ivil Appeal No 1617 of 1968
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 19 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Second  Appeal No 2296 of 1961
1 P Goyal and A G Ratnaparkhi for the appellant
CBAgarwala and R Mahalingier for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J
The question of law that arises for decision in this appeal by special leave is not free from difficulty
That question is whether a decree for eviction obtained in a suit instituted after obtaining the permission of the Commissioner under sub section
3 of section 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act becomes unenforceable if the State Government acting under section 7F of that Act revokes the permission granted by the Commissioner after the decree is passed  The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in respect of a shop in Balugani in Agra
On January 2 1959 the respondent applied to the District Magistrate under section 31 of the Act for permission to institute a suit against the appellant for evicting him from the shop in question
That application was rejected by the District Magistrate as per his order of July 9 1959
The respondent took up the matter in revision to the Commissioner under sub section 2 of section 3
The Commissioner reversed the order of the District Magistrate and granted the permission asked for on October 16 1959
As against that order the appellant moved the State Government under section 7F on November 17 1959
On January 299 1 1960 the respondent served on the appellant a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
The appellant replied to that notice on January 6 1960
In that reply he informed the respondent that he had already moved the State Government to revoke the permission granted by the Commissioner
On February 13 1960 the respondent instituted suit No 115 of 1960 in the Court of Munsiff Agra seeking the eviction of the appellant from the suit premises
The appellant filed his written statement in that case on May 7 1960
Therein again he took the plea that the permission granted by the Commissioner is not final as he had moved the Government to revoke the same
The suit was decreed by the learned Munsiff on November 2 1960
The appellant went up in appeal as against that order to the Civil Judge Agra
On January 27 1961 the State Government revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner during the pendency of the appeal
Relying on this order the Civil Judge of Agra allowed the appeal of the appellant on February 9 1961
As against that decision the respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court
The High Court allowed the second appeal on 19th March 1968 following the Full Bench decision of the Court in Bashi Ram vs Mantri Lal1
This appeal is directed against that decision
The Act was intended as a temporary measure as could be gathered from its title as well as the preamble
It is deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of October 1946 though it was passed in 1947
Under the Act as originally stood the decision of the District Magistrate under section 3 was neither appealable nor revisable
As per the amendments effected in 1952 a Limited power of revision was conferred on the Commissioner
By the Amending Act 17 of 1954 the power conferred on the Commissioner was enlarged and section 7F was incorporated in the Act which says that the State Government may call for the records of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3   and make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice
 The only sections in the Act material for the purpose of this appeal are sections 3 and 7F
Section 3 reads thus
 Restrictions on evictions
Subject to any order passed under sub section  3  no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds 1 1965 1 A11
300 a that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand b the at the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation c that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion the court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value d that the tenant has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the landlord s interest therein e that the tenant has on or after the 1st day of October 1946 sub let the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord f that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant g that the tenant was allowed to occupy the accommodation as a part of his contract of employment under the landlord and his employment has been determined
Explanation
For the purposes of sub section e lodging a person in a hotel or a lodging house shall not be deemed to be sub letting
2 Where any application has been made to the District Magistrateor permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses the permission the party aggrieved by his order may within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order
3 The Commissioner shall hear the application made under sub section 2 as far as may be 301 within six weeks from the date of making it and he may if he is not satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or revise his order or make such other order as may be just and proper
4 The order of the Commissioner under subsection 3 shall subject to any order passed  by the State Government under section 7 F be We have earlier quoted the relevant portion of section 7 F
Conflicting opinions were expressed by different Benches of the Allahabad High Court as to the scope of section 3 till the decision of the Full Bench in Bashi Ram s casex
The Full Bench held that a decree obtained in a suit for eviction instituted after obtaining the requisite permission will not become unenforceable even if the State Government revoked after the decree is passed the permission granted in exercise of its powers under section 7F
Majority of the Judges in that case further held that once a suit is instituted after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate any further order made either by the Commissioner or the State Government cannot affect the course of that suit or the decree passed therein
Dwivedi J the other Judge did not express any opinion on that question but even according to him in the appeal filed against the decree the appellate court cannot receive in evidence the order made by the State Government which means that the decree cannot be reversed on the ground that the State Government had revoked the permission granted
