Civil Appeal No 3015 of 1987
From the Judgment and order dated December 11 1985 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision R No 47 of 1984
Rajinder Sachhar PC Mudgal and SP Gupta for the Appellant
Anil Nauria and Mrs Rekha Pandey for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1061 RANGANATHAN J
The appellant is an advocate
He is the owner of premises No H 26 Model Town Delhi
He let out a part of this premises comprising a set of rooms above the garage which may be briefly referred to as servants  quarters  and a hall on the ground floor of the building to the respondent
The letting was oral and on a monthly rent of Rs600 exclusive of electricity and water charges from July 1976
In January 1980 the landlord filed an eviction petition under proviso e to section 141 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
He claimed that he needed the premises bona fide for the personal residential requirements of himself and the members of his family
His case was that he was having his office at Chandni Chowk on a first floor but as he had been advised by the doctor not to climb upstairs he desired to move the office and library to the ground floor hall of the premises in question
He also claimed that the servants  quarters were required for the use of his servants and their families
The petition was resisted by the respondent on a number of grounds
We are however concerned here only with two of the grounds put forward by the tenant
His first submission was that though the premises had initially been taken only for the residential use of himself subsequently two separate tenancies had been created in respect of premises in dispute
He claimed that he was the tenant only of the servants  quarters and that the hall or the ground floor had been let out to Bal Kunj a society registered under the  of which he was the Secretary
It was pointed out that from November 1986 onwards the petitioner was being paid two sums a sum of Rs250 by the respondent and another sum of Rs350 per month by the respondent on behalf of Bal Kunj
It was therefore contended that the petition as filed was not maintainable
The second plea taken by the respondent was that the intended use of the ground floor hall as the office of the petitioner lawyer constituted a non residential use and was therefore outside the purview of proviso e to section 141
The Rent Controller rejected the contentions of the tenant
He held that there had been a single tenancy
The premises had been let out by the landlord only to the respondent Prabhu Chaudhury on a rent of Rs600 per month
On the second aspect the claim of the landlord that he required the entire premises for use by himself and his servants and that the ground floor was needed for setting up his office and library was held by the Rent Controller to fall within the scope of 1062 the relevant statutory provision
The Rent Controller therefore directed eviction as prayed for by the petitioner
The above order had been passed under the provisions of section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act
The landlord having succeeded in his eviction petition the tenant filed a revision petition before the Delhi High Court under sub section 8 of that section
The learned Judge who heard the petition reversed the findings of the Rent Controller
He held that the landlord would be entitled to be put in possession only of the servants  quarters and that the petitioner could not claim the use of the hall on the ground floor
In the result therefore the learned Judge modified the order passed by the Rent Controller
He restricted the eviction order granted by the Rent Controller to the servants  quarters
We may mention here that in compliance with the order of the learned Judge the respondent has since vacated and delivered vacant possession of the servants  quarters to the landlord
The controversy before us is restricted to the hall on the ground floor
The first question that arises for our consideration is whether the High Court was right in holding that there were two separate tenancies one in respect of the servants  quarters and the other in respect of the hall on the ground floor
The position is this
There was oral evidence let in by the petitioner to show that the premises had been let out to the respondent in July 1976 at Rs600 pm
It appears the respondent started paying two separate amounts of Rs250 and Rs350 since November 1976
It also appears that the former amount was paid by the respondent and the letter by means of cheques in the name of the trust
It also seems to be common ground that the respondent was occupying the servants  quarters and the Bal Kunj was occupying the hall on the ground floor though it is not clear at what point of time this happened
Counsel for the respondent relies on these circumstances
He wants to use the fact that the petitioner who was also occupying a hall on the ground floor adjacent to the hall occupied by the trust clearly must have been aware of the use of the hall to submit that the trust had been accepted as a tenant in respect of the hall at Rs350 pm
He also relies on a fact which he says the Rent Controller completely missed that in 1978 when a number of cheques given to the landlord had been returned dishonoured the landlord wrote a letter dated 26111978 to the tenant in which he specifically referred to the fact that five of the cheques belong to Balkunj
 It is submitted that these facts clearly put the matter beyond all doubt that though initially the premises had been taken only by the 1063 respondent it had subsequently been converted into two tenancies
