Appeal No 134 of 1951
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 20th November 1950 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal Lucknow in Appeal No 10 of 1950
Bakshi Tek Chand and Veda Vyasa section B Kapur with them for the appellants
Shaukat Hussain for the respondent
Bishen Singh for the intervener
December 17
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS J
This appeal has been filed with the special leave granted by this Court on May 10 1951
By the order granting such leave the appeal has been restricted to one point only namely  whether the Government of Uttar Pradesh had the power to extend the time for making the award ex post facto ie after the time limit originally fixed therefore had expired
There is no dispute as to the facts
An industrial dispute having arisen between the appellant company and its employees by Labour Department Notification No 637 STXVIII 53 ST50 dated February 18 1950 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh was pleased in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 read with section 4 of the U P U P Act No XXVIII of 1947 to refer the said dispute to the Labour Commissioner
U P or a Conciliation Officer of the State Government nominated by him for adjudication on seven several issues specified therein and to direct the adjudicator to conclude the adjudication proceedings and submit his award to the Government not later than April 5 1950
The Labour Commissioner by his letter No IMR 14 A nominated Shri M P Vidyarthi Regional Conciliation Officer U P as the adjudicator in the above dispute with a direction that be should submit his award by March 25 1950 and that if the proceeding were not likely to be 441 completed within that time he should move the Government for extension of time at least a week before the specified date
By Notification No 897 STXVIII 53 ST50 dated March 20 1950 the Governor was pleased to order that the adjudicator should also adjudicate on an additional issue formulated therein
By a further Notification No 950  STXVIII 53 ST60 dated March 24 1950 the Governor was pleased to refer another additional issue for the decision of the adjudicator
The adjudicator did not make his award on or before April 55 1950 as directed by the first order of reference but made his award on April 13 1950 that is to say 8 days after the expiry of the time originally fixed for the making of the award
About thirteen days after
the I delivery of the award Labour Department Notification No 1247 STXVIII 53 ST50 was issued on April 26 1950 whereby the Governor was pleased in exercise of powers conferred by section 3 read with section 4 of the Act to allow the adjudicator in the said dispute to submit his award by April 30 1950
Thereafter by Notification No 1447 STXVIII 53ST50 dated August 1 1950
 the Governor was pleased in exercise of powers conferred by section 6 2 read with sections 3 and 4 of the Act to order that the award be enforced for a period of six months from the date of that order in the first instance and thereafter for such further period as might be prescribed
On August 17 1950 the appellant company preferred an appeal against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal contending inter alia as follows That the award dated April 13 1950 is vitiated having been given after the expiry of the time limit
a In its order dated February 18 1950 para
5 Government directed the adjudicator to conclude the proceedings and submit his award not later than the 5th April 1950
The award is dated 13th April 1950
The Government however tried to remedy 442 this defect by the issue of GO No 1247 ST XVIII 53 ST50 dated April 26 1950 but under the law this is of no avail
To be a valid extension of date granted to the adjudicator Government order should have been issued before the 5th April 1950 to keep the authority of the adjudicator alive
On the date the adjudicator made the award ie 13th April 1950 he had no power to make an award
 The Appellate Tribunal by its decision given on November 20 1950 dismissed the appeal with the following observations on the point mentioned above  With regard to the last point our view is that as the Government had the authority under section 6 of the Act to fix time limit for submitting an award it had also the necessary and incidental power to extend the time limit originally fixed if it considered it necessary
The first proviso to section 3 empowers the Provincial Government to add more matters for adjudication
It is obvious that additions to the matters already referred to would or may take more time than what had been originally estimated and so it may lead to an impossible position if the Government had no power to extend the time originally fixed by it and it makes no difference in our opinion whether the time is extended before or after the expiry of the time originally limited
 The present appeal is against that decision of the Appellate Tribunal but limited to the question hareinbefore mentioned
Dr Tek Chand appearing in support of this appeal urges that the adjudicator derived his authority under the order made by Notification No 637 dated February 18 1950
Section 6 1 provides that the adjudicator  shall within such time as may be specified submit its award to the State Government
 The time specified by the order was  not later than April 5 1950
 On the expiry of that time the adjudicator became functus officio and bad no power or authority to make the award
It is true that two 448 more issues were by the two subsequent orders added to the list of issues to be determined by the adjudicator but those issues Dr Tek Chand submits did not involve any detailed investigation into facts necessitating any further time for making the award
