Appeal No 2063 of 1973
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the 25th July
1973 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No 1193 of 1972
Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973
From the judgment and order dated the 3rd February 1972 of the Calcutta High Court in LPA No 14 of 1969
P Chatterjee and Rathin Das for the appellant In C A 206373
Urmila Kapoor and Shobha Dikshit for the respondent In CA No 206373
PK Chatterjee G section Chatterjee and Sukumar Basu for the Advocate General for the State of West Bengal
Sukumar Ghose for the appellants
In CA No 130473
D N Mukherjee for the respondents in CA No 130473
The judgment of M H Beg and V R Krishna Iyer JJ was delivered by Krishna Iyer J P K Goswami J gave a separate Opinion
KRISHNA IYER J Calcutta or Cochin for the urban people of India the shocking scarcity of a roof to rest one s tired bones is an L346SupCI75 778 unhappy problem of social justice that compels control of rent
and eviction laws
In the case now before us attacking the constitutionality of legislation handcuffing the landlord proprietariat s right of eviction the law has to be tested not merely by the cold print of article 191f but also by the public concern of article 195 and the compassionate animus of article 39 Parts III and IV of the Constitution together constitute a complex of promises the nation has to keep and the legislation challenged before us is in partial fulfilment of this tryst with the people
These observations become necessary in limine since counsel for the respondents dismissed the concept of social justice as extraneous to an insightful understanding of the section invalidated by the High Court while we think that judicial conscience is not a mere matter of citations of precedents but of activist appraisal of social tears to wipe out which the State is obligated under the Constitution
The two appeals before us raising substantially identical points have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment
Both of them stem from a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported as Sailendra Nath vs section E Dutt1
One of the decisions under appeal CA 2063 of 1973 was rendered by a Single Judge of the High Court following a Division Bench ruling of the same Court ie the one reported as Sailendra Nath vs section E Dull since he was obviously bound by it
A provision imparting some sort of retroactivity to a 1969 legislative amendment implanting additional restrictions on eviction of premises under the earlier West Bengal rent control law has been voided by the High Court in the judgment under appeal
The aggrieved tenant in each case has appealed and the State not being directly a party to the legislation has entered appearance to support the legislation and to challenge the Calcutta decision to the extent it has invalidated the retrospective part of the statute
Welfare legislation calculated to benefit weaker classes when their vires is challenged in Court casts an obligation on the State particularly when notice is given to the Advocate General to support the law if necessary by a Brandeis brief and supply of socio economic circumstances and statistics inspiring the enactment
Courts cannot on their own adventure into social research outside the record and if Government lets down the Legislature in Court by not illumining the provisions from the angle of the social mischief or economic menace sought to be countered the victims will be the class of beneficiaries the State professed to protect
In this case we are unable to compliment the State or the Advocate General from this point of view
It may happen that when the Court decides against the validity of a measure or order because Government fails to bring the socially relevant totality of facts it is used Is an alibi by 1 A1 R 779 he latter for the misfortune
Courts cannot help cover up the Executive s drowsy default or half hearted help in making the socioconomic conspectus available
The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 Act XII of 956 for short referred to as the basic Act clamped down several restrictions on ejectment of tenants by landlords from buildings the policy behind it being alleviation of the lot of the weaker segment of the urban community without their own homes in the context of the scarcity of accommodation and the colossal sociceconomic upheaval which would follow if unbridled evictions were allowed
The temptation to evict or rack rent under scarcity conditions is an irresistible evil in our economic order and it is an all India phenomenon that the social conscience of the State Legislatures has responded to this large scale threat by effective control measures
Indeed for decades now every State in India has on the statute book rent control law and what is more pertinent to the present case tactics of circumvention have compelled the enactment of additional safeguards from time to time by vigilant statutory measures
West Bengal a populous State with an overcrowded city choked by the largest human congregation in the country enacted the basic Act whereby the plenary right of landlords to recover possession of their buildings was shackled in many ways
Industrial growth and other factors induced demographic congestion such as was witnessed in the urban areas of that State
Consequently the legislature was faced with a fresh danger in the shape of ingenious transfers of ownership of buildings by indigenous but indigent landlords and the transferees resorting to eviction on a large scale equipped as they were with better financial muscles and motivated as they were by hope of speculative returns from their investments oil eviction
Presumably the phenomenal increase of the menance of eviction by the new species of transferee owners of building was countered by a legislative measure the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Second Amendment Act 1969 Act XXXIV of 1959 hereinafter referred to as the amendment Act
By this legislation the new class of transferee landlords was subject to a stringent trammel viz that they should not sue for eviction within three years of the date of transfer We are not immediately concerned here with certain other changes effected by the Amendment Act
The social objective and the practical effect of this fetter will be con Court has upheldthis provision which is now contained in section 133A sidered briefly the little later
Suffice it to say at this stage the High of the basic Act
However  while holding the provision substantial intra vires the Court has invalidated the giving effect to the provision to pending suits and appeals
Such limited retrospectivity had been incorporated by section 13 of the amending Act and if the law were only prospective the landlords in the two cases who had initiated their litigation several years prior to the enactment of the Amendment Act would be free from the three year interdict and the other extra restrictions
Once the embargo is out of their way the decree  for eviction they have secured must stand
