TION Civil Appeal Nos
260680 694483 377988 and 378088
PG NO 562 From the Judgments and Orders dated 23180 26483 221182 and 181984 of the Allahabad High Court in CM Writ No 5491979 CMWP No 694281 CMWP No 8383 of 1989 and CMWP No 112031980 respectively
SN Kacker BD Aggarwal RK Jain Dalip Tandon Rajiv Dutta KK Patel KK Mohan PK Jain RK Khanna and Pankaj Kalra for the Appellants
Manoj Swarup Ms Lalita Kohli Anil Kumar Gupta SK Mehta SM Sarin Dhruv Mehta Aman Vachher and R Jagannath Goulay for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
The civil appeals as well as the special leave petitions raise a common question as to whether the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation Of Letting Rent and Eviction Act Act No 13 of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act are applicable to cantonments situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh
Since the two civil appeals are already pending on the issue we grant special leave in the special leave petitions as well and proceed to dispose of all the four matters by this common judgment
The main judgment of the High Court under consideration is that in the case of Brij Sunder Kapoor vs Additional District Judge  Ors reported in 1980 All India Rent Cases 319 which answered the question in the affirmative
The Allahabad High Court has reiterated the same view i its latter decision in Lekh Raj vs 4th Addl
Judge Meerut AIR 1982 All
265 which we are told is also under appeal to this Court
It is sufficient to set out certain brief facts in the matter of Brij Sunder Kapoor CA 2606 of 1980 in order to appreciate the question of law that arises for consideration
Jhansi is a cantonment in Uttar Pradesh
Brij Sunder Kapoor is a tenant of premises No 103 Sadar Bazar Jhansi of which respondent No 3 Bhagwan Das GUpta is the landlord
In 1975 the landlord Bhagwan Das Gupta filed an application before the prescribed authority under section 21 of the Act praying that he needed the above premises for his personal occupation and that the same may be released to him
The tenant contested the application
The application was dismissed by the prescribed authority but allowed on appeal by the Additional District Judge
The tenant preferred a writ petition which has been dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court and hence the present appeal
We are not concerned with the factual PG NO 563 aspects of the controversy between the parties
The short point urged by learned counsel before us which is common to all these appeals and which was also argued unsucessfully before the High Court was that the Act did not apply to cantonments in Uttar Pradesh and that therefore the order of release made by the appellate authority under section 21 of the said Act was a nullity
In order to appreciate the point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants it is necessary to set out at some length the history of tenancy legislation in the State of Uttar Pradesh
In this State rent and eviction control legislation was initiated by the United Provinces Temporary Control of Rent  Eviction Ordinance promulgated on 1101946
This Ordinance was followed by UP Act III of 1947 which was made retrospective with effect from 1101946
Both the Act and the Ordinance applied to cantonment areas as well as other parts of the State
Subsequently the above Act was amended by UP Amendment Act 44 of 1948
By this Act cantonment areas were excluded from the purview of Act III of 1947
This amendment was introduced perhaps as it was felt that the cantonment areas were to be governed by the Cantonments House Accommodation Act 1923 and that the simultaneous application of Act III of 1947 to cantonment areas may create problems
It appears that subsequently a number of representations were made by residents of cantonments for extending the provisions of Act III of 1947 to cantonment areas as well
Perhaps because of such representations UP Ordinance 5 of 1949 was promulgated on 26th September 1949
But this ordinance was allowed to lapse
In the meantime the Allahabad High Court in Smt
Ahmedi Begam vs District Magistrate Agra took the view that the State Legislature was incompetent to regulate accommodation lying in cantonments since that was a subject on which Parliament alone was competent to legislate a view which was subsequently been approved by this court in Indu Bhushan Bose vs Rama Sundri Devi 1978 I SCR 443
Thereupon Parliament enacted the UP Cantonments Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1952 Act 10 of 1952
Though this was an Act of Parliament its operation was confined to cantonments in Uttar Pradesh
In 1957 Parliament enacted the Act XLVI of 1957
Act 22 of 1972 gave it retrospective effect from 2611950
It provided for the extension to cantonments in each State of PG NO 564 laws relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation prevalent in the particular State in respect of areas other than cantonments
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act specifically states that the Act became necessary because the power to make laws with respect to rent control and house accommodation in cantonment areas is exclusively vested in Parliament
Section 3 of this Act originally read thus The Central Government may by notification in the official gazette extend to any cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which is in force on the date of notification in the State in which the cantonment is situated
The words on the date of the notification in the section were omitted by section 3 of Central Act 22 of 1972 with full retrospective effect
The promulgation of this Act created a somewhat anomalous position so far as the State of UP was concerned
As we have already mentioned Act 10 of 1952 was already in force in the cantonment areas of the State and the issue of a notification by the Central Government purporting to apply Act III of 947 also to the cantonments in UP would create complications
If Act III of 1947 had to be extended to cantonment areas in UP in place of Act 10 of 1952 it was necessary that the provisions of Act 10 of 1952 should be repealed by a parliamentary enactment
This was done by enacting the UP Cantonments Control of Rent and Eviction Repeal Act 1971 Act 68 of 1971
The object of passing the Act as given in its long title
was to provide for the repeal of UP Act 10 of 1952
Section 2 of this Act reads as under On and from the date on which the United Provinces Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 is extended by notification under section 3 of the to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh the  Act l0 of 1952 shall stand repealed
 It was only on April 3 1972 that a notification was issued by the Central Government under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 extending the provisions of UP Act III of 1947 to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
But soon PG NO 565 after the above notification was issued UP Act III of 1947 itself was repealed and replaced by UP Act 13 of 1972 which came into force on 15th July 1972
This necessitated the issue of another notification under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 extending the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 to the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh
This notification dated 191973 and gazetted on 2991973 reads as follows In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the  Act 46 of 1957 and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence No SRO 8 dated 3rd April 1972 the Central Government hereby extends to all the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 UP Act XIII of 1972 as in force on the date of this notification in the State of Uttar Pradesh with the following modifications namely It was in view of the above notification that respondent No 3 filed his application under section 21 of the said Act which has given rise to the present proceedings
Three questions were posed by Shri SN Kacker who opened arguments for the appellants but unfortunately could not complete them due to his unexpected demise and Shri Agarwal who followed him
These were i Does Act XLVI of 1957 apply to the State of UP at all in view of the fact that Act 10 of 1952 which was a detailed and elaborate enactment contained special provisions applicable to cantonments in this State ii Did not the power of the Central Government under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 get exhausted when the notification dated 3rd April 1972 was issued by which the provisions of Act III of 1947 were extended to cantonments in UP If yes was not the second notification dated 191973 purporting to extend the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 to cantonments in UP illegal and non est iii Does not section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers and PG NO 566 is it not consequently void and inoperative Apart from these principal questions it was pointed out by Shri Tandon appearing for the petitioner in SLP No 6944 of 1983 that in his case the landlord was trying to resort to provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as amended by Act 28 of 1976
It was submitted that while Act 13 of 1972 as in force on 1973 was extended to UP cantonments by the notification dated 191973 there was no further notification applying the provisions of the Acts amending the same to the cantonments till 1721982
It was therefore contended that in any event the amended provisions would not be applicable to the cantonment areas of UP So far as the first contention is concerned we do not think there is any substance in it
It is true that Act 1 of 1952 was a detailed statute which was applicable to cantonments in the State of UP
It is also true that this enactment which was a Central enactment could not be rendered inoperative by the mere issue of a notification under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 and that it could be repealed or made inoperative only by an Act of Parliament
But in this case there is a parliamentary legislation which terminates the applicability of Act 10 of 1952 in Uttar Pradesh Cantonments