Learned counsel contends that the UP Act under consideration has no provision empowering the State Government to enlarge the time for the making of  the award by the adjudicator In the circumstances if the State Government took the view that the addition of those two issues would render the time  specified in the original order inadequate for the purpose it should have cancelled the previous notification and issued a fresh notification referring all the issues to the adjudicator and specifying a fresh period of time within which he was to make his award  The State Government did not adopt that course
What it purported to do was to extend the time for making the award not only after the time originally fixed had expired but also after the award had actually been submitted
The argument is that even assuming but not admitting that the State Government had the power to extend the time before the time had expired it certainly had no power to do so after the award had been made for it was meaningless urges Dr Tek Chand to extend the time to do an act which bad already been done
He refers us to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Baja Har Narain Singh vs Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar1 where it was held that under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 the Court had no power to extend the time for making the award after the award had been filed
Section 514 of that Code enabled the Court to grant a further time and from time to time to enlarge the period for the delivery of the award but section 521 provided that no award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by the Court
Their Lordships of the Privy Council took the view that it would not have been competent for the Court to extend the time after the award had been made for once the award was made 1 LR 18 IA 55 13 All
300 444 and delivered the power of the Court under section 514 was spent and that although the Court had the fullest power to enlarge the time under that section as long as the award was not completed it no longer possessed any such power when once the award was made
in order to give full effect to section 521 the Judicial Committee had to confine the exercise of the power to extend the time given to the Court by section 514 to a point of time before the award had been made
This decision was relied upon by Mr Justice Harring ton sitting singly on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court in Shib Krishna Dawn  Co vs Satish Chander Dutt1 which was a case governed by the Code of 1908
The learned Judge overlooked the fact that paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the Code of 1908 which corresponded to section 514 of the Code of 1882 expressly conferred power on the Court to allow further time and from time to time either before or after the expiration of the period fixed for the making of the award to enlarge such period and that paragraph 15 which corresponded to section 521 of the Code of 1882 contained no provision that an award made out of time was ipso facto invalid and that consequently the reasoning underlying the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Narain Singh vs Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar 2 had no application to the case before him which was governed by the Code of 1908
Having regard to the difference in the language of the relevant provisions of the two Codes the correctness of the decision of Harrington J was doubted by Mr Justice Chitty also sitting singly on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Lal vs Arjun Das3
Eventually the decision of Mr Justice Harrington was dissented from by a Division Bench of the same High Court sitting in appeal from the Original Side in Jetha Lal Laxmi Chand Shah vs Amrita Lal Ojha4 which held that the Court had power to enlarge the time for making the award even after the award had 1 ILR38 Cal
3 2 18 IA 55
4 IL R 42 CWN 833
445 actually been made
The learned Judges in the last mentioned case referred to and relied on the case of Lord vs Lee1
Reference has also been made by learned counsel for the respondents to Dentron vs Strong 2 and toMay vs Harcourt 3
It will be noticed that all those English cases were decided under section 15 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 17  18 Vic  c 125
It is true that in that English statute there was no provision similar to section 521 of our Code of 1882 which was noticed by the Privy Council in the case cited by Dr Tek Chand nevertheless section 15 of the English statute like section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 corresponding to paragraph 8 of the Second Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 and like section 9 of the English Arbitration Act 1889 corresponding to section 12 of the Indian Arbitration Act 1899 empowered the Court from time to time to enlarge the time for making the award
There is a similar provision for enlargement of time in section 148 of our Civil Procedure Code of 1908
There is however no similar provision in the U P
Section 61 of that Act peremptorily requires the adjudicator to submit his award to the State Government  within such time as may be specified  and not within such time as may from time to time be specified
 It is significant that the only occasion when the State Government can under the U P Act specify a fresh period of time is when it remits the award for reconsideration under sub section 2 of section 6 for under subsection 3 the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his award after reconsideration within such period as may be specified by the State Government
Even in this case under section 62 and 3 the State Government may in the order remitting the award specify a time within which the award after reconsideration must be filed
This gives power to the State Government to fix a fresh period of time to do a fresh 1 2 1874 L R 9 QB 11 7 3 IPR 13 Q BD 688 446 act namely to reconsider and file the reconsidered award
It does not give the State Government any power to enlarge the time fixed originally for the initial making of the award
Therefore except where the State Government under section 6 2remits the award for reconsideration it has no power even to specify a fresh period of time and much less a power to extend the time for the initial making of the award under section 6 1
