ivil Appeal No 823 of 1981
738 From the Judgment and Order dated 16101979 of the Punjab  Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No 2300 of 1979
VC Mahajan NP Ms Urmila Kapoor Ms section Janani and Ms Meenakashi for the Appellant
ML Verma and PC Kapur for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA J
This appeal by a tenant defendant is directed against the decree for his eviction from a shop on the ground mentioned in section 132v of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act which renders the tenant liable for eviction if he has ceased to occupy the rented premises for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause
The questions which are involved in this case are whether a tenant can be said to have ceased to occupy a building merely for the reason that he temporarily suspends the actual physical user there of and whether a landlord is entitled to a decree even if the tenant has re occupied the premises before the eviction proceeding was commenced
The landlord respondent filed the present application for eviction of the appellant before the Rent Controller in March 1973and inter alia pleaded that for a continuous period of more than four months the appellant had ceased to occupy the shop during 1969 to 1971 and he was therefore liable to be ejected
The appellant disputed the allegation but the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority rejected the defence and accepted the plaintiff s plea
After unsuccessfully moving the High Court under section 155 of the Act the tenant had filed the present appeal by special leave
The grounds on which a tenant can be asked to quit are mentioned under section 132 of the Act and under clause v thereof the Controller may pass an order for the ten ant s eviction if he is satisfied 132v That where the building is situated in a place other than a hill station the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause Mrs Urmila Kapoor appearing in support of the appeal con tended that the appellant has all along been in possession of the shop which 739 was never vacated and merely for the reason that the shop remained closed for a temporary period he cannot be said to have ceased to occupy the same
The argument is that the appellant s occupation of the shop was never interrupted as it was in his effective control although closed and secured under the appellant s lock which nobody ever disturbed
We do not find ourselves in a position to accept the interpre tation of the section as attempted on behalf of the appel lant
The reason of including the clause v in section 132 is to ensure that buildings which are scarce in number spe cially in the towns necessitating rent control legislation do not remain unused at the instance of tenants who do not actually need them
A tenant who is in possession of a building in the legal sense only cannot be said to be in occupation thereof for the purpose of section 132v otherwise a question of his eviction as envisaged in that section would not arise
The section by making provisions for his ejectment assumes that he is in possession but still includes cessation of occupation as one of the grounds
The clause therefore has to be interpreted in this background and it must take colour from the context
We therefore hold that if a tenant stops the business which he is carry ing on in a shop and closes the premises continuously for a period of four months without a reasonable cause he will be liable for eviction
The other point urged by Mrs Kapoor needs more serious consideration
The non occupation of the premises by the tenant did not continue after 197 1 and the eviction petition was filed in 1973
Is it permissible to hold in this situation that the ground mentioned in section 132v has been made out On behalf of the respondent it has been contended that since in a number of Rent Acts of other States a similar ground specifically requires such non occupation for a period immediately preceding the date on which the ejectment application is filed the present Act which does not use identical language should be interpreted differently
Reliance has also been placed on the observa tions of this Court in Gajanan Dattatraya vs Sherbanu Hosang Patel  Ors 1976 1 SCR 535 a case arising under the  Bombay Rents Hotel  Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947
The prayer for eviction in the above case was rounded on a plea of subjetting and the ground in this regard as mentioned in section 131e is that the tenant has since the coming into operation of the Act unlawfully sublet the premises
The Court rejected a similar conten tion of the tenant as in the present case by holding that To accede to the contention of the appellant would mean 740 that a tenant would not be within the mischief of unlawful subletting if after the landlord gives a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground or unlawful subletting the subten ant vacates
The landlord will not be able to get any relief against the tenant in spite of unlawful subletting
In that way the tenant can foil the attempt of landlord to obtain possession of the premises on the ground of subletting every time by getting the sub tenant to vacate the premises
 The observations and consequently the decision were based on the law requiring service of notice to quit before start ing an action for ejectment as assumed earlier before the decision of 7 learned Judges in V Dhanpal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal  holding otherwise was given
The provisions of section 13 had then to be construed in a manner which did not render the same completely ineffec tive
Now that is not the position
It is true that the Court in the former decision also observed that the tenant s liability to eviction arose once the fact of unlawful sub letting is proved but the very next sentence further clarifies the position in the following words At the date of the notice if it is proved that there was unlawful subletting the tenant is liable to be evicted
 It is significant to note that according to the decision the subletting had to continue till the date of the notice
If the requirement of notice disappears the above observation must be read as referring to the application for eviction and not the notice
The observations in an earlier case of this Court in Goppulal vs Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji  Anr   may be of some help in the present context
This decision was discussed in Gajanan Dattatraya s case supra and was distinguished on the ground that the Court there had no occasion to consider the question as to whether subletting to be within the mischief of the relevant statute is to subsist at the date of the suit