On tile contrary if the restriction on eviction by the transferee landlords were to operate on 780 pending litigation the appellants tenants are immune to eviction in the current proceedings as they now stand
Thus the short constitutional issue is as to whether section 133A of the basic Act to the extent it applies to pending litigation on the strength of section 13 of the Amending Act is violative of articles 14 and 191f of the Constitution weapons relied upon for the attack before the High Court and here
We will proceed to consider the constitutional vulnerability of this limb of the protective legislation
By way of anticipating our conclusion we may also pose the problem whether sections 1 3 and 4 of the Amendment Act can be validly implemented vis a vis pending actions in any other just manner which will preserve the additional protection minimise multiplicity of litigation and make law and justice bedfellows in the hanged statutory circumstances
Some background observations to appreciate the contest in court are necessary
No social realist will deny the frightful dimensions of the problem of homeless families and precarious tenancies and if the Directive Principles of State Policy are not to be dismissed by the masses as a teasing illusion and promise of unreality  curtailment in public interest of such extreme rights of the landlord as are red in tooth and claw  is a constitutional compulsion
The Court informed by this sore economic situation and reinforced by the initial presumption of constitutionality hesitates to strike a socially beneficial statute dead leading to escalation of the mischief to suppress which the House legislated unless of course a plain breach of the fundamental right of the citizen is manifest
The perspective of the amending Act is sketched by the High Court in lurid language  The scarcity of accommodation is a burning problem not only of the State of West Bengal but of the other States as well
Keeping pace with the needs of the gradually swelling population of West Bengal new buildings have not been built owing to abnormal high price of land and materials
A large majority of the people of West Bengal live in those premises at the mercy of the landlords
 The explosive import of neglecting such a distressing urban development reasonably obliges the State to impose drastic restrictions on landlords  right to property
And when circumvention of wholesome legal inhibitions are practised on a large scale the new challenge is met by clothing the law with more effective amount and that is the rationale of the Amendment Act
The learned Judges rightly refer to the legislative proceedings notorious common knowledge and other relevant factors properly brought to their ken
The sound proof theory  of ignoring voices from parliamentary debates once sanctified by British tradition has been replaced by the more legally realistic and socially responsible canon of listening to the legislative authors when their artifact is being interpreted We agree with the High Court when it observes  Proceedings of legislature can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at 781 or about the time of the enactment in question which actuated the sponsor of the bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Second Amendment Bill 1969 it is stated that it has been consider necessary that some more reliefs should be given to the tenants against eviction
It is found from the speech of the Minister at the time of introducing the Bill in the legislature that the problems of tenants are many  there are landlords of different kinds  there is one class original owners who are the old inhabitants of the city  these owner landlords are Dot affluent they solely depend upon the rents received from the tenants
It has been ascertained from experience that two of the grounds of eviction namely of the landlords and for the purpose of building and rebuilding have been misused by the landlords
In the city of Calcutta and other towns there are millions of tenants who are left at the mercy of the landlords
In this background and after taking into account similar provisions in other States it has been decided that some restrictions ought to have been imposed upon transferee landlords prohibiting them from bringing ejectment suits against the tenants within three years from their purchase
On the above two grounds and for that purpose the said classification has been made
 The conclusion of the Court crystellised in the following words commends itself to us  Taking an overall view of the various considerations the statement of the Minister the objects of the Bill matters of common knowledge and state of facts existing at the time of the legislation it may be well conceived that underlying policy and objects of the amended provision is to give more protection to the tenants against eviction and the classification of landlords into owner landlords and transfereelandlords is based upon a rational and intelligible differentia and we hold accordingly
 Proceeding to examine the limited attack on section 133A of the basic Act read with section 13 of the Amending Act we have to remember die comity of constitutional instrumentalities and raise the presumption that the legislature understands and appreciates the needs of the people and is largely aware of the frontiers of and limitations upon its power
See The State of Bombay vs R M D Chamar baguwala1 and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice section R Tendolkar  Others2
Some Courts have gone to the extent of holding that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality and a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt and to doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve it in favour of its validity
3 Indeed the Legis 1  2  3 Constitutional law of India by H M Seervai p 54 vol
1 782 lature owes it to the Court to make like respectful presumptions
We therefore view the provision impugned through a socially constructive not legally captious microscope to discover glaring unconstitutional infirmity if any and not chase every chance possibility of speculative thought which may vitiate the law
Stray misfortunes when laws affecting large chunks of the community are enacted are inevitable and the respondents before us may perhaps belong to that category
Social legislation without tears affecting vested rights is impossible
Statutory construction has a benignant sensitivity and we are satisfied the High Court in substantially upholding the Amendment Act has done right but in striking down the retrospective portion of the section has stumbled into a specious error
It is helpful to reproduce the relevant portion of section 13 of the basic Act in its unamended state and the amendments dovetailed into it by the 1969 Act The so called retrospectivity  of this provision has been anathematised by the respondent landlords and annulled by the High Court  131 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds namely unamended cl
f  where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held cls
