ivil Appeal No 2368 of 1986 Etc 656 From the Judgment and Order dated 3051986 of the Delhi High Court in CW No 1295 of 1986
KK Venugopal AK Ganguli Yogeshwar Prasad PR Seetharaman SK Gupta and AK Srivastava for the Appel lants
Soli J Sorabjee Attorney General Kapil Sibbal Addi tional Solicitor General
GL Sanghi section Ganesh Mrs Sushma Suri EMS Anam Atul Namda
Aman Vachher SK Mehta Kailash Vasdev and SR Srivastava for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SC AGRAWAL J
The common question which arises for consideration in these appeals by special leave and the writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is whether a person who was inducted as a tenant in premises which are public premises for the purpose of the hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act  and whose tenancy has expired or has been terminated can be evicted from the said premises as being a person in unautho rised occupation of the premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and whether such a person can invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Act 
In short the ques tion is whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in relation to premises which fall within the ambit of both the enactments
Civil Appeals Nos 2368 and 2369 of 1986 relate to the premises which are part of a building situated at 5 Parlia ment Street New Delhi
The said building originally be longed to Punjab National Bank Ltd a banking company
Ashoka Marketing Ltd Appellate No 1 in Civil Appeal No 2368 of 1986 and Ms Sahu Jain Services Ltd Appellant No 1 in Civil Appeal No 2369 of 1986 were tenants of premises located in the said building since July 1st 1958
As a result of the enactment of the Banking Companies Acquisi tion and Transfer of Undertakings Act
1970 hereinafter referred to as the Banks Nationalisation Act  the under taking of the Punjab National Bank Ltd was transferred and vested in Punjab National Bank a body corporate constituted under the provisions of the said Act and the aforesaid appellants became the tenants of Punjab National Bank
By notices dated May 18 1971 issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the tenancies of both the appel lants were terminated by 657 Punjab National Bank with effect from November 30 1971
Thereafter the said Bank initiated proceedings under the Rent Control Act against both the appellants
In those proceedings an objection was raised by the said appellants that proceedings for eviction under the Rent Control Act were not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act
During the pendency of the said proceedings under the Rent Control Act proceedings were initiated by the Estate Officer against the appellants under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and while the said proceedings under Public Premises Act were pending the earlier proceedings initiated under the Rent Control Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller Delhi by orders dated August 6 1979
In the proceedings under the Public Premises Act the Estate Officer passed orders for eviction against the appellants and the appeals filed by the appellants against the said orders of the Estate Officer were dismissed by the Additional District Judge
Delhi
The appellants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Court
The said writ peti tions were dismissed by the High Court by orders dated May 30 1986
Aggrieved by the said orders of the High Court the appellants have filed these appeals after obtaining special leave to appeal
Civil Appeal No 3725 of 1986 relates to an office room in the Allahabad Bank Building situated at 17 Parliament Street New Delhi
The said building belongs to Allahabad Bank a body corporate constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act
The said premises were let out to Pt
KB Parsai the appellant in this appeal for a period of three years with effect from February 1 1982
After the expiry of the said period eviction proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises Act were initi ated to evict the appellant and in those proceedings the Estate Officer passed an order dated March 29 1986
The appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution wherein he challenged the validity of the order passed by the Estate Officer
The said writ petition was dismissed by the Delhi High Court by order dated August 7 1986
The appellant has filed this appeal against the said decision of the Delhi High Court after obtaining Spe cial Leave to Appeal
Writ Petition No 864 of 1985 relates to premises in the building located at 10 Darya Ganj New Delhi
The said building originally belonged to Bharat Insurance Company Limited as Insurance Company which was carrying on life insurance business
Ms Bennett Coleman  Co Ltd peti tioner No 1 in the writ petition was in occupation of a part of the said property as a tenant under Ms Bharat 658 Insurance Co Ltd since 1948
The life insurance business was nationalised under the whereby the Life Insurance Corporation was established and the life insurance business carried on by the various insurance companies including Ms Bharat Insurance Company Ltd was nationalised and vested in the Life Insurance Corporation
As a result petitioner No 1 became a tenant of the Life Insurance Corporation
The Life Insurance Corpora tion gave a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating a tenancy of petitioner No 1 with effect from August 31 1953 and thereafter proceedings for eviction were initiated against petitioner No 1 under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and notices dated December 15 1984 were issued by the Estate Officer under Section 41 and Section 73 of the Public Premises Act
Feeling aggrieved by these notices the petitioners have filed the writ petition
Before we proceed to deal with the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants in the appeals and for the petitioners in the writ petition hereinafter referred to as the petitioners  it would be relevant to advert to the legislative history of Public Premises Act
The Public Premises Act was preceded by two such enact ments
The first enactments was the Government Premises Eviction Act 1950 hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act  which was enacted by Parliament to provide for the eviction of certain persons from Government premises and for certain matters connected therewith
It was confined in its application to premises a building or a part of a build ing belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by the Central Government and it empowered the competent authority tO evict a person in unauthorised occupation of such prem ises after issuing a notice to such person
The 1950 Act did not define the expression unauthorised occupation and it also did not prescribe the procedure to be followed by the competent authority before passing the order of eviction
There was a provision for appeal to the Central Government against the order of the competent authority
The 1950 Act was declared as unconstitutional by the Calcutta High Court in Jagu Singh vs M Shaukat Ali and by the Punjab High Court in Satish Chander  Anr
vs Delhi Im provement Trust Etc AIR 1958 Punjab 1 on the ground that it imposed unreasonable restriction on the fight of the citizens to acquire hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Article 191f of the Constitution and by the Allahabad High Court in Brigade Commander Meerut Sub Area vs Ganga Prasad on the ground that it was violative 659 of the rights to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution
Thereupon Parliament enacted the Public Premises Evic tion of Unauthorised Occupants Act 1958 hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Act 
In the 1958 Act the defini tion of Public Premises was enlarged to include in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi premises belonging to Municipal Corporation of Delhi or any municipal committee or notified area committee and premises belonging to Delhi Development Authority
In the 1958 Act the expression unauthorised occupation was defined
It also laid down the procedure to be followed by the Estate Officer for evicting a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises and it made provision for filing an appeal against every order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge or such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the District Judge may designate in that behalf
In Northern India Caterers Private Limited vs The State of Punjab  Anr  Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land Eviction and Rent Recovery Act 1959 was held to be void by this Court on the ground that the said provision conferred an additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupa tion of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure under Section 5 the said provision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
The provisions contained in the Punjab Act were similar to those contained in the 1958 Act
Keeping in view the deci sion of this Court in Northern India Caterers Private Limit ed s case supra Parliament enacted Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Amendment Act 1968 whereby the 1958 Act was amended and Section 10E was intro duced and a bar was created to the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of the rent or damages payable under the provisions of the 1958 Act
The Delhi High Court in PL Mehra etc
vs DR Khanna etc AIR 1971 Delhi 1held that whole of the 1958 Act was void under Article 152 being violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and the amendment of 1968 was ineffective This led to the enactment of the Public Premises Act by Parliament in 1971
It was brought into effect from 16th September 1958 660 the date on which the 1958 Act came into force
The provi sions of the Public Premises Act are similar to those con tained in the 1958 Act
The definition of public premises  contained in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act has been widened so as to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of a company as defined in Section 3 of the  in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up capital is held by the Central Government as well as premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any corporation not being a compa ny as defined in Section 3 of the in 1956 or a local authority established by or under a Central Act and owned and controlled by the Central Government
It contains certain additional provisions providing for offences and penalties Section 11 liability of heirs and representa tives Section 13 recovery of rent etc
as an arrear of land revenue Section 14 and bar of jurisdiction of Courts Section 15
The validity of the Public Premises Act was upheld by this Court in Hari Singh  Ors
vs The Military Estate Officer  Anr 15
The Public Premises Act was amended in 1980 by the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Amend ment Act 1980 whereby the definition of public premises  in Section 2e was amended to include premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of certain autonomous and statutory organisations viz any University established or incorporated by any Central Act any Institute incorporated by the  any Board of Trustees constituted under the major Port Trusts Act 1963 and the Bhakra Management Board and as well as premises belonging to or taken on lease by any Company which is subsidiary of a Company as defined in Section 3 of the in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up capital is held by the Central Govern ment
By the said Amending Act of 1980 the total period taken in eviction proceedings was also sought to be cur tailed by reducing the period for showing cause against notice of eviction the period within which an unauthorised occupant should vacate the premises after eviction order has been passed and the period for filing an appeal against the order of an Estate Officer
By the said Amending Act of 1980 provisions were also made by inserting Sections 5A 5B and 5C to deal with the squatting or spreading of goods on or against or in front of any public premises and removal of unauthorised constructions or encroachments on public prem ises
