Criminal Appeal No 385 of 1988
D From the Judgment and order dated 1481987 of the Guwahati High Court in Criminal Revision No 303 of 1986
R Ramachandran for the Appellant
B Datta Additional Solicitor General Kitty Kumar Marylar and Ms A Subhashini for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
Special leave granted
The appeal is disposed of by the order passed herein
On 20th of November 1976 the appellant was posted in the State of Arunachal Pradesh as an Executive Engineer Elect
An accident took place in the jeep which was alleged to have been driven by the appellant
The accident took place within the Bomdila Police Station in Arunachal Pradesh
In the said accident one of the occupants JK Jain Assistant Engineer Elect died and another section Karim driver sustained grievous injuries
According to the police the accident is attributable to rash and negligent driving of the appellant
As per the case file Shri RB Singh Sub Inspector submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner Bomdila on 22nd November 1976 who H 480 according to the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under section 32c of Regulation I of 1945 and the police registered the case
The learned Magistrate held that cognizance was taken on 22nd November 1976
This finding however was not sustained by the High Court
The police is alleged to have registered the case and took up investigations and submitted the chargesheet in September 1977 which however appears to have been placed before the Deputy Commissioner on 31st March 1986 and it was on that date that the cognizance of the offence was taken according to the High Court
The learned Magistrate in his order stated that the reason why report could not be placed before the Court promptly merited detailed probing which showed that cognizance was taken on 22nd November 1976 by the competent authority but the court proceedings thereof commenced on 31st March 1986
The appellant was chargesheeted under section 279 read with section 304A338 of the Indian Penal Code
According to the appellant cognizance was only taken on 31st March 1986
The first question therefore in this case is when was the cognizance taken
By the order of the learned Magistrate the appellant was directed to appear on the next date of hearing that is on 8th September 1986
The order was passed on 14th July 1986
Challenging the said order the appellant moved the High Court of Gauhati under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing the charges framed by the Magistrate 1st Class Bomdila
The High Court in its judgment and order dated 14th August 1987 held that the investigation started on 22nd November 1976 on the registration of the case under sections 279 304A and 338 of the IPC and the investigation was completed on 8th September 1977 and cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986 when the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order Records perused
Issue summons to the accused to appear at Kameng on 9th May 1986
 Therefore the first question that arises is when was the cognizance taken on 22nd November 1976 or 31st March 1986
The High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March 1986
The offence under section 279 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or with fine or with both
Offence under section 304A is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or with fine or with both
Offence under section 338 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years
Or with fine or with both
In the aforesaid view of the matter the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offences would be three years
Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows 481 468
Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation 1 Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub section 2 after the expiry of the period of limitation
2 The period of limitation shall be a six months if the offences is punishable with fine only b one year if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year c three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years
 There is however a provision for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases where on the facts and circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary in the interest of justice to do so
This is provided in section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the following terms 473 Extention of period of limitation in certain cases Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice
 It was contended before us that the first question that arises in this appeal is when the cognizance of the offence was taken in this case
This Court in Tula Ram and others vs Kishore Singh  explained the meaning of the words taking cognizance and held that it means judicial application of mind of the magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action
In this connection reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Bhagwant Singh vs Commissioner of Police and another  It was held by this Court as follows 482 Now when the report forwarded by the officer in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub section 2i of section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate one of two different situations may arise
The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case the Magistrate may do one of three things1 he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or 2 he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or 3 he may direct further investigation under sub section 3 of section 156 and require the police to make a further report
The report may on the other hand state that in the opinion of the police no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses 1 he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or 2 he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further take cognizance of the offence and issue process or 3 he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub section 3 of section l56
       
But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose wholly or in part
    
There can therefore be no doubt that when on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub section 2i of section 173 the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process the informant must by given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process
 The High Court was of the view that really cognizance in this case was taken on 31st March 1986
The High Court has set out the facts on which it is relied
The said finding of the High Court has not 483 been challenged
The appellant in this case before this Court has proceeded on that basis
Shri B Datta Additional Solicitor General contended that cognizance was taken as early as in September 1977
It was contended before us on behalf of the appellant as it was said before the High Court that if the cognizance was taken in 1986 then it was clearly beyond the time
If the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied the laking of cognizance of the offence was barred by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
