Appeal No 166 of 1951
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated September 15 1948 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla Mahajan and Teja Singh JJ in Regular Second Appeal No 1844 of 1945 from the Judgment and Decree dated June 5 1945 of the Court of the District Judge Gurgaon in Civil Appeal No 171 of 1943 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated August 27 1943 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge Gurgaon in Civil Suit No 11 of 1943
Tarachand Brijmohanlal for the appellant
Gurubachan Singh Radha Krishan Aggarwal with him for the respondent
1952 November 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J
The plaintiffs Joti Prasad and Sat Narain sued for partition and possession of their two fifths share in the suit properties alleging that the first defendant wag alone in possesSion of the same having redeemed a mortgage executed by the joint family of which the plaintiffs and defendants were members in favour of one Raghumal in the year 1896 on paying Rs 5800
Defendants 2 to 5 were impleaded as co sharers
Out of them defendants 2 and 3 admitted the claims of the plaintiffs
Defendant 4 died pending suit and her name was struck off
Defendant 5 supported the first defendant
On the date of the trial court s decree the two plaintiffs were held entitled to one sixth share each
The first defendant resisted the plaintiffs  claim
He contended that the redemption by him in 1920 was not on behalf of the joint family as alleged by the plaintiffs but on his own account as there had been a disruption of the joint family status much earlier and that before the plaintiffs could get arty relief they were bound to pay him not merely a proportionate share in the sum of Rs 5800 which he paid to the mortgagee for redemption but their share in the original mortgage debt of Rs 11200
He also denied that the original mortgage was executed on behalf of the joint family
The Subordinate Judge and on appeal the High Court found that the original mortgage was a mortgage transaction of the joint family and that the first defendant Ganeshi Lal redeemed the mortgage on his own account and for his own benefit at a time when there was no longer any joint family in existence
It was further held by the trial court that the plaintiffs and other co sharers were bound to pay their proportionate share of the amount paid by the first defendant to redeem the mortgage namely Rs 5800
But from this a sum of Rs 1200 which he had already received by way of redemption of certain mortgage rights had to be deducted
The District Judge enhanced this sum of RS
4600 to 245 Rs 5000 as the first defendant had paid taxes due on the property up to 1940 but he confirmed the main findings of the Subordinate Judge
A second appeal preferred by the first defendant was dismissed by the High Court at Simla Mehr Chand Mahajan and Teja Singh JJ
They repelled the contention of the first defendant that a suit for partition and possession was not maintainable without bringing a suit for redemption
They also negatived his right to get a proportionate share in the amount of Rs 11200 due on the mortgage
Two other learned Judges gave leave to appeal under section 109 c of the Civil Procedure Code as a substantial question of law was involved
Three points were argued before us by learned counsel for the appellant firstly there was an assignment of the mortgage in favour of the appellant with the result that the entire rights of the mortgagee vested in him secondly even viewing the question as one of legal subrogation he was entitled under the principles of justice equity and good conscience which governed the State of Punjab as the has not been applied to the State to recover from the co mortgagors not merely their shares in the sum of Rs 5800 which he had paid for redemption but their shares in the full amount of Rs 11200 due under the mortgage and thirdly that the suit for partition without asking for redemption was not maintainable
Points Nos 1 and
3 have no force whatever
The registered deed of redemption does not contain any words of assignment
To say that Ganeshi Lal shall be the owner of the entire amount due from the mortgaged property is something different from stating that the security has been assigned in his favour
On the other hand the endorsement of receipt of payment on the back of the mortgage deed itself and the statement of the mortgagee that he has released the mortgaged property from his mortgage go to show that there was no assignment
246 The non maintainability of the suit does not seem to have been in issue either before the trial court or before the District Judge and it appears to have been raised for the first time before the High Court
It was pointed out by the learned Judges and quite rightly that so long as no question of limitation was involved there was no objection to a claim for redemption and one for possession and partition being joined together in the same suit
Only the second point remains for consideration and this raises an interesting question of law
It is not denied that Ganeshi Lal who redeemed the prior mortgage is subrogated to the mortgagee s rights but the controversy is about the extent of his rights as subrogee
By virtue of the redemption does he get all the rights of the mortgagee and hold the mortgage as a shield against the co mortgagors for the full amount due on the mortgage on the date of redemption whatever he may have himself paid to get it discharged or does he stand in the mortgagee s shoes only to the extent of getting reimbursed from the comortgagors for their shares in the amount actually paid by him The lower courts have held that the latter is the correct position in law but the appellant has challenged it as unsound
