ivil Appeal No 5736 of 1985  CA No 5081986
From the Judgment and Order dated 1481985 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Writ Petition No 3420 of 1983
NN Keswani and RN Keswani for the Appellants
G Ramaswamy Additional Solicitor General SK Dhola kia Shishir Sharma PH Parekh AS Bhasme and VB Joshi for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
The case involved in these two appeals with leave seems indeed straight forward enough but the High Court of Bombay made it as we venture to think unsatisfactory and in a sense against judicial pro priety and decorum
The facts which are of central importance may be stated as follows
On June 19 1982 the Government of Maharashtra issued a draft notification under sec
33 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act 1949 the Act
The draft notification proposed the formation of what is termed as Kalyan Corporation the Corporation
It suggested the merging of Municipal areas of Kalyan Ambarnath Domoivali and Ulhasnagar
Against this proposal there were many objections and representations from persons companies and the authorities
Ambarnath and Ulhasnagar Municipal bodies and also some of the residents therein submitted their represen 409 tations
They objected to the merger of their municipal areas into the Corporation
It is said that in Ulhasnagar Municipal area Sindhies are predominant
In 1947 they were the victims of partition of the country
Being uprooted from their home land they have since settled down at Ulhasnagar
They have formed union or federation called the All India Sindhi Panchayat Federation
It is interested in having a separate identity for Ulhasnagar
The Federation challenged the said draft notification by a writ petition before the Bombay High Court
The writ petition was not disposed of on merits
It was permitted to be withdrawn on an assurance given by the Government
The Government gave the assurance that the representatives of the Federation would be given an opportunity of being heard before taking a final decision
As per the assurance they were given personal hearing on their representations
The others who have filed similar representations were not heard
But their objections or representations were duly considered
Thereupon the Govern ment decided to exclude Ulhasnagar from the proposed Corpo ration
Accordingly a notification under sec
32 of the Act was issued
The Corporation was thus constituted without Ulhasnagar
That was the only alteration made in the propos al earlier notified
All other areas indicated in the draft notification were merged in the Corporation
The residents of Ambarnath Municipal areas were not satisfied
They were perhaps more worried by the exclusion of Ulhasnagar than the inclusion of their own area
They moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the notification issued under sec
32 of the Act
They inter alia contended that the action of the Government affording an opportunity of being heard only to the Federation and not to other objectors was contrary to Article 14
It was a hostile discrimination to hear only one of the objectors
They asserted that the establishment of the Corporation without Ulhasnagar Municipal area having regard to the geographical contiguity was unintelligible and incomprehensible
It was arbitrary and opposed to the object of the Act
They also contended that there ought to have been a fresh draft notification after taking a decision to exclude Ulhasnagar from the proposal
With similar conten tions and for the same relief there was another writ peti tion before the High Court
It was filed by the National Rayon Corporation Limited which is a company located within the Municipal limits of Ambarnath
The Sindhi Panchayat Federation was not a party to the writ petitions
It was however allowed as an intervener
Some other persons who were interested in the outcome of the writ petitions were 410 also permitted to intervene in the proceedings
They sup ported the stand taken by the Government which was the main respondent in the writ petitions
The State in its counter affidavit resisted the peti tioners  claim raising several grounds
The first point to be noted in this context is this That the formation of Municipal Corporation under sec
3 of the Act is an extension of the legislative process and therefore sec
3 is nothing but a piece of conditional legisla tion
The principles of natural justice will not apply to such legislative function nor it could be imparted into it even by necessary implication
The petitioners have not chal lenged the validity of the sub section 2 of sec
8 of the Act and even otherwise the said validity has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court Shah and Deshpande J J in writ petition No 706 A of 1982 The Village Panchayat Chikalthane and Anr
vs The State of Maharashtra and Anr
decided on 2324 Decem ber 1982
Therefore it cannot be said that the notification issued in exercise of the said legislative power is vitiated by non complaince with the principles of natural justice
The conditions laid down by sec
3 are fully complied with a preliminary notifi cation was issued as contemplated by sub section 4 of sec
3 of the Act the objec tions and suggestions made by the various citizens and persons were duly considered by the State Government and thereafter the final notification was issued
In the very nature of things there is bound to be difference and variance between the preliminary notification and the final notification
