ivil Appeal No 138 of 1955
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated October 15 1953 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Regular Appeal No 255 of 1950 51 arising out of the order dated September 18 1950 of the Court of the District Judge Bangalore in Misc
Case No 39 of 1947 48
G Channappa Assistant Advocate General Mysore R Gopala Krishnan and T M Sen for the appellant  A V Viswanatha Sastri M A Rangaswami K R Sarma and K R Choudhury for the respondent
November 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K DAS J
This appeal by the Special Land Acquisition Officer Bangalore has been brought to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court of Mysore and is from the decision of the said High Court dated October 5 1953 in a regular appeal from an order made by the 2nd Additional District Judge Bangalore on September 18 1950 on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act herein
after referred to as the Act
The facts so far as they are relevant to the appeal before us are these
An area of about 51243 squard 406 yards of land was acquired by Government under Notification No M 11054 Med
80 45 25 dated April 16 1946 for development of the Appiah Naidu Maternity Home at Malleswaram Bangalore City into a Maternity Hospital
There were eight owners interested in the property acquired out of whom two objected to the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer now appellant before us
One of these two was T Adinarayana Shetty a diamond merchant of Mysore City
Originally he was the respondent before us and on his death his son and legal representative has been brought into the record as the sole respondent to this appeal
The deceased respondent Adinarayana Setty hereinafter called the respondent was interested in 48404 sq
yards out of the total area and it may be stated here that there is no dispute before us that out of the said 48404 sq
yards an area of about 3000 sq
yards consists of land which has been variously characterised as a depression or a pit or low lying land called halla  in the local vernacular language
Out of the total amount of compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer a sum of Rs 141169was awarded to the respondent
The Special Land Acquisition Officer proceeded on the following basis for his award
Firstly he found that the land value in and around Bangalore City had increased in recent years owing to the war and the respondent had paid to the Deputy Commissioner Bangalore District a sum of money called a conversion fine for sanctioning a scheme of converting the land into non agricultural land
Thereafter a layout for building sites was prepared and approved by the Municipality and the res pondent sold a few of the sites shown in the layout to some purchasers
This was done before the publication of the preliminary notification of acquisition but the sale of further building sites was stopped after the said publication
Secondly the Special Land Acquisition Officer took into consideration the value of the sites sold by the respondent and came to the conclusion that Rs 10 per sq
yard was the market value of the land in question
He awarded to the respondent compensation for approximately 48404 sq yards at the 407 rate of Rs 10 per sq yard but after deducting therefrom an area of 26248 sq yards which according to the Special Land Acquisition Officer was required for making roads and drains as per the layout scheme
The total amount thus calculated came to Rs 221563
and odd and from this a sum of Rs 98807 was again deducted as representing the expenditure which would be required for making roads and drains
The net amount was thus found to be Rs 122756 and odd and adding 15 as the statutory compensation payable to the respondent the total amount awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer to the respondent came to Rs 141169 
Against this award the respondent raised an objection and a reference was accordingly made to the District Judge of Bangalore under section 18 of the Act
This reference was heard by the 2nd Additional District Judge who by his order dated September 18 1950 came to the following conclusions i that the rate awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer at Rs 10 per sq
yard was fair and should beupheld ii that a sum of Rs 10000 for providing electric installation out of the sum of Rs 98807 deducted by the Land Acquisition Officer from the compensation payable to the respondent should not be deducted and iii that with regard to the area of the low lying
land which I was completely excluded by the Land Acquisition Officer the respondent should get at the rate of Rs 3 per sq yard or approximately a sum of I Rs 10000 
In other words the learned Additional District Judge increased the compensation in favour of the respondent by a sum of about Rs 20000 
Not being satisfied the respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court of Mysore
The learned Judges of the High Court found that the proper compensation for the land
except the portion characterised as low lying should be Rs 138per sq yard and as to the low lying portion it should be reduced by Rs 51 per sq
yard inasmuch as a sum of Rs 15000 was necessary according to the 408 evidence given in the case for filling it up in other words the High Court awarded compensation at the rate of Rs 88 per sq yard for the low lying land
The High Court also reduced the area which had to be deducted for making roads etc according to the layout scheme from 26248 sq
yards to 12101 sq
yards
It also reduced the layout charges to Rs 64432 
The High Court added to the compensation a sum of Rs 7000 as the value of a building which the respondent had constructed on one of the sites on the finding that the construction was made prior to the preliminary notification
In this respect the High Court departed from the finding of the Land Acquisition Officer that the building was put up after the publicaion of the preliminary notification
The total amount of compensation which the High Court awarded came to about Rs 480000 and odd
As the judgment of the High Court was a judgment of reversal and the appellant felt dissatisfied with it a certificate of fitness was asked for and was granted by the High Court on July 6 1954
The present appeal has been brought to this Court in pursuance of that certificate
