Civil Appeal No 23 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the decision dated September 29 1956 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal Bombay in Appeal Mad No 96 of 1956 arising out of the Award dated April 9 1956 of the Industrial Tribunal Madras in ID No 52 of 1954
A V Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal for the appellants
T section Venkataraman and M K Ramamurth for the respondents
February 22
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J
The appellant the Tinnevelli Tuticorin Electric Supply Co Ltd Tuticorin is an electric supply undertaking and it carries on its business as a licensee under the State Government of 70 Madras subject to the provisions of the Act 9 of 1910 and the Electric Supply Act 1948 Act 54 of 1948
This latter Act will hereinafter be called the Act
The business of the appellant consists of buying electric supply from the State Hydro electric Projects and of supplying the same to consumers within the areas specified in its licence this area is in and around Tinnevelli and Tuticorin Municipalities
The appellant s workmen hereinafter called the respondents made several demands in respect of their terms of employment
These demands gave rise to an industrial dispute which was referred by the Madras Government to the Industrial Tribunal at Madurai for adjudication under section 101c of the XIV of 1947
Amongst the items thus referred for adjudication was included the respondents  claim for additional bonus for the year 1952 53
Without prejudice to its contention that the appellant was not liable to pay bonus it had in fact voluntarily paid two months  basic wages by way of bonus to the respondents
The respondents however claimed additional bonus and this claim was one of the items of dispute referred to the tribunal for its adjudication
Before the industrial tribunal the appellant contended that since it was working as a licensee under the Act no claim for bonus was admissible outside the provisions of the Act
In support of this plea the appellant relied on the scheme of the Act which restricted the profit making of the electricity concerns to a prescribed limit with a possibility of a surplus only in cases of overcharging provided for in the rules
The appellant s case was that having regard to the scheme object and the background of the Act under which the appellant was carrying on its busi ness the respondent s claim for additional bonus was wholly misconceived
No claim for bonus can be entertained it was urged on behalf of the appellant without reference to the provisions of the Act which governs the business of the appellant
The tribunal however rejected the appellant s contentions and held that the appellant was liable to pay two months  basic wages as additional bonus to 71 the respondents
This award was passed on March 4 1955
Against this award the appellant preferred an appeal No 56 of 1955 to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and contended that no additional bonus should have been awarded in the absence of proof of an excess of clear profits over reasonable return  it was the appellant s case that it was only from excess of clear profits over reasonable return as defined by the Act that bonus can be legitimately awarded to the respondents
It appears that about this time a number of appeals raising the same question were pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and decisions given by the Labour Appellate Tribunal showed divergence of opinion on the question about the effect of the Act in respect of the claim for bonus made by employees of electricity concerns and undertakings
That is why the Chairman of the Labour Appellate Tribunal issued an administrative order that all appeals which raised the said question should be grouped together and posted for hearing before a specially constituted fuller bench of five members
The Chairman thought that a decision by a fuller bench would finally resolve the apparent conflict disclosed in several decisions pronounced thereto and give proper guidance to the tribunals in future
The special bench of the appellate tribunal then heard the group of appeals including the appeal preferred by the appellant
It held that bonus could be ordered to be paid notwithstanding the limitations of the Act and that the quantum of bonus should be determined even in the case of electricity concerns or undertakings by the application of the Full Bench formula laid down in that behalf
Having decided the question of law in this manner the appeals were remanded to the respective benches of the Labour Appellate Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law
The appeal preferred by the appellant was in due course taken up by the Industrial Tribunal at Madras the Industrial Tribunal at Madurai having been in the meanwhile abolished and the appeals on its file transferred to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras
This latter tribunal considered the merits 72 of the contentions raised by the parties applied the Full Bench formula and ultimately passed an award on April 9 1956 directing the appellant to pay an additional bonus of two months  basic wages to the respondents
Thereupon the appellant preferred another appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and it was numbered as Appeal Madras No 96 of 1956
Certain contentions were raised before the appellate tribunal on the merits and it was urged that the direction to pay an additional bonus of two months basic wages was improper and unjustified
The appellate tribunal negatived most of the contentions raised by the appellant but it was satisfied that the calculation made by the tribunal in regard to the quantum of available surplus was erroneous and so after rectifying the said error it held that the additional bonus which the appellant should pay to the respondents was one month s basic wage
It is against this decision of the appellate tribunal that the present appeal by special leave has been filed by the appellant before this Court
