ivil Appeal No 1743 of 1975
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 591975 of the Rajasthan High Court in SB Civil 2nd Appeal 302 of 1974 M Jain for the appellant
SC Agarwala and VJ Francis for Respondents 1  2
The Judgment of YV Chandrachud and PK Goswami JJ was delivered by Goswami JS Murtaza Fazal Ali J gave a separate Opinion
GOSWAMI J
The facts of the case relating to this appeal by special leave have been fully described in the judgment of our learned brother Fazal Ali J
We agree with the conclusion reached by him that this appeal should be dismissed
We also agree with our learned brother that the appeal should be dismissed on the merits
However so far as the question of law that arises in this appeal we would like to confine our decision to the reasons given hereinafter
The question of law that arises in this appeal is as to whether an application for special leave or an appeal by special leave to thin Court is an appeal within the meaning of section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 as amended by the Rajasthans Ordinance No 26 of 1975 briefly the Act
We should therefore read section 13A 13A Special provisions relating to pend ing and other matters Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Ordinance or in any other law a no court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent the tenant applies under clause b and pays to 327 the landlord
or deposits in court within such time such aggregate of the amount of rent in arrears interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause b in every such proceeding the court shall on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commence ment of the amending Ordinance notwithstand ing any order to the contrary determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at six per cent per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the court and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid the proceeding shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default c the provisions of clause a and b shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or applications for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the amending Ordinance against decree for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause b for the expression from the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance the expression from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision shall be substi tuted d no court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction solely on the ground that due to the death of the tenant as defined in clause vii of section 3 as it stood before the commencement of the amending Ordi nance his surviving spouse son daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub clause b 04 clause vii of section 3 were not entitled to the protection against eviction under this Act as it stood before the com mencement of the amending Ordinance e no decree for eviction passed by any court before the commencement of the amending Ordinance shall unless the same already stands executed before such commencement be executed against the surviving spouse son daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub clause b of the clause vii of section 3 if such decree was passed solely on the ground as is referred to in clause d and such decree shall be deemed to be a nullity as against them and 5 1546SCI77 328 f the provisions of clause d shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or appli cations for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the amending Ordinanceand Explanation For the purposes of this section  a amending Ordinance means the Rajas than Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Amendment Ordinance 1975 and b proceeding  means suit appeal or application revision
 Even in the original Act passed in 1950 section 131a was there with two provisos and there was restriction against eviction
Under section 134 of the original Act a right was conferred upon the tenant in a suit founded on the ground of non payment of rent to pay the arrears with inter est and costs as determined by the court on the first day of hearing within the outside limit Of fifteen days from the date of the order
If the tenant complied with the order the suit for eviction stood dismissed By the Amending Rajasthan Act 12 of 1965 section 13A was introduced
Sub section 4 of section13 of the original Act was substituted by still preserving the tenant s right to pay the arrears with interest and costs within the out side limit of two months and on payment of the same no decree for eviction on the ground of nonpayment of rent shall be passed
The Rajasthan Ordinance No 26 of 1975 inter alia has amended the opening non obstante clause of section 13A and except for substituting the word Act  by Ordinance  in clauses a b and c nothing else has been altered
Section 13A is selective enough
Only one type of eviction decree which is solely based on the ground of non payment of rent is taken care of extending still further the period for payment of arrears with interest and costs
Under section 13A as amended the benefit is available in pending suits of that category appeals therefrom and appli cations for revision pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance that is on 29th September 1975
The decree of eviction with which we are concerned in this appeal is founded on the ground of non payment of rent as specified in section 131 a
There is a two fold submission bY the learned Counsel for the appellant
First in view of the fact that the appellant lodged on 23rd September 1975 an application under Article 136 of the Constitution praying for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court and the Ordinance was passed on 29th September 1975 after that application his case is governed by section 13Aa and b of the Act