The first two clauses of the present section 92 of the run in these terms  Any of the persons referred to in section 91 other than the mortgagor and any co mortgagor shall on redeeming property subject to the mortgage have so far as regards redemption foreclosure or sale of such property the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems may have against the mortgagor or any other mortgagee
The right conferred by this section is called the right of subrogation and a person acquiring the same is said to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems
 It is a new section and was inserted by the amending Act XX of 1929
The original sections 74 and 247 75 conferred the right to redeem in express terms only on second or other subsequent mortgagees though the co mortgagor s right to subrogation on redemption was recognised even before the Act
As the has not been extended to the State of East Punjab it is unnecessary to decide whether section 92 is retrospective in its operation on which point there has been a conflict of opinion between the several High Courts
Section 95 of the Act which removed the confusion caused by the old section which conferring on the co mortgagor what was called a charge and thus seeming to negative the application of the doctrine of subrogation is also inapplicable to the present case
We therefore steer clear of sections 74 and 75 of the old Act and sections 92 and 95 of the present Act and we are free to decide the question on principles of justice equity and good conscience
If we remember that the doctrine of subrogation which means substitution of one person in place of another and giving him the rights of the latter is essentially an equitable doctrine in its origin and application and if we examine the reason behind it the answer to the question which we have to decide in this appeal is not difficult
Equity insists on the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice and good conscience is bound to pay it and it is well recognised that where there are several joint debtors the person making the payment is a principal debtor as regards the part of the liability he is to discharge and a surety in respect of the shares of the rest of the debtors
Such being the legal position as among the co mortgagors if one of them redeems a mortgage over the property which belongs jointly to himself and the rest equity confers on him a right to reimburse himself for the amount spent in excess by him in the matter of redemption he can call upon the co mortgagors to contribute towards the excess which he has paid over his own share
This proposition is postulated in several authorities
In the early case of Hodgson vs Shaw 1 Lord Brougham said 1   248 The rule is undoubted and it is one founded on the plainest principles of natural reason and justice that the surety paying off a debt shall stand in the place of the creditor and have all the rights which he has for the purpose of obtaining his reimbursement
 I have italicised the word  reimbursement Sheldon in his well known treatise on Subrogation has got the following passage in section 13 of the Second Edition  There is another class of cases in which he who has paid money due upon a mortgage of land to which he had some title which might be affected or defeated by the mortgage and who was thus entitled to redeem has the right to consider the mortgage as subsisting in himself and to hold the land as if it subsisted until others interested in the redemption or who held also the right to redeem have paid a contribution
 Be it noted that what is spoken of here is a contribution
Dealing with the subject of subrogation of a surety by payment of a promissory note and citing the observations of the Alabama Court Harris says in his work on Subrogation 1889 Edition at page 125  The rule is that a surety paying a debt shall stand in the place of the creditor and is entitled to the benefit of all the securities which the creditor had for the payment of the debt from the principal debtors in a word he is subrogated to all the rights of the creditor the surety however cannot avail himself of the instrument on which he is surety by its payment
By payment it is discharged and ceases to exist and the payment will not even in equity be considered an assignment the surety merely becomes the creditor of the principal to the amount paid for him
 To compel the co debtors or co mortgagors to pay more than their share of what was paid to the creditor or mortgagee would be to perpetrate an inequity or 249 injustice as it would mean that the debtor who is in a position to pay and pays up can obtain an advantage for himself over the other joint debtors
Such a result will not be countenanced by equity the favouritism shown by law to a surety high as it is does not extend so far
The surety can ask to be indemnified for his loss he can invoke the doctrine of subrogation as an aid to his right of contribution
Sheldon says in section 105 of his book   The subrogation of a surety will not be carried further than is necessary for his indemnity if he buys up the security at a discount or makes his payment in a depreciated currency he can enforce it only for what it cost him
He cannot speculate at the expense of his principal  his only right is to be repaid
 In section 178 Harris is still stronger  Since subrogation is founded on principles of equity the surety who would avail himself of the doctrine and invoke equity must do equity  and while  he is entitled to a reimbursement in all that he pays out properly for his principal debt interest and cost he is not entitled in any way to recover more than he has paid
For instance if he pays the debt of his principal in depreciated currency the rule would seem to be that he could demand from the principal only the value of that currency at the time he made the payment
