etition No 252 of 1956
Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights
Veda Vyasa section K Kapur and Ganpat Rai for the petitioner
G C Mathur and C P Lal for the respondent
April 5
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS CJ
This is a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for a declaration that section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and unconstitutional and for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the petitioner s conviction under that section and for ancillary reliefs
The material facts lie within a narrow compass
The petitioner is the editor printer and publisher of a monthly magazine called Gaurakshak
The magazine is devoted to cow protection
In July or August 1954 a Hindi Daily newspaper named Amrit Patrika  of Allahabad printed and published an article or a cartoon about a donkey on which an agitation was started by the muslims of Uttar Pradesh
The editor and printer and publisher of Amrit Patrika  were prosecuted by the State but they have been eventually acquitted by the High Court of Allahabad
In the meantime in its issue for the month of Kartik Samvat 2009 corresponding to November 1952 an article was published in the petitioner s magazine Gaurakshak  On December 12 1952 the State Government ordered the prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of the said article
Accordingly on June 8 1953acomplaint was filed in the court of the District Magistrate Kanpur 111 862 by the Senior Superintendent of Police Kanpur against the petitioner for offences under sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code
The Magistrate by his order dated August 5 1953 charged the petitioner under sections 153A and 295A and committed the petitioner to the Sessions Court of Kanpur for trial
The petitioner pleaded not guilty
The learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated November 16 1953 acquitted the petitioner of the charge under section 153 Abut convicted him under section 295A and sentenced him to 18 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2000 and in default of payment of the fine to further rigorous imprisonment of 4 months
The petitioner filed an appeal to the High Court at Allahabad
The learned Single Judge by his judgment dated October 25 1956 held that the article was published with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of muslims and that the petitioner was guilty under section 295A of the Indian Penal Code
The learned Judge however reduced the sentence of imprisonment to 12 months and the fine from Rs 2000 to Rs 250 only
An application for certificate to appeal to this Court under articles 132 and 134 having been rejected by the High Court on October 30 1956 the petitioner moved this Court for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated October 25 1956
The petitioner also on December 5 1956 presented the present petition under article 32 for the reliefs mentioned above
The petitioner also made an application in this Court along with the writ petition for stay of the sentence passed on him
On December 18 1956 both the stay application and the petition for special leave were dismissed by this Court
The petition under article 32 has now come up for hearing
Presumably the petitioner has surrendered and is undergoing the sentence of imprisonment
Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition urges that section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and void inasmuch as it interferes with the petitioner s right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to him as a citizen of India by article 191a of our Constitution
The contention is that this section 863 cannot be supported as a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by article 191a as provided in cl
2 of the said Article
Learned counsel says that the interest of public order is the only thing in cl
2 which may possibly be relied upon by the State as affording a justification for its claim for the validity of the impugned section
A law interfering with the freedom of speech and expression and imposing a punishment for its breach may says counsel be in the interests of public order only if the likelihood of public disorder is made an ingredient of the offence and the prevention of public disorder is a matter of proximate and not remote consideration
Learned counsel points out that insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of India may not lead to public disorder in all cases although it may do so in some case
Therefore where a law purports as the impugned section does to authorise the imposition of restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right the court should not uphold it even in so far as it may be applied within the constitutionally permissible limits as it is not severable
So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must according to learned counsel be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void
Reference has been made to the cases of Romesh Thappar vs The St ate of Madras1 and Brij Bushan vs The State of Delhi 2
In Romesh Thappar s case in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 91 A of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949 the Governor of Madras being satisfied that for the purpose of securing public safety and the maintenance of public order it war
necessary so to do prohibited the entry into or the circulation sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross Roads  an English Weekly published at Bombay
1  2  864 The impugned section section
91 A was a law enacted for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order Public order  was said to be an expression of wide connotation and to signify that state of tranquillity which prevailed among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulation enforced by the Government which they had established Public safety  used in that section was taken as part of the wider concept of public order 
Clause 2 of article 19 as it stood then protected a law relating inter alia to a matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State
Some breach of public safety or public order may conceivably undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State but equally conceivably many breaches of public safety or public order may not have that tendency
Therefore a law which imposes restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression for preventing a breach of public safety or public order which may not undermine the security of the State or tend to overthrow the State cannot claim the protection of cl
2 of article 19
Section 91 A was challenged as it embraced both species of activities referred to above and as the section was not severable the whole section was held to be bad
In Brij Bushan s case supra the validity of section 71c of the East Punjab Public Safety Act 1949 as extended to the Province of Delhi came
up for consideration
That section provided that the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may by order in writing addressed to the printer publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny
It was held by this Court Fazl Ali J dissenting that inasmuch as the section authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 191a for the purposes of preventing activities prejudicial to 865 public safety and maintenance of public order it was not a law solely relating to a matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State within the meaning Of Cl
