Special Leave Petition Civil No 14822 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 1681990 of the Bombay High Court in LPA No 65 of 1990
GL Sanghi KSV Murthy SM Puri and Pramod Dayal for the Petitioners
Ashok H Desai George Kurian AP Vaze and GB Sathe for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 32 SC AGRAWAL J
The questions raised for consideration in this petition for special leave to appeal involve the interpretation of the expression arising out of the use of a motor vehicle contained in section 92A of the hereinafter referred to as the Act 
On October 29 1987 at about 3 AM there was a colli sion between a petrol tanker bearing Registration No MKL 7461 and a truck bearing Registration No MEH 4197 on the National Highway No 4 near village Kavatha in District Satara Maharashtra
The petrol tanker was proceeding from Pune side to Bangalore whereas the truck was coming from the opposite direction
As a result of the said collision the petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at a distance of about 20 feet from the highway
As a result of the overturning of the petrol tanker the petrol contained in it leaked out and collected nearby
At about 715 AM an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker resulting in fire
A number of persons who had assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn injuries and a few of them succumbed to the said injuries
One of those who died as a result of such injuries was Deepak Uttam More
The respond ent is the mother of Deepak Uttam More
Petitioner No 1 is the owner of the said petrol tanker and Petitioner No 2 the insurer of the same
The respondent as the legal representative of her deceased son filed a claim petition before the Motor Acci dent Claims Tribunal Satara Claims Tribunal  under section 110 of the Act claiming Rs75000 as compensation from the petitioners
She also made a claim for payment of Rs 15000 as compensation under section 92A of the Act
It appears that claim petitions were also filed by the legal representatives of other persons who had died as a result of the burn injuries sustained by them in the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker
The petitioners contested the claim petitions filed by the respondent and other claimants under section 92A of the Act and raised objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to enter tain such petitions on the ground that explosion and fire resulting in injuries to the deceased could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle
The Claims Tribunal decided all the claim petitions filed under Section 92A of the Act by a common order dated Decem ber 2 1989 whereby the said petitions were dismissed on the ground that the explosion could not be said to be an acci dent arising out of the use of the petrol tanker and that the provisions of section 92A of the Act were not attracted
The Claims Tribunal was of the view that the explosion and the fire which took place after about four 33 hours had no connection whatsoever with the accident which took place at 3 AM and that the explosion and the fire was altogether an independent accident
The Claims Tribunal also observed that the villagers tried to take the benefit of the earlier accident and tried to pilfer petrol from the petrol tanker and while thus pilfering the petrol there was fric tion which caused ignition and explosion and since an out side agency was responsible for the explosion and fire which situation was created by the villagers themselves the explo sion could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of the tanker
The respondent filed an appeal against the said order of the Claims Tribunal before the High Court
The said appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by judgment dated February 5 1990
The learned Single Judge disagreed with the finding of the Claims Tribu nal that the explosion was a direct consequence of the attempt to pilfer petrol from the tanker and observed that the Tribunal was not justified in proceeding on the assump tion that all the injured persons and deceased were engaged in pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a direct consequence of the same
The learned Single Judge also held that in view of sub section 4 of section 92A of the Act if there is a wrongful act neglect or default on the part of the deceased or the injured the claim under section 92A of the Act for compensation for no fault liability cannot be rejected
With regard to the applicability of section 92A of the Act the learned Single Judge observed that the fact that at the material time the tanker was not being driven on the Highway but was lying turtle on its side would make no difference and that it was a vehicle lying on the side of the Highway and would be covered by the expression use  in section 92A of the Act and compensation would be payable under no fault liability of section 92A of the Act
He therefore directed payment of Rs 15000 as compensation under section 92A of the Act to the respondent
The Peti tioners filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the said decision of the learned Single Judge which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated August 16 1990
The Appellate Bench of the High Court has affirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge that there was no evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92A were themselves committing theft or pilferage of petrol at the time of their deaths and that these victims could have only been curious by standers at the site of the accident
The learned Judges have observed that the expression use of a motor vehicle  covers a very wide field a field more extensive than which might be called traffic use of the motor vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not confined to the periods when it Was in motion or was moving and that a vehicle would still be is use 34 even when it was stationary The learned Judges were of the view that merely  because there Was interval of about four and half hours between the collision of the petrol tanker and the explosion and fire in the tanker it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation between earlier event and the later incident of explosion and fire and that the earlier collision if not the cause was at least the main contributory factor for the subsequent explosion and fire in the tanker in question inasmuch as the tanker was carrying petrol which was a highly combustible and volatile material and after the collision the petrol tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker and the tanker was allowed to remain in such a dangerous condition for hours without any effort being made to prevent such great hazard of fire and explo sion from petrol escaping from the tanker
