vil Appeal Nos
2839 40 of 1989 etc
From the Judgment and Order dated 612
1984 of the Delhi High Court in RFA Nos 113 and 114 of 1968
K Parasaran Attorney General TS Krishnamurthy Iyer BRL Iyengar MS Gujaral FS Nariman AK Ganguli K Swamy CV Subba Rao RD Agrawala P Parmeshwaran OP Sharma RC Gubrele KR Gupta RK Sharma KL Rathee Chandulal Verma Subhash Mittal section Balakrishnan NB Sinha KK Gupta Sanjiv B Sinha MM Kashyap PC Khunger Swaraj 321 Kaushal Pankaj Kalra SK Bagga Ravinder Narain Sumeet Kachwala section Sukumaran KR Nagaraja SS Javali Ms Lira Goswami DK Das BP Singh Ranjit Kumar Santosh Hegde MN Shroff PN Misra DC Taneja PK Jena AK Sanghi and M Veerappa for the appearing parties
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK CJ
The question of law referred to us for decision in these cases is Whether under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 the claimants are entitled to sola tium at 30 per cent of the market value irre spective of the dates on which the acquisition proceedings were initiated or the dates on which the award had been passed It would suffice if we briefly refer to the facts in the Civil Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petitions Nos
8194 8195 of 1985 Union of India  Another vs Raghubir Singh
The land belonging to the respondents in village Dhaka was taken by compulsory acquisition initiated by a notifica tion under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 issued on 13 November 1959
The award with regard to compensation was made by the Collector on 30 March 1963
A reference under section 18 of the Act was disposed of by the Additional District Judge on 10 June 1968
He enhanced the compensation
The respondents preferred an appeal to the High Court claiming further compensation
During the pendency of the appeal the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 was introduced in Parliament on 30 April 1982 and became law as the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 when it received the assent of the President on 24 September 1984
The High Court disposed of the appeal by its Judgment and Order dated 6 December 1984
While it raised the rate of compensation it also raised the rate of interest payable on the compensa tion and taking into account the change in the law effected by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 referred to hereinafter as the Amendment Act it awarded solatium at 30 per cent of the market value
The Judgment and Order of the High Court is the subject of these appeals
When these cases came up before a Bench of two learned Judges 322 ES Venkataramiah and RB Misra JJ on 23 September 1985 they referred to two earlier decisions of this Court and expressed the view that the question set forth above required re examination by a larger Bench of five Judges
It was further directed that the other questions involved in the petitions would be considered after the aforesaid ques tion had been resolved by the larger Bench
The two deci sions referred to in the Order of the learned Judges are K Kamalajammanniavaru dead by Lrs
vs Special Land Acquisi tion Officer decided by O Chinnappa Reddy and Sabyasachi Mukharji JJ
on 14 February 1985 and Bhag Singh and Ors
vs Union Territory of Chandigarh  decided by PN Bhagwati CJ AN Sen and DP Madon JJ
on 14 August 1985
Solatium is awarded under sub section
2 of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act
Before the Amendment Act was enacted the sub section provided for solatium at 15 per cent of the market value
By the change introduced by the Amendment Act the amount has been raised to 30 per cent of the market value
Sub section
2 of section 30 of the Amendment Act specifies the category of cases to which the amended rate of solatium is attracted
In K Kamalajammanniavaru supra the two learned Judges held that sub section
2 of section 30 referred to orders made by the High Court or the Supreme Court in ap peals against an award made between 30 April 1982 and 22 September 1984 and that therefore solatium at 30 per cent alone pursuant to sub section
2 of section 30 had to be awarded in such cases only
In Bhag Singh supra however the three learned Judges held that sub section
2 of section 30 referred to proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30 April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court even if they had finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act
In taking that view they overruled K Kamalajammanniavaru supra and approved of the opinion expressed in another case State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh and another decided by section Murtaza Fazal Ali A Varadarajan and Ranganath Misra JJ
on 1 May 1985
At the outset a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri BRL Iyengar to the validity of the reference of these cases to a larger Bench
He contends that the mere circumstance that a Bench of two learned Judges finds itself in doubt about the correctness of the view taken by a Bench of three learned Judges should not provide reason for refer ring the matter to a larger Bench
The preliminary objection raised by Shri Iyengar has been vigorously resisted by the 323 appellants
Having regard to the submissions made before us we think it necessary to lay down the law on the point
India is governed by a judicial system identified by a hierarchy of courts where the doctrine of binding precedent is a cardinal feature of its jurisprudence
It used to be disputed that Judges make law
Today it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law govern ing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the State flows from the decisions of the superior courts
There was a time  observed Lord Reid when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law They only declare it  
But we do not believe in fairy tales any more The Judge as law Maker p 22
 In countries such as the United Kingdom where Parliament as the legislative organ is supreme and stands at the apex of the constitution al structure of the State the role played by judicial law making is limited
In the first place the function of the courts is restricted to the interpretation of laws made by Parliament and the courts have no power to question the validity of Parliamentary statutes the Diceyan dictum holding true that the British Parliament is paramount and all powerful
In the second place the law enunciated in every decision of the courts in England can be superseded by an Act of Parliament
As Cockburn CJ
observed in Exp
Canon Selwyn There is no judicial body in the country by which the validity of an Act of Parliament could be questioned
An act of the Legislature is superior in authority to any Court of Law
