Appeal No 25 of 1961
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated November 26 1957 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No 235 of 1957
3 CB Agarwala and C P Lal for the appellants
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India section K Kapur Bishamber Lal and
K K Jain for the respondent
March 26
The Judgment of Sinha CJ Subba Rao and Ayyangar JJ was delivered by Subba Rao J Mudholkar J delivered separate Judgment
SUBBA RAO J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of a division Bench of the Allahabad High Court confirming those of a single Judge of that court dismissing the application filed by the appellant to review the order of the High Court dated November 22 1958
The facts leading up to the filing of this appeal may be briefly stated
The respondent held certain zamindari and agricultural properties in different districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh
On December 22 1952 the Additional Collector Banaras in exercise of the powers conferred on him under the provisions of the U P Agricultural Income Tax Act Act III of 1949 assessed the respondent to an agricultural income tax of Rs 99964 12 0 for the year 1359 fasli
On September 30 1955 the respondent filed a petition before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said order on the ground that the Additional Collector Banaras had no jurisdiction to make the said assessment On November 22 1955 Mehrotra J allowed the writ petition quashing the said assessment
The State of Uttar Pradesh did not prefer an appeal against the said order and allowed it to become final
On February 9 1956 the State of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance being Ordinance No 11 of 1956 which was subsequently replaced by U P Act No XIV of 1956 Under the provisions of the Ordinance the assessments made 4 by the Additional Collector were retrospectively validated and under s6 thereof a right was conferred upon any party to the proceedings under the UP Agricultural Income tax Act 1948 hereinafter called the principal Act wherein any assessment made by an Additional Collector or Additional Assistant Collector was set aside merely on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make the assessment to apply within 90 days from the date of the commencement of the said Ordinance for a review of the said proceedings in the light of the provisions of the Ordinance and a statutory injunction was imposed upon a court to review the said order accordingly
Pursuant to the provisions of s6 of the said Ordinance on March 14 1956 the appellants filed an application in the High Court at Allahabad for review of its order dated November 22 1956
Subsequently as stated earlier the
Ordinance was replaced by the U P Act XIV of 1956 hereinafter called the Act
In the course of the judgment we shall refer only to the provision of the Act
The said application was heard in the first instance by Mehrotra J
and he held that section II of the Act which corresponds to s6 of the Ordinance did not entitle the appellant to file an application for review of an order made by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution
The appellant s petition was dismissed on that ground
The appellants preferred an appeal against the said order to a division Bench of that court
Nootham CJ and Srivastava J who heard the appeal dismissed it on two grounds namely 1 under Ch
VIII r5 of the Rules of Court a special appeal against an order of a single Judge of the court can be maintained only if that order amounts to a Judgment and an order refusing an application for review not being a Judgment cannot be the subject of an appeal 2 on merits that is on the construction of section II of the Act the view taken by Mehrotra J was correct
The present appeal as already stated was preferred against the said order
5 Mr C B Aggarwala learned counsel for the appellants has raised before us the following points 1 The order of Mehrotra J dismissing the application for review of his earlier order is a Judgment within the meaning of Ch
VIII r 5 of the Rules of Court and therefore an appeal lies against that order to a division Bench of that court
2 The terms of section 11 of the Act are comprehensive enough to take in an order made by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution quashing the order of assessment and even if there is some lacuna the provisions shall be so construed as to carry out clear intention of the Legislature
3 In any view the application for review filed by the appellants could be treated as one filed under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the earlier order reviewed on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the record
We shall take the questions in the order they were argued
The first question is whether an appeal Jay against the order of Mehrotra J rejecting the application for review filed by the appellants to a division Bench of the High Court
Chapter VIII r5 of the Rules of Court provides for an appeal against an order of a single judge
Under that rule a special appeal against an order of a single judge of the court can be maintained only if that order amounts to a judgement
That rule gives effect to cl 10 of the letters Patent for the High Court of Allahabad which gives a right _ of appeal against a judgment of a single judge subject to the conditions mentioned therein
The said cl10 corresponds to cl15 of the letters Patent for the High Courts of Calcutta Bombay and Madras
