ivil Appeals Nos 132 133 and 137 of 1955 and Petition No 567 of 1954
Appeals under Article 1321 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 18th October 1954 of the Nagpur High Court in Misc
Peti 486 tions Nos 265 348 and 275 of 1953 respectively and Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights
M C Setalvad Attorney General of India R M Hajarnavis and G C Mathur with him for the appellant in CA No 132 of 1955
N C Chatterji R M Hajarnavis and G C Mathur with him for Intervener No 1 in C A No 132 of 1955
R M Hajarnavis and G C Mathur for Intervener No 2 in C A No 132 of 1955
R M Hajarnavis and G C Mathur for the appellant in C A No 133 of 1955
R M Hajarnavis and G C Mathur for the appellant in CA No 137 of 1955
M Adhikari Deputy Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh and I N Shroff for respondents in allappeals
M C Setalvad Attorney General of India and C K Daphtary Solicitor General of India A P Sen J B Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain with them for the petitioner in Petition No 567 of 1954
T L Shevde Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh M Adhikari Deputy Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh and I N Shroff with him for respondents
J B Dadachanji R M Hajarnavis and Rajinder Narain for the Intervener 1955
September 20
The judgment
of section R Das
Acting Chief Justice Bhagwati Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ was delivered by Bhagwati J Jagannadhadas J delivered a separate judgment
Civil Appeals Nos 132 133 and 137 of 1955 BHAGWATI J
These 3 appeals with certificate under article 1321 of the Constitution involve the interpretation of the proviso to article 2862 and raise a common question as to whether that proviso also saves 487 the transactions of sale or purchase covered by the Explanation to article 2861 a from the ban imposed therein
The Appellants in Civil Appeal No 132 of 1955 are Messrs Ramnarain Sons Ltd a firm registered as a As dealer under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh
After the Cotton Control Order 1949 came into force on the 12th September 1949 the Appellants entered into agreements with several mills situated outside Madhya Pradesh by which they undertook to purchase kapas in the various markets in Madhya Pradesh as their agents on their account and on their behalf The kapas after purchase was to be ginned and pressed into bales and sent to the mills
All the expenses involved in the process were to be borne by the mills which were also to be credited with the sale proceeds of the cotton seeds and the Appellants were only entitled to commission on a percentage basis
The Ap pellants worked as such agents for the period 1st October 1949 to 30th September 1950
By his order dated the 30th June 1953 the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax Amravati Respondent No 1 included the transactions valued at Rs 7286454 5 10 with the said mills in the Appellants  turnover and ordered the Appellants to pay Rs 113850 13 6 as sales tax on the said transactions
The Appellants filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 2 on the 30th July 1953
The appeal was however entertained by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 3 who ordered the Appellants to pay Rs 25000 by the 31st August 1953
The Appellants thereupon filed a petition under Article 226 being Misc Petition No 265 of 1953 in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur asking inter alia for the quashing of the order of 30th June 1953 passed by Respondent No I and for consequential reliefs
The Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the Appellants and praying for the dismissal of the petition with costs
62 488 The Appellants in Civil Appeal No 133 of 1955 are the Eastern Cotton Company a firm registered as a dealer under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 and carrying on business at Amravati and at other places in Madhya Pradesh
They also during the period 1st October 1949 to 30th September 1950 worked as agents of certain mills situated outside Madhya Pradesh procured kapas for them in Madhya Pradesh and sent it to the mills for consumption outside the State
By his order dated the 9th September 1953 the Respondent No
I included the transactions valued at Rs 3347405 5 6 with the said mills in the Appellants  turn over and ordered the Appellants to pay Rs 52303 4 0 as tax on the said transactions
These Appellants also filed a petition under article 226 being Misc
Petition No 348 of 1953 in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur for quashing the order dated the 9th September 1953 passed by Respondent No 1 and for con sequential reliefs
The Respondents filed a return denying their contentions
The Appellants in Civil Appeal No 137 of 1955 are the firm Ramdas Khimji Brothers Bombay registered as a dealer under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 and carrying on business as cotton dealers in Madhya Pradesh
During the period 1st October 1950 to 30th September 1951 the Appellants sold cotton worth Rs 601949 1 9 to various persons outside Madhya Pradesh
The cotton was delivered to the buyers for consumption outside Madhya Pradesh as a direct result of such sales
By his order dated the 29th December 1952 the Sales Tax Officer Amravati in the assessment of the Appellants for the same period included the said transactions in the Appellants  turn over and assessed sales tax thereon
The Appellants filed an appeal to Respondent No I but the same was dismissed by an order dated the 10th July 1953
The Appellants filed on 22nd August 1953 a revision before the Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh
The Appellants also filed a petition under Article 226 being MiscPetition No 274 of 1953 in the High Court of Judicature at 489 Nagpur asking for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of Respondent No I passed by him in Sales Tax Appeal No 13 A dated the 10th July 1953 and for consequential reliefs
The Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the Appellants and A asking that the petition be dismissed with costs
These petitions came up for hearing and final disposal before the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur along with MiscPetitions No 288 of 1953 and No 132 of 1954
A considered judgment was delivered in Miscellaneous Petition No 132 of 1954 and the reasoning contained therein governed the decision in the connected Petitions Nos 265 274 and 348 of 1953
