ivil Appeals Nos 170 to 173 of 1968
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos 741 973 974 and 975 of 1966
B Sen section N Prasad and R B Datar for the appellant in all the appeals
53 Janardan Sharma for the respondents Nos 4 to 14 in CA No 170 of 1968 respondents Nos 4 to 24 and 26 to 53 in CA No 171 of 1968 respondent No 4 in CA No 172 of 1968 and respondents Nos 4 to 17 in CA No 173 of 1968
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava J
these four connected appeals have been filed by special leave by the Town Municipal Council Athani and are directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in four writ petitions filed by the appellant under article 226 of the Constitution dismissing the writ petitions
The circumstances in which these appeals have arisen may be briefly stated
Four different applications under section 33C2 of the No 14 of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act were filed in the Labour Court Hubli by various workmen of the appellant
Application LCH No 139 of 1965 was filed by eleven workmen on 28th July 1965 seeking computation of their claim for overtime work for the period between 1st April 1955 and 31st December 1957 and for work done on weekly off days for the period between 1st April 1955 and 31st December 1960
The amount claimed by each workman was separately indicated in the application under each head
The total claim of all the workmen was computed at Rs 6242082P according to the workmen themselves
The second application LCH No 138 of 1965 was presented by 50 workmen on 23rd July 1965 putting forward a claim for washing allowance at Rs 36 each from 1st January 1964 to 30th June 1965 and cost of uniform at Rs 40 each from 1st January 1964 to 30th June 1965 in respect of 18 of those 50 workmen
The third application LCH No 101 of 1965 was filed by one workman alone on 19th April 1965 claiming a sum of Rs 891072P in respect of his over time work and compensation for work done on weekly off days
The fourth application LCH  No 140 of 1965 was filed on 26th July 1965 by 14 workmen making a total claim of Rs 1730260P for work done on weekly off days during the period from 1st December 1960 to 30th June 1965
13 of the workmen claimed that they were entitled to payment at Rs 1190 each while one workman s claim was to the extent of Rs 183260P The Labour Court at Hubli entertained all these applications under section 33C2 of the Act computed the amounts due to the various workmen who had filed the applications and directed the appellant to make payment of the amounts found due
Thereupon the appellant challenged the decision of the Labour Court before the High Court of Mysore by four different writ petitions under article 226 of the Constitution
The order in Application LCH No 1391965 was challenged in 54 Writ Petition No 741 of 1966 that in Application LCH No 1381965 in Writ Petition No 973 of 1966 that in Applica tion LCH No 101 of 1965 in Writ Petition No 974 of 1966 and that in Application LCH No 1401965 in Writ Petition No 9751966
The principal ground for challenging the decision of the Labour Court was that all these amounts could have been claimed by the workmen by filing applications under section 201 of the No 11 of 1948 and since that Act was a self contained Act making provision for relief in such cases the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the general Act viz the was taken away and excluded
It was further pleaded that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the claims under section 201 of the had become time barred and such claims which had become time barred could not be entertained by the Labour Court under section 33C2 of the Act
Some other pleas were also taken in the writ petitions which we need not mention as they have not been raised before us
The High Court did not accept the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant and dismissed the writ petitions by a common order dated 25th August 1967
These four appeals are directed against that common order dismissing the four writ petitions
Civil Appeals Nos 170 171 172 and 173 of 1968 are directed against the order governing Writ Petitions Nos
741 1966 97311966 9741966 and 9751966 respectively
In these appeals in this Court also the principal point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was the same which was raised before the High Court in the Writ Petitions viz that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the claims of the workmen under section 33C2 of the Act was barred by the fact that the same relief could have been claimed by the workmen under section 201 of the 
In the course of the arguments however learned counsel conceded that he could not press this point in Civil Appeal No 171 of 1968 arising out of Writ Petition No 973 of 1966 which was directed against the order of the Labour Court in Application LCH No 138 of 1965 because the claim in that application before the Labour Court was confined to washing allowance and cost of uniform which are items not governed by the at all
His submissions have therefore been confined before us to the other three appeals in which the claim of the workmen was for computation of their benefit in respect of overtime work and work done on weekly off days
It may be mentioned that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was raised on behalf of the appellant not 55 only in the writ petitions before the High Court but even before the Labour Court itself when that Court took up the hearing of the applications under section 33C2 of the Act
However the ground for challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined to the point mentioned by us above
It was not contended either before the Labour Court or in the writ petitions before the High Court that the applications were not covered by the provisions of section 33C2 of the Act
