Civil Appeal No 236 of 1969
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 2425th August 1967 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No 58563
section K Dholakia and R C Bhatia for the Appellant
1026 P Ram Reddy Amicus Curiae for Respondent No 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA J
The appellant is the Gujarat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd hereafter referred to as the Bank
It is a Society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 as applicable to the erstwhile State of Saurashtra
According to the appellant s writ petition it is doing banking business
It has 127 Branches spread all over the State of Gujarat
One of its Branches is in Dasada Surendranagar District
The Head Office of the Bank is at Ahmedabad
The second respondent Babu Bhai Negracha was serving as an Additional Supervisor in the Dasada Branch of the Bank
His services were terminated by an order dated February 21 1962 by giving him one month s pay in lieu of notice under Staff Regulation No 15
The Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act 1961 came into force from May 1 1962 and the appellant Bank being a Society under the Cooperative Societies Act came to be governed by the said Act
By Notification No BIR 1362 5 H dated March 2 1963 published in the Gujarat Gazette in March 1963 the Government of Gujarat directed under Section 24 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 Bombay Act 11 of 1947 that all the provisions of the said Act shall apply with effect from March 15 1963 to the business of banking by Cooperative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutch areas of the State registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act 1961
Aggrieved by the termination of his service the second respondent approached the appellant s Dasada s Branch by a letter dated August 20 1962 stating that since his services were terminated illegally by way of victimisation he should be reinstated in the service
Thereafter the second respondent filed an application in the Labour Court at Rajkot alleging that his service had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of his trade union activities
He prayed for setting aside the order of his termination of service and for reinstatement with full back wages
The Bank filed a written statement raising a preliminary objection that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 under which the application was made by the respondent was not applicable to its case as it was a Cooperative Society governed by the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act under which only the Registrar or his nominee 1027 had jurisdiction to decide the dispute and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application of the second respondent
By its Order dated June 11 1963 the Labour Court overruled this objection and held that it had jurisdiction to hear the application
The Bank then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court to challenge the Order of the Labour Court
The High Court by a common judgment dated August 25 1967 dismissed the writ petition but in view of the importance of the question of law involved granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court
On the strength of that certificate the Bank has come in appeal before us against the aforesaid judgment of the High Court
In this Court on January 22 1969 the Bank made an application for leave to urge as additional ground namely that the Bank is not doing banking business ie accepting for the purpose of lending or investment of deposits of money from the public repayable on demand or otherwise and withdrawable by cheque draft order or otherwise as defined in Section 5 Clauses b and c of the Banking Companies Act 1949 and that this being the true position the Notification No DIR 1362 IV H dated March 2 1963 published in the Gujarat Government Gazette dated March 7 1963 under Section 24 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 Bombay Act XI of 1947 is not applicable to the appellant
This application was strenuously opposed by Shri Ram Reddy who is assisting the Court as amicus curiae on behalf of respondent 2 who has not been able to appear and defend himself in this appeal
We have declined permission to raise this new plea for the first time in this Court for these reasons i It is much too belated ii It stands in direct contradiction to the position taken by the appellant in its writ petition and the affidavit in support thereof filed in the High Court
Therein the appellant had categorically pleaded The petitioner is a Society registered under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 Bombay Act VII of 1925 and is engaged in the business of banking iii It is not a purely legal plea but a mixed plea of law and fact and cannot be determined on the basis of material already on the record
We therefore take it that the appellant is a Cooperative Society engaged in the business of banking and as such the Bombay Industrial 1028 Relations Act 1946 is applicable to it by virtue of the aforesaid Notification dated March 2 1963 issued by the State Government under Section 24 of that Act
The arguments of Mr Dholakia appearing for the appellant may be summarised as follows i The case is governed by the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act 1961 hereafter called the Act of 1961 and not by the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 hereafter referred to as the Act of 1925
ii The phrase any dispute touching the business of the Society particularly the word touching therein is of very wide amplitude
It would comprehend any matter which relates to or concerns or affects the business of the Society
Every society ex necessitiate employs some servants for the purpose of carrying on its business
That being so the payment of wages appointment and removal of its servants under law is a part of the business or touches the business of the Society