The High Court held that the Explanation II to section 2g of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 as amended by the Central Provinces and Berar Act XVI of 1949 having been declared invalid from its inception by the High Court in Messrs Shriram Gulabdas vs Board of Revenue ILR 1953 Nagpur 332 and by this Court in   the original Explanation remained in force until the 1st April 1951 when it was amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act IV of 1951
Explanation II originally enacted was in the terms following Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian  the sale of any goods which are actually in the Central Provinces and Berar at the time when the contract of sale as defined in that Act in respect thereof is made shall wherever the said contract of sale is made be deemed for the purpose of this Act to have taken place in the Central Provinces and Berar
The Appellants contended that this Explanation offended article 2861 a read with the Explanation to the same and the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore not entitled to tax the transactions of sale in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for the purpose of consumption outside Madhya Pradesh
The Respondents on the other hand contended that the said Explanation was protected until the 31st March 1951 by the Sales Tax Continuation Order No 7 of 1950 issued by the 490 President on  the 26th January 1950 under the proviso to article 2862
The High Court was of the opinion that the original Explanation was validly enacted as the assent of the Governor General to the enactment was given on the 23rd May 1947 and that under that Explanation the tax prior to the commencement of the Constitution was lawfully levied on the sales of goods wherever the contracts of sale took place if the goods were actually in the State at the time the contracts of sale were made
This power could be exercised by the State even if the sales took place during the course of inter State trade or commerce and the goods were delivered as a direct result of the sales for the purpose of consumption outside the State
This was because the situs of the goods constituted a sufficient nexus between the transactions and the taxing State which was the foundation for taxation prior to the commencement of the Constitution
This position continued until the com mencement of the Constitution and on the 26th January 1950 the President issued the Sales Tax Continuation Order No 7 of 1950 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to article 2862
The sales in question had taken place in the course of inter State trade or commerce and accordingly they were covered by article 2862 and would therefore be liable to tax even after the commencement of the Constitution by virtue of the President s order
Reliance was further placed on the majority judgment of this Court in The State of Bombay vs The United Motors India Ltd  where it was held that the transaction vis a vis the delivery State lost its inter State character if it fell within the Explanation to article 2861 a and was accordingly made liable to taxation by the delivery State
So far however as the exporting State was concerned it retained its character of an inter State transaction and would not therefore be liable to taxation by that State vide article 2862
The President s order however removed this ban and
the exporting State was entitled to tax the transaction by virtue of the power derived by it from the same
On a construction of 491 the relevant provisions of article 2861 and article 2862 the High Court was of the opinion that it would be making the proviso to article 2862 nugatory if it was held that article 2861 overrides it and takes away the taxing power of all States in inter State trade or commerce except the delivery State
The High Court accordingly dismissed the petitions with costs
The learned Attorney General appearing for the Appellants before us contended that so far as the post Constitution period is concerned the position is governed by our judgment in The Bengal Immunity Co Ltd vs The State of Bihar delivered on the 6th September 1955
He urged that the bans imposed on the powers of the State Legislatures to levy taxes on the sale or purchase of goods in the several clauses of article 286 are independent and separate and that the transactions of sale or purchase referred to in the various clauses must be looked at from different viewpoints
Even if a transaction might fall within the category of inter State sale or purchase and the President s order under the proviso to article 2862 might enable the State to levy any tax on such sale or purchase which was being lawfully levied by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution such transaction had also to surmount the ban imposed under article 2861 a and the Explanation thereto so that if as a direct result of such sale the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in another State the exporting State to use the phraseology of the Nagpur High Court or the title State to use the phraseology adopted in some of the judgments in The Bengal Immunity Co s Appeal would not be entitled to levy a tax on such sale the transaction being fictionally outside the State by reason of the Explanation and therefore coming within the ban of article 2861a
It was however urged on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh that the President s order not only saved the transactions from the ban of article 2862 but also from the ban of article 286 1 a because the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 492 2861a were of the same category as transactions covered by article 2862 and were all in the course of inter State trade or commerce
It was further urged that if the transactions covered by the Expla nation to article 286 1 a were not saved from the ban by the President s order the whole intention of the Constitution makers in maintaining the status quo qua the taxes on sales or purchases of goods which were being lawfully levied by the State immediately before the commencement of the Constitu tion would be frustrated because the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 2861 a being necessarily in the course of inter State trade or commerce the President s order would be rendered nugatory and the exporting State or the title State would  be restrained from levying tax on such transactions in spite of the ban having been lifted by the President s order
