87 of 1959
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights
M P Amin Dara P Mehta P M Amin section N Andley J B Dadachanji Rameshwar Nath and P L Vohra for the petitioners
A V Viswanatha Sastri R Ganapathy Iyer P Kesava Pillai and T M Sen for the respondents
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India B Sen and R H Dhebar for the Intervener
541 1960
November 21
The Judgment of P B Gajendragadkar A K Sarkar K Subba Rao and J R Mudholkar JJ was delivered by P B Gajendragadkar J K N Wanchoo J delivered a separate judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR J This is a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution in which the validity of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act  1952 XXVII of 1952 is challenged
The first petitioner is a public limited company which has its registered office at Bombay
A large majority of its shareholders are citizens of India some of them are themselves companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act
Petitioners Nos
2 to 7 are the Directors of Petitioner No 1 the second petitioner being the Chairman of its Board of Directors
These petitioners are all citizens of India
At all material times the first petitioner carried on and still carries on the business of producing and selling coal excavated from its collieries at Rampur in the State of Orissa
Two leases have been executed in its favour the first was executed on October 17 1941 by the Governor of Orissa whereby all that piece or parcel of land in the registration district of Sambalpur admeasuring about 334179 acres has been demised for a period of 30 years commencing from September 1 1939 in consideration of the rent reserved thereby and subject to the covenants and conditions prescribed thereunder and the second is a surface lease executed in its favour by Mr Mohan Brijraj Singh Dee on April 19 1951 in relation to a land admeasuring approximately 21194 acres for a like period of 30 years commencing from February 4 1939 in consideration of the rent and subject to the terms and conditions prescribed by it
Pursuant to section 5 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act 1951 all the right title and interest of the Zamindar of Rampur in the lands demised to the first petitioner under the second lease vested in respondents the State of Orissa
Since then the first petitioner has duly paid the rent reserved by the said lease to the appropriate authorities appointed by respondent 1 69 542 and has observed and performed all the conditions and covenants of the said lease
In exercise of its rights under the said two leases the first petitioner entered upon the lands demised and has been carrying on the business of excavating and producing coal at its collieries at Rampur
In December 1952 the Legislature of the State of Orissa passed the impugned Act and it received the assent of the Governor of Orissa on December 10 1952
It was however not reserved for the consideration of the President of India nor has it received his assent
In pursuance of the rule making power conferred on it by the impugned Act respondent 1 has purported to make rules called the Orissa Mining Areas Development Act Rules 1955 these rules have been duly notified in the State Gazette on January 25 1955
Subsequently the Administrator respondent 2 appointed under the impugned Act issued a notification on June 24 1958 whereby the first petitioner s Rampur colliery has been notified for the purpose of liability for the payment of cess under the impugned Act
The area of this colliery has been determined at 334179 acres
In its appeal filed under rule 3 before the Director of Mines the first petitioner objected to the issue of the said notification inter alia on the ground that the impugned Act and the rules framed under it were ultra vires and invalid no action has however been taken on the said appeal presumably because the authority concerned could not enter tain or deal with the objections about the vires of the Act and the rules
Thereafter on March 26 1959 the Assistant Administrative Officer respondent 3 called upon the first petitioner to submit monthly returns for the assessment of the cess
The first petitioner then represented that it had filed an appeal setting forth its objections against the notification and added that until the said appeal was disposed of no returns would be filed by it
In spite of this representation respondent 3 by his letter of May 6 1959 called upon the 543 first petitioner to submit monthly returns in the prescribed form and issued the warning that failing compliance the first petitioner would be prosecuted under section 9 of the impugned Act
A similiar demand was made and a similar warning issued by respondent 3 by his letter dated June 6 1959
It is under these circumstances that the present petition has been filed
The petitioners contend that the impugned Act and  the rules made thereunder are ultra vires the powers of the Legislature of the State of Orissa or in any event they are repugnant to the provisions of an existing law
According to the petition the cess levied under the impugned Act is not a fee but is in reality and in substance a levy in the nature of a duty of excise on the coal produced at the first petitioner s Rampur colliery and as such is beyond the legislative competence of the Orissa Legislature
Alternatively it is urged that even if the levy imposed by the impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule it would nevertheless be ultra vires having regard to the provisions of Entry 54 in List I read with Central Act LIII of 1948
The petitioners further allege that even if the said levy is held to be a fee it would be similarly ultra vires having regard to Entry 52 in List I read with Central Act LXV of 1951
According to the petitioners the impugned Act is really relatable to Entry 24 in List III and since it is repugnant with Central Act XXXII of 1947 relatable to the same Entry and covering the same field the impugned Act is invalid to the extent of the said repugnancy under article 254
On these allegations the petitioners have applied for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of the said writ or any other writ order or direction prohibiting the respondents from enforcing any of the provisions of the impugned Act against the first petitioner a similar writ or order is claimed against respondent 3 in respect of the letters addressed by him to the 1st petitioner on March 3 1959 and June 6 1959
This petition is resisted by respondent 1 on several grounds
It is urged on its behalf that the levy 544 imposed by the impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II and its validity is not affected either by Entry 54 read with Act LIII of 1948 or by Entry 52 read with Act LXV of 1951
In the alternative it is contended that if the said levy is held to be a tax and not a fee it would be a tax relatable to Entry 50 in List II and as such the legislative competence of the State Legislature to impose the same cannot be successfully challenged
Respondent 1 disputes the petitioner s contention that the impugned Act is relatable to Entry 24 in List III and so according to it no question of repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 1947 arises
After this appeal was fully argued before us Mr Amin suggested and Mr Sastri did not object that we should hear the learned Attorney General on the question as to whether even if the levy imposed by the impugned Act is a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule it would nevertheless be ultra vires having regard to the provisions of Entry 54 in List I read with Central Act LIII of 1948
Accordingly we directed that a notice on this point should be served on the learned Attorney General and the case should be set down for hearing on that point again
For the learned Attorney General the learned Additional Solicitor General appeared before us in response to this notice and we have had the benefit of hearing his arguments on the point in question
The first question which falls for consideration is whether the levy imposed by the impugned Act amounts to a fee relatable to Entry 23 read with Entry 66 in List II
Before we deal with this question it is necessary to consider the difference between the concept of tax and that of a fee
The neat and terse definition of tax which has been given by Latham C J in Matthews vs Chicory Marketing Board 1 is often cited as a classic on this subject
A tax said Latham C J is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered
In bringing out the essential features of a tax this defini 1   276
545 tion also assists in distinguishing a tax from a fee
It is true that between a tax and a fee there is no generic difference
Both are compulsory exactions of money
by public authorities but whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes and is not and need not be supported by any consideration of service rendered in return a fee is levied essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it
If specific services are rendered to a specific area or to a specific class of persons or trade or business in any local area and as a condition precedent for the said services or in return for them cess is levied against the said area or the said class of persons or trade or business the cess is distinguishable from a tax and is described as a fee
Tax recovered by public authority invariably goes into the consolidated fund which ultimately is utilised for all public purposes whereas a cess levied by way of fee is not intended to be and does not become a part of the consolidated fund
It is earmarked and set apart for the purpose of services for which it is levied
There is however an element of compulsion in the imposition of both tax and fee
When the Legislature decides to render a specific service to any area or to any class of persons it is not open to the said area or to the said class of persons to plead that they do not want the service and therefore they should be exempted from the payment of the cess
Though there is an element of quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority there is no option to the tax payer in the matter of receiving the service determined by public authority
In regard to fees there is and must always be co relation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered
Cases may arise where under the guise of levying a fee Legislature may attempt to impose a tax and in the case of such a colourable exercise of legislative power courts would have to scrutinise the scheme of the levy very carefully and determine whether in fact there is a co relation between the service and the levy or whether the levy is either not co related with service or is levied to such an 546 excessive extent as to be a presence of a fee and not a fee in reality
In other words whether or not a particular cess levied by a statute amounts to a fee or tax would always be a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of each case
The distinction between a tax and a fee is however important and it is recognised by the Constitution
Several Entries in the Three Lists empower the appropriate Legislatures to levy taxes but apart from the power to levy taxes thus conferred each List specifically refers to the power to levy fees in respect of any of the matters covered in the said List excluding of course the fees taken in any Court
The question about the distinction between a tax and a fee has been considered by this Court in three decisions in 1954