Reliance for this argument has been placed on Farkhundali Naunhay vs V B Potdar 1
iii Even if contention ii is not accepted the dispute raised by the respondent Babu Bhai Negracha is one touching the management of the Society
The expression management  takes in the entire staff or establishment of servants which run the affairs of the Society
iv Once it is held that the dispute between the Society and its past servant Babu Bhai Negracha touches the business or the management of the Society or both within the meaning of Section 96 the Registrar or his nominee alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such dispute by compulsory arbitration and the non obstante clause in the Section shall bar the determination of that dispute by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
As against the above Mr Rama Reddy amicus curiae submitted as under i Since the services of the second respondent were terminated on February 21 1962 before the Act of 1961 came into force the Act relevant for this discussion is the Act of 1925
ii Irrespective of whether the Act of 1925 or the Act of 1961 governs the appellant Society the expression any dispute commonly occurring in Section 54 of the Act of 1925 and Section 96 of the 1029 Act of 1961 is restricted in its scope to a dispute of a civil nature which is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee and does not take in an industrial dispute between the Society and its workmen which under the BIR Act is triable by the Labour CourtIndustrial Tribunals only
iii BIR Act is a special law dealing with the special subject of industrial disputes which in their nature are essentially different from ordinary Civil disputes between an employer and his employee governed by the Law of Contract BIR Act provides for a special machinery for adjudication of industrial disputes
As against this the Cooperative Societies Act of 1925or of 1961 is a general enactment and it must yield to the BIR Act whenever the provisions of the latter by their language are clearly applicable to a dispute
Reference has been made to Jullundur Transport Cooperative Society Ltd vs Punjab State1
iv The scope of the expression any dispute touching the business of the Society occurring in Section 54 of the Act of 1925or Section 96 of the Act of 1961 is limited to disputes directly relating to the actual trading or commercial activities of the Society
This expression does not take in a dispute between the Society and its employee relating to the conditions of his employment which will include the termination of his employment
This point is concluded by the decision of this Court in Cooperative Central Bank Ltd vs Additional Industrial Tribunal Hyderabad2 which follows the ratio of its earlier decision in Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd vs Dalichand Jungraj Jain3
In view of these decisions the ratio of Farkhundali s case ibid decided by the Bombay High Court is no longer good law
v The expression management in Section 96 of the Act of 1961 means the Board of Directors or the Board of Trustees or the Managing Committee or Executive Body which has the overall control of the affairs and business of the Society and it does not include the individual workers or employees individual workmen or employees of the Society who carry on the day to day administration of the Society nor will it take in matters touching the service conditions of the servants of the Society such as their appointment to service or their discharge removal from service and their wages
A dispute of the kind raised by the second respondent therefore 1030 will not fall within the purview of the phrase any dispute touching the management of the Society used in Section 96
Before appreciating the contentions canvassed on both sides it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Act of 1925 and the Act of 1961
The relevant part of Section 54 of the Act of 1925 reads thus 1 a If any dispute touching the constitution or business of Society arises between members or past members of the Society or persons claiming through a member or a past member or between members or past members or persons so claiming and any officer agent or servant of the Society or its Committee and any officer agent member or servant of the Society past or present it shall be referred to the Registrar for decision by himself or his nominee  The corresponding Section 96 of the Act of 1961 lays down 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution management or business of a Society shall be referred in the prescribed form if the parties thereto are from amongst the following a a Society its Committee any past Committee any past or present officer any past or present agent any past or present servant or nominee heir or legal representative of any deceased officer deceased agent or deceased servant of the Society or the Liquidator of the Society  A comparison between the portions of the two Sections extracted above brings out two points of difference
Firstly in Section 54 there is no non obstante clause while Section 961 begins with the words Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force
Secondly while in Section 54 the word management  does not occur in the corresponding Section 961 of the 1961 Act the word management  has been inserted in between the words constitution  and business 
It is significant to note that the phrase any dispute touching the constitution or business of the Society is a common feature of both the aforesaid Sections
We emphasise this fact because it is this common feature rather than the points of difference between the two Sections that holds the key to a correct solution of the problem before us
1031 From a conspectus of the decisions cited at the Bar we may devise two broad tests to determine the points in controversy in the instant case
