Appeal
2259 of 1969
Appeal under section 38 of the from the order dated October 26 1969 of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India in DC Appeal No 18 of 1968
C K Daphtary A section R Chari J B Dadachanji O C Mathur Ravinder Narain and section Swarup for the appellant
 V section Desai and B D Sharma for respondent No 1 M C Bhandare and section B Wad for Respondent No 2
V A Seyid Muhammad and section P Nayar for
Attorney General for India
A V Rangam for Advocate General for the Tamil Nadu
M C Setalvad Rameshwar Nath for Bar Council of India
O P Rana for Advocate General for the State of UP A G Pudissery for Advocate General for the State of Kerala
K Baldev Mehta for Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan
A P section Chauhan A D Mathur and N P Jain for Bar Council UP Sukumar Ghose and G section Chatterjee for the Advocate General for the State of West Bengal
P Parmeswara Rao for Advocate General for the Andhra Pradesh
I N Shroff for Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh
J C Medhi Advocate General for the State of Assam and Naunit Lal for the Advocate General for the State of Assam
HIDAYATULLAH CJ and MITTER J on behalf of SHELAT Jand himself delivered separate judgments
VAIDIALINGAM andRAY JJ
delivered separate dissenting opinions
Hidayatullah CJI agree with the judgment delivered by my brother Mitter but in view of the importance of the question and the difference between my brethren I have chosen to express myself separately
872 We heard this appeal on a preliminary point raised by the appellant that the appeal of the Advocate General of Maharashtra filed before the Bar Council of India was incompetent as the Advocate General did not fall within the expression a person aggrieved  to whom alone is given the right of appeal under section 37 of the of 1961 against the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State
The facts necessary to bring out the controversy may be briefly stated
The appellant is an advocate from Maharashtra
The Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra had called upon him suo motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct
It appears that the appellant was convicted before a Summary Court in London on a charge of pilfering some articles from departmental stores and sentenced to a fine
The record of the proceedings in London was not before the Bar Council of the State and action was taken on the basis of a brief report of the incident in a newspaper
The appellant explained before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State that he was the victim of a misunderstanding but as he had no means of defending himself effectively he was found guilty and received a light sentence of fine
He explained how he had fallen into this unfortunate predicament and did not know how to extricate himself
The order of the Summary Court was not a speaking order and the proceedings were summary
The disciplinary committee were satisfied that there was no reason to hold him guilty of professional or other misconduct
They therefore ordered that the proceedings be filed
The Advocate General of the State who was sent a notice of the proceedings as is required by the second sub section of section 35 and had appeared before the committee purporting to act under section 37 of the Act filed an appeal before the Bar Council of India
It was heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
The advocate objected that the Advocate General had no locus standi to file the appeal
The objection was overruled and the appeal was accepted
The advocate was held guility of misconduct and suspended for a year from practice
The advocate now appeals under section 38 of the Act to this Court
His appeal raises questions of merit but he contends at the threshhold that the Advocate General was not competent to file the appeal under section 37 of the Act
The point in controversy before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India and now before us is a short one
It is  whether the Advocate General can be said to be a person aggrieved  by the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State Having heard this point in detail we took time to consider
I am of the opinion that it must be held in favour 873 of the advocate and the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India now under appeal before us must be set aside on this short ground without going into the merits of the case
Section 37 of the reads 37
Appeal to the Bar Council of India
1 Any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council made under section 35 may within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India
2 Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which may pass such order thereon as it deems fit
 The expression a person aggrieved  is not new nor has it occurred for the first time in the 
In fact it occurs in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a hundred years
In the latter a right of appeal to a person aggrieved  is conferred in diverse contexts
It occurs in the Ale House Act the Bankruptcy Acts Copyright Act Highway Act Licensing Acts Milk and Dairies Amendment Act Rating and Valuation Act Summary Jurisdiction Act Union Committee Act Local Acts in certiorari proceedings and the Defence of Realm Regulations to mention only a few
The list of Indian Acts is equally long
As a result of the frequent use of this rather vague phrase which practice as Lord Parker pointed out in Dealing Corporation vs Jones1 has not been avoided in spite of the confusion it causes selections from the observations of judges expounding the phrase in the context of these varied statutes were cited before us for our acceptance
The observations often conflict since they were made in different contexts and involved the special standing of the party claiming the right of appeal
Yet these definitions are not entirely without value for they disclose a certain unanimity on the essential features of this phrase even in the diversity of the contexts
The font and origin of the discussion is the well known definition of the phrase by James LJ in In Re Sidehotham exhibit j Sidebotham2
It was observed that the words person aggrieved  in section 71 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 meant   not really a person who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some order had been 1 L R 2 C A 874 made
A person aggrieved must be a man who had suffered a legal grievance a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something
 The important words in this definition are a benefit which he might have received  and a legal grievance  against the decision which wrongfully deprives him of something  or affects his title to something
The definition was held in later cases to be not exhaustive and several other features of the phrase were pointed out
Thus under the Bankruptcy Acts where the Board of Trade summoned to support the validity of the appointment of a trustee went before the judge and failed it was considered a person aggrieved  on the principle that a person who is brought before the Court to submit to its decision but not a person who is heard in a dispute between others must be treated as a person aggrieved  see In Re Lamb exhibit p Board of Trade1 per Lord Esher
Here again the words to notice are brought before the court to submit to its decision that is to say a person who is in the nature of a party as contra distinguished from a person who is next described as a person who is heard in a dispute between others
To distinguish between these two positions Ist may refer to a few more decisions
In In Re Kitson exhibit p Sugden Thomas  Sons Ltd2 it was further explained that the mere fact that an order is wrongly made does not of itself give a grievance to a person not otherwise aggrieved per Phillimore J It was added that a person deprived of the fruits of litigation which he had instituted in the hope for them is a person aggrieved 
Similarly a creditor who did not wish an adjudication order to be made was held not to be a person aggrieved See In Re Brown exhibit p Debtor vs Official Receiver3
The utmost that this series of cases goes is to be found in the observations of James LJ in Ellis exhibit p Ellis4 that even a person not bound by the order of adjudication must be treated as a person aggrieved  if the order embarrasses him
In a later case In Re Woods exhibit P Ditton 5 Cotton LJ held that even so the person must be aggrieved by the very order and not by any of the consequen ces that ensue
This was clarified in R vs London County Keepers of the Peace and Justices6 by Lord Coleridge CJ while 1 at 812
3 1943 Ch D D 177
5 CA 79 2 at 112 114
4 6 at 361
875 dealing with the Highway Act denying the right of appeal in these words Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a person aggrieved  He may be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach of the law is not a breach of law but is he aggrieved because some one is held not to have done wrong  It is difficult to see that the section meant anything of the kind
The section does not give an appeal to anybody but a person who is by the direct act of the Ma gistrate aggrieved that is who has had something done or determined against him by the Magistrate
 These observations again show that the person must himself suffer a grievance or must be aggrieved by the very order because it affects him
Two cases which may usefully be seen in the same context may next be mentioned
In Jennings vs Kelly1 in relation to the Government of Ireland Act 1920 Lord Wright did say that if a person was treated in certiorari proceedings as a competent party and notice was served on him as being a proper party he would be a person aggrieved  The point to bear in mind is that the person must be treated as a party
However the force of the observation was considerably weakened because the party there was ordered to pay costs and the right of appeal was held to be available on that limited ground
Further qualification is to be found in In Re Riviere where Lord Selborne observed pro ratione voluntas the applicant must not come merely saying I do not like this thing to be done it must be shown that it tends to his injury or to his damage in the legal sense of the word
 The locus standi of the person aggrieved must be found from his position in the first proceeding and his grievance must arise from that standing taken with the effect of the order on him
These cases are of course far removed from the one before me and as Branwell LJ observed in Robinson vs Currey2 the expression is nowhere defined and therefore must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances
He pointed out that the words are ordinarily English words which are to have the ordinary meaning put upon them 1 174 A C 206
2  470
C A 876 From these cases it is apparent that may person who feels disappointed with the result of the case is not a Person aggrieved
He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way
The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something
It is no doubt a legal grievance and not a grievance about material matters but his legal grievance must be a tendency to injure That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance
These principles are gathered from the cases cited and do not as I shall show later do violence to the context in which the phrase occurs inthe 
Although I am aware that in Seven Oaks Urban District Council vs Twynham1 Lord Hewart CJ uttered words of caution again emphasised by Lord Parker CJ in Ealing Corporation vs Jones2 in applying too readily the definitions given in relation to other statutes but I do not think I am going beyond what Lord Hewart CJ said and what Lord Parker CJ did in the case
Lord Parker observed 
As Lord Hewart CJ pointed out in Seven Oaks Urban District Council vs Twynam  But as has been said again and again there is often little utility in seeking to interpret particular expressions in one statute by reference to decisions given upon similar expressions in different statutes which have been enacted alio intuitu
The problem with which we are concerned is not what is the meaning of the expression aggrieved  in any one of a dozen other statutes but what is its meaning in this part of this statute   Accordingly I only look at the cases to which we have been referred to see if there are general principles which can be extracted which will guide the court in approaching the question as to what the words person aggrieved  mean in any particular statute
 If I may say respectfully I fully endorse this approach
I am now in a position to examine the Advocates  Act but before so I must refer to a case near in point to this case than any considered before
The case is reported in Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierrie Saar N jie3
A legal practitioner was held guilty of professional misconduct but was acquitted on appeal and an appeal was taken to the Judicial Committee against the decision of the West African Court of Appeal
This involved consideration of 1  443
3 2 L R 877 whether the Attorney General could be said to be a person aggrieved 
The facts need to be stated a little fully as both sides rely upon the observations of Lord Denning and they need to be explained carefully
A barrister a member of the English Bar and also a Soli citor the two professions appear to be united in the Gambia practising in the Supreme Court of the Gambia was charged with professional misconduct and an order was made September 22 1958 by the Deputy Judge Abbot J striking off his name from the roll of that Court and directing that the matter be reported to the Masters of the Bench of his Inn
On June 5 1959 the West African Court of Appeal Bairamian Ag
P Hurley Ag
JA and Ames Ag
JA set aside the order on the ground that the Deputy Judge had no jurisdiction
The Attorney General of the Gambia thereupon sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council but this was refused
Then a petition was made for
special leave
Special leave was granted subject to the preliminary objection by the respondent that no appeal lay at the inst ance of the Attorney General
The preliminary objection was rejected
Section 31 of the West African Appeal to Privy Council Order in Council 1949 under which special leave was asked reads  Nothing in this order contained shall be deemed to interfere with the right of His Majesty upon the humble petition of any person aggrieved by any judgment of the court to admit his appeal therefrom upon such con ditions as His Majesty in Council shall think fit to impose
In the Gambia disciplinary jurisdiction over barristers and solicitors is embodied in Rules of the Supreme Court 1928
Under those rules the Supreme Court  Judge and there is only one admits and enroll barristers and solicitors of the Court and Schedule I Order 9 r 7 says that  The Judge shall have power for reasonable cause to suspend any barrister or solicitor from practising within the jurisdiction of the court for any specified period or order his name to be struck off the roll of court
 Then there is the West African Court of Appeal and it hears appeals from the Supreme Court  in civil and criminal matters
In an earlier case in which a certain Mr Mccauley was struck off the roll of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone and Mr Mccauley sought to appeal to
the Full Court of West Africa it was ruled 878 by the Full Court that the decision of the Chief Justice was not a decision of the Supreme Court  and was therefore not appealable and that the only remedy was to obtain special leave to appeal to the Privy Council see W E A Mccauley  vs Judges of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone and Anr1
The legislature  then added section 14 which provided An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from any order of the judge suspending a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court from practice or striking his name off the roll and for the purposes of any such appeal any such order shalt be deemed to be an order of the Supreme Court
 The words of the section show that the legislature did not regard a decision in disciplinary matters as a judgment of a court but only deemed it to be so
The Full Court on the appeal of N Jie from the order of the Deputy Judge held that a Deputy Judge could not deal with any matter which was not a proceeding in the court in the exercise of judicial power
The Judicial Committee held that this was exercise of judicial power
Then the preliminary objection was considered
The objection was that the Attorney General had no locus standi not being a person aggrieved
This was overruled by the Judicial Committee
Lord Denning referred to the definition of James LJ in In Re Sidebotham exhibit p Sidebotham2 and said that if the definition were to be regarded as exhaustive and were held applicable an aggrieved person  would be only a person who was a party to a lis a controversy inter partes and had a decision given against him
The Attorney General would not come within this restricted definition as there was no suit between two parties when disciplinary proceedings were started ex mero motu by the court or at the instance of the Attorney General or some one against a legal practitioner
But the definition of James LJ was not exhaustive and the words person aggrieved were of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation
They included not a busy body but certainly one who had a genuine grievance because an order had been made which prejudicially affected his interests
Posing the question did the Attorney General have a sufficient interest  the Judicial Committee answered he had
The Attorney General in a Colony represented the Crown as the guardian of public interest and it was his duty to bring before the Judge a case of misconduct to warrant action
Then Lord Denning proceeded to distinguish two kind  of cases to determine if the Attorney General would be a person aggriev 1 L R 2 A 879 ed  The first was a case where the judge acquitted the practitioner
In such a case no appeal was open to the Attorney General under the Supreme Court Ordinance and Lord Denning added He has done his duty and is not aggrieved
In other words he did not come within the words of the 3 1 st section of the Order in Council
The Attorney General could not therefore ask for special leave as a person aggrieved 
But the case was different if the judge found the practitioner guilty and a Court of Appeal reversed the decision on a ground which went to the root of the jurisdiction of the judge or was otherwise a point in which the public interest was involved
In that case the Attorney General was a person aggrieved 
The observations of Lord Denning clearly meant that the Attorney General could not pose as a person aggrieved  to seek to bring a simple case of acquittal for reversal by the Judicial Committee under the 31st section of the Order in Council for he could not be regarded as a person aggrieved 
The remark was made perhaps to repel an argument that every case of acquittal would make the Attorney General an aggrieved person 
Lord Denning said that this was not the true position
The Attorney General could only move the judge and there his duty ended
The law gave him no express right of appeal and he could not claim to be a person aggrieved 
He could only invoke the 3 1 st section if he could make out his grievance and it was found to be as a person representing the Crown and the guardian of public interest seeking to get reversed a decision which struck at the root of the jurisdiction of the disciplinary judge by denying that the Deputy Judge was exercising judicial power under section 7 of the Supreme Court Ordinance
The Crown was aggrieved by this decision and the Attorney General representing the Crown was an aggrieved person
The scheme of the law under which the disciplinary action was taken and the appeal to the Privy Council was brought gave the true connotation of the expression person aggrieved 
In those cases in which no question of public interest was involved the Attorney General even if he had moved the judge and got an adverse decision could not be regarded as aggrieved but in a case in which apart from the merits of the case against the practitioner some grave I question of public importance was involved the Attorney General representing the Crown could be regarded as
a person aggrieved 
It was presumably after reading this case and understanding it as I have done that the Advocate General set about making 880 out a question of public importance
He did not seem only to get the decision overturned on facts
This is what he said  The appellant has filed this appeal as the Advocate General of Maharashtra
Under the  as under the  the Advocate General represents the public interest in every disciplinary inquiry
Under sec
35 of the  the Advocate General is entitled to notice in respect of every disciplinary inquiry is entitled to have an opportunity of being heard before the disciplinary committee passes any order
This appeal raises very important questions of principle as regards the effect of a conviction of an Indian Advocate of an offence recognised by all civilised countries as an offence involving moral turpitude
The question raised also related to the requirements of natural justice in a criminal court and the effect of the judgments of the Supreme Court on the subject
It raises the further question whether an Indian Advocate convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude by a Court outside India is immune from disciplinary action because a minor dif ferences of procedure in such countries where such trial has been held in complete accord with principles of natural justice