In The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt 1 the vires of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 Madras Act XIX of 195 1 came to be examined
Amongst the sections challenged was section 761
Under this section every religious institution had to pay to the Government annual contribution not exceeding 5 of its income for the services rendered to it by the said Government and the argument was that the contribution thus exacted was not a fee but a tax and as such outside the competence of the State Legislature
In dealing with this argument Mukherjee J as he then was cited the definition of tax given by Latham CJ in the case of Matthews 2 and has elaborately considered the distinction between a tax and a fee
The learned judge examined the scheme of the Act and observed that the material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the present case is that the money raised by the levy of the contribution is not earmarked or specified for defraying the expense that the Government has to incur in performing the services
All the collections go to the consolidated fund of the State and all the expenses have to be met not out of those collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method of appropriation as is done in the 1  2  547 case of other Government expenses
The learned judge no doubt added that the said circumstance was not conclusive and pointed out that in fact there was a total absence of any co relation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount raised by contribution
That is why section 761 was struck down as ultra vires
The same point arose before this Court in respect of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1939 as amended by amending Act 11 of 1952 in Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das vs The State of Orissa 1
Mukherjea J who again spoke for the Court upheld the validity of section 49 which imposed the liability to pay the specified contribution on every Mutt or temple having an annual income exceeding Rs 250 for services rendered by the State Government
The scheme of the impugned Act was examined and it was noticed that the collections made under it are not merged in the general public revenue and are not appropriated in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses for other public purposes
They go to constitute a fund which is contemplated by section 50 of the Act and this fund to which the Provincial Government contributes both by way of loan and grant is specifically set apart for the rendering of services involved in carrying out the provisions of the Act
The same view was taken by this Court in regard to section 58 of the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950 Act XXIX of 1950 which imposed a similar contribution for a similar purpose in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State of Bombay 2
It would thus be seen that the tests which have to be applied in determining the character of any impugned levy have been laid down by this Court in these three decisions and it is in the light of these tests that we have to consider the merits of the rival contentions raised before us in the present petition
On behalf of the petitioners Mr Amin has relied on three other decisions which may be briefly considered
In P P Kutti Keya vs The State of Madras 3 the Madras High Court was called upon to consider inter 1  2 1954 SCR 1055
3 AIR 1954 Mad 621
548 alia the validity of section 11 of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act 20 of 1933 and Rules 281 and 283 framed thereunder
Section 111 levied a fee on the sales of commercial crops within the notified area and section 12 provided that the amounts collected by the Market Committee shall be constituted into a Market Fund which would be utilised for acquiring a site for the market constructing a building maintaining the market and meeting the expenses of the Market Committee
The argument that these provisions amounted to services rendered to the notified area and thus made the levy a fee and not a tax was not accepted by the Court
Venkatarama Aiyar J took the view that the funds raised from the merchants for a construction of a market in substance amounted to an exaction of a tax
Whether or not the construction of a market amounted to a service to the notified area it is unnecessary for us to consider
Besides as we have already pointed out we have now three decisions of this Court which have authoritatively dealt with this matter and it is in the light of the said decisions that the present question has to be considered
In Attorney General for British Columbia vs Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Co 1 the Privy Council had to deal with the validity of forest protection impost levied by the relevant section of the Forest Act R section B C 1936
The lands in question were statutorily exempted from taxation and it was urged against the validity of the impost that the levy of the said impost was not a service charge but a tax and since it contravened the exemption from taxation granted to the land it was invalid
This plea was upheld by the Privy Council
The Privy Council did consider two circumstances which were relevant the first that the levy was on a defined class of interested individuals and the second that the fund raised did not fall into the general mass of the proceeds of taxation but was applicable for a special and limited purpose
It was conceded that these considerations were relevant but the Privy Council thought that the weight to be attached to them should not be exagge 1 540 rated
In appreciating the weight of the said relevant circumstances the Privy Council was impressed by the fact that the lands in question formed an important part of the national wealth of the Province and their proper administration including in particular protection against fire is a matter of high public concern  as well as one of particular interest to individuals
In other words the effect of the impugned provision was that the expenses of what was the public service of the greatest importance for the Province as a whole had been divided between the general body of tax
payers and those individuals who had a special interest in having their property protected
It would thus appear that this decision proceeded on the basis that what was claimed to be a special service to the lands in question was in reality an item in public service itself and so the element of quid pro quo was absent
It is true that when the Legislature levies a fee for rendering specific services to a specified area or to a specified class of persons or trade or business in the last analysis such services may indirectly form part of services to the public in general
If the special service rendered is distinctly and primarily meant for the benefit of a specified class or area the fact that in benefiting the specified class or area the State as a whole may ultimately and indirectly be benefited would not detract from the character of the levy as a fee
Where however the specific service is indistinguishable from pub lic service and in essence is directly a part of it diffe rent considerations may arise
In such a case it is necessary to enquire what is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose which it is intended to achieve
Its primary object and the essential purpose must be distinguished from its ultimate or incidental results or consequences
That is the true test in determining the character of the levy
In Parton
vs Milk Board Victoria1 the validity of the levy imposed on dairymen and owners of milk depots by section 30 of the Milk Board Act of 1933 as amended by subsequent Acts of 1936 1939 was 1  70 550 challenged and it was held by Dixon J that the levy of the said contribution amounted to the imposition of a duty of excise
This decision was substantially based on the ground that the statutory board performs no particular service for the dairyman or the owner of a milk depot for which his contribution may be considered as a fee or recompense that is to say the element of quid pro quo was absent qua the persons on whom the levy had been imposed
Therefore none of the decisions on which Mr Amin has relied can assist his case
Let us now examine the scheme of the impugned Act
As the preamble shows it has been passed because it was thought expedient to constitute mining areas and a Mining Areas Development Fund in the State of Orissa
It consists of 11 sections
Section 3 of the Act provides for the constitution of a mining area whenever it appears to the State Government that it is necessary and expedient to provide amenities like communications water supply and electricity for the better development of any area in the State of Orissa wherein any mine is situated or to provide for the welfare of the residents or to workers in any such areas within which persons employed in a mine or a group of mines reside or work
Under this section the State Government has to define the limits of the area
and is given the power to include within such area any local area contiguous to the same or to exclude from such area any local area comprised therein that is the effect of section 31
Section 32 empowers the owner or a lessee of a mine or his duly constituted representative in the said area to file objections in respect of any notification issued under section 31 within the period specified and the State Government is required to take the said objection into consideration
After considering objections received the State Government is authorised to issue a notification constituting a mining area under section 33
Section 4 deals with the imposition and collection of cess
The rate of the levy authorised shall not exceed 5 per centum of the valuation of the minerals at the pit s mouth
Section 5 provides for the constitution of the Orissa Mining Areas Development 551 Fund
This fund vests in the State Government and has to be administered by such officer or officers as may be appointed by the State Government in that behalf Section 52 requires that there shall be paid to the credit of the said fund the proceeds of the cess recovered under section 4 for each mining area during the quarter after deducting expenses if any for collection and recovery
Section 53 contemplates that to the credit of the said fund shall be placed all collections of cess under section 52 as well as amounts from State Government and the local authorities and public subscriptions specifically given for any of the purposes of the fund
Section 54 deals with the topic of the appli cation of the said fund
The fund has to be utilised to meet expenditure incurred in connection with such measures which in the opinion of the State Government are necessary or expedient for providing amenities like communications water supply and electricity for the better development of the mining areas and to meet the welfare of the labour and other persons residing or working in the mining areas
Section 55 lays down that without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions the fund may be utilised to defray any of the purposes specified in cls
a to e
Under section 56 the State Government is given the power to decide whether any particular expenditure is or is not debitable to the fund and their decision is made final and section 57 imposes on the State Government an obligation to publish annually in the gazette a report of the activities financed from the fund together with an estimate of receipts and expenditure of the fund and a statement of account
Section 6 prescribes the mode of constituting an advisory committee
