Appeal No 501 of 1966
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 23 1964 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No 1985 of 1963
H R Gokhale A N Sinha and D N Gupta for the appellants B R L Iyengar Bisliamber Lal and H K Puri for respon dent No 1
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam J
This appeal by the Management concerned by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Mysore High Court dated October 23 1964 dismissing Writ Petition No 1985 of 1963 and declining to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the second respondent the Industrial Tribunal Bangalore 1 from proceeding with the adjudication in 1
D No 8 of 1963
The short facts leading up to the State of Mysore making the reference which is the subject of adjudication by the second respondent in ID No 8 of 1963 are as follows The appellant is a textile mill in Bangalore manufacturing cotton silk and cotswool piece goods
After the Act XX of 1946 hereinafter to be referred to as the Standing Orders Act came into force the standing orders of the appellant s establishment were duly drawn up and certified by the authorities
Those standing orders among other things related to the question of leave to be granted 583 to the workmen
By its order dated August 2 1955 the Government of Mysore referred to the Industrial Tribunal Bangalore for adjudication an industrial dispute raised by certain categories of workmen of the appellant company
That reference was numbered as IC No 11 of 1955
The dispute that was referred was Whether the Standing Orders filed by the Management and now certified by the certifying authority be modified as a modification to the existing Standing Orders as amended by the employees through their association in the light of the views and as indicated in the Annexure to this notification
The Industrial Tribunal Bangalore made an award Exhibit M 6 on September 25 1956 whereby the Tribunal directed the addition of certain clauses in the Certified Standing Orders of the appellant company
There is no controversy that paragraphs 50 to 70 of Exhibit M 6 deal with privilege leave sick leave and casual leave which could be availed of by the workmen
Exhibit M 5 is a copy of the Certified Standing Orders of the Management company
After the amendments effected to those Standing Orders in pursuance of the award Exhibit M 6 clauses 1 2 3 and 4 of Order 9 of Exhibit M 5 deal with festival holidays
leave with wages medical leave and casual leave respectively
The award Exhibit M 6 after publication in the State Gazette on October 18 1956 came into operation on November 18 1956 under the provisions of section 193 read with section 17A1 of the Act XIV of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act
The first respondent began to make certain claims for revi sion of the provisions regarding leave and as the appellant was not willing to concede those
claims the first respondent appears to have approached the State Government to refer the dispute regarding this matter to the Tribunal for adjudication  but the State Government by its order Exhibit M 2 dated October 10 1962 declined to refer the matter for adjudication
In the said order the Government is of the view that as compared with leave facilities provided for in similar major industries in Bangalore the leave facilities then granted by the Management to the workmen of the appellant company cannot be considered to be inadequate and therefore the issue raised by the workmen does not merit reference for adjudication
But nevertheless later on the State Government referred for adjudication by its order dated March 20 1963 the following matters to the second res pondent Whether the workmen of Bangalore Woollen Cotton  Silk Mills Co Ltd are entitled to the following leave benefits a Privilege leave for one month in a year with pay
584 b Casual leave of 12 days in a year with pay
c Sick leave of 30 days in a year with full pay less ESI benefits
If not to what reliefs they are entitled to This reference out of which the present proceedings arise was registered as ID No 8 of 1963
From the questions referred to above it will be seen that the dispute that was referred for adjudication almost exclusively relates to the question of privilege leave casual leave and sick leave which are already provided for
in the Standing Orders of the Management Exhibit M 5
The first respondent has placed its demands in respect of this question before the Industrial Tribunal and the Management have also placed their points of view on these matters
It is not necessary to refer to the pleas made either by the appellant or the first respondent regarding the merits of the claim which has not been adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal
But the Management raised two preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to entertain and adjudicate upon the questions referred by the State Government
Those two preliminary objections were to the effect i The award Exhibit M 6 dealing with leave and other facilities not having been terminated by the first respondent by issue of a notice as contemplated under section 196 of the Act continues to be in force and therefore the question of leave cannot form the subject matter of adjudication
ii The question regarding leave facilities having been provided for in the Certified Standing Orders framed by the company under the Standing Orders Act any modifications to those provisions as is now sought to be done can only be in the manner provided for in the Standing Orders Act and cannot form the subject of adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal under the Act
The Workers  Union met these contentions by stating that the various representations made by it to the Management
as well as the presentation of a Charter of Demands amounted to notice of termination of the Award and that notwithstanding the Standing Orders Act when an industrial dispute was raised regarding matters which might be covered by the Standing Orders of the Management by the workmen and such a dispute was referred
