vil Appeal No 2 104 of 1989
WITH CMP No 26956 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 2241988 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CR No 2875 of 1979
Ashok K Sen and GK Bansal for the Appellant
SM Ashri and CS Ashri for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
Special leave granted
This appeal is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 22nd April 1988
The dispute was between the two brothers
Both the parties appointed one Shri Ajit Singh as the Arbitrator on 7th March 1974 for settlement of the dispute about 2 12 Killas of land situated near Chandni Bagh Panipat in the State of Haryana
The said land stood in the name of the appellant
According to the respondent Ram Lal it was benami in the name of the appellant
That was the dispute
The arbitrator gave his award on 22nd May 1974 and moved an application on 23rd September 1974 before the Court of Sub Judge IInd Class Panipat for making the award the rule of the Court
The application was registered in the said Court and notice was issued to the appellant herein on 7th November 1974
Objections were filed by the appellant taking various grounds
It was contended that the appellant had informed the sole arbitrator through registered notice and by a telegraphic notice that he had no faith in the said arbitra tor and had thus repudiated his authority to proceed with the arbitration proceedings
It was also contended that the award was lop sided perverse and totally unjust and against all cannons of justice and fair play
It was alleged that the arbitrator had acted in a partisan manner
He never heard the claim of the appellant and never 254 called upon him to substantiate his claim and had acted as an agent of the respondent
It was therefore prayed by the appellant that the award be set aside
It may be mentioned that no point was raised that the award was bad and unforce able because it was not properly stamped nor any plea was taken that the award was an unregistered one as such could not be made the rule of the court
Several issues were framed
No issue was however framed on the ground that the award was bad because it was not properly stamped or that it was not registered
The appellant who was respondent No 2 in the said proceedings before the learned Trial Judge gave his version about the repudiation of the authority
The learned Trial Judge had however held that the appellant had failed to prove that he had repudiated the authority of the arbitrator to enter upon the arbitration through registered notice or otherwise before the arbitrator announced his award
It was further held that the award of the arbitrator was not liable to be set aside on the grounds taken
The objections were treated as objections under section 33 of the and it was filed within the limitation period
In that view of the matter the learned Sub Judge IInd Class Panipat by his order dated 28th July 1977 dismissed the objections under Section 14 of the and made the said award the rule of the court
Aggrieved thereby the appellant went up in first appeal before the Additional District Judge Karnal
The learned Additional District Judge while dealing with the conten tions of the appellant held that the application was prop erly filed
A point was taken before the first Appellate Court that the award was on an unstamped paper and as such could not be made the rule of the court
The learned District Judge held that the award has not been properly stamped and as such could not be made the rule of the court
It was also contended before the learned District Judge that the award was unregistered and as such it could not be made the rule of the court as it affected immovable property of more than Rs 100
The learned Dis trict Judge after analysing the provisions of section 17 of the hereinafter referred as to the Act  came to the conclusion that the award declared right in immovable property and since it was unregistered it could not be made the rule of the court
The learned Dis trict Judge however also came to the conclusion that the authority of the arbitrator had been repudiated
This ground no longer survives
In the aforesaid view of the matter the learned District Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the 255 award was unregistered and unstamped and as such could not be made the rule of the court and set aside the order of the learned Trial Judge
There was a second appeal to the High Court
The High Court upheld the award
The High Court noted that the neces sary stamp was purchased on 8th August 1974 before the award was filed on the 9th September 1974
And that being so it could not be argued successfully that the award was unstamped
In that view of the matter the High Court held that the learned District Judge was in error in allowing the stamp objection to be taken
As regards the registration it was held by the High Court that the award did not create any right as such in immovable property it only admitted the already existing rights between the parties and hence it did not require any registration
In that view of the matter the High Court was of the opinion that the first appellate Court was wrong
The High Court was further of the view that no right was created in favour of Shri Ram Lal the respondent herein when he was declared the owner
Both Lachhman Das the appellant and Ram Lal the respondent had claimed their ownership and ac cording to the High Court they had the existing rights
The award only made according to the High Court it clear that the ownership would vest in one of the brothers Ram Lal
In the aforesaid view of the matter the High Court was of the view that it did not require registration
The High Court allowed the appeal and directed the restoration of the order of the learned trial court and the award be made the rule of the court
Aggrieved thereby the appellant has come up to this Court
The question is Was the High Court right in the view it took Mr AK Sen learned counsel for the appellant contend ed that the High Court was clearly in error in the facts and circumstances of this case to have made this award the rule of the court and to have looked upon this award which at all relevant and material time was unregistered
