90 of 1956
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights
R V section Mani for the petitioner
NS Bindra K L Hathi and R H Dhebar for the respondents
January 12
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J
This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution for issuing an appropriate writ to the respondents not to enforce the provisions of s1144 of the Criminal Procedure Code or an appropriate writ forbidding respondent No 4 from proceeding further with the prosecution of the petitioner for offences under sections 143 and 188 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 1 17 thereof for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner before respondent No 4 and for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to respondents 1 to 3 directing them to produce or to cause to be produced the petitioner to be dealt with according to law and to set him at liberty
The facts which have led up to the petition are briefly as follows There are two unions of textile workers in Nagpur one known as the Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh and the other as Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh
The former is a branch of the Indian National Trade Union Congress
The Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh entered into an agreement with the management of the Empress Mills regarding the closure of Empress Mill No 1 for rebuilding it and regarding the employment of workers who were employed therein in a third shift
This agreement was opposed by the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh
On January 25 1956 a group of workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh went in a procession to Gujar s Wada Mahal Nagpur where the office of the Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh is located
54 426 It is said that a scuffle took place there between some members of the procession and some workers belonging to Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh
Thereupon an offence under section 452 read with section 147 of the Indian Penal Code was registered by the police on January 27 1956
A large procession consisting of the workers of the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh was taken out
This procession marched through the city of Nagpur shouting slogans which according to the District Magistrate were provocative
On the same night a meeting was held at the Kasturchand Park in which it was alleged that the workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh were instigated by the speakers who addressed the meeting to offer satyagraha in front of the Empress Mill No 1 and also to take out a procession to the office of the Rashtriya Mill Majdoor Sangh
On January 281956 the workers belonging to the Nagpur Mill Majdoor Sangh assembled in large numbers in Mahal Chowk and on Mahal road blocking the traffic on the road
It is said that these persons were squatting on the road and as they refused to budge the District Magistrate passed an order at 4 00 am on January 29 1956 which came into force immediately and was to remain in force for a period of fifteen days prohibiting among other things the assembly of five or more persons in certain areas specified in the order
The petitioner entertained the view that the order promulgated by the District Magistrate under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was an encroachment on the fundamental rights of the citizens to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably and without arms guaranteed under article 191a and b of the Constitution and therefore he held a public meeting outside the area covered by the aforesaid order
It is alleged that at that meeting he criticised the District Magistrate and exhorted the workers to contravene his order and take out processions in the area covered by the order
Thereupon he was arrested by the Nagpur police for having committed the offences already referred to and produced before a magistrate The magistrate remanded him to 427 jail custody till February 15 1956
The petitioner s application for bail was rejected on the ground that the accusation against him related to a Don bailable offence
Thereupon the petitioner moved the High Court at Nagpur for his release on bail but his application was rejected on February 22 1956
The petitioner then presented a petition before the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a writ of habeas corpus
That petition was dismissed by the High Court on May 9 1956
The petitioner then moved the High Court for granting a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution
The High Court refused to grant the certificate non the ground that in its opinion the case did not involve any substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of the Constitution and was also not otherwise fit for grant of a certificate
On April 23 1956 the petitioner presented the present petition before this Court
The petitioner also sought an exparte order for the stay of the proceedings before the respondent No 4 till the decision on the petition to this Court
This Court admitted the petition but rejected the application for stay
On May 6 1956 the petitioner took out a notice of motion for securing stay of the proceedings before respondent No 4
On May 281956 this Court ordered that the entire prosecution evidence be recorded but the delivery of the judgment be stayed pending the decision of this petition
After the proceedings were stayed by this Court the petitioner was released on bail by the trying magistrate
On behalf of the petitioner Mr Mani has raised the following contentions 1 That section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it relates to placing of restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly confers very wide powers on the District Magistrate and certain other magistrates and thus places unreasonable restrictions on the rights guaranteed under article 191a and b of the Constitution
2 The District Magistrate constitutes the whole legal machinery and the only check for control on 428 his powers is by way of a petition to him to modify or rescind the order that thus the District Magistrate becomes  a judge in his own cause presumably what learned counsel means is a judge with regard to his own decision and so the remedy afforded by the section is illusory
Further the remedy by way of a revision application before the High Court against the order of the District Magis trate is also illusory and thus in effect there can be no judicial review of his order in the proper sense of that expression
3 Section 144 adopts likelihood or tendency as tests for judging criminality  the test of determining the criminality in advance is unreasonable