f and ff substituted therefor fsubject to the provisions of sub section 3A and section 18A where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for purposes of building or re building or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations and such building or rebuilding or additions or alterations cannot he carried out without the premises being vacated ff subject to the provisions of subsection 3A where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation Sub section
3A newly introduced
133A Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause f or clause ff of sub section 1 shall be insti 78 3 tuted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest  Provided that a suit for the recovery of the possession of the premises may be instituted on the ground mentioned in clause f of sub section 1 before the expiration of the said period of three years if the Controller on the application of the landlord and after giving the tenant an opportunity of being beard permits by order the institution of the suit on the ground that the building or rebuilding or the additions or alteration as the case may be are necessary to make the premises safe for human habitation
 Once the substantive restriction super added by section 133A is held valid we have to focus attention only on the extension of the new ban to pending proceedings
That legislative competence to enact retroactively exists is trite law and we have only to test its validity on the touchstone of articles 14 and 19 1 f pressed into service before us
Law is a social science and constitutionality turns not on abstract principles or rigid legal canons but concrete realities and given conditions for the rule of law stems from the rule of life
We emphasize this facet of sociological jurisprudence only because the High Court has struck down section 13 of the Amendment Act on surmises possi bilities and may be rather than on study of actualities and proof of the nature number and age of pending litigations caught in the net of the retrospective clause
Judges act not by hunch but on hard facts properly brought on record and sufficiently strong to rebuff the initial presumption of constitutionality of legislation
Nor is the Court a third Chamber of the House to weigh whether it should legislate retrospectively or draft the clause differently
We find no foundation for the large assumptions made by the High Court and duly repeated before us by counsel that there may be cases of ejectment instituted prior to 1956 or that a number of suits and decrees perhaps decades old will unjustly be nullified by the previous operation of the new ban
Recondite instances and casual hardships cannot deflect constitutional construction of social legislation if the main thrust of the statute relates to a real social evil of dimensions deserving to be antidoted by antedated legislative remedy
In the present case indubitably the State was faced with a new insidious and considerable situation of exploitation undermining the security of tenancy conferred by the basic Act
A large number of original landowners living in their own home could not under the basic Act claim recovery of possession being occupants of their own houses
Likewise they could not urge the ground of recovery for rebuilding not being financially able to invest on such a costly venture
They had to look up to modest old time rentals as the only source of return and lest the penurious tenantry desperately inhabiting little tenements be forced to pay extortionate rents the rent control law of 1956 froze the rates at the 1940 level with gentle increases as provided therein
However for now buildings to be constructed 784 special incentive provision was made by deeming the contract rent as fair rent thus ensuring a high return on building investment
The social upshot of this scheme was that the old landlords found their ownership a poor return investment saw a new class of wealthier investors streaming into cities and towns ready to buy the premises evict old tenants re let on rack rents or re build and reap a rich return
They had no buildings of their own and could prove plans to rebuild thus disarming the nonevictability provision of section 13 of the basic Act
The transferees could thus get decrees for eviction under the basic Act
Naturally transfers of buildings to this somewhat speculating class increased and the spectacle of eviction litigation  or potential eviction proceedings was projected on the urban scene
The Legislature promptly reacted by the Amendment Act to rescue the lessees by clamping down new restrictions by way of section 13 3A
A three year moratorium was given to the tenants from being hunted out of their homesteads by imposing a ban on institution of suits for eviction by transferee landlords
This would both disenchant speculative purchases and provide occupants time to seek alternative housing
Presumably these objects inspired the law makers to extend the embargo backwards to pending eviction proceedings
Quite conceivably the tendency to create a transferee class of real estate owners gradually gathered in volume and showed up in rashes of pending actions
When Government was alerted amending legislation was proposed
Unfortunately the State s legal wing has failed to protect in Court the class for whose benefit the amending law was made by placing luscent social or statistical materials on these aspect 
As earlier stated by us Government have a duty where social legislation to protect the weak are challenged to exhibit the same activism in the Halls of Court as in the Houses of Legislature
Failure in the former duty can be as bad as not promulgating the law
Not an elucidatory affidavit by the State nor even the Minister s explanatory speech has been filed in this Court
We make these observations because of the handicaps we have faced and the little help on facts the State has given to sustain the legislation
The Calcutta High court has upheld the vires of sub section
3A but invalidated its application to pending litigation
So the short issue is whether this projection into the past of the otherwise reasonable restriction on the right of eviction arbitrary irrational ultra vires  If yes the lethal sting of articles 14 and 191 f will deaden section 13 of the Amendment Act
And the High Court has held so on he latter Article
The prospective validity of the restriction under articles 14 and 191 f the High Court thinks is vindicated by sound classification and sanctioned reasonably by the interest of the general public
Having regard to the policy of the legislation the classification of landlords into two classes of owner landlords and transferee landlords and the imposition of an embargo on the latter minacious class against bringing eviction suits within three years of purchase passes the dual tests of reasonable classification and the differentia having a rational nexus with the statutory object
Therefore the High Court had no hesitation and we totally concur that the provision is 78 5 impregnable