We are unable to accept this contention
As held by the majority Judges in The Bengal Immunity Co s Appeal the bans imposed by article 286 on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before a State Legislature can impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of goods
These bans have been imposed from different view points and even though the transactions of sale or purchase may in conceivable cases overlap so far as these different viewpoints are concerned each of those bans is operative and has to be enforced
So far as article 2861 a is concerned the Explanation determines by the legal fiction created therein the situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming within that category and when a transaction is thus determined to be inside a particular State it necessarily becomes a transaction outside all other States
The only relevant enquiry for the purposes of article 2861 a therefore is whether a transaction is outside the State and once it is determined by the application of the Explanation that it is outside the State it follows as a matter of course that the State with reference to which the transac tion can thus be predicated to be outside it can never 493 tax the transaction
This ban is effective independently of the fact that the transaction may also have taken place in the course of inter State trade or commerce or with reference to goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community
The ban imposed under article 2862 is an independent and separate one and looks at the transactions entirely from the point of view of their having taken place in the course of inter State trade or commerce
Even if such transactions may also fall within the category of transactions covered by article 286 1a and the Explanation thereto or article 2863 the moment article 2862 is attracted by reason of the transactions being in the course of interState trade or commerce the ban under article 286 2 operates and such transactions can never be subjected to tax at the instance of a State Legislature except in so far as Parliament by law may otherwise provide or such power of taxation is saved by the President s order contemplated in the proviso
The ban under article 2862 may be saved by the President s order but that does not affect or lift the ban under article 286 1 a read with the Explanation
Apart from the construction thus put upon the several clauses of article 286 by the majority of the Judges in The Bengal Immunity Co s Appeal as above the terms of the proviso itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the ban under article 286 2 and no other
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision
It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as  a proviso and to no other
Even if the non  obstante clause Notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause had not been enacted in the proviso the proviso could only have been construed as operating upon the field enacted in article 2862 and could not be extended to any of the other provisions of article 286
The non obstante clause however makes it abundantly and further clear and states in 494 explicit terms that it is enacted only with reference to this clause ie article 2862
The President s order may direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was to continue to be levied until 31st March 1951 but the effect of that order was to raise the ban in so far as it was imposed by the provisions of this clause
The President s order therefore only lifted the ban in so far as the transactions took place in the course of inter State trade or commerce and could not be projected into the sphere of any other clause of article 286
It bad therefore  not the effect of lifting the ban which was imposed by article 2861a and the Explanation thereto even though the transactions covered by the Explanation to article 2861 a by and large fell within the category of transactions which took place in the course of inter State trade or commerce
The ban imposed by article 2861 a was independent and separate and could not be lifted by the President s order which had operation only in regard to the interState character of the transactions
The moment it was determined that the transactions were outside the State by virtue of the Explanation to article 2861a the ban imposed by article 2861a attached to the same and could not be lifted by the President s order which operated only on the interState character of the transactions and saved only those inter State transactions which did not come within the Explanation
If the contention urged on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh is accepted it would mean that we should re write or amend the proviso to article 2862 in order to effectuate the supposed intention of the Constitution makers
The supposed intention of the Constitution makers was alleged to be to preserve to the States all the taxes on sale or purchase of goods which were being lawfully levied by them immediately before the commencement of the Constitution by having resort to the territorial connection or nexus theory
We have no evidence before us of this 495 supposed intention of the Constitution makers Whatever their intention was can only be gathered from the language which they have used and where the language is plain there is no scope whatever for speculation in that behalf When the Constitution  makers themselves used the words Notwithstanding that the imposition of such a tax is contrary to the provisions Of this clause it would not be legitimate for us to go behind the plain words and try to read into the proviso something which would involve either a deletion of the non obstante clause or a re writing thereof as suggested
Whatever be the effect of our judgment on the treasuries of the exporting or title States we cannot assist them by reading something into the proviso which is not warranted by any canon of construction
The proviso has reference only to article 2862 and cannot be projected into any other clause of article 286
The untenability of the contentions of the Respondents will be clear from the following illustrationSuppose the goods are in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time the contracts of sale of those goods are made in say the State of Bombay