The plea taken was that even though the applications could be made under section 33C2 of the Act the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to proceed under that provision of law was barred by the provisions of the 
Mr B Sen appearing on behalf of the appellant wanted permission to raise the question whether these applications before the Labour Court were at all included within the scope of section 33C2 of the Act but on the objection of learned counsel for the respondents the permission sought was refused
As we have mentioned earlier the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on this ground was not challenged either before the Labour Court itself or before the High Court
No such ground was raised even in the special leave petition nor was it raised at any earlier stage by any application
It was sought to be raised by Mr Sen for the first time in the course of the arguments in the appeals at the time of final hearing
We did not consider it correct to allow such a new point to be raised at this late stage
However another new point which had not been raised before the Labour Court and in the writ petitions before the High Court was permitted to be argued because it was raised by a separate application presented before the hearing seeking permission to raise it
The new question sought to be raised is that even if the applications under section 33C2 of the Act were competent and not barred by the provisions of the  they were time barred when presented under article 137 of the Schedule to the No 36 of 1963
The question of limitation was incidentally mentioned before the Labour Court as well as the High Court relying on the circumstance that applications under section 201 of the could only have been presented within a period of six months from the date when the claims arose
At that stage reliance was not placed on article 137 of the Schedule to the  but well before the final hearing a written application was presented on behalf of the appellant seeking permission to raise this plea of limitation in these appeals
Notice of that application was served on the res pondents well in time so that by the time the appeals came up for hearing they knew that this point was sought to be raised by the appellant
A question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and in these cases this question could be decided 56 on the basis of the facts on the record being a pure question of law
It is in this background that we have permitted this question also to be raised in these appeals though it was not put forward either in the High Court or before the Labour Court
Thus we are concerned in these appeals with the two aspects relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain applications under section 33C2 of the Act because of the provisions of the  and the plea that the applications under section 33C2 of the Act were time barred Dr at least part of the claims under the applications were ame barred in view of article 137 of the schedule to the 
On the first question both the Labour Court and the High Court held that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded because of section 201 of the has no force on the assumption that the claims made in these applications under section 33C2 of the Act could have been presented before the Labour Court under section 201 of the 
In our view this assumption was not justified
As we shall indicate hereafter the claims made by the workmen in the applications under section 33C2 of the Act could not have been made before the Labour Court under section 201 of the  so that it is not necessary for us to decide the general question of law whether an application under section 33C2 of the Act can or cannot be competently entertained by a Labour Court if an application for the same relief is entertainable by the Labour Court under section 201 of the 
The long title and the preamble to the show that this Act was passed with the object of making provision for fixing minimum rates of wageaein certain employments The word wages has been given a wide meaning in its definition in section 2h of that Act and quite clearly includes payment in respect of overtime and for work done on weekly off days which are required to be given by any employer to the workmen under the provisions of that Act itself
Section 131 which deals with weekly off days and section 141 which deals with overtime are as follows  13
1 In regard to any scheduled employment minimum rates of wages in respect of which have been fixed under this Act the appropriate Government may a fix the number of hours of work which shall constitute a normal working day inclusive of one or more specified intervals 57 b provide for a day of rest in every period of seven days which shall be allowed to all employees or to any specified class of employees and for the payment of remuneration in respect of such days of rest c provide for payment for work on a day of rest at a rate not less than the overtime rate 14
1 Where an employee whose minimum rate of wages is fixed under this Act by the hour by the day or by such a longer wage period as may be prescribed works on any day in excess of the number of hours constituting a normal working day the employer shall pay him for every hour or for part of an hour so worked in excess at the overtime rate fixed under this Act or under any law of the appropriate Government for the time being in force whichever is higher
 In order to provide a remedy against breach of orders made under sections 131 and 141 that Act provides a forum and the manner of seeking the remedy in section 20 which is as follows  20
1 The appropriate Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen s Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause b or clause c of subsection 1 of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14 to employees employed or paid in that area