The scope of the expression judgment came under the judicial scrutiny of the various High Courts there is a cleavage of opinion on that question
We shall briefly no ice the leading decisions of the various High Courts on the subject
Couch CJ 6 in The Justices of the Peace for Calcuttu vs The Oriental Gas CO
1 defines the word judgment in el
15 of the Letters Patent thus We think judgment  in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability
It may be either final or preliminary or interlocutory the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it leaving other metters to be determined
The same High Court in Hadjee Ismael vs Hadjee Mahommed 2  held that an appeal lay under the said clause from an order refusing to set aside an order granting leave to sue to the plaintiff under cl12 of the Letters Patent
Therein Couch CJ observed It is not a mere formal order or an order merely regulating the procedure in the suit but on that has the effect of giving a jurisdiction to the court it otherwise would not have
And it may fairly be said to determine some right between them viz the right to sue in a particular Court and to compel the defendants who are not within its jurisdiction to come in and defend the suit or if they do not to make them liable to have a decree passed against them in their absence The Bombay High Court followed the Calcutta view
The leading judgment of the Madras High Court is that in Tuljaram vs Alagappa 3 where it was held that an order of a single Judge in the Original Side refusing to frame an issue asked for by one of the parties is not a judgment  within 1  452
2  101
3 1912 1LR  7 15 7 the meaning of cl15 of the Letters Patent
White CJ laid down the following tests The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made
If its effect whatever its form may be and whatever be the nature of the appli cation on which it is made is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned or if its effect if it is not complied with is to put an end to the suit or proceeding I think the adjudication is a judgment  within the meaning of the clause
 Referring to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court the learned Chief Justice proceeded to state On the other hand I am not prepared to say as was held in The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta vs The Oriental Gas Company 1 and in Sonbai vs Ahamedbhai Habibhai 2 it must be a decision which affects the merits by determining some right or liability
think the decision may be a judgment for the purposes of the section though it does not affect the merits of the suit or proceeding and does not determine any question of right raised in the suit or proceeding
Krishnaswami Ayyar J observed much to the same effect I would only stop here to remark that a decision which determines the cause or proceeding so far as the particular court is concerned though it refused to adjudge the merits must also be deemed to be a judgement far otherwise the rejection of a plaint for defect of form or insufficiency of Court 1 2 1872 9 BHCR 398
8 fee or a return of it for want of jurisdiction would be outside the definition of the learned Chief Justice which could hardly have been his meaning
I may also observe that the Part which is determined may be a part of the claim separable from the rest or a determination of liability generally though the actual measure of liability may be a matter of account
The Lahore High Court generally followed the view expressed by the Madras High Court
The Allahabad High Court in Muhammad Naim Ullah Khan vs Ihsan Ullah Khan 1 expressed the view that an order which is not appealable under 043 r 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable under cl 10 of the Letters Patent
This view has been followed by a division Bench of the same High Court in Tirmal Singh vs Kanhayia Singh 2
But the said decisions do not attempt to lay down a definition of the expression judgment in the Letters Patent
The Nagpur High Court in Manohar vs Baliram3 by a majority after considering the case law on the subject laid down the following definition
Hidayatullah J who delivered the leading judgment laid down the test at p 522 thus A judgment means a decision in an action whether final preliminary or interlocutory which decides either wholly or partially but conclusively in so far as the Court is concerned the controversy which is the subject of the action
It does not include a decision which is on a matter of procedure nor one which is ancillary to the action even though it may either imperil the ultimate decision or tend to make it effective
The decision need not be immediately executable per 88 but if left untouched must result inevitably without anything further save the determination of 1 1892 1
L R 14 All 226 2 1923 1
L R 45 All 535
3 1
L R 9 consequential details in a decree or decretal order that is to say an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done in relation to the facts of the contro versy
The decision may itself order that thing to be done or not to be done or it may leave that over till after the ascertainment of some details but it must not be interlocutory having for its purpose the ascertainment of some matters or details prior to the determination of the whole or any part of the controversy
 The foregoing brief analysis of judgment shown that the definition given by the Madras High Court is wider than that given by the Calcutta and Nagpur High Courts
It is not necessary in this case to attempt to reconcile the said decision or to give a definition of our own for on the facts of the present case the order of Mehrotra J would be a judgment within the meaning of the narrower definition of that expression
