minal Appeal No 130 of 1956
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 12 1955 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No 52 D of 1954 arising out of the judgment and order dated December 6 1954 of the Court of the Special Judge at Delhi in Corruption Case No 1 of 1954
1038 N C Chatterjee and C V L Narayan for the appellant in Cr A No 130 of 56
Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal for the appellant in Cr A No 25 of 56
CK Daphtary Solicitor General of India AM Chatterjee H R Khanna and R H Dhebar for the respondent in both the appeals
December 3
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J A question of law common  to these appeals by special leave requires determination hence they were heard together
Special leave in Criminal Appeal No 130 of 1956 was limited to the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence for want of sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 11 of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act
Criminal Appeal No 25 of 1956 was not so limited and additional points were raised for our consideration to which reference will be made when that appeal is specifically dealt with
The question of law common in both these appeals is whether there was any necessity for a sanction under section 6 of the Act before a court could take cognizance of an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code or section 52 of the Act or both alleged to have been committed by a person who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance was not a public servant but was so at the time of the commission of the offence
In Criminal Appeal No 130 of 1956 the appellant was convicted under section 52 of the Act and sentenced to six months  simple imprisonment by the Special Judge Delhi
He appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Punjab High Court
That Court while admitting the appeal issued notice upon the appellant to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced
The High Court ultimately dismissed his appeal and enhanced the sentence of six months  imprisonment to two years  rigorous imprisonment
As in this appeal special leave has been granted limited 1039 to the question already stated it is unnecessary to set out the prosecution case against the appellant
In Criminal Appeal No 25 of 1956 the appellant had applied to the Allahabad High Court under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the proceedings pending against him before the Special Judge
The application was dismissed
It is against the order dismissing his application that this appeal has been filed by the appellant
It is admitted that at the time the Special Judges concerned purported to take cognizance the appellants were not public servants and that no order of sanction under section 6 of the Act by a competent authority was on the record
At the time that the appellants are alleged to have committed the offence they were public servants
Section 6 of the Act states 6
Previous sanction necessary for prosecution 1 No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code Act 45 of 1860 or under sub section 2 of section 5 of this Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction ain the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government of the Central Government bin the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government of the State Government cin the case of any other person of the authority competent to remove him from his office
2Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub section 1 should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which 132 1040 would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed
 There is no dispute that if at the time when a court purports to take cognizance of offences punishable under section 161 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or section 52 of the Act committed by a public servant and that person is a public servant cognizance cannot be taken by a court unless a sanction by the competent authority has been previously accorded
The real controversy in these appeals is whether such a sanction is required before a court can take cognizance in the case of a person who is not a public servant at the time the court is asked to take cognizance although the offence alleged against him was committed by him as a public servant
To determine this question section 6 of the Act requires to be interpreted
In substance it was urged on behalf of the appellants that on a proper interpretation of section 6 of the Act the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence alleged against him was the essence of the matter and not his status at the time the court was asked to take cognizance of the offence in which case a sanction under section 6 of the Act was necessary before a court could take cognizance although at that stage the accused had ceased to be a public servant
On the other band the Solicitor General contended that on a proper interpretation of the provisions of section 6 of the Act not only an offence mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant but that that person is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the offence
Before we proceed to construe the provisions of section 6 of the Act it is necessary to refer to some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants
It was said that in construing the provisions of a statute a court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature and it must do this not only from the language of the statute but also from the 1041 consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy
It must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature
Reliance was also placed upon certain decisions construing the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Reference was also made to article 361 of the Constitution and section 197A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in aid of the construction which the learned Counsel contended for with reference to the words used in section 6 of the Act
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court in the first instance to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein if those words are clear enough
It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which led to the enactment of the statute
