Civil Appeal No 93 of 1951
Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the Bombay High Court Chagla CJ and Bhagwati J dated 6th Septem ber 1949 in Appeal No 16 of 1949 arising out of the Judgment dated  2nd February 1949 of a Single Judge of the same High Court Tendolkar J  in Miscellaneous Application No 223 of 1948
The facts of the case and arguments of counsel are stated fully in the judgment
CK Daphtary Solicitor General for Indict G N Joshi with himfor the appellant
NC Chatterjee R M Hajarnavis with him for the respondent
November 23
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J
The question here is whether an order should issue under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the appellant who is the Commissioner of Police Bombay
The respondent Gordhandas Bhanji wanted to build a cinema house on a plot of land at Andheri in the year 1945
At that date Andheri did not form a part of Bombay and under the
rules then in force it was necessary to obtain permis sion from the District Magistrate of that area in the form of a No Objection Certificate
Accordingly the respondent made the necessary application on the 12th of September 1945
Permissionwas refused on the 30th of September 1945 on the ground that the public of the locality objected and also because there was already one cinema theatre at Andheri and so it was not necessary to have another for the present
 On the 1st of October 1945 Andheri became a part of Greater Bombay and the jurisdiction to grant or refuse a license was transferred to the Commissioner of Police Bombay
The respondent accordingly put in a second applica tion on the 21st of November 1945 and 138 addressed it to the Commissioner of Police
After some correspondence this was also turned down on the 19th of March 1946 owing to public opposition
 Nothing daunted the respondent applied again on the 1st of April 1946 and asked for a reopening of his case
One of the grounds given was that The Government of Bombay are giving very careful atten tion and affording all reasonable facilities to develop the Greater Bombay into a model one
A modern cinema there fore of the type I propose to build is indispensable
 In view of that not unnaturally the Commissioner of Police appears to have consulted the Government of Bombay for he wrote to the respondent on the 25th of April 1946 saying that the whole question of considering and approving sites for cinemas is under the consideration of the Government of Bombay and he promised that when a decision is arrived at your application will be examined
 It seems that somewhere about this time a Cinema Adviso ry Committee was constituted by Government
We have not been enlightened about the scope and extent of its powers but it is evident from its nomenclature that its functions were purely advisory
Five members of this Committee appear to have inspected the site on the 12th of May 1947 and after prolonged discussion they reached the conclusion that in view of the location of four schools near by the site this site is unsuitable for the purpose required and therefore it should be rejected
 A note was drawn up to that effect and the matter was ordered to be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee for final decision This final decision has not been placed on record but the Commissioner of Police tells us in his affidavit that within a month the Committee advised that the application should be granted
Accordingly the Commissioner accorded the necessary permission by his 139 letter dated the 1416th of July 1947
There is no refer ence here to the recommendations of the Advisory co Commit tee and
though they may have weighed and rightly with the Commissioner there is nothing on the face of the letter to indicate that the decision was not that of the Commis sioner himself given in bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in him
We refer to this because the Commissioner has stated in his affidavit that I was fully satisfied that the petitioner s application should be refused but that it was only at the instance of the Cinema Advisory Committee that I granted the said per mission on the 14th of July 1947
 That however would not affect the validity of his order
There is no suggestion that his will was overborne or that there was dishonesty or fraud in what he did
In the absence of that he was entitled to take into consideration the advice thus tendered to him by a public body set up for this express purpose and he was entitled in the bona fide exercise of his discretion to accept that advice and act upon it even though he would have acted differently if this important factor had not been present to his mind when he reached a decision
The sanction accorded on the 16th of July 1947 was therefore a good and valid sanction
This sanction occasioned representations to Government presumably by the public who were opposing the scheme
Anyway the Commissioner wrote to the respondent on the 1920th September 1947 and direct him not to proceed with the construction of the cinema pending Government orders Shortly after on the 2730th September 1947 the Commissioner sent the respondent the following communica tion I am directed by Government to inform you that the permission to erect a cinema at the above site granted to you under this office letter dated the 16th July 1947 is hereby cancelled
 140 It will be necessary at this stage to determine whether this was a cancellation by the Commissioner of on his own authority acting in the exercise of some power which was either vested in him or of which he bona fide believed himself to be possessed or whether he merely acted as a post office in forwarding orders issued by some other au thority