for adjudication under the Act by the Government concerned the Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that dispute
These two questions have been answered by the Industrial Tribunal against the Management by its order dated August 26 1963
The High Court in its order under attack has also agreed 585 with the findings recorded by the Tribunal
In considering the first objection both the Tribunal and the High Court have gone into the question as to whether the notice contemplated under section 196 of the Act should be in writing or whether it can be oral and have expressed the concurrent view that such notice can be oral also but the ultimate finding recorded by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court is that the various correspondence that passed between the Management and the Union will clearly show that the Union has terminated the Award
On the second objection the Tribunal whose findings have again been accepted by the High Court has held that the scope of the Standing Orders Act is very limited and that there is really no conflict between the Act and the Standing Orders Act
It is the further view of the Tribunal that in spite of the provisions contained in the Standing Orders framed by the company under the provisions of the Standing Orders Act it is nevertheless open to a Tribunal to adjudicate upon those matters when the question is referred to it as an industrial dispute under the Act
In this appeal on behalf of the Management Mr H R Gokhale learned counsel has raised the same two contentions relating to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute in question
In respect of the first objection that the award Exhibit M 6 has not been terminated by a written notice under section 196 of the Act counsel urged that the views expressed by both the Tribunal and the High Court that there could be a notice given even orally terminating the award is not correct
No doubt
the findings in this regard that there can be an oral notice given under section 196 of the Act has been sought to be supported by Mr B R L Iyengar learned counsel appearing for the Union
In our opinion it was not really necessary either for the Tribunal or for the High Court to embark upon and express an opinion on the question as to whether the notice of termination of an award under section 196 of the Act can be oral because
so far as we can see the Union has not raised any plea that the termination of the award Exhibit M 6 in this case has been brought about by its giving an oral notice to the Management
On the other hand the specific plea of the Union on this aspect was that the various representations made by it to the Management as well as the presentation of the Charter of Demands
amounted to a notice of termination of the award
The various representations and the Charter of Demands referred to by the Union are the representations and charter given in writing to the Management on various matters
Therefore we express no opinion on this case as to whether the termination of an award can be brought about by an oral notice being given under section 196 of the Act
We will then consider the _question as to whether there has been a termination of the award Exhibit M 6 in the manner pleaded by the Union
It cannot be over emphasized that an 586 intimation claimed to have been given regarding the termination of an award must be fixed with reference to a particular date so as to enable a Court to come to the conclusion that the party giving that intimation has expressed its intention to terminate the award
Such a certainty regarding date is absolutely essential because the period of two months after the expiry of which the award will cease to be binding on the parties will have to be reckoned from the date of such clear intimation
It is also necessary to state that in this case the High Court and the Tribunal have proceeded on the basis that the decision of this Court in The Workmen of Western India Match Co Ltd vs The Western India Match Co Ltd1 supports the proposition that an inference of an intention to terminate an award or a settlement can be gathered from the various correspondence that passed between the Management and the Union
That decision in our opinion does not lend any support to such a view
From the facts of that case it is seen that there was a settlement between the parties on April 29 1955 and there was a Charter of Demand given by the workmen on January 25 1957
On January 14 1953 the Government of West Bengal referred to the Industrial Tribunal concerned for adjudication the demands made by the workmen
Earlier to that date on March 29 1957 the management had sent a reply to the Union that the Charter of Demands of January 25 1957 could not be considered inasmuch as the settlement of April 29 1955 had not been validly terminated under the Act
In answer to that communication the Union wrote on April 8 1957 that the various representations made by it to the management and the representation of the charter of demands amounted to a notice of termination of the settlement
In dealing with this point it will be seen that this Court observes that no formal notice as contemplated by section 192 of the Act has been given by the Union
But this Court ultimately held that though no such formal notice was given the letter of April 8 1957 written by the Union could itself be construed as notice within the meaning of section 192 and therefore the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim as the reference was made by the State Government long after the expiry of two months from April 8 1957
It will therefore be seen that this Court treated the letter of April 8 1957 written by the Union as amounting to a notice of intention to terminate the settlement
in the instant case we specifically desired Mr lyengar counsel for the Union to state which was the particular letter or representation made by the Union which could be considered to amount to a notice of termination of the award
Learned counsel stated that he relied upon the letter dated June 26 1961 written by the Union to the Management as amounting to a notice given by his client intimating its intention to terminate the award Exhibit M 6