According to the learned Judges the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explo sion and fire were not unconnected but related events
The learned Judges rejected the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that in the instant case the first information report recorded by the police and the panchanama indicated that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette
The learned Judges held that the papers and documents filed before the Claims Tribunal under rule 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 did not establish that the fire was ignited by someone carelessly throwing a match stick
Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court the petitioner have filed this petition for special leave to appeal
A notice for final disposal was issued on the petition and the learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length
Shri GL Sanghi the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has urged that in the instant case it cannot be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which occurred at about 715 AM ie nearly four and half hours after the collision involving the petrol tanker and the other truck was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and therefore the claim petition filed by the respondent could not be entertained under section 92 A of the Act
Shri Sanghi has made a three fold submis sion in this regard
In the first place he has submitted that the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle as defined in section 218 of the Act at the time when the explosion and fire took place because at that time the petrol tanker was lying turtle and was 35 not capable of movement on the road
The second submission of Shri Sanghi is that since before the explosion and fire the petrol tanker was lying immobile it could not be said that the petrol tanker even if it be assumed that it was a motor vehicle was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and fire
Thirdly it has been submitted by Shri Sanghi that even if it is found that the petrol tanker was in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the explosion and fire there was no causal relationship between the collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the truck at about 3 AM and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker which took place about four and half hours later and it cannot therefore be said that explosion and fire in the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle
Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid submissions of Shri Sanghi it would be relevant to mention that section 92A of the Act forms part of Chapter VII A which was intro duced in the Act by Motor Vehicles Amendment Act 1982 Act 47 of 1982
The said Chapter bears the heading LI ABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN CERTAIN CASES and contains sec tions 92A to 92E
The purpose underlying the enactment of these provisions as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill was as follows There has been a rapid development of road transport during the past few years and large increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road
The incidence of road accidents by motor vehicles has reached serious propor tions
During the last three years the number of road accidents per year on the average has been around 145 lakhs and of these the number of fatal accidents has been around 20000 per year
The victims of these accidents are generally pedestrians belonging to the less affluent sections of society
The provisions of the Act as to compensation in respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a result of a wrongful act or negli gence on the part of the owners or drivers of the vehicles concerned
Having regard to the nature of circumstances in which road acci dents take place in a number of cases it is difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove negligence
Further in what are known as hit and run accidents by reason of the identity of the vehicle involved in the acci dent not being known the persons affected cannot prefer any claims for compensation
It is therefore considered necessary to amend the 36 Act suitably to secure strict enforcement of road safety measures and also to make as a measure of social justice suitable provisions first for compensation without proof of fault or negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the vehicle and secondly for compensation by way of solatium in cases in which the identity of the vehicle causing an accident is unknown   In this context it may be pointed out that before the said amendment this Court had highlighted the need for legislation providing for no fault liability in motor acci dents claims in a number of decisions
See Manjusri Raha  Ors
vs BL Gupta  Ors
   State of Haryana vs Darshana Devi  Ors   Bishan Devi  Ors
vs Sirbaksh Singh  Anr  and NKV Bros Ltd vs M Karumai Ammal and Ors
etc 1
Section 92A which made provision for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault read as under 92 A Liability to pay compensation in cer tain cases on the principle of no fault 1 Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles the owner of the vehicle shall or as the case may be the owners of the vehicles shall jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section
2 The amount of compensation which shall be payable under sub section 1 in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees
3 In any claim for compensation under sub section 1 the claimant shall not be re quired to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrong ful act neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person
37 4 A claim for compensation under sub section 1 shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disa blement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement
 Section 92 B preserved the right to pay compensation for death or permanent disablement under other provisions of the Act and it provided as follows 92 B Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disable ment 1 The right to claim compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right hereafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault to claim compensation in respect there of under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force