2 Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in sub section 1 the employee himself or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf or any Inspector or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub 58 section 1 may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub section 3  Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period
3 When any application under sub section 2 is entertained the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard and after such further inquiry if any as it may consider necessary may without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act direct i in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess ii in any other case the payment of the amount due to the employee together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit not exceeding ten rupees and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application
4 If the Authority hearing any application under this section is satisfied that it was either malicious or vexatious it may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer by the person presenting the application
5 Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered 59 a if the Authority is a Magistrate by the Authority as if it were a fine imposed by the Authority as a Magistrate or b if the Authority is not a Magistrate by any Magistrate to whom the Authority makes application in this behalf as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate
6 Every direction of the Authority under this section shall be final
7 Every Authority appointed under sub sec tion  1  shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and every such Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
 We have mentioned these provisions of the  because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to the clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with fixing of rates rates of minimum wages overtime rates rate for payment for work on a day of rest and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is made in other laws such as the No 4 of 1936 and the No 14 of 1947
In section 201 of the also provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause b or clause c of sub section 1 of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14
This language used in section 201 shows that the Authority appointed under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to rates of wages rates for payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates
If there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and the employees section 201 would not be attracted
The purpose of section 201 seems to be to ensure that the rates prescribed under the are complied with by the employer in making payments and if any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates the workmen are given the right to invoke the aid of the Authority appointed under section 201
In cases where there is no dispute as to rates of wages and the only question is whether a particular payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages overtime 60 or work on off days is due to a workman or not the appropriate remedy is provided in the 
If the payment is withheld beyond the time permitted by the even on the ground that the amount claimed by the workman is not due or if the amount claimed by the workman is not paid on the ground that deductions are to be made by the employer the employee can seek his remedy by an application under section 151 of the 
In cases where section 15 of the may not provide adequate remedy the remedy can be sought either under section 33C of the Act or by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it decided under the various provisions of that Act
In these circumstances we are unable to accept the submission made by Mr Sen on behalf of the appellant that section 201 of the should be interpreted as intended to cover all claims in respect of minimum wages or overtime payment or payment for days of rest even though there may be no dispute as to the rates at which those payments are to be claimed
It is true that under section 203 power is given to the Authority dealing with an application under section 201 to direct payment of the actual amount found due but this it
appears to us is only an incidental power granted to that Authority so that the directions made by the Authority under section 201 may be effectively carried out and there may not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings
The power to make orders for payment of actual amount due to an employee under section 203 cannot therefore be interpreted as indicating that the jurisdiction to the Authority under section 201 has been given for the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the various rates fixed under that Act
This interpretation in our opinion also harmonises the provisions of the with the provisions of the which was already in existence when the was passed
In the present appeals therefore we have to see whether the claims which were made by the workmen in the various applications under section 33C2 of the Act were of such a nature that they could have been brought before the Authority under section 201 of the inasmuch as they raised disputes relating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work done on weekly off days
We have examined the applications which were presented before the Labour Court under section 33C2 of the Act in these appeals and have also taken into account the pleadings which were put forward on behalf of the appellant in contesting those applications and we are unable to find that there was any dispute 61 relating to the rates
It is true that in their applications the workmen did plead the rates at which their claims had to be computed but it was nowhere stated that those rates were being disputed by the appellant