In the alternative the appellant submits that at any rate after the special leave had been granted by this Court there was an appeal reading against the judgment of the High Court 329 and since he submitted an application within 30 days from the grant of Special leave his case is covered by section 13Ac of the ACt
 With regard to the first submission it may be pointed out that an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment or an order cannot be equated with the ordinary remedy of appeal as of right under any provisions of law
It is an extraordinary right conferred under the Constitution within the discretion of this Court and such an application for Special leave does not come within the contemplation of appeal pending before the court under Section 13Aa
It is true that the word proceeding winch appears in section 13Aa and b means suit appeal or application for revision according to the Explanation appended to section 13A
Therefore in order to attract section 13Aa a suit appeal or application for revision must be pending on the date of commencement of the Ordinance No 26 of 1975
In view of the connotation of the wordl proceeding as given under the Explanation to section 13A it is impermissi ble to extend the meaning of the word proceeding to in clude an application for Special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution
The collocation of the Words suit appeal or application for revision in the Explanation to denote proceeding would go to show that suits regular appeals therefrom as provided under the ordinary law and applications for revision alone are intended
It is incon ceivable that if the legislature had intended to include within the ambit of proceeding an application for special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution it would have omitted to mention it in express terms
We will now deal with the second submission of the appellant
which is the alternative argument
It is submitted by the appellant that even if an appli cation for special leave is not an appeal for the purpose of section 13Aa in view of the fact that leave of this Court had been obtained and an appeal had been pending in pursu ance of the grant of special leave he iS entitled to invoke the protection under section 13Ac
It is on that basis that the appellant submitted a second application relying on section 13Ac
Under Order XVI rule 11 of the Supreme Court Rules on the grant of special leave the petition for special leave shall subject to the payment of additional court fee if any be treated as the petition of
appeal and it shall be registered and numbered as such
Under section 13Ac read with section 13Ab in a pending appeal the tenant has to make an application within 30 days from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal
There is no provision in an appeal by special leave for presentation of a memorandum of appeal but as stated earlier under rule 11 on the grant of special leave the petition for special leave is treated as the petition of appeal and registered and numbered as such
We may in this connection contrast the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code where the proce dure is laid down for appeals
Order 41 Civil Procedure 330 Code deals with appeals from original decrees
Under sub rule 1 of rule 1 of Order 41 every appeal shah be pre ferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf
Under Order 42 the rules of Order 41 shah apply so far as may be to appeals from appellate decrees
Similarly the same procedure as under Order 41 is provided for under Order 43 rule 2 with regard to appeals from orders
It is therefore clear that under the Civil Procedure Code an appeal has to be preferred in the form of a memorandum and presented to the court or to such officer appointed by the court in that behalf
The question of limitation provided under section 13Ab and c is important and the terminus a quo for the purpose of section 13A c is from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal
Since no petition of appeal has to be presented in this court after special leave is granted such a contingency of appeal to this Court by way of special leave is not intended to be covered by section 13Ac
On the other hand the expression the presentation of the memorandum of appeal in section 13Ac chimes with the construction that the legislature clearly intended to in clude only the hierarchy of appeals under the Civil Proce dure Code wherein presentation of the memorandum of appeal is an obvious requisite
We may next deal with the question whether section 22 of the Act is of assistance in deciding this controversy since our learned brother s conclusion has received sustenance also from the said section
We do not think so
Before we proceed further we may turn to some of the material provisions in the Act
Section 6 provides for fixation of standard rent and under sub section 1  thereof the landlord or the tenant may institute a suit in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction for fixation of standard rent for any premises
Sub section 1 of section 7 provides for fixation of provisional rent by the same court upon the institution of a suit under section 6
Under sub section 4 of section 7 any failure to pay the provisional rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month shah render the tenant liable to eviction under clause a of sub section 1 of section 13 and all sums due from the tenant as such rent shall be recoverable from him as if the order under subsection 1 were a decree of the court in a suit for periodical payments
Section 11 provides for procedure for increasing rent and the landlord may bring a suit under subsection 3 of section 11 for increasing rent or standard rent in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction
Under sub section 114 the court shall after such summary en quiry as it may think necessary make orders according to law and a decree shall follow