And Ungoed Thomas J in Cheney vs Conn referred to a Parliamentary statute as the highest form of law  which prevails over every other form of law
 The position is substantially different under a written Consti tution such as the one which governs us
The Constitution of India which represents the Supreme Law of the land envis ages three distinct organs of the State each with its own distinctive functions each a pillar of the State
Broadly while Parliament and the State Legislature in India enact the law and the Executive government implements it the judiciary sits in judgment not only on the implementation of the law by the Executive but also on the validity of the Legislation sought to be implemented
One of the functions of the superior judiciary in India is to examine the compe tence and validity of legislation both in point of legisla tive competence as well as its consistency with the Funda mental Rights
In this regard the courts in India possess a power not known to the English 324 Courts
Where a statute is declared invalid in India it cannot be reinstated unless constitutional sanction is obtained therefore by a constitutional amendment or an appropriately modified version of the statute is enacted which accords with constitutional prescription
The range of judicial review recognised in the superior judiciary of India is perhaps the widest and the most extensive known to the world of law
The power extends to examining the validi ty of even an amendment to the Constitution for now it has been repeatedly held that no constitutional amendment can be sustained which violates the basic structure of the Consti tution
See His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalava ru vs State of Kerala  Smt
Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain  Minerva Mills Ltd and others vs Union of India and others 1980 2 SCC 591 and recently in SP Sampath Kumar etc
vs Union of India and Ors
  With this impressive expanse of judicial power it is only right that the superi or courts in India should be conscious of the enormous responsibility which rests on them
This is specially true of the Supreme Court for as the highest Court in the entire judicial system the law declared it is by Article 141 of the Constitution binding on all courts within the territory of India
Taking note of the hierarchical character of the judi cial system in India it is of paramount importance that the law declared by this Court should be certain clear and consistent
It is commonly known that most decisions of the courts are of significance not merely because they consti tute an adjudication on the rights of the parties and re solve the dispute between them but also because in doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding principle in future cases
In this latter aspect lies their particular value in developing the jurisprudence of the law
The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transaction forming part of his daily affairs
And therefore the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a Court
But like all principles evolved by man for the regula tion of the social order the doctrine of binding precedent is circumscribed in its governance by perceptible limita tions limitations arising by reference to the need for re adjustment in a changing society a re adjustment of legal norms demanded by a changed social context
This need for 325 adapting the law to new urges in society brings home the truth of the Holmesian aphorism that the life of the law has not been logic it has been experience
Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law p 5 and again when he declared in another study that Oliver Wendell Holmes Common Carriers and the Common Law 1943 9 Curr
LT 387 388 the law is forever adopting new principles from life at one end and sloughing off old ones at the other
Explaining the conceptual import of what Holmes had said Julius Stone elaborated that it is by the introduction of new extra legal propositions emerging from experience to serve as premises or by experience guided choice between competing legal propositions rather than by the operation of logic upon existing legal propositions that the growth of law tends to be determined
Julius Stone Legal Systems  Lawyers Rea soning pp
58 59
Legal compulsions cannot be limited by existing legal propositions because there will always be beyond the frontiers of the existing law new areas inviting judicial scrutiny and judicial choice making which could well affect the validity of existing legal dogma
The search for solu tions responsive to a changed social era involves a search not only among competing propositions of law or competing versions of a legal proposition or the modalities of an indeterminacy such as fairness or reasonableness but also among propositions from outside the ruling law corre sponding to the empirical knowledge or accepted values of present time and place relevant to the dispensing of jus tice within the new parameters
The universe of problems presented for judicial choice making at the growing points of the law is an expanding universe
The areas brought under control by accumulation of past judicial choice may be large
Yet the areas newly presented for still further choice because of changing social economic and technological conditions are far from inconsiderable
It has also to be remembered that many occasions for new options arise by the mere fact that no generation looks out on the world from quite the same van tage point as its predecessor nor for the matter with the same perception
A different vantage point or a different quality of perception often reveals the need for choice making where formerly no alternatives and no problems at all were Perceived
The extensiveness of the areas for judicial choice at a particular time is a function not only of the accumulation of past decisions not only of changes in the environment but also of new insights and perspec tives both on old problems and on the new problems thrown up by changes entering the cultural and social heritage
326 Not infrequently in the nature of things there is a gravity heavy inclination to follow the groove set by prece dential law
Yet a sensitive judicial conscience often persuades the mind to search for a different set of norms more responsive to the changed social context
The dilemma before the Judge poses the task of finding a new equilibri um prompted not seldom by the desire to reconcile opposing mobilities
The competing goals according to Dean Roscoe Pound invest the Judge with the responsibility of proving to mankind that the law was something fixed and settled whose authority was beyond question while at the same time enabling it to make constant readjustments and occasional radical changes under the pressure of infinite and variable human desires Roscoe Pound an Introduction to the Phi losophy of Law p 19
