ivil Appeal No 2589 of 1979
From the Judgement and Order dated 881977 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No 983 of 1972
VM Tarkunde Ms section Janani and Mrs Urmila Kapoor for the Appellant
SB Bhasme UR Lalit DN Misra RA Gupta and Ms Shefali Khanna for the Respondents
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN
This appeal arises from the judgement of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No 983 of 1972 setting 834 aside the order made by the appellate officer the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court Bombay under section 105F of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888  The Act  whereby he allowed the appellant s appeal against the order of eviction made against it under section 105B of the Act by the enquiry officer acting in terms of section 68 of the Act as a delegate of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay the first respondent the Corporation
By the impugned judgement the High Court has confirmed the order of eviction made against the appellant the principal occupant of two godowns belonging to the Corporation
the original occupant of the godowns Glenfield  Co had on 1101963 granted to the appellant a licence in respect of these premises and subsequently by a deed of assignment dated 1381966 assigned all its rights title and interest in the premises in favour of the appellant
The appellant thereafter requested the Corporation on the ground that Ghatge  Patil Transport Pvt Ltd the second respondent had been already in occupation of the premises and after satisfying itself as to those terms the Corporation transferred the occupancy right from Glenfield  Co to the appellant on the appellant executing a formal agreement dated 1761967
The Corporation was thus fully aware of the terms and conditions of occupation of the premises by the second respondent and with the full knowledge of those terms the appellant was recorded in the Corporation s book as the principal occupant in the place of Glenfield  Co the second respondent was thus understood and accepted by the Corporation to be in occupation of the premises under the appellant
All this was in 1967
A notice dated 2571969 terminating tenancy purporatedly in terms of the agreement dated 1761967 was served on the appellant
This was followed by an enquiry under the Act which commenced in 1970 and resulted in the order of eviction dated 611971
The order of eviction refers to the appellant as the principal tenant and the second respondent as a sub tenant
The enquiry officer acting as a delegate in terms of section 68 and exercising the power of Commissioner 835 under section 105B ordered eviction of the appellant on the ground of sub letting the premises
She held that the appellant had sub let the premises contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation and had thus become an unauthorised occupant liable be evicted from the premises
The enquiry officer on inspection found that that the second respondent was in occupation of the premises as sub lessee
She noticed the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 2731964 under which the premises had been allowed to be occupied by the second respondent
She concluded that the appellant had by reason of sub letting contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation become liable to be evicted in terms of section 105B
Accordingly she passed an order of eviction against the appellant
This order was on appeal set aside by the appellate officer
On appreciation of the evidence on record including the terms of the relevant agreements the appellate officer held that the agreement dated 2731964 under which the second respondent occupied the premises had been well known to the Corporation and the Corporation having satisfied itself as to the full implication and significance of that occupation approved and recorded the assignment and transfer of the right title and interest of Glenfied  Co to the appellant and recognised the appellant as the principal occupant
The Corporation was thus at all material times aware of the appellant s relationship with the second respondent and the occupation of the premises by the second respondent under the appellant
Accordingly the appellate officer held that in the absence of any material to show that the relationship between the appellant and the second respondent had so altered since the appellant s agreement with the Corporation as to violate the terms or conditions of occupation the eviction of the appellant solely on the ground of sub letting was unwarranted
The reasoning of the appellate officer thus appears to be that the Corporation having allowed the transfer of the occupancy right of Glenfield  Co to the appellant with the full knowledge of the terms and conditions under which the second respondent was already let into the premises by the appellant whatever be the nature of their relationship whether it be a lease or licence the Corporation was estopped from now contending that the alleged sub letting was contrary to the terms or conditions of the appellant s occupation of the premises and that the appellant had for that reason become liable to be evicted
836 This is what the appellate officer stated on the point 
There is no allegation that after the tenancy was transferred in the name of the applicantwith the full knowledge and consent of the Municipal Corporation as to the terms and conditions on which the premises were occupied by the 2nd respondent there has been any change in the nature of the 2nd respondent s occupation of the part of the premises and also in the terms and conditions of the occupation