Section 19A provides for payment remittance and deposit of rent by tenants and the court for the purpose of that section as well as for sec tions 19B and 19C with respect to any local area means any civil court which may be specially authorised by the State Govern 331 ment by notification in this behalf or where no civil court is so authorised the court of the Munsif and the court of the Civil Judge where there is no court of Munsif having jurisdiction over the area
Section 12 provides for dealing with disallowance of amenities by the landlord by the Magistrate
The Magistrate means the sub Divisional Magistrate having jurisdiction
over the place where the premises in question are situated and includes such other Executive Magistrate having juris diction over and sitting at that place as the State Govern ment may empower in this behalf section 3i
Under sub section 6 of section 12 the order of the Magistrate under subsection 3 shall be executed by the Munsif having juris diction or where there is no Munsif by the Civil Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the premises are situated as if it were a decree passed by such Munsif or Civil
Judge as the case may be
Nextsection 17 describes the powers of a Magistrate to require premises to be let and certain orders can be passed under that section by the Magistrate
Similarly section 19 enables the Magistrate to pass certain orders with regard to the vacant building sites
From a conspectus of the above provisions it will be seen that there are two types of forums for instituting action under the Act
One category of actions is taken to the lowest court of competent jurisdiction which is a civil court and the other category is lodged before the Magistrate on the executive side
The word court however is not defined in the Act but for purposes of sections 19A 19B and 19C
While the forums are specified for certain types of actions enumerated in the Act no court as such is specified in the Act for entertaining suits of eviction by landlord against a tenant
It is therefore manifest that such suits will lie in the ordinary civil court of competent jurisdiction
That court will however have to take into account the relevant provisions of the Act for the purposes of determination of controver sies raised before it
The benefits conferred by the Act upon the tenants will have to be given by the civil court in trying eviction suits
Where there is a bar of eviction under the Act the court will have to give effect to it
As is clear from the above narration that there is a dichotomy of forums under the Act some matters are lodged before the lowest court of competent jurisdiction and some others before the Magistrate
There is a tertium quid namely the usual court which is available to the landlord for instituting suits for eviction against tenants
The landlord however will have to take note of the provisions under the Act and comply with those provisions in such a litigation
The tenant also in such suits will be able to claim all the benefits conferred upon him under the Act which the courts will in appropriate cases grant
In the above background of the provisions in the Act section 22 which provides for appeals and revisions may be read 332 221 From every decree or order paSsed by a court under this Act an appeal shall lie to the court tO which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former court
2 No second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court for Rajasthan in revision 3 Any person aggrieved by an order of the
Magistrate may within fifteen days from the date of such order appeal therefrom to the District Magistrate or such
authority
as the State Government may from time to time appoint in that month
 It is very significant that while SectiOn 22 1  quali ties the decree or order aS being under this Act Section 13A on the contrary does not describe proceeding to be under the Act
Section 221 refers to every decree or order passed by a court under this Act
The decree or order passed
under this Act musttherefore have reference to those passed under Sections 6 7 11 19A and 19C Sub section 2 pro vides that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order
Such decrees or orders are therefore again referable to those passed under the above mentioned sections under the Act While a second appeal is barred in case of those decrees and orders under the Act the High Court s power of revision is not barred
Sub section 3 of section 12 provides for appeals from an order of a Magistrate to the District Magistrate or such authority as may be appointed by the Government
As noticed earlier Certain orders are passed bythe Magistrate under section 13 Section
17 and section 19 Section 223 makes provision of appeal against such orders passed under section 123 section 17 and section 19
It is therefore clear that the Act provides for the institution of actions in two different forums and also makes provision for appeals and revisions against orders and decrees passed under the Act
There is no provision in the Act for institution of suits for eviction which will there fore lie in the ordinary courts of competent jurisdiction
Appeals also revisions where competent will lie against decrees in eviction suits in the usual hierarchy of Courts
It is manifest from a perusal of the scheme of the Act that appeals or applications for revision under section 13Ac relate only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground
of nonpayment of rent
Such appeals or appli cations for revision under section 13Ac are not contem plated under section 22 of the Act
As shown above decrees or orders passed by the court under the Act against which appeals and revisions are provided in Section 22 do not take in decrees or orders passed in a Suit for eviction
Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class of 333 suits