The Public Premises Act was further amended in 1984 by the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Amendment Act 1984 whereby certain further amendments were made to provide for increased penalties and 661 making the offences under the Act cognisable and to enable the Estate Officers to exercise their powers under the Act effectively
As stated in the preamble the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters
In Section 2 various expressions have been de fined
The definitions of the following expressions which are of relevance are reproduced as under c Premises means any land or any building or part of a building and includes i the garden grounds and out houses
if any appertaining to such building or part of a building and ii any fitting affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof e Public Premises means 1 any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisi tioned by or on behalf of the Central Government and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Amend ment act 1980 under the control of Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat 2 any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of i any company as defined in Section 3 of the 1 of 1956 in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Central Government or any Company which is a subsidiary within the meaning of the Act of the first mentioned company ii any corporation not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the  1 of 1956 or a local authority established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government 662 iii any University established or incorporated by any Central Act iv any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Tech nology Act 1961 59 of 1961 v any Board of Trustees constituted under the 38 of 1963 vi the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Recoganisation Act 1966 31 of 1966 and that Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra Beas Management Board under Sub section 6 of Section 80 of the Act and 3 in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi i any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or any municipal committee or notified area committee and ii any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Author ity whether such premises are in the possession of or leased out by the said Authority g Unauthorised Occupation in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance by any person of the public premises after the authority whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been expired for any reason whatsoever Section 3 makes provision for appointment by Central Govern ment of gazetted officer of Government or officers of equal rank of the statutory authority as Estate Officers
Section 4 relates to issue of show cause against order of eviction and provides as under 1 If the Estate Officer is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted the Estate Officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling 663 upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made
2 The notice shall a specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and b require all persons concerned that is to say all persons who are or may be in occupation of or claim interest in the public premises  i to show cause if any against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof and ii to appear before the Estate Officer on the date speci fied in the notice alongwith the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown and also for personal hearing if such hearing is desired
3 The Estate Officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other con spicuous part of the public premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned
4 Where the Estate Officer knows or has reasons to believe that any persons are in occupation of the public premises then without prejudice to the provisions of subsection 3 he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed
 Section 5 relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants and provides as under  1 If after considering the cause if any shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing if any given under clause b of sub 664 section 2 of Section 4 the estate officer is satisfied that occupation of public premises is unauthorised the estate officer may make an order of eviction for reasons to be recorded therein directing that the public premises shall be vacated on such date as may be specified in the order by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof and cause a copy of the order to be af fixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises
2 If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction on or before the date specified in the said order or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under sub section 1 whichever is later the estate officer of any other officer duly authorised by the estate officer in this behalf may after the date so specified or after the expiry of the period aforesaid whichever is later evict that person from and take possession of the public premises and may for that purpose use such force as may be neces sary Section 5A provides for removal of unauthorised construc tionsstructures or fixtures cattle or other animal from public premises
Section 5B deals with demolition of unau thorised constructions
Section 5C empowers the Estate Officer to seal unauthorised constructions
Section 6 pro vides for disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants
Section 7 empowers the Estate Offi cer to require payment of rent or damages on account of use and occupation of public premises alongwith interest by the person found in unauthorised occupation
Section 8 lays down that an Estate Officer shall for the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when trying to suit in respect of certain matters viz summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath requiring discovery and production of documents and any other matter which may be prescribed
Section 9 provides for an appeal from every order of the Estate Offi cer in respect of any public premises passed under Sections 5 5B 5C and 7 to an appellate officer who shall be a district judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in the district of not less than ten years  standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf
It also prescribes the period of limitation for filing such appeals and also lays down that the appeal shall be disposed of by the appellate offi cer as expeditiously as possible
Sections 10 attaches finality to the orders 665 made by an Estate Officer or appellate officer and provides that the said orders shall not be called in questions in any original suit application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Act
Section 11 provides for offences and penalties and Section 11A lays down mat the offences under Section 11 would be treated as cognizable offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
Section 15 relates to bar of jurisdiction and it provides as under No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of a the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occu pation of any such public premises or b the removal of any building structure of fixture or goods cattle or other animal from any public premises under Section 5 A or C the demolition of any building or other structure made or ordered to be made under Section 5B or cc the sealing of any erection or work or of any public premises under Section 5 C d the arrears of rent payable under sub section 1 of Section 7 or damages payable under sub section 2 or interest payable under sub section 2 A of that section e the recovery of i costs of removal of any building structure or fixture or ggods
cattle or other animal under Section 5 A or ii expenses of demolition under Section 5 B or iii costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory authority under sub section 5 of Section 9 or iv any portion of such rent damages cost of removal expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central Government or the statutory authority
 666 In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 18 of the Public Premises Act the Central Government has made the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Rule 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Rules 
Rule 5 of said Rules relates to holding of in quiries and Rule 9 relates to procedure in appeals
We will first deal with the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to the scope of the definition of the expression Public Premises  con tained in Section 2e and unauthorised occupation  con tained in Section 2g of the Public Premises Act
As mentioned earlier the appeals relate to premises belonging to nationalised Banks viz Punjab National Bank and Allahabad Bank constituted under the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act
It has been urged by Shri Yogesh wer Prasad that the premises belonging to a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of the definition of Public Premises  contained in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act for the reason that nationalised bank is not a company as defined in Section 3 of the and it is also not a corporation established by or under a Central Act
The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent banks is that the nationalised bank is a corpora tion established by a Central Act viz the Banks Nationali sation Act and the premises belonging to a nationalised bank are public premises  under Section 2e2ii of the Public Premises Act
The question which therefore requires to be considered is whether a nationalised bank is a corpo ration established by or under a Central Act and is owned or controlled by the Central Government
The nationalised banks have been established under the Banks Nationalisation Act wherein the nationalised banks have been described as corresponding new bank 
In sub section i of Section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation Act it has been provided that on the commencement of the said Act there shall be constituted such corresponding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule
In subsection 2 of Section 3 it is laid down that the paid up capital of every corresponding new bank constituted under sub section 1 shall until any provision is made in this behalf in any scheme made under Section 9 be equal to the paid up capital of the existing bank in relation to which it is the corre sponding new bank
Sub section3 of Section 3 provides that the entire capital of the new bank shall stand vested in and allotted to the Central Government
Sub section 4 of Section 3 lays down that every corresponding new bank shall be a body corpo 667 rate with perpetual succession and a common seal with power subject to the provisions of the said Act to acquire hold and dispose of property and to contract and may sue and be sued in its name
From the aforesaid provisions contained in Section 3 of the Banks Nationalisation act it is evident that the nationalised banks have been established under the provisions of the said Act and the same are distinct juris tic persons with perpetual succession and the power to acquire hold and dispose of property and to contract and having the right to sue and be sued in their own name and further that the entire capital of the said banks is vested in the Central Government meaning thereby that the said banks are owned by the Central Government
Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has pointed out that in view of Section 34 of the Banks Nationalisation Act the nationa lised bank is a body corporate and not a corporation and that there is a distinction between a body corporate and a corporation inasmuch as a body corporate includes bodies such as companies co operative societies etc which are not corporations
Reliance has been placed in this regard on the decision of Delhi High Court in Oriental Bank of Com merce and Another vs Delhi Development Authority and Anoth er We find no substance in this contention
