Appeal No 5617 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 981990 of the Karna taka Administrative Tribunal Bangalore in Application No 3155 of 1989
PP Rao SR Bhat Alok Aggarwal and Ms Mohini L Bhat 1or the Appellant
393 P Chidambaram M Veerappa NP and KH Nobin Singh for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH J
Even the General Law later in time prevails over the earlier Special Law if it clearly and directly supersedes the said Special Law  is an unexcep tionable proposition of law
K Jayachandra Reddy J has interpreted Rule 32 of General Rules consistently with Rules 13a 31 and 42 of the same Rules
Giving harmonious construction to various provisions of the General Rules the learned Judge has held that the General Rules do not supersede the Special Rules
Yogeshwar Dayal J on the other hand has focused his attention on the language of Rule 32 of the General Rules and has concluded that there is clear indication in the said Rule to supersede the Special Rules
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the reason ing adopted by the learned Judges in their respective judg ments
Rule 13a of the General Rules which lays down the extent and applicability of the General Rules specifi cally provides that the General Rules shall not be applica ble to the State Civil Services for which there are express provisions under any law for the time being in force
When the General Rules were enforced the Special Rules were already holding the field
The Special Rules being law the application of the General Rules is excluded to the extent the field is occupied by the Special Rules
I do not agree that the non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules has an overriding effect on Rule 13a of the said Rules
With utmost respect to the erudite judgment prepared by Yogeshwar Dayal J I prefer the reasoning and the conclusions reached by K Jayachandra Reddy J and agree with the judgment proposed by him
KJAYACHANDRA REDDY J
This appeal is directed against the order of the Administrative Tribunal Bangalore dismiss ing an application filed by the appellant
The principal question involved is whether SubRule 2 of Rule 3 of Karna taka Civil Services General Recruitment Rules 1977  General Rules  for short has the overriding effect over the Karnataka General Service Motor Vehicles Branch Recruitment Rules 1976  Special Rules  for short
For a better appreciation of the question it becomes necessary to state few facts
The appellant was appointed initially as Inspector of Motor  Vehicle and was promoted as Assistant Regional Transport Officer in the 394 year 1976 in which year the Special Rules were framed
In the year 1981 the appellant was promoted as Regional Trans port Officer
Some of the General Rules of 1977 were amended in the year 1982 and Sub Rule 2 of Rule 3 was inserted in the said Rules
In the year 1989 the second respondent was promoted as Deputy Commissioner of Transport on seniority cure merit basis alone as purported to have been provided in new Rule 32 of General Rules
Being aggrieved by the same the appellant filed an Application No 315589 before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal questioning the promotion of second respondent on the ground that the promotion to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Transport should be by selec tion from the cadre of Regional Transport Officers and not merely on seniority cum merit basis
His application was dismissed by the Tribunal holding that Rule 32 of General Rules which was introduced later overrides the earlier Special Rules
It is this order which is questioned in this appeal
Shri PP Rao learned counsel appearing for the appel lant contended that the Special Rules are exclusively meant to govern the recruitment and promotion of officers of various cadres of the Motor Vehicle Department and the General Rules which generally regulate the recruitment of all State Civil Services broadly even though later in point of time cannot abrogate the Special Rules and that they are not meant to do so since the Special Rules also are very much in force inasmuch as they are not superseded
Shri P Chidambaram learned counsel for the State of Karnataka contended that the non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules which was introduced later clearly indicate the intention of he Legislature to supersede the Special Rules and promotions from the cadre of Regional Transport Officer to that of Deputy Commissioner of Transport could only be on the basis of seniority cam merit and not by election
From the rival contentions it emerges that the real question involved is one of construction of non ob stante clause in Rule 32 and its fleet on the Special Rules providing for promotion to the post of Deputy Commis sioner of Transport by selection from the cadre of Regional Transport Officers
We shall now refer to the relevant Special and General Rules
The special Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Con stitution of India in the year 1976
The special Rules of recruitment for the category of post of Deputy Commissioner of Transport reads thus 395 Category of Method of Minimum posts recruitment Qualification 1 2 3
Deputy Transport By promotion by Must have put in not Commissioner selection from the less than five years of cadre of Regional service in cadre of Transport Officers Regional Transport Officers
 It can be seen that this part of Special Rules clearly provides for promotion to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Transport by selection from the cadre of Regional Transport Officers who have put in not less than five years of serv ice
The General Rules were framed in the year 1977 and Rule 3 reads as under Method of recruitment 1 Except as otherwise provided in these rules or any other rules specially made in this behalf recruitment to any service or post shall be made by direct recruitment which may be either by competitive examination or by selection or by promotion which may be either by selection or on the basis of seniority cure merit
The methods of recruitment and qualifications shall be as specified in the rules of recruitment special ly made in that behalf  provided that in respect of direct recruitment to any service or post when the method of recruitment is not specified in the rules of recruitment specially made the method of recruitment be by selection after an interview by the Commission the Advisory of Selection Committee or the Appointing Authori ty as the case may be
Provided further that no person shall be eligible for promotion unless he has satisfac torily completed the period of probation or officiation as the case may be in the post held by him
