ivil Appeal Nos
337 38 of 1982
From the Judgments and order date 5780 and 321981 of the Karnataka High Court in WP No 5431976 and 1217 of 1981 respectively 
RN Narasimamurthy
Attorney General and PR Ramasesh for the Appellants
GL Sanghi AK Sen HB Datar
KR Nagaraja
N Ganpathy KR NambiaI RP Ranga Swamy RB Datar and Ms c
K Sucharita for the Respondents 
RS Hegde for the impleded party
DUTT J
These appeals by special leave preferred at the instance of the Secretary Regional Transport Authority Bangalore and the State of Karnataka are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High PG NO 1041 Court dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants and affirming that of the learned Single Judge of the High Court whereby the Rule issued on the writ petition filed by the respondent No 1 DP Sharma was made absolute
The respondent No 1 who is the owner of a public service vehicle made an application on October 10 1976 to the Regional Transport Authority for the grant of a special permit under sub section 6 of section 63 of the for the period from November 15 1976 to November 22 1976
The Regional Transport Authority rejected the said application on the ground that the provisions of the Karnataka Contract Carriages Acquisition Act 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Act  prohibit the grant of such permits
The respondent No 1 being aggrieved by the refusal by the Regional Transport Authority to grant a special permit filed a writ petition in the High Court
A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the Regional Transport Authority to consider the application of the respondent No I for the grant of special permit
Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge the appellants preferred a writ appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court
The Bench took the view that the intention of the Legislature was that only a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had been issued when the Act came into force and which was not operating as a stage carriage should be acquired
Accordingly it was held that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not been issued when the Act came into force would not come within the definition of contract carriage  under section 3g of the Act and the prohibition contained in section 28 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage permit would not extend to the grant of special permit under sub section 6 of section 63 of the 
In that view of the matter the Division Bench dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants
The only point that is involved in these appeals is whether after the coming into force of the Act a special permit under section 636 of the can be granted under the Act
The Act is to provide for the acquisition of contract carriages and for matters incidental ancillary or subservient thereto
The preamble provides inter alia as follows PG NO 1042 Whereas contract carriages and certain other categories of public service vehicles are being operated in the State in a manner highly detrimental and prejudicial to public interest And Whereas with a view lo prevent such misuse and also to provide better facilities for the transport of passengers by road and to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing that the ownership and control of the resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment And Whereas for the aforesaid purposes it is considered necessary to provide for the acquisition of contract carriages and certain other categories of public service vehicles in the State and for matters incidential
ancillary or subservient thereto It is apparent from the preamble of the Act that the primary object of the Act is acquisition of contract carriages with a view to preventing misuse and also to provide better facilities for the transport of bassengers by road Besides the prearmble
we may refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act which will show the back ground for the enactment of the Act
The Statement of objects and Reasons for the Act is as follows A large number of contract carriages were being operated in the StaLe to the detriment of public interest and were also functioning stealthily as stage carriages
This had to be prevented
Article 39b and c enjoins upon the 
State to see that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth to the common detriment
In view of the aforesaid it was considered necessary to acquire the contract carriages run by private operators Accordingly the Karnataka Contract Carriages PG NO 1043 Acquisition Ordinance 1976 was promulgated
The Bill seeks to replace the Ordinance
 The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged before this Court and a Constitution Bench of Seven Judges in State of karnataka vs Shri Ranganatha Reddy 1978 I SCR 641 upheld the validity of the Act
In considering the question of validity of the Act this Court referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Act and on the basis of various affidavits filed on behalf of the State observed that the operators were misusing their permits granted to them as contract carriage permits and that in many cases the vehicles here used as stage carriages picking up and dropping passengers in the way
Accordingly
the Legislature thought that to prevent such misuse and to provide for better facilities to transport passengers and to the general public it was necessary to acquire the vehicles permits and all right title and interest of the contract carriage operators etc
Keeping in view the objects and reasons for the enactment of the Act we have to consider whether after the coming into force of the Act it is permissible to grant a special permit under section 686 of the 
But before we do that we may refer to the Scheme of the Act
We have already referred to the preamble to the Act providing for the acquisition of contract carriages
The Act shall be deemed to have come into force on January 30 1976 as provided in sub section 3 of section 1 of the Act
Section 2 contains a declaration that the Act is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses b and c of Article 39 of the Constitution of India and the acquisition therefor of the contract carriages and other property referred to in section 4 of the Act
Section 3 is the definition section
Clause g of section 3 is an extended definition of contract carriage  as given in section 32 of the 
and we shall presently refer to and deal with the definition in detail
Clause h of section 3 of the Act defines contract carriage operator 