In view of this stand taken by the counsel for the Union we are not referring to the events that took place subsequent to this  587 date viz June 26 1961 excepting to state that ultimately the State Government referred the present dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal
We have already stated that the award in IC No 11 of 1957 remained in operation till November 18
1957 under section 193 of the Act but notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation of the award under sub section
3 the said award will continue to be binding on the parties unless it is terminated in accordance with section 196 of the Act
Even during the period when this award was in operation ie within November 18 1957 the workers made certain demands as mentioned in their letter dated October 28 1957
The demands referred to in the said letter
related to various claims
made by the Union
In particular item 3 of Annexure A to the said letter related to certain claims made by the several employees regarding privilege leave and casual leave
On September 19 1958 there was a settlement arrived at between the parties under Exhibit M 3
It is only necessary to note clause 5 of this agreement whereby the Staff Association withdrew the demands in respect of the various claims made on October 28 1957 including the claim made for privilege leave and casual leave
The Staff Association also agreed that for a period of three years commencing from January 1 1958 they would not raise any dispute regarding any of the subjects covered by Annexure A to their original demands which included also the claim for privilege leave and casual leave
No doubt there is a reservation regarding gratuity
with which we are not now concerned
Therefore it will be noted that though a claim was made in respect of leave on October 28 1957 the Union withdrew that claim under the agreement M 3 and they also agreed not to make any demands for three years
This is a settlement arrived at
by the parties and this settlement will be binding on them
unless it is terminated
in accordance with section 192 of the Act
On August 14 1961 the Union issued a notice Exhibit W 3 to the Management under section 192 of the Act stating that the settlement of September 19 1958 will stand terminated and cease to be binding after the expiry of two months
from the date of receipt of that letter by the Management
it is in between September 19 1958 the date of the settlement M 3 and August 14 1961 the date of the notice W 3 terminating the settlement that the letter dated June 26 1961 relied on by Mr Iyengar as amounting to a notice of termination of the award as sent by the Union
No doubt in this letter the Union has among other matters claimed leave facilities
as stated therein
That claim related to privilege leave casual leave and sick leave
Even this letter does not as such intimate the Management of the Union s intention to terminate the award Exhibit M 6
Mr Iyengar
learned counsel urged that the very fact that the Union has made claims in this letter regarding leave facilities which are inconsistent with the award  Exhibit M 6 will clearly show that the Union is not standing by the award
From the facts
mentioned 588 above it will be clearly seen that the parties have entered into a settlement on September 19 1958 and one part of the agreement is that the Union is withdrawing its claim regarding leave facilities and it has also agreed not to raise any disputes regarding that matter for a period of three years
This settlement is bindingon both the Management and the Union and will continue to be binding until it is terminated in accordance with section 192of the Act
Notice of intention to terminate the settlement was given on August 14 1961 and under section 192 of the Act the settlement will cease to be binding after the expiry of two months ie on October 14 1961
This letter written on June 26 1961 long before the issue of the notice on August 14 1961 terminating the settlement under section 192 is in our opinion of no avail
Unless the settlement is terminated the Union had no right to make any demands regarding leave facilities as it has purported to do on June 26 1961
Therefore in our opinion this letter cannot be considered to be a notice given by the Union expressing its intention to terminate the award
Apart from the fact that it does not convey any such intention it is also invalid inasmuch as it has been given even before the settlement was terminated
From this it will follow that when there is a subsisting award binding on the parties the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to consider the same points in this reference
Normally this conclusion arrived at by us may be enough to dispose of this appeal  but the second question relating to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal functioning under the Act to adjudicate upon a dispute which may result in the modification of the Standing Orders
framed by the management
under the Standing Orders Act has also been adjudicated upon by the Tribunal and the High Court and the correctness of those findings have been canvassed
before us
If later on there is a proper reference to the Tribunal the same questions may arise for consideration and therefore
we shall proceed to express our views on that aspect also
The contention of Mr Gokhale
learned counsel for the appellant is that the Management after the coming into force of the Standing Orders Act had framed standing orders which have been certified by the Certifying Officer
Those Standing Orders originally framed made provision for the grant of privilege leave sick leave casual leave and other allied matters
The Award Exhibit M 6 dealt with the claim of the workmen in this regard and gave certain directions
Those directions have been incorporated by the Management
by amending the Standing Orders and the provisions regarding leave
 are all to be found in those Standing Orders Exhibit M 5
The Standing Orders Act as the various provisions therein will show is a self contained statute imposing obligations on the Management and also conferring rights
on the parties concerned