Only because the Ulhasnagar Municipal Council is excluded from the final notification it cannot be said that there was any major departure from the prelim inary notification or it was necessary to issue a preliminary notification over again before the final notification was issued in that behalf
 The second factual point to be noted is this Due to partition of India in 1947 the Sindhi people have been uprooted from their homeland and with hard labour they have settled them selves in different parts of the country
One can appreciate their feelings about their anxi 411 ety to maintain their separate entity
If such a large part is forcibly included in the Corporation ignoring their sentiments and wishes it may not result in smooth working of the proposed Corporation which is necessary for proper development
It is therefore desirable to constitute the new Kalyan Corpo ration without including Ulhasnagar for the time being The High Court was not impressed with the above reason ings
The High Court said that the decision to exclude Ulhasnagar was taken by the Government abruptly and in an irrational manner
The decision was arbitrary and against the purpose of the Act
On the legality of the procedure followed by the Government the High Court said Once that decision was taken it was obliga tory on the part of the Government to recon sider the proposal as a whole so far as the rest of the areas are concerned Reference was also made to the report of the Sathe Commission to fortify the conclusion that Ulhasnagar could not have been isolated
The Sathe Commission was a one man Commission appointed by the State Government to enquire and report on the establishment of new Municipal Corporations
The Commission in its report among others seems to have indicated that Kalyan Ulhasnagar and Ambarnath are one contiguous stretch of territory with a length of about 8 kms
from North West to South East
The High Court then made some general observations as to the purpose for which Municipal Corporations should be constituted went on It was the avowed policy after independence to change the socio economic map of the vil lage and town
A corporate life can only be ensured if there is a corporate conscience and an attitude to live together
City is an epitome of the social world where all belts of civilization interest along its avenues
A Municipal Corporation is   in nature where people belonging to different castes creeds religious and language want to live with each other
Town planning cannot be denominational or fractional
It is not a museum of human beings otherwise Harijan Bastis Mominpures and such other Mohallas will have to be preserved to maintain its separate identity and the socio 412 economic map of the village or city will never change
It cannot be forgotten that we are heading towards a global village
By saying this we do not want to belittle the achieve ments of sacrifice of the Sindhi Community
However that is not very relevant for decid ing the question of the establishment of a Municipal Corporation
Its main object is to ensure better municipal government of the city
It appears that Government was also aware of this and this seems to be the reason why the decision for the time being is perti nent and clearly indicates that the Government wanted to reconsider the issue at a later stage
However unfortunately till today Government has not taken any decision in that behalf
 The High Court however felt that it was not necessary to quash the notification establishing the Corporation
This is how the conclusion was reached It will not be fair to quash the notification as a whole and unsettle the Municipal Adminis tration
In our view that is also not neces sary since from the affidavit of the Govern ment it is clear that the decision taken in that behalf was tentative ie for the time being and it is not all time permanent deci sion
Under sub section 3 of sec
3 of the act the State Government has power to exclude or include any area specified in the notifica tion issued so far as Ambarnath Town is con cerned reconsideration of the present case of the whole matter was absolutely necessary when the decision to exclude the Ulhasnagar Munici pal Council from the proposed Municipal Corpo ration though tentative in nature was taken
 Finally the operative portion of the Order was put in the following terms Therefore without setting aside the final notification we direct the State Government to reconsider the proposal under sub sec
3 of sec
3 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act either to exclude or include any area within a period of six months from today
The writ of mandamus to be issued accordingly
It is needless to say that after the necessary steps are taken under sec
33 of the Act the State Government shall make the necessary 413 amends in the notification issued
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX In the result therefore the rule is made partly absolute and the State Government is directed to exercise its power under sec
3 sub sec
3 of the Act in accordance with law within a period of six months
It is needless to say that the petitioners will be entitled to raise objections and make their suggestions in that behalf after a notification under sub sec 3 read with sub sec 4 of sec
3 of the Act is issued
Since the popular local self Government is not in existence in any of the Municipal Councils or even in the newly established municipal corporation and having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in our view this is a fit case where the petitioners of these two petitions and All India Sindhi Panchayat Federation should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any final decision in the matter is taken
 Against the judgment of the High Court the State Gov ernment has not preferred any appeal