2 Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the rules of recruitment specially made in respect of any service or a the promotion to the post of Head of Department or the 396 post of an Additional Head of Department if it is in a grade equivalent to that of the Head of Department concerned shall be by selection Provided that for the purpose of promotion by selection the number of persons to be consid ered shall be such number of persons eligible for promotion in the order of seniority as is equal to five times the number of vacancies to be filled
b the promotion to all other posts shall be on the basis of seniority cam merit Emphasis supplied It may be noted that Sub Rule 32 with which we are mainly concerned was inserted in the year 1982
Shri Chidam baram strongly relying on the non obstante clause in Rule 32 with which this Sub Rule begins contended that this general rule dearly supersedes the special law and there fore according to him the Tribunal was right in holding that the promotion to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Transport could be only on the basis of seniority cum merit
It is true that a simple reading of Rule 32 appears to lay down that notwithstanding anything contained in the General Rules or in the Special Rules the promotion to the post of a Head or Additional Head of a Department only shall be by selection and that the promotion to all other posts shall be on the basis Of seniority cum merit
This clause b of Sub Rule 2 is in general terms and as already noted the General Rules indicate that they regulate general recruit ment to all the Karnataka State Civil Services broadly
It is not in dispute that just like the Special Rules providing for recruitment of the Transport Department there are such special rules in respect of many other departments also
It is therefore clear that while General Rules broadly indicate that they regulate general recruitment including promotion to all the State Civil Services but at the same time each Department has its own Special Rules of recruitment and they are co existing
Such Special Rules of recruitment for the Motor Vehicles Department are not repealed by any provision of the General Rules which are later in point of time
As a matter of fact Rule 21 which provides for repeal does not in any manner indicate that any of the Special Rules stood repealed
It is in this background that we have to consider the interpretation of non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules
At this juncture it is necessary to note that some of the rules of the General Rules also provide for promotion by way of selection and that Special Rules providing for such promotion by selection should be adhered 397 to
They are Rule 13a the first part of Rule 3 and Rule 4 which are existing
In Sub rule 13a of the General Rules we find the following 13a These rules shall apply to recruit ment to all State Services and to all posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Karnataka and to members of all State Civil Services and to the holders of posts whether temporary or permanent except to the extent otherwise expressly provided i by or under any law for the time being in force or XX XX emphasis supplied This is the opening rule of the General Rules and it abundantly makes it clear that the rest of the rules are subject to any other rules expressly providing for recruit ment
Then in clause 1 of Rule 3 of the General Rules we find the words Except as otherwise provided in these Rules or any other rules specially made in this behalf recruitment to any service or post shall be made by direct recruitment which may be either by competitive examination or by selec tion or by promotion which may be either by selection or on the basis of seniority cum merit
The methods of recruit ment and qualification shall be as specified in the rule of recruitment specially made in that behalf
 This part of General Rule 3 provides for recruitment by way of promotion either by selection or on the basis of seniority cum merit as specified in the said Rules of recruitment specially made
Further the opening words of clause 1 Except as otherwise provided in these Rules or any other Rules spe cially made give a clue that the special rules would govern and regulate the method of recruitment including promotion by way of selection
Further Rule 4 of the General Rules which lays down the procedure of appointment contains Sub Rule 2 which reads as under 4
Procedure of appointment subject to the provisions of these rules appointment to any service or post shall be made xxxx xxxx xxxx 2 in the case of recruitment by promotion a if it is to a post to be filled by promo tion by selection by selection of a 398 person on the basis of merit and suitability in all respects to discharges the duties of the post with due regard to seniority from among persons eligible for promotion
b if it is to a post other than that re ferred to in sub clause a by selection of a person on the basis of seniority cure merit that is seniority subject to fitness of the candidate to discharge the duties of the post from among persons eligible for promotion emphasis supplied Though Rule 32 of the General Rules is inserted later the above mentioned Rules remain undisturbed and they co exist
They provide for recruitment and promotion by selection to certain categories of posts and for others on the basis of seniority cure merit
From a combined reading of these provisions of General Rules it follows that re cruitment to any service by promotion as regulated by Special Rules can be by way of selection
Then the question is whether Rule 32 of the General Rules which is intro duced in 1982 particularly providing the method of promotion by selection to the post of heads and additional heads of departments has altogether dispensed with the promotion by selection to all other posts and whether the non obstante clause in this rule in these circumstances can be inter preted as to have the overriding effect as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents
The non obstante clause is sometimes appended to a section or a rule in the begin ning with a view to give the enacting part of that section or rule in case of conflict an overriding effect over the provisions or act mentioned in that clause
Such a clause is usually used in the provision to indicate that the said provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non obstante clause
But it has to be noted at this stage that we are concerned with the enforceability of special law on the subject inspire of the general law
In Maxwell on the Interpretation or Signites Eleventh Edition at page 168 this principle of law is stated as under A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication
Generalia specialibus non derogant or in other words where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed altered or derogated from merely by force of such 399 general words without any indication of a particular intention to do so