The correctness of the Full Bench decision is challenged by the appellant in this appeal
In support of his interpretation of sections 3 and 7F he placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Dr SL Khoparji vs State Governmenta
He also sought support from the decision of a Single Judge of that Court in Basant Lal Sah vs Bhagwan Prasad Sah3
It is not necessary to refer to the various decisions of the Allahabad High Court on this question
Suffice it to say that in that Court there was serious cleavage of opinion on the question that we are considering in this appeal till the decision of the Full Bench in Bashi Ram s casex
We were given to understand that Dhavan j had doubted the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench and had requested the Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision in Bashi Ram s case1 but in view of the pendency of this appeal the constitution of a larger bench was not considered necessary
1 1965 1 All
3 AIR 1964 All p 210
2 302 The contention of Mr Goyal the learned Counsel for the appellant was that the Act generally speaking  has restricted the right of the landlord to evict his tenant to one or other of the grounds mentioned in cls
a to
g of section 31  but in order to meet any exceptional case it is provided in section 3 1  that a suit for eviction may be instituted on any ground other than those mentioned in cls
a to g if the permission of the District Magistrate is obtained the order made by the District Magistrate is revisable both by the Commissioner as well as the State Government the only order that is final is that made by the State Government
If a landlord chooses to institute a suit on the basis of the permission granted by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner without waiting for the decision of the State Government he takes the risk if the State Government revokes the permission granted by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner then the suit must be deemed to have been instituted without permission and consequently not maintainable
Mr Goyal urged that if the decision in Bashi Ram s case1 is accepted as correct then so far as the tenant is concerned generally speaking he cannot invoke the powers of the State Government under section 7F because immediately after the decision of the Commissioner if the same is in his favour the landlord is likely to institute a suit for eviction and thus nullify the power of the State Government under section 7F
He urged that as section 7F empowers the State Government to revise the order made by the subordinate authorities whether the same is in favour of the landlord or the tenant we should not place an interpretation on section 3 which would affect the power of the State Government to do justice to the tenants for whose benefit the Act has been enacted
On the other hand it was urged by Mr CB Aggarwal learned Counsel for the respondent that the landlord has a right to sue for the eviction of his tenant under the provision of the Transfer of Property Act subject to the restrictions stipulated therein
That is a statutory right
The provisions contained in the Act to the extent they encroach upon the rights of the landlord either specifically or by necessary implication further control the rights of the landlord
In other respects the landlord s rights under the Transfer of Property Act remain unaffected
According to him the only restriction placed on the landlord in the matter of instituting a suit for eviction on grounds other than those mentioned in cls
a to g of section 31 is to obtain the prior permission of the District Magistrate subject to the order made under sub section
3 of section 3 by the Commissioner once a suit is validly instituted in accordance with those provisions no order of the State Government can either interfere with the course of that suit or invalidate the decree obtained therein
He urged that if the position is as 1 1965 1 Ali
545 303 contended by the
learned Counsel for the appellant curious results are likely to follow
Section 7 F does not fix any period within which the State Government must act
It can exercise its power under that provision at any time it pleases may be after 10 years or 20 years the power conferred on the State Government is extremely wide as observed by this Court in Shri Bhagwan and anr
vs Ram Chand and anr1
Therefore it can revoke the permission granted after the decree for eviction is confirmed by the High Court or even the Supreme Court and thus make a mockery of the judicial process this could not have been the intention of the legislature
According to Mr Aggarwal from the very scheme of the Act and from the very nature of the power conferred on the State Government it cannot be exercised after a suit is instituted after complying with the requirements of subs
1  of section 3
His further contention was that on a proper construction of sub section
 1  of section 3 it would be seen that the suit instituted after obtaining the required permission being a validly instituted suit its progress cannot be interrupted the permission required under section 3 1  is the permission of the District Magistrate subject to any order under section 33 by the Commissioner in other words the permission given by the District Magistrate is not final till affirmed by the Commissioner till then it remains tentative once the Commissioner affirms the same or grants the permission asked for it becomes final and thus amounts to a valid permission to sue hence a suit filed on the basis of that permission is a validly instituted suit unless the permission granted was revoke by the State Government before the institution of the suit
Proceeding further he stated that it is true that the order of the Commissioner though final yet it is subject to any order that may be passed by the State Government but section 3 1  the provision dealing with the permission to file a suit for eviction does not refer to the order under section 7F it only speaks of the permission granted by the District Magistrate subject to the order of the Commissioner and not further subject to any orders made by the State Government
In this connection he invited our attention to the fact that as against the order passed by the District Magistrate under subs
 1  of section 3 a revision petition can be filed before the Commissioner within 30 days of that order and not thereafter
