Appeal No 1936 of 1967 From the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th October 1966 of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No 239 of 1961 and Memo of Cross Objections therein arising out of the judgment and decree dated 28th March 1958 of the Subordinate Judge Srikakulam in Original Suit No 101 of 1954
M Natesan K Jayaram and R Chandrasekhar for the appellant P Parmeshwara Rao and T Satyanarayana for the respondent
The Judgment of D G PALEKAR and R section SARKARIA JJ
was delivered by SARKARIA J V R KRISHNA IYER J gave a separate Opinion
658 SARKARIA J
This appeal by certificate involves an examination of the limits of the respective
jurisdictions of the Settlement OfficerTribunal and the Civil Court in relation to an inquiry under section 91 of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 for short Abolition Act and the effect of the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 and Act 20 of 1960 on cases regarding such an inquiry pending in or decided by the Civil Courts
It arises out of the following facts  The lands in dispute are situated in village Kadakalla Taluk Palakonda
On June 13 1950 the then State Government issued and published a notification under the Madras Estates Reduction of Rent Act 1947 for short Rent Reduction Act in respect of this village
Subsequently the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo motu made an enquiry as to whether this village was an estate or not within the contemplation of section 92 of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 for short called Abolition Act and by an order dated September 2 1950 held that it was not an inam estate  within the meaning of section 27 of the Abolition Act
The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village Kadakalla became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land 3rd Amendment Act 1936
Against that order of the Settlement Officer the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal Vizianagaram
The Tribunal by its order dated September 16 1952 dismissed the appeal in limine with the observation that the decision of the Settlement Officer being in their favour the appellants had no right of appeal The appellants then instituted OS 47 of 1953 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Srikakulam against the State Government for a declaration that Kadakalla village was not an estate  under section 3 2 d of 1908 Act and consequently_the Rent Reduction Act and the Abolition Act were not applicable to it
The trial court decreed the suit
Aggrieved by the decree the State preferred an appeal AS 668 of 1954 to the High court of Andhra Pradesh
During the pendency of the said appeal the appellants instituted Original Suit No 101 of 1954 out of which the present appeal has arisen in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam against the respondents herein and others for the recovery of Rs 1568119 as rent or damages for the year 1953 in respect of the lands cultivated by them in the area of village Kadakalla
The suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground that the suit village was an estate  as defined in section 32 d of the 1908 Act and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer as per his Order dated September 2 1950
It was further averred that the defendants not being parties to OS 47 of 1953 were not bound by the decision in that case
It was added that the question as to whether this village was an estate or not was pending in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal from the decision in OS 47 of 1953 and as such was sub judice
The jurisdiction of the Subordinate 659 Judge to try the suit OS 101 of 1954 was also questioned
The claim for rent or damages was also resisted
On January 22 1958 the respondents herein made an application for permission to file an additional written statement for adding the plea that the suit village is an inam estate
On March 17 1958 the trial court dismissed this application holding that the question ought to be raised was already covered by Issue No 1
The trial court framed as many as eleven issues out of which Issues 1 6 and 8 were as follows  1 Whether the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3 2 d of the Madras Estates Land Act  6 Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to claim rents in view of prior pattas and rent decrees that were previously obtained  8 Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit On March 26 1958 the Advocates for the parties filed a joint memo to the effect that both parties agree to abide by the final decision whether in the High Court or in the Supreme Court as the case may be in the appeal or revision arising out of OS No 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under section 32d of the Madras Estates Land Act as amended upto date
As a result of this compromise it was held that the decision of Issues 1 6 and 8 would follow the final decision in OS 47 of 1953
The remaining Issues were tried and decided on merits
On March 28 1958 the trial court keeping in view the joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other Issues passed a decree in these terms  In case it is ultimately decided by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be in the appeal or revision arising out of OS No 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court that the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate within the meaning of section 3 2 d of the Estates Land Act the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs 3000 with in terest at 5 12 per cent per annum from 26 3 1958 with interest thereon and for costs and that otherwise suit should stand dismissed with costs and that the decree should take effect from the date of the final decision of OS No 47 of 1953 referred to above
 The appeal AS 668 of 1954 arising out of OS 47 of 1953 was decided by the High Court on February 12 1959 whereby the decree of the trial court declaring that village Kadakalla was not an estate was confirmed
The application of the State for issuance of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court
The State did not prefer any Special Leave Peti 660 tion in this Court with the result that the High Court s decision in that case became final and the decree dated March 28 1958 of the Subordinate Judge in OS 101 of 1954 also became effective
After the disposal of its appeal AS 668 of 1954 the Government issued GORT No 619 Rev dated June 30 1966 canceling the earlier notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact that prior to such renotification section 9 A had been inserted in the Abolition Act by the Amending Act 20 of 1960
Appellants preferred an appeal AS 239 of 1961 against the said decree dated March 28 1958 of the Subordinate Judge to the High Court
Though in the Memorandum of Appeal it was said
as usual in general terms that the decision of the lower court is against law weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and that its decree was worthless and did not conform to the requirements of section 22 of the Civil Procedure Code yet in substance the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or damages
The appellants  claim was that the entire suit land as alleged in the plaint was under the cultivation of the respondents and consequently
the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants  claim for Rs 1568119 as rent or damages in toto
On April 6 1962
the respondents filed cross objections contending that the question as to whether Kadakalla village is or is not an estate  as defined in section 32d of the 1908 Act should have been gone into by the trial court and that the rent should have been decreed only in the sum of Rs 55129