It may be mentioned that when this matter came up before this Court on the 5th December 1988 the matter was adjourned for two months and it was recorded In the meantime the parties may take steps
Thereafter it appears that the award was filed for registration on 19th December 1988 before the Sub Registrar Panipat and was registered actually on 3rd Febru ary 1989
Mr Sen contended that the registration of the award subsequently made in the manner indicated hereinbefore did not validate it retrospectively in 256 view of the relevant provisions of the Act
The award being an unregistered one could not have been looked into by the High Court
Mr Sen tried to urge before us that the award was got registered by misrepresentation of the order of this Court dated 5th December 1988
This Court did not on 5th December 1988 direct that the registration could be made
All that this Court observed was that the parties might take steps
It may be mentioned that on or about 18th December 1988 it appears at page 75 of the present paper book that an application was made for registration of award which was said to have been applied by Shri Ajit Singh So Shri Beer Singh
In the said letter it was mentioned that Mr justice JV Gupta of the Hon ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana had held in favour of the said writer and it was further stated that on the 5th December 1988 this Court dismissed the case of Lachhman Singh the appellant herein copy whereof was enclosed
The award was filed for registration on 18th December 1988
The statements contained in the letter were incorrect and misleading inasmuch as this Court did not dismiss the case of the appellant on 5th December 1988
On the other hand this Court as mentioned hereinbe fore on the 5th December 1988 merely observed that the appellant would be at liberty to do what was needful
Mr Ashri learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the registration was done in view of provisions of sections 23 and 25 of the Act
Mr Sen on the other hand submitted before us that this was wholly irregular to have obtained registration by misleading the Sub Registrar and this was of no effect
Furthermore in any event according to Mr Sen the registration having been beyond the period of four months as enjoined by the relevant provisions was wholly bad
The first question that requires consideration in the instant case is whether the Court could have looked into the award for the purpose of pronouncing judgment upon the award
In order to deal with this question it is necessary to refer to Section 17 of the Act
Section 17 deals with documents of which registration is compulsory
Section 17 of the said Act mentions the documents which must be regis tered
Section 171e inter alia provides non testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create declare assign limit or extin guish whether in present or in future any right title or interest 257 whether in present or in future any right title or interest whether vested or contin gent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property Section 23 of the said Act provides as under Subject to the provisions contained in sec tions 24 25 and 26 no document other than will shall be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which the decree or order was made or where it is appealable within four months from the day on which it becomes final Section 25 of the said Act provides as under If owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident any document executed or copy of a decree or order made in India is not present ed for registration till after the expiration of the time hereinbefore presented in that be half the Registrar in cases where the delay in presentation does not exceed four months may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration fee such document shall be accepted for registration Section 49 of the said Act provides as under No document required by section 17 or by any provision of the  to be registered shall a affect any immovable property comprised therein or b confer any power to adopt or c be received as evidence of any transac tion affecting such property or conferring such power unless it has been registered 258 The proviso to this section deals with a suit for specific performance with which we are not concerned
Shri Ashri contended that the document in question was one which did not require registration
He submitted that the High Court was right in the view it took
He further submitted that the property in dispute was in the joint name of the appellant and the respondent
The dispute was whether the half of the property held by the appellant was benami for the respondent or a declaration to that effect could be made by the arbitrator
Mr Ashri further submitted that it was the case of the appellant that he was the owner of the property in question
The award in question recites that Shri Ajit Singh had been appointed as arbitrator by an agreement dated 7th March 1974 by both the parties
The award further recites that he was appointed arbitrator to adjudicate through arbitration their disputes regarding property against each other
The arbitrator thereafter recites the steps taken and the proceedings before him
It was further stated that the appellant did not orally reply to the contentions of the respondent nor did he submit his claims in writing
In these circumstances the award was bad
The award stated inter alia Land of Tibbi comprising of rect
No 13 Kila No 23 3 11 261 11 165 15 175 14 254 4 2327 and 261 situated in Mauz Ugra Kheri near Chandni Bagh which is in the joint name of Shri Ram Lal Party No 1 and Shri Lachhman Dass Party No 2
The half ownership of Shri Lachhman Dass shall be now owned by Shri Ram Lal in addition to his 12 share owned by him in these lands
 The award gave certain other directions
Regarding other claims it was held that lands were allotted in the names of both the brothers and in that context Rs 16000 were spent by the respondent from his own sources
The arbitrator stated that he admitted these expenses at Rs 10000 and awarded that an amount of Rs5000 equal to 12 share should be paid by the appellant to the respondent
The other claims were also decided by the award with which it is not neces sary to deal in the present appeal