The Commissioner has not even the power to condone the delay in filing the revision petition
Further under subs
3 of section 3 the Commissioner is required to hear the application made under sub section
2 of section 3 as far as may be within six week from the date of making it
All these provisions indicate that the legislature was of the opinion that the proceedings under section 3 should be carded_on expeditiously and the decision of the Commissioner should be considered as final
According to Mr Aggarwal the question of granting or refusing to grant the permission under s 3 are primarily to be 1 1965 3 SCR218 304 dealt with only by the District Magistrate and the Commissioner
They are the only tribunals in the hierarchy of the tribunals constituted for that purpose
The power given to the Government under section 7F is merely a supervisory power
That is why no limitation is imposed on the exercise of that power either in the matter of time within which it should be exercised or the circumstances under which it can be exercised
Such a power according to him is a reserve power and therefore has to be exercised before the court s jurisdiction is invoked He particularly laid emphasis on the fact that sub section
1 of section 3 the compliance of which is necessary before validly instituting the suit does not at all refer to an order under section 7F
After examining the provisions of this Act we are constrained to observe that the drafting of this Act leaves considerable room for improvement despite the fact that it was amended twice over
Though it was intended to be a temporary measure when it was originally enacted it has now reminded in the statute book for over 20 years and there is no knowing how long the same will continue to be in force
Therefore it is but appropriate that the provisions of this Act should be clear and unambiguous
From sub section
1  of section 3 it is not possible to find out the contents of the powers of the District Magistrate
No guide lines are laid down therein to regulate the exercise of the powers of the District Magistrate
It is not possible to find out from that provision under what circumstances the District Magistrate can grant the permission asked for and under what circumstances he can refuse the same
It is likely that different District Magistrates are exercising that power in different ways
One consideration may appeal to one District Magistrate and a totally different consideration may influence another District Magistrate
It would have been appropriate if the legislature had defined the scope of the powers of the District Magistrate or at least laid down certain guide lines for regulating his discretion
Sub section
3  of section 3 says that if the Commissioner is not satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate he may alter or reverse the order of the District Magistrate or make such other order as may be just and proper
It is not possible to find out on what basis the Commissioner can determine the correctness legality or propriety of the order made by the District Magistrate
As seen earlier no restrictions are placed on the powers of the District Magistrate in granting or refusing to grant the permission asked for under section 3 1 
Therefore the only thing the Commissioner can do is to exercise his discretion in preference to the discretion exercised by the District Magistrate
Now coming to the power conferred on the State Government under section 7 F it would be seen that it is a power of wide amplitude
It can be exercised by it in any way it pleases
No restriction either as to the time 305 within which it can be exercised or as to the circumstances under which it can be exercised is placed on the State Government
Under these circumstances the anomalies pointed out by MrGoyal as well as by Mr Agarwal are inevitable
Therefore in construing this Act no useful purpose will be served by taking into consideration the hardship to the parties
In whatever way we may construe sections 3 and 7F hardship to one party or the other is inevitable
Neither Counsel suggested to us any interpretation which could steer clear of the anomalies pointed out at the bar
Therefore we have to fall back on the grammatical construction of sub section
1  of section 3 and leave out of consideration all other rules of construction for finding out the intention of the legislature
Section 31 does not
restrict the landlord s right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in cls
a  to g of that sub section
But if he wants to sue his tenant for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in those clauses then he has to obtain the permission of the District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order passed under sub section
3 of section 3 by the Commissioner
These are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant
If a landlord files a suit for the eviction of his tenant without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate that suit is not maintainable but if he files a suit after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate and if the Commissioner revokes the permission granted by the District Magistrate in a properly instituted application under section 32 then the suit instituted by him will be considered as having been filed without the permission of the District Magistrate because section 3 1  in specific terms says that the permission given by the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed under sub section
In other words the permission given by the District Magistrate does not acquire any finality until either the period fixed for filing an application under sub section 2 of section 3 expires and no application under that section was filed within that time or if an application had been filed within that time the same had been disposed of by the Commissioner
The permission to file a suit for eviction assumes finality under section 3 1  once the Commissioner decides the revision petition pending before him
In fact sub section
4 of section 3 says that the order of the Commissioner is final
It is true that that order despite the fact that it is final is subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7F
There is no provision in the Act providing that a suit validly instituted after getting the required permission under section 3 1  ceases to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under section 7F