for the framing of and effecting modifications in the Standing Orders
The manner in 589 which the modification is to be sought is also indicated in the Act
In this connection learned counsel referred us to the interpretation placed upon item 5 in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act by this Court in The Bagalkot Cement Co Ltd vs R K Pathan1 that it is open to the authorities functioning under the Standing Orders Act to make substantive provisions for the granting of leave and holidays along with conditions in respect of them
Mr Gokhale pointed out that the Standing Orders Act placed an obligation on the management to have the Standing Orders certified it imposes a duty on the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the reasonableness and fairness of the Standing Orders  a right has been given
both to the workmen and the management to apply to the Certifying Officer to have the Standing Orders modified there is provision for appeals penal provisions are provided for failure to submit draft standing orders or for modifying standing orders otherwise than in accordance with section 10 and finally jurisdiction is given under section 13 A to the Labour Court constituted under the Standing Orders Act to entertain any dispute that may be referred to it by the employer or workman regarding the application or interpretation of a standing order
These provisions according to the learned counsel
clearly show that the Standing Orders Act is a self sufficient statute
by if any provision made
in respect of leave
in any Standing Orders requires modification
the only procedure to be adopted by the party concerned
is as indicated in the Standing Orders Act
In respect of all matters which are to be so dealt with
regarding industrial establishments
to which the Standing Orders Act applied the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Act will have no jurisdiction to entertain a claim or adjudicate upon the same
When two statutes
as in this case
the Act and the Standing Orders Act more or less deal with some common matters the proper and reasonable view to hold will be that the Act can be invoked only in respect of industrial establishments which are not governed by the Standing Orders Act
Mr Gokhale also pointed out that under such circumstances the remedy to be adopted is the one under the Standing Orders Act and this is also to be deduced from the views expressed by this Court
in certain deci sions to which he has drawn our attention
Mr lyengar learned counsel for the Union on the other hand points out that the Act and the Standing Orders Act
have been enacted for different purposes the scope of an adjudication under the Standing Orders Act counsel points out is only regarding the fairness or reasonableness of standing orders
The Standing Orders certified under the Standing Orders Act are no doubt binding on the parties and in individual cases it may be possible for a workman to apply for a modification of a particular Stand 1 1962 Supp 2 SCR 697
590 ing Order or raise a question regarding the application or interpretation of a Standing Order and refer it to the Labour Court
But counsel points out
that does not mean that there cannot be a larger question by way of an industrial dispute
raised by the Union or the workmen as a body concerned which will necessitate an adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal under the Act
In this connection counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Act and the Standing Orders Act were amended by a common Act the Industrial Disputes Amendment And Miscel laneous Provisions Act 1956 Act KXXVI of 1956
This Amending Act made provision for adjudication by the certifying authority and the appellate authority under the standing Orders Act Upon the reasonableness and fairness of standing orders
It made a provision giving a right to a workman also to apply to the Certifying Officer to have the standing orders modified
Section 13A regarding reference being made to the Labour Court by a workman or an employer in respect of the application or interpretation of a standing order was also incorporated by the Amending Act
Side by side with these amendments made to the Standing Orders Act various amendments were effected in the Act also
Provisions regarding the constitution of the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Tribunals and matters over which they have jurisdiction as enumerated in the particular Schedules to that Act were also made
An adjudication made by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is binding on the parties referred to in section 18 of the Act
No doubt section 13A of the Standing Orders Act enables an employer or a workman to refer to the Labour Court any question relating to the application or interpretation of a standing order
But the same Amending Act has incorporated in the Second Schedule to the Act item 2 relating to the application and interpretation of standing orders  over which the Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon Similarly counsel points out the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Act has been given jurisdiction to deal with matters referred to in the Second and Third Schedules to the Act Leave with wages and holidays  is item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act over which jurisdiction has been given only to the Industrial Tribunal
If the contention of the appellant is accepted it will mean
that in respect of a similar question covered by the standing orders framed by a company the Labour Court which is denied jurisdiction under the Act will be competent to adjudicate upon the same
Therefore counsel points out that the matters covered by the standing orders in respect of the various items contained in the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act can no doubt be dealt with in accordance with the provisions contained therein but a general or a larger controversy regarding those matters can certainly form the subject of an industrial dispute  as that expression is defined in the Act and if that is so the Industrial Tribunal will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those matters when a reference is made by the State Government