The reconciliation suggested by Lord Reid in The Judges as Law Maker pp 25 6 lies in keeping both objectives in view that the law shall be certain and that it shall be just move with the times
 An elaboration of his opinion is contained in Myers vs Director of Public Prosecutions  where he expressed the need for change in the law by the court and the limits within which such change could be brought about
He said ibid at p 1021
I have never taken a narrow view of the functions of this House as an appellate tribu nal
The common law must be developed to meet changing economic conditions and habits of thought and I would not be deterred by ex pressions of opinion in this House in old cases
But there are limits to what we can or should do
If we are to extend the law it must be by the development and application of fundamental principles
We cannot introduce arbitrary conditions or limitations that must be left to legislation
And if we do in effect change the law we ought in my opinion only to do that in cases where our decision will produce some finality or certainty
 Whatever the degree of success in resolving the dilemma the Court would do well to ensure that although the new legal norm chosen in response to the changed social climate repre sents a departure from the previously ruling norm it must nevertheless
carry within it the same principle of certain ty clarity and stability
The profound responsibility which isborne by this Court in its choice between earlier established standards and the formulation of a new code of norms is all the more sensitive and significant because the 327 response lies in relation to a rapidly changing social and economic society
In a developing society such as India the law does not assume its true function when it follows a groove chased amidst a context which has long since crum bled
There will be found among some of the areas of the law norms selected by a judicial choice educated in the experi ence and values of a world which passed away 40 years ago
The social forces which demand attention in the cauldron of change from which a new society is emerging appear to call for new perceptions and new perspectives
The recognition that the times are changing and that there is occasion for a new jurisprudence to take birth is evidenced by what this Court said in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs The State of Bihar and Others  when it ob served that it was not bound by its earlier judgments and possessed the freedom to overrule its judgments when it thought fit to do so to keep pace with the needs of changing times
The acceptance of this principle ensured the preser vation and legitimation provided to the doctrine of binding precedent and therefore certainty and finality in the law while permitting necessary scope for judicial creativity and adaptability of the law to the changing demands of society
The question then is not whether the Supreme Court is bound by its own previous decisions
It is not
The question is under what circumstances and within what limits and in what manner should the highest Court over turn its own pronouncements
In the examination of this question it would perhaps be appropriate to refer to the response of other jurisdictions specially those with which the judicial system in India has borne an historical relationship
The House of Lords in England provides the extreme example of a judicial body which until recently disclaimed the power to overrule it self
It used to be said that the House of Lords did never overrule itself but only distinguished its earlier deci sions
An erroneous decision of the House of Lords could be set right only by an Act of Parliament
See Street Tramways vs London County Council  and Radcliffe vs Ribble Motor Services Ltd 245  Apparent ly bowing to the pressure of a reality forced upon it by reason of a rapidly gathering change in the prevailing socio economic structure on 26 July 1966 Lord Gardiner LC made the following statement on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary Their lordship regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases
It provides at least 328 some degree of certainty upon which individu als can rely in the conduct of their affairs as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules
Their lordships nevertheless recog nise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law
They propose therefore to modify their present practice and while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so
In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal Law
 Since then the House of Lords has framed guidelines in a series of cases decided upto to 1975 and the guidelines have been summarised in Dr Alan Paterson s Law Lords 1982 pp
156 157
He refers to several criteria articulated by Lord Reid in those cases
The freedom granted by the 1966 Practice Statement ought to be exercised sparingly the use sparingly  crite rion Jones vs Secretary of State for Social Services 1972 AC at 966
A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so would upset the legitimate expectations of people who have entered into contracts or settlements or otherwise regulated their affairs in reliance on the validity of that decision the legitimate expectations  criterion Ross Smith vs Ross Smith  303 and Indyka vs Indyka 1969 I AC 33 69 3
A decision concerning questions of construction of statute or other documents ought not to be overruled except in rare and exceptional cases the Construction  criterion Jones at 966
4a A decision ought not to be overruled if it would be impracticable for the Lords to foresee the consequences of departing from it the unforseeable consequences  crite rion Steadman vs Steadman 542
b A decision ought not to be overruled if to do so would involve a change that ought to be part of a 329 comprehensive reform of the law
Such changes are best done by legislation following on a wide survey of the whole field  the need for comprehensive reform  criterion DPP vs Myers  1022 Cassell vs Broome   11086 and Haughton vs Smith 1975 AC 476500
In the interest of certainty a decision ought not to be overruled merely because the Law Lords consider that it was wrongly decided
There must be some additional reasons to justify such a step the precedent merely wrong  crite rion Knuller vs DPP 1973 A C 435455 6
A decision ought to be overruled if it causes such great uncertainty in practice that the Parties  advisers are unable to give any clear indication as to what the courts will hold the law to be the rectification of uncertainty  criterion Jones at 966 Oldendroll  Co vs Tradex Export SA 1974 479533535 7