Learned counsel for the landlord on the other hand submitted that the question whether there was a single tenancy or two tenancies is essentially a question of fact
The Rent Controller after appreciating all the circumstances had come to the conclusion that there was a single tenancy
There was clear evidence to show that initially in July 1976 the landlord had let out the premises only to the respondent for a monthly rent of Rs600
It is true that subsequently after a few months the tenant paid the rent by way of two cheques one drawn by himself and the other drawn on behalf of Balkunj
But learned counsel submits relying on the decision in Sheodhari Rai vs Suraj Prasad Singh AIR 1954 SC 758 this alone cannot lead to the conclusion that a separate tenancy had been created in respect of the hall between Balkunj and the petitioner
Learned counsel also pointed out that the Rent Controller had referred to two important documents AW 818 and AW 820
These were two letters dated 581977 and 1511978
In these two letters the landlord had specifically and categorically denied the tenancy on behalf of Balkunj
What had happened was that the respondent on behalf of Balkunj had written to the landlord making certain claims for repairs etc
in respect of the hall occupied by Balkunj
Immediately the landlord wrote back saying that he had nothing to do with Balkunj that the tenancy was only in favour of the respondent and that he did not recognise Balkunj as his tenant
These two letters remained unanswered
Learned counsel for the landlord therefore submitted that there was ample material and clinching evidence before the Rent Controller to come to the conclusion that there was a single tenancy and that was between Prabhu Chowdhary and the landlord and that therefore there was no question of there being two tenancies as held by the High Court
We are inclined to agree with this submission of the landlord
The initial tenancy was only an oral tenancy
Nevertheless there were two witnesses who deposed that the original tenancy agreement was only between the petitioner and the respondent
At that time admittedly there was no question of Balkunj being the tenant in respect of any portion of the premises
All that the respondent says is that subsequently cheques were being issued in the name of Balkunj also and that this must be taken to lead to an inference that the petitioner had accepted Balkunj as its tenant
It is very difficult to accept this argument
It is no doubt true that the rent has been paid by two cheques since November 1976 but the mere payment of rent by two cheques in the circumstances of this case cannot mean that there were two tenancies
The landlord was entitled to a rent of Rs600 pm and so 1064 long as he got this amount it was immaterial for him whether the amount was paid in a lump sum or by one cheque or more than one cheque and who the makers of the cheques were
It is not unusual to come across cases where a tenant pays the rent not by a cheque drawn by himself but by a cheque drawn by some other concern in which he has an interest such as a partnership concern a limited company or other entity in which he is interested
So the mere fact that for some reason the respondent chose not to issue a single cheque for the rent of Rs600 but that he gave two separate cheques one for Rs250 drawn by himself and one for Rs350 drawn in the name of Balkunj cannot lead to an irresistible conclusion that the tenancy was created in favour of Balkunj with the concurrence of the landlord
The letter dated 261178 far from clinching the respondent s claim as held by the High Court does not in our view improve the tenant s case at all
It only evidences the fact that the landlord was receiving the cheques issued in the name of the trust in discharge of the respondent s obligation to pay the rent of Rs600 pm
It is also true that since the landlord was also occupying a part of the ground floor premises he might have been aware that certain activities of Balkunj were being carried on in the hall
But this can only mean that the landlord permitted the tenant to use a portion of the premises let out for running the activities of the trust
Even assuming that standing by themselves these two facts might have been sufficient to draw any such inference as is suggested the two letters of 5877 and 15178 place the matter beyond all doubt
The landlord categorically asserted in these letters that he does not recognize Balkunj as his tenant and that the respondent alone was his tenant
There was no reply to these letters from the respondent
In these circumstances there can be no doubt at all that the premises had been let out only to the respondent by the petitioner and that Balkunj cannot be considered to be a tenant of the premises or any portion thereof
The finding of the Rent Controller that there was only a single tenancy was essentially a finding of fact based on the material and circumstances to which we have adverted and we are also inclined to accept the conclusion of the Rent Controller as the correct one
We also agree with the landlord that this is a finding with which the High Court should not have interfered
Though under Section 25B8 of the Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are somewhat wider than similar powers of revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code it is well established by a series of decisions of this Court that the power of revision under the Rent Control Acts does not entitle the High Court to enter into the merits of the factual con 1065 troversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard
It is sufficient in this context to refer to the decision of this Court in Helper Girdharbhai vs Saiyed Mohmad  which was reviewed earlier decisions
The decision in Sushila Devi vs Avinash Chandra Jain to which counsel for the respondent referred lays down no different principle
So far as the second point is concerned learned counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mohanlal vs Kondi  and in Subramania Mudaliar vs Kolapur Traders In the former it was held that the profession of a lawyer is business within the meaning of section 103aiii of the Andhra Pradesh Building Lease Rent  Eviction Control Act 1960
The latter is a decision to a like effect
These decisions are not of much help in the context of the present case and of the provisions of clause e of the proviso to section 141 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
Here the landlord is seeking to recover possession of a residential premises
There is as we have already held a single tenancy in favour of the respondent for a residential purpose
Though learned counsel for the respondent invited us to say that so far as the hall was concerned the premises were being used by a trust and hence for a non residential purpose we cannot permit him to raise this plea
Such a plea was not taken before the High Court
Against the order of the High Court the respondent had also filed a special leave petition to this Court which has been dismissed
It is therefore not open to the respondent to urge this point before us
The only point taken before the High Court was that the petitioner could not get relief because the use of the hall by a lawyer as his office and library could not amount to a residential requirement
We shall therefore confine ourselves to this question
In our opinion the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted in the extreme form in which it is urged here
It may be that in a case where a lawyer seeks to evict a tenant on the ground that the entire premises sought to be got vacated are solely needed by him for use as his office and library his requirement may not satisfy the requirements of clause e of the proviso to section 141
But this is quite different from saying that where the premises are sought to be got vacated for use as a residence and the landlord being a lawyer desires to use a part of such residence as a study office or library such use would be a non residential use
Any professional man of standing would necessarily have to set apart a portion of his residence for such purposes and the premises do not cease to be his residence because 1066 of that
in the present case the petitioner seeks eviction of the suit premises for his bona fide residential requirement and the use of the hall as an office is only incidental to such a requirement
In ascertaining the bona fide need of residence in the case of a lawyer the fact that a room has to be used as an office cannot be a consideration extraneous to the scope and content of clause e of the proviso to section 141
To test our conclusion we may see what the position would be in the converse case
If in the present case the petitioner had stated that he required the hall because he had no living room in the premises which he was occupying as the only room there was being or had to be used by him as an office the petitioner s claim could not have been rejected for he would then have needed the hall clearly as part of his residential requirement
The decision in Khanna vs Batra illustrates this
There an advocate had asked for eviction of a tenant from the first floor as the ground floor premises occupied by him were not sufficient for his needs for purposes of residence and office
The Rent Control Tribunal held that since the appellant intended to convert the existing residential accommodation in his possession into an office and library for the use of his clerk and clients such a user was not permissible in law
Reversing this conclusion Grover J observed It seems to me that the Rent Control Tribunal was clearly in error in thinking that merely because the appellant wanted to use the accommodation in his possession for professional purposes he could not claim benefit of the provision contained in clause e of the proviso to section 141 of the Act
It was this error which led to the conclusion at which the Rent Control Tribunal arrived upholding the decision of the Controller on the second point namely the requirement of the appellant on personal grounds
I cannot therefore accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the finding of the Rent Controller Tribunal with regard to the personal need or requirement was one of fact and thus immune from challenge in the second appeal
Should the position is different in this case Merely because the petitioner has come forward with an honest plea that he intends to use a part of his residence as an office should a different result follow particularly in a case like this where ill health compels him to have his 1067 office at home Should the result depend on the jugglery of pleadings or the substance of the matter We think the substance should prevail
In our opinion where a landlord applies for the possession of his residential premises his bona fide requirement of the premises for his residential purposes will not stand vitiated merely because he intends to use a portion of the premises for purposes of his office library or study
