Appeal No 934 of 1964
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 13 1964 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Writ No 258 D of 1957
Hardayal Hardy B Dutta M section K Sastri and J B Dadachanji for the appellants
C K Daphtary Attorney General R K P Shankardass and R H Dhebar for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar CJ
The two appellants the Hamdard Dawakhana Wakf Delhi and its Mutawalli Haji Hakim Hameed represent the Hamdard Dawakhana institution which was initially established in or about 1906 as a dawakhana and was subsequently declared and founded as a Wakf
Since its inception the institution has been running dispensaries and clinics for the treatment of patients and has been manufacturing and supplying medicines and medicinal products according to Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of medicines
Appellant No 1 also manufactures medicated syrups which contain some fruit juices for medicinal use and they are prepared according to a certain formula devised by it
Sharbat Rooh Afza which is a medicated syrup manufactured by appellant No 1 is made of the following ingredients Kasni seeds Khus Pumpkin Juice Water melon Juice Chharila Ripe grapes Spinach Nilofar Sandal 194 Gul Gaozaban Coriandar Carrot Mint Kulfa Keora Rose Citrus flower Orange Juice Pine apple Juice Water Sugar
The formula determining the ratio and proportion in which each one of the ingredients has to be used has been evolved by appellant No 1 as a result of various experiments spread over a long period
The manufacture of this Sharbat began in 1920
It is intended to be used for common ailments during hot season particularly for ailments like loss of appetite sun stroke nausea sleeplessness etc
This Sharbat Rooh Afza is not a foodstuff and cannot be regarded as an essential commodity under section 2 of the No 10 of 1955 hereinafter called the Act 
In substance this is the case as set out by the appellants in their petition
Purporting to act under section 3 of the Act the Central Govern ment made an Order called the Fruit Products Order 1955 hereinafter called the Fruit Order  under Notification No SRO 1052 dated May 3 1955
Under clause 3 of the Order respondent No 4 the Central Fruit Products Advisory Committee has been constituted
It appears that on the 22nd September 1956 the Central Government purporting to act under section 3 of the Act made certain amendments in the Fruit Order
The result of one of the amendments thus made was to direct that the minimum percentage of fruit juice in the final product of a fruit syrup as indicated in Part 11 of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order should be raised from 10 to 25
The change so made was notified to the appellants by respondent No 2 the Marketing Development Officer Fruit Products Central Zone Delhi on January 29 1957
As a result of this intimation certain correspondence followed between the appellants and respondent No 2
The appellants had urged in the course of this correspondence that Sharbat Rooh Afza did not fall within the scope of the Act and the Fruit Order
On March 25 1957 respondent No 3 the Agricultural Marketing Adviser to the Government of India New Delhi invited a representative of the appellants for discussions and as a result of the said discussion Mr Sood the Marketing Development Officer Delhi inspected the factory of the appellants and watched the process of manufacture of Sharbat Rooh Afza on April 29 1957
Thereafter on May 10 1957 the appellants received a communication from Mr Sood ordering the appellants to stop further manufacture and sale of Sharbat Rooh Afza forthwith on 195 the ground that it did not contain the minimum percentage of fruit juice prescribed by the relevant clause of the Fruit Order
This communication mentioned the fact that the appellants had been specifically asked to prepare fruit syrups strictly in accordance with the specifications prescribed but in utter disregard of the said instructions the appellants had wilfully continued to contravene the provisions of the Fruit Order
That is why by virtue of the powers conferred on him by clause 13f of the Fruit Order the present order was served on the appellants
It is this order which was challenged by the appellants by their writ petition filed before the Punjab High Court on the 18th May 1957 No 258 D of 1957
By their writ petition the appellants prayed that the impugned order as well as the several orders passed preceding it should be quashed and a writ of mandamus should be issued against the respondents restraining them from seeking to enforce the material provisions of the Fruit Order in respect of the appellants  product Sharbat Rooh Afza 
The appellants urged that the said Sharbat is not a foodstuff but a medicinal product and as such its produc tion cannot be regulated under the provisions of section 3 of the Act
According to them the said Sharbat was not an essential commodity nor was it a fruit product  as defined by clause 2d of the fruit Order
They also urged that the impugned order was invalid because it contravened the fundamental rights of the appellants under article 191fg of the Constitution the Sharbat in question was in fact a medicinal product and as such the impugned order was inconsistent with clause 16 1 c of the Fruit Order