The Kalyan City Corpo ration though vitally concerned with the matter has also not appealed to this Court
The present appeals are only by those who were impleaded as interveners in the writ peti tions
We have heard counsel for all parties and gave our best attention to the questions raised by the appellants
Counsel for the appellants reiterated the stand taken by the Govern ment before the High Court
He urged that the State has a wide discretion in the selection of areas for constituting the Corporation and the Court cannot interfere with such discretion
The Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the reason that goes into the decision of the Government
The power to constitute Municipal Corporations under sec
3 of the Act is legislative in character
It is an extension of legislative process for which rules of natural justice have no application
He said that the Gov ernment in the instant case has complied with the statutory requirements and it was not expected to do anything more in the premises
And at any rate it is wholly unnecessary according to the counsel to go through that exercise again as the High Court has suggested
414 The other limb of the argument of counsel for the appel lants relates to the manner in which the High Court disposed of the matter
it was said that a decision of this Court has been disregarded and a binding decision of a co ordinate Bench of the same Court has been ignored
The grievance of the appellants  counsel in our opin ion is not wholly unjustified
At the beginning of the judgment we have said that the High Court rendered the judgment in a sense against the judicial propriety and decorum
We were not happy to make that observation but constrained to say so in the premise and background of the case
It may be noted that the result of the writ petitions before the High Court turns on the nature and scope of the power conferred on the Government under sec
3 of the Act
A Division Bench of the High Court has taken the view that that power is in the nature of legislative process
That judgment was rendered on 2324 December 1982 by a Bench consisting of Shah and Deshpande JJ
It was in writ peti tion No 706 A of 1982 The Village Panchayat Chikalthana and Another vs The State of Maharashtra and Another In that case the challenge was to the validity of sec
32 of the Act on the ground that it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation for want of guidelines for the exercise of power
Repelling the contention it was held that sec
3 is in the nature of a conditional legislation and therefore laying down the policy or guidelines to exercise the power was unnecessary
It was emphasized that the exercise of power under sec
32 is conditioned by only two requirements viz 1 previous publication as contemplated by sub sec
4 of sec
3 of the Act 2 issuance of a notification by the Government after such previous publication
Once the Government publishes such a notification the legislation becomes complete and the other provisions of the Act are ipso facto attracted to the Corporation so constituted
This was the view taken by the High Court in Chikalthane case
To reach that conclusion the learned judges relied upon the decision of this Court in Tulsipur Sugar Company case  The attention of the High Court in the present case was drawn to the decision in Chikalthane case
Counsel for the State and interveners seemed to have argued that the present case really fell fairly and squarely within what was said there
They were indeed on terra firma since the decision in Chikalthane case was a clear authority against every conten tion raised by the petitioners
Faced with this predicament counsel for the petitioners urged before the High Court that their case should be referred to a larger Bench to reconsid er the deci 415 sion m Chikalthane case
But learned Judges Dharmadhikari and Kantharia J J did not heed to that submission
They neither referred the case to a larger Bench nor followed the view taken in the Chikalthane case
It was not as if they did not comprehend the issue to be determined and the prin ciple to be applied
They were very much aware of it when they remarked In our opinion once it is accepted that this is a piece of conditional legislation then it will have to be held that the principle of natural justice would not apply to such a case as held by the Division Bench of this Court in village Panchayat Chikalthane s case nor it could be said that because under a mistaken notice the Federation was heard the denial of such a right to the petitioners will amount to hostile discrimination within the contempla tion of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
 After referring to these simple legal principles it is unfortunate that the issue at stake was little explored
The key question raised in the case was side tracked and a new strategy to interfere with the decision of the Government was devised
The learned Judges directed the Government to publish again a draft notification for reconsideration of the matter
They gave liberty to the writ petitioners and the interveners to submit their representations
They ob served that this is a fit case where the parties should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard
 They did not quash the impugned notification but told the Government to make necessary changes in the light of fresh consideration
All these directions were issued after recording a positive finding that the exclusion of Ulhasnagar from the Corpora tion was arbitrary and irrational
