Appeal No 120 of 1955
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 25 1949 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No 55 of 1946 arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 26 1945 of the Court of the District Judge of Bellary in Original Suit No 39 of 1943
A V Viswanatha Sastri and K R Chaudhury for B K B Naidu for the appellant
KN Rajagopala Sastri and M section K Sastri for the respondents
December 19
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J
This appeal is before us on a certificate granted by the High Court as according to that Court a substantial question of law arose in the case which was stated by it to be  Is the adoption of the second defendant invalid as the approval or consent of the five trustees mentioned in paragraph 14 of the will of Kari Veerappa Exbt
P 2a was not obtained and is the authority to adopt at an end if any one of those five persons did not accept the trusteeship or died before the adoption or refused to give their approval 
In view of certain matters about to be stated the question of law as propounded by the High Court does not require to be considered
Kari Veerappa was the last male owner of the estate mentioned in his will Exbt
P 2a which he executed on October 10 1920
Under this will he authorised his wife Setra Veeravva first defendant to adopt a son for the purpose of continuation of his family as 970 he had no issue
The authority to adopt was in the following terms  I have given her permission to adopt as many times as would be necessary should the previous adoption be unsuccessful
But Veeravva must adopt only a boy approved by the respectable persons appointed by me in paragraph 14 should Veeravva die before making any adoption the persons becoming trustees should arrange for the adoption of a boy for the continuation of my family in accordance with my kulachara family usage At this stage it is unnecessary to refer to the other provisions of the will of Kari Veerappa
This gentle
man died on October 23 1920
After his death his widow made two attempts to adopt a son in accordance with his will
The first attempt was in 1939 which did not accomplish the purpose of the will as the person alleged to have been adopted died
The validity of this adoption was being questioned but as the boy said to have been adopted had died effects to dispute the adoption did not materialise
Veeravva thereafter on October 11 1942 adopted second defendant Sesalvada Kotra Basayya
Two documents in this connection are on the record
The first document is Exbt
D 25 dated the 18th of September 1942 which was a registered agreement to adopt the second defendant
The second document is also a registered document which is described as the deed of adoption and is dated June 23 1943
This clearly states that on October 11 1942 Veeravva had adopted the 2nd defendant
Reference was also made in this document to the agreement of September 18 1942
The appellant claiming to be the nearest reversioner of Kari Veerappa filed the present suit asking for a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant by Veeravva was invalid and not binding on the appellant or the other reversioners to the estate of the late Kari Veerappa
The suit filed by the appellant was heard by the District Judge of Bellary who dismissed it
The appellant appealed to the High Court of Madras
His appeal was dismissed and the decision of the District 971 Judge was substantially affirmed
The High Court did not allow compensatory costs granted by the District Judge nor did it agree with his finding that the appellant had failed to prove the relationship he had propounded and that lie was not a reversioner at all far less the nearest reversioner
In the opinion of the High Court the appellant was a relative and a reversioner though he had not proved that he was the nearest reversioner alive at the time the appeal was heard and that he need not prove this until he actually sought to recover possession of the property after Veeravva s death
When this appeal came on for hearing the learned Advocate for the respondents took a preliminary objection that the suit filed by the plaintiff must in any event fail having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the 30 of 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act
Hence the present appeal arising out of that suit must also fail
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that either there was a valid adoption or there was not
If there was a valid adoption and the decisions of the High Court and the District Judge on this question were correct then obviously the suit of the appellant must be dismissed
If on the other hand it was found that the adoption of the second defendant by Veeravva was either invalid or in fact had not taken place then under the provisions of section 14 of the Act Veeravva became the full owner of her husband s estate and was not a limited owner thereof
Consequently the appellant s suit was not maintainable
In view of this submission we are of the opinion that the point raised by way of preliminary objection must first be considered and decided
It is well settled that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration any change in the law vide the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri1
Section 14 of the Act states  141 Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
1 972 Explanation
In this sub section  property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act
