Appeal No 177 of 1955
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 28 1953 of the former Nagpur High Court in First Appeal No 115 of 1951 arising out of the judgment and decree dated July 25 1951 of the Court of Additional District Judge Bhandara in Civil Suit No 14 A of 1957
C B Aggarwala and Radheylat Aggarwal for the appellant
section P Sinha and section N Mukherjee for the respondent
December 1
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 700 KAPUR J
This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Nagpur reversing the decree of the Additional District judge dismissing the plaintiff s suit
The appellant before us is the defendant Kishori Lal who claimed to be the adopted son adopted by the husband of the plaintiff Mst
Chaltibai who is the respondent in this appeal
The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by Mst
Chaltibai the widow of Lakshminarayan a Marwari Aggarwal of the District of Bhandara against Badrinarayan defendant No 1 and his son Kishori Lal defendant No 2 now appellant for a declaration that properties in sch
B  C belonged to her as heir to her deceased husband Lakshminarayan and for possession of the property in schedule D
The facts of the litigation relevant for the purpose of this judgment are these Badrinarayan and Lakshminarayan were two brothers the former who was elder was carrying on business at Raipur and the latter who was younger carried on business in the ancestral village named Tirora where it is stated Badrinarayan also was doing some business
Lakshminarayans first wife died in 1919 leaving a son and a daughter
In 1922 Lakshminarayan married the respondent Mst
Chaltibai
His son died sometime after this marriage and therefore the only remaining child of Lakshminarayan was the daughter Mst
Jamnabai who was married to one Chotteylal
On January 6 1936 Lakshminarayan died of a heart disease leaving his estate which is given in schs
B C and D and is valued at about Rs 30000
Although the plaintiff Chaltibai now respondent had alleged that Lakshminarayan died suddenly and did not suffer from any heart disease previous to his death the appellant pleaded that Lakshminarayan developed heart trouble in 1934
He also pleaded that because of this heart trouble Lakshminarayan became despaired of begetting a son and therefore adopted in Jaisth May June 1935 the appellant Kishorilal then aged 13 years who was the youngest of the five sons of his brother Badrinarayan the others being Mohanlal Gowardhan Nandlal and Narayan
He further pleaded that after 701 his adoption he resided with Lakshminarayan as his adopted son and when Lakshminarayan died he performed his obsequies as such adopted son was placed on the gaddi and the turban was tied on his head in accordance with the custom of the caste that he was on the thirteenth day tervi taken by the respondent Chaltibai in her lap from Badrinarayan with the consent and in the presence of the relations of Lakshmi narayan on the thirteenth day of the death of Lakshminarayan  that he entered into possession of the estate of the deceased Lakshminarayan and was recognised as his adopted son even by the respondent who continued to accept and treat him as such upto 1946 and in 1942 the respondent performed his the appellant s marriage
After he attained majority he managed the estate himself and there was a partition in the family of Badrinarayan on October 30 1943 in which the appellant because of his having been given out in adoption in another family received no share
The respondent in the plaint denied both the adoption and the treatment or acceptance of the appellant as an adopted son
She also stated that she was an illiterate purdanashin woman who was not conversant with the management of business and after the death of her husband she reposed full confidence in Badrinarayan who assured her that he would properly look after her affairs business and property and consequently Badrinarayan took over the management of the estate and the account books and also looked after court work
At his instance she the respondent signed certain papers without understanding them or without knowing their contents and sometimes she even signed blank papers
The appellant and his father Badrinarayan then attempted to oust her from the business and the estate of her husband which led to disputes between the parties and proceedings under ss107  145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started a receiver was appointed and the Magistrate by an order dated May 19 1947 directed the parties to have their rights decided by a civil court
This order was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant in revision
In the criminal case the appellant it is 702 alleged asserted that he had been adopted by Lakshminarain six months prior to his death a fact which the respondent Chaltibai denied in her plaint
On these pleadings the court framed four issues and the two relevant issues for the purpose of this appeal are  1Did the deceased Lakshminarayan validly adopt the defendant No 2 in the bright fortnight of Jyestha June 1935 A D  b Was the adoption valid according to law  2 Had the plaintiff all along recognised the adoption as valid and legal and had she been treating defendant No 2 as Lakshminarayan s son all along  b If so result  The trial court dismissed the suit
It held the adoption proved but found against the appellant on the question of estoppel
The High Court on appeal reversed the finding as to the factum of adoption but upheld the finding on the question of estoppel
It was of the opinion that the respondent was not estopped on account of any misrepresentation made by her and that there was no such conduct on her part which deprived her of her right of bringing the present suit and that both parties knew that there was no adoption in fact
The appeal was therefore allowed
