Appeal No 146 of 1956
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 3 1954 of the Madras High Court in Referred Case No 69 of 1954
M section K Aiyanger for the appellant
1094 R Ganapathy Iyer and T M Sen for respondents Nos 1 and 2 1957
May 6
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J
This appeal by special leave and the summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules 1950 have been heard together and will be disposed of by this Judgment
The appellant was an advocate of the Madras High Court of more than 25 years  standing and was enrolled as an advocate of the then Federal Court in the year 1939
As will presently appear he has had a chequered career at the Bar
A Full Bench of the Madras High Court presided over by the Chief Justice of that Court by its judgment and order dated December 3 1954 has directed that the appellant s name be removed from the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court for grave professional misconduct
This Court having been apprised of the result of the proceedings against the appellant in the High Court issued notice to him to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice in view of the findings recorded by the High Court
It appears that the appellant was engaged by one K T Appannah ordinarily residing in Bangalore city who will hereinafter be referred to as the Complainant to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city of Madras whom we shall call in the course of this judgment as the vendor after scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property which was the subject matter of the transaction of sale
Before the appellant was engaged by the complainant the bargain had been struck and the sale price of the property had been fixed at Rs 15000 out of which Rs 1300 had been paid to the vendor by way of earnest money
A retired Government servant named Sundararajayya who was a relation of the complainant and used to live near about the appellant s residence had also helped the complainant in acquiring the property and in that connection used to give instructions to the appellant 1095 on behalf of the complainant
On May 11 1951 the complainant sent by way of a demand draft the sum of Rs 1400 to the appellant to meet the costs of stamp for the sale deed and registration and a fee of Rs 150 to the appellant for his work in connection with the transaction
In the course of the enquiry into the title to the property it was discovered that there was a mortgage on the property of Rs 5500 on the basis of a registered mortgage deed which had been filed in Court in connection with a litigation in respect of that very property pending on the original side of the Madras High Court
By negotiation it was settled that Rs 5500 out of the sale price shall be reserved for the discharge of the mortgage debt and that the remaining amount of the consideration will be paid to the vendor on completion of the sale transaction and delivery of vacant possession of the property
The appellant wrote to the complainant that the latter should send him a demand draft for Rs 5600 in his name for payment to the mortgagee aforesaid when the mortgage bond properly discharged would be handed over to the appellant acting for the complainant
In due course on or about June 26 1951 a demand draft in the name of the appellant for Rs 5600 was sent by the complainant for the express purpose of discharging the mortgage debt aforesaid
On August 21 1951 a cheque for Rs 1200 on September 26 1951 a cheque for Rs 500 and on October 19 1951 a demand draft for Rs 5500 all in the name of the appellant were sent by the complainant in order to put him in funds for completing the transaction of sale and for payment of the consideration money to the vendor
On July 9 1951 the sale deed was executed by some of the executants and on September 6 1951 it was executed by the remaining executant and registered
Hence it would appear that between May 11 1951 and October 24 1951 the complainant had paid to the appellant the sum of Rs 15200 which was sufficient to pay the outstanding amount of the consideration for sale namely Rs 13700 including the mortgage amount aforesaid of Rs 5500 besides the costs of stamp and registration and the appellant s fees
But it appears 1096 that the vendor s portion of the consideration money was paid by the appellant on November 23 1951 after some avoidable delay due to him and vacant delivery of possession given to the appellant as stipulated between the parties
It appears further that the complainant was in need of raising money on the security of the newly acquired property and therefore was anxious to receive all the documents of title including the mortgage bond duly discharged
But the appellant for reasons of his own went on postponing the payment of the mortgage money on some pretext or the other
On being pressed for the mortgage deed duly discharged being handed over to the complainant and as a result of a protracted correspondence the appel lant sent to the complainant on June 26 1952 a number of documents including cancelled mortgage documents
 It should be added here that the mortgage transaction of Rs 5500 had been entered into by the owner of the property in order to discharge previous mortgages on the same property