Even in the pleadings put forward on behalf of the appellant as incorporated in the order of the Labour Court there was no pleading that the claims of the workmen were payable at a rate different from the rates claimed by them
It does appear that in one case there was a pleading on behalf of the appellant that no rates at all had been prescribed by the Mysore Government
That pleading did not mean that it became a dispute as to the rates at which the payments were to be made by the appellant
The only question that arose was whether there were any rates at all fixed under the for overtime and for payment for work done on days of rest
Such a question does not relate to a dispute as to the rates enforceable between the parties so that the remedy under section 201 of the could not have been sought by the applicants in any of these applications
No question can therefore arise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain these applications under section 33C2 of the Act being barred because of the provisions of the 
The first point raised on behalf of the appellant thus fails
In dealing with the second question relating to the applicability of article 137 of the schedule to the to applications under section 33C2 of the Act we may first take notice of two decisions of this Court on the scope of the parallel provision contained in article 181 of the First Schedule to the Indian No 9 of 1908
Article 181 of that Schedule laid down that the period of limitation for an application for which no period of limitation was provided elsewhere in the schedule or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 would be three years and the time from which the period would begin to run would be when the right to apply accrued
The scope of this article was considered first by this Court in Sha Mulchand  Co Ltd In Liquidation vs Jawahar Mills Ltd1 where the Court had to consider the question whether this article would govern an application made by the Official Receiver under section 38 of the Indian Companies Act for rectification of the register of a limited company
The Court noted the fact that the advocate appearing in the case relied strongly on article 181 of the and thereafter took notice of the fact that that article had in a long series of decisions of most if not all of the High Courts been held to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure
The Court also dealt with the argument advanced 1  62 that the reason for holding that article 181 was confined to applications under the Code was that the article should be construed ejusdem generis and that as all the articles in the third division of the schedule to the related to applications under the  Code article 181 which was the residuary article must be limited to applications under the Code
That reasoning it was pointed out was no longer applicable because of the amendment of the by the introduction of articles 158 and 178 which governed applications under the Arbitration Act and not thus under the Code
The Court then considered the views expressed by the various High Courts in a number of cases and held  It does not appear to us quite convincing without further argument that the mere amendment of articles 158 and 178 can ipso facto alter the meaning which as a result of a long series of judicial decisions of the different High Courts in India came to be attached to the language used in article 181
This long catena of decisions may well be said to have as it were added the words under the Code  in the first column of that article
If those words had actually been used in that column then a subsequent amendment of articles 158 and 178 certainly would not have affected the meaning of that article
If however as a result of judicial construction those words have come to be read into the first column as if those words actually occurred therein we are not of opinion as at present advised that the subsequent amendment of articles 158 and 178 must necessarily and automatically have the effect of altering the long acquired meaning of article 181 on the sole and simple ground that after the amendment the reason on which the old construction was founded is no longer available
 This earlier decision was relied upon by the Court in Bombay Gas Co Ltd v Gopal Bhiva and Others1 where the Court had to deal with the argument that applications under section 33C of the Act will be governed by three years  limitation provided by article 181 of the 
The Court in dealing with this argument held  In our opinion this argument is one of desperation
It is well settled that article 181 applies only to applications which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure and so its extension to applications made under section 33C2 of the Act would not be justified
As early 1   722 23 63 as 1880 the Bombay High Court had held in Rai Manekbai vs Manekji Kavasji1 that art 181 only relates to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure in which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application and the consensus of judicial opinion on this point had been noticed by the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta vs Official Liquidators Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company Ltd 2 An attempt was no doubt made in the case of Sha Mulchand  Co Ltd vs Jawahar Mills Ltd to suggest that the amendment of article 158 and 178 ipso facto altered the meaning which had been attached to the words in article 181 by judicial decisions but this attempt failed because this Court held that the long catena of decisions under article 181 may well be said to have as it were added the words u nder the Code in the first column of that Article 
Therefore it is not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by article 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications under section 33C2 of the Act