The defendant Kishorilal has brought this appeal to this Court under a certificate of the High Court and the judgment of the High Court is assailed on several grounds Firstly it was urged that the evidence produced in support of the adoption proved that the appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan six months before his death
Secondly the doctrine of estoppel was relied upon estoppel on the ground that the respondent Chaltibai had represented in previous legal proceedings and in various ways by execution of docu ments and by her actions that the appellant was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan
She had put him in possession as owner of all the estate of Lakshminarayan and had given up her own claim to heirship to his estate and as a result of this conduct and representations made by the respondent the appellant had 703 altered his possession i by being completely transplanted from his real father s family into another family and ii by being deprived of his share of the properties in his natural family
Thirdly it was argued that because of her admission that the appellant was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and his heir the burden was on her to show that he was not the adopted son
And fourthly it was submitted that having regard to the long course of conduct of the respondent Chaltibai in treating the appellant as the adopted son of Lakshminarayan the evidence produced should be appraised in such a manner as to hold it sufficient for proving the adoption
There is no formal deed of adoption the appellant therefore sought to prove it by the evidence of six witnesses who were
his real brother Mohanlal his natural father Badrinarayan and two relations Narsingdas and Shankarlal a neighbour Chattarpatti who is some kind of a physician and Kishorilal himself appeared in support of his case
A seventh witness Sobharam was produced to prove an admission by Lakshminarayan that he had adopted the appellant
The story of the adoption as disclosed by the evidence for the appellant was that as Lakshminarayan had no son of his own he asked his brother Badrinarayan to give his youngest son in adoption to which he agreed and the adoption took place at the house of Lakshminarayan at Tirori in the month of Jyaistha 1935 about six months before the death of Lakshminarayan
The formalities of adoption according to this evidence consisted of placing the appellant as a son not in lap of the adoptive mother but of Lakshminarayan who put a tilak on the appellant s forehead and tied a turban on his head
This was followed by distribution of pansupari to the persons assembled who were Narasingdas and Shankarlal who were from outside Tirora Raman and Jivan Singh who were servants of Lakshminarayan Chhatarpatti a neighbour and Bhaiyalal who has not been examined and there was also present Mohanlal a real brother of the appellant
Some other persons were also present by the appellant but they are not witnesses in the case and Badrinarayan and Mohanlal did 704 not mention their presence
No religious ceremony was performed and there was no priest though witness Narsingdas stated that a priest was present at the adoption ceremony and ganesh puja was performed
The evidence also shows that no invitations were sent to the brotherhood friends or relations and besides the persons mentioned above no one else was present and thus no publicity was given to the adoption
None of the relations of the respondent were invited or were present although she had brothers and sisters and they were married
Even the respondent Chaltibai was not present at the ceremony of adoption
It is stated that she was in some inner room
And after the formalities of adoption Lakshminarayan himself put the adopted son in the lap of the respondent Chaltibai
The adoption was not followed by any feast nor was any photograph taken and no presents were given to the adopted son
Lakshminarayan did not consult any priest as is usual for fixing an auspicious day for adoption
Although the defendants were allowed to amend their written statement they gave no details of the adoption by Lakshminarayan beyond saying that it was in the month of Jyaistha 1935 but what date it was not mentioned
The parties are Aggarwals and belong to a commercial community who maintain complete and detailed accounts
Although Badrinarayan who was defendant No 1 chose to put in accounts of January 20 1936 in connection with what he expended on the tervi thirteenth day ceremony after the death of Lakshminarayan yet he filed no such accounts showing the date when he and his son the appellant came to Tirora from Raipur for the purposes of adoption or when they went back
No contemporary document of any kind has been produced to show when the adoption took place or what was expended by Badrinarayan nor have the accounts of Lakshminarayan who ac cording to the appellant himself maintained account books been produced to show as to the expenses of whatever little ceremony was observed on the date of the adoption
The account produced by Badrinarayan shows the amount expended on the occasion of 705 thirteenth day ceremony after the death of Lakshminarayan on betel leaves milk betelnuts and also what was paid at the house of Lakshminarayan including the amount paid for the turban for the reading of the garud puran or what was paid to Kesu which we are told is a pet name of Kishorilal for touching the feet of the elders
The significance of this fact has not been explained by the appellant
I As an adoption results in changing the course of succession depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave DO occasion for doubting its truth
Failure to produce accounts in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case would be a very suspicious circumstance