Observations of Denning L J as he then was in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd vs Asher 1 were relied upon by Mr Chatterjee
It is however clear that the observations of the learned Judge were made with reference to the provision of a statute which was ambiguous
We cannot construe the observations to mean that where the language of a statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon the court to do anything more than to give effect to the words used
Although reference was made to article 361 of the Constitution and section 197A of the Code by Mr Sethi we are unable to see how the words used therein assist us in con struing the provisions of section 6 of the Act
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Nagpur High Court in the case of section Y Patil vs Vyankatswami 2  and the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind in the case of Suganchand vs Seth Naraindas 3 in support of the submission that even if a person had ceased to be a public servant before the prosecution started such a person was 11949 2 K B 481 498
2 I L R 3A I R 1932 Sind
1042 protected by the provisions of section 197 of the Code and a sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance
It is true that so far as section 197 of the Code is concerned these two decisions do lend support to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellants
It is however to be noticed that the decision of the Nagpur High Court which was of a single Judge was overruled by a Division Bench of that Court in the case of The State vs Hifzul Rahman 1 where it was held that the person accused must be a public servant at the time of the accusation and section 197 of the Code afforded no protection to a public servant if he had ceased to hold office
In the case of Prasad Chandra Banerji vs Emperor2 the Calcutta High Court held that the protection given by section 197
of the Code applied only to a person who is still a public servant at the time the prosecution is launched and does not extend to a person who is no longer a public servant at that time but was in office when the offence charged was alleged to have been committed
Accordingly no sanction under section 197 of the Code was necessary in order to prosecute a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time of the launching of the prosecution
A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Imperator vs Joshi 3 and by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor vs Suraj Narain Chaube 4
It would thus appear that the High Courts of Calcutta Bombay Allababad and Nagpur are agreed that section 197 of the Code affords no protection to a person who is not a public servant at the time he is accused of an offence before a court although at the time he committed the offence he was a public servant
The decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of The State vs Gurcharan Singh 5 was brought to our notice wherein it was held that in view of the form of wording in the two sections namely section 197 of the Code and a 6 of the Act the same principles would apply to them having regard to the decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the protection afforded by section 197 of 1I L R 2 1
L R 3 I L R 4 1
L R 1938 All
5 A I R 1952 Pun89
1043 the Code was available to a person who was a public servant while still in office but was not available to him when he had already been discharged from service before he was prosecuted
These cases may render assistance in understanding the reason why a public servant while he is a public servant cannot be prosecuted without a previous sanction for offences committed by him as a public servant and thus may be of some indirect help in construing the words used in section 6 of the Act
Section 6 however must be construed with reference to the words used therein independent of any construction which may have been placed by these decisions on the words used in section 197 of the Code
Before an attempt is made to construe the words contained in section 6 of the Act some reference may be made to the power vested in a court to take cognizance of an offence
Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a general power on a criminal court to take cognizance of offences but the exercise of such power in certain cases is prohibited by the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Code unless the conditions mentioned therein are complied with
Under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 XLVI of 1952 Special Judges are appointed to try offences under section 161 162 163 164 165 or section 165A of the Indian Penal Code or section 52 of the Act
They are authorized to take cognizance of these offences without the accused person being committed to them for trial
The exercise of this general power to take cognizance by them is prohibited with respect to offences committed under section 161 164 or section 165 of Indian Penal Code or under section 52 of the Act by a public servant without the previous sanction of a competent authority
In our opinion if a general power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in a court any prohibition to the exercise of that power by any provision of law must be confined to the terms of the prohibition
In enacting a law prohibiting the taking of cognizance of an offence by a court unless certain conditions were complied with the legislature did not purport to condone the offence
It was primarily concerned to 1044 see that prosecution for offences in cases coveted by the prohibition shall not commence without complying with the conditions contained therein such as a previous sanction of a competent authority in the case of a public servant and in other cases with the consent of the authority or the party interested in the prosecution or aggrieved by the offence
There can be little doubt that in the case of a public servant the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove him from service is vitally interested in the matter of his prosecution
Such authority is directly concerned in the matter as it has to decide whether to accord or not to accord its sanction for the prosecution of one of its servants
The authority concerned may refuse to accord such sanction on the ground that the prosecution is frivolous or vexatious or on the ground that in the public Interest it would be inexpedient to do so
