ivil Appeals Nos
1266  1267 of 1969
From the Judgment and order dated the 29th July 1968 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 61 of 1967 H K Puri and K K Mohan for the appellant 264 D Goburdhan for respondent Nos 1 and 2 In both the appear Respondent No 21 In CA No 126669 and for respondent No 60 in CA No 126769
A K Nag for respondent Nos 3 19 In CA No 126669 and for respondent Nos 4 S 7 9 11 32 35 42 44 52 54 58 In CA No 126769
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI J
By two notifications dated 22 6 65 and 28 8 65 the Government of Bihar sent to the Labour Court Chota Nagpur Division Ranchi applications in respect of 73 workers of the appellant for decision under section 33C2 of the Industrial disputes Act for retrenchment compensation
The employer contended that it was a case of closure for reasons beyond its control and that therefore the workmen were entitled to compensation under the proviso to subsection 1 of section 25FFF of the Act and not to retrenchment compensation workers contended however that they were entitled to retrenchment compensation under s25F
The Labour Court held that it was a case of retrenchment
Two writ petitions filed by the employer before the High Court of Patna failed and these appeals have been filed in pursuance of a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court
The argument on behalf of the appellant is that where there is a dispute before the Labour Court considering an application under section 33C2 as to whether the workmen had been retrenched or the factory had been closed for reasons beyond the control of the employer it was not a matter which the Labour Court was competent to decide and that it was a matter which only an Industrial Tribunal considering a reference under section 10 is competent to decide
In particular Item 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act is relied upon to show that the matter relating to retrenchment and closure is one which only an Industrial Tribunal is competent to decide
Reliance is placed upon a decision of this Court in UP Elect
Co vs R K Shukla1 where it was held that the power of the Labour Court is to complete the compensation claimed to be payable to the workmen on the footing that there has been retrenchment of the workmen that where retrenchment is conceded and the only matter in dispute is that by virtue of section 25FFF no liability to pay compensation has arisen the Labour Court will be competent to decide the question that in such a case the question is one of computation and not of determination of the conditions precedent to the accrual of liability and that where the dispute is whether workmen have been retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or incidental the Labour Curt will have no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with which it is statutorily invested
In the UP Electric Company case supra the facts were somewhat different
The Court in that case noticed at page 513 of the report that The company had expressly raised a contention that they had not retrenched the workmen and that the workmen had 265 voluntarily abandoned the Company s service by seeking employment with the Board even before the company closed its undertaking
This Court emphasised at page 5l7 of the report that If the liability arises from an award settlement or under the provisions of Ch
V A or by virtue of a statute or a scheme made thereunder mere denial by the employer may not be sufficient to negative the claim under section 33C2 before the Labour Court
We therefore do not see how the decision in the UP Electric Company s case supra can come to the aid of the appellant in this case
The said case is clearly distinguishable on the peculiar facts as noticed above
In Central Bank of India Ltd vs P section Rajagopalan1 this Court considered the scope of section 33C2 elaborately and it would be necessary to quote at some length from that decision
In that case it was urged by the employer that section 33C2 can be invoked by a workman who is entitled to receive from the employer the benefit there specified but the right of the workman to receive the benefit has to be admitted and could not be a matter of dispute between the parties and that the only point which the labour Court can determine is one in relation to computation of the benefit ill terms of money
This Court observed We are not impressed by this argument
In our opinion on a fair and reasonable construction of sub section
2 it is clear that if a workman s right to receive the benefit is disputed that may have to be determined by the Labour Court
Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court inevitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit
If the said right is not disputed nothing more needs to be done and the labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of money but if the said right is disputed the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making necessary computation can arise
It seems to us that the opening clause of sub section
2 docs not admit of the construction for which the appellant contends unless we add some words in that clause
The clause Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit does not mean where such workman is admittedly or admitted to be
entitled to receive such benefit
 The appellant s constructional would necessarily introduce the addition of the words admittedly or admitted to be in that clause and that clearly is not permissible
Besides if seems to us that is the appellant s construction is accepted it would necessarily mean that 266 it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub section 2 because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman s application
The claim under section 33C2 clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub s2
As Maxwell in Interpretation of Statutes p 350 has observed where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution we must accordingly hold that section 33C2 takes within its purview case of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers
Incidentally it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub s 3 the Labour Court should have been authorised to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub section