This is Act 68 of 1971
Section 2 of this Act has already been reproduced
It enacts that Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed in its application to the State of UP on and from the date on which Act III of 1947 was extended to the cantonment areas in the State by a notification under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957
As we have already mentioned a notification was issued on 341972 under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 extending the provisions of Act III of 1947 with certain modifications set out therein to cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
On and from 3rd April 1972 therefore Act 10 of 1952 ceased to apply to cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
In view of this there was at least on and after that date no obstacle in the way of Act III of 1947 being operative in the cantonments of the State of UP as well
Perhaps releasing this a contention was put forward that Act XLVI of 1957 promulgated at a time when Act 10 of 1952 was in force in UP should be construed as an enactment applicable to all States in India other than the State of Uttar Pradesh
It is not possible to accept this contention for two reasons
In the first place the language of the Act does not justify any such restriction
Secondly since the Act has been given retrospective effect from 2611950 it should be deemed to have been in force from that date
On that date Act 10 of 1952 was not in force in the State of UP and so the terms of Act 46 of 1957 would be applicable to contonments in all States including UP
This takes away PG NO 567 the entire basis of the argument
Again there might have been some difficulty If by a notification under section 3 of this Act the Central Government had sought to apply Act III of 1947 to cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh without there being a repeal of Act 10 of 1952
But this possible repugnancy between two legislations operating in the State of Uttar Pradesh one by virtue of the notification under section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and the other by virtue of the provisions of Act 10 of 1952 has been obviated by the provisions of Act 68 of 1971
These provisions have rendered Act 10 of 1952 inoperative as and from 341972 leaving the provisions of Act III of 1947 in the field only until it was replaced by Act 13 of 1972
One more somewhat different argument which seems to have been addressed before the High Court on the basis of Act 68 of 1971 is that on the issue of the notification dated 341972 the provisions of Act III of 1947 subject to the modifications mentioned in the notification stood bodily lifted and incorporated in Act 68 of 1971 and that the repeal thereafter of Act III of 1947 did not have any bearing in respect of cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
In other words the argument is that Act Ill of 1947 continues to be in operation in the cantonment areas even now
The appellants obviously have in mind the principles of referential legislation by incorporation outlined in Mahindra  Mahindra vs Union and other cases
We agree however with the High Court that section 2 of Act 68 of 1971 is not an instance of legislation by incorporation
The only purpose of 1947 to cantonment areas was already there in Act XLVI of 1957
But there was a hurdle in the issue of a notification under section 3 of that Act in that Act 10 of 1952 was already in force in such areas
Act 68 of 1971 merely removed this obstacle and enacted that Act 10 of 1952 would stand repealed on the date of issue of the notification under section Once such a notification was issued Act 68 of 1971 had served Its purpose out and had no further impact
It did not have the further effect of incorporating within itself the provisions of the extended law
If that had been the intention section 2 of Act 68 of 1971 as pointed out by the High Court would have read something like this On and from the date of commencement of this Act the provisions of UP Act III of 1947 shall be applicable to be cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh and Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed
 PG NO 568 It will be noticed that the above argument also overlooks the effect of later notifications under section 3 which have superseded the effect of the one dated 341972
To get over this difficulty it is argued that section 3 empowers the Government to issue a notification thereunder only once and that once the notification dated 341972 was issued the power got exhausted
The further notifications dated 191973 and 1721982 are it is said null and void
The argument is based on a short passage in Lachmi Narain vs Union  This case has a relevance on the third contention also to which we shall advert later
So far as the aspect presently under discussion is concerned its relevance arises in this way
In that case section 2 of the Part C States Laws Act 1950 empowered the Central Government to extend by notification in the official gazette to any Part C State or part of it any enactment in a Part A State
The Central Government in exercise of this power issued a notification in 1951 extending the provisions of the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act l941 to the then Part C State of Delhi with certain modifications set out in section 6
In 1957 the Central Government issued another notification again in purported exercise of the powers conferred by section 2 by which an additional modification of section 6 of the Bengal Act was introduced in the 1951 notification as a result of which certain exemptions available to the petitioner were withdrawn at shorter notice than was permissible under the modifications notified in I951
The notification of 1957 was held to be invalid and ineffective on several grounds one of which was thus stated at page 801 The power given by section 2 exhausts itself on extension of the enactment it cannot be exercised be repeatedly or sub sequently to such extension
It Can be exercised only once simultaneously with the extension of the enactment
This is one dimension of the statutory limits which circumscribe the power
 This was elaborated further by the learned Judge Sarkaria J at p 802 contrasting a clause of the kind under consideration with a Removal of Difficulty Clause which permits removal of difficulties felt in the operation of an Act from time to time
The learned Judge observed Firstly the power has not been exercised contemporaneously with the extension or for the purposes of the extension of the Bengal Act to Delhi
The power given by section 2 of the Laws Act had exhausted itself when the Bengal Act was extended with some alterations to Delhi by PG NO 569 Notification dated 2841951
The impugned notification has been issued on 7121957 more than six and a half years after the extension
There is nothing in the opinion of this Court rendered in Re Delhi Laws Act supra to support Mr B Sen s contention that the power given by section 2 could be validly exercised within one year after the extension
What appears in the opinion of Fazal Ali J at page 850 is merely a quotation from the report of the Committee on Minister s Powers which considered the propriety of the legislative practice of inserting a Removal of Difficulty Clause in Acts of British Parliament empowering the executive to modify the Act itself so far as necessary for origining it into operation
This device was adversely commented upon
While some critics conceded that this device is partly a draftsman s insurance policy in case he has overlooked something eg Sir Thomas Carr page 44 of his book concerning English Administrative Law others frowned upon it and nicknamed it as Henry VIII Clause after the British Monarch who was a notorious personification of absolute despotism
It was in this perspective that the Com mittee on Minister s Powers examined this practice and recommended    first that the adoption of such a clause ought on each occasion when it is on the initiative of the Minister in charge of the Bill proposed to Parliament to be justified by him upto the essential
It can only be essential for the limited purpose of bringing an Act into operation and it should accordingly be in most precise language restricted to those purely machinery arrangements vitally requisite for that purpose and the clause should always contain a maximum time limit of one year after which the power should lapse
 It may be seen that the time limit of one year within which the power under a Henry VIII Clause should be exercisable was only a recommendation and is not an inherent attribute of such power
In one sense the power of extension cum modification given under section 2 of the Laws Act and the power of modification and adaptation conferred under PG NO 570 a usual Henry VIII Clause  are kindred powers of fractional legislation delegated by the legislature within narrow circumscribed limits
But there is one significant difference between the two
While the power under section 2 can be exercised only once when the Act is extended that under a Henry VIII Clause  can be invoked if there is nothing to the contrary in the clause more than once on the arising of a difficulty when the Act is operative
That is to say the power under such a clause can be exercised whenever a difficulty arises in the working of the Act after its enforcement subject of course to the time limit if any for its exercise specified in the statute
Thus anything said in Re Delhi Laws Act supra in regard to the time limit for the exercise of power under a Henry VIII Clause  does not hold good in the case of the power given by section 2 of the Laws Act
Fazl Ali J did not say anything indicating that the power in question can be exercised within one year of the extension
On the contrary the learned Judge expressed in unequivocal terms at page 849 Once the Act became operative any defect in its provision cannot be removed until amending legislation is passed 