It is true that the Court did not have to consider and decide directly the present controversy but the comment made on the lan guage of the statute concerned is helpful to the tenant
The dispute in that case depended on the interpretation of section 131e of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 which forbids the Court to pass a decree for eviction unless inter alia the tenant has assigned sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the disputed premises
There the words has sublet needed construing while in the case before us they are 741 has ceased to occupy
In this background the Court said that the use of present perfect tense contemplates a period even connecting in some way with the present time
So far as the language of some rent Acts specifical ly indicating that the period of non occupation should be one immediately preceding the suit is concerned the learned counsel is right that a comparison of the language of the present Act lends some support to his stand but this alone does not outweigh the other relevant circumstances
On the other hand if the provisions of several other Acts are examined it will be seen that the section has been phrased in a way which avoids the use of present perfect tense
As an illustration the provisions of the Bihar Rent Act may be seen which forbids the eviction of a tenant except in execution of a decree passed for subletting or for other grounds mentioned therein
Besides as pointed out in Nathia Agarwalla and Another vs Musst
Jahanara Begum and Others   comparing statutes of different States is not to be commended because similarity or varia tion in the laws of different States is not necessarily indicative of a kindered or a different intention
The reason for this view was expressed in the following lan guage Enactments drafted by different hands at different times and to satisfy different requirements of a local character seldom afford tangible or sure aid in construction
We would therefore put aside the Rent Control Acts of Madras Bihar Delhi and other States because in these States the problem of accommodation in relation to the availability of lands and houses and the prior legislative history and experience cannot be same as in Assam
On an examination of all the provisions of the Act and on taking into account the other relevant considera tions we are of the view that the non occupation of the premises by a tenant must continue till the date of the filing of the application for his eviction on the ground covered by section 132v
Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the decision of the courts below is set aside
The parties shall bear their own costs throughout
NPV Appeal al lowed


Summary:
A case was registered against the respondent an officer of the Indian Police Service under Section 52 read with Section 51e of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 on 831984 but the investigation report was submitted to the Government on 1791987
In November 1987 the respond ent filed a criminal petition for quashing further proceed ings pursuant to the registration of the First Information Report contending that there had been inordinate delay in the investigation and that the prosecution had not filed the report as contemplated under Section 173 Cr
PC till he filed the petition
The appellant contended that the delay was occasioned on account of dilatory tactics adopted by the respondent and that the case was a complicated and time consuming one
The High Court quashed the First Information Report and observed that wherever there was an inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing investigation the case merited quashing of the First Infor mation Report even
The State preferred an appeal in this Court contending that the High Court s observation was too wide a proposition and it would be detrimental to the prosecution in future under all circumstances regardless of reasons therefor
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 11 No general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is inordinate delay on the part of the 747 investigating agency in completing the investigation such delay ipso facto would provide ground for quashing the First Information Report or the proceedings arising there from
750H 751A 12 A lethargic and lackadaisical manner of investiga tion over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceeding to live every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis
Therefore it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence and inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation
However there are offences of grave magnitude which would necessari ly involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book
Therefore it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investiga tion in a criminal case should be completed
750B F 13 The determination of the question whether the ac cused has been deprived of a fair trial on account of de layed or protracted investigation would also therefore depend on various factors including whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether it was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused
The Court in addition has to consider whether such delay on the part of the investigating agency has caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused
The assessment of these factors necessarily vary from case to case
750G H Raghubir Singh vs State of Bihar 1986 4 SCC 481 relied on
Bell vs Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica and another 1985 2 All England Law Reports 585 referred to
The Power of the Courts to stay a Criminal Prosecution   referred to
In the instant case the respondent was placed under suspension pending enquiry but was reinstated on the basis of enquiry report and further action was stopped
However by a subsequent order dated 5th July 1985 the earlier order was cancelled and a show cause notice for 748 his compulsory reitrement was issued
The Central Adminis trative Tribunal held that the order dated 5th July 1985 was illegal and beyond the powers of State Government
This Court dismissed State s Special Leave Petition
In the meantime the respondent was allowed by the appellant to retire peacefully from service on attaining the age of superannuation and the First Information Report and conse quent proceedings were quashed by the High Court
In these circumstances this is not a fit case for interference
751D E G 752A C E