ivil Appeal Nos
259 to 261 NT77 etc
From the Judgment and Order dated 211076 and 241276 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in WP Nos 439 and 287 of 1975 and 4144 of 1976 and W P No8905 of 1987 AS Nambiar B Parthasarthi and B Kanta Rao for the Appellants
PA Choudhary TVSN Chari Badridas and Ms V Grover for the Respondents
PG NO 1090 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
A common question is involved in all these matters which are therefore being disposed of by this common judgment
The question is whether tobacco seed oil and tobacco seed cake are entitled to exemption under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
The question arises in the following circumstances
Section 8 of the Act confers an exemption from sales tax in respect of certain goods
It provides that Subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed including conditions as to licence fees a dealer who deals in the goods specified in the fourth schedule shall be exempt from tax under this Act in respect of such goods  Entry 7 in the Fourth Schedule was tobacco and all its products  3
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Amara Purushotham Mamidi Obaiah  Co vs State of AP 1962 29 STC 654 was called upon to consider whether tobacco seed tobacco seed oil and tobacco seed cake were exempt from sales tax under the above provision
The Bench held that tobacco seeds could be said to be tobacco only so long as they remain attached to the plant
They however ceased to be tobacco the moment they are removed from the plant
Thereafter they may be considered to be a product of tobacco
But they constitute a separate and a distinct class of goods with independent properties and potentialities not the same as those of the parent plant
Products manufactured out of tobacco seed could not be said to be products of tobacco
The Court in this context referred to the analogy of cotton seeds which have been considered to be distinct from cotton
The above Bench decision was rendered in spite of the wide words of the exemption which covered not only tobacco in its comprehensive sense but also all products of tobacco
The Act was amended by Amendment Act 9 of 1970
There was a slight amendment which is not material for our present purpose in section 8 which substituted the words licences and licence fees in place of words licence fees alone which had been mentioned in the section previously
Tobacco continued to be the item in entry 7 of the Fourth Schedule but this entry now referred only to tobacco
The words and all its products which had been used earlier were omitted
An explanation was added to the PG NO 1091 Fourth Schedule to the following effect Explanation Expressions in items 5 6 and 7 have the same meanings assigned to them in Additional Duties of Excise Goods of Special Importance Act of 1957 Central Act 58 of 1957 5
The new explanation to Schedule IV makes it necessary for us to consider the provisions of Central Act 58 of 1957
This is an Act which provides for the levy and collection of additional duties of excise in respect of certain goods over and above the duties of excise levied and collected in respect of such goods under the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 hereinafter referred to as the 1944 Act 
The statement of objects and reasons of Act 58 of 1957 has been referred to before us and its short contents may be extracted here The object of the bill is to impose additional duties of excise in replacement of the sales taxes levied by the Union and States on sugar tobacco and millmade textiles and to distribute the net proceeds of these taxes except the proceeds attributable to Union Territories to the States
The distribution of proceeds of the additional duties broadly follows the pattern recommended by the Second Finance Commission
Provision has been made that the States which levy a tax on the sale or purchase of these commodities after the 1st April 1958 do not participate in the distribution of the net proceeds
Provision is also being made in the Bill for including these three goods in the category of goods declared to be of special importance in inter State trade or commerce so that following the imposition of uniform duties of excise on them the rates of sales tax if levied by any State are subject from 1st April 1958 to the restrictions in section 15 of the 
 In short the object of the Act was to substitute additional duties of excise in place of sales tax so far as these goods were concerned
Since the State Legislature were at liberty if they wished to levy taxes on the sale or purchase of these commodities the Act provided that the additional excise duties will be distributed only among such States as did not levy a tax on the sale or purchase of these commodities
Also by including these goods in the category of goods declared to be of special importance in inter State PG NO 1092 trade or commerce the legislation ensured that if any State levied sales tax in respect of these commodities such levy was subject to the restrictions contained in the  6
Apparently the intention of the Andhra State Legislature when the Amendment Act of 1970 was introduced was to exempt certain goods from the purview of sales tax because they also came within the purview of the levy of additional duties of excise under Act 58 of 1957
This is the reason why the Explanation to the entries in the Fourth Schedule to the Act incorporated the definition of these goods as contained in Act 58 of 1957