It has to consist of such number of members and chosen in such manner as may be prescribed provided however that each committee shall include representatives of mine owners and workmen employed in mining industry
The names of the members of the committee are required to be published in the gazette
Section 7 deals with the appointment and functions of the statutory authorities to carry out the purpose of the Act while section 8 confers on the State Government power to 552 make rules
Section 9 prescribes penalties and provides for prosecutions and section 10 gives protection to the specified authorities or officers in respect of anything done or intended to be done by them in good faith in pursuance of the Act or any rules or order made thereunder
Section 11 which is the last section confers on the State Government the power to do anything which may appear to them to be necessary for the purpose of removing difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act
The scheme of the Act thus clearly shows that it has been passed for the purpose of the development of mining areas in the State
The basis for the operation of the Act is the constitution of a mining area and it is in regard to mining areas thus constituted that the provisions of the Act come into play
It is not difficult to appreciate the intention of the State Legislature evidenced by this Act
Orissa is an underdeveloped State in the Union of India though it has a lot of mineral wealth of great potential value
Un fortunately its mineral wealth is located generally in areas sparsely populated with bad communications
Inevitably the exploitation of the minerals is handicapped by lack of communications and the difficulty experienced in keeping the labour force sufficiently healthy and in congenial surroundings
The mineral development of the State therefore requires that provision should be made for improving the communications by constructing good roads and by providing means of transport such as tramways supply of water and electricity would also help
It would also be necessary to provide for amenities of sanitation and education to the labour force in order to attract workmen to the area
Before the Act was passed it appears that the mine owners tried to put up small length roads and tramways for their own individual purpose but that obviously could not be as effective as roads constructed by the State and tramway service provided by it
It is on a consideration of these factors that the State Legislature decided to take an active part in unsystematic development of its mineral areas which would help the mine owners in moving their 553 minerals quickly through the shortest route and would attract labour to assist the excavation of the minerals
Thus there can be no doubt that the primary and the principal object of the Act is to develop  the mineral areas in the State and to assist more efficient and extended exploitation of its mineral wealth
The constitution of the advisory committee as prescribed by section 4 emphasises the fact that the policy of the Act would be to carry out with the assistance of the mine owners and their workmen
Thus after a mining area is notified an advisory committee is constituted in respect of it and the task of carrying out the objects of the Act is left to the care of the said advisory committee subject to the provisions of the Act
Even before an area is notified the mine owners are allowed an opportunity to put forward their objections
These features of the Act are also relevant in determining the question as to whether the Act is intended to render service to the specified area and to the class of persons who are subjected to the levy of the cess
Section 5 shows that the cess levied does not become a part of the consolidated fund and is not subject to an appropriation in that behalf it goes into the special fund earmarked for carrying out the purpose of the Act and thus its existence establishes a correlation between the cess and the purpose for which it is levied
It was probably felt that some additions should be made to the special fund and so section 53 contemplates that grants from the State Government and local authorities and public subscriptions may be collected for enriching the said fund
Every year a report of the activities financed by the fund has to be published together with an estimate of receipt and expenditure and a statement of accounts
It would thus be clear that the administration of the fund would be subject to public scrutiny and persons who are called upon to pay the levy would have an opportunity to see whether the cess collected from them has been properly utilised for the purposes for which it is intended to be used
It is not alleged by the petitioners 554 that the levy imposed is unduly or unreasonably excessive so as to make the imposition a colourable exercise of legislative power
Indeed the fact that the accounts have to be published from year to year affords an indication to the contrary
Thus the scheme of the Act shows that the cess is levied against the class of persons owning mines in the notified area and it is levied to enable the State Government to render specific services to the said class by developing the notified mineral area
There is an element of quid pro quo in the scheme the cess collected is constituted into a specific fund and it has not become a part of the consolidated fund its application is regulated by a statute and is confined to its purposes and there is a definite co relation between the impost and the purpose of the Act which is to render service to the notified area
These features of the Act impress upon the levy the character of a fee as distinct from a tax
It is however urged that the cess levied by section 42 is in substance and reality a duty of excise
As we have already noticed section 42 provides that the rate of such levy shall not exceed 5 per centum of the valuation of the minerals at the pit s mouth in other words it is the value of the minerals produced which is the basis for calculating the cess payable by mine owners and that precisely is the nature in which duty of excise is levied under Entry 84 in List I The said Entry empowers Parliament to impose duties of excise inter alia on goods manufactured or produced in India
When minerals are produced from mines and a duty of excise is intended to be imposed on them it would be normally imposed at the pit s mouth and that is precisely what the impugned Act purports to do
It is also contended that the rate prescribed by section 42 indicates that it operates not as a mere fee but as a duty of excise
This argument must be carefully examined before the character of the cess is finally determined
It is not disputed that under Entry 23 in List II read with Entry 66 in the said List the State Legislature can levy a fee in respect of mines and mineral development
Entry 23 reads thus Regu lation of Mines and mineral development subject to 555 the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union
We will deal with the condition imposed by the latter part of this Entry later
For the present it is enough to state that regulation of mines and mineral development is within the competence of the State Legislature
Entry 66 provides that fees in respect of any of the matters in the said List can be imposed by the State Legislature subject of course to the exception of fees taken in any Court
The argument is that though the State Legislature is competent to levy a fee in respect of mines and mineral development if the statute passed by a State Legislature in substance and in effect imposes a duty of excise it is travelling outside its jurisdiction and is trespassing on the legislative powers of Parliament
This argument is based on two considerations
The first relates to the form in which the levy is imposed and the second relates to the extent of the levy authorised
The extent of the levy authorised would always depend upon the nature of the services intended to be rendered and the financial obligations incurred thereby
If the services intended to be rendered to the notified mineral areas require that a fairly large cess should be collected and co relation can be definitely established between the proposed services and the impost levied then it would be unreasonable to suggest that because the rate of the levy is high it is not a fee but a duty of excise
In the present case if the development of the mining areas involves con siderable expenditure which necessitates the levy of the prescribed rate it only means that the services being rendered to the mining areas are very valuable and the rate payer in substance is compensating the State for the services rendered by it to him
It is significant that the petitioners do not seriously suggest that the services intended to be rendered are a cloak and not genuine or that the taxes levied have no relation to the said services or that they are unreasonable and excessive
Therefore in our opinion the extent of the rate allowed to be imposed by section 42 cannot by itself alter the character of the levy from a 556 fee into that of a duty of excise
If the co relation between the levy and the services was not genuine or real or if the levy was disproportionately higher than the requirements of the services intended to be rendered it would have been another matter
Then as to the form in which the impost is levied it is difficult to appreciate how the method adopted by the Legislature in recovering the impost can alter its character
The character of the levy must be determined in the light of the tests to which we have already referred
The method in which the fee is recovered is a matter of convenience and by itself it cannot fix upon the levy the character of the duty of excise
This question has often been considered in the past and it has always been held that though the method in which an impost is levied may be relevant in determining its character its significance and effect cannot be exaggerated
In Balla Ram vs The Province of East Punjab 1 the Federal Court had to consider the character of the tax levied by section 3 of the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property tax Act XVII of 1940
Section 3 provided as follows There shall be charged levied and paid an annual to tax on buildings and lands situated in the rating areas shown in the schedule to this Act at such rate not exceeding twenty per centum of the annual value of such buildings and lands as the Provincial Government may by notification in official gazette direct in respect of each such rating area
The argument urged before the Federal Court was that the tax imposed by the said section was in reality a tax on income within the meaning of Item 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935 and as such it was not covered by Item 42 in List II of the said Schedule
This argument was rejected on the ground that the tax levied by the Act was in pith and substance a tax on lands and buildings covered by Item 42
It would be noticed that the basis of the tax was the annual value of the building which is the basis used in the Indian Income tax Act for determining income from property and so the attack against the section was based on 1 557 the ground that it had adopted the same basis for leaving the impost as the Income tax Act and the said basis determined its character whatever may be the appearance in which the impost was purported to be levied