On the other hand sub s3 becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour of Court under sub section
Further on this Court observed It is thus clear that claims made under s33C1 by itself can be only claims referable to the settlement award or the relevant provisions of Chapter VA
These words of limitations are not to be found in s33C2 and to that extent the scope of section 33C2 is undoubtedly wider than that of section 33C1
It is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall under section 33C2
There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in section 33C 1 fall under section 33C2 and in that sense section 33C2 can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding but it is possible that claims not based on settlements awards or made under the provisions of Chapter VA may also be competent under section 33C2 and that may illustrate its wider scope This Court then went on to discuss some of the claims which would not fall under s33C2 which is not very relevant for the purposes of this case
The present case stand on an even stronger footing
Even the employer does not dispute that the workmen are entitled to compensation
It only says that the compensation should be calculated on a particular basis different from the basis on which the workmen claim
The claim also falls under Chapter VA 267 In the decision in South Arcot Elect
Co vs N K Khan1 where a right had been claimed by the various workmen in their applications under section 33C2 it was held that it was a right which accured to them under s25FF of the Act and was an existing right at the time when these applications were made that the Labour Court clearly had jurisdiction to decide whether such a right did or did not exist when dealing with the application under that provision and that the mere denial of that by the company could not take away its jurisdiction
We hold that in this case it was competent to the Labour Court to decide whether the case before it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the proviso to sub section
1 of section 25FFF was attracted on closure of the establishment
The question even according to the employer falls under section 25FFF and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court has necessarily to decide whether the proviso has been satisfied
We do not consider that the reference to item No 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act can decide the matter one way or the other
The item reads as follows 10
Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment It does not say that all questions arising out of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishments have to be decided by Industrial Tribunal
Logically if the contentions is to be accepted even if the question of retrenchment is not disputed the Labour Court will not be competent to decide the question of compensation payable in a case of retrenchment because it raises a question of jurisdiction
This entry should therefore be held to refer to cases where the right to retrench workers or to close an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal
In that case the Tribunal will be competent to decide whether the closure or retrenchment was justified and whether the retrenched workmen should be reinstated or the workers in the establishment purported to have been closed should be continued to be paid on the basis that the so called closure was to closure at all
In the present case the workmen do not ask for reinstatement
They accept the termination of their services and ask for compensation
The only dispute is about the compensation whether it is to be paid under s25F or 25FFF
Item 10 of Third Schedule will not cover such a case
We therefore uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss these appeals with costs
VMK Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The Government of Bihar sent to the Labour Court Chota Nagpur Division Ranchi application in respect of 73 workers of the appellant for decision under sec
33C2 of the for retrenchment compensation
The contention of the appellant was that it was a case of closer for reasons beyond its control and that therefore the workmen were entitled to compensation under the proviso to sub section 1 of sec
25FFF of the Act and not to retrenchment compensation
The workers contended that they were entitled to retrenchment compensation under sec
25F The Labour Court held that it was a case of retrenchment
The writ petitions filed by the employer in the High Court has failed and these appeals have been preferred to this Court on the basis of the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court
Dismissing the appeals  HELD  i It was competent to the Labour Court to decade whether the case before it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the proviso to sub sec
1 of section 25FFF was attracted on closure of the establishment
Even the employer does not dispute that the workmen are entitled to compensation
It only says that the compensation should be calculated on a particular basis different from the basis on which the workmen claim
The claim also falls under Chapter VA of the Act
266H 267B C Central Bank of India Ltd vs P section Rajagopalan  relied on
UP Electric Company vs R K Shukla 1970 1 SCR 507 and South Arcot Elect
Co vs N K Khan 1969 2 SCR 902 referred to
ii Item No 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act does not say that all questions arising out of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment have to be decided by Industrial Tribunal
This entry refers to cases where the right to retrench workers or to lose an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal
In that case the Tribunal will be competent to decide whether the closure or retrenchment was justified and whether the retrenchment workmen should be reinstated or the workers in the establishment purported to have been closed should be continued to be paid on basis that the so called closure was no closure at all
In the present case the workmen do not ask for reinstatement
They accept the termination of the services and ask for compensation
The only dispute is about the compensation whether it is to be paid under section 25F or 25FFF
Item 10 of Third schedule will not cover such a case
267D G