2 A claim for compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compen sation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the princi ple of fault the claim for Compensation under Section 92A shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place
3 Notwithstanding anything con tained in subsection 1 where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person the person liable to pay compensation under section 92A is also liable to pay com pensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault the person so liable shall pay the first mentioned compensation and a if the amount of the first mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second mentioned he shall be liable to pay in addition the first mentioned compensa tion only so much of the second mentioned compen 38 sation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first mentioned compensation b if the amount of the first men tioned compensation is equal to or legs than the amount of the secondmentioned compensa tion he shall not be liable to pay the sec ond mentioned compensation
 In section 92 C of the Act the expression permanent disablement for the purpose of Chapter VII A was explained
Section 92 D made the provisions of Chapter VII A applicable in relation to any claim in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person under the 8 of 1923 resulting from an accident of the nature referred to in sub section 1 of section 92 A Section 92 E of the Act gave overriding effect to the provi sions of Chapter VII A over any other provisions of the Act or of any law for the time being in force
In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai  Anr  a reference has been made to the background in which Chapter VII A was introduced in the Act and it has been observed When the  was enacted there were no motor vehicles on the roads in India
Today thanks to the modern civilisation thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles acci dents
In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic the motor vehi cles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands vs Fletcher 1968   340
From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous
Hit and run  cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number
Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all
In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the 39 deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation through out the world to make the liability for dam ages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault
In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission Chapter VIIA was introduced in the Act
pp 4 15 4 16 In that case this Court after taking note of the provi sions contained in section 92A has further observed It is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted under section 92 A of the Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on account of motor vehicles accidents
Now they can claim Rs15000 without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person
This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law princi ple that a claimant should establish negli gence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compen sation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident
To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified pp 416 4 17 It is thus evident that section 92 A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability
In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a con struction which advances the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose
The same approach has been adopted by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act
See Motor Owners  Insurance Co Ltd vs Jadavji Keshavji Modi  Ors 1982 1 SCR 860 and Skandia Insurance Co Ltd vs Kokilaben Chandravadan  Ors
  The expression arising out of the use Of motor vehi cles was also used by Parliament in sub section 1 of section 110 of the Act wherein provision was made for con stitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for speedy and expeditious adjudication of claims of compensation in re spect of accidents involving death or bodily injuries to 40 persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both
Fur thermore by subsection 1 of section 94 of the Act an obligation was imposed that no person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person touse a motor vehicle in a public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person as the case may be a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the Act
Section 95 prescribed the requirements of such insurance policies as well as limits of liability
In clause b of sub section 1 of section 95 it was laid down that the policy of insurance required must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub section 2 against i any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place and ii the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehi cle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place
While construing the expression arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in sub section 1 of section 92 A of the Act regard will have to be had to the fact that expressions to the same effect were also contained in sec tions 95 and 110 of the Act
The first submission of Shri Sanghi is based on the definition of the expression motor vehicle contained in sub section 18 of section 2 of the Act which was as under 218 motor vehicle means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises Shri Sanghi has urged that the word adapted in the aforesaid provision has been construed by this Court in Bolani Ores Ltd etc
vs State of Orissa etc
  to mean suitable or fit for use on the roads and that in the instant case it cannot be said that at the time when the explosion and fire took place the petrol tanker which was lying turtle was suitable or fit for use on the road
We find it difficult to accept this contention
The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose of trans porting petrol
It was a vehicle which had been 41 adapted for such use and was suitable for use on the road for transporting petrol
At the time when the petrol tanker collided with the truck on the national highway it was being used for the purpose of transporting petrol