4 Section 144 substitutes suppression of lawful activity or right for the duty of public authorities to maintain order
5 Even assuming that section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not ultra vires the Constitution the order passed by the District Magistrate in this case places restrictions which go far beyond the scope of clauses 2 and 3 of article 19 and thus that order is unconstitutional
Learned counsel also challenged the validity of the order on grounds other than constitutional but we need not consider them here since it will be open to the petitioner to raise them at the trial
This being a petition under article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner must restrict himself to those grounds which fall within cl
1 thereof
We think it desirable to reproduce the whole of section 144
1In cases where in the opinion of a District Magistrate a Chief Presidency Magistrate Sub Divisional Magistrate or of any other Magistrate not being a Magistrate of the third class specially empowered by the State Government  or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate to act under this section there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and im mediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable such Magistrate may by a written order stating 429 the material facts of the case and served in manner provided by section 134 direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life health or safety or a disturbance of the public tranquility or a riot or an affray
2 An order under this section may in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed be passed ex parte
3 An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place
4 Any Magistrate may either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor in office
5 Where such an application is received the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order and if the Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part he shall record in writing his reasons for doing
6 No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof unless in cases of danger to human life health or safety or a likelihood of a riot or an affray the State Government  by notification in the Official Gazette otherwise directs
 Sub section 1 confers powers not on the executive but on certain Magistrates
This provision has been amended in some States as for instance the former Bombay State where power has been conferred on the Commissioner of Police to pass an order thereunder
But we are not concerned with that matter here 430 because that provision is not contained in the law as applicable to the former State of Madhya Pradesh with which alone we are concerned in the matter before us
Under sub section 1 the Magistrate himself has to form an opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable
Again the subsection requires the Magistrate to make an order in writing and state therein the material facts by reason of which he is making the order thereunder
The sub section further enumerates the particular activities with regard to which the Magistrate is entitled to place restraints
Sub section 2 requires the Magistrate ordinarily to serve a notice on the person against whom the order is directed and empowers him to proceed exparte only where the circumstances do not admit of serving such a notice in due time
Sub section 3 does not require any comment
Sub section 4 enables a Magistrate to rescind or alter an order made under this section and thus enables the person affected if the order is addressed to a specified individual or any member of the public if the order is addressed to the public in general to seek by making an application exemption from compliance with the order or to seek a modification of the order and thus gives him an opportunity to satisfy the Magistrate about his grievances
The Magistrate has to deal with applications of this kind judicially because he is required by sub section
5 to state his reasons for rejecting wholly or in part the application made to him
Finally the normal maximum duration of the order is two months from the date of its making
The restraints imposed by the order are thus intended to be of a temporary nature
Looking at the section as a whole it would be clear that broadly speaking it is intended to be availed of for preventing disorders obstructions and annoyances and is intended to secure the public weal
The powers are exercisable by responsible magistrates and these magistrates have to act judicially
Moreover the 431 restraints permissible under the provision are of a temporary nature and can only be imposed in an emergency
Even so according to the learned counsel these provisions place unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights of citizens
Firstly according to learned counsel restrictions on the rights guaranteed by cls
2 and 3 of article 19 of the Constitution can be placed in the interest of id public order  and not in the interest of the  general public  which expression according to him is wider in its ambit than public order and that since section 144 enables a magistrate to pass an order in the interest of the general public the restrictions it authorises are beyond those permissible under cls
2 and 3 of article 19
It is significant to note that section 144 nowhere uses the expression  general public 
Some of the objects for securing which an order thereunder can be passed are  to prevent obstruction annoyance injury   etc
No doubt the prevention of such activities would be in the public interest but it would be no less in the interest of maintenance of  public order
 Secondly according to learned counsel section 144 is an amalgam of a number of things to many of which there is no reference even in el
2 of article 19
In order to enable the State to avail of the provisions of cls
2 and 3 he contends a special law has to be passed and a provision like section 144 can serve no purpose
This contention has only to be mentioned to be rejected
Clauses 2 to 6 of article 19 do not require the making of a law solely for the purpose of placing the restrictions mentioned in them
Thirdly according to learned counsel sub section
1 of a 144 does not require the magistrate to make an enquiry as to the circumstances which necessitate the making of an order thereunder
It is true that there is no express mention anywhere in section 144 that the order of the magistrate should be preceded by an enquiry
But we must construe the section as a whole
The latter part of sub section
1 of section 144 specifically mentions that the order of the magistrate should sot out the 432 material facts of the case
It would not be possible for the magistrate to set out the facts unless he makes an enquiry or unless he is satisfied about the facts from personal knowledge or on a report made to him which he prima facie accepts as correct