In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act In Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur vs Thakur Manmohan Dey and ors AIR 1966 SC 1931 applying this principle it is held that general law does not abrogate earlier special law by mere implication
In Eileen Louise Nicoole vs John Winter Nicolle  Lord Phillimore observed as under It is a sound principle of all juris prudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a poste rior law expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language ap plicable to and covering a number of cases of which the particular law is but one
This as a matter of jurisprudence as understood in England has been laid down in a great number of cases whether the prior law be an express statute or be the underlying common or customary law of the country
Where general words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indi rectly repealed altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words without any indication of a particular intention to do so
 In Justiniane Augusto De Piedade Barreto vs Antonio Vicente Da Fortseca and others etc   this Court observed that A law which is essentially general in nature may contain special provisions on certain matters and in respect of these matters it would be classified as a special law
Therefore unless the special law is abrogated by express repeal or by making provisions which arc wholly inconsistent with it the special law cannot be held to have been abrogated by mere implication
I have already noted that even in the General Rules the promotion by selection is provided for and if there are any special rules in that regard they are not abrogated except by an express repeal
I shall now examine whether the interpretation of non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules as given by the Tribunal is warranted
The Tribunal has held that the non obstante clause which was 400 introduced in the General Rules clearly indicates the inten tion to supersede the special law
The Tribunal has also noted even a later general law provision can override earli er special law if it clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
As a proposition of law one cannot dispute this part of the finding but I am not able to agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the non obstante clause in Rule 32 clearly abrogates earlier special law
This very question was considered by Karnataka High Court in Muniswamy vs Superintendent of Police ILR 1986 Karnataka 344 Vol 36
In that case also the same General Rules and particularly Rule 32 inserted later came up for consideration
The Special Rules were that of Karnataka State Police State Recruitment Rules 1967
The Director General of Police issued a circular for the purpose of recruitment of Head Constables on purely seniority cum merit basis
It was contended that the posts of the Head Consta bles have to be filled up by promotion by selection as provided in the Special Rules and Rule 32 of the General Rules cannot have an overriding effect inspire of a non obstante clause
The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that Sub rule 2 of Rule 3 which is an amend ment to the General Rules cannot be treated as an amendment to the Special Police Rules and that Rule 32 cannot be read as amending all other special rules of recruitment of all other department of Government in general
It also further observed that this amendment to the General Rules must be read as subordinate to the application of Rules declared by Rule 13 of the Rules and cannot be read as enlarging the scope
This judgment rendered by the High Court in the year 1986 has become final
The fact that the State did not appeal or repeal the Special Rules suitably in spite of the decision clinchingly shows that it accepted this position
In Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Another vs Arabinda Bose and Another   it was observed as under It should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning and the non obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment
 It was further held that 401 Nor can we read the non obstante clause as specifically repealing only the particular provisions which the learned Judges below have been at pains to pick out from the Bar Coun cils Act and the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts
If as we have pointed out the enacting part of section 2 covers all Advocates of the Supreme Court the non obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding anything contained in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment although the draftsman appears to have had primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting with the new Act
The enacting part of a statute must where it is clear be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously for even apart from such clause a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it
Posteriors leges priores contrarias abrogant Broomo s Legal Maxims 10th Edn p347 emphasis supplied In The Dominion of India Now the Union of India and another vs Shribai A Irani and another   it was observed as under While recognising the force of this argument it is however necessary to observe that al though ordinarily there should be a close approximation between the non obstante clause and the operative part of the section the non obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of an enactment
If the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of only one interpretation on a plain and gram matical construction of the words thereof a non obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation
In such cases the non obstante clause has to be read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been incorporated in the enactment by the Legisla ture by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope of the opera tive part of the enactment
emphasis supplied In Union of India and Another
vs GM Kokil and 0 hers
 it was observed as under It is well known that a non obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment that is to say to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions
 In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs Ashalata section Guram    the scope of non obstante clause is ex plained in the following words A clause beginning with the expression notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force or in any contract is more often than not appended to a section in the beginning with a view to give the enacting part of the section in case of con flict an overriding effect over the provision of the Act or the contract mentioned in the non obstante clause
It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provision of the Act or any other Act mentioned in the non obstante clause or any contract or document mentioned the enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause would not be an impediment for an operation of the enactment