Nor would he upon principles of equity be permitted to purchase the debt at a discount and then be subrogated to collect the whole face value of the debt and especially if he held securities or if the creditor held securities which would fall into his hands out of which to pay the debt because the securities are trust funds for the purpose and set aside for the payment of that debt and an assignee of trustee cannot speculate in the purchase of claims against the fund in his hands
It would not be equality it would not be equity
 While it can be readily conceded that the joint debtor who pays up and discharges the mortgage 250 stands in the shoes of the mortgagee and secures to himself the benefit of the security by such payment the extent to which he can enforce his right as against the other joint debtors is a different matter altogether
In his monumental work on Equity Jurisprudence Pomeroy points out that he will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee only to the extent necessary for his own equitable protection
See page 632 of Volume IV of the Fifth Edition by Symons
Clearer still is the passage found at page 640 of the same book  The mortgagor himself who has conveyed the premises to a grantee in such manner that the latter has assumed payment of the mortgage debt becomes an equitable assignee on payment and is subrogated to the mortgagee so far as is necessary to enforce his equity of reimbursement or exoneration from such grantee
 It is as regards the excess of the payment over his own share that the right can be said to exist
Pomeroy says this at pages 660 and 661 In general whenever redemption by one of the above mentioned persons operates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage to himself he can keep the lien of it alive as security against others who are also interested in the premises and who are bound to contribute their proportionate shares of the sum advanced by him or are bound it may be to wholly exonerate him from and reimburse him for the entire payment 
The doctrine of contribution among all those who are interested in having the mortgage redeemed in order to refund the redemptor the excess of his payment over and above his own proportionate share and the doctrine of equitable assignment in order to secure such contribution are the efficient means by which equity completely and most beautifully works out perfect justice and equality of burden under these circumstances     Whatever the difference might be between the English law and the Indian law as regards the right 251 to enforce decrees and securities for the due payment of a debt in the case of a surety who discharges a simple money debt and a surety who pays up a mortgage it is still noteworthy that Section V of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act of 1856 England provided for indemnification by the principal debtor for the advances made and loss sustained by the surety
There is a distinction in this respect between a third party who claims subrogation and a co mortgagor who claims the right and this is brought out by Sir Rashbehary Ghose in his Law of Mortgage in India Volume I 5th Edition
He says at page 354 pointing out that co mortgagors stand in a fiduciary relation   I should add that an assignee of a mortgage is entitled as a rule to recover whatever may be due on the security
But if he stands in a fiduciary relation he can only claim the price which he has actually paid together with incidental expenses
 The right of the co mortgagor who redeems the mortgage is spoken of as the right of reimbursement at page 372 in the following passage  Strictly speaking therefore when one of several mortgagors redeems a mortgage he is entitled to be treated as an assignee of the security which be may enforce in the usual way for the purpose of re imbursing himself
 The redeeming co mortgagor being only a surety for the other co mortgagors his right is strictly speaking a right of reimbursement or contribution and in law when we have regard to the principles of equity and justice there should be no difference between a case where he discharges an unsecured debt and a case where he discharges a secured debt
It is unnecessary for us to decide in this appeal whether section 92 of the was intended to strike a departure from this position when it states that the co mortgagor shall have the same 252 rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems and whether it was intended to abrogate the rule of equity as between co debtors and provide for the enforcement of the liability on the basis of the amount due under the mortgage  and this is because as has been already stated we are governed not by the statute but by general principles of equity and justice
If it is equitable that the redeeming co mortgagor should be substituted in the mortgagee s place it is equally equitable that the other co mortgagors should not be called upon to pay more than he paid in discharge of the encumbrance
In this connection reference may be made with advantage to the decision of Sir Asutosh Mookerjoe and Teunon JJ
in DigambarDas vs Harendra Narayan Panday 1 where the question arose as regards the the rate of interest and the period for which the redeeming co mortgagor would be entitled
There is an elaborate examination of the nature of the right of subrogation obtained by one of several joint comortgagors who redeems the mortgaged property and in the course of the discussion the following observations occur  In so far as the amount of money which he is entitled to recover from his co mortgagors is concerned he can claim contribution only with reference to the amount actually and properly paid to effect redemption to which sum he can add his legitimate expenses  