To hold otherwise will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigation be he a landlord or tenant against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the inten tion of the legislature
Second appeal is only barred in ease of decrees or orders passed under the Act to which a copious reference has been made hereinabove with reference to the various provisions of the Act
With regard to execution proceedings it would appear that these are outside the scheme of clauses a to c of section 13A but it is unnecessary to express any firm opinion on that point since it does not arise in this ap peal
We are of opinion that the appellant cannot take advan tage of section 13A in this appeal by special leave
His applications under section 13A stand dismissed
The appeal is therefore dismissed but there will be no order as to costs
FAZAL ALl J
This appeal by special leave involves a question of law regarding the ambit andscope of section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 as amended by Ordinance No 26 of 1975 dated September 29 1975 which was later replaced by an Act
The appeal arises in the following circumstances
The defendantappellant along with his two brothers Padam Chand and Tara Chand had taken on lease a shop at a monthly rent of Rs60 from the plaintiffsrespondents as far back as September 1 1961
The shop was situated in Tripolia Bazar Jaipur City Rajasthan
The plaintiffs served a notice of eviction under section 106 of the Transfer
of Property Act on the appellant and his two brothers terminating
the tenancy and directing
them to vacate the premlses
As the tenants did not Vacate the premises the plaintiffS instituted the present suit in the Court of the Munsiff East Jaipur City_ claiming eviction of the appel lant and his two brothers on me ground that they had not paid or tendered rent for a period of six months from Magh shukla 1 smvt
In the plaint the plaintiffs also averted that the
shop was required by them for their own use and occupation and that the tenants had sublet the shop to Rajasthan Bartan Bhandar
without the consent of the plaintiffs
We might mention here that these two grounds
taken by the plaintiffs have been held by all the Courts to be completely disproved andthe suit was decreed by the District Judge and the High Court mainly on
the ground that thetenants had defaulted in payment of rent for a PeriOd of six months and were therefore liable to be ejected under the provisions
0f the Rajasthan premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
It appears that after summonses were served on all the three defendants including the appellant two of the brothers of the appellant Viz Padam Chand and Tara Chand put in their appearance but the appel lant despite the service did not put in his appearance
In fact the counsel who was appearing for the other two defend ants had been instructed to appear for the appellant also but the Vakalatnama was not signed by the appellant
The appellant appears to have taken advantage of 334 this lacuna in contending that he had not participated in the proceedings of the Trial Court
On February 14
1966 the defendant Tara Chand moved an application under section 13 of the Act praying to the Court that the rent due may be determined and the defendants may be directed to deposit the rent
The Court accordingly determined the rent on March 1 1966 and directed the defendants to deposit a sum of Rs398 75 Paise on or before April 19 1966
As the rent was not deposited the plaintiffs moved an application for striking out the defence of the defendants against eviction for their failure to comply with the provisions of section 134 of the Act
The Court accordingly by its order dated December 14 1966 struck out the defence of the defendants
It may be pertinent to note that although the appellant had not put in his formal appearance he under stood the order of the Trial Court dated December 14 1966 striking out the defence and treated the same as having been passed not only against his brothers Padam Chand and Tara Chand the two defendants but also against himself and accordingly he along with his brothers preferred an appeal against that order to the Senior Civil Judge Jaipur City on October 30 1967
This appeal was ultimately dismissed and then the three defendants flied an application for revision before the High Court which was also dismissed by the High Court by its order dated September 19 1968
Thus it is manifest that the appellant was fully aware of the proceedings that had taken place as also of the order that had been passed against the defendants striking out their defence
When the record was received back by the THai Court Shri Tara Chand Jain Advocate of the defendants informed the Court on November 26 1968 that he was holding brief only on behalf of the two defendants Padam Chand and Tara Chand and not on behalf of the appellant Gyan Chand
The Court accordingly passed an order that the suit was to proceed ex parte against the appellant
On November 30 1968 the appellant flied an application for setting aside the ex parte order passed against him and this application found favour with the Trial Court and was accordingly allowed
The appellant was allowed to file his written statement which he filed on January 27 1969
Thereafter the appellant applied to the Court for determining the rent due to the plaintiffs but that application was rejected on the ground that no amount of rent was payable as the entire rent due had already been paid by the other two defendants
Thereafter the plaintiffs flied an application before the Trial Court for striking out the defence against Gyan Chand as he had not complied with the order under section 134 of the Act passed by the Court previously
The Trail Court however did not pass any orders on that application and ultimately dismissed the suit holding that there was no default
It may be