The net result of it is that there is now no discretion with the Government to keep Ulhasnagar away from the Corporation
It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court
One must remember that pursuit of the law however glamorous it is has its own limitation on the Bench
In a multi judge court the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure
They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found no rule and no authority
The judicial decorum and legal pro priety demand that where a learned single judge or a Divi sion Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co ordinate jurisdiction the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench
It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure
416 Deprecating this kind of tendency of some judges Das Gupta J in Mahadeolal Kanodia vs The Administrator Gener al of West Bengal AIR 1960 SC 926 said at 941 We have noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision of two Judges of the same High Court in Deorajin s case 1954 Cal 119 was cited before the learned Judges who heard the present appeal they took on themselves to say that the previ ous decision was wrong instead of following the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision of referring no less than legal propriety form the basis of judicial procedure
If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing it is the quality of certainty
That quality would totally disappear if Judges of co ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another s decision
 The attitude of Chief Justice Gajendragadkar in Lala Shri Bhagwan and Anr
vs Ram Chand and Anr
  was not quite different at 1773 It is hardly necessary to emphasize that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge need to be reconsidered he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single judge but should refer the matter to a Divi sion Bench or in a proper case place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question
That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is rounded on healthy principles of judi cial decorum and propriety
It is to be re gretted that the learned Judges departed from this traditional way in the present case and choose to examine the question himself
 The Chief Justice Pathak in a recent decision stressed the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a Court
Speaking for the Constitution Bench Union of India vs Raghubir Singh  learned Chief Justice said at 766 The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of pro 417 moting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transac tions forming part of his daily affairs
And therefore the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the deci sions of a Court
 Cardozo propounded a similar thought with more emphasis 1 am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction of inconsisten cies and irrelevancies and artifical excep tions unless for some sufficient reason which will commonly by some consideration of history or custom or policy or justice
Lacking such a reason I must be logical just as I must be impartial and upon like grounds
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another The Nature of the Judicial Process by Benjamin N Cardozo p33 In our system of judicial review which is a part of our Constitutional scheme we hold it to be the duty of judges of superior courts and tribunals to make the law more pre dictable
The question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches
The law must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour
It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the Courts profession and public
Otherwise the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients
Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions
The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute
Judge learned Hand has referred to the tendency of some judges who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table
The Spirit of Liberty by Alfred A Knopf New York 1953 p 131
This is indeed to be deprecated
It is needless to state that the judgment of superior courts and Tribunals must be written only after deep travail and posi tive vein
One should never let a decision go until he is absolutely sure it is right
The law must be made clear certain and consistent
But certitude is not the test of certainty and consistency does not mean that there should be no word of new content
The principle of law may develop side by side with new content but not 418 with inconsistencies
There could be waxing and wanning the principle depending upon the pragmatic needs and moral yearnings
Such development of law particularly is inevita ble in our developing country
In Raghubir Singh case learned Chief Justice Pathak had this to say  at 767 Legal compulsions cannot be limited by exist ing legal propositions because there will always be beyond the frontiers of the exist ing law new areas inviting judicial scrutiny and judicial choice making which could well affect the validity of existing legal dogma
The search for solutions responsive to a changed social era involves a search not only among competing propositions of law or competing versions of a legal proposition or the modalities of an indeterminacy such as fairness or reasonableness but also among propositions from outside the ruling law corresponding to the empirical knowledge or accepted values of present time and place relevant to the dispensing of justice within the new parameters
And he continued The universe of problems presented for judi cial choicemaking at the growing points of the law is an expanding universe