The substitution therefore of the new creditor in place of the original one does not place the former precisely in the position of the latter for all purposes 
If therefore one of several mortgagors satisfies the entire mortgage debt though upon redemption he is subrogated to the right and remedies of the creditor the principle has to be so administered as to attain the ends of substantial justice regardless of form  in other words the fictitious cession in favour of the person who effects the redemption operates only to the extent to which it is necessary to apply it for his indemnity and protection 1 258 There is a definite expression of opinion by the Madras High Court on the point in the decision reported in Suryanarayana vs Sriramulu1
In that case a purchaser of a half share of the equity of redemption claimed to recover half of the amount of the mortgage on the security of the other share in the hands of the defendant and it was held that as his purchase of the decree on the mortgage was prior to his purchase of the equity of redemption he was entitled to the full amount claimed by him
The learned Judges distinguish the case from one where one of two mortgagors discharges an encumbrance binding on both and say that in such a case the mortgagor doing so could not recover from his comortgagors more than a proportionate share of the amount actually paid by him
After this rather lengthy discussion of the subject we consider it unnecessary to notice and comment on the several decisions cited for the appellant
It may be said generally that they only lay down that in cases where the  as it stood originally or as amended in 1929 is not applicable we are governed by the principles of equity justice and good conscience and that sections 92 and 95 embody such principles
None of the cases deals with the extent or degree of subrogation and there is nothing in them which runs counter to the view that the doctrine must be applied along with other rules of equity so that the person who discharges the mortgage is amply protected and at the same time there is no injustice done to the other joint debtors
He who seeks equity must do equity and we shall be violating this rule if we give effect to the appellant s contention
The High Court in our opinion reached the correct conclusion
The parties are not agreed on the shares to which the plaintiffs are entitled and this is because after the date of the final decree some of the branches have become extinct by the deaths of their representatives
Whether under customary law in the Punjab uncles 1 254 exclude nephews or they take jointly and whether succession is per stirpes or per capita was the subject of disagreement at the Bar before us
This question must therefore be left over for determination by the trial court and the case will have to go back to that court for effecting partition and delivery of possession according to the shares to which the plaintiffs may be found entitled
Subject to what is contained in the foregoing paragraph the appeal will stand dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The Governor General of India finding that on account of mismanagement and neglect a situation had arisen in the affairs of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd which had prejudicially affected the production of an essen tial commodity and had caused serious unemployment amongst a certain section of the community and that an emergency had thereby arisen which rendered it necessary to make special provision for the proper management and administration of the said company promulgated an Ordinance which was subse quently reenacted in the form of an Act of the Legislature called the sholpur Spinning and Weaving Company Emergency ProvisionsAct 1950 the net result of which was that the Managing Agents of the said company were dismissed the directors holding office at the time automatically vacated their office the Government was authorised to appoint new directors the rights of the shareholders of the company were curtailed in the matters of voting appointment of directors passing of resolutions and applying for winding up and power was also given to the Government to further modify the Indian Companies Act in its application to the company and in accordance with the provisions of the Ordi nance new directors were appointed by the Government
A shareholder of the company made an application under article 32 of the Constitution for a declaration that the Act was void and for enforcement of his fundamental rights by a writ of mandamus against the Central Government the Government of Bombay and the directors restraining them from exercising any powers under the Act and from interfering with the management of the company on the ground that the Act was not within the Legislative competence 870 of the Parliament and infringed his fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 19 1 f 31 and 14 of the Constitu tion and was consequently void under article 13
The company was made a respondent and opposed the petition
Held per KANIA CJ FAZL ALI MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ i that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamental right of the petitioner under article 31 1 as if did not deprive the company or the petitioner of any property save under authority of law ii that the impugned Act did not infringe any fundamen tal right guaranteed by article 31 2 inasmuch as it did not authorise the acquisition of any property of the company or of the shareholders or the taking possession of the property of the petitioner namely the shares which he held in the company though he was disabled from exercising some of the rights which an ordinary shareholder in a company could exercise in respect of his shares such as the right to vote to appoint directors and to apply for winding up and if the Act had authorised the taking possession of the property of the company the petitioner was not entitled to any relief on that score under article 32 iii that as the Act did not impose any restrictions on the petitioner s right to acquire hold and dispose of his shares there was no infringement of article 19 1 f and assuming that the restrictions imposed on the right of voting etc