Clearly therefore the section does not confer an arbitrary power on the magistrate in the matter of making an order
It is contended that section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers very wide powers upon certain magistrates and that in exercise of those powers the magistrates can place very severe restrictions upon the rights of citizens to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peaceably and without arms
It seems to us however that wide though the power appears to be it can be exercised only in an emergency and for the purpose of preventing obstruction annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or danger to human life health or safety or a disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot or  an affray 
These factors condition the exercise of the power and it would consequently be wrong to regard that power as being unlimited or untrammelled
Further it should be borne in mind that no one has a right to cause  obstruction annoyance or injury etc  to anyone
Since the judgment has to be of a magistrate as to whether in the particular circumstances of a case an order in exercise of these powers should be made or not we are entitled to assume that the powers will be exercised legitimately and honestly
The section cannot be struck down on the ground that the magistrate may possibly abuse his powers
It is also true that initially it is the magistrate con cerned who has to form an opinion as to the necessity of making an order
The question  therefore is whether the conferral of such a wide power amounts to an infringement of the rights guaranteed under article 191a and b of the Constitution
The rights guaranteed by sub cl
a are not absolute rights but are subject to limitations specified in cl
2 of article 19 which runs thus  Nothing in sub clause a of clause 1 shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the 433 State from making any law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the security of the State friendly relations with foreign States public order decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court defamation or incitement to an offence
 Similarly the rights to which sub cl
b relates are subject to the limitations to be found in cl
3 of article 19 which runs thus  Nothing in sub clause b of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevent the State from making any law imposing in the interests of public order reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause
 The Code of Criminal Procedure was an existing law at the commencement of the Constitution and so in the context of the grounds on which its validity is challenged before us what we have to ascertain is whether the conferral thereunder of a power on a magistrate to place restrictions on the rights to which sub section
a and b of article 19 relate is reasonable
It must be borne in mind that the provisions of section 144 are attracted only in an emergency
Thereunder the initial judge of the emergency is no doubt the District Magistrate or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the sub divisional magistrate or any other magistrate specially empowered by the State Government
But then the maintenance of law and order being the duty and function of the executive department of the State it is inevitable that the q question of formation of the opinion as to whether there is an emergency or not must necessarily rest in the first instance with those persons through whom the executive exercises its functions and discharges its duties
It would be impracticable and even impossible to expect the State Government itself to exercise those duties and func tions in each and every case
The provisions of the section therefore which commit the power in this regard to a magistrate belonging to any of the classes referred to therein cannot be regarded as unreasonable
We 55 434 may also point out that the satisfaction of the magistrate as to the necessity of promulgating an order under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not made entirely subjective by the section
We may also mention that though in an appropriate case a magistrate is empowered to make an order under this section ex parte the law requires that he should where possible serve a notice on the person or persons against whom the order is directed before passing that order
Then sub section
4 provides that any magistrate may either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved rescind or alter any order made under this section
This clearly shows that even where an ex parte order is made the person or persons affected thereby have a right to challenge the order of the magistrate
Sub section
5 provides that where such a challenge is made the magistrate shall give an early opportunity to the person concerned of appearing before him and showing cause against the order
The decision of the magistrate in such a proceeding would undoubtedly be a judicial one inasmuch as it will have been arrived at after hearing the party affected by the order
Since the proceeding before the magistrate would be a judicial one he will have to set aside the order unless he comes to the conclusion that the grounds on which it rests are in law sufficient to warrant it
Further since the propriety of the order is open to challenge it cannot be said that by reason of the wide amplitude of the power which section 144 confers on certain magistrates it places unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights
Learned counsel however says that the right conferred on the aggrieved person to challenge the order of the magistrate is illusory as he would be a judge with regard to his own decision
This argument would equally apply to an application for review made in a civil proceeding and we do not think that it is at all a good one
Again though no appeal has been provided in the Code against the Magistrate s order under section 144 the High Court has power under section 435 read with section 439 of the Code to entertain an application for the revision of such an order The powers of the High Court in 435 dealing with a revision application are wide enough to enable it to quash an order which cannot be supported by the materials upon which it is supposed to be based
We may point out that sub section
1 of section 144 requires a magistrate who makes an order thereunder to state therein the material facts upon which it is based and thus the High Court will have before it relevant material and would be in a position to consider for itself whether that material is adequate or not
As an instance of a case where the High Court interfered with an order of this kind we may refer to a decision in P T Chandra Editor Tribune vs Emperor1