First whether the expression any dispute spoken of in Section 54 of the Act of 1925 and Section 96 of the Act of 1961 is one which is capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee under the relevant Cooperative Societies Act Second whether a dispute raised by a servant against his employer the Cooperative Society for setting aside his removal from service on the ground that it was an act of victimisation and for reinstatement in service with back wages is one touching the management or business of the Society within the contemplation of the said provisions As regards the first test it is to be noted that the expression any dispute has not been defined in the Acts of 1925 and 1961
The term dispute means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects
It postulates the assertion of a claim by one party and its denial by the other
The word any prefixed to dispute may at first glance appear to give the expression any dispute a very wide amplitude covering all classes of disputes whatever be their nature
But the context of these provisions the object and scheme of the Acts of 19251961 show that the Legislatures never intended to give such a wide scope to this expression
The related provisions and the scheme of the Acts unerringly indicate that the expression any dispute has been used in a narrower sense limited to contested claims of a civil nature which could have been decided by civil or revenue courts but for the provisions with regard to compulsory arbitration by the Registrar or his nominee found in Section 54 of the Act of 192596 of the Act of 1961
The first indication of this being the right construction is discernible in sub section 2 of Section 96 which states that when any question arises whether for the purposes of sub section 1 a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not the question shall be considered by the Registrar whose decision shall be final
This means it is incumbent on the Registrar to decide as a preliminary issue whether the dispute is of a kind under sub section 1 of Section 96 falling within his jurisdiction
If this preliminary issue is found in the negative he will have no further jurisdiction to deal with the matter
A further clue to the interpretation of any dispute used in Section 961 is available in Section 971 which prescribes periods of limitation for disputes of the kind specified in its clauses a and b referred to the Registrar under Section 96
Sub section 2 of Section 97 which is in the nature of a residuary provision states that the period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub section 1 which are required to be referred to the 1032 Registrar under Section 96 shall be regulated by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar as Civil Court
The last clause of sub section 2 which has been underlined unmistakably shows that only disputes of a civil nature which could be the subject of civil suits triable by ordinary civil courts will fall within the scope of the expression any dispute used in Section 961
Another definite pointer to the above being the right construction of any dispute is available in sub section 3 of Section 98 which provides Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 96 the Registrar may if he thinks fit suspend proceedings in regard to any dispute if the question at issue between a society and a claimant or between different claimants is one involving complicated question of law or fact until the question has been tried by a regular suit instituted by one of the parties or by the society
If any such suit is not instituted within two months from the Registrar s order suspending proceedings the Registrar shall take action as is provided in sub section 1
 It is noteworthy that this sub section is substantially in the same terms as the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 54 of the Act of 1925 extracted earlier
The proviso to sub section 1 of Section 54 of the Act of 1925 corresponding to sub section 3 of Section 98 of the Act of 1961 unmistakably shows that the compulsory arbitration by the Registrar on a reference under Section 96 only a substitute for adjudication of disputes of a civil nature normally tried by civil courts
Further indication regarding the nature of disputes which the Registrar may determine is furnished by Section 1661 which provides 1661
Bar of jurisdiction of Courts  Save as expressly provided in this Act no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of a   b any dispute required to be referred to the Registrar or his nominee or board of nominees for decision
 It will be seen that Section 166 in terms bars the jurisdiction only of Civil or Revenue Court and not of the Labour Court or any 1033 Industrial Tribunal constituted under the BIR Act or Industrial Disputes Act to adjudicate industrial disputes
It is clear that the Legislature never intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to determine claims and industrial disputes which cannot be adjudicated by the ordinary Civil Courts
Now let us turn to the nature of the dispute raised by the second respondent
Is it a dispute relating to a right which he could establish by filing a suit in a Civil Court assuming for the moment that nothing in the relevant Cooperative Societies Act is a bar to such a suit
The answer must be in the negative
The respondent is not claiming a civil right arising from the contract of employment with the appellant Bank
What he is claiming is not enforcement of any term of the contract of his employment on the part of his employer
He is alleging that his services have been terminated unfairly and vindictively because of his legitimate trade union activities as an act of victimisation
The relief claimed by him is of reinstatement in service with back wages
The rights and reliefs which he is claiming could not be determined and granted by a Civil Court in a suit
As Luding Teller puts it a Court of Law proceeds on the footing that no power exists in the Courts to make contracts for people and the parties must make their own contracts
