No 119 of 1957
Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights
Achhru Ram J P Goyal and K L Mehta for the petitioners
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India KL Misra Advocate General for the State of U P and Gopi Nath Dixit for the respondent
December 17
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J
This petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenges the constitutionality of the 117 930 UP Consolidation of Holdings Act U P V of 1954 as amended by U P Acts No XXVI of 1954 No XIII of 1955 No XX of 1955 No XXIV of 1956 and No XVI of 1957 hereinafter called the Act
The applicants are four brothers holding land in village Banat tahsil Kairana District Muzaffarnagar
A notification was issued under section 4 of the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil Kairana declaring that the State Government had decided to make a scheme of consolidation in that area
This was followed up by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act resulting in a statement of proposals under section 19
Objections to these proposals were filed by the petitioners and others which were decided in April 1956
The petitioners went in appeal to the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was decided in August 1957
It was thereafter that the present petition was filed in this Court
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds of which the following five have been urged before us 1Section 6 read with section 4 of the Act gives arbitrary powers to the State Government to accord discriminatory treatment to tenure holders in different villages by placing some villages under consolidation while excluding others thus offending article 14 of the Constitution
2Sections 8 9 and 10 read with section 49 of the Act provide a procedure for the correction and revision of revenue records for villages under consolidation which is vitally different from that applicable to villages not under consolidation and there is thus discrimination which offends article 14 of the Constitution  3Sections 14 to 17 read with section 49 confer arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities under which they can deprive a tenure holder of his land or rights therein and the tenure holder has been deprived of the protection of courts available to other tenure holders in villages not under consolidation thus creating discrimination which offends article 14 931 4Sections 19 to 22 read with section 49 again create discrimination on the same grounds as sections 14 to 17 and are therefore hit by article 14 and 5Section 29 B which provides for compensation gives inadequate compensation and is therefore hit by article 312 of the Constitution
Before we take these points seriatim it is useful to refer to the background of this legislation
As far back as 1939 the U P Consolidation of Holdings Act No VIII of 1939 was passed
It was however of little effect because it could only be applied when more than one third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an order of consolidation of the village
It was therefore felt that some kind of compulsion would be necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings in villages
That consolidation would result in improving agricultural production goes without saying and it was with the object of encouraging the development of agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were taken up in various States after the recommendation of The Famine Inquiry Commission 1944 in its Final Report Seepage 263
The State of Bombay
was the first to pass an Act called the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act Bom
LXII of 1947
This was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh
The object of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure holders so that large scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages
Thus  by the reduction of boundary lines saving of land takes place and the number of boundary disputes is reduced
There is saving of time in the management of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from field to field which may be at considerable distances from each other  Proper barriers such as fences hedges and ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent trespassing and thieving
It would further be easier to control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water would be reduced considerably where compact areas are allotted to tenure holders
Lastly the control of pests insects 932 and plant disease is made easier where farmers have compact areas under cultivation
These advantages resulting from consolidation of holdings are intended to encourage the development of agriculture and larger production of food grains which is the necessity of the day
With these objects in mind the Act was passed by the U P Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President on March 4 1954
It was published in the gazette on March 8 1954 and declarations under section 4 were made for the major part of the State of Uttar Pradesh including the petitioners  village in July 1954
The scheme of the Act is as follows When consolidation of a village is taken up the first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records and sections 7 to 12 deal with that
Then comes the second stage of preparing what are called statements of principles  see sections 14 to 18
Objections to these principles are entertained and decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under section 18
Then comes the third stage vide sections 19 to 23 which deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals
Objections to this are also invited and disposed of and then proposals are confirmed under section 23
After the proposals have been confirmed we come to the last stage in which the confirmed proposals are enforced see sections 24 onwards
It will be clear therefore from the objects of the Act and the advantages that accrue from its implementation that it is a piece of legislation which should be a boon to the tenure holders in a village and should also lead to the development of agriculture and increase of food production
It is in this setting that we have to examine the attack that has been made on the constitutionality of the Act
Re 1  Section 6 of the Act gives power to the State Government at any time to cancel the declaration made under section 4 in respect of the whole or any part of the area specified therein