591 We are in agreement with the contentions of Mr Iyengar on this point
The scheme of the Standing Orders Act has been dealt with by this Court in three of its reported decisions Guest Keen Williams Private Ltd vs P J Sterling1 The Bagalkot Cement Co Ltd vs R K Pathan2 and Salem Electricity vs Employees 
Therefore we do not think it necessary to cover the around over again
Those decisions have also noted the amendments effected to the Standing Orders Act by the Amending Act XXXVI of 1956
Those are the decisions which have been referred to by Mr Gokhale in support of his contention that the observations made therein will show that after the amendment of the Standing Orders Act in 1956 no industrial dispute can be raised under the Act in respect of the matters covered by the Standing Orders Act and that the remedy of the parties concerned will only be as laid down therein
On a perusal of those decisions we do not find that any such proposition has been laid therein
On the other hand we will presently show that in the latest decision of this Court the question as to whether there can be an industrial dispute raised which can form the subject of an adjudication under the Act has been specifically left open
In Guest Keen Williams Private Ltd vs P J Sterling1 the Management had framed standing orders which had been certified under the Standing Orders Act
On the basis of those standing orders certain workmen were voluntarily retired at the age of 55 years and the dispute regarding this matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act
The order of the Management was set aside and reinstatement of some of the workers was ordered
An objection was raised on behalf of the Management before this Court that the reference by the Government itself was bad on the ground that section 7 of the Standing Orders Act makes the standing orders binding between the employer and his employees and till those standing orders are modified the parties will be governed by those standing orders and the legality of the action taken by the Management on the basis of the standing orders cannot form the subject of a reference under the Act
But this Court after referring to the scheme of the Standing Orders Act observed that before the Standing Orders Act was amended in 1956 if the employees wanted to challenge the reasonableness or fairness of any of the standing orders the only course was to raise an industrial dispute in that matter but that this position was altered by the amendments made to the Standing Orders Act by which it bad been made obligatory on the part of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the reasonableness and fairness of a standing order and a right had been given to the workman also
to apply 1  2 1962 Supp 2 SCR 697
3  592 for the modification of any standing order
This Court further observed at p 358 The standing orders certified under the Act no doubt become part of the terms of employment by operation of section 7 but if an industrial dispute arises in respect of such orders and it is referred to the tribunal by the appropriate government the tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with it on the merits
According to Mr Gokhale these observations will clearly indicate that the view of this Court is that prior to 1956 the questions regarding standing orders could form the subject of an industrial adjudication under the Act and he wants us to draw the inference that after 1956 the view of this Court is that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in such matters has been taken away
We are not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel for this Court in the above decision had no occasion to consider the provisions of the Standing Orders Act in relation to the Act
In fact there is no reference at all to the amendments effected in 1956 to the Act
The next decision is The Bagalkot Cement Co Ltd vs R K Pathan1
In that decision this Court had to consider again the effect of the Standing Orders Act prior to its amendment in 1956
No doubt the amendments effected in 1956 are also adverted to when considering the scheme of the Standing Orders Act
In particular the scope of item 5 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act to the effect conditions of procedure in applying for and the authority which may grant
leave and holidays  came up for consideration
The contention on behalf of the Management appears to have been that the jurisdiction
conferred on a Certifying Authority under this clause does not empower the said Authority to deal with the substantive question of the extent and quantum of leave and holidays
It was further contended that the said clause only required the Standing Orders to provide for conditions subject to which leave and holidays could be granted as well as the procedure in respect thereof
In short it was contended that the quantum of leave and holidays to be granted to workmen was outside the purview of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act and as such they could not be included by the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority in the Standing Orders
This contention was rejected by this Court and it was held that the substantive provisions for the granting of leave and holidays along with conditions in that respect could be provided for in the Standing Orders under cl 5 of the Schedule
It will be noted that this decision was also concerned solely with the question of the jurisdiction of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority under the Standing Orders Act in relation to the standing orders which came up for consideration before them
In this decision also this Court did not have occasion to 593 consider whether those matters could form the subject of an industrial adjudication under the Act
Mr Gokhale no doubt relied upon the observation at p710 to the following effect It is not disputed that the claim for leave and holidays can become the subject matter of an industrial dispute and if such a dispute is referred for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal the Tribunal can fix the quantum of holidays and leave