The profession of an advocate is an honourable profession and the disciplinary provisions of the are designed to secure that per guilty of offences involving moral turpitude are subject to appropriate disciplinary action
 It is obvious that the Advocate General has attempted to use the observations of Lord Denning in the Gambia case and wishes to plead that he enjoys a special position in the Bar and under the and therefore is entitled to appeal as a  person aggrieved 
This was the line adopted by Mr M C Setalvad counsel for the Bar Council of India
On the other band Mr V section Desai appearing for the Advocate General argued that the Advocate General having notice of disciplinary proceedings in any event must be treated as a person aggrieved  within sections 35 and 38 of the 
I shall consider the narrow question presented by Mr Setalvad latter
I shall first take up for consideration the larger question and the more general application of the expression person aggrieved  In support of his contention Mr V section Desai cited three cases from this Court one from the Judicial Committee and one from the Bombay High Court
They all relate to disciplinary proceedings and I may begin by considering them
881 The case of the privy Council reported in Advocate General of Bombay  Ors
vs Phiroz Rustamji Bharucha1 was next cited
It was an application for special leave by the Advocate General of Bombay in a proceeding relating to professional misconduct of an advocate
The standing of the Advocate General was questioned
The report in the Bombay Law Reporter Series2 reproduces more fully the arguments than
the official report and we were referred to the arguments
The point was not debated and there does not appear to be a pronouncement on this point either during the course of argument or in the judgment since special leave was refused on another ground
Mr Desai says that if the Judicial Committee had found substance in this objection they would have ruled out the Advocate General on this ground alone
There is no reason to think that the objection was considered at all
I cannot derive any assistance from this ruling because the prerogative of the Crown to grant special leave as of grace in any case was always there irrespective of the standing of the Advocate General
The Privy Council often granted special leave and even heard appeals on certificates wrongly granted
See Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal vs Dakore Temple Committee2 and the cases collected in Halsbury Laws of England 3rd Edn Vol
9 p 380 paragraph 886 note h
This prerogative the Judicial Committee has exercised on behalf of the Crown particularly in cases of general interest see ibid p 379 section 885 note s
The provisions of the former section 112 of the Code of Civil Procedure show the extent of the prerogative
Therefore
because the Privy Council refused special leave on one ground rather than another cannot import a rejection of the objection as to the standing of the Advocate General
Next we have an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in B M Madani vs Commissioner of Work men s Compensation
Bombay3
In that case the anneal was taken by the Commissioner for enhancement of penalties against the delinquent advocate and the penalty was in fact increased
This Court held that he was entitled to do so as a person aggrieved
The Particular misconduct was committed in relation to a claimant before the Commissioner
The Advocate had pocketed the travelling allowance granted by the Commissioner to the widow of a deceased workman
There may be some doubt whether the Commissioner was a person aggrieved  by the Denalty imposed in the first instance but I do not pursue this matter
The case can be justified on the dictum in some cases that a party which moves the court or a Person brought before the court to be bound by its order May be a person aggrieved
 See for example the case of the Official Receiver in Re Payne Ex p Castle Mail Packets 1 2 A I R 1915 P C 155
3 C A 877 of 1968 decided on October 10 1968
69Sup
CIP71 12 882 Co1 and In Re Lamb exhibit p Board of Trade already considered by me
Madani s case does not help to resolve the dispute centering round the Advocate General
The next case is reported in Bhataraju Nageshwara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the Madras High Court and others2
That case arose under the Bar Councils Act 1926 when the Judges exercised disciplinary power
In the case before the Supreme Court the Judges of the Madras High Court were shown as respondents
This Court observed at page 1064 as follows Before parting with this appeal we desire to say that it appears to us that it was wholly wrong and inappropriate for the appellant to have made the Honourable Judges of the Madras High Court respondents to this appeal
It appears that in some cases involving contempt of Court the Honourable Judges have been made parties
It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this occasion as to the propriety of that procedure in contempt cases but we are clearly of the opinion that in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act the appropriate parties should be the advocate concerned the complainant if any the Bar Council or the secretary thereof and the Advocate General of the State concerned to whom notice have to be issued under section 123 of the 
 This does not advance the case of the Advocate General of Maharashtra any further
The last case of this Court is Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay vs Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors8
In land acquisition cases started for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation certain notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act were set aside by the High Court and the Municipal Corporation sought to appeal
It was held not to be a person grieved 
This case even if I were to accept it as correctly decided does not assist us in relation to our Act passed with a different intent and purpose and using the words in another context
The last case is from Bombay but it did not discuss the point and cannot be held to have laid down a precedent
It is useless to refer to it
I now proceed to examine the larger question whether by rea son of the provisions of the the Advocate General of the State enjoys such position that he must necessarily be treat 1 C A 2  3 C A No 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1 1970
883 ed as a person aggrieved entitling him to file an appeal
For this purpose we have to examine critically the provisions of the Act to discover if the claim can be entertained
The was passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of bar Councils and an All India Bar
It replaced the earlier Acts governing the legal profession particularly the 
Prior to the passing of the  the enrollment and discipline of legal practitioners was in the hands of the courts and in the case of the advocates the High Court entertained and determined cases of misconduct against them
Now this jurisdiction is completely transferred to the Bar Councils of the States and the Bar Council of India
In the Bar Councils of the States except Delhi the Advocate General of the State is an ex officio member
In Delhi the Additional Solicitor General takes the place of the Advocate General
Other members are elected
In the Bar Council of India the Attorney General and the Solicitor General are ex officio members and the other members are elected one each by the State Bar Councils
In the Union Territory of Delhi the Additional Solicitor General is ex officio member
The functions of the Advocate General are not different from those of the other members in so far as the affairs of the Bar Council are concerned
The only matters where the Advocate General the Attorney General and the Solicitor General and the Additional Solicitor General are mentioned are these
The Act gives a right of pre auidence over other advocates to the Attorney General the Solicitor General the Additional Solicitor General and the Advocate General
The right of pre audience gives them a standing for hearing of cases but does not confer on them any other rights
The magniloquent phrases such as Leader of the Bar Keeper of the Conscience of the Bar have no meaning neither now nor before under the Bar Councils Act of 1926
They are just honorific titles given by courtesy but are not grounded on law
Indeed the Keepers of the Conscience of the Bar are the Bar Councils and the Leader of the Bar may be someone who may even have refused to accept Advocate Generalship
The functions of the Bar Councils of the States and the Bar Council of India throw some light on the remaining functions of the Advocate General and may first be seen
Section 6 of the Act lays down the functions of the State Bar Council and section 7 those of the Bar Council of India
Apart from certain administrative functions
which these councils which are bodies corporate perform their functions in relation to the Bar are somewhat different
Both have their own rolls and they prepare and 884 maintain the rolls
The State Bar Council entertains and determines cases of misconduct of advocates oil its roil and safeguards the rights privileges and interests of advocates on its roll
The Bar council of India lays down the standards of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of each of the State Bar Councils
The Bar Council of India also safeguards the rights and privileges and interests of advocates and exercises general supervision and control over State Bar Councils
It also deals with and disposes of any matter arising under the which may be referred to it by a State Bar Council
There are other functions which relate to the education etc
of those who wish to join the legal profession
The Bar Council of India maintains a common roll of advocates
The Bar Councils also decide in relation to their rolls all questions of seniority
The State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India constitute one or more disciplinary committees and under Chapter V questions of the conduct of advocates on their respective rolls are referred to them
The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India exercises superior powers inasmuch as it hears appeals from the orders of the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Councils and may even of its own motion withdraw for inquiry before itself for disposal any proceeding for disciplinary action against an advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any State Bar Council
The disciplinary proceedings commence both before the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India on a complaint or otherwise made respectively to the State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India
The Bar Councils in either case refer them for disposal to their respective disciplinary committees
The disciplinary committee in each case can reject the complaint summarily but if it proceeds to hear the matter further it causes a notice thereof to be sent to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State or the Attorney General of India as the case may be
The disciplinary committee after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General or the Attorney General as the case may be an opportunity to be heard makes an order either dismissing the complaint or where the proceedings are found to be not fit for consideration and are started at the instance of the Bar Council ordering that they may be filed
The committee may if the advocate is found guilty reprimand him or suspend him from practice for such period as it deems fit or may remove him altogether from the roll of advocates
The Advocate General or the Attorney General as the case may be need not appear personally but may appear through an advocate
885 From the decision of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council an appeal lies to the bar Council of India which is heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which may pass such orders thereon as it deems fit
From the decision or the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India an appeal lies to this Court
The appeals can be taken by a  person aggrieved  by the order of the disciplinary committee of tile State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India as the case may be
It is in this context that we have to determine whether the Advocate General can be regarded as a person aggrieved 
In view of the common roll maintained by the Bar Council of India it appears to me that if anybody represents the Bar it would be the Bar Council of India and in the case of the States the Bar Council of the State
The Advocate General has no right to speak on behalf of the body of the advocates as if he represented them and their interests
Neither is this privilege expressly conferred on him nor can it be implied from any of the provisions of the Act
The question therefore arises  in what capacity does the Advocate General appear before a disciplinary committee  It is obvious that he is not a prosecutor on behalf of the Bar Council because if he was one his presence would be more necessary at the stage at which the disciplinary committee considers in limini to decide whether the matter should be proceeded with at all
The next question is  why is he summoned at all  In my opinion the Advocate General is not noticed and brought before the court because he is a prosecutor or is to be bound by the order of the disciplinary committee
He represents no interest there and is heard merely because he is the chief counsel of the State and therefore his assistance at the hearing is useful
The fact that he need not appear by himself and may appear through an advocate renders his position a little weaker in the matter of his grievance If he is to be treated as a perso n aggrieved  he must argue the case himself
The fact that he appears through a counsel shows that the intention is merely to have the opinion of a person who is neither siding with the complainant nor with the advocate and who will thus have unbiased and impartial approach to the case
The Advocate General is generally a lawyer of some standing having made a mark in the profession and his contribution to the deliberations of the disciplinary committee is welcome because thus the disciplinary committee is helped to reach a proper conclusion
If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order but a person who is heard in a dispute between others merely to be of assistance in reaching the right conclusion he can hardly have a grievance
The Advocate General must after he has done his duty leave the matter to the complainant and the advocate or the 886 Bar Council to take the matter further if they choose
In no event the Advocate General is in the nature of a party having independent rights which he can claim are injured by the decision
The decision does not deny him anything nor does it ask
him to do anything
It is thus that Lord Denning says that in these disciplinary proceedings the Attorney General is not  a party as in a lis and after the decision his duty ends
Lord Denning points this out clearly by saying that the Attorney General in that case could not have been aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Judge if he had acquitted the delinquent advocate in that case The Attorney General s interest was found by Lord Denning in relation to the Crown and the Colony and that too for the special reason that appeal court had denied that the Deputy Judge possessed jurisdiction to hear the case
In our country the Advocate General does not represent the Executive or the Legislature or the Judiciary in
disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee
His function is advisory and more akin to an amicus curiae He is not to take sides except in so far his arguments lend weight to the case of the one side or that of the other
Beyond that he is not interested in the dispute either in his personal capacity or in his capacity as an Advocate General
He does not represent the Government in these proceedings
If the Government was interested the notice would have gone to it
In other statutes where the Central Government is vitally interested as for example in the Chartered Accountants Act the notice does not go to the Advocate General but to Government and the government appears through the Advocate General
The Advocate General under the Act finishes his duty when the hearing is over and he cannot be considered to be a party interested or a perso n aggrieved 
I do not find anything in the Act which indicates that the Advocate General is to be treated as a person aggrieved  by a decision whether in favour of the advocate or against him
Indeed it would have been the easiest thing to give a right of appeal to the Advocate General eo nomine without including him in the compendious phrase a person aggrieved 
If he is not noticed the order would be held to deny him something which the law entitled him to
That is quite different
The larger proposition contended for by Mr Desai is therefore not acceptable to me
This brings me to the narrow ground on which Mr Setalvad very properly rested the case of the Bar Council of India
That narrow ground is that in this case there were several Points of general public interest which needed to be solved and therefore if the decision of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council was wrong the Advocate General in the public interest could take the matter further
I do not think that I can subscribe to this approach either in this case
The Advocate General presented his views that a conviction in England showed moral turpitude 887 in the advocate
I do not think that this inference necessarily follows
The advocate explained that he was held guilty in a summary court and received a small fine because he was not in a position to prove his innocence before the Magistrate
Now in disciplinary proceedings the advocate was not estopped from questioning the charge that be was guilty of corrupt practice
In a civil proceeding the decision of a criminal court is not res judicata
To give an example if a person is involved in a traffic offence in which some one is injured he may in the criminal court receive a light sentence but if he is sued in a civil court for heavy damages he pan plead
and prove that he was not negligent or that accident was due to the contributory negligence of the defendant
The decision of the criminal court would not preclude him from raising this issue before the civil court
The advocate here explained that he was held guilty before the Magistrate in the circumstances in which he was placed
The fact of his conviction as well as his full statement bearing on his conduct were before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
They had to choose between the two that is to say the result of a summary trial Without going into merits and proof of the misconduct
Having examined the advocate and seen the record the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council chose to accept the plea of the advocate and held that he was not guilty
They were also satisfied that the summary proceedings in the criminal trial in England offended against the principles of natural justice
They were entitled to this view on which much can be said on both sides
If the Advocate General s view of the case was not accepted by the disciplinary committee he could not have any grievance
He could not make this into his own cause or a cause on behalf of persons he did not represent
He had done his duty and the matter should have rested there
For this reason I am of the view in this case the Advocate General was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 37 of the even on the narrow ground and the appeal filed by him before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India was incompetent
The conclusion which I have reached does not mean that I have gone into the merits of the advocate s plea
Nor does it indicate that 1 sitting as a judge
would have accented the plea of the advocate if I were to decide the ease on facts
That is a matter quite beside the point
I refer to the plea because it was raised and was accepted by his peers on the  disciplinary committee
I would
therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
888 MitterJ
On the basis of a news item in the Times of India of August 27 1966 the Bar Council of Maharashtra in exercise of its powers under section 35 of the issued a notice to the appellant to face an inquiry into his conduct by its disciplinary committee
The said committee exonerated the appellant of the charge levelled against him and held that he was not guilty of any misconduct professional or otherwise
Relying on the provisions of section 37 of the said Act the Advocate General of Maharashtra who had appeared before the said committee preferred an appeal to the Bar Council of India
The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India disagreed with the finding of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra observing that the conduct of the appellant which was investigated into before the State Bar Council was quite undeserving of an advocate and directed his suspension from practice for a period of one year
The appellant has come tip in appeal to this Court and has urged a preliminary point that the appeal by the Advocate General to the Bar Council of India was incompetent and the finding and order of the disciplinary committee of the said body ought to be set aside on that ground alone without our going into the facts of the case
