ON Criminal Appeal No 50 of 1979
From the Judgment and Order dated 23121977 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No 162 of 1975
RK Garg RK Jain Ranjan Mahapatra and PK Jain for the Appellant
VC Mahajan Ashok Bhan NP and Ms A Subhashini NP for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAYACHANDRA REDDY J
The appellant the sole accused in this case has been convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the High Court of Delhi for causing the murder of one Champat Rai the deceased in the case
The prosecution case mainly rests on the evidence of PW 2 the sole eye witness
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the uncorroborated testimony of PW 2 is not wholly reliable and therefore the conviction cannot be sustained
However we may at this stage point out that the main submission has been that even if the prosecution case is to be accepted an offence of murder is not made out as the accused was entitled to the right of private defence
Even otherwise according to the learned counsel having regard to the fact that as the appellant is alleged to have inflicted only a single injury which proved fatal the offence committed would be one amounting to culpable homicide
To appreciate these submissions in a proper perspective we 205 think it necessary to state the facts of the case
The deceased was married to Agya Devi examined as PW 3
He lived with his wife in a house in East Azad Nagar Shahdra Delhi
In the adjoining house were living his mother PW 1 and his two brothers PWs 2 and 5
The appellant was married to a cousin of Agya Devi PW 3 and he used to visit the house of the deceased ostensibly as a relative
The deceased PWs 12 and 5 objected to the appellant s visit as they suspected illicit relation between the appellant and Agya Devi PW 3 wife of the deceased
On August 18 1973 at about 11 PM when the deceased was not in the house  the appellant came to visit Agya Devi
A few minutes later the deceased also came home and he objected to the presence of the appellant
On this there was an altercation and exchange of hot words
Then the appellant took out a kirpan churra from his waist and stabbed the deceased in the chest
The deceased fell down crying that the appellant has killed him
The appellant with the weapon ran out of the house
The incident was witnessed by PW 2 from the roof where he had retired for sleeping during the night
PW 2 and his another brother PW 5 chased the appellant but as the appellant who was armed with a lethal weapon threatened them and made good his escape
On return they found the deceased dead
PW 3 was sitting next to the body and was crying
The information was sent to the police and PW 18 the Sub Inspector Kotwali Police Station came to the scene of occurrence and recorded the statement of PW 2 on the basis of which the case was registered against the appellant
He seized certain incriminating articles held the inquest and sent the dead body for post mortem
He also recorded the statement of the material witness
One of the recoveries made by him consisted of a sheath of the kirpan
The Doctor PW 17 examined the dead body and conducted the post mortem
He found one incised stab wound on the left chest which proved fatal
The particulars of the injury are 1 One incised stab wound horizontally placed on the L side of the chest 1 lateral to the left side and 2 below and medial to the L_ Nipple size 1 x 12 x with spindle shaped appearance and with either margins pointed
The margins of the wound were smooth and the collection of blood in the soft tissues
2 One incised wound over right little finger at the base of second phalynx on dorcal surface size 34 x 410 x bone deep
There is collection of blood in the soft tissues and there was cut 206 mark on the base of second phalnyx right little finger
The wound was bandaged with a piece of bandage and cotton soiled in blood
The wound is not spindle shaped in appearance
The margins were smooth
This injury was a simple one and not due to a separate blow
The Doctor opined the injury NO1 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
The cause of death was haomorrhage and shock due to injuries
The accused was arrested on 28873 and at his instance the kirpan was recovered
After completion of the investigation the charge sheet was laid
The accused pleaded not guilty and denied the recoveries
The prosecution examined PW 2 the brother of the deceased and PW 3 Agya Devi wife of the deceased
But PW 3 turned hostile
Consequently the prosecution was left with the testimony of PW 2 the remaining eye witness
Both the courts below relied on the evidence of PW 2 and they also held that his evidence was corroborated by that of PWs 1 and 5
As hereinbefore mentioned the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of PW 2 on which the case entirely rests cannot be accepted
We have gone through his evidence carefully as well as that of PWs 1 and 5
The evidence of PW w does not suffer from any serious infirmity
At any rate there is other corroborative evidence also
We see absolutely no reason to disagree with the findings of the courts below regarding their evidence
The learned counsel however submitted that the accused must have acted in right of self defence
According to the learned counsel PW 2 himself has deposed that there was exchange of hot words between the appellant and the deceased which would have resulted in a fight and the appellant having reasonably apprehended danger to his life inflicted the injury on the deceased in self defence
We see no basis for this submission
PW 2 has no doubt stated that there was exchange of hot words between the appellant and the deceased but he did not speak about any fight between the two
On the other hand his evidence shows that when the deceased came and questioned the accused then there was exchange of hot words