We have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that this is not an order of cancellation by the Commission er but merely intimation by him of an order passed and made by another authority namely the Government of Bombay
An attempt was made by referring to the Commissioner s affidavit to show that this was really an order of cancella tion made by him and that the order was hisorder and not that of Government
We are clear that public orders public ly made in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do
Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to hum they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself
Turning now to the language used we are clear that by no stretch of imagination can this be construed to be an order which in effect says  I so and so by virtue of the authority vested in me do hereby order and direct this and that
 If the Commissioner of Police had the power to cancel the license already grant ed and was the proper authority to make the order it was incumbent on him to say so in express and direct terms
Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exactly what authority is making the order
141 But if there is ambiguity or doubt in the language used here a glance at the surrounding circumstances will dispel it
What was the position at the time  Permission was first refused and then granted then suspended and the respondent was told to await not the Commissioner s orders but those of Government
Then comes the letter in question which conveys those orders
So also there is the conduct of the Commissioner not long after
The respondent s solicitors placed the same construction on the order of the 30th Sep tember as we do and asked the Commissioner how Government could interfere with a permission granted by him
They said on the 18th November 1947  Our client has been advised that the authority to grant permission is in you acting in consultation with the Adviso ry Board
It is difficult to understand how the Government can interfere with the permission granted by you The Commissioner s reply dated 34th December 1947 was I write to inform you that permission granted to your client was cancelled under the orders of the Government who may be approached  We are clear that this roundabout language would not have been used if the order of cancellation had been that of the Commissioner
We do not mean to suggest that it would have been improper for him to take into consideration the views and wishes of Government provided he did not surrender his own judgment and provided he made the order but we hold on the material before us that the order of cancellation came from Government and that the Commissioner acted only as a transmitting agent
It is next necessary to determine whether the Government of Bombay had the power to cancel a license once issued
That depends on a consideration of the Rules
They are framed under section 22 1 f i g and h of the City of Bombay Police Act 1902
They regulate the licensing controlling keeping and regulation of places
of public amusement in 19 142 the City of
Bombay
Rule 8 applies to any person desirous of erectinga cinema building
There is in our opinion a distinction of principles between the erection and use of buildings for purely private and residential purposes and those intended to be used as places of public amusement
Considerations arise regarding the latter which would not be applicable to the former among them the right to withdraw or modify a license once issued
Ordinarily a man can do what he likes with his property subject of course to specific laws regulating his use of it there fore in the case of a private residence he would in a general way have a right to build if he complies with all the rules and regulations and restrictions which may be imposed by law and if permission is withheld when all the conditions are fulfilled he would normally have a right to demand that the necessary permission be given
But that sort of consideration does not apply to a place intend ed to be used for public performances
There questions affecting the safety convenience morality and welfare of the public must be given overriding precedence and it isusual in these cases on grounds of public concern to vest some public authority with a discretion to grant or refuse such licences and to modify or cancel ones already granted
It is necessary to bear this distinction in mind when construing the present rules Therefore when Rule 8 speaks of erecting such premises it must be borne in mind that the rule is not a mere building rule affecting the erection of a building in the abstract but applies to a building intended to be used for a particular purpose and the license applied for is not merely for permission to build but also to use structure when erected for a partic ular purpose affecting the public at large and the residents of the locality in particular
Rule 8 falls under Part II which is headed  Preliminaries to obtaining license for premises
 These preliminaries include a the making of an application in writing to the Commis sioner of Police and 143 bthe giving of a certain notice as a preliminary to the application
This notice has to be in the form prescribed in Schedule A and has to be maintained on a certain board until the application has been dealt with by the Com missioner and the rule prescribes that  no application shall be considered before the expira tion of one fortnight after the receipt by the Commissioner of a copy of the notice etc
 Schedule A shows that the object of the notice is to enable the Commissioner to receive objections to the pro posed erection
The rest of the rules in Part II specify the matters which the application shall contain and the documents which must accompany it including plans and specifications of the proposed building