Notice of this hearing was given to the Advocates General and the Bar Councils of all the States as also the Attorney General of India and we have had the benefit of arguments advanced before us not only on of the Advocate General for the State of Maharashtra but also  on behalf of the Bar Council of India the Attorney General of India and some of the Advocates General of the States
The determination of this question depends on the interpretation of section 37 of the hereinafter referred to as the Act  1 Any person
aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary committee of
a State Bar Council made under section 35 may within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India
2 Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India which may pass such order thereon as it deems fit
 To put the matter in a nut shell the question is Is the Advocate General of a State who appears before the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council in pursuance of a notice given  to him under section 352 of the Act a person aggrieved  within the meaning of the words used in section 37  889 To decide this question we have to look into the Act to find out the role of the Advocate General of a State in proceedings of this kind
The object of the Act is to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an All India Bar
All the States and the Union territories are to be under the jurisdiction of named State Bar Councils and there is also to be a Bar Council of India for the territories to which the Act is extended
Generally speaking a State Bar Council is to consist of a number of members including the Advocate General of the State ex officio while the Attorney General of India ex officio is to be a member of the Bar Council of India
The other members of the Bar Councils are to be elected in terms of the Act
Under section 6 the functions of a State Bar Council are to be inter alia a to admit persons as advocates on its roll b to prepare and maintain such roll c to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its rail
section 7 lays down the functions of the Bar Council of India which are to be inter alia  a to prepare and maintain a common roll of advocates b to lay down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for  advocates and c to lay down the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of each State Bar Council
Under section 9 a Bar Council has to constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which is to consist of three perso ns of whom two are to be persons elected by the Council from amongst its members and the third is to be a person co opted by the Council from amongst advocates possessing the qualifications specified in the proviso to sub s2 of section 3 but is not a member of the council
section 15 empowers Bar Councils to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act
Chapter III of the Act containing sections 16 to 28 provides for admission and enrollment of advocates
the determination of their seniority etc
The right of an advocate to practice is dealt with in Chapter IV
Chapter V which contains sections 35 to 44 deals with conduct of advocates
The relevant provisions thereof are set out as under 351 Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or 890 other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee
2 The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council if it does not summarily reject the complaint
shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State
3 The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard may make any of the following orders namely a dismiss the complaint or where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council direct that the proceedings be filed b reprimand the advocate c suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit d remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates
5 Where any notice is issued to the Advocate General under sub section 2 the Advocate General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf
Supra
Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 may within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order thereon as it deems fit
 S42 gives the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of various matters including the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath requiring discovery and production of documents etc
and under sub section
2 all proceedings before a disciplinary committee of a Bar Council are to be deemed judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal 891 Code
section 43 empowers the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council to make such order as to costs of any proceedings before it as it may deem fit
section 44 gives the disciplinary committee power to review any order passed by it of its own motion or otherwise
The above provisions of the Act make it clear that subject to a right of appeal to this Court under section 38 the inquiry into charges of misconduct against an advocate are to be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bar Councils
Any complaint against the conduct of an advocate has to be preferred before a State Bar Council and when the council has reason to believe on the strength of such complaint that an advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it has to refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee
The council can take such a step of its own motion
Section 351 shows that it is not obligatory on the State Bar Council to refer each and every complaint to the disciplinary committee
It has to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case for investigation
It can throw out a complaint if the same appears to be frivolous
Sub section
2 of section 35 shows that it is not incumbent on the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council to proceed further with the matter if it takes the view that the complaint is without substance
It is not obliged to call upon the advocate concerned to
explain his conduct or to inform the Advocate General that it has rejected the complaint summarily
It is only when the disciplinary committee is satisfied that the complaint ought not to be rejected out of hand that it has to fix a date for the hearing of the case and give notice thereof to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State
It is mandatory on the disciplinary committee to give such a notice to both
Sub sections
3 and 5 of section 35 go to show that it is not incumbent on the Advocate General to appear at the hearing and that it is within his discretion to appear either by himself or through another advocate of his choice and place his viewpoint before the disciplinary committee
He is not a party to the proceedings but he has a right to appear and to make submissions both on questions of fact and questions of law
section 3 7 does not in terms lay down who can prefer an appeal from the order of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
There can be no doubt that the advocate agianst whom an order is made would be a person aggrieved
The State Ba Council cannot be such a person as the order is made by itself acting through its disciplinary committee
A member of the public may make a complaint to the State Bar Council against an advocate on the ground of loss or damage or any serious Prejudice caused to him by the advocate be it negligence or fraud eg collusion with the opponent or misappropriation of 892 any moneys belonging to him and there does not seem to be any justifying cause for holding that he is not a person aggrieved by an order which dismisses his complaint
The question arises as to whether the Advocate General is a person aggrieved because the disciplinary committee does not take the same view of the matter as himself be it for or against the advocate
To place the Advocate General in the category of person aggrieved  one must be able to say that the disciplinary committee committed an error which it was his duty to attempt to set right because of some function attributable to him as the Advocate General or some obligation cast upon him by the Act or the general law of the land to safeguard and maintain standards of conduct of advocates laid down by the Bar Council of India
Generally speaking a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other
A person who is not a party to a litigation has no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him
But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
We find ourselves unable to take the view that because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions he should without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions
An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal the matter rests there
Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to a person aggrieved by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person preferring an appeal falls within that expression
As was observed in Robinson vs Currey1 the words person aggrieved are ordin ary English words which are to have the ordinary meaning put upon them 
According to Halsbury s Laws of England Third Edition Vol 5 page 29 foot note h The expression is nowhere defined and must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances 1 993 Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases
In Ex parte Sidebotham In re Sidebotham1 it was observed by James LJ But the words Person aggrieved  do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made
A person aggrieved  must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something
 The above definition of James LJ was described by Esher MR in Ex Parte Official Receiver In Re Reed Bowen  Co as not an exhaustive definition
His Lordship added It is an affirmative definition of a person who may appeal and at all events it includes a person who has asked for a decision for which he had a right to ask
and has been wrongfully refused
 The Queen vs The Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London 3 was a case of an appeal by an informant against the judgment of a justice of the peace upon the hearing of an information or complaint by the vestry of the parish against a person for unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the free passage of a certain highway
The relevant section provided If any person shall think himself aggrieved by
any order conviction judgment or determination made or by any matter or thing done by any justice or other person in pursuance of this Act such person may appeal to quarter sessions
 In holding that an informant had no right of appeal Lord Coleridge CJ said Is a person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another a person aggrieved   He may be annoyed at finding that what he thought was a breach of law is not a breach of law but is he aggrieved  because some one is held not to have done wrong  It is difficult to see that the section meant anything of that kind In Rex vs London Quarter Sessions Ex parte Westminster Cor poration4 a borough council whose cancellation of the registration of a street trader had been reversed by a magistrate on 1 14 ch D 458 at 465
3  361
2 at 178
4 512 K B 508 894 appeal by the trader concerned under section 25 of the London County Council General Powers Act 1947 was held not to be a person aggrieved by an order of a court of summary jurisdiction within the meaning of section 64 of the Act
The argument advanced on behalf of the corporation was that it had a public administrative duty to perform in the regulation of the streets and Having been interfered with in the execution of that duty by the decision of the magistrate they were persons aggrieved by his order
One of the grounds for refusal of the application by Lord Goddard C J was that the order made did not directlyaffect the borough council in such a way as to make them a person aggrieved within the meaning of the section
According to the learned Chief Justice what the statute did was to substitute the opinion of the magistrate for the opinion of a borough council
It was said that the court of summary jurisdiction had to take into account the same matters as the borough council had to take into account and if the court thinks that the cancellation of the licence is not justified it can restore the licence to the street trader
If the court of summary jurisdiction refuses to grant a licence then the street trader is a person aggrieved because his livelihood is affected or an order is made directly affecting him
The case of Sevenoaks Urban District Council vs Twynam1 was relied upon by counsel appearing for the Advocate General of Maharashtra support his argument that even a person who had no proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation might be a person aggrieved so as to give him a right to appeal
The statute in this case was however worded very differently from the statutes which came up for consideration in the cases noted earlier
section 681 of the Public Health Act 1925 laid down that Where for the purpose of relieving or preventing congestion of traffic it appears to the local authority to be necessary to provide within their district suitable parking places for vehicles then that authority may subject to certain conditions provide those parking places and might acquire land suitable for use as a parking place
The proviso to the section however laid down that no such order shall authorise the use of any part of a street so as unreasonably to prevent access to any promises adjoining the street or the use of the street by any person entitled to the use thereof or so as to be a nuisance or be made in respect of any part of a street without the consent of the authority or person responsible for the 1 9291 2 K B 440 at 444
895 maintenance of the street
Sub section
2 of the section provided that where a local authority proposes to acquire and for the purpose of using it as a parking place they are to give notice of the proposal specifying the land and notify the date within which any objection is to be sent to them and the notice is to state that a right of appeal was conferred by the section
Sub s3 provided that before carrying into effect any proposal of which notice was required to be given the local authority shall consider any objection which was sent to them in writing
There was no limit there as to the kind of person making the objection or the kind of objection which might be raised
The respondent a rate payer duly gave notice under sub s3 on various grounds but he did not allege the infringement of any personal legal right and he objected in his capacity as a rate payer and as a member of the public on grounds common to them all
The urban council considered the objection and informed him of their decision to proceed with the scheme
The respondent appealed to petty sessions which allowed his objection
The appellant appealed to quarter sessions and took the preliminary objection that the respondent was not a person aggrieved because he had alleged no infringement of any legal right personal to him
Referring to the dicta of James LJ Esher MR and Lopes LJ in the above cases Lord Hewart CJ observed I think this respondent did ask for a decision for which he had a right to ask
He did give notice of an objection of which he was entitled to give notice but the person making the objection is not to have an appeal unless he satisfies two conditions  1 that he is the author of the objection and 2 that he is aggrieved by the refusal in the sense that he has a special and individual right infringed
It seems to me that upon the fair construction of this sub section which is by no means a common kind of statutory provision what is meant is that a person may make an objection and is entitled to a decision upon it and if the decision is adverse to him he may it he thinks fit and subject to the usual consequences appeal from it to a petty sessional court and so appealing may in consequence of other statutory provisions appeal if need be to the court of quarter sessions According to Avory J There is no limit there in sub section
3 of the kind of person or the kind of objection which may be made
it proceeds that after so considering the objection they 896 are to give notice of their decision to the person by whom the objection was made and any person who is aggrieved by such decision may appeal
I cannot help thinking that on the plain words of that statute it was intended to give a right of appeal to any person who has made an objection to the proposal and has received notice that objection has been overruled
 In Ealing Corporation vs Jones1 Lord Parker CJ remarked that it was easier to say what will not constitute a person aggrieved than it was to say what person aggrieved included
He observed that a person was not aggrieved when being a public body it had been frustrated in the performance of one of its public duties
He amplified this by saying that If costs have been awarded in a case against a local authority it is clear on the authorities that the local authority would be an aggrieved person
Equally if the result of the decision has been to put some legal burden on the public body concerned that has been held to make it a person aggrieved
 According to Donovan J in the same case The word aggrieved  connotes some legal grievances for example a deprivation of something an adverse effect on the title to something and so on and I cannot see that this is so here
The local planning authority has simply been told that it cannot enforce the discontinuance of the present use of this land by the appellant by means of an enforcement notice under section 23
 If one is to be guided merely by the provisions of the Advo cates Act it is difficult to see how the Advocate General can be a person aggrieved because the State Bar Council takes the view whatever be its reasoning that an advocate on its roll has not been guilty of any misconduct
The entertaining of complaints the inquiry into them and the punishment to be meted out to the advocate are all concerns of the Bar Council
The Advocate General no doubt is entitled to a hearing if the complaint is not rejected summarily
The statute expects him to take a fair and impartial attitude
He has to render all assistance to the Bar Council so that a proper decision may be arrived at
His role is not that of a prosecutor  nor is he a defence counsel on behalf of the advocate
He is not interested in getting the advocate punished any more than he is interested in seeing that the character of a fellow member of the Bar is cleared even if his conduct be unworthy of an advocate
1 at 390
897 The Act does not make it obligatory on him to take part in the proceedings where he thinks that the facts of the case are so plain that his assistance is not called for
It is only when he feels that a case requires a careful investigation and proper elucidation of the facts or the exposition of the law on the subject that he is called upon to render all assistance in the proceedings
When he chooses to do
so he does his duty by appearing at the hearing and putting before the disciplinary committee the facts in their proper perspective and advancing the proper inference to be drawn therefrom
Once he does so there is an end of the matter so far as he is concerned
He cannot have any grievance because the decision of the Bar Council is  against his submission or not to his liking
The question then arises as to whether any duty is cast on the Advocate General by reason of his position to question the decision of the Bar Council if he feels it in the general interest of the members of the Bar or a wider public to do so
article 1652 of the Constitution epitomizes the functions and duties of the Advocate General in the following words It shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor and to discharge the functions conferred upon him by or under the Constitu tion or any other law for the time being in force 
A notable instance of his statutory duties is furnished by Order XXVII A of the Code of Civil Procedure
By the provisions of section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure no suit for a declaration and injunction in the case of a public nuisance can be instituted except by him or with his consent
Similar powers are given and duties cast on him by section 92 CPC in the case of trusts created for public purposes
Section 526 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives an Advocate General power to apply to the court for the committal or transfer of a case to the High Court where any person subject to the Naval Discipline Act or to the Army Act or to the Air Force Act is accused of any of the offences specified therein
It is not open to the Advocate General to intervene in any suit or legal proceeding apart from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure because he thinks public interest is involved in the matter
Treating the matter historically it may be said that in many respects the position of an Advocate General before 1950 was very similar to that of the Attorney General in England
Sections 100 and III of a statute of 1813 53 George M C 155
L169Sup
CIP71 13 898 enabled the Advocates General to exhibit to the respective Supreme Courts of Judicature at any of the Presidencies or to the Recorder s Court at Bombay any information or information for breaches of Revenue laws etc
as might be taken by the Attorney General in the court of Exchequer in England or in the nature of action or actions at law or of a bill or bills in equity as occasion might require against any person or persons residing within such jurisdiction as His Majesty s Attorney General for the time being was by law authorised to exhibit