The accused immediately took out a kirpan churra from his waist and stabbed the deceased
Both the courts below also have rightly rejected this plea
Therefore we see absolutely no grounds to come to a different conclusion
207 The next and rather the main submission is that the offence committed by the appellant would only amount to culpable homicide inasmuch as he has inflicted only one injury
In support of his submission he relied on some of the decisions of this Court
In Tholan vs State of Tamil Nadu the accused who dealt a single knife below on the chest found to be sufficient to cause death was convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC disagreeing with the contention on behalf of the State that Clause III of Section 300 IPC would be attracted in such a case
In arriving at such a conclusion this Court took into consideration various surrounding circumstances namely that the presence of the deceased at the scene of occurence was wholly accidental and that the accused dealt only one blow
It must also be mentioned that the deceased who was a stranger in that case came out of his house and cautioned the accused not to indulge in abusive language as ladies were present in that area
The accused thereupon questioned him and when both were remonstrating he took out a knife from his waist and stabbed the deceased on the right side of the chest
On these facts this Court held We are satisfied that even if Exception I is not attracted the requisite intention cannot be attributed to the appellant
But in the circumstances herein discussed he wielded a weapon like a knife and therefore he can be attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death
In such a situation he would be guilty of committing an offence under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code
 In support of this view reliance is placed on some earlier decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh vs State of Haryana   Randhir Singh vs State of Punjab  Kulwant Rai vs State of Punjab  Hari Ram vs State of Haryana  Jagtar Singh vs State of Punjab and Ram Sunder vs State of UP Criminal Appeal No 55583 decided on 24101983
The learned counsel submitted that the observations made in these cases apply on all fours to the facts of this case
According to him there was an altercation and during the same the appellant suddenly whipped out a kirpan and inflicted only one injury and it is therefore reasonable to infer that he would not have intended to cause that particular injury and consequently Clause Thirdly of Section 300 is not attracted
The submission though put forward in a simple way leads to an important legal quandary regarding the interpretation of Clause Thirdly Section 300 IPC which is considered be a 208 difficult and interact issue by the courts
However Virsa Singh vs State of Punjab  is considered to be an authoritative pronouncement in this regard
But perhaps inspired by some of the decisions rendered thereafter both by the High Courts and the Supreme Court there is a marked change in the trend of the contentions regarding the scope of Clause Thirdly Section 300 IPC
It has reached a stage over simplification and it is very often argued that whenever death is due to a single blow the offence would be a culpable homicide and not murder
Somewhat to the same effect is the contention in the instant case
In our view it is fallacious to contend that when death is caused by a single blow Clause Thirdly is not attracted and therefore it would not amount to murder
The ingredient Intention  in that Clauses is very important and that gives the clue in a given case whether offence involved is murder or not
For the purpose of considering the scope of Clause 3 it is not necessary for us to embark upon an examination of the entire scope of Section 299 and 300 IPC
It is enough if we start with Virsa Singh s case
Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC reads thus 3rdly If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or  We may note at this stage that intention  is different from motive  or ignorance  or negligence 
It is the knowledge  or intention  with which the act is done that makes difference in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder
Therefore it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions as used in these provisions
Before doing so we shall first refer to the to the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh s case and the meaning given to the expression intention 
The appellant Virsa Singh was sentenced to imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC
There was only one injury on the deceased and that was attributed to him
It was caused as a result of the spear thrust and the Doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
The Courts also found that the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a chance of meeting
Peritonit is also supervened which hastened the death of the deceased
It was contended that the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in 209 the ordinary course of nature and therefore the offence was not one of murder
This contention was rejected
After analysing the Clause Thirdly it is held the Court that the prosecution must prove First it must establish quite objectively that a bodily injury is present Secondly the nature of the injury must be proved there are purely objective investigations
Thirdly it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury that is to say that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended
Once these three elements are proved to be present the enquiry proceeds further and Fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender
 The Court Further added thus One of these four elements is established by the prosecution and of course the burden is on the prosecution throughout the offence is murder under Sec
300 3rdly