 On a conspectus of the above authorities it emerges that the non obstante clause is appended to a provision with a view to give the enacting part of the provision an overrid ing effect in case of a conflict
But the non obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of an enactment and if the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of a clear interpreta tion on a plain and grammatical construction of the words the non obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation
In Such cases the non obstante clause has to be read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been incorporated in the enactment by the Legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope of the Spe cial Rules
Further the influence of a non obstante clause has to be considered on the basis of the context also in which it is used
In State of West Bengal vs Union of India 1964 1 SCR 371 it is observed as under The Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by 403 directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs
 It is also well settled that the Court should examine every word of a statute in its context and to use context in its widest sense
In Reserve Bank of India etc
vs Peerless General Finance and Investment Co Ltd  Ors   it is observed that That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual
In this case Chinnapa Reddy J noting the importance of the context in which every word is used in the matter of inter pretation of statutes held thus Interpretation must depend on the text and the context
They are the bases of interpretation
One may well say if the text is the texture context is what gives the colour
Neither can be ignored
Both are important
That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual
A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted
With this knowl edge the statute must be read first as a whole and then section by section clause by clause phrase by phrase and word by word
If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment with the glasses of the statute maker provided by such context its scheme the sections clauses phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context
With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section each clause each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act
No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation
Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place
If we examine the scope of Rule 32 particularly along with other General Rules the context in which Rule 32 is made is very clear
It is not enacted to supersede the Special Rules
As already noted there should be a clear inconsistency between the two enactments before giving an overriding effect to the non obstante clause but when the scope of the provisions of an earlier enactment is clear the same cannot be cut down by resort to non obstante clause
In the instant case we have noticed that even the General Rules of which Rule 404 32 forms a part provide for promotion by selection
As a matter of fact Rules 13a and 31 and 4 also provide for the enforceability of the Special Rules
The very Rule 3 of the General Rules which provides for recruitment also pro vides for promotion by selection and further lays down that the methods of recruitment shall be as specified in the Special Rules if any
In this background if we examine the General Rules it becomes dear that the object of these Rules only is to provide broadly for recruitment to services of all the departments and they are framed generally to cover situations that are not covered by the Special Rules of any particular department
In such a situation both the Rules including Rule 13a 31and 4 of general rules should be read together
If so read it becomes plain that there is no inconsistency and that amendment by inserting Rule 32 is only an amendment to the General Rules and it cannot be interpreted as to supersede the Special Rules
The Amendment also must be read as being subject to Rules 13a 31 and 42 of the General Rules themselves
The amendment cannot be read as abrogating all other Special Rules in respect of all departments
In a given case where there are no Special Rules then naturally the General Rules would be applicable
Just because there is a non obstante clause in Rule 32 it cannot be interpreted that the said amendment to the General Rules though later in point of time would abrogate the special rule the scope of which is very clear and which co exists particularly when no patent conflict or inconsistency can be spelt out
As already noted Rules 13a 31 and 4 of the General Rules themselves provide for promotion by selection and for enforceability of the Special Rules in that regard
Therefore there is no patent conflict or inconsistency at all between the General and the Special Rules
Shri P Chidambaram in this context however submit ted that the intention of the Legislature is to do away with promotion by selection and instead of amending every special rule the General Rule in the form of Rule 32 is inserted and therefore by virtue of non obstante clause all other special rules governing the recruitment to all departments stand abrogated
I am unable to agree
If such was the intention of the amendment then I see no reason as to why even in the General Rules as noted above the promotion by selection is recognised and provided for and these Rules remain unaffected
This is also clear from the fact that the Government did not even appeal against the High Court deci sion rendered in Muniswamy s case
Shri P Chidambaram however further submitted that a plain reading of Rule 32 which is later in point of time would clearly indicate that 405 the Special Rule providing for promotion by selection is repealed at least by implication
There is no doubt that a later statute may repeal an earlier one either expressly or by implication
In the instant case we have already noted that there is no express repeal of the Special Rule provid ing for promotion by selection
The Courts have not favoured such repeal by implication
On the other hand it is indicat ed by the courts that if earlier and later statutes can reasonably be construed in such a way that both can be 
given effect to the same must be done
In Re Chance Farewell J observed that If it is possible it is my duty so to read the section   as not to effect an implied repeal of the earlier Act
In Kunter vs Philips it is held that It is only when the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one then only the two cannot stand together and the earlier stands abrogated by the later
