Criminal Appeal No 1731956
Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 23 1956 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revision No 10581954
K L Arora for the appellant
N section Bindra and R H Dhebar for the respondent
November 11
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J
This appeal on a certificate under articles 132 and 1341 of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Punjab raises for consideration the constitutionality of section 71 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act 1940
The appellant Manohar Lal has a shop at Ferozepore Cantt
in which business is carried on under the name and style of I Imperial Book Depot 
Section 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act 1940 hereinafter called the Act enacts  7
1 Save as otherwise provided by this Act every shop or commercial establishment shall remain closed on a close day
2i
The choice of a close day shall rest with the occupier of a shop or commercial establishment and shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within two months of the date on which this Act comes into force to extract the provision relevant to this appeal
The 345 appellant had chosen Friday as  the close day  ie the day of the week on which his shop would remain closed
The Inspector of Shops and Commercial Establishments Ferozepore Circle visited the appellant s shop on Friday the 29th of January 1954 and found the shop open and the appellant s son selling articles
Obviously if section 71 were valid the appellant was guilty of a contravention of its terms and he was accordingly prosecuted in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate Ferozepore for an offence under section 16 of the Act which ran  Subject to the other provisions of this Act whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act         shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty five rupees for the first offence and one hundred rupees for every subsequent offence 
The appellant admitted the facts but he pleaded that the Act would not apply to his shop or establishment for the reason that he had engaged no strangers as employees but that the entire work in the shop was being done by himself and by the members of his family and that to hold that section 71 of the Act would apply to his shop would be unconstitutional as violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14 191f and g of the Constitution
The additional District Magistrate rejected the plea raised by the appellant regarding the constitutionality of section 71 in its application to shops where no  employees  were engaged and sentenced him to a fine of Rs 100 and simple imprisonment in default of payment of the fine since the appellant had been convicted once before
The appellant applied to the High Court of Punjab to revise this order but the Revision was dismissed
The learned Judges however granted a cer tificate of fitness which has enabled the appellant to file the appeal to this Court
Though the validity of section 71 of the Act was challenged in the High Court on various grounds learned Counsel who appeared before us rested his attack on one point
He urged that the provision violated the 44 346 appellant s right to carry on his trade or business guaranteed by article 191g and that the restriction imposed was not reasonable within article 196 because it was not in the interest of the general public
Learned Counsel drew our attention to the long title of the Act reading  An Act to limit the hours of work of Shop Assistants and Commercial Employees and to make certain regulations concerning their holidays wages and terms of service  and pointed out that the insistence on the appellant to close his shop in which there were no  employees  was really outside the purview of the legislation and could not be said to subserve the purposes for which the Act was enacted
In short the submission of the learned Counsel was that the provision for the compulsory closure of his shop for one day in the week served no interests of the general public and that it was unduly and unnecessarily restrictive of his freedom to carry on a lawful trade or business otherwise in accordance with law as he thought best and in a manner or mode most con venient or profitable
We are clearly of the opinion that the submissions of the learned Counsel should be repelled
The long title of the Act extracted earlier and on which learned Counsel placed considerable reliance as a guide for the determination of the scope of the Act and the policy underlying the legislation no doubt indicates the main purposes of the enactment but cannot obviously control the express operative provisions of the Act such as for example the terms of section 71
Nor is the learned counsel right in his argument that the terms of section 71 are irrelevant to secure the purposes or to subserve the underlying policy of the Act
The ratio of the legislation is social interest in the health of the worker who forms an essential part of the com munity and in whose welfare therefore the community is vitally interested
It is in the light of this purpose that the provisions of the Act have to be scrutinized
Thus section 3 which lays down the restrictions subject to which alone I young persons  defined as those under the age of 14 could be employed in any shop or commercial establishment is obviously with a view to 347 ensuring the health of the rising generation of citizens
Section 4 is concerned with imposing restrictions regarding the hours of work which might be extracted from workers other than  young persons 
Section 41 enacts  Subject to the provisions of this Act no person shall be employed about the business of a shop or commercial establishment for more than the normal maximum working hours that is to say fifty four hours in any one week and ten hours in any one day
bringing the law in India as respects maximum working hours in line with the norms suggested by the International Labour Convention
Sub clauses 4 and 5 of this section are of some relevance to the matter now under consideration  4 No person who has to the knowledge of the occupier of a shop or commercial establishment been previously employed on any day in a factory shall be employed on that day about the business of the shop or commercial establishment for a longer period than will together with the time during which he has been previously employed on that day in the factory complete the number of hours permitted by this Act
5 No person shall work about the business of a shop or commercial establishment or two or more shops or commercial establishments or a shop or commercial establishment and a factory in excess of the period during which he may be lawfully employed under this Act
 It will be seen that while under sub cl
4 employers are injuncted from employing persons who had already worked for the maximum number of permitted hours in another establishment sub cl
5 lays an embargo on the worker himself from injuring his health by overwork in an endeavour to earn more
From this it would be apparent that the Act is concerned and properly concerned with the welfare of the worker and seeks to prevent injury to it not merely from the action of the employer but from his own