It can not therefore be disputed that when the said collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined in section 218 of the Act
Did it cease to be motor vehicle after the collision with the truck on account of its lying turtle on its side at some distance from the road as a result of the said collision In our view this question must be answered in the negative
Merely because the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the collision and was lying at a short distance away from the road does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle
No material has been placed on record to show that the petrol tanker would not have been in a position to move after it was put back on the wheels
The question whether a vehicle has ceased to be a me chanically propelled vehicle has been considered by the English Courts in cases involving prosecution for offence under Section 15 of the Vehicles Excise Act 1949 which imposed a penalty on a person using on a public road any mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence under the said Act was not in force
In Newberry vs Simmonds the prosecution was in respect of a motor car whose engine had been stolen some time prior to the period in question
It was contended by the owner that since the engine of the motor car had been stolen it had ceased to be a mechanically propelled vehicle
Negativing the said con tention it was held
We are however satisfied that a motor car does not cease to be a mechanically propelled vehicle upon the mere removal of the engine if the evidence admits the possibility that the engine may shortly be replaced and the motive power restored p 350 In Smart vs Allan  Anr a similar question arose
Here the defendant had bought a car for Pounds 2 and subsequently sold it as scrap for 30s
It was found that the engine was in a rusty condition and was incomplete and it did not work and there was no gear box or electric batteries and the car was incapable of moving under its own power having been towed from place to place and that it could only have been put in running order again by supplying a considerable number of spare parts and ef fecting considerable repairs the  cost of which would have been out of all proportion to its value
In 42 support of the prosecution it was urged that every vehicle which starts its life as a mechanically propelled vehicle remains such until it is physically destroyed
Rejecting the said contention Lord Parker CJ observed   it seems to me as a matter of common sense that some limit must be put and some stage must be reached when one can say This is so immobile that it has ceased to be a mechanically propelled vehicle
 Where as in the present case and unlike Newberry vs Simmonds there is no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile again it seems to me that at any rate at that stage a vehicle has ceased to be a mechanically pro pelled vehicle
p 298 We are inclined to agree with this formulation
In the instant case it cannot be said that the petrol tanker as a result of the collision with the truck was damaged to such an extent that was no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile again
In the circum stances it cannot be held that the petrol tanker which was a motor vehicle when it collided with the truck had ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said collision and it could not be regarded a motor vehicle under Section 218 of the Act at the time when the explosion and fire took place
The second submission of Shri Sanghi was that even if it be assumed that at the time when the explosion and fire took place in the petrol tanker it was a motor vehicle the tanker was not being used as a motor vehicle at that time inasmuch as it was lying immobile on its side
It is howev er not disputed by Shri Sanghi that at the time when the petrol tanker had collided with the truck it was being used as a motor vehicle but his submission was that the said user came to an end on such collision when the petrol tanker turned turtle and was rendered immobile
This contention postulates a restricted meaning for the word use in the expression use of the motor vehicle by confining it to a situation when the vehicle is mobile
The learned counsel for the respondent has on the other hand suggested a wider connotation for the word use so as to include the period when the vehicle is stationary and has invited our attention to the observations in Elliott vs Grey  Government Insurance Office South Wales vs RJ Green  Lloyd Pty Ltd   Pushpa Rani Chopra vs Anokha Singh  Ors  43 General Manager KSRTC vs section Satalingappa  Ors and Oriental Fire  General Insurance Co Ltd vs Suman Navnath Rajguru  Ors Elliott vs Grey supra related to prosecution for of fence under section 351 of the Road Traffic Act 1930 for using a motor car on road without there being in force in relation to such user an insurance policy in respect of third party risks complying with the requirements of Part 2 of the said Act
The motor car of the appellant was standing on the road outside the appellant s house for the past few months after it broke down and in the meanwhile the insur ance cover of the motor car had terminated
While it was thus parked another motor vehicle had collided with appel lant s motor car
On that date the appellant had cleaned the car sent the battery to be recharged and had replaced the old carburettor with a new one
The car could not be mechanically propelled because the engine would not work
On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the ordinary use of the words to use in relation to a motor car contem plates some active movement either driving it or taking part in a journey in it or moving it and the word use is quite inapt in relation to a motor car which cannot be used because it is out of action
The said contention was reject ed
The word usewas construed in a wider sense to mean to have the advantage of a vehicle as a means of transport including for any period or time between journeys
In taking this view Lord Parker CJ stated that he was influenced by the fact that section 35
appeared in Part 2 of the Road Traffic Act under the heading Provisions against third party risks arising out of the use of motor vehicles which is intended for protection of third parties
Similarly in Government Insurance Office of New South Wales vs RJ Green  Lloyd Pty Ltd supra Barwick CJ while construing the word use  in Motor Vehicles Third Party Insurance Act 1942 1951 NSW has observed that the said Act indicated an intention to cover a very wide field a field more extensive than what might be called the traffic use of the motor vehicle