The controversy rages round giving effect to these stringent restraints newly enacted on earlier legal actions
This it is contended is a horrendous invasion of property right and unjust anteriority which hits innocent plaintiffs whose purchases were beyond three years
Before us respondents  counsel have contended that article 14 is violated
by section 3 read with section 4 of the Amendment Act although the high Court has negatived this submission thus  We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and we are of the Opinion that the retrospective operation of sub section 3A on pending suits and appeals does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution
 Since the argument dressed differently has been urged before us again we will briefly deal with it agreeing as we do with the High Court
Plaintiffs whose transfers are twenty years ago or two years before the Act are lugged together and subjected to the same ban if their suits were instituted within three years of the transfer
This blanket ban regardless of the varying periods which have elapsed after the transfers and before the Act was passed was unequal treatment or rather harshly equal subjection to restriction of plainly unequally situated transferees
There is seeming attractiveness in this presentation
But Courts are concerned not how best to hammer out equal justice but to oversee whether the classification is without rational basis unrelated to the object of the Act
That is why we are confined to check whether the reasoning on this aspect adopted by the High Court is not tenable
We may or may not disagree with the wisdom of the Legislature in the grouping adopted or hold views about fairer ways of treatment
But our powers are judicial not legislative and arbitrariness and irrationality are not writ large in the method of differentiation the legislature has here chosen
In the words of A K Mukuherji J  In the instant case suits of the affected transfereelandlords may be regarded as a sub class within a class and if within the said sub class the suits are not differently treated they will not be hit by Article 14
The persons affected are transferee landlords who instituted their suits within three years of their purchase and they form a separate class and among the suits of that affected class  there is no discrimination
The law applied equally with respect to the pending suits with regard to this affected class
 Some hardship is bound to occur peripherally in any mode of classification and a few hard cases we have not been shown whether many have been struck by this pattern of grouping cannot guide the Court in upsetting legislative compartmentalisation
The next attack by the respondents is that the deprivation of the right to sue is absurdly beyond the object of the Act when applied to pending cases where the transfers took place more than three years before the Act
Were we draftsmen of legislation may be counsel s submission could have had more potency
But our limited power is to 786 examine the reasonableness of the restriction not by substituting our personal notions but by interfering if the Legislature has gone haywire in unreasonably hamstringing transferee landlords by dismissing suits brought long before the legislative bill was in the womb of time
In an earlier case this Court observed1 Right at the threshold we must warn ourselves of the limitations of judicial power in this jurisdiction
Mr Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States has delineated these limitations in United States vs Butter  80 Law
Ed 477 thus The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness
One is that courts ire concerned only with the power to enact statutes not with their wisdom
The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint the only check upon our exercise of power is our own sense of self restraint
For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government
 In short unconstitutionality and not unwisdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review The High Court has assumed that even proceedings started prior to 1956 may be affected
This admittedly is wrong as pre basic Act suits will be governed by the then law as provided in section 40 and the Amendment Act amends only the 1956 Act
It may also be conceded that in both the appeals before us thanks to Indian longevity of litigation more than three years from the date of transfer in favour of the plaintiff has passed and thus the spirit of the protection in that sense is fulfilled
Indeed counsel for the
respondents urged that the validation of the retrospective limb of the law would only drive the parties to fresh suits thus promoting multiplicity of suits ruinous to both sides with no social gain
There is force in this submission
Its relevance to decide the constitutional issue is doubtful but its influence on our ultimate solution in this case as will be seen later is undeniable
A closeup of the social milieu leading up to the enactment in 1969 of the Amendment Act is useful to identify the substantial mischief the law was intended to overpower
Did that evil reasonably necessitate for effectual implementation of purpose the extension of the new law to pending suits and appeals  How many suits appeals and second appeals by transferees within the three year belt were pending How long had they been so pending Were there only stray eviction cases of long ago and was it feasible or necessary to 1 Murthy Match Works vs Asst
Collector of Central Excise ATR 1974 8C 497 503
787 draw a line somewhere to prevent injustice to non speculative and old time buyers of buildings without impairing the limited immunity meant for tenants and intended against now realty investors  On these facts the State has sat with folded hands and we have been thrown on our own to scan and sustain or strike down
But here arises the significance of initial presumption of constitutionality
The High Court has made short shrift of this plea thus  There is nothing on the record to show that the mischief sought So be remedied by the amended legislation was in existence since 1956
On the other hand the ministerial speech referred to above rather indicates that the said mischief was of comparatively recent origin
In this context the application of the restriction on the omnibus scale to ill pending suits and appeals would smack of unreasonableness
 Who has the onus to place compelling facts except in flagrant cases of gross unreasonableness to establish excessiveness or perversity in the restriction imposed by the statute Long ago in Dalmia s Case1 this Court held that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles and that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds  If nothing is placed on record by the challengers the verdict ordinarily goes against them
Moreover what is the evil corrected by the Amendment Act The influx of a transferee class of evictors of tenants and institution of litigation to eject and rack rent or re build to make larger profits