The importance of accounts was emphasised by the Privy Council in Sootrugun vs Sabitra 1  in Diwakar Rao vs Chandanlal Rao 2  in Kishorilal vs Chunilal 3 in Lal Kunwar vs Charanji Lal 4 and in Padamlal vs Fakira Debya 5
The oral evidence of witnesses deposing to the factum of adoption is both insufficient and contradictory
Beyond their being agreed on the question of taking the appellant in adoption by Lakshminarayan the witnesses are not in accord as to the details of the adoption or as to the ceremonies or as to the usual feast following it
The giving of presents is the only detail on which they are agreed they all deposed that no presents were given
As to what happened in regard to the taking of the appellant in her lap by the respondent after the death of Lakshminarayan the witnesses are not in accord
There is disagreement as to its date how it came about and why
The adoption during the lifetime of Lakshminarayan is contradicted by a document dated January 24 1938 a sale deed by the respondent Chaltibai in favour of the 1 1834 2 Knapp
2 Calcutta 201 PC
3 1908 36 IA 9
4 1909 37 IA 1 7
5AIR 193 PC 84
89 706 Firm Ganeshram Fatteh Chand the family firm of witness Narsingdas
Therein the adoption of the appellant is stated to have taken place after the death of Lakshminarayan and was by Chaltibai respondent under the authority of her deceased husband and with the consent of the whole family
This document was witnessed by the natural father Badrinarayan
No satisfactory explanation of this wholly different adoption being mentioned in a deed executed only two years after the death of Lakshminarayan has been given by the appellant except this that whether he was adopted by Lakshminarayan in his lifetime or after his death by the respondent Chaltibai he would be the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and therefore this discrepant recital in the sale deed was of little consequence
This argument ignores the case set up by the appellant in his written statement and the utter lack of evidence of the authority of the husband or of the assent of his kinsmen which was neither pleaded nor proved
Another circumstance which casts a great deal of doubt on the adoption set up by the appellant is that after the adoption the appellant went back to Raipur where his natural father was residing
Although Badrinarayan stated that after the adoption the appellant lived with his adoptive father this is negatived by the evidence produced by the appellant himself which is to the effect that he went back to school at Raipur and returned to Tirora on the day Lakshminarayan died
The High Court also found that he left for Raipur after the obsequies and returned three or four months later
The school leaving certificate shows that he was a student in the school at Tirora from June 22 1936 to June 30 1937 and there he was entered as the son of Badrinarayan
Taking all these facts into consideration the High Court in our opinion has cor rectly held that the factum of adoption by Lakshminarayan has not been established
It was next argued on behalf of the appellant that even though the evidence produced in support of the adoption might be unsatisfactory and not sufficient to establish the factum of adoption the respondent in this 707 case was estopped from setting up the true facts of the case inasmuch as she represented in the former document and legal proceedings and in various other ways that the appellant was the adopted son of the deceased Lakshminarayan and thereby caused him to change his position by being transferred from the family of Badrinarayan to that of Lakshminarayan
These documents will be discussed later
In this case both the parties were aware of the truth of the facts and consequently the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable
It cannot be said that the respondent by her own words or conduct wailfully caused the appellant to believe the existence of a certain state of things ie adoption by Lakshminarayan and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter his position and therefore she could not be concluded from averring a different state of things as existing at the same time
See Pickard vs Sear 1 and Square vs Square 2 
The Privy Council in Mohori Bibi vs Dhurmdas Ghogh 3  held that there can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both the parties
Therefore when both the parties are equally conversant with the true facts the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable
The documents giving rise to the plea of estoppel were four and the appellant also relied on the acts of the respondent which will be referred to later
The first document was an application dated March 21 1936 for a succession certificate which was filed by the respondent as  guardian mother  of the appellant Kishorilal
The necessity for this application arose because in order to get insurance money on a policy taken out by the deceased Lakshminarayan a succession certificate had to be obtained
The High Court came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the respondent Chaltibai s signatures were obtained on the document after it was explained to her the document was in English and she was not conversant with that language
Two other drafts were made for the application for this succession certificate which 1   2 3 1902 30 IA 114
708 are both on the record
In these two drafts Badrinarayan is shown as  guardian uncle  of the appellant Kishorilal
Although Badrinarayan was reluctant to do so he had to admit the existence of these two drafts but added that he had instructed Jivan Singh a servant of Lakshminarayan not to file the application till after he had consulted a Mr P section Deo a pleader and after he had consulted him the application was filed but with Chaltibai as guardian
This document in para
3 sets out the names of the relations of the deceased