All these documents had to be withdrawn from the High Court where they had been in the custody of the Court as already indicated
Unfortunately Sundararajayya died on June 28 1952
As a result of further correspondence the complainant came to realise to his cost that the mortgage debt of Rs 5500 had not been paid to the mortgagee as arranged between the appellant and the complainant who had put him in funds with the express purpose of obtaining a clear title to the property which he had agreed to purchase
Thus the complainant was reduced to the necessity of filing a regular petition of complaint in the High Court on November 14 1952
In that petition of complaint the complainant made copious quotations from the letters addressed by the appellant to him and made reference to the fact that the mortgagee had already instituted a suit in court for recovery of the mortgage money and had impleaded the complainant as party defendant to the suit
The gravamen of the charge against the appellant was that he had not discharged the outstanding mortgage on the property purchased for which he had been supplied with ample funds by the complainant 1097 and that he had not disclosed how and in what manner the complainant s money meant for the purpose had been utilized by the appellant
In answer to the notice issued to him on February 16 1953 the appellant submitted along statement by way of an explanation which runs into about 43 pages in print which is more in the nature of an argument in justification of his conduct than a statement of facts
The High Court referred the complaint for inquiry and report to the Bar Council
Three members of the Council constituted the Tribunal which held a very elaborate inquiry
After recording both oral and documentary evidence the Bar Council made its report on May 5 1954 holding that   both the charges have been fully established and that the respondent has not only not used the moneys of the complainant for the purpose for which the money was sent but that the respondent has not accounted at all for the sum of rupees 5000 which was admittedly cashed by him and brought into his bank account though not in his professional account
 In course of its report the Tribunal found that the appellant had received all the amounts sent by the complainant as set out above
It also pointed out that an unfortunate feature of the case was that the mortgage bond in question which was one of the cancelled mortgage documents had not been produced before it
The non production of the crucial document was explained to the Tribunal by counsel for the complainant
It was stated that the mortgagedeed in question along with other documents had been left by the complainant with his counsel and that the whole bundle of papers including those documents had disappeared from his office
One can only surmise as to who may have been responsible for secreting those documents or for whose benefit they had been stolen away as alleged by counsel for the complainant
Another ugly aspect of the proceedings was that a number of letters admittedly written by the appellant to the complainant in connection with the transaction of sale had been found by the High Court to have been 141 1098 tampered with or bodily substituted
The Tribunal observed with particular reference to exhibit C 12 which was alleged to have been substituted for the original that the learned counsel for the complainant had not persisted in the charge that it had been substituted and that he did not press the charge that there had been certain alterations in some other letters which formed part of the voluminous correspondence that passed between the appellant and the complainant
It may be observed here that no specific charge had been drawn up against the appellant in respect of those letters
Hence when the Tribunal stated that the  charge  had been withdrawn it only meant to say that the learned counsel for the complainant did not persist in his allegations about those alterations or the wholesale substitution of exhibit C 12 about which we will have to say something more in the course of this judgment
The Tribunal examined in some detail the particular defence of the appellant with reference to the specific charges made against him in respect of the sum of Rs 5600 admittedly sent by the complainant for the specific purpose of discharging the mortgage encumbrance on the purchased property
It appears to have been the appellant s case that the demand draft for Rs 5500 dated October 24 1951 had been sent to him through Sundararajayya and that the appellant after getting the amount of the draft credited to his personal account kept only Rs 500 for payment to the vendor and made over to Sundararajayya the remaining 5000 rupees in cash
It was not his case that the complainant had instructed him to pay to Sundararajayya the 5000 rupees alleged by him to have been paid to Sundararajayya
It was not even his case that he had taken any receipt for the said sum from Sundararajayya though he alleged that he had given a receipt to Sundararajayya for the much smaller sum of Rs 500 which he admitted to have kept in his hands on account of the complainant for payment to the vendee