were restrictions on the right to acquire hold or dispose of property within article 19 1 f such restric tions were reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the public namely to secure the supply of a commodity essential to the community and to prevent serious unemploy ment amongst a section of the people and were therefore completely protected by cl
5 of article 19
Held also per KANIA CJ FAZL ALI and MUKHERJEA JJ
PATANJALI SASTRI AND DAS JJ
dissenting that though the Legislature had proceeded against one company only and its shareholders inasmuch as even one corporation or a group of persons can be taken to be class by itself for the purposes of legislation provided there is sufficient basis or reason for it and there is a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionalityof an enactment the burden was on the petitioner to prove that there were also other companies similarly situated and this company alone had been discrimi nated against and as he had failed to discharge this burden the impugned Act cannot be held to have denied to the peti tioner the right to equal protection of the laws referred to in article He and the petitioner was not therefore entitled to any relief under article 32
Per PATANJALI SASTRI J
As the impugned Act plainly denied to the shareholders of this particular company the protections of the law relating to incorporated Joint Stock Companies as embodied in the Indian Companies Act
it was Prima facie within 871 the inhibition of article 14 and even though when a law is made applicable to a class of persons or things and the classification is based on differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be attained it can be no objection to its constitutional validity that its applica tion is found to affect only one person or thing
since the impugned Act selected a particular company and imposed upon it and its shareholders burdens and disabilities on the ground of mismanagement and neglect of duty on the part of those charged with the conduct of its undertaking no ques tion of reasonable classification arose and the Act was plainly discriminatory in character and within the constitu tional inhibition of article 14
Whilst all reasonable pre sumptions must undoubtedly be made in favour of the consti tutional validity of a law made competent legislature no such presumption could be raised in this case as on the face of it the Act was discriminatory and the petitioner could not be called upon to prove that similar mismanagement existed in other companies
The issue was not whether the impugned Act was ill advised or not justified by the facts on which it was based but whether it transgressed the ex plicit constitutional restriction on legislative power imposed by article 14
Per DAs J The impugned Act ex facie is nothing but an arbitrary selection of a particular company and its shareholders for discriminating and hostile treatment and read by itself is palpably an infringement of article 14 of the Constitution
Assuming that mismanagement and neglect in conducting the affairs of a company can be a basis of classification and that such a classification would bear a reasonable relation to the conduct of all delinquent compa nies and shareholders and may therefore create no inequali ty a distinction cannot be made between the delinquent companies inter se or between shareholders of equally delin quent companies and one set cannot he punished for its delinquency while another set is permitted to
continue or become in like manner delinquent without any punishment unless there be some other apparent difference in their respective obligations and unless there be some cogent reason why prevention of mismanagement is more imperative in one instance than in the other
The argument that the pre sumption being in favour of the Legislature the onus is on the petitioner to show that there are other individuals or companies equally guilty of mismanagement prejudicially affecting the production of an essential commodity and causing serious unemployment amongst certain section of the community does not in such circumstances arise for the simple reason that here there has been no classification at all and in any case the basis of classification by its very nature is much wider and cannot in its application be limited only to this company and its shareholders and that being so there is no reason to throw on the petitioner the almost impossible burden of proving that there are other companies which are in fact precisely and in all particulars similarly situated
In any event the petitioner 872 may well claim to have discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders have been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act on the face of it has adopted a basis of classification which by its very nature cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally ap plicable to other companies and their shareholders and has penalised this particular company and its shareholders leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preamble in the Ordinance
Per PATANJALI SASTRI MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ
KANIA CJ dubitante
In so far as the petitioner s rights as a shareholder were curtailed he was entitled to apply for relief under article 30 in his own right on the ground that the Act denied to him the equal protection of the laws and therefore contravened article 14 even though the other share holders did not join him in the application