2Nothing contained in sub section 1 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property
 On behalf of the appellant it was urged that section 14 of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present case because the estate of Veerappa was not in possession of his widow Veeravva but was in possession of the second defendant at the time the Act came into force and secondly because under sub section
2 of section 14 Veeravva got a restricted estate under the will Exbt
P 2a and the agreement to adopt Exbt
It was submitted that the widow  s power of adoption did not depend on her ownership of the estate of her husband
That power in the present case was derived under the Hindu law either from the authority conferred by her husband or the consent of his agnates
The Act did not enlarge her power of adoption and did not render an invalid adoption made by her immune from attack by the reversioners during her life time
The act of Veeravva in the present case was to bring in a stranger
The appellant as a rever sioner was therefore entitled during the life time of Veeravva to bring the present suit to obtain a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant was invalid
The question raised by the preliminary objection taken by the respondents must be considered an the assumption that the adoption of the second defendant 973 was invalid
The provisions of a 14 of the Act would not arise for consideration if the second defendant had been validly adopted
It is necessary therefore to determine whether the provisions of section 14 apply to the facts of the present case
It was strongly urged on behalf of the appellant that the words  any property possessed by a female Hindu  in section 14 of the Act referred to actual possession of the property whether the property was acquired before or after the Act came into force
This was a condition precedent to the applicability of the provisions of section 14 to the present case
Since the Act came into force on June 17 1956 and the decision of the High Court was given on March 25 1955 the question as to who was in actual possession of the estate of Veerappa did not arise for consideration on the case of the appellant set out in his plaint
The appellant should accordingly be given an opportunity to have a finding recorded on this question after the taking of evidence in that respect
On behalf of the respondents it was urged that the words  any property possessed by a female Hindu  did not refer merely to actual physical possession only but to ownership and possession in law as well
It was further urged on behalf of the respondents that even if it be assumed that the words  possessed by a female Hindu  mean actual possession then in the present case it had been proved that Veeravva was in actual possession of the estate of Veerappa when the Act came into force
It could not be disputed that on the death of Veerappa Veeravva came into possession of his estate and that she remained in possession at least until 1942 when the adoption of the second defendant is said to have taken place
But even on the adoption of the second defendant the agreement to adopt dated September 18 1942 stated that Veeravva was to remain in possession of her husband s estate during her life time in spite of the adoption
In the written statement filed by Veeravva and the second defendant it was clearly stated in para
6 thereof that Veeravva came into possession of her husband s property and that she recovered possession 974 of the property covered by the decree in 0
section 20 of 1921 on the file of the Subordinate Judge s Court Bellary and that she had been in sole possession of the said property up to date and that although she had adopted the second defendant on October 11 1942 it was subject to retention of the enjoyment possession and management by her of her husband s property during her life time
An affidavit had been filed in this Court by the second defendant in which he has clearly admitted that Veeravva is still in possession of his adoptive father s estate in pursuance of the agreement of September 18 1942
This was an admission against his own interest by the second defendant which he was not likely to make unless it was a fact that Veeravva was in possession of the estate since her husband s death up to the present
In answer to the affidavit of the second defendant and Veeravva that she was in actual possession the appellant had failed to file an affidavit with any clear assertion that to his knowledge Veeravva was not in Possession
The affidavit filed by the appellant was in the nature of submissions made to the Court rather than an affidavit in which facts to his knowledge were asserted
In para
2 he had made the significant statement  I understand that the possession of the suit properties has been and is now in truth and in fact with the alleged adopted son the second petitioner
He is in possession of these properties and is dealing with them He did not disclose bow he came to under
stand this
He certainly did not assert that all that was stated in para
2 was to his knowledge
As an alternative the appellant in para
4 of his affidavit had submitted If I succeed in proving that the adoption is not true and valid the petitioners cannot turn round and say that the possession of the first petitioner is that of a widow of an intestate and invoke the provisions of section 14 of the Succession Act He had further submitted in this paragraph that even on the case of the respondents set out in their petition for adding additional grounds Veeravva s estate was divested by the adoption and as she came into possession by reason of the ante adoption agreement 975 Exbt
