Civil Appeal No 3677 of 1984
From the Judgment and Order dated 1751982 of the Delhi High Court in FA No 30 of 1975
PP Malhotra and NK Sharma for the Appellant
OP Goyal Ms Sunita Vasudeva and RC Verma for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA J
This appeal by special leave has been filed by the National Insurance Company Ltd New Delhi against a judgment of the Delhi High Court in an appeal under Section 110 D of the hereinafter referred to as the Act 
Necessary facts may be stated herein in a nutshell
Shri Jugal Kishore Respondent No 1 was on 15th June 1969 driving a threewheeler scooter when he met with an accident with bus No DLP 913 3699 driven by Shri Rai Singh Respondent No 2 and owned by Ms Delhi Janata Co operative Transport Society Limited Respondent No 3 He sustained injuries consequent upon which he made a claim for compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Delhi against Respondent Nos 2 and 3 and the appellant which was the insurer of the bus aforesaid
The claim of Respondent No 1 was contested by the appellant and also by Respondent No 3 but proceeded ex parte against Respondent No 2
The Tribunal awarded compensation in the sum of Rs10000 recoverable jointly and severally from the appellant and Respondent No 3
Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal Respondent No 1 preferred an appeal before the High Court of Delhi and asserted that the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal was inadequate
His appeal was allowed by the High Court and the award was modified
The High Court awarded a sum of Rs 100000 as compensation to Respondent No 1 with interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of institution of the claim till realisation with costs against the driver as well as the owner of the bus as also against the appellant Insurance Company
Before granting special leave this Court required the appellant to deposit Rs 100000 namely the amount of compensation awarded by the High Court and permitted Respondent No 1 to withdraw the same
Special leave was granted on 14th September 1984 by the following order of this Court
Under the orders of this Court the appellant has deposited Rs One lac which is the amount of compensation awarded to the claimants
The claimants have withdrawn the amount without furnishing security
Special leave granted on condition that in the event of reversal of the decision of the High Court the said amount shall not be refunded by the claimants
Stay of further execution of the award confirmed
 It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the statutory provision contained in this behalf in clause b of sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act as it stood on the date of accident namely 15th June 1969 which happens to be prior to 2nd March 1970 the date of commencement of Amending Act 56 of 1969 no award in excess of Rs20000 could have been made against the appellant
Before dealing with the submission we may point out that the policy under which the bus aforesaid was insured had not been 914 filed either before the Tribunal or before the High Court
A photostat copy of the policy has however been filed in this Court and learned counsel for the respondents did not have objection in the same being admitted in evidence
Clause b of sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time reads as under 95
1    2 Subject to the proviso to sub section 1 a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits namely a     b Where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward a limit of twenty thousand rupees and in respect of passengers a limit of twenty thousand rupees in all and four thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver or two thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver c   
On the plain language of the aforesaid clause b which applies to the instant case it is apparent that the liability of the appellant could not be in excess of Rs20000
Learned counsel for the respondents however urged that notwithstanding the provision contained in this behalf in clause b aforesaid it was open to the insurer to take a policy covering a higher risk than contemplated by the aforesaid clause b and consequently the said clause had to be read subject to the terms of the policy which was taken in the instant case
We find substance in this submission in view of the decision of this Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and others vs Ms Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co and another where it was held that the insurer can always take policies covering risks which are not covered by the re 915 quirements of Section 95 of the Act
We have accordingly perused the photostat copy of the policy to ascertain whether risk for any amount higher than the amount of Rs20000 contemplated by clause b aforesaid was covered
Our attention was invited by learned counsel for the respondents to the circumstance that at the right hand corner on the top of page 1 of the policy the words COMMERCIAL VEHICLE COMPREHENSIVE were printed
On this basis and on the basis that the premium paid was higher than the premium of an act only policy it was urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the liability of the appellant was unlimited and not confined to Rs20000 only
We find it difficult to accept this submission
Even though it is not permissible to use a vehicle unless it is covered at least under an act only policy it is not obligatory for the owner of a vehicle to get it comprehensively insured
In case however it is got comprehensively insured a higher premium than for an act only policy is payable depending on the estimated value of the vehicle
Such insurance entitles the owner to claim reimbursement of the entire amount of loss or damage suffered up to the estimated value of the vehicle calculated according to the rules and regulations framed in this behalf
Comprehensive insurance of the vehicle and payment of higher premium on this score however do not mean that the limit of the liability with regard to third party risk becomes unlimited or higher than the statutory liability fixed under sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act
For this purpose a specific agreement has to be arrived at between the owner and the insurance company and separate premium has to be paid on the amount of liability undertaken by the insurance company in this behalf