When such declaration is made the area ceases to be under consolidation operations and section 5 which provides for the effect of a declaration ceases to operate
It is urged that section 4 933 gives arbitrary power to the State Government to cancel the declaration even with respect to a part of the area covered by it and thus discriminates between villages which are under consolidation and those which are not under consolidation
The learned Additional Solicitor General counters this argument in two ways i Section 6 is nothing more than a restatement of the power which the State Government otherwise possessed under the General Clauses Act and ii the high status of the authority to whom the power is given namely the State Government and the rules framed under the Act laying down a standard for the Government to follow remove any flavour of arbitrariness which the terms of the section might import
It is not necessary to express any opinion in this case on the said contention for even if it be accepted the result would be only that section 6 would be struck down
The petitioners would be in the same position with section 6 on the Statute or without it
It may be that if a citizen in whose favour an order of consolidation has been made but subsequently cancelled comes to court with a grievance that the order of consolidation was for his benefit but was cancelled in exercise of a power under a void section this question might arise for consideration
It may also be that the petitioners  right might be infringed if section 6 were not severable from the other provisions of the Act which enable the Government to direct consolidation of holdings
The power of cancellation cannot be said to be so inextricably mixed up with the power to order consolidation as to prevent the operation of one section without the other
Nor can it be said that the Legislature would not have conferred the power on the Government to consolidate holdings without at the same time conferring on them the power to cancel the said order of consolidation
The said provisions are clearly severable
In the circumstances as the petitioners  case is not affected by section 6 of the Act we leave this open to be decided in an appropriate case
Re 2 This deals with the first stage of revision and correction of maps and records which has to take place before the actual consolidation scheme is put 934 into force
Section 7 provides for the examination of the revenue records by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and he is enjoined to test the accuracy of the village map khasra and the current annual registers by making a partal in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed
After he has done the partal he is to prepare a statement showing the mistakes discovered in the map khasra and khatauni and the number and nature of disputes pertaining to land records under the U P Land Revenue Act 1901
Then under section 8 he submits a report to the Settlement Officer Con solidation in this connection with his opinion whether any revision of such maps and records is needed
On receipt of this report the Settlement Officer may either order the Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with the correction of maps and records which we presume he will order when there are not too many mistakes or recommend to the State Government for revision of maps or records in accordance with the provisions of Ch
IV of the U P Land Revenue Act 1901 which he will presumably do if there are too many mistakes found
If the Assistant Consolidation Officer is ordered to make the corrections he will make a further partal if necessary and correct the map or the entries in annual register in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed
The procedure is prescribed in r 22 and among other things it lays down that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall issue a notice to all persons affected by the provisional entries proposed by him objections are invited and parties are examined and heard and their evidence taken and then the Assistant Consolidation Officer makes the corrections
His order is open to appeal within twentyone days under section 84 to the Consolidation Officer and the order of the latter is made final
It is urged that this procedure is vitally different from the procedure prescribed under the U P Land Revenue Act and that under section 49 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts with respect to any matters arising out of consolidation proceedings is barred thus depriving those affected by the orders of the Consolidation Officer the right to file a suit as they 935 could have done under the provisions of the U P Land Revenue Act see sections 40 41 51 and 54
There is no doubt that there is some difference between the procedure provided under the Act and that which the tenure holders Would have been entitled to if their village was not under consolidation
But if consolidation is a boon to the tenure holders of a village as we hold it is and if it is to be put through within a reasonable period of time it is necessary to have a procedure which would be shorter than the ordinary procedure under the U P Land Revenue Act or through a suit in a civil or revenue court
The procedure that has been provided cannot by any means be said to be arbitrary or lacking in the essentials of principles of natural justice
The Assistant Consolidation Officer gives notice to the persons affected hears their objections and gives them an opportunity to produce evidence
Thereafter he decides the objections and one appeal is provided against his order
This should in our opinion be enough in the special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to those who object to the correction of records
All that has happened is that the number of appeals is out down to one and that in our opinion is not such a violent departure from the ordinary procedure as to make us strike down the provisions contained in Ch
II of the Act as discriminatory in the peculiar circumstances arising out of a scheme of consolidation which must if it has to be of any value be put through within a reasonable period of time
Whatever difference there may be may well be supported as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act
Further section 12 provides that where there is dispute as to title and such question has not already been deter
mined by any competent Court the Consolidation Officer has to refer the question for determination to the Civil Judge who thereafter will refer it to the arbitrator
