minal Appeal No 126 of 1961
Appeal from the judgment and order dated May31961 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No 381 of 1960
O P Rana for the appellant
The respondent did not appear
April 25
The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J
Raja Kamlakar Singh of Shankargarh UP took a lease from the District Board Allahabad with respect to the realisation of bayai and bazaar dues on the sale of commodities in the bazaar of Shankargarh
Bachchoo Lal was his employee to collect these dues
On April 13 1959 Bahadur Singh  a peon of the Raja Sahib asked Shyam Lal Kurmi PW 2 who had sold two bullock load of linseed to Mewa Lal respondent 2 in that 360 bazaar to accompany him to the Munim in order to pay the bayai dues there
Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay those dues
The peon however took Shyam Lal to Bachchoo Lal appellant at the grain godown
Mewa Lal armed with a lathi came there and on Bachchoo Lal s asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the dues filthily abused him and threatened to break his hand and feet and kill him
Bachchoo Lal thereafter instituted a complaint against Mewa Lal on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate for prosecuting Mewa Lal for an offence under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act 1922 UP Act No X of 1922 hereinafter called the Act
The trial Magistrate the II Class Tashildar Magistrate of Karchana convicted Mewa Lal of the offences under sections 504 and 506 IPC and also of an offence under section 107 of the Act
On appeal the Sessions Judge Allahabad acquitted Mewa Lal holding that proper authority in favour of Bachchoo Lal for prosecuting Mewa La under section 10 7 of the Act had not been proved that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try an offence under section 506 Part II IPC which was triable by a Magistrate of the I Class and that the prosecution case under section 504 IPC was suspicious
Bachchoo lal filed an appeal against the acquittal of Mewa Lal after obtaining the permission of the High Court under sub section
3 of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter called the Code
The High Court dismissed the appeal repelling the contentions for the appellant to the effect that the appellant being the complainant and therefore a party to the criminal case against Mewa Lal ought to have been given notice of the appeal by the Sessions judge and also ought to have been given an opportunity to be heard and that such notice and opportunity of hearing were necessary on the principles of natural justice and in view of the fact that section 417 3 of the Code conferred a 361 substantive right of appeal on the complainant
The High Court further held that though the Sessions judge was wrong in holding that the sanction required by section 182 of the Act had not been proved the sanction was in the name of Raja Sahib of Shankargarh and not of Bachchoo Lal and therefore the complaint was not a valid complaint and that the Raja Sahib could not collect Tah Bazari through his agents
It also held that the acquittal of the accused of the offence under section 506 IPC was justified and that the acquittal of the offence under section 504 IPC could not be said to be erroneous and that in any case the matter was too petty for interfering with an order of acquittal even if it had taken a different view of facts from the one taken by the Sessions judge
The High Court accordingly dismissed the appeal
Bachchoo La has preferred this appeal after obtaining the requisite certificate from the High Court under article 134 I c of the Constitution
The State of UP is the first respondent and Mewa Lal the accused is respondent No 2
Three questions have been raised on behalf of the appellant
One is that the Assistant Sessions judge ought to have issued a notice of the hearing of the appeal to the appellant on whose complaint Mewa Lal was convicted by the Magistrate and against which order of conviction he had filed an appeal
No such notice was issued to him and therefore the order of the Assistant Sessions Judge acquitting Mewa Lal was not a good order  The second contention is that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja of Shankargarh could not collect the Tah Bazari dues through his agents
The third contention is that Bachchoo Lal had requisite sanction under section 182 of the Act for prosecuting Mewa La and therefore the finding to the contrary is wrong
362 The third contention is correct
The requisite authority under section 182 of the Act is in favour of not only the Raja of Shankargarh but also in favour of several of his employees including Bachchoo Lal the appellant
We need not express an opinion on the second contention as we do not know the terms of the lease executed by the District Board in favour of the Raja of Shankargarh and as we are not concerned with the civil rights with respect to the manner of collecting the dues which he could collect under the lease
We are however of opinion that section 107 does not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with the Board an offence
Section 107 of the Act reads Whoever obstructs or molests a person employed by or under contract with the Board under this Act in the performance of his duty or in the fulfilment of his contract or removes a mark set up for the purpose of indicating any levels or direction necessary to the execution of works authorised by this Act shall be liable on conviction to a fine which may extend to fifty rupees
 The section speaks of the obstruction or molestation of two classes of persons
One class of persons consists of persons employed by the District Board under the Act
The Raja of Shankargarh or Bachchoo Lal is not an employee of the District Board
The second class of persons consists of those who are under contract with the Board under the Act
Surely the person under contract with the Board is the Raja of Shankargarh and not Bachchoo Lal
Bachchoo Lal is only an employee of the Raja
363 We did not hear the learned counsel on the merits of the case under section 504 of the Code and accept the finding of the court 
below
In view of the considerations mentioned no interference is possible with the acquittal of the respondent No 2 on merits
It is therefore not necessary to decide the first question raised for the appellant
We accordingly dismiss the appeal


Summary:
One Raja Sahib took a lease from the District Board Allahabad
with respect to the realisation of bayai and bazar dues on the sale of commodities in the bazar
The appellant was his employee to collect these dues
A peon of Raja Sahib asked Shyam Lal PW 2 who had sold linseed to Mewa Lal respondent No 2 to come to the Munim and pay the beyai dues
Mewa Lal asked Shyam Lal not to pay those dues
The peon took Shyam Lal to the appellant
The respondent No 2 armed with a lathi came there and on appellant s asking him as to why he was creating obstruction in the realisation of the dues filthily abused him and threatened to kill him
The appellant thereafter on obtaining sanction of the District Magistrate instituted a complaint against Respondent No 2 for prosecuting him for an offence under section 107 of the United Provinces District Board Act
The trial Magistrate convicted him of the offences under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and also of an offence under section 107 of the Act
On appeal Sessions judge acquitted him of all the charges
Against acquittal the appellant filed an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed
On appeal by certificates three contentions were raised by the appellant in this Court i The order of the Sessions judge aquitting Mewa Lal was bad as no notice of hearing of the appeal was issued to the appellant on whose complaint the Magistrate convicted him ii The High Court was wrong in holding that the Raja could not collect the Tah Bazari dues through his agents and iii that the appellant had requisite sanction under section 182 of the Act for prosecuting Mewa Lal respondent No 2
Held that section 107 of the Act does not make obstruction or molestation of an employee of the person under contract with 359 the Board an offence
The section speaks of the obstruction or molestation of two classes of persons
One class consists of persons employed by the District Board under the Act
The Raja or the appellant is not an employee of the District Board
The second class consists of those persons who are under contract with the Board under the Act
Surely the person under contract with the Board is the Raja and not the appellant
The appellant is only an employee of the Raja
In view of these considerations the acquittal of the respondent No 2 could not be interfered with merits
The appeal therefore must be dismissed
The appeal was not heard on merits
If was considered not necessary to decide the first contention and the Court did not express any opinion on the second contention as the terms of the lease were not known
The third contention was held to be correct