Part III prescribes various structural details with which the building must conform
They include fire resist ing material for the roof stage staircases and dressing rooms of a certain type seating arrangements Corridors exits and so forth
This part of the rules would apply to a building already in existence but not yet licensed for public performance as well as to one which has yet to be erected
Part IV relates to the Use of cinematograph Apparatus and other optical Lan terns
 The rules prescribed there are mainly for purposes of health and safety
Parts V and VI do not concern us
They prescribe spe cial rules for Circuses and for exhibitions of Boxing and Wrestling
Then comes Part VII which is material for present pur poses
It is headed Licenses
Rule 237 prescribes that The person being the owner tenant or occupier of such premises and the person who proposes to give any public performance entertainment or exhibition on 144 such premises shall each take out a license under these rules Then follows a sub heading Licenses for Premises and under that come Rules 238 to 257
Rule 23S prescribes that  No such premises shall be opened or kept open for use as a place of public amusement unless the person being the owner tenant or occupier thereof shall have obtained from the Commissioner the necessary license
 Rule 248 invests the Commissioner with absolute discretion in refusing any license etc if such place appears to him likely to cause obstruction inconvenience annoyance risk danger or damage to resi dents or passers by in the vicinity of such premises
 Then follows Rule 250 which is crucial here
It says  The commissioner shall have power in his absolute dis cretion at any time to cancel or suspend any license granted under these Rules  After Rule 257 comes a second sub heading entitled Per formance License and Rules 258 to 283 set out the require ments relating to the holding of performances as distinct from the requirements relating to the building or premises in or on which they are to be held
The rest of the rules do not concern us
It is clear to us from a perusal of these rules that the only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a license for the erection of a building to be used for pur poses of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police
It is also clear that under Rule 250 he has been vested with the absolute discretion at any time to cancel or suspend any license which has been granted under the rules
But the power to do so is vested in him and not in the State Govern ment and can only be exercised by him at his discretion
No other person or authority can do it
It was argued that Rule 250 did not apply to licenses to erect buildings but only referred to other matters 145 such as their maintenance and the kind of performances to be given in them
We are unable to agree
The preamble to the rules states that the Rules are for the licensing controlling keeping and regulation of places of public amusement in the City Bombay
Part II which deals with the erection cinema houses nowhere autho rises the issue of a license but it does indicate that a license is necessary
For instance the heading states that the rules which follow in Part II are only the prelimi naries to obtaining license for premises and Rule 21 sets out that Before a license is granted for such premises certain certificates must be produced
All of which indi cates that a license is necessary
But the only provision the actual issue of the license is in Part VII and Rules 237 and 238 in that part require the owner tenant or occu pier of premises intended to be used for a cinema house for public amusement to take out a license as well as for the person who proposes to give a public performance on such premises
In our opinion Rule 250 does authorise the can cellation of a license already issued but the only person who can effect the cancellation is the Commissioner of Police
It was contended that this would work great hardship in some cases and that if money had already been expended on the building an estoppel at least would arise
No question of estoppel has been raised here so that is not a question we need consider nor need we answer the converse question whether an estoppel would hold good in the face of a law enacted for the public good on grounds of public policy also whether there can be an estoppel when a person builds knowing the risk he runs of cancellation at any time under Rule 2S0
The next question is whether an order in the nature of a mandamus can issue under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act
It is necessary to emphasise that the present case does not fall either under article 32 2 or article 2261 of the Constitution
We are confined here to section 45 of the Specific Relief Act
146 The jurisdictionconferred by
that section is very spe cial in kind and is strictly limited in extent though the am but of the powers exercisable within those limited is wide
Among the limitations imposed are the following First the order can only direct some specific act to be done or some specific act to be forborne
It is not possible therefore to give a mere declaratory relief as under section 42
Next because of the proviso the order can only be made if the doing or the for bearing is clearly recumbent upon the authority concerned under any law for the time being in force
And thirdly there must be no other specific and adequate legal remedies available to the applicant
Now applying these rules to the present case the appli cant must show what specific act he wants to
be done or to be forborne
That can only be gathered from the petition