The High Court posted the appeal and the cross objections for hearing in July 1965
 At that stage on July 19 1965
an application was made by the respondents praying that Exhts
B 196 and B 197 being copies of the order dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer and the order dated September 16 1952 of the Estate Abolition Tribunal respectively be read as additional evidence
It was contended that the Amending Act 20 of 1960 had added section 9A to the Abolition Act as a result of which the order of the Settlement Officer had acquired statutory validity  and since the appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the commencement of the Amendment Act the decision of the Settlement Officer became final and binding on all the parties including the appellants
In spite of opposition by the appellants the High Court by its order dated August 23 1956 allowed this additional evidence and the setting up of the new plea
The appeal and the cross objections were heard together in August
The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village is an estate or not and therefore any decision given by the High Court in appeal AS 668 of 1954 would not bind the parties and the decree in the present suit OS 101 of 1954 on the basis of the judgment and decree in AS 668 661 of 1954
would be without jurisdiction rendering it null and void that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his decision had become final in view of the introduction of Section 9A by Act 20 of 1960
The preliminary objection of the respondents was upheld The contention of the appellants that since section 9A was inserted by an amendment which came into force on June 23 1960 it could not affect the compromise decree of the Court passed earlier on March 28
1958 or the decree of the High Court whereby both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of OS 47 of 1953 was rejected in these terms We see no force in this contention as Section 9A is designed to meet such of the decisions where it has been held that the village is not an inam estate as it stood after the 1936 Act and certainly the respondents can take advantage of change
in statute if it is to their benefit and there could be no estoppel against a statute and the rights accrued under a statute
It cannot reasonably be contended that the suit filed by the appellants and the decree obtained have reached any finality as an appeal is only the continuation of the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs
 In the result
it dismissed the appeal holding that the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants and the questions raised in the suit including the claim  for arrears of rent or damages
were outside the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court
Before dealing with the contentions canvassed it will be useful to have a clear idea of the relevant statutory provisions including the expressions inam village inam estate and estate as defined therein
section 32d of the Madras Estates Land Act
1908 as it originally stood defined estate as any village of which the land revenue alone ie melwaram alone has been granted in inam to a person not owing the kudiwaram rights in soil thereof provided the grant has been made confirmed or recognised by the British Government or as separated part of such village
 In this definition it was not clear whether the inamdar had the melwaram alone or both melwaram and kudiwaram
To remove this obscurity the Madras Estates Land Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 substituted for the original sub clause d in section 32 this new clause d any inam village of which the grant has been made confirmed or recognised by the Government notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees  Section 32d was further amended by Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 with retrospective effect from the date 662 on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force
It inserted among others Explanation 1 to this clause which reads Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village
the area which forms the subject matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name would have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes Explanation I makes it clear that apart from being made confirmed or recognised by the Government an inam grant in order to come within the purview of estate under section 32 d has to be a grant expressly made of a named village or whole Village and not only of a part of the village or of some defined area in a village
However it remains and is deemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstanding the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes nor does it cease to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been subsequently  partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors
The interpretation of estate has behind it the authority of a bedroll of decisions including that of this Court in District Board Tanjore vs Noor Mohammed1 Next in chronological order is the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari
Act XXVI of 1948
Section 13 thereof provided that it applies to all estates as defined in section 3 clause 2 of the Madras Estates Land Act
1908 except inam villages which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land Third Amendment Act 1936
The material part of section 2 of this Act says 3 Estate means a zamindari or an under tenure or an under tenure of an inam estate
7 Inam Estate means an estate within the meaning of section 3
clause 2 d of the Estates Land Act but does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land Third Amendment Act 1936
Thus to begin with this Act did not take in its fold post 1936 inam estates
Its operation remained confined to pre 1936 inam estates till the commencement of Act 18 of 1957 which we shall presently notice
Section 9 of the Abolition Act indicates the authorities empowered to determine Inam estate
It says 1 As soon as may be after the passing of this Act the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall on application enquire and determine whether an inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not
1 1952 2 M J 586 section C 663 2 Before holding the inquiry the Settlement Officer shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner a notice requiring all persons claiming an in terest in any land in the village to file before him statements bearing on the question whether the village is an inam estate or not
3 The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire to examine all such documents as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give him decision in writing
4 a Any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub section 3 may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow appeal to the Tribunal
b Where any such appeal is preferred the Tribunal shall cause to
be Publisher in the village in the prescribed manner a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub section 1 or filed before him before it and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard give its decision
c The decision of the Tribunal under this sub section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law
5 No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub section 3 or of the Tribunal under sub section 4 shall be invalid by reason of any defect in the form of the notice referred to in sub section 2 or sub section 4 as the case may be or the manner of its publication
