Criminal Appeal No 43 of 1965
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 10 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No 2097 of 1963
BC Misra for the appellant
OP Rana for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar J
This appeal raises a question of construction of sub section
1 of section 16 of the 
The sub section in providing for punishment for breaches of the Act states for a second offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine
In respect of the first offence it provides for a smaller sentence
The question is whether the appellant was liable to punishment for a second offence
The order of this Court granting leave to appeal confined it only to that question
It appears that on an earlier occasion the appellant kept fonds tuff for sate in a container without covering it as required by sub r
3 of r 49 of the rules made under the Act and was thereupon convicted under section 16 and sentenced to a fine of Rs 40 as tot a first offence
This time he has been convicted for selling foodstuff which had been coloured with a dye the use of which was prohibited by r 28 of the same rules
Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the present was not a second offence
If we have understood his arguments correctly and we confess to some difficulty in understanding them he said that the second offence contemplated is an offence constituted by the same kind or type of act for which he had been convicted under the Act on an earlier occasion
According to him if the present conviction was for keeping foodstuff intended for sale in a container not covered as required by sub r
3 of r 49 then only it would have been for a second offence but as the conviction in the present case was for selling foodstuff coloured with prohibited dye it was not for a second offence
This contention does not seem to us to be acceptable
This real question is What do the words second offence  mean Learned 808 counsel for the appellant referred us to Webster s New World Dictionary where one of the meanings of the word second  has been stated to be of the same kind as another 
That meaning cannot be attributed to that word in the sub section
It increases the penalties as the offences are first  second  or third 
Thus it states for a third and subsequent offences with imprisonment for a term which may extend to four years and with fine
The word subsequent  makes it clear that the words first  second  and third  were intended to indicate things happening one after another in point of time
Sub section 2 of section 16 also leads to the same conclusion
It says If any person convicted of an offence under this Act commits a like offence afterwards the subsequent conviction and the penalty imposed with his name and address may be published in a newspaper at his expense
The word afterwards clearly indicates that the statute was contemplating offences committed subsequently and was indicating a sequence of time
In the dictionary to which learned counsel referred the meaning on which he relies is illustrated by the following sentence There has been no second Shakespeare
It seems plain to us that the meaning conveyed by the word second  in this sentence cannot be attributed to the word second  as used in the sub section
Then as regards the word offence in the expression second offence we find no justification for confining it to an offence constituted by the same type or kind of conduct as the previous offence
The sub section does not say second offence of the same type the latter words are not there
The object of the sub section clearly is to prevent repetition of offences
That is why for the offence subsequently committed a heavier sentence is provided
We cannot imagine what object would have been served by seeking to stop the repetition of the same type of conduct only
The Act no doubt intends to prevent the doing of various acts by punishing them
That object is better served by imposing a heavier penalty when a person repeats any of such offensive acts
The gravamen of the charge of a second offence is the repetition of any offence under the Act and not the repetition of one of the various types of offences mentioned in it
Any interpretation which would not carry out the object of the Act would be unnatural
We therefore think that the words second offence mean any offence under the Act committed by a person after his conviction earlier for any one of the offences punishable under the Act
It was said that it would be strange if the Act intended to impose a heavier punishment for a second offence which might be of a trivial nature while the first offence which might have been of a serious nature entailed a lighter punishment
This contention is fallacious
There is no foundation in the Act for distinguishing between trivial and serious offences for the Act provides the same punishment for each offence under it
If the punishment is 809 the same it would follow that the statute considered them to be of the same seriousness
The weakness of this argument will further appear if we consider a case where the first offence was of what is called a trivial nature and the second of a serious nature though constituted by different acts
It would be equally strange if the Act in such a case contemplated the same punishment for the subsequent and serious offence as would be the case if the subsequent offence was not a second offence 
This contention lends no support to the interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the appellant
Learned counsel then said that the word offence has to be understood as defined in section 238 of the  and therefore means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force
If we substitute this definition for word offence in the provision now under consideration it will mean an act made punishable by the law
That law must be the present Act
This does not assist learned counsel s contention at all it really goes against him
The word offence no doubt refers to an offence under the Act
It cannot possibly mean any offence under any other Act