A decision ought to be overruled if in relation to some broad issue or principle it is not considered just or in keeping with contemporary social conditions or modern conceptions of public policy the unjust or outmoded  criterion ibid Conway vs Rimmer  938
Dr Paterson noted that between the years 1966 and 1988 there were twenty nine cases in which the House of Lords was invited to overrule one of its own precedents that the House of Lords did so in eight of them while in a further ten cases at least one of the Law Lords was willing to overrule the previous House of Lords precedent
In a consid erable number of other cases however the Law Lords seemed to prefer to distinguish the earlier decisions rather than overrule them
The High Court of Australia the highest Court in the Commonwealth has reserved to itself the power to reconsider its own decision but has laid down that the power should not be exercised upon a mere suggestion that some or all the member of the later Court would arrive at a different con clusion if the matter were res integra
In the Tramways case   Griffith CJ while doing so administered the following caution In my opinion it is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that Court is either legally or technically bound by previ ous decisions
Indeed it may in a proper case be 330 its duty to disregard them
But the rule should be applied with great caution and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong as for instance if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired Statute or is contrary to a decision of another Court which this Court is bound to follow not I think upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter was res integra
Otherwise there would be grate danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of law
 In the same case Barton J observed at p 69   
I would say that I never thought that it was not open to this Court to review its previous decisions upon good cause
The question is not whether the Court can do so but whether it will having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in the judicial decision
Changes in the number of appointed Justices can I take it never of themselves furnish a reason for review  
But the Court can always listen to argument as to whether it ought to review a particular decision and the strongest reason for an overruling is that a decision is manifestly wrong and its continuance is injurious to the public interest
In the United States of America the Supreme Court has explicitly overruled its prior decision in a number of cases and reference will be found to them in the judgment of Brandeis J in State of Washington vs Dawson  Co  where he said The doctrine of Stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it
The decisions are recent ones
They have not been acquiesced in
They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered
They affect solely matters of a transitory nature
On the other hand they affect seriously the lives of men women and children and the general welfare
Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action
But it is not a univer sal inexorable command
The instances in which the Courts have disregarded its admonition a re many
 331 Elaborating his point in his dissenting judgment in David Burnel vs Coronado Oil  Gas Company   76 LEd 815 Brandeis J observed Stare decisis usually the wise policy because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled right
Compare National Bank vs Whitney 103 US 99 26 LEd
443 444
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern provided correction can be had by legislation
But in cases involving the Feder al Constitution where correction through legislative action is practically impossible this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning recognising that the process of trial and error so fruitful in the physical sciences is appropriate also in the judicial function
 The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council also took the view that it was not bound in law by its earlier deci sions but in In re Compensation to Civil Servants LR  AIR 1929 PC 84 87 it declared that it would hesitate long before disturbing a solemn decision by a previous Board which raised an identical or even a simi lar issue for determination and reiterated that reservation in the Attorney General of Ontario vs The Canada Temperance Federation LR 76 QA 10 and Phanindra Chandra Neogy vs The King  These cases from England Australia and the United States were considered by this Court in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited vs The State of Bihar and others supra perhaps the first recorded instance of the Supreme Court in this country being called upon to consider whether it could overrule an earlier decision rendered by it
A Bench of seven Judges assembled to consider whether the majority decision of a Constitution Bench of five Judges in State of Bombay vs The United Motors India Ltd  should be reconsidered
Four Judges of the Bench of seven said it should and voted to overrule the majority decision in the United Motors supra
The remaining three voted to the contrary
Das Acting CJ speaking for himself and on behalf of Bose Bhagwati and Jafar Imam JJ preferred the approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court since in the view of that learned Judge the position in India approximated more closely to that obtaining in the United states rather than to the position in England where Parlia ment could rectify the situation by a simple majority and to that in Australia where the mistake could be 332 corrected in appeal to the Privy Council
The learned Judge observed There is nothing in our Constitution which pre vents us from departing from a previous decision if we are convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public And reference was made to the circumstance that Article 141 of the Constitution made the law declared by this Court binding on all Courts in India
Speaking with reference to the specific case before the Court the learned Judge referred to the far reaching effect of the earlier decision in the United Motors supra on the general body of the consuming public and that the error committed in the earlier decision would result in perpetuat ing a tax burden erroneously imposed on the people giving rise to a consequence manifestly and wholly unauthorised The learned Judge observed It is not an ordinary pronouncement declaring the rights of two private individuals inter se