In repelling this argument Fazl Ali J observed that the crucial question to be answered was whether merely because the Income tax Act has adopted the annual value as the standard for determining the income it must necessarily follow that if the same standard is employed as a measure for any other tax that tax becomes a tax on income
The learned judge then proceeded to add that if the answer to this question is to be given in the affirmative then certain taxes which cannot possibly be described as income tax must be held to be so
In other words the effect of this decision is that the adoption of the standard used in Income tax Act for getting at the income by any other act for levying the tax authorised by it would not be enough to convert the said
tax into an income tax
During the course of this judgment Fazl Ali J also noticed with approval a similar view taken by the Bombay High Court in Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy vs The Province of Bombay 1
This decision has been expressly approved by the Privy Council in Governor General in Council vs Province of Madras 2
Consistently with the decision of the Federal Court their Lordships expressed the opinion that a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced
It is a tax on goods and not on sales or the proceeds of the sale of goods
The two taxes the one levied on the manufacturer in respect of his goods and the other on the vendor in respect of his sales may in one sense overlap but in law there is no overlapping the taxes are separate and distinct imposts
If in fact they overlap that may be because the taxing authority imposing a duty of excise finds it convenient to impose that duty at the moment when the excisable article 1 ILR 2 1945 LR 72 IA 91
71 558 leaves the factory or workshop for the first time on the occasion of its sale
In that case the question was whether the tax authorised by the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1939 was a tax on the sale of goods or was a duty of excise and the Privy Council held it was the former and not the latter
Therefore in our opinion the mere fact that the levy imposed by the impugned Act has adopted the method of determining the rate of the levy by reference to the minerals produced by the mines would not by itself make the levy a duty of excise
The method thus adopted may be relevant in considering the character of the impost but its effect must be weighed along with and in the light of the other relevant circumstances
In this connection it is always necessary to bear in mind that where an impugned statute passed by a State Legislature is relatable to an Entry in List II it is not permissible to challenge its vires only on the ground that the method adopted by it for the recovery of the impost can be and is generally adopted in levying a duty of excise
Thus considered the conclusion is inevitable that the cess levied by the impugned Act is neither a tax nor a duty of excise but is a fee
The next question which arises is even if the cess is a fee and as such may be relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II its validity is still open to challenge because the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and that takes us to Entry 54 in List I
This Entry reads thus Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest
The effect of reading the two Entries together is clear
The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry
If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union to 559 the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded
In other words if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as required by Entry 54 and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra vires not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law
The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of he State Legislature itself
This position is not in dispute
It is urged by Mr Amin that the field covered by the impugned Act has already been covered by the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act 1948 LIII of 1948 and he contends that in view of the declaration made by section 2 of this Act the impugned Act is ultra vires
This Central Act was passed to provide for the regulation of mines and oil fields and for the development of minerals
It may be stated at this stage that by Act LXVII of 1957 which has been subsequently passed by Parliament Act LIII of 1948 has now been limited only to oil fields
We are however concerned with the operation of the said Act in 1952 and at that time it applied to mines as well as oil fields
Section 2 of the Act contains a declaration as to the expediency and control by the Central Government
It reads thus It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Central Government should take under its control the regulation of mines and oil fields and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided
It is common ground that at the relevant time this Act applied to coal mines
Section 4 of the Act provides that no mining lease shall be granted after the commencement of this Act otherwise than in accordance with the rules made under this Act
Section 5 empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification for regulating the grant of mining leases or for prohibiting the grant of such leases in respect of any mineral or in any area
Sections 4 and 5 thus 560 purport to prescribe necessary conditions in accordance with which mining leases have to be executed
This part of the Act has no relevance to our present purpose
Section 6 of the Act however empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification in the official gazette for the conservation and development of minerals
Section 62 lays down several matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the Central Government
This power is however without prejudice to the generality of powers conferred on the Central Government by section 61
Amongst the matters covered by section 62 is the levy and collection of royalties fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined quarried excavated or collected
It is true that no rules have in fact been framed by the Central Government in regard to the levy and collection of any fees but in our opinion that would not make any difference
If it is held that this Act contains the declaration referred to in Entry 23 there would be no difficulty in holding that the declaration covers the field of conservation and development of minerals and the said field is indistinguishable from the field covered by the impugned Act
What Entry 23 provides is that the legislative competence of the State Legislature is subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and Entry 54 in List I requires a declaration by Parliament by law that regulation and development of mines should be under the control of the Union in public interest
Therefore if a Central Act has been passed for the purpose of providing for the conservation and development of minerals and if it contains the requisite declaration then it would not be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act in respect of the subject matter covered by the said declaration
In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union
In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field 561 or not
Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act LIII of 1948
It still remains to consider whether section 2 of the said Act amounts in law to a declaration by Parliament as required by article 54
When the said Act was passed in 1948 the legislative powers of the Central and the Provincial Legislatures were governed by the relevant Entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935
Entry 36 in List I corresponds to the present Entry 54 in List I
It reads thus Regulation of Mines and Oil Fields and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under Dominion control is declared by Dominion law to be expedient in public interest
It would be notic ed that the declaration required by Entry 36 is a declaration by Dominion law
Reverting then to section 2 of the said Act it is clear that the declaration contained in the said section is put in the passive voice but in the context there would be no difficulty in holding that the said declaration by necessary implication has been made by Dominion law
It is a declaration contained in a section passed by the Dominion Legislature  and so it is obvious that it is a declaration by a Dominion law but the question is Can this declaration by a Dominion law be regarded constitutionally as declaration by Parliament which is required by Entry 54 in List I It has been urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr Amin that in dealing with this question we should bear in mind two general considerations
The Central Act has been continued under article 3721 of the Constitution as an existing law and the effect of the said constitutional provision must be that the continuance of the existing law would be as effective and to the same extent after the Constitution came into force as before
It is urged that after the said Act was passed and before the Con stitution came into force no Provincial Legislature could have validly made a law in respect of the field covered by the said Act and it would be commonsense to assume that the effect of the continuance of the 562 said law under article 3721 cannot be any different
In other words if no Provincial Legislature could have trespassed on the field covered by the said Act before the Constitution the position would and must be the same even after the Constitution came into force
It is also contended that for the purpose of bringing the provision of existing laws into accord with the provisions of the Constitution the President was given power to make by order appropriate adaptations and modifications of such laws and the object of making such adaptations obviously was to make the continuance of the existing laws fully effective
It is in the light of these two general considerations so the
argument runs must the point in question be considered
The relevant clause in the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 on which reliance has been placed in support of this argument is el 16 in the Supplementary Part of the said Order
This clause provides that subject to the provisions of this Order any reference by whatever form of words in any existing law to any authority competent at the date of the passing of that law to exercise any powers or authorities or to discharge any functions in any part of India shall where a corresponding new authority has been constituted by or under the Constitution have effect until duly repealed or amended as if it were a reference to that new authority
The petitioners contend that as a result of this clause the declaration made by the Dominion Legislature in section 2 of the Central Act must now be held to be the declaration made by Parliament
Is this contention justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the clause That is the crux of the problem
In considering this question it would be relevant to recall the scheme of the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950
It consists of Three Parts
Part 1 deals with the adaptation of Central Laws and indicates the adaptation made therein Part 11 deals with the adaptation of Provincial Laws and follows the same pattern and Part III is a Supplementary Part which contains provisions in the nature of supplementary provisions
A perusal of the clauses contained in Part 563 I would show that though some adaptation was made in Act LIII of 1948 it was not thought necessary to make an adaptation in section 2 of the said Act whereby the declaration implied in the said section has been expressly adapted into a declaration by Parliament