The arbitrator then proceeds in the manner provided by r 73 and gives a bearing to the parties and takes evidence both oral and documentary before making his award and section 37 of the Act makes the 936 Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator in the matter of procedure
Taking therefore the scheme of Ch
11 and remembering that if consolidation is to be put through there must be a more expeditious procedure there is in our opinion rational basis for classification which justifes the procedure under Ch
11 of the Act read with the Rules in villages where consolidation scheme is to be effective
The attack therefore under article 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch
II fails
Re 3 and 4 The contentions on these heads may be taken together
They attack the provisions of Ch
III dealing with the Statement of Principles and Statement of Proposals
The statement of principles is first published and objections are invited
Under section 17 the Assistant Consolidation Officer decides the objections after hearing the parties if necessary and taking into account the view of the Consolidation Committee
He then submits a report to the Consolidation Officer who after hearing the objectors and taking such evidence as may be necessary passes final order and confirms the statement of principles see r 43 B
Similarly when statements of proposals are published objections are invited to them and the same procedure is followed in the decision of these objections as in the case of the objections to the statement of principles
In the case of the statement of proposals also there is similar provision to refer disputed question of title to the Civil Judge who in his turn refers it to the arbitrator
Section 22 also provides that where such question has been referred to the arbitrator all suits or proceedings in the court of first instance appeal reference or revision in which the question of title to the same land has been raised shall be stayed
Section 223 makes the decision of the arbitrator final
There is no provision for appeal in Ch
III though in fact two persons hear the matter namely the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer
But the main attack is on the provisions of section 222 on account of which it is said that even where a party has obtained a decree which might be under appeal the jurisdiction of the ordinary 937 courts is taken away and the decision of the arbitrator is made final
That is undoubtedly so
But if the consolidation scheme has to be put through in a reasonable period of time such a provision is in our opinion necessary but for it the consolidation schemes may never be really put through for there will be little purpose in making consolidation where a large number of disputes are pending in the courts
Reasons which we have given in dealing with the second point apply with equal force to these two points also and we are of opinion that there is a rational basis for a classification which has a nexus with the object of the Act and therefore the attack under article 14 on the provisons of Chapter III also must fail
Re 5
Under this head the inadequacy of compensation provided under section 29 B of the Act is raised
It may be mentioned that the Act as originally passed did not contain any provision for compensation
There were a number of writ applications in the Allahabad High Court and that court held that inasmuch as some property was taken away under section 141 ee for public purposes and no compensation was provided that provision was void under article 31 2 as it stood before the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act 1955 hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment
Appeals by the State Government from that decision of the Allahabad High Court are pending before us and we shall deal with them separately
The legislature then enacted section 29 B laying down the principles on which compensation would be paid for lands taken away under section 14 1 ee after the decision of the Allahabad High Court
This section was put by Act XVI of 1957 in the original Act with retrospective effect from the date from which the original Act was enforced
It is urged that the compensation provided therein is inadequate and therefore the provision should be struck down under article 31 2 as it was before the Fourth Amendment
Arguments were also addressed on the question whether section 29 B would be saved by the 118 938 Fourth Amendment
We however think it unnecessary to go into these arguments for we have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case the compensation provided under section 29 B is adequate
Assuming that the case is governed by article 31 2 as it was before the Fourth Amendment section 29 B provides for payment of cash compensation equal to four times the value determined at hereditary rates to a bhumidar and two times the value to a sirdar
The difference between the two rates has not been attacked for the rights of a bhumidar are much higher than the rights of a sirdar
The bhumidar is the owner of the land while the sirdar is merely a tenant but the argument is that the amount provided is inadequate and that it is certainly not the fair market value of the land
Let us see what section 14 1 ee provides
It lays down the basis on which the tenure holder will contribute towards the land required for public purposes and the extent to which vacant land may be utilised for the said purpose
We are here concerned with the first part namely the contribution of tenure holders towards land required for public purposes
In this case the petitioners had lands in one chak of the rental value of Rs 20 6 0 and they have been allotted lands of the rental value of Rs 20 5 0 instead
In another chak in place of land the rental value of which is Rs 148 10 0 they have been allotted land of the rental value of Rs 147 13 0
Thus out of the land valued at Rs 169 0 0 they have been allotted land of the value of Rs 168 2 0 and land valued at Annas 0 14 0 has gone to the common pool
The percentage is just over a half per cent
it hardly ever exceeds one per cent
Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything
These small bits of lands are collected from various tenure holders and consolidated in one place and added to the land which might be lying vacant so that it may be used for the purposes of section 14 1 ee
A compact area is thus created and it is used for the purposes of the tenure holders themselves and other villagers