The wording of section Ill shows that its object was to dispel doubts which had arisen about the competency of the Advocate General or Principal Law Officer of the East India Company to take such action
 section 114 of the Government of India Act 1915 empowered the Advocate General for any Presidency to take on behalf of His Majesty such proceedings as might be taken by His Majesty s Attorney General in England
section 652 of the Government of India Act 1935 laid down that it was the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Provincial Government upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor
The position of the Attorney General in England is stated by Hood Phillips on Constitutional and Administrative Law Fourth Edition at p 316 to be as follows  The Law Officers consist of the Attorney General and Solicitor General for England and the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General for Scotland
They are regarded as the heads of the Bar in their respective countries and as such are referees on points of professional etiquette
The learned author goes on to note at p 317 The Attorney General represents the Crown in civil proceedingsin which it is specially concerned
His consent is necessary for the prosecution of certain offences eg under the Official Secrets Acts
In criminal proceedings he or the Solicitor General or their deputies prosecute in important cases
It is the practice for the Attorney General to lead in treason and important constitutional cases
He may also file ex officio criminal information though this procedure is now rarely used
He may stop the trial of an indictment by entering a none prosequi
He may also take over certain proceedings on the relation of private individuals relator actions eg public nuisance etc 
The Attorney Generalls procedural privileges include the right to demand a trial at Bar privilege ie now before a Divisional 899 Court and the right to choose the venue for any civil or criminal proceedings in which the Crown is concerned  Anson in his treatise on Law and Custom of the Constitution Volume II Part I 4th Edition 1935 describes the Attorney General the Solicitor General and the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General for Scotland as the chiefs of the legal profession in their respective countries and states that in England and Northem Ireland they represent the Bar when the Bar takes collective action
So far as England is concerned neither the Attorney General nor the Solicitor General appears to have had for a very long time any function to discharge or any duty to perform when the conduct of a barrister or a solicitor was called in question
The power of inquiry was delegated by the Judges to the Inns of Court so far as barristers were concerned and as regards solicitors the matter has for some time been delegated to the Law Society
It may not also be out of place to note the history of the legislation in India with regard to enquiries against members of the legal profession prior to the Act of 1961
Under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Calcutta of the year 1865 the High Court was to have power to make rules for the qualification and admission of proper persons to be advocates vakils and attorneys at law and was to be empowered to remove or suspend them from practice on reasonable cause
The Letters Patents of other High Court contained provisions
The appears to have been the earliest Indian statute on the subject
Under section 13 of this Act the High Court was empowered after such enquiry as it though fit to suspend or dismiss any pleader or muktyar who was guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty
The Bar Councils came into existence for the first time under the Bar Councils Act 1926
But even under this Act the power to reprimand suspend or remove from practice any advocate of the High Court charged with professional or other misconduct was left with the High Court under section 101
section 102 laid down the procedure to be adopted by the High Court when a complaint was made to it by any Court or by the Bar Council or by any other person that an advocate had been guilty of misconduct
The High Court could summarily reject the complaint or refer the case for enquiry to the Bar Council or after consultation with the Bar Council refer it to the Court of a District Judge and it also might
of its own motion refer any case where it had reason to believe
that any advocate had been so guilty
Under section 11 it was the duty of a committee of the Bar Council to inquire into a complaint made under section 10 Under section 122 of the Act the finding of a Tribunal on an inquiry referred to the Bar Council was to be forwarded to the High Court through the Bar Council and the finding of a District Court on such inquiry was to be forwarded 900 to the High Court direct with a copy to the Bar Council
section 123 of the Act contained a provision somewhat similar to section 353 of the Act of 1961
The hearing was however to take place before the High Court which I had to give notice of the date fixed for the purpose to the advocate concerned to the Bar Council and to the Advocate General and to afford them an opportunity of being heard before orders were passed in the case
Under the Act of 1926 the Advocate General appeared on the scene only after the Bar Council had recorded its finding
The significant departure in the Act of 1961 from the analogous provision of the Act of 1926 is that the Advocate General is given notice of hearing of the case
By itself this cannot affect any change in his position as regards an inquiry into the conduct of an advocate
It would be reasonable to hold that while passing the statutes of 1926 and 1961 the Legislature thought that the Advocate General should be heard inasmuch as he occupied the position of a general referee on points of professional etiquette very much like the Attorney General in England
However that may be once he does the duty enjoined upon him by the statute of making such submissions as he thinks proper at the hearing his functions qua the inquiry come to an end
As a referee he has no further interest in the matter
If the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council makes an order against the advocate which the Advocate General considers harsh and unreasonable in the circumstances of the case he is not called upon to file an appeal to protect the interests of the advocate
Neither is he interested in prosecuting the matter further if he takes the view that the punishment meted is not commensurate with the misconduct of the advocate
Elaborate reference was made at the Bar to the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney General of the Gambia vs Pierre Sarr N Jie1
In that case the conduct of the respondent a member of the English Bar admitted to practice as a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Gambia was found to dishonourable and as such an order striking his name off the roll of the court was made by the deputy Judge with a direction that it should be reported to the Masters of the Bench of the Inn to which he belonged
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Gambia had criticised the conduct of the barrister severely in the course of a trial held before him and had sent a copy of his judgment to the Attomey General of the Gambia
The AttorneyGeneral served a notice of motion on the barrister for an enquiry to be made by the Chief Justice but as the Chief Justice was the only Judge of that Court he recommended that some one other than himself should be appointed as a deputy Judge to hold the 1  630
901 inquiry
The Deputy Judge ordered his name to be struck off the roll
His order was however set aside by the West African Court of Appeal not on merits but on the ground that a Deputy Judge had only jurisdiction to represent the Chief Justice in the exercise of his judicial powers and according to the Court of Appeal the power to strike the name of a legal practitioner off the roll was not a judicial power
The Attorney General of the Gambia appealed to Her Majesty in Council
The question of the maintainability of the appeal was also canvassed before the Board
With regard to inquiries into the conduct of barristers and solicitors in the Crown colonies Lord Denning who delivered the judgment of the Privy Council said by the common law of England the Judges have the right to determine who shall be admitted to practice as barristers and solicitors and as incidental thereto the judges have the right to suspend or prohibit from practice
In England this power has for a very long time been delegated so far as barristers are concerned to the Inns of Court and for a much shorter time so far as solicitors are concerned to the Law Society
In the colonies the Judges have retained the power in their own hands His Lordship went on to remark at p 631 When the judges exercise this power to suspend or expel they do not decide a suit between the parties
There is no prosecutor as  in a criminal case nor any plaintiff as in a civil suit
The judges usually act on their own initiative ex mero motu on information which has come to their notice or to the notice of one or other of them in the course of their duties
 Further When a legal practitioner is suspended or struck off by the judges of a colony he has always been at liberty to petition Her Majesty in Council to restore him Rejecting the argument that the Attorney General had no locus standi to petition for special leave to appeal as he was not a person aggrieved the Board referred to section 31 of the Order in Council 1949 which gave very wide powers to His Majesty in Council to entertain the petition of any person aggrieved by any judgment of the court and to admit his appeal upon such conditions as His Majesty in Council would think fit to impose
On the facts of the case the Board held that the Attorney General had a sufficient interest in the matter because the order made by the 902 West African Court of Appeal prejudicially affected his interests
The reasoning of the Board was as follows The Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest
It is his duty to bring before the Judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action
True it is that if the judge acquits the petitioner of misconduct no appeal is open to the Attorney General
He has done his duty and is not aggrieved
But if the Judge finds the practitioner guilty of professional misconduct and a Court of Appeal reverses the decision on a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of the judge or is otherwise a point in w hich the public interest is concerned the Attorney General is a person aggrieved  by the decision and can properly petition Her Majesty for special leave to appeal
 It is clear that Lord Denning considered the denial of jurisdiction of the deputy Judge to be a matter of public interest and therefore held the Attorney General as the Crown s representative to be a person sufficiently interested as to be a person aggrieved
That surely is not the position here nor is an Advocate General the representative of the Government
Neither the Constitution nor the holds him as the representative of the Government or as a person representing the public interest
Whatever may be the position of the Attorney General in a colony as a representative of the Crown he is not the guardian of the public interest in India in any matter except as provided for in the statutes
He like any other person may draw the attention of the Bar Council to any misconduct of an advocate which according to him merits disciplinary action
The Act of 1961 provides for notice to be given to him of all such proceedings and gives him a right to appear at the hearing but once the hearing is over and a finding recorded he has done his duty and cannot be said to be aggrieved within the meaning of the expression used in section 37
It is only because the Attorney General for the Gambia had an interest in seeing that the Court of Appeal did not reverse the decision of the Deputy Judge on a ground which went to the jurisdiction of the Judge or was otherwise a point in which the public interest was concerned that the Board held that he was a person aggrieved
Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Judicial Com mittee in Advocate General Bombay vs Phiroz Barucha1 where the Privy Council entertained an appeal by the Advocate General 1 37 BLR 722
903 of Bombay against an advocate who had been found by the High Court of Bombay to have been guilty misconduct but against whom no disciplinary action had been taken by the Judges
Although there was a good deal of discussion Lit the Bar about the maintainability of the appeal which was sought for by special leave the Board remarked that the circumstances were not such as to justify it in advising His Majesty to grant such special leave principally on the ground that the question was one of the exercise of statutory discretion by the Judges as to whether the circumstances of the case as established before the High Court called for any disciplinary action and the Board felt that the action of the High Court in exercising their discretion in the way they had done was not such as His Majesty would be advised further to consider
This decision does not help the Advocate General of Maha rashtra because it did not decide the point as to the maintainability of the appeal
It is well known that the Judicial Committee was never chary in granting special leave to appeal when it felt that the justice of the case demanded a further hearing
Mr Daphtary appearing for the appellant very fairly drew our attention to an observation of this Court in Bhataraju Nageswara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the Madras High Court1 which was a case of an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court at Madras under section 12 of the debarring the advocate for a period of five years on charges of misconduct which were held by the High Court as proved
In the ultimate paragraph of the judgment this Court recorded its strong disapproval of the frame of the appeal in that the Judges of the High Court had been made respondents to it
They however went on to observe that in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act the appropriate parties should be the advocate concerned the complainant if any the Bar Council or the secretary thereof and the Advocate General of the State concerned to whom notices have to be issued under section 123 of the 
 With great respect we find ourselves unable to concur in the above so far as the Advocate General is concerned
It does not appear that any argument was advanced about the proper parties to the appeal before this Court and the point as to whether the Advocate General was a person aggrieved was neither raised nor argued
The only party to appear before this Court wag the Judges of the High Court
 1 1955 1SCR 10551064 904 It appears that the Advocate General of Maharashtra felt in this case that the disciplinary committee of the Maharashtra Bar Council had gone wrong and that there was a question of principle involved as regards the effect of a conviction of an Indian advocate of an offence recognised by all civilised countries as an offence involving moral turpitude and that the question also related to the requirements of natural justice in a criminal court
Every day courts of law are called upon to decide questions of law inter partes which may be of general importance to the public
The Advocate General cannot prefer an appeal merely because the question is one of considerable importance to the public inasmuch as he is not a party to it and he has no locus standi to do so even in a case where the statute only gives him an opportunity of appearing at a hearing and making his submissions
A decision by the disciplinary committee cannot necessarily be said to raise a point of public interest merely because the Advocate General feels that it is erroneous or that he himself would have arrived at a different conclusion
That at best is his personal opinion as regards the conduct of an advocate who has to deal with the public and the non acceptance thereof does not make him a person aggrieved
An Advocate General in India is not the guardian angel of the Bar nor is he the champion of public interest in any matter save as specified in a statute
In conclusion we hold that the appeal by the Advocate General of Maharashtra to the Bar Council of India was incompetent and this appeal should be allowed and the finding of the Bar Council of India set aside
Vaidialingam J
With respect I am not able to agree with the views expressed by My Lord and Mr Justice Mitter That the appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India was incompetent
The preliminary point that has been argued before us in this appeal relates to the maintainability of the appeal by the Advocate General of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India under section 371 of the Advocates Act 1961 Act 25 of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act against the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra hereinafter referred as the Committee dated October 19 1968 holding the appellant not guilty of any professional misconduct
It is not necessary to refer to the allegations of professional misconduct made against the appellant as this appeal has yet to be heard on merits
Against the order of the Committee acquitting the appellant the Advocate General of Maharashtra Sri H N Seervai filed 905 under section 371DCAppeal No 18 of 1968 before the Bar Council of India
The said appeal was heard by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India hereinafter referred to as the
Appellate Committee as required by section 372 of the Act
A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the appellant that the Advocate General was not competent to prefer the appeal as he was not the complainant nor were the proceedings for taking disciplinary action initiated at his instance and he is not any person aggrieved  under section 371
The State Bar Council which initiated the proceedings was apparently satisfied with the decision of its Committee and did not take any further action
In short
according to the appellant the Advocate General was not any person aggrieved under section 371 of the Act
The appeal was also contested by the appellant on merits
The Appellate Com mittee by its order dated October 26 1969 overruled the preliminary objection and held that the Advocate General was competent to maintain the appeal under section 371
By the same order the Appellate Committee disagreed with the findings of the Committee and found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct and ordered his suspension from practice for a period of one year
The appellant was also directed to pay the costs of the proceedings
It is this order of the Appellate Committee that is the subject of the appeal before us
As stated earlier we have heard arguments only on the question of the maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the Advocate General of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India
As the question raised was a fairly important one notice had been issued to the Attorney General of India the Bar Council of India the Advocates General and the Bar Councils of the States
Advocates General of most of the States were represented by counsel
The Attorney General of India the Bar Council of India as well as
the Bar Council of Maharashtra were also represented by counsel before us
The question posed for our consideration is whether the Advocate General of a State comes within the expression any person aggrieved in section 371 of the Act
Mr Daphtary learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the various provisions of the Act and pointed out that matters concerning the legal profession have now been entrusted to the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India and them powers to take disciplinary action have also been vested in them
Whatever may have been the position once occupied by the
Advocate General vis a vis the legal profession that has now been changed by the Act
His appearance in disciplinary matters is only to assist the Committee and he has no further interest in 906 those proceedings
Whether an Advocate is acquitted or convicted is no concern of the Advocate General because he is not interested in the actual decision of the Committee
Hence the Advocate General cannot be considered to be any person aggrieved by any order of the Committee so as to be eligible to file an appeal under section 37 of the Act
In this connection Mr Daphtary referred us to several English decisions where the expression person aggrieved  has been considered and interpreted with references to the statutes in which those expressions occur
Relying on the principles laid down in those decisions to which reference will be made later Mr Daphtary pointed out that the expression perso n aggrieved  should not be interpreted as covering every person who is disappointed or dissatisfied with a decision rendered by a Committee
On the other hand the counsel urged that in order to be considered as a person aggrieved  that person must be one who has suffered a legal grievance a man against whom a decision has been pronounced and which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something
An appeal must be by the party who has endeavored to maintain the contrary of that which has taken place
The counsel further pointed out that the Advocate General is a public officer and cannot be considered to be a party to the proceedings before the Committee
The Advocate General may be even annoyed with the decision of the Committee acquitting an Advocate but that will not make him a person aggrieved 