The main question which the appeal raises for our decision is whether the fuller bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Full Bench formula can and should be applied in adjudicating upon the respondents  claim for bonus against the appellant
Incidentally we may point out that the fuller bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of U P Electricity Supply Co Ltd  Ors
vs Their Workmen 1 has decided two questions of law
The first was in regard to the applicability of the Full Bench formula to the employees  claim for bonus against their employers carrying on the business of the supply of electricity and the second was in regard to the extent of the statutory depreciation allowed by the Full Bench formula
The question was whether it should not include initial depreciation and additional depreciation which are given for the purpose of allowing relief in the matter of taxation under section 102 vi b of the Income tax Act
The fuller bench had decided that in allowing a prior charge in the 1 73 working of the formula it is only the normal incometax depreciation including multiple shift depreciation that should be allowed
The correctness of this latter decision was challenged before this Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd vs Their Workmen 1 but the challenge failed and the decision of the fuller bench was confirmed
In the present appeal it is the correctness of the fuller bench decision on the first question which is challenged before us
Let us being by stating briefly the appellant s contention
It is urged on behalf of the appellant that it is only where the  clear profits  are in excess of the  reasonable return  under the Act that a case for the payment of bonus can really arise in regard to the electricity concerns and undertakings
The Act is a self contained code intended to regulate the business and affairs of electricity concerns including the claim of their employees for bonus and as such an industrial dispute between such concerns and their employees in regard to bonus must be determined solely by reference to the provisions of the Act and and not by the application of the Full Bench formula
As to the quantum of bonus which should be awarded it would depend upon the circumstances in each case but it is urged that it may as an ad hoe measure be decided that 14th of the excess between clear profits and the reasonable return may be taken as a fair quantum of bonus which electricity concerns should be ordered to pay to their employees
Before dealing with the validity of this argument it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act
Let us first consider some of the provisions in the 9 of 1910 which may be relevant
Section 32di provides that the State Government may on an application made in the prescribed form and on payment of the prescribed fee if any grant after consulting the State Electricity Board a licence to any person and that the said licence may prescribe such terms as to the limits within which and conditions under which the supply of energy is to be compulsory or permissive and generally as to such matters as the State Govern 1 74 ment may think fit
Section 3f provides that the provisions contained in the Schedule shall be deemed to be Incorporated with and to form part of every licence granted under this Part except as in the manner therein described
Section 41b empowers the State Government inter alia to revoke the licence where the licensee breaks any of the terms or the conditions of his licence the breach of which is expressly declared by such licence to render it liable to revocation
Section 71 provides to the authorities specified in it option to purchase the undertaking
Section 11 requires the licensee to prepare and render to the State Government or to such authority as the State Government may appoint in that behalf on or before the prescribed date in each year an annual statement of account of his undertaking made up to such date in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed in that behalf
Section 22 imposes on the licensee obligation to supply energy subject to the conditions prescribed  and section 23 provides that a licensee shall not in making any agreement for the supply of energy show undue preference to any person
The licensee cannot also charge for such supply any rates higher than those permitted
The appropriate Government is authorised to fix the maximum charges and by appropriate rules both the maximum and minimum charges have been prescribed
These are the relevant provisions of Act 9 of 1910
Let us now refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act
Section 57 provides the licensee s charges to consumers
According to it the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee not being a local authority in the manner specified by it
This section further provides inter alia that as from the specified date the licensee shall comply with the provisions of the said Schedules and not provisions of Act 9 of 1910 and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other law agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall in relation to the licence be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the 75 provisions of section 57A and the said Schedules
Section 57 deals with the licensee s charges to the consumers and lays down provisions which shall have effect in relation to the licence where the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the table appended to the Seventh Schedule are under sub section
1 deemed to be incorporated in the said licence
These provisions relate to the appointment of the Board and the rating committee
Section 57A prescribes the principles and the procedure which has to be followed by the rating committee in making its report to the State Government regarding the charges for electricity which the licensee may make to any class or classes of consumers
This provision gives us an idea as to the object which the Legislature had in mind in ultimately fixing the minimum and maximum rates chargeable to the consumers