Apparently the inflow of such suits must have been swelling slowly over the years and when the stream became a flood the Legislature rushed with an amending bill
Had it made the law merely prospective those who bad in numbers already gone to Court and induced legislative attention would have escaped the inhibition
This would defeat the object and so the application of the additional ban to Pending actions could not be called unreasonable
To omit to do so would have been unreasonable folly
The question is whether those cases which were filed several years ago should have been carved out of the category of transferees hit by the Act  Where do you draw the line  When did the evil assume proportions  These are best left to legislative wisdom and not court s commonsense although there may be grievances for some innocent transferees
1   297 propositions b and c
788 If this be the paradigm of judicial review of constitutionality we have to ignore exceptional cases which suffer misfortune unwittingly
The law is made for the bulk of the community to produce social justice and isolated instances of unintended injury are inevitable martyrs for the common good since God Himself has failed to make perfect laws and perfect justice Freaks have to be accepted by the victims rightly or wrongly as forensic fate Not that it should be so but human infallibility being unattainable easily the next best in social justice is to promote the public weal sacrificing some unmerited private hurt as unfortunate but unavoidable
It must be conceded that prima facie the two landlord respondent s had purchased the buildings in the early sixties and three time three years or more have now passed since that date
But while considering constitutionality can we be moved by such accidental instances  No
The substantial evil has been substantially met by a broad application of the new ban to pending proceedings
We see in the Amendment Act no violation of article 191 f read with 195
The same High Court in a later case Kalyani Dutt vs Pramila Bala Dassi1 came to the same conclusion by what it called independently considering the question 
We discern nothing substantially different in the analysis or approach to merit review of our result
We hold section 13 of the Amendment Act valid and repel the vice of unreasonableness discovered in both the reported rulings of the High Court
And if reasonable interpretation can avoid invalidation it is surely preferable
Here humanist considerations public policy and statutory purpose may provide guidelines of construction within reasonable limits
Section 13 of the Amendment Act reads 13
Retrospective effect
The amendments made to the said Act by section 4 7 8 and 9 of this Act shall have effect in respect of suits including appeals which are pending at the date of commencement of this Act
 The Court is called upon to give effect to section 4
of this new Act  Section 4 introduced amendments in section 13 of the basic Act which we have set out earlier
There is no doubt that the purpose of the law is to interdict for a spell of three years institution of suits for eviction on grounds f and ff of sub section
Section 13 of the Amending Act makes it expressly applicable to pending actions so much so the operation of the prohibition is not simply prospective as in the Kerala case cited before us Nealakandhayya Fillai vs Sankaran2
Section 13 fairly read directs that the amendment made by section 4 shall have effect in respect of suits including appeals pending at the commencement of the Act
We are therefore bound to give effect to section 4 in pending actions regardless of isolated anomalies and individual hardships
As earlier noticed section 4 has two limbs
It amends section 13 of the basic Act by substituting two new clauses f and ff in place of the old clause f of sub section
1 of section 13 Secondly it forbids for a period of three years from the date of acquisition suits by new acquirers of 1 ILR 2 1961 RLT 755
789 landlord s interest in premises for recovery of possession on any of the grounds mentioned in cl
f or cl
ff of sub section 1
The result of the two mandatory provisions has to be clearly understood
For one thing although the old cl
f is substantially similar to the present cls
f and ff the latter imposes more severe restrictions protecting the tenants
Much more has to be proved by the landlord now before he can get eviction than when he was called upon to under the earlier corresponding provision of the basic Act
Moreover the three year prohibition against institution of the suit is altogether new
It follows therefore that on the present allegations and evidence the landlord may not get a decree his suit having been instituted at a time when he could not have foreseen the subsequent enactment saddling him with new conditions
We consider that where two interpretations are possible that which validates the statute and shortens litigation should be preferred to the one which invalidates or proliferates it
We are guided by that consideration in the interpretative process
We are satisfied further that originally brought in is defective since it did not contain and ordinarily could not averments complying with the new cls
f and ii of sub section
1 of section 13 and we are making it effectively by construing the word institute  in a natural and grammatical way
The suit is really instituted in compliance with cls
f andor ff only when the new pleading is put in
The bigger roadblock in the way of the plaintiff is in a pending action lies in the prohibition of the institution of the suit within three years of the transfer from the landlord
Indeed such prohibitions are common in rent control legislation as has been noticed by the Calcutta High Court and is found even in agrarian reforms laws vide Malaber Tenancy Act as amended by Act VII of 1954 Madras
Section 13 of the Amendment Act compels the postponement of the institution of the suit including appeal for a period of three years from the date of the transfer
In both the cases before us the suits were instituted within the prohibited period of three years
The argument therefore is that the suits must be straightaway dismissed the institution being invalid
We do not think that this consequence is inevitable To institute is to begin or commence  in plain English
The question then is whether the suit can be said to begin on the date it was filed in 1961 or 1964 as the case may be
Here we have to notice a certain nice but real facet of sub section
The prohibition clamped down by sub section
3A carefully read is on suits for recovery of possession by transferee landlords on any of the grounds mentioned in cl
f or cl
ff of subs1 
Obviously the suits with which we are concerned are not for recovery on grounds contained in cis
f and ff
They were based on the repealed cl
f of section 13 of the basic Act
Strictly speaking sub section
3A brought in by section 4 of the Amending Act applies only if a the suit is by a transferee landlord b it is for recovery of possession of premises and c the ground for recovery is what is mentioned in cl
f and cl