After reviewing the entire evidence and particularly the correspondence that passed between the appellant and the complainant the 1099 Tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant dishonestly and fraudulently represented to the complainant that the mortgage had been cancelled and he picked out 3 out of the 36 documents received by him from the vendor including the mortgage document herein involved and sent the same to the complainant describing them as cancelled documents 
The only inference that one can draw is that the respondent having utilized the monies intended for the discharge of the mortgage for his own purpose put on the mortgage document the marks of cancellation and sent the same to the complainant at the pressure of the complainant s demand for the discharged mortgage document
The Tribunal also examined all the relevant evidence bearing on the payment back of Rs 5000 to Sundararajayya out of the demand draft for Rs 5500 admittedly sent by the complainant and credited to the personal account of the appellant
As already indicated Sundararajayya had died before the commencement of the inquiry and therefore his evidence could not be available to the Tribunal
But in spite of the complete absence of the mortgage bond in question from the record and of the possible explanation of Sundararajayya the Tribunal had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is clearly guilty not only of professional misconduct but also a clear breach of trust
 This report of the Tribunal was closely examined by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court
The learned Chief Justice who presided over the Bench after carefully considering all that could have been said on behalf of the appellant and the relevant evidence both oral and documentary confirmed the findings of the Tribunal
It went a little further and held that exhibit C 12 was not genuine and that the letters exhibits C 10 and C 11 contained interpolations at the instance of the appellant who was the respondent before the Court
In this connection the High Court made the following observations  The learned Advocate General attacked the genuineness of this letter
Whether there was another genuine letter of the same date or not it is not 1100 necessary to decide
No doubt this letter is in the handwriting of the respondent
After deep consideration of all the circumstances we are clearly of opinion that this letter must have been introduced into the bundle is of documents with the complainant s advocate at or about the same time when the respondent made the interpolations in the letters dated 6 9 1951 and 6 10 1951 exhibits C 10 and C 11
 In the result the High Court directed that the appellant s name be removed from the roll of advocates of that Court
Against this order the appellant prayed for and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court
It is convenient at this stage to deal with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant
It has been suggested that the inquiry by the Bar Council Tribunal was rambling and roving
This objection is not altogether unfounded
It appears from the order sheet maintained by the Tribunal that charges were framed on July 22 1953 and the inquiry continued from date to date until the report was made on May 5 1954
The Tribunal handled the case on as many as 45 dates and the printed record of the inquiry runs into 296 pages in print
This must have entailed a good deal of expenditure of time and money to the parties and one may particularly sympathize with the complainant who had to go through all this after having been deprived of at least Rs 5000 if not more as found by the High Court and the Tribunal
But if it is necessary to apportion blame much of it may be laid at the door of the appellant himself who appears to have spent a lot of ingenuity over trying to explain his dealings with his unfortunate client
In answer to the charge framed by the Bar Council Tribunal the appellant submitted a long written answer on September 27 1953
But before that he had already submitted a written explanation  on February 16 1953 running into 43 pages in print as already indicated
There is no doubt that the appellant left no stone unturned to cloud the issues and to throw a veil over his mis deeds as found by the Tribunal and the Madras High Court
It is cleat therefore that it is 1101 not the appellant who should have made any grievance out of the so called rambling and roving inquiry
It was next pointed out that the inquiry by the Tribunal into the alleged misconduct of the appellant was in the nature of a quasi criminal proceeding and as necessary corollaries to this proposition it was contended 1 that the charge should have been more precise that 2 it should have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt
We have examined these contentions with reference to the record as prepared by the Tribunal and in our opinion it has not been made out that the charge was so defective as to mislead the appellant or to cause any substantial prejudice to him or that there is any room for reasonable doubt as to the truth of the charges framed against the appellant