Sections 78 and 79 provide for power to make rules and regulations
Nine Schedules are attached to the Act
Schedule Six deals with the financial principles and their application Schedule Seven deals with the depreciation of assets Schedule Eight provides for the determination of cost of production of electricity at generating stations and schedule Nine prescribes the method for allocation of costs of production at generating stations
It is necessary at this stage to refer briefly to some of the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule because Mr Viswanatha Sastri for the appellant has relied on the scheme of the said Schedule in support of his principal argument
These provisions prescribe the financial principles which have to be followed by the electricity concerns and undertakings covered by the Act
It is urged by the appellant that these principles along with the rest of the Schedules and the provisions of the Act constitute a self contained code which govern the business and the financial affairs of electricity concerns and as such even the claim of the appellant s employees for bonus must be dealt with in the light of these provisions
Paragraph 1 of Sixth Schedule provides  1
Notwithstanding anything contained in the 9 of 1910 except sub section
2 of section 22A and the provisions In the 76 licence of a licensee the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity whether by enhancing or reducing them that his clear profits in any year of account shall not as far as possible exceed the amount of reasonable return
This provision is made subject to four provisos which it is unnecessary to mention
Paragraph 2 reads thus  II
1 If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account is in excess of the amount of reasonable return one third of such excess not exceeding five per cent
of the amount of reasonable return shall be at the disposal of the undertaking
Of the balance of the excess one half shall be appropriated to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the remaining half shall either be distributed in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts collected from the sale of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the licensee for distribution to the consumers in future in such manner as the State Government may direct
2 The Tariffs and Dividend Control Reserve shall be available for disposal by the licensee only to the extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return in any year of account
3 On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms of its licence any balance remaining in the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed over to the purchaser and maintained as such Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve
 Paragraph 3 provides for the creation from existing reserve or from the revenue of the undertaking a reserve to be called Contingencies Reserve
Paragraph 4 prescribes the manner in which the licensee shall appropriate to Contingencies Reserve from the revenues of each year of account
Paragraph 6 directs that there shall be allowed in each year in respect of depreciation of fixed assets employed in the business of electricity supply such an amount as would if set aside annually throughout the prescribed period and accumulated at compound interest at 4 per 77 cent
per anum produce by the end of the prescribed period amount equal to 90 per cent
of the original cost of the asset after taking into account the sums already written off or set aside in the books of the undertaking annual interest on the accumulated balance will be allowed as expense from revenue as well as the annual incremental deposit
Paragraph 7 deals with assets which have ceased to be avilable for use through obsolescence inadequacy superfluity or for any other reason and it allows the licensee to describe the said assets as no longer in use and no further depreciation in respect thereof shall be allowed as a charge against the revenue
Paragraph 8 prohi bits any further depreciation where an asset has been written down in the books of the undertaking to 10 per cent
or less of its original cost
Under paragraph 9 where a fixed asset is sold for a price exceeding its written down cost the excess has to be credited to the Contingencies Reserve
Paragraph 10 requires the consent of the State Government to carry sums to a reserve or to declare a dividend in excess of 3 per cent
on share capital or other matters specified therein
Paragraph 13 imposes limitations in respect of ordinary remunerations of managing agents whereas paragraph 14 provides that the Board of Directors shall not contain more than 10 directors and paragraph 15 prescribes the way in which the licensee can make any capital expenditure which exceeds Rs 25000 or 2 per cent
of the capital base within three years before the next option of purchase under the licence arises
Paragraph 16 contains an arbitration clause
Paragraph 17 gives definitions for the purpose of this Schedule
Capital base is defined by paragraph 171 clear profit is defined by paragraph 172 as meaning the difference between the amount of income and the sum of expenditure plus specific appropriations made up in each case as prescribed in several sub clauses of clauses a b and c
It is necessary to refer to two sub clauses under clause b   xi other expenses admissible under the law for the time being in force in the assessment of Indian Income tax and arising from and ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply 78 xii contributions to Provident Fund staff pension gratuity and apprentice and other training schemes
 Paragraph 179 defines a reasonable return as meaning   in respect of any year of account the sum of the following a the amount found by applying the standard rate to the capital base at the end of that year b the income derived from invesments than those made under paragraph IV of this Schedule c an amount equal to one half of one per centum on any loans advanced by the Board under subparagraph 2 of paragraph I of the First Schedule
