ivil Appeals Nos
1270  1317 1319 of 1970
From the Judgment and Order dated 5 2 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L P A Nos
96 99 of 1966
Kapil Sibal J B Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant
section Manchanda Mrs Shobha Dikshit and Mrs Urmila Kapoor for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI J
These appeals by certificate are directed against a Common judgment dated February 5 1970 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which a Letters Patent Appeal against a decision of the Single Judge was dismissed
The facts of the case lie within a narrow compass and all the appeals involve a short point of law relating to the interpretation of s9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
The history of the case has been detailed in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same
Shorn of unnecessary details the appeals arose out of applications made by Pera Ram
Ganga Ram Bhago and Kalu Ram who were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs Raj Kanta the appellant in these appeals
The tenants made separate applications under section 18 of the Act on September 4 1961 for purchasing the land held by them from Mrs Raj Kanta hereinafter called the land owner 
These applications were allowed by the Assistant Collector on October 31 1961
Accordingly the tenants deposited the 1009 first instalment in November 1961
Ultimately however the tenants did not pay the rent of the respective holdings for Kharif 1961
It is common ground that the last date by which the rent for Kharif 1961 was payable by the tenants to the land owner was January 15 1962 and that the tenant did not pay the rent and did not show sufficient cause for the same
In view of the default the land owner filed separate applications under s91 ii of the Act on the ground that as the tenants had failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause they were entitled to be ejected by the land owner
The applications for ejectment were however dismissed but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeals by his order dated May 31 1962
Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 51162 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21 1962
Having failed before the Revenue courts the tenants respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which was heard by a Single Judge
But in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for his ejectment by the land owner as a result of which the land owner filed a writ petition in the High Court
All the petitions were consolidated and heard together by the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the tenants and quashed the order of the Financial Commissioner directing ejectment of the tenants
The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Ram was however dismissed
Hence the four appeals by the land owner appellant in this Court
The only point that has been canvassed before us is as to whether or not the High Court was right in interpreting s9 of the Act by holding that the term regularly  used in s91 ii would not include a single default
While the Revenue courts had held that the mere fact that the tenants made a single default in payment for the rent for Kharif 1961 was sufficient to attract the penalty of ejectment envisaged by section 91 ii of the Act the High Court took the view that on a proper interpretation of the term regularly  it will appear that the legislature did not contemplate that ejectment should be ordered straightaway even if a single default though unexplained is committed by the tenant which interpretation would run against the avowed object of the legislation which was to advance and ameliorate the lot of the tenants
The High Court had considered the matter at very great length and placed a very wide interpretation on the term regularly  so as not to include within its ambit one single default
It has also referred to a number of authorities and Dictionaries to 1010 show that the word regularly  does not mean absolute symmetry
Having gone through the reasons given by the High Court we are unable to agree with the view taken either by the single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court
There can be no doubt that the Act is a piece of social legislation meant to ameliorate the lot of the tenants and to further the rights of the tenants by conferring on them the status of a permanent tenancy or the rights to purchase the land on payment of instalments
At the same time we cannot overlook the fact that the landlords within a very limited sphere have been assured protection in respect of the rights which they possess in the land and have been given the right to eject the tenants on specified grounds which are contained in the various sub clauses of section 9 of the Act
One such sub clause is sub clause ii which falls for interpretation in the instant case
Section 91 as also clauses i and ii may be extracted thus 9
Liability of tenant to be ejected 1
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force no land owner shall be competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant i is a tenant on the area reserved under this Act or is a tenant of a small land owner or ii fails to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause   While interpreting the word regularly  the High Court seems to have overlooked two important circumstances
In the first place the word regularly  has been used immediately after the phrase fails to pay rent  and is followed by the words without sufficient cause 
Secondly there is nothing in the section to indicate that the legislature intended to exclude one single default
The High Court attempted to supply words to the section which are not there
In doing so it has failed to consider that if once the court was to lay down a particular line of demarcation by extending the connotation of the word regularly  to exclude one default it is difficult to explain why the legislature contemplated only one default and not two or three for that matter
In order to construe the plain language of s91 ii which admits of no ambiguity it may be necessary to look to the object and the purposes of the Act
In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand vs State of Punjab  Ors
a full Bench of the Punjab  Haryana High Court held that the Preamble of the Act stated that it was intended to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters
It 1011 is no doubt true that the main thrust of the provisions of the Act are directed towards preventing the landlords from ejecting their tenants except on the grounds mentioned in s9 but at the same time it cannot be denied that the legislature undoubtedly provided some protection to the landlords by conferring on them a limited right to eject their tenants and within this limited sphere the right was absolute and could not be curtailed by interpreting clause ii of section 91 of the Act through a process of twisting the law and doing violence to the language of the section
To begin with the word regular  is derived form the word regula  which means rule  and its first and legitimate signification according to Webster is conformable to a rule or agreeable to an established rule law or principle to a prescribed mode
In Words and Phrases Vol
36A p241 the word regular  has been defined as steady or uniform in course practice or occurrence etc and implies conformity to a rule standard or pattern 