Without some safeguard of this kind a public servant may find it impossible to carry on his official duties efficiently
The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and corruption
Its provisions are severe
Certain presumptions of guilt of offences committed under sections 161 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code were enjoined by section 4 of the Act unless the contrary was proved by the accused
Section 5 of the Act created the offence if criminal misconduct on the part of a public servant an offence unknown to any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with bribery or corruption
Sub section 2 made such an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to a term of 7 years or with fine or with both
Under sub section
3 a court shall presume that the accused was guilty of misconduct if it was proved that he or any other person on his behalf was in possession for which the accused person could not satisfactorily account of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income
These provisions of the Act indi cate that it was the intention of the legislature to treat more severely than hitherto corruption on the part of a public servant and not to condone it in any manner whatsoever
If section 6 had Dot found a place in 1045 the Act it is clear that cognizance of an offence under s161 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under s52 of the Act committed by a public servant could be taken by a court even if he had ceased to be a public servant
The mere fact that he had ceased to be a public servant after the commission of the offence would not absolve him from his crime
Section 6 certainly does prohibit the taking of cognizance of his offence without a previous sanction while he is still a public servant but does that prohibition continue after he has ceased to be a public servant  It is to determine that question which requires us to examine and construe the provisions of section 6 of the Act and to express our opinion thereon
When the provisions of section 6 of the Act are examined it is manifest that two conditions must be fulfilled before its provisions become applicable
One is that the offences mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant and the other is that that person is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or is a public servant who is removable from his office by any other competent authority
Both these conditions must be present to preventa court from taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office
If either of these conditions is lacking the essential requirements of the section are
wanting and the provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a court taking cognizance without a previous sanction
An offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code can be committed by a public servant or by a person expecting to be a public servant but section 6 of the Act refers only to an offence committed by a publicservant under that section
If therefore at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code the accused is a public servant but was not so at the time that the offence was committed but at which time he was 1046 merely expecting to be a public servant a previous sanction would be unnecessary before a court could take cognizance
as the provisions of the section would be inapplicable
Conversely if an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code was committed by a public servant but at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the offence that person had ceased to be a public servant one of the two requirements to make section 6 of the Act applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would be unnecessary
The words in section 61 of the Act are clear enough and they must be given effect to
There is nothing in the words used in section 61 to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed
It was suggested that el
c in section 61 refers to persons other than those mentioned in cls
a and b
The words  is employed  are absent in this clause which would therefore apply to a person who had ceased to be a public servant though he was so at the time of the commission of the offence
Clause c cannot be construed in this way
The expressions  in the case of a person  and in the case of any other person  must refer to a public servant having regard to the first paragraph of the sub section
Clauses a and b therefore would cover the case of a public servant who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government and el
c would cover the case of any other public servant whom a competent authority could remove from his office
The more important words in cl
c are of the authority competent to remove him from his office
A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by a competent authority
Section 2 of the Act states that a public servant for the purpose of the Act means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code
Under 1047 cl
c therefore any one who is a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance but does not come within the description of a public servant under cls
a and b is accused of an offence committed by him as a public servant as specified in section 6 would be entitled to rely on the provisions of that section and object to the taking of cognizance without a previous sanction
To read cl
c in the way suggested on behalf of the appellants would be to give a meaning to this clause which is not justified by the words employed therein
It was further suggested that the provisions of sub section
2 of section 6 indicate that it was the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence which was relevant rather than his status at the time a court was asked to take cognizance
This sub section was inserted into the Act by the Prevention of Corruption Second Amendment Act 1952 and it purported to finally settle any doubts which may arise as to which authority should grant the sanction in the case of a public servant who had committed an offence mentioned in section 61 and who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance is still a public servant
For example it is not difficult to imagine cases where a public servant employed by a State Government is subsequently employed by the Central Government and a question arises as to which of the two Governments is to grant the sanction for his prosecution