It is on these grounds that the appellants sought relief by way of an appropriate writ or order quashing the impugned order issued against them on May 10 1957
To this petition the appellants impleaded the Union of India as respondent No 1
This petition was resisted by the respondents on several grounds
It was alleged that the Sharbat in question fell within the scope of the Act and the Fruit Order
The respondents referred to the fact that the Hamdard Dawakhana had duly applied and was granted a licence in 1955 as a manufacturer engaged in the business of manufacturing fruit products for sale
The Dawakhana is holding this licence since 1955
The bottles in which the Sharbat in question is sold by the appellants do not bear labels containing the words for medicinal use only
It appears that the Dawakhana obtained a licence for the year 1952 under the Fruit Products Order 1948 for the manufacture of the Sharbat in question
On analysis it was found that the said Sharbat did not 196 contain fruit juice though it was sold as fruit juice
The label on the bottle of the Sharbat depicts pictures of fruits
Under the said Order of 1948 the synthetic syrups containing no fruit juice were required to be clearly marked as synthetic  and to abstain from using labels with pictures of fruits
In 1954 when it was found that the Dawakhana did not get the licence renewed the appellants were asked either to get their licence renewed or to get exemption by complying with the necessary conditions
When the appellants did not comply with these directions some of the bottles of the Sharbat were detained in the market
That led to a writ petition filed by the appellants in 1954 No 11 D1954 in the Punjab High Court
When the petition however came for final hearing it was not pressed and so was dismissed on June 5 1954
The Dawakhana then filed a suit for injunction but the said suit became infructuous with the expiry of the Fruit Products Order 1948 on January 25 1955
The present Fruit Order came into force on May 3 1955 and the Dawakhana filed another suit for injunction but pending the suit the appellants applied for and obtained a licence under the Fruit Order and in consequence the suit was withdrawn on October 18 1955
Even after obtaining the licence the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order as to the minimum percentage of fruit juice were not complied with by the appellants and that led to the impugned order
That is the background of the present writ petition
In the present writ petition the respondents urged that the Sharbat in question is not sold for medicinal purposes it is manufactured by the appellants as a fruit product and sold as such
No exemption was claimed by the appellants under clause 16 of the Fruit Order
The Sharbat in question is foodstuff within the meaning of section 2 of the Act and it falls within the purview of the Fruit Order
The impugned order is not unconstitutional because the restriction imposed by it is consistent with the relevant provisions of the Act and the Fruit Order and the said provisions are perfectly valid because they impose a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public
This writ petition came on for final disposal before the Punjab High Court on January 13 1964
The High Court has rejected the pleas raised by the appellants and dismissed their writ petition
The High Court has held that there was no substance in the appellants  grievance that the Fruit Order was invalid
In support of this conclusion the High Court has relied upon a decision of this 197 Court in Ms Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd vs The State of Uttar Pradesh1
The High Court negatived the appellants  argument that the Sharbat in question was either prepared or sold as a medicinal product
In this connection the High Court has commented  on the fact that the label borne by the bottles containing the Sharbat did not show that it was for medicinal use only as required by cl 16 1 c of the Fruit Order According to the High Court clause 1 1 of the Fruit Order covered the case of the Sharbat prepared by the appellants and so the impugned order was justified
The High Court also found that there was no substance in the grievance made by the appellants that as a result of this impugned order their registered trade mark label had been affected
The High Court then examined the question as to whether the provisions of the Fruit Order could be said to be invalid and it held that the said provisions were perfectly valid inasmuch as the restrictions imposed by them were reasonable and in the interests of  the general public
It is on these grounds that the High Court dismissed the appellants  petition
Thereafter the appellants applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court to come to this Court in appeal
This certificate was granted on July 22 1964 After the appeal
was admitted in due course the appellants moved this Court on October 26 1964 for stay in fact during all the seven years that the writ petition was pending before the High Court the appellants had obtained stay and they wanted the stay to continue pending the final  disposal of this appeal
When we found that the writ petition had taken an unusually long time in the Punjab High Court we directed that the stay should continue in favour of the appellants but that the appeal should be heard on November 9 1964