It involves an adjudication on the taxing power of the States as against the consuming public generally
If the decision is errone ous as indeed we conceive it to be we owe it to the public to protect them against the illegal tax burdens which the States are seeking to impose on the strength of that errone ous recentdecision
Cautioned that the Court should not differ merely because a contrary view appeared preferable the learned Judge affirmed that we should not lightly dissent from a previous pronouncement of this Court
 But if the previous decision was plainly erroneous he pointed out there was a duty on the Court to say so and not perpetuate the mistake
The appeal to the principle of stare decisis was rejected on the ground that a the decision intended to be overruled was a very recent decision and it did not involve overruling a series of decisions and b the doc trine of stare decisis was not an inflexible rule and must in any event yield where following it would result in perpetuating an error to the detriment of the general wel fare of the public or a considerable section thereof
Since then the question as to when should the Supreme Court overrule its own decision has been considered in several cases
Relying on the Bengal Immunity case Khanna J remarked that certainly in the law which was an essen tial ingredient of the Rule of Law would be considerably eroded if the highest court of the land lightly overruled the view expressed by it in earlier cases
One instance where such overruling could be permissible was a situation where contextual values giving birth to the earlier view had altered substantially since
333 In Maganlal Chhagganlal P Ltd vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  Ors
  he explained Some new aspects may come to light and it may become essen tial to cover fresh grounds to meet the new situations or to overcome difficulties which did not manifest themselves or were not taken into account when the earlier view was pro pounded
Precedents have a value and the ratio decidendi of a case can no doubt be of assistance in the decision of future cases
At the same time we have to as observed by Cardozo guard against the notion that because a principle has been formulated as the ratio decidendi of a given prob lem it is therefore to be applied as a solvent of other problems regardless of consequences regardless of deflect ing factors inflexibly
and automatically in all its pristine generality see Selected Writings p 31
As in life so in law things are not static
 In Lt Col Khajoor Singh vs The Union of India  Anoth er  the majority of this court emphasised that the court should not depart from an interpretation given in an earlier judgment of the court unless there was a fair amount of unanimity that the earlier decision was manifestly wrong
In Keshav Mills Company vs Commissioner of Income Tax  921 this court observed that a revision of its earlier decision would be justified if there were compelling and substantial reasons to do so
In Sajjan Singh vs State of Rajasthan  947 948 the court laid down the test Is it absolutely necessary and essential that the question already decided should be reo pened  and went on to observe the answer to this ques tion would depend on the nature of the infirmity alleged in the earlier decision its impact on public good and the validity and compelling character of the considerations urged in support of the contrary view  There can be no doubt as was observed in Girdhari Lal Gupta vs DH Mill  that where an earlier relevant statutory provision has not been brought to the notice of the court the decision may be reviewed or as in Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd vs ITO A  Ward Calcutta  Anr   if a vital point was not considered
A more compendious examination of the problem was undertaken in Keshav Mills Company vs Commissioner of Income Tax supra where the Court pointed out It is not possible or desirable and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should 334 govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the ques tion of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions
It would always depend upon several relevant considerations What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based On the earlier occasion did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and materi al statutory provision or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed Is the court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts And would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconven ience hardship or mischief These and other relevant con siderations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions
These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of the Bench of five learned Judges of this Court
 Much importance has been laid on observing the finality of decisions rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court and in Ganga Sugar Company vs State of Uttar Pradesh   782 the Court held against the finality only where the subject was of such fundamental importance to national life or the reasoning is so plainly erroneous in the light of later thought that it is wiser to be ultimately right rather than to be consistently wrong 
It is not necessary to refer to all the cases on the point
The broad guidelines are easily deducible from what has gone before
The possibility of further defining these guiding principles can be envisaged with further juridical experience and when common jurisprudential values linking different national systems of law may make a consensual pattern possible
But that lies in the future
There was some debate on the question whether a Division Bench of Judges is obliged to follow the law laid down by a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges
Doubt has arisen on the point because of certain observations made by O Chinnappa Reddy J in 335 Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1985 SC 23 1
Earlier a Division Bench of two Judges of whom he was one had expressed the view in TV Vatheeswaran vs The State of Tamil Nadu that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle a person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 of the Constitution and demand the quashing of the sentence of death
This would be so he observed even if the delay in the execution was occasioned by the time necessary for filing an appeal or for considering the reprieve of the accused or some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible
This view was found unacceptable by a Bench of three Judges in Sher Singh  Ors
vs State of Punjab  where the learned Judges observed that no hard and fast rule could be laid down in the matter