 It appears to us that the view expressed by this Court in those cases must be held to be applicable even when considering the scope and applicability of article 137 in the new of 1963
The language of article 137 is only slightly different from that of the earlier article 181 inasmuch as when prescribing the three years period of limitation the first column giving the description of the application reads as any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division
In fact the addition of the word other between the words any and application would indicate that the legislature wanted to make it clear that the principle of interpretation of article 181 on the basis of ejusdem generis should be applied when interpreting the new article 137
This word other implies a reference to earlier articles and consequently in interpreting this article regard must be had to the provisions contained in all the earlier articles
The other articles in the third division to the schedule refer to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure with the exception of applications under the Arbitration Act and also in two cases applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure
The effect of introduction in the third division of the schedule of reference to applications under the Arbitration Act in the old has already been considered by this Court in the case of Sha Mulchand  Co Ltd 3
We think that on the same principle it 1 1880 1 L R 2 1932 L R 60 1
A 13 20 3  64 must be held that even the further alteration made in the articles contained in the third division of the schedule to the new containing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be held to have materially altered the scope of the residuary article 137 which deals with other applications
It is not possible to hold that the intention of the legislature was to drastically alter the scope of this article so as to include within it all applications irrespective of the fact whether they had any reference to the Code of Civil Procedure
This point in our opinion may be looked at from another angle also
When this Court earlier held that all the articles in the third division to the schedule including article 181 of the of 1908 governed applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only it clearly implied that the application must be presented to a Court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
Even the applications under the Arbitration Act that were included within the third division by amendment of articles 158 and 178 were to be presented to courts whose proceedings were governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
At best the further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the third division of the schedule so as also to include some applications presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure
One factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications must be to courts to be governed by the articles in this division
The scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts such as a quasi judicial tribunal or even an executive authority
An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure
We cannot therefore accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court
The alterations made in the article and in the new Act cannot in our opinion justify the interpretation that even applications presented to bodies other than courts are now to be governed for purposes of limitation by article 137
Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel for the appellant primarily on the decision of the Bombay High Court in The Manager Mls
P K Porwal vs The Labour Court at Nagpur1
We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in that case
The High Court ignored the circumstance that the provisions of article 137 were sought to be applied to an application which was presented not to a court but 1 70 B L R 104
65 to a Labour Court dealing with an application under section 3 3C 2 of the Act and that such a Labour Court is not governed by any procedural code relating to civil or criminal proceedings
That Court appears to have been considerably impressed by the fact that in the new of 1963 an alteration was made in the long title which has been incorrectly described by that Court as preamble
Under the old  no doubt the long title was An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and for other purposes while in the new Act of 1963 the long title is An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith
In the long title thus the words other proceedings have been added but we do not think that this addition necessarily implies that the is intended to govern proceedings before any authority
whether executive or quasijudicial when earlier the old Act was intended to govern proceedings before civil courts only
It is also true that the preamble which existed in the old of 1908 has been omitted in the new Act of 1963
The omission of the preamble does not however indicate that there was any intention of the legislature to change the purposes for which the has been enforced
The Bombay High Court also attached importance to the circumstance that the scope of the new has been enlarged by changing the definition of applicant in section 2a of the new Act so as to include even a petitioner and the word  application so as to include a petition
The question still remains whether this alteration can be held to be intended to cover petitions by a petitioner to authorities other than Courts
We are unable to find any provision in the new which would justify holding that these changes in definition were intended to make the applicable to proceedings before bodies other than Courts
We have already taken notice of the change introduced in the third division of the schedule by includ ing references to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure which was the only other aspect relied upon by the Bombay High Court in support of its view that applications under section 33C of the Act will also be governed by the new article 137