Likewise if risk of any other nature for instance with regard to the driver or passengers etc
in excess of statutory liability if any is sought to be covered it has to be clearly specified in the policy and separate premium paid therefor
This is the requirement of the tariff regulations framed for the purpose
Coming to the photostat copy of the policy in the instant case it would be seen that Section II thereof deals with liability to third parties
Sub section 1 minus the proviso thereto reads as hereunder 1
Subject to the Limits of Liability the Company will indemnify the insured against all sums including claimant s cost and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of i death or bodily injury to any person caused by or 916 arising out of the use including the loading andor unloading of the Motor Vehicle
ii damage to property caused by the use including the loading andor unloading of the Motor Vehicle
The Schedule to the policy indicates the limits of liability and the amount of premium paid
The limits of liability are indicated as hereinbelow Limits of Liability Limit of the amount of the Company s Such amount as is necessary liability under Section II 11 in to meet the requirements of respect of any one accidentthe Motor Vehicle Act 1939 Limit of the amount of the Company s liability under Section II 111 in respect of any one claim or series of claims arising out of one event Rs20000 The premium paid on the other hand is shown as below Premium Rs41500 Add 12 on IEV
Rs20000 Add for 53 Pass 9 of Rs250 Rs13250 Add for Driver  Conductor Rs1000 75750 A perusal of the policy therefore indicates that the liability undertaken with regard to the death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use including the loading and or un loading of the motor vehicle falling under Section II1i has been confined to such amount as is necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939
 This liability as is apparent from clause b of sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act was at the relevant time Rs20000 only
The details of the premium also indicate that no additional premium with regard to a case falling under Section II1i was paid by the owner of the vehicle to the insurance company
It is only the vehicle which was comprehensively insured the insured s estimate of value including accessories IEV thereof having been shown as Rs40000
In this view of the matter the submission made by learned 917 counsel for the respondents that the appellant had in the instant case undertaken an unlimited liability does not obviously have any substance
The liability under the policy in the instant case was the same as the statutory liability contemplated by clause b of sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act namely Rs20000
An award against the appellant could not therefore have been made in excess of the said statutory liability
Learned counsel for the appellant then urged relying on the decision of this Court in British India General Insurance Co Ltd vs Captain Itbar Singh and Others AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1331 that in view of the sub section 6 of Section 96 of the Act no insurer to whom the notice referred to in sub section 2 thereof has been given is entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment as is referred to in sub section 1 thereof otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub section 2
On this basis it was urged that the appellant was not entitled to assert that its liability was confined to Rs20000 only inasmuch as this is not one of the defences specified in sub section 2 of Section 96 of the Act
We find it difficult to agree with this submission either
Firstly in paragraph 12 of the report of this very case it has been held that sub section 2 of Section 96 in fact deals with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy
Secondly from the words to avoid his liability used in sub section 6 of Section 96 it is apparent that the restrictions placed with regard to defences available to the insurer specified in sub section 2 of Section 96 are applicable to a case where the insurer wants to avoid his liability
In the instant case the appellant is not seeking to avoid its liability but wants a determination of the extent of its liability which is to be determined in the absence of any contract to the contrary in accordance with the statutory provisions contained in this bahalf in clause b of sub section 2 of Section 95 of the Act
In the instant case since as seen above the appellant did not undertake in the policy any liability in excess of the statutory liability the award against it could be only in accordance with the said statutory liability
Before parting with the case we consider it necessary to refer to the attitude often adopted by the Insurance Companies as was adopted even in this case of not filing a copy of the policy before the Tribunal and even before the High Court in appeal
In this connection what is of significance is that the claimants for compensation under the Act are invariably not possessed of either the policy or a copy thereof
This Court has consistently emphasised that it is the duty of the party 918 which is in possession of a document which would be helpful in doing justice in the cause to produce the said document and such party should not be permitted to take shelter behind the abstract doctrine of burden of proof
This duty is greater in the case of instrumentalities of the State such as the appellant who are under an obligation to act fairly
In many cases even the owner of the vehicle for reasons known to him does not choose to produce the policy or a copy thereof
We accordingly wish to emphasise that in all such cases where the Insurance Company concerned wishes to take a defence in a claim petition that its liability is not in excess of the statutory liability it should file a copy of the insurance policy along with its defence
Even in the instant case had it been done so at the appropriate stage necessity of approaching this Court in Civil Appeal would in all probability have been avoided
Filing a copy of the policy therefore not only cuts short avoidable litigation but also helps the Court in doing justice between the parties