Under clause m of section 3 of the Act permit  means the permit granted under the  authorising the use of a vehicle as a contract carriage
Section 4 is the vesting provision of contract carriages etc
Section 6 provides for the determination of the amount for the vesting of the acquired property under section 4 of the Act
Section 14 bars the issuance of a fresh permit or renewal of the existing permit for the running of any contract carriage
Sub section l of section 20 provides inter alia that all contract carriage permits granted or renewed in respect of PG NO 1044 any vehicle other than a vehicle acquired under the Act or belonging to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation or referred to in section 24 of the Act shall stand cancelled
Sub section 3 of Section 20 provides that no officer or authority shall invite any application or entertain any such application of persons other than the Corporation for the grant of permit for the running of any contract carriage
It has been already noticed that the Act provides for acquisition of contract carriages
The words contract carriage  have been defined in section 3R of the Act as follows 3g contract carriage  shall have the same meaning as in clause3 of section 2 of the and includes i a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit has been issued under sub section 6 of section 63 of the  ii a public service vehicle in relation to which a temporary permit has been issued under sub section l of section 62 or sub section lC of section 68F of the  iii a public service vehicle without a contract carriage permit but which is specified as contract carriage in the concerned certificate of registration iv any right in or over such vehicles or moveable property but does not include i a tourist vehicle in relation to which a permit has been issued under sub section 7 of section 63 of the  ii a vehicle operating as a stage carriage in relation to which on the 30th day of January 1976 a temporary contract carriage permit or a special permit issued under sub section  l of section 62 or sub section 6 of section 63 respectively of the  is in force iii a motor cab PG NO 1045 Under section 3g the contract carriage  shall in the first place have the same meaning as in section 23 of the  which provides as follows 23 contract carriage  means a motor vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum i on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance
or ii from one point to another and in either case without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares In the second place section 3g gives an extended meaning to contract carriage 
Under the extended meaning contract carriage  will include a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit has been issued under section 6 of section 63 of the or in relation to which a temporary permit has been issued under sub section l of section 62 or sub section IC of section 68F of the 
It also includes a public service vehicle without a contract carriage permit but which is specified as contract carriage in the concerned certificate of registration
We are not referring to clauses iv and v of the extended definition as the same are not relevant for our purpose
A public service vehicle  has been defined in section 225 of the as meaning any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward and includes a motor cab contract carriage and stage carriage
Thus it is apparent from the definition of public service vehicle  that it includes a contract carriage and a stage carriage as well
Under clauses i and ii of section 3g of the Act if a special permit under section 636 or a temporary permit under section 621 or sub section lC of section 68F of the has been issued it will come within the purview of the definition of contract carriage 
In other words if a contract carriage  or a stage carriage  within the meaning of the has been issued a special permit or a temporary permit as referred to in PG NO 1046 clauses i and ii of section 3g
such contract carriage  or stage carriage  will be a contract carriage within the meaning of section 3g of the Act
Now we may refer to the latter part of the definition of contract carriage  under section 3g of the Act which excludes certain vehicles from the definition of contract carriage 
The exclusion that has been provided in clause ii is important for our purpose
It excludes a stage carriage in respect of which a temporary contract carriage permit under section 621 or a special permit under section 636 of the is in force on January 3 1976 that is the date on which the Act is deemed to have come into force
Under clauses i and ii of section 3g of the Act which form a part of the extended definition of contract carriage  a public service vehicle that is to say a contract carriage or a stage carriage in respect of which a special permit under section 636 or a temporary permit under section 621 or section 68FlC of the has been issued will come within the meaning of contract carriage  under the Act
On the other hand if a special permit under section 621 or under section 636 of the was in force on January 30 1976 in respect of a stage carriage such a stage carriage will not be a contract carriage  within the meaning of section 3g of the Act
The High Court seems to think that if any special permit had not been granted to a public service vehicle when the Act came into force such a vehicle will not come within the meaning of the definition of contract carriage  under section 3g
This view of the High Court is not correct
In clauses i and ii of section 3g the expression has been issued  occurs
It is submitted by the learned Advocate General of Karnataka that in view of the expression has been issued  clauses i and ii contemplate the issuance of a special permit or a temporary permit after the coming into force of the Act
It does not include the issuance of a special permit or a temporary permit earlier than the date of the commencement of the Act
The learned Advocate General has placed reliance on an English decision in re Athlumne Ex parte Wilson In that case the words where a date has been proved under the principal Act  came to be construed and it was observed But this form of words is often used to refer not to a past time which preceded the enactment but to a time which is made past by anticipation a time which will have become a past time only when the event occurs on which the statute is to operate