The charges framed against the appellant were in these terms  That you Mr  C  in acting for the petitioner as his advocate in the matter of scrutinising the title deeds of No 104 A Lloyds Road Gopalapuram Madras and putting through the sale of the said premises in petitioner s favour received from the petitioner Rs 5600 for the purpose of discharging a mortgage encumbrance on the property and that you have not applied the monies so entrusted to you then and there for the purposes of entrustment
That you Mr C  have further not disclosed to the petitioner how and in what manner you have utilised the said monies and that you have not accounted for the same when demanded
That you have for these reasons committed acts of professional misconduct liable to be dealt with under the Bar Councils Act
 With reference to the charge in the first paragraph it was contended that the charge as it appears has been completely answered by the appellant
The argument runs as follows The reference to the sum of Rs 5600 apparently is to the demand draft for the said amount dated January 26 1951
This amount the appellant claimed had been paid over to the vendee 1102 himself on November 23 1951 when vacant possession of the premises purchased was delivered to the appellant
This could have been a complete answer to the charge if it had been found as a fact that out of the demand draft dated October 24 1951 of Rs 5500 the appellant had paid back to Sundararajayya the sum of Rs 5000 as alleged by him
But as found by the Court below confirming the conclusions of the Bar Council Tribunal the appellant had failed to establish by reliable evidence that the sum of Rs 5000 had as a matter of fact been paid back to Sundararajayya aforesaid
Hence on the findings it is clear that the appellant had in his hands more than ample funds to pay the entire consideration money including the mortgage encumbrance of Rs 5500 after deducting Rs 1300 which had already been paid to the vendor by way of earnest money before the appellant came on the scene
But it is sought to be pointed out on behalf of the appellant that the charge against him was not that he had not accounted for or had embezzled any portion of the sum of RE 5500 sent to him last on October 24 1951
This argument assumes that the mortgage debt outstanding against the purchased property had to be discharged in specie out of any particular item out of several instalments in which the complainant bad entrusted the total sum of Rs 15200 to the appellant in connection with the transaction in question
The appellant had to account for the due application of the said amount of Rs 15200 being the total sum placed in his hands by his client for the purpose of seeing through the transaction
The appellant himself does not claim that he rendered account of the total sum thus entrusted to him by his client
The appellant cannot be said to have duly accounted for all this sum unless it were held that he had paid Rs 5000 in cash to Sundararajayya
On his own showing if it is held as it has been found by the High Court in agreement with the Tribunal that the sum of Rs 5000 had not been paid to Sundararajayya the appellant has not accounted for the entire amount entrusted to him by his client
This then is a clear 1103 case shorn of all verbiage introduced by the appellant himself to cloud the issues that the appellant was entrusted by his client with the sum of Rs 15200 out of which he had to discharge the mortgage debt of Rs 5500 as settled with the mortgagee by the appellant himself acting on behalf of the complainant
The appellant has never pretended that he has paid this sum to the mortgagee
This is made absolutely clear by the appellant s statement in paragraph 58 of his written explanation  to the following effect  There is no question of my having discharged the mortgage
I did not discharge the mortgage
I never paid any money to the mortgagee or to anyone on his behalf
I never told or wrote and I could not have told or written to any at any time that I had paid the mortgage claim
The allegation or suggestion to that effect is untrue
As already stated I was not placed with the requisite funds on and after 21 11 1951
 There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the appellant had not applied the sum of Rs 5500 in discharging the mortgage debt aforesaid out of the sum of Rs 15200 placed in his hands by the complainant for the specific purpose of acquiring a clear title to the property
It would have been better if the Bar Council Tribunal had called upon the appellant to account for the entire amount of Rs 15200 which he admitted he had received from his client instead of mentioning only the one item of Rs 5600
That would have been a straight case to state against the appellant
But there is no reason to hold that the appellant was in any way prejudiced in his defence by the omission in the charge to mention the entire sum of money entrusted to him
It was repeatedly mentioned before us that the appellant might have been a fool in his dealings with the money placed at his disposal by his client the complainant
There are clear indications in the record that the appellant far from being a fool is a knave and that he knew fully what charge he had to meet
There is no ambiguity in the charge and there is no doubt that the High Court was fully justified in wholeheartedly confirming the conclusions of the 1104 Tribunal