This sub section resolves the difficulty by directing that where a doubt arises the authority which was to grant the sanction was the one which was competent to remove him from his office at the time of the commission of the offence
If the provisions of sub section
1 bear the construction which we place upon them there is nothing in sub section
2 which is in conflict with that construction
Besides there is nothing in the language of sub section
2 which carries the meaning suggested on behalf of the appellants or which assists us in construing the provisions of sub section
We cannot construe the words  is employed  and  is not removable in cls
a and b and competent to remove him from his office in cl
c as was employed and  was not removable  and  would have been I33 1048 competent to remove him from his office 
To do so would be to substitute our own words for the words of the statute as contained in these clauses
In Criminal Appeal No 122 of 1954 dealt with by another judgment where a similar question bad been raised the appellant had suggested that two defects appearing in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended to be remedied by the Act 1 that section 197 did not apply to a public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of an offence and 2 that an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code committed by a public servant was not covered by section 197 of the Code as such offence could not be said to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty having regard to the decisions of the courts in India and of the Privy Council
We cannot see how this assists us in construing s6 of the Act
Whatever the phraseology of s197 of the Code may have been in the past the decisions of the courts in India that section 197 of the Codedoes not apply to a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance were based upon the words used in that section at the time the judgments were pronounced
These decisions laid emphasis on the words  when any person who is a judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code    or when any public servant who is not removable from his office     It was held in these decisions that these words meant that the person must be a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance although be may have been a public servant at the time of the commission of the offence
It is true that unlike section 197 of the Code section 6 of the Act does not contain the words  while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty 
We have to construe section 6 of the Act as we find it and the absence of these words from the section renders us no assistance in its construction
In our opinion in giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 6 of the Act the conclusion 1049 is inevitable that at the time a court is asked to take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by a public servant but the person accused is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of section 6 can apply
In the present appeals admittedly the appellants had ceased to be public servants at the time the court took cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by them as public servants
Accordingly the provisions of section 6 of the Act did not apply and the prosecution against them was not vitiated by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority
Criminal Appeal 25 of 1956
In this appeal apart from the question that the court could not take cognizance of the offence alleged against the appellant without a previous sanction of a competent authority additional points had been taken for quashing the prosecution pending against him
The appellant was appointed Deputy Assistant Director Enforcement in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on March 25 1949 and was promoted to the office of Assistant Director on July 14 1949
It was alleged that he accepted on September 11 1951 a sum Rs 10000 as bribe in part payment out of an agreed amount of Rs 30000
An enquiry under r 55 of the Civil Service Rules took place and thereafter he was dismissed from service on September 25 1953
In the meantime it appears that correspondence bad ensued between the appellant and the Government
On September 18 1952 a final report was submitted to the court under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein it was stated that although a prosecution was recommended the order of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was that the appellant would be dealt with departmentally
On September 19 1952 the Magistrate by his order approved of the closing of the investigation discharged the appellant from his bail and directed that the sum of Rs 10000 seized from him was to be returned to the complainant
The prosecution of the appellant was 1050 however recommenced on February II 1954 on the same materials and same allegations but on a fresh complaint
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that once a sanction had been refused then that was the end of the prosecution for all times
If once the sanction was refused it could not ever be granted later on
If the prosecution had been dropped then it could not be revived in a case where a sanction was necessary prior to a prosecution and a promise not to prosecute prevented a reconsideration of the matter
Lastly it was urged that in the circumstances of the case it was an abuse of the process of the court to allow a prosecution to be recommenced after it had been withdrawn
We have examined the correspondence which has been referred to in the petition for special leave and which is to be found on the record of this case
There is nothing in them to establish the allegation that a sanction for the prosecution of the appellant was positively refused
All that is indicated is that the Government chose to proceed against the appellant departmentally
It can hardly be said that in doing so the Government had positively refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant
Indeed it may be legitimately said that the Government preferred to wait the result of a departmental enquiry
If that enquiry exonerated the appellant the occasion for granting a sanction may not arise
If on the other band the departmental enquiry established the allegation against the appellant the Government might find itself in possession of more material than that disclosed by the police investigation on which to decide whether a sanction should or should not be granted
