ivil Appeal Nos
1894 1895  1896 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 921989 of the Punjab  Haryana High Court in Civil WP Nos
1778 1776  1777 of 1989
528 Balbir Singh Wasu NS Das Bahl for the Appellant
Har Dev Singh and Ms Madhu Moolchandani for the Re spondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL J
Special leave granted
All these petitions by Special leave are disposed of by one single order as identical questions of law are involved and they are directed against the similar order of the High Court dated 9th February 1989
Short controversy raised in these cases is regarding the grant of benefits under amended Sections 231 A 232 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act
The President Land Acquisition Tribu nal Hoshiarpur District Court initially granted solatium at 15 on the compensation and interest at 6 per annum on the additional amount of compensation till the date of payment
The claimants submitted an application for modifi cation of the award as regards solatium and interest in view of the Amending Act which came into force on 24th September 1984
The Land Acquisition Tribunal granted benefit of the Amending Act and modified the award by passing the following operative order which is subject matter of challenge in Special Leave Petition No 9434 of 1989
Similar orders have been passed in other two cases also
Accordingly I modify the award to the extent that solatium shah be payable at the rate of 30 instead of 15 granted earlier
Similarly interest at the rate of 12 per annum is granted from the date of notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 till the date of award of the Collector the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier
Further interest is awarded at the rate of 9 per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of delivery of possession till the expiry of one year
Thereaf ter interest is awarded at the rate of 15 per annum from the date of expiry of period of one year till payment
The applicant shall be entitled to recover the solatium and interest as per the modification indicated above  
529 Aggrieved against the above order the Hoshiarpur Im provement Trust has come before this Court
In order to decide the controversy it would be neces sary to mention some important dates in each of the above cases
In Special Leave Petition No 9434 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6th January 1979
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal Hoshiarpur on 28th March 1983
The award was modified by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal by order dated 29th August 1988
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust on 9th February 1989
In Special Leave Petition No 9521 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 30th April 1982
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal Hoshiarpur on 29th August 1985
The President Land Acquisition Tribunal modified the award by order dated 29th August 1988
The Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust was dismissed by the High Court on 9th February 1989
In Special Leave Petition No 10 130 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 30th April 1982
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal Hoshiarpur on 29th August 1985
The award was modified by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal by order dated 14th September 1988
Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust was dismissed by the High Court on 9th February 1989
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Improvement Trust contended that no benefit could have been given under Section 231 A which was inserted by the Amending Act
It was contended that in a recent decision given by this Court in Union of India  Ors
vs Mr Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama JT it has been held that the additional amount under Sec
231 A can only be allowed in those cases where proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act were pending on the 30th day of April 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisi tion Amendment Bill 1982 in the House of People in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date
If the Collector has made the award before that date then the additional amount cannot be awarded
Thus it was contended that the additional benefit of interest 530 at the rate of 12 per annum from the date of notification till the award made by the Collector or the date of taking over possession which ever is earlier is liable to be set aside
In order to appreciate the argument advanced by the Learned counsel appearing for the Improvement Trust it would be necessary to give a background of some important events and decisions having a bearing on the question
The Land Acquisition Act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act was sought to be amended and in this regard on 30th April 1982 the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 was introduced in Parliament
On 24th September 1984 it became law as the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984 when it received assent of the President
Before the amendment Section 232 of the Principal Act provided for solatium at 15 on the market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition
After amendment by Act 68 of 1984 solatium was raised to 30 on the market value under Section 232
A Constitution Bench in Union of India  Another vs Raghubir Singh dead by Lrs
   overruled Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandi garh  and State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh held that the higher solatium at the rate of 30 would be given in cases of awards made by the Collector or the Court between 30th April 1982 and 24th September 1934
In the cases before us the claimants have been rightly held entitled to solatium at 30 applying the ratio in the case of Union of India  Ors
vs Raghubir Singh supra
So far as the award of interest at the rate of 9 for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 for the subsequent years is concerned the claimants have been rightly held entitled to the same under Section 28 as stood amended by the Amending Act
Now the only controversy which remains to be considered is with regard to the additional benefit allowed by way of rate of interest at 12 per annum from the date of notifica tion issued under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act 1922 till the date of award of the Collector or the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier
It is important to note that in the case of Union of India vs Raghubir Singh supra the above question was neither called for consideration nor decided
In Union of India  Ors
vs Mr Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama supra the above question directly came up for considera tion before this Court
It was held that the above benefit has been provided under the amended Sections 23i A  232