Suppose further that the property in the goods has by reason of such sales passed in the State of Bombay but the goods as a direct result of such sales have been delivered for consumption in the State of Madras
According to the Respondents the President s order made under the proviso to article 2862 saves the transactions from the ban of article 286 1 a read with the Explanation
Then the State of Madras will be able to tax by virtue of article 2861 a read with the Explanation or on the nexus theory by reason of the goods being delivered there for consumption the State of Bombay will be able to tax because the title to the goods passed there and the State of Madhya Pradesh will also be able to tax under the Explanation 11 to section 2g of the Act because the goods were in the State of Madhya Pradesh at the time when the contracts of sale were made in the State of Bombay
Nobody will say that the Constitution makers intended to perpetuate multiple taxation of 63 496 this kind and yet that will be the result if we were to accede to the arguments advanced by the Respondents
The result therefore is that so far as the post Con stitution period is concerned the ban which is imposed by article 286 1 a and the Explanation thereto cannot be removed by the President s order which was issued under the proviso to article 2862 and the High Court was in error when it construed the proviso to article 2862 as projecting into the field of article 286 1 a and lifting the ban imposed therein
On the above reasoning Civil Appeal No 137 of 1955 filed by the firm of Ramdas Khimji Brothers Bombay which relates only to the post Constitution period will be allowed and the order of assessment dated the 29th December 1952 will be set aside
The Respondents will pay the costs of the Appellants here as well as in the Court below
As regards Civil Appeals Nos 132 of 1955and 133 of 1955 however the assessments therein relate not only to the post Constitution period but also the preConstitution period to which different considerations would apply
The validity of the assessment in regard to the same would have to be canvassed having regard to the various contentions of law and fact which could be urged against the same by the Appel lants
There are two outstanding questions which have been mooted before us by the learned AttorneyGeneral in regard to this period viz 1 a question of fact as to whether the Appellants were agents of the various mills in regard to the transactions which were the subject matter of the assessment and 2 a question of law whether the law under which the tax was levied viz Explanation II to section 2g of the Act was validly enacted
Both these contentions though they are also relevant to the post Constitution period were not specifically pressed before us because the argument based on the proviso to article 286 2 was considered sufficient to set aside the assessment for that period
They would however appropriately arise and be urged by the appellants when the liability to assessment for the pre Constitution 497 period is to be determined and if we were to determine that liability we would have to deal with the same
The necessity for doing so is however obviated by reason of the fact that the assessment is one composite whole relating to the pre Constitution as well as the post Constitution periods and is invalid in toto
There is authority for the proposition that when an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of the property treated as assessable the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a provision of law were expressly exempted from taxation renders the assessment
invalid in toto The
Privy Council have observed in Bennett  White Calgary Ld
And Municipal District of Sugar City No 5 1951 Appeal Cases 786 at page 816 When an assessment is not for an entire sum but for separate sums dissected and earmarked each of them to a separate assessable item a court can sever the items and cut out one or more along with the sum attributed to it while affirming the residue
But where the assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of property treated as assessable and when one component not dismissible as de minimis is on any view not assessable and wrongly included it would seem clear that such a procedure is barred and he assessment is bad wholly
That matter is covered by authority
in Montreal Light Heat  Power Consolidated V City of Westmount  the court see especially per Anglin CJ in these conditions held that an assessment which was bad in part was infected throughout and treated it as invalid
Here their Lordships are of opinion by parity of reasoning that the assessment was invalid in toto
It was therefore urged that on the facts of this case the assessment was invalid in toto and that it should be set aside
The learned Deputy Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh did not seriously contest this position and the result therefore is that the order of assessment dated the 30th June 1953 in Civil Appeal No 132 of 1955 and the order of assessment dated the 498 9th September 1953 in Civil Appeal No 133 of 1955 are liable to be set aside
The appeals will therefore be allowed the orders of assessment will be set aside and the matters will go back to the Assessment Officer for re assessment of the Appellants in accordance with law
The Appellants will be at liberty to urge before the Assessment Officer the contentions of law and fact available to them in the fresh assessment proceedings including those adverted to above
The Respondents will pay the costs of these Appellants here as well as in the Court below
Petition No 567 of 1954
BHAGWATI J
This petition under article 32 of the Constitution also involves the interpretation of the proviso to article 2862 and raises the same question as to the meaning scope and operation of the proviso as was raised in the Civil Appeals Nos 132 133 and 137 of 1955 just disposed of The facts giving rise to this Petition may be shortly stated
The petitioners are a partnership firm carrying on business of manufacturing bidis at Jabalpur and registered as a dealer under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947
The petitioners had their branches at Lucknow Kanpur Faizabad Agra Bombay and Bhopal
They had also their selling agents at various places in Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere outside the Stae of Madhya Pradesh
They also entered into transactions direct with merchants in Uttar Pradesh