The learned Chief Justice has further observed In my opinion the relevant use of the vehicle cannot be confined to the periods it is in motion or its parts moving in some operation
It may be in use though stationary
In Pushpa Rani Chopra  Ors
vs Anokha Singh  Ors supra a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court while con struing the word use  in section 110 of the Act has held that the said word has been used in a wider sense and it covers all employments of the motor vehicle on the 44 public places including its driving parking keeping sta tionarys repairing or leaving unattended on the road or for any other purpose
In that case the truck in question was stationary as its axle had broken down and it was parked on the road at the time of the accident
In General Manager KSRTC vs section Satalingappa and Ors  supra the vehicle in question was a transport bus which was stationed by its driver on a slope unattended
The bus suddenly started moving and dashed against a tea shop
It was held by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court that the bus was in use at that time
In Oriental Fire  General Ins
Co Ltd vs Suman Nav nath Rajguru and Ors supra a petrol tanker was parked near  the footpath on the road in front of a petrol pump and it burst and explOded causing fatal injuries to a passerby
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rejected the contention that at the material time the petrol tanker was not in use 
These decisions indicate that the word use in the context of motor vehicles has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary being either parked on the road and when it is not in a position to move due to some break down or mechanical defect
Relying on the abovementioned decisions the Appellate Bench of the High Court had held that the expression use of a motor vehicle in section 92 A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary
With reference to the facts of the present
case the learned Judges have observed that the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway No 4 ie while in use after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled
We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court
In our opinion the word use has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been ren dered immobile on account of a break down or mechanical defect or accident
In the circumstances it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck
The only other question which remains to be considered is whether the explosion and fire which caused injuries to the deceased son of the respondent can be said to have taken place due to an 45 accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle viz the petrol tanker
Shri Sanghi has urged that the expression arising out of the use of a motor vehicle  implies a causal relationship between the user of the motor vehicle and the accident which has resulted in death or disablement and that in the present case it cannot be said that the explosion and fire which took place in the petrol tanker four and half hours after  the collision and after the tanker had turned turtle was an accident arising out of the use of the petrol tanker
In this regard Shri Sanghi has emphasised that the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker were pilfering petrol which had leaked out from the petrol tanker and the explosion and fire was the result of the said unlawful activity of those persons and that it was not on account of the user of the petrol tanker
Shri Sanghi in this connection has placed reliance on the decision in Mackinnon Machkenzie  Co Pvt Ltd vs Ibrahim Mahommed Issak  wherein this Court has construed the expression arising out of employment  appearing in section 3 of the Workmen s Compen sation Act 1923 and has laid down that there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment
Shri Sanghi has urged that similarly there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the user of the motor vehicle for the purpose of maintainability of a claim under section 92A of the Act
With regard to the submission of Shri Sanghi that the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in the  petrol tanker were pilfering petrol which had leaked out from the tanker and that the explosion and fire was the result of this unlawful activity of those persons we find that Claims Tribunal has recorded a finding that persons from the village Kavatha had gathered with their tins and barrels with the intention to pilfer petrol from the tanker and while pilfering the petrol probably ignition was caused by friction but the said finding of the Claims Tribunal has not been upheld by the High Court
The learned Single Judge has observed The learned member was influenced by the fact that certain villagers were trying to pilfer from the tanker to indicate that the explosion was a direct consequence of the attempt of pilfering the petrol from the tanker
In my view the learned member was not justified in proceeding on the assumption that all the injured and the deceased were engaged in pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a direct consequence of the same  
It would not be just to hold that all the injured as also the deceased 46 who met their fate on account of the explosion were all engaged in the crime of pilfering of the petrol
 The Appellate Bench affirming the said finding of the learned Single Judge has laid down The learned Single Judge has also rightly pointed out that there was also no evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92 A were themselves actually committing theft or pilferage of petrol at the time of their deaths
These victims could have been only curious bystand ers at the site of the accident
We find that in the instant case the papers and docu ments including the FIR and the panchnama produced before the Tribunal did not establish that the fire was ignited by someone careless ly throwing a match stick
 We find no ground for interfering with these findings recorded by the High Court and we must proceed on the basis that the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker were not indulging in any unlawful activity which may have caused the said explosion and fire