ff of sub section
Undoubtedly the third condition is not fulfilled and there fore sub section
3A is not attracted
This does not mean that the suit 790 can be proceeded with and decree for recovery passed because section 13 of the basic Act contains a broad ban on eviction in the following words  131 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds namely emphasis ours Since the new cls
f and ff are included by the Amendment Act in section 13 of the basic Act and since the suits we are concerned with as they now stand do not seek eviction on those grounds they will have to be dismissed on account of the omnibus inhibition on recovery of possession contained in section 13 itself
A just resolution of this complex situation was put by us to counsel on both sides and the learned Advocate representing the State readily agreed that the policy of the legislation and the conditions in the Amendment Act would be fulfilled if the interpretation we proposed were to be accepted
We are satisfied that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation
Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation should be preferred to any literal pendantic legalistic or technically correct alternative
On this footing we are prepared to interpret section 13 of the Amendment Act and give effect to section 4 of that Act
How do we work it out  We do it by directing the plaintiffs in the two cases to file fresh pleadings setting out their grounds under cls
f andor ff_ of sub s1 if they so wish
On such pleading being filed we may legitimately bold that the transferee landlord institutes his suit on grounds mentioned in cls
f or ff of sub section
1 on that ate
It is only when he puts in such a pleading setting out the specific ground covered by sub section
3A of section 13 that we can say he has begun or instituted a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on that ground
Institution of a suit earlier has to be ignored since that was not based on grounds covered by cls
f andor ff and is not attracted by sub section 3A
He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these_grounds
In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading
We cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorpo rating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law
On the other hand social justice and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in subject of course to the three year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading
Section 13 of the Amendment Act speaks of suits including appeals
It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in by the plaintiff either in the suit if that is pending
or in appeal or second appeal if that is pending
Thereupon the opposite party
tenant will be given fin opportunity to file his written statement and the Court Will dispose of it after giving both sides the right to lead 791 additional evidence
It may certainly be open to the appellate Court either to take evidence directly or to call for a finding
Expeditious disposal of belated litigation will undoubtedly be a consideration with the court in exercising this discretion
The proviso to sub section
3A can also be complied with if the plaintiff gets the permission of the Rent Controller in the manner laid down therein before filing his fresh pleading
We are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the expression institution of the suit  as amounting to filing of fresh pleading
By this construction we do no violence to language but on the other hand promote public justice and social gain without in the least imperiling the protection conferred by the Amendment Act
Ruinous protraction of litigation whoever may temporarily seem to benefit by delay bankrupts both in the end and inflicits wounds on society by sterile misuse of money
Tenant passengers who prolong their expensive flight on the litigation rocket are buying tickets for financial crash drugged though they be by the seeming blessings of law s delays
Courts by interpreting the expression institution of suits  cannot authorize reincarnation all over again of litigation for eviction
We save the tenant by applying it to pending cases and save him also from litigative waste
This consideration is itself germane to the larger concept of justice which it is the duty of Courts to promote
Law finds its finest hour when it speaks to justice on fair terms
In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been imbued with this spirit
In the process of interpretation where alternatives are possible  the man in the law influences the law in the man may be and the construction on sections 4 and 13 of the Amendment Act herein adopted we admit appeals to us as more humane
The calculus of statutory construction relating to complex problems of the community cannot be hide bound by orthodox text book canons
An obiter maybe
More buildings is the real solution for dwelling shortage freezing scarcer accommodation relieves for a little while
Tiger balm is no serious cure for brain turnover We make no more comments on the need for dynamic housing policies beyond statutory palliatives
These belong to legislative wisdom  and administrative activism  and not to judicial constitutionalism 
It was noticed in the course of arguments that a later Amending Act of 1970 purporting to give relief to tenants against whom decrees for eviction bad been passed but dispossession had not ensued had been put on the statute book
It is surprising that counsel on either side did not choose to address us any arguments on the basis of those provisions
We therefore do not go into the impact of that Act on situations where eviction has been ordered by Courts
We therefore allow the appeals with costs but direct the High Court to dispose of the cases in the light of the directions and obser 792 vations we have made
It will be open to the Court seised of the matter to direct in its discretion award of costs to be incurred hereafter
GOSWAMI JCivil Appeal No 1304 of 1973 is by certificate granted by the Calcutta Hi Court and Civil Appeal No 2063 of 1973 is by Special Leave of this Court
The first one arises out of Letters Patent Appeal No 14 of 1969 of the Calcutta High Court dismissed on February 3 1972 relying upon its earlier decision in Kalyani Dutt vs Pramila Bala Dassi since reported in ILR 1972 2 Calcutta 660
A preliminary question had arisen in connection with the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal along with three other appeals at an earlier stage with regard to the constitutionality of section 133A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Second Amendment Act 1969 briefly the Amendment Act
A Division Bench repelled the contention of the appellants in decision which has since been reported in AIR 1971 Calcutta 331 Sailendra Nath Ghosal  Ors
vs Sm
Ena Dutt  Others
The Division Bench had held that sub section 3A of section 13 in so far as it was retrospective in operation was ultra vires Article 191 f of the Constitution on the ground of unreasonableness