In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses b c d and g of section 3 and section 8 of the U P  the Governor was pleased to make an order embodied in Notification No 615 LLXVIII 7 LL 1951 dated March 15 1951
The proviso to rule 16 of that order authorised the State Government to extend from time to time the period within which the Tribunal or the adjudicator was to pronounce the decision
These rules were however not in force at the time material to the case before us
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent and for the State of Uttar Pradesh have not referred us to any similar rule which was in force in 1950
In view of the language of section 6 of the U P Act and in the absence of a rule like the proviso to rule 16 referred to above it must follow that the State Government had no authority whatever to extend the time and the adjudicator became functus officio on the expiry of the time specified in the original order of reference and therefore the award which had not been made within that time must be held to be without jurisdiction and a nullity as contended by Dr Tek Chand
Learned counsel for the respondents refers us to the provisions of section 14 of the U P General Clauses Act 1904 which provides that where by any Uttar Pradesh Act any power is conferred on the State Government then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires
Sections 3 and 4 of the U P  certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision 447 and section 6 1 may be read as empowering the State Government to specify the time within which the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is to submit his award
The combined effect of section 14 of the U P General Clauses Act and section 61 of the U P  it is contended is that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his report within such time as may from time to time be specified  and that this being the position the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to above must be held to be applicable to the present case
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning
Under section 14 of the U P General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by sections 3 4 and 6 that is to say it can from time to time make orders referring disputes to an adjudicator and whenever such an order of reference is made to specify the time within which the award is to be made
This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order
The legislative practice as evidenced by the provisions of the different statutes referred to above is to expressly confer the power of extension of time if and when the legislature thinks fit to do so
There is no question of any inherent power of the Court and much less of the Executive Government in this behalf
Section 14 of the U P General Clauses Act does not in terms or by necessary implication give any such power of extension of time to the State Government and therefore the Respondents can derive no support from that section
Learned advocate for the Intervener the State of Uttar Pradesh draws our attention to section 21 of the U P General Clauses Act 1904 and contends that the order of April 26 1950 should be taken as an amendment or modification within the meaning of that section of the first order of February 18 1950
It is true that the order of April 26 1950 does ex facie purport to rectify the order of 448 February 18 1950 but in view of the absence of any distinct provision in section 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of April 26 1950 viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification cannot by virtue of section 21 have that effect
If therefore the amending order operates prospectively ie only as from the date of the order it cannot validate the award which bad been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date of the amending order during which period the adjudicator was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all
We do not think the respondents can derive any support from section 21 of the U P General Clauses Act
The result therefore is that this appeal must be allowed and the award must be declared to be null and void and we order accordingly
In the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs
Appeal allowed
Agent for the intervener C P Lal


Summary:
On February 181950 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner or a person nominated by him with the direction that the award should be submitted not later than April 5 1950
The award however was made on April 13 and on April 26 the Governor issued a notification extending the time for making the award up to April 30 Held i in view of the language of section 6 of the U P  and in the absence of a provision like that contained in the proviso to r 16 of the Governor s notification dated in March 15 1951 the State Government had no authority whatever to extend the time and the adjudicator became functus officio on the expiry of the time fixed in the original order of reference and the award was therefore one made without jurisdiction and a nullity
iiSection 14 of the U P General Clauses Act 1904 did not in terms or by necessary implication give any such power of extension of time to the State Government
iiiThough the order of April 26 did exfacie purport to modify the order of February 18 in view of the absence of any distinct provision in section 21 of the U P General Clauses Act 1904 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the State Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of April 26 viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification cannot by virtue of section 21 have retrospective effect
Raja Har Narain Singh vs Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar LR 18 IA 55 applied
Jetha Lal Lakshmi Chand Shah vs Amrita Lal Ojha ILR  Lord vs Lee LR 3 QB 404 Dentron vs Strong LR 9 QB 117 May vs Harcourt LR 13 QBD 688 distinguished
57 440