In English law a corporation has been defined as a body of persons or an office which is recognised by the law has having a personality which is distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body or the personality of the individual holder for the time being of the office in question See Halsbury s Laws of England Fourth Edition Volume 9 Para 1201
Generally speaking corporations are of two kinds corporation aggregate and corporation sole
A corporation aggregate has been described as an incorporated group of co existing persons and a corporation sole as an incorporated series of successive persons Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edition P 308
The distinctive feature of a corporation are that it has the capacity of continuous existence and succession notwithstanding changes in its membership and it possesses the capacity of taking holding and conveying property entering into contracts
suing and being sued and exercising such other powers and priviledges conferred on it by law of its creation just as a natural person may See SS Dhanoa vs Municipal Corporation Delhi  Ors
  Corporations aggregate may be public or private
A public corporation is a corporation formed for a public purpose eg local government authori ties and it is usually incorporated by a public general Act of Parliament
A private corporation is a corporation formed for profit 668 eg a limited company and it is usually incorporated under a statutory enactment
After the second world war there has been development of a new pattern of public corporations in England as an instrument of planning in the mixed economy
The general characteristics of such a public corporation is that it is normally created by a special statute it has no shares and no shareholders either private or public and its shareholder in the symbolic sense is the nation represent ed through Government and Parliament the responsibility of the public corporation is to the Government represented by the competent Minister and through the Minister to Parlia ment the administration of the public corporation is en tirely in the hands of a board which is appointed by the competent Minister and it has the legal status of a corpo rate body with independent legal personality
See W Fried man The New Public Corporations and the Law 1947 12 Mod
LR 234 236 There is a similar growth of this type of public corporation in other countries
This trend is also evident in our country since independence and a number of such public corporations have been constituted by Acts of Parliament
The distinction between such a public corporation and a corporation generally known in law has been explained in the following observations of Denning LJ as he then was The Transport Act 1947 brings into being the British Transport Commission which is a statutory corporation of a kind comparatively new to English law
It has many of the qualities which belong to corporations of other kinds to which we have been accustomed
It has for instance defined powers which it cannot exceed and it is directed by a group of men whose duty it is to see that those powers are proper ly used
It may own property carry on business borrow and lend money just as any other corporation may do so long as it keeps within the bounds which Parliament has set
But the significant difference in this corporation is that there are no shareholders to subscribe the capital or to have any voice in its affairs
The money which the Corporation needs is not raised by the issue of shares but by borrowings and its borrowing is not served by debentures but is guaranteed by the Treasury
If it cannot repay the loss falls on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom that is to say on the taxpayer
There are no shareholders to elect the direc tors or to fix their remuneration
There are no profits to be made or distributed Tamfin vs Hannaford 669 Reference has already been made to the provisions of the Banks Nationalisation Act which show that the nationalised bank has been constituted as a distinct juristic person by the Act and it is owned by the Central Government
There are other provisions in the Banks Nationalisation Act which show that the general superintendence direction and management of the affairs of the business of the bank is vested in a Board of Directors constituted by the Central Government and the Central Government has the power to remove a person from the membership of the Board of Directors Section 72  73 and in the discharge of its functions the Bank is to be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank give Section 8
This indicates that the nationalised bank has all the attributes of the new pattern of public corpora tion
Merely because the expression body corporate  has been used in relation to the nationalised banks in Section 34 of the Banks Nationalisation Act and the expression corpo ration  has not been used does not mean that the nationa lised bank is not a corporation
The expression body corpo rate  is used in legal parlance to mean a public or private corporation  Black s Law Dictionary p 159
Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has urged that in order to consti tute a corporation there must exist persons ie members composing it and that this element is missing in the natio nalised banks inasmuch as the Banks Natiolisation Act does not provide for any membership to these banks
This conten tion is without any merit because as noticed earlier in the new pattern of public corporations which have developed there are no shares and no shareholders either public or private and its shareholder in the symbolic sense is the nation represented through Government and Parliament
A similar contention was raised before the High Court of Australia in the Bank of New South Wales  Ors
vs The Commonwealth in relation to the Common wealth Bank established as a body corporate by the Common wealth Bank Act 1945
While rejecting this contention Latham CJ has observed The Commonwealth Parliament has declared that the bank is a corporation and the Court must on this as on many previous occasions accept that the bank though it has no corpora tors exists as a new kind of juristic person p 227 670 Similarly Dixon J has observed Although the Commonwealth Bank is declared to be a body corporate there are no corporators
I see no reason to doubt the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament for a purpose within its competence to create a juristic person without identifying an individual or a group of natural persons with it as the living constituent or constituents of the corporation
In other legal systems an abstraction or even an inanimate physical thing has been made an artificial person as the object of rights and duties p 36 1 It may also be mentioned that in RC Cooper vs Union of India  this Court while referring to nationalised banks constituted under the provisions of the Banking Companies Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Ordinance 1969 has treated the nationalised banks as corporations
While construing the expression corporation  in Section 2e 2ii of the Public Premises Act it cannot be ignored that the object of the legislation in enlarging the defini tion of public premises  in Section 2e is to make avail able the machinery of the Act for evicting unauthorised occupants not only from the premises belonging to the Cen tral Government but also from premises belonging to Compa nies Corporations and statutory bodies in which the Central Government has a substantial interest
Under Section 2e2i premises belonging to a company incorporated under the  in which not less than fifty one per cent of the paid up capital is held by the Central Government are to be treated as public premises
It could not be the intention of Parliament that premises belonging to public corporations whose entire paid up capital vests in the Central Government and who are the instrumentalities of State would be excluded from the ambit of the definition of public premises 
In our opinion
therefore the expres sion corporation  in Section 2e2ii of the Public Premises Act would include public corporations of the new pattern constituted under the Central Acts wherein the entire paid up capital vests in the Central Government
Shri Yogeshwere Prasad has placed reliance on the deci sion of this Court in SS Dhanoa s case supra wherein this Court has considered the question whether the Co opera tive Store Ltd a cooperative society registered under the Bombay Co operative Societies is a corporation established by or under a Cen tral Provincial or State Act for the purposes of clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code
This Court has observed that a corporation established by or under an Act of legislature could only mean a body corporate which owes its existence and not merely its corporate status to the Act and a distinction has been drawn between a corpora tion established by or under an Act and a body incorporated under an Act
It has been held that the Co operative Store Ltd which is a society registered under the Bombay Co operative Societies Act 1925 is not a statutory body because it is not created by a statute and that it is a body created by an act of a group of individuals in accordance with the provisions of a Statute
This decision does not lend any assistance to the contention of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad
In Oriental Bank of Commerce s case Supra the over ruled question for consideration was whether the Chairman of a nationalised bank is a public servant and sanction under Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure was neces sary to prosecute him
ML Jain J has held that the nationalised bank is a body corporate and not a corporation within the meaning of clause Twelfth of Section 21 IPC and therefore the Chairman of the nationalised bank is not a public servant under Section 21 IPC
The learned Judge has further held that even if the nationalised bank is a corporation the Chairman of the said bank is not in the service or pay of the bank and further in the facts of the case it could not be said that the Chairman was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty
Sachar J did not consider it necessary to deal with the question as to whether the nationalised bank is a corporation because he was of the view that Section 197 Cr
PC was not at tracted
For the reasons mentioned earlier the judgment of Jian J insofar as it draws a distinction between a body corporate  and a corporation  and laws down that the natio nalised bank though a body corporate  is not a corpora tion cannot be upheld
The other reason given by Jain J is that the nationalised bank is merely a personified insti tution having no members and is therefore not a corpora tion
This view also cannot be sustained
We have already pointed out that in order to constitute a corporation it is not necessary that there should be shareholders or members and that in the new pattern of public corporation that has developed there are no shareholders or members
Keeping in view the provisions of the Banks Nationalisa tion Act we are of the opinion that the nationalised bank is a corporation established by a Central Act and it is owned and controlled by the 672 Central Government
The premises belonging to a nationalised bank are public premises under Section 2e2ii of the Public Premises Act
We are therefore unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that premises belonging to a nationalised bank do not fall within the ambit of the definition of public premises  contained in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act
Shri Yogeshwer Prasad has also urged that public prem ises  as defined in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act must be confined to premises let out for residential pur poses only and should not cover premises let out for commer cial purposes and that if premises let out for commercial purposes are included Section 2e would be rendered uncon stitutional as being violative of the provisions of Articles 14 191g and 21 read with Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution
The submission of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad is that a construction which would sustain the constitutionali ty of the provisions of Section 2e should be preferred over a construction which would render them constitutional
We find no force in this contention
There is no warrant for confining the scope of the definition of public premises  contained in Section 2e to premises used for residential purposes only and to excluded premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit
In Hari Singh vs Military Estate Officer Supra a similar contention was advanced and it was argued that the expres sion premises  in Public Premises Act would not apply to agricultural land
This Court rejected that contention with the observation The word premises  is defined to mean any land
Any land will include agricultural land
There is nothing in the Act to exclude the applicability of the Act to agricultural land
 We are also unable to hold that the inclusion of prem ises used for commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of public premises  would render the Public Premises Act as violativeof the right to equality guaran teed under Article 14 of the Constitution or right to free dom to carry on any occupation trade or business guaranteed under Article 191g of the Constitution or the right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
It is difficult to appreciate how a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises used for commercial purposes can invoke the Directive Principles under Article 39 and 41 of the Constitution
As indicated in the 673 statement of Objects and Reasons the Public Premises Act has been enacted to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises
It serves a public purpose viz making available for use public premises after eviction of persons in authorised occupation
The need to provide speedy machinery for evic tion of persons in unauthorised occupation cannot be con fined to premises used for residential purposes
There is no reason to assume that such a need will not be there in respect of premises used for commercial purposes
No dis tinction can therefore be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial pur poses in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitate providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises apply equally to both the types of public premises
We are therefore unable to accept the contention of Shri Yogeshwer Prasad that the definition of public premises contained in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act should be so construed as to exclude premises used for commercial purposes from its ambit
Shri AK Ganguli has urged that a person who was put in occupation of the premises as a tenant and who was con tinued in such occupation after the expiry or the termina tion of his tenancy cannot be regarded as a person in unau thorised occupation under Section 2g of the Public Prem ises Act
The submission of Shri Ganguli is that the occu pation of a person who was put in possession as a tenant is juridical possession and such an occupation cannot be re garded as unauthorised occupation
In support of this sub mission Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier KK Verma  Anr
vs Union of India  Anr AIR 1954 Bombay 358 which has been approved by this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh vs Rao Jag dish Singh  Ors  The definition of the expression unauthorised occupa tion  contained in Section 2g of the Public Premises Act is in two parts
In the first part the said expression has been defined to mean the occupation by any person of the Public premises without authority for such occupation
It implies occupation by a person who has entered into occupa tion of any public premises without lawful authority as well as occupation which was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so
The second part of the definition is inclu sive in nature and it expressly covers continuance in occu pation by any person of the public premises after the au thority whether by way of grant or any other mode of trans fer under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has 674 expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever
This part covers a case where a person had entered into occupation legally under valid authority but who continues in occupation after the authority under which he was put in occupation has expired or has been determined
The words whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer in this part of the definition are wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act
The definition of unauthorised occupation contained in Section 2g of the Public Premises Act would therefore cover a case where a person has en tered into occupation of the public premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy has expired or has been determined in accordance with law
Brigadier KK Verma  Anr
vs Union of India  Anr
Supra was decided under the provisions of the Government Premises Eviction Act 1950 which did not contain the definition of the expression unauthorised occupation 
In that case it has been held that under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law and although he may not have the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenan cy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute and therefore an erstwhile tenant can never become a trespasser and his possession cannot be regarded as unauthorised occupation
The learned Judges have also observed that unless the legislature had given indica tion of a clear intention that by the expression unautho rised occupation  it meant not only person who had no title at all but also persons who are titled at the inception and whose title came to an end it would not be proper to give an interpretation to the expression unauthorised occupa tion  which would run counter to the principles of law which have been accepted in this country
After this decision the legislature intervened and introduced the definition of the expression unauthorised occupation  in the  which defi nition has been reproduced in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act and in the said definition the legislature has taken care to make an express provision indicating that the expression unauthorised occupation  includes the continu ance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever
In the circumstances the petitioners cannot derive any assistance from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Brigadier KK Verma s case supra
675 Shri Ganguli has placed reliance on the decision of AP Sen J in Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd  Ors
vs Union of India  Others 1985 Suppt
3 SCR 382 and has submitted that in that case the learned Judge has held that cases involving relationship between the lessor and lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act
We have carefully perused the said decision and we are unable to agree with Shri Ganguli
In that case AP Sen J has observed that the new building had been constructed by the Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd after the grant of permission by the lessor and therefore the Express Newspapers Pvt
Ltd was not in unauthorised occupation of the same within the meaning of Section 2g of the Public Premises Act
It was also held by the learned Judge that the Express Building constructed by the Express Newspapers Ltd with the sanction of lessor on plots Nos 9 and 10 demised on perpetual lease can by no process of reasoning be regarded as public premises belonging to the Central Government under Section 2e of the Public Premises Act and therefore there was no question of the lessor applying for eviction of the Express Newspapers Pvt Ltd under the provisions of the Public Premises Act
The aforesaid observations indicate that the learned Judge did not proceed on the basis that cases in volving relationship of lessor and lessee fall outside the purview of the Public Premises Act
On the other hand the said observations show that the learned Judge has held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act could not be invoked in the facts of that case
Another submission that has been urged by Shri Ganguli is that the question whether a tease has been determined or not involves complicated questions of law and the estate officer who is not required to be an officer well versed in law cannot be expected to decide such question and there fore it must be held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act have no application to a case when the person sought to be evicted had obtained possession of the premises as a lessee
It is true that there is no requirement in the Public Premises Act that the estate officer must be a person well versed in law
But that by itself cannot be a ground for excluding from the ambit of the said Act premises in unauthorised occupation of persons who obtained possession of the said premises under a lease
Section 4 of the Public Premises Act requires issuing of a notice to the person in unauthorised occupation of any Public Premises requiring him to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made
Section 5 makes provisions for production of evidence in support of the cause shown by the person who has been served with a notice under Section 4 and giving of a personal hearing by the estate officer
Section 8 provides that an estate 676 officer shall for the purpose of holding any enquiry under the said Act have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified therein namely a summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath b requiring discovery and production of documents and c any other matters which may be prescribed
Rule 52 of the Public Premises Eviction of Unautho rised Occupants Rules 1971 requires the estate officer to record the summary of evidence tendered before him
Moreover Section 9 confers a right of appeal against an order of the estate officer and the said appeal has to be heard either by the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years  standing as the dis trict judge may designate in that behalf
In shows that the final order that is passed is by a judicial officer in the rank of a district judge
A similar contention was raised before this Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal P Ltd vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  Others  wherein the validity of the provisions of Chapter VA of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act  1888 and the Bombay Government Premises Eviction Act 1955 were challenged before this Court and the said contention was negatived
Aligiriswami J speaking for the majority has observed as under Even though the officers deciding these questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers
The provi sions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath and requiring the discovery and production of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected
So is the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court in the city of Bombay or to a District Judge in the district who has got to deal with the 677 matter as expeditiously as possible also a sufficient safeguard as was recognised in Suraj Mail Mehta s case
 Having dealt with the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners on the applicability of the provisions of Public Premises Act we may come to the main question in volved in these matters namely whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act
For appreciating the submissions of the learned counsel on this question it is necessary to examine the provisions of both the enactments
The relevant provisions of the Public Premises Act have already been set out
We may briefly refer to the provisions of the Rent Control Act
The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament to provide for the control of rents and evictions and of rate of hotels and lodging houses and for the lease of vacant premises to Government in certain areas in the Union Terri tory of Delhi
It extends to the areas included within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in the First Schedule to the Act Section 12