There the learned judges quite correctly pointed out that the propriety of the order as well as its legality can be considered by the High Court in revision though in examining the propriety of the order the High Court will give due weight to the opinion of the District Magistrate who is the man on the spot and responsible for the maintenance of public peace in the district
In that case the learned judges set aside an order of the District Magistrate upon the ground that there was no connection between the act prohibited and the danger apprehended to prevent which the order was passed
We would also like to point out that the penalty for infringing an order under section 144 is that provided in section 188 Indian Penal Code
When therefore a prosecution is launched thereunder the validity of the order under section 144 Criminal Procedure Code could be challenged
We are therefore unable to accept Mr Mani s contention that the remedy of judicial review is illusory
The argument that the test of determining criminality in advance is unreasonable is apparently founded upon the doctrine adumbrated in Scheneck s case2 that previous restraints on the exercise of fundamental rights are permissible only if there be a clear and present danger
It seems to us however that the American doctrine cannot be imported under our Constitution because the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19 1 of the Constitution are not absolute rights but as pointed out in State of Madras 1 AIR 1942 Lah 171
2 Scheneck vs U section  436 vs
V G Row 1 are subject to the restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of article 19
There is nothing in the American Constitution corresponding to cls
2 to 6 of article 19 of our Constitution
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U section Constitution provides among other things that  no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life liberty or property without due process of law that of the Constitution of the United States
Then again the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the privileges and immunities conferred by the Constitution are subject to social control by resort to the doctrine of police power
It is in the light of this background that the test laid down in Scheneck s case 2 has to be understood
The language of section 144 is somewhat different
The test laid down in the section is not merely  likelihood  or  tendency 
The section says that the magistrate must be satisfied that immediate prevention of particular acts is necessary to counteract danger to public safety etc
The power conferred by the section is exercisable not only where present danger exists but is exercisable also when there is an apprehension of danger
Apart from this it is worthy of note that in Scheneck s case 2 the Supreme Court was concerned with the right of freedom of speech and it observed It well may be that the prohibition of law abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints although to prevent them may have been the main purpose We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights
But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 1  2  437 panic
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent
It is a question of proximity and degree
 Whatever may be the position in the United States it seems to us clear that anticipatory action of the kind permissible under section 144 is not impermissible under cls
2 and 3 of article 19
Both in el
2 as amended in 1951 and in cl
3 power is given to the legislature to make laws placing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by these clauses in the interest among other things of public order
Public order has to be maintained in advance in order to ensure it and therefore it is competent to a legislature to pass a law permitting an appropriate authority to take anticipatory action or place anticipatory restrictions upon particular kinds of acts in an emergency for the purpose of maintaining public order
We must therefore reject the contention
It is no doubt true that since the duty to maintain law and order is cast upon the Magistrate he must perform that duty and not shirk it by prohibiting or restricting the normal activities of the citizen
But it is difficult to say that an anticipatory action taken by such an authority in an emergency where danger to public order is genuinely apprehended is anything other than an action done in the discharge of the duty to maintain order
In such circumstances that could be the only mode of discharging the duty
We therefore reject the contention that section 144 substitutes suppression of lawful activity or right for the duty of public authorities to maintain order
Coming to the order itself we must consider certain objections of Mr Mani which are in effect that there are three features in the order which make it unconstitutional
In the first place according to him the order is directed against the entire public though the magistrate has stated clearly that it was promulgated 438 because of the serious turn which an industrial dispute had taken
Mr Mani contends that it is unreasonable to place restrictions on the movements of the public in general when there is nothing to suggest that members of the public were likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to public order
It is true that there is no suggestion that the general public was involved in the industrial dispute
It is also true that by operation of the order the movements of the members of the public would be restricted in particular areas
But it seems to us that it would be extremely difficult for those who are in charge of law and order to differentiate between members of the public and members of the two textile unions and therefore the only practical way in which the particular activities referred to in the order could be restrained or restricted would be by making those restrictions applicable to the public generally
The right of citizens to take out processions or to hold public meetings flows from the right in article 191b to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to move anywhere in the territory of India
If therefore any members of the public unconnected with the two textile unions wanted to exercise these rights it was open to them to move the District Magistrate and apply for a modification of the order by granting them an exemption from the restrictions placed by the order
Mr Mani s contention and that is his second ground of attack on the Magistrate s order is that the only exception made in the order is with respect to funeral processions and religious processions and therefore it would not have been possible to secure the District Magistrate s permission for going out in procession for some other purpose or for assembling for some other purpose in the area to which the order applied
