Civil Appeal No 5933 1983
From the Judgment and Order dated 192
1980 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc
Petition No 5860 of 1978
RK Jain Ms Abha R Sharma and RP Singh for the Appellant
M C Dhingra for the Respondents
This appeal by special leave involves the question as to the interpretation of the provisions of Section 29 A of the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
967 The Act was enacted by the U P
State legislature to provide in the interest of the general public for the regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and for matters connected therewith
The Act as originally enacted was confined in its application to buildings only
It was amended by UP Act XXVIII of 1976 whereby Section 29 A was inserted with a view to give pro tection against eviction to certain classes of tenants of land on which building exists
The relevant provisions of Section 29 A read as under 2 This Section applies only to land let out either before or after the commencement of this Section where the tenant with the landlord s consent has erected any perma nent structure and incurred expenses in execution thereof
XXX XXX XXX 4 The tenant of any land to which this Section applies shall be liable to pay to the landlord such rent as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties and in the absence of agreement the rent determined in accordance with sub section 5
5 The District Magistrate shall on the application of the landlord or the tenant determine the annual rent payable in respect of such land at the rate of ten per cent per annum of the prevailing market value of the land and such rent shall be payable except as provided in sub section 6 from the date of expiration of the term for which the land was let or from the commencement of this Section whichever is later
XXX XXX XXX 7 The provisions of this section shall have effect not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any contract or instrument or in any other law for the time being in force
 The appellant is the owner of a plot of land measuring 30 x 65 sq
situated at Garhmukteshwar Road Azad Road Meerut
The said plot of land was let out by the appellant to the respondent No 1 on March 20 1957 at an annual rent of Rs 170
After the said plot of 968 land had been let out to him respondent No 1 with the consent of the appellant constructed a building over the said plot in 1965
After the enactment of Section 29 A the appellant submitted an application on September 29 1976 before the District Supply OfficerDelegated Authority Meerut for fixation of appropriate rent for the plot of land under sub section 5 of Section 29 A
The said appli cation of the appellant was dismissed by the District Supply Officer Delegated Authority by order dated April 14 1978 on the view that the provisions of sub section 5 of Section 29 A for fixation of rent are applicable to those cases only in which there is no agreed rent and that in this case both the parties have accepted that the rent of land is Rs 170 per year has been fixed on the basis of mutual agreement and therefore the question of re fixation of rent does not arise
Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the District Supply Officer the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
The said writ petition was dis missed by a Division Bench of the said High Court by order dated February 19 1980
The learned Judges have held that under Section 29 A the District Magistrate has jurisdiction to determine the rent only in those cases where there is no agreement relating to rent and if there is an agreement between the landlord and the tenant then the District Magis trate has no jurisdiction to determine the rent
The learned Judges have further found that in the instant case admitted ly an agreement existed between the appellant and the tenant that the tenant shall pay rent at the rate of Rs 170 per annum to the appellant and as such there could be no en hancement of the rent under sub section 5 of Section 29 A Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave to appeal
Shri RK Jain the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that sub section 4 of Section 29 A postulates determination of rent in accordance with sub section 5 in cases where the rent has not been mutually agreed upon between the parties
The submission of Shri Jain is that the expression such rent as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties in sub section 4 of Section 29 A means rent which has been mutually agreed upon after the enactment of Section 29 A and any agreement prior to the said enactment would not preclude determination of rent under Section 29 A of the Act
In support of this submission Shri Jain has invited our attention to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Trilok Chand vs Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Another  969 In Trilok Chand vs Rent Control and Eviction Officer case supra a Full Bench of the High Court has considered the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench in the present case and has construed the provisions of Section 29 A of the Act
In that case it has been held that sub section 4 of Section 29 A precludes determination of rent only in those cases where the agreement fixing the rent was entered into subsequent to the coming into force of Section 29 A
It has been observed The reason is this sub section 4 applies to the land to which Section 29 A applies
