minal Appeal No 131 of 1959
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 21 1958 of the Patna High Court in M J C No 805 of 1958
G section Pathak section C Banerjee and P K Chatterjee for the appellant
R Ganapathy Iyer and B H Dhebar for the respondents
February 10
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA J
On February 20 1958 there occurred in the Central Bhowra Colliery in Dhanbad in Bihar an accident as a result of which 23 persons lost their lives
After an inquiry under
a 24 of the  into the causes of and the circumstances attending the accident and the publication of the report of the inquiry a complains was prepared by the Regional Inspector of Mines Dhanbad under the direction of the Chief Inspector of Mines Dhanbad before the Sub Divisional Officer Dhanbad against the appellant for an offence under section 74 of the  for contravention of regulations 107 and 127 of the Coal Mines Regulations 1957
The Central 35 Bhowra Colliery belongs and belonged at the relevant date to a private company viz Ms Central Bhowra Colliery Co Private Limited
The appellant is and was a shareholder and a director of this company
After the Sub Divisional Officer took cognizance of the complaint and issued processes against him the appellant made an application to the Patna High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ for quashing the criminal proceedings
This application was summarily dismissed
It if against that order of dismissal that this appeal has been filed by special leave obtained from this Court
The two main grounds on which the prayer for quashing the proceedings was based were 1 that section 76 of the  in pursuance of which the appellant who was not himself the owner of the colliery company but only one of the directors and shareholders has been prosecuted is void as it violates article 14 of the Constitution 2 the Coal Mines Regulations 1957 are invalid having been framed in contravention of a 593 of the 
These two contentions were also urged before us in appeal
The first contention is based on an assumption that the word any one in section 76 means only one of the directors and only one of the shareholders
This question as regards the interpretation of the word any one in section 76 was raised in Criminal Appeals Nos 98 to 106 of 1959 Chief Inspector of Mines etc 1 and it has been decided there that the word any one should be interpreted there as every one
Thus under section 76 every one of the shareholders of a private company owning the mine and every one of the directors of a public company owning the mine is liable to prosecution
No question of violation of article 14 therefore arises
As regards the other contention that the regulations are invalid the appellant s argument is that the provisions of section 12 and section 59 of the  are mandatory
Section 12 provides 1 The Central Government may constitute for any part of the territories to which this
Act extends 1  36 or for any group or class of mines a Mining Board consisting of a a person in the service of the Government not being the Chief Inspector or an Inspector appointed by the Central Government to act as Chairman b the Chief Inspector or an Inspector appointed by the Central Government c a person not being the Chief Inspector or an Inspector appointed by the Central Government d two persons nominated by owners of mines or their representatives in such manner as may be prescribed e two persons to represent the interest of miners who shall be nominated in accordance with provisions laid down in the section
 Section 59 empowers the Central Government to make regulations consistent with the Act for all or any of the purposes mentioned therein while section 58 empowers the Central Government to make rules consistent with the Act for all or any of the purposes mentioned therein
Section 59 after providing in its first sub section that the power to make regulations and rules conferred by sections 57 and 58 is subject to the condition of the regulations and rules being made after previous publication provides in its third sub
section further conditions as regards the making of regulations
This sub section runs thus Before the draft of any regulation if published under this section it shall be referred to every Mining Board which is in the opinion of the Central Government concerned with the subject dealt with by the regulation and the regulation shall not be so published until each such Board has had a reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency of making the same and as to the suitability of its provisions
 A similar provision was made in the fourth sub section as regards the making of rules
By an amendment made in 1959 these two subsections have been combined into one
It was not disputed before us that when the Regulations were framed no Board as required under section 12 37 had been constituted and so necessarily there had been no reference to any Board as required under section 59
The question raised is whether the omission to make such a reference make the rules invalid
As has been recognised again and again by the courts no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory meaning thereby that non observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory ie a direction the non observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity whatever other consequences may occur
But in each case the court has to decide the legislative intent
Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provisions that nonobservance of this would entail invalidity or did it not To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the visions and the material danger to the public by pro the contravention of the same
In the present case we have to determine therefore on a consideration of all these matters whether the legislature intended that the provisions as regards the reference to the Mines Board could be contravened only on pain of invalidity of the regulation
Looking at the language of the section we find the legislature after saying in the first part of sub section
3 that before any regulation is published it shall be referred to every Mining Board which is in the opinion of the Central Government concerned with the subject and goes on to say in the latter part that the regulation shall not be published until each Board has had a reasonable opportunity of reporting as to the expediency and suitability of the provisions