6 Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision every decision of the Settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any law in the village
notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be
7 In the absence of evidence to the contrary the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal may Presume that an inam village is an inam estate
Madras Amendment Act 17 of 1951 introduced section 64 A which runs thus 64 A1 The decision of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal in any proceeding under this Act or of a Judge of the 664 High Court hearing a case under Section 51 2 on any matter falling within its or his Jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto  and persons claiming under them in any suit of
proceeding in a Civil Court in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or proceeding
2 The decision of a Civil Court not being he Court of Small Causes on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal or Special Tribunal or a Judge of the High Court under section 5 1 2 in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding
 In 1957 two Amending Acts both of which came into force on December 23 1957 were passed
One was Andhra Pradesh Act 17 of 1957 which substituted the following clause for clause a in subsection 4 of section 9 of the Abolition Act 1948  a i Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under subsection 3 the Government may within one year from the date of the decision or if such decision was given before the commencement of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 1957 within one year from such commencement and any persons aggrieved by such decision may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow appeal to the Tribunal
ii If before the commencement of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Andhra Pradesh Amendment Act 1957 any order has been passed by the Government against a decision of the Settlement Officer on the ground that the Government were not competent to file an appeal under this clause or that such appeal was time barred the Tribunal shall on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act aforesaid vacate the order already passed by it and pass a fresh order on merits
 In clause b of s94 of the Abolition Act after the words where such appeal is preferred the words by an aggrieved person the Tribunal shall give notice to the Government and in the case of all appeals whether by the Government or by an aggrieved person were inserted
The second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of 1957 section 2 of which substituted the following section for sub section 3 of section 1 of the Abolition Act 665 It applies to all estates as defined in section 3 clause 2 of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 Madras Act 1 of 1908
 This Act further substituted the following clause for clause 7 of s2 of the principal Act In an estate means an estate within the meaning of section 3 clause 2 d of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 Madras Act 1 of 1908
In s9 of the principal Act after the words Inam village or the village wherever they occurred the words or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam were inserted
It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957 made the Abolition Act applicable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment of the 1908 Act
For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinction between pre 1936 and post 1936 inam grants disappeared and this Act became applicable to all estates falling under the definition ill section 3 2 of the 1908 Act
Andhra Pradesh Act No 20 of 1960 which came into force on the 23rd of June 1960 inserted in the Abolition Act s9 A which provides   Inquiry under section 9 not necessary in certain cases If before the commencement of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment Act 1957 Andhra Pradesh Act XVIII of 1957 any decision was given under section 9 in respect of any village that it was not an inam estate as it stood defined before such commencement and that decision was based on the finding that the inam village became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land  third Amendment Act 1936 Madras Act XVIII of 1936 then a if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Tribunal under sub section4 of section 9 no fresh inquiry under that section shall be necessary for taking any proceedings tinder this Act on the basis of that finding and b if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Settlement Officer and no appeal was filed to the Tribunal the Government or any person aggrieved may appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding within two months from the com mencement of the Madras Estates Abolition and ment
Act 1960 and if no such appeal is filed the finding of the Settlement Officer shall be final and no fresh inquiry shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under this Act on the basis of that finding
 666 The same Act 20 of 1960 introduced this section in the present Act  121 No notification issued under sub section 4 of section 1 of the principal Act during the period between the 23rd December 1957 and the commencement of this Act on the basis of finding recorded in any decision given before the said date by the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal under section 9 of the principal Act such finding being to the effect that the inam village become an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land Third Amendment Act 1936 Madras Act XVIII of 1936 shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely on the ground a that before issuing the notification no fresh inquiry was made by the Settlement Officer under the said section 9 after the said date or b that the landholder or other person aggrieved had No occasion to appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding of the Settlement Officer and all such notifications issued and actions taken in pursuance thereof during the period aforesaid shall be deemed always to have been validly issued and taken in accordance with law
2 No suit or other proceeding challenging the validity of any such notification or action or for any relief on the ground that such notification or action was not validly issued or taken shall be maintained or conti nued in any court and no court shall enforce any decree or other holding any such notification or action to be invalid or grant any relief to any person
 The first question that falls for decision is  To what extent and in what circumstances the Civil Court is competent in a suit to go into the question whether a particular village is an estate By virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred
The exclusion of the civil court s jurisdiction therefore is not to be readily assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable implication does so
The question thus further resolves itself into the issue  How far s91 of the Abolition Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine inam estates This matter is not res Integra
In Addenki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh 1 this Court held that there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate upon the question whether any inam village is an inam 1
AIR 1964 section C 807 667 estate or not and that to the extent of the question stated in section 91 the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive 
It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations
First the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure
The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive
The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute
and its general scheme taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors
Applying the above principles the Court clarified the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement OfficerTribunal and the civil
court thus  the object of the Act is to abolish only inam estates
This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every inam village is not necessarily an inam estate viz 1 whether a particular property is or is not an inam village and 2 whether such a village is an inam estate within the definition of section 27
The first of these questions whether the grant is of an inam village is referred to in section 91 itself as some extrinsic fact which must preexist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer 
Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under section 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an inam village he has of necessity to decide the Issue for until he holds that this condition is satisfied he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by section 91 of the Act he is directed to conduct
On the terms of section 9 1 the property in question being an inam village is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former be cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction
Any determination by him of this question therefore is subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act but no further
The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision
 668 Now let us approach the problem in hand in the light of the principles enunciated in Desika Charyulu s case supra
Mr Natesan learned Counsel for the appellants contends that in the instant case the decision dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer fell within the second category of cases pointed out in Desika Charyulu s case supra which could be challenged in the civil court because firstly Kadakalla village was not an inam village as the grant was not of the whole village and the Settlement Officer had grievously erred in assuming it to be so secondly as soon as the Settlement Officer reached the finding that the village was not an inam estate within the then extant definition in section 27 of the Abolition Act he became functus officio and had no further jurisdiction under section 91 to proceed with the enquiry and hold that it was an estate under section 32d of the Estates Land Act 1908
In reply Mr P Rameshwara Rao learned Counsel for the respondents maintains that under section 91 the Settlement Officer had the jurisdiction to determine all the three facts namely  1 whether Kadakalla was an inam village  2 if so whether it was a pre 1936 inam estate  falling under the definition in section 27 of the Abolition Act or 3 a post 1936 inam estate  under section 32d of the 1908 Act
The decision of the Settlement Officer according to the learned Counsel as to fact No 1 was conclusive and operated as res judicata under section 64 A of the Abolition Act between the parties because before the Settlement Officer it was no body s case that Kadakalla was not an inam village
In these circumstances the decision of the Settlement Officer not being in excess of his jurisdiction could not be questioned in a civil court
The argument though seemingly attractive does not stand a close examination and we are unable to accept it
On the other hand we find force in what has been contended from the appellants  side
Under the Abolition Act as it stood at the material date the enquiry by the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the ascertainment of only two issues of fact viz1 Was Kadakalla an inam village  2 if so was it an inam estate  as defined in section 2 7 of the Abolition Act Once issue 2 was determined the enquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by section 91 reached and if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine further something which was unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue 2 then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be questioned in the civil court
Again any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an inam village  or not is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact only the preexistence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer
Investigation as to the existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an inam estate 
If upon such investigation he 669 finds that the property is an inam village  the foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid and he can then and then only embark upon the enquiry envisaged by the statute
If such investigation reveals that the property is not an inam village  the con dition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by him would be lacking
The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or nonexistence of this prerequisite the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him
Perhaps that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement OfficerTribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be question in civil court
The contention of Mr Rao that before the Settlement Officer the fact of Kadakalla village being an inam village was not disputed does not appear to be home out by the record
A perusal of the
Settlement Officer s order dated September 2 1950 would show that it was contended before him on behalf of the Inamdars that there was no village at all at the time of grant and that there were more than one grant as Inam in the village
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had failed to contest or adduce proof before the Settlement Officer that Kadakalla was not an inam village  then also we fail to appreciate how on Principle that would make the case any different so as to preclude the appellants from reagitating that matter in the civil court
Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
In view of the above discussion it is clear that under the law in force at the material time a suit for a declaration that the decision of the Settlement OfficerTribunal holding certain properties to be an estate  under section 3 2 a of the 1908 Act was void was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an inam village 
There can be no dispute that Suit No 47 of 1953 is of that category and falls well nigh within the ratio of Gosukonda Venkata
Narasayya vs State of Madras1 which was approved by this Court in Desika Charyulu s case supra
The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not in inam village  as the grant did not comprise the whole village and consequently it is not an estate  within the definition in s3 2 d of the 1908 Act
The trial court accepted this contention and decreed the suit
The High Court confirmed that decision holding that when the grant was made in 1774 it was neither of the whole village nor of a named village within the meaning of Explanation 1 to s3 2 d of the 1908 Act
In Original Suit 101 of 1954 also the relief of rent or damages 1 A I R 670 is conditional and dependent upon and linked up by an agreement between the parties with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit
We have therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not on the ground that it was not an inam village was within the competence of the civil court
Further point to be considered is  whether the jurisdiction of the civil courts to proceed with and determine the aforesaid suits was in any way affected by the enactment of Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957