Considerable reliance was placed by Mr Daphtary on the observations of Lord Denning in Attorney General of the Gambia vs Pierre Sarr N Jie1 to the effect that the Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest and that it is his duty to bring before the Judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action and that if the Judge acquits the practitioner of misconduct no appeal is open to the Attorney General who has done his duty and is not aggrieved
But if on the other hand a Court of Appeal reverses the decision holding a practitioner guilty of professional misconduct on a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of the Judge or is otherwise a point in which the public interest is concerned the Attorney General is a perso n aggrieved  by the decision and can properly petition Her Majesty for special leave to appeal
Drawing support from these observations Mr Daphtary urged that in this case the Committee had acquitted the appellant and the Advocate General having appeared through counsel before the Committee has done his duty and as such he cannot be considered to be aggrieved
No question of jurisdiction of the Committee or any point in which the public interest is 1 1961 Appeal Cases 617
907 concerned arose for decision in the appeal filed by the Advocate General so as to make the appeal competent even within the limited rule laid down by Lord Denning
Mr V section Desai learned counsel appearing for the Advocate General of Maharashtra and Mr M C Setalvad learned counsel appearing for the Bar Council of India have supported the decision of the Appellate Committee holding in favour of the competency of the appeal filed by the Advocate General as any person aggrieved under section 37 of the Act
The counsel appearing for the Attorney General the Bar Council of Maharashtra and the Advocates General represented before us have supported this view
Mr V section Desai pointed out that the Act is a self contained Code and that the various decisions where the expression perso n aggrieved  has been interpreted must be appreciated in the particular context in which those expressions occur in the statutes which were before the Courts
The reasoning in those decisions may furnish a guide but cannot be applied ipso facto when interpreting section 37 of the Act
The expression  any person aggrieved in section 37 of the Act will have to be understood and interpreted in the context in which it appears having due regard to the scheme of the Act
The counsel also referred us to certain decisions bearing on this matter to which we shall refer in due course
Mr M C Setalvad learned counsel appearing for the Bar Council of India urged in particular that the Advocate General is a responsible person and is the highest Law Officer of the State
The legal profession is very closely associated with the administration of justice by the Courts
The Bar in that context has to come into contact with the public to assist them in legal matters
This responsible position occupied by the legal profession has to be properly safeguarded and that could be done only by insisting that its members are persons of high character and integrity and who observe rules of professional etiquette
The Act has made it obligatory to give notice in the disciplinary proceedings to the Advocate General and give him an opportunity of being heard
The purpose for which the highest Law Officer of the State the Advocate General is brought in not only in the Act but also in the of 1926 Act 38 of 1926 hereinafter referred to as the Bar Councils Act is to subserve the public interest namely of seeing that the integrity and honesty of the legal profession are maintained and that proper decisions are given in disciplinary proceedings
There may be cases of inadequate punishment or even harsh punishment being awarded by the Committee
The Advocate General in proper cases can bring up such matters before the Bar Council of India
Mr Setalvad further pointed out that there is no restriction placed in section 37 denying the right of the Advocate General to file an appeal against the orders of the Committee
Having due regard to the scheme of the Act 908 and particularly of sections 35 and 37 the Advocate General comes within any person aggrieved and hence he was competent to file the appeal
I have given careful consideration to the various aspects placed before us by all the learned counsel and I am of the view that the decision of the Appellate  Committee holding that the appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra was competent is correct
I am further of the view that the expression any person aggrieved in section 37 will have to be interpreted in the context in which it appears having due regard to the provisions of the Act and its scheme
Considered in this manner it has to be held that the Advocate General comes within any person aggrieved in section 37
The decisions relied on by Mr Daphtary have no doubt interpreted the expression person aggrieved  occurring in the particular statutes which came up for consideration in those decisions but in my opinion it will not be safe to adopt in toto the interpretation so placed no doubt on the identical expression occurring in different statutes when construing the said expression in the Act before us
As pointed out by Lord Parker CJ in Ealing Corporation vs Jones1 cases which have interpreted similar expressions can be looked into to see if there are general principles which can be extracted which will guide the court in approaching the question as to what the words person aggrieved  mean in any particular statute
 I will make a brief reference to the decisions cited for the appellant later
But before doing so it is desirable to refer to some of the provisions of the Act itself so that the scheme of the Act will become evident and that will throw considerable on the interpretation of section 37
Before I refer to the Act I think it desirable to advert to some of the provisions of the Bar Councils Act
Even at the outset I may point out that the scheme of the Bar Councils Act was different
In the Bar Councils Act the disciplinary jurisdiction over Advocates was vested in the High Court vide section 101
Under section 10 2 the High Court
if the complaint is not summarily rejected by it had to refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar Council or after consultation with the Bar Council to the Court of a District Judge
When a case is referred for inquiry to the Bar Council under section 1 1 the case was to be inquired into by the Committee of the Bar Council referred to as the Tribunal and that Tribunal consisted of the particular number of person mentioned in section II 2 appointed for the purpose by the Chief Justice
The High Court had power to make rules under section 121 prescribing the procedure to be followed in the conduct of inquiries
The finding of the inquiry by the Tribunal had to be forwarded to the High Court
On receipt of the finding the High Court had to fix 1 909 a date for hearing of the case
Under section 123 it was obligatory to give notice amongst other persons to the Advocate General of the day fixed for hearing and it was also further obligatory to give the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard before orders
were passed
Under section 124 the High Court could pass final orders or refer the case back for further inquiry Under sub section
5 the High Court had also power when passing final orders to give directions regarding payment of costs
I am only referring to the material provisions of the Bar Councils Act to show that the High Court was then the disciplinary authority and the function of the Committee of the Bar Council was only to submit a finding after conducting an inquiry as directed by the High Court
It is however to be noted that the Advocate General then was not associated in the inquiry proceedings before the Tribunal of the Bar Council but he was entitled to be given notice of the date fixed for hearing and also to be heard in the proceedings before the High Court after receipt of the finding submitted by the Committee of the Bar Council
Those provisions clearly establish the important position occupied by the Advocate General and recognised by the Bar Councils Act
The scheme is slightly different when we come to the Act
The State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India have been made autonomous units and various functions regarding the legal profession have been entrusted to them
Taking disciplinary action against the delinquent members of the Bar and conducting inquiries are all part of their functions
Barring a provision of a right to appeal to the Supreme Court under section 38 of the Act the Courts are completely out of picture so far as the legal profession is concerned
The Act was one to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Councils of the States and the Bar Council of India
Section 3 makes provisions for the State Bar Councils
Under sub section 2 the Advocate General of the State is an ex officio member
Similarly the Additional Solicitor General of India is an ex officio member of the State Bar Council of Delhi
Section 6 1  enumerates the functions of the State Bar Councils
One of the functions under cl
c relates to entertaining and determining cases of misconduct against advocates on the roll of the State Bar Council
Section 7 similarly enumerates the functions of the Bar Council of India
Under cl
c the Bar Council of India has got the power to lay down the procedure to be followed by its Disciplinary Committee and the Disciplinary Committees of each State Bar Councils
Section 9 deals with the Bar Council constituting one or more Disciplinary Committees in the manner indicated therein
Section 23 gives a right of pre audience to the Attorney General of India the Solicitor General of India the Additional 910 Solicitor General of India and the Advocate Generals of the States as mentioned in sub sections 1 to 4 respectively
Chapter V deals with the conduct of Advocates and contains the group of sections 35 to 44
Section 35 deals with the punishment of Advocates for misconduct and is as follows Section 35  Punishment of advocates for mis conduct 1 Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its dis ciplinary committee
2 The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council if it does not summarily reject the complaintshall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State
3 The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard may make any of the following orders namely a dismiss the complaint or where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council direct that the proceedings be filed b reprimand the advocate c suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit d remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates
4 Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause c of sub section 3 he shall during the period of suspension be debarred from practicing in any court or before any authority or person in India
5 Where any notice is issued to the Advocate General under sub section 2 the Advocate General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any advo cate appearing on his behalf Similarly section 361 deals with the disciplinary powers of the Bar Council of India
Sub section 2 confers powers on the 911 Appellate Committee of its own motion to withdraw for inquiry for itself any disciplinary action against an advocate pending before the Committee and dispose of the same
Sub section 3 provides for the Appellate Committee when disposing of a case under section 36 observing so far as may be the procedure laid down in section 35
It further provides that references to the Advocate General in section 35 are to be construed as references to the Attorney General of India
Sections 37 and 38 which provide for an appeal to the Bar Council of India and to the Supreme Court effectively run as follows Section 37  Appeal to the Bar Council of India
1 Any person aggrieved by a order of the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Councilunder section 35 may within sixty days of date of the communication of the order to him prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India
2 Every such appeal shall be heard by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India which may pass such order thereon as it deems fit Section 38
Appeal to the Supreme Court Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 may within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order thereon as it deems fit Section 421 deals with powers of the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council with regard to the various matters provided for in cls
a to f
Section 43 provides for making of orders as to costs by the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council
Section 44 gives powers of review to the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council
Section 48A in Chapter VI deals with the revisional
powers of the Bar Council of India
It will be seen from sections 3 2 a 23 4 and 35 that the Advocate General of the State is given by the Act a very important and responsible position
Some discussion took place before us whether the Advocate General can be considered to be the person who is charged with the duty of safeguarding the professional integrity of the members of the Bar when powers and duties in that regard have been conferred under the Act on the 912 State Bar Councils
I do not think it necessary to go into that aspect as I think a inquiry in that regard is not relevant for the present purpose of construing section 37
Nor can the analogy of the Attorney General in a colony representing the Crown being the guardian of public interest as stated by Lord Denning in Attorney General of the Gambia vs Pierree Sarr N Jie1 be brought in for interpreting section 37 of the Act as we are only concerned to find out the right given to the Advocate General by the Act
So far as that is concerned I am satisfied that the Act has given due recognition to his status by virtue of his being the highest Law in the St ate as the Advocate General and who may be trusted to place a disinterested and dispassionate view before the Committee to enable it to come to a proper decision having due regard to the Advocate concerned as well as the entire legal profession to which he belongs
Apart from his being under s 
3 2 a an ex officio member of the State Bar Council section 23 4 gives him a right of pre audience over all other advocates
Coming to section 35 read with section 37 which has been extracted earlier the main features that emerge therefrom are as follows 1 The State Bar Council can suo moto or on receipt of a complaint when it has reason to believe that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct refer the case to its committee
2 If the Committee does not summarily reject the complaint it is bound to fix a date for hearing of the case and it is also further bound to give notice of the date of hearing apart from the advocate concerned to the Advocate General of the State
3 The Committee is bound in the inquiry to give an opportunity of being heard both to the advocate concerned and the Advocate General
After such an inquiry the Committee can pass one or other of the orders enumerated in clauses a to d of section 35
4 The Advocate General may appear before the Committee in person or through an advocate appearing on his behalf
5 The orders of the Committee have to be communicated to the Advocate General and the advocate concerned
1 913 6 Against the orders passed under section 35 any person aggrieved is entitled to file an appeal under section 37 to the Bar Council of India
While under the Bar Councils Act the Advocate General was associated with the disciplinary proceedings only when the matter was being decided by the High Court after receipt of the findings submitted by the Tribunal of the Bar Council it is significant to note that under the Act the Advocate General is associated with the disciplinary proceedings right from the stage of inquiry by the Committee
Under sub section 2 of section 35 the Committee is bound to give notice of the date of hearing not only to the Advocate concerned but also to the Advocate General of the State
It will be noted that disciplinary proceedings may have been occasioned because of a complaint made by a third party or may have been initiated suo Moto by the State Bar Council
In whatever manner the proceedings may have been initiated the Advocate General is entitled to be given notice of the date of hearing
It cannot be a formal and empty notice to the Advocate General because sub section 3 clearly indicates that the Advocate General should be given an opportunity of being heard
It is significant to note that sub section 3 of section 35 which deals with the giving of am opportunity of being heard both to the advocate concerned and the Advocate General does not make any distinction in the opportunity so afforded to both of them
The same opportunity that the Advocate concerned has under sub section
3 is also afforded to the Advocate General
It is not necessary to go to the extent of holding that there is a lis before the Committee and that the Advocate General is a party in the sense that expression is ordinarily understood in law
The advocate concerned win be interested in disputing the allegations made or charges levelled against him and he will be entitled to lead evidence in support of his plea
If there is a complainant he will of course lead evidence to support his case
The Advocate General on the other hand is also entitled to place before the Committee all aspects of the matter including facts that may be in favour of the advocate whose conduct is under inquiry
This is because of the important position occupied by him
It may be that the Advocate General may not be able to appear personally and participate in all the disciplinary proceedings and that is why provision has been made in section 355 enabling the Advocate General to appear either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf
Just as the Advocate concerned will have an opportunity of examining his witnesses and cross examining the witnesses produced against him the Advocate General or the counsel appearing on his behalf will also have a right of cross examining the witnesses produced in the case so as to elicit information about the charge of professional misconduct levelled against the advocate concerned
The 9 SupCI71 14 914 Advocate General need not be vindictive and take sides as a party to a litigation and see that the advocate is found guilty
On the other hand by virtue of the special and dispassionate role occupied by him he will be able during the inquiry to place such materials or evidence which will enable the Committee to come to a proper and correct finding in the interest of both the legal practitioner and legal profession to which he belongs
It is in this context of the close association of the Advocate General with the disciplinary proceedings that the expression person aggrieved  in section 37 has to be interpreted
There can be no controversy 
that an appeal will lie against the various orders that the Committee may pass as enumerated in cls
a to d of section 35 3
The question is at whose instance the appeal will lie
If the complaint is dismissed the complainant will be a person aggrieved  who can file an appeal under section 37
In fact it has been held by this Court in B M Madani vs Commissioner of Workmen s Compensation Bombay1 that when proceedings are initiated on a complaint by a party and the Committee after finding the advocate guilty of the charges passed an order reprimanding with a warning an appeal filed by such a complainant before the Appellate Committee only on the question of sentence imposed was competent as the complainant was a person aggrieved 
Similarly an order adverse to the advocate concerned can be the subject of appeal at his instance
There is no controversy that the order passed by the Com mittee was communicated to the Advocate General
As already pointed out a series of steps is contemplated under section 35 reference to the Committee of a case of professional misconduct notice of the date of hearing to be given to the Advocate General Advocate General being given an opportunity of being heard at the hearing the Advocate General being entitled to appear before the Committee either in person or through an Advocate his being entitled to be communicated with a copy of the order passed by the Com mittee
It is in that context and for these purposes that I have considered the meaning of the expression any person aggrieved in section 37 1
The fact that the Advocate General does not allege an infringement of any legal rights of his own is of no consequence
The particular preceding in which the Advocate General is given a right to participate relates to an inquiry into the allegations of misconduct against an advocate
Upon a fair construction of section 37 read with section 35 of the Act the Advocate General in my opinion is any person aggrieved and as such was entitled to file the appeal under section 37 1  against the order passed by the Committee
The same reasoning will apply to the Attorney General of India under section 38
1 Civil Appeal No 877 of 1968 decided on 8 10 1968
915 It may be that in a particular case the Advocate General may feel that the findings arrived at in favour of the advocate by the Committee is not justified by the evidence and that decision will have to be reconsidered by the Appellate Committee or it may even be that in a particular case the sentence imposed by the Committee may not be commensurate with the guilt of the advocate or it may also be that the sentence imposed on an advocate by the Committee is very harsh or the finding of guilt is not correct