The matter has therefore to be exam ined in the light of the meaning to be assigned to the words arising out of in the expression accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in section 92 A
The words arising out of have been used in various statutes in different contexts and have been construed by Courts widely as well as narrowly keeping in view the context in which they have been used in a particular legis lation
In Heyman vs Darwins Ltd while con struing the arbitration clause in a contract Lord Porter expressed the view that as compared to the word under the expression arising out of has a wider meaning
In Union of India vs EB Aaby s Rederi AS Viscount Discount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon stated that they could not discover any difference between the expression arising out of and arising under and they equated arising out of in the arbitration clause in a Charter Party with arising under
In Samick Lines Co Ltd vs Owners of the Antonis P Lemos 1985 2 WLR 468 the House of Lords was considering the question 47 whether a claim for damages based on negligence in tort could be regarded as a claim arising out of an agreement under section 2021h of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and fell within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court
The words any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship in section 202ih were held to be wide enough to cover claims whether in contract or tort arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a vessel and it was also held that for such an agreement to come within paragraph h it was not necessary that the claim in question be directly connected with some agreement of the kinds referred to in it
The words arising out of were not construed to mean arising under as in Union of India vs EB Aaby s AS supra which decision was held inapplicable to the construction of section 2021h and it was ob served by Lord Brandon With regard to the first point I would readily accept that in certain contexts the expression arising out of may on the ordi nary and natural meaning of the words use be the equivalent of the expression arising under and not that of the wider expression connected with
In my view however the  expression arising out of  is on the ordi nary and natural meaning of the words used capable in other contexts of being the equivalent of the Wider expression connected with
Whether the expression arising out of has the narrower or the wider meaning in any particular ease must depend on the context in which it is used
keeping in view the context in Which the expression was used in the statute it was construed to have the wider meaning viz connected With
In the context of motor accidents the expressions caused by and arising out of are often used in statutes
Although both these expression s imply a causal relation ship between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of prox imity of such relationship
This distinction has been lucid ly brought out in the decision of the High Court of Austra lia in Government Insurance Office of N SW vs RJ Green s case supra wherein Lord Barwick CJ has stated Bearing in mind the general purpose of the Act I think the expression arising out of must be taken to require a less 48 proxionship of the injury to the relevant use of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the words caused by 
It may be that an associa tion of the injury with the use of the vehicle while it cannot be said that that use was causally related to the injury may yet be enough to satisfy the expression arise out of  as used in the Act and in the policy p 433 In the same case Windeyer J has observed as under The words injury caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle  postulate a causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury
Caused by  connotes a di rect  or proximate  relationship of cause and effect Arising out of  extends this to a result that is less immediate but it still carries a sense of consequence p 447 This would show that as compared to the expression caused by the expression arising out of has a wider connotation
The expression caused by was used in sections 951bi and ii and 962bii of the Act
In section 92 A Parliament however chose to use the expression arising out of which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under section 92 A the causal rela tionship between the use of the motor vehicle and the acci dent resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate
This would imply that accident should be connect ed with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate
This construction of the expression arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in section 92 A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment
Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor vehicle In our view in the facts and circumstances of the present case this question must be answered in the affirma tive
The High Court has found that the tanker in question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and vola tile material and after the collision with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and that there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker
In the 49 light of the aforesaid circumstances the learnedJudges of the High Court have rightly concluded that the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events and merely because there was interval of about four to four and half hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no Causal relation between explosion and fire
In the circumstances it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz the petrol tanker No MKL 7461
Shri Sanghi has also raised a question as to the proce dure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal whileadjudicat ing claims under section 92A of the Act and has submitted that such claims have to be adjudicated upon like other claims under section 110A of the Act and that claimant must first adduce evidence to establish hisher case and that the owner as well as the insurer of the vehicle in question must have a right to adduce evidence to rebut the same
In this context it may be mentioned that procedure for adjudication of a claim petition under Section 110A of the Act by the Accident Claims Tribunal is contained in Rules 291 to 311 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 hereinafter referred to as the Rules 
