ivil Appeal No 1308 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 91286 of the Madras High Court in AAO No 42183
K Parasaran B Ramamoorthy and V Balachandran for the Appellant
MR Narayanaswamy and ATM Sampath for the Respond ents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN J
Special leave is granted
This appeal arises from the judgment of the Madras High Court in AAO No 421 of 1983
The sole question that arises for consideration is as regards the period of limita tion for making a deposit to make an application under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 to set aside sale of immovable property sold in execution of a decree
Has the deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale as required by sub rule 2 of Rule 92 of Order XXI or within 60 days from the date of sale as provided in Article 127 of the  The High Court by the impugned judgment held that Arti cle 127 governed the period of limitation to make a deposit in terms of Rule 89
In coming to that conclusion the High Court followed its earlier decision in Thangammal  Ors
vs K Dhanalakshmi  Anr AIR 1981 Mad 254 and the decision of this Court in Basavantappa vs Gangadhar Narayan Dharwad kar  Anr  In the latter decision a Bench of two Judges of this Court held that Thangammal supra was correctly decided on the point and the deposit made within 60 days from the date of sale was well within time
485 We shall read the relevant provisions insofar as they are material
Rule 89 of Order XXI provides 89
Application to set aside sale on deposit 1 Where immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree any person claiming an interest in the property sold at the time of the sale or at the time of making the application or acting for or in the interest of such person may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court a for payment to the purchaser a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money and b for payment to the decree holder the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered less any amount which may since the date of such proclamation of sale have been received by the decree holder Rule 922 of Order XXI reads 2     where in the case of an applica tion under Rule 89 the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale or in cases where the amount deposited under Rule 89 is found to be deficient owing to any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the depositor and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the Court the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale
The words shown in bracket in Rule 922 were substitut ed by section 72 of the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 1976 with effect from 121977
The object of the amendment was to afford an opportunity to the applicant to make good any deficiency in the amount deposited under Rule 89 when the deficiency occurred by reason of clerical or arithmetical mistake on his part
That amendment has no relevance to the point in issue as regards the period of limitation except to emphasise that sub rule 2 of Rule 92 had received the special attention of Parliament in 1976
Parliament addressed itself particularly to the sub rule and yet did not apart from the special 486 contingency provided for by the amendment think it neces sary to extend the period generally prescribed under Rule 922 to make the deposit which is a condition precedent to an application to set aside a sale
Rule 89 postulates an application on deposit
It says may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court
These words show that deposit is a condition prece dent to the making of an application to set aside a sale
That condition must be satisfied within the period pre scribed by sub rule 2 of Rule 92 which undoubtedly is 30 days
Parliament refused to alter that provision even when a part of the sub rule was substituted
No doubt on this aspect would probably have arisen had it not been for the longer period prescribed by Article 127 of the as substituted by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 121977 for making an application under Rule 89
That Article reads Description Period of Time from which of suit limitation period begins to run 127
To set aside Sixty The date of a sale in execution days the sale of a decree includ ing any such applica tion by a judgment debtor
 Prior to the Amending Act 104 of 1976 the period pre scribed by Article 127 was 30 days
As a result of the amendment a period of 60 days is provided for making an application to set aside a sale
It is important to remember that Article 127 appears in Part I of Third Division of the Schedule to the  dealing exclusively with applications
Article 127 thus relates solely to the making of an application and not to a deposit
This Article governs applications made under Rules 90 and 91 as well but we are not concerned with them
It is true that prior to the Amending Act 104 of 1976 the period prescribed for the making of an application was identical to that for the 487 making of a deposit
But as a result of the amendment different periods are now prescribed for the making of the deposit and the application
That it was the legislative intent to provide different periods of limitation for these two matters is from the language used in the two enact ments clear and explicit
The reason why the legislature provided for different periods for the two matters which are the necessary steps one following the other to be taken for setting aside the sale of an immovable property sold in execution of a decree is not for the Court to question
This Court would not assume that the legislature made a mistake in this respect or made an omission in accomplishing what it had set out to achieve
There is no inconsistency between the two sets of provi sions prescribing different periods of limitation
Such inconsistency can arise only if obedience of one provision will result in disobedience of the other
While Rule 922 requires a deposit to be made within 30 days from the date of sale Article 127 requires an application contemplated under Rule 89 to be made within 60 days from the date of sale
As stated earlier the deposit must necessarily pre cede the application for no application under Rule 89 can be made except on depositing the amount in Court
We see no inconsistency in these two sets of provisions
The words of the statutes being clear explicit and unambiguous there is no scope to have recourse to external aid for their construction
Nevertheless in deference to the arguments of the respondents  counsel we would refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons in respect of clause 102 of the Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha on 8th April 1974 Published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary Part II Section 2 dated April 8 1974 amending Article 127
It states Clause 102 Amendment of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1953 An application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree on deposit under Rule 89 of Order XXI is re quired to be made within thirty days from the date of the sale
Experience shows that this period is too short and often causes hardship because the judgment debtors usually fail to arrange for moneys within that time
Banks usually take more than thirty days to sanction loans and advances
In the circumstances entry 127 of the Schedule to the is being amended to increase the period of limitation to sixty days in respect of an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree
This increase in 488 the period of limitation will not affect the purchaser because five per cent of the purchase money is required to be paid to him