The areas brought under control by the accumulation of past judicial choice may be large
Yet the areas newly presented for still further choice because of changing social economic and technological conditions are far from inconsiderable
It has also to be remembered that many occasions for new options arise by the mere fact that no generation looks out on the world from quite the same vantage point as its predecessor nor for that matter with the same perception
A different vantage point or a different quality of perception often re veals the need for choicemaking where formerly no alternatives and no problems at all were perceived
 Holmes tells us The truth is that the law is always ap proaching and never reaching consistency
It is forever adopting new principles from life at the end and it always retains old ones from history at the other which have not yet been absorbed or 419 sloughed off
It will become entirely consist ent only when it ceases to grow Holmes the Common Law p 36 1881
Apart from that the judges with profound responsibility could iII afford to take stolid satisfaction of a single postulate past or present in any case
We think it was Cicero who said about someone He saw life clearly and he saw it whole The judges have to have a little bit of that in every case while construing and applying the law
Reverting to the case we find that the conclusion of the High Court as to the need to reconsider the proposal to form the Corporation has neither the attraction of logic nor the support of law
It must be noted that the function of the Government in establishing a Corporation under the Act is neither executive nor administrative
Counsel for the appellants was right in his submission that it is legisla tive process indeed
No judicial duty is laid on the Govern ment in discharge of the statutory duties
The only question to be examined is whether the statutory provisions have been complied with
If they are complied with then the Court could say no more
In the present case the Government did publish the proposal by a draft notification and also con sidered the representations received
It was only thereaf ter a decision was taken to exclude Ulhasnagar for the time being
That decision became final when it was notified under Section 32
The Court cannot sit in judgment over such decision
It cannot lay down norms for the exercise of that power
It cannot substitute even its juster will for theirs
 Equally the rule issued by the High Court to hear the parties is untenable
The Government in the exercise of its powers under Section 3 is not subject to the rules of natu ral justice any more than is legislature itself
The rules of natural justice are not applicable to legislative action plenary or subordinate
The procedural requirement of hear ing is not implied in the exercise of legislative powers unless hearing was expressly prescribed
The High Court therefore was in error in directing the Government to hear the parties who are not entitled to be heard under law
Megarry J in Bates vs Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone and Ors while dealing with the legisla tive process under Section 56 of the Solicitors Act 1957 said at 1378 In the present case the committee in ques tion has an entirely different function it is legislative rather than 420 administrative or executive
The function of the committee is to make or refuse to make a legislative instrument under delegated powers
The order when made will lay down the remu neration for solicitors generally and the terms of the order will have to be considered and construed and applied in numberless cases in the future
Let me accept that in the sphere of the so called quasi judicial the rules of natural justice run and that in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness
Nevertheless these considerations do not seem to me to affect the process of legislation whether primary or delegated
Many of those affected delegated legislation and affected very substantially are never consulted in the process of enacting that legislation and yet they have no remedy
Of course the informal consultation of repre sentative bodies by the legislative authority is a commonplace but although a few statutes have specifically provided for a general process of publishing draft delegated legisla tion and considering objections see for example the Factories Act 1961 Schedule 4 I do not know of any implied right to be con sulted or make objections or any principle upon which the courts may enjoin the legisla tive process at the suit of those who contend that insufficient time for consultation and consideration has been given
I accept that the fact that the order will take the form of a statutory instrument does not per se make it immune from attack whether by injunction or otherwise but what is important is not its form but its nature which is plainly legisla tive
 There are equally clear authorities on this point from this Court
The case in Tvlsipur Sugar Co Ltd vs The Notified Area Committee Tulsipur  was indeed a hard case
But then this Court did not make a bad law
There a notification dated August 22 1955 was issued under Section 3 of the UP Town Area covering the petition er s factory
Consequently the octroi was levied on goods brought by the factory management into the limits of Town Area Committee
The Company questioned the validity of that notification
The case pleaded was that the company had no opportunity to make representation regarding the advisabili ty of extending the limits of the Town Area Committee
Venkataramiah J as the present learned Chief Justice then was while rejecting the contention observed 111920 421 The power of the State Government to make a declaration under Section 3 of the Act is legislative in character because the applica tion of the rest of provisions of the Act to the geographical area which is declared as a town area is dependent upon such declaration
Section 3 of the Act is in the nature of a conditional legislation
Dealing with the nature of functions of a non judicial authori ty Prof SA De Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action third edition observes at page 163 However the analytical classi fication of a function may be a conclusive factor in excluding the operation of the audi alteram partem rule
It is generally assumed that in English law the making of a subordi nate legislative instrument need not be pre ceded by notice or hearing unless the parent Act so provides In Baldev Singh vs State of Himachal Pradesh a similar question arose for consideration
An attempt was made to constitute a notified area as provided under Section 256 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act 1968 by including portions of the four villages for such purposes
The residents of the villages who were mostly agriculturists challenged the validity of the notification before the High Court on the ground that they had no oppor tunity to have their say against that notification
The High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition
In the appeal before this Court it was argued that the extension of notified area over the Gram Panchayat limits would involve civil consequences and therefore it was necessary that persons who would be affected thereby ought to be given an opportunity of being heard
Ranganath Misra J did not accept that contention but clarified at 515 We accept the submission on behalf of the appellants that before the notified area was constituted in terms of Section 256 of the Act the people of the locality should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard and the administrative decision by the State Government should have been taken after con sidering the view of the residents
Denial of such opportunity is not in consonance with the scheme of the rule of law governing our socie ty
We must clarify that the hearing contem plated is not required to be oral and can be by inviting objections and disposing them of in a fair way
 The principles and precedents thus enjoin us not to support the 422 view taken by the High Court
We may only observe that the Government is expected to act and must act in a way which would make it consistent with the good administration
It is they and no one else who must pass judgment on this mat ter
We must therefore leave it to the Government
In the result and for the reasons stated we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court
In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs
Y Lal Appeals allowed


Summary:
The appellant had taken the premises on rent from the respondent landlord for running a cycle and rickshaw repair ing shop
In the rent note there was no stipulation that the appellant would not do any business in the shop except the cycle or rickshaw repairs
Along with the repair business the appellant temporarily carried on sale of televisions also in the premises
The landlord filed an application for eviction under section 132iib of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 alleging that the tenant had put the premises to different use
The Rent Controller rejected the application by holding that the temporary sale of televisions did not constitute user for a purpose other than that for which the premises was leased
On an appeal filed by the landlord the appellate authority granted eviction by holding that the statutory condition was satisfied
The appeal filed by the tenant against the decision of the appellate authority was dis missed by the High Court
Hence this appeal by the tenant
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of eviction HELD Letting of a premises can broadly be for residen tial or commercial purpose
The restriction which is statu torily provided in section 132iib of the Act is obvi ously one to protect the interests of the landlord and is intended to restrict the use of landlord s premises taken by the tenant under lease
It is akin to the provision con tained in section 108o of the dealing with the obliga 424 tions of a lessee
A house let for residential purpose would not be available for being used as a shop even without structural alteration
The concept of injury to the premises which forms the foundation of clause o is the main basis for providing clause b in section 132ii of the Act as a ground for the tenant s eviction
426H 427A B The landlord parts with possession of the premises by giving a lease of the property to the tenant for a consider ation
Ordinarily as long as the interest of the landlord is not prejudiced a small change in the user would not be actionable
In the instant case the premises was let out for running of a repair shop
Along with the repair busi ness sale of televisions was temporarily carried on
This did not constitute a change of user within the meaning of section 132iib of the Act so as to give a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant
427E F Mohan Lal vs Jai Bhagwan   applied
Des Raj vs Sham Lal AIR 1980 P  H 229 held inapplica ble
Moti Ram vs State of Mahdya Pradesh AIR 1978 SC 1594 Maharaj Krishan Kesar vs Milkha Singh Civil Appeal No 1086 of 1964 decided on November 10 1965 SC Dup port Steel Ltd vs Sirs  UP Naing vs Burma Oil Co AIR 1929 PC 108 Raghavan Pillai vs Sainaba Beevi 1977 Kerala LT 417 and Dattatraya vs Gulab Rao  referred to