The said Rules prescribe a form for filing a claim petition and the documents to be filed along with it Rule 291 examination of the applicant Rule 293 issue of notice to the opposite party Rule 297 filing of written statement by the opposite party Rule 298 framing of issues Rule 299 recording of evidence Rules 300 and 301 local inspection Rule 302 and judgment and award of compensation Rule 306
After the enactment of section 92 A amendments have been made in the Rules in 1984
In Rule 291A which has been inserted by such amendments it has been provided that Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 291 every application for a claim under section 92A shall be filed before the Claims Tribunal in triplicate and shall be signed by the appellant and the following documents be appended to every such application namely 50 i Panchnama of the accident ii First information report iii Injury CertifiCate or in case of death postmortem report or death certificate and iv a certificate regarding ownership and insurance particulars of vehicle involved in the accident from the Regional Transport Officer or the Police
Rule 297 was substituted by the fallowing provision 297
Notice to opposite party 1 If the application is not dismissed under rule 296 the Claims Tribunal shall on an application in writing made to it by the applicant sent to the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both from whom the applicant claims relief here in after re ferred to as the opposite party and the insurer a copy of the application together with a notice of the date on which it will dispose of the application and may call Upon the parties to produce on that date any evi dence which they may wish to tender
2 Where the applicant makes a claim for compensation under section 92A the Claims Tribunal shall give notice to the owner and insurer if any of the vehicle involved in the accident directing them to appeal on a date not later than ten days from the date of issue of such notice The date so fixed for such appearance shall also be not later than fifteen days from the receipt of the claims application filed by the claimant
The Claims Tribunal shall state in such notice that in case they fail to appear on such appointed date the Tribunal will proceed ex parte on the presumption that they have no contention to make against the award of compensation
 Rule 306 A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain what ever supplementary information and documents which may be found necessary from the police medical and other authori ties and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice to appear or not on the appointed date
Rule 306B lays down 51 1 The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim of compensation under section 92A on the basis of i registration certifi cate of the motor vehicle involved in the accident ii insurance certificate or policy relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third party risks iii panchnama and first information report iv post mortem certificate or death certifi cate or certificate of injury from the medi cal officer and v the nature of the treatment given by the medical officer who has examined the victim
2 The Claims Tribunal in passing orders shall make an award of compensation of fifteen thousand rupees in respect of the death and of seven thousand five hundred rupees in respect of the permanent disablement to be paid by insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident
3 Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them
4 The Claims Tribunal in passing order under subrule 2 shall direct the insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant within two weeks from the date of the said order
5 The Claims Tribunal shall as far as possible dispose of the application for compensation within forty five days from the date of receipt of such application
Rule 306C prescribes the procedure of disbursement of compensation under Section 92A to the legal heirs in case of death
The submission of Shri Sanghi is that in spite of the aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules after the enactment of section 92A the Claims Tribunal is required to follow the procedure contained in the other rules before awarding compensation under section 92A of the Act
In other words it must proceed to adjudicate the claim 52 after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to file the written submission under Rule 298 by framing issues under Rule 299 and after recording evidence in accordance with rules 300 and 301 and that it is not permissible for the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis of the documents referred to in Rules 29 IA 306A and 306B
In our opinion the said submission of Shri Sanghi cannot be accepted
The object underlying the enactment of section 92A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs 15000 in case of death and Rs7500 in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under section 110A of the Act
This would be apparent from the provisions of section 92B of the Act
Section 92B2 of the Act provides that a claim for compensation under section 92A in respect of death or permanent disable ment of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault the claim for compensation under section 92A shall be dis posed of as aforesaid in the first place
With a view to give effect to the said directive contained in section 92B of the Act the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims under section 92A in rules 291A 291B 2972 306A 306B 306C and 306D of the Rules
The object underlying the said provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition under Section 92A of the Act
The said object would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section 110 A of the Act
Morever for award ing compensation under section 92A of the Act the Claims Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters i an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle ii the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is making the claim iii the claim is made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident The documents referred to in Rules 291A and 306B will enable the Claims Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters
The panchnama and the First information Report will show 53 whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question
The Injury Certificate or the post mortem report will show the nature of injuries and the cause of death
The Registration Certificate and Insurance Certif icate of the motor vehicle will indicate who is the owner and insurer of the vehicle