2 of article 19 as it then stood
The principles laid down in Romesh Thappar s case were applied to this case and the law was held to be void
The case of Chintaman Rao vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 1 has also been relied upon in support of the contention that where the language employed in the Statute is wide enough to cover restrictions on a fundamental right both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right and the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out the law must be held to be wholly void
After this Court decided the cases of Romesh Thappar supra and Brij Bushan supra cl
2 of article 19 of the Constitution was amended
Clause 2 as amended protects a law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by sub cl
a of cl
1 of article 19 in the interests of the security of the State friendly relations with foreign States public order decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court defamation or incitement to an offence The question for our consideration is whether the impugned section can be properly said to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of public order
It will be noticed that the language employed in the amended clause is in the interests of and not for the maintenance of
As one of us pointed out in Debi Soron vs The State of Bihar2 the expression in the interests of makes the ambit of the protection very wide
A law may not have been designed to directly maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interests of public order
It is pointed out that section 295A has been included in chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code which deals with offences relating to religion and not in chapter VIII 1  2 AIR 1954 Patna 254
866 which deals with offences against the public tranquillity and from this circumstance it is faintly sought to be urged therefore that offences relating to religion have no bearing on the maintenance of public order or tranquillity and consequently a law creating an offence relating to religion and imposing restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression cannot claim the protection of el
2 of article 19
A reference to articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution which guarantee the right to freedom of religion will show that the argument is utterly untenable
The right to freedom of religion assured by those Articles is expressly made subject to public order morality and health
Therefore it cannot be predicated that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on the maintenance of public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot under any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order
These two Articles in terms contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the interests of public order
Learned counsel then shifted his ground and formulated his objection in a slightly different way
Insults to the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of India may says learned counsel lead to public disorders in some cases but in many cases they may not do so and therefore a law which imposes restrictions on the citizens  freedom of speech and expression by simply making insult to religion an offence will cover both varieties of insults ie those which may lead to public disorders as well asthose which may not
The law in so far as it covers the first variety may be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order within the meaning of el
2 of article 19 but in so far as it covers the remaining variety will not fall within that clause
The argument then concludes that so long as the possibility of the law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out the entire law should be held to be unconstitutional and void
We are unable in view of the language used in the impugned section 867 to accede to this argument
In the first place el
2 of article 19 protects a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of public order which is much wider than for maintenance of public order
If therefore certain activities have a tendency to cause public disorder a law penalising such activities as an offence cannot but be held to be a law imposing reasonable restriction in the interests of public order although in some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public order
In the next place section 295A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class
Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deli
berate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section
It only Punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class
The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order and the section which penalises such activities is well within the protection of cl
2 of article 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 191a
Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by the impugned section there cannot in our opinion be any possibility of this law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution
In other words the language employed in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right guaranteed by article 191s and consequently the question of severability does not 868 arise and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner have no application to this case
For the reasons stated above the impugned section falls well within the protection of el
2 of article 19 and this application must therefore be dismissed
Application dismissed


Summary:
This was a petition challenging the constitutional validity of section 295A of the Indian Penal Code and for quashing the petitioner s conviction thereunder for publishing an article in a monthly magazine of which he was the printer publisher and the editor
It was contended on his behalf that the impugned section infringed his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by article 191a of the Constitution and was not a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the right in the interests of public order under cl
2 of article 19 which alone could have afforded a justification for it
Held that section 295A of the Indian Penal Code was well within the protection of Cl
2 of article 19 of the Constitution and its validity was beyond question
The expression in the interests of occurring in the amended Cl
2 of article 19 had the effect of making the protection afforded by that clause very wide and a law not directly designed to maintain public order would well be within its protection if such activities as it penalised had a tendency to cause public disorder
Debi Soron vs The State of Bihar AIR 1954 Pat 254 referred to
It was absurd to suggest that insult to religion as an offence could have no bearing on public order so as to attract cl
2 Of article 19 in view of the provisions of articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution which while guaranteeing freedom of religion expressly made it subject to public order
861 Nor having regard to the language and ingredients of section 295A of the Indian Penal Code could it be contended that the restrictions imposed by it could be used for purposes other than those falling within the limits of the Constitution
Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras   Brij Bushan vs The State of Delhi  and Chintaman Rao vs The State of Madhya Pradesh 1950 SCR 759 held inapplicable