 In our opinion whether the expression has been  occurring in a provision of a statute denotes transaction prior to the enactment of the statute in question or a transaction PG NO 1047 after the coming into force of the statute will depend upon the intention of the Legislature to be gathered from the provision in which the said expression occurs or from the other provisions of the statute
In the instant case the words has been  contemplate the issuance of a special permit or a temporary permit as referred to in clauses i and ii of section 3g of the Act after the enactment of the Act which is clear from the exclusion clause ii of section 3g which excludes a stage carriage from the definition of contract carriage  if special permits issued under section 621 or section h6 of the were in force on January 30 1976
It is difficult to interpret clauses i and ii of section 3g as contemplating the issuance of a temporary permit or a special permit
as referred to therein before the coming into force of the Act
Merely because of the use of the words has been in clauses i and ii of section 3g such an interpretation is not possible to be made particularly in view of the legislative intent apparent from the exclusion clause ii namely
that the Legislature only
excluded a stage carriage in respect of which a temporary contract carriage or a special permit issued under section 621 or 636 of the was in force on January 30 1976
It has however been urged by Mr A K Sen learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No 1
that a stage carriage vehicle in respect of which a special permit has been granted is excluded form the operation of the Act
counsel submits that the Act only contemplates the acquisition of a contract carriage within the meaning of the Motor vehicles Act and not a stage carriage in respect of which a special permit was or has been granted
In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed strong reliance on the definition of the word permit under section 3m of the Act as meaning the permit granted under the  authorising the use of a vehicle as a contract carriage
It is submitted by him that the contract carriage under the 
It is urged by the learned Counsel that the word permit used in the different provisions of the act will have the same meaning of the word as defined in section 3m that is to say the permit granted under the for the use of a vehicle as a contract carriage
In section 3h contract carriage operator  has been defined as follows PG NO 1048 3h contract carriage operator  means an operator holding one or more contract carriage permit and includes any person in whose name a public service vehicle is registered and is specified as a contract carriage in the certificate or registration of such vehicle  According to the learned Counsel the word permit  in section 3h refers only to permit granted in respect of a contract carriage under the 
Section 4 is the vesting provision of contract carriages
Clause a of sub section  1 of section 4 provides as follows 4 Vesting of contract carriages etc 1 On and from such date as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf by notification in respect of any contract carriage operator a every contract carriage owned or operated by such contract carriage operator along with the permit or the certificate of registration or both as the case may be shall vest in the State Government absolutely free from all encumbrances Counsel submits that the word Permit  in clause a refers to a permit granted to a vehicle for the use of a contract carriage under the 
In other words the sum and substance of the argument of Mr Sen is that the word permit  in section m relates to the permit granted to a vehicle for the use as a contract carriage under the and the definition with this interpretation should be applied to the word Permit  occurring in the different provisions of the Act including section 3h and should also be applied to the word occuring in section 14 of the Act
Section 14 provides as follows 14 Fresh permit or renewal of the existing permit barred
Except otherwise provided in this Act 1 no person shall on or after the commencement of this Act apply for any permit or fresh permit or for renewal of an existing permit for the running of any contract carriage in the State and 2 every application for the grant of a permit or fresh permit Or for the renewal of the existing permit and all PG NO 1049 appeals or revisions arising therefrom relating thereto made or preferred before the commencement of this Act and pending in any court or with any officer authority or Tribunal constituted under the shall abate
 It is submitted that only the grant or renewal of a permit in respect of a contract carriage  within the meaning of the is prohibited under section 14 of the Act and such prohibition does not relate to a stage carriage for the running of the same as contract carriage
We are unable to accept the contention
If the interpretation as given by Mr Sen of the definition of the word permit  under section 3m of the Act is accepted it will make the definition of the words contract carriage  under section 3g of the Act meaningless and nugatory and also set at naught the object of the Act and the clear intention of the Legislature to acquire a stage carriage as well in respect of which a special permit or a temporary permit as referred to in clauses i or ii of section 3g has been granted
The words contract carriage  occurring in section 3m must in our opinion be read in the light of the definition as contained in section 3g of the Act
So read it is manifest that section 14 read with section 203 of the Act clearly bars the making of any application for a permit or fresh permit or for renewal of an existing permit for the running of a vehicle whether a contract carriage Or a stage carriage
as a contract carriage
It is not disputed before use that the Act does not contemplate the vesting of stage carriage simpliciter But section 14 read with section 203 of the Act clearly prohibits the grant or renewal of any permit for the running of any contract carriage
A stage carriage in respect of which d temporary contract carriage permit or a special permit under section 621 or section 636 respectively of the was in force on January 3t 1 76 has been excluded from the definition obtaining a permit under the 
But whether a special permit was granted in respect of a stage carriage or not no such PG NO 1050 permit can be granted in respect of a stage carriage for the running of it as a contract carriage
In other words section 14 read with section 203 of the Act confers a monopoly on the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation to run vehicles as contract carriages