 Basing himself on this passage learned counsel contended that once the notification dated 3rd April 1972 was issued the power under section 3 had got exhausted and the section could not have been invoked by the Central Government once again to issue the notification of Ist September 1973 extending Act 13 of 1972 to the cantonments of UP
It will be at once clear that there is a basic difference between the situation in Lachmi Narain supra and that in the present case
In both cases the power conferred is to extend the provisions of another Act with modifications considered necessary
In Lachmi Narain this had been done by the 1951 notification
The Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act had been extended to Delhi with certain modifications
The object of the 1957 notification was not to extend a Part A legislation to Delhi it was to modify the terms of an extension notified earlier
This was held to be impermissive in as much as all that the section permitted was an extension of the laws of a part A State to Delhi which ex facie had already been done in 1951
Here the nature of the legislation in question is totally different
As we shall explain later the whole purpose of PG NO 571 Act XLVI of 1947 was to ensure that the cantonment areas in a State have the same rent laws as the other areas thereof
This when Act III of 1947 ceased to be in force in the rest of the State no purpose would be served by its continuing in force in the cantonment areas alone
So also when the provisions of the law in force in the State got amended there should be a power to extend the amended law in the cantonment
This was obviously the reason why Act 22 of 1972 amended section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 to omit the words on the date of the notification retrospectively
The provisions of section 3 of the Act XLVI of 1957 should in the circumstances be construed so as to achieve this purpose and as enabling the Central Government to issue notifications from time to time and not as exhausted by a single invocation as in the case of the statute considered in the Delhi Laws Act case supra
section 3 could therefore be invoked from time to time as occasion arise and the notifications dated 191973 and 1721982 are valid and intra vires
In such a situation we think the limitation suggested in the above decision will not operate
On the other hand the provisions of section 14 and section 21 of the General Clauses Act will apply and it will be open to the Government to extend another legislation or further legislations to cantonments in place of the one that had been repealed
The above conclusion can also be supported on the ratio of decision in Gurcharan Singh and Others vs VK Kaushal   also a case concerned with notifications under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957
In exercise of this power the Central Government issued on 2 1111969 a notification extending the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act 1949 to cantonments in the State of Punjab  Haryana Subsequently after the amendment of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 by Act 22 of 1972 another notification was issued on 241 1974 superseding the earlier notification and extending the East Punjab Act afresh to cantonments in the State of Punjab  Haryana with a modification of section 13 of the said Act with retrospective effect from 261 1950
Upholding the validity of this notification and repelling an argument similar to the one now advanced before us the Court observed Two points are raised on behalf of the appellants against that conclusion
The first is that the power under section 3 of the having been exercised once that is to say by the notification dated November 21 1969 the power of extension stood exhausted and could not be availed of again and therefore the Notification dated January 24 1974 was with our statutory sanction and invalid We are referred to PG NO 572 Lachmi Narain vs Union of India  That was a case where this Court held that a notification under Section 2 States Laws Act 1950 having been issued in 1951 by the Central Government extending the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act 1941 to the State of Delhi the power given by section 2 exhausted itself on the extension of the enactment and could not be exercised again to enable the issue of a fresh notification modifying the terms in which the Bengal Act was extended
The case is clearly distinguishable
The power under which the notification dated January 24 1974 has been issued is a separate and distinct power from that under which the notification dated November 21 1969 was made
The power now exercised passed into the when it was amended in 1972
In its nature and quality it is not identifiable with the power vested under the unamended Act
A power conferred by statute is distinguished by the character and content of its essential components
If one or more material components characterising the power cannot be identified with the material components of another they are two different and distinct powers
Although broadly the power envisaged in section 3 of the amended is a power of extension even as it was under the unamended Act there is a vital qualitative difference between the two
The power under the unamended Act was a limited power
It could operate prospectively only
There was no choice in the matter
After amendment the Act provided for a power which could be exercised retrospectively
The power extended to giving retrospective effect to an enactment in force in the State in the form in which that enactment was in force on the date on which the extension was made
It was a power whose reach and cover extended far beyond what the power under the unamended Act could achieve
We are of the view that in issuing the notification dated January 24 1974 and thereby extending the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act to the Ambala Cantonment retrospectively with effect from January 26 1950 the Central Government exercised a power not available to it when it issued the notification dated November 21 1969
The contention that the issue of the notification of January 24 PG NO 573 1974 amounted to a further exercise of power conferred by section 3 of the  under which the earlier notification was issued is without force and must be rejected
underlining ours This principle will also apply in the present case for while the notification dated 341972 was issued in exercise of the power under the unamended section 3 the one dated 191973 was issued in exercise of the new power available after the amendment of Act 22 of 1972 which came into force on 2nd June 1972 though there is a distinction between the two cases in that the latter notification unlike the second notification in the other case did not purport to give any retrospective effect to the extended legislation
It should be mentioned here that notification dated 191973 extended to the cantonment areas only the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as they stood on that date
It was only on 1721982 that a further notification was issued superseding the notification dated 191973 by which the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh were also extended to the cantonment areas
The purpose of this notification obviously was that since there had been amendments to Act XIII of 1972 in 1974 and again in i976 it was necessary and desirable That the amended provisions should also be extended to the cantonment areas
The question raised above on behalf of the appellants regarding the validity of the notification dated 191973 has to be considered also in the context of this notification dated 17121982
For the reasons discussed above we are of the opinion that the Central Government acted within its powers in issuing the subsequent notification dated 1721982 as well
This also is not a case like the one in Lachmi Narain vs Union  l976 2 SCR 785 where the purpose of the second notification was to modify without any provocation the contents of the first notification issued for the purposes of extension
Here the subsequent notification became necessary because subsequently the enactments had amended the provisions of the Act which had been extended previously
Moreover
as the original Act l3 of 1972 has already been extended the real purpose of this notification was to extend the provisions of Act 19 of 1974 and Act 28 of 1976 also to those areas
In our view the provisions of sections 14 and 21 of the  clearly apply for this reason as well as for the reason given in Gurcharan Singh s case
The validity of the notification dated 1721982 is therefore upheld
PG NO 574 Shri SK Mehta also contended that even if the notification of l91973 is left out of account the notification of 34
1972 was itself sufficient to achieve the present purpose
He submitted that since Act 13 of 1972 repealed and re enacted the provisions of Act Ill of 1947 all references in Act 28 of 1971 as well as in the notification dated 341972 to Act III of 1947 and its provisions should be construed as references to Act 13 of 1972 and its corresponding provisions as amended from time to time
He relied on section 8 of the 
In the view we have taken above we consider it unnecessary to deal with this contention or express any opinion thereon
Now to turn to the principal contention in the case the contention is that Act XLVI of 1957 does not itself enact any provisions in respect of house accommodation in the cantonment areas of UP Section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 purports only to empower the Central Government to legislate for such areas
It is true that the Central Government is not given carte blanche to do whatever it likes in this respect and that its power of notification is restricted to merely extending to cantonment areas the provisions of the corresponding laws in force in the other areas of the State of Uttar Pradesh
But this itself amounts to excessive delegation of legislative power for three reasons a On the date of the enactment of Act 46 of 1957 Parliament could not predicate what type of provisions will be in operation in the other areas of the States on some future date s on which the Central Government may issue notifications under section 3 in respect of various States