The Courts reach their limit of power when they enforce contracts which the parties had made Quoted with approval in Rohtas Industries Ltd vs Brijnandan Pandey1 The rights claimed by the second respondent are those which are conferred on workmen and employees under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act to ensure social justice
Such rights which do not stem from the contract of employment can be enforced only in the Labour Court constituted under the BIR Act
The Labour Court is competent to grant the relief of reinstatement claimed by the respondent while in view of Section 21b of the Specific Relief Act then in force the Civil Court was not competent to grant that relief
The dispute was raised by the second respondent by writing an approach letter to his employer the appellant as required by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
In substance it was an industrial dispute
It was not restricted to a claim under the contract or agreement of employment
The Civil Court cannot grant the reliefs claimed by the second respondent
As rightly submitted by Mr Rama Reddy if a Court is incapable of granting the relief claimed normally the proper construction would be that it is incompetent to deal with the matter
1034 The matter can be looked at from another angle also
The law of industrial disputes or industrial relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it
As against this the provision in Section 54 of the Act of 1925Section 96 of the Act of 1961 is a general provision
In accordance with the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant therefore nothing in these general provisions can derogate from BIR Act and the Cooperative Society Act must yield to the special provisions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act whenever a dispute clearly comes within the language of the latter Act
In the light of the above discussion the conclusion is inescapable that the expression any dispute referred to in Section 54 of the 1925 ActSection 96 of the 1961 Act does not cover a dispute of the kind raised by respondent 2 against the appellant Bank
Coming now to the second test it may be observed that to a part of it the pronouncement of this Court in Cooperative Central Bank Ltd vs Additional Industrial Tribunal Hyderabad ibid furnishes a complete answer wherein the interpretation of this very phrase touching the business of the Society occurring in Section 61 of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act 1964 which largely corresponds to Section 96 of the Gujarat Act 1961 came up for interpretation
The subject matter of the dispute was divided into three issues
The first issue comprised a number of service conditions including inter alia salary scales and adjustment or dearness allowance conveyance charges provident fund and gratuity etc
It was contended on behalf of the Bank that the effect of Section 61 and other provisions of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act was to exclude the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to deal with such disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act
After noticing a number of decisions and after referring to the previous decision of this Court in Deccan Cooperative Bank the Court negatived the contention with these observations The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute
The Registrar it is clear from the provisions of the Act could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself
The word business is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other 1035 similar business activity of the society and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects such as laying down the conditions of service of its employee can be said to be a part of its business it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of the society
Thus it is clear that in respect of the dispute regarding the alteration of various conditions of service the Registrar or other person dealing with it under Section 62 of the Act is not competent to grant the relief claimed by the workmen at all
On the principle laid down by this Court in the case of the Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd Civil Appeal No 358 of 1967 dated 29 8 68 supra therefore it must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of Section 61 of the Act
Such a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under Section 62 of the Act and must therefore be held to be outside the scope of Section 61
 The observations quoted above negate contention ii advanced by Mr Dholakia
It however remains to be considered whether the dispute raised by the second respondent in the present case comes within the purview of the expression touching the management of the Society used in Section 96c of the Act of 1961
In this connection it may be noticed that just as in Section 961 in Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Corporation Societies  Act 1964 also which came up for consideration in Cooperative Central Banks  case before this Court the term management does occur in the collocation of words constitution management or business
But no specific argument seems to have been then raised that a dispute between the Society and its former servants relating to the conditions of service comes within the purview of the expression touching the management of the Society 
Perhaps it was taken for granted that if the dispute was not comprehended by the expression business of the Society it would not be covered by the words management of the Society either
Although there is little discussion in the judgment about the ambit and import of the expression management yet in conclusion it was clearly and emphatically held 1036 that the dispute in that case was outside the scope of Section 61
 We will now focus attention on the expression management of the Society used in Section 961 of the Act of 1961