The obligation on the part of the State or its instrumentalities to act fairly can never be over emphasised
In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed to this extent that the liability of the appellant is fixed at Rs20000 together with interest as allowed by the High Court
In view of the order of this Court dated 14th September 1984 quoted above however it is held that even if the total liability of the appellant falls short of Rs100000 it shall not be entitled to any refund out of the sum of Rs100000 which was deposited by it and withdrawn by the claimant respondent in pursuance of the said order
The decree of the High Court as against the driver and the owner of the vehicle namely Respondents 2 and 3 is however maintained and all sums in excess of Rs100000 which has already been withdrawn by the claimant respondent as aforesaid shall be recoverable by him from Respondents 2 and 3 only
There shall be no order as to costs
RSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
 These appeals together with a petition for special leave raised a common question of law whether against an order of a District Court in revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings Lease  Rent Control Act 2 of 1965 a further revision would lie to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Though the question was not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai  the matters were listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal s case above said and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hegde vs G Venkatesha Bhatt  Ors   and whether the view taken in the earlier case required reconsideration
Aundal Ammal s case arose under the Kerala Act afore mentioned and the Shyamaraju Hegde s case was under the karnataka Rent Control Act and there were essential differences between the two Acts
The scope and effect of section 201 read with section 185 of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary AIR 1969 Kerala 103 which held that a decision of a District Court under section 20 of the Kerala Act was undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
The question decided by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above mentioned came to be considered by this Court a Bench of two Hon Judges in Aundal Ammal s case supra and the Court held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed s case supra could not be approved because the High Court had not properly construed the sections 185 872 and 20 of the Kerala Act and was in error
So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned this Court held in Shyamaraju Hegde s case supra that an order of a District Judge under section 502 though it conferred finality under the Act was nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by revision under section 115 CPC by the aggrieved party
What fell for consideration in the present cases was whether there was any conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal s case supra and Shyamaraju Hegde s case supra and whether the ratio in the former case required reconsideration
Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special Leave the Court  HELD Per Sabyasachi Mukharji  section Natarajan JJ
After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail the Court concluded that there was really no conflict between the two decisions of this Court in Aundal Ammal s case supra and Shyamaraju Hegde s case supra because the provisions in the two Acts were materially different
As to the question whether a fresh thinking was called for on the scope of section 20 read with section 185 of the Kerala Act the Court did not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in the Aundal Ammal s case on the contrary the renewed discussion by the Court of the matter called for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal s case
889C D The Court was unable to conntenance in the circumstances of the case the argument advanced that since the decision of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary aforementioned had been a good law for a number of years in the Kerala State and since the High Court had been entertaining revision petitions under section 115 CPC against the revisional orders of the District Courts under sections 201 of the Kerala Act the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court and the reason therefore the Court observed could be set out by referring to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein in West Ham Union vs Edmonten Union 13 at 4 Robinson Brothers Brewers Ltd vs Hongton V Chester ie Street Assessment Committee 12  affirmed in These decisions had been followed in Brownsee Haven Proper 873 ties Ltd vs Poole Corporation On similar lines this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed vs Mary supra as the decision suffered from miscontruction of the relevant sections in the Act and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad       890A C In the light of the conclusion of the Court all the appeals succeeded in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under section 115 CPC was concerned
In Civil Appeals Nos
626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985 the High Court allowed the revision petitions under section 115 CPC and ordered the eviction of the tenants
In Civil Appeal No 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order of eviction
In the Civil Appeal No 1619 of 1986 the District Judge allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court confirmed the said order in revisions
In the Civil Appeal No 7505 of 1983 the District Judge reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellant Authority and ordered eviction and the High Court confirmed the order of the District Judge
In the petition for special leave listed with the appeals the Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under section 113 of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Controller for deciding the question whether the tenant was entitled to resist the claim for eviction
The District Court and the High Court confirmed the order of remand890D G In accordance with the pronouncement of the Court the order of the High Court under section 115 CPC in each of the appeals above mentioned was set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case restored to become operative