While it is true that language is only one of the many considerations which have to be taken into account in deciding whether a requirement is directory or mandatory it is legitimate to note that the language used in this case is emphatic and appears to be designed to express an anxiety of the legislature that the publication of the regulation which is condition precedent to the making of the regulations should 38 itself be subject to two conditions precedent first a reference to the Mining Boards concerned and secondly that sufficient opportunity to the Board to make a report as regards the expediency and suitability of the proposed regulations
The cause of this anxiety becomes patent when one examines the matters on which regulations can be made Even a cursory examination of the purposes set out in the 27 clauses of section 57 shows that most Of them impinge heavily on the actual working of the mines
To mention only a few of these viz cl
c under which regulations may be made for prescribing the duties of owners agents and managers of mines and of persons acting under them g for determining the circumstances in which and the conditions subject to which it shall be lawful for more mines than one to be under a single manager j for prohibiting restricting or regulating the employment of adolescents and women in mines k for providing for the safety of the persons employed in a mine m for providing for the safety of the roads and working places in mines n for the inspection of workings and sealed off fire areas in a mine o far providing for the ventilation of mines r for providing for proper lighting of mines and regulating the use of safety amps therein are sufficient to show that the very purpose of the Act may well be defeated unless suitable and practical regulations are framed to help the achievement of this purpose Arbitrary and haphazard regulations without full consideration of their practicability and ultimate effect on the efficient working of the mines would apart from often defeating the purpose of the Act affect injuriously the general economy of the country
That we are entitled to presume is the reason behind the legislature s anxiety that Mining Boards should have an opportunity of examining regulations and expressing their opinion before they are finalised
As has been already mentioned section 12 which deals with the formation of boards provides for representation thereupon of two persons nominated by owners of mines or their representatives and two persons to re
present the interests of persons employed in mines in 39 addition to three persons representing the Government
The constitution is calculated to ensure that all aspects including on the one hand the need for securing the safety and welfare of labour and on the other hand the practicability of the provisions proposed from the point of view of the likely expense and other considerations can be thoroughly examined
It is certainly to the public benefit that Boards thus constituted should have an opportunity of examining regulations proposed in the first place by an administrative department of the government and of express ing their opinion
It is true that the law does not require concurrence of the Board with the regulations proposed
It is reasonable to expect however that when a Board has expressed an opinion in favour of the rejection or modification of a proposed regulation the department would not treat it lightly
But even where the opinion expressed by the Board is not accepted the very fact that there has been such an examination by the Board and a consequent re
examination by the department is likely to minimise the risks to public welfare
There can be little doubt therefore that generally speaking strict obedience of the command in sub section
3 of section 59 regarding consultation with the Mining Board is likely to promote public welfare
Let us now examine the matter from another aspect and ask ourselves the question what risk there is to the public welfare of an insistence in all cases that the omission of consultation as enjoined in section 59 would invalidate a regulation
Emergencies may arise when in order that the public may not suffer
regulations must be framed with the least possible de lay and much valuable time may be lost if a reference must be made to all the Mining Boards concerned and opportunity given to them to express their opinion before regulations are made
In such cases public interest may well be endangered if regulations in order to be valid have to conformto the requirements of previous consultation with the Mining Boards
We find however that such cases of emergency have been specially dealt with in a 60 of the Act the operative portion of which runs thus 40 Notwithstanding anything contained in subsec tions 1 2 and 3 of section 59 regulations under clause 1 and clauses k to a excluding clause 1 of section 57 may be made without previous publication and without previous reference to Mining Boards if the Central Government is satisfied that for the prevention of apprehended danger or the speedy remedy of conditions likely to cause danger it is necessary in making such regulations to dispense with the delay that would result from such publication and reference
Thus the apprehended danger to public interest from requiring as a condition of the validity of regulations previous consultation with the Mining Board is averted
An examination of all the relevant circumstances viz the language used the scheme of the legislation the benefit to the public on insisting on strict compliance as well as the risks to public interest on insistence on such compliance leads us to the conclusion that the legislative intent was to insist on these provisions for consultation with the Mining Board as a prerequisite for the validity of the regulations
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that in section 60 when providing for the framing of regulations in certain cases without following the procedure enjoined in section 59 the legislature took care to add by a proviso that any regulation so made shall not remain in force for more than two years from the making thereof
By an amendment made in 1959 the period has been changed to one year
It is not unreasonable to read this proviso as ex
pressing by implication the legislature s intention that when the special circumstances mentioned in section 60 do not exist and there is no scope for the application of that section no regulation made in contravention of s59 will be valid for a single day
Strew was laid on behalf of the respondent on the fact that section 59 does not require that regulations must have the concurrence of the Mining Boards and it was pointed out that this Court in State of U P vs Manbodhan Lal Srivastava 2 in holding that article 3203 2  41 of the Constitution was not mandatory relied inter alia on the fact that the requirement of the consultation with the Commission does not extend to making the advice of the Commission on these matters binding on the government
