Appeal No 279 of 1967
343 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated September 15 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No 222 of 1960
G N Dikshit and O P Rana for the appellants
E C Agrawala for respondents Nos 1 2 4 and 5
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Beg J
There are two appeals by Special Leave before us Leave against the Judgment and decree of a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing a plaintiff s second appeal The plaintiff s case was that the Government of Rampur had given him a house under the orders of His Highness the Nawab of Ramur passed on 23rd June 1945
It appears that after the merger of Rampur State in Uttar Pradesh in 1949 when Rampur became a district of Uttar Pradesh this house was given by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Municipal Board of Rampur Defendant Appellant which demanded rent from the plaintiff by notice
On the plaintiff s refusal to pay the house was attached on 23rd February 1955
The plaintiff deposited a sum of Rs 100 under protest
He then filed his suit on 26 10 56 for a declaration that he is the owner in possession of the house and in the alternative that he is a licensee entitled to remain in possession of the house for life without payment of rent The defendants the State of Uttar Pradesh the Municipal Board of Rampur and the Public Work Department at Rampur denied the alleged gift of either the ownership or of a life interest in the house to the plaintiff
They also pleaded that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants
Their case was that if any permission to reside in the house was given to the plaintiff by the ruler of the State of Rampur before the merger of Rampur with Uttar Pradesh it was valid and effective only so long as the plaintiff was in the service of the former ruler of Rampur
They set up a claim to damages for use and occupation in the form of rent from the plaintiff at Rs 10 per month from 1 4 1953 to 30 1 1954
According to them the plaintiff s licence if any automatically terminated when the State of Rampur merged with the State of Uttar Pradesh
The defendants had also pleaded that the alleged gift which was not governed by Mahomedan law could not be upheld because no registered deed of gift was executed to transfer a house the value of which was far in excess of Rs 100 
The Trial court as well as the first Appellate Court bad found after in examination of all the evidence including the alleged 344 order dated 23rd June 1945 of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur Exhibit 1 a letter dated 30th June 1949 Exhibit A 10 from a Minister of Rampur State to the Secretary Buildings fixing rent for the house and the oral evidence that the plaintiff had not proved either of the two alternative claims set
up by him
A learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had upon the plaintiff s second appeal reversed the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below because the learned Judge thought that the order of the Nawab of Rampur dated 23rd June 1945 constituting a valid declaration of a gift by the owner of the house followed by the plaintiff s admitted actual possession of the house conferred ownership of the house upon the plaintiff respondent according to Mahomedan law
The learned Judge also held that nothing beyond this order of the Nawab could be looked into for deciding what was intended by the Nawab and that the use of the words inteqal and atta in the following extract from the order in Urdu determined the intent of the Nawab conclusively Ap ki sakunat ke waste Abdul Karim Sabib wala makan atta farmaya gaya hai
Ap aj hi us me muntaquil ho jayen
Ap un se mil kar inteqal niaka1 ki karrawai kariye
The questions arising before us for decision are  firstly whether the alleged gift is governed by Mahomedan Law secondly whether the requirements of Mahomedan law for establishing a gift of the house or of its usufruct for life to the plaintiff could be held to have been satisfied in this case and thirdly whether nothing beyond the order of 23 6 1945 could be looked into to determine the Nawab s intention
One could legitimately presume that a gift by the Nawab of Ranipur a Muslim would be governed by the rules of Mahome dan law if the Nawab was dealing with his own private property
In the case before us we find that the plaintiff himself has pleaded that he acquired his right and title to the house in dispute from the Government of Rampur State although the action of the Government was said to be under the orders dated June 23 1945 of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur
Upon an examination of the alleged order which has been treated by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court as a valid declaration of a gift of the house by its owner governed by Mahomedan law we find that it is only a piece of information sent
to the plaintiff who is described as Nigran Shikar Mahi or Supervisor of Fishing
 The communication translated in English in the paper book of this Court reads as follows  His Highness has passed orders that you should immediately vacate the house in which you reside and 345 pay up to the landlord all his dues
Abdul Karim wala house has been given to you for your residential purpose
You should shift to that house this very day
The Executive Engineer Buildings has been intimatto allot the said house to you immediately
Please contact him and take steps to va cate the house
The plaintiff himself had produced Agha Khan the Assistant Military Secretary of the Nawab of Rampur who had signed and sent the communication set out above to the plaintiff
His evidence shows that the Nawab of Rampur had probably given some oral order to get the private house in which the plaintiff was living vacated and to give another House to him for residence
Under cross examination the witness stated that by using the word inteqal in the writing he meant to convey that the plaintiff should leave that house and live in the house in dispute This witness who was not owner of the house could not gift the house in dispute to the plaintiff
He could only give the house to the plaintiff in the sense that he could under the Nawab s orders obtain its allotment for the plaintiff
He said that its previous occupant a mechanic was also occupying it without payment of any rent with the Nawab s permission
The implication of such a statement could only be that the plaintiff had a similar permission
He did not depose that the Nawab had asked him to inform the plaintiff that the Nawab was making a gift of the house to the plaintiff
The witness stated that the house belonged to the Government of Rampur
All this evidence is consistent with the view that the Nawab meant to do nothing more than to resolve the immediate difficulty of the plaintiff by giving him some free residential accommodation in a house owned by the Government so that the plaintiff could clear up his dues to his landlord rather than with the conclusion that the Nawab intended to confer the ownership of the house on the plaintiff
It is well established that a document must be read as a whole
In a document meant for a transfer of ownership the purpose is generally stated clearly to be that the property given will be owned and possessed henceforth by the donee in such a way that he could use it or deal with it as he liked