Although the subsequent agreement was entered into between the appellants and the 2nd respondent it was on the same terms and conditions as the first agreement which was produced before the ward officer before the transfer of tenancy in favour of the appellants  
In this case therefore even if the agreement between the appellants and the 2nd respondent is interpreted as a sub tenancy agreement and under the said agreement the appellants are said to have sublet the premises to the 2nd respondent the said subletting was prior to the transfer to tenancy in favour of the appellants and was with the full knowledge and consent of the Municipal Corporation and therefore that cannot be considered to be subletting in breach of the agreement of tenancy so as to enable the Municipal Corporation to evict the appellants on that ground  This is essentially a finding of fact
The order of the appellate officer is final and is not ordinarily liable to be called in question see section 105G
Nevertheless this finding was set aside by the High Court by the impugned judgment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
The High Court held 
Even otherwise in our view respondent No1 was liable to be evicted under section 105B1 clause a subclause ii
We are unable to agree with the finding given by the learned Principal Judge that no change in the circumstances under which the tenancy had been transferred in the name of respondent No 1 has taken place after the grant of the lease and therefore the Corporation would be stopped from alleging that respondent No 1 had sublet the premises  The High Court thus held that the appellate officer was wrong in 837 saying that the circumstances had not altered so as to warrant an order of eviction on the ground or sub lease
The High Court also held that the lease in favour of the appellant had been duly determined by the Corporation in terms of the contract and the appellant having thus become an unauthorised occupant was as such liable to be evicted under clause b of sub section 1 of section 105B
The High Court stated   if a tenancy is terminated in accordance with terms of the tenancy agreement it must be held to be duly terminated
Such a person was liable to be evicted under the provisions of section 105B1 of the Act
 The Corporation has indeed the power to order eviction on the ground of sub letting which is contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation
But it cannot be gainsaid that when by specific agreement dated 1761967 the Corporation recognised the assignment of all rights title and interest made by Glenfield  Co on 1381966 in favour of the appellant in respect of the premises in question and thus treated the appellant as the principal occupant the Corporation was fully aware of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 2731964 under which the second respondent was already in occupation of the premises
Nevertheless the Corporation entered into the agreement dated 1761967 accepting the appellant as the principal occupant in the place of Glenfield  Co In the absence of any evidence to show that the relationship between the appellant and the second respondent has since altered so as to violate the terms of the agreement of occupation dated 1761967
It is not open to the Corporation to order eviction of the appellant on the ground of sub letting which is alleged to be contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation
The High Court in our view wrongly reversed the finding of fact on that question by the appellate officer
Whether the circumstances had changed or not was a question then is whether as found by the High Courtit is open to the Corporation to have recourse to clause b of sub section 1 of section 105B to order eviction of the appellant as an unauthorised occupant
Is clause b attracted where eviction is sought to be made by determination of authority otherwise than in terms of the statute Mr VM Tarkunde appearing for the appellant submits that the appellate officer having found that the Corporation was when it 838 entered into an agreement of occupation with the appellant on 1761967 fully aware of the terms and conditions under which the second respondent was in occupation of the premises in question under the appellant the High Court was not justified in upholding the eviction of the appellant on the very same ground
The application of clause b of sub section 1 of section 105B counsel says is confined to persons in unauthorised occupation
Persons in occupation of premises under authority are not liable to be evicted otherwise than on any one of the statutorily specified grounds
Mr SB Bhasme appearing for the Corporation submits that in view of the finding that the sub lease granted or renewed by the appellant was contrary to clause 6 of its agreement dated 1761967 which provided  I agree that this godown will not be assigned or sub let or allowed to be occupied by any person and if it or any part of it is assigned or sub let to any other party I will be liable to be ejected immediately
and also in view of clause 2 of the said agreement which reads Each party may terminate the tenancy at the end of any English Calendar month by giving to the other party one month s notice in writing
the appellant has after the expiry of the period stipulated in the notice dated 2571969 become an unauthorised occupant and is liable to be evicted in terms of clause b of sub section 1 of section 105B of the Act
According to Mr Bhasme the agreement under which the appellant occupied the premises has expired or has been duly determined by order of the competent authority
Further continuance by the appellant is an unauthorised occupation so as to attract the provisions of section 105B