Since however the Letters Patent Appeal was not completely disposed of the bar of sub section 3A was this time pleaded asserting that Article 19 was not at all attracted to the present case on the ground that the right of reversion of the landlord namely the right to recover possession of the property from the tenant is not a right of property which is a condition precedent to the application of Article 191 f and consequently the question as to the infringement of fundamental right did not at all rise and that there could not be any scope for holding that the provision of sub section 3A offended against Article 191f
This second contention which was allowed to be raised by the Letters Patent Bench was also repelled following its earlier decision in Kalyani Dults case supra disposed of on September 7 1971
Civil Appeal No 2063 of 1973 arises out of the decision of the High Court in Second Appeal No 1193 of 1972 disposed of on 25th July 1973 relying upon Sailendra Nath Ghosal s case supra which is the subject matter of appeal in Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973
The history of tortuous litigation in both the appeals may also be noticed
In Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973 the plaintiff respondent herein purchased the premises in suit on February 16 1961
She instituted Title Suit No 480 of 1961 in the court of Munsif of Sealdah District 24 Pargana for ejectment of the defendant on July 24 1961
The suit was decreed by the Munsif on July 21 1964 but was dismissed by the lower appellate court on May 17 1965
On second appeal at the instance of the plaintiff the High Court framed an additional issue and remanded the suit to ram a finding on the same
On receipt of the finding of the court below the learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the second appeal and granted 793 leave to a Letters Patent Appeal
That appeal was dismissed on February 3 1972
The High Court granted certificate to appeal against that decision to this Court on May 24 1973 referring to the earlier certificate granted by that Court in Kalyani Dutt s case supra
That is how Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973 is now before us
The facts in Civil Appeal No 2063 of 1973 are these
The property in suit was purchased by the plaintiff respondent herein on February 7 1964 and the eviction suit No 76 of 1966 was instituted in February 1965
The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on October 11 1966
On appeal by the plaintiff the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal on June 8 1967 and remanded the suit for disposal after taking additional evidence
The Munsif thereafter decreed the plaintiff s suit on December 23 1968
On appeal by the defendant the Additional District Judge allowed the same and dismissed the suit on April 8 1969
On plaintiff s appeal to the High Court in Second Appeal No 968 of 1969 the High Court allowed the same on April 3 1971 and remanded the suit to the Munsif for retrial
The Munsif again dismissed the plaintiff s suit on September 13 1971
On appeal by the plaintiff the Additional District Judge allowed the same and decreed the suit on April 29 1972
The High Court on appeal by the defendant dismissed the second Appeal on July 25 1973 relying upon Salindra Nath Ghosal s case supra disposed of on January 28 1971
The defendant then obtained special leave
Thus the life of litigation in Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973 is now in the fourteenth year after purchase of the premises by the plaintiff six months earlier
The second one is a decade old the property having been purchased about a year earlier
Both the appeals were argued together and will be governed by this common judgment
The suits in both the appeals are by what has come to be known as transferee landlords
They have instituted suits in one case within six months of the purchase in 1961 and in the other within one year of the purchase in 1965
During the long pendency of the litigation the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Second Amendment Act was passed which came into force on November 14 1969
and section 4 inter alia was made applicable to pending suits including appeals
It amended the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 West Bengal Act XII of 1956 briefly the Original Act
Section 4 of the Amendment Act introduced the following changes in section 13 of Section 131 f of the Original Act stood as follows the Original Act  131 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises hall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds namely fWhere the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or 4 L346Sup
CI75 794 for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held
After the amendment of section 13 by section 4 of the Amendment Act clause f was split up into two clauses f and ff which read as under  f Subject to the provisions ofsub section 3A and section 18A where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations and such building or re building or additions or alterations
cannot be carried out Without the premises being vacated ff Subject to the provisions of sub section 3A where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation
In addition section 4 of the Amendment Act introduced a new subsection 3A which reads as follows  Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause f or clause ff of sub section 1 shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest Provided that a suit for the recovery of the possession of the premises may be instituted on the ground mentioned in clause f of sub section 1 before the expiration of the said period of three years if the Controller on the application of landlord and after giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard permits by order the institution of the suit on the ground that the building or re building or the additions or alterations as the case may be are necessary to make the premises safe for human habitation
It should be noted that the grounds for ejectment in the earlier sub section f ire the same as the new grounds in clauses f and ff except for some additional restrictions
The common grounds for eviction are broadly speaking reasonable requirement for the Purpose of building or rebuilding etc
sub clause f and reasonable requirement for occupation by the landlord etc
sub clause ff
There is there fore no particular significance to the mention of  grounds in clause f or clause ff of subsection 1 in subsection 3A
Section 13 of the Amendment Act which is the bone of contention grants retrospectivity to section 4 of the Amendment Act and therefore necessarily to sub section 3A and section 131fff
The grievance centres round retrospectivity of sub section 3A and 795 section 131f and ff made applicable by force of section 13 of the Amendment Act to suits and appeals pending on the commencement of the Act
It may be in order first to deal with the question of retrospectivily of sub section 3A which is the principal ground of attack in these appeals