The transactions in
question which were the subject matter of assessment at the instance of the Sales Tax authorities were for the period of assessment 21st October 1949 to 9th November 1950 and spread over two periods viz 1 the period between 21st October 1949 to 25th January 1950 which may be called the pre Constitution period and 2 the period subsequent to the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January 1950 up to the 9th November 1950 which may be called the postConstitution period
The petitioners  gross turn over was determined to be Rs 4940140 6 9 and the 499 amount of Sales Tax assessed on the transactions was Rs 151291 13 0 as per the order of the Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 3 dated the 14th July 1954 in Sales Tax Appeal No 6A 1654
The petitioners preferred_a second appeal to the Respondent No 2 against the said order
The Respondent No 2 however refused to admit or register the appeal unless the amount of tax assessed was paid up
The petitioners paid about Rs 91000 towards the amount of tax assessed but finding it difficult to pay the balance filed this Petition against the State of Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 1 the Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 2 and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 3 for a writ of certiorari quashing the said order dated the 14th July 1954 made by Respondent No 3 and for consequential reliefs
The Respondents filed a return denying the contentions of the petitioners and maintaining that the Sales Tax was lawfully assessed by them against the petitioners
The position as regards the petitioners  turn over for the period of assessment was as stated below Nature of the Parties
Sales Prices of goods
a Direct to selling agents on orders    615236 3 0 b Direct to merchants on orders
399450 2 0 c Direct to destinations other than branches or depots but accounted for against branchesand depots
620996 14 0 d Direct to Stations or destinations having branches or depots owned by the proprietors of this registered firm Kanpur Bombay Lucknow and Faizabad   3106739 13 0 500 The Sales Tax authorities treated all these transactions as transactions of sale coming within the definition contained in Explanation II to section 2g of the Act and assessed the petitioners to sales tax in respect of the same negativing the contentions of the petitioners that they were in any event sales effected by them outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore not entitled to impose a tax on those tran sactions by virtue of the provisions of article 2861 a and the Explanation thereto
The learned Attorney General who appeared for the petitioners contended that the bidis manufactured by the petitioners were all actually delivered as a direct result of the transactions of sale for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh and that after the inauguration of the Constitution on the 26th January 1950 it was only the State of Uttar Pradesh which was the delivery State that alone had the right to impose the tax on these transactions notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to the sale of goods the property in the goods might have passed in the State of Madhya Pradesh
He therefore urged that these transactions were sales outside the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was not entitled to impose a tax on such sales
The learned Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh on the other hand contended that these were purely intra state transactions entered into by the petitioners within the State of Madhya Pradesh and that the Explanation to article 2861a did not come into play at all because the goods were not actually delivered as a direct result of such sales for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh
He therefore maintained that even for the post Constitution period there was no ban on the State of Madhya Pradesh imposing the sales tax on what were purely inside sales
It is necessary in view of these rival contentions to ascertain the true nature of the transactions in question
In paragraph 15 of the Petition the petitioners 501 had averred that the bidis manufactured by the firm were all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for consumption in that State and that after the 26th January 1950 the delivery State viz the State of Uttar Pradesh had alone the right to impose tax on the sales of the commodity
They had further submitted that the State of Madhya Pradesh where the bidis were manufactured and from where they were sent could not any more exercise its right to levy a tax on such transactions of sale taking place elsewhere by reason of the inhibition contained in article 286
In the return filed by the Respondents they did not deny the allegation made by the petitioners in their Petition that the bidis manufactured by the firm were all delivered in the State of Uttar Pradesh for consumption in that State
In substance they contended that in spite of the State of Uttar Pradesh being the delivery State within the meaning of the Explanation to article 286 1 a the liability of these transactions to sales tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was saved by the President s order made under the proviso to article 2862 and that the imposition of such tax at the instance of the State of Madhya Pradesh was lawful and did not contravene the provisions of article 2861a read with the Explanation thereto
Both the order which was made by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax Jabalpur in the original assessment case No 16 of 1950 51 dated the 7th August 1953 and the order which was made in Sales Tax Appeal No 6A 1654 by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 3 dated the 14th July 1954 proceeded on the basis that even though the transactions in question were transactions of sale where the goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sales for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh the President s order made under the proviso to article 286 2 saved the transactions also from the ban of article 2861 a and the Explanation thereto and that the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore entitled to impose a tax on the same
It was never
502 contended before either of them that the sales were purely inside sales and that the Explanation to article 2861a did not come into play at all under the circumstances of the case