They were the widow Chaltibai the daughter Jamnabai the brother Badrinarayan and the four sons of Badrinarayan
In this column the appellant Kishorilal was not shown as a relative of the deceased
In a later paragraph it was stated that the petitioner i e the appellant Kishorilal claimed the certificate as the adopted son of the deceased Lakshminarayan
On the finding of the High Court that the document was not explained to the respondent Chaltibai it cannot be said that it established any admission much less estoppel
This document did not contain any admission which would necessarily show that Kishorilal appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan during his lifetime
The next document relied upon is a bahi entry in a Mathura Panda s book dated July 21 1944
The story is that the respondent Chaltibai visited Mathura on her way back from Badrinarayan and the Panda of the family made an entry in his bahi after making enquiries from her showing the appellant Kishorilal as the adopted son
The entry is signed by her
This document is contradicted by another entry in the same Panda s bahi which is stated to have been made at the instance of Mohanlal the eldest brother of the appellant on March 2 1947 about 2 12 years after the pre vious entry
In the later entry the appellant Kishorilal was shown as the son of Badrinarayan and not the adopted son of Lakshminarayan
Whether the document the previous Bahi entry was at the instance of the respondent Chaltibai or not is not material because it does not advance the case of the appellant
This document also does not show that the appellant 709 was adopted by Lakshminarayan
Then there is a document adhikar patra dated May 4 1946 by which a dispute between the appellant and the respondent was referred to the arbitration of 7 persons
It was signed by the appellant and the respondent and it was therein recited  Relations between us mother and son have become strained in connection with some matters
it is very necessary to remove the same
In another portion of the document also words used are between us the mother and the son
This document also was not accepted by the High Court as containing an admission because even at the time of its execution the respondent Chaltibai was denying the adoption of Kishorilal which was proved by the testimony of two of the panches arbitrators themselves
It cannot be said therefore that this document represented correct state of affairs but even if it did it cannot be treated as an admission by the respondent that the appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan
Lastly there is the deed of sale dated January 24 1938 wherein the respondent had recited that the appellant Kishorilal was adopted by her husband in accordance with his wishes and consent of the entire family 
This recital negatives the whole case of the appellant as set up in his written statement that he was adopted by Lakshminarayan during his lifetime
In his written statement he bad only pleaded his having been placed in the lap of the respondent Chaltibai as confirmatory of his adoption by Lakshminarayan
The documents mentioned above do not support the plea that the appellant had been led
to alter his position through a belief in any misrepresentation made by the respondent Chaltibai as to his having been adopted by Lakshminarayan
And he cannot be allowed to set up a case different to his case in the written statement nor can he be allowed to prove his title as an adopted son on such different case
See Tayammaul vs Sashachalla Naiker 1 Gopeelal vs Mussamat Chandraolee Buhajee 2 
The correct rule of estoppel applicable in the case of adoption is that it 1 1865 10 MIA 429
2 1872 SUPP
IA 131
710 does not confer status
It shuts out the mouth of certain persons if they try to deny the adoption but where both parties are equally conversant with the true state of facts this doctrine has no application
Two further facts which the appellant s counsel relied upon to support his plea of estoppel were 1 his being allowed to perform the obsequies of Lakshminarayan and 2 the performance of his marriage by the respondent Chaltibai as his adoptive mother
If the adoption itself is disproved these two facts will not add to the efficacy of the plea of estoppel which otherwise is inapplicable Dhanraj vs Sonabai 1
The appellant relied on Rani Dharam Kunwar vs Balwant Singh 2 which was a case where the adoptive mother the Rani had herself in a previous proceeding pleaded that she had authority to adopt and the Privy Council were of the opinion that the question could be decided on its own facts without recourse to the doctrine of estoppel although they did not differ from the view of the courts below as to the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel
That was not a case of the parties being equally conversant with the true facts and further there was a finding that the person claiming to be the adopted son was as a matter of fact adopted
In our view there is no substance in the plea of estoppel raised by the appellant
Whatever the acts of the respondent Chaltibai what
ever her admissions and whatever the course of conduct she pursued qua the appellant Kishorilal they could not amount to estoppel as both parties were equally conversant with the true facts
In none of the four documents which are signed by her is there any admission that Kishorilal was adopted by her husband during his lifetime
On the other hand in the sale deed dated January 24 1938 she recited an adoption by herself which is not the adoption that the appellant relied upon in support of his case
The other documents i e the application for succession certificate and the arbitration agreement and the entry in the Panda s bahi are all consistent with the recital in the sale deed and do not establish the case 1 1925 52 IA 231 243
2 1912 39 IA 142 148