That is how the hearing of this appeal has been specially expedited
Before we deal with the points which have been raised before us by Mr Pathak we would refer very briefly to the scheme and the relevant provisions of the Act and the Fruit Order
The Act was passed in 1955 for the purpose of controlling the production supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in certain commodities in the interests of the general public
The commodities which were intended to be brought within the purview of the Act were essential commodities as defined by section 2a of the Act
Amongst them are included foodstuffs including edible oil seeds and oils covered by section 2 a v and any other class of  commodity which the Central Government may by notified order 1 Criminal Appeal No 141 of 1959 decided on 30 11 1960
198 declare to be an essential commodity for the purposes of this Act being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of entry 33 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution this is included in the definition by section 2 a xi
Section 3 1  provides that if the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices it may by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein
Sub section 2 by clauses a to h provides for different categories of orders which may be passed by the Central Government without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred on it by sub section 1
It would thus be clear that the Act confers power on the Central Government to regulate the production supply and distribution of essential commodities
This power is conferred in a very general and wide sense by section 3  1 
There can be little doubt that the power to regulate the production of an essential commodity will include the power to regulate the production of essential commodities which may operate either qualitatively or quantitatively
In other words in regard to essential commodities the Central Government is given the power to direct how certain essential commodities should be produced and in what quantity
This power of course can be exercised only if the condition precedent prescribed by section 31 is satisfied and that is that the Central Government should be of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to regulate the production of any essential commodity for one of the purposes mentioned by it
This position cannot be and is not disputed before us
In fact in Ms Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd1 this Court whilst dealing with the provisions of the Vegetable Oil Products Control Order 1947 issued under section 3 1  of the Act has definitely ruled that a qualitative regulation in respect of the production of an essential commodity is permissible under section 31 of the Act
That takes us to the Fruit Products Order which was issued by the Central Government on May 3 1955 in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 3 of the Act
Clause 2 of the Fruit Order defines fruit product 
2d 1 takes in synthetic beverages syrups and sharbats cl 2 d v takes in squashes crushes cordials barley water barreled juice and ready to serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp
Clause 2 d xiv takes in any other unspecified items relating to fruits or vegetables
Clause 2j defines sharbat as 199 meaning any non alcoholic sweetened beverage or syrup containing non fruit juice or flavoured with non fruit flavours such as rose khus kewra etc and cl
2k defines synthetic beverage as meaning any non alcoholic beverage or syrups other than aerated waters containing no fruit juice but having an artificial flavour or colour resembling as fruit
Clause 7 of the Fruit Order prescribes that every manufacturer shall manufacture fruit products in conformity with the sanitary requirements and the appropriate standard of quality and composition specified in the Second Schedule to this Order it adds that every other fruit and vegetable product not so specified shall be manufactured in accordance with the standard of quality and composition laid down in this behalf by the Licensing Officer
That takes us to clause II it is necessary to read this clause fully  1Any beverage which does not contain at least 25 per centum of fruit juice in its composition shall not be described as a fruit syrup fruit juice squash or cordial or crush and shall be described as a synthetic syrup
2 Every synthetic syrup shall be clearly and conspicuously marked on the label as a SYNTHETIC  product and no container containing such product shall have a label whether attached thereto or printed on the wrapper of such container or otherwise which may lead the consumer into believing that it is a fruit product Neither the word FRUIT  shall be used in describing such a product nor shall it be sold under the cover of a label which carries the picture of any fruit
Aerated water containing no fruit juice or pulp shall not have a label which leads the consumer into believing that it is a fruit product
Part II of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order prescribes the specifications for fruit juice and other beverages
In regard to fruit syrup it provides inter alia that the minimum percentage of fruit juice in the final product must be 25
The respondents  contention is that since the Sharbat in question produced by the appellants does not comply with this specification it contravenes the mandatory provision of cl