The appellants filed an application to review the order of the High Court quashing the order of assessment made by the Additional Collector
It was alleged in the affidavit that the impugned assessment had been validated under the Ordinance and that the applicants had the right to have the order of Mehrotra J reviewed in the light of the provisions of section 6 thereof
The assessee denied that the appellants had any such right
The appellants  statutory right to have the order of the High Court reviewed was denied by the other side and was put in issue before the High Court
The relevant provisions of the Act read  Section 2 In Section 2 of the U P Agricultural Income Tax Act 1948 hereinafter called the Principal Act for clause 4 the following shall be and be deemed always to have been substituted 10 4 a Collector  shall have the meaning as in the U P Land Revenue Act 1901 and will include an Additional Collector appointed under the said Act
 Section 10
Validation 1 For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that a in rule 18 of the U P Agricultural Income Tax Rules 1949 the expression Collector and Assistant Collector in charge of a sub division shall respectively include and be deemed always to have included an Additional Collector and an Additional Assistant Collector in charge of a sub divisional
b all orders actions or proceedings taken directions issued or jurisdiction exercised or in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act or of any rule framed thereunder prior to the amendment of that Act by Section 2 of this Act shall be deemed to be as good and valid in law as if Section 2 aforesaid had been in force at all material dates
2 Where any question arises as to the validity or legality of anuy assessment made by an Additional Collector in charge of a sub division or by an Additional Collector in pur ported exercise of the powers under Section 14 or of the rules framed under clause c of sub section 2 of Section 44 of the Principal Act the same shall be determined as if the provisions of Section 2 of this Act had been in force at all material dates
Section 11 Review of Proceedings  Where before the commencement of this Act any court or authority had in any proceedings under the Principal Act set aside any assessment made by an Additional Collector or 11 Additional Assistant Collector in charge of a subdivision merely on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make an assessment any party to the proceedings may at any time within ninety days from the date of commencement of this Act apply to the Court or authority for a view of the proceedings in the light of the provisions of this Act and the Court or authority to which the application is made shall review the proceedings accordingly and make such order if any varying or revising the order previously made as may be necessary to give effect to the pro
visions of the Principal Act as amended by Sections 2 and 8 of this Act
Under the aforesaid provisions the assessments made by the Additional Collector were retrospectively validated and a right was conferred on a party to the proceedings under the Principal Act wherein the assessments were set aside merely on the ground that the assessing authority bad no jurisdiction to make an assessment to apply to the court to have that order reviewed
A statutory injunction was also issued to the court which set aside the assessment on the ground of want of jurisdiction to review its order and to give effect to the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by sections 2 and 4 of the Act that is to say a fresh right has been conferred upon a party to the earlier proceedings to have the previous order set aside and to have decision from the court on the basis of the amended Act
This is a valuable and substantive right conferred upon a party to the proceeding
On the rival contentions the question of the fresh right conferred upon a party to the proceeding and the jurisdiction of the court to enforce the said right would be in issue and any decision thereon could legitimately be said to be a decision determining the rights of parties
But for the 12 amending Act the order of the High Court admittedly would have become final but because of the amending Act there was a controversy whether the binding decision could be reopened and the rights of the parties decided in accordance with the amending Act
The decision of Mehrotra J dismissing the application was certainly a decision denying the right of the appellants alleged to have been conferred under the amending Act
We therefore hold that the order of Mehrotra J dismissing the application filed for review of his earlier order on the ground that section 11 of the Act did not confer any such right on the appellants was a judgment  within the meaning of cl10 of the Letters Patent as well as Ch
VIII r5 of the Rules of Court
If so we must hold that the division Bench of the High Court went wrong in holding that no appeal lay against the order of Mehrotra J
Even so the appellants would not be entitled to succeed unless we hold differing from the High Court that s11 of the Act confers a right on the appellants to have the order of Mehrotra J reviewed
We have already extracted the provisions of a 11