Now the effect of el 16 in substance is to equate an authority competent at the date of the passing of the existing law to exercise any powers or authorities or to discharge any functions with a corresponding new authority which has been constituted by or under the Constitution
Reference to the authority in the con
text would suggest cases like reference to the Governor General eo nomine or Central Government which respectively would be equated with the President or the Union Government
Prima facie the reference to authority would not include reference to a Legislature in this connection it may be relevant to point out that article 3721 refers to a competent Legislature as distinguished from other competent authorities
That is the first difficulty in holding that el
16 refers to the Dominion Legislature and purports to equate it with the Parliament
It is clear that for the application of this clause it is necessary that a reference should have been made to the authority by some words whatever may be their form
In other words it is only where the existing law refers expressly to some authority that this clause can be invoked
It is difficult to construe the first part of this clause to include authorities to which no reference is made by any words in terms but to which such reference may be implied and quite clearly the Dominion Legislature is not expressly referred to in section 2
In construing the present clause we think it would be straining the language of the clause to hold that an authority to which no reference is made by words in any part of the existing law could claim the benefit of this clause
Besides there is no doubt that when the clause refers to any authority competent to exercise any powers or authorities or to discharge any functions it refers to the powers authorities or functions attributable to the existing law itself that is to say authorities 564 which are competent to exercise powers or to discharge functions under the existing laws are intended to be equated with corresponding new authorities
It is impossible to hold that the Dominion Legislature is an authority which was competent to exercise any power or to discharge any function under the existing law
Competence to exercise power to discharge functions to which the clause refers must inevitably be related to the existing law and not to the Constitution Act of 1935 which would be necessary if Dominion Legislature was to be included as an authority under this clause
The Constitution Act of 1935 had been repealed by the Constitution and it was not and could not obviously be the object of the Adaptation of Laws Order to make any adaptation in regard to the said Act
Therefore the competence of the Dominion Legislature which flowed from the relevant provisions of the Constitution Act of 1935 is wholly outside this clause
We have carefully considered the arguments urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr Amin but we are unable to hold that cl
16 can be pressed into service for the purpose of supporting the conclusion that the declaration by the Dominion Legislature implied in section 2 of Act LIII of 1948 can by virtue of cl 16 be held to be a declaration by Parliament within the meaning of the relevant Entries in the Constitution
If that be the true position then the alternative challenge to the vires of the Act based on el
16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order must fail
There is another possible argument which may prima facie lead to the same conclusion
Let us assume that the result of reading article 372 and cl 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order is that under section 2 of Act LIII of 1948 there is a declaration by Parliament as suggested by the petitioners and the learned Additional Solicitor General
Would that meet the requirements of Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative because the relevant provisions of the Constitution are prospective and the declaration by Parliament specified by Entry 54 must be declaration made by 565 Parliament subsequent to the date when the Constitution came into force
Unless a declaration is made by Parliament after the Constitution came into force it will not satisfy the requirements of Entry 54 and that inevitably would mean that the impugned Act is validly enacted under Entry 23 in List II of the Seventh Schedule
If that be the true position then it would follow that even on the assumption that el 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order and article 372 can be construed as suggested by the petitioners the impugned Act would be valid
Faced with this difficulty both the learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr Amin argued that cl
21 of the said Order may be of some assistance
Clause 21 reads thus Any Court Tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce any law in force in the territory of India immediately before the appointed day shall notwithstanding that this Order makes no provision or insufficient provision for the adaptation of the law for the purpose of bringing it into accord with the provisions of the Constitution construe the law with all such adaptations as are necessary for the said purpose
Assuming that this clause is valid we do not see how it is relevant in the present case
All that this clause purports to do is to empower the Court to construe the law with such adaptations as may be necessary for the purpose of bringing it in accord with the provisions of the Constitution
There is no occasion to make any adaptation in construing Act LIII of 1948 for bringing it into accord with the provisions of the Constitution at all
The said Act has been continued under article 3721 and there is no constitutional defect in the said Act for the avoidance of which any adaptation is necessary
In fact what the petitioners seek to do is to read in section 2 of the said Act the declaration by Parliament required by Entry 54 so as to make the impugned Act ultra vires
Quite clearly cl 21 cannot be pressed into service for such a purpose
Therefore we reach this position that the field covered by Act LIII of 1948 is substantially the same as the field covered by the 72 566 impugned Act but the declaration made by section 2 of the said Act does not constitutionally amount to the requisite declaration by Parliament and so the limitation imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation in the present case
Act LIII of 1948 continues in operation under article 372 with this modification that so far as the State of Orissa is concerned it is the impugned Act that governs and not the Central Act
Article 3721 in fact provides for the continuance of the existing law until it is altered repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority
In the absence of the requisite parliamentary declaration the legislative competence of the Orissa Legislature under Entry 23 read with Entry 66 is not impaired and so the said Legislature is competent either to repeal alter or amend the existing law which is the Central Act LIII of 1948 in effect after the impugned Act was passed so far as Orissa is concerned the Central Act must be deemed to be repealed
This position is fully consistent with the provisions of article 372
The result is that the material words used in cls
16 and 21 being unambiguous and explicit it is difficult to give effect to the two general considerations on which reliance has been placed by the petitioners
Incidentally the present case discloses that in regard to the requisite parliamentary declaration prescribed by Entry 54 in List I in its application to the pre Constitution Acts under corresponding Entry 36 in List I of the Constitution Act of 1935 there is a lacuna which has not been covered by any clauses of the Adaptation of Laws Order that however is a matter for Parliament to consider
There is one more point which is yet to be considered
Mr Amin contends that Entry 23 in List II is subject to the provisions in List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and according to him Entry 52 in List I is one of such provisions
In this connection he relies on the said Entry which deals with industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest and Industries Development and Regulation Act 1951 LXV 567 of 1951
This Act has been passed to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries one of which undoubtedly is coal mining industry
Section 2 of this Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First Schedule
This declaration is a declaration made by Parliament and if the provisions of the Act read with the said declaration covered the same field as is covered by the impugned Act it would undoubtedly affect the vires of the impugned Act but in dealing with this question it is important to bear in mind the doctrine of pith and substance
We have already noticed that in pith and substance the impugned Act is concerned with the development of the mining areas notified under it
The Central Act on the other hand deals more directly with the control of all industries including of course the industry of coal
Chapter II of this Act provides for the constitution of the Central Advisory Council and Development Councils chapter III deals with the regulation of scheduled industries chapter IIIA provides for the direct management or control of industrial undertakings by Central Government in certain cases and chapter IIIB is concerned with the topic of control of supply distribution price etc of certain articles
The last chapter deals with miscellaneous incidental matters
The functions of the Development Councils constituted under this Act prescribed by section 64 bring out the real purpose and object of the Act
It is to increase the efficiency or productivity in the scheduled industry or group of scheduled industries to improve or develop the service that such industry or group of industries renders or could render to the community or to enable such industry or group of industries to render such service more economically
Section 9 authorises the imposition of cess on scheduled industries in certain cases
Section 94 provides that the Central Government may hand over the proceeds of the cess to the Development Council there specified and that the Development Council shall utilise the said proceeds to achieve the objects mentioned in cls
a to d
These 568 objects include the promotion of scientific and industrial research of improvements in design and quality and the provision for the training of technicians and labour in such industry or group of industries
It would thus be seen that the object of the Act is to regulate the scheduled industries with a view to improvement and development of the service that they may render to the society and thus assist the solution of the larger problem of national economy
It is difficult to hold that the field covered by the declaration made by section 2 of this Act considered in the light of its several provisions is the same as the field covered by the impugned Act
That being so it cannot be said that as a result of Entry 52 read with Act LXV of 1951 the vires of the impugned Act can be successfully challenged
Our conclusion therefore is that the impugned Act is relatable to Entries 23 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule and its validity is not impaired or affected by Entries 52 and 54 in List I read with Act LXV of 1951 and Act LIII of 1948 respectively