The expression premises is defined in Section 2i as under Premises means any building or part of a building which is or is intended to be let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose and in cludes i the garden grounds and outhouses if any appertaining to such building or part of the building ii any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of the building but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house
 Section 3 which excludes the applicability of the Act to certain premises provide as under Nothing in this Act shall apply a to any premises belonging to the Government b to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a 678 grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government Provided that where any premises belonging to Government have been or are lawfully let by any person by virtue of an agreement with the Government or otherwise then notwith standing any judgment decree or order of any court or other authority the provisions of this Act shall apply to such tenancy
c to any premises whether residential or not whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees or d to any premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Delhi Rent Control Amendment Act 1988 for a period of ten years from the date of completion of such construction Chapter II Sections 4 to 13 contains provisions re garding rent including fixation of standard rent
Chapter III Sections 14 to 25 contains provisions for control of eviction of tenants
Section 14 gives protection to tenants against eviction and provides that an order for eviction of a tenant can be passed only on one or more of the grounds mentioned in clauses a to 1 of sub section 1
Special provisions have been made for recovery of immediate posses sion of premises in Sections 14A to 14D in respect of cer tain classes of landlords
Section 22 contains a special provision for recovery of possession of premises where the landlord is a company or a body corporate or a local author ity or a public institution if the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution for the furtherance of its activities
In Chapter IIIA Sections 25 A to 25 C provisions have been made for summary trial of certain applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord
Chapter IV Sections 26 to 29 contains provisions relating to deposit of rent
Chapter V Sections 30 to 34 contains provisions relating hotels and lodging houses
Chapter VI Sections 35 to 43 contains provisions relating to appoint ment of controllers and their powers and functions and appeals
Section 42 makes provisions for execution of orders passed by the Controller or in appeal as a decree of civil court
Section 43 attaches finality to the order passed by the Controller and the order passed in appeal
Chapter VII Sections 44 to 49 contains provisions regarding special obligations of landlords and 679 penalties
Chapter VIII Sections 50 to 57 contains miscel laneous provisions
Under Section 50 jurisdiction of civil courts is barred in respect of matters specified therein
Section 54 saves the operation of certain enactments name ly  the and the Delhi Tenants Temporary Protection Act 1956
On a comparison of the provisions of the Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act it will be found that 1
By virtue of Section 12 of the Public Premises Act the said Act is applicable throughout the territory of India whereas view of Section 12 of the Rent Control Act the said Act is confined in its application to areas included within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Com mittee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in the First Schedule and any other urban area included within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to which provisions of the said Act are extended by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette
2 Under Clauses c of Section 2 of the Public Premises Act the expression premises  has a wider connotation and it includes open land as well as building or part of a building
Under the Rent Control Act the expression prem ises  as defined in clause i of Section 2 has a narrower connotation to mean any building or a part of building and it does not cover open land
In view of the definition of the expression public premises  contained in clause e of Section 2 of the Public Premises Act the said Act in addition to the premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government is applicable to premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of the compa nies and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e
The Rent Control Act on the other hand is applicable to all premises except premises belonging to the Government or to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of the premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government Section 3
In view of the amendment introduced in Section 3 by the Delhi Rent Con 680 trol Act is not applicable to premises whether residential or not whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five hundred rupees and premises constructed on or after the commencement of the said Amendment Act for a period of ten years from the date of completion of such construction
The provisions of the Public Premises Act are applica ble to Public Premises in occupation of a person having no authority for such occupation including a person who was allowed to occupy the public premises under a grant or any other mode of transfer and who has continued in occupation after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy that premises has expired or has been terminated
The provi sions of the Delhi Rent Control Act are applicable only to persons who have obtained possession of the premises as tenants and whose tenancy is continuing as well as persons who after the expiration or termination of the tenancy have continued in occupation of the premises
As a result of this comparison it can be said that certain premises viz building or parts of buildings lying within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and in urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which belong to or are taken on lease by any of the companies or statuto ry bodies mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e of the Public Premises Act and which are in occupation of a person who obtained possession of the said premises as a tenant and whose tenancy has expired or has been terminated but who is continuing in occupation of the same would ex facie fall within the purview of both the enactments
The question which therefore arises is whether the occupant of such premises can seek the protection available under the provisions of Rent Control Act and he can be evicted from the premises only in accordance with the said provisions and proceedings for eviction of such a person cannot be initiat ed under the provisions of the Public Premises Act
Shri Venugopal and other learned counsel representing the petitioners have urged that the Rent Control Act is a self contained code providing for regulating the relation ship of landlords and tenants and it makes comprehensive provisions with regard to control of rents as well as evic tion of tenants and that the provision of the Rent Control Act being special in nature insofar as lease hold proper ties in Delhi are concerned would prevail over the provi sions of the Public 681 Premises Act which are in the nature of general provisions relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from Govern ment premises in the whole country
In support of this submission the learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on Sections 22 and 54 and the non obstante clause contained in Section 141 of the rent Control Act
It has also been urged by the learned counsel for the peti tioners that the Public Premises Act does not contain any machinery for the termination of the tenancy and that in view of the decision of this Court in V Dhanapal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal   the jural relationship of landlord and tenant can come to an end only on the pass ing of an order of eviction by a competent court in accor ding with the provisions of the Rent Control Act and that in the absence of an order of eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act no proceedings can be initiated against a person who came into occupation of the premises as a tenant and who is continuing in occupation of the said premises after the contractual tenancy has expired or has been terminated
The learned Attorney General and Shri GL Sanghi appearing on behalf of the respondents in the appeals have urged that the Public Premises Act is in the nature of a special enactment making provision for speedy and expedi tious recovery of possession of public premises from persons in unauthorised occupation of the same whereas the Rent Control Act is general enactment regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant and since the Public Premises Act is a special enactment it would override the provisions of the Rent Control Act
It has also been urged that the Public Premises Act is a later enactment having been enacted in 1971 whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted in 1958 and therefore the Public Premises Act would prevail over the Rent Control Act
It has been urged that Section 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of other Courts is in the nature of a non obstante clause which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act
The learned Addl
Solicitor General appearing for the respondents in the writ petitions has adopted a different line of argument
He has contended that the Public Premises Act had been enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legis lative power under Article 2461 read with entries 32 95 and 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution whereas the Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legislative power under Article 2464 read with entries 6 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and since the Public Premises Act has been enacted in 682 exercise of the legislative power under Article 2461 of the Constitution it would prevail over the Rent Control Act enacted in exercise of legislative power under Article 2464 of the Constitution
At this stage it may be mentioned that in Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs Life Insurance Corporation of India  Another  decided by a bench of three Judges it has been held that the Public Premises Act over rides the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act
In that case it has been observed that the scope and object of the Public Premises Act is quite different from that of Rent Control Act and while the Public Premises Act operates in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals a particular set of juristic persons like Companies Corporations or the Central Government whereas the Rent Control Act is of much wider application and it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Public Premises Act and the object of the Rent Control Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate Bodies
It was therefore held that the Public Premises Act is a special Act as compared to the Rent Control Act and it overrides the provisions of the Rent Control Act
The learned counsel for the petitioners have assailed the correctness of the said decision and have submitted that it needs reconsideration
As regards rent control legislation enacted by the State legislatures the position is well settled that such legisla tion fall within the ambit of entries 6 7 and 13 List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution See Indu Bhushan Bose vs Rama Sundari Devi  Another   V Dhanpal Chettiar s case supra Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi etc
vs Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal  Others  and Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt Ltd  Another vs Union of India  Others  The Rent Control Act has been enacted by Parliament in relation to the Union Territory of Delhi in exercise of the legislative power conferred under Article 2464 of the Constitution which empowers Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List