It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature not that there is any real distinction between the two
It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death
Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether as a matter of purely objective inference the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of of nature to cause death
No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder
If they inflict injuries of that kind they must face the consequences and they can 210 only escape if it can be shown or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional
 emphasis supplied The learned Judge also observe thus In the absence of evidence or reasonable explanation that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did
Once that intent is established and no other conclusion is reasonable possible in this case and in any case it is a question of fact the rest is a matter for objective determination from the medical and other evidence about the nature and seriousness of the injury
 Adverting to the contention that there is only a single blow it is further held The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present
If he can show that he did not or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference then of course the intend that the section requires is not proved
But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it
Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences it neither here nor there
The question so far as the intention is concerned is not whether he intended to kill or to inflicit an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion
But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law
Whether the wound is serious or otherwise and if serious how serious is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question
 211 At another passage which has to be noted in this context reads thus It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury
For example if it can be proved or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used then of course the offence is not murder
But that is not because the prisoner did not intended the injury that he intended to inflict to be a serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all
His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury
The difference is not one of law but one of fact and whether the conclusion should be one way or the other is a matter of proof where necessary by calling in aid all reasonable inferences of fact in the absence of direct testimony
It is not one for guesswork and fanciful conjecture
Referring to these observations Divisional Bench of this Court in Jagrup Singh s case observed thus These observations of Vivian Bose J have become locus classicus
The test laid down in Virsa Singh s case for the applicability of clause Thirdly is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law
 The Division Bench also further held that the decision in Virsa singh s case has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles
In both these cases it is clearly laid down that the prosecution must prove 1 that the body injury is present 2 that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death 3 that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended
In other words the 3rd Clause consists of two parts
The first part is that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
Under the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that particular injury
whereas the second part whether it was sufficient to cause the death is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or deduction from the particulars of the injury
The language of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 212 speaks of intention at two places and in each the sequence is to be established by the prosecution before the case can fall in that Clause
The intention  and knowledge  of the accused are subjective and invisible state of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the circumstances such as the weapon used the ferocity of attack multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances
The framers of the code designedly used the words intention  and knowledge  and it is accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the samething as the intention that such consequences should ensue
Firstly when an act is done by a person it is presumed that he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow
But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue
As compared to knowledge  intention  requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences namely the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end
Kenny in Outline of Criminal Law 17th Edition at page 31 has observed Intention To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desire objective the noun intention  in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only forsees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct
Thus if one man throws another from a high tower or cuts off his head it would seem plain that the both foresees the victim s death and also desires it the desire and the foresight will also be the same if a person knowingly leaves a helpless invalid or infant without nourishment or other necessary support until death supervenes
It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight since a man must decide to his own satisfaction and accordingly must foresee that to which his express purpose is directed
Again a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it
It may well be a thing that he dislikes doing but he dislikes still more the consequences of his not doing it
That is to say he desires the lesser of two evils and therefore has made up his mind to bring about that one Russel on Crime 12th Edition at Page 41 has observed 213 In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word intention  is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so