The reliefs specifically sought there are 1 an order directing the Commissioner to withdraw the cancellation andor 2 directing him to grant permission for the erec tion of a cinema
Taking the second
first it is evident from the rules that there is no specific law which requires the Commission er to grant a license on the fulfillment by the petitioner of certain conditions
He is vested with a discretion to grant or to refuse a license and all that the law requires is that he should exercise that discretion in good faith
But that he has done
In the exercise of that discretion he granted a license and that license still holds good because on the view we have taken there has been no valid order of cancellation
Accordingly this relief cannot be granted
Turning next to the first relief that cannot be grant ed in the form in which it is sought because the rules vest the Commissioner with an absolute discretion to cancel at any time a license once granted
There is no specific law which compels him to forbear from canceling a license once granted in fact that would be an impossibility still less is there any law which compels him to withdraw a cancella tion already effected that would fetter the absolute dis cretion 147 vested in him by Rule 250
Therefore this relief cannot be granted in the way it is asked for
But we are of opinion that we are free to grant the respondent a modification of that relief in a different form
It is to be observed that the petitioner did ask that he be granted such further and other relief as the nature and circumstances of the case may require
 We have held that the Commissioner did not in fact exercise his discretion in this case and did not cancel the license he granted
He merely forwarded to the respondent an order of cancellation which another authority had pur ported to pass
It is evident from these facts that the Commissioner had before him objections which called for the exercise of the discretion regarding cancellation specifi cally vested in him by Rule 250
He was therefore bound to exercise it and bring to bear on the matter his own inde pendent and unfettered judgment and decide for himself whether to cancel the license or reject the objections
That duty he can now be ordered to perform under section 45
It was objected as to this that there is no specific law which compels him to exercise the discretion
Rule 250 merely vests a discretion in him but does not require him to exercise it
That is easily met by the observations of Earl Cairns LC in the House of Lords in Julius vs Lord Bishop of Oxfordi observations which have our full and respect ful concurrence  There may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done something in the object for which it is to be done something in the conditions under which it is to be done something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised which may couple the power with a duty and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so
 The discretion vested in the Commissioner of Police under Rule 250 has been conferred upon him for public rea sons involving the convenience safety 1 5 App
214 at 222 223
148 morality and welfare
of the public at large
An ena bling power of this kind conferred for public reasons and for the public benefit is in our opinion coupled with a duty to exercise it when the circumstances so demand
It is a duty which cannot be shirked or shelved nor can it be evaded performance of it can be compelled under section 45
It was then objected that performance cannot be com pelled for another reason
Section 45 it was said is limited to duties which must be performed or forborne under any law for the time being in force and it was argued that this means statute law
There is authority for this point of view but we see no reason for limiting the clear words of the section or for reading into it matter which is not there
The provision is a beneficent one to compel the performance of public duties by public officers
It is intended to open up a swift and summary remedy to the subject against on the one hand certain kinds of abuse or excesses on the part of public officers or on the other of laziness incompetence inertia or inaction on their part
We can see no reason why statutory duties should be placed on any different plane from other duties enjoined by any other kind of law especially as some
statutory duties are slight or trivial when compared to certain other kinds of duties which are not referable to a statutory provision
In our opinion the words any law are wide enough to embrace all kinds of law and we so hold
The only other point we need consider is whether the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the re spondent could have ignored the so called order of cancella tion if he considered it was of no effect alternatively he had the specific legal remedy of suing for an injunction which could have accorded him adequate relief
In our opinion
the first is neither a specific nor an adequate legal remedy
Here is an order purporting to 149 emanate from the State Government itself served on the respondent by a responsible public officer
Whether the order is his order or an order of the State Government it is obviously one which primarily compels obedience as a matter of prudence and precaution
It may in the end prove to be ineffective as has happened in this case but it would be wrong to expect a person on whom it is served to ignore it at his peril however much he may be legally entitled to do so
Also the very fact that this order was served on him especially when it followed on the Commissioner s letter of the 1920th September 1947 indicated that objections of a serious nature which it was the Commissioner s duty to consider had been raised