Section 11 is in two parts the first part of the section confers a right on a party to the proceedings under the Principal Act to apply to the court or authority for a review of the proceeding in the light of the provisions of the Act within 90 days from the commencement of the Act and the second part issues a statutory injunction on such a court or authority to review the proceedings accordingly and to make an order as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by ss2 and 4 of the Act
The first question therefore is whether the order of Mehrotra J in an application under article 226 of the Constitution was in any proceeding under the Principal Act
Obviously a petition under article 226 of the Constitution cannot be a proceeding under the Act it is a proceeding 13 under the Constitution
But it is said relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes at p 68 and in Crawford on Statutory Construction  at p 492 that it is the duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter if within its spirit or reason
But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction
Maxwell says at p68 of his book The construction must not of course be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute s scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature
The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar
When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises for the Act speaks for itself
It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature
So construed there cannot be two possible views on the interpretation of the first part of the section
Learned counsel suggested that we should read the relevant portion of the first part thus in any proceedings to set aside any assessment made on the basis of the Principal Act
To accept this argument is to rewrite the section
While the section says that the order sought to be reviewed is that made in a proceeding under 14 the Principal Act the argument seeks to remove the qualification attached to the proceeding and add the same to the assessment
The alternative argument namely that without changing the position of the words as they stand in the section the expression on the basis of may be substituted for the expression under does Dot also yield the results expected by the learned counsel
It cannot be held with any justification without doing violence to the language used that a proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution is either one under the Principal Act or on the basis of the Principal Act for it is a proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order on the ground that it was made in violation of the Act
An attempt is then made to contend that a proceeding under article 226 of the Constitution is a continuation of the proceedings before the Additional Collector and therefore the said proceedi ings are proceedings under the Act
This leads us to the consideration of the question of the scope of the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution
Article 226 confers a power on a High Court to issue the writs orders or directions mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose
This is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
Though the power is not confined to the prerogative writs issued by the English Courts it is modeled on the said writs mainly to enable the High Courts to keep the subordinate tribunals within bounds
Before the Constitution the chartered High Court that is the High Courts at Bombay Calcutta and Mad ras were issuing prerogative writs similar to those issued by the King s Bench Division subject to the same limitations imposed on the said
writs
In Venkataratnam vs Secretary of State for India1 1 1930 ILP 15 a division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Venkatasubba Rao and Madhavan Nair JJ held that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari was original jurisdiction
In Ryots of Garabandha vs The Zamindar of Parlakimedi 1 another division Bench of the same High Court consisting of Leach C J and Madhavan Nair J considered the question again incidentally and came to the same conclusion and held that a writ of certiorari is issued only in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court
In Ramayya vs State of Madras 2 a division Bench consisting of Govinda Menon and Ramaswami Oounder JJ considered the question whether the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution are in exercise of the original Jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and the learned Judges held that the power to issue writs under article 226 of the Constitution is original and the jurisdiction exercised is original jurisdiction
In Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani vs Banwarilal Boy 3 the Privy Council was considering the question whether the original civil jurisdiction which the Supreme Court of Calcutta possessed over certain classes of persons outside the territorial limits of that jurisdiction has been inherited by the High Court
In that context the Judicial Committee
observed
It cannot be disputed that the issue of such writs is a matter of original jurisdiction
The Calcutta
High Court in Budge Budge Munici pality vs Mangru4 came to the same conclusion namely that the jurisdiction exercised under article 226 of the Constitution is original as distinguished from appellate or revisional jurisdiction but the High Court pointed out that the jurisdiction though original is a special jurisdiction and should not be 1 ILR 2 AIR 1952 Nad 300
3 1942 It M L J 32 35
4 16 confused with ordinary civil jurisdiction under the Letters Patent
The Andhra High Court in Satyanarayanamurthi vs 1
T Appellate Tribunal 1 described it as an extraordinary original jurisdiction