Grammatically one meaning of the term management  is the Board of Directors  or the apex body  or Executive Committee at the helm which guides regulates supervises directs and controls the affairs of the Society 
In this sense it may not include the individuals who under the over all control of that governing body or Committee run the day to day business of the Society
see Words and phrases by West Publishing Co Permanent Edition Vol 26 page 357 citing Warner  Swasey Co vs Rusterholz D C Minn1
Another meaning of the term management  may be the act or acts of managing or governing by direction guidance superintendence regulation and control the affairs of a Society  A still wider meaning of the term which will encompass the entire staff of servants and workmen of the Society has been canvassed for by Mr Dholakia
The use of the term management  in such a wide sense in Section 961 appears to us to be very doubtful
Be that as it may what has been directly bidden out of bounds for the Registrar by the very scheme and object of the Act cannot be indirectly inducted by widening the connotation of management 
A construction free from contexual constraints having the effect of smuggling into the circumscribed limits of the expression any dispute a dispute which from its very nature is incapable of being resolved by the Registrar has to be eschewed
Thus considered a dispute raised against the Society by its discharged servant claiming reliefs such as reinstatement in service with back wages which are not enforceable in a Civil Court is outside the scope of the expression touching the management of the Society used in Section 961 of the Act of 1961 and the Registrar has no jurisdiction to deal with and determine it
Such a dispute squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the BIR Act
Learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue as a last resort that the relief sought by the second respondent could be granted by the Registrar by relaxing or moulding the Staff Regulations and Bye laws which lay down conditions of service governing the employees of the Society
It is pointed out that under the Act of 1961 the Registrar has the power to amend or modify such Regulations and Bye laws
1037 We find no merit in this contention also
A similar argument was advanced before this Court in Cooperative Central Bank s Case ibid and was repelled inter alia with the reasoning that the bye laws of the Bank containing the conditions of service were in the nature of a contract between the Bank and its employees and a change of such bye laws embodying the conditions of employment could not possibly be directed by the Registrar where under section 62 4 of the ANDHRA Act he is specifically required to decide the dispute referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the bye laws
It was further observed that a dispute referred to the Registrar can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested with powers in that behalf or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator
But neither the Registrar nor his nominee will be competent to grant the relief requiring a change in the service conditions of the employees under section 62 of the Andhra Act
Such a relief could be granted only by the Industrial Tribunal which under the Industrial Disputes Act has the jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service between an employer and employees
This reasoning is applicable mutatis mutandis to the instant case
For all the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
In token of our gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered to us by Shri Rama Reddy as amicus curiae we direct that an honorarium of Rs 1500 be paid to him which shall be taxed as costs awarded against the appellant
VDK Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant Bank was a society registered under the Bombay Co operative Societies Act 1925 and with the coming into force from May 1 1962 of the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act 1961 it came to be governed by the said Act
By Notification No BIR 1362 5 H dated March 2 1963 the Government of Gujarat directed under section 24 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 Bombay Act 11 of 1947 that all the provisions of the said Act shall apply with effect from March 15 1963 to the business of banking by Co operative Banks in the Saurashtra and Kutch areas of the State registered and deemed to be registered under the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act 1961
The second respondent Babu Bhai Negracha who was working as an additional supervisor in the Dasada Branch of the appellant Bank and whose services were terminated by an order dated February 21 1962 by giving him one month s pay in lieu of notice under Staff Regulation No 15 filed an application in the Labour Court Rajkot alleging that his services had been illegally and maliciously terminated as an act of victimisation on account of his trade union activities and praying for setting aside the order of his termination of service and for reinstatement with full back wages
The Labour Court by its order dated June 11 1963 over ruled the preliminary objection raised by the appellant Bank namely that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 under which the application was made by the respondent was not applicable to its case as it was a co operative society governed by the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act under which only the Registrar or his nominee had jurisdiction to decide the dispute and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application
The appellant Bank s writ petition challenging the said order of the Labour Court was dismissed by the Gujarat High Court by its judgment dated August 25 1967
Dismissing the appeal by certificate the Court  HELD 1
No new plea can be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court as a matter of right
