minal Appeal Nos
420 22 of 1993
From the Judgment and Order dated 3181992 of the Kerala High Court in Crl
RP Nos
66591 and 66691 and Crl
MC 832 of 1992
AND Criminal Appeal No 423 of 1993
From the Judgment and Order dated 15121992 of the Kerala High Court in Crl
MC No 1192 of 1992
TS Krishna Murthy Iyer and MT George for the Petitioner in CA Nos
420 2293 and for the Respondents in CA No 42393
G Ramaswamy John Joseph PS Nayar KV Sree Kumar K Raghunath and TGN Nair for the Appellant in CA No 42393 and for the Respondents in CA Nos
420 42293
J Special Leave granted
Untramelled by questions of fact the learned Senior counsel on both sides neatly presented question of law whether sandlewood oil is forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 f 1 of the Kerala Forest Act 1961 for short the Act 
When proceedings were laid under section 51 1 of the Act against the respondents in Special Leave Petition Crl Nos
27 29 of 1992 they questioned the jurisdiction of the court in CC Nos 145 and 148 of 1988
Eschewing delineation of intermediary proceedings went on from the start of prosecution the High Court in exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 for short the Code  by order dated August 31 1992 reported in Mohammed Aliv
Forest Range Officer quashed the complaint holding that Sandal Wood Oil is not wood oil  as defined in s2 f i of the Act
So it is not a forest produce
Thus these appeals by Special leave
When same question subsequently arose other learned Single Judge doubting the correctness of aforesaid judgment referred the matter to the division bench which by order dated December 15 1992 reported in Khushboo Enterprises vs Forest Range officer held that Sandalwool Oil is a forest produce within the meaning of S2 f 1 of the Act
Thus the appeal in the other case
The Forest Conservation Act 1980 aims to prevent depleting forests conservation thereof and protection of wild life in the country to maintain ecological balance
The State Acts regulate preservation of forest and forest produce to supplement the Central Act
The Act prescribes procedure for preservation of the forest and regulates possession of the forest produce failing of trees in the forest area and removal from the forest or reserved forest area by transit permits etc
When Sandalwood Oil either was found in transit or in possession of the manufacturers it was seized in the respective cases and laid the complaints under section 5 1 1 or contravention thereof
As said earlier the jurisdictional question was raised on the premise that Sandal Wood Oil is not a wood oil as defined under section 2f 1 of the Act
The question therefore emerges whether Sandalwood Oil is a wood oil
S2f defines forest produce thus Section 2f forest produce  includes ithe following whether found in or brought from a forest or not 502 that is to say timber charcoal wood oil gum resin natural varnish bark lac fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood and iithe following when found in or brought from aforest that is to say atrees and leaves flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce not here in before mentioned of trees
bplants not being trees including grass creapers reeds and moss and all parts or produce of such plants c silk cocoons honey and wax and d peat surface soil rock and minerals including lime stone laterite mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries
A reading thereof do indicate that the forest produce whether found in or brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which include that is to say the enumerated items in Clauses 1 and 11 wood oil is one of the enumerate items as well as roots of sandalwood and rosewood
The contention of Sri G Ramaswami the learned Senior counsel for the accused is that technical Dictiontries Botanical Tax Books and expert opinion would bring out a demonstrable distinction between wood oil and sandalwood oil
The wood oil is a natural produce of the forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the family of the Dipterocarpucoae trees while sandal wood oil is a bye product from sandalwood Santalum Album by industrial process
Wood oil is produced by making a hole on the trunk of the living tree commonly known as oil trees or wood oil trees
This family of trees are variously known in different parts of South India but they relate to Dipterocarpucoae family
Wood oil is gathered by heating the hole in the trunk to induce exudation of the olec resin from the tree and commercially dealt with as wood oil which is a cheap substance in the commercial world used solely for the purpose of painting planks of wood or wooden vessels floating in the sea
The physio chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and different from other oil
Sandal wood oil would be produced only at factory level and that too by mechanised process utilising the heart wood and roots of sandal wood trees removed from the forest as a raw material
Sandal wood oil is having very high commercial value and it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and 503 cosmetic items of different types and grades
The production of sandal wood oil is being carried out as industry either by licence by the individuals or the state government as its monopoly like Karnataka State in a larger scale or as a small scale business
It is further contended that the meaning of the word wood oil defined in section 2 f 1 must receive its colour from its context and connotation
When the legislature used the word that is to say the wood oil and other natural growth referred to in the definition it would only mean natural bye product directly drawn from the trees
The Learned Single Judge had rightly construed the meaning of the word wood oil  and held that sandal wood oil being the bye product derived commercially manufacturing process is not wood oil
The division bench committed manifest error in its construction of the word wood oil to include sandal wood oil
Sri Krishna Murthy Iyer the learned Senior counsel for the respondents on the other hand refuted the contention arguing that inclusive definition of forest produce must receive extended meaning
It must also be construed in the context in which it is used and the purpose the Act seeks to serve and the family to which sandal wool oil belongs being an essential oil would include wood oil
The expression wood oil being a technical and part of inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense and in an exhaustive manner
It cannot be restricted in a narrow circumference as was done by the learned Single Judge so as to defeat the object and purpose of the Act
Extraction of sandal wood oil even by mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil
He laid emphasis on the word timber  defined in section 2k which include Sandal wood  being a forest produce the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word wood oil 
The restricted meaning canvassed by the counsel would defeat the purpose of the Act and the literal interpretation giving narrow meaning to the word wood oil  should be excluded
Ex facie the argument of Sri Ramaswami backed by material though is alluring deeper probe denied its acceptance