711 of the appellant as to the adoption by Lakshminarayan himself
It was then argued for the appellant that the course of conduct of the respondent and her various acts of admission and the treatment of the appellant as an adopted son by the respondent and other members of the family gave rise to a strong inference that he the appellant was adopted as aleged by him and the evidence should have been so appraised as to support that inference
Particular emphasis was placed by counsel for the appellant on the fact that soon after the death of Lakshminarayan it was given out that the appellant was his adopted son and this assertion was continuously made in many transactions and documents
These documents the course of conduct of Chaltibai respondent in treating the appellant as the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and the length of the appellant s possession of Lakskminarayan s estate it was contended showed that he was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan
It was also submit ted that the admissions shifted the onus on to the respondent on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established Chandra Kunwar vs Narpat Singh 1
The question of onus loses its efficacy because it was never objected to in the courts below and evidence having been led by the parties at this stage the court has to adjudicate on the material before it
And admissions are not conclusive and unless they constitute estoppel the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue Trinidad Asphalt Company vs Coryat 2
Admissions are mere pieces of evidence and if the truth of the matter is known to both parties the principle stated in Chandra Kunwar s case 1 would be inapplicable
And in this case there is no admission by the respondent of the appellant s adoption by her husband in his lifetime
Such admissions that there are cannot help the case of the appellant or support a different appraisal of the evidence of the factum of 1 1906 34 1
A 27
2 712 adoption or establish an adoption which is otherwise disproved
In order to properly appreciate the effect of these admissions it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which these various documents were executed and the acts done or the admissions made
At the death of Lakshminarayan the respondent was 24 or 25 years old surrounded by the family of Badrinarayan whose interest it was to foist an adoption on her
Her own relations do not seem to have taken much interest in her or her affairs
She was thus a widow lonely and dependent upon her husband s relations
The trial Court described her as a pardanashin woman
Although Badrinarayan himself denied that he was managing the estate of Lakshminarayan Narsingdas one of the appellant s witnesses stated that Badrinarayan was doing so and Badrinarayan admitted that he looked after the court cases though at the request of the respondent
It is with this back
ground that the evidence has to be considered and weighed
Any admission made by a widow situated as the respondent was would necessarily carry very little weight Padamlal vs Fakira Debya 1
Besides the four documents above mentioned the appellant Kishorilal relied on the following facts as instances of admissions and conduct of the respondent Chaltibai
The first is the performance of obsequies by the appellant and the subsequent taking of the appellant in her lap by the respondent
The mere fact of performance of these funeral rites does not necessarily support an adoption
The performance of these rites frequently varies according to the circumstances of each case and the view and usage of different families
The evidence led by the appellant him self shows that in the absence of the son junior relations like a younger brother or a younger nephew performs the obsequial ceremonies
As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Tayamal s case 2 the performance of funeral rites will not sustain an adoption unless it clearly appears that the adoption itself was performed under circumstances as would render it 1 AIR 1931 PC 84
2 1865 10 MIA 429
713 perfectly valid
But then it was submitted that the taking by the respondent of the appellant in her lap coupled with the performance of obsequies was a clear proof of her acceptance of the appellant s adoption by her deceased husband
This again is slender basis for any such inference as Badrinarayan himself stated that it was not customary amongst them for the widow to take the adopted son in her lap and in this particular case it was only done as she desired it
As proof of adoption by Lakshminarayan this piece of evidence has no value because that is not the case of the appellant and as showing confirmatory process it is valueless in the absence of evidence sufficient to establish the adoption by Lakshminarayan which in this case is lacking
The appellant s residing with Lakshminarayan after his adoption and after the death of Lakshminarayan with the respondent was next relied upon by counsel for the appellant As we have already said the appellant had not proved that he was residing with Lakshminarayan after his adoption on the contrary the evidence shows that he left Tirora soon after his alleged adoption and did not return till after the death of Lakshminarayan
And then again he returned to Raipur and returned to Tirora after about four or five months
The mere fact that he continued to reside with the respondent since would not in this case prove adoption because in the school register he was shown as the son of Badrinarayan and continued to be so shown upto June 30 1937 and mere residence of a young nephew with a widowed and young aunt is no proof of adoption by her husband in the absence of satisfactory evidence of the factum of adoption
The appellant it was next contended was in possession of the properties of Lakshminarayan after the latter s death and his name was brought on the record in all civil and revenue proceedings