In the instant case the new plea that the appellant is not doing banking business was not entertained for the reasons 1024 namely i it was much too belated ii it stood in direct contradiction to the position taken by the appellant in its writ petition and the affidavit in support thereof in the High Court wherein it had been clearly admitted that the society is engaged in the business of banking and iii it was not a purely legal plea but a mixed plea of law and fact and could not be determined on the basis of material already on the record
1027 F G 2
The expression any dispute referred to in Section 54 of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 and in Section 96 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act does not cover a dispute of the kind raised by respondent 2 against the appellant bank
1034 C a It is clear from the object and the scheme of the Acts of 1925 and 1961 that the legislature never intended to give such a wide scope to the expression any dispute so as to cover all classes of disputes whatever be their nature as the prefix any to dispute appears to give
The term dispute means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects
It postulates the assertion of a claim by one party and its denial by the other
1031 C D b The expression any dispute has not been defined in the Acts of 1925 and 1961
This expression has been used in a narrower sense limited to contested claims of a civil nature which could have been decided by civil or revenue courts but for the provisions with regard to compulsory arbitration by the Registrar or his nominee found in Section 54 of the Bombay Act of 1925 and in Section 96 of the Gujarat Act 1961
The words as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar as Civil Court occurring in sub section k of Section 97 of the Gujarat Act also make this position clear
1031 C D E G c The compulsory arbitration by the Registrar on reference under section 96 is only a substitute for adjudication of disputes of a civil nature normally tried by the Civil Court
It is incumbent under sub section 2 of section 96 of the 1961 Act on the Registrar to decide as a preliminary issue whether the dispute is of a kind under sub section 1 of section 96 falling within his jurisdiction
If this preliminary issue is found in the negative he will have no further jurisdiction to deal with the matter
1031 F G 1032 F d Thus considered a dispute raised against the Society by its discharged servant claiming reliefs such as reinstatement in service with back wages which are not enforceable in a civil court is outside the scope of the expression touching the management of the Society used in section 961 of the Act of 1961 and the Registrar has not jurisdiction to deal with and determine it
What has been directly bidden out of bounds for the Registrar by the very scheme and object of the Act cannot be directly inducted by widening the connotation of management 
Such a dispute squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
1036 E G 3
The law of Industrial disputes or Industrial Relations is a special law dealing with rights and obligations specially created by it
The provisions in section 54 of the Bombay Act and in section 96 of the Gujarat Act being general provisions in accordance with the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant nothing in these general provisions can derogate from Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the Cooperative Societies Act must yield to the special provi 1025 sions in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act whenever a dispute clearly comes within the language of the latter Act
Section 1661 of the Gujarat Act in terms bars the jurisdiction only of Civil or Revenue Court and not of the Labour Court or any Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act or Industrial Disputes Act
The legislature never intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to determine claims and industrial disputes which cannot be adjudicated by the ordinary Civil Court
1032 H 1033 A 1034 A B In the instant case  a The Labour Court is competent to grant the relief of reinstatement while in view of section 21b of the Specific Relief Act then in force the Civil Court was not competent to grant that relief
If a Court is incapable of granting the relief claimed normally the proper construction would be that it is incompetent to deal with the matter
1033 F H b The dispute was raised by the second respondent by writing an approach letter to his employee the appellant as required by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act
In substance it was an industrial dispute
It was not restricted to a claim under the contract or agreement of employment
1033 F G c The rights and reliefs claimed by the second respondent could not be determined and granted by a Civil Court in a suit
His allegation was that his services were terminated unfairly and vindictively because of his legitimate trade union activities as an act of victimisation
The relief claimed is reinstatement in services with back wages
The rights claimed are those which are conferred on workmen and employees under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act to ensure social justice
Such rights which do not stem from the contract of employment can be enforced only in the Labour Court constituted under BIR Act
1033 B F Jullundur Transport Cooperative Societies Ltd vs Punjab State AIR 1959 Pun 34 approved
Rohtas Industries Ltd vs Brijnandan Pandey   referred to
d Neither the Registrar nor his nominee will be competent to grant the relief of requiring change in the service conditions of the employee
Such a relief could be granted by the Industrial Tribunal which under the Industrial Disputes Act has the jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service between an employer and employees
1037 C D Co operative Central Bank Ltd vs Additional Industrial Tribunal Hyderabad  applied
Farkhundali Naunhay vs V B Potdar AIR 1962 Bom
362 over ruled