stated at the outset that when the appellant applied for setting aside the ex parte order he gave no explanation whatsoever for his non appearance in the suit after the summonses were served on him but merely tried to explain his absence on November 26 1968
We have already pointed out that the appellant knew very well that the defence had been struck out by an order of the Court and had actually joined in the appeal and the revision flied by the other two defendants
In spite of that for two years he kept quiet and gave no explanation whatsoever for not appearing before the 335 Court and participating in the proceedings until November 30 1968
This delay of two years which has been seriously commented upon by the High Court has not been explained satisfactorily by the appellant
After the suit was dismissed by the Trial Court the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal holding that the defendants were defaulters and accordingly decreed the suit
The grounds of subletting and personal requirement as alleged by the plaintiffs were however held not proved
Thereaf ter there was second appeal to the High Court which affirmed the judgment of the District Judge and maintained the decree passed by the District Judge
The High Court has rightly pointed out that the conduct of the appellant in not giving any explanation for not participating in the proceed ings despite service of the summonses speaks volumes against him
The argument of the appellant that the entire proceedings should be cancelled as they had taken place in his absence was rightly rejected by the High Court
In view of the concurrent findings of fact recorded on this point by the District Judge and the High Court we are not at all inclined to interfere in this appeal by special leave with the merits of the case decided by the Courts below we are satisfied that the appellant was not diligent at all and has to thank his stars if the decision of the Courts below went against him In these circumstances we do not propose to enter into merits of the appeal
Mr Jain however raised a pure question of law flowing from the amendment by which section 13A was introduced in the Act by virtue of Ordinance No 26 of 1975
Mr Jain submitted that the statutory benefit conferred by section 13A would have to be extended to the appellant before this Court also and since the rent due had already been paid and the appellant was prepared to pay the costs and interest the suit should be dismissed
In order to appreciate this point it may be necessary to state the sequence of facts
The High Court dismissed the second appeal of the appellant on September 5 1975
Against this judgment the appellant filed an applica tion for special leave in this Court on September 23 1975
Six days later ie on September 29 1975 Ordinance No 26 of 1975 dated September 29
1975 introduced section 13A by amend ing the Act
On October 28 1975 the appellant filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition in this Court praying that the Court may issue directions under the newly amended section 13A c of the Act
On November 14 1975 this Court granted special leave
On December 11 1975 another Civil Miscella neous Petition was filed by the appellant renewing his prayer for directions to be given by this Court under section 13A of the Amending Act
The significance of these Civil Mis cellaneous Petitions appears to have been that if the spe cial leave petition was not treated as an appeal then the moment the special leave was granted by this Court the appeal stood admitted by this Court and therefore the second application was filed for directions under section 13A of the Act as amended
Mr Agarwala counsel for the respondents has vehemently contended that section 13A of the Act would have absolutely no application to appeal by special leave filed in this Court
In order to appreciate 336 this point it may be necessary to examine the language and the circumstances under which section 13A was introduced
It would appear that before the introduction of section 13A by virtue of the
Ordinance there was no provision in the Act which prohibited the Court from passing any decree if at any stage the tenant was prepared to deposit the entire rent costs and interest as directed by the Court
The Legisla ture in pursuance of its socialistic policies attempted to liberalise the conditions of tenancies so as to give the tenants special protection against frivolous evictions
With this object in view the Ordinance appears to have been passed which was later on replaced by an Act
In the state ment of objects and reasons accompanyingthe amending Act it is mentioned that the Legislature decided to provide relief to tenants occupying premises in urban areas and in clause 6 0f the said statement the following observations are made In relation to pending suits and pro ceedings for ejectment on ground of defaults an opportunity had been given to tenants to deposit the arrears of rent within thirty days and upon such deposit no decree for ejectment will be passed on such ground against them Thus a perusal of clause 6 of the statement of Objects and reasons would clearly show that the intention of the Legislature was to confer certain benefits on the tenants to pending suits and proceedings for ejectment only on ground of defaults by giving them an opportunity to deposit the arrears within a specified time
It is nowhere mentioned in clause 6 that this benefit was to be extended beyond the frontiers of the State in appeals which Were not ordinary remedies but which were special remedies provided for under the Constitution
Thus the scope of the amendment was to confine the protection given to the tenants within the limits of the hierarchy of courts mentioned by the Act and to the
Courts in the State of Rajasthan
It may be noticed that the statement ofobjects and reasons does not even give a hint that the benefit conferred by section 13A would  be available even in the execu tion proeedings after the decree had been passed