He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims
 it can thus be seen that the knowledge  as contrasted with intention  signify a state of mental realisation with the bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive
On the otherhand intention  is a conscious state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end
it means shaping of one s conduct so as to bring about a certain event
Therefore in the case of intention  mental faculties are projected in a set direction
Intention need not necessarily involve premediation
Whether there is such an intention or not is a question of fact
In Clause Thirdly the words intended to be inflicted are singnificantl As noted already when a person commits an act he is presumed to expect the natural consequences
But from the mere fact that the injury caused is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it does not necessarily follow that the offender intended to cause the injury of that nature
However the presumption arises that he intended cause that particular injury
In such a situation the Court has to ascertain whether the facts and circumstances in the case are such as to rebut the presumption and such facts and circumstances cannot be laid down in an abstract rule and they will vary from case to case
However as pointed out in Virsa Singh s case the weapon used the degree of force released in wielding it the antecedent relation of the parties the manner in which the attack was made that is to say sudden or premeditated whether the injury was inflicted during a struggle or grappling the number of injuries inflicted and their nature and the part of the body where the injury was inflicted are some of the relevant factors
These and other factors which may arise in a case have to be considered and if on a totality of these circumstances a doubt arises as to the nature of the offence the benefit has to go to the accused
In some cases an explanation may be there by the accused like exercise of right of private defence or the circumstances also may indicate the same
Likewise there may be circumstances in some cases which attract the first exception
In such cases different considerations arise and the Court has to decide whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of the exception though the prosecution established that one or the other clauses of Section 300 IPC is attracted
In the present enquiry we need not advert to that aspect since we are concerned only with scope of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC 214 The decision in Virsa Singh s case has throughout been followed in a number of cases by the High Courts as well as by the Supreme Court
Such decisions are too numerous and it may not be necessary for us to refer to all those cases
However it would be useful to refer to a few decisions which have a bearing to the point in issue
In Chahat Khan vs State of Haryana the deceased was waylaid by the accused who were armed with lathis
The accused had both gun and a lathi but he used only the lathi and struck a blow on the head with sufficient force and the solitary below with the lathi was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was held that the case fell within clause Thirdly as there was clear intention to cause such bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death
In Chamru Budhwa vs State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 652 there was exchange of abuses between the two parties armed with lathis and in the course of the fight the accused struck one lathi blow on the head of the deceased which causes a fracture of the skull resulting in death and it was held that he had given the blow with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death
In Willie Williams Slaney vs State of Madhya Pradesh there was a sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and in the heat of the moment a solitary blow with a hockey stick had been given on the head
It was held that the offence amounted to culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC
In Harjinder Singh alias Jinda vs Delhi Admn
  the facts are that there was a sudden commotion and when the deceased intervened in the fight the accused took out a knife and stabbed the deceased and the deceased was in crouching position presumably to intervene when he received the blow
Though the injury was found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
 he was convicted for the offence of culpable homicide
The intention to cause that particular injury was not present
To the same effect is the decision in Laxman Kalu Nikalji vs State of Maharashtra  where the accused lost his temper and took out a knife and gave one blow during a sudden quarrel
In all these cases the approach has been to find out whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause the particular injury was present or not and it is held that circumstances like a sudden quarrel in a fight or when the deceased intervenes in such a fight would create a doubt about the ingredient of intention as it cannot definitely be said in such circumstances that the accused aimed the blow at a particular part of the body
When an accused inflicts a blow with a deadly weapon the presumption is that he intended to inflict that injury but 215 there may be circumstances like those as mentioned above which rebut such presumption and throw a doubt about the application of clause Thirdly
Of course much depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
Now let us examine some of the cases relied upon the learned counsel for the appellant
In Kulwant Rai s case a Bench consisting of DA Desai and RB Misra JJ
held in a hit and run case that where it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict the very fatal injury clause Thirdly is not attracted
