vil Appeal Nos
80405 of 1975
From the Judgment and Order dated 28121973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in STA Nos 1 and 3 of 1971
PR Seetharaman and TVSN Chari for the Appellant
MC Bhandare AVV Nair for the Respondent
Under the provisions of the said Act on 7 9 1949 the Gosha hospital at Vizianagaram which was till then manned by the hereditary landlord and zamindar of the impartible Estate of Vizianagaram hereinafter referred to as the Estate was handed over to the State
The late Maharani Appalakondayamba otherwise popularly known as Rani of Rewa had executed a Will on 14 12 1911 creating a permanent endowment of a sum of Rs100000 for the maintenance of the said hospital
This amount was kept in deposit with the Estate
Since the Government had taken over the hospital by its Application No TOP 12358 to the Estates Abolition Tribunal and Distt
Judge Vishakhapatnam the Government claimed the recovery of the said amount with interest at the rate of 6 per annum and also claimed a priority over the other creditors
The Tribunal by its Order dated 15 12 62 allowed the claim for the amount but rejected the claim for priority
The Tribunal also directed the payment of Rs36695 to the Government out of the total amount of compensation which was then 137 deposited with it
The Government filed an appeal against the said Order being STA No 164 in the High Court but the same was dismissed
It appears that subsequently another sum of compensation being Rs117858109 was deposited and hence the Government filed another application viz TOP 569 for payment of the balance of Rs63305 with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per annum from 1 7 49 till the date of payment
In this application the appellant did not dispute the Government s claim for Rs63305 but contended that no interest on the sum of Rupees one lakh or on any part thereof was payable since according to him the Tribunal had rejected the claim for interest by its earlier Order of 15 12 62 in TOP 12358
The Tribunal accepted the appel lant s contention and held that the claim for interest was rejected earlier and disallowed the same
Against the said Order the Government preferred an appeal to the High Court being STA 171 3
The late Rani of Rewa by her same Will had also deposited another sum of Rupees one lakh with the Estate with the direction that the interest thereon should be utilised in feeding Telugu Brahmin students studying ad vanced Sanskrit Literature and Shastras at Banaras
The said fund will hereinafter be referred to as the Banaras Chari ties Fund
It appears that sufficient number of Telugu Brahmin students were not available and hence the Executor of the Will had applied for utilisation of the said amount for the Gosha hospital and in that application the High Court had directed that out of the accumulated surplus interest of Rs47897 in the said Banaras Charities Fund a sum of Rs30000 be capitalised and deposited with the Estate and the interest thereon at the rate of 3 per annum be utilised to meet the recurring annual expenditure of the Gosha hospital
After the abolition of the Estate the Government filed before the Tribunal a claim application being TOP No 12458 for recovery of the said sum of Rs30000 with interest at the rate of 6 per annum
The Government also claimed priority over the other creditors for the said amount as well
The Tribunal by its same order of 15 12 62 allowed the Government s claim for the amount but rejected the claim for priority
The Tribunal also directed that a sum of Rs1100850 be paid to the Govern ment from out of the amount of compensation which was then deposited
Against the said order the Government preferred an appeal to the High Court being STA No 264 which was dismissed
On the subsequent deposit of further compensa tion the Government preferred another application being TOP 669 for the balance of Rs1899150 and for interest thereon at the rate of 6 per annum from 1 7 49 till the date of payment
The appellant did not dispute the 138 claim for the payment of the balance amount of Rs1099150 but resisted the claim for interest firstly on the ground that there was no provision for payment of interest in the Act and secondly on the ground which was urged in the other appeal viz that in TOP 12458 it was rejected by the Tribunal earlier
The Tribunal accepted the appellant s contention and disallowed the claim for interest
Against the said order the Government preferred an appeal to the High Court being STA No 371
Thus before the High Court the only question in both the appeals was whether the Tribunal by its earlier order of 15 12 62 in TOP 123 and 12458 had allowed or rejected the claim for interest The High Court by its common order dated 28 12 73 held that the Tribunal by its earlier order of 15 12 62 had not only allowed the claim for the principal endowed amounts of Rupees one lakh and Rs30000 respective ly but also interest thereon and directed the payment of interest thereon from 1 7 49 as claimed
It is this order which is challenged by the appellant by these two separate appeals
Civil Appeal No 804 is against the order of the High Court in STA No 171 arising out of TOP 569 corresponding to earlier TOP 12358 and Civil Appeal No 805 is against the order in STA No 371 arising out of TOP 669 corre sponding to earlier TOP 12458
Mr Bhandare learned counsel appearing for the appellant in both the appeals contended firstly that the Tribunal while disposing of TOPs Nos 123 and 124 of 1958 should be deemed to have rejected the claim for interest because in the operative part of the order the Tribunal did not state that it was granting interest but only mentioned that it was granting the amounts which were claimed in the applications
The expression amount  claimed in the appli cation should be construed to mean the principal amount only and not interest
He also tried to derive support to this submission from the fact that while directing the payment of specific amounts the Tribunal had considered only the principal amounts in both cases as is evident from the orders of the Tribunal in that behalf
Hence he submitted that the issue with regard to the interest was barred by resjudicata and the interest could not have been claimed by the Government in its subsequent applications
His second contention was that assuming without admitting that there was a direction given by the Tribunal to pay the interest such direction was without jurisdiction because there was no provision in the Act for payment of interest
Thirdly he submitted that in any case it would be inequitable to ask the Estate to pay interest 139 when the compensation which was paid to the Estate did not bear any interest