Form CH 21 framed under r 41 1 shows the purposes to which this land would be applied 939 namely 1 plantation of trees 2 pasture land 3 manure pits 4 threshing floor 5 cremation ground 6 graveyards 7 primary or other school 8 playground 9 panchayatghar and 10 such other objects
These small bits of land thus acquired from tenure holders are consolidated and used for these purposes which are directly for the benefit of the tenure holders
They are deprived of a small bit and in place of it they are given advantages in a much larger area of land made up of these small bits and also of vacant land
The question then is whether in these circumstances it can be said that the tenureholders have been given adequate compensation by
section 29 B for the small bits of land acquired from them for public purposes
This case must be distinguished from other cases where lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for here the benefit is direct to the tenure holders while in ordinary cases of land acquired for public purposes if there is any benefit to the person from whom the land is acquired it is indirect and remote
It is contended on behalf of the State in the circumstances that the compensation which the tenure holders get is not merely the cash compensation which they receive under section 29 B but also the advantage which they receive by these small bits taken from them being consolidated into a larger area of land in which they will have benefits the nature of which is indicated in form CH 21 over and above the advantage of having their scattered holdings consolidated into a compact block
The question therefore is whether in these circumstances the provision of actual cash compensation under section 29 B can be said to be inadequate
We are of opinion that taking into account the peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and remembering that the land taken from each individual tenure holder may be a small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area by adding some other lands taken from other tenure holders and the whole is then used for the advantage of the whole body of tenure holders it cannot be said that the cash compensation added to the advantages which the tenure holders get in the 940 large area of land thus constituted and on account of getting a compact block for themselves is inadequate
Therefore assuming that article 31 2 applies as it was before the Fourth Amendment it cannot be said that the compensation which the tenure holders will get under section 29 B is inadequate in the circumstances
This ground of attack also therefore fails
There is no force in this petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs
Petition dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was injured in a road accident on 2211989 and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 1531990 with a prayer for condonation of delay before the Claims Tribunal
Meanwhile the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 171989
The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 166 of the new Act the delay of more than six months could not be condoned and dismissed the claim
Before the High Court the appellant challenged the Tribunal s decision but was not successful
Thereafter he preferred this appeal by special leave
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that since the accident took place when the old Act was in force the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act under which the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of Section 6 of the  and that his claim could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation under the new Act
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1 The High Court was right in taking the view that the case was covered by the new Act and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned
920D 2
The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to by reason of the accident was certainly en forceable as a right
So far the 913 period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned it is adjectival in nature and has to be gov erned by the new Act subject to two conditions
If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation the same cannot be held to govern the case otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right
The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy
916F G New India Insurance Co Ltd vs Smt
Shanti Misra   relied on
There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application
Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege
917E Isha Valimohammad  Anr
vs Haji Gulam Mohammad  Haji Dada Dust 1975 1 SCR 720 and Lalji Raja and Sons vs Firm Hansraj Nathuram   relied on
Director of Public Works and Anr
vs Ho Po Sang and Ors  and Abbott vs Minister of Lands  referred to
In the instant case the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was the same viz six months which expired three weeks after coming into force of the new Act
It was open to the appel lant to file his claim within this period or even later by 2271989 with a prayer to condone the delay
His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitu tion of one Act with another
Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise
So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned there was no charge in the position under the new Act
The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay
Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enact ment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit
The occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law
Obviously the ground for condonation set up as sufficient cause  also relates to the time after the repeal
The 914 benefit of the repealed law could not therefore be avail able simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal Sufficient cause  as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from cause of action  for the claim itself
The question of condonation of delay must therefore be governed by the new law
919F H A C 920A 5
Clause e of Section 6 of is also not attracted because by the enactment of the new law viz the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all
Appellant s right to claim compensation by filing the claim within the same period of limitation has been preserved
And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege avail able under the old Act
916C