That was a case were only one blow was given with the dagger in the epigastrium area and the facts would go to show that there was no pre meditation no prior enmity and a short quarrel preceded the assault
However we do not find any discussion about the scope of clause Thirdly
Randhir Singh s case was decided by a Bench consisting of DA Desai and Baharul Islam JJ
In that case a single head injury was inflicted by a college student on the deceased with a weapon supplied by his father and the deceased died after six days and there also an assault was preceded by a quarrel between the father of the accused and the deceased
The Bench observed that Merely because the blow landed on a particular spot on the body divorced from the circumstances in which the blow was given it would be hazardous to say that the accused intended to cause that particular injury
The weapon was not handy
He did not possess one
Altercation took place between his father and the deceased and he gave blow with kassi
In our opinion in these circumstances it would be difficult to say that the accused intended to cause that particular injury
 Before the same Bench in Gurmail Singh and others vs State of Punjab this question again came up for consideration
In that case an indecent joke cut by the accused with the wife of a PW led to a quarrel and the deceased who was nowhere in the picture tried to intervene two of the accused gave some blow on him
Then Gurmail Singh the appellant therein gave a single blow with spear on the chest which proved fatal
It was contended by the State that clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC was attracted
it is observed that But it was said that the case would be covered by Para 3 of Section 300 in that Gurmail Singh intended to cause an injury and the injury intended to be inflicted was proved to 216 be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
This argument is often raised for consideration by this Court and more often reliance is placed on Virsa Singh vs State of Punjab  We would have gone into the question in detail but in Jagrup Singh vs State of Haryana   Sen J after examining all the previous decisions on the subject observed that in order to bring the case within Para 3 of Section 300 IPC it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death
This view was further affirmed in a decision rendered in Randhir Singh vs State of Punjab We are of the opinion that in the facts found by the High Court it could not be said that accused 1 Gurmail singh intended to cause that particular bodily injury which in fact was found to have been caused
May be the injury inflicted may have been found to be a sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
What ought to be found is that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted
It is difficult to say that with confidence in the present case keeping in view the facts found by the High Court that accused 1 Gurmail Singh intended to cause the very injury which was found to be fatal Therefore this decision also affirms the view taken in Virsa Singh s case
Then came the decision in Jagtar Singh s case rendered by a Bench consisting of DADesai and Amarendra Nath Sen JJ
In that case a single knife blow was inflicted in the chest and it was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
The Bench held that clause Thirdly was not attracted in view of circumstances ie there the accused was a young man and inflicted the injury on the spur of the moment and some extent on deceased s provocation in a sudden chance quarrel and on a trivial issue
The Bench observed that The cause of quarrel though trivial was just sudden and in this background the appellant a very young man gave one blow
He could not be imputed with the intention to cause death or the intention to cause that particular injury which proved fatal
 In this case there is no reference to Virsa Singh s case but there is a 217 references to Jagrup Singh s case which decision as noted already has followed the ratio in Virsa singh s case
Then came the decision in Tholan s case on which the counsel has heavily relied upon
In that case also the appellant inflicted only a single knife blow on the chest of the deceased sufficient to cause death but it was on the spur of the moment
The Division Bench consisting of DA Desai and RBMisra JJ
took into the consideration that the deceased had nothing to do with the chit organised by one KG Rajan in respect of which there was a quarrel between the appellant and the organisers of the chit and when the accused was abusing the organisers the deceased seemed to have told the accused not to misbehave in the presence of the ladies and not to use vulgar and filthy language
The presence of the deceased was wholly accidental and the appellant on the spur of the moment inflicted the fatal injury on the chest
The Division Bench relying on the earlier decision under similar circumstances convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II
A reference is also made to the decision in Jagrup Singh s case
Therefore in this case also the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh s case is presumably followed
In all these cases injury by a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
The supreme Court took into consideration the circumstances such as sudden quarrel grappling etc
as mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular injury ie to say that he desired expressly that such injury only should be the result
It is held in all these cases there was no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those circumstances the accused could have been barely aware ie only had knowledge of the consequences
These circumstances under which the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or atleast a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular result