The question is does this award purport or operate to create declare or assign limit or extinguish any right title or interest in immova ble property Shri Ashri submitted that as his client was the real owner and as respondent No 1 was mere benamdar and the arbitrator merely declared the true position and the award did not as such create declare or assign any fight title or interest in any immovable property by the aforesaid clause in the award
259 The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Ramaswamy Ayyar  Anr
vs Thirupathi Naik ILR XXVII Madras p 43 has observed that the criterion for purposes of registration under the Registration Act 1877 III of 1877 which was in the same term as the provision of the present Act was what was expressed on the face of the document not what inci dents might be annexed by custom to a grant of the kind
Therefore we have to see not what the document intends to convey really but what it purports to convey
In other words it is necessary
to examine not so much what it intends to do but what it purports to do
The real purpose of registration is to secure that every person dealing with the property where such document re quires registration may rely with confidence upon state ments contained in the register as a full and complete account of all transactions by which title may be affected
Section 17 of the said Act being a disabling section must be construed strictly
Therefore unless a document is clearly brought within the provisions of the section its non registration would be no bar to its being admitted in evidence
On a proper construction of the award it does appear to us that the award did create declare or assign a right title and interest in the immovable property
The award declares that 12 share of the ownership of Shri Lachhman Dass shall be now owned by Shri Ram Lal the respondent in addition to his 12 share owned in those lands
Therefore the said award declares the right of Ram Lal to the said share of the said property mentioned in that clause
It is not in dispute that the said property is immovable property and it is not merely a declaration of the pre existing right but creation of new right of the parties
It is significant to bear in mind that the section enjoins registration wher ever the award purports or operates to create declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right title or interest of the value of Rs 100 or upwards in immovable property
Shri Ashri tried to submit that while reading the award reasonably and fairly it must be construed that there was no creation or declaration of any new right in the immovable property
What was done was only according to Shri Ashri a declaration of existing right that is to say Ram Lal s full ownership of the property in question
The section however enjoins registration in respect of any document which purports not which intends to create a right in immov able property or declare a right in immovable property
It is not a question of declaration of an existing right
It is by this award that a new right was 260 being created in favour of Ram Lal the respondent herein
In that view of the matter in our opinion it cannot be contended that the award did not require registration
This question was considered by this Court in Satish Kumar  Ors
vs Surinder Kumar  Ors
 There an arbi trator appointed by the appellants and the respondents partitioned their immovable property exceeding the value of Rs 100
The arbitrator applied under section 14 of the to the Court for making the award a rule of the Court
On the question whether the award was admissible in evidence as it was not registered it was held that the award required registration
It was further held by Justice Sikri as the Chief Justice then was and Justice Bachawat that all claims which were the subject matter of a reference to arbitration merged in the award which was pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and after an award had been pronounced the rights and liabili ties of the parties in respect of the said claims could be determined only on the basis of the said award
After an award was pronounced no action could be started on the original claim which had been the subject matter of the reference
The position under the registration Act is in no way different from what it was before the Act came into force
Therefore the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on a court under the did not make an award any less binding than it was under the provisions of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure
It was further held that the filing of an unregistered award under section 49 of the Act was not prohibited
What was prohibit ed was that it could not be taken into evidence so as to affect immovable property falling under section 17 of the Act
It was further reiterated that it could not be said that the registration did not in any manner add to its efficacy or give it added competence
If an award affected immovable property above the value of Rs 100 its registration would not rid of the disability created by section 49 of the Act
The award in question was not a mere waste paper but had some legal effect and it plainly purported to affect or affected property within the meaning of section 171b of the Act
Justice Hegde gave a separate but concurring judgment
He observed that it was one thing to say that a right was not created it was an entirely different thing to say that the right created could not be enforced without further steps
An award did create rights in that property but those rights could not be enforced until the award was made a decree of the Court
For the purpose of section 171b of the Act all that had to be seen was whether the award in question pur ported or operated to create or declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or future any right title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property
261 It was incorrect to state that an award which could not be enforced was not an award and the same did not create any right in the property which was the subject matter of the award
An award whether registered or unregistered accord ing to Justice Hegde does create rights but those rights could not be enforced until the award is made the decree of the court