It is therefore clear from the nature of the power conferred under article 226 of the Constitution and the decisions on the subject that the High Court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court
This jurisdiction though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdictions is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may
for convenience be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction
If that be so it cannot be contended that a petition under article 226 of the Constitution is a continuation of the proceedings under the Act
There is another insurmountable difficulty in accepting the construction suggested by learned counsel
Under the second part of the section a party to the earlier proceedings may within the prescribed time apply to the court or authority for a review of the proceedings in the light of the pro visions of the Act and the court or authority to which the application is made shall review the proceedings accordingly and make such order if any varying or revising the order previously made as may be necessary to give effect to the Principal Act as amended by section 2 of the Act
Should it be held that this section applies to an order made by a High Court under article 226 of the Constitution the statutory mandatory injunction issued under the second part of the section to the High Court to make an order in a particular way would be constitutionally void
Under the Constitution the Legislature of a 1 A 1
R 1957 Andhra 123
17 State derives its authority to make laws under article 245 of the Constitution which reads 1  Subject to the provisions of this Con stitution Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State
 Article 245 is therefore subject to article 226 of the Constitution
It follows that no law made by the Legislature of a State can be in derogation of the powers of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution
It is well settled that article 226 confers a discretionary power on the High Courts to make or issue appropriate orders and writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose
While article 226 confers a discretionary power on the High Court the second part of section 11 of the Act enjoins on the High Court to make an order in a particular way
We should not give such a construction to the section as would bring it into conflict with article 226 of the Constitution and which would have the effect of invalidating it to that extent
On the other hand the construction adopted by us would be consistent with the second part of the section for if the first part is confined only to an order made by any court or authority other than the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution both the parts fall in a piece and we would not only be giving a natural meaning to the express words used in the section but we would also be saving the section from the vice of constitutional invalidity
Learned counsel for the appellants seeks to got over this obvious difficulty by contending that the word shall may be treated as may so that the discretion of High Court under article 226 may be maintained
Alternatively he contends that the second part of the section comprises two parts the 18 first empowers an aggrieved party only to file an application and the second imposes a statutory duty and that the first may conveniently be served from the second and its validity to that extent sustained
The first argument is contrary to the express words used and the intention of the Legislature
If we read shall as  may the same discretion will have to be given even to authorities and courts other than the High Court with the result the purpose of the section would be defeated
On the other hand if the expression shall is given its natural meaning the section carries out the intention of the Legislature viz the mandatory injunction imposed on courts and authorities to restore the assessment declared invalid
The decisions cited by the learned counsel in support of his construction are not of any help for they were based upon the construction of the relevant provisions under consideration in those cases
The second argument if accepted would be rewriting the section
While the dominant intention of the Legislature is to issue a mandatory injunction on the courts or authorities to review their orders on a suitable application made to them we would be deleting it and thus defeating the object of the Legislature
For the foregoing reasons we have no hesitation in holding that on a plain reading of the clear words used in the section it does not apply to an order made by the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution
Lastly it is contended that even if section 11 does not apply we should treat the application filed by the appellants before the High Court as one made under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
There are
many objections for allowing the appellants to do so at this very late stage of the Proceedings
The application was filed only under section 11 of the Act and no attempt was made either before Mehrotra J or before the division Bench of the High Court to ask for an amendment 19 or to sustain the petition under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor did the appellants raise this plea in the petition filed for special leave or even in the statement of case as originally filed by them
After the case was argued for sometime on an observation casually made by the Court time was taken and for the first time this plea was taken in the additional statement of case filed by the appellants