It is further stated in the said Book that regular  means steady or uniform in course practice or occurrence not subject to unexplained or irrational variation
The word regular  means in a regular manner methodically in due order
Similarly Webster s New World Dictionary defines regular  as consistent or habitual in action not changing uniform conforming to a standard or to a generally accepted rule or mode of conduct In the case of Arab Bank Ld vs Ross while construing the words complete and regular  Romer LJ observed as follows It wold accordingly follow in my judgment in the present case that the omission of the word company from the endorsement would reasonably give rise to a doubt whether in point of personality the payees and the indorsers were necessarily the same and if so the bills cannot as I think be said to be complete and regular on their face
 The view of the Judge clearly indicates that the word regular  postulates a state of symmetry consistency and uniformity
In Hammond vs London County Council while construing the term regularly employed Farwell J observed as follows It is of course a question of fact in each case whether a man was regularly employed or not but in this particular case I think that the plaintiff who was employed for the five years and paid his wages day in and day out during that period as a servant or officer of the defendants  predecessors was regularly employed during that period
 1012 This interpretation also supports our view that the word regular  means a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach
On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above it seems to us that the legislature clearly intended to use the word regularly  to mean payment of rent in a uniform and consistent manner without any breach or default
The legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned
This inference is fortified by the words without sufficient cause
In other words the legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default whether one two or more the same could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise
If however we accept the interpretation of the High Court then the words sufficient cause becomes absolutely redundant
On an overall consideration of the matter a correct interpretation of the plain language and the words and phrases used in clause ii of s91 of the Act seems to us that the word regular  connotes a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach and the words regular payment of rent  mean that the rent should be paid punctually without any default or laxity
Although the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as to confer on them several important benefits and privileges yet as the Act is confiscatory in nature so far as the landlord is concerned it should be strictly construed within the limited sphere inasmuch as the landlord is conferred limited grounds on which ejectment is permissible under s9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act
In order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to assure the limited protection to the landlord the language employed in the various clauses of section 9 has to be construed so as to give real benefit to the landlord within the limited range that the section operates
In the instant case the words failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause  postulate the following conditions 1 there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent 2 such failure must be to pay rent regularly that is to say the rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach 3 if there is any default ranging from one to several the tenant has got to show sufficient cause if his case is to be taken out of the mischief of section 91 ii
1013 We might add at the risk of repetition that the use of the words without sufficient cause  clearly indicates that the intention of the legislature was that in order to escape ejectment the tenant must at least be regular in payment of the rent and if he wants to get rid of the consequences of his default he must prove sufficient cause
If however we construe the word regularly  as meaning at regular intervals so as to include a single default then the term without sufficient cause  becomes absolutely redundant
For instance even if a single default in the payment of the rent is committed by the tenant his case could be taken out of the ambit of clause ii of section 91 without insisting on the tenant to prove sufficient cause for this single default
That would therefore make the words sufficient cause  meaningless in such cases
It is well settled that the legislature does not waste words and every word that is used by it must be presumed to have some significance
The function of the Court says Sir Fracis Bacon is jus decere and not jus dare to interpret the law and not to make the law
The Court cannot therefore in order to promote its social philosophy turn and twist the plain and unambiguous language of the law so as to ascribe to it a meaning different from the one intended by the legislature
We are constrained to observe with due respect that this is what the High Court seems to have done in this case by adopting a puerile and pedantic process of reasoning
In these circumstances reading the entire sentence the cumulative effect thereof unmistakably is that the Act includes even a single default and that is why instead of using the word default  the word regularly  has been employed which is immediately followed by the words without sufficient cause 
Moreover we might mention that in the various Rent Acts passed in the States ejectment is permissible in some cases where there is a single default in other cases where there is more than one default and so on
If the legislature intended that a single default would not entitle a landlord to eject the tenant under the Act then it would have said so expressly either by way of an explanation or otherwise in clause ii of section 91 of the Act
Finally we cannot lose sight of the explanation used for the various clauses of section 91 which runs thus  Explanation
For the purposes of clause iii a tenant shall be deemed to be in arrears of rent at the commencement of this Act only if the payment of arrears is not made by the tenant within a period of two months from the date of notice of the execution of decree or order directing him to pay such arrears of rent
 While the explanation takes care to define as to when a tenant would be deemed to be in arrears and fixes a period of two months 1014 indeed if the intention of the legislature was that a single default in payment of rent could be condoned it should have included this incident also in the explanation
This provides therefore the most important intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation which we have put on clause ii of s91 of the Act and which invalidates the reasons given by the High Court
For the reasons given above we are satisfied that the High Court took an erroneous view of law in interpreting clause ii of section 91 of the Act as the tenants have been proved in this case to have committed default in the payment of rent for Kharif 1961 they must be held to have failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause as envisaged by clause ii and are therefore legally entitled to ejectment
The view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and cannot be supported
In Civil Appeal No 1319 of 1970 an objection was taken by the appellant that the appeal had abated as the heirs of respondent No 1 Ganga Ram were not brought on record