 One of the points which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether an amount of bonus paid by the employer to his employees is included under paragraph 17 2 bxi of the Sixth Schdule
It would thus be clear that the provisions of the Act in general and those of the Sixth Schedule in particular are no doubt intended to control and regulate the rates chargeable to consumers and to provide the method and the machinery by which the electrical system of the country could be properly coordinated and integrated
The rates chargeable are fixed so is a reasonable return provided for
But it is not as if the Act intends to guarantee a minimum return to the undertaking
What it purports to do is to prohibit a return higher than the one specified
Appropriations permissible under revenue receipts are also defined and enumerated and a clear profit as contemplated by the Act is also prescribed and defined
Large powers have been given to the Electricity Authority Boards and Councils for the purpose of canalising the activities of the concerns as well as for adjusting their activities for changing conditions and circumstances
Just as the Act has made provision for the control of rates chargeable to consumers its policy also is to give a fair deal to the undertaking and persons engaged in the business of supplying electricity It is with this twin object that a working sheet is required to be prepared under the provisions of the Act
It is however clear that the working sheet thus prescribed is essentially 79 different from the balance sheet and profit and loss account which companies keep under the provisions of the Companies Act
The determination of clear profits on the basis of the working sheet proceeds on the consideration of previous losses contributions towards the arrears of depreciation and several appropriations authorised by the State Government matters which have no relevance to commercial accounting
The principles of commercial accounting on which the balance sheets are prepared and profit and loss account made are very different from the principles on which the working sheet as specified in the Act is required to be prepared
The question which arises for our decision is whether the appellant is right in contending that the present dispute arising from the respondents  claim for bonus must be decided by the provisions of the Act alone and that the Full Bench formula is wholly inapplicable for the purpose
In dealing with this contention it is necessary to bear in mind that the fields covered by the Full Bench formula and by the provisions of the Act are entirely different
The Full Bench formula has been evolved by industrial adjudication for the purpose of doing social justice to workmen and it is
now well established that the workmen s claim for bonus is justified on the ground that they contribute to the employer s profit and are entitled to claim a share in the said profit with a view to fill the gap between their actual wages and the living wage which they aspire to earn
On the other hand the Act does not purport to deal with this problem at all
It is significant that though the Act makes detailed provisions in respect of matters intended to be covered by it it does not refer to the wages which the employer may have to pay to his employees
Can it be said that in fixing the wage
structure as between an electricity undertaking and its employees considerations of social justice would be irrelevant In fixing such wage structure none of the provisions of the Act can afford the slightest assistance to industrial tribunals
That task must be attempted by the tribunals in the light of principles of social justice and other relevant considerations such as the capacity of the employer to pay and the wages 80 received by employees in comparable trades in the same region
Just as the problem of wage structure has to be solved in the case of electricity concerns apart from the provisions of the Act and in the light of the relevant industrial principles so must the problem of bonus be resolved in the like manner
There is really no conflict between the Act and the principles of industrial adjudication
In fact they cover different fields and their relevance and validity is beyond question in their respective fields
As we have just indicated the method of accounting required by the Act in preparing the working sheet is substantially different from the commercial method of accounting which yields the gross profits in the form of profit and loss account
Determination of gross profit is the first step which industrial tribunals take in applying the Full Bench formula
Such gross profit cannot be ascertained from the working sheet prepared under the Act
It is not denied that the appellant has to keep accounts under the Companies Act on a commercial basis
That being so in dealing with the respondents claim for bonus it is the balance sheet and the profit and loss account  prepared by the appellant that must be taken as the basis in the present proceedings and that is precisely what the tribunals below have done
Therefore we are satisfied that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the respondents  claim for bonus must be governed by the application of the Full Bench formula
In this connection it may be useful to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Baroda Borough Municipality vs Its Workmen 1
One of the points raised on behalf of the Baroda Borough Municipality in resisting the claim for bonus by its workmen was that the scheme of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 18 of 1925 by which the Municipality was governed did not permit the making of any claim for bonus  and so it was not open to the labour court or tribunal to direct payment of bonus to municipal employees
This argument was rejected
The demand for bonus as an industrial claim  it was 1  81 observed is not dealt with by the Municipal Act it is dealt with by the 