Turning then to Act 58 of 1957 section 2c of that Act provided that the words and expressions sugar tobacco cotton fabrics and woollen fabrics to mention only four of the items referred to in the definition section shall have the same meanings respectively as have been assigned to them in Item Nos 1 4 19 and 21 of the First Schedule to the 1944 Act
The above definition takes us to the 1944 Act
There the definition of the word tobacco  is contained in item No 4 of the First Schedule
The definition reads Tobacco means any form of tobacco whether cured or uncured and whether manufactured or not and includes the leaf stalks and stems of the tobacco plant but does not include any part of a tobacco plant while still attached to the earth The Schedule thereafter proceeds to set out two broad categories namely unmanufactured tobacco and manufactured tobacco
The former is divided into eight sub categories in respect of each of which a separate duty of excise is prescribed
Three of the entries mentioned are 3 if flue cured and not otherwise specified
6 if other than flue cured and not otherwise specified
8 Stalks The second category of manufactured tobacco is classified into various items like cigars and cheroots cigarettes PG NO 1093 biris smoking mixtures for pipes and cigarettes and chewing tobacco of various kinds snuff and hookah tobacco
The question whether tobacco seed oil and tobacco cake fall within entry 7 of Schedule IV to the Act as amended came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the same High Court 1977 40 STC 572
This Bench agreed with the conclusion of the earlier Division Bench though not with its line of reasoning
It was of the view that the definition clause properly interpreted in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in Dilworth vs Commissioners of Stamps 1899 AC 99 and CI T vs Taj Mahal Hotel  justified the inference that tobacco seed was not tobacco and that only leaf stalks and stems of the tobacco plant could be said to be tobacco within the meaning of the definition in item 4 of the Schedule to the 1944 Act
The Bench concluded Under these circumstances it is obvious that the definition of the word tobacco according to item 4 of Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act of 1944 does not bring tobacco seed within its purview and therefore tobacco seed is not exempted from the levy of sales tax under the AP General Sales Tax Act since tobacco seed does not fall within the meaning of the word tobacco as defined in the Fourth Schedule to the AP General Sales Tax Act
It is clear in view of this conclusion of ours that since tobacco seed is not tobacco for purposes of exemption under section 8 of the Act much less can tobacco seed oil or tobacco seed oil cake or tobacco seed cake can be said to be tobacco for the purposes of this exemption
 The Bench therefore denied the exemption to the appellantspetitioners before us and hence these petitionsappeals
Before us it is urged on behalf of the asessees that the word tobacco in its ordinary connotation takes in the tobacco plant and every part of it including the seed
The definition also make it clear that it takes in every form of tobacco manufactured or unmanufactured
Thus tobacco seeds not only when they are in their raw unmanufactured state but also when on manufacture they manifest themselves in the form of tobacco seed oil or tobacco seed cake will fall within the definition
On the other hand
on behalf of the State it is submitted that the PG NO 1094 definition which covers both what the expression means as well as what it includes is exhaustive
Tobacco seed does not come within the first part of the definition for the expression tobacco cured or uncured manufactured or unmanufactured has to be read as a whole and will not take in tobacco seed
It will not come under the second part because it specifically mentions leaves stalks and stems but leaves out seeds
Since tobacco seeds do not fall within the definition the oil and cake produced by the crushing of the seeds will not also be covered by the definition or eligible for the consequent exemption
We are inclined to accept the contention urged on behalf of the State that the definition under consideration which consists of two separate parts which specify what the expression means and also what it includes is obviously meant to be exhaustive
As Lord Watson observed in Dilworth vs Commissioner of Stamps 1899 AC 99 the joint use of the words mean and include can have this effect
He said in a passage quoted with approval in earlier decisions of this Court Sect
2 is beyond all question an interpretation clauses and must have been intended by the Legislature to be taken into account in construing the expression charitable device or bequest as it occurs in section 3
It is not said in terms that charitable bequest shall mean one or other of the things which are enumerated but that it shall include them
The word include is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include
But the word include is susceptible of another construction which may become imperative if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined
It may be equivalent to mean and include and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to these words or expressions Underlining ours PG NO 1095 13
Looking therefore at the terms of the definition more closely it is quite clear that tobacco seeds do not fall within the second or inclusive part of the definition
This part of the definition is important
It specifically excludes from the definition any part of the tobacco plant so long as it is still attached to the earth