In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider whether the impugned Act can be justified under Entry 50 in List II or whether it is relatable to Entry 24 in List III and as such suffexs from the vice of repugnancy with the Central Act XXXII of 1947
The result is the petition fails and is dismissed with costs
WANCHOO J I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Gajendragadkar J and regret that I have not been able to persuade myself that the cess levied in this case on all extracted minerals from any mine in any mining area at a rate not exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals at the pit s mouth by the Orissa State Legislature under section 4 of the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act No XXVII of 1952 hereinafter called the Act is a fee properly so called and not a duty of ex cise
The facts are all set out in the judgment just delivered and I need not repeat them
The scheme of the Act as appears from section 3 thereof is to give power to the State Government whenever it 569 thinks it necessary and expedient to provide amenities like communications water supply and electricity for the better development of any area in the State where  in any mine is situated or to provide for the welfare of residents or workers in any such area within
which persons employed in a mine or a group of mines reside or work to constitute such an area to be a mining area for the purposes of the Act to define the limits of the area to include within such area any local area contiguous to the same and defined in the notification and to exclude from such area any local area comprised therein and defined in the notification
A notification under section 3 is made after hearing objections from owners or lessees of mines
After such an area is con stituted under section 3 a cess is imposed under section 4 on all extracted minerals from any mine in any such area at the rate not exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals at the pit s mouth
The cess so collected is credited to a fund called the Orissa Mining Area Development Fund created under section 5 of the Act besides other amounts with which we are not concerned in this case
The Fund is to be applied to meet expenditure incurred in connection with such measures which in the opinion of the State Government are necessary or expedient for providing amenities like communications water supply and electricity for the better development of mining areas and to meet the welfare of labour and other persons residing or working in the mining areas
Then come other provisions for working out the above provisions including section 8 which gives power to the State Government to frame rules to carry
into effect the purposes of the Act
The Rules were framed under the Act in January 1955
The constitutional competence of the Orissa State Legislature to levy the cess under the Act is attacked on two main grounds
In the first place it is urged that the cess is in pith and substance a duty of excise under item 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and therefore the levy of such a cess is beyond the competence of the Orissa State Legislature
In the second place it is urged that even if the cess is a fee in view 570 of the two Acts of the Central Legislature and Parliament namely The Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act No LIII of 1948 and The Industries Development and Regulation Act No LXV of 1951 the Orissa Legislature was not competent to pass the Act
The petition has been opposed on behalf of the State of Orissa and the main contentions urged on its behalf are that the cess is a fee properly so called and not a duty of excise and therefore the Orissa State Legislature was competent to levy it and the two Central Acts do not affect that competence
In the alternative it has been urged that even if the cess is a tax the State Legislature was competent to levy it under item 50 of List If of the Seventh Schedule
The first question therefore that falls for consideration is whether the cess in this  ease is a tax or a fee
Difference between a tax properly so called and a fee properly so called came up for consideration before this Court in three cases in 1954 and was considered at length
In the first of them namely The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt it was pointed out that though levying of fees is only a particular form of the exercise of the taxing power of the State our Constitution has placed fees under a separate category for purposes of legislation and at the end of each one of the three legislative lists it has given a power to the particular legislature to legislate on the imposition of fees in respect to every one of the items dealt with in the list itself
It was also pointed that the essence of a tax is compulsion that is to say it is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer s consent and the payment is enforced by law
The second characteristic of a tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax
This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue which when 1  571 collected forms part of the public revenues of the State
As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual there is as it is said no element of quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority
Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden quantum of imposition upon the tax payer depends generally upon his capacity to pay
 As to fees it was pointed out that a fee  is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency
The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed
Ordinarily the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay
 Finally it was pointed out that the distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege  
Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives
 The consequence of these principles was that if as we hold a fee is regarded as a sort of return or consideration for services rendered it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should on the face of the legislative provision be co related to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services  
If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public it could be counted as fees and not a tax Having laid down these principles that case then considered the vires of section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act No XIX of 1951 and it was pointed out that the material fact which negatived the theory of fees in that case was that the money raised by levy of the contribution was not ear marked or specified for defraying the expenses 572 that the Government had to incur in performing the services
All the collections went to the consolidated fund of the State and all the expenses had to be met not out of those collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method of appropriation as was done in the case of other government expenses
That in itself might not be conclusive but in that case there was total absence of any co relation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of section 76 and in those circumstances the theory of return or counter payment or quid pro quo could not have any possible application to that case
Consequently the contribution levied under section 76 was held to be a tax and not a fee
In the second case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das vs The State of Orissa 1 a similar imposition by the Orissa Legislature came up for consideration
After referring to the earlier case it was pointed out that two elements are thus
essential in order that a payment may be regarded as a fee
In the first place it must be levied in consideration of certain services which the individuals accepted either willingly or unwillingly
But this by itself is not enough to make the imposition a fee if the payments demanded for rendering of such services are not set apart or specifically appropriated for that purpose but are merged in the general revenue of the State to be spent for general public purposes The Orissa imposition was held to be a fee because the collections made were not merged in the general public revenue and were meant for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Commissioner and his office which was the machinery set up for due administration of the affairs of the religious institution
They went to constitute a fund which was contemplated by section 50 of the Orissa Act and this fund was specifically set apart for rendering services involved in carrying out the provisions of the Act
The third case namely Ratilal Panachand Gandhi 1  573 vs The State of Bombay 1 came from Bombay
58 of the Bombay Act No XXIX of 1950 provided for an imposition in proportion to the gross annual income of the trust
This imposition was levied for the purpose of due administration of the trust property and for defraying the expenses incurred in connection with the same
After referring to the two earlier cases the Court went on to say that taxis a common burden and the only return which the taxpayer gets is participation in the common benefits of the State
Fees on the other hand are payments primarily in the public interest but for some special service rendered or some special work done for the benefit of those from whom the payments are demanded
Thus in fees there is always an element of quid pro quo which is absent in a tax 
But in order that the collections made by the Government can rank as fees there must be co relation between the levy imposed and the expenses incurred by the State for the purpose of rendering such services
 It was then pointed out that the contributions which were collected under section 58 were to be credited in the Public Trusts Administration Fund as constituted under section 57
This fund was to be applied exclusively for the payment of charges for expenses incidental to the regulation of public trusts and for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act
The imposition therefore was in that case held to be a fee
These decisions clearly bring out the difference between a tax and a fee and generally speaking there is always an element of quid pro quo in a fee and the amount raised through a fee is co related to the expenses necessary for rendering the services which are the basis of quid pro quo
Further the amount collected as a fee does not go to augment the general revenues of the State and many a time a special fund is created in which fees are credited though this is not absolutely necessary
But as I read these deci sions they cannot be held to lay down that What is in pith and substance a tax can become a fee merely 1 1954 SCR 1055
574 because a fund is created in which collections are credited and some services may be rendered to the persons from whom collections are made
If that were so it will be possible to convert many taxes not otherwise leviable into fees by the device of creating a special fund and attaching some service to be rendered through that fund to the persons from whom collections are made
I am therefore of opinion that one must first look at the pith and substance of the levy and if in its pith and substance it is not essentially different from a tax it cannot be converted into a fee by creating a special fund in which the collections are credited and attaching some services to be rendered through that fund
Let me then look at the pith and substance of the cess which has been imposed in this case
The cess consists of a levy not exceeding five per centum of the value of the minerals at the pit s mouth on all extracted minerals
Prima facie such a levy is nothing more nor less than a duty of excise
