ivil Appeal No 1312 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 67
1988 of the Rajasthan High Court in DB Civil WP No 7177
section Hegde Additional Solicitor General A Subba Rao for CVS Rao for the Appellants
SC Birla for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 762 K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
Special leave granted
Bakshi Ram respondent was a constable in the Central Reserve Police Force at Devli in Rajasthan
On 17th March 1971 at about 845 pm he along with another constable forced entry into the room of Garib Das the constable of the CRP Group Centre band platoon
Garib Das was then not present in the room
His wife Savitri Devi who was inside tried to prevent their entry but in vain
Both the consta bles caught hold of her and misbehaved with her
The respondent was tried for an offence under Section 101 of the 
Section 10 of the Act sets out less heinous offences and Section 101 refers to any act or omission which though not speci fied in the Act is prejudiciable to good order and disci pline
On the evidence adduced in the case he was found guilty of the charge and by judgment dated 23rd March 1971 he was sentenced to four months RI by the Magistrate 1st Class and Commandant Group Centre CRPF Deoli Rajasthan
He was lodged in the Civil Jail Jaipur to undergo the sentence
In view of his conviction and sentence
 the Department by way of disciplinary action dismissed him from service
This action was taken when his appeal against the conviction and sentence was pending before the Sessions Judge
The learned Judge by judgment dated 22 September 1971 upheld the conviction but released him under the the Act
Apparently he was released under Section 4 of the Act upon furnishing bonds to keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of six months
The re spondent complied with those conditions
After expiry of the period of good conduct he moved the High Court with Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal from service
The High Court relying upon Section 12 of the Act has set aside the dismissal and di rected that he should be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits
The High Court has expressed the view that the sole reason for dismissal of the respondent was his conviction under Section 101 of the Central Re serve Police Force Act but in view of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1968 there was no disqualifica tion for him to continue in service
This is how the High Court observed The clear language of Section 12 of the Probation of Of fenders Act 1958 which provides that a person dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 of that 763 Act shall not suffer disqualification if any attaching to a conviction under any law notwithstanding anything con tained in any other law
This provision has the effect of removing disqualification attaching to the petitioners  conviction under Section 10n of the CRPF Act
Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act dealing specifically with this situation clearly provides that the provisions therein is notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law  Hence effect has to be given to the same
 The judgment of the High Court has been challenged in this appeal
Since the result of the appeal turns on the scope and meaning of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act it is necessary to set out the Section
Section 12 is in these terms 12
Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 shall not suffer dis qualification if any attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who after his release under Section 4 is subse quently sentenced for the original offence
 Section 3 of the pro vides power to the Court to release certain offenders after admonition
Section 4 provides power to the Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct
Under the disposition made by the Court under Section 4 the sentence is suspended during the period of probation and the offender is released on his entering into a bond to keep peace and be of good behaviour
Section 9 provides for procedure in case of offender failing to observe conditions of bond
The Court if satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of bond for keeping good behaviour could sentence him for the original offence or where the failure is for he first time then without prejudice to the continuance in force of the bond the Court may impose upon him a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees
764 It will be clear from these provisions that the release of the offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction
Dealing with the scope of Sections 3 4 and 9 of the  Fazal Ali J in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway and Anr
TR Challappan etc
 at 596 speaking for the Court observed These provisions would clearly show that an order of re lease on probation comes into existence only after the accused is found guilty and is convicted of the offence
Thus the conviction of the accused or the finding of the Court that he is guilty cannot be washed out at all because that is the sine qua non for the order or release on proba tion of the offender
The order of release on probation is merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed by the Court
This has been made permissible by the Statute with a humanist point of view in order to reform youthful offenders and to prevent them from becoming hardened criminals
The provisions of Section 93 of the Act extracted above would clearly show that the control of the offender is retained by the criminal court and where it is satisfied that the condi tions of the bond have been broken by the offender who has been released on probation the Court can sentence the offender for the original offence
This clearly shows that the factum of guilt on the criminal charge is not swept away merely by passing the order releasing the offender on proba tion
Under sections 3 4 or 6 of the Act the stigma continues and the finding of the misconduct resulting in conviction must be treated to be a conclusive proof
In these circumstances therefore we are unable to accept the argument of the respondents that the order of the Magistrate releasing the offender on probation obliterates the stigma of conviction
 As to the scope of Section 12 learned Judge went on at 596 It was suggested that Section 12 of the Act completely obliterates the effect of any conviction and wipes out the disqualification attached to a conviction of an offence under such law