We shall now analyse section 13A of the Act against the background of the main objective of the Legislature
Section 13A of the ACt as introduced by Ordinance No 26 of 1975 and later re placed by the Act runs thus 13A Special provisions relating to pending and other matters Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it  existed before the commencement of the ordinance or in any other law a no court shall in any proceeding
pending on the date of commencement of the amending ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent if the tenant applies under clause b and pays to the landlord or deposits in court Within such time
such aggregate of the amount of rent in arrears interest 337 thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause
b in every such proceeding the court shall on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commence ment of the amending ordinance notwithstand ing any order to the contrary determine the amount of rent in arrears upto the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at six per cent per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time not exceeding ninety days as may be fixed by the court and on such payment being made within the time fixed as afore said the_proceeding shall be disposed of as if the tenant had not committed any default c the provisions of clauses a and b mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or application for revisions preferred or made after the commencement of the amending ordi nance against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause b for the expression from the date of commencement of the amending ordinance the expression from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision shall be substi tuted X X X Explanation For the purpose of this section 
a amending ordinance means the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Amendment Ordinance 1975 and b Proceeding means suit appeal or application for revision
 Section 13A contemplates only three kinds of proceedings namely suits appeals and applications for revisions and these proceedings must be under the Act itself
Clause
a of section 13A of the Act provides that no court after the commencement of the mending ordinance shall pass any decree on the ground of non payment of rent if the tenant applies and a s to the landlord the entire rent in arrears interest and full costs of the suit
Clause b requires that such an application is to be made within thirty days of the com mencement of the amending ordinance onWhich the Court would determine the rent in arrears and direct interest to be paid at the rate of six per cent per annum
Clauses a and b obviously do not apply to the present case because the proceedings were not pending in any court when the ordinance or the Act came into force
Reliance was however placed on the word proceeding as appearing in clauses a and b in 338 order to plead an argument that the word proceeding was wide enough to include not
only Suits but appeals at all stages
This argument in our opinion is based on a serious misconception of the interpretation of the word proceeding
The Legislature has not left the connotation of the word proceeding in doubt because clause b of the Explanation clearly indicates what proceedings contemplat ed by section 13A in clauses a b and c are
The Expla nations clearly shows that proceeding means suit appeal or application for revision
A logical interpretation of clause b of the Explanation would clearly reveal that the Act itself has limited the scope of the proceeding to suits appeals or applications for revision under the hierarchy of the statute
In other words the Explanation refers only to Such proceedings as may be pending in any suit appeal or application for revision under the Act
Section 22 of the Act runs thus 22
Appeals and Revisions  1 From every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former court
2 No second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court for Rajasthan in revision X X X X  Section 22 provides for an appeal to the Court where an appeal ordinarily ties ie the Court of the District Judge in the instant case and thereafter an application in revi sion to the High Court
The use of the words such proceed ing in clause b of section 13A fortifies our conclusion that the proceedings contemplated by section 13A are really the pro ceedings referred to in Explanation which means proceedings in the nature of suits appeals or applications for revision as referred to in section 22 of the Act
In these circumstances we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that proceedings in this Court would fall within the ambit of clauses a and b of section 13A of the Act
It was then submitted that at any rate clause c
of section 13A would apply to the facts of the present case and the appellant should be given the benefit of that provision
It is true that clause e applied the provisions of clauses a and b mutatis mutandis to appeals and applications for revision
It may be noticed however mat this benefit is not conferred even in the execution proceedings arising out of decrees passed in suits or appeals and upheld in revi sions
The true interpretation of clause c of section 13A would therefore be that this clause also contemplated the same proceedings as contemplated by clauses a and b namely the proceedings indicated in the Explanation
Thus the benefit conferred by clause c would apply only to appeals or applications for revisions filed under the 339 Act as provided by section 22 of the Act
The Legislature never intended to confer this benefit beyond the frontiers of the State
It was however submitted that the word appeal is wide enough to include an appeal by special leave filed in this Court
It is however not possible to accept this conten tion
The amendment was passed some time in the year 1975 ie about 25 years after the Constitution had come into force