Therefore it is not a relevant consideration whether there are provisions in the Municipal Act with regard to bonus
The provisions of the Municipal Act are relevant only for the purpose of determining the quality or the nature of the municipal property or fund those provisions cannot be stretched beyond their limited purpose for defeating a claim of bonus 
That is why this Court came to the conclusion that the absence of provisions in the Municipal Acts for payment of bonus to municipal employees was not a consideration which was either determinative or conclusive of the question at issue before it
The next question which arises is whether a claim for bonus can be said to be included under paragraph 17 2 b xi
This provision includes under expenditure other expenses admissible under the law for the time being in force in the assessment of Indian Income tax and arising from
and ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply
It is admitted that bonus paid by an employer to his employees constitutes expenses admissible under section 102vi of the Income tax Act but it is urged that it is not an expense which can be said to arise from and ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply
The argument is that cl
xi lays down two tests one of which is satisfied viz that it is expense admissible under the lndian Income tax Act but the other is not satisfied and so the clause is inapplicable to the amount paid by way of bonus
The appellate tribunal has held that even the other test is satisfied and that the expenditure in question can be said to arise from or to be ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply
In our opinion it is difficult to accept the appellant s argument that the construction placed by the appellate tribunal on the latter part of this clause is not reasonably possible
Besides it may be relevant to point out that by a subsequent amendment made in 1957 cl
xiii has been added under paragraph 172b of the Sixth Schedule
This clause which is numbered xiii reads thus  Bonus paid to the employees it 82 of the undertaking a where any dispute regarding such bonus has been referred to any tribunal or other authority under any law for the time being in force relating to industrial or labour disputes in accordance with the decision of such tribunal or authority  b in any other case with the approval of the State Government 
After the insertion of this clause there can be no doubt that the amount paid by the employer to his employees by way of bonus would definitely be admissible expenditure under paragraph 172b
In our opinion the insertion of this clause can be more reasonably explained on the assumption that the Legislature has thereby clarified its original intention
Even when cl
xi was enacted the intention was to include claims of bonus under expenses covered by the said clause but in order to remove any possible doubt the Legislature thought it better to provide specifically for bonus under a separate category
Otherwise it is difficult to appreciate how contributions to Provident Fund were treated as admissible expenditure all the time since they were covered by cl
xii and bonus could not have been treated as admissible expenditure under cl
That is why we are on the whole prepared to agree with the construction put upon cl
xi by the appellate tribunal
If that be the true position then bonus has always been an admissible expenditure under the scheme of the Act and as such there is no conflict between the scheme of the Act and the claim made by the respondents in the present case
Incidentally we may add that this point appears to have been conceded by the appellant before the appellate tribunal
We must accordingly hold that the appellate tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the Full Bench formula applied in adjudicating upon the respondents  claim for bonus against the appellant in the present proceedings
As we have already indicated before the fuller bench reached this decision there was a conflict of opinion in the decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunals but in view of our conclusion it is unnecessary to refer to the said earlier decisions
83 That takes us to the merits of the award
The first point is in regard to the appellant s claim for rehabilitation
Before the Labour Appellate Tribunal it was fairly conceded by the respondents that at least income tax at seven annas in a rupee on the gross profits less depreciation and also a contingency reserve of Rs 6047 have to be allowed in arriving at the figure of net available surplus for the purpose of bonus payable to the respondents  and that in regard to normal statutory depreciation the correct figure must be taken to be Rs 99038 instead of Rs 90393 as given by the industrial tribunal
Then as to the rehabilitation the appellant has led no evidence at all and so the appellate tribunal refused to grant any sum by way of rehabilitation in addition to the total amount of Rs 113950
In our opinion the appellate tribunal was right in holding that the adoption of a factor of 2 7 for all assets purchased before 1945 was not justified and that the adoption of the figures of the estimated life of the assets from the Schedule to the Electric Supply Act without even deducting the respective portions of the life of the assets which had already expired was equally unjustified
In that view of the matter we do not see how  the appellant can make any grievance against the finding of the appellate tribunal on the question of rehabilitation
The appellate tribunal has fairly observed that in future if a dispute arises between the appellant and its employees the appellant may substantiate its claim for rehabilitation by leading proper evidence
The claim of the appellant for the triple shift allowance in respect of the mains has been allowed by the appellate tribunal and there is no dispute in respect of it but it is urged that rule 8 of the Incometax Rules justifies the appellant s claim in respect of all its electric plant and machinery under Entry IIIE 1