The High Court is not therefore right in its view that a public service vehicle in relation to which a special permit had not been issued when the Act came into force would not come within the definition of contract carriage  in section 3g and the prohibition contained in section 20 of the Act against the grant of contract carriage permit cannot extend to grant of special permit under section 636 of the 
But before we conclude we may observe that but for the object of the Act as stated above it would have been very difficult for us to interpret the provisions of the Act in view of bad drafting of the same
Be that as it may for the reasons aforesaid these appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside
The writ petition filed by the respondent No 1 in the High Court is dismissed
There will however be no order as to costs
NVK Appeals allowed


Summary:
Under the  November 1 1966 was fixed as the appointed day on and from which date certain territories of the State of Punjab were transferred to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh alongwith some officers and staff
Accordingly respondents Nos 4 and 5 who were holding the posts of Tourist Officers in the Pay scale of Rs250 350 in the State of Punjab were allocated to Himachal Pradesh as Tourist Officers in the same scale
The appellant who was a confirmed Reception Officer in the Department of Public Relations  Tourism Himachal Pradesh had been temporarily promoted on May 13 1966 as District Public Relations Officer in the pay scale of Rs250 500 against an ex cadre post
In the provisional seniority list and the final seniority list published in 1971 the appellant was shown as Reception Officer while respondents Nos 4 and 5 were shown senior to him as Tourist Officers
The appellant made a representation to the Government regarding his promotion and seniority
As a result the appellant was given proforma promotion as Assistant Manager with retrospective effect from June 4 1966
In the seniority list prepared by the Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation on December 31 l977 the name of the appellant was placed at the top of the names of other the officers including those of respondents Nos
l  5
However on the representation of respondent Nos 4  5 the Tourism Development Corporation issued an order dated PG NO 1009 PG NO 1010 April 28 1982 that the inter se seniority of the appellant and respondents nos
4  5 was to be determined on the basis of their substantive ranks on November l 1966 and that the said respondents being in higher scale on that date would rank senior to the appellant as the appellant was not entitled to any advantage in seniority on account of his proforma promotion
The appellant moved a writ petition before the High Court against the order dated April 28 1982
The High Court dismissed the writ petition principally on the ground that the seniority list once finalised after integration could not be reopened
Allowing the appeal it was HELD l Both the provisional and the final seniority lists were prepared without complying with the directions of the Central Government as contained in the letter of the Joint Secretary to the Government of lndia Ministry of Home Affairs dated February 14 1967
1017E F 2 According to the instructions issued by the Central Government for the integration of services and determination of relative seniority one of the two steps which had to be taken was determination of equivalent posts the most important factor for such determination being the salary of the post
1014F G 3 There was no attempt to determine the equivalent posts that is to say no endeavour was made by the Government to equate one post with another for the purpose of integration and determination of relative seniority
Instead the posts as they were were placed in the seniority list
l017F 4 lunder the directions of the Central Government the post of Tourists Officer could not be equated with that of the District Public Relations Officer because the scale of pay of the former is less than that of the latter
1O15E 5 One of the factors that should have been taken into consideration for the purpose of determination of relative seniority as mentioned in the letter of the Government of lndia is length of continuous service whether temporary or permanent in the equivalent post excluding periods for which an appointment is held in a purely stopgap or fortuitous arrangement
1017G H PG NO 1011 6 The Government utterly ignored the direction of the Central Government and the appellant s substantive rank as the Reception Officer as on November 1 1966 was erroneously taken into consideration for the purpose of preparing the inter se seniority
This omission vitiates the final seniority list apart from the omission to equate one post with another for the purpose of integration
1018B C 7 Normally when a seniority list has been made final it should not be allowed to be challenged
But when a seniority list is prepared ignoring all just principles and also the rules framed or directions given by appropriate authority seriously affecting any officer
it is liable to be examined and set aside by the Court
1018G H 8 It is only on April 28 1982 when the Government accepted the representation of respondents nos
4  5 and directed that the inter se seniority of the appellant and the said respondents was to be determined on the basis of their substantive ranks as on November l 1966 that the cause of action really arose to the appellant for moving the writ petition
There has thus been no unreasonable delay on the part of the appellant to challenge the final seniority list
It is also not correct to say that no representation was made by the appellant earlier
1019E F 9 What has been done in the instant case is that a glarming injustice was done to the appellant by taking into account his substantive rank as the Reception Officer on November 1 1966 while as a matter of fact
on that date he was holding the position of District Public Relations Officers
That was done in violation of the directions of the Central Government and subsequently the Government rectified the mistake by granting proforma promotion to the appellant with effect from June 4 1966 to the post of Assistant Manager equivalent to the post of District Public Relations Officer
There is therefore no question of taking the previous approval of the central Government as contamplated by Section 826 of the Act
1020F G 1022l State of Himachal pradesh vs Union of lndia l974 3 SCR 907 N Subba Rao vs Union of India 1973 l SCR 94