It makes mention only of parts of the plant after it is severed from the earth
It is common knowledge that when a plant is severed from the earth its parts will comprise of not only the leaves stalks and stems but also the seeds
Yet the inclusive part of the definition enumerates only the leaves stalks and stems and deliberately one should think avoids mention of seeds
Can then the words tobacco  and any form of tobacco  in the first part of the definition be given a wider meaning and read as including the seeds also particularly as it talks of tobacco in any form cured or uncured manufactured or unmanufactured We do not think they can be for several reasons
In the first place tobacco seeds hardly answer to the description of either the expression manufactured tobacco  or the expression unmanufactured tobacco  in their ordinary connotation and the expression cured or uncured  cannot also be associated with tobacco seeds
The expression used in the first part of the definition though very wide is therefore singularly inappropriate to take within its purview tobacco seeds as well
Secondly the definition occurs in a statute levying excise duty which is concerned not with the parts of a plant grown on the field but with the use to which those parts are put or can be put after severance
The legislature could not but have been aware that if the leaves stalk and stem of the tobacco plant are used for manufacturing cured tobacco biris cigarettes and so on the seed is also used to produce oil and cake
It takes care to mention the first three items which are used in the manufacture of some forms of tobacco consumption which are also enumerated but refrains from referring to seeds which it would have done had it been intended to include the oil and cake also for purposes of the levy
The categories of unmanufactured tobacco enumerated in the entry in the Schedule include stalks  but not seeds 
This also indicates that seeds are not intended to be included
In other words the omission of the word seeds  from the second part of the definition casts its shadow on the first part as well
Indeed it rather looks as if the second part of the definition is intended to restrict rather than expand the scope of the first part
Thirdly it is to be noticed that the first part of definition is somewhat restrictively worded
It could have said for instance that tobacco  means any part of the tobacco plant and includes its leaves and stems after the plant is severed from the earth
What it does say is PG NO 1096 however different
The present definition when it says that tobacco means any form of tobacco lays emphasis that the item under consideration should be tobacco inform
The leaves stalks and stems even after drying curing and other processes and even manufacture  retain the form of tobacco as understood in common parlance
But it is otherwise with the seeds
They are not tobacco in form
They do not have the properties of tobacco
They are not used to exploit the narcotic qualities of tobacco
Apart from their use for seeding purposes the seeds are only used for the manufacture of oil and cake
We are told that the oil is used as an ingredient in the manufacture of scents and the cake as manure
Having regard to all this we agree with the High Court that tobacco seed once it is separated from the plant is an item entirely different from tobacco and does not fall within the expression tobacco or any form of tobacco 
We would like to add that even if by stretching the language somewhat tobacco seeds can be brought within the first part of the definition the oil and cake we are concerned with here cannot
This again we say for two reasons
In the first place as discussed earlier tobacco seed oil or cake can hardly be said to be a form of the tobacco seed
It is true that one can say that it is the contents of the seed that have manifested themselves on being crushed into two forms the oil and the cake
But this is not enough
The definition requires that the item in question should be a form of the tobacco seeds that is manufactured
While as already pointed out the leaves stalks and stems even after manufacture retain the form of tobacco the complete metamorphosis of the seed on its manufacture renders it impossible to describe the oil and cake as a form of the tobacco seed
Secondly in our view we should take note of the circumstance that earlier the item in Schedule IV covered not only tobacco but all its products
Never theless
it was held not to include the oil and cake
The legislature has subsequently amended the provision by deleting the reference to all products of tobacco
In this context of an abridgement of the definition it will not be correct in our view to construe the item so as to bring tobacco seed oil and cake within the scope of the exemption
Sri Choudhary points out that if the contention of the assessees were accepted they would be only jumping as it were from the frying pan into the fire
Since the item of exemption under the Act is worded identically with the item of the levy under the 1944 and 1957 Acts the effect of accepting the assessees  claim for exemption would be to automatically catapult them into the levy of excise and additional excise duties as well as into the rigours of the restrictions and regulations prescribed under those PG NO 1097 enactments
True the consideration that if the oil and cake fall under item 7 such consequences as have been mentioned will follow cannot really guide or deter us in construing the definition