Similarly there is no provision in the Act invalidating a decree passed after the Act came into force in a validly instituted suit
Section 14 provides  306 no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force except on any of the grounds mentioned in section 3 Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the landlord reasonable annual rent or the rent payable by him before the passing of the decree whichever is higher  This provision applies only to decrees passed before the date of the commencement of the Act
A decree of a Court in a suit validly instituted is binding on the parties to
the same
It is true that the finality or the force of a decree can be taken away by a statute but the Court will not readily infer that a decree passed by a competent Court has become unenforceable unless it is showy that a provision of law has specifically or by necessary implication made that decree unenforceable
No such provision was brought to our notice
On an examination othe relevant provisions of the Act our conclusion is that when the Commissioner sets aside the order passed by the District Magistrate granting permission to file a suit for ejecting a tenant the order of the Commissioner prevails
If he cancels the permission granted by the District Magistrate there is no effective permission left and the suit instituted by the plaintiff without awaiting his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the District Magistrate
To this extent we are in agreement with the decision of Upadhyaya J in Munshi Lal and anr
vs Shambhu Nath Ram Kishan1
From this it follows that the Full Bench decision in Bashi Ram s case2 to the extent it held that a suit filed by the landlord after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate cannot become infructuous even if the Commissioner revokes the permission is incorrect
But we agree with the Full Bench that a suit validly instituted after obtaining a permission as required by section 3 1  does not cease to be maintainable even if the State Government revokes after the institution of the suit the permission granted
If the State Government revokes the permission granted before the institution of the suit then there would be no valid permission to sue
In other words the State Government s power to revoke the permission granted under section 31 gets exhausted once the suit is validly instituted
For the reasons mentioned above this appeal fails and the same is dismissed
But in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
RKPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in respect of a shop in Agra Uttar Pradesh
The respondent applied to the District Magistrate under section 31 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 for permission to institute a suit against the appellant for evicting him from the shop
The application was rejected by the District Magistrate but the Commissioner by order under section 33  granted the permission
The appellant thereupon moved the State Government under section 7F of the Act but it was only after the respondent had flied a suit and obtained a decree that the State Government passed an order revoking the permission granted by the Commissioner
The first Appellate Court in view of the order under 7F act aside the decree of the trial Court
However in second appeal the High Court relying upon a Full Bench decision of that Court in Bashi Ram vs Mantri Lal 1965 1 All 545 decided in favour of the respondent
In appeal before this Court by
special leave the question for consideration was whether a decree for eviction obtained in a suit instituted after obtaining the permission of the Commissioner under section 33 of the Act becomes unenforceable if the State Government acting under section 7F of the Act revokes the permission granted by the Commissioner after the decree is passed
HELD The order of the District Magistrate is by section 31 specifically made subject to the order of the Commissioner in revision under section 33  but the Commissioner s order according to section 3 4  is final though subject to the order of the State Government under section 7F
There is no provision in the Act providing that a suit validly instituted after getting the required permission under section 3 1  ceases to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under section 7F
305 G H Similarly there is no provision in the Act invalidating a decree passed after the Act came into force in a validly instituted suit
The finality or the force of a decree can be taken away by a statute but the Court will not readily infer that a decree passed by a competent Court has become unenforceable unless it is shown that a provision of law has specifically or by necessary implication made that decree unenforceable
305 H 306 C D On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act the conclusion must be that when the Commissioner sets aside the order passed by the District Magistrate granting permission to file a suit for ejecting a tenant the order of the Commissioner prevails
If he cancels the permission granted by the District Magistrate there is no effective permission left and the suit instituted by
the plaintiff without awaiting his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the District Magistrate
To this extent the decision in Munshi Lal and ant
Shambhu Nath Ramkishan was correct
305 D F Sup
C169 2 298 It follows that the Full Bench decision in Bashi Ram s case to the extent it held that a suit filed by the landlord after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate cannot become infructuous even if the Commissioner revokes the permission was incorrect
306 F Bashi Ram s case was however correctly decided in so far as it held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining a permission as required by section 31 does not cease to be maintainable even if the State Government revokes after the institution of the suit the permission granted
if the State Government revokes the permission granted before the institution of the suit then there would be no valid permission to sue
In other words the State Government s power to revoke the permission granted under section 31 gets exhausted once the suit is validity instituted
306 G Bashi Ram vs Mantri Lal 1965 1 All 545 and Munshi Lal and ant
vs Shambhu Nath Ram Kishan 1958 ALJ p 584 considered
Dr SL Khoparji vs State Government 1958 ALJ p 724 Basant Lal Sah vs Bhagwan Prasad Sah AIR 1964 All
p 210 and Shri Bhagwan and ant
vs Ram Chand and anr
   referred