section 3 thus authorises the introduction on a Government notification of a law to the provisions of which Parliament has had no occasion to apply its mind at all b There is a further vitiating element in that the Central Government under section 3 is empowered to direct not merely that the provisions of a State enactment which may be in force in the State on the date of the such notification should apply to the cantonment areas in the State as well
The amendment to section 3 by Act 22 of 1972 goes one step further to make it clear that the Central Government can make a general notification that any State enactment in force in the State would apply to cantonments as well
This means that on a mere notification by the Central Government not merely the provisions of an enactment which are in force on the date of the notification but also all future enactments on this topic that may come into force from time to time in the State would automatically apply to cantonment areas as well
Thus even PG NO 575 the notifying authority may not have had occasion to apply its mind at all to the provisions of the law that are to be made applicable to the cantonments
Thus for instance the amendments in 1976 to Act 13 of 1972 can be sought to be made applicable though on the date of issue of the notification under section 3 the Central Government could not at all have anticipated that there would be such an amendment and c The Central Government has been empowered to apply such laws with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit
Such an unrestricted power may well result in the notification modifying the State law in material respects and enacting a law of its own for cantonment areas which is not permissible
Learned Counsel submitted that there is not even a broad indication in the principal statute viz Act XLVI of 1957 as to the nature of the provisions of the enactment which it would like to be applied to cantonments
A mandate to the Government for a blind application at its choice of an enactment existing or future to cantonment areas within a State merely because such an enactment happens to be operative in respect of other areas in the State it is said amounts to a complete abdication of legislative Power by Parliament which is not permissible under our Constitution
We may at once deal with limb c of the above contention a direct answer to which is furnished by the decision in Lachmi Narain s case  already discussed
Referring to the judgment in the Delhi Laws Act case  and Rajnarain Singh s case on the scope of expressions such as subject to such restrictions and modification as it thinks fit Sarkaria J observed Bearing in mind the principles and the scope and meaning of the expression restrictions and modifications  explained in Delhi Laws Act let us now have a close look at section 2
It will be clear that the primary power bestowed by the section on the Central Government is one of extension that is bringing into operation and effect in a Union Territory an enactment already in force in a State
The discretion conferred by the section to make restrictions and modification  in the enactment sought to be extended is not a separate and independent power
It is an integral constituent of the powers of extension
It cannot be exercised apart from the power of extension
This is PG NO 576 indubitably clear from the preposition with  which immediately precedes the phrase such restrictions and modifications  and conjoins it to the principal clause of the section which gives the power of extension
According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one meaning of the word with  which accords here with the context is part of the same whole 
The power given by section 2 exhausts itself on extension of the enactment it cannot be exercised repeatedly or sub sequently to such extension
It can be exercised only once simultaneously with the extension of the enactment
This is one dimension of the statutory limits which circumscribe the power
The second is that the power cannot be used for a purpose other than that of extension
In the exercise of this power only such restrictions and modifications  can be validly engrafted in the enactment sought to be extended which are necessary to bring it into operation and effect in the Union Territory
Modifications  which are not necessary for or ancillary and subservient to the purpose of extension are not permissible
And only such modifications  can be legitimately necessary for such purpose as are required to adjust adapt and make the enactment suitable to the peculiar local conditions of the Union Territory for carrying in into operation and effect
In the context of the section the words restrictions and modifications do not cover such alterations as involve a change in any essential feature
of the enactment or the legislative policy built into it
This is the third dimension of the limits that circumscribe the power
It is true that the words such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit  if construed literally and in isolation appear to give unfettered power of amending and modifying the enactment sought to be extended
Such a wide construction must be eschewed lest the very validity of the section becomes vulnerable on account of the vice of excessive delegation
Moreover such a construction would be repugnant to the context and the content of the section read as a whole and the statutory limits and conditions attaching to the exercise of the power
We must therefore confine the scope of the words restrictions and modifications  to alterations of such a character which keep the inbuilt policy essence and substance of the enactment PG NO 577 sought to be extended in tact and introduce only such peripheral or insubstantial changes which are appropriate and necessary to adapt and adjust it to the local conditions of the Union Territory
 These observations make it clear that though apparently wide in scope the power of the Central Government for the extension of laws is a very limited one and cannot change the basic essential structure or the material provisions of the law sought to be extended to cantonment areas
The principal decision on which counsel for the appellants placed reliance in support of the other limbs of his contention is the decision of this court in B Shama Rao vs The Union Territory of Pondicherry  In that case the legislative assembly for the Union Territory of Pondicherry passed the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act 10 of 1965 which was published on June 30 1965
Section 12 of the Act provided that it would come into force on such date as the Pondicherry Government may by notification appoint
Section 21 of the Act provided that the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1959 as in force in the State of Madras immediately before the commencement of the Pondicherry Act shall be extended to Pondicherry subject to certain modifications
The Pondicherry Government issued a notification under section 12 on Ist March 1966 appointing April 1 1966 as the date of commencement of the Act
It so happened that between 30th of June 1965 when the Pondicherry Act was published and the Ist April 1966 which was the notified date for its commencement the Madras legislature had substantially amended the Madras Act
It was the Madras Act as amended upto Ist April 1966 which was brought into force in Pondicherry
When the Act came into force the petitioner was called upon to register himself as a dealer under the Act
He filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the Act
After the petition was filed the Pondicherry legislature passed an amendment Act whereby section 12 of the principal Act was amended to read that the principal Act shall come into force on the Ist April 1966 and also contained a validating provision in respect of all proceedings taken in between
The majority of the Constitution Bench which heard the matter held Shah and Bhargava JJ
dissenting that the Act of 1965 was void and still born and could not be revived even by the amendment Act passed in 1966
The dissenting judges did not express any view on the contention th4t the principal Act was bad for excessive delegation of powers when it was enacted and published as they were of the view that the subsequent PG NO 578 amendment Act passed by the Pondicherry Legislature had the effect of bringing into force in Pondicherry a valid Act under which the proceedings sought to be taken against the petitioner were fully justified
We are here concerned with the majority view on the question of abdication of legislative functions
After referring to certain earlier decisions of the court and in particular the decision in the case of Delhi Laws Act   Shelat J speaking for the Court observed as follows The question then is whether in extending the Madras Act in the manner and to the extent it did under sec
21 of the principal Act the Pondicherry legislature abdicated its legislative power in favour of the Madras legislature
It is manifest that the Assembly refused to perform its legislative function entrusted under the Act constituting it
It may be that a mere refusal may not amount to abdication if the legislature instead of going through the full formality of legislation applies its mind to an existing statute enacted by another legislature for another jurisdiction adopts such an Act and enacts to extend it to the territory under its jurisdiction
In doing so it may perhaps be said that it has laid down a policy to extend such an Act and directs the executive to apply and implement such an Act
But when it not only adopts such an Act but also provides that the Act applicable to its territory shall be the Act amended in future by the other legislature there is nothing for it to predicate what the amended Act would be
Such a case would be clearly one of non application of mind and one of refusal to discharge the function entrusted to it by the Instrument constituting it
It is difficult to how such a case in not of abdication or effacement in favour of another legislature at least in regard to that particular matter