Fourthly he contended that in any event the appellant personally cannot be held liable to pay the interest since the endowed amounts were always a part of the Estate which was abolished and the compensation which was paid and later on distributed among the sharers of the Estate covered the said endowed amounts
The interest according to him therefore has to come out of the shares of all the sharers and the appellant alone cannot be direct ed to pay the same
Fifthly his contention was that assum ing without admitting that the appellant as an executor had retained the said amounts and applied them to purposes other than the objects of the endowment he cannot be penalised for the same under the Act by making him pay the interest on them
At the most he may be liable for misfeasance as a trustee under the appropriate law
Lastly he submitted that in any case since other sharers are not made parties to the present proceedings no direction can be given in the present proceedings for payment of interest which has to come out of the compensation received by all the sharers
As regards the first contention namely that the Tribunal had not directed the payment of interest in TOPs 123 and 12458 it may be pointed out that in the applica tions made by the State Government to the Tribunal for the recovery of the two endowed amounts the Government had in clear terms claimed that they were entitled to the said sums with interest  6 per annum from 1 7 49 till the date of payment and that the Government was entitled to this amount after the compensation was deposited
The Government had also made a further claim that it was entitled to the pay ment of the said amount in priority over the claims of all other persons
Pursuant to these averments the Tribunal had framed Issue No 2 in TOP 12358 and Issue No 3 in TOP 12458 in identical terms as follows Whether the Government is entitled to claim the said amount with interest from the date of abolition    While recording its findings in both the TOPs the Tribunal had in paragraph 21 state as follows Under these circumstances I hold under point 3 that the Government is entitled to get payment of the amounts claimed in TOPs Nos 123 2458
 The Tribunal further reiterated the said finding in para graph 29 as follows 140 It is not in dispute that the amount of these two lakhs of rupees continued to be with the Samsthanam and the Samstha nam was paying interest on those amounts for the purposes of the endowments  
From that time onwards all along these two amounts have been treated as debts payable by the Samsthanam
The amounts claimed under TOP Nos   123 2458 relate to this amount of Rupees two lakhs and interest accrued thereon
Under these circumstances I hold that the amounts claimed under the said petitions are debts payable from and out of the assets of the Impartible Estate
 Again later in the same paragraph it is stated as follows Under these circumstances I hold under point 15 that the amounts claimed in TOP Nos     123 24 58     are debts to be paid from and out the assets of the Impartible Estate of Vizianagaram and therefore they are debts which come under the category of debts contemplated under Section 453 of the Abolition Act and those debts are liable to be paid from out of the com pensation amount before any division of it can be made between the sharers and maintenance holders
 In paragraph 32 the Tribunal has observed as follows From the above discussion it is clear that out of the amount of Rs363007 in dispute concerned in the first instance the State Government is entitled to payment of the amount due to it under TOP No 12258 and out of the balance remaining the amounts payable under TOP Nos 123 2458   should be paid
 It is therefore more than clear that the Tribunal had by its order in question given a finding that the Government was entitled to the entire amount claimed by it namely the principal endowed amount and also interest claimed thereon
The contention that because the Tribunal had not reiterated the word interest  in the next sentence of its direction and had only mentioned the amount payable under the TOPs and therefore it should be held that the Tribunal had rejected the claim for interest is too facile to be accepted
For the same
reason we are also not impres 141 sed by the argument that since the Tribunal had while di recting the payment of specific amounts had only referred to a part of the principal amounts it should be held that the Tribunal had rejected the claim for interest
Under the scheme of the Act itself the Tribunal was required to apportion the amounts according to the priorities depending upon the amount of compensation deposited at the time of the giving of the direction in question
It was therefore only to be expected that the Tribunal would first give directions with regard to the payment of the principal amounts and defer the payment of interest to a future date
That is exactly what the Tribunal had done in the present case and hence in the second set of applications made by the Govern ment the Government had not only claimed the balance of the principal amounts but also interest on the entire of the said amounts from 1 7 49
The High Court was therefore right in holding that the Tribunal by its order of 15 12 62 had allowed the claim for interest
In the circumstances the issue with regard to the claim for interest in the subsequent applications namely applications TOPs 569 and 669 was not barred by resjudicata as contended by Shri Bhandare
The second contention that the Tribunal could not have directed the payment of interest because there was no jurisdiction to do so is also misconceived for the simple reason that in the Will in question both the said amounts were deposited by the testator with the Estate and the beneficiaries of the endowment namely Gosha hospital and the Banaras Charities Fund were to be financed from the interest accruing on the said two amounts respectively
It was not in dispute that these two amounts were lying depos ited with the Estate and the Estate was paying interest  6 per annum on the amount of Rupees one lakh which was meant for Gosha hospital and  5 per annum on the amount meant for the Banaras Charities Fund
Hence all that the Tribunal had done was to direct the Estate to pay the amounts in question to the Government together with interest at the admitted rate which interest was in any case payable to wards the endowment objects
Under the Act the Tribunal had among other things to determine the liability of the Es tate
The endowment amounts together with the interest admittedly accruing thereon together formed the total li ability of the Estate
The interest further was a recurring one and the objects of the endowment were to be financed from out of the said interest
When therefore the Tribunal directed the payment of interest together with the principal amount it did nothing more than direct the Estate to honour its liability