The appellant has confined his appeal to the following three points 1 payment of compensation of a sum of Rs 7000 for the building said to have been constructed before the publication of the preliminary notification 2 payment of compensation at Rs
88per sq yard for the low lying land halla and 3 payment of compensation at Rs 138 for the remaining land after deducting the area for making roads and buildings
We may state that there is no dispute before us now as to the area which should be so deducted and also as to the amount of layout charges as the findings of the High Court on these two points nave not been challenged before us
On behalf of the respondent our attention has been  drawn to the decisions of the Privy Council in Charan Das vs Amir Khan 1 Narsingh Das vs Secretary of State for India 2 and Nowroji Bustomji Wadia vs 1 1920 47 IA 255
2 1924 52 IA 133
409 Bombay Government 1
On these decisions it is submitted by learned counsel that though section 26 of the Act was amended in 1921 by insertion of sub section
2 which says that every award shall be deemed to be a decree  and thus an appeal therefrom must be considered and determined in the same manner as if it is a judgment from a decree in an ordinary suit the established practice of the Privy Council has been not to interfere with a finding on the question of valuation unless there is some fundamental principle affecting the valuation which renders it unsound
The practice it is stated was based on two considerations first that the courts in India were more familiar with local conditions and circumstances on which the valuation depended and secondly the Privy Council found it necessary to limit the extent of the enquiry in order to spare the parties costly and fruitless litigation
On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that this Court has no doubt adopted the practice that it will not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact but this Court has no such established practice as was adopted by the Privy Council in valuation cases even where a difference of opinion has occurred between two courts upon the number of rupees per yard to be allowed for a plot of land
He has further submitted that the reasons for the practice adopted by the Privy Council do not apply with equal force to this Court
In view of the facts of this case and the opinion which we have formed after hearing learned counsel for both parties we do not think it necessary to make any final pronouncement as to the practice which this Court should adopt in a valuation case where two courts have differed
We are content to proceed in this case on the footing that we should not interfere unless there is something to show not merely that on the balance of evidence it is possible to reach a different conclusion but that the judgment cannot be supported by reason of a wrong application of principle or because some important point affecting valuation has been overlooked or misapplied
1 1925 52 IA 367
52 410 We are satisfied that there is no error of principle or otherwise in the findings of the High Court as to the first two points urged in support of the appeal
As to the construction of the building for which a compensation of Rs 7000 has been awarded the clear finding of the High Court is that it was constructed prior to the preliminary notification
It has been further stated before us that the building is in actual occupation of the medical department
Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence on the question of construction of the house and the application for a licence for building the said  house which was made by the respondent to the Bangalore Munici pality
We are unable to hold that that evidence has the effect of displacing the clear finding of the High Court
As to the low lying land we consider that the High Court has given very good reasons for its finding
Admittedly the area of the low lying land halla is about 3000 sq
yards
The Land Acquisition Officer valued it at Rs 3 per sq yard
A sum of Rs 15000 has been deducted from the compensation payable to the respondent on the ground that that amount will be required for filling up the low lying land and converting it into building sites
Therefore the position is that the respondent has not only been made to part with 3000 sq
yards of land at 3 per sq yard but he has also been made to pay Rs 15000 for filling up the land
If these two figures are added even then the market value of the land comes to about Rs 8 per sq yard
This is so even if we do not follow the method adopted by the High Court that the sum of Rs 15000 for 3000 sq
yards gives an average of Rs 5 per sq yard and that amount should be deducted from the rate of Rs 13 8 0 per sq yard fixed as the proper compensation for the remaining land
We are of the opinion that on the materials before us the value per sq yard fixed by the High Court for the low lying land is fully justified even on adoption of the method suggested by learned counsel for the appellant
Learned counsel for the respondent has referred us to the circumstance that some of the sales 411 of building sites which the respondent had made appertained to the low lying land and he has further emphasised the circumstance that just opposite the low lying land which is at the eastern end of the entire area some houses had been built
We have taken these circumstances into consideration but do not think that the conclusion which learned counsel for the respondent wishes us to draw follows therefrom
First of all it is by no means clear that the sales of the building sites at the low rate of Rs 6 8 0 or thereabout appertained to the low lying land only and secondly the mere circumstance that some buildings have been made on land opposite the low lying lands but on the other side of the road does not necessarily mean that the low lying lands are as valuable as the other land in the area
We are therefore of the view that the compensation fixed by the High Court for the low lying land is not vitiated by any error of the kind which will justify our interference with it
We now proceed to consider the third and main point urged on behalf of the appellant namely the rate of 138 per sq yard for the other land in the area
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted before us that the High Court has committed two fundamental errors in arriving at this finding