In direct disagreement with the view in TV Vatheeswaran supra the learned Judges said that account had to be taken of the time occupied by pro ceedings in the High Court and in the Supreme Court and before the executive authorities and it was relevant to consider whether the delay was attributable to the conduct of the accused
As a member of another Bench of two Judges in Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala supra O Chinnappa Reddy J questioned the validity of the observations made in Sher Singh supra and went on to note without express ing any concluded opinion on the point that it was a seri ous question whether a Division Bench of three Judges could purport to overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of two Judges merely because there is larger than two
The Court sits in Divisions of two and three Judges for the sake of convenience and it may be inappropriate for a Division Bench of three Judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges
Vide Young vs Bristol Aero plane Co Ltd It may be otherwise where a Full Bench or a Constitution Bench does so
 It is pertinent to record here that because of the doubt cast on the validity of the opinion in Sher Singh supra the question of the effect of delay on the execution of a death sentence was referred to a Division Bench of five Judges and in Triveniben vs State of Gujarat AIR 1989 SC 142 the Constitution Bench overruled TV Vatheeswaran supra
What then should be the position in regard to the effect of the law pronounced by a Division Bench in relation to a case raising the same point subsequently before a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges There is no constitu tional or statutory prescription in the matter and the point is governed entirely by the practice in India of the Courts sanctified by repeated affirmation over a century of time
It cannot be doubted that in order to promote consist ency and certainty 336 in the law laid down by a superior Court the ideal condi tion would be that the entire Court should sit in all cases to decide questions of law and for that reason the Supreme Court of the United States does so
But having regard to the volume of work demanding the attention of the Court it has been found necessary in India as a general rule of practice and convenience that the Court should sit in Divisions each Division being constituted of Judges whose number may be determined by the exigencies of judicial need by the nature of the case including any statutory mandate relative there to and by such other considerations which the Chief Jus tice in whom such authority devolves by convention may find most appropriate
It is in order to guard against the possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division Benches that the rule has been evolved in order to promote consistency and certainty in the devel opment of the law and its contemporary status that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges
This principle has been followed in India by several generations of Judges
We may refer to a few of the recent cases on the point
In John Martin vs The State of West Bengal  a Division Bench of three Judges found it right to follow the law declared in Haradhan Saha vs State of West Bengal  decided by a Division Bench of five Judges in preference to Bhut Nath Mate vs State of West Bengal  decided by a Division Bench of two Judges
Again in Smt
India Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Raj Narain Beg J held that the Constitution Bench of five Judges was bound by the Constitution Bench 01  thirteen Judges in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru vs State of Kerala 1973 Suppl
1 SCR
In Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar  Anr
vs Waman Shripad Mage Since Dead Through Lrs this Court expressly stated that the view taken on a point of law by a Division Bench of four Judges of this Court was binding on a Division Bench of three Judges of the Court
And in Mattulal vs Radhe Lal  this Court specifically observed that where the view expressed by two different Division Benches of this Court could not be reconciled the pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges had to be preferred over the deci sion of a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges
This Court also laid down in Acharaya Maharajshri Narandrapra sadji AnandprasadjiMaharaj etc
vs The State of Gujarat  Ors  that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or other wise of the views of the other
The principle was reaffirmed in Union of India  Ors
vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd 1985 4 337 SCC 369 which noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit Ram vs State of Haryana  had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs State of UP  on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity and holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later Bench referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation called for such reference
We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges and in order that such decision be binding it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court
We would however like to think that for the purpose of imparting certainty and endowing due authority decisions of this Court in the future should be rendered by Division Benches of at least three Judges un less for compelling reasons that is not conveniently possi ble
Upon the aforesaid considerations and in view of the nature and potential of the questions raised in these cases we are of the view that there was sufficient justification for the order dated 23 September 1985 made by the Bench of two learned judges referring these cases to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the question decided in K Kamalajam mannivaru dead by Lrs supra and Bhag Singh and Ors supra
The preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents to the validity of the reference is overrruled
We now come to the merits of the reference
The refer ence is limited to the interpretation of section 302 of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 1984
Before the enact ment of the Amendment Act solatium was provided under section 232 of the Land Acquisition Act shortly the parent Act at 15 on the market value of the Land computed in accordance with section 231 of the Act the solatium being provided in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition
The Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 was introduced in the House of the People on 30 April 1982 and upon enactment the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 commenced operation with effect from 24 September 1984