This argument in our opinion is based on a gross misreading of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act the words attaching to a conviction of an offence 765 under such law refer to two contingencies i that there must be a disqualification resulting from a conviction and ii that such disqualification must be provided by some law other than the 
The Penal Code does not contain any such disqualification
Therefore it cannot be said that section 12 of the Act contemplates an automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused
It is also manifest the disqualification is essentially differ ent in its connotation from the word misconduct  In criminal trial the conviction is one thing and sen tence is another
The departmental punishment for misconduct is yet a third one
The Court while invoking the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act does not deal with the convic tion it only deals with the sentence which the offender has to undergo
Instead of sentencing the offender the Court releases him on probation of good conduct
The conviction however remains untouched and the stigma of conviction is not obliterated
In the departmental proceedings the delin quent could be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge See Article 3112b of the Constitution and Tulsiram Patel case 1985 Supp
2 SCR 131 at 282
Section 12 of the Act does not preclude the department from taking action for misconduct leading to the offence or to his conviction thereon as per law
The section was not intended to exonerate the person from departmental punish ment
The question of reinstatement into service from which he was removed in view of his conviction does not therefore arise
That seems obvious from the lerminology of Section 12
On this aspect the High Court speak with one voice
The Madras High Court in R Kumaraswami Aiyer vs The Commission er Municipal Council Tiruvannamalai and Anr 1957 Crl
L J 225 Vol
58 and Embaru P vs Chairman Madras Port Trust Mad the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A Satyanarayana Murthy vs Zonal Manager LIC AIR 1969 AP 371 the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Prem Kumar vs Union of India and Ors 1971 Lab  Ind cases 823 the Punjab  Haryana High Court in Om Prakash vs The Director Postal Services Post and Telegraphs Deptt Punjab Circle Ambala and Ors The Delhi High Court in Director of Postal Services and Anr
vs Daya Nand have expressed the same view
This view of the High Courts in the aforesaid cases has been approved by this Courtin TRChallappan s case 766 In Trikha Ram vs
VK Seth and Anr 1987 Supp
SCC 39 this Court after referring to section 12 has altered the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner therein into removal from service so that it may help him to secure future employment in other establishment
Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offender shall not suffer disqualification if any attach ing to a conviction of an offence under such law
Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction
For instance if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office or for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed
That in effect is the scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act
But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstate ment upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct
Apparently such a view has no support by the terms of Section 12 and the order of the High Court cannot there fore be sustained
In the result the appeal is allowed
The impugned order of the High Court is set aside
However we alter the penal ty of dismissal from service into removal from service  as it was done in Trikha Ram s case
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
TNA Appeal al lowed


Summary:
About 250 acres of wooded evergreen land was given to the ancestors of Respondent by grant over a hundred years ago and a patta in respect thereof granting the aforesaid lands was given to them in 1912 and in that patta there was an endorsement reading redeemed coffee sagawall malai indicating that the trees on the land had been paid for
In 1918 it appears that pursuant to an order passed by the Commissioner the said entry had been altered to unre deemed showing that the trees had not been paid for
The respondent applied for permission of appellant No 1 to cut and remove some of the trees from the land granted to his ancestors
The said application was rejected on the ground that the seigniorage payable on the value of the timber standing on the land granted had not been paid and hence before the trees could be cut and the timber removed seign iorage in respect of the trees had to be paid
The respond ent thereupon filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge Madakeri for a declaration that the said land granted to him was redeemed in tenure and hence no payment of seigniorage could be demanded from him
The respondent claimed that the alteration of the relevant entry from redeemed  to unre deemed  in the record of rights pertaining to the lands in question was made under orders of the Commissioner and not of the Chief Commissioner as required under the Regulation and hence the alteration was void having been directed to be made by an unauthorised person
The trial Court decreed the suit and granted the declaration
The appellants preferred an appeal against the said decision to the District Court but the appeal failed
Appellant s further appeal to the High Court of Karnataka was also dismissed
Hence this appeal by special leave
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD The suit in the instant case were not barred as they did not question the right of the Government to levy seigniorage nor the liabi 728 lity of the plaintiffs to pay but the plea was that seign iorage had already been levied and paid
731E Identical orders changing the word redeemed  to the word unredeemed  in the relevant entries have been unifor mally made in a large number of cases which would suggest that these changes were made pursuant to a special revision of the record of rights in respect of a number of properties and was not an individual change in a particular entry in the record of rights of a particular plot of land
731G H Under regulation 29 of the Coorg Regulation this could have been done only pursuant to a direction or order of the Chief Commissioner
but no such order or direction of a notification to that effect appears to be on the record
The result is that the said change must be held to be unautho rised in law void and of no legal effect
732A B State of Mysore vs Kainthaje Thimmanna Enat and Ors to