111
Part IV of the Second Schedule prescribes the specifications for synthetic syrups and sharbats
Under this Part there is no requirement as to any minimum of fruit juice in the said syrups and sharbats
200 Clause 16 of the Fruit Order provides for cases to which this Order does not apply Clause 16 1 c provides that nothing in this Order shall be deemed to apply to any syrups which are sold in bottles bearing a label containing the words For medicinal use only which does not exhibit any picture of fruits
It is common ground that the appellants do not sell the Sharbat in question in bottles bearing a label containing the words For medicinal use only and so cl 1 6 1 c does not apply and the appellants can claim no exemption on that account
Mr Pathak no doubt attempted to argue that the Sharbat in question is not an essential commodity and as such it does not fall within the purview of the Act or within the purview of the Fruit Order
It appears that this plea was not urged by the appellants before the Punjab High Court
It was argued by them before the High Court that the Sharbat in question was a medicinal product and that point had been considered and rejected by the High Court and so it has assumed that the Sharbat in question is an essential commodity within the meaning of section 2 of the Act that question cannot now be allowed to be argued for the first time before this Court
Mr Pathak wanted to suggest that the Sharbat in question is not a fruit product and as such is outside the purview of the Fruit Order
We are not impressed by this argument
We have already referred to cl 2 d v of the Fruit Order which refers to several beverages and the residuary part of this clause takes in any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp
The suggestion that this clause should be read ejusdem generis with the previous categories of beverages cannot obviously be accepted because an examination of the said beverages will disclose the fact that there is no genus by reference to which the rule of ejusdem generis can be properly invoked
Besides the context of the clause clearly suggests that it is intended to take in all beverages other than those earlier specified provided they contain fruit juices or fruit pulp
Therefore we feel no difficulty in holding that the Sharbat in question falls within the purview of cl 2 d v of the Fruit Order and as such its production can be controlled by its relevant provisions Then it is urged by Mr Pathak that the Fruit Order itself is invalid because it does not purport to say that before it was issued the Central Government had formed the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to issue the Order for maintaining or increasing supplies of the commodity in question
Mr Pathak 201 contends and rightly that the condition prescribed by the first part of section 31 of the Act is a condition precedent and it is only when and after the said condition is satisfied that the power to issue a regulatory order can be exercised by the Central Government
This contention again cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal because if it had been raised before the High Court the respondents would have had a chance to meet it
It is true as Mr Pathak contends that in the absence of any specific averment made by the Fruit Order that the Central Government had formed the necessary opinion no presumption can be drawn that such opinion had been formed at the relevant time but it would have been open to the respondents to prove that such an opinion had been formed at the relevant time and it cannot be suggested that the failure to mention that fact expressly in the Fruit Order itself would preclude the respondents from proving the said fact independently
That is why we think Mr Pathak cannot be permitted to urge this contention at this stage
Mr Pathak has however strenuously argued before us that the Fruit Order is invalid because its relevant provisions indicate that it is an Order which could have been appropriately issued under the No 37 of 1954
In support of this argument Mr Pathak has relied on the fact that Act 37 of 1954 is relatable to the legislative power conferred by Entry 18 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which refers to adulteration of foodstuffs and other goods and so the material provisions of the Fruit Order which really prevent the adulteration of fruit products could be legitimately enacted under this Act
On the other hand the is relateable to Entry 33 in List III and the Fruit Order issued under it would therefore be inappropriate having regard to the object which this Order is intended to achieve
He argues that the two powers are distinct and separate and the Fruit Order with which we are concerned cannot be said properly to have been issued under the Act
It is true that the does deal with the problem of preventing adulteration of food but it is not easy to accept Mr Pathak s assumption that the regulatory Order of the kind with which we are concerned which imposes regulations Of a qualitative character in the production of essential goods could have been issued under this Act
But quite apart from this consideration if section 31 of the Act authorises the Central Government to regulate the qualitative and quantitative production of essential commodities it is idle to contend that the regulations p 65 14 202 imposed by the Fruit Order in respect of fruit products are outside the purview of section 3 1