We may point out that we are not concerned with the intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder simpliciter unless exception is attracted
We are concerned under clause Thirdly with the intention be cause that particular injury which is subjective inquiry and when and when once such intention is established and if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death clause Tirdly is attracted and it would be murder unless one of the exceptions to Section 300 is attracted
If on the otherhand this ingredient of intention  is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that Clause Thirdly is not 218 attracted and that the accused must be attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause death in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC Bearing these principles in mind if we examine the facts in the present case clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC is fully attracted
The appellant was having illicit relation with Agya Devi wife of the deceased and his visits to her house were resented and objected
On the day of occurence the accused visited the house when the deceased was not there and he went there armed with a kirpan
When the deceased came and objected to his presence there was only an altercation and exchange of hot words and not a fight
Thereupon he took out a knife and stabbed on the chest of the deceased resulting instantaneous death of the deceased
The above circumstances would show that the accused intentionally inflicted that injury though it may not be pre mediated one
All the above circumstances would certainly indicate such a state of mind namely he aimed and inflicted that injury with a deadly weapon
As observed in Virsa Singh s case in the absence of evidence or reasonable explanation show that the appellant did not intend to stab in the chest with a kirpan with that degree of force sufficient to penetrate the heart it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict that injury that he did
When once the ingredient intention  is established then the offence would be murder as the intended injury is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
Therefore an offence of murder is made out
Accordingly the appeal is dismissed
YLal Appeal dismissed


Summary:
On the death of a Railway employee dispute arose among his wife sons daughters and brother for the family pension gratuity and other emoluments
The brother of the deceased employee filed a civil suit in the court of Sub judge for a permanent injunction restraining the appellants the wife sons and daughter from claiming or receiving any monetary benefits from the Railway Administration contending that by a will dated 991984 of the deceased employee he was entitled to receive the benefits to the deceased employee s widow
The Railway Authority did not pay any amount as an injunction had been issued by the Civil Court
The appellants there upon made an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal for a direction for the release of the amounts on the grounds that the will was a forged one and the beneficiary was not entitled to receive pensionary benefits
The Tribunal held that since the dispute related to rival claims based on title arising from relationship it had no jurisdiction to decide the same
It also directed transfer of the case to the Civil Court for trial
In the appeal to this court on the question was whether family pension payable under the service rules could be bequeathed by means of a will
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 1
Family Pension Rules 1964 provided for the sanction of family pension to the survivors of a Railway Employee
Rule 801 provides that family pension shall be granted to the widowwidower and where there is no widowwidower to the minor children of a Railway servant who may have died while in service
Under the Rules son of 283 the deceased is entitled to family pension until he attains the age of 25 years an unmarried daughter is also entitled to family pension till she attains the age of 25 years or gets married whichever is earlier
The Rules do not provide for payment of Family Pension to brother or any other family member or relation of the deceased Railway employee
The Family Pension Scheme under the Rules is designed to provide relief to the widow and children by way of compensation for the untimely death of the deceased employee
The rules do not provide for any nomination with regard to family pension instead the Rules designate the persons who are entitled to receive the family Pension
Thus no other person except those designated under the Rules are entitled to receive family pension
285E H 2
The Family Pension Scheme confers monetary benefit on the wife and children of the deceased Railway employee but the employee has no title to it
The employee has no control over the family pension as he is not required to make any contribution to it
The family pension Scheme is in the nature of welfare scheme framed by the Railway administration to provide relief to the widow and minor children of the deceased employee
285H 286B 3
Since the Rules do not provide for nomination of any person by the deceased employee during his life time for the payment of family pension he has no title to the same
Therefore it does not form part of his estate enabling him to dispose of the same by testamentary dis position
286B C The appellant No 1 widow of the deceased Railway employee is entitled to receive the family pension notwithstanding the will alleged to have been executed by the deceased on 991984 in favour of his brother
As regards appellant Nos 2 to 6 are concerned they are not minors therefore under the Rules they are not entitled to any family pension
286F H The Railway Administration is free to evict them in accordance with the Rules only after arrears of family pension are paid to the widow 287B C Jodh Singh V Union of India  Anr 1980 4 SCC 306 followed