section 15 of the Amendment Act amended section 232 of the parent Act and substituted the words 30 per centum  in place of the words 15 per centum 
Parliament intended that the be 338 nefit of the enhanced solatium should be made available albeit to a limited degree even in respect of acquisition proceedings taken before that date
It sought to effectuate that intention by enacting section 302 in the Amendment Act section 302 of the Amendment Act provides 2 the provisions of sub section
2 of section 23  of the principal Act as amended by clause b of section 15   of this Act   shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 in the House of the People and before the commencement of this Act In construing section 302 it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under section 11 of the parent Act and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under section 19 of the parent Act
There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by section 302 in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by section 302 to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April 1982
The question is what is the meaning of the words or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award Are they limited as con tended by the appellants to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 or do they include also as contended by the respondents appeals disposed of between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April 1982
We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents
Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against any such award 
The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words any such award  mean the award made by the Collector or Court and carry no 339 greater limiting sense and that in this context upon the language of section 302 the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April 1982
To our mind the words any such award  cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned counsel for the respondents
No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were neces sary
Plainly having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of for a contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court
The words any such award  are intended to have deeper signifi cance and in the context in which those words appear in section 302 it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
In other words section 302 of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Su preme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September 1984 or after that date
All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K Kamalajammanniavaru dead by Lrs
vs Special Land Acquisi tion Officer supra and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh and Others vs Union Terri tory of Chandigarh supra
The expanded meaning given to section 302 in the latter case does not in our opinion flow reasonably from the language of that sub section
It seems to us that the learned judges in that case missed the sig nificance of the word such  in the collocation any such award  in section 302
Due significance must be attached to that word and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April 1982 and 24 Septem ber 1984
We find substance in the contention of the learned Attorney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language
On the contrary as he says the terms in which section 302 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit
The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with 340 effect from any particular date and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned
Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself close attention must be paid to the provi sions of section 302 for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium
The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date
Delays in the superi or Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute
If it was intended that section 302 should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984 they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before
It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now enjoy the benefit of statutory en hancement
It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under section 111 and section 231 with reference to the date of publication of the notification under s41 and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium
Both section 111 and section 231 speak of compensation being determined on the basis inter alia of the market value of the land on that date and solatium by section 232 is computed as a per centage on such market value
Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh supra but in the absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it difficult to endorse that decision
It received the approval of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh supra but the judgment in Bhag Singh supra as we have said earlier has omitted to give due significance to all the material provisions of section 302 and consequently we find ourselves at variance with it
The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under section
18 but in our opinion the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself
Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re hearing of the original matter but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle
Learned counsel 341 for the respondents points out that the word or  has been used in section 302 as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and he says properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April 1982 to 24 September 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court
We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of section 302 will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates
The word or  is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under section
302 is sought to be extended
If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates the benefit of section 302 will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates
If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court it is at that stage when the benefit of section 302 will be applied
But in every case the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984
In the result we overrule the statement of the law laid down in Mohinder Singh supra and in Bhag Singh and Anoth er supra and prefer instead the interpretation of section 302 of the Amendment Act rendered in K Kamalajammanniava ru dead by Lrs
supra
The cases will now be listed before a Division Bench of three learned Judges for hearing on the merits of the other points raised in the cases