The facts as found by the Sales Tax authorities also emphasized that these transactions fell within the definition of sale contained in the Explanation 11 to section 2g of the Act and that so far as the post Constitution period was concerned they were saved from the ban of article 286 1 a and the Explanation thereto by the President s order made under the proviso to article 2862
It was however urged by the learned Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh that the transactions were pure inside sales entered into by the petitioners in Madhya Pradesh on orders received by them from outside the State
These orders were accepted by the petitioners in the State of Madhya Pradesh and goods were appropriated to the contracts and the property in the goods passed within the State of Madhya Pradesh and that therefore they were pure intraState sales or inside sales which it was within the competence of the State of Madhya Pradesh to tax
This contention of the learned Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh is untenable
So far as direct supplies to selling agents on orders and direct supplies to merchants on orders covered by items a and b above are concerned it was found that these supplies were made to the merchants buying the goods on commission basis or profit on their previous orders instructions or indents which were either in printed forms or in ordinary letters and the sale prices were realised by sending bills and railway receipts through some scheduled banks
The very fact that the bills and the railway receipts were sent through the scheduled banks went to show that the petitioners reserved the right of disposal of goods covered by those railway receipts and the property in the goods passed in the State of Uttar Pradesh only after the relative bills were either accepted or honoured by the purchasers and the railway receipts delivered by the scheduled banks to them
It is clear therefore that 503 in those cases the sales were completed in the State of Uttar Pradesh and were not intra State sales or inside sales qua the State of Madhya Pradesh
As regards the direct supplies to destinations other than branches or depots but accounted for against the branches or depots being item c above it was found that the petitioners despatched the goods and billed them to depot managers who were responsible for the collection of the orders and then the railway receipts and bills were sent there
The managers prepared other bills adding incidental or other charges and delivered the railway receipts to the customers to whom the goods were sent from the State of Madhya Pradesh
Here also the despatches of the goods were made from the State of Madhya Pradesh by the petitioners to their depot managers and it was the depot managers who in their turn prepared and submitted their own bills and handed over the railway receipts to the respective customers appropriating the goods themselves to the contracts of sale which had been entered into by them with the latter and completing the sales in the State of Uttar Pradesh
These transactions also were therefore sales effected in the State of Uttar Pradesh and did not fall within the category of intra state sales or inside sales qua the State of Madhya Pradesh
The direct supplies to Stations or destinations having branches or depots owned by the proprietors of the firm Kanpur Bombay Lucknow and Faizabad being item d above also were outside sales qua the State of Madhya Pradesh inasmuch as the branch managers asked the petitioners to send stocks of goods to execute the orders which they had obtained from the customers to make their own supplies to them
As a matter of fact it was found that several consolidated indents were placed by the depot managers with the petitioners in respect of the previous orders which had been collected by them and the petitioners supplied the goods to the depots or branches in pursuance of such indents
If this was the true position qua these supplies these sales also were completed in 64 504 the State of Uttar Pradesh by the depots or branches supplying the goods in their turn to several customers
There could be no sales as such between the petitioners on the one hand and their depots or branches on the other hand and the State of Madhya Pradesh could certainly not be at all in a position to tax the same
The whole theory therefore of inside sales falls to the ground and the only thing which we are left with is that these transactions were inter State transactions in which as a direct result of such sales the goods were actually delivered for the purpose of consumption in the State of Uttar Pradesh
The Explanation to article 2861a determined the State of Uttar Pradesh to be the State in which the sales took place and which alone was entitled to tax these transactions the State of Madhya Pradesh becoming an outside State for the purpose
Apart from the ban imposed on the State of Madhya Pradesh under article 2861 a and the Explanation thereto these transactions were also in the course of inter State trade or commerce and were hit by the ban of article 2862
The President s order no doubt lifted that ban but was not competent to lift the ban under article 286 1 a and the Explanation thereto with the result that in spite of that order the State of Madhya Pradesh was not in a position to impose a tax on these transactions during the post Constitu tion period
The assessment of these transactions to tax for the post Constitution period therefore is invalid and cannot be sustained
The assessment moreover is a composite one covering the pre Constitution period as well
The case therefore falls within our judgment in Civil Appeals Nos 132 133 and 137 of 1955 just delivered and following the reasoning contained therein we are of the opinion that the order dated the 14th July 1954 made by the Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Respondent No 3 in Sales Tax Appeal No 6A 1654 should be set aside
We accordingly allow the Petition set aside the 505 said order dated the 14th July 1954 and the matter will go back to the Assessment Officer for re assessment of the petitioners in accordance with law
The petitioners will be at liberty to urge before the Assessment Officer the contentions of law and fact available to them in the fresh assessment proceedings
The Respondents will pay the costs of the petition