In Municipal Council Palai vs TJ Joseph   this Court has observed that there is a presumption against a repeal by implication and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject matter and therefore when it does not provide a repealing provision it gives out an intention not to repeal the existing legislation
It is further observed that such a presumption can be rebutted and repeal by necessary implication can be inferred only when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsist ent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act that the two cannot stand together
I am satisfied that there is no patent inconsistency between the General and Special Rules but on the other hand they co exist
Therefore there is no scope whatsoever to infer the repeal by implication as contended by the learned counsel Shri
Chidambaram
In the result the appeal is allowed and the Government is directed to consider the case of the appellant for promo tion to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Transport on the basis of promotion by selection as provided in the Special Rules namely Karnataka General Service Motor Vehicles Branch Recruitment Rules 1976
In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs
YOGESHWAR DAYAL J
I have had the pleasure of going through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Justice KJ Reddy
However with due respect 1 regret 1 have not been able to persuade myself to 406 agree to either his reasoning or the conclusion
There is no quarrel that general principle is that special law prevails over general law but the learned Judge has failed to note that even there is an exception to such a general law namely it is a later general law which prevails over the earlier special law if it clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
This appeal by Special Leave has been filed by Sri RS Raghunath against the order of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal Bangalore dated 9th August 1990
Before the Tribunal the appellant sought a declaration that the promo tion of Shri IK Devaiah respondent No 2 herein was illegal and to direct the respondent No 1 to consider the case of the appellant for promotion to the cadre of Deputy Transport Commissioner with all consequential benefits
The Tribunal dismissed the application filed by the appellant
The Tribunal was called upon to construe Rule 32 of the Karnataka Civil Services General Recruitment Rules 1977 as amended in June 1982 hereinafter referred to as the General Rules The Tribunal after considering the general Rules took the view that the non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules which was introduced after framing of the Karnataka General Service Motor Vehicles Branch Recruitment Rules 1976 in short the Special Rules  clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
The Tribunal took the view that the general principle that the special law prevails over the general law has one exception and that is a later general law prevails over earlier special law if it clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
The Tribunal held that a non obstante clause in Rule 32 of the General Rules which was enacted after the Special Rules clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
The controversy rises in the following circumstances
The Special Rules came into force on or about 10th December 1976 on the publication of the same in the Karna taka Gazette Extraordinary
It consisted of only two Rules I and II
The first Rule gave the title and commencement  and the second Rule dealt with the method of recruitment and minimum qualifications 
There was a sched ule attached to Rule 1I
In the schedule for the post speci fied in column 1 thereof the method of recruitment and minimum qualification were specified in corresponding en tries in columns 2 and 3 thereof
It dealt with roughly 35 categories of posts
I may mention that there was only one post namely the post of Deputy Transport Commissioner for which the method of recruitment was by selection from the cadre of Regional Transport Officers who must have put in not less than five years of service in that cadre
407 For all the rest of the posts in the schedule there was no provision for recruitment by way of promotion by selection
For all the posts the method of recruitment was either by promotion or by deputation or by direct recruitment or both by direct recruitment and promotion or by merely posting a suitable officer or by direct recruitment through employment exchange etc
The only recruitment to the post of Deputy Transport Commissioner was by method of promotion by selec tion
At the time when the aforesaid Special Rules were enact ed the Karnataka State Civil Services General Recruitment  Rules 1957 in short the General Rules of 1957  were in operation which were repelled by the General Rules
So long as the General Rules of 1957 continued the Special Rules continued to govern the method of recruitment of the posts as specified in the schedule attached to the said Special Rules
The General Rules of 1957 as stated earlier were repelled by the General Rules which came into force on 25th June 1977
Rule 13a of the General Rules provided thus 13 a These rules shall apply to re cruitment to all State Services and to all posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Karnataka and to members of all State Civil Services and to the holders of posts whether temporary or permanent except to the extent otherwise expressly provided i by or under any law for the time being in force or ii in respect of any member of such service by a contract or agreement subsisting between such member and the State Government
It is thus clear from the provision of Rule 13a that the General Rules were applicable for all purposes to mem bers of all State Civil Services including the Motor Vehi cles Branch except to the extent otherwise expressly provid ed by the Special Rules
The Special Rules as mentioned earlier dealt with the method of recruitment and qualifica tion for the Motor Vehicles Branch and so far as the post of Deputy Transport Commissioner was concerned the method of recruitment was promotion by selection
The Special Rules dealt with nothing else
It is also clear from Rule 13 of the General Rules itself as to what is the scope of its applicability
It was applicable to all posts except to the extent otherwise expressly provided for by the Special Rules
Rule 31 of the General 408 Rules before the insertion of sub rule 2 reads as fol lows 3
Method of recruitment 1 Except as otherwise provided in these rules or any other rules specially made in this behalf recruit ment to any service or post shall be made by direct recruitment which may be either by competitive examination or by selection or by promotion which may be either by selection or on the basis of seniority cum merit