531 The Legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 231 A for certain cases and it would be deter mined from Section 301a  b of the Transitional Provisions which read as follows Section 30 Transitional Provisions 1 The provision of Sub section 1 A of Section 23 of the Principal Act as inserted by clause a of Section 16 of this Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to a every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on the 30th day of April 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amend ment Bill 1982 in the House of the People in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date
b every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act
It was observed in the above case that Section 301a provides that additional amount provided under Sec
231a shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30th April 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date
If the Collector has made the award before that date then that additional amount cannot be awarded
We agree with the view taken in the above case
Thus applying the above principle in the cases in hand before us it would be clear that in Special Leave Petition No 9434 of 1989 the award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6th January 1979 ie long before 30th April 1982 and as such the claimant in the above case is not entitled to the benefit of Section 231 A as inserted in the Principle Act by the Amending Act
So far as the other two Special Leave Petitions namely 952189 and 1013089 are concerned the awards have been made by the Land Acqui sition Collector on 30th April 1982 itself but not before that date
Section 30 the Transitional Provisions clearly provide that the provisions of Subsection 1 A of Section 23 of the Principle Act as inserted by Clause a of Sec tion 16 of this Act shall apply to every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principle Act pending on 30th day of April 1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before 532 that date
In the above two cases the award has not been made by the Collector before 30th day of April 1982 but made on 30th April 1982 itself and as such the claimants in these two cases become entitled to the benefit of Section 231 A
As a result of the above discussion the civil appeals in SLP C Nos
952 1 of 1989  10 130 of 1989 stand dis missed
So far as appeal in Special Leave Petition No 9434 of 1989 is concerned it is allowed in part and the order of the High Court as well as that of the President Land Acqui sition Tribunal is modified only to the extent that interest shall be allowed at the rate of 6 per annum instead of 12 per annum from the date of Notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act till the date of award of the Collector or the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier
So far as other additional benefits granted by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal are concerned the same would remain in tact
In the facts and circum stances of the case there would be no order as to costs
TNA Appeal allowed partly


Summary:
One post of Upper Division ClerkEnglish Clerk fell vacant in the Small Causes Court
Appellant made his claim to the post on the footing that he was a graduate and on the basis of Rule of Rotation embodied in Rule VI of the High Court Rules and Orders Volume 1 Respondent No 1 made his claim on the basis of seniority
The Judge Small Causes Court took the view that the appellant was entitled to promotion in preference to Respondent No 1 because of the rule of rotation
On an Administrative Appeal the District applicable to the establishment of Judge Small Causes Court and appointed Respondent No 1 as Upper Division Clerk
The Appellant preferred a departmental appeal which was heard by a Single Judge on the Administrative side of the High Court
He took the view that the promotion in question could be made by the District  Sessions Judge and should be in accordance with the rule of rotation
Respondent No 1 challenged the said decision by way of a Writ Petition
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and held that not only initial appointments but also ap pointments by promotion were to be made by the Judge Small Causes Court and not by the District  Sessions Judge and that the rule of rotation was not applicable
Against the High Court s decision the appellant has preferred this appeal contending that the promotion in question could only be made by the District  Sessions Judge and that the rule of rotation was applicable even to the appointment by promotion
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
Whenever a specific mention is made regarding a 134 particular officer of an establishment in a rule that particular rule would normally apply to that establishment alone and the powers conferred by that rule would be con ferred on the officer mentioned in the rule
Rule VI1 of the High Court Rules speaks of appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishments and states that these appointments should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades provided that the officer to be promoted possesses the qualifications prescribed
The first proviso to that rule goes on to say that the permanent vacancies in the original grade of Rs75 5 125 shall be filled in by the District  Sessions Court by rotation as set out in the said sub rule 1 of Rule VI
The 1st part of Rule VI deals with appointments by promotion to the higher grade of ministerial establishment
Generally it must be held applicable to the establishment of the District  Sessions Court as well as that of the Judge Small Causes Court
This part however does not deal specifically with the question as to who is the officer competent to promote
In view of this the proviso can only be construed as laying down that where the power of appointment by promotion is vested in the District  Sessions Judge in making appointments by promotion to fill in the permanent vacancies in the said original grade of Rs75 5 125 rule of rotation set out in the first provi so to clause I of Rule VI should ordinarily be followed
It is not disputed that there is a separate Cadre for the Court of Small Causes
Rule IV3 shows that the first appointment of the ministerial officers in the Court of Small Causes is to be made by the Judge of the Small Causes Court
139F H 140A C 2
A reading of sub section 1 of the Punjab Courts Act 1918 the High Court Rules and Notification issued makes it clear that appointments by promotion to the posts in the entire ministerial cadre other than those in the process serving and mental establishments in the Court of Small Causes have to be made by the Judge Court of Small Causes and the first proviso to Rule VI1 prescribing the rule of rotation has no application to such appointments
Moreover it would be unreasonable to apply the principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes where there is only one UDC
The principle of rotation can be made applicable to the District  Sessions Court because there are a number of posts of Upper Division Clerks
It would be irrational to apply that principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes in which there is only one Upper Division ClerkEnglish Clerk
140D E