It is equally clear to us that there is no room for any doubt whatsoever that the appellant had misappropriated his client s money and that the High Court was fully justified in striking off his name from the roll of advocates of that Court
It remains to consider the further points sought to be made on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in recording its findings in respect of exhibits C 10 C 11 and C 12 quoted above specially when the learned counsel for the complainant had not pressed those allegations of interpolation and forgery before the Tribunal
This contention is well founded
We have therefore left completely out of account those allegations of material alterations in exhibits C 10 and C 11 and the alleged wholesale substitution of the original of exhibit C 12
In considering the question whether the charges framed against the appellant have been substantiated we have proceeded on the assumption that these letters as they appear at present are genuine
They contain the statements of the appellant himself and constitute an attempt to explain away his acts of omission and commission in relation to the transaction of sale for which he had been engaged by the complainant
Those statements are wholly out of tune with the rest of the record and particularly inconsistent with the rest of the correspondence which had admittedly passed between the appellant and the complainant
We have not dealt in detail with the voluminous correspondence between the parties because this being an appeal by special leave we have not found it necessary to examine very closely the findings of fact recorded by the High Court in concurrence with the Tribunal
The case against the appellant as made out by the complainant is fully supported by a large body of reliable oral and documentary evidence which is consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and wholly inconsistent with his innocence notwithstanding the fact that he made a belated but vain attempt to white wash his misconduct
Turning to the summons issued by this Court to the appellant the first question that arises is the 1105 procedure according to which this summons is to be disposed of Should this Court initiate independent proceedings in the sense of making fresh inquiry after recording evidence pro and con and then come to its conclusions or should this Court proceed upon the inquiry already made by the High Court through the Bar Council Tribunal and record its orders after giving the Advocate concerned an opportunity of being heard against similar orders being passed by this Court in view of the consideration that an advocate of this Court may be entitled to practice in any of the subordinate courts in India even though he may not be borne on the roll of advocates of any particular High Court  In this connection we have precedents of the time of the Federal Court and of this Court which are analogous to the case in hand
In those cases the Federal Court and subsequently this Court acted upon the report of the High Court containing its orders in respect of an advocate on its rolls and passed orders after giving an opportunity to the advocate concerned to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him in view of the findings of the High Court
In those cases it was not considered necessary to have a fresh inquiry made and the Court being satisfied that the orders of the High Court were well founded in fact and law passed similar orders
Curiously enough the first precedent of the Federal Court In the matter of an Advocate 1 relates to the case of the appellant himself at an earlier stage of his career as an advocate
The Court consisting of Sir Maurice Gwyer Chief Justice Sir section Varadachariar and Sir Torick Ameer Ali JJ
dealt with his case
The appellant had been charged in respect of events which had happened in 1934 35 and was convicted in 1941 at the Madras Sessions of only one out of 5 counts of an attempt to cheat
He served a sentence of 18 months  rigorous imprisonment
Then the matter was dealt with by the High Court on a report made by the Tribunal of the Madras Bar Council to the effect that the 1 Case No XVI of 1942 decided on March 23 1943
142 1106 appellant s conviction involved moral turpitude and in 1942 the Madras High Court ordered him to be struck off the roll of advocates of that Court
In the course of their short order the  Federal Court made the following observations  Having regard to the decision of the High Court of Madras in a matter which may be regarded as analogous In re an Advocate 1 L R 46 Mad
p 903 we have not dealt with that before us as if an order made against the respondent must follow automatically from the result of the proceedings in Madras and we have heard the respondent at length in support of the written memorandum submitted
As a result of such hearing however we are not satisfied that circumstances exist so exceptional or extraordinary as to make it either possible or proper for us to disregard the verdict or the subsequent order of the High Court against the respondent  
In these circumstances we have to hold that grounds have not been adduced sufficient to prevent an order removing the respondent from the rolls of this Court following upon the order made by the High Court of Madras and such an order must now be made