The advantage of the increased period of limitation will also be available to an application under Rule 90 or Rule 91 of Order XXI to set aside a sale in execution of a decree
In view of the increase in the period of limitation confirmation of a sale will have to await the expiry of the increased period of limitation emphasis supplied The legislative intent as seen from the above state ment was indeed to extend the period prescribed for making an application and not for any other purpose
That is the reason why Article 127 was amended enlarging the period for making an application from 30 days to 60 days
That period has no bearing on the time allowed for making a deposit in respect of which the period is prescribed not under Article 127 but under Rule 922 of Order XXI and this period has always been and remains to be 30 days
We see no repug nance or inconsistency or lack of clarity in these two sets of provisions
Appearing for the appellant the auction purchaser Mr Parasaran submits that the High Court was not justified in attempting to correct or supply what it thought to be a defect or an omission in the statute
He rightly contends that even if there was an omission it was not for the Court to rectify it
The Court must indeed proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it intended to say what it said See Nalinakhya Bysack vs Shyam Sunder Haldar  Ors  at 545
Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency
The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result
No case can be found to authorise any court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus Per Lord Halsbury Mersey Docks vs Henderson  602
We cannot aid the legislature s defective phrasing of an Act we cannot add and mend and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there Crawford vs Spooner   8 9
Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contra diction 489 Of the apparent purpose of the enactment the Court can of course adopt a construction which will carry out the obvi ous intention of the legislature
In doing so a judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can and should iron out the creases Per Denning LJ as he then was Seaford Court Estates vs Asher All ER 1949 2 155 at 164
See the observation of Sarkar J in M Pentiah  Ors
vs Muddala Veeramallapa  Ors  at 314
In the construction of the relevant provisions we see no contradiction or ambiguity or defect or omission
We see no merit in the argument that Article 127 must override Rule 922 of Order XXI in respect of limitation
We view both the provisions as prescriptive of time for different pur poses and of equal efficacy and particularity
The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant has no relevance to their construction
Nor does the principal in Heydon s case  76 ER 637 offer any help on the point in issue
The mischief which the legislature had set out to remedy by amendment of Article is what is stated in the objects and reasons clause
That object was accomplished by prescribing a longer period for filing an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree
Further more as already seen by amendment of Rule 922 of Order XXI an opportunity was accorded to the depositor to make good the deficiency in the deposit made by him due to arithmetical or clerical mistake on his part
In no other respect did the legislature evince an intention to extend the period prescribed for making the deposit
It would perhaps have been better more logical reasonable and practical as stated by the Kerala High Court in Dakshayini  Ors
vs Madhavan AIR 1982 Kerala 126 to enlarge the period for making the deposit so as to make it identical with that prescribed for making the appli cation and such extended period would have better served the object of the amendment namely ameliorating the plight of the judgment debtor but such are matters exclusively within the domain of legislation by Parliament and the Court cannot presume deficiency and supply the omission
The legislature did not do more than what it did
It has in our view accomplished what it had set out to achieve
No more no less
In the circumstances we hold that the correct construc tion of Rule 922 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 leads to the irresistible conclusion that the time for making a deposit in terms of Rule 89 of Order XXI is 30 days and Article 127 of the prescrib ing the period for making an application under Rule 89 has no relevance to the prescribed time for making the deposit
490 Neither provision has any effect on the other as to time
All decisions the contrary on the point we hold are incorrect
With the greatest respect we disagree with the contrary view expressed in Basavantappa vs Gangadhar Narayan Dharwadkar  Anr  On the question of limitation the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed to that ex tent
We make no order as to costs
RNJ Appeal allowed


Summary:
In the proceedings for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 for arrears of rent subletting conver sion of user from residential to commercial and bona fide need the appellant tenant committed breach of the Control ler s directions under section 151 of the Act in the matter of payment of monthly rent
Consequently his defence was struck off and the suit decreed on the sole ground of de layed payment of future rent
All the other grounds were rejected
The tenant assailed the order before the Rent Control Tribunal relying on Hem Chand vs Delhi Cloth Mills on the rigour of section 151 of the Act
The Tribunal found that there was no infirmity in the order
The High Court maintained the ejectment
In the appeal by special leave it was contended for the appellant on the strength of the decision in Ram Murti vs Bhola Nath that section 157 of the Act con fers a discretion on the Rent Controller not to strike off the defence of the tenant and consequently the delay by him in making deposit of future rent should have been excused and that since no cross appeals were filed by the landlord against the rejection of other grounds in the court of the Rent Control Tribunal or in the High Court nor those grounds were pressed in these two forums by the landlord those grounds were no more available to him
The landlord died during the pendency of the appeal and his widow and divorced daughter respondent succeeded to him as landlords
It was contended for them that the tenant was a rich and well connected industrialist deserving no protection of the rent laws
Dismissing the appeal the Court HELD 1
If the appeals were to be allowed by releasing and relaxing the rigour of the order of eviction the matter then would have to be 507 remitted back at an appropriate stage where the successor landlords could conveniently have the other grounds of eviction adjudicated upon by overruling the objection that the landlord could have filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court seeking eviction of the tenant on grounds other than the ground on which the evic tion was ordered
51 lB C 2
The successor landlords are two ladies one a widow and the other a divorcee brought in the fray by operation of law
Remitting the case back would not only be unfair and unreasonable but time consuming and inequitous as well to them
Since almost eighteen years have passed by there should be an end to the dispute
This course is in the interest of all concerned as well as the State
Instead of putting the parties to a fresh bout of litigation the order of eviction should therefore be sustained 51 IC E 3
The appellant is granted time ending on March 31 1991 for vacating the premises subject to his giving an undertaking for vacation on or before the said date and payment of rent to the landlords
511E F