This objection has been overruled and we have allowed substitution as per our separate order dated 28th April 1980
The result is that the appeals are allowed the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Collector directing ejectment of the tenants is restored
The writ petitions filed by tenants before the High Court stand dismissed and the one filed by the appellant against Kalu Ram stands allowed
In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs
section R Appeals allowed


Summary:
Pera Ram Ganga Ram Bhago and Kalu Ram were the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs Raj Kanta the appellant
The tenants made separate applications under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 on September 4 1961 for purchasing the land held by them from the land owner
These applications were allowed by the Assistant Collector on October 31 1961
Accordingly the tenants deposited the first instalment in November 1961
Ultimately however the tenants did not pay the rent of the respective holdings for Kharif 1961
It is common ground that the last date by which the rent for Kharif 1961 was payable by the tenants to the land owner was January 15 1962 and that the tenant did not pay the rent and did not show sufficient cause for the same
In view of the default the land owner filed separate applications under section 91ii of the Act on the ground that as the tenants had failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause they were entitled to be ejected by the land owner
The applications for ejectment were however dismissed but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeals by his order dated May 31 1962
Second appeals preferred by the tenants in the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5 11 62 of the Commissioner and ultimately upheld by the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21 1962
Having failed before the Revenue courts the tenants respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court which was heard by a single judge
But in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for his ejectment by the land owner as a result of which the land owner filed a writ petition in the High Court
All the petitions were consolidated and heard together by the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the tenants and quashed the order of the Financial Commissioner directing ejectment of the tenants
The writ petition of the land owner against Kalu Ram was however dismissed
Hence the four appeals by the land owner appellant to this Court
Allowing the appeals the Court  HELD 1
The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 is a piece of social legislation meant to ameliorate the lot of the tenants by conferring on them the status of a permanent tenancy or the rights to purchase the land on payment of instalments
At the same time the landlords within a very limited sphere have been assured protection in respect of the rights which they possess in the land and have been given the right to eject the tenants on specified grounds which are contained in the various sub clauses of section 9 of the Act
Sub Clause ii is one such sub clause
This right was absolute and could not 1007 be curtailed by interpreting clause ii of section 91 of the Act through a process of twisting the law and doing violence to the language of the section especially when it admits of no ambiguity
1010 A C 1011 A B Bhagirath Ram Chand vs State of Punjab and Ors AIR 1954 Punjab 167 referred to
The word regular  which is derived from the word regula  which means rule  means in a regular manner methodically in due order and postulates a state of symmetry consistency and uniformity
In other words regular  means a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach
1011 B D F  1012 A Arab Bank vs Ross  Hammond vs London County Council 1931 Chancery 540 quoted with approval
Although the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as to confer on them several important benefits and privileges yet as the Act is confiscatory in nature so far as the landlord is concerned it should be strictly construed within the limited sphere inasmuch as the landlord is conferred limited grounds on which ejectment is permissible under section 9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act
In order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to assure the limited protection to the landlord the language employed in the various clauses of section 9 has to be construed so as to give real benefit to the landlord within the limited range that the section operates
1012 D F A correct interpretation of the plain language and the words and phrases used in clause ii of section 91 of the Act would be that the word regular  connotes a consistent course of conduct without any break or breach and the regular payment of rent  would mean that the rent should be paid punctually without any default or laxity
The Legislature clearly intended to use the word regularly  to mean payment of rent in this manner
The Legislature never contemplated that a single default could be condoned
The word regularly  has been used immediately after the words fails to pay the rent  and is followed by the words without sufficient cause
The Legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default whether one two or more the same could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise
1012 A D 4
The words failure to pay rent regularly without sufficient cause in Section 91ii of the Act cause postulate the following conditions 1
there must be a failure on the part of the tenant to pay rent 2
such failure must be to pay rent regularly that is to say the rent should be paid punctually consistently without any break or breach 3
if there is any default ranging from one to several the tenant has got to show sufficient cause if his case is to be taken out of the mischief of section 91ii
1012 F H 5
It is well settled that the Legislature does not waste words and every word that is used by it must be presumed to have some significance
The function of the Court is jus decere  not jus dare 
The Court cannot therefore in 1008 order to promote its social philosophy turn and twist the plain and unambiguous language of the law so as to ascribe to it a meaning different from the one intended by the Legislature
The words without sufficient cause  clearly indicate that in order to escape ejectment the tenant must at least be regular in payment of the rent and if he wants to get rid of the consequences of his default he must prove sufficient cause
Reading the entire sentence the cumulative effect thereof unmistakably is that the Act includes even a single default and that is why instead of using the word default  the word regularly has been employed which is immediately followed by the words without sufficient cause 
If the legislature intended that a single default would not entitle a landlord to eject the tenant under the Act then it would have said so expressly either by way of an explanation or otherwise in clause ii of section 91 of the Act
1013 C F 6
While the Explanation to section 91 of the Act takes care to define as to when a tenant would be deemed to be in arrears and fixes a period of two months indeed if the intention of the legislature was that a single default in payment of rent could be condoned it should have included this incident also in the explanation
This provides therefore the most important intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation of clause ii of section 91 of the Act
1014 A B