Per MUKHERJEA J
The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are available not merely to individual citizens but to corporate bodies as well except where the language of the provision or the nature of the right com pels the inference that they are applicable only to natural persons
An incorporated company therefore can come up to the Supreme Court for enforcement of its fundamental rights and so may the individual shareholders to enforce their own but as the company and its shareholders are in law separate entities it would not be open to an individual shareholder to complain of a law which affects the fundamental right of the company except to the extent that it constitutes an infraction of his own rights as well
In order to redress a wrong to the company the action should prima facie be brought by the company itself
Article 32 of the Constitution is not directly concerned with the determination of the constitutional validity of particular enactments what it aims at is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and to make out a case under the Article it is incumbent on the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the Legislature but that it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of which he could seek enforcement by an appropriate writ or order
Under article 32 the Supreme Court has a very wide discre tion in the matter of framing writs to suit the exigencies of particular cases and an application under the article cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that the proper writ or direction has not been prayed for
In the context in which the word acquisition is used in article 31 i2 it means and implies the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature or extent of that right might be 873 The guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India in spite of differences of circumstances and conditions
It means only that there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation their position is the same
Quaere  Whether the word property in article 31 means the totality of the rights which the ownership of the property connotes and whether clause 1 of article 31 contem plates only confiscation or destruction of property in exercise of what are known as police powers in American law for which no compensation is necessary
DAS J
The question whether an Act has deprived a person of his property must depend on whether it has taken away the substantial bulk of the rights constituting his property
Where the most important rights possessed by the shareholders of a company are still preserved by an Act even though certain privileges incidental to the ownership of the shares have been put in abeyance the shareholders cannot be said to have been deprived of their property in the sense in which that word is used in article 191 f and article 31
If on the face of the law there is no classification at all or at any rate none on the basis of any apparent dif ference specially peculiar to the individual or class af fected by the law it is only an instance of an arbitrary selection of an individual or class for discriminating and hostile legislation and therefore no presumption can in such circumstances arise at all Assuming however that even in such a case the onus is thrown on the complainant there can be nothing to prevent him from proving if he can from the text of the law itself that it is actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary and thereby discharging the initial onus
The right to vote to elect directors to pass resolu tions and to present an application for winding up are privileges incidental to the ownership of a share but they are not by themselves apart from the share property within the meaning of article 19 1 f and article 31 and even assuming that they are property such rights cannot be said to have been acquired or taken possession of by the Govern ment in this case within article 31 2
The language of clause 1 of article 31 is wider than that of clause 2 for deprivation of property may well be brought about otherwise than by acquiring or taking possession of it and in such a case no question payment of compensation arises
FAZAL ALI MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ
Except in the matter writs in the nature of habsas corpus no one but those whose rights are directly affected by a law can raise the question of the constitutionality of a law and claim relief under article 39
A corporation being a different entity from the shareholders a 112 874 share holder cannot complain on the ground that the rights of the company under articles 19 1 f or 31 are infringed
FAZL ALl J
A classification which is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no classification and a proper classification must always rest upon some difference and must hear a reasonable and lust relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed
But the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles
Though article 14 lays down an important fundamental right which should be closely and vigilantly guarded a doctri naire approach which might choke all beneficial legislation should not be adopted in construing it
i AK Gapalan vs The State 1950 SCR 87 Minister of State for the Army vs Dalziel   Yick Wo vs Hopkins  Southern Railway Co vs Greene   Gulf C  SF Co Ellis   Middle ton vs Texas Power and Light  Co   Badice vs New York 264 US Pennsylvania Coal Co vs Mahon 960 US 3931 McCabe vs Archison   Jeffrey Manufactur ing Co vs Blang  Newark Natural Gas and Fuel Co vs City of Nework US 403 Truax vs Raich 939 US 33 Buchanan vs W arley  Darnell vs The State of Indiana  Lindely vs Natural Carbonic Gas Co  and Barbier vs Connolly  referred to