The only karawai  or proceeding to which a reference is made in the document seemed to be allotment of accommodation or transfer of plaintiff s residence into another house owned by the State for which appropriate steps were to be taken by a Government official
The communication savs as translated that the Executive Engineer Buildings had been informed that the house in question was to be allotted to the plaintiff
If the plaintiff was to become its owner that would have been communicated to the 346 Executive Engineer
A transfer of ownership would in the ordinary course be expected to be evidenced by much more clear and unequivocal language
The appropriate proceeding after a gift is that of mutation in Municipal records
No evidence was given of any mutation in a Municipal record showing transfer of ownership of the corpus  for which the term milkiyat  is used
It is true that as the learned Judge observed the word Inteqal  is used ill connection with a transfer of property
This is so when it occurs in juxtaposition with Jaidad 
In the document before us the following words indicate that transfer which the Nawab had in mind was that of the plaintiff himself to another residence in the physical sense  Ap aj hi us me muntaqil ho jayen
 This meaning is further emphasised by the use of the words sakunat ke waste for residential purpose which was the only stated object of the inteqal Again the word atta is used to denote all kinds of grants
The grant may be of a license or of ownership of property
The word atta could be used by a courtier as a matter of form to indicate anything granted by the Nawab whether it be mere permission to live in a house or something more
If the intention of the Nawab was to grant ownership the language used to communicate it would not have left it in doubt
It is significant that the plaintiff who stated in his evidence that the gift was meant to have been made in lieu of old services had not mentioned this object of the alleged donation in his plaint
It is also evident that he was not sure of his own rights or position because he took up an alternative case of a gift of the right to live in the house for life
We do not find the word hibba  or gift used at all in this document
Nor is the word amree or any other similar word which could connote a life estate used in the document
There being no mention either of rights of ownership or those of a life estate holder the mere use of the words inteqal and atta does not determine as the learned Judge assumed what was really meant to be granted or transferred
We think that oral and other evidence besides the document under consideration was both necessary and admissible under Proviso 6 to Sec
92 of the Indian Evidence Act to resolve a latent ambiguity caused by the two vague words used in it and to show how its language was related to the existing facts even if one were to assume that the information contained in it was meant to reduce the terms of a grant to the form of writing
Upon the view we are taking of the facts of this case it is not necessary for us to embark on any detailed discussion of essentials 347 of a gift under the Mahomedan law
It is enough to point out that even if the rules of Mahomedan law were to be applied to the transaction before us the very first of the three conditions of a valid gift given in Mulla s Principles of Mahomedan Law 16th Edn
p 141 that of a declaration of gift by the donor is lacking here
Such a declaration must indicate with reasonable clarity what is really gifted
It is also not necessary for us to deal with the distinction between separable gifts of the corpus  and the usufruct  recognised by Mahomedan law which references to Amjad Khan vs Ashraf Khan  and Nawazish Ali Khan vs Ali Raza Khan2 would disclose
After an examination of all the admissible evidence relating to the nature of the transaction set up by the plaintiff which should have been considered we are satisfied that the plaintiff failed to prove either a grant of the corpus  or of the usufruct  of the house to him for his life by its owner
The transaction before us would amount to nothing more than the grant of a license revocable at the Grantor s option to reside in the house so long as the grantor allowed the licensee to do so
Such a grant is known as areeat in Mahomedan law See Mulla s Principles of Mahomedan Law Sixteenth Edition page 166
The terms of the alleged grant even if they are to be found only in the communication sent to the plaintiff are not read in the context in which they occur capable of raising an inference of a larger grant
The mere expenditure of small sums of money over necessary repairs alleged by the plaintiff could not convert it into an irrevocable license
Consequently we allow this appeal and set aside the judg ment and decree of the High Court
We do not think that this is a fit case in which the appellant should get the costs of this litigation as the plaintiff had some grounds to be misled by the communication received by him
The parties will therefore bear their own costs throughout
VPS Appeal allowed
1 A I R 2 AIR 1948 PC p 134


Summary:
Pursuant to an order by a Muslim ruler of an erstwhile princely State the respondent was allotted a house and he was living in it
After the merger of the princely State with the appellant State rent was demanded from the respondent and he filed a suit for a declaration that be was the owner in possession of the house and in the alternative that he was a licensee entitled to remain in possession for life without payment of any rent
The High Court in second appeal held that the use of the Urdu words inteqal  and atta  showed that the Ruler intended the order to be a valid declaration of gift under Mohammedan Law and that when the respondent took possession of the house he became its owner
The High Court also held that no other evidence was admissible for deciding on the Ruler s intention
Allowing the appeal to this Court HELD  1 There being no mention in the order either of rights of ownership or those of a life estate holder the mere use of the two words did not determine what was meant to be granted
The word inteqal  is used in connection with a transfer of property but in the context of its use here it could only indicate that the respondent was to have change or transfer his residence in the physical sense
The word atta  is used to denote all kinds of grants including a mere permission to live in a house
Therefore assuming that the order reduced the terms of a grant to writing oral and other evidence was both necessary and admissible under section 92 proviso 6 Evidence Act to resolve the latent ambiguity
The evidence adduced in the case however is more consistent with the view that the Ruler meant to resolve the immediate financial difficulty of the respondent by giving him free residential accommodation than with a conferment of the ownership of or a life interest in the house
346 B H 2 There was no declaration of any gift either of the corpus or the usufruct and the admissible evidence relating to the nature of the transaction which the High Court should have considered showed that the transaction amounted to nothing more than a grant of a licence revocable at the grantor s option
From the mere expenditure by the respondent of money over some necessary repairs an inference of a larger grant cannot be drawn
347 C E