Under such and similar circumstances in the interests of the Advocate and the legal profession the Advocate General will be competent to bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee so that justice may be done
In this context the observations of Lord Hewart CJ in Sevenoaks Urban District Council vs Twynam1 are apposite
The question before the Court in that decision was whether an objector to a proposal made by a local authority to acquire land in order to provide parking place for vehicles and whose objections were overruled was a person aggrieved  under section 683 of the Public Health Act 1925 and as such entitled to appeal
It was found that the objector alleged no ground of objections personally to himself
Nevertheless it was held that such an objector was a person aggrieved  and entitled to appeal
Lord Hewart CJ at page 443 states  The question therefore is  Is it true to say that in these circumstances and within the meaning of this part of this statute this respondent was a person aggrieved   Now undoubtedly those words a person aggrieved  have very often been considered and if one looked at the mere terms apart from their context and apart from the particular circumstances it would have been quite easy to marshal decisions of contradictory import
But as has been said again and again there is often little utility in seeking to interpret particular expressions in one statute by reference to decisions given upon similar expressions in different statutes which have been enacted alio intuitu
The problem with which we are concerned is not what is the meaning of the expression aggrieved  in any one of a dozen other statutes but what is its meaning in this part of this statute  It is a little important to see what this part of this statute is dealing with
 The above extract has been quoted with approval by Lord Parker CJ in Ealing Corporation vs Jones 
I have already indicated earlier that the problem before us whether the Advocate General is a person aggrieved  under section 37 1 2 1959 1 Q D 384
916 of the Act will have to be tackled with reference to the scheme and provisions of the Act and that is exactly what I have done and arrived at the conclusion that he is a person aggrieved
Mr Daphtary argued that when the Committee consisting of members of the legal profession has decided in favour of the Advocate the Advocate General can have no grievance
Thisin my view is really begging the question
Why did the Legislature then bring in the Advocate General at all and why has it associated him in disciplinary proceedings from the very beginning of the inquiry  That and other circumstances already pointed out by me bring him under section 37 as any person aggrieved Mr Daphtary then urged that if the Advocate General was expected to safeguard the interest of the Advocate and the legal profession by seeing that proper decisions are given by the Committee that purpose is not served when powers have been given to the Committee under section 352 to summarily reject a complaint and the Advocate General will have no remedy against such rejection
The short answer to this contention is that a right of appeal must be specifically conferred by statute
Section 371 gives a right of appeal against an order passed under section 35
The orders which could be passed after hearing the case are enumerated in clauses a to d of section 35 3
It is not necessary for me to express any opinion whether an order summarily rejecting a complaint can also be the subject of an appeal under section 371 as that section is in very wide terms
In any event Mr Daphtary s contention will only amount to this viz that the Advocate General is not associated at the stage of summary rejection of a complaint
That circumstance does not militate against the view already expressed by me
Probably the Legislature may have felt that if there is any wrongful summary rejection of a complaint it could be set right by the Bar Council of India under section 48A
But once the Committee decides to hear the cases and passes an order under section 35 the Advocate General gets a right of appeal under section 371
Mr V section Desai referred us to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Advocate General of Bombay and others vs Pitamberdas Gokuldas Mehta and others1 wherein according to him an appeal by the Advocate General of Bombay against the decision of the High Court of Bombay Pleaders Act was entertained by the Judicial Committee
He has also referred us to the discussion between the Court and counsel in the said decision reported in Advocate General of Bombay vs Phiroz Rustomji Bharucha2 which according to him will show that though an objection about the locus standi of the Advocate General to file an 2 37 Bombay Law Reporter 722
1 Indian Appeals 235
917 appeal under such circumstances was raised but was not accepted by the Judicial Committee
I have gone through both the reports and there is no indication that the question of maintainability of an appeal by the Advocate General was decided one way or the other by the Judicial Committee
Mr Daphtary has referred us to the decisions in Re Side botham1 in re
Reed Bowen  Co2 The Queen vs The Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London3 Rex
vs London Quarter Sessions4 and Ealing Corporation vs Jones5 wherein the expression person aggrieved  occurring in different statutes came up for interpretation
The principles that emerge from those decisions appear to be that a person aggrieved  must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance or who has claimed a title to something and his claim has been negatived or who has maintained to the contrary in the proceedings or litigation
It has been further held in some of those decisions that the said expression does not take in any person who may be affected by the order or who may feel disappointed or even annoyed at the decision
In the view that I take that the expression person aggrieved  in section 37 of the Act has to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of and scheme of the Act as well as the context in which those expressions appear
I do not think it necessary to consider in great detail those decisions which have been rendered on different statutes
The decision in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad vs Chandulat Shamaldas Patel and others6 referred to by Mr Daphtary in my opinion does not assist the appellant
In that decision it was held that when certain notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act were set aside by the High Court the Municipal Corporation on whose behalf the acquisition was being made by the Government cannot be considerd to be a person aggrieved  entitled to challenge the order of the High Court
An additional reason has also been given against the competency of the appeal that even an order for costs has not been passed against the Municipal Corporation
That decision was rendered on the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act and so does not help the appellant
It was urged on behalf of the appellant that if the Advocate General was really intended to be given a right of appeal under section 37 1 the Legislature should have used the expression any person including the Advocate General aggrieved by an order
1 14 Chancery Davison 458
3 5 1959 I Q D 384
2 19 Q B 174
4 1951 2 K B D 508
6 Civil Appeal No 1716 of 1967 decided on 1 8 1970 918 I am of the view that it was unnecessary to make any such provision because the expression as it stands clearly takes within its fold the Advocate General also
This leaves me with the decision in Attorney General of the Gambia vs Pierre Sarr N Jie1 which has been very strongly relied on by Mr Daphtary
One Mr X a member of the English Bar was admitted to practice as a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Gambia
The Deputy Judge made an order striking his name off the roll of that Court
This decision was reversed by the West African Court of Appeal on the ground that the Deputy Judge had no jurisdiction in the matter
The Attorney General of Gambia sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council but the West African Court of Appeal declined to grant him leave on the ground that notice had not been given in due time to Mr X
The Attorney General then made a petition to Her Majesty for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal setting aside the order of the Deputy Judge as well as refusing to grant leave to appeal
The Attorney General s petition was granted but liberty was reserved to Mr X to raise the preliminary point that no appeal lay at the instance of the Attorney General
During the course of arguments the Judicial Committee rejected the preliminary objection
It is to be noticed that against the decision of the Deputy Judge striking his name off the roll Mr X filed an appeal to the West African Court of Appeal under section 14 which was as follows An appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from any order of the Judge suspending a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court from practice or striking his name off the Roll and for the purposes of any such appeal any such order shall be deemed to be an order of the Supreme Court
 I am particularly referring to this decision because certain observations of Lord Denning on which reliance has been placed by Mr Daphtary will have to be understood with reference to this provision of law
Exercising jurisdiction under this section the West African Court of Appeal set aside the order of the Deputy Judge
In the first instance the Attorney General sought leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the West African Court of Appeal under section 5 of the West African Appeal to the Privy Council Order in Council
1949 which is as follows Applications to the court for leave to appeal shall be made by motion or petition within 21 days from the date of the judgment to be appealed from and the 1 919 applicant shall give the opposite party notice of his intended application The West African Court of Appeal declined to grant leave to appeal to the Attorney General on the ground that notice had not given within the time mentioned in the above order to Mr X
The Attorney General made an application to the Judicial Committee for special leave to appeal from the two orders mentioned above of the West African Court of Appeal
That petition was filed under section 31 of the West African Appeal to Privy Council Order in Council 1949 which runs as follows Nothing in this order contained shall be deemed to interfere with the right of His Majesty upon the humble petition of any person aggri eved by any judgment of the Court to admit his appeal therefrom upon such condi tions as His Majesty in Council shall think fit to impose
 The question that arose before their Lordships was whether the Attorney General was a person aggrieved  under the above order
In discussing this question Lord Denning at page 634 observes   
The words person aggrieved  are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive inter pretation
They do not include of course a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests
Has the Attomey General a sufficient interest for this purpose Their lordships think that he has
The Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest
It is his duty to bring before  the judge any misconduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant discriplinary action
True it is that if the judge acquits the practitioner of misconduct no appeal is open to the AttorneyGeneral
He has done his duty and is not aggrieved
But if the judge finds the practitioner guilty of professional misconduct and a Court of Appeal reverses the decision on a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of the judge or is otherwise a point in which the public interest is concerned the Attorney General is a person aggrieved  by the decision and can properly petition Her Majesty for special leave to appeal
It was for these reasons that their Lordships rejected the preliminary objection and held that the Attorney General was a 920 person aggrieved  by the decision of the West African Court of Appeal
 The observations made in the above extract in my opinion have to be related to the particular provision of the order in Council which the Judicial Committee was considering
In the case before the Judicial Committee the Attorney General had initiated the disciplinary proceedings against the Barrister
Under section 14 there was only a very limited right of appeal and that too in favour of the barrister or solicitor in respect of the orders mentioned therein
The Attorney General though he may have been the complainant under section 14 had no right of appeal if the barrister was acquitted
That is why Lord Denning states that it is true that if the Judge acquits the practitioner of misconduct no appeal is open to the Attorney General
This view with respect is correct because section 14 does not give a right of appeal to the Attorney General
Lord Denning no doubt has further stated that the Judicial Committee has rejected the preliminary objection in view of the fact that it was of the opinion that in the case before it a question of jurisdiction or a point of public interest is involved and therefore the Attorney General is a person aggrieved
I have already indicated that there are no restrictions or limitations imposed in section 37 of the Act giving a right of appea l only to the advocate who may have been found guilty
On the other hand the words any person aggrieved in section 37 are very wide and as observed by Lord Denning in the opening part of the above extract these words should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation
In the view that I take that the Advocate General has an unqualified right of appeal under section 371 I do not think it necessary either to refer to article 165 of the Constitution nor do I think it necessary to consider the further question whether the appeal filed by the Advocate General before the Bar Council of India relates to any question of jurisdiction or a point of public interest
To conclude the appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra before the Appellate Committee was competent and this point has to be held against the Appellant
The result will be that the appeal before us will have to be heard on merits
RAY J
I agree with Vaidialingam J I desire to express my separate opinion in view of the importance of the question raised in this appeal
This is an appeal from the order dated 26 October 1969 of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India suspending the appellant from practice for a period of one year
921 An appeal to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India was preferred by Shri H M Seervai Advocate General of Maharashtra against the order dated 17 October 1968 of the Bar Council of Maharashtra holding that the appellant was not guilty of professional misconduct or otherwise
Before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India a preliminary objection was taken by AdiPheroz Shah Gandhi as to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the Advocate General of Maharashtra
The appellant pressed the same preliminary objection in this Court namely that the Advocate General of the State of Maharashtra could not prefer an appeal against an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council
The relevant provision for appeal to the Bar Council of India is to be found in section 37 of the hereinafter referred to as the Act
There are two sub sections of section 37
The first sub section enacts that any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council made under section 35 may within sixty days of the date of the communication of the order to him prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India
Sub section 2 of section 37 states that every such appeal shall be heard by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
The present appeal is under section 38 of the Act which con fers right of appeal to the Supreme Court by any person aggrieved by an order made by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
The entire controversy in this appeal centers on the meaning of the words any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council  occurring in sub section 1 of section 37 of the Act
The same words also occur in section 38 of the Act
Mr Daphtary on behalf of the appellant contended first that the Advocate General did not represent public interest and could not therefore be said to be a person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee
Secondly that the provisions in section 35 of the Act that the Advocate General was entitled to a notice from the Disciplinary Committee of the date of hearing and the provision that the Advocate General was entitled to be heard by the Disciplinary Committee could not have the effect of making the Advocate General a party and thirdly the Advocate General was an impartial person and his duty would end by making submissions if any before the Disciplinary Committee and he would 922 not be a person aggrieved either by an order of dismissal of a complaint against the Advocate or by any order passed against the Advocate
Notices were given to the Attorney General and the Advocates General of different States in view of the importance of the question involved in this appeal
Mr V section Desai on behalf of the Advocate General of Maharashtra Mr Setalvad on behalf of the Bar Council of India Dr Seyied Muhammad on behalf of the Attorney General Mr Datar counsel for the Maharashtra State Bar Council of India Dr Seyied Muhammad on behalf of the of other States all contended that the Advocate General would have the right under the Act to prefer an appeal as a person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council
Various decisions were cited at the Bar to illustrate the meaning of the words person aggrieved 
One group of decisions is based on the locus classics in Re
Ex parte Sidebotham1
The other line of decisions is to be found in Ex parte Official Receiver In Re Reed
Bowen  Co2 and Sevenoaks Urban District Council vs Twynam3
James J in the case of Ex parte Sidebotham said that a person aggrieved  must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something Lord Esher M R on the other hand in Ex parte Official Receiver In Re
Reed Bowen  Co2 said that the meaning given by James LJ to the words person aggrieved  would not be an exhaustive definition and the words would include a person who has asked for a decision for which he had a right to ask and has been wrongfully refused
In the Sevenoaks3 case Lord Hewart CJ said that when a person might make an objection and was entitled to a decision upon it he would if the decision was adverse to him be able to appeal
These decisions indicate that the words person aggrieved  would have different shades of meaning in accordance with the tenor of the relevant statute
The observations of James LJ in the case of Ex parte Sidebotham turn on the meaning of the words person aggrieved  occurring in the English Bankruptcy Act 1914 which inter alia provided that the orders of the Court in bankruptcy matters except in cases specially excluded were subject to appeal at the instance of any person aggrieved even if he had not appeared in the court below
It is in the context of the English Bankruptcy Act that creditors trustees administrators of a debtor 1 3 1929 2 Y B 404
2 923 or bankrupt would have a legal grievance against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something
Lord Hewart CJ in Sevenoaks case1 said the problem is not what is the meaning of the expression person aggrieved  in one or dozen statutes but what is its meaning in this part of the Statute
In that case the relevant provision of the Public Health Act conferred a power on a local authority to provide within that district suitable parking place for vehicles
The statute further in that case contemplated a notice of the proposal to acquire land for using it as a parking place and objections if any
to such proposal
When objections were made the local authority would have to consider them
In the Sevenoaks case the Urban Council considered the objection of a rate payer and thereafter proceeded with the scheme of the parking place
Lord Hewart CJ in giving meaning to the words person aggrieved  in that case said that first a person was an author of an objection and secondly he was aggrieved by the refusal of his objection
It was held that a special individual right was infringed
In the Sevenoaks1 case there was neither a pecuniary nor a proprietary grievance
The action of the local authority in providing a parking place invited objections
It is the refusal of that objection which constituted a grievance and it was a grievance sustainable in law
Mr Daphtary relied on the observations of James LJ in Re Sidebotham 2 that a disappointed person would not be a person aggrieved  and also on the observations of Lord Coleridge in Queen vs Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London 3  that one would not be an aggrieved person because someone was held not to have done wrong
In other words it was said that the Advocate General would make submissions or advance contentions and the non acceptance by the Disciplinary Committee of such submissions would not constitute either a legal grievance or rejection of a remedy asked for
Mr Daphtary also leaned heavily on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierre Sarr N  Jie4 in support of two propositions