The methods of recruitment and qualifications shall be as specified in the rules of recruit ment specially made in that behalf Provided that in respect of direct recruitment to any service or post when the method of recruitment is not specified in the rules of recruitment specially made the method of recruitment shall be by selection after an interview by the Commission the Advisory or Selection Committee or the Appointing Authori ty as the case may be
Provided further that no person shall be eligible for promotion unless he has satisfac torily completed the period of probation or officiation as the case may be in the post held by him
 The substantive part of Rule 31 described various methods of recruitment but stated that the methods of re cruitment and qualifications shall be as specified in the rules of recruitment specially made in that behalf
The first proviso described that when in the Special Rules for recruitment no provision is made for direct recruitment the method of recruitment shall be by selection after an inter view by the Commission the Advisory or Selection Committee to the Appointing Authority as the case may be
The second proviso to Rule 31 contemplated that no person shall be eligible for promotion unless he has satisfied three com pleted years of probation or officiation as the case may be in the post held by him
The second proviso is by way of abundant caution in view of the Karnataka Civil Services Probation Rules 1977 hereinafter referred to as the Probation Rules  because of Probation Rules contemplated that the period of probation shall be as may be provided for in the rules of recruitment specially made for any service or post which shall not be less than two years 
The Proba tion Rules also contemplated declaration of satisfactory completion of probation at the end of the prescribed period of probation as extended or reduced by the appointing au thority
It may be useful to note that Rule 19 of the Gener al Rules also dealt with probation and appointments by promotion
It is clear from reading of Rules 1 2 and 409 3 as originally enacted of the General Rules that so far as the Special Rules expressly provided to any particular branch of the State Service that was to prevail over the General Rules
Rule 3A as amended provided for qualifica tion in respect of ex servicemen irrespective of the provi sions of the Special Rules
Rule 4 provided the procedure of appointment
It also provided that if the appointment is by way of selection how a selection has to be conducted and if the recruitment is by way of promotion how it has to be done
Rule 5 provided for disqualification for appointment
Rule 6 provided the age limit for appointment
Rule 8 pro vided for reservation of appointments for scheduled castes scheduled tribes backward tribes etc
Rule 9 contained provision for ex servicemen and physically handicapped notwithstanding anything contained in the Special Rules
Rule 10 contemplated conditions relating to suitability and certificates of character
Rule 11 provided for procedure how the applications have to be made by the Government servants for recruitments
Rule 16 provided for relaxation notwithstanding the provisions contained in the General Rules or the Special Rules
Rule 16 A provided for appoint ment by transfer
Rule 17 dealt with appointment by direct recruitment or by promotion in certain cases notwithstanding anything contained in the General or Special Rules
All these Rules arc applicable to all the posts except to the extent as contemplated by Rule3 of the General Rules
This was the position at the time of enactment of General Rules in 1977
appears that Rule 3 of the General Rules was amended and subrule 2 was added to Rule 3
Rule 32 of the Gener al Rules so added in June 1982 reads thus 32
Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the rules of recruitment specially made in respect of any service or post a the promotion to the post of Head of Department of the post of an Additional Head of Department if it is in a grade equivalent to that of the Head of Department concerned shall be by selection Provided that for the purpose of promotion by selection the number of persons to be consid ered shall be such number of persons eligible for promotion in the order of seniority as is equal to five times the number of vacancies to be filled
410 b the promotion to all other posts shah be on the basis of seniority cum merit
We are really concerned with the scope of Rule 32 of the General Rules for proper decision of this case
Both the General Rules and the Special Rules have been framed by the Government of Karnataka in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India
It is clear from Rule 13a of the General Rules that the General Rules apply to recruitment to all State Services and to all posts in connection with the affairs of the State
A perusal of different rules in the General Rules makes it clear that the general provisions which apply to recruitment to all posts under the Government are specified in those Rules instead of repeating them in each and every Special Rules of recruitment relating to different depart ments
For example provisions relating to age limit for recruitment disqualification for recruitment joining time etc
should find place in Special Rules and normally they should be uniform for all categories of posts
Instead of repeating them in all Special Rules of each department they have been put in one set of rules known as the General Rules
It would be impossible to limit the application of the General Rules only for recruitment to posts for which no Special Rules have been made
If that was so what arc the provisions relating to disqualification age limit joining time etc
for posts for which Special Rules governing of recruitment have been made  There are no other rules gov erning the subject except the General Rules
By the wording of Rule 32 of the General Rules it is clear that the Government took conscious and deliberate policy decision and gave a mandate to make only posts of Head of Departments Additional Head of Departments as selection posts and all other posts on promotion will be filled by the criterion of seniority cum merit 
To give effect to that policy decision instead of amending every Special Rules of recruitment relating to different State Civil Services the Government made a provi sion in the General Rules by incorporating a non obstante clause stating that it would apply to all services and posts j notwithstanding the provisions in the General Rules or in the Special Rules of the State
This aspect is absolutely clear by a mere reading of Rule 32 of the General Rules
In the case of Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur vs Man Mohan Dev
AIR 1966 SC 1931 the Supreme Court approved the following quotation from Maxwell on Interpretation of Stat ute 411 A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication
Generalia specialibus non derogant or in other words where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt
with by earlier legislation you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words without any indication of a particular intention to do so
 In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act  It is stated therein that for the general principle that the special law prevails over general law there is one exception and that is a later general law prevails over earlier special law if it clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law
The non obstante clause intro duced by amending Rule 3 of the General Rules by adding Rule 32 which was enacted after the Special Rules indicates the clear intention to supersede the Special Law to the extent that for the posts which arc not Head of the Departments or Additional Head of Departments the promotion if provided for by way of selection would mean on the basis of seniori ty cum merit and not on the basis of merit only
As I have noticed earlier if we look at the Special Law it contained various methods of recruitment to about 35 posts mentioned in the Schedule annexed thereto but there is only one post for which the promotion was proposed by selec tion
Surely it would have been flimsy way of drafting if one particular clause of a particular Special Law was sought to be individually repelled by enacting a repealing clause for that purpose
To get over that the non obstante clause is introduced later on by the same authority which enacted both the General and Special Laws to give its latest man date
The latest mandate cannot be ignored
Rule 13 of the General Rules which accepted the ap plicability of Special Rules is itself a part of General Rules and the non obstante clause is not merely to what is mentioned to the contrary in the Special Rules but it is also notwithstanding anything contained in the General Rules itself
In the present case the respondent No 2 herein was promoted after the amendment of Rule 3 of the General Rules and there is no dispute about his recruitment by way of promotion on the basis of seniority cummerit and that the earlier Special Rules which contemplated the promotion by selection were not followed in view of the latest intention clearly given 412 by a positive mandate
The learned counsel for the appellant strongly placed reliance on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Muniswamy vs Superintendent of Police dated 18th July 1986 Annexure F  pages 66 to 108 of the paper book
That decision dealt with the General Rules and the Special Rules in relation to Karnataka State Police Service Re cruitment Rules
We have to construe the meaning of Clause 32 for ascertaining the object and purpose which the legislature had in view in enacting the said provision and the context thereof
It appears to me that the Special Rules for re cruitment to some of the services had been in force provid ing a particular method of either selection or promotion
It appears that because of the experience the Government had of its working it was thought proper to change this policy namely instead of providing selection on the basis of merit to every post in certain posts it thought it fit to give due weightage to seniority and merit instead of having the best 
The selection of best  very often has an ele ment of chance which may not be very conducive to proper climate and harmony in service
It appears that because of that experience the rule making authority thought it fit that the process of promotion by selection should be con fined only to top posts and for rest of the posts the method should be promotion by adopting the principle of seniority cum merit
I find that there is a clear mandate of latest intention of the rule making authority contained in Rule 32 of the General Rules and this must be respected by the Court
The Courts are not expert body in knowing what is the best method for selection and to assume that the purest method must be found by the Court and implemented even by violation of the Rule will not be sound rule of construc tion of statute
I am afraid I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the reasoning of the learned Division Bench in the aforesaid case of Muniswamy vs Superintendent of Police
The learned Division Bench had restricted the scope of Rule 32 to only such officers whose service or post is not regulated by any Special Rules
then and then only the posts of Head of Departments of Government as defined in 1982 Rules had to be filled by promotion by selection and all other posts in such Departments have to be filled by promotion on seniority cure merit basis
The Division Bench also examined the merits and demerits of various forms of selection at great length and took the view in paragraph 41 of the judgment as under We were shocked and surprised when the learned Govern 413 ment Advocate submitted before us that he was supporting the stand urged by Sri Bhat and the circular issued by the Director under instruc tions from Government
We have no doubt that the Government had not really reflected on the untenable stand it was urging before this Court which if accepted would have meant death knell to efficiency in the services of the State
 I am surprised with this type of approach
It is not the function of the Court to examine the efficacy of one form of selection or the other
It is for the recruiting authority namely the Government to examine it and enforce it in the way it like
To use such an expression death knell to efficiency really gives the mind of the Court that it wants to enforce the particular policy even though the latest mandate is for change of the policy in the name of efficien cy
This type of reasoning really ignores the specific provision of the non obstante clause applying to even in the rules of recruitment specially made in respect of any service or post
In Ajay Kumar Banerjee and others vs Union of India and others at page 153 Sabyasachi Mukharji J as His Lordship then was observed thus As mentioned herein before if the scheme was held to be valid then the question what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would pre vail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle Generalia specialibus non derogant
The general rule to be followed in ease of con flict between the two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one
In other words a prior special law would yield to a later general law if either of the two fol lowing conditions is satisfied
i The two are inconsistent with each other
ii There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment
If either of these two conditions is ful filled the later law even though general would prevail
It is thus clear that both the conditions mentioned by Mukharji J 414 speaking for the Bench are fulfilled
In this case whether the promotion has to be by the method of selection or sim plicitor promotion on the basis of seniority cum merit is the contest