Summary:
In these two appeals filed by the State of Andhra Pra desh against the orders of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal the question that arises for consideration is whether amended Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Treasury and Accounts Subordinate Service Rules 1963 Is violative of the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Organisation of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment Order 1975
The circumstances under which this question has arisen are stated hereinbelow
Prior to the filing of Representative Petitions Nos
1595 and 788 of 1984 by the Respondents in the Tribunal out of which these appeals have arisen seven persons belonging to category 5 of Branch II of the Andhra Pradesh Treasury and Accounts Subordinate Service had presented a Petition before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal challeng ing the vires of Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Treasury and Accounts Subordinate Service Rules 1963 being violative of para 51 of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Order issued by the President of India under clauses 1  2 of Article 371 D of the Constitution inter alia on the ground that it made provision for promotion of clerks of the Directorate of Treasuries and Accounts and Assistants of the Finance De partment of the Secretariat to the post of Head Accountants and Sub Treasury Officer which posts had become Zonal posts after the promulgation of Presidential order
According to them only the UD Accountants of the feeder sources of the Zone were eligible for consi 343 deration in that particular Zone for promotion to the rank of Head Accountant and Sub Treasury Officer and not the personnel from the other Zones including UD Accountants of the Directorate
The Tribunal held that by virtue of para 51 of the Presidential order for purposes of promotion Zonal Cadre had to be treated as a separate unit and consequently the posts of Head AccountantsSubTreasury Officers could be filled up by promotion only on Zonal basis and as such Rule 3 which specified various categories of posts without refer ence to Zone as feeder posts for the purpose of promotion to the posts in question were inconsistent with para 51 of the Presidential order
The Tribunal therefore declared that after the promulgation of Presidential order the provisions of Rule 3 would have to be reviewed so as to make them consistent with the provisions of the Presidential order
The Tribunal further declared that various categories of feeder posts including the posts of Assistant Section Offi cers of the Secretariat from which promotion to the posts of Head AccountantsSub Treasury Officer could be made Could not be made operative after the promulgation of the Presi dential order
After the aforesaid decision of the Tribunal the State Government amended Rule 3 and gave it a retrospec tive operation wef 18101975
The validity of the amended Rule was questioned by the Respondents in the context of certain Assistant Section Officers in the Finance Department Secretariat Service borne on Zone VII being appointed to the post of Sub Treas ury Officers borne on the Subordinate Offices under the Directorate of Treasuries and Accounts borne on Zones I to IV by filing the said Representation Petitions before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal
It was again con tended before the Tribunal that the amended Rule 3 was violative of the Presidential order
According to the State the amended Rule had been issued by the Governor in exercise of the power conferred on him by the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and hence the validity of the Rule could not be questioned by the Petitioners
It was further con tended by the State that the earlier GO was not violative of the Presidential order of the provisions of Article 371 D but even so as it was considered by the Tribunal to be inoperative because the special provision did not explicitly state that they had been made in exercise of the authority vested in the State Government under para 52 of the Presi dential order the Government had set right the lacuna by framing the amended Rule specifically in exercise of the powers conferred on Government under para 52 of the Presi dential order
344 The Tribunal held that the impugned GO 196 did not set out under which sub para viz sub para a b or c in para 52 of the Presidential order the GO was issued and therefore the amended GO could not be upheld
The Tribunal also declared that there was no justification for transfer ring a person who did not belong to concerned Zone to be inducted into that Zone as that would defeat the underlying purpose of the Presidential order
The State has therefore preferred these appeals
Allowing the appeals this Court HELD That the Tribunal has failed to construe para 52 of the Presidential order in its proper perspective and give full effect to the powers conferred thereunder on the State Government to make provisions contrary to the scheme of local cadres prescribed under para 51
The words in para 52 viz nothing in this order shall prevent the State Government from making provision for sets out the over riding powers given to the State Government under the sub para
Such overriding powers have been given to the State Government in express terms in recognition of the principle that public interest and administrative exigencies have precedence over the promotional interests of the members belonging to local cadres and zones
353C E In order to make the provisions of old rule to have currency even after the Presidential order was passed the Government issued GO Ms No 728 on 11175
The Govern ment has issued GO Ms No 196 dated 17683 for amending Rule 3 so as to make the Rule conform to the requirements of para 52 of the Presidential order
354B C D The mode of recruitment and the category from which the recruitment for a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the Executive
It is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Executive in choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are matters of policy decision failing exclusively within the purview of the Executive
355B The question of filling up of posts by persons belong ing to other local categories or zones is a matter of admin istrative necessity or exigency
When the rules provide for such transfers being effected and when the transfers are not assailed on the ground of arbitrariness or discrimination the policy of transfer adopted by the Government cannot be struck down by Tribunals or Court of Law
355C 345 Rule 3 of the amended Rule declared to be intra vires of the Presidential Order
355E F