But Mr Setalvad contended that the validity of such legislation has been accepted in Delhi Laws Act s case  and particularly in the matter of heading No 4 as summarised by Bose J in Raj Narayan Singh s case  In respect of that heading the majority conclusion no doubt was that authorisation in favour of the executive to adopt laws passed by another legislature or legislatures including future laws would not be invalid
So far as that conclusion goes Mr Setalvad is right
But as PG NO 579 already stated in arriving at that conclusion each learned Judge adopted a different reasoning
Whereas Patanjali Sastri and Das JJ accepted the contention that the plenary legislative power includes power of delegation and held that since such a power means that the legislature can make laws in the manner it liked if it delegates that power short of an abdication there can be no objection
On the other hand Fazl Ali J upheld the laws on the ground that they contained a complete and precise policy and the legislation being thus conditional the question of excessive delegation did not arise
Mukherjea J held that abdication need not be total but can be partial and even in respect of a particular matter and if so the impugned legislation would be bad
Bose J expressed in frank language his displeasure at such legislation but accepted its validity on the ground of practice recognised ever since Burah s ease 5 IA 178 and thought that that practice was accepted by the Constitution makers and incorporated in the concept of legislative function There was thus no unanimity as regards the principles upon which those laws were upheld
All of them however appear to agree on one principle viz that where there is abdication or effacement the legislature concerned in truth and in fact acts contrary to the Instrument which constituted it and the statute in question would be void and still born
In the present case it is clear that the Pondicherry legislature not only adopted the Madras Act as it stood at the date when it passed the Principal Act but also enacted that if the Madras legislature were to amend its Act prior to the date when the Pondicherry government would issue its notification it would be the amended Act which would apply
The legislature at that stage could not anticipate that the Madras Act would not be amended nor could it predicate what amendment or amendments would be carried out or whether they would be of a sweeping character or whether they would be suitable in Pondicherry
In point of fact the Madras Act was amended and by reason of section 21 read with section 12 of the Principal Act it was the amended Act which was brought into operation in Pondicherry
The result was that the Pondicherry legislature accepted the amended Act though it was not and could not be aware what the provisions of the PG NO 580 amended Act would be
There was in these circumstances a total surrender in the matter of sales tax legislation by the Pondicherry Assembly in favour of the Madras legislature and for that reason we must agree with Mr Desai that the Act was void or as is often said still born 
It was however argued that the Act cannot be said to be still born as it contained certain provisions independent of the Madras Act viz the section which provides for the Appellate Tribunal and the said Schedule
But the core of a taxing statute is in the charging section and the provisions levying such a tax and defining persons who are liable to pay such tax
If that core disappears the remaining provisions have no efficacy
In our view Act l0 of 1965 was for the reasons aforesaid void and still born
It may appear that there is a great similarity between1 the facts in Shama Rao supra and in the cases before us
In each of them the provisions of the enactment of one legislature enact that the provisions of an enactment of another legislature should apply within the territory subject to its jurisdiction on the issue of a Government notification and the first legislature does not know the details of the provisions of the enactment of the second legislature that will become applicable in consequence of the Government notification
We are not however able to accept the contention that the ratio of Shama Rao s case will govern the situation in the present case also
We say this for two reasons
In the first place the principles regarding delegation of legislative powers have been discussed in several decisions of this Court the leading decision being the one in the case of Delhi Laws Act  In the last mentioned authority separate judgments were delivered by the various learned judges of this Curt and instead of referring to each of them individually the best course would be to adopt the summary of Vivan Bose J at page 298 in Raj Narain Singh s case  That case concerned a Bihar Act which permitcertain areas by notification 
The validity of this statutory provision was upheld but the notification issued was held to be ultra vires the provision
In the course of the discussion the learned Judge said The Court in the Delhi Laws Act case had before it the PG NO 581 following problems
In each case the Central Legislature had empowered an executive authority under its legislative control to apply at its discretion laws to an area which was also under the legislative sway of the Centre
The variations occur in the type of laws which the executive authority was authorised to select and in the modifications which it was empowered to make in them
The variations were as follows l Where the executive authority was permitted at its discretion to apply without modification save incidental changes such as name and place the whole of any Central Act already in existence in any part of India under the legislative sway of the Centre to the new area This was upheld by a majority of six to one
2 Where the executive authority was allowed to select and apply a Provincial Act in similar circumstances This was also upheld but this time by a majority of five to two
3 where the executive authority was permitted to select future Central laws and apply them in a similar way This was upheld by five to two
4 Where the authorisation was to select future Provincial laws and apply them as above
This was also upheld by five to two
5 Where the authorisation was to repeal laws already in force in the area and either substitute nothing in their places or substitute other laws Central or Provincial with or without modification
This was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three
6 Where the authorisation was to apply existing laws either Central or Provincial with alterations and modifications and PG NO 582 7 Where the authorisation was to apply future laws under the same conditions The views of the various members of the Bench were not as clear cut as in the first five cases so it will be necessary to analyse what each Judge said
 As to categories 6 and 7 mentioned above Bose J after referring to the opinion of each of the other learned Judges in the Delhi Laws Act case supra concluded with a reference to his own observations in the earlier decision Bose J contented himself at page 1121 by saying that the delegation cannot extend to the altering in essential particulars of laws which are already in force in the area in question
 But he added at page 1124 My answers are however subject to this qualification
The power to restrict and modify  does not import the power to make essential changes
It is confined to alterations of a minor character such as are necessary to make an Act intended for one are applicable to another and to bring it into harmony with laws already in being in the State or to delete portions which are meant solely for another area
To alter the essential character of an Act or to change it in material particulars is to legislate and that namely the power to legislate all authorities are agreed cannot be delegated by a Legislature include a change of policy
 In our opinion the majority view was that an executive authority can be authorised to modify either existing or future laws but not in any essential feature
Exactly what constitutes an essential feature cannot be enunciated in general terms and there was some divergence of view about this in the former case but this much is clear from the opinions set out above it cannot include a change of policy In other words the delegation of a power to extend even future laws of another State will not be bad so long as they are laws which are already in force in the said area and so long as in the process and under the guise of alteration and modification an alteration of the essential character PG NO 583 of the law or a change of it in essential particulars is not permitted
This interpretation of the Delhi Laws Act case supra was placed before the Bench which decided Shama Rao but without dissenting from this approach the learned Judges did not choose to apply it perhaps as they felt that the Pondicherry legislature in the case before them had completely abdicated its functions to the Madras Legislature
There was also it should be remembered a substantial difference between the Madras Act to which the Pondicherry legislature had applied its mind and the Madras Act which actually became applicable by a deferment of the date of commencement
Such a vast change within a short time could not at all have been in the contemplation of the Pondicherry legislature and this is perhaps what heavily weighed with the Judges
This decision has been distinguished in the Gwalior Rayon s case  by Khanna J and Mathew J who delivered separate but concurring judgments
Khanna Jobserved It would appear from the above that the reason which prevailed with the majority in striking down the Pondicherry Act was the total surrender in the matter of sales tax legislation by the Pondicherry Legislature in favour of the Madras Legislature
No such surrender is involved in the present case because of the Parliament having adopted in one particular respect the rate of local sales tax for the purpose of central sales tax