As we have said above Badrinarayan took over the management of the estate of Lakshminarayan and was looking after the conduct of the court cases
If in those circumstances the mutations were made in the name of the 90 714 appellant or suits were brought in his name or even if he took out licences in his name would be matters of small consequence
It is not shown that at the time of the mutations the respondent was present or was represented or the suits were brought with her knowledge and it appears that all this was done because the management of the estate as well as the conduct of the cases in courts was in the hands of Badrinarayan
Then the fact that after he attained majority the appellant was managing the estate and was recognised by everybody as its owner also is of little consequence because as far as the respondent was concerned somebody had to manage the property whether it was Badrinarayan or the appellant Kishorilal to her it made no difference
It may also be mentioned here that in the mutation order passed by the Tehsildar on April 8 1936 which related to 3As
share of Mouza Jabartola the mutation entry was made in favour of the respondent and not in the name of the appellant and in the jamabandi papers relating to different holdings in some places the appellant is shown under the guardianship of his mother Chaltibai and in other places under the guardianship of Badrinarayan as his uncle
A great deal of stress was laid by the appellant on the fact that his marriage was performed by the respondent Chaltibai and she purported to do so as his adoptive mother
The performance of the marriage itself does not prove adoption which is otherwise disproved and as a circumstance supporting the inference of adoption set up by the appellant it is wholly neutral
At the most the circumstances relied upon by the appellant may be acts of acquiescence attributed to the respondent but they would be important only if they were brought to bear upon the question which depended upon preponderance of evidence
If the facts are once ascertained presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts themselves disprove See Tayamal s case 1 at p 433
Presumptions cannot sustain an adoption even though 11865 10 MIA 429
715 it might have been acquiesced in by all concerned when as in the present case the evidence shows that the adoption did not take place
Another fact on which the appellant relied was that on October 30 1933 Badrinarayan his wife and his sons partitioned their family property
That is not an act of the respondent and cannot affect her rights if they are otherwise enforceable
On the whole we are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court is sound and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 was amended by Act 57 of 1988 which introduced Sections 14B to 14D to the Act carving out thereby classified landlords from the general class of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if these are required for their own residence
The released or retired persons from armed forces or the dependents of the member of armed forces killed in action are covered by Section 14B the retired employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14C and the landlords who are widows are covered by Section 14D
These classified landlords are also given the benefit of summary trial under Chapter IIIA by introducing Sections 14B to 14D in Sub section 1 of Section 25B but there are no corresponding amendments to sub sections 2 to 5 of Section 25B
The two petitioners who are tenants were in occupation of the premises belonging to two Army Officers respondent landlords
In the 365 action for eviction brought by the landlords on the ground that they needed the premises for their occupation the tenants sought leave to contest the application which the Rent Controller being not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in their affidavits denied
The Rent Controller accepted the case of the landlords and ordered eviction of the tenants
The two tenants challenged the eviction orders by filing separate revision petitions in the High Court
They also challenged the validity of Section 14B of the Act before the High Court by means of two separate writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution
The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the revision petition filed by one of the tenants who being aggrieved moved this Court by way of special Leave Petition Nos
7146 Court following its decision in the first case dismissed the writ petition filed by him though the revision petition filed by him was still pending
The tenant challenged the decision of the High Court by preferring Special Leave Petition No 7364 of 1990 to this Court
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the tenant s right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14le cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14B to 14D
The tenant is entitled to leave to contest the application by disclosing such facts in the affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14le
This is because of retention of sub section 5 of Section 25B without any amendment and absence of amendment to Section 25C2
It was also contended that sub sections 4 and 5 of Section 25B are a composite scheme and since that scheme has been left untouched the tenant s right thereunder cannot be denied
It was further contended that sub section 6 of Section 14 is attracted to applications under Sections 14B to 14D
Dismissing the Petitions the Court HELD 1
Section 14B is a special provision made by the legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover from their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their occupation