What the Tribunal can do on such reference is now intended to be achieved by the Standing Orders themselves in respect of industrial establishments to which the Act applies
We have noticed that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority are in substance industrial authorities and if they are given power to make provision for leave and holidays as they undoubtedly are given power to provide for termination of employment and suspension or dismissal for misconduct there is nothing inconsistent with the spirit of the Schedule or With the object of the Act and attempted to persuade us to hold that in respect of all the matters covered by the standing orders exclusive jurisdiction is vested only in the authorities constituted under the Standing Orders Act
Though prima facie the above observations may appear to give some support to this contention of Mr Gokhale in our opinion those observations must be limited to the question that this Court was considering in that case which
again
was with reference to the powers of the authorities under the Standing Orders Act as well as the rights of the parties with reference to those standing orders
But at any rate as we shall presently show in the later decision the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in such matters has been specifically left open
We then come to the decision of this Court in Salem Electricity vs Employees1
In that case the appellant had framed standing orders and got them certified in or about 1947
under the Standing Orders Act
In 1960 the appellant made an application before the Certifying Officer for amendment of certain standing orders
By virtue of the proposed amendment the management wanted to have two sets of standing orders
to govern the relevant terms and conditions of its employees
Both the Certifying Officer as well as the Appellate Authority declined to modify the standing orders as desired by the management
The question that arose for decision was it short one as to whether the rejection of the application of the management was justified or not
This Court again considered the scheme of the Standing Orders Act both before and after its amendment in 1956 and held that in regard 1 L JN6SCI 12 594 to the certification of the standing orders the Standing Orders Act provided for a self contained code and ultimately held that the refusal of the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority to modify the standing orders was perfectly justified
Here again this Court had no occasion to consider the position of standing orders framed under the Standing Orders Act in relation to an industrial dispute that may be raised and referred for adjudication under the Act
In fact that no decision was intended to be given on that aspect is made clear by the learned Chief Justice when he observes at p 506 It may be that even in regard to matters covered by certified Standing Orders industrial disputes may arise between the
employer and his employees and a question may then fall to be considered whether such disputes can be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication under section 101 of the 
In other words where an industrial dispute arises in respect of such matters it may become necessary to consider whether notwithstanding the selfcontained provisions of the Act it would not still be open to the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication
We wish to make it clear that our decision in the present appeal has no relation to that question
In the present appeal the only point which we are deciding is whether under the scheme of the Act it is permissible to the employer to require the appropriate authorities Under the Act to certify two different sets of Standing Orders in regard to any of the matters covered by the Schedule
 None of the above decisions lend support to the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that after the amendment effected in 1956 to the Standing Orders Act the Industrial Tribunal will have no jurisdiction under the Act to adjudicate upon any disputes in relation to matters covered by the Standing Orders framed under the Standing Orders Act
Further accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant will be to practically wipe out the existence of the Act so far as industrial establishments governed by the Standing Orders Act are concerned
The Legislature in 1956 amended by the same Act viz Act XXXVI of 1956 both the Act and the Standing Orders Act
Schedules were also incorporated in the Act and
in particular the same item
which is referred to in section 13A of the Standing Orders Act is again referred to as item 2
of the Second Schedule to the Act over which the Labour Court has jurisdiction
Item 5 of the Schedule to the Standing Orders Act as interpreted by this Court
gives jurisdiction to the authorities under that Act to frame standing order
with reference 595 not only to the procedure for rant of leave and holidays but also in respect of the quantum of leave and allied matters
The Legislature in item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act dealing with leave with wages and holidays  has conferred jurisdiction In that regard on the Industrial Tribunal
The Standing Orders Act which has for its object the defining with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under the industrial establish ments and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the workman for the purpose of having a standing order modified or for having any question relating to the application or interpretation of a standing order referred to a labour Court
But there is no warrant in our opinion for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a self contained statute with regarded to the matters mentioned therein the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Act to adjudicate upon the matters covered by the standing orders has been in any mannerabridged or taken away