We are therefore of opinion that the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of the Rent Controller on this point as well
This is no doubt a mixed question of fact and law but for the reasons given earlier we are inclined to agree with the conclusion of the Rent Controller
In the result we hold that the High Court was in error in granting relief to the petitioner only in respect of the servants  quarters and in declining to grant the petitioner relief in respect of the hall
We allow the appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the order of the Rent Controller that the petitioner is entitled to the possession of the entire premises in question
There will however be no order as to costs
RSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
 The State Government by Circular dated July 231957 directed revision of the existing pay scales of various categories of subordinate staff including Teachers in the Education Department
Paragraph 3 of the said circular provided for revision of pay scales of Teachers and placed them into two distinct categories Category A and Category B and laid down the requirements of academic qualification with respect to each of them
Category B was further sub divided into two groups viz Group I Matric with Basic training including Junior Teachers
Group II Junior School Teachers including Assistant Mistresses with BAInterMatric plus JAV training
On more occasions than one this Court intervened on behalf of those Teachers who had improved or acquired higher academic qualifications and were denied higher scales of pay and issued directions for extending the benefit of para 3 of the aforesaid Circular
In compliance with the directions of this Court in Avtar Singh vs Manmohan Singh  Anr the Director of Public Instructions Schools 1088 by Order dated June 30 1986 accorded sanction to payment of arrears of pay to Teachers belonging to Category B Group I to 3600 JBT Teachers belonging to Category B Group II who had improved their educational qualifications and acquired degrees in BA BTBA BSc BEd
Similar relief was however denied to 6000 other Teachers falling in Category B Group II on the ground that they did not have requisite professional training of JSTJAV and were therefore not entitled to the higher grade
In the Writ Petitions to this Court by the Matriculate Junior Basic Trained Teachers in Government Schools placed in Category B Group II of the Circular dated July 23 1957 it was contended that the State Government was bound to grant the benefit of higher grade of pay to all the Teachers belonging to Category B Group II on their improving or acquiring higher educational qualifications as and from the respective dates of their passing the examination and that it was not open to the Government on the pretext of verification of claims to confine the relief to some of the teachers and deny the same to the others who were all similarly situated and recruited in the same manner and appointed as Matriculate JBT Teachers and had improved their qualifications by acquiring degrees in BA BT etc and that the so called professional training ie JSTJAV could not be made a condition pre requisite to the grant of higher pay
These petitions were contested by the State Government by contending that the petitioners were not entitled to higher pay merely on their acquiring higher educational qualifications as they did not stand the eligibility test on verification of their claims and that according to paragraph 3 of the Circular all Teachers according to their qualifications were placed into two broad categories for purposes of revision of payCategory A consisting of BABScBComBSc
Agriculture and BT and Category B of whom Group I was Matric with basic training including JBT 
On the question whether JBT Teachers falling under Category B Group II were not entitled to the higher pay merely on their acquiring higher Educational Qualifications of BA BTBA BEd
but that gaining professional experience of JSTJAV training was essential
Allowing the Writ Petitions  HELD 1
Graduate Teachers form a class by themselves and cannot be subjected to the further requirement of having JSTJAV 1089 training
The words plus JAV training  clearly qualify the work Matric  and relate only two Matriculate JBT Teachers
Such a classification for revision of pay satisfies the touchstone of Article 14 and would render the action of the State Government in seeking to discriminate between Graduate Teachers with JSTJAV training and Graduate Teachers with or without such training impermissible as the attempt is to create a class within a class without any rational basis
1095D F 2
It is regrettable that despite clear pronouncements made by this Court as well as the High Court in a long line of decisions there is no redressal of the wrong done to JBT Teachers belonging to Category B Group II although they had acquired BA BTBA BEd qualifications
1095F G 3
The petitioners who are Teachers placed in Category B Group II are entitled to higher pay on acquiring or improving their academic qualifications
The respondents are directed to give them the higher scale of pay as admissible to Teachers in Category B Group I with effect from the respective dates of their acquiring the qualification
1097B C State of Punjab  Anr
vs Kirpal Singh Bhatia  Ors
1976 1 SCR 529 State of Punjab  Ors
vs Labh Singh Garcha  Ors CA Nos 926 2777 decided on August 7 1979 and Avtar Singh vs Manmohan Singh  Anr CA No 379083 decided on September 14 1984 referred to