Indeed as mentioned earlier the adoption of the local sales tax is in pursuance of a legislative policy induced by the desire to prevent evasion of the payment of central sales tax by discouraging inter State sales to unregistered dealers
No such policy could be discerned in the Pondicherry Act which was struck down by this Court
Another distinction though not very material is that in the Pondicherry case the provisions of the Madras Act along with the subsequent amendments were made applicable to an area which was within the Union Territory of Pondicherry and not in Madras State
As against that in the present case we find that the Parliament has adopted the rate of local sales tax for certain purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act only for the territory of the State for which the Legislature of that State had prescribed the rate of sales tax
The central sales tax in respect of the territory of a State is ultimately assigned to that State under article 269 PG NO 584 of the Constitution and is imposed for the benefit of that State
We would therefore hold that the appellants cannot derive much assistance from the above mentioned decision of this Court
Mathew J had this to say We think that the principle of the ruling in Shama Rao vs Pondicherry supra must be confined to the facts of the case
It is doubtful whether there is any general principle which precludes either Parliament or a State legislature from adopting a law and the future amendments to the law passed respectively by a State legislature or Parliament and incorporating them in its legislation
At any rate there can be no such prohibition when the adoption is not of the entire corpus of law on a subject but only of a provision and its future amendments and that for a special reason or purpose
Secondly we think that the facts of the present case are also distinguishable from those in Shama Rao supra
Parliament was faced with the problems of enacting laws relating to house accommodation in cantonments in various States
Earlier an attempt had been made to have a separate Act for UP Cantonments but it was then considered that it would be better to have a uniform policy of legislation in respect of all cantonments in India
These cantonments were located in the heart of various cities in the different States and unlike the position that prevailed in early years had ceased to be a separate and exclusive colony for army personnel
It was therefore but natural for Parliament to decide as a matter of policy
that there should be no difference in the matter of housing accommodation between persons residing in cantonment areas of a State and those residing in other parts of the State and it is this policy that was given effect to by Act XLVI of 1957
Having decided upon this policy it was open to Parliament to do one of two things pass a separate enactment in respect of the cantonment areas in each State or to merely extend the statutes prevalent in other parts of the respective States by a single enactment
The second course was opted upon but there was one difficulty
The enactments in force in the various States may need some modifications or changes before they could be fitted to the requirements of the cantonments
We have already explained that the expression restrictions and modifications  has a very limited connotation
If this is borne in mind it will be clear that the nature of modifications or restrictions PG NO 585 each statute would require can only be a matter of detail of drafting of not much significance or importance once the general policy was clear
It is only this matter of detail that has been delegated to the Central Government to be attended to while passing appropriate notifications in each case
As pointed out in Sita Ram Bishambher Dayal vs State of UP  in the context of a tax legislation In a Cabinet form of Government the Executive is expected to reflect the views of the Legislatures
In fact in most matters it gives the lead to the Legislature
However much one might deplore the New Despotism of the Executive the very complexity of the modern society and the demand it makes on its Government have set in motion forces which have made it absolutely necessary for the Legislatures to entrust more and more powers to the Executive
Textbook doctrines evolved in the Nineteenth Century have become out of date
Present position as regards delegation of legislative power may not be ideal but in the absence of any better alternative there is no escape from it
The Legislatures have neither the time nor the required detailed information nor even the mobility to deal in detail with the innumerable problems arising time and again
In certain matters they can only lay down the policy and guidelines in as clear a manner as possible
 For the same reasons the scope of delegation in a measure like this should have a degree of flexibility to deal with minor variations and details of statutory adoption having regard to the situation differing from State to State
The legislature hardly has the time to enter into this arena
We therefore think that there was no infirmity in the delegation of power contained in section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957
The further argument that in any event the 1976 amendments of Act 13 of 1972 will not get attracted has to be rejected on the same line of reasoning as has been indicated above
Once it is the avowed policy of Parliament that cantonment areas in a State should be subject to the same tenancy legislation as the other areas therein it follows that the decision involves also that future amendments in such State legislation should become effective in cantonment areas as well
In some rare case where Parliament feels that such subsequent amendments need not apply to cantonment areas or should apply with more than the limited restrictions and modifications permitted by section 3 it is open to Parliament to legislate independently for such PG NO 586 cantonment areas
But the decision that in the main such State legislation should apply is unexceptionable and cannot be said to constitute an abdication of its legislative function by Parliament
But here the difficulty arises not so much because of the language of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 as on account of the language of the notification issued on Ist September 1973
The wording of this notification has been set out earlier
It reads that in supersession of the earlier notification of 3rd April 1972 the Central Government extends to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 UP Act XIII of 1972 as in force on the date of this notifications in the State of Uttar Pradesh with the following modifications 
 It must be pointed out in this connection that this notification was issued after Act XLVI of 1957 had been amended by Act 22 of 1972 and a power had been conferred on the Central Government to issue the notification without the restriction previously contained in section 31 that the statute proposed to be extended should be as in force on the date of the notification
In other words depsite the enlarged power conferred by amending Act 22 of 1972 the notification is couched in the same way as the earlier notification of 3rd April 1972 and purports to extend to the cantonments only the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as in force on the date of the notification that is as on 191973
The restricted language of the notification therefore makes applicable to cantonments only the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as they stood on 19
1973 and not its subsequent amendments
Act 13 of 1972 as initially enacted required an application under section 21 to be made before the Prescribed Authority Prescribed Authority  was defined by section 3e to mean a Magistrate of the first class having 3 years experience as such duly authorised by the District Magistrate to exercise perform and discharge all or any of the powers functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act Act 19 of 1974 amended this definition wef 207 1974 to mean an officer not less than three years experience as a Munsif Magistrate of the first class or as Executive Magistrate authorised as aforesaid by the State Government 
PG NO 587 Still later on 571976 Act 28 of 1976 substituted a new clause e for previous one
Under the new clause the definition read Prescribed Authority means a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise perform and discharge all or any of the powers functions and duties of the Prescribed Authority under this Act 
As explained in the judgment of the District Judge in the case under appeal different types of officers were contemplated under the different definitions
Initially the Prescribed Authority had to be a Magistrate of the first class under the old Code of Criminal Procedure and had also to be a nominee of the District Magistrate
This had to change because first class Magistrates subordinate to the District Magistrate had ceased to exist after 3131974
Thereafter there were only Executive Magistrates subordinate to the District Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of the first and second class under the District Judges
Therefore the amended section gave power to the State Government to authorise Munsifs Judicial Magistrates or Executive Magistrates to discharge duties of a Prescribed Authority
This must have meant a very heavy load on the State Government and hence a third change was effected wef 571976
Thereafter a nominee and subordinate of the District Judge was to be the Prescribed Authority
In Civil Appeal No 6944 of 1983 to which we have made reterence earlier the landlord had made his application under section 21 of Act XIII of 1972 before the Prescribed Authority on 20121975
It was made before Shri Khem Karan who had been appointed as the Prescribed Authority on 1191975
However when the definition was amended by Act 28 of 1976 Shri SC Srivastava was appointed as the Prescribed Authority and the application of the landlord was transferred to him and he disposed it off by his order dated 2791977
It may be mentioned that both Shri Khem Karan and Shri Srivastava were Munsifs