This is therefore a highly belated attempt to convert the application filed on one basis into that on another
Further the plea if allowed is not so innocuous or smooth sailing as it appears to be but is brimming with many controversial questions
It raises the following questions  1 Whether the application treated as one made under order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was within time  2 if it was out of time could the delay be excused without the appellant filing an application for excusing it and giving valid reasons for the same  3 whether an order made by the High Court in exercise of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution could be reviewed under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and if not under section 151 of the said Code  4 whether the amendment of an Act with retrospective effect could be treated as an error on the face of the record or as a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for reviewing the final orders and decrees made by courts on the basis of the law obtaining at the time the said orders or decrees were made  and 5 if the order of Mehrotra J was one made under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure would an appeal lie to a division Bench of the High Court under Order 43 of the Code
We do not propose to express any opinion on the aforesaid questions
It would be enough to say that we are not justified to allow the appellants to convert their petition to one made under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Pro 20 cedure at this very late stage in view of the foregoing reasons
In the result we hold that the order of the High Court is correct
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
MUDHOLKAR J
I agree with my learned brother that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons stated in his judgment
I however express no opinion on the question regarding the maintainability of the appeal under the Letters Patent against the decision of a single Judge in a case of this kind
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondent who owned agricultural properties in the different districts of Uttar Pradesh was assessed to agri cultural income tax by the Additional Collector of Banaras
On challenge by way of a petition under article 226 of the Constitution assessment was quashed by the Allahabad High Court on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to assess
Under section 6 of the UP Act No XIV of 1956 the assessments by the Additional Collector were validated and a party to the proceedings under Agricultural Income tax Act was given the right to move the Court or authority within the prescribed period to review the proceedings where in the assessments had been set aside on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make the assessment
By section 11 the authority or court so moved was bound to review the order
The State of Uttar Pradesh applied to the High Court for review of its earlier order quashing the assessment
The single judge of the High Court held that section II of the Act did not apply to writ pro ceedings under article 226 of the Constitution
On appeal the Division Bench held that the order for the single judge did not amount to a judgment  under Ch
VIII r5 cl10 of the Letter Patent and the Rules of Allahabad High Court and that section 11 of the Act did not apply to proceedings
by way of a writ before the High Court
On appeal by special leave by the State it was contended that the Division Bench was wrong and by an additional statement of case it was sought to be urged that the application for review should be treated as one under order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 2 Held per Sinha C J Subba Rao Ayyangar and Aiyar jj that under cl
IO of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court and the Rules of the Court the expression judgment  would even on the narrow view of the expression include the order in the present case whereby the statutory right given to the party was finally negatived and that the Division Bench was in error in holding that it was not a judgment 
Held further that the proceeding under article 226 of the constitution were neither proceedings  under the Act nor proceedings on the basis of the Act
The proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution were independent and original proceeding and not a continuation of the assessment proceedings
Venkataratnam vs Secretary of State for India 1930 ILR53 Mad
979 Ryots of Garabandha vs The Zamindar of Parlakimedi ILR  Ramayya vs State of Madras AIR 1952 Mad
300 Moulvi Hamid Hassan Nomani vs Banwarilal Coy
1947 II MLJ 32 Budge Budge Municipality vs Mangru 1952 57 CWN25 and Satyanarayanamurthi vs 1T Appellate Tribunal AIR1957 Andhra 123 referred to
The Act had to be interpreted consistently with the Constitution and there was no power in the State Legislature to compel the High Court to act in a particular way in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitu tion
Section II could only apply to cases Where any court or authority other than the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution had decided the matter
Held further that construing shall  in section II of the Act as may  would defeat the very provisions of the Act
Held also that the contention that the application under s11 of the Act may be treated as one order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was highly belated and further there were many possible objections to such a course and it cannot be acceded to