Item 84 of List I gives power to levy duties of excise exclusively to the Union and is in these terms  Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except a alcoholic liquors for human consumption b opium Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub paragraph b of this entry
 This item gives power to Parliament to impose duties of excise on all goods manufactured
or produced in India with certain exceptions mentioned therein
Taking this particular case coal is produced from the mine and would clearly be covered by the words  other goods produced in India and a duty of excise can be levied on it
What then exactly is meant by a duty of excise Reference in this connection may be made to Governor General in Council vs Province of Madras 1
In that case the point arose whether the sales tax imposed by the Madras Legislature was a duty of excise
The Privy Council pointed out that 1 1945 LR 72 IA 91
575 in a Federal constitution in which there is a division of legislative powers between Central and Provincial legislatures it appears to be inevitable that controversy should arise whether one or other legislature is not exceeding its own and encroaching on the other s constitutional legislative power and in such a controversy it is a principle which their Lordships do not hesitate to apply in the present case that it is not the name of the tax but its real nature its pith and substance  as it has sometimes been said which must determine into what category it falls
 The Privy Council went on to consider what a duty of excise was and said that it is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced
It is a tax on goods not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods
Though sometimes a duty of excise may be imposed on first sales a duty of excise and a tax on the sale of goods were separate and distinct imposts and in law do not overlap The Privy Council approved of the decisions of the Federal Court in re The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act 1938 1 and The Province of Madras vs Messrs Boddu Paidanna and Sons 2
It seems to have been urged that because in some cases a duty of excise may be levied on the occasion of the first sale and a sales tax may also be levied on the same occasion there is really no difference between the two
It is however clear that a duty of excise is primarily a tax on goods manufactured or produced it is not a tax on the sale of goods though the taxing authority may as a matter of concession to the producer not charge the tax immediately the goods are produced and may postpone it to make it easy for the producer to pay the tax till the first sale is made by him nevertheless the charge is still on the goods and is therefore a duty of excise
On the other hand a sales tax can only be levied when a sale is made and there is nothing to prevent its levy on the first sale
The two concepts 1 2 1948 FCR go
576 are however different and as the Privy Council pointed out a sales tax and a duty of excise are separate and distinct imposts and in law do not overlap
The pith and substance of a duty of excise is that it is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced
Let me therefore see what the Orissa Legislature has done in the present case
It has levied a cess at a rate not exceeding five per centum on the value of minerals at the pit s mouth on all extracted minerals
All the extracted minerals are nothing other than goods produced and the cess is levied on the goods produced at a rate not exceeding five per centum of the value at the pit s mouth
The cess therefore in the present case cannot be anything other than a duty of excise
The pith and substance of the cess in this case falls fairly and squarely within entry 84 of List I and is therefore a duty of excise which cannot be levied by the Orissa State Legislature
I may in this connection refer to the cesses levied by the Central Legislature and Parliament by Act XXXII of 1947 and by the Act No LXV of of Act XXXII of 1947 lays down that there shall be levied and collected as a cess for the purposes of that Act a duty of excise on all coal and coke dispatched from collieries at such rate not less than four annas and not more than eight annas per ton as may from time to time be fixed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette
This is obviously a tax on the goods produced the basis of the tax being so much per ton
Again sec
9 of Act LXV of 1951 lays down that there may be levied and collected as a cess for the purposes of that Act on all goods manufactured or produced in any such scheduled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government by notified order a duty of excise at a rate not exceeding two annas per centum of the value of the goods
This again is clearly a tax on goods produced or manufactured and is in the nature of a duty of excise the basis of the tax being so much of the value of the goods
If these two taxes are duties of excise 577 I fail to see any difference in pith and substance between these two taxes and the cess levied under the Act
It is however urged that the method employed in the Act for realising the cess is only a method of quantification of the fee and merely because of this quantification the pith and substance of the impost does not change from a fee to a duty of excise
Reference in this connection was made to three cases of quantification
In Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy vs The Province of Bombay 1 a question arose with respect to a tax imposed on urban immovable property whether it was a tax on lands and buildings
The challenge to the tax was on the ground that it was tax on income or capital value within items 54 and 55 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act and could not therefore be imposed by the Bombay Legislature
It was held that the tax was a tax on lands and buildings within the meaning of item 42 of List II of the same Schedule and that the basis of the tax which was the annual value would not convert it into a tax on income or capital value
The High Court considered the pith and substance of the said Act and came to the conclusion that every tax on annual value was not necessarily a tax on income and it was held that the mode of assessment of a tax did not determine its character and one has to look to the essential character of the tax to decide whether it was a tax on income or on lands and buildings
Looking to the pith and substance of the tax it was held in that case that it was a tax on lands and buildings
That decision was in the circumstances of that case right because the intention of the legislature was not to tax the income of any one the essential character of the tax in that case was to tax the lands and buildings and the annual value of the lands and buildings was only taken as a mode of levying the tax
In the present case however the very mode of the levy of the cess is nothing other than the levy of a duty of excise and therefore the principle of quantification for purposes of a fee cannot be extended to 1 ILR 578 such an extent as to convert what is in pith and substance a tax into a fee on that basis
The next case to which reference was made is Municipal Corporation Ahmedabad vs Patel Gordhandas Hargovandas 1
In that case the Ahmedabad Bo
rough Municipality had levied a rate on open lands and the basis of the levy was one per centum of the capital value of the land
It was urged that this amounted to a capital levy within entry 54 of List I but the court repelled that contention and held that the levy was in pith and substance a tax on lands which came within entry 42 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act
A distinction was made between a tax on land which is levied on the basis of its capital value and a tax which is on capital treating it as an asset itself
This decision also if I may say so with respect is correct for the basic idea was to tax lands and some method had to be found for doing so and the method evolved though it might look like a capital levy was in pith and substance not so
But the theory of quantification which is the basis of these two cases cannot be stretched so far as to turn levies which are in pith and substance taxes into fees by the process of attaching certain services and creating a fund
The third case is Ralla Ram vs The Province of East Punjab 2
That was a case of a tax on lands and buildings and annual value was the basis on which the tax was levied
The Federal Court rightly pointed out that the pith and substance of the levy had to be seen and on that view it was not income tax but a tax on lands and buildings and the method adopted was merely a method of quantification
The Federal Court also pointed out that where there is an apparent conflict between an Act of the Federal Legislature and an Act of the Provincial Legislature we must try to ascertain the pith and substance or the true nature and character of the conflicting provisions and that before an Act is declared ultra vires there should be an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting jurisdictions and only if such a reconciliation should prove 1 ILR 2 579 impossible the impugned Act should be declared invalid
 It may also be pointed out that in all these three cases one source of income of an individual or one item out of the total capital of an individual was the basis of calculation while income tax or capital levy is generally on the total income or the total capital of a person
That aspect must have gone into the decision that the method employed was merely a mode for imposing a tax on lands and buildings
In the present case however I see no difference between the method of imposing a duty of excise and the method employed in the Act for imposing a cess a matter which will be clear from the cesses imposed under the two Central Acts already referred to No XXXII of 1947 and No LXV of 1951
It is not as if there could be no method of imposing a fee properly so called in this case except the one employed
Two methods readily suggest themselves
A lump sum annual fee could be levied on each mine even on a graded scale depending on the size of the mine as evidenced by its share capital
Or a similar graded fee could be levied on each mine depending on its size determined by the number of men employed therein
Where therefore the result of quantification is to bring a particular impost entirely within the ambit of a tax it would not be right to say that such an impost is still a fee because certain services have to be rendered and a fund has been created in which collections of the impost are credited
If this were permissible many taxes not otherwise leviable would be converted into fees by the simple device of creating a special fund and attaching certain services to be rendered from the amount in that fund
That would in my opinion be a colourable exercise of the power of legislation as explained in K C Gajapati Narayan Deo vs The State of Orissa 1
Let me illustrate how taxes can be turned into fees on the so called basis of quantification with the help of the device of creating a fund and attaching certain services to be rendered out of monies in the fund
Take the case of income tax under item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule which is exclusively reserved 1  580 for the Union
Suppose that some State Legislature wants to impose a tax on income other than agricultural income in the garb of fees
All that it has to do is then to create a special fund out of the amounts collected and to attach rendering of certain services to the fund