However the fact that the oil and cake have not been considered to be excisable commodities for the past several years is an indication as to how the legislature and the administration have understood and applied these provisions all along
Certain other judicial decisions were cited by both parties but we are not discussing them
They neither directly deal with the point before us nor do they deal with definitions or situations which furnish a useful analogy for comparison
For the reasons discussed above we affirm the view taken by the High Court and dismiss these appeals and petitions
We however make no orders as to costs
R section section Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The Government of India set up a Wage Board for the port and dock workers at major ports on November 13 19641 to determine the categories of employees who should be brought within the scope of proposed wage fixation and 2 to work out a wage structure for those employees on the basis of the guidelines laid down by the Government
The Wage Board submitted its final report on November 29 1969
The Wage Board did not choose to make any recommendation in respect of bargemen ie Dandees and Majhis at the Port of Calcutta
According to the Wage Board the bargemen were engaged more in the transport of cargo rather than its handling and they therefore did not fit in with the definition of dock worker 
Thereupon the bargemen raised an industrial dispute claiming the benefit of the Wage Board recommendations
Accordingly the Central Government on August 22 197o constituted a National Tribunal at Calcutta for adjudication whether the recommendations of the Wage Board were applicable
to the bargemen and if not to what relief with regard to wages and allowances were they entitled
The National Tribunal held that the bargemen were entitled to be paid wages and allowance at the rates of wages recommended by the Wage Board on the ground that the bargemen came within the meaning of the definition of dock worker  and thus the recommendations of the Wage Board were applicable to them and alternatively on the ground that PG NO 1034 PG NO 1035 they were entitled to the same rates of wages and allowances even independently having regard to the financial capacity of the management and all other relevant considerations governing the determination of the wages
Aggrieved by the award of the National Tribunal the managements filed two writ petitions before the High Court at Calcutta questioning its validity on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the reference
The learned Single Judge observed 1 that the scope of the reference was to find out from the report of the Central Wage Board itself whether the recommendations were applicable to the bargemen or not and it was not for the National Tribunal to criticise the report of the Central Wage Board and to establish that the bargemen were dock workers within the meaning of the Act 2 the National Tribunal in a round about way made the recommendations of the Central Wage Board applicable to the bargemen although apparently the recommendations were not applicable to them and 3 the National Tribunal having held that the recommendations of the Central Wage Board were applicable to the bargemen there was no scope for it to decide independently the pay structure of the bargemen
The learned Single Judge accordingly quashed the award as beyond the jurisdiction of the National Tribunal
The Division Bench on appeal agreed with the Single Judge and further held that the National Tribunal had failed to fix the wages in accordance with the settled principles
Allowing the appeal it was HELD l The object of enacting the and of making provision therein to refer disputes to tribunals for settlement is to bring about industrial peace
Whenever a reference is made by a Government to an industrial tribunal it has to be presumed ordinarily that there is a genuine industrial dispute between the parties which requires to be resolved by adjudication In all such cases an attempt should be made by Courts exercising power of judicial review to sustain as far as possible the awards made by industrial tribunals instead of picking holes here and there in the awards on trivial points and ultimately frustrating the entire adjudication process before the tribunals by striking down awards on hyper technical grounds1042B C PG NO 1036 2 In order to decide the question whether the bargemen were dock workers or not the National Tribunal had to examine incidentally the correctness of the decision of the Wage Board on the question and after taking into consideration all the material before it the National Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the bargemen were also dock workers and there was no justification for denying them the benefit of the recommendations of the Wage Board
This part of the Award could therefore be considered to be outside the scope of the reference made to the National Tribunal
The finding recorded by the National Tribunal may be right or wrong but it could not be considered as one recorded without jurisdiction
1048B D 3 The National Tribunal while holding that even independently of the recommendations of the Wage Board the bargemen were entitled to the same wages and allowances which had been recommended by the Wage Board had observed that it would not be beyond the capacity of the employers to pay
The criticism of the award in this regard by the High Court was wholly unjustified
1048E F 1049A 4 The wages and allowances fixed by the National Tribunal were just and not at all excessive
1049E Express Newspapers Private Ltd and Anr
vs The Union of India and Others referred to