The pith and substance of the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order clearly is to regulate the qualitative production of fruit products covered by it
This object is illustrated by the specification with which we are concerned
Part II of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order 1which has imposed the obligation on the manufacturers of fruit Syrups to include at least 25 of fruit juice in the final product of the fruit syrup produced by them shows that by virtue of its powers under section 3 1 of the Act the Central Government thought it necessary to require that a particular quality of fruit syrup should be put on the market as fruit syrup and no other
This object plainly falls within the purview of section 31 and so the contention that the Fruit Order is invalid inasmuch as it purports to tackle the problem of adulteration of fruit product cannot be accepted
Then Mr Pathak suggested that there was some inconsistency between the definition of synthetic beverage  prescribed by cl 2 k and the provisions of cl 11 2 of the Fruit Order
We have already read cl 11
The effect of cl 11 1 is that if any beverage does not contain at least 25 per cent of fruit juice it shall not be described inter alia as fruit syrup  but shall be described as a synthetic syrup  and sub cl
2 of cl 11 therefore provides that if any syrup which has to be described as a synthetic syrup  by virtue of the provisions of sub cl
1 is put on the market it would be necessary to describe it as a Synthetic  product clearly and conspicuously
It is with the object of bringing it to the notice of the customers at large that the synthetic product does not contain the minimum fruit juice prescribed by the Fruit Order that sub cl
2 imposes an obligation that whoever puts the synthetic product in the market shall mark it with a label Synthetic and no attempt would be made to describe the product as though it was a fruit product
That is why a specific provision is made by sub cl
2 that neither the word Fruit shall be used in describing such a product nor will it bear a label which carries the picture of any fruit
From this provision aerated waters are exempted because it was thought that no customer would ever mistake aerated water for fruit juice
Now if we bear in mind this scheme of clause 11 it is difficult to see where the inconsistency lies between cl 11 and the definition of a synthetic beverage  as prescribed by cl 2k
The definition of synthetic beverage indicates that it is a beverage which contains no fruit juice and clause 11 which contains a positive provision that beverages 203 containing less than 25 per cent fruit juice should be shown as a synthetic  product
The definition of synthetic beverage  cannot be said to conflict with the requirement that the products falling under cl
112 should be sold as synthetic  products
Besides clause 1 1 contains a positive provision and the validity of the mandatory requirements of cl 11 cannot be said to be impaired by any alleged inconsistency between the said provision and the definition of synthetic beverage  prescribed by cl 2 k of the Fruit Order
The last contention which Mr Pathak urged before us is that the impugned order is invalid because it affects the appellants  trade mark right
It is not easy to appreciate this argument
We have already held that the Act and the Fruit Order issued by the Central Government by virtue of its powers conferred by section 31 of the Act are valid
If that be so the impugned order which is fully justified by the provisions of the Act and the Fruit Order cannot be challenged as being invalid
The conclusion that the Act and the Fruit Order issued under it are constitutionally valid proceeds on the basis that the restrictions imposed by them are reasonable and in the interests of general public
What the impugned order purports to do is to require the appellants to comply with the reasonable restrictions imposed by the Fruit Order
The fact that incidentally compliance with Fruit Order may tend to affect their trade mark right cannot in our opinion render the impugned order invalid
In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that appellant No I would not be justified in con tending that the registered trade mark which is usually intended to distinguish one manufactured article from another can be used by it even though it is likely to mislead the customers or its use would mean a breach of some other law
Besides it is significant that the impugned order does not really compel the appellants to change their trade mark
If the appellants desire that the Sharbat in question should be put on the market without complying with the requirements of clause 1 1  1  all that they to do is to comply with cl 1 1 2 of the Fruit Order
In the process of complying with cl 1 1 2 if their trade mark right is likely to be affected that would not render the impugned order invalid because the restriction which is sought to be enforced against them is found to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public
Besides we would like to add that if the appellants wanted to urge this point seriously they should have placed before the Court more material in respect of their alleged trade mark right