For reasons that follow the answer to this question in our opinion must be in the negative
It is well settled that ordinarily when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights Maxwell on Interpretation 12th Edn 220
That is to say in the absence of anything in the Act to say that it is to have retrospective operation it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed
Let us therefore see whether there is anything in the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 which in clear language gives them a retrospective effect
A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show that there is nothing of this kind in them which expressly or by necessary intendment affects pending actions
The only major change introduced by Act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the Government a right to file an appeal to the Tribunal if it felt aggrieved against the decision of Settlement Officer under sub section
3 of s9 of the Abolition Act within one year from the date of the decision or if such decision was rendered before December 23 1957 ie the commencement of Act 17 of 1957 within one year from such date
It further entitled the Government to get its appeal if any dismissed as incompetent by the Tribunal restored within one year of the commencement of the Amending Act
Likewise the only effect of the Amending Act 18 of 1957 was that it enlarged the definition of inam estate  for the purpose of Abolition Act by taking in post 1936 Inams
There is no non obstante clause in
these Amending Acts of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions
Nor is there anything in the scheme setting or provisions of these Amending Acts which fundamentally alters the conditions on which such actions were founded
No back date or dates of their commencement have been specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates Land Amendment Act 11 of 1945 which was expressly enforced with effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936
These Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23 1957 and will therefore be deemed to have come into force 671 from that date only
The provisions of these Amending Statutes are not merely Procedural but affect substantive rights and impose
new obligation  and disabilities
In them the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued or cause abatement of pending actions
These Amending Acts therefore can be construed as having a prospective operation only
They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in Suits OS 47 of 1953 and OS 101 of 1954 which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage to have their respective claims determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions
Before we come to the Amending Act 20 of 1960 it is necessary to examine whether the decrees in OS 47 of 1953 and OS 101 of 1954 had attained finality
And if so when and to what extent  So far as the decree of the High Court in AS 668 of 1954 arising out of OS 47 of 1953 is concerned there is no dispute that it had become final and conclusive between the parti es to that action namely the State Government and the present appellants on February 12 1954
Learned Counsel are however not agreed as to whether the decree dated March 28 1958 passed by the civil court in Suit No 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character
Mr Natesan
vehemently contended that this decree in so far as it pursuant to the agreement between the parties incorporated in it the final determination of the High Court in AS 668 of 1954 that Kadakalla was not an estate was a consent decree and as such was final and non appealable in view of section 963 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure
On the respondents  side Mr Rao argued that no part of this decree was final and conclusive between the parties on the ground of estoppel or otherwise because a the appellants had in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo of Appeal presented in the High Court challenged the decree in its entirety b the joint memo filed by the Advocates concerned legal issues including that of jurisdiction
and as such the agreement was not lawful that would bind the parties c the respondents were not a party to the proceedings in A section 668 of 1954 and d the arrangement arrived at by the Advocates being dependent on the happening of a future event did not amount to a lawful adjustment of the claim and the decree based on it was inchoate
None of the points urged by Mr Rao appears to hold water
The allegations in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo of Appeal which have been referred to in a foregoing part of this judgment are too vague and general to amount to an averment
They appear to have been introduced just as a matter of form and habit by the draftsman
From the Memo of Appeal read as a whole it is clear that in substance and truth the challenge was directed only against that part of 3 L748SCI74 672 the decree which fixed the quantum of rent and damages
In fact before the High Court it was vigorously contended on behalf of the appellants that  part of the decree which in effect declared that the village is not an estate  under section 3 2 d having been imported with the consent of the parties was not appealable under section 963 Code of Civil Proce dure and in reality had not been appealed against
In support of this contention reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision in Srinivasa vs Tathachariar1
The High Court did not discuss or distinguish this decision
Nor did it say in so many words that the whole of the decree including the part based on compromise was under challenge in the appeal
It rejeited the contention with the remark that it had already observed that the appeal is but a continuation of the suit and there could be no estoppel against a statute
Perhaps it was assumed that in the Memo of Appeal every bit of the decree was being challenged by the appellants
We think with all respect that such an assumption was contrary to the well established principle that in construing a pleading or a like petition in this country the court should not look merely to its form or pick out from it isolated words or sentences it must read the petition as a whole gather the real intention of the party and reach at the substance of the matter
Thus construed the Memo of Appeal in this case could not be said to contain a challenge to that part of the decree which was in terms of the compromise agreement between the parties
Order 23 Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit
If the compromise agreement was lawful and as we shall presently discuss it was so the decree to the extent it was a consent decree was not appealablebecause of the express bar in section 963 of the Code
Next point is whether this agreement was lawful  We have already discussed that the Amending Acts of 1957 did not affect pending actions in which a declaration is sought that a particular property is not an estate on the ground that it is not an inam village 
This issue which was intertwined with that of jurisdiction was very largely a question of fact
It follows therefrom that in any such suit the parties in order to avoid unnecessary expense and botheration could legitimately make an agreement to abide by a determination on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage
There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly when the interests at the respondents were sufficiently safeguarded by the State which was hotly controverting the decree of the trial court regarding Kadakalla being an estate