The respondent had a right to expect the Commissioner to make up his mind and reach a decision otherwise it left him in a state of uncertainty
If he commenced to build the Commissioner would have a right to take action under Rule 250 and tell him to stop and at best that would involve the respondent in a long and expensive litigation which he might or might not win
We are clear that he had a right to be told definitely by the proper legal authority exactly what he might or might not do so that he could adjust his affairs
We are clear that the dangerous course of ignoring an official order at one s peril is not the kind of adequate and specific legal remedy contemplated by section 45
Next as regards the relief of injunction
We do not say that would not be a proper and adequate remedy in certain cases
Each case must necessarily depend on its own facts and we have no intention of laying down any hard and fast rule
But we do not think that would be adequate to meet the exigencies of the present case
In the first place a suit if lodged would require notice under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code as it would be a suit against a public officer in his official capacity and that would at once import delay so would the long drawn out procedure of civil litigation with its concomitant appeals
In a commer cial undertaking of the kind we have here inordinate delay might well spell ruin to the project
Large sums of money have necessarily to be tied up 20 150 so long as the matter remains in abeyance the prices of land and materials are constantly rising and there is in the vicinity a rival theater which is all the while acquiring reputation and goodwill two undefinable but important considerations in commercial undertakings
It is therefore desirable that questions of the kind we have here should be decided as soon as may be It may be that any one of those considerations taken separately might not be enough to fulfil this requirement of section 45 but considered cumu latively we are of opinion that the applicant has no other adequate remedy in tiffs case
In any event there are many cases of a similar nature in which section 45 has been applied without objection despite the fact that an injunc tion could have been sought
We need only cite a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council A1cock Ashdown  Co vs Chief Revenue Authority Bombay 1 where Lord Phillimore says at page 233  To argue that if the Legislature says that a public officer even a revenue officer shall do a thing and he without cause or justification refuses to do that thing yet the Specific Relief Act would not be applicable and there would be no power in the Court to compel him to give relief to the subject is to state a proposition to which their Lordships must refuse assent Their Lordships then issued an order under section 45
Lastly it was urged that the petition is incompetent because the provisions of section 46 of the Specific Relief Act have not been complied with namely the petitioner has not shown that he made a demand for justice and that it was denied
The demand and denial which section 46 requires are matters of substance and not of form
In our opinion there was a substantial demand here and it is clear that there was a denial
Soon after the order of cancellation was intimat ed to the petitioner he instructed his solicitors to write to the Commissioner and enquire 1 50 IA 227 at 233
151 why the permission granted had been so arbitrarily can celled
This was on the 18th November 1947
The reply dated 34th December 1947 was that the cancellation was under the orders of Government and that they should be approached in the matter
Government was approached
The petitioner s solicitors wrote to the Home Minister on the 9th December 1947 and said  Our client has not been informed of any reasons which had moved the Government to direct the cancellation of the permission
Our client was really entitled to be heard in the matter
Our client desires to present his case before you and he shall feel obliged if you give him an interview  The Secretary to the Home Department replied on the 12th of January 1948 that the Commissioner was directed to cancel the permission in view of numerous protests which Government received
This was replied to on the 16th of February 1948 and the petitioner s solicitors said  Our client feels that he has not been treated fairly and that justice has been denied to him The only reply to this was  I am directed to inform you that Government does not wish to add anything to the reply already given to you The correspondence read as a whole contains a clear demand for justice and a denial
It is true the actual demand was not made to the Commissioner nor was the denial by him but he clearly washed his hands of the matter by his letter of the 3rd4th December 1947 and referred the petitioner to Government under whose orders he said he was acting
The demand made to Government and the denial by them were therefore in substance a demand made to the Commission er and a denial by him
In any event an evasion or shelvingof a demand for justice is sufficient to operate as a denial within the meaning of section 46
In England the refusal need not be in so many words All that is necessary is to 152 show that the party complained of has distinctly deter mined not to do what
is demanded See 9 Halsbuy s Laws of Eng land Hailsham edition page 772
And in the United States of America a demand is not required where it is manifest it would be but an idle ceremony See Ferris on Extraordinary Legal Remedies page 281
The law in India is not differ ent except that there must be a demand and a denial in substance though neither need be made in so many words The requirements of section 46 were therefore fulfilled