First that the Judicial Committee found in the Gambian case that in the colonies the Attorney General represented the Crown and was therefore the guardian of the public interest
Mr Daphtary submitted that the Advocate General did not represent public interest in our country and therefore could not be said to be a guardian of public interest
Secondly the Judicial Committee in the Gambian case said that in 1 3 2 4 924 relation to disciplinary proceedings if a legal practitioner was acquitted of misconduct no appeal was open to the Attorney General because he had done his duty and was not aggrieved
Extracting that proposition from the Gambian case Mr Daphtary submitted that similarly the Advocate General could not have any grievance where an Advocate was acquitted
The purpose and the provisions of the will determine whether the Advocate General is a person aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant sections in the Act
It may not be out of place to refer to the Bar Councils Act 1926 which dealt with disciplinary conduct of practitioners
Prior to the the High Court under the Bar Councils Act 1926 had power to suspend any advocate from practice whom it found guilty of professional or other misconduct
Under the said 1926 Act upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any court or by Bar Council or by any other person that any Advocate had been guilty of misconduct the High Court if it did not summarily reject the complaint referred the case for enquiry to the Bar Council or after consultation with the Bar Council to the Court of a District Judge and the High Court might of its own motion refer any case in which it had reason to believe that any such Advocate had been so guilty
If any case was referred under the Bar Councils Act 1926 for enquiry the case was to be enquired into by the Committee of the Bar Council which was called the Tribunal
The Tribunal consisted of not less than three and not more than five members of the Bar Council appointed for that purpose by the Chief Justice or Chief Judge of the High Court and one of the members so appointed was the President of the Tribunal
The finding of a Tribunal was forwarded to the High Court through the Bar Council and the finding of a District Court was to be forwarded direct to the High Court with a copy to the Bar Council
On receipt of the finding the High Court was to fix a date for the hearing of the case and notice of the date so fixed was to be given to the Advocate concerned and to the Bar Council and to the Advocate General
The High Court was also required under the statute to afford the Advocate concerned and the Bar Council and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard before orders were passed in that case
Mr Desai relied on the provisions of the Bar Councils Act 1926 to show that under the said Act notice was to be given to the Advocate General and that the Advocate General was entitled to be heard and he relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee in Advocate General of Bombay vs Phiroz Bharucha1 and the decision of this Court in Bhataraju Nageshwara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the Madras High Court  Ors
2  in support of two 1 62 I A 235 2  925 propositions namely that the Advocate General could prefer an appeal and in an appeal preferred by the Advocate concerned the Advocate General would be a respondent to such an appeal
In Bharucha s case1 certain Advocates were members of Associations declared unlawful by Government and they were convicted of offences punishable under section 171 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1908
The High Court did not take any steps against the Advocates an the ground that it did not consider that membership of an unlawful Association would render the Advocates unfit for the exercise of the profession
The Advocate General of Bombay made applications for special leave before the Judicial Committee to appeal against the decision of the High Court
The Judicial Committee did not grant any special leave and agreed with the view of the High Court
No question was raised in the applications before the Judicial Committee as to the maintainability of the applications for special leave
It should be noticed that under the Bar Councils Act there was no provision for any appeal
Mr Desai rightly relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee not for an actual decision that the Advocate General had a right of appeal but for the purpose of showing that the Advocate General had not only locus standi to make an application for leave but also could be said to have been aggrieved by an order in relation to professional misconduct of an Advocate
The Judicial Committee would not have entered into the merits of the case if the Advocate General had no right to apply for leave to appeal
The decision of this Court in Bhataraju s case2 was to the effect that in an appeal preferred to the Supreme Court by an Advocate against whom an order of suspension was passed by the High Court under section 12 of the Bar Councils Act the proper respondents would be the complainant if any the Bar Council and the Advocate General of the State concerned and not the High Court
The appeal to this Court in Bhataraju s case2 was by special leave
This Court held that the Advocate General the Bar Council and the complainant would be parties to the appeal on the ground that notices under the Bar Councils Act had been issued top those persons
The decisions of this Court and the Judicial Committee both indicate that the Advocate General under the Bar Councils Act had locus standi in making an application for leave to appeal and being a respondent to an appeal preferred by the Advocate
The position held by the High Court under the Bar Councils Act 1926 is now occupied by the Bar Council under the Advo cates Act
There are State Bar Councils and there is also a Bar Council of India
Every Bar Council is a body corporate
The 1 62 IA 2350 2  926 functions of the State Bar Council are inter alia to admit persons as advocates on its roll to prepare and maintain such roll to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll to safeguard the rights privileges and interest of advocates on its roll
The functions of the Bar Council of India are to lay down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advo cates to lay down the procedure to be followed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and the Disciplinary Committees of the State Bar Councils to safeguard the rights privileges and interests of advocates
A Bar Council is empowered under the Act to constitute one or more Disciplinary Committees
Sections 35 to 44 deal with conduct of Advocates and powers of th e Disciplinary Committees of the State Bar Councils as also of the Bar Council of India
Under section 35 of the Act where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee
The Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council if it does not summarily reject the complaint shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause
a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State
The Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard may dismiss the complaint or reprimand the advocate suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit or remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates
Where any notice is issued to the Advocate General the Advocate General may appear before the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf
These provisions establish first that the Advocate General is entitled to a notice of the date of hearing secondly that no order can be made by the Disciplinary Committee without giving an opportunity to the Advocate General of being heard and thirdly that the Advocate General may appear in person or through any advo cate
It cannot be said that the Advocate General is appearing as a friend of the Court
The right of the Advocate General to appear is based on statute
The word may  is used to indicate the choice of the Advocate General to appear in person or through any advocate
He may choose not to appear at all
But when the Advocate General does appear he does so by virtue of the statutory rights and powers conferred on him
It is therefore necessary to know as to why notice under the Act is given to the Advocate General and why he is to be heard before an order is made by the Disciplinary Committee
The Judicial Committee in the Gambian case found that the name of N Jie was struck off the roll of barristers and solicitors of 927 the Supreme Court of Gambia by an order of Abbott J Deputy Judge of the Supreme Court in the Colony of Gambia
The Deputy Judge had jurisdiction to represent the Chief Justice in the exercise of his judicial powers
The power to strike the name of the legal practitioner off the roll was held by the Judicial Committee not to be a judicial power but an administrative one of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Gambia
Therefore the order of Abbott J was without jurisdiction
The West African Court of Appeal under those circumstances set aside the order of Abbott J The Attorney General of Gambia thereupon preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee
An appeal to the Privy Council lay under section 31 of the West African Appeal to Privy Council Order in Council 1949
Broadly stated the pro vision was to the effect that any person aggrieved by any judgment of the Court could prefer ail appeal to His Majesty
The Judicial Committee construed the words person aggrieved  occurring in section 31 of the West African Order in Council 1949 not to be subjected to a restrictive interpretation but to include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affected his interest
The Attorney General of Gambia was found to have sufficient interest for the purpose and the interest was held to be a public one which the Attorney General represented
The Judicial Committee also said that if the Judge found the practitioner guilty of misconduct and the West African Court of Appeal of Gambia reversed the decision which went to the jurisdiction of the Judge or was otherwise a point in which public interest was concerned the Attorney General would be a person aggrieved by the decision
The Judicial Committee construed the words perso n aggrieved  to include the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest
The most significant feature in sections 35 and 36 of the Act is that the Disciplinary Committee does not either give any notice to or hear the complainant
On the contrary notice is given under section 36 to the Attorney General and under section 35 to the Advocate General
The Disciplinary Committee without giving the Attorney General in one case and the Advocate General in another case an opportunity of being heard cannot pass any order against the Advocate concerned
The Attorney General under Article 76 of the Constitution and the Advocate General under Article 165 of the Constitution have to discharge the functions conferred on them by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force
The concerns the Advocate and it is in the fitness of things that the Attorney General and the Advocate General of a State are heard as persons representing the profession which assists the litigant public and the courts in the administration of justice
The Attorney General and the Advocates General of States are persons of high standing 928 and with long experience in the profession and it is indisputable that they will ever adopt any partisan attitude in proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee
The gives special preeminence to the Attorney General and the Advocate General in disciplinary proceedings because it is not an attempt of the Disciplinary Committee to redress the grievance of an individual complainant but to find out whether there is any breach of professional standard and conduct
The high tradition dignity and purity of the Bar is to be maintained
The Attorney General and the Advocate General are heard because they are heads of their respective Bar and the proceedings affect discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the professional conduct of an Advocate
They are not parties to a lis 
They have no personal or pecuniary or proprietary interest in the matter
It is manifest that their locus standi and interest is based on professional code of conduct and for the purpose of upholding the purity of the Bar and preservation of correct standards and norms in the profession
The Attorney General and the Advocates General will uphold the professional discipline dignity and decorum and that is why no order is made by the Disciplinary Committee without giving them an opportunity of being heard
The issue before the Disciplinary Committee is whether there has been professional misconduct and the question has to be looked at purely from the point of view of profession
The profession touches the public on the one hand and the courts on the other
On no other basis could the presence of the Advocate General be explained
In a recent decision of this Court in B M Madnani vs Com missioner of Workmen s Compensation Bombay1 the Commis sioner of Workmen s Compensation preferred an appeal for en hancement of penalties against the Advocate concerned
This Court held that the Commissioner was entitled to maintain the appeal as a person aggrieved
Mr Daphtary at one stage contended that a complainant would not be a person aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant section of the to prefer an appeal
The decision of this Court repels that submission
It may not be out of place to notice that the Act uses the words person aggrieved  and not the words party aggrieved 
First in disciplinary proceedings there is no party
It is a matter touching the professional conduct of the Advocate
The enquiry is by the Disciplinary Committee
The Advocate is heard
The Attorney General in one case and the Advocates General in other cases are heard
They are heard not because they are parties but because they represent the interest of the profession
They represent the standards to be maintained in the profession
Suppose 1 CA No 877 of 1968 decided on October 10 1968
929 the Disciplinary Committee held proceedings without giving notice to the Advocate General or made an order Without giving the Advocate General an opportunity of being heard
In either Case the Advocate General would be a person aggrieved
Would the participation by the Advocate General in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee alter the position  Neither
on logic nor on principle could it be said that the Attorney General and the Advocates General who have the right to be heard could not be persons aggrieved by the decision
If they have the right to be heard they may have grievance as to the result of the hearing
The Attorney General and the Advocates General receive notice and are entitled to be heard by virtue of the provisions in the statute
They are performing statutory duties
They are not contemplated in the statute as ordinary counsel
It was not them intention of the statute that they would be merely neutral observers before the Disciplinary Committee and they would have no duty to perform
They would have to express their views one way or the other
It is true that they would be completely free from personal favour or disfavour in these matters touching the professional conduct
Their presence before the Disciplinary Committee is explicable only on the ground of adhering to the correct professional code
It would therefore be open to them Attorney General and the Advocate General to take the view that in a matter of sufficient gravity a completely inadequate punishment would not be in public interest of the profession
Similarlyif the punishment is severe in a case which did not merit suchaction the Attorney General and the Advocate General would be persons aggrieved to have it corrected
To accede to the contention of Mr Daphtary that the words person aggrieved  refer only to Advocates would be misreading the provisions
The words person aggrieved  will be referable tothe Advocate concerned the complainant and the Attorney General or the Advocate General as the case may be
The Attorney General and the Advocate General will be persons aggrieved because they are interested in maintaining the professional rectitude
The Attorney General and the Advocate General have the right of pre audience
Such right determines that they are leaders of the profession in their respective fields
They will ask formatting the proper standards of professional ethics
It is from that point of view that the Attorney General and the Advocate General will be aggrieved persons when they will find that them interest of the Bar the public interest have not been proper safeguarded by decisions of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council
169 Sup CIP 71 15 930 For these reasons I am of opinion that the Advocate General of the State of Maharashtra is competent to appeal as a person aggrieved under section 37 of the 
ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed and the order of the Bar Council of India is set aside
There shall be no order as to costs


Summary:
The appellant was an advocate from Maharashtra
He was convicted by a Summary Court in London on a charge of pilfering from a Departmental Store and was sentenced to pay a fine
The State Bar Council called upon him sou motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct
he submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council was satisfied that there was no reason for holding him guilty of professional misconduct
The Advocate General of the State who was sent a notice of the proceedings as required by section 352 of the  and bad appeared before the Disciplinary Committee filed an appeal to the Bar Council of India under section 37 of the Act under which any person aggrieved by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council made under section 35 of the Act may prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India
The appellant objected that the Advocate General had no locus standi to file the appeal
The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and the appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct
in appeal to this Court on the question of the competency of the Advocate General to file the appeal under section 37
HELD  Per Hidayatullah
CJ Shelat and Mitter JJ The was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of 37 and therefore the appeal filed by him was incompetent and hence finding of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India should be get aside
887 H 904 E Per Hidayatullah CJ 1 The expression person aggrieved  must be construed by reference to the context of the enactment in which it and all the circumstances
Under the Act disciplinary proceedings before a State Bar Council commence on a complaint to it or suo motu and are referred to its Disciplinary Committee
The Disciplinary Committee can reject the matter summarily but if it proceeds to hear it further notice thereof is sent to the concerned advocate and to the advocate General of the State
The Advocate General may appear personally or by counsel
If the Disciplinary Committee after giving the Advocate and the Advocate General an opportunity to be heard holds hat the Advocate is not guilty of any misconduct it makes an order it her dismissing the complaint or where the proceeding was started by in Bar Council makes an order that the matter may be filed
If it finds the advocate guilty it may either reprimand the advocate or suspend 864 the advocate from practice for a specified period or remove his name from the roll of Advocates
From the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India at the instance of a person aggrieved 
The appeal is heard by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and from its decision an appeal lies to this Court
884 E H 885 A B a In these proceedings before the disciplinary committee the Advocate General is not in the nature of a party having independent rights which lie can claim nor is he injured by the decision
The decision does not deny him anything nor does it ask him to do anything
He is also not intended to be bound by the decision
He does not represent the Bar nor has he a right to speak on behalf the body of the advocates
Such a privilege is neither expressly conferred on him nor can it be implied from the provisions of the Act
885 C D 886 A B b In the State Bar Councils except in Delhi the Advocate General of the State is an ex officio member but his functions are not different from those of other members
He has a right of pre audience but the does not confer any other right on him
When the Committee considers in limini to decide whether the matter should be proceeded with at all the Advocate General s presence is not considered necessary
Therefore the Advocate General is not a prosecutor on behalf of the Bar Council
He is noticed and brought before the Committee because he is the Chief Counsel of the State and therefore his assistance at the hearing is useful
He is generally a lawyer of some standing having made a mark in the profession and his contribution to the deliberations of the Disciplinary Committee is welcome because thus the Disciplinary Committee is helped to reach a proper conclusion
The fact that he can appear through counsel shows that the intention is merely to have his opinion as an amicable curiae who is neither siding with the complainant nor with the Advocate and who will thus have an unbiased and impartial approach to the case
He must after he has done his duty leave the matter to the complainant and the advocate or the Bar Council to take the matter further if they choose