The Special Law contemplated promotion by selection whereas the later law contemplates promotion by the method of seniority cum merit
The two are inconsistent with each other
This fulfills the first condition
So far as the second condition is concerned there is an express reference in the later general law in the earlier enact ment
But as per the proposition of Mukharji J if either of the two conditions are fulfilled the later law even though general would prevail
Surely the provision of recruitment contemplated in the Special Police Rules is inconsistent with the latest general provision applicable to all posts in Karnataka
In the present case the later gener al law prevails over the earlier special law because the non obstante clause specifically mentions its efficacy inspite of the Special Law
It was for the legislature to choose the method of indicate its intention
The Courts should not defeat their intention by overlooking it
The respondent No 2 has been selected for promotion by follow ing the General Rules amending the Special Rules and I find it was strictly in accordance with law
I am therefore of the considered view that the appeal deserves to be dismissed with parties to bear their own costs
GN Appeal allowed


Summary:
According to the prosecution when the deceased a peti tion writer was sleeping in a room with his wife PW19 on the iII fated night he heard someone knocking at the door
The deceased switched on the light and opened the door
The accused A1 and A2 entered his room
They whipped up their knives and gave stab wounds one on the chest another on the hack while bending
They also slapped and listed the deceased
It was further stated that the second appellant A 5 caught hold of the deceased and banged him against the wall repeatedly
PW19 tried to save her husband but she was pushed aside
During the course of the occurrence a gold PUTRI  which PW 19 was wearing was attempted to be snatched away from her
The eldest daughter of the deceased PW 1 who was sleeping in a room on the first floor on hearing the cry got down and saw the appellants and the other accused leav ing her father s room
The appellants while running away took with them a box containing some clothes and other articles belonging to PW 1 and chained the doors in such a way that the other inmates of the house could not reach the spot
The deceased s son PW 3 who was sleeping in another room reached the spot
PW 15 a tenant in an adjoining room on hearing the distress cry of PW 19 wanted to come out of his room but he could not do 426 so as the house was chained from outside
He came to the spot after the door was opened
All the witnesses saw bleeding injuries on the body of the deceased who was unable to speak
PW 3 at the instance of his deceased father brought a pen and a piece of paper on which the injured deceased wrote Gulab Chand  and thereaf ter became unconscious and he was then taken to the Govern ment hospital where he succumbed to his injuries
The two appellants A4 and A5 before the Trial Court along with three others were tried section 302 IPC or section 302149 and section 396 for causing the death of the deceased accused No 2 stabbing the deceased with a knife and the rest of the accused assaulting him and for committing the offence of dacoity
The Trial Court found the third accused not guilty of any of the charges and acquitted him but convicted others section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life and acquitted them of the offence section 396 IPC
The High Court confirmed the conviction
The present two appellants A4 A5 filed the present appeal against the judgment of the High Court through special leave
The other two accused A1 and A2 preferred a separate special leave petition which was dismissed by this Court
Allowing the appeal of the two accused A4 A5 this Court HELD 1
The powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are wide but in criminal appeals this Court does not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances
430 H 2
Within the restrictions imposed by itself this Court has the undoubted power to interfere even with findings of the fact making no distinction between judgments of acquit tal and conviction if the High Court in arriving at those findings has acted perversely or otherwise improperly
431 C Arunachalam vs PSR Sadhananthan   State of 427 Madras vs
A Vaidyanatha Iyer   Himachal Pradesh Administration vs Om Prakash 19721 SCC 249 referred to 301 The deceased was a petition writer and so in that capacity he was very well conversant as to how to draft a complaint
He asked for a pen and paper and wrote the name Gulab Chand  evidently thereby saying that Gulab Chand was the assailant
The deceased had not written any other name except the name of Gulab Chand
Now the explanation given by the prosecution is that the deceased became unconscious after writing this one name Gulab Chand thereby saying had he not become unconscious probably he would have written the name of other assailants also
431 E F 302
PW 19 the wife of the deceased was sleeping in the same room in which the deceased was sleeping did not inform either PW 1 or PW 2 the names of the assailants but she gave the names only to PW 3 her son
It transpires from the evidence of PW 19 that after PW 1 went to fetch the rickshaw PW 3 asked his father as to who had assailed him and that it was only thereafter the injured deceased wrote the name of Gulab Chand on a piece of paper
Before the deceased wrote the name of Gulab Chand on a piece of paper given by his son PW 3 no one including PW 19 came forward with the names of the assailants
431 F G 303
The evidence of PW 2 and 19 indicated that PW 3 was not informed of the names of the assailants before his father the deceased wrote the name of Gulab Chand
Till the deceased wrote the name of Gulab Chand on a piece of paper evidently PW 3 did not know as to who the assailant or assailants waswere
The Courts below have not approached this signifi cant aspect of this salient feature in the proper perspec tive
432 G 305
In the inquest report there is a specific averment that the two assailants namely Gulab Singh A2 and Gulab Chand A1 stabbed the deceased with knives which case alone fits in with the earlier statements of PWs 2 and 19 as well as the version of the deceased in Exh
P 50
If really the names of the two appellants had been mentioned by the witnesses those names also would have been specifically mentioned in Exh
P 24 the inquest report
433 B C 428 306
It is in evidence that both the appellants were present at the scene of occurrence when the police constable came but none pointed out to the police that these two appellants also participated in the crime
The prosecution has not satisfactorily established the guilt of the two appellants beyond all reasonable doubt