We cannot read into the correspondence as was suggested on behalf of the appellant that there was a promise on the part of the Government not to prosecute the appellant
It is true that there was a final report and a withdrawal of the case before a Magistrate
At the stage when the withdrawal took place the appellant was still a public servant and the court could not take 1051 cognizance of the offence under s 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 52 of the Act without a previous sanction
The withdrawal of the case at that stage meant no more than this that the appellant was discharged
A withdrawal of a case resulting merely in a discharge does not prevent the prosecution being recommenced on a fresh complaint
On February 11 1954 when the fresh complaint was filed the appellant was not a public servant and therefore the court could take cognizance without a previous sanction
It is unnecessary for us to say whether once a sanction is positively refused a fresh sanction cannot be granted because we are satisfied on the materials before us that in fact there was no positive refusal to sanction the prosecution of the appellant
We are also satisfied that the circumstances do not establish that there had been any abuse of the process of the court and the provisions of section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply
As the points urged in these appeals have failed the appeals must accordingly be dismissed
Appeals dismissed


Summary:
 Sub section 1 of section 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 barred suits without the permission of the District Magistrate against tenants for eviction except on the grounds mentioned therein
Sub section 2 provided for revision to the Commissioner and sub section 4 made the order of the Commissioner final
Section 7 F empowered the State Government to interfere with such orders
That Act was repealed by the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972
Section 432rr of the new Act inserted therein by UP Act 37 of 1972 provided that where any permission obtained under section 3 of the old Act had become final either before the commencement of the Act or in accordance with the provisions of the sub section after the commencement of the Act the landlord may apply to the Prescribed Authority for tenant s eviction
This section was against amended in 1976 by insertion of the words whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted and giving it retrospective operation
The order of the Prescribed Authority in such cases was made final
The landlord s application under section 3 of the 1947 Act for eviction of the tenants appellants was granted by the Commissioner in April 197I
The revision preferred by them was rejected by the State Government in February 1972 and the permission became final
In pursuance 841 Of the said permission the landlord filed a suit for eviction of the appellants
Thereafter in 1973 he filed an application for withdrawal of the said suit on the ground that as the 1972 Act had been amended he would file an application for enforcement of the permission
The Court of Small Causes found that as the cause of action on which the suit had been filed was rendered infructuous the suit was liable to be dismissed
The application filed by the landlord under section 432rr of the new Act for eviction of the appellants was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that since permission obtained under section 3 of the old Act had been exhausted the application was not maintainable
An appeal against that order was allowed by the District Judge
In the writ petition filed by the appellants tenants under article 226 of the Constitution it was contended that the permission obtained by the landlord having been utilised by filing the suit another proceeding on the basis of the said permission could not be initiated and that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge
The High Court held that the landlord had right to file the second application
It took the view that dismissal of the first action taken by the landlord after obtaining permission under the old Act did not preclude him from taking the second action under section 432rr of the Act
It further held that since the first suit was not decided on merits subsequent action was not precluded
Dismissing the appeal by special leave  HELD 1
Section 432rr of the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 as it stood in 1973 permitted a landlord to file an application for the enforcement of the permission obtained by him under section 3 of the 1947 Act
After the aforesaid provision was amended in 1976 the landlord was not required to file a suit to avail of the permission
The amendment was retrospective in operation
844G H 2
The Prescribed Authority was in error in taking the view that as the previous suit had been filed by the landlord on the basis of permission and the same had been dismissed the application under section 432rr of the 1972 Act was not maintainable
Such a view would frustrate the very purpose of the express provision of the section which conferred a right on a landlord who had obtained permission under the old Act and has filed an application under the new provision to get the 842 tenant evicted
More so when the permission granted had not been exhausted because the suit was dismissed on a technical plea and not on the merit of the contentions
846C D 845C Pahlad Das vs Ganga Saran and Another AIR 1958 Allahabad 774 approved
31 Finality of order in judicial proceeding is one of the essential principles which the scheme of the administration of justice must strive for
846D DK Soni vs PK Mukherjee  Ors
CA No 6626 of 1983 decided on October 27 1987
referred to 32 In the instant case through no appeal lay before the District Judge the High Court came to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper
On that ground it declined to interfere with the order of the District Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution
Since justice has been done by setting aside the improper order of the Prescribed Authority no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court
There is therefore no scope for interference under article 136 of the Constitution
847A B 1 Shri Bhagwan and Anr
vs Ram Chand and Anr   inapplicable