An appeal by special leave was a special remedy provided for by article 136 of the Constitution and the State Legislature of Rajasthan must be presumed to be aware of this special remedy as also the nomenclature of this remedy
If the intention was to extend the benefit to appeals for special leave it should have been so clearly stated in clause c
Furthermore the Rules flamed by the Supreme Court the knowledge of which also must be ascribed to the State Legislature make a clear cut distinc tion between an application filed in the Court for grant of special leave and a petition of appeal after the leave is granted
It was suggested that the application for special leave to appeal may be treated as the memorandum of appeal as referred to in clause c of section 13A
It is however not possible to accept this contention because the constitu ents and ingredients of an application for special leave to appeal are quite different from those of a memorandum of appeal preferred to an appellate Court under O XLI r 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Under O XVI r 4 of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 the petition for special leave is to contain only the necessary facts and not the grounds
It is true r 11 of O XVI of the Supreme Court Rules provides that the petition for special leave would be treated as a petition of appeal after the special leave is granted but that also cannot be equated with a memorandum of appeal as contemplated by clause c of section 13A of the Act
In contra distinction to the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules it would appear that O XLI r 1 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure runs thus The memorandum shall set forth con cisely and under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively
 It would thus appear that the provisions of r 1 2 of O XLI Code of Civil Procedure require that the memorandum of appeal has to set forth under the distinct heads the grounds of objections to the decree appealed from
No such requirement is to be found in the Supreme Court Rules either for an application for special leave to appeal or in the petition of appeal which is required to be field if certifi cate by High Court is granted
The Legislature must be presumed to be aware of the difference between an applica tion for special leave to appeal and a memorandum of appeal
If the intention was to extend the benefit of section 13A even to appeals before the Supreme Court then apart from the word memorandum of appeal the words application for special leave to Supreme Court should have been mentioned
The fact that clause c of section 13A merely mentions the words from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision clearly indicate that 340 the remedies contemplated by the Act are the remedies of appeal and revision as provided for by section 22 of the Act
In fact as already pointed out the benefit conferred by section 13A of the Act does not extend even to the
execution pro ceedings and in these circumstances it cannot be assumed that it would have applied to a Court which is beyond the frontiers of the State and to a remedy which has been pro vided not by the State Legislature but by the Constitution itself
For these reasons therefore we reject the argument of the appellant that clause c of section 13A of the Act would apply to the present appeal and that the appellant is thereforeentitled to the benefit of this provision on the basis of the Civil MisCellaneous Petition filed by him
We are clearly of the opinion on an interpretation of the various clauses of section 13A of the Act and the Explanation thereto that
the benefit under section 13A has been intended by the Legislature to be conferred only on the appellate and revisional courts and even execution proceedings have been excluded from the ambit Of the protection granted
For these reasons I agree with the judgment proposed by my brother Goswami J and dismiss the appeal but in the peculiar circumstances of the case without any order as to costs
PBR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Section 13A was introduced in Rajasthan Premises Con trol of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 by an Ordinance on September 29 1975 The Ordinance was later replaced by an Act
Clause aof the section provides that no Court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent under certain circumstances
Clause b provides that in every such proceeding the Court shall on the application of the tenant made within 30 days from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision determine the amount of rent in arrears
Clause c provides that the provisions of els
a  b shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or applications for revision preferred or made after the commencement of the Amending Ordinance
Explanation b to the section defines a proceeding to mean a suit appeal or application for revision
Section 221 provides that from every decree or order passed by the Court under the Act an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decrees and orders passed by such former Court
On the ground of non payment of rent a decree of evic tion was passed against the appellant who was the respond ent s tenant
The High Court having affirmed the decree on appeal the appellant filed an application for special leave to this Court on September 23 1975
The Ordinance intro ducing section 19A was passed on September 29 1975
This Court granted special leave on November
In appeal to this Court it was contended by the appel lant 1 that since the application for special leave was pending before this Court on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance the case was governed by section 13A a and b of the Act 2 in the alternative since as a result of the grant of special leave an appeal had been pending before this Court the appellant was entitled to the protection of section 13Ac of the Act