By no stretch of reasoning it could be said that this agreement was collusive or was an attempt to contract out of the statute
There can be no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties and acting on it passed a 1 A I R 673 decree in terms thereof the compromise to the extent of the matter covered by it was complete
Nothing further remained to be done by the parties in pursuance of that agreement
The decree had become absolute and immediately executable on February 12 1959 when the High Court in AS 668 of 1954 finally decided that Kadakalla was not an estate
Be that as it may the bar to an appeal against a consent decree in sub section
3 of section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel
It presupposes that the parties to an action can expressly or by implication waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise or even by conduct
Therefore as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal AS 668 and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement the principle of estoppel underlying 1963 became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and binding between the parties
And it was as effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on contest
Thus the determination in AS 668 that Kadakalla was not an estate  became as much binding on the respondents as on the parties in that appeal
In the view we take we can derive support from the ratio of this Court s decision in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa1
In that case there was a compromise decree between the predecessors in title of the appellant therein on the one hand and the Secretary of State on the other that Kanika Raj was an estate  as defined by Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951
This Court held that the appellant was estopped by the compromise decree from denying that the Raj was not such an estate 
In the light of the above discussion we would hold that part of the decree in Suit No 101 of 1954 which was in terms of the compromise agreement had become final between the parties and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement
The combined effect of the two integrated decrees in Suit No 47 and Suit No 101 in so far as they declared that Kadakalla not being an inam village was not an estate under section 32d of the 1908 Act was to completely vacate and render non est the decision dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer
Against the above background we have to consider whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 operates retrospectively to nullify final decrees of civil courts which had before its commencement declared such decisions of Settlement Officer totally void and nonexistent  Does the Act expressly or by necessary intendment bring into life again all such dead decisions of the Settlement Officer  In approaching these questions two fundamental principles of interpretation have to be kept in view
The first is that if the Legislature 1  674 acting within its legislative competence wants to neutralise or reopen a court s decision it is not sufficient to use the words of Hidaytullah CJ in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd vs Broach Borough Municipality1 to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise
A court s decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances
 Thus the first test to be applied is whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 has so radically altered the conditions on which the said decrees proceed that they would not have been passed in the altered circumstances  The point is that the law which was the basis of the decision must be altered and then the foundation failing the binding value of the decision fails when the non obstante clause is superadded
As shall be presently seen by this test the answer to this question must be in the negative
The second principle to recall the words of Bowen LJ in Reid vs Reid2 is that in construing a statute or a section in a statute which is to a certain extent retrospective we ought nevertheless to bear in mind the maxim that is except in special cases the new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested eights as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain
That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective than you can plainly see the Legislature meant
 With the above principle in mind let us now examine the provisions of the Amending Act 20 of 1960
In this Act also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned
It will therefore be deemed to have commenced on June 23 1960 which is the date on which it was published in the Govt
Gazette
It does not say excepting in section 12 inserted by it which obviously does not apply to the facts of this case that the amendment would have effect and would be deemed always to have had effect from the inception of the parent Act nor does it use any equivalent expressions or similar words which are usually found in Amending Acts intended to have retrospective operation without any limit  Section 9 A inserted by this Amending Act in the parent Act does not begin with any non obstante cause whatever having reference to decrees or orders of civil courts
In terms it concerns itself only with a certain category of decisions given before the commencement of Act 18 of 1957 by the Settlement OfficerTribunal under section 9 of the Abolition Act
Such decisions are those which were based on the finding that a particular Inam village had become estateby virtue of the
Madras Estates Land Third Amendment Act 1936
The Order dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case was a decision of this category inasmuch as he held that
Kadakalla was not an inam estate  because it was a post 1936 1 L19701 1 SCR 388
2 at 408
675 inam and as such was not covered by the definition in section 2 7 of the Abolition Act
But before the commencement of the Amending Act 1960 this decision as a result of the High Court s decree stood finally vacated
It is not at all clear from the language of this Amending Act that the intention was to revive even such legally non existent decisions of the Settlement Officer
On The contrary definite indications ire available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation
The first of such indications is available from the marginal heading of section 9 A itself  which is to the effect  Inquiry under section 9
not necessary in certain cases The heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of the new provision
it envisages only such cases in which the decision of the Settlement Officer was not successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the parti cular property was not an inam village for it would be pointless only in such cases to hold a further inquiry into the matter
The second hint of legislative intent is available in section 64 A 2 which has not been touched by the Amending Act
Section 64 A2 provides that the decision of the civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under the Abolition Act before the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal
If the intention was to exclude the Jurisdiction of the civil court altogether s64 A2 would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as to alter the basic conditions with effect from the very inception of the parent Act that in the altered Conditions those decisions could not have been rendered by the civil courts