So far as the customary religious or funeral processions are concerned the exemption has been granted in the order itself that if anyone wanted to take out a pro cession for some other purpose which was lawful it was open to them under section 144 sub section
4 to apply for an alteration of the order and obtain a special exemption
439 More omission of the District Magistrate to make the exemption clause of the order more comprehensive would not in our opinion vitiate the order on the ground that it places unreasonable restrictions on certain fundamental rights of citizens
The third and last ground on which Mr Mani challenged the constitutionality of the order was that while the order prohibits the shouting of provocative slogans in public places etc it does not give any definition of what was meant by the expression provocative slogans 
Therefore according to Mr Mani this order is vague and must be deemed to be placing unreasonable restrictions on the rights of free speech of citizens
It seems to us that the expression  provocative slogans  has necessarily to be understood in the context in which it has been used in the order and therefore it cannot be regarded as vague
We have therefore reached the conclusion that the order of the District Magistrate is not unconstitutional either because section 144 is itself violative of fundamental rights recognised in article 19 or on the ground that it is vague and places unreasonable restrictions on those fundamental rights
We therefore dismiss this petition
Shortly after this petition was made to this Court the petitioner presented a special leave petition in which he seeks to challenge the judgment of the Nagpur High Court dated April 9 1956 dismissing his writ petition to that High Court
The points raised in the Special Leave Petition are similar to those raised in this petition
Since we are dismissing this petition there can be no question of granting the special leave to the petitioner to appeal against the judgment of the Nagpur High Court
Petition dismissed


Summary:
The appellant had been incorporated in 1944 as a private company limited by shares in the former State of Bhor with its registered office in Bhor
The shareholders of the company were at all material times resident in British India
By virtue of the States Merger Governors  Provinces Order 1949 the State was merged with the Province of Bombay with effect from August 1 1949
The provisions of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 were extended to the merged State with effect from April 1 1949
Under the power given by section 60A of the Act which enabled the Central Government to remove any difficulty in the application of the Act to merged States by making a general or special order granting exemption or other modification the Central Government notified the Merged States Taxation Concessions Order 1949
Paragraph 12 of that Order stated that  the provisions of section 23A of tile Indian Income tax Act shall not be applied in respect of the profits and gains of any previous year ending before 1st day of August 1949 unless the State law contains a provision corresponding thereto
 The total world income of the company for 1946 and 1947 was Rs 657084 and 78o 125 respectively and for those years the company declared dividends of Rs 2580 and Rs 1140
For the assessment years 1947 48 and 52 410 1948 49 corresponding to the account years 1946 and 1947 the Income tax Officers assessed the company as nonresident  for the assessment year 1947 48 the Officer held that  the assessable income of the company in British India for 1946 less the taxes must be deemed to be distributed among the shareholders in the proportion of their shareholdings under section 23A of the Act while for the account year 1947 the total world income less the taxes was deemed to be is tributed the part proportionate to the income in Bhor State being excluded except for purposes of rate
In computing the  deemed dividends  the Income tax Officer did not deduct the interest charged to the company under section 18A 8 from the assessable income along with the income tax and super tax under section 23A1
The company and the shareholders claimed 1 that para
12 of the Merged States Taxation Concessions Order 1949 precluded the Income tax Officer from making an order under section 23A of the Act in respect of the profits and gains of the account years ending December 31 1946 and December 31 1947 which were previous years ending before August 1 1949 and 2 that in any case interest under section 18A8 ought to have been deducted along with the income tax before the fictional dividends were computed
A further contention was raised that since the dividends in question would be deemed to have been declared in Bhor State and received there unless another fiction was engrafted upon the fiction created in section 23A that the dividends must be deemed to have been received in the taxable territories they could not be taxed in the hands of the shareholders
The shareholders also claimed the benefit of s 142C in respect of the entire amount of the balance deemed to be distributed
Held 1 that the expression any previous year in para
12 of the Merged States Taxation Concessions Order 1949 did not refer to all the previous years prior to and ending before August 1 1949 but meant only one previous year which would be a previous year for the purposes of the assessment year 194950 but which to get the exemption must end before the first day of August 1949 2 that the force of the fiction under section 23A of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 which makes the dividends which ought to have been distributed to be so distributed transcends all questions of accrual and receipt and what is deemed to be distributed must also be deemed to have accrued and received by the person to whom it is deemed to be distributed 3 that section 142c of the Act saves only that portion of the income which is not assessable in the taxable territories by reason of its accrual in the State and does not affect the operation of section 23A on the assessable income of the company which by reason of the application of the Indian Income tax Act even prior to the extension of the Act to the State after merger was assessable under the Act 411 4 that the wording of section 18A8 of the Act under which interest is recoverable along with the tax does not show that it is to be treated as tax but retains its character as interest and since section 23A speaks of deduction only of income tax and supertax no deduction could be made in respect of the interest under that section