The learned Judge made it clear that for the purpose of section 171b of the Act all that had to be seen was whether the award in question purported or operated to create or declare assign limit or extinguish whether in present or future any right title or interest whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs 100 and upwards in the immovable property
If it does it is compulsorily registerable
A document might validly create rights but those rights might not be enforced for various reasons
The Court found that the award in that case created right in immovable property and it required registration
This Court in Ratan Lal Sharma vs Purshottam Harit  had to consider the question of registra tion and the effect of non registration of an award
The appellant and the respondent therein had set up a partner ship business in the year 1962
The parties however there after fell out
At the time the disputes arose the running business had a factory and various movable and immovable properties
On August 22 1963 by agreement in writing the parties referred the disputes of our concern to the arbi tration of two persons and gave the arbirators full author ity to decide their dispute
The arbitrators gave their award on September 10 1963
The award made an exclusive allotment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant
He was absolutely enti tled to the same in consideration of a sum of Rs 17000 plus half the amount of the realisable debts of the business to the respondent and of the appellants renouncement of the right to share in amounts already received by the respond ent
The award stipulated that the appellant should not run the factory unless he had paid the awarded consideration to the respondent
The arbitrators filed the award in the High Court on November 8 1963
On September 10 1964 the re spondent filed an application for determining the validity of the agreement and for setting aside the award
On May 27 1966 a learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application as time barred
But he declined the request of the appellant to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award because in his view i the award was void for uncertainty and ii the award which created rights in favour of the appellant over immovable property worth over Rs 100 required registration and was unregistered
From this part of the order the 262 appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed as not main tainable by the Division Bench of the High Court
The appel lant preferred an appeal by special leave to this Court against the decision of the Single Judge declining to pro nounce judgment in accordance with the award
He also filed a special leave petition against the judgment of the Divi sion Bench
In the appeal before this Court the appellant contended that the award was not void for uncertainty and that the award sought to assign the respondent s share in the partnership to the appellant and so did not require registration and that under sec
17 of the  the Court was bound to pronounce judgment in accordance with the award after it had dismissed the respondent s applica tion for setting it aside
It was held that the share of a partner in the assets of the partnership which had also immovable properties was movable property and the assign ment of the share did not require registration under section 17 of the Act
But the award in the instant case this Court observed did not seek to assign the share of the respondent to the appellant either in express words or by necessary implication
The award expressly makes an exclusive allot ment of the partnership assets including the factory and liabilities to the appellant
It went further and made him absolutely entitled to the same in consideration of a sum of Rs 17000 plus half of the amount of Rs 192488 P to the respondent and the appellant s renouncement of the right to share in the amounts already received by the respondent
In express words the award purported to create rights in immovable property worth above Rs 100 in favour of the appellant
It would require accordingly registration under section 17 of the Act
As the award was unregistered the court could not look into it
The award being inadmissible in evidence for want of registration the Court could not pro nounce judgment in accordance with it
Section 17 of the presupposes an award which could be validly looked into by the Court
The appellant could not success fully invoke section 17
The award is an inseparable tangle of several clauses and cannot be enforced as to the part not dealing with immovable property
In the instant case also it appears to us that the award affects immovable property over Rs I00 and as such was required to be registered
Shri Ashn however contended that the fact that the award was unregistered had not been taken before the learned trial judge
Indeed this was not urged within 30 days and the time for filing of application for setting aside an award under section 30 of the Arbitra tion Act was 30 days and as such this not having been taken the appellant was not entitled to take this point at a later stage
1t is
true that in the application for making the award a rule of the court before 263 the learned trial judge this point had not been taken
Section 33 of the provides that Any party to an arbitration agreement or of any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits
 It has been held by the majority of three learned Judges in a full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Saha  Co vs Ishar Singh Kirpal Singh AIR 1956 Cal 321 that under the Indian  there was no distinction between an application for setting aside of an award and an application for adjudgment of the award as a nullity and all applications must be under section 30 within the time stipulated for that application
The existence of an award and validity of the reference both have to be chal lenged in the same manner
But the next question that arises is whether an unregistered award can be set aside or not
It was submitted by Mr Ashri that the award was otherwise invalid under section 30c of the 
It is however not necessary for the present purpose to decide this question