D 25 section 14 of the Act was not applicable
It seems to us that if it were permissible to decide the question of Veeravva s possession on only the affidavits before us we would find no difficulty in holding that she was in possession of her husband s estate when the Act came into force
It is to be remembered however that this question has arisen now and the appellant has had no real opportunity to establish his assertion that the second defendant is in actual possession and not Veeravva
It is necessary therefore to consider the true scope and effect of the provisions of sub section
1 of a 14 of the Act
If the words  possessed by a female Hindu  occurring therein refer only to actual physical possession it may be necessary to call for a finding on the question of such possession if on the contrary these words have a wide connotation and include constructive possession or possession in law the preliminary objection can be determined on the footing that Veeravva was in such possession at the relevant time
The provisions of section 14 of the Act have been the subject of scrutiny and interpretation by various High Courts
In the case of Rama Ayodhya Missir vs Raghunath Missir 1 and in the case of Mt Janki Kuer vs Chhathu Prasad 2 the Patna High Court took the view that the effect of sections 14 and 15 of the Act was that a reversioner recognised as such under the Hindu law was no more a reversioner as a female Hindu possessing any property whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act held not a limited estate but an absolute estate therein and after the coming into force of the Act he had no right of reversion or any kind Of Spes successionsis
The High Courts of Calcutta Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have taken a view which does not support the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the aforesaid cases The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Mt Lukai vs Niranjan 3 dissented from the decisions of the Patna High Court in the above mentioned cases  Indeed the Patna High Court in the case of 1AIR 1957 Pat 480
2 AIR 1957 Pat
3 AIR 1058 Madh
Pra 160
976 Harak Singh vs KailaSh Singh 1 overruled its previous decisions referred to above and rightly pointed out that the object of the Act was to improve the legal status of Hindu women enlarging their limited interest in property inherited or held by them to an absolute interest provided they were in possession of the property when the Act came into force and therefore in a position to take advantage of its beneficial provisions but the Act was not intended to benefit alienees who with their eyes open purchased the property from the limited owners without justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when the vendors had only a limited interest of Hindu women
In the case before us the essential question for con sideration is as to how the words any property possessed by a female Hindu whether aquired before or after the commencement of this Act  in a 14 of the Act should be interpreted
Section 14 refers to property which was either acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and that such property should be possessed by a female Hindu
Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section re trospective but even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable
There is no question in the present case that Veeravva acquired the property of her deceased husband before the commencement of the Act
In order that the provisions of section 14 may apply to the present case it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time the Act came into force
It was the case of the appellant that the estate of Veerappa was in actual possession of the second defendant and not Veeravva at the relevant time
On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the words  possessed by  had a wider meaning than actual physical possession although physical possession may be included in the expression
1 AIR 1958 Pat
977 In the case of Gaddam Venkayamma vs Gaddam Veerayya 1 Viswanatha Sastri J with whom Satyanarayana Raju J agreed expressed the opinion that the word  possessed  in section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force
course possession referred to in section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female but may be possession in law
The possession of a licensee lessee or a mortgagee from the female owner or the possession of a guardian or a trustee or an agent of the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of section 14
The word  possessed  is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in one s hands or power
it includes possession by receipt of rents and profits
 The learned Judges expressed the view that even if a trespasser were in possession of the land belonging to a female owner it might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the female owner provided the trespasser had not perfected his title
We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges went
It is sufficient to say that possessed  in section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one s hand or power
In the case of Gostha Behari vs Haridas Samanta 2 P N Mookherjee J expressed his opinion as to the meaning of the words  any property possessed by a female Hindu  in the following words The opening words in  property possessed by a female Hindu obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act