Undoubtedly the Karnataka Forest Act 1963 incorporated in its definition of forest produce Sandalwood oil after the word wood oil and the legislature in Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu like the Act do not specifically incorporate Sandalwood oil in the definition of forest produce
From this could it be concluded if it be otherwise interpretable that wood oil would not include Sandalwood oil as well
Undoubtedly Stedman s Medical Dictionary 23rd Edition defined at page 1576 wood oil as gurjan balsam and gurjan balsam defined at p 156 to mean wood oil oleo resin from Dipterocarpus alatus family Dipterocarpuceae a tree of India and other regions of Southern Asia
Similar meaning was given in Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary edited by H Bennett Fourth Edition at page 1217 Scientific Treatises on the subject by Ernest Guenther in volume 6 Edward Balfour in his Cryclopaedia of India  and of Eastern and Southern Asia RN Khori in his Materia Medica of 504 India and their Therapeutics  and  Pharmacographia Indica  by Willim Dymock defined wood oil in the same strain
All these technical literatures were concerned in finding out physio chemical properties contained in wood oil and the source from which they are drawn for use in industrial purposes
The literal interpretation given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose of the Act
In its interpretation we have to keep at the back of our mind the purpose which the Act and the Parent Act Forest Conservation Act seek to subserve
JF Dastru equally in his Medical Plants of India and Pakistan tread into the same path and given construction to wood oil in the context of its exudation obtained from the trunk of the trees belonging to the family of Dipterocarpaceae as an oleoresin or gurjan balsam
There would be no quarrel on that behalf
It must be noted in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India the important being Sandalwood oil agar wood oil deodar oil and pine oil apart from oleo resin and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area
These essential oils are obtained from any of forest wood
Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest produce
Even its roots thereof are also included as forest produce
They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2k of the Act
The purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain ecology
Forest produce defined under section 2f is an inclusive definition
It is settled law that the word include  is generally used as a word of extension
When used in an interpretation clause it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or pharases occuring in the body of the Statute
Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition at p 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meanings of the words and pharases that The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves
If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense
The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver
At p 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning
An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary popular and natural sense whenever that word that would be properly applicable but to enable the word as used in the Act when there is nothing in the context or the subject matter to the contrary to be applied to some things to which it would not ordinarily be applicable 
An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting word which are ambiguous or equivocal and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain
At p 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another or as strictly defining what the meaning 505 of the term must be under all circumstances but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed
This Court in Babu Manmohan Das Shah  Ors
vs Bishun Das   adopting the ordinary rule of construction stated that the provisions of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons such as where the literal construction would reduce the Act to absurdity or prevent manifest legislative purpose from being carried out
The question therein was the interpretation of the phrase materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value in the construction to a shop
In that context this court laid that cardinal principle of statutory construction referred to hereinbefore would apply
In State of Madhya Pradesh vs M V Narasimhan  the definition of public servant  in S21 IPC was amended and clause 12 thereof was brought on statute
The Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 created its own provisions as specific offences of criminal misconduct which is different from the offence of bribery defined in the Indian Penal Code
When similar definition was not given under the PC Act 1947 the contention was raised that the respondent cannot be prosecuted not being a public servant under the PC Act
This court while holding that definition of public servant was incorporated in PC Act by necessary implication of public servant defined in Cl 12 of S21 IPC and held that PC Act is supplemental to IPC and that therefore both would deal with the same offence
Accordingly the respondent was held to be public servant coming within the definition of PC Act
This court adopted the doctrine of purposive interpretation to prevent corruption a penal offence
In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs Indian Oil Corporation  this Court adopted purposive construction in the definition of the word building  for the purpose of levy of property tax under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to include oil storage tanks to be building and held that the language of a statutory provision is not static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change as they are bound to do in any country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on agalitarian values the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change
The law does not operate in a vaccum
It cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate
The Judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the legislature and invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering justice
The word include in the definition under section 2f would show that it did 506 not intened to exclude what was ordinarily and in common parlance be spoken of wood oil
The expression being technical and being part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an exhaustive manner it cannot be restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the principle object and purpose of the Act
The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be extracted by natural process of exudation or it may be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process and Sandalwood Santalum Album are cut into pieces
Its heart wood and roots of Sandalwood trees removed from the forest are used as a raw material at a factory level that too by mechanised process to extract sandalwood oil
The purpose for which the oil is used is not decisive
Therefore the word wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation drawing the context in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve
The restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning
The Legislature does not intend to restrict the word wood oil nor we find any compelling circumstances in the Act to olive restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the accused and found acceptance to the learned single Judge
The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandle wood a valuable forest wealth prevent illicit failing and transportation of them and makes the manufacturers of sandlewood oil accountable to the possession of sandlewood trees or chips or roots etc
Incorporation of sandlewood oil abundentecatela in Karnataka Act and absence thereof in sister Acts operating in South India does not detract from giving its due meaning
The expert opinion is only an opinion evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation
This court in Adity Mills vs Union of India  did not adopt the dictionary meaning as it may be to some extent delussive guide to interpret entries in Central Excise and Salt Act
In Kishan Lal vs State of Rajasthan  to which one of us Sahai J was member this court was to consider the word Sugar  whether under Rajasthan Agricultrual Produce Marketing Act 1961 an agricultural produce
It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce
Repelling that contention this Court held that the word agricultural produce include all produce whether agricultural horticultural animal husbandary or otherwise as specified in the schedule
The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially apart the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither exclude any item produced in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil
If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded
It further overlooks the expression or otherwise as specified in the Schedule
Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an agricultural produce under that Act
In State of Bombay  Ors
vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha  Ors
 this court adopted purposive approach 507 in interpreting the word industry  in section 2j of the Industrial Disputes Act and held that the Legislature in defining the word industry  in s2 j of the Act deliberately used term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extention
The conventional meaning attributed to trade or business was eschewed even in the absence of profit motive
It was held that hospital was an industry
Therefore the ratio far from helping the accused is consistent with the view we have expressed above
In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr
vs State of Gujarat and Anr
  the inclusive definition was construed in the context of the explanation given to Entry 22
It was held therefore that the word pottery  does not include tiles industry for the purpose of Minimum Wages Act
The ratio therein renders little assistance to the accused
In Rathi Khandsari Udyog and Ors
vs State of UP and Ors
   this court held that the words not defined may be construed in the popular sense in which it is being commonly used in commercial parlance
The ratio is not apposite to the fact situation
Similarly the construction placing reliance on the passage at p 164 of Craies on Statute Law that the word is to be construed in the sense in which it is being understood in trade business or transaction known to the trade is also inapplicable to the factual context
In Fatesang Gimba Vasava and Ors
vs State of Gujarat and ors
 the division bench construed whether bamboo would include in its ambit cut pieces in the context and the purpose the Act sought to serve the tribals in the forest area
Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest produce from forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood
When toplas supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips were being taken out for sale they were sought to be prosecuted
It was challenged by the tribals
In that context the division bench held that though bamboo is a forest produce the Bamboo chips of the specified description do not fall within the definition of forest produce
Accordingly it was interpreted from the context and purposive approach of the word forest produce 
Accordingly the ratio therein does not assist the accused
The Andhra Pradesh High Court relied for the accused had not correctly laid the law in Kangundi Industrial works Kuppam vs The Govt
of AP
Accordingly we hold that Sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of section 2 f i of the Act
Therefore it is a forest produce
Necessary conclusion is that the Trial Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial
It is for the Trial Court to find whether the offence as imputed to the accused has been made out the trial
We need express no opinion at this stage
The appeals of the State are allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed
RP Appeals dismissedallowed


Summary:
The appellant landlord determined the tenancy of the contractual tenant in 1966 and filed a suit for his eviction
The suit was decreed ex parte
In execution proceedings the licensee obstructed and claimed to be protected licensee under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947
The objection was rejected by the executing Court
The appellate Court confirmed the same holding that even though the first licence was created in 1966 before determination of the tenancy for a period of six years and the second licence having been created in 1972 it was not necessary to examine the validity of the first as the second one was created when contractual tenant had become statutory tenant and therefore he was incapable of transferring any right or interest in favour of the licensee
On appeal the High Court upheld the finding of the appellate court that the licence was created in 1972 It also held that creation of licence by a statutory tenant was valid
Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the appellant landlord preferred an appeal before the Court
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 11 In the absence of any legislation touching the contract a contractual tenant is left with no transferable right after determination of his tenancy
465 B 12 The law would operate in favour of a person who held the premises under valid licence
A valid licence could be created by a contractual tenant or by a statutory tenant if he continued at par with contractual tenant by 461 operation of legislation
465 G 13In the instant case the licence was granted by the contractual tenant in 1972
But his tenancy had been determined by the landlord in 1966
He thus had become statutory tenant
He did not in law had any assignable interest on the date he created the licence
The grantor therefore from a cause preceding the grant had ceased to have any interest and was incapable of creating any valid licence unless he could be deemed to be at par with the contractual tenant by any provision in the Statute
In absence of any such provision in the Bombay Rent Act the licence was invalid and stood revoked
The occupation of the respondent thus was not as licensee within the meaning of Section 15A of the Act
466 B C Vasant Tatoba Hargude and Ors
vs Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari  approved
Anand Nivas Private Ltd vs Anandji Kalyanji s Pedhi  Others AIR 1965 SC 414 Jai Singh Morarji and others vs Ms Sovani P Ltd   Damadilal and others vs Parashram and Others  and Luadhichem Agencies vs Ahmed R vs Peer Mohamed and Anr 1 referred to