The result is that in substance the appeal fails though it will be necessary to effect a modification of the High Court s order
The High Court directed the Commissioner of police to Withdraw the order of cancellation passed by him
 We have held that he did not make the order and that even if he did a direction of that sort would not lie because of the discretion vested in him by Rule 250
The following will accordingly be substituted for what the High Court has ordered The Commissioner of Police be directed to consider the requests made to him for cancellation of the license sanc tioned by his letter dated the 1416th of July 1947 and after weighing all the different aspects of the matter and after bringing to bear his own unlettered judgment on the subject himself to issue a definite and unambiguous order either canceling or refusing to cancel the said license in the exercise of the absolute discretion vested in him by Rule 250 of the Rules for Licensing and Controlling Theaters and Other Places of Public Amusement in Bombay City 1914
As the appeal fails except for the slight modification indicated above the appellant will pay the respondent s costs
Decree modified


Summary:
An application by the respondent for permission to build a cinema on a site within the City of Bombay was rejected by the Commissioner of Police Bombay
The respondent applied for reconsideration of his application and the Commissioner acting on the advice of the Cinema Advisory Committee granted the application on the 16th July 1947 though he indicated in an affidavit flied later that but for this advice he would have refused the application again
Subse quently under instructions from Government the Commissioner sent the following communication to the respondent I am directed by Government to inform you that the permission to erect a cinema at the above site granted to you under the office letter dated 16th July 1947 is hereby canceled
 The respondent applied to the High Court of Bombay for an order under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act directing the Commissioner of Police Bombay to withdraw the cancellation and to grant permission for the erection of the cinema and the High Court directed the Commissioner of Police to withdraw the order of cancellation passed by him The Commissioner of Police appealed to the Supreme Court
Held i that there was nothing in the letter dated 16th July 1947 to indicate that the decision was not that of the Commissioner himself given in the bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in him
The sanction was not conse quently invalid merely because the Commissioner decided to accept the advice of the Cinema Advisory Committee even though without that advice he would not have granted the permission
ii There was no valid cancellation of the license because a the order of cancellation communicated to the respondent was one made by the Government of Bombay and not by the Commissioner on his own authorityhe acted in the matter only as a transmitting agent b under the rules framed under 136 section 22 1 f 1 g and n of the City of Bombay Police Act 1902 the Government of Bombay had no power to cancel of license once issued
The only person vested with authority to grant or refuse a license for the erection of a building to be used for purposes of public amusement is the Commissioner of Police
iii The relief sought by the respondent of an injunction to direct the Commissioner of Police to grant permission for the erection of a cinema could not be granted because he had already granted permission and there was no valid order of cancellation
iv The other relief asking for an injunction directing the commissioner to withdraw the cancellation also could not be granted because Rule 250 vests the Commissioner with an absolute discretion in the matter
v Though there was no specific provision of law compel ling the Commissioner to exercise the discretion vested in him under Rule 250 inasmuch as the enabling power vested by Rule 250 was vested in the Commissioner for the welfare of the public at large it was coupled with a duty to exercise it when the circumstances so demanded
The Commissioner could consequently be ordered under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act to exercise his discretion and decide whether the licence should or should not be cancelled
vi The words any law in section 45 do not mean statutory law alone but embrace all kinds of law whether referable to a statutory provision or otherwise
Therefore the perform ance of duties under the rules can be compelled under the provi sions of section 45
vii There was no other specific and adequate legal remedy open to the respondent within the meaning of section 45 for though the respondent could have ignored the so called order of cancellation  he could only have done so
at his peril as it purported to emanate from the State Government and was served by a public officer
The remedy of injunction was not a proper and adequate remedy in the circumstances of the present case
viii The petition was not incompetent under section 46 of the Specific Relief Act as there had been a demand of justice and a denial thereof within the meaning of the section in the circumstances of the case
ix Public orders publicly made in exercise of a statu tory authority cannot be construed in the light of explana tions subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant or of what was in his mind or what he intend ed to do
As such orders are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed  they must be construed objec tively with reference to the language used in the order itself
137 Julius vs Lord Bishop of Oxford 5 App
Cas 214 Alcock Ashdown  Co vs Chief Revenue Authority 50 I A 227 referred to