As regards the third contention that it was inequitable for 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1990 1 SCR the Tribunal to ask the Estate to pay the interest since the compensation paid to the Estate did not bear any interest we are afraid that the submission is beside the point
In the first instance under the scheme of the Act the amount of compensation was to be paid in stages as and when the compensation was deposited
Secondly whether the Estate was paid or not paid the interest on compensation due to it has nothing to do with the Estate s liability towards the endow ments
The interest directed to be paid by the Tribunal was not interest over and above the endowed amounts
It is the principal amount together with the interest accruing thereon which constituted the total endowed amounts at the time of the abolition of the Estates
The next three contentions can be dealt with togeth er
There is no doubt that the amounts were deposited with the Estate and it was the Estate which was paying interest to the beneficiary or beneficiaries under the endowments
Hence as observed by the Tribunal in the first instance the endowment amounts together with the interest accruing thereon had to be set apart from out of the compensation payable to the Estate and it is the balance which had to be distributed among the sharers or the creditors of the shar ers as the case may be
As we read the Tribunal s order of 15 12 62 as well as the impugned order of the High Court we see no direction to the appellant to pay the said amount personally as indeed on such direction could have been given since the facts show that both the amounts were lying with the Estate and not with the appellant in his individual capacity
What is recorded in the Tribunal s order is that it is the Estate holder who had not made over the two amounts to the Government on the date of its taking over
Hence the direction of the High Court to pay the said amount will have to be read as a direction to the appellant to do so in his capacity as the Estate holder and not in his individual capacity
If the final amounts are already dis tributed among all the sharers andor the creditors the Government has to look for the amount of interest to all the sharers andor their creditors including of course the appellant
All the sharers will be liable to contribute towards the payment of the amount of interest in proportion to their share in the compensation
That is how the impugned order of the High Court and the earlier order of 15 12 62 passed by the Tribunal will have to be read and construed
In the circumstances it matters not whether all the sharers were parties to the proceedings
The proceedings were essen tially against the Estate and the present appellant in his capacity as an Estate holder represented the Estate and all the sharers
The order passed in the proceedings is there fore binding on all the sharers in the Estate notwithstand ing the fact that all the sharers 143 were not parties to the proceedings
We therefore find no substance in the contention that the present proceedings were bad in law because all the sharers were not made par ties to the same
In the result both the appeals fail
In the circum stances however there will be no order as to costs
GN Appeals dis missed


Summary:
The respondent a Sub Inspector of police was convicted under section 376 of IPC for having committed rape on a young newly married girl of 19 or 20 years of age by the Additional Sessions Judge Nagpur
The respondent challenged his conviction in appeal to the High Court
The High Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court and acquitted him
The State feeling ag grieved came up in appeal by special leave
While allowing the appeal setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court the Court HELD A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice
She is in fact a victim of the crime
The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars
She is undoubtedly a competent witness under section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence
The same degree of care and caution must attache in the evalua tion of her evidence as in the case of any injured complain ant or witness and no more
123B C What is more necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her
Having regard to the increase in the number of sex violation cases in the recent past particu larly cases of molestation and rape in custody it is proper to remove the notion if it persists that the testimony of a woman who is a 116 victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases
123C D 124B C Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour
Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the Western and European countries
Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the same as in those countries
It is however unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing
An Indian Woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms from lewd remark to eve teasing from molestation to rape
Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the social norms
The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account the tact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecu trix is available
124D F Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman more so a young girl will not stake her reputation by leveling a false charge concerning her chastity
By our criminal laws vide powers are conferred on police officers investigating cognizable offences
The infrastructure of our criminal investigation system recognises and indeed protects the right of a woman to decent and dignified treatment at the hands of the investigating agency
124F H The purpose and setting the person and his position the misuse or abuse of office and the despair of the victim which led to her surrender are all relevant factors which must be present in the mind of the Court while evaluating the conduct evidence of the prosecutrix
A person in author ity such as a police officer carries with him the awe of office which is bound to condition the behaviour of his victim 125C D The Court must not be oblivious of the emotional turmoil and the psychological injury that a prosecutrix suffers on being molested or raped
She suffers a tremendous sense of shame and the fear of being shunned by society and her near relatives including her husband
Instead of treating her with compassion and understanding as one who is an injured victim of a crime she is more often than not treated as a sinner and shunned
It must therefore be realised that a woman who is subjected to sex violence would always be slow and hesitant about disclosing her plight
The Court must therefore evaluate her evidence in the above background
117 Bharwada Bhognibhai Hirjibhai vs State of Gujarat  upon