In the event of the Claims Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or genuine ness of any of these documents or if it considers it neces sary to obtain supplementary information or documents Rules 306A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain such supplemen tary information or documents from the Police medical or other authorities
This would show that Rules 291A 306A and 306B contain adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 92A of the Act and in view of these special provisions which were introduced in the Rules by the amendments in 1984 the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal proce dure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim under section 110A of the Act for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under section 92A of the Act
In the result we find no merit in this special leave petition which is accordingly dismissed
By order dated January 7 1991 while directing issue of notice on the special leave petition it was ordered that the issue of the said notice shall be subject to the condition that the petitioners shall deposit a sum of Rs5000 in the Registry of this Court towards cost of the respondent and that the notice shall be issued only after the amount of cost has been deposited and the said amount shall be paid over to the respondent on her putting in appearance in this Court and the payment of the amount of cost to the respondent shall be irrespective of the result of the special leave petition
In view of the said order no further direction with regard to costs is necessary
GN Petition dismissed


Summary:
The appellants and the deceased Harnam Singh were neighbours and had strained relations on account of passage of sullage water and elections
According to the prosecution they had quarrelled over the passage of sullage water a few months before the incident the appellants had diverted their sullage water towards the house of the deceased and the latter had protested and frustrated their effort with the result the water collected in a pool near the house of the appellants which infuriated them
The appellants attacked and murdered Harnam Singh on the night between 6th and 7th June while he was sleeping at his tubewell alongwith PWs 2 and 3 and one Narain Singh not examined P Ws 2 and 3 were sleeping at a distance of about 15 karams while Narain Singh was sleeping near the deceased
The prosecution alleged that Gurmej Singh fired a shot from close range at the deceased while he was asleep Gian Singh struck a Gandasi blow on the chest and Bur Singh gave a Dang blow on the arm
After making sure that the victim had died the appellants fled away
P Ws 2 and 3 did not raise any alarm as they were threatened by the appellants that they would be killed in case they made any hue and cry
P W 2 lodged the FIR and disclosed therein the names of the appellants only as assailants
Two other persons Sucha Singh and Santokh Singh were also shown as arrested for the commission of this crime though their names did not figure in the FIR
According to the prosecution witnesses these persons were falsely implicated by PW 8 Sub Inspector
The appellants alongwith these two persons were put up for trial
The trial Judge acquitted these persons as having been falsely involved and no appeal against their acquittal was preferred
However the Trial Court relying on the evidence of PWs convicted Gurmej Singh under Section 302 IPC and the other two under Section 30234 IPC and sentenced all 967 the three to imprisonment for life and also imposed token fines
The appellants appealed against their conviction before the High Court but the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed their appeal
They have now filed this appeal against their conviction and sentence after obtaining special leave
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD It is true that Narain Singh was sleeping near the deceased when the latter was shot at Narain Singh was indeed a witness to the occurrence and ordinarily we would have expected the prosecution to examine him
Dropping a witness on the specious plea that he was won over without laying the foundation therefor is generally to be frowned upon
973E The defence at no point of time questioned the prosecution statement that Narain Singh was won over
The courts below accepted the prosecution statement in this behalf
The judgment of both the courts reveal that no submission was made before them regarding the non examination of this witness
If an objection was raised at the earliest point of time the prosecution may have called him to the witness stand
His presence was not required to unfold the prosecution story
That had been done by PWs 2 and 3
Therefore the non examination of Narain Singh cannot reflect on the credibility of PWs 2 and 3
973G 974A Both the courts were right in coming to the conclusion that the contradictions brought on record from the statement of PWs 2 and 3 can have no evidentiary value
977B There is no substance in the criticism levelled by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the prosecution had shifted its case at the trial from the one narrated to the police in the course of investigation
The prosecution version is that immediately after the incident PW2 went to the residence of his father PW 4 and informed him about the incident
This conduct of PW 2 is quite natural
The evidence of PW 2 stands corroborated by the evidence of PW 4 PW 2 therefore hired a tempo and left for the police station and promptly lodged the first information report
It must be realised that PW 2 had no time for manipulation as he had reached the Police Station which was at a distance of 12 Km
before 830 am He would not have named the assailants if he had not seen them
There was no reason for him to falsely implicate the appellants since he bore no grudge against them it was just the reverse
A copy of this report had reached the concerned 968 Magistrate by about 1115
am This first information report also lends corroboration to his testimony
The medical evidence tendered by PW 1 also corroborates the version of PWs 2 and 3
There is therefore no infirmity in the approach of the two courts below in convicting the appellants
977D G Sahaj Ram vs State of UP  Hallu Singh  Ors
vs State of Punjab  Kartarey vs State of UP  Ishwar Singh vs State of UP  AN Rao vs Public Prosecutor Andhra Pradesh and State of UP vs Hari Prasad  Ors 1974 3 SCC 673 referred to