They clearly contemplate the female s possession when the Act came into force
That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law but unless the female Hindu whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into 1 AIR 1957 Andh
Pra 280
123 2 AIR 1957 Cal
557 559
978 absolute estate under this particular section was at least in such possession taking the word  possession  in its widest connotation when the Act came into force the section would not apply 
In our opinion the view expressed above is the correct view as to how the words  any property possessed by a female Hindu  should be interpreted
In the present case if the adoption was invalid the full owner of Veerappa s estate was his widow Veeravva and even if it be assumed that the second defendant was in actual possession of the estate his possession was merely permissive and Veeravva must be regarded as being in constructive possession of it through the second defendant
In this situation at the time when the Act came into force the property of Veerappa must be regarded in law as being possessed by Veeravva
It was suggested that according to the will of Veerappa Exbt
P_2a in the properties mentioned in para
1 of that will Veeravva got only a restricted estate
The provisions of para
4 of the will however make it clear that they would come into force only if the trustees mentioned in the will and Veeravva should disagree
No material was shown to us that in fact the trustees and Veeravva had disagreed and that the provisions of para
4 were given effect to
Paragraph 12 of the will also showed that if the adoption was invalid the property devolved on Veeravva as in intestacy
It is clear therefore that the provisions of para
4 are of no assistance to the appellant in applying the provisions of sub section
2 of section 14 of the Act
Reference was also made to the contents of the agreement Exbt
D 25 dated September 18 1942 in this connection
It is clear  however that by this agreement no estate was conferred on Veeravva and she did not thereby acquire any estate much less a restricted estate
All that this document stated was that there was an agreement between the guardians of the boy to be adopted and Veeravva that even if the boy is adopted Veeravva would remain in possession and enjoyment of her husband s estate during her life time
In our opinion there is 979 no material on the record by which it can reasonably be said that the provisions of sub section
2 of section 14 of the Act applied to the present case
It was urged that the act of Veeravva in adopting the second defendant was to bring in a stranger and this action of hers could be questioned by a reversioner as any alienation made by her during her life time
Reference was made to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act Illustration f
In our opinion this is of no avail to the appellant because Illustration f obviously refers to a Hindu widow s estate and has no reference to a full owner
The right of a reversioner as one of the heirs under section 42 Specific Relief Act is limited to the question of preserving the estate of a limited owner for the benefit of the entire body of reversioners but as against a full owner the reversioner has no such right
In our opinion under the Act Veeravva becoming a full owner of her husband s estate the suit could not succeed and the appeal must accordingly fail
In our opinion the appellant s suit was not maintainable having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the Act even if it be assumed that there was no valid adoption of the second defendant
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Under Section 20 of the Forest Act 1927 certain areas were declared as reserve forest
On behalf of the inhabi tants of the areas the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition challenging their eviction from the said areas
From time to time this Court had been passing interim orders and directions
This Court also appointed Commissioners for the purpose of preparation of land records identification of forest land and the final action to be taken under the Forest Act
Reviewing the progress made so far and passing interim directions this Court HELD 1
The exercise involved in the process of prepar ing the records identification of forest land and final action under the Forest Act is undoubtedly massive but that by itself would not justify a protracted proceeding
403E 2
Mr RP Pandey one of the Commissioners has been staying at Allahabad and he does not find it convenient to shift to the site
The matter has reached a stage where presence of all the officers and the Commissioners at the site has become almost indispensable
Not much of his serv ices can be utilised if he is allowed to stay at Allahabad
It would therefore be necessary to substitute him by appointing some other judicial officer as Commissioner
In his place Shri Prem Singh retired District Judge would be appointed as one of the Commissioners
The Registry shall take steps to intimate him of the assignment at his V arana si address
403G H 404A B 3
With regard to the direction for depositing Rs20 lakhs it is modified as Rs5 lakhs in view of the assurance that more funds can come on requisition without loss of time
404D 403 4
The Chief Secretary may revive the Committee set up to monitor the work
404E F 5
The Executive Chairman of UP State Legal Aid and Advice Board would continue to supervise the work and send monthly reports to the Court
404F G