The Public Premises Act deals with Government property as well as property belonging to other legal entities men tioned in clauses 2 683 and 3 of Section 2e of the Public Premises Act
In so far as it relates to eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government the Public Premises Act would fall within entry 32 of List I being law with respect to a property of the Union
The property belonging to the various legal entities mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e of the Public Premises Act cannot be regarded as property of the Union and the Public Premises Act cannot be held to have been enacted under entry 32 of List I in respect of the said properties
In Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt Ltd and Another vs Union of India and Others supra this Court has held that the Public Premises Act in relation to properties other than the properties belonging to the Central Government has been enacted under the concurrent list
The learned Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Smt
Saiyada Mossarrat vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  wherein it has been held that with regard to the subject matter of speedy eviction of unautho rised occupants from properties belonging to a Government company wherein the Central Government has more than fifty one per cent of the paid up capital the source of authority can be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of Union List List 1
This Court has however affirmed the decision of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in LS Nair vs Hindustan Steel Ltd AIR 1980 MP 106 wherein it has been held that insofar as the Public Premises Act deals with a lessee or licence of premises belonging to a Government company the subject matter of the Act would be covered by entries 6 7 and 46 of List III
After quoting the observa tions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in this regard this Court has observed Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of the High Court This shows that the decision of this Court is rounded on the view mentioned above
Since the Act was held to be covered by entries 6 7 and 46 of List III it was not necessary to invoke the residuary power of legislation under entry 97 of List I
The observations made by this Court that the source of authority in the matter of speedy eviction of unautho rised occupants from properties belonging to a Government company wherein the Central Government has more than fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital can in any case be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of List I are obiter in nature only
There is therefore no inconsistency between the decisions of this Court in Accoun 684 tant and Secretarial Services Pvt
Ltd supra and Smt
Saiyada Mossarrat case supra inasmuch as in both the decisions it is held that the Public Premises Act insofar as it deals with a lessee or licencee of premises other than premises belonging to the Central Government has been enact ed in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List
We are in agree ment with this view
This means that both the statutes viz the PubLic Premises Act and the Rent Control Act have been enacted by the same legislature Parliament in exercise of the legis lative powers in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List
We are therefore unable to accept the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the Public Premises Act having been enacted by Parliament in exercise of legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Union List would ipso facto override the provisions of the Rent Control Act enacted in exercise of the legislative powers in respect of matters enumerated in the Concurrent List
In our opinion the question as to whether the provisions of the Public Premises Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act will have to be considered in the light of the principles of statutory interpretion applicable to laws made by the same legisla ture
One such principle of statutory interpretation which is applied is contained in the latin maxim leges posteriors priores conterarias abrogant later laws abrogate earlier contrary
laws
This principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant a general provision does not derogate from a special one
This means that where the literal meaning of the general enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in an earlier Act it is presumed that the situation was intended to continue to be dealt with by the specific provision rather than the later general one Benion Statutory Interpretation p 433 34
The rationale of this rule is thus explained by this Court in the JK Cotton Spinning  Weaving Mills Co Ltd vs The State of Uttar Pradesh  Others  The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers Judges but springs from the common understanding of man and women that when the same person gives two directions 685 one covering a large number of matters in general and anoth er to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier directions should have effect p 94 In UP State Electricity Board  Ors
vs Hari Shankar Jain  Ors  this Court has observed In passing a special Act Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject
When a General Act is subsequently passed it is logical to presume that Parlia ment has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received con sideration from Parliament p 366 In Life Insurance Corporation vs
DJ Bahadur  Krishna Iyer J has pointed out In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective
For certain purposes an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with liner points of law p 1127 The Public Premises Act is a later enactment having been enacted on 23rd August 1971 whereas the Rent Control Act was enacted on 31st December 1958
It represents the later will of Parliament and should prevail over the Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the Public Premises Act is a general enactment whereas the Rent Control Act is a special enactment and being a special enactment the Rent Control Act should prevail over the Public Premises Act
The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Rent Control Act is a special enactment dealing with premises in occupation of tenants whereas the Public Prem ises Act is a general enactment dealing with the occupants of Public Premises and that insofar as public premises in occupation of tenants are concerned the provisions of the Rent Control Act would continue to apply and to that extent the provisions of the Public Premises Act would not be applicable
In support of this submission reliance has been placed on the non obstante clauses contained in Section 14 and 22 of the Rent Control Act as well as the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the said Act
On the 686 other hand the learned counsel for the respondents have urged that the Rent Control Act is a general enactment dealing with the relationship of landlord and tenant gener ally whereas the Public Premises Act is a special enactment making provision for speedy recovery of possession of Public Premises in unauthorised occupation and that the provisions of the Public Premises Act a later Special Act will therefore override the provisions of the Rent Control Act in so far as they are applicable to Public Premises in occupation of persons who have continued in occupation after the lease has expired or has been determined
The learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on Section 15 of the Public Premises Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any Public Premises and other matters specified herein
It has been submitted that the said provision is also in the nature of a non obstante clause which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act
Thus each side claims the enactment relied upon by it is a special statute and the other enact ment is general and also invokes the non obstante clause contained in the enactment relied upon
The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Trnasfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the evic tion of a tenant it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings
The rent Control Act can therefore be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union Territory of Delhi
The Public premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unau thorised occupants from public premises
As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent Court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil procedure the Public Prem ises Act confers the power to pass an order or eviction of an unauthorised occupant in a public premises on a designat ed officer and prescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer before passing such an order
Therefore the Public Premises Act is also a special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises
In other words both the enactments namely the Rent Con trol Act and the Public Premises Act are special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein
Since the Public premises Act is a special statute and not a general enactment the 687 exception contained in the principle that a subsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier special law cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle that the later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws the Public Premises Act must prevail over the Rent Control Act
We arrive at the same conclusion by applying the princi ple which is followed for resolving a conflict between the provisions of two special enactments made by the same legis lature
We may in this context refer to some of the cases which have come before this Court where the provisions of two enactments made by the same legislature were found to be inconsistent and each enactment was claimed to be a special enactment and had a non obstante clause giving overriding effect to its provisions
In Shri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking and Industrial Co Ltd  this Court was considering the provisions contained in the Banking Companies Act 1949 and the 
Both the enactments contained provisions giving overriding effect to the provisions of the enactment over any other law
This Court has observed Each enactment being a Special Act the ordinary principle that a special law overrides a general law does not afford any clear solution in this case p 613 It is therefore desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts in a given case on much broader considera tions of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the rele vant provisions therein p 615 Similarly in Kumaon Motor Owners  Union Ltd and Another vs The State of Uttar Pradesh 1 there was conflict between the provisions contained in Rule 1312gg and i of the Defence of India Rules 1962 and Chapter IV A of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939
Section 68 B gave overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IVA of the Motor Vehicle Act whereas Section 43 of the Defence of India Act 1962 gave overriding effect to the provisions contained in the Defence of India Rules
This Court held that the Defence of India Act was later than the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore if there was anything repugnant the provisions of the later 688 Act should prevail
This Court also looked into object behind the two statutes namely Defence of India Act and Motor Vehicles Act and on that basis also it was held that the provisions contained in the Defence of India Rules would have an overriding effect over the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act
In Sarwan Singh  Another vs Kasturi Lal   the question for consideration was whether the provi sions of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control Act will prevail over those contained in Sections 19 and 39 of the 
Section 14A and 25A of the Rent Control Act contained non obstante clauses but in Section 54 of the Rent Control Act it was expressly provided that nothing in the said Act shall effect the provisions of the 