It was submitted before the High Court of Gauhati and reiterated before us that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh
In this connection reliance was placed on section 32 of the Assam Frontier Administration of Justice Regulation 1945
Section 32 of the Regulation provides that the High Court the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner shall be guided in regard to procedure by the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as these are applicable to the circumstances of the District and consistent with the provisions of the Regultion
There are exceptions to section 32
Those exceptions are irrelevant for the present purpose
The High Court held and in our opinion rightly that section 32 of the said Regulation should be guided by the spirit of the Code and it will be proper to throw out a complaint if there was inordinate or undue delay which was not explained
Indeed this Court in State of Punjab vs Sarwan Singh 1981 3 SCR 349 observed at page 351 of the report that the object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence
This Court reiterated that the object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution
Shri Raju Ramachandran submitted that the exercise of the power under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code extending the period of limitation by condoning the delay in launching the prosecution should precede the taking of cognizance of the offence
Reliance was placed on the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Kathamuthu vs Balammal It was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ghansham Dass vs Sham Sundar Lal that cognizance taken by the Magistrate without deciding the point in limitation was beyond his jurisdiction
In this connection reliance may be placed to the decision of this Court in Surinder Mohan Vikal vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra 1978 484 2 SCC 403 where at page 407 of the report while dealing with the provisions of section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court observed that it is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them
For instance they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment
They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor
As has been stated a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case
Our attention was also drawn to the case of Vijay Kumar Agarwalla vs State of Assam  where the Court held that taking of cognizance without condoning delay was bad and without jurisdiction
The High Court in the instant judgment under appeal held that this aspect of the matter was not considered by the Magistrate and the High Court quashed the charges against the appellant and remitted the case to the Magistrate for considering the case afresh
In the instant case the broad facts that emerge are that the alleged offence took place in November 1976 and until the High Court s order in August 1987 no investigation had taken place
The offence is of rash and negligent driving
It is as such neither a grave and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such though all criminal offences are crimes against society
It is not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to decide whether cognizance was properly taken
It is also not necessary to decide whether the extension of period of limitation under section 473 must precede or taking of the cognizance of the offence
It 1 is also not necessary to decide whether cognizance in this case was taken on 8th September 1977 as held by the learned Magistrate or on 31st March 1986 as held by the High Court
Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the respondent 912 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving is too long a time
Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution
Keeping a person in suspended animation for 912 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law
In that view of the matter it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further
We do so accordingly
485 In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the A proceedings cannot be proceeded any further
We allow the appeal set aside the order of the High Court of Gauhati
dated 14th August 1987 and quash the proceedings against the appellant
The proceedings against the appellant are hereby quashed
GN Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant engaged as C  Grade Fitters in a Central Government Undertaking filed applications under section 33 C2 of the for computation of wages payable to them for certain periods
Their case before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court was that since they were doing the same duties which were performed by a B  Grade Fitter they were entitled to claim wages payable to B  Grade Fitters
The Management contended that since the principal question involved in all the applications related to re classification of the workmen concerned a relief which could not be claimed under section 33 C2 of the Act these were not maintainable
The Tribunal rejected the applications by a common order
In this appeal by special leave it was contended for the workmen that they should be classified as B  Grade Fitters even though they had been appointed as C  Grade Fitters because they had been performing the duties which were similar to the duties of B  Grade Fitters
Dismissing the appeal  HELD11 A workman cannot put forward a claim in an application filed under section 33 C2 of the in respect of the relief which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an industrial dispute requiring a reference under section 10 of the Act
475C D 12 By merely doing the same kind of work which is done by a senior grade workman a junior grade workman will not be entitled to claim the wages of senior grade unless he is duly promoted
Such a workman cannot complain that he is not being paid the salary and allowances due to a senior grade workman since he does not possess an 472 existing right to claim it
If on an adjudication made on the said question on a reference made under section 101 of the Act it is held that he should be deemed to be a member of the senior cadre then only he would be able to claim the salary and allowances payable to senior grade workmen
474G H475A B Central Rank of India Ltd vs PS
Rajagopalan etc
   State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Khandelwal RL
1968 I LLJ 589 and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Gopal Sahal Pareek
1968 1 LLJ 593 referred to
R B Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co Ltd vs Labour Court Nagpur  Ors  and VM Vankar Macwana vs Indian Farmers Fertilizer 1984 Lab
IC 1342 distinguished
13 In the instant case the appellants had been employed as C  Grade Fitters and in order to get the salary and allowances payable to B  Grade Fitters they had to be promoted to the cadre of B  Grade Fitters on their passing certain trade tests
They had not been so promoted
The claim of the appellants therefore is not tenable
473D E 2
It is open to the workmen if they are so advised to seek a reference of the question whether they are entitled to be treated as B  grade Fitter Under section 10 of the Act
476E