While it is true that this Court did attach weight to this circumstance we have to remember that this was the only one of the several circumstances on the total consideration of which the court decided that the provision for consultation in article 3203 was not mandatory
One of these circumstances was that article 3203 contained a proviso which gave a clear indication of the intention of the Constitution makers that they did envisage certain cases or class of cases in Which the Commission need not be consulted
If the provisions of article 3203 were of a mandatory character observed Sinha J as he then was while delivering the judgment of the Court the Constitution would not have left it to the discretion of the head of the executive government to undo these provisions by making regulations to the contrary
It has to be noticed as pointed out above that section 60 of the  also lays down clear provisions where the consultation as required in section 59 need not take place
Here however the legislature has not left it to the discretion of the executive government to undo these provisions by making regulations to the contrary
The legislature itself has given clear guidance as to the cases where such consultation need not be made by the Government
What is more the legislature has laid down that regulations made without such consultation would have a limited life
In Srivastava s Case 1 this Court quoted with approval the following observations of the Privy Council in Montreal Sirgeet Railway Company vs Nor
mandin  When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience 1  2   175
42 or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only the neglect of them though punishable not affecting the validity of the acts done and applied the principle thus laid down to the case before it
There is however no scope in the present case of applying this principle in support of the directory nature of section 593
As we have pointed out above the inconvenience that might be caused by holding regulations made in contravention of section 593 invalid is removed by the provisions of section 60 and on the other hand to hold that regulations may be validly made without following the procedure laid down in section 59even in cases not falling within section 60 is likely to be harmful to public interest and to cause general incon venience
It is really a converse case of what the Privy Council had to consider in Montreal Street Railway Company s Case 1 and this Court considered in Srivastava s Case 2
For all the reasons given above we are of opinion that the provisions in section 593 of the  are mandatory
There remains for consideration the question whether these provisions were complied with before the Coal Mines Regulations 1957 were I framed
As has been pointed out above it was not disputed before us that at the time when the regulations were framed no new Mining Board had been constituted under the  and consequently no consultation with any Mining Board constituted under the 1952 Act took place
It has been stated before us however on behalf of the respondents that the Mining Boards constituted under section 10 of the Mines Act 1923 were continuing to operate at the time these regulations were framed and that there was full consultation with these Mining Boards before these regulations were framed
1   175
2  43 If in fact there was such consultation the further question would arise whether consultation with the Mining Boards constituted under the provisions of the Mining Act 1923 would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 593 of the present Act
Before these questions are decided it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion whether the Coal Mines Regulations 1957 are valid or not
As there is not sufficient material before us to decide the question whether in fact the Mining Boards constituted under section 10 of the 1923 Act were functioning at the date when these regulations were made and whether these Boards were consulted before the regulations were framed we have not thought fit to consider here the further question whether if such consultation had taken place that would be sufficient compliance with section 593 of the 1952 Act
In the circumstances the proper course in our opinion is to direct that the criminal proceedings pending in the court of the sub divisional magistrate be disposed of by him or any other magistrate to whom the case may be transferred in accordance with law after deciding the question whether there was consultation with Mining Boards constituted under section 10 of the Mines Act 1923 before the regulations were framed and if so whether such consultation amounted to sufficient compliance with section 59
If his conclusion is that there has not been compliance with the provisions of section 59 the regulations must be held to be invalid and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal if on the other hand he holds that there has been sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 59 he should dispose of the case after coming to a conclusion on the evidence as regards the allegations made against the appellant in the petition of complaint
The appeal is disposed of accordingly
Appeal allowed
Case remanded


Summary:
The rule of blending in Hindu Law as evolved by judicial decisions can have no application to a property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner
That rule postulates a coparcener deliberately and intentionally throwing his independently acquired property into the joint family stock so as to form a part of it
Although it is unnecessary now to investigate whether there is any other text on which that rule could be founded it is quite clear that the text of Yagnavalkya in a different context and the commentary thereupon by Vijnyaneshwara relied on by the Privy Council in this connection can have no relation to the said rule
Shiba Prasad Singh vs Rani Prayag Kumari Debi 1932 LR 59 IA 331 disapproved
Rajanikanta Pal vs Jaga Mohan Pal 1923 LR 50 IA 173 relied on
Consequently where in a partition suit certain immovable properties acquired by a Hindu female from her father as a limited owner were claimed to form part of the joint family property of her husband by virtue of the said rule Held that the claim must fail
Held further that a Hindu female owning a limited estate cannot circumvent the rules of surrender and allow the members of her husband s family to treat her limited estate as part of the joint family property of her husband
Before the said rule can be invoked it must be shown that the owner wanted to extinguish his title to the property in question and impress upon it the character of joint family property