In other words the worker is prevented from attempting to earn more wages by working longer hours than is good 348 for him
If such a condition is necessary or proper in the case of a worker there does not seem to be anything unreasonable in applying the same or similar principles to the employer who works on his own business
The learned Judges of the High Court have rested their decision on this part of the case on the reasoning that the terms of the impugned section might be justified on the ground that it is designed in the interest of the owner of the shop or establishment himself and that his health and welfare is a matter of interest not only to himself but to the general public The legislation is in effect the exercise of social control over the manner in which business should be carried on regulated in the interests of the health and welfare not merely of those employed in it but of all those engaged in it
A restriction imposed with a view to secure this purpose would in our opinion be clearly saved by article 196
Apart from this the constitutionality of the impugned provision might be sustained on another ground also viz with a view to avoid evasion of provisions specifically designed for the protection of workmen employed
It may be pointed out that acts innocent in themselves may be prohibited and the restrictions in that regard would be reasonable if the same were necessary to secure the efficient enforcement of valid provisions
The inclusion of a reasonable margin to ensure effective enforcement will not stamp a law otherwise valid as within legislative competence with the character of unconstitutionality as being unreasonable
The provisions could therefore be justified as for securing administrative convenience and for the proper enforcement of it without evasion
As pointed out by this Court in Manohar Lal vs The State 1 when the appellant challenged the validity of this identical provision but on other grounds  The legislature may have felt it necessary in order to reduce the possibilities of evasion to a minimum to encroach upon the liberties of those who would not otherwise have been affected 
To require a shopkeeper who employs one or two men 1   675 349 to close and permit his rival who employs perhaps a dozen members of his family to remain open clearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage
To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in the end react upon the relations between employer and employed
 We have therefore no hesitation in repelling the attack on the constitutionality of section 71 of the Act
The appeal fails and is dismissed
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondents were the elected members of the Vicarabad 296 Municipal Committee constituted in 1953 under the Hydera bad Municipal and Town Committees Act 1951 That Act was repealed by section 320 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act 1956 which came into force in 1956
That section provided that the committee constituted under the repealed enactment was to be deemed to have been constituted under the Act and the members thereof should hold office till the first meeting of the committee was called under section 35 of the Act
No election was held under the new Act the old committee which continued to function after duly passing a resolution and obtaining the necessary sanction from the Government sold certain municipal lands to third parties
The appellants who were rate payers of the said Municipality moved the High Court for the issue of a writ of quo warranto challenging the said sales under article 226 of the Constitution
The High Court dismissed the petition
The contention of the appellants in this Court was that the members of the said committee were functus officio on expiry of three years from the commencement of the Act for section 34 of the Act prescribed a term of three years and section 320 of the Act did not provide any definite term for them
But if section 34 was held to be inapplicable neither could the first general election under the Act for which section 16 of the Act was the only provision be held nor could the first meeting of the committee called under section 35 of the Act and the result would be that the old committee would continue indefinitely
Held that the contention must be negatived
The word committee  in section 320 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act 1956 did not mean a committee elected under the Act and the term of three years prescribed by section 34 of the Act could not therefore apply to it
Construed in the light of well recognised principles of interpretation of statutes and the scheme as envisaged by sections 16 17 18 20 32 34 and 320 of the Act section 320 of the Act could be no more than a transitory provision and it would be unreasonable to suggest that the Legislature which repealed the earlier Act with the express intention of constituting committees on broad based democratic principles intended to perpetuate old committees constituted under the repealed Act
Section 161 of the Act properly construed was clearly inapplicable to the first general election under the Act and could apply only to subsequent elections
So far as the first general election under the Act was concerned sections 17 and 20 of the Act provided a self contained and integrated machinery therefor independent of section 161 of the Act
Canada Sugar Refining Co vs R  referred to
The Legislature in enacting the new Act assumed and expected that the Government would within a reasonable time issue notifications for holding the first general election under section 17 of the Act and its failure to do so and thus implement the 297 Act and not any inherent inconsistency in the Act itself prolonged the life of the old committee
Since section 77 of the Act expressly authorised the Municipal Committee to sell municipal property subject to the conditions specified therein no prohibition could be implied from the provisions of s 76 of the Act and the impugned sales effected in conformity with the conditions precedent laid down by section 77 of the Act could not be said to be ultra vires the powers of the committee
Elizabeth Dowager Baroness Wenlock vs The River Dee Company and Attorney General vs Fulhan Corpora tion  considered
Per Sarkar J
It is well settled that where the language of a statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment as the language of section 16i does in the present case the Court has the power so to read it as to carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the new Act clearly was that elections should be held and committees constituted under it
Seaford Court Estates Ltd vs Asher  referred to
Section 161 is the only section of the Act which authorises the holding of a general election but since the requirements as to time in section 16i of the Act could not apply to the first general election that section must be read to carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature as if there was no such requirement in the case of the first general election under the Act
Although this would not indicate when that election was to be held the obvious implication would be that it must be held within a reasonable time of the commencement of the Act
Section 20 of the Act does not authorise the holding of a general election
Salmon vs Duncombe  referred to