For the reasons we have indicated earlier we are unable to accept the view expressed by the Bombay High Court and we hold that article 137 of the schedule to the does not apply to applications under section 33C2 of the Act so that the previous decision of this Court that no limitation is prescribed for such applications remains unaffected
The appeals fail and I are dismissed with costs
One hearing fee
VPS Appeals dismissed


Summary:
Applications in which the claim of the workmen of the appellant for computation of their benefit in respect of over time work and work done on weekly off days were entertained by the Labour Court under section 33C2 of the 
The Labour Court computed the amounts due to the various workmen and directed the appellant to make the payments
Writ petitions filed by the appellant in the High Court challenging the decision of the Labour Court were dismissed
In appeal to this Court it was contended that  1 The jurisdiction of the Labour Court to proceed with the applications was barred by the provisions of the  and 2 Even if the applications were competent and not barred by the  they were time barred under article 137 of the 
HELD  1 The is concerned with the fixing of rates rates of minimum wages overtime rates rates for payment of work on a day of rest and is not intended for enforcement of payment of wages
Under section 201 of the  in which provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than minimum rates or in respect of remuneration for days of rest or for work on such days or of wages at the overtime rates the Authority is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to rates of wages rates for payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates
The power under section 203 of the given to the Authority dealing with an application under section 201 to direct payment of the actual amount found due is only an incidental power for working out effectively the directions under section 201 fixing various rates under the Act
That is if there is no dispute as to rates between the employer and the employee and the only question is whether a particular payment at the agreed rate is due or not then section 201 of the would not be attracted at all and the appropriate remedy would only be either under section 151 of the  or under section 33C2 of the 
59 D G 60 B C In the present case there was no dispute by the appellant about the rates put forward by the workmen and a pleading by the appellant in one  of the applications that the State Government had not prescribed any rates under the  did not mean that there was a dispute as to the rates claimed by the workmen
Therefore the remedy under section 201 of the could not have been sought by the workmen and hence the question of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the applications under section 33C2 of the industrial Disputes Act being barred because of the provisions of the  could not arise61 A D 52 2 a Though the question of limitation under article 137 of the 1963Act was not raised either in the Labour Court or the High Court it could be allowed to be raised in this Court because a question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and is a pure question of law when it could be decided on the basis of the facts on the record and the respondents had sufficient notice of the question
55 G H b Article 137 of the governs only applications presented to courts under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes
The use of the word other  in the first column of the article giving the description of the application as any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division  indicates that the Legislature wanted to make it clear that the interpretation put by this Court in Mulchand vs Gopal Bhiva   722 723 on article 181 of the 1908 Act on the basis of ejusdem generis should be applied to article 137 of 1963 Act also the language of which is only slightly different from that of article 181 of the 1908 Act
That is in interpreting article 137 of the 1963 Act regard must be had to the provisions contained in the earlier articles
These articles refer to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure to two cases of applications under the Arbitration Act and to two cases of applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure
This Court in Mulechand  Co Ltd case held that the reference to applications under the Arbitration Act had no effect on the interpretation of article 181 of the 1908 Act and that that article applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure
On the same principle the further alteration made in the articles in 1963 Act containing reference to applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure could not alter the scope of article 137 of the 1963 Act
Moreover even the applications under the Arbitration Act were to be presented to courts whose proceedings are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
The further amendment including applications governed by the Criminal Procedure Code still shows that the applications must be to courts
The alterations in the 1963 Act namely the inclusion of the words other proceedings  in the long title to the 1963 Act the omission of the preamble and change in the definition so as to include petition  in word application  do not show an intention to make article 137 applicable to proceedings before bodies other than courts such as quasi judicial tribunals and executive bodies
63 D H 64 A G 65 B F In the present case since the applications were presented to the Labour Court a tribunal which is not a court governed by the Civil or Criminal Procedure Codes the applications are not governed by article 137 of 1963 Act
65 G H Manager Mls
P K Porwal vs The Labour Court at Nagpur 70 BLR 104 overruled