Furthermore the High Court has been influenced by extraneous considerations such as the purpose for which the land was acquired the report of certain medical authorities as to the unsuitability of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired and the delay in putting the land to the use for which it was acquired
We agree with learned counsel for the appellant that these were extraneous considerations which had no bearing on the question of valuation and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves as to the scope of the enquiry before them when they imported these considerations into the question of valuation
We further think that the High Court committed an error of principle in arriving at the figure Rs 138 and the error was committed by adopting a wrong method in ascertaining the market value of the land at the 412 relevant time
It is not disputed that the function of the court in awarding compensation under the Act is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of the notification under section 41 and the methods of valuation may be 1 opinion of experts 2 the price paid within a reasonable time in bonafide transactions of purchase of the lands acquired or the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advantages and 3 a number of years  purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired
In the case under our consideration the High Court adopted the second method but in doing so committed two serious errors
There were altogether seven transactions of alienation made by the respondent
One was a gift which must necessarily be excluded
The earliest of the sales was in favour of Muniratham which was made on May 15 1945
Another was made on July 18 1945
This was in favour of Venugopal who was the husband of a grand daughter of the respondent
Four other transactions in favour of Kapinapathy Puttananjappa Shamanna and Rajagopal Naidu were made in August 1945
The notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on October 4 1945
What the learned Judges of the High Court did was to take only four out of the aforesaid six transactions into consideration and then to draw an average price therefrom
The learned Judges gave no sufficient reason why two of the transactions were left out
In one part of their judgment they said   The evidence discloses that the appellant has effected four sales about a couple of months prior to the date of preliminary notification and the rates secured by him are Rs 12 15 14 and 78 which on calculation give an average of Rs 122 per sq yard 
Why the transaction of May 15 1945 which was at a rate of Rs 68 per sq yard only was left out it is difficult to understand
Similarly the transaction of July 18 1945 was at the rate of Rs 10 per sq yard
That also was left out
We are of the view that this arbitrary selection of four transactions only out of six has vitiated the finding of the High Court
If all the six transactions of sale are taken into consideration the average rate comes to about Rs 1013 per sq yard only
Having arbitrarily discarded two of the transactions the learned Judges of the High Court committed another error in taking a second average
Having arrived at an average of Rs 122 per sq yard from the four transactions referred to above they again took a second average between Rs 15 which was the maximum price obtained by the respondent and Rs 122
Having struck this second average the learned Judges of the High Court arrived at the figure of Rs 138
No sound reasons have been given why this second average was struck except the extraneous reasons to which we have already made a reference
It is obvious that the maximum price Rs 15 per sq yard had already gone into the average when an average was drawn from the four transactions
It is difficult to understand why it should be utilised again for arriving at the market value of the land in question
We are of the view that if the aforesaid two errors are eliminated then the proper market value of the land in question is Rs 11 only
Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the claim made by the respondent himself before the Land Acquisition Officer exhibit 11
The respondent had therein said Hence under the standing orders compensation has to be paid at rates for building land in the neighbourhood
This rate ranges from Rs 10 to Rs 12 an average of Rs 10 a sq yard as could be verified from entries in the local Sub Registrar s Office and Bangalore City Municipal Office
At any rate I myself have sold in the course of this year some six sites out of the land proposed to be acquired for rates ranging from Rs 7 to Rs 15 or on an average of Rs 10 per sq yard
At this rate the compensation amount will be Rs 512430 and adding the statutory allowance of Rs 76860 at 15 per cent
on the compensation amount on account of the compulsory nature of the acquisition the total cost of the land will be Rs 589290 or nearly six lakhs of rupees
 414 The learned Judges of the High Court took the aforesaid claim to mean that the average rate was Rs 10 per sq
yard only if the entire area was taken into consideration but the rate would be different if small building sites were sold according to a layout scheme
It is worthy of note however that in his claim the respondent clearly stated that even as building land the average rate in the neighbourhood ranged from Rs 10 to Rs 12 per sq yard and he had himself sold six building sites at an average rate of about Rs 10 per sq yard
It is worthy of note that the six transactions to which the respondent referred were sales of small building sites
It appears to us therefore that the High Court had in effect given the respondent a rate more favourable than what he had himself claimed
We consider therefore that on a proper consideration of the materials in the record and after eliminating the two errors which the High Court had committed the proper value of the land in question should be Rs 11 per sq yard
The result therefore is that we allow this appeal to this limited extent only namely the order of the High Court will be modified by substituting the figure Rs 11 per sq yard for the figure Rs 138 awarded by the High Court as compensation to the respondent for land other than the low lying land