For instance it could say that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an inam village  or not would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so In view of what has been said above we are of the opinion that s9 A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court
The decision dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case was not such a decision
It had ceased to exist as a result of the inter linked decree in OS 47 of 1953 and OS 101 of 1954 passed before the enactment of this Amending Act
The Amending Act of 1960 therefore does not in any way affect the finality or the binding effect
of those decrees
Quite a number of authorities were cited by the learned Counsel on both sides but it is not necessary to notice all of them because in lost of them the facts were materially different
Only one of those cases in which the interpretation of sections 9 A and 64 A was involved reserves to be noticed
It is reported in Yeliseth Satyanarayana vs Aditha agannadharab and ors1 1 1966 ILR AP 729
676 The writ petitioners in that case had challenged the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal which had held 1 that the previous order of the Civil Court holding the suit lands to be an estate by virtue of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 was not res judicata under section 64 A of the Abolition Act and 2 that the land holder had a right of appeal under section 9 A of the said Act and that the inam was not of the whole village and conse quently was not an estate 
The first question for consideration by the High Court was whether the appeal filed by the land holder before the Estates Abolition Tribunal was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that such an appeal was not entertained earlier by the Tribunal on the ground of its being incompetent
On the construction of section 9 Ab this question was answered in the affirmative
The second question before the High Court was whether the previous judgments of the Civil Court were res judicata under section 64 A
The Bench analysed and explained the circumstances in which the first or the second sub s of section 64 A operates
It will be useful to extract those observations here The bar under section 64 A is applicable in two sets of circumstances one where the decision was of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a case under section 51 2 the other where it is a decision of a Civil Court on any matter falling within its jurisdiction
The decisions mentioned in the first category are binding on the Civil Courts and the decisions mentioned in the second category are binding on the Tribunal or Special Tribunal or a Judge of the High Court when he hears a case under section 51 2
In so far as the facts of this case are concerned it is sub section 2 of section 64 A that is applicable On the second question the learned Judges held that the previous decisions of the Civil Court could not operate as res judicata because the issue as to whether the suit property was an estate under the Amending Act of 1957 was not under contest
Both the parties as a matter of concession had conceded that fact and the Government
was not a party to the proceeding
In these peculiar circum stances it was held that the concession or assumption made in the previous proceedings was not a decision  within the meaning of section 64 A2
In the case before us as already observed the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not right upto the High Court
It would therefore operate as res judicata between the State and the land owners
The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen
Thus this ruling does not advance the case of the respondents
For all the foregoing reasons we allow this appeal reverse the judgment of the High Court and send the case back to it for decision 677 on the remaining issues in accordance with law
We make no orders as to the costs of this Court
KRISHNA IYER J
The judgment just delivered has my concurrence
But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen LJ in Reid vs Reid1 persuades me to break my silence not so much in dissent but in explanatory divagation
The proposition there expressed and here followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation
Certainly this legal creed of Anglo Indian vintage has the support of learned pronouncements English and Indian
But when we apply it in all its sternness and sweep we err
Precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from the socioeconomic mores of the age
Judges are not prophets and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary ethos
To regard them otherwise is unscientific
My thesis is that while applying the policy of statutory construction we should not forget the conditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason
Justice Gardozo2 has in felicitous words made the same point  There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position  when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new signifi cance or development with the progress of the years
In such circumstances the words of Wheeler J in Dwy vs Connecticut Co  99
express the tone and temper in which problems should be met  That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may in the fullness of experience be found to serve another generation badly and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society Ind no considerable property rights have be come vested in reliance upon the old rule
It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its growth and in its growth found its health and life
It is not and it should not be stationary Change of this character should not be left to the legislature
 If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours they ought not to tie  in helpless submission the hands of their successors
 The Indian Constitution adopting the fighting faith of equal_protection of the laws to all citizens necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be and often times are extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers  social goals
1 1886 31 Ch
D402408
2 Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process PP
151 52
678 Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice as in the present case cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts
However in the present case let me hasten to repeat the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty
I have said these words only to enter a mild caveat on the lines indicated so as to obviate future misapprehensions about theruleof interpretation not to add a new element of judicial sub jectvism
Speaking generally courts have to be anchored to well known canons of statutory construction and if they are out of time with the law makers  meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act
PBR Appeal allowed


Summary:
The Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 suo motu made an inquiry as to whether a particular village notified by the State Government was an estate or not within the contemplation of section 92 of the Act and held that it was not an inam estate within the meaning of section 27 of the Abolition Act but that the village became an estate by virtue of Madras Estates Land 3rd Amendment Act 1936
Ther appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Estate Abolition Tribunal
The appellant then instituted a suit OS 47 of 1953 against the State Government for a declaration that the village was not an estate under section 32d of them Madras Estates Land Act 1908 and consequently Madras Estate Reduction of Rent Act 1947 and the Abolition Act were not applicable to it
The trial court decreed the suit
The State Preferred an appeal