Apart from the grounds mentioned in sub clauses i ii iii and iv of clause a of sub section 1 of section 105B the Corporation is also empowered under clause b of sub section 1 of that section to evict any person whose authority to occupy has expired or has been duly determined and who thereafter remains in occupation of the premises
The authority to occupy he says is duly determined even if the determination is sought to be founded on the ground of sub letting contrary to the terms and 839 conditions of occupation or on any other ground specified in clause a or clause c of sub section 1 105B and that ground is subsequently held to be not proved and the order of eviction on that ground is accordingly found to be invalid
This invalidity according to counsel is only as far as it related to the alleged ground
Nevertheless he says such order determining authority to occupy is sufficiently efficacious to make further occupation unauthorised  so as to attract clause b of sub section 1 provided the determination of authority can otherwise be justified in terms of the agreement of occupation
In such circumstances he says clause b of sub section 1 is a potent weapon in the hands of the Corporation
We shall now examine the relevant provisions
Section 105A to section 105H of chapter VA were inserted in the Act in 1961 so as to provide for speedy eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of Corporation premises
Section 105A d defines unauthorised occupation  in the following words d unauthorised occupation in relation to any corporation premises means the occupation by any person of corporation premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been duly determined
 The definition shows that occupation of Corporation premises without authority for such occupation is an unauthorised occupation
Such occupation includes continuance in occupation by a person after the authority under which he occupied the premises has expired or it has been duly determined
The definition thus includes not only a trespasser whose initial and continued occupation has never been under any valid authority but it also includes in equal measure a person whose occupation at its commencement was under authority but such authority has since expired or has been duly determined Which means validly determined
The expiry of authority to occupy occurs by reason of the terms or conditions of occupation
On the other hand the determination of authority to occupy to be due or valid must be founded on one of the grounds specified by the statute
Any order of eviction on the ground of either expiry or due determination has to be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statute
840 Section 105B in so far as it is material reads section 105B 1 Where the Commissioner is satisfied a that the person authorised to occupy any corporation premises has whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Amendment Act 1960 i not paid for a period of more than two months the rent or taxes lawfully due from him in respect of such premises or ii sub let contrary to the terms or conditions of his occupation the whole or any part of such premises or iii committed or is committing such acts of waste as are likely to diminish materially the value or impair substantially the utility of the premises or iv otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms expreses or implied under which he is authorised to occupy such premises b that any person is in authorised occupation of any corporation premises c that any corporation premises in the occupation of any person are required by the corporation in the public interest
the Commissioner may notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force by notice served by post or by affixing a copy of it on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of such premises or in such other manner as may be provided for by regulations order that that person as well as any other person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice
2 before an order under sub section 1 is made against 841 any person the Commissioner shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made
The notice shall a specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made and b require all persons concerned that is to say all persons who are or may be in occupation of or claim interest in the corporation premises to show cause against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice
    3 If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub section 1 the Commissioner may evict that person and any other person who obstructs him and take possession of the premises and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary emphasis supplied Clause a of sub section 1 of this section contains various grounds upon which a person is liable to be evicted
Clause b says that unauthorised occupation itself is a ground for eviction
Clause c provides that requirement in the public interest is a ground for eviction
Sub section 2 speaks of show cause notice before an order of eviction by notice is made under sub section 1
Sub section 3 has conferred sufficient power on the Commissioner to enforce an order of eviction made by him under sub section 1
For the purpose of holding an enquiry under the Act the commissioner is invested with all the powers of a Civil Court section 105E
An appeal lies from every order of the Commissioner under section 105B or section 105C to the appellate officer namely the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court of Bombay section 105F whose orders are final and not liable to be called in question in any original suit application or execution proceeding section 105G