All that would be necessary would be to define the services to be rendered so widely that the amount required for the purpose would be practically limitless
In that case there would be no difficulty in levying any amount of tax on income for the amount collected would always be insufficient for the large number of services to be rendered
What has to be done is to find out a number of items in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule in respect of which fees can be levied by the State Legislature
These fees can be levied on a total basis for a large number of services under various entries of Lists II and III
A fund can be created say for rendering services of various kinds to residents of one district
In order to meet the expenses of tendering such services suppose the legislature imposes a tax on every one in the district at 10 per centum of the net total income other than agricultural income the amount so collected is put in a separate fund and ear marked for such special services to be rendered to the residents of that district
Can it be said that such a levy is a fee justified under various entries of Lists II and III and not a tax on income on the ground that this is merely a mode of quantification As an instance take item 6 of List II Public health and sanitation hospitals and dispensaries item 9 Relief of the disabled and unemployable item II Education item 12 Libraries museums and similar institutions item 13 communications that is to say roads bridges and other means of communications item 17 Water that is to say water supplies irrigation and canals drainage and embankments water storage and water power and item  25 Gas and gas works item 23 of List III Social security and social insurance employment and unemployment item 24 Welfare of labour including conditions of work provident funds employers  liability workmen s compensation invalidity and old age 581 pensions and maternity benefits item 25 Vocational and technical training of labour and item 38 Electricity Assume that a fund is created for rendering these services to the residents of a district
The State Legislature is entitled to impose fees for rendering these services to the residents of the district the costs of these services would obviously be limitless and in order to meet these costs the State legislature levies a consolidated fee for all these purposes at 10 per centum of the total net income on the residents of the district excluding his agricultural income as a measure of quantification of the fee
Can it be said in the circumstances that such a levy would not be Income tax simply because a fund is created to be used in the district where collections are made and these services have to be rendered out of the fund so created to the residents of that district and to no others The answer can only be one viz that the nature of the impost is to be seen in its pith and substance and if in pith and substance it is income tax within item 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule it will still remain income tax in spite of the creation of a fund and the attaching of certain services to the monies in that fund to be rendered in a particular area
Such an impost can never be justified as a consolidated fee on the ground that it is merely a method of quantification
Compare what has been done in this case
Sec 3 of the Act which refers to the services to be rendered mentions communications that is roads bridges and other means of communication barring those given in List I water supply and electricity for the better development of the area
These three items themselves would mean expenditure of such large amounts that anything could be charged as a fee to meet the costs particularly in an undeveloped State like Orissa
Further the section goes on to mention provision for the welfare of residents or workers in any such area which would include such things as social security and social insurance provident funds employer s liability workmen s compensation invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits and may be even employment and unemployment
Again large funds would 74 582 be required for these purposes
Therefore the services enumerated in section 3 being so large and requiring such large sums any amount can be levied as a fee and in the name of quantification any tax even though it may be in List I can be imposed and that is exactly what has been done namely what is really a duty of excise has been imposed as a fee for these purposes which fall under items 13 and 17 of List II and 23 24 and 38 of List III
There can be no doubt in the circumstances that the levy of a cess as a fee in this case is a colourable piece of legislation
I do not say that the Orissa State Legislature did this deliberately
The motive of the legislature in such cases is irrelevant and it is the effect of the legislation that has to be seen
Looking at that the cess in this case is in pith and substance nothing other than a duty of excise under item 84 of List I and therefore the State legislature was incompetent to levy it as a fee
The next contention on behalf of the State of Orissa is that if the cess is not justified as a fee it is a tax under item 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule
Item 50 provides for taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development
This raises a question as to what are taxes on mineral rights
Obviously taxes on mineral rights must be different from taxes on goods produced in the nature of duties of excise
If taxes on mineral rights also include taxes on minerals produced there would be no difference between taxes on mineral rights and duties of excise under item 84 of List I A comparison of Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule shows that the same tax is not put in both the Lists
Therefore taxes on mineral rights must be different from duties of excise which are taxes on minerals produced
The difference can be understood if one sees that before minerals are extracted and become liable to duties of excise somebody has got to work the mines
The usual method of working them is for the owner of the mine to grant mining leases to those who have got the capital to work the mines
There should 583 therefore be no difficulty in holding that taxes on mineral rights are taxes on the right to extract minerals and not taxes on the minerals actually extracted
Thus tax on mineral rights would be confined for example to taxes on leases of mineral rights and on premium or royalty for that
Taxes on such premium and royalty would be taxes on mineral rights while taxes on the minerals actually extracted would be duties of excise
It is said that there may be cases where the owner himself extracts minerals and does not give any right of extraction to somebody else and that in such cases in the absence of mining leases or sub leases there would be no way of levying tax on mineral right 
It is enough to say that these cases also rare though they are present no difficulty
Take the case of taxes on annual value of buildings
Where there is a lease of the building the annual value is determined by the lease money but there are many cases where owners themselves live in buildings
In such cases also taxes on buildings are levied on the annual value worked out according to certain rules
There would be no difficulty where an owner himself works the mine to value the mineral rights on the same principles on which leases of mineral rights are made and then to tax the royalty which for example the owner might have got if instead of working the mine himself he had leased it out to somebody else
There can be no doubt therefore that taxes on mineral rights are taxes of this nature and not taxes on minerals actually produced
Therefore the present case is not a tax on mineral rights it is a tax on the minerals actually produced and can be no different in pith and substance from a tax on goods produced which comes under Item 84 of List I as duty of excise
The present levy therefore under section 4 of the Act cannot be justified as a tax on mineral rights
In the view I have taken it is not necessary to consider the other point raised on behalf of the petitioners namely that even if it is a fee in view of the two Central Acts mentioned earlier the Orissa Legislature was not competent to pass the Act
I would 584 therefore allow the petition and declare that the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act 1952 is beyond the constitutional competence of the Orissa Legislature to pass it
The whole Act must be struck down because there will be very little left in the Act if section 4 falls as it must
The legislature would never have passed the Act without section 4
By COURT
In accordance with the majority Judgment of the Court the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs


Summary:
In a plaint the following reliefs were asked for viz i that it be declared that the appointment of defendant No 2 as chairman of the board of directors of a company is illegal invalid and ultra vires and that he has no right to act as chairman managing director etc and ii that a receiver be appointed to take charge of the management of the company
The plaint bore a court fee stamp of Rs 10 only but the objection of the defendants ad valorem fee was paid Rs 51000 which was the valuation of the suit
The suit was dismissed and the plaintiff preferred an appeal giving up the second relief and paying a court fee of Rs 10 only
The appellate Court ordered payment of ad valorem court fee and non compliance rejected the memorandum of appeal 0n further appeal  198 Held i that it was o pen to the appellant to give up the second relief in appeal and as the subject matter of the appeal was of  purely declaratory nature the memorandum of appeal was properly stamped iithat the first relief was of a purely declaratory nature and did not involve any consequential relief  iiithat section 12 of the Court Fees Act did not preclude the Court from considering the correctness of the order of the low er appellate court rejecting the appeal the ground that the memorandum of appeal was not properly stamped
The finality imposed by section 12 of the Court Fees Act deci sions relating to court fee attaches only to decisions concerning valuation simpliciter it does not attach to decisions relating to the category under which a suit or appeal falls for purposed of court fees
Section 12 of the Court Fees Act when it says that such a decision shall be final between the parties only makes the decision of the court a question of court fee non appealable and places it the same footing as other interlocutory non appealable orders under the Code and does no more than that
If a decision under section 12 is reached by assuming jurisdiction which the court does not possess or without observing the formalities which are prescribed for reaching such a decision the order obviously would be revisable by the High Court in the exercise of revisional powers
Similarly when a party thinking that a decision under section 12 is palpably wrong takes the risk of his plaint being rejected or suit dismissed and then appeals from the order rejecting the plaint or from the decree dismissing the suit but not from the decision the question of court fee then it is open to him to challenge the interlocutory order even the question of court fee in the suit or appeal
The word  finality  construed in the limited sense in which it is often used in statutes means that no appeal lies from an order of this character as such and it means no more than that