JAGANNADHADAS J I regret I feel constrained to differ from the view taken by my learned brothers as regards the construction of proviso to article 2862 and the effect of the Presidential order issued there under
There is no dispute that the proviso has to be construed as part of article 2862
It is meant to empower the President to keep the ban arising thereunder in temporary abeyance so that the States may continue to levy taxes on sales by virtue of their preConstitution sales tax laws if then lawful for a limited period
It is urged however that the proviso meaning thereby also the Presidential order thereunder is effective to lift only the ban under article 2862 and that the ban under article 2861a is operative nonetheless
Now it may be correct to say that these two bans are imposed from different angles and are in that sense independent
But there can be no doubt that they are substantially overlapping in operation
A transaction which brings about an outside sale is also an inter State transaction barring if at all a few ingeniously conceived and illustrated cases
The effect of each of the bans under article 286 is to demarcate the fields within which the taxing power of the States on sales cannot operate
If as I conceive the two bans under articles 2861 a and 2862 are overlapping the fact that they are imposed from different angles cannot obscure the result viz that they bring about the demarcation of the same or substantially the same field of no taxation
It appears to me that it is in this light that the proviso and the Presidential order issued thereunder have to be construed
Now the proviso with the Presidential order declares the field covered by sales in the course 506 of inter State trade and commerce as taxable for a limited period by stating positively and emphatically that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution
shall continue to be levied until the 31st day of March 1951
There is no doubt the non obstante clause which will be dealt with presently and which only emphasises the fact that this is a proviso to article 2862
But there is no mistaking the positive and mandatory terms of the proviso
The effect of this is clearly and unequivocally to make the whole field of inter State trade and commerce temporarily taxable in respect of the sales which take place in the course thereof
If this be so it appears to me to be implicit therein that no other ban on such taxation can operate for the time being within that very field
To construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively operative is to impute to them some kind of Picturesque potency and is to miss the reality viz that all the bans under article 286 are meant to serve the same purpose viz that of imposing restrictions and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation
The bans and the proviso are parts of the same article and have to be harmoniously construed
The un equivocal and positive language of one part cannot be taken to have been obliterated by the negative language of the other part so as to rsult in futility
A similar situation as that contemplated by the proviso would also arise with reference to the saving clause in article 2862
If the proviso is to be construed in the way suggested by the learned AttorneyGeneral it would seem to follow that when and as the Parliament lifts the ban under article 2862 the lifting of that ban would equally become futile by virtue of article 2861a
The Parliament has not in terms Veen given the power to lift the latter ban
This therefore will lead to the extraordinary result that though the Constitution has in terms provided that the ban on taxation of sales in the course of inter State trade and commerce can be lifted by the Parliament generally and by the President for a 507 limited period the exercise of both these powers would become ineffective and still born by virtue of article 2861a
It appears to me unreasonable to impute any such intention as inevitably arising from the language used
It appears to me with great respect that whether it is by parliamentary legislation or by the Presidential action that the ban on taxing sales in the course of inter State trade and commerce is lifted the principle of harmonious construction of article 286 taken as an integral whole requires that the lifting of the ban is to be construed as laying open for taxation the entire field covered by article 2862 and to carry with it the implication that no other overlapping ban will be operative
No doubt it has been suggested that so far as lifting of the ban under article 2862 by the Parliament is concerned the same would be at least partly operative by virtue of article 2861 a taken with the Explanation under which the consumption delivery State may well be free to tax
This was the view expressed by the learned dissenting Judge in the case in The State of Bombay vs The United Motors India Ltd1
But the majority in the recent decision in the Bengal Immunity Co Ltd vs State of Bihar2 including the said learned Judge have left that question open
It is problematical whether having regard to the inevitable extra territorial operation of the levy of such a tax and the consequent harassment to the business community which looms large the Explanation will receive that construction again and not receive the strict construction preferred in the dissenting judgment in the case in State of Travancore Cochin vs Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory3
The result therefore of construing the proviso and by parity of reasoning the saving clause as merely removing the ban of a particular nature leaving another overlapping ban to operate would be to render both the saving clause in and the proviso to article 2862 virtually nugatory
1  2 Supreme Court Judgment in Civil Appeal No 159 of 1958 3  508 The argument based on the non obstante clause in the proviso viz Notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause remains to be considered
It is urged that this clause clearly indicates the intention that the operation of the proviso is to be confined to the sole purpose of lifting the ban arising under article 2862
With respect I am unable to agree
The non obstante clause undoubtedly affirms the fact that the proviso is operative in respect of article 2862
But it does not purport to limit the effect of the proviso which a reasonable construction thereof may justify
A non obstante clause does not normally add to or subtract from the main provision of which it is a part