Moreover in Section 19 of the mere was non obstante clause and Section 39 of the said Act gave overrid ing effect to the provisions of the said enactment over any other Jaw
This Court has observed When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law stimulating and inci sive problems of interpretation arise
Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the obeject and purpose of the laws under consideration p 433 After examining the special and specific purpose under lying the enactment of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control act and the fact that the Rent Control Act was a later enactment this Court held that the provisions of the Rent Control Act would prevail over those contained in the 
The principle which emerges from these decisions is that in the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments both of which can be regarded as Special in nature the conflict has to be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein
We propose to consider this matter in the light of this principle
The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the 689 Rent Control Act indicates that it has been enacted with a view a to devise a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudica tion of proceedings between landlords and tenants b to provide for the determination of the standard rent payable by tenants of the various categories of premises which should be fair to the tenants and at the same time provide incentive for keeping the existing houses in good repairs and for further investment in house construction and c to give tenants a larger measure of protection against eviction
This indicates that the object underlying the Rent Control Act is to make provision for expeditious adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants determination of standard rent payable by tenants and giving protection against eviction to tenants
The premises belonging to the Government are excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act which means that the Act has been enacted primarily to regulate the private relationship between landlords and tenants with a view to confer certain benefits on the ten ants and at the same time to balance the interest of the landlords by providing for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenant
As mentioned earlier the Public Premises Act has been enacted with a view to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises
In the statement of objects and reasons for this enactment reference has been made to the judicial decisions whereby by the 1958 Act was declared as unconstitutional and it has been mentioned The court decisions referred to above have created seri ous difficulties for the Government inasmuch as the proceed ings taken by the various Estate Officers appointed under the Act either for the eviction of persons who are in unau thorised occupation of public premises or for the recovery of rent or damages from such persons stand null and void
It has become impossible for Government to take expeditious action even inflagrant cases of unauthorised occupation of public premises and recovery of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation
It is therefore considered imper ative to restore a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation 690 of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provision of the Constitu tion and the judicial pronouncements referred to above This shows that the Public Premises Act has been enacted to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorised occupation of public premises by providing a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation
In order to secure this object the said Act prescribes the time period for the various steps which are enquired to be taken for securing eviction of the persons in unauthorised occupation
The object underlying the enactment is to safeguard public interest by making available for public use premises belonging to Central Government Companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest Corpora tions owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse of such premises
It would thus appear that while the Rent Control Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants in respect of premises other than government premises the Public Premises Act is intended to deal with speedy recovery of possession of premises of public nature ie property belonging to the Central Government or Compa nies in which the Central Government has substantial inter est or Corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain corporations institutions autono mous bodies and local authorities
The effect of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Pubic Premises Act over the Rent Control Act would be that buildings belonging to Companies Corporations and Autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2e of the Public Permises Act would be excluded from the ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner as properties belonging to the Central Govern ment
The reason underlying the exclusion of property be longing to the Government from the ambit of the Rent Control Act is that Government while dealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as a private landlord but would act in public interest
What can be said with regard to Government in relation to property belonging to it can also be said with regard to companies corporations and other statutory bodies mentioned in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act
In our opinion therefore keeping in view the object and purpose underlying both the enactments viz the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act the provisions of the Public Premises Act have to be construed as overriding the provi sions contained in the Rent Control Act
691 As regards the non obstante clauses contained in Sec tions 14 and 22 and the provisions contained in Sections 50 and 54 of the Rent Control Act it may be stated that Par liament was aware of these provisions when it enacted the Public Premises Act contained a specific provision in Sec tion 15 barring jurisdiction of all courts which would include the Rent Controller under the Rent Control Act
This indicates that Parliament intended that the provisions of the Public Premises Act would prevail over the provisions of the Rent Control Act inspite of the above mentioned provisions contained in the Rent Control Act
It has been urged by the learned counsel for the peti tioner that there is no conflict between the provisions of the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act and that both the provisions can be given effect to without one overriding the other
In this regard it has been pointed out that since no provisions has been made in the Public Premises Act for the termination of the lease the provi sions of the Rent Control Act can be held applicable upto the stage of termination of the lease and thereafter proceedings can be initiated for eviction under the provi sions of the Public Premises Act
In support of this submis sion reliance has been placed on Dhanpal Chettiar s case supra wherein it has been held that in view of the spe cial provisions contained in the State Rent Control Acts it is no longer necessary to issue a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to terminate the tenancy because inspite of the said notice the tenant is entitled to continue in occupation by virtue of the provisions of the said Acts
In the said case it has been further laid down that the relationship between the landlord and tenant con tinues till the passing of the order of eviction in accord ance with the provisions of the Rent act and therefore for the eviction of the tenant in accordance with the law an order of the competent Court under the Rent Control Act is necessary
This would mean that in order to evict a person who is continuing in occupation after the expiration or termination of his contractual tenancy in accordance with law two proceedings will have to be initiated
First there will be proceedings under Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller followed by appeal before the Rent Control Tribu nal and revision before the High Court
After these proceed ings have ended they would be followed by proceedings under the Public Premises Act before the Estate Officer and the Appellate Authority
In other words persons in occupation of public premises would receive greater protection than tenants in premises owned by private persons
It could not be the intention of Parliament to confer this dual benefit on persons in occupation of public premises
692 It has also been urged that in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act special provision has been made for recovery of possession of premises belonging to a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and that premises belonging to companies corporations and autonomous bodies mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of Sec tion 2e of the Public Premises would be covered by the said provision and that in view of this special provision it is not necessary to have a further provision in the Public Premises Act for the recovery of possession belonging to those bodies and therefore the provisions of the Public Premises Act should be confined in their application to premises other than premises covered by the Rent Control Act
Section 22 of the Rent Control Act provides as under Where the landlord in respect of any premises is any compa ny or other body corporate of any local authority or any public institution and the premises are required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of a public institution for the furtherance of its activities then notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or any other law the Controller may on an application made to him in this behalf by such landlord place the landlord in vacant possession of such premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof if the Controller is satisfied a that the tenant to whom such premises were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord has ceased to be in such service or employment or b that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms express or implied under which he was authorised to occupy such premises or c that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such premises or d that the premises are required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities
Explanation For the purpose of this section public in stitution includes any educational institutional library hospital and charitable dispensary but does not include any 693 such institution set up by any private trust
 The said special provision shows that it enables recov ery of possession or premises of which the landlord is a company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution in certain circumstances viz if the premises are required for the use of the employees or such landlord
In the case of public institutions possession can also be obtained under this provision if the premises are required for the furtherance of its activities
In other words recovery of possession is permissible under this provision only in certain circumstances and for certain purposes
Inspite of this provision Parliament has consid ered it necessary tO extend the Public Premises Act to premises belonging to companies corporations and statutory bodies mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e by widening the definition of the expression public premises in Section 2e of the Public Premises Act
The scope and ambit of the aforesaid power conferred under the Public Premises Act cannot be restricted by reference to the provi sion contained in Section 22 of the Rent Control Act
It has been urged by the learned counsel for the peti tioners that many of the corporations referred to in Section 2e2ii of the Public Premises Act like the nationa lised banks and the Life Insurance Corporation are trading corporations and under the provisions of the enactments whereby they are constituted these corporations are required to carry on their business with a view to earn profit and that there is nothing to preclude these corporations to buy property in possession of tenants at a low price and after buying such property evict the tenants after terminating the tenancy and thereafter sell the said property at a much higher value because the value of property in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property