It provides that the tenant shall be liable to pay to the landlord such rent as may be agreed between the parties
In the absence of such agreed rent the sub section further provides that the tenant is liable to pay the rent determined in accordance with subsec tion 5
These terms are clear enough and indicate that the agreement envisaged thereunder is not the agreement existed prior to coming into force of Section 29 A
It refers to subsequent agreement only
The words such rent as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties refers to future agreement and not the past agreement
Subsection 4 again emphasises such rent
Such rent in the context means the rent to be mutually agreed upon by parties
Sub section 4 further states that in the absence of agreement the rent has to be determined in accordance with sub section 5 p 636 Yet another reason to support our view could be found from sub section 7
It provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any contract or instrument or in any other law for the time being in force the provisions of Section 29 A shall have effect
It means clearly that the agreement if any existing on the date of coming into force of Section 29 A is no bar for enforcing the rights under sub section 5
Sub sections 4 and 5 shall prevail and not the antecedent agreement if any p 636 The learned Judges of the Full Bench have overruled the decision of the Division Bench in the present case
We are in agreement with the view propounded by the Full 970 Bench in Trilok Chand s case supra
In our opinion the words such rent as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties in subsection 4 of Section 29 A envisage an agreement with regard to rent entered by the landlord and tenant after the coming into force of Section 29 A An agreement prior to the commencement of Section 29 A would not preclude determination of rent under sub section 5 of Section 29 A
In this context it may be mentioned that the words may be used in sub section 4 of Section 29 A are much oftener used with reference to the future than the past or the present Pollock CB in Brown vs Batchelor 25 L J exhibit 299 Stroud s Judicial Dictionary 5th Edn P 1575
In sub section 4 of Section 29 A the words may be are preceded by the word as and are followed by the words mutually agreed upon which indicate that the words are used with reference to the future
The provisions of sub section 7 which give overriding effect to the provisions of Section 29 A over an existing contract also lend support to this construction
We are therefore unable to uphold the view of the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court in this case that there could be no enhancement of the rent under sub section 5 of Section 29 A in view of the agreement between the appellant and the tenant that the tenant shall pay rent at the rate of Rs 170 per annum
The appeal is therefore allowed
The judgment and order of the High Court dated February 19 1980 as well as the order dated April 14 1978 passed by the District Supply OfficerDelegated Authority Meerut are set aside and the matter is remanded to the District Supply OfficerDelegated Authority Meerut for consideration of the application submitted by the appellant for fixation of rent under Section 29 A of the Act in accordance with law
No order as to costs
GN Appeal allowed


Summary:
The respondents instituted a civil suit challenging the election of the office bearers  of the appellant Society and asked for rendition of accounts
The appellant Society contested the suit on the ground that in view of Sections 23 and 25 of the the suit was barred
The courts below having held that the suit was not barred the defendant Society filed appeal in this Court
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
A litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has independently of any statute a right to institute a suit in the civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
The exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied
973A B KS Venkataraman  Company vs State of Madras   Ganga Bai vs Vijay Kumar and Ors   Dhula Bhai and Ors
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors   referred
Raleigh Investment Company Limited vs The Governor General in Council 1947 LR 74 IA 50 cited
The provisions of Section 23 of the Societies Regis tration Act 1860 are confined to audit and have nothing to do with the relief of rendition of accounts
976B 972 3
Section 25 deals with disputes regarding challenge to the eviction of office bearers
The maintainability of dispute within the purview of that Section is hedged with conditions and unless such requirement is fulfilled a statutory dispute would not be maintainable
976B 31 In the instant case the action in the Civil Court is by some of the members who perhaps would not satisfy the requirement laid down in Section 25
It cannot be said that Section 25 having provided the pre conditions on the satis faction of which a dispute within the purview of that Sec tion would be maintainable before the Registrar takes away the right of Members of the Society to claim relief other wise outside the purview of Section 25 on the basis of their right to seek remedy for their grievance
It is not the appellant s contention that the relief claimed is not one which would come within the ambit of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Therefore the bar of Section 25 is not applicable to the facts of the case and the conclusion reached in the Courts below is correct and the suit is maintainable
976C E