It is often enough inserted by way of extra caution
But it does not have the effect of limiting the operation of the main provision
See Aswini Kumar Ghosh vs Arabinda Bose1 and The Dominion of India vs Shrinbai A Irani2
The suggestion that the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards the inter State sales would be to read the phrase notwithstanding that as meaning in so far as
I can see no warrant for any such reading
In my view therefore the pre Constitution salestax laws if then lawful are not hit by article 2861 a at least to the extent that the ban under article 2861 a overlaps with that under article 2862 In this view the orders of assessment in these cases cannot be set aside and the validity of the relevant preConstitution laws will have to be considered and the further facts gone into
But it is now not necessary to do so in these cases in the view taken by my learned brothers and the order proposed by them will govern these cases
1   21 and 24
2   213


Summary:
Held per section B DAs ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE BHGWATIJAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ
JAGANNADHADAS J 484 dissenting
The bans imposed by Article 286 of the Constitution on the taxing powers of the States are independent and separate and each one of them has to be got over before a State Legislature can impose tax on transactions of sale or purchase of goods
The Explanation to Article 2861a determines by the legal fiction created therein the situs of the sale in the case of transactions coming within that category and once it is determined by the application of the Explanation that a transaction is outside the State it follows as a matter of course that the State with reference to which the transaction can thus be predicated to be outside it can never tax the transaction
The ban under Article 2861a read with the Explanation is effective independently of the fact that the transaction may have taken place in the course of inter State trade or commerce or with reference to goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community
The ban imposed under Article 2862 is an independent and separate one and looks at the transactions entirely from the point of view of their having taken place in the course of inter State trade or commerce
 Even if such transactions may also fall within the category of transactions covered by Article 2861a and the Explanation thereto or Article 2863 the moment Article 2862 is attracted by reason of the transactions being in the course of inter State trade or commerce the ban under Article 2862 operates and such transactions can never be subjected to tax at the instance of a State Legislature except in so far as Parliament by law may otherwise provide or such power of taxation is saved by the President s order contemplated in the proviso
The ban under Article 2862 may be saved by the President s order but that does not affect or lift the ban under Article 2861a read with the Explanation
Apart from the aforesaid construction put upon the several clauses of Article 286 in The Bengal Immunity Co case the terms of the proviso to Article 2862 itself make it abundantly clear that the proviso is meant only to lift the ban under Article 2862 and no other
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso carves out an exception to the main provision to which it is enacted as a proviso and to no other
This is made further clear by the nonobstante clause which states in express terms that it is enacted only with reference to this clause ie Article 2862
The proviso cannot be extended to any of the other provisions of Article 286 and it has
therefore not the effect of lifting the ban which is imposed by Article 2861a and the Explanation thereto
Therefore so far as the post Constitution period is concerned the ban imposed by Article 2861a and the Explanation thereto could not be removed by the President s order which was issued under the proviso to Article 2862 in the present case
Explanation 11 to Section 2g of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act 1947 offended Article 2861a road with the 485 Explanation to the same and the State of Madhya Pradesh was therefore not entitled to tax the transactions of sale in which goods had actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale for purposes of consumption outside Madhya Pradesh and the said Explanation was riot protected by the President s order issued under the proviso to Article 2862
Where an assessment consists of a single undivided sum in respect of the totality of the property treated as assessable the wrongful inclusion in it of certain items of property which by virtue of a provision of law were expressly exempted from taxation renders the assessment invalid in toto
Bennett  White Calgary Ltd and Municipal District of Sugar City No 5 1951 Appeal Cases 786 at p 816 referred to
JAGANNADHADAS J Dissenting The two bans under Articles 2861a and 2862 are overlapping and the fact that they are imposed from different angles cannot obscure the result viz that the bring about the demareation of the same or substantially the same field of no taxation
To construe the two bans as independently and cumulatively operative is to impute to them some kind of picturesque potency and is to miss the reality viz that all the bans under Article 286 are meant to serve the same purpose viz that of imposing restrictions and thereby demarcating the fields of no taxation
The bans and the proviso are part of the same Article and have to be harmoniously construed
The unequivocal and positive language of one part cannot be taken to have been obliterated by the negative language of the other part so as to result in futility
The result of construing the proviso and by parity of reasoning the saving clause as merely removing the ban of a particular nature leaving another overlapping ban to operate would be to reuder both the saving clause in
and the proviso to Article 2862 virtually nugatory
A non obstante clause does not normally add to or subtract from the main provision of which it is a part It is often enough inserted by way of extra caution
But it does not have the effect of limiting the operation of the main provision The suggestion that the Presidential action lifts the ban only as regards the inter State sales would be to read the phrase notwithstanding that as meaning in so far
There is no warrant for any such reading