The satisfaction of the Commissioner which is the condition precedent to the exercise of power of eviction by the summary procedure 842 prescribed by the Act may be in respect of any of the circumstances falling under clauses a b or c of sub section 1 of section 105B
Clause a contemplates eviction of any person on any one of the grounds mentioned in sub clauses i to iv thereof
These grounds relate only to a person in authorised occupation of Corporation premises
They have no application to a trespasser
This is clear from the grounds themselves as well as from the wording of clause a which reads that the person authorised to occupy 
Likewise clause c presumably applied to authorised occupation of Corporation premises which the Commissioner is empowered to terminate by ordering eviction of the occupant otherwise than on any of the grounds specified under clause a provided the Commissioner is satisfied that the premises in question are required by the Corporation in the public interest
All that the Commissioner has to satisfy himself in a case falling under clause c is as regards the public interest requiring eviction
Construction of parks playgrounds hospitals colleges markets destitute homes and the like will indeed qualify for invoking the Commissioner s power under clause c Clause b on the other hand is a powerful weapon for eviction of an unauthorised occupant
This clause is applicable equally to a trespasser as it is to a person whose occupation has ceased to be an authorised occupation by reason of expiry of authority in terms thereof or due determination of authority under clause a or clause c of sub section 1 of section 105B
If a person is in occupation without authority as in the case of a trespasser or if the authority under which a person has been in occupation has expired in terms thereof and he continues to remain in occupation of the premises he will be liable to be evicted on the ground mentioned in clause b of sub section 1 of section 105B but in accordance with the procedure laid down in that section and on the satisfaction of the Commissioner expressed by an order as to the lack or expiry of authority
It must however be remembered that except in the case of a trespasser or a person remaining in occupation even after the expiry of the period of authority clause b can be invoked only where the Commissioner is satisfied and has so found be an order that any one of the grounds falling under clause a or clause c of sub section i for determination of authority has been established
In the absence of such a valid order invoking clause a or clause c a person in occupation under authority which has not expired is not liable to be evicted under section 105B
We do not accept Mr Bhasme s argument to the contrary on this point
It is not the case of the Corporation that the authority under 843 which the appellant has been in occupation has expired in terms thereof
That was not the basis upon which the enquiry was conducted and the order of eviction was made
If that was the ground and that ground was rightly invoked the position might well be different
The specific ground upon which eviction was sought as seen in the order of the enquiry officer and as categorically found by the High Court was one of sub letting contrary to the terms or conditions of occupation
No other ground as the High Court says was relied upon by the Corporation
In the circumstances the Commissioner or his delegate must be understood to have restricted the scope of the enquiry to the ground falling under clause a ii of sub section 1 of section 105B for the purpose of invoking the summary power of eviction vested in him under the statute
Sub letting as such without more is not a ground for eviction under clause a ii
What attracts eviction in terms of that provision is sub letting which is contrary to the terms or conditions or occupation
The appellate officer has found that the occupation of the premises by the second respondent under the appellant was well known to the Corporation the terms and conditions of that occupation were closely scrutinised by the Corporation before recognising the transfer of rights and interest from the previous principal occupant to the appellant and it was on that basis and with that knowledge that the Corporation authorised the occupation of the premises by the appellant in terms of the agreement dated 1761967
In such circumstances whatever right of occupation which the second respondent enjoyed under the appellant must be deemed to have been incorporated as a term of the authority granted by the Corporation in favour of the appellant
The appellate officer has categorically found that there was no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the circumstances in which the premises had been occupied by the second respondent had in any manner or at any time altered so as to affect the terms or conditions under which the appellant was recognised as the principal occupant
The Corporation is accordingly on the facts found stopped from having recourse to the ground falling under clause a ii of sub section 1 of section 105B
As stated by the High Court this was the only ground on which eviction was sought and that ground as found by the appellate officer has not been established
In proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court was not in our view justified in interfering with the finding of 844 fact rendered against the Corporation by the appellate officer
Accordingly we set aside the impugned judgement of the High Court and restore the order of the appellate officer
This appeal is allowed in terms of what is stated above
The parties shall however bear their respective costs
NVK Appeal allowed


Summary:
The Indian Olympic Association was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act with the principal object to sponsor supervise finance regulate and control all aspects of sports activity in relation to the Asian Commonwealth Olympic and International competitions
The Society had a set of rules and regulations
There are five categories of members described in Rule 3
The management of the affairs of the Association is entrusted to an Executive Council defined in Rule 1v
Rule 8 provided that the Executive Council shall have i a President ii 9 Vice Presidents iii a Secretary General iv 6 Joint Secretaries v a Treasurer and vi 19 Members
The terms of the Executive Council was to be 4 years while Rule 11 provides the voting procedure
The Indian Olympic Association was reconstituted with effect from 28 of October 1984 with the appellant in CA No 852 of 1991 Shri V C Shukla as the President K Murugan the appellant in CA No 848 of 1991 as one of the 6 Joint Secretaries
In November 1988 one of the Vice President of the 1984 Executive Council Shri BS Adityan the appellant in CA No 84991 was elected as President for a term of four years
On 16th of May 1990 there was a requisition of 17 Members for a special general meeting for considering the move of a no confidence 659 motion against the aforesaid Shri BS Adityan and his Executive Council
This initiated a period of confrontation between the two groups in the Association
In May 1990 the Executive Council overruled the aforesaid requisition as invalid and President Adityan called a metting of the General Assembly at Madras for 15th of June 1990
For the same day the other group summoned a meeting at New Delhi
This aforesaid situation led to Court proceedings and the Delhi High Court restrained the requisitionists from holding their meeting at New Delhi and appointed a retired Judge of the Delhi High Court as an observer for the meeting to be held at Madras
At this meeting Shri VC Shukla the appellant in CA No 85291 claimed to have been elected
The matter was taken to Court and a Single Judge decided in favour of Shri BS Adityan the appellant CANo 854991 but when the matter came up before the Full Bench of the High Court it remitted the matter to a Single Judge who appointed a retired Judge of this Court to discharge the function of the President of the Association as an interim measure
This Order has been challenged by the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos
852 85391
The Fencing Association of India filed a civil suit at Jabalpur for the declaration that Shri V C Shukla had been duly elected
The application for injunction from having been rejected by the Trial Judge an appeal had been taken to the High Court where the Single Judge ordered status quo
Two Civil Appeals were also filed against this order
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that under the rules the term of the President and the Executive Council was four years and in the absence of a clear provision for a vote of no confidence which would curtail the period there could be no reduction of the period of office and that the entire Executive Council could not be voted out of office by a motion of no confidence
Disposing of the appeals this Court HELD 1 Sports in modern times has been considered to be a matter of great importance to the community
International sports has assumed greater importance and has been in the focus for over a few decades
664D E 660 2
It is unfortunate that the highest body incharge of monitoring all aspects of such sports has got involved in group fight leading to litigation and the objectives of the IOA have been lost sight of
The representation of India in the IOA has been in jeopardy
664E F 3
The grooming of amateurs has been thrown to the winds and the responsibility placed on the Society has not been responded
This therefore does not appear to be a situation where rights to office will have to be worked out by referring to the provisions of the law relating to meetings injunction and rights appurtenant to elective offices
664F G 4
What seems to be of paramount importance is that healthy conditions must be restored as early as possible into the working of the Society and a fresh election has to be held as that seems to be the only way to get out of the malady
644G H 5
The entire nation is looking up to the results of the competitions at the international games when they are held
IOA has great responsibilities to discharge in organising and streamlining the national sport activities intended for international events
The monitoring has to be a continuous one and unless the scheme is ongoing and is made result oriented the international performance cannot be up to any appreciable level
664G 665B 6
This does not appear to be a matter where individual rights in terms of the rules and regulations of the Society should engage attention
664D E 7
It is appropriate that all the litigations now pending should abate and for appropriate functioning of the Society the litigation outside the headquarters of the Society should not be permitted
665B C 8
A fresh Executive Council should be set up and for that purpose elections should be held within two months hence a retired Judge of this Court is appointed to conduct the elections keeping the provisions of the rules and regulations of the IOA in view
All the proceedings in the different High Courts abate
665C D G 9
It is directed that the Union of India should take greater interest in organising sports both for national and international purposes
Sports have a role to play in building up good citizens
That 661 aspect should be kept in view while a lot of money is allotted for the purpose of improvement of sports the result has been considerably poor and deceptive
This aspect of the criticism hear from everywhere in this country shall also be given due consideration
666A B