It will always be open in a proper casefor the Union or workmen to raise an industrial dispute  as that expression is defined in section 2k of the Act and if such a dispute is referred by the Government concerned for adjudication the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be
will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same
But it must also be borne in mind that an industrial dispute  has to be raised by the Union before it can be referred and it is not unlikely that a Union must
be persuaded to raise the dispute though the grievance of a particular workman or a member of the Union be otherwise well founded
Even if the Union takes up the dispute the State Government may or may not refer it to the Industrial Tribunal
The discretion of the State Government under section 10 of the Act is very wide
It may be that the workmen
affected by the standing orders may not always and in every case Succeed in obtaining a reference to the Industrial Tribunal on a relevant point
These are some of the circumstances for giving a right and remedy to the workman under the Standing Orders Act itself but there is no indication in the scheme of the Standing Orders Act that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to entertain an Industrial dispute  bearing upon the standing orders of in industrial establishment and to adjudicate upon the same has any manner been abridged or taken away by the Standing Orders Act
Therefore on this aspect we are in agreement with he conclusions arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal and the High Court
But in view of our finding on the first point that the award Exhibit M 6 had not been terminated
it follows that the reference
made by the State Government dated March 201963 in his case is incompetent and the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same in ID No 8 of 1963
In the result the order of the High Court is set aside and a writ of 596 prohibition restraining the second respondent from proceeding_ with the adjudication in ID No 8 of 1963 will issue and the appeal allowed to that extent
Parties will bear their own costs in this appeal
GC Appeal allowed in part


Summary:
The Standing Orders of the appellant s establishment duly certified under the  dealt inter alia with provisions relating to leave to be granted to the workmen
In IC 11 of 1955 the Industrial Tribunal by its award modified the said standing orders and made provisions for certain kinds of leave
The award came into operation on November 18 1956 under section 193 read with section 17A7 of the 
On further disputes arising the parties entered on September 19 1958 into a settlement under section 123 of the whereby in return for the revision of the scales of pay the workmen agreed that for a period of three years commencing from January 1 1958 they would not raise any dispute on certain matters including leave
This settlement was terminated by the workmen by notice dated August 14 1961 under section 192 of the 
In 1963 the State Government again referred to the Industrial Tribunal an industrial dispute between the appellant and the workmen
This dispute was registered as ID No 8 of 1963 and the questions referred related to privilege leave casual leave and sick leave
The appellant urged before the Tribunal that it was not competent to hear the reference because i the earlier award in IC 11 of 1955 which dealt with matters relating to leave had not been terminated by a notice under section 196 of the  ii the Standing Orders in question could be modified only by the procedure under the Standing Orders Act and not under the because the former Act was self sufficient in regard to the matters covered by it
The Tribunal and the High Court both rejected the appellant s objections whereupon by special leave appeal was filed in this Court
On behalf of the workmen it was stated that notice of termination of the earlier award under section 196 of the Industrial disputes Act had been given by them in a letter dated June 26 1961
HELDi When there is a subsisting award binding on the parties the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the same points in a fresh reference
In the present case the earlier award had not been terminated and the reference was therefore incompetent
588D The letter of June 26 1961 could not be treated as a notice under s196 of the terminating the earlier award in IC 11 of 1955 because it did not convey any such intention
Moreover it was written while the settlement of September 19 1958 by which the workmen had bound themselves not to raise any dispute regarding leave facilities for three years was still in force for the notice of
termination of the settlement under section 192 was given by the workmen only on August 14 1961
Until the said settlement was terminated the union of workmen had no right to make demands about leave facilities as it purported to do on June 26 1961
587G 588C 582 The Workmen of Western India Match Co Ltd vs The Western India Match Co Ltd   referred to
ii The Standing Orders Act which has for its object the defining with sufficient precision
the conditions of employment under the industrial establishments and to make the said conditions known to the workmen has provided more or less a speedy remedy to the workmen for the purpose of having a standing order modified or for having any question relating to the application or interpretation of a standing order
referred to a labour court
But there is no warrant for holding that merely because the Standing Orders Act is a selfcontained statute with regard to the matters mentioned therein the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Act
to adjudicate upon the matters covered by the standing orders has been in any manner abridged or taken away It will always be open in a proper case for the union or workmen to raise an industrial dispute  as that expression is defined in section 2k of the  and if such a dispute is referred by the Government concerned for adjudication the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be will have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same
595B D Guest Keen Williams Private Ltd vs P J Sterling   The Baualkot Cement Co Ltd vs R K Pathan 1962 Supp
2 SCR 697 and Salem Electricity vs Employees  distinguished