Rule 8 provides that the allowance under section 10 2 vi of the Act in respect of depreciation of buildings machinery plant or furniture shall be a percentage of the written down value or original cost as the case may be equal to one twelfth the number shown in the corresponding entry in the second column of the following statement
There are two 84 provisos to this rule which it is not necessary to set out
The appellant makes a claim under IIIE 1 which deals with electric plant machinery and boilers whereas according to the respondents the appellant s case in this behalf falls under IIIC 4 and 5 which respectively deal with underground cables and wires and overhead cables and wires
The argument for the respondents is that in respect of these items the appellant s claim is inadmissible
In support of this argument the respondents rely upon the remark against item 3 on page 8 of the Rules
This remark would show that the benefit claimed by the appellant does not apply to an item of machinery or plant specifically excepted by the letters N E S A being shown against it
These letters are the contraction of the expression  No Extra Shift Allowance 
There is no doubt that these letters are to be found against items in IIIC 4 and 5
Therefore the point which arose for decision before the appellate tribunal was whether the appellant s claim falls under IIIE 1 or IIIC 4 and 5
The appellate tribunal has observed that the appellant made no attempt to show that any such claim for shift depreciation in respect of its cables and wires had been put forward by it before the income tax authorities or that it was held to be admissible by them
It has also observed that if the appellant s case was true that the cables and wires fell under IIIE 1 it was difficult to understand why separate provision should have been made in respect of depreciation of cables and wires under IIIC 4 and 5
Besides the appellate tribunal was not satisfied that such cables and wires would depreciate in value to a materially greater extent when electrical energy is allowed to pass through them for more than one shift
That is why on the materials as they were available on the record the appellate tribunal saw no reason why the appellant should be allowed any extra shift depreciation in respect of underground and overhead cables by way of a prior charge
The appellant s claim for the provision of Rs 23516 in that behalf was  therefore rejected
It would thus be seen that the appellant seeks to claim this amount by way of prior charge 85 and in substance this claim has been rejected by the appellate tribunal on the ground that sufficient material has not been placed before it by the appellant on which the claim could be examined and granted
In such a case we do not see how we can interfere in favour of the appellant
The present decision will not preclude the appellant from making a similar claim in future and justifying it by leading proper evidence
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
At the trial of a person for murder by alleged poisoning the fact of death by poisoning is provable by circumstantial evidence notwithstanding that the autopsy as well as the chemical analysis fail to disclose any poison though the cause of death may not appear to be established by direct evidence the medical evidence of experts and the circumstances of the case may be sufficient to infer that the death must be the result of the administration to the victim of some unrecognised poison or drug which acts as a poison and a conviction can be rested on circumstantial evidence provided that it is so decisive that the court can unhesitatingly hold that the death was not a natural one
Per section K Das and M Hidayatullah jj
Where the evidence showed that the appellant who was the medical adviser of the deceased deliberately set about first to ingratiate himself in the good opinions of his patient and becoming her confidant found out all about her affairs and gradually began managing her affairs that all the time he was planning to get at her property and had forged her signature on a dividend warrant and had obtained undated cheque from her and then under the guise of helping her to have a consultation with a specialist in Bombay took her in a train and then brought the patient unconscious to a hospital bereft of all property with which she had started from home and gave a wrong name to cover her identity and wrong history of her ailments that after her death he abandoned the body to be dealt with by the hospital as an unclaimed body spread the story that she was alive and made use of the situation to misappropriate all her properties and that he tried by all means to avoid postmortem examination and when questioned gave false and conflicting statements held that if the deceased died in circumstances which prima facie admit of either disease or homicide by poisoning one must look at the conduct of the appellant both before and after the death of the deceased that the corpus delicti could be held to be proved by a number of facts which render the commission of the crime certain and that the medical evidence in the case and the conduct of the appellant unerringly pointed to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was the result of the administration of some unrecognised poison or drug which would act as a poison and that the appellant was the person who administered it
461 Per Sarkar J If it could be established in this case that the deceased had died an unnatural death the conclusion would be inevitable that unnatural death had been brought about by poison but the circumstances were not such that from them the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn was that the deceased died an unnatural death
Held that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellant
Regina vs Onufrejczyk 1955 1 QB 388 The King vs Horry 1952 NZL 111 Mary Ann Nash s case 1911 6 Cr
R 225 and Donnall s case  considered and relied on