 The appellant ceased to be on the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court and of the Federal Court as a result of the Federal Court order passed as quoted above some time in 1943
In 1948 the appellant moved the Federal Court for reinstatement as an advocate of that Court in view of the fact that he had been re instated by the Madras High Court by its order dated March 22 1948
That Court had passed its orders on affidavits and certificates of good character during the period the advocate stood struck off the roll of advocates
A Judge of the Federal Court during the long vacation passed orders reinstating the appellant as an advocate of that Court following the orders passed by the Madras High Court
That is how the appellant was re introduced to the profession and within about two years of his reinstatement the complainant fell a victim to the appellant s dishonest and fraudulent conduct as found above
1107 In another case In re D A Shanmugasundaraswami1 an Advocate coming again from the Madras High Court a similar proceeding followed
One D A Shanmughasundaraswami an advocate of the Madras High Court had been dealt with by that Court for c professional misconduct on several counts
After the necessary inquiry and report by the Tribunal of the Bar Council the High Court directed his name to be struck off the roll of advocates of that Court
As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court summons under Order IV rule 29 of the rules of that Court was issued and the Federal Court consisting of Kania Chief Justice Fazl Ali Patanjali Sastri Mahajan and B K Mukherjee JJ
by their order dated January 24 ordered that his name should be similarly removed from the roll of advocates of the Federal Court
Their Lordships relying upon the precedent referred to in the last paragraph passed their order in these terms  Having regard to a precedent of this Court we did lot consider that on the footing of the order made by the Madras High Court an order of removal of his name from the Rolls of this Court should automatically follow
He accordingly argued his case before us in detail
After hearing the respondent at great length we see no reason to differ from the conclusion of the Madras High Court
We are not satisfied that circumstances exist which make either possible or proper for us to disregard the verdict or the subsequent order of the Madras High Court against the respondent
Under the circumstances we hold that no sufficient grounds have been adduced to prevent an order removing the respondent from the Rolls of this Court following upon the order made by the Madras High Court and such an order is therefore made
 This Court dealt with the case of an advocate of the Bombay High Court who was also enrolled as a senior advocate of this Court
That case is In the matter of Mr G  a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court2 
After 1 Misc
Case No X of 1948 decided on January 24 1949
2 1955 1 SCR 490 1108 the advocate had been suspended from practice by the Bombay High Court for six months and that order was brought to the notice of this Court this Court dealt with the matter under Order IV rule 30 and passed orders similar to that passed by the Bombay High Court
Another case from the Bombay High Court dealt with by this Court is In the matter of  D  an Advocate of the Supreme Court1
When the matter was dealt with by this Court under Order IV rule 30 of the Rules the advocate after having been suspended from practice for a period of one year by the Bombay High Court prayed that a fresh inquiry might be held into the matter
This Court rejected that prayer of the advocate and proceeded upon the record as made by the High Court through the Bar Council
This Court agreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court about his misconduct in connection with a criminal trial and suspended the advocate from practice for a period co terminus with the period of suspension fixed by the High Court
On a review of the aforesaid precedents it may be taken that the following principles have been laid down by the Federal Court and by this Court when dealing with a summons under rule 30 of Order IV of Supreme Court Rules or its equivalent rule of the Federal Court 1 Any order by a High Court by way of disciplinary action against an advocate borne on the roll of advocates both of a High Court and of this Court is not automatically followed by a similar order by this Court 2 this Court need not start a fresh inquiry by way of recording evidence over again against the advocate concerned for professional misconduct 3 it is enough that this Court should generally examine the record prepared by the Bar Council of a High Court under the directions of that Court on the basis of which the High Court has passed its orders and take into account the findings of the High Court 1  1109 4 of course this Court has to grant a reasonable opportunity to the advocate concerned of being heard against the action proposed to be taken against him under its disciplinary jurisdiction 5 it is open to this Court in an appropriate case to permit the advocate to adduce such additional evidences it thinks fit 6 this Court after hearing the advocate or his legal adviser and if necessary the Attorney General or such other advocate as may be appointed to place the view point of the legal profession generally or of the complainant or the aggrieved party if he desires to be heard in the matter may pass such order as it may deem fit and proper in its judicial discretion