While Shri Khem Karan was a Prescribed Authority appointed by the State Government under section 3e as amended in 1974 Shri Srivastava was a Prescribed Authority authorised by the District Judge after 5th of July 1976
In this state of facts the argument urged on behalf of the tenant before the High Court in addition to the principal argument that Act 13 of 1972 was not at all applicable to cantonment areas was that Sri Srivastava PG NO 588 appointed in pursuance of the amendment Act 28 of 1976 was not the Prescribed Authority authorised in accordance with the provisions of the Act as they stood on Ist September 1973 and therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the landlord under section 21 of the Act
Though the dates and facts of other cases were also similar this point was taken only in this case at the earlier stages
This argument was accepted by the learned District Judge who set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority on 221981
The High Court in the writ petition filed by the tenant did not however accept this argument
The learned single Judge who heard the writ petition was of the opinion that the District Judge was in error and that the argument put forward on behalf of the tenant was not tenable
He observed Section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 inter alia provided that section 3 of the Principal Act namely Act 46 of 1957 shall be renumbered as sub section I thereof and in sub section I as so renumbered the words on the date of the notification shall be and shall be deemed always to have been omitted
The effect of the words on the date of the notification being omitted from section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 in the manner contemplated by section 3 of Act 22 of 1972 was that the aforesaid words would be deemed not to have been in existence in section 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 from the very inception
As such section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 did not confer on the Central Government the power to issue a notification under that section to extend to any cantonment an enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which was inforce on the date of the notification in the State in which the cantonment is situated
The use of the words on the date of this notification after the words as in force and before the words in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the notification dated Ist September 1973 were therefore beyond the power conferred on the Central Government by section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and will accordingly be deemed to be not in existence in the aforesaid notification and have to be ignored After referring lo the decision of the Supreme Court In Bajya vs Smt
Gopikabai and another   the learned Judge observed Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 after its amendment by Act 22 of 1972 as aforesaid on the face of it comes in the PG NO 589 latter category referred to in the decision of Bajya supra
Consequently the definition of the term Prescribed Authority as it was subsequently amended by UP Act 28 of 1976 is applicable for finding out as to who is the Prescribed Authority to entertain an application under section 21 of the Act even in regard to those buildings which are situated within a cantonment area
The view taken to the contrary by the District Judge in the impugned order suffers from a manifest error of law and deserves to be quashed
 He therefore held that the application preferred by the landlord had rightly been dealt with by Sri Srivastava and therefore remanded the matter to the learned District Judge for disposing of the appeal filed before him by the tenant on its merits
It is against the order of the learned single Judge that CA No 6944 of 1983 has been preferred
We are unable to support the line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge to uphold the order passed by Sri Srivastava
We have already expressed our opinion that amended section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 on a proper construction validly empowers the Central Government by notification to extend the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh not only in the form in which it stood on the date of the said notification but also along with its subsequent amendments
But for the Central Government to have such power is one thing and for the Central Government to exercise such power is a totally different thing
Despite the fact that Act 22 of 1972 with full retrospective effect omitted the words as on the date of the notification from section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 the terms of the actual notification on 191973 purported to extend only the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as on the date of such notification
We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge that this restricted notification was ultra vires or travelled beyond the provisions of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957
What happened was that the section in the statute conferred a larger power on the Central Government but the Central Government utilised the said power in a limited manner
That was perfectly within the scope of the power delegated to it under section 3
We cannot uphold the view that the words as on the date of this notification in the notification dated Ist September 1973 can be ignored or be deemed to have been omitted merely because those words had been omitted from the section
Nonetheless we are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge has to be upheld
For PG NO 590 this there are two reasons
The first is the effect of section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 as amended by Act 22 of 1972
This Act amended section 3 in more respects than one
Apart from omitting the words as on the date of the notification in section 3 and re numbering section 3 as 31 it added to section 3 certain other sub sections so that after the amendment section 3 read as follows 3
Power to extend to cantonments laws relating to control of rents and regulation of house accommodation 1 The Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette extend to any cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation which is in force in the State in which the cantonment is situated
Provided that nothing contained in any enactment so extended shall apply to a any premises within the cantonment belonging to the Government b any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises within the cantonment taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government or 2 The extension of any enactment under sub section l may be made from such earlier or future date as the Central Government may think fit Provided that no such extension shall be made from a date earlier than a the commencement of such enactment or b the establishment of the cantonment or c the commencement of this Act whichever is later PG NO 591 3 Where any enactment in force in any State relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation is extended to a cantonment from a date earlier than the date on which such extension is made hereafter referred to as the earlier date such enactment as in force on such earlier date shall apply to such cantonment and where any such enactment has been amended at any time after the earlier date but before the commencement of the Cantonments Extension of Rent Control Laws Amendment Act 1972 such enactment as amended shall apply to the cantonment on and from the date on which the enactment by which such amendment was made came into force
4 Where before the extension to a cantonment of any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation therein hereafter referred to as the Rent Control Act i any decree or order for the regulation of for eviction from any house accommodation in that cantonment or ii any order in the proceedings for the execution of such decree or order or iii any order relating to the control of rent or other incident of such house accommodation was made by any court tribunal or other authority in accordance with any law for the control of rent and regulation of house accommodation for the time being in force in the State in which such cantonment is situated such decree or order shall on and from the date on which the Rent Control Act is extended to that cantonment be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provisions of the Rent Control Act as extended to that cantonment as if the said Rent Control Act as so extended were in force in that cantonment on the date on which such decree or order was made
It has been mentioned earlier that on 1721982 the Central Government issued a further notification under section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 in supersession of its earlier notification dated Ist September 1973
By this notification PG NO 592 the Central Government extended to all cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh with certain modifications
Considering that Act 13 of 1972 had already been extended this really meant the extension of Act 19 of 1974 and Act 28 of 1976 to cantonment areas
If in the light of this fact we read section 34 of Act XLVI of 1957 it will be seen that the order of Sri Srivastava has to be upheld
The provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as amended by Act 28 of 1976 have been extended to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh only with effect from 1721982
But notwithstanding this the order passed by Sri Srivastava on 2791977 was passed by an authority in accordance with the law which was for the time being ie as on 27977 in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh
Under section 34 it should therefore be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision of the Rent Control Act as extended by that notification ie as amended in 1976 as if the said amended Rent Control Act as so extended were in force in that cantonment on the date on which such order was made
That this will be the position is clear from the decision of this court in the case of Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi etc