It is sufficient to emphasise that an award affecting immovable property of the value of more than Rs 100 cannot be looked into by the Court for pronouncement upon the award on the application under section 14 of the Arbi tration Act unless the award is registered
section 14 enjoins that when an award of an arbitrator has been filed the Court should give notice to the parties and thereupon the court shall pronounce judgment upon the award and made it a rule of the court
But in order to do so the court must be competent to look into the award
section 49 of the Act enjoins that the award cannot be received as evidence of any trans action affecting immovable property or confering power to adopt unless it is registered
In that view of the matter no judgment upon the award could have been pronounced upon the unregistered award
Mr Ashri however relied on a decision of the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in which one of us Sabyasachi Mukharji J had occasion to deal with the question whether an application for determination of the validity of an award could be entertained after the lapse of 30 days time
It was held that an application challenging an award on the ground of non registration must be by procedure under section 30 of the and the party not apply ing with in the time under section 30 was estopped from agitating the 264 question subsequently
The relevant case law was discussed and it was held that where an adjudication was necessary as to whether registration was required or not and it was emphasised that in the instant case also an adjudication was necessary because the High Court had held that registration was not necessary while the appellant is contending and as we are inclined to agree that registration was necessary in such a case it must be done by means of an application within 30 days
It is true that where an application is made for determining the validity and effect of an award in such a case as was the case in the application made to the Calcutta High Court for determination and admissibility of the award and for a declaration that the award was void it is necessary that the application should be made within 30 days
But that problem does not arise here because here under section 14 of the  a judgment is sought in favour of the award
In order to pronounce that judgment the award has to be looked into
The court cannot do it when the award affects the immovable property or purports to affect the immovable property of the value of more than Rs 100 and it is not registered and as such it cannot be looked into
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in the order under appeal
It may be appropriate in this connection to refer to the observations of Justice Vivian Bose in the Gangaprashad vs Mt Banaspati AIR 1933 Nagpur 132
In that decision Justice Bose speaking for the Nagpur High Court observed at page 134 of the report that it was argued before him that even though it was not possible for the plaintiff to challenge the fact that there was a reference to arbitration and an award and that there was no misconduct etc he could still question its validity on the ground that it had not been registered
But this question was barred by the rule of constructive res judicata
He referred to Mulla that if an application was made to the court to file an unregistered award which requires registration then the court must reject it
It followed that this was one of the grounds which could be urged against the filing of an award
If it was not urged and the award was filed then that question was as much barred in a subsequent suit as the others
In this case however this point that the award is not registered and as such it could not be filed though not taken subsequently in argument before the trial Judge it was urged before the First Appellate Court and it was held in favour of the present respondent
This is an appeal by special leave in subsequent decision from that decision where the filing of the award is being challenged on the ground that it 265 is unregistered
Therefore in our opinion though it may not be possible to take the point that the award is bad because it is unregistered as such it could not be taken into consideration in a proceeding under section 30 or 33 of the  but can be taken in the proceedings under section 14 of the when the award is sought to be filed in the court and the court is called upon to pass a decree in accordance with the award
As the court as mentioned hereinbefore could not look into the award there is no question of the court passing a decree in accordance with the award and that point can also be taken when the award is sought to be enforced as the rule of the court
Mr Ashri however contended that the award had been subsequently registered and unless the registration was set aside the award did not suffer from any defect
We have however to examine whether the High Court was fight in accepting the award and in pronouncing the judgment in terms of the award
At the relevant time the award was not regis tered
If that is the position then the subsequent regis tration of the award whether in confirmity with sections 23 and 25 of the Act or whether in breach or in violation of the same is not relevant
It is not necessary in the view that we have taken to go into the question whether the appellant was right in getting this document registered in the manner it has been done by making certain representation which was not correct to the Sub Registrar
Learned Counsel for the respondent drew our attention to certain observations of this court in Raj Kumar Dey and Others vs Tarapada Dey and Others  where registration was permitted by the Court after the lapse of four months as enjoined by section 23 of the Act
But the facts and the circumstances and the grounds upon which registra tion was permitted were entirely different from the present case
In the premises the observations made in the said decision are not relevant or germane for the present contro versy
In the aforesaid view of the matter the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained
The appeal is therefore allowed
The judgment andor order of the High Court are set aside
But in the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will pay and bear their own costs
RPD Appeal allowed


Summary:
The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act 955 put a total ban on the slaughter of all categories of animal of the species of bovine cattle
The U P Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act 1955 put a total ban on the slaughter of cows and her progeny which included bulls bullocks heifers and calves
The C P and Berar Animal Preservation Act 1949 placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows male or female calves of cow bulls bullocks and heifers and the slaughter of buffaloes male or female adults or calves was permitted only under a certificate granted by the proper authorities
No exception was made in any of these Acts permitting slaughter of cattle even for bona fide religious purposes
These three Acts were enacted in pursuance of the directive principles of State policy contained in article 48 Of the Constitution
The petitioners who were engaged in the butcher s trade and its subsidiary undertakings challenged the constitutional validity of the three Acts on the grounds that they infringed their funda mental rights guaranteed under articles 14 191g and 25 of the Constitution
The respondents contended that the impugned Acts were constitutional and valid as they were made in consonance with the directive principles of Art 48 which were superior to the fundamental rights and that the impugned Acts did not offend article 14 191g or 25 Held i that a total ban on the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves of cows and of she buffaloes male and female was quite reasonable and valid iithat a total ban on the slaughter of she buffaloes or breeding bulls or working bullocks cattle as well as buffaloes as long as they were capable of being used as milch or draught cattle was also reasonable and valid and iii that a total ban on the slaughter of she buffaloes bulls 630 and bullocks cattle or buffalo after they ceased to be capable of yielding milk or of breeding or working as draught animals was not in the interests of the general public and was invalid
The directive in article 48 for taking steps for preventing the slaughter of animals is quite explicit and positive and contemplates a ban on the slaughter of the several categories of animals specified therein namely cows and calves and other cattle which answer the description of milch or draught cattle
The protection is confined only to cows and calves and to those animals which are presently or potentially capable of yielding milk or of doing work as draught cattle but does not extend to cattle which at one time were milch or draught cattle but which have ceased to be such
The directive principles of State policy set out in Part IV of the Constitution have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the fundamental rights in Part 111
State of Madras vs Smt
Champakam Dorairajan 1951 SCR 525 followed
The ban on the slaughter of cows even on the slaughter day did not violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners under article 25 as it had not been established that the sacrifice of a cow on that day was an obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi vs The State of Bombay 1954 SCR 1055 applied
The impugned Acts which affected only the butchers who slaughtered cattle and not the butchers who slaughtered sheep or goats did not offend article 14 Of the Constitution
The different categories of animals being susceptible of classification into separate groups on the basis of their usefulness to society the butchers who kill each category may also be placed in distinct classes according to the effect produced on society by the carrying on of their respective occupations
This classification is based on an intelligible differentia which places the petitioners in a well defined class and distinguishes them from those who slaughter sheep or goats and this differentia has a close connection with the object sought to be achieved by the im pugned Acts namely the preservation protection and improvement of livestock
In determining the question of the
reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights conferred by article 191g the Court cannot proceed on a general notion of what is reasonable in the abstract or even on the consideration of what is reasonable from the point of view of the person or persons on whom the restrictions are imposed
What the Court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interests of the general public
The test of reasonableness has been laid down in State of Madras vs I G Row 1952 SCR 597 at 602
It should also be remembered that the legislature 631 is the best judge of what is good for the community
Though a constitutional question cannot be decided on the grounds of the sentiment of a section of the people it has to be taken into consideration though only as one of the elements in arriving at a judicial verdict as to the reasonableness of the restrictions
The effect of the impugned Acts on the fundamental rights of the petitioners under article 191g is direct and instantaneous as soon as the Acts are brought into force and it has to be determined whether they can be justified under cl
6 of article 19 The country is in short supply of milch cattle breeding bulls and working bullocks and a total ban on the slaughter of these which are essential to the national economy for the supply of milk agricultural working power and manure is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public
But a total ban on the slaughter of useless cattle which involves a wasteful drain on the nation s cattle feed which is itself in short supply and which would deprive the useful cattle of much needed nourishment cannot be justified as being in the interests of the general public
Under O XLI r 2 Of file Supreme Court Rules intervention is permitted only to the Attorney General of India or the Advocates General for the States
There is no other provision for permitting a third party to intervene in the proceedings before the Supreme Court
In practice however the Supreme Court in exercise of its inherent powers allows a third party to intervene when such third party is a party to some proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the High Courts where the same or similar questions are in issue for the decision of the Supreme Court will conclude the case of that party