AIR 1930 Privy Council 93 and Desai Navinkant Kesarlal vs Prabhat Kabhai 9 Gujarat Law Reporter 694 referred to
The account books have to be rejected as not reli able
It is apparent from the evidence that nobody takes the responsibility of supporting the correctness of the entries therein
Many of the documents produced by Defendant No 1 were accepted but the account books which were section Nos
123 75 to 123 97 of Ext
123 were in express terms not admitted
The plaintiff filed his objection Ext
Defendant No 6 also filed her objection Ext
The books were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits on the statement of the plaintiff which he made in cross exami nation
The plaintiff by saying that he had written as per the instructions of Defendant No 1 made it clear that he Could not vouchsafe for its reliability
Defendant No 1 could not summon courage to support them either personally or through any witness
No reason has been suggested as to why he did not produce other important documents in his possession which could have supported the account books and the joint case of the parties resisting the appellant s claim
243B E 3
Defendant No 1 cannot be treated to be in joint possession as he was actually collecting the rents from the tenants
it is well settled that the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fidu ciary relationship Defendant No 1 cannot be permitted to claim his own possession
247D E David Lyeii vs John Lawson Kennedy 1889 XIV HLE 437 Williams vs Pott LR XII Equity Cases 149 and Secre tary of State for India vs Krishnamoni Gupta 29 Indian Appeals 104 referred to
It is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes 235 possession adverse and this animus possidendi must be evi denced and effectuated by the manner of occupancy which again depends upon the nature of the property
The manner of possession depends upon the kind of possession which the particular property is susceptible
That possession to the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be hostile and exclusive and will cover only to the extent of the owner s possession
246E F b
The title to the chawl as owner subject to the tenancy was an interest in immovable property so as to be covered by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 which specifically mentioned 
or any interest therein
246E In the instant case the parties have been fighting for the rent from the chawl so long as it continued in posses sion of the tenants
Before the gift of 1946 the Defendant No 1 was collecting the rent and he continued to do so even thereafter till 1952
The appellant has however estab lished her case that the Defendant No 1 acted as her agent after 1946 and when he repudiated this agency in 1952 he was effectively removed from the management of the chawl
Since 1946 the tenants attorned to the Defendant No 6 and paid rent to her under printed receipts announcing her ownership but of course through her agent the Defendant No 1
The fact that the tenants have been in actual physical posses sion of the chawl is in the circumstances of no assistance to the respondents
What is material is that they paid the rent to the Defendant No 6
Defendant No 6 was in adverse possession from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent Defendant No 1 and thereafter through her husband and son Defendant No 7 till 1960 when the suit was filed the total period being more than 12 years
246G H 248G Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju and another vs Josyula Hanumayamma and another and Hari Prasad Agarwalla and another vs Abdul Haw and others AIR 1951 Patna 160 referred to