883 C E F 885 E H 886 A c If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order but a person who is heard in a dispute between others merely to be of assistance in reaching the right conclusion he can hardly have a grievance
Any person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not a person aggrieved 
He must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone the other way
The order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something or must have a tendency to injure him
That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought to be convicted does not by itself give rise to a legal grievance
876 A C Therefore it cannot be said that by reason of the provisions of the  the Advocate General of the State enjoys such a position that be must necessarily be treated as a person aggrieved  entitling him to file an appeal
882 H 886 G In re
Sidebotham exhibit Sidebotham 1880 14 Ch D 458CA
In re
Lamb Exp
Board of Trade 1894 2 OBD 805 812 In re
Kitson Exp
Sugden Thomas  Sons Ltd  112 114
Brown Exp
Debtor vs official Receiver Ellis Exp
Ellis 18762 Ch
D 779 In re
Words Exp
Dalton 187440 LT 297CA R vs London County Keepers of Peace and Justice  Jennings vs Kelly In 865 re
Reviere  Robinson vs Currey  470 CA Seven Oaks Urban District Council vs Twynham   443 Eating Corporation vs Jones L R  B M Madani vs Commissioner of Workmen s Compensation Bombay CA 877 of 1968 decided on October 10 1968 and Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay vs Chandulal Shamldas Patel CA 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1 1970 referred to
2 It could not be said that in the present case there were several points of general public interest which needed to be solved and therefore if the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council was wrong the Advocate General in public interest could take the matter further
886 G H Unlike the position of an Attorney General in a Crown Colony the Advocate General of a State in India does not represent the Executive or the Legislature or the Judiciary or the Central Government in disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee
The magniloquent phrases such as Leader of the Bar Keeper of the Conscience of the Bar have no meaning neither under the nor under the Bar Councils Act 1926
They are just honorific titles given by the courtesy but are not grounded on law the keepers of the conscience of the Bar being the Bar Councils
883 F G 886 C D In the present casethe appellant was not precluded from questioning the charge in the disciplinary proceedings because of the decision of the Criminal Court in London
His explanation was accepted by the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council
They were also satisfied that the summary proceedings in the criminal trial in England offended against the principles of natural justice and that therefore the conviction of the appellant in England did not show any moral turpitude in the appellant
If the Advocate General s view on these matters were not accepted by the Disciplinary Committee he could not have any grievance
He could not make it his own cause or a cause on behalf of others whom he did not represent
He had done his duty and the matter should have rested there
887 C F Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierre Saar N Jie 1961 AC 617 PC referred to
3 a The facts that in Advocate General of Bombay vs Phiroz Rustamji Barucha the standing of the Advocate General to apply for special leave in a proceeding relating to professional misconduct of an Advocate was questioned before the Privy Council but that the Privy Council refused special leave on a different ground cannot import a rejection of the objection as to the standing of the Advocate General
881 E b The observations in B Nageshwara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the Madras High Court  that in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act it was inappropriate to make the Judges respondent and that the appropriate parties should be the concerned Advocate the complainant if any the Bar Council and the Advocate General of the State do not advance the case of the Advocate General in this case
882 E Per Shelat and Mitter JJ 1 A State Bar Council consists of a number of members including the Advocate General of the State ex officio
Under the provisions of the  subject to a right of appeal to this Court under section 38 inquiries into charges of misconduct against L169CI71 11 866 advocates are to be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bar Councils
If a complaint is received against an Advocate it is referred to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council or the Bar Council can take such a step suo motu
It is however not obligatory to refer each and every com plaint but only when the Bar Council is satisfied that there is a prima facie case for investigation
if it is not so satisfied it can throw out the complaint as frivolous
And it is only when the Disciplinary Committee does not summarily reject the complaint that a date has to be fixed for its hearing and notice there of must be given to the advocate concerned and the Advocate General of the State but it is not incumbent on the Advocate General to appear in person he can appear through another advocate and place his view point before the Disciplinary Committee
The Advocate and a complainant who makes allegations against an advocate are persons aggrieved entitled to file an appeal under section 37 if an order is made against the advocate or the complaint is dismissed by the Disciplinary Committee
But the State Bar Council cannot be such a person as the order is made by itself and acting through its Disciplinary Committee
889 B C 891 B C Generally speaking a person is said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other
A person who is not a party to a litigation has no right of appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him
A person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court when the judgment would be binding on him
But because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions he does not without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submissions
To place the Advocate General in the company of persons aggrieved one must be able to say that the Disciplinary Committee committed an error which it was his duty to attempt to set right because of some function attributable to him as the Advocate General or some obligation cast upon him by the Act or the general law of the land to safeguard and maintain standards of conduct of Advocates laid down by the Bar Council of India
892 B F a The Advocate General is entitled to a hearing if the complaint is not rejected summarily
But it is not obligatory on him to take part in the proceedings
It is only when he feels that a case requires a careful investigation and proper elucidation of the facts or the exposition of the law on the subject that he is called upon to render assistance
He has to take a fair and impartial attitude and render all assistance to the Bar Council to enable it to arrive at a proper decision
His role is not that of a prosecutor nor is he a defence counsel on behalf of the advocate
Ms duty is to put before the Disciplinary Committee the facts in their proper perspective and to advance the proper inference to be drawn
Once he does so there is an end of the matter so far as he is concerned and he cannot have any grievance because the decision of the Bar Council is against his submission or not to his liking 
896 G H 897 A C b Article 1652 of the Constitution epitomizes the functions and duties of the Advocate General
It lays down that he has to discharge the functions conferred upon him by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force
It is not open to the Advocate General to intervene in any suit or legal proceeding apart from the provisions of the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure merely because he thinks public interest is involved in the matter
Considering the matter 867 historically the Legislature while passing the Bar Councils Act 1926 and the  thought that the Advocate General should be heard inasmuch as he occupied the position of a general referee on points of professional etiquette very much like the Attorney General in England
Once he does this duty enjoined upon him by the statute
of making such submissions as he thinks proper at the hearing his functions qua the enquiry come to an end
As a referee he has no further interest in the matter and if the Disciplinary Committee makes an order against the advocate which the Advocate General considers harsh and unreasonable he is not called upon to file an appeal
Neither is he interested in prosecuting the
matter further if he takes the view that the punishment meted out is not commensurate with the misconduct of the advocate
897 D E G H 900 C F Robinson vs Currey  Ex parte Sidebotham
In re Sidebotham 465 Ex parte Official Receiver
In re Read Brown  Co  178 the Queen vs Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London  361 Rex vs London Quarter Sessions Exparte Westminster Corporation  Seven Oaks Urban District Council vs Twynham  Ealing Corporation vs Jones  390 referred to
2 The Advocate General of a State in India is not a representative of the Government
Neither the Constitution nor the holds him so nor is be a person representing public interest unlike the Attorney General in a Crown Colony  except as provided in statutes
He may draw the attention of the Bar Council to any misconduct of an advocate and appear at the hearing
Once the hearing is over and a finding is recorded he has done his duty and be cannot be said to be aggrieved within the meaning of section 37
Every day courts of law are called upon to decide questions of law inter parties which may be of general importance to the public
The Advocate General cannot prefer an appeal merely because the question is one of considerable importance to the public inasmuch as he is not a party to it and he has no locus stand to do so even in a case where the statute only gives him an opportunity of appearing at a hearing and making his submission
A decision of the Disciplinary Committee cannot necessarily be said to raise a point of public interest merely because the Advocate General feels that it is erroneous or that he himself would have arrived at a different in India is not the guardian angel of the Bar nor is he the champion of public interest in any matter save as specified in a statute
902 D G 904 B E Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierre Saar N  Jie  referred to
3a The decision of the Judicial Committee in Advocate General Bombay vs Phiroz Barucha 37 BLR 722 PC does not help the Advocate General because it did not decide the point as to the maintain ability of the appeal
903 C D b It did not appear that any argument was advanced in Nageswara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the  Madras High Court   1064 about the proper parties to the appeal before this Court arising from proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and the point as to Whether the Advocate General was a person aggrieved was neither raised nor argued
Therefore
the observation in the case that 868 the Advocate General of the state is an appropriate party in the appeal should not be accepted
1903 G H Per Vaidialingam and Ray JJ
dissenting  The appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra was competent as he was a person aggrieved  under section 37 of the 
908 B C 920 G H Per Vaidialingam J  1 The question whether the Advocate General is a person aggrieve under section 37 of the will have to be tackled with reference to the scheme and provisions of the Act  Under the Act the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India have been made autonomous units and various functions regarding the legal profession have been entrusted to them including taking disciplinary action against delinquent members and conducting inquires
Barring a right of appeal to this Court under section 38 the courts are completely out of the picture
Under sections 3 2 a 23 4 and 35 the Advocate General of the State is given a very important and responsible position and the Act has given due recognition to his status by virtue of his being the highest law officer in the State and as one who may be trusted to place a dis interested and dispassionate view before the Disciplinary Committee to enable it to come to a proper decision with respect to the advocate concerned and the legal profession
Apart from being an ex officio member of the State Bar Council he has also a right of pre audience over other advocates
909 D G 911 G H 912 B D 916 A Under sections 35 and 37 i the State Bar Council can suo motu or on receipt of a complaint when it has reason to believe that an advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct refer the case to its Disciplinary Committee ii If the Committee does not summarily reject the complaint it is bound to fix a date for its hearing and also bound to give notice to the advocate and the Advocate General of the State iii The Committee is bound to give an opportunity of being heard to the Advocate and the Advocate General and there is no distinction in the opportu nity so afforded to both of them iv The Advocate General may appear in person or through counsel v the Committee can pass one or other of the orders enumerated in section 35a to d and the orders have to be communicated to the Advocate General also and under section 37 any person aggrieved  is entitled to file an appeal to the Bar Council of India
Unlike under the Bar Councils Act the Advocate General is associated with the disciplinary proceedings right from the stage of the inquiry by the Committee
The notice to the Advocate General cannot be a formal and empty notice because he should begin an opportunity of being heard
Even though there may be no lis  and the Advocate General may not be a party  in the usual sense he is also entitled like the advocate against whom the inquiry is being conducted to place before the Committee all aspects of the matter in favour of and against the advocate
He is allowed to appear by counsel because he may not be able to appear personally and participate in all the disciplinary proceedings
He need not be vindictive or take sides but by virtue of his special and dispassionate role he will be able to place all relevant material to enable the Committee to come to a proper and correct finding
912 D H 913 A H 914 A B a The fact that the Advocate General does not allege an infringement of any legal rights of his own is of no consequence
It may be that in a particular case the Advocate General may feel that the finding arrived at either in favour of the advocate or against him or the punishment imposed on the advocate is not justified by the evidence on record
Under such and similar circumstances the Advocate General will be competent as a person aggrieved to bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee so that justice may be done 914 G 915 A C 869 Sevenoaks Urban District Councilv
Twynham 1929 2 K B 440 Ealing Corporation vs Jones 1959 1 QB 584 Madani vs Commissioner of Workmen s Compensation Bombay CA 877 of 1968 decided on October 10 1968
Sidebotham  The Queen vs The Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London  Re
Reed Brown  Co 19 QB 174 Rex vs London Quarter Sessions and Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay vs Chandulat Shamaldas Patel CA 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1 1970 referred to
b The fact that the Legislature provided that the Advocate General should be associated with the disciplinary proceedings from the very beginning of the inquiry brings him under section 37 as a person aggrieved  and hence the fact that the Committee decided in favour of the Advocate has no bearing on the question
914 G H c The fact that the Advocate General is not given notice before rejecting a complaint summarily does not militate against the view that he is a person aggrieved  because probably the Legislature felt that if there was a wrongful summary rejection of a complaint it could be set right by the Bar Council of India under a 48A by exercising its signal powers
916 FF d In this view it is unnecessary to mention the Advocate General specifically a person aggrieved  in a 37
918 A 2 Ile analogy of the Attorney General in a Colony representing the Crown and being the guardian of public interest as stated in Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierre Sarr N  Jie 1961 A C 617 cannot be brought in for interpreting s37 of the  and the observations therein must be related to the particular legal provisions which were considered
But even that decision recognised that the words person aggrieved  are very wide and should not be subjected to any restrictive interpretation
912 A B 920 A B E 3 The decisions in Advocate General of Bombay vs Pitambardas Gokuldas 62 IA 235 and Advocate General of Bombay vs Phiroz Rustomji barucha 37 BLR 722PC do not decide the question one way or the other 917 A D Per Ray J  1 The purpose and the provisions of the determine whether the Advocate General is a person aggrieved within the meaning of s37 of the 
Under the Act a State Bar Council is empowered to constitute a Disciplinary Committee
Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that an advocate on its roll is guilty of professional misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee and if the Committee does not summarily reject it a date of hearing shall be fixed
The provisions relating to inquiries into professional misconduct of an advocate establish first that the Advocate General entitled to a notice of the date of hearing secondly that no order can be made by the Disciplinary Committee without giving him an opportunity and thirdly that he may appear in person or through an advocate and that he has a right of preaudience
He may not choose to appear but if he does appear his right is based on statute and he does not appear as a mere friend of the court
He is heard because he is the head of the Bar in the State and the proceedings affect the discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the professional 870 conduct of an advocate
Under article 165 of the Constitution the Advocate Generalhas to discharge the functions conferred on him by the Constitution or any other law in force
The concerns an advocate and it is in the fitness of things that the Advocate General of the State is heard as a person representing the profession which assists the litigant public and the courts in the administration of justice
He is usually a person of high standing and experience and will pot adopt any partisan attitude in the proceedings
The purpose of the inquiry is not to redress the grievance of an individual complainant in fact sections 35 and 36 do not contemplate any notice to the complainant but to find out whether there is any breach of professional standards and conduct
926 C H 827 F H 928 A C a It is not the intention of the statute that he would be merely a neutral observer before the Disciplinary Committee and that he would have no duty to perform
He would have to express his views and if in a matter of sufficient gravity a totally inadequate punishment is imposed or if the punishment is too severe the Advocate General would be a person aggrieved  to have it corrected
The words person aggrieved  will be referable to the Advocate complainant and the Advocate General or Attorney General as the case may be
The Advocate General and the Attorney General will be persons aggrieved because they are interested in maintaining professional rectitude
929 C G b Further if the proceedings were held without notice to the Advocate General or without giving him an opportunity of being heard he would be a person aggrieved
His participation in the proceedings does not alter the position
If he has a right to be heard he may have a grievance as to the result of the hearing
929 A B Re
Exparte Sidebotham  Exparte Official Receiver In re
Reed Bowen  Sevenoaks Urban British Council vs Twynhan 192 9 2 K B 104 Queen vs Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County of London and Madani vs Commissioner of Workmen s Compensation Bombay CA 877 of 1968 decided on October 10 1968 referred to
2 In disciplinary proceedings there is no party in the usual sense
The Advocate General is not a party to a lis  and has no personal or pecuniary or proprietary interest in the matter
That is why the Act uses the words person aggrieved  and not party aggrieved 
But he is heard not because he is a party but because he represents the interest of the profession and for the purpose of upholding its purity and the preservation of correct standards and norms
From this point of view he will be an aggrieved person when he finds
that the interests of the Bar which is a matter of public interest is not properly safeguarded by the Disciplinary Committee
In Attorney General of Gambia vs Pierre Saar N  Jie
the Judicial Committee construed the words person aggrieved  as not to be subjected to a restrictive interpretation but to include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affected his interest and that the words would include the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest
927 E F 928 C D G H 929 G H 3 The decisions of the Judicial Committee in Advocate General of Bombay vs Phiroz Barucha 62 IA 235 and of this Court in B Nageshwara Rao vs The Hon ble Judges of the Madras High Court  indicate that the Advocate General under the Bar Councils Act 1926 had locus standi to prefer an appeal
925 D E G 871