Dismissing the appeal HELD Per Chandrachud and Goswami JJ 1a In order to attract section 13Aa a suit appeal or application for revision must be pending on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance
An application for special leave under article 136 of the Constitution cannot be equated with the ordinary remedy of appeal as of right under any provision of law
It is an extraordinary right conferred under the Constitution within the discretion of the Supreme Court and an application for special leave does not come within the contemplation of appeal pending before the Court under section 13Aa
The collocation of the words suit a appeal or application for revision used in the explanation to denote proceeding shows that the suits and regular appeals therefrom as provided under the ordinary law and applications for revision alone are intended
329C  B 325 b The expression presentation of memorandum of appeal under section 13A c chimes with the construction that the legislature clearly intended to include only the hierarchy of appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure
330D c Under section 13Ac read with section 13Ab in a pending appeal the tenant has to make an application within 30 days from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal
There is no provision in an appeal by special leave for presentation of memorandum of appeal under r 11 of OXVI
of the Supreme Court Rules on the grant of special leave the petition for special leave is treated as the petition of appeal
In contrast under O41 r 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant and pre sented to the Court
329H d The terminus a quo for the purpose of section 13Ac is from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal
Since no petition of appeal has to be presented in the Supreme Court after the special leave is granted such a contingency of appeal to this Court by way of special leave is not intended to be covered by section 13Ac
330C 2 Section 22 cannot assist the appellant in this case
While section 221  qualifies the decree or order as being under this Act section 13A does not describe proceeding to be under the Act
330E 332C The Act provides for the institution of serious in two different forums namely the lowest Court of competent jurisdiction which is the Civil Court and the other before a Magistrate on the executive side
332F Appeals or applications for revision under section 13Ac relate only to decrees in suits for eviction based on the ground of non payment of rent
Such appeals or applications for revision under section 13Ac are not contemplated under section 22
Decrees or orders passed by the Court under the Act against which appeals and revisions are provided in section 22 do not take in decrees and orders passed in a suit for eviction
Usual rights of appeal and revision will be available in the latter class of suits
To hold otherwise will be to deny a right of second appeal to a litigant whether it is landlord or tenant against a decree in an eviction suit which is clearly not the intention of the legislature
Second appeal is only barred in case of de crees or orders passed under the Act
332H Per section Murtaza Fazal Ali J Proceedings in this Court would not fall within the ambit of cls
a and b of section 13A 338F a The Explanation to the section clearly shows that the word proceeding refers only to such proceedings as may be pending in any suit appeal or application for revision under the Act
The use of the words such proceedings in section 13Ab shows that the proceedings contemplated by section 13A are really proceedings referred to in the explanation which means proceedings in the nature of suits appeals or appli cations for revision as referred to in section 22
338E F b Section 13Ac would not apply to the present case
The benefit conferred by el
c would apply only to appeals and applications for revision filed under the Act as provid ed by section 22
The true interpretation of cl
c would be that this clause contemplated the same proceedings as con templated by els
a and b namely proceedings indicated in the explanation
338G H c An appeal by special leave is a special remedy provided by article 136 of the Constitution and the legislature must be presumed to be aware of this special remedy
If the intention was to extend the benefit to appeals for special leave it should have been clearly stated in el
339B d The Supreme Court Rules make a clear cut distinction between an application filed for the grant of special leave and a petition of appeal if the leave is granted
The constituents and ingredients of an application for special leave to appeal are quite different from those of a memoran dum of appeal under OXLI r 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure
339D 326 e The provisions of OXLI r 12 CPC require that the memorandum of appeal has to set forth under distinct heads the grounds of objections to the decree appealed from
No such requirement is to be found in the Supreme Court Rules either for an application for special leave to appeal or in the petition of appeal which is required to be filed if certificate by the High Court is granted
The legislature must be
presumed to be aware of the difference between an application for special leave to appeal and a memorandum of appeal
Though r 11 of OXVI of the Supreme Court Rules provides that the petition for special leave would be treat ed as a petition of appeal after the special leave is grant edit cannot be equated with a memorandum of appeal contem plated by section 13Ac of the Act
339G H f The fact that section 13Ac mentions the words from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision clearly indicates that the reme dies contemplated by the Act are remedies of appeal and revision as provided for by section 22 of the Act
339H