The appellants had alleged in their writ petition that they are putting the 204 Sharbat on the market as a medicinal product
In that case they may claim exemption by complying with cl 16 i c of the Fruit Order
We are therefore satisfied that the Punjab High Court was right in holding that no case had been made out by the appellants for quashing the impugned order
Before we part with this appeal we would like to refer to one unfortunate aspect of the present proceedings
We have already indicated that the present writ petition was filed by the appellants in the Punjab High Court on May 18 1957 and it was finally decided on January 13 1964
It is very much to be regretted that the final disposal of this writ petition should have taken such an unusually long period
The appellants have been agitating this matter since 1957 and as a result of the long duration of the present writ petition in the High Court they have had the benefit of the stay order all this time though ultimately it was found that there was no substance in the petition
It is hardly necessary to add that writ petitions in which orders of stay and injunction are passed should be decided as expeditiously as possible
That is why when it came to the notice of this Court that this writ petition has taken an unusually long period in the High Court we directed that it should be set down for hearing within a fortnight after it was brought to us on a notice of motion for stay
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appea1 dismissed


Summary:
The appellants manufacture a medicated syrup Sharbat Rooh Afza according to a formula and containing some fruit juices
Acting under section 3 of the  the Central Government made the Fruit Products order in 1955 as a result of an amendment in September 1956 of the relevant provisions of this Order the requirement of the minimum percentage of fruit juices in a fruit syrup covered in of the Second Schedule of the Fruit Order was raised from 10 to 25
This requirement was duly notified to the Appellants
Thereafter as a result of an inspection of their factory by the Marketing development Officer the appellants received an order from him requiring them to stop further manufacture and sale of Sharbat Rooh Afza  forthwith on the ground that it did not contain the minimum percentage of fruit juices prescribed by the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order
The appellants challenged this order in a Writ Petition on the ground inter alia that the Fruit Order did not apply to Sharbat Rooh Afza  and also that the impugned order and the Fruit Order were invalid
The High Court however rejected these grounds upheld the validity of the Fruit Order and dis missed the petition
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the Sharbat  was a medicinal product and not a fruit product  as defined by cl 2d of the Fruit Order that the Fruit Order was invalid because it could have appropriately been issued only under the  and not the  and that the impugned order was invalid because it affected the appellant s Trade mark rigts
HELD  i The Sharbat was a fruit product within the meaning of cl 2d v of the Fruit order as the residuary part of that clause took in any beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp as such its production could be controlled by the relevant provisions of the order
The High Court was right in rejecting the appellant s contention that the Sharbat was a medicinal product in view of the fact that the appellants had not claimed exemption from the application of the Fruit Order by complying with Cl 161c thereof
200 E G 201 H 203 A iiAs section 31 of the authorised the Central Government to regulate the qualitative and quantitative production of essential commodities and as the pith and substance of the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order was clearly to regulate the qualitative production of the Fruit Products covered by it the contention that the regulations imposed by the order were outside the purview of section 31 could 193 not be accepted
The order was not therefore invalid on the ground that it purported to tackle the problem of adulteration and should therefore have been issued under the 
201 D 202 C iiiThe Fruit Order and the Act under which it was issued were constitutionally valid as the restrictions imposed by them were reasonable and in the interest of the general public
What the impugned order purported to do was to require the appellants to comply with reasonable restric tions imposed by the Fruit Order and the fact that incidentally compliance with the Fruit Order might tend to affect the trade mark rights could not render the impugned order invalid
203 D E ivThe definition of synthetic beverage  in cl 2k of the Fruit Order which indicates that it is a beverage which contains no fruit juice cannot be said to conflict with the requirements of cl
112 that beverages containing less than 25 fruit juices should be sold as synthetic  pro ducts
Furthermore cl 11 contains a positive provision and the validity of the mandatory requirements of cl 11 could not be impaired by the alleged inconsistency between that provision and the definition of synthetic  beverage prescribed by cl 2k
203 A B Amrit Banaspati Co Ltd vs The Stale of UP Cr
A No 141 of 1959 dated 30 11 60 referred to