This view has invariably been taken in all the cases which have been cited to us see City Board Saharanpur vs Abdul Wahid1 and Chuttan vs State2 In In re Authers3 it was said where the legislature passes a statute and imposes a penalty of 501
for a first offence it must mean in the absence of express words to the contrary that the conviction for the first offence must be under that Act and the second conviction under the same Act if it were otherwise it would be idle to introduce the warning of a lower penalty for the first offence and to impose a higher penalty for the second
 This case supports our interpretation of the words second offence based on the object of the Act
Learned counsel for the appellant no doubt agrees that the second offence must refer to an offence under the Act but he says that since it would amount to adding the words under the Act it would justify the addition of further words implying that the second offence had to be of the same type as the first
This is a wholly unfounded contention
the offence contemplated in the expression second offence has to be under the Act because that arises from the object of the Act and
as we shall later show from the necessary implication of the structure of the sub section
There is no such reason to confine the second offence to an offence of the same type
We have so far been dealing only with that portion of sub section
1 of section 16 which concerns the penalty for the second offence
Considering the sub section as a whole we find that it supports the 1 AIR 1959 All
2 AIR 1960 All 629
3  349
810 interpretation of the expression second offence which has appealed to us
It says that if any person does any of the acts mentioned in cls
a to g in it he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain penalty for the second offence with a higher penalty and for the third a still higher penalty
It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned in the different clauses constitute offences for which the penalties are provided
From this structure of the subsection the implication necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only
Now cl
a deals with a person importing manufacturing for sale storing selling or distributing any article of food in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any rule made thereunder
This clause contemplates the breaches of various provisions of the Act and the rules which are numerous
It covers various types of conduct act or omission each of which is punishable and each of which is therefore an offence
Turning next to that part of the sub section which prescribes penalties we find it provides increasing degrees of punishment for the second offence and the third and subsequent offences
It follows that an offence contemplated in this part of the statute and with it we are now directly concerned would be constituted by any of the acts which would come within el
a and likewise within all the other clauses following it
We have pointed out that the acts and omissions contemplated there are of diverse kinds
The words second offence must therefore mean any act which is an offence under any of the clauses in the sub section which has been done later in point of time after a conviction for an offence under the Act no matter whether the acts or omissions constituting the two offences are of the same type or not
The appellant must therefore be held to have committed the second offence within the meaning of the sub section on the present occasion and was liable to have the heavier punishment awarded to him
The sentence awarding such punishment is unexceptionable
The appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant having been once convicted under the for keeping foodstuff for sale in a container without covering it was for a second time convicted for selling foodstuff which had been coloured with a prohibited dye
Treating the latter conviction as a second offence under section 161 of the Act the Trial Court sentenced the appellant to two years imprisonment
Having failed to get redress in the High Court he appealed to this Court by special leave
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the second offence contemplated by section 161 was an offence of the same kind as the first and not any offence under the Act
HELD i The word second in the expression second offence in section 161 means second in time and not second of the same type
The section does not say second offence of the same type the latter words are not there
On the other hand from the phrase subsequent offences  used in the section in respect of offences subsequent to the third one it is clear that the words first  second  and third  were intended to indicate things happening one after another in point of time
808 B The object of the sub section is clearly to prevent repetition of offences
That is why for the offence subsequently committed a heavier sentence is provided
No object could have been served by seeking to stop the repetition of the same type of conduct only
808 E F ii There is no foundation in the Act for distinguishing between trivial and serious offences and then arguing that the Act could not have intended to impose a heavier punishment for a second offence which might be of a less serious nature than the first
The Act provides the same punishment for each offence under it
If the punishment is the same it would follow that the statute considered them to be of the same seriousness
808 H iii The second offence must be an offence under the Act although it is not specifically so stated
Section 161 says that if any person does any of the acts mentioned in cls
a to g in it he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain penalty for the second offence with a higher penalty and for the third a still higher penalty
It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned 807 in the different clauses constitute the offences for which the penalties are provided
From this structure of the sub section the implication necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only
809 E F City Board Saharanpur vs Abdul Wahid AIR 1959 All
695 Chuttan vs State AIR 1950 All
629 and In re Authers  referred to