The appeals were directed only against the orders of the High Court passed in revision and they were disposed of with the pronouncement of the Court on the above lines
890G H 891A In the petition for special leave also the order of the High Court under section 115 CPC was not sustainable but even so the Court did not find any merit in the petition because the finding of the Appellate Authority and the order of remand passed by it had been confirmed by the District Court and as such there were no merits in the petition
891B 874 Per section Ranganathan J dissenting While a number of enactments of various States on rent control confer specific jurisdiction on the State High Courts some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments
Though the Court was concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these matters a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other States as well891C D The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders
The question in these matters was whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 CPC could be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge
This question was answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai 1987 1 SCC 133 a decision under the Kerala Act but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde vs Venkatesha Bhat  a decision under the Karnataka Act and hence this reference to a larger Bench891E F Normally a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the CPC against any order of the District JudgeCourt
The fact that the order might have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contained expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District JudgeCourt or a subordinate authority or Court had been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction
This was the effect of the decisions in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation Indore  and Krishandas Bhatija vs Venkatachala Shetty SLP No 913 of 1978 decided on 1321978 and Shyamaraju s case supra which were direct decisions under the Karnataka Act
In the opinion of his Lordship there was no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also
891G H 892A B Under the Karnataka Act after its amendments in 1975 the rent control matters are decided in the first instance by the District Munsiff or the Civil JudgeRent Controller
There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision
This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the District Court
The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the Civil JudgeRent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff
Section 502 specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final
The Kerala pattern is the same except that section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller 875 to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank
Section 20 provides for revision
The revisional power is to be exercised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the subordinate Judge and the High Court in other cases
Section 20 does not provide as does section 50 of the Karnataka Act that the decision of the District Judge would be final
The much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the CPC as had been held in the two cases referred to above and it was difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act
892C H This led to the question of a choice between the two views of this Court one in Shyamaraju and the other in Aundal Ammal
Shyamaraju followed the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation Indore AIR 1977 SC 1955 and Krishnadas Bhatija vs AS Venkatachala Shetty SLP Civil No 913 of 1978 decided on February 13 1978
The only other decision of this Court having relevance in the present context was Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad   relied upon in Aundal Ammal
His Lordship was in agreement with the view in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally statutory context
That decision turned largely on legislative history of section 115 of the CPC and section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh
His Lordship was therefore inclined to lean in favour of the view that had commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court had a power of revision over the order of the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well
The result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court in the Rent Control matters and this as the two Acts were in pari materia according to his Lordship s view would leave the litigant in Karnataka only a right of revision to the District Court
It was doubtful whether in the absence of clear language the Legislature could be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important Branch of law
The provisions did not and could not in his Lordship s view preclude the applicability of section 115 of the CPC to an order passed by the District Court not as a persona designata but as a civil court of the land
Section 18 and 20 had a vital role to pay but their effect was not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115
893A F 894B C As a result of the various decisions of the Courts the position had been that right through in the State of Karnataka and for at least a 876 period of 20 years in the State of Kerala the prevalent view had been in favour of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court
In a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication was quite clear to the contrary
894F The revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable894G Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai 1987 1 SCC 133 Shyamaraju Hegde vs G Venkatesha Bhatt  Ors
   Balagangadhara Menon vs TV Peter 1984 KLT 845 Vareed vs Mary AIR 1969 103 Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad  Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar  Ors ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation Indore   Krishnadas Bhatija vs AS Venkatachala Shetty SLP Civil No 913 of 1978 decided on February 13 1978 MM Yaragatti vs Vasant  Ors AIR 1987 Karnataka 186 SS Khanna vs FJ Dillon AIR 1954 SC 497 West Ham Union vs Domonton Union 13 at 4 Robinson Brothers Brewers Ltd vs Honghton  Chester_ie_Street Assessment Committee 12 and and Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd vs Poole Corporation referred to