vs Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and Ors  It is not necessary to refer to the decision in detail
It is sufficient to refer to the following passage from the judgment Shri VM Tarkunde learned counsel for the appellant urged that sub section 4 had to be read in the context of sub sections 2 and 3 and that it was to be applied only to cases where a notification issued under sub section 1 was given retrospective effect under the provisions of sub section 2
We see no justification for confining the applicability of sub section 4 to cases where notifications are issued with retrospective effect under sub section 2 sub section 4 in terms is not as confined
It applies to all cases of decrees or orders made before the extension of a State Legislation to a cantonment area irrespective of the question whether such extension is retrospective or not
The essential condition to be fulfilled is that the decree or order must have been made as if the State Legislation was already in force although strictly speaking it was not so in force
In our view sub section 4 is wide enough to save all decrees and orders made by the wrong application of a State rent control and house accommodation legislation to a cantonment area though such State Legislation could not in law have been applied to cantonment areas at the time of the PG NO 593 passing of the decrees or order
We therefore hold that the decree obtained by the respondents is saved by the provisions of section 3 sub section 4 of the Cantonment Extension of Rent Control Laws Act of 1957 as amended by Act 22 of 1972
 From the above decision it will be seen that sub section 4 is independent of sub sections 2 and 3 and has effect whether or not the extension of laws made to the cantonment is made retrospective
Even though the extension of Act 22 of 1972 as amended by Act 28 of 1976 is not retrospective and will be effective only from 571976 the effect of section 34 of Act XLVI of 1957 is that even orders passed prior to such extension should be deemed to have been passed under the extended amended Act
Judged by this test the order passed by Sri Srivastava who was the Prescribed Authority after the amendment of Act 28 of 1976 will be valid
We should also like to refer in this connection to the judgment of this Court in SP Jain vs Krishna Mohan Gupta and others  In that case the landlord moved an application under section 24 C of Act 13 of 1972
Section 24 C formed part of Chapter IV A which had been inserted in Act 13 of 1972 only by the amendment Act 28 of 1976
The application of the landlord was allowed no 1781981 by what was then called the Delegated Authority
Revision application to the District Judge failed
Thereupon the tenant filed a writ petition before the High Court and contended that since Chapter IV A of the Act had been made applicable to cantonment areas only by the notification dated 1721982 that is after the filing of the application under section 24 C by the landlord section 24 B and 24 C of the UP Rent Act were inapplicable
This contention was rejected by a Bench of this Court which included one of us
After pointing out that on the date on which the application was filed as well as on the date on which the order was made
the cantonment area did not come within the ambit of the Act in question and that it was only by the date on which the revisional order was passed by the Additional District Judge that the building in question came within the purview of the Act by reason of the notification dated 1791982 the court observed In view of the ratio of Jaisingh Jairam Tyagi vs Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal   it must be held that the provisions of Chapter IV A of the Act would be applicable
The amending Act was passed for the express PG NO 594 purpose of saving decrees which had already been passed
Therefore action under section 24 C of the Act in this case was justified
The High Court did not decide this point because it was of the opinion that the second point which we shall note presently the High Court was in favour of the respondent
We are however of the opinion that the first point urged on behalf of the respondent cannot be accepted in view of the position in law as discussed hereinbefore
It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that section 24 B gave substantive rights to the appellant and section 24 C was the procedure for enforcing those substantive rights
Therefore these were not only procedural rights
Therefore there was no question of retrospective operation to take away vested right
We are however of the opinion that it would be an exercise in futility if the application is dismissed on this ground it can be filed again and in view of the subsequent legislation as noted hereinbefore it was bound to succeed on this point
In exercise of our discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution it would not be proper to interfere in the facts and circumstances of the case on this ground
In the premises in view of the ratio of the decision of this Court in Jaisingh case and reason mentioned hereinbefore this contention urged on behalf of the respondent must be rejected
 In our opinion the ratio of this case squarely applies to the facts of the case in CA No 6944 of 1983
We are therefore unable to accept any of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants
The appeals are therefore dismissed but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs
Y Lal Appeals dismissed


Summary:
Section 92 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act empowers the appellant Undertaking to make appointments to category A  posts after consultation with the I PSC However
such consultation is not required if the appointment is for a period not exceeding one year
In the absence of any regulation made by the Corporation with regard to the conditions of service of its employees the Central Government has framed Delhi Municipal Corporation Service Regulation 1959
Regulation 3 of which provides that these Regulations shall he applicable to all Municipal Officers and other Municipal employees whose pay is chargeable to the General Account  of the Municipal Fund
The appellants as well as respondents who were working as Assistant Engineers were appointed as Executive Engineers on different dates for a period of one year or till the posts are Filled up in consultation with the Commission
They all worked continuously in their respective posts till their services were regularised by the Commission with effect from 8 january 1971
Their seniority in the cadre of Executive Engineers was determined reflecting the respective rankings in the feeding cadre
ie Assistant Engineer excluding the services rendered on ad hoc appointments
The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the validity of seniority list filed by the aggrieved officials
On appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal holding that the determination of seniority of PG NO 633 PG NO 634 officers is not governed by any statutory rule and continuous officiation in the post should be the basis
In the appeal by special leave before this Court it was argued by the appellants that since the Commission regularised the services of all Executive Engineers with effect from a common date the inter se seniority in the lower cadre should be the proper basis in the higher cadre also
On the contrary the respondent Executive Engineers contended that the continuous officiation in the post till regularisation should be the basis for determining the seniority
The applicability of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service Regulation 1959 to the employees of the Undertaking was also questioned
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1 The Service Regulation 1959 applies only to those who were paid out of General Account  and it has no application to the category of officers of the appellant Undertaking as the salary of the employees in the Undertaking is paid out of the account of the Undertaking and not from the General Account  of the Municipal Fund
639E F 2 In the absence of any rule or order the length of service should be the basis to determine the seniority
646D 3 The judgments of Courts or observations made thereon are not to be read as statutes
They are made in the setting of facts obtained in a particular case
643D The principle of counting service in favour of one should not be violative of equality of opportunity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
If ad hoc appointment or temporary appointment is made without considering the claims of seniors in the cadre the service rendered in such appointment should not be counted for seniority in the cadre
The length of service in ad hoc appointment or stop gap arrangement made in the exigencies of service without considering the claims of all the eligible and suitable persons in the cadre ought not be reckoned for the purpose of determining the seniority in the promotional cadre
To give the benefit of such service to a favoured few would be contrary to the equality of opportunity enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
But if the claims of all eligible candidates were considered of the time of ad hoc appointments and such appointments continued uninterruptedly till the regularisation of services by the Departmental Promotion Committee or the Public Service Commission there is no PG NO 635 reason to exclude such service for determining the seniorlty
Of course if any statutory rule or executive order provides to the contrary the rule or order will have supremacy
645G H 646A C Baleshwar Dass  Ors
vs State of UP 1981 1 SCR 449 at 469 A Janardhan vs Union of India     GP Doval vs Chief Secretary Government of UP  Ors   CS Lamba vs Union of India L1985 3 SCR 431 GC Gupta vs NK Pandey 1988 l SCC 316 NK Chauhan vs State of Gujarat l977 l SCR 1037 SB Patwardhan vs State of Maharashtra   referred to
Ashok Gulati and Ors
vs BS Jain and Ors   Dr SD Choudhury vs State of Assam l976 I SCC 283 distinguished
Vasant Kumar Jaiswal vs State of MP 
l987 4 SCC 450
relied on