We maintain the order of the High Court that the parties will receive and pay costs in proportion to their success and failure as now determined in the courts below but so far as the costs of this Court are concerned the parties must bear their own costs in view of their divided success here
Appeal partly allowed


Summary:
The land belonging to the respondent intermediaries comprising of certain plots stood vested in the State of West Bengal by operation of a Notification issued under Section 41 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953
Since the plots were recorded as tank fisheries  used as pisciculture they stood excluded from the purview of the vesting Notification under Section 61e of the Act and preserved to the respondent intermediaries
Subsequently the primary authority the Assistant Set tlement Officer initiated suo moto proceedings by issuing notice to the respon 92 dents under Section 442a of the Act for correction of classification of lands on the ground that the plots were wrongly recorded as fishery plots
The respondents objected to reclassification of the lands by contending that in 1952 they were granted Dakhilas to the said land by one B  the Principal landlady and thereafter they have been cultivat ing pisciculture on the said plots of the land and conduct ing fishery business
The Assistant Settlement Officer rejected the claim of the respondents and ordered reclassi fication of the plots
The respondents filed an appeal before the Tribunal District Judge under section 443 of the Act
The Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer and confirmed the original classification of the plots
Against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal the State filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court which dismissed the petition in limine
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the State i that the Appellate Tribunal had reversed the findings without considering the validity of the reasons recorded by the Assistant Settlement Officer ii that the Appellate Tribunal had taken irrelevant factor or non exist ing factors into account and thereby its findings were based on no evidence and hence vitiated in law
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that since the Appellate Authority has recorded the findings of fact that pisciculture was in existence as on the date of vesting the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Court particularly when the High Court did not choose to interfere with the finding
Allowing the Appeal this Court HELD 1
Giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice
A right to reason is therefore an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review
Reasoned decision is not only for the purpose of showing that the citizen is receiving justice but also a valid discipline for the Tribunal itself
Therefore statement of reasons is one of the essentials of justice
99C D 11 The appellate authority in particular a trained and experienced District Judge is bound to consider the entire material evidence adduced and relied on by the parties and to consider whether the reasons assigned by the primary authority is cogent relevant to the 93 point in issue and based on material evidence on record
The appellate authority being final authority on facts is enjoined and incumbent upon it to appreciate the evidence consider the reasoning of the primary authority and assign its own reasons as to why it disagrees with the reasons and findings of the primary authority
Unless adequate reasons are given merely because it is an appellate authority it cannot brush aside the reasoning or findings recorded by the primary authority
99D 102E F 2
If the appellate authority had appreciated the evi dence on record and recorded the findings of fact those findings are binding on this Court or the High Court
By process of judicial review this Court cannot appreciate the evidence and record its own findings of fact
If the find ings are based on no evidence or based on conjectures or surmises and no reasonable man would on given facts and circumstances come to the conclusion reached by the appel late authority on the basis of the evidence on record certainly this Court would oversee whether the findings recorded by the appellate authority is based on no evidence or beset with surmises or conjectures
99A C 21 In the instant case the Appellate Tribunal disre garded the material evidence on record kept it aside indulged in fishing expedition and crashed under the weight of conjectures and surmises
The appellate order is there fore vitiated by manifest and patent error of law apparent on the face of record
The order of Appellate Tribunal is quashed and the order of Assistant Settlement Officer is restored
103F G 104D 3
Tank fishery means the lands being used for piscicul ture or any fishing in a reservoir or storage place whether formed naturally or by artificial contrivance as a permanent measure except such portion of embankment as are included in a homestead or in a garden or orchard to be tank fishery
Such lands occupied by pisciculture or fishing stand pre served to the intermediaries and thus stands excluded from the operation of sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953
But the crucial date for establish ing as a fact that the pisciculture was being carried on in the disputed land is the period of vesting
The existence of fishery subsequent to that period is not of any relevance
100G H 101E Chamber s 20th Century Dictionary page 829 Webster comprehensive Dictionary Vol
II and Stroud s Judicial Dictionary Vol
II 4th Edn page 1051 referred to
94 31 In the instant case the respondents did not produce before the Assistant Settlement Officer either post or pre record till date of vesting to establish that from 1952 to 1955 56 ie from the date of obtaining settlement till date of vesting the lands were recorded in settlement records as pisciculture of fishery
Therefore there is no documentary evidence to establish that the lands were being used on the date of settlement or also on the date of vesting as pisci culture or fishery
101F 102A 4
Admittedly the High Court did not go into any of the questions raised by the appellant in the writ petition
It summarily dismissed the writ petition
The High Court com mitted error of law in dismissing the writ petition in limine
98G 103F