It may be noted that in the instant case at the final hearing we did not find it necessary to adjourn the hearing to issue notice to the Attorney General nor was any request made in that behalf
In view of these precedents as also in view of the fact that ordinarily it is necessary that a person in order to be entitled to be enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court should be borne on the roll of advocates of a High Court proceedings in this Court under rule 30 of Order IV of the Rules should normally be treated as a natural sequel to the proceedings in the High Court under the Bar Councils Act
If one is not a fit and proper person to continue on the roll of advocates of a High Court a fortiori he cannot be permitted to continue on the roll of advocates of this Court
It is a great privilege to be borne on the roll of advocates of the Supreme Court and only such persons as show a high degree of integrity of character should be so enrolled
Any person who has been found by the High Court to have fallen from that high standard of integrity of character required of an advocate of a court must suffer the consequences of his name being removed from the roll of advocates of this Court
As already indicated it was rather unfortunate that the appellant after being once struck off the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court and of the Federal Court should have been reinstated and thus been ennobled to deal 1110 with clients who have to trust their legal advisers with moneys in the course of their fiduciary relationship
These protracted proceedings against the appellant leading up to the summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules have ended in the removal of the appellant s name from the roll of advocates of the High Court and of this Court but only after the complainant has lost his good money
It is clear therefore that the continuance of the appellant in the legal profession is a serious menace to the profession itself which requires a high degree of integrity of character and sense of responsibility in which the appellant has been found singularly lacking
In view of these considerations the appeal must be dismissed and the rule made absolute with the result that the appellant s name shall stand removed from the roll of advocates of this Court
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant an Advocate whose name was borne on the rolls of the Madras High Court and of the Supreme Court was found guilty of gross professional misconduct by the Madras High Court on the report of the Bar Council Tribunal and debarred from 1093 practising in that Court
The charge against him was that he did not utilise a particular sum of money entrusted to him by his client to clear a mortgage in order to secure a clear title for him in completion of a transaction of sale for that purpose nor account for it
The appellant preferred an appeal by special leave and this Court being apprised of the order passed by the  Madras High Court issued a Rule under r 30 0
IV of the Supreme Court Rules
It was found by this Court that the charge against the appellant was fully supported by a large volume of evidence on record both oral and documentary
Held that the appeal must be dismissed and the Rule made absolute and the appellant s name removed from the roll of Advocates of this Court
It is a great privilege to be an Advocate of this Court and only such persons as can satisfy a very high standard of integrity of character can be enrolled as such
An Advocate who is found to have fallen from that standard and is debarred by the High Court cannot be considered fit to practise in this Court
Proceedings under r 30 0
IV Of the Supreme Court Rules should be treated as a natural sequel to proceedings in the High Court under the Bar Councils Act and although an order made by the High Court under that Act is not to be automatically followed by this Court it is not necessary that this Court should start a fresh inquiry on evidence
It would be enough for it to generally examine the record prepared by the Bar Council Tribunal and take into account the findings of the High Court based on such report
Reasonable opportunity must however be afforded to the Advocate of being heard against the action proposed to be taken against him and adducing such additional evidence as this Court may think proper
The Attorney General or any other Advocate representing the Legal Profession generally or the complainant or the aggrieved party may also be heard before the final decision is arrived at
In the matter of an Advocate Case No XVI of 1942 decided on March 23 1943 In Ye D A Shammugasundaraswami an Advocate Misc
Case No X of 1948 decided on January 24 1949 In the matter of Mr G  a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court and In the matter of D  an Advocate of the Supreme Court   referred to