During the pendency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit OS No 101 of 1954 against the respondents for recovery of certain amount as rent or damages in respect of lands cultivated by them in the village in dispute
The respondents contended that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Act and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer
Ultimately both the parties filed a joint memo on 26th March 1958 that they would abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the appeal or revision arising out of the suit OS 4753 on the question whether the village was or was not an estate under section 32d of the Madras Estates Land Act
The High Court in AS No 668 of 1954 which was an appeal arising out of OS 47 of 1953 confirmed the decree of the trial court that the village in dispute was not an estate 
The State did not appeal with the result that the High Court s decision became final and the decree dated 28th March 1958 became effective
Against the decree of 28th March 1958 the appellants preferred an appeal AS 239 of 1961 to the High Court
The appeal related only to the extent of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or damages
The appellants  claim was that the entire land was under cultivation of the respondents and so the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants  claim for rent or damages in toto
The respondents raised a preliminary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village was an estate or not and therefore any decision given by the High Court would not bind the parties and the decree in OS 101 of 1954 would be without Jurisdiction rendering it null and void and that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his deci sion had become final in view of the introduction of section 9A by Act 20 of 1960
The High Court upheld the preliminary objection of the respondents and rejected the contentions of the appellants that since section 9A was inserted by an amendment which came into force on 23rd June 1960 it could not affect the compromise decree of the court passed on March 28 1958 or the decree of the High Court by which both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of OS 47 of 1953
The High Court held that the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants and the questions raised in the suit L748SuP CI74 656 including the claim for arrears of rent or damages were outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and so dismissed the appeal
Allowing the appeal HELD1 a There is no doubt that the question was within the competence of the Civil Court
Under the Abolition Act as it stood at the material date the inquiry of the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the ascertainment of only two disputes of fact viz i Was the village an inam village ii If so was it an Inam Estate  as defined in section 27 of the Abolition Act  Once issue ii was determined the inquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by section 91 reached if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine something which is unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue No ii then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be questioned in a Civil Court
668FG b Any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an inam village  or not  is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact only the Preexistence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer
668H c The legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or nonexistence of this prerequisite the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him
Perhaps that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement OfficerTribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be questioned in a Civil Court
Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction
669B C E Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 807 followed
District Board Tanjore vs Noor Mohammed 1952 2 MJ
586 SC referred to
2 It is well settled that ordinarily when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the action was taken unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights
A plain reading of the impugned Act would show that there was nothing of this kind which expressly or by necessary intendment affects pending actions
67OC D b There is no non obstante clause in the amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions
These amending Acts  were published in the government gazette of December 23 1957 and will therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only
They could therefore be construed as having prospective operation only
67OG H c In the Amending Act 20 of 1960 also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned
It will therefore be deemed to have commenced on June 23 1960 which is the date on which it was published in the Government gazette
674E Section 9A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court
675 F In the instant case the decision of the Settlement Officer dated September 2 1950 was not such a decision
It had ceased to exist as a  result of the inter linked decree in OS 47 of 1953 and O section 101 of 1954 passed before the enactment of the Amending Act
The Amending Act of 1960 therefore does not in any way affect the finality or the binding effect of those decrees
675G 657 d Order 23 rule 3 CPC not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit
If the compromise agreement was lawful the decree to the extent it was a consent decree was not appealable because of the express bar in section 963 of the Code
672E Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa   Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd vs Broach Borough Municipality and Reid vs Reid at 408 followed
e In any suit the parties in order to avoid unnecessary expenses and botheration could legitimately make an agreement to abide by a determination on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly when the interestsof the respondents were sufficiently safeguarded by the State
By no stretch of reasoning it could be said that the agreement was collusive or was an attempt to contract out of the statute
In the instant case as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal A section 668 and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement the principle of estoppel underlying section 963 CPC became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and binding between the parties
It was as effective in creating an estoppel between the Parties as a judgment on contest
672F C  673C In the instant case that part of the decree in suit No 101 of 1954 and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement
The combined effect of the two integrated decrees was to completely vacate and render non est decision dated September 2 1950 of the Settlement Officer
673F Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa  applied
Per Krishna Iyer J concurring Courts have to be anchored to well known canons of statu tory construction and if they are out of tune With the law maker s meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act
678B The Indian Constitution adopting the fighting faith of equal I protection of the laws to all citizens necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be and often times are extensively interfered
with for achieving the founding fathers  social goals
Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice as in the present case cannot be considered in the light of dated value system though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts
677H In the present case the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty