iminal Appeal No 32 of 1956
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 7 and 10 1955 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No 817 of 1955
Porus A Mehta R Ganapathy Iyer and G Gopalakrishnan for the appellant
N section Bindra R H Dhebar and T M Sen for the respondent
January 27
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J
This is an appeal by special Rag leave by Ardeshir H Bhiwandiwala against the order of the High Court of Bombay allowing an appeal 594 by the State against the acquittal of the appellant of an offence under section 92 of the Act LXIII of 1948 hereinafter called the Act for his working the Wadia Mahal Salt Works situate at Wadala Bombay without obtaining a licence under section 6 of the said Act read with r 4 of the rules framed under the Act
The main question for determination in this appeal is whether these Salt Works come within the definition of the word  factory  under cl
m of section 2 of the Act
The answer to this question depends on the meaning of the word  premises  in the definition of the word factory  and on the determination whether what is done at this Salt Works in connection with the conversion of sea water into crystals of salt comes within the definition of the expression  manufacturing process  in cl
k of section 2 of the Act
The Salt Works extend over an area of about two hundred and fifty acres
Some of the other salt works however have even larger areas
The only buildings on this land consist of temporary shelters constructed for the resident labour and for an office
At a few places pucca platforms exist for fixing the water pump when required to pump water from the sea
When not required this pump is kept in the office
With the exception of the constructions already mentioned the entire area of the Salt Works is open
On the sea side it has bunds in order to prevent sea water flooding the salt pans
Clause m of section 2 of the Act reads factory  means any premises including the precincts thereof i whereon ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on or ii whereon twenty or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on 595 but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the  or a railway running shed
 The relevant portion of the definition of  manufacturing process  in cl
k of section 2 reads   manufacturing process  means any process fori making altering repairing ornamenting finishing packing oiling washing cleaning breaking up demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale transport delivery or disposal or ii pumping oil water or sewage or  
It is contended for the appellant that the expres
sion premises in the definition of the word factory means  buildings  and that mere open land  is not covered by the word  premises  and as there are no buildings except temporary sheds on the Salt Works the Salt Works cannot be said to be a  factory 
We do not agree with this contention
The word premises  has now come to refer to either land or buildings or to both depending on the context
The meanings of the word  premises  in various lexicons and dictionaries are given below a Wharton s Law Lexicon  Premises  is often used as meaning  land or houses 
b Cochran s Law Lexicon IV Edition  Premises  means  houses or lands c Black HC Law Dictionary IV Edition  Premises  as used in the estates means i lands and tenements an estate land and buildings thereon the subject matter of the conveyance ii a distinct and definite locality and may mean a room especially building or other definite area d Earl Jowitt Dictionary of English Law Premises  from this use of the word  premises  has gradually acquired the popular sense of land or buildings
Originally it was only used in this sense by laymen and it was never so used in well drawn instruments but it is now 596 frequently found in instruments and in Acts of Parliament as meaning land or houses eg the Public Health Act 1875 section 4 where premises includes messuages buildings lands easements tenements and hereditaments of any tenure e Ballentine JA Law Dictionary with Pronunciation II Edition  Premises  as applied to land Webster s New International Dictionary defines the word as follows The property conveyed in a deed hence in general a piece of land or real estate  sometimes especially in fire insurance papers a building or buildings on land the premises insured
It is therefore clear that the word  premises  is a generic term meaning open land or land with buildings or buildings alone
The expression premises including precincts it has been urged clearly indicates that in the context of the definition of the word  factory  premises meant only buildings as buildings alone can have precints and there can be no precincts of any open land
This expression  premises including precincts does not necessarily mean that the premises must always have precincts
Even buildings need not have any precincts
The word  including  is not a term restricting the meaning of the word  premises  but is a term which enlarges the scope of the word  premises 
We are therefore of opinion that even this contention is not sound and does not lead to the only conclusion that the word  premises  must be restricted to mean buildings and be not taken to cover open land as well
Sub cl
bb of el
1 of section 7 of the Act requires the occupier of a factory to mention in the written notice to be sent to the Chief Inspector before his occupying or using any premises as a factory the name and address of the owner of the premises or building including the precincts thereof referred to in section 93
This sufficiently indicates that the word  premises  is not restricted in scope to buildings alone
of course the building referred to in this clause is the 597 building which is referred to in section 93 of the Act
Sub section
1 of section 93 reads  Where in any premises separate buildings are leased to different occupier for use as separate factories the owner of the premises shall be responsible for the provision and maintenance of common facilities and services such as approach roads drainage water supply lighting and sanitation
 This again makes it clear that  premises  refer to an entire area which may have within it several separate buildings
Further section 85 empowers the State Government to declare that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall apply to any place wherein a manufacturing process is carried on with or without the aid of power or is so ordinarily carried on notwithstanding certain matters mentioned in the section
The word  place is again a general word which is applicable to both open land and to buildings and its use in this section indicates that the Act can be applied to works carrying on a manufacturing process on open land
There is thus internal evidence in the Act itself to show that the word  premises  is not to be confined in its meaning to buildings alone
The High Court has rightly pointed out that the Act is for the welfare of the workers and deals with matters connected with the health safety welfare working hours of the workers employment of young persons and leave to be granted to workers and that therefore the legislature could not have intended to discriminate between the workers who are engaged in a manufacturing process in a building and those who are engaged in such a process on open land
It is contended for the appellant that the various provisions of the Act cannot be applicable to salt works where the process of converting sea water into salt is carried on in the open
This is true as regards some of the provisions but then there is nothing in the Act which makes it uniformly compulsory for every occupier of a factory to comply with every requirement of the Act An occupier is to comply 598 with such provisions of the Act which apply to the factory he is working
It is admitted that the workers have at times to work at night that some women workers are employed that workers have to take rest that they have to take food at about mid day that they do require drinking water and that first aid things are kept in the office room
It may be that the occupier has made adequate arrangements for such purposes but this does not mean that the provisions of the Act concerning such amenities shall not be applicable to salt works
Further the Act has sufficient provisions empowering the State to exempt the occupiers from complying with certain I provisions as a special case
Section 6 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules requiring the previous permission in writing of the State Government or the Chief Inspector to be obtained for the site on which the factory is to be situated and for the construction or extension of any factory or class or description of factories
This provision of the Act together with the relevant rules framed in that connection does not mean that every factory must have a building and that necessary permission for its construction or extension is to be obtained
Of course every factory must have a site and previous permission of the State Government or the Chief Inspector may be necessary before the site is to be used for the purposes of a factory
Further there is nothing in the definition of manufacturing process  which would make it necessary that this process be carried on in a building
This definition really deals with the nature of the work done and not with where that work is to be done
The work can be done both in the building or in the open
Lastly learned counsel for the appellant relied on certain cases which are detailed below In Kent vs Astley 1 it was held that a slate quarry a large open space extending over an area of 400 acres the works of which were carried on in the open 1 599 air the only buildings being sheds was not a factory within the meaning of 30  31 Viet
c 103 Factory Acts Extension Act 1867 section 3 sub section
Cockburn CJ said at page 23  Therefore if this work had been carried on within a building I think that it would have fallen within the scope of the statute and that the justices  ought to have convicted  and I do not think that in using the word I premises  the legislature intended to include sheds erected in the quarry merely as a protection against the weather they are only accessories to the quarry and the quarrying processes and the legislature has not yet declared that open air works shall be within the scope of the Factory Acts
But except in cases which have been specially provided for it has not as yet included works carried on in the open air because they are less exposed to the evils incident to manufactures carried on in buildings
 Mellor J said at page 24  The legislature has from time to time extended the Factory Acts to different trades and businesses
Numerous slate quarries exist and a large number of persons are employed in them if the legislature intended to apply the Factory Acts to them it would have been done by special enactment
 Hannen J said  I agree with my Brother Mellor that if the legislature had intended to apply the Factory Acts to quarries they would have been expressly mentioned and this omission leads strongly to the conclusion that it was not intended to interfere with persons employed in quarries
 It is not clear from these observations alone why the slate quarries where work was carried on in the open air and not in building was not held to be a factory on that account
This is however apparent when one considers that the Factory Act of 1833 was enacted to regulate the labour of children and young persons in the mills and factories of the United Kingdom and applied only to cotton woollen worsted hemp flax tow linen or silk mill or factory wherein 77 600 steam or water or any other mechanical power was used to propel or work the machinery in such mill or factory
The other subsequent Acts simply extended the scope of the Factory Act of 1833
The Act of 1844 was to amend the law relating to labour in factories and provided by section LXXIII that the Factory Act as amended by this Act and this Act  would be construed together as one Act
The relevant portion of the definition of the word  factory  in this Act reads The word I factory  notwithstanding any Provision or Exemption in the Factory Act shall be taken to mean all Buildings and Premises situated within any part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland wherein or within the Close or Curtilage of which Steam Water or any other mechanical Power shall be used to move or work any Machinery employed in preparing manufacturing or finishing or in any Process incident to the Manufacture of Cotton
 Wool Hair Silk Flax Hemp Jute or Tow either separately or mixed together or mixed with any other Material or any Fabric made thereof
 This indicates that is premises  need not consist of buildings and that they mean something different from buildings The Act of 1850 was for the regulation of the employment of children in factories and provided that that Act would be construed together with the previous Acts as one Act
There is nothing particular in the Factory Act of 1856 to refer to
The Act of 1860 dealt with the employment of women young persons and children in bleaching works and dyeing works under the regulations of the  section VII which defines the words  Bleaching Works  and  Dyeing Works  reads with regard to its relevant portion thus  In the Construction of this Act the words Bleaching Works  and Dyeing Works  shall be understood respectively to mean any Building
Buildings or Premises in which Females Young 601 Persons and Children or any of them are employed and in One or more of which Buildings or Premises any Process previous to packing is carried on  Section IX gives the exemptions and its relevant portion is  Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or apply to  or to any Premises either open inclosed  or covered used or to be used bona fide exclusively for the purposes of carrying on 
This makes it clear that  Premises  can consist of open areas
The 1867 Act is described as  Factory Acts Extension Act 1867  and according to section 3  factory means        7
Any premises whether adjoining or separate in the same occupation situate in the same City Town Parish or Place and constituting One Trade Establishment in on or within the Precincts of which Fifty or more Persons are employed in any manufacturing Process         It is clear from the series of legislation up to the decision in Kent s case that the Parliament specifically enacted with respect to the places which were to be controlled by the respective Factory Acts and that it was therefore that it was said that if the legislature had intended to apply the Factory Act to the slate quarries it would have extended the Act to them
As the various Factories and Mills which were covered by the Factory Act of 1833 were such which could function only in buildings the conception grew that nothing would come within the expression  factory  unless it had a building and unless the Factory Act definitely provided for the application of the Act to it
The next case relied on is Redgrave vs Lee 2 
The earlier decision was just followed in this
The next case cited for the appellant is Nash vs Hollin shead 3
This case too is distinguishable as the farm on which the workman was employed to drive a movable steam engine for the purpose of working a 1 2 3 602 mill for grinding meal intended to be used for food for stock on the farm and not for sale was held to be not a factory in view of the fact that the meal which was ground was not intended for the purpose of sale but was meant only for feeding the stock from the farm
It was also observed that the consequences of holding a farm to be a factory  would really produce a ludicrous result 
It is on the basis of this observation that the trial Court in the present case held that the application of the provisions of the Act to the Salt Works would lead to  ludicrous results 
We have already stated that such is not the result of the application of the relevant provisions of the to the Salt Works
There is nothing useful for the present case for our purpose in Weston vs London County Council 1 and in Wood vs London County Council 2
It may now be mentioned that the Factories Act 1937 I Edw 8  1 Geo 6 c 67 specifically provides in sub section
7 of section 151 that  premises shall not be excluded from the definition of a factory by reason only that they are open air premises 
Various clauses of sub section
1 of section 151 define  factory  to mean  any premises in which certain type of work is carried on by way of trade or for purposes of gain
 These provisions support the interpretation we are putting on the word  premises  in cl
m of section 2 of the Act
We therefore hold that the Salt Works would come within the meaning of the expression  premises  in the definition of the word  factory  and would be a factory if the work carried on there comes within the definition of  manufacturing process 
The second contention for the appellant is that the process of converting sea water into salt does not amount to  manufacturing process  as no process for making altering packing cleaning or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use sale transport delivery or disposal is carried on
It is also urged that no other process mentioned in cl
k of section 2 is carried on in the Salt Works that it is just the force of gravity and the solar energy which 1 2 603 do the necessary work for the occupiers of the Salt Works to convert sea water into salt and that no human agency is employed in such conversion
This contention found favour with the trial Court
The High Court however did not agree with it and stated In our opinion it is a travesty of language to say that although 47 workmen are working on these works salt is made without the assistance of human agency 
Now in this case there is no doubt that the workmen employed on these salt works are dealing with the sea water in a particular manner and but for the dealing with it in that manner salt as made on these works would not be made
We agree with the High Court that the conversion of sea water into salt is not due merely to natural forces but is due to human efforts aided by natural forces
The sea water in the sea never becomes salt merely on account of the play of sun s rays on it
The natural force of gravity is utilised for carrying sea water from the sea to the reservoirs thence to the tapavanis and from there to the crystallizing pans which are specially prepared by thumping the mud and making the layer of tile ground hard and water tight
The solar energy is utilised in evaporating the water in the brine
The human agency is employed for other processes carried on in the Salt Works
The process of making salt is described in the letter dated July 12 1949 included in Exhibit 1 from the President Salt Merchants and Shilotires Association Bombay to the Secretary Department of Industry and Supply Government of India New Delhi thus A salt work mainly consists of an open marshy area surrounded by mud embankment the height of which is above the highest tide water mark in that locality to prevent inundation
In this embankment sluice gates are provided with suitable places to take in and discharge the sea water and the waste water respectively
The inner enclosed area is divided into compartments for the storage of sea brine of different densities
When the salt is formed it is stored on the platform by the laborers engaged in the manufacture
It is then weighed bagged and 604 carried to Railway Station or to a port of shipment
For said production the sea water is taken into the Reservoirs at high water tide twice during a month
The high tides take place on about nine or ten days in a month five days during day time and four times at night
Some of the labourers are detained for this work but they are also not required to be present the whole time when the evaporation is going on
Once the brine is let into the crystallising beds its surface is not to be disturbed for four or five days
After this the labourer has to be careful to see that the density does not exceed a certain limit and that the other kinds of salt contained in the brine are not deposited thus contaminating the sodium chloride common salt already formed
This they learn by experience
Sifting and storing then begins
The labourer has also to refill the crystallizing beds with fresh brine
Thus the labourers work is intermittent and not continuous for any fixed hours
 It is clear therefore that labourers are employed for i admitting sea water to the reservoirs by working sluice gates sometimes at night also or the pump ii filling crystallizing beds iii watching the density of brine in the crystallizing beds iv seeing that the density does not exceed certain limits and that salts other than sodium chloride common salt are not formed v scraping and collecting salt crystals vi grading the salt crystals by  sieving  and vii putting salt into gunny bags
It follows that it is due to human agency aided by natural forces that salt is extracted from sea water
The processes carried out in the Salt Works and described above come within the definition of  manufacturing process  inasmuch as salt can be said to have been manufactured from sea water by the process of treatment and adaptation of sea water into salt
The sea water a non commercial article has been adapted to salt a commercial article
The observations in Sedgwick vs Watney Combe Reid  Company Limited1 at page 463 support the 1  605 view that the process undergone at the Salt Works is the process of treatment of sea water for the purpose of converting it into salt
The hereditament the subject of controversy in the case was used in connection with the manufacture of  bottled beer  by the respondent
Brewed beer which was not in a drinkable condition and therefore not saleable as draught  beer was brought to the premises in tank wagons and pumped into large tanks
Carbonic acid gas was put into it
It was then filtered and put into bottles which were corked and labelled
The bottles were then packed and removed for delivery
The question for decision was whether the hereditament was occupied and used for the purpose of distributive wholesale business
In that connection it was said  But the point is whether the treatment that the beer undergoes in these premises is a mere prelude to distribution
I am clearly of opinion that it is not
The finished article that is being prepared for distribution is bottled beer
It undergoes treatment a treatment which changes its quality and makes it from an unpotable and unmarketable article into a potable and marketable one
 In the present case in the Salt Works the finished article is  salt 
It does not enter the Salt Works as  salt 
It enters as brine which under the process carried out changes its quality and becomes salt a marketable article
The observations in Grove vs Lloyds British Testing Co Ltd1 at page 467 support the view that the conversion of sea water into salt amounts to adapting it for sale
It is stated there  I think  adapting for sale  points clearly to something being done to the article in question which in some way makes it in itself a little different from what it was before In Kaye vs Burrows  Others and Hines vs Eastern Counties Farmers  Co operative Association Ltd 2 it was said at page 484  The test is just as it was in the bottled beer case
You must look at what is the finished article  1  2 606 to be turned out
If that finished article is only put into the condition of a finished article by the processes to which it has been subjected in the hereditament then the processes will fall within the expression altering or adaptation for sale 
In both the cases of the rags and the seeds the finished article is different from the article in bulk which enters the hereditament and that is in our opinion an adaptation for sale In The State of Kerala vs V M Patel 1 this Court held the treatment of pepper and ginger to be a  manufacturing process  where the work which was carried on in the premises of the firm was described thus  It consisted of winnowing cleaning washing and drying pepper on concrete floor
A similar process was also being applied to ginger which was dipped in lime and laid out to dry in a warehouse on the premises
 The case reported as In re Chinniah Manager Sangu Soap Works 2 is of no help to the appellant as there nothing definite was held about the process carried out to be a manufacturing process or not and what was stated was in connection with the word I manufacture in general and not with reference to  manufacturing process
 Similarly the case reported as Paterson vs Hunt is not of much help
It simply held that mere sorting of rags will not amount to adapting for sale
In this case reference was made to it being held in Law vs Graham 4 that washing the bottles before the beer was put into them was not adapting the beer or adapting the bottles or adapting the bottled beer for the purpose of sale and in Hoare vs Truman Hanbury Buxton  Co 5 that it was a case of adapting for sale when gas was used to force carbonic acid at high pressure into the beer for charging it with the acid and mixing it and so aerating the beer
The case is 1 Crl
42 of 1959
decided on October 12 1960
2 AIR 1957 Mad 755
3 4 5 607 distinguishable as sorting of rags brought about no change in particular rags sorted out
They were just separated from other things with which they were mixed and therefore the rags were in no way adapted to some different article
This cannot be said in connection with the conversion of sea water into salt
The decisions in McNicol vs Pinch 1 State vs Chrestien Mica Industries Ltd 2 and G R Kulkarni vs The State 3 are of no help in determining the point under consideration as there the word  manufacture  was interpreted according to the dictionary meaning and the context
In the present case we are considering the definition of the expression  manufacturing process  and no dictionary meaning of the word  manufacture  and no interpretation of what constitutes  manufacture  for the purposes of other Acts can be of any guide
It may however be noted that even according to the meaning given to the word  manufacture  the conversion of brine into salt would amount to manufacture of salt as  the essence of making or of manufacturing is that what is made shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made  vide McNicol vs Pinch4 page 361
We are therefore of opinion that the process of converting sea water into salt carried on on the appellant s Salt Works comes within the definition of manufacturing process  in el
k of section 2 of the Act
Reference was made to the expression of opinion by the Chief Inspector of Factories in his letter to the Deputy Salt Commissioner Bombay in support of the appellant s contention that salt works as such do not come within the definition of the word  factory 
It was stated in this letter that originally salt pans were considered to be amenable to the Factories Act and as such salt pan occupiers were informed to get the pans registered and licensed
However as some doubt was felt the question was re examined and it had been found that salt pans would not be factories except where they were equipped with a building used 1 2 1956 Pat 660 3 ILR 1937 M P 13 608 in connection with the manufacture of salt
The Deputy Commissioner for Salt was not satisfied with this view and in his reply dated September 13 1952 stated after referring to the provisions of cl
m of section 2 of the Act that  by premises is meant building and its adjuncts 
No further correspondence between these authorities has been brought on the record and we do not know what had been the final view taken by the authorities in this connection
Further such a view expressed by any authority is of no help in deciding the questions before us
It may also be mentioned that the representation made by the President of the Salt Merchants and Shilotires Association on July 12 1949 to the Secretary to Government of India Department of Industries  Supply did not raise the contention that the salt works did not come within the definition of the word  factory  and merely represented that the provisions of the Act be not applied to the salt works in view of the matters mentioned in that representation
Even the reply by the appellant s firm to the Inspector of Factories dated April 9 1952 did not state that the salt works did not come within the definition of the word  factory  and simply stated that the provisions of the Indian Factories Act were considered redundant for which their Bombay Salt Association had already made a suitable representation to the Government of India
It was for the first time in the written statement filed by the appellant in the trial Court that it was contended that the Salt Works would not come within the word  factory  in the Act
Omission of the accused or the Association of salt merchants to contend at an earlier stage that the salt works do not come within the definition of the word  factory  is also not of any relevance for our considering the questions before us
We have made reference to it only in view of the reference made by the appellants to an opinion expressed by the Chief Inspector of Factories in his letter to the Deputy Salt Commissioner dated September 13 1952
In view of the above we are of opinion that the appellant s Salt Works do come within the definition 609 of the word factory and that the appellant has been rightly convicted of the offence of working the factory without obtaining a licence
We therefore dismiss the appeal
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
During controversy between two brothers each of whom claimed to be appointed Mutawalli the Commissioner of Wakfs appointed a third brother as a temporary Mutawalli under section 40 of the Bengal Wakf Act which appointment was challenged on the ground that the order of the Commissioner appointing a temporary Mutawalli was illegal because under the rules framed by the Government of West Bengal the Board constituted under Bengal Wakf Act could alone make the appointment and the Commissioner could only make a report and recommendation to the Board
Held that under the provisions of section 40 read with section 29 of the Bengal Wakf Act a temporary Mutawalli can be appointed by the Commissioner to whom the powers and duties have been 760 delegated by the Board
The Rules cannot affect the powers of the Board to delegate its functions under section 29 of the Act to the Commissioner and once the delegation is made the rules cease to apply
Held further that where power and duty are interconnected and it is not possible to separate one from the other in such wise that power can be delegated while duty is retained and vice versa the delegation of powers takes with it the duties