369E 21 The Tenant cannot claim right to contest an application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14le against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14B to 14D Acceptance of such a claim would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who are carved out from 366 the general landlords indeed it would render the whole exercise of creating special classes of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate of the premises let out by them nugatory
371H 372C 22 The remedy under Section 14le is available only to landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under Sections 14B to 14D
The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under Section 14le
372E F 23 Sections 14B to 14D are markedly different from Section 141e375E F 31 The argument that the absence of amendments to sub sections 4 and 5 of Section 25B preserves the tenant s right to contest the application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14le is not sustainable
Sub section 4 of Section 25B provides that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided which in the contest means as provided under sub section 5
This is the only sub section under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises
376G F 32 The form specified in the Third Schedule refers only to application filed under Section 14le or Section 14A
Therefore when an application is filed under Section 14B a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other references which are not relevant and the summons should state that the application is filed under Section 14B and not under Section 14le or 14A Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14C to 14D the summons should state accordingly
That would indicate the scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub section 5 of Section 25B 377G 378A 33 Under sub section 5 the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Sections 14A 14B 14C or 14D or under Section 14le
378B The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under Section 14le as against an application under Section 14B There cannot be 367 any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant
That would be against our jurisprudence and would be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose
The courts have always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes
378C D 34 Section 14B and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and sub section 5 of Section 25B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Sections 14B to 14D
It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 148 to 14D 378E 4
The tenant is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords
The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14B to 14D do not absolve the landlord from proving that the requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide
In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one
There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of section 25B which states special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement
378H 379B 5
Section 14B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let out and not acquired by transfer
One may become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D
If the transferee wants to evict the tenant he must take action only under Section 14le
Equally Sub section 7 of Section 14 has no application to eviction under Sections 14B to 14D nor the amended provisions under Section 25C2
But that does not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14B to 14D are not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the premises
It is always left to the Controller who is a quasi judicial authority to exercise his discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and grant a reasonable time to the tenant
379E G 6
The Controller s power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 14le or Section 14A is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified  in the respective sections
Therefore if an application is filed under Section 14B or 14C or 14D the tenant s right to contest the application is narrowed down 368 and is restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections
He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14le
Subsection 5 of Section 25B is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to play there
38OB C Busching Schmitz Private Ltd vs PT Menghani  Anr1977 2 SCC 835 affirmed and reiterated
Precision Steel  Engineering Works and Anr
vs Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal  harmonised
The landlord in SLP No 1142590 is living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs2000 pm and requires the premises for himself and the members of his family
The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own premises under section 14B when he is residing in a rented premises
38OD E 8
The contention that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and has become a part of the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was not intended to confer such landlord the special right to recover immediate possession of the premises is not maintainable because Section 14Bl states that the persons who have already retired may within one year from the date of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14B whichever is later apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises
That is the legislative wisdom
38OF G 9
True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings it is permissible to supply the words
Having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful
An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute
378E G Craies Statute Law 7th Edition P 109 Hameedia Hardware Stores V B Mohan Lal Sowcar  at 524 25 and Sirajul Haq Khan  Ors
vs The Sunni Central Board of Waqf 19591 SCR 1287 at 1299 relied upon