We are unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act on the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out by this Court in Ms Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons vs Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay  Every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest
All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act 694 as private landlords must be judged by that standard These observations were made in the context of the provi sions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act 1947 whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay Port Trust
The consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Con trol Act
The actions of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 2e of the Public Premises Act while dealing with their properties under the Pubic Premises Act will therefore have to be judged by the same standard
For the reasons aforesaid we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cannot be applied to premises which fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act
In our opinion the provisions of the Public Premises Act to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of the Rent Control Act override the provisions of the Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under Section 2e of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act
In Civil Appeal No 3723 of 1966 Shri Yogeshwer Prasad sought to raise contentions relating to the particular facts of that case namely that the termination of the lease of the appellant is vitiated by mala fides and that the said appellant could not be held to be a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises and further that the proceedings have not been taken in accordance with the provisions of the Public Premises Act
We find that in this case the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court directly against the order passed by the Estate Officer without filing an appeal against the said order before the Appellate Authority
The High Court has held that the question of mala fides is a disputed question of fact and the same could not be gone into in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution
We are in agreement of the said view of the High Court
As regards the other contentions we are of the view that the appellant cannot be permitted to agitate matters which could be agitated by him in appeal before the Appellate Authority
In Civil Appeals Nos 2368 and 2369 of 1986 the learned counsel 695 for the respondents have raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of these appeals on the ground that the appellants on account of their conduct are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
The submission of the learned counsel is that before initiating proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises Act the respondent Bank viz the Punjab National Bank had initiated proceed ings under the Rent Control Act for the eviction of the appellants had in those proceedings the appellants had filed an objection with regard to the maintainability of the eviction proceedings under the Rent Control Act before the Additional Rent Controller and thereupon the Respondent Bank initiated proceedings for eviction of the appellants under the Public Premises Act and thereafter the proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank under the Rent Control Act were dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller by orders dated the 6th August 1989
The learned counsel of the respondents have urged that the appellants having raised the objection against the maintainability of the proceedings for eviction under the Rent Control Act on the ground that proceedings could only be maintained under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and having got them dismissed cannot turn round and raise an objection that the proceed ings for eviction under the Public Premises Act are not maintainable and the proceedings can only be taken under the Rent Control Act
The learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that special leave to appeal was granted by this Court after notice to the respondents and at that stage the respondents had raised this objection but this Court granted special leave and it is not permissible for the respondents to agitate this question now
The orders dated the 6th August 1989 which were passed by the Additional Rent Controller in the proceedings for eviction initiated by the respondent Bank under Rent Control Act against the appellants in these appeals have been placed on record by the respondents and from the said orders it appears that in the proceedings initiated under the Rent Control Act the appellants had raised a plea that the premises in question had been declared public premises under the Public Premises Act and in view of that the proceedings under the Rent Control Act were not competent
The said orders also show that the Additional Rent Controller dismissed the proceed ings for eviction under the Rent Control Act on the view that the Public Premises Act is applicable to premises in question and his jurisdiction was excluded
This would show that the proceedings which were initiated by the Respondent Bank for the eviction of the appellants under the Rent Control Act were dismissed as not maintainable on the ground that the Rent Control Act was not applicable to the premises and the premises are governed by the provisions of the 696 Public Premises Act
This finding was recorded by the Addi tional Rent Controller in view of the objection raised by the appellants with regard to the maintainability of those proceedings
In other words the appellants succeeded in those proceedings on the basis of their plea that the prem ises were not governed by the Rent Control Act and were governed by the provisions of the Public Premises Act
Having got the proceedings under the Rent Control Act dis missed the appellants are now raising the plea that the proceedings under the Public Premises Act are not maintain able and that the only remedy available is under the Rent Control Act
This conduct of the appellants would have disentitled them from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
Since we are of the view that the appellants cannot succeed on the merits we do not propose to dismiss the appeals on this preliminary ground
In the result the appeals and the writ petition are dismissed
There will be no order as to costs
The appellants in Civil Appeals Nos 2368 and 2369 of 1986 had been dispossessed from the premises in their occu pation after the dismissal of their appeals by the Addition al District Judge
During the pendency of these appeals interim orders were passed by this Court whereunder posses sion of a part of the premises was restored to the appel lants
Since these appeals have been dismissed the appel lants in both the appeals are directed to handover the possession of the portion of the premises in their occupa tion to the Respondent Bank within one month
In Civil Appeal No 3725 of 1986 and Writ Petition No 864 of 1985 this Court had passed interim orders staying the eviction of the petitioners in those matters
Since the appeal and the writ petition are being dismissed the said interim orders shall stand vacated
RSS Petitions dismissed


Summary:
The appellant and 14 others including respondent No 1 applied for grant of a stage carriage permit
The RTA rejected the applications of respondent No 1 and some others on the only ground that each of them had been granted one other permit in the same sitting and granted the permit to the appellant for a period of three years
On appeal by respondent No 1 and some others the State Transport Appel late Tribunal set aside the RTA s order and granted the permit in favour of respondent No 1
The appellant and another unsuccessful applicant filed two civil revision petitions
The High Court by an interim order stayed the Tribunal s order and directed that the appellant as well as respondent No 1 be allowed to operate on the route but ultimately dismissed both the revision petitions
The appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court
By virtue of this Court s interim order the appel lant and respondent No 1 were continuing to operate on the route throughout as a result though the permit granted for three years expired long back both the claimants had been operating on the route all these years
On behalf of the parties common request was made for remanding the matter to the RTA for fresh decision on merits and for a direction to allow both the parties to ply their stage carriages on the route on the ground that there was necessity for two permits on the route
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 11 The grant of a permit is to be made by the RTA primarily with reference to the object of serving the interests of the general public and other relevant factors
It cannot be treated as a dispute relating to grant of a permit between the rival claimants only
It is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of conflicting interests of 803 private individuals alone
That apart under Section 473 of the  the RTA is first re quired to determine the number of stage carriages for the route and then to grant permits according to that determina tion made earlier
Grant of any permit in excess thereof was not permissible without first making a fresh determination and increasing the number if necessary
807E G 12 Therefore an order allowing two claimants to ply their stage carriages on a single route on the basis of agreement between them that there is necessity for two permits cannot be made unless the grant of a permit to both the rival claimants would be within the limit fixed by the RTA at the relevant time
The grant of a permit is not a matter which can be decided merely on the basis of an agree ment between the two rival claimants who alone out of sever al claimants remain in the lis at this stage
807H  F M Chinnaswamy vs Ms Dhandayuthanpani Roadways P Ltd  Civil Appeal No 1133 of 1970 decid ed on 9121981 and Civil Appeal No 136 of 1980 decided on 1371990 distinguished
13 The fact that the claimants had the benefit of plying their stage carriages for several years on the basis of interim orders of the Court or other authorities long after the period of the permit had expired is not a valid reason for perpetuating that act and confining the grant only to the litigants before the court when claimants for the permit were many and are likely to be many in case the question of grant at this point of time is decided afresh
Admittedly the appellants for permit before the RTA were many more and when the matter is to be considered afresh by the RTA everyone of them is entitled to a fresh consider ation of his claim on merits
808B D 14 The grant of permit by the RTA to the appellant refusing to consider the claim of respondent No 1 and some other applicants on merits solely on the ground that they had been granted one other permit in the same sitting is clearly untenable
The grant of a permit for another route to the respondent No 1 and some others could only be a relevant circumstance while assessing the comparative merits of all the applicants but by itself it could not be decisive or sufficient to refuse consideration of their claim
The orders of the RTA the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the matter remanded to the RTA for a fresh consideration and decision of the claim of all the applicants on merits in accordance with law
805C D 808F1 804 The Court vacated the interim order permitting the appellant and respondent No 1 to ply their stage carriages on the route and directed the RTA to make arrangement for operation of the route till the matter is decided afresh to avoid inconvenience to the traveling public 808F G