Section 13 of the Amendment Act provides that
effect should be given to section 4 of the Amendment Act in pending suits including appeal on the date of the commencement of the Act
The suits of the particular category by transferee landlords therefore could be pending on commencement of the Amendment Act and these may have been instituted several years prior to the Amendment Act
There may also be appeals pending in different appellate courts against decrees in such suits
The appeals necessarily have to be understood as appeals arising out of suits instituted within the three years  ban
The tenants are now permitted to take objection on the score of contravention of section 133A before the courts either in a pending suit or in a pending appeal against decrees in such suits and the point for consideration then would be whether such a suit was instituted within three years  ban and the appeal was pending against such a banned suit
When section 13 of the Amendment Act provides that section 4 therein has to be given effect in pending suits including appeals effect has to be given by the courts
Now how will effect be given to section 133A  Retrospectivity to be given under section 13 of the Amendment Act to section 4 broadly requires compliance as follows 1 that no suit for eviction by a transferee landlord shall be instituted within three years of his acquisition of the premises 2 if eviction is sought on the ground under section 131f of the Amendment Act an additional restriction is put namely that such building or rebuilding or additions or alterations cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated 3 if eviction is sought on the ground under section 131ff a further restriction is put upon the right of the landlord to evict viz that the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation
Under proviso to section 133A a transferee landlord can however institute a suit within three years  ban provided he obtains prior permission from me Controller who on an application by the landlord and after hearing the parties may decide whether permission should be given or not
Prime facie a suit which had already been instituted prior to the Amendment Act would not come within the mischief of section 133A since this sub section in terms prohibits only institution of suits and does not provide for dismissal of suits already instituted
Similarly while there is a relaxation in favour of a transferee landlord under the proviso to obtain permission from the Controller this bene fit is out of the way even in a genuine case where the suit had already 796 been instituted within three years of purchase and the same or an appeal therefrom is now pending after the passing of the Amendment Act
In this regard also it appears sub section 3A is not intended to be attracted to suits which were already instituted prior to the Amendment Act
But as will be seen hereafter the above position is altered by the express provision of section 13 of the Amendment Act whereby it is intended that the court should give retrospectivity inter alia to section 4 of the Amendment Act
On the terms of only section 13 3A it is difficult to hold that it would bring old sections within the mischief of section 13 3A which imposes a ban expressly on institution of suits within three years of the acquisition of ownership of the premises subject to the relaxation contained in the proviso thereto
This being the correct interpretation of sub section 3A taken by itself what is the effect of section 13 of the Amendment Act upon this provision Section 13 of the Amendment Act in seeking to give retrospective effect to sub section 3A does exactly what sub section 3A by itself contra indicates
The first part of section 133A which provides for a ban against institution of suits for eviction within three years of acquisition of the premises must be given effect to under section 13 of the Amendment Act in pending suits and in pending appeals arising out of the decrees passed in such suits provided the former had been instituted within the period of the ban
If therefore after the Amendment Act it is found in a pending suit or in a pending appeal that the particular suit was instituted within the three years  ban the same will have to be dismissed and only in that way the court will be able to give effect to sub section 3A
With regard to the proviso of subsection 3A when the ground of eviction is relatable to section 131f of the Amendment Act the court will have to dismiss the suit in absence of the requisite permission
That being the practical result of restrospectivity given to subsection 3A is that sub section in so far as it is retrospective violative of Article 191f of the Constitution That takes us to the object and purpose of the Amendment Act
The Statement of Objects and Reasons as quoted in Kalyani Dutt s case supra is as follows It has been considered necessary that some more relief should be given to the tenants against eviction that the necessity of tender of rent to the landlord every time the rent is deposited with the Controller during a continuous period should be dispensed with that the interests of the residents of hotels and lodging houses should be safeguarded and that the penalties for contravention of some of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 should be made more stringent
In the earlier judgment of the High Court which is also the subject matter of Civil Appeal No 1304 of 1973 the High Court referred to the statement of the Minister at the time of piloting of the Bill in the following words 797 It is found from the speech of the Minister at the time of introducing the Bill in the legislature that the problems of tenants are many there is one class original owners who are the old inhabitants of the city these owner landlords are not affluent they solely depend upon the rents received from the tenants
It has been ascertained from experience that two of the grounds of eviction namely requirement of the premises for own use of the landlords and for the purpose of building and re building have been misused by the landlords
In the city of Calcutta and other towns there are millions of tenants who are left at the mercy of the landlords
In this background and after taking into account similar provisions in other States it has been decided that some restrictions ought to have been imposed upon transferee landlords prohibiting them from bringing ejectment suits against the tenants within three years from their purchase
The High Court also observed further that there is nothing on the record to show that the mischief sought to be remedied by the amended legislation was in existence since 1956
On the other hand the ministerial speech referred to above rather indicates that the said mischief was of comparatively recent origin
Again in Kalyani Dutt s case supra the High Court in para 27 observed that such suits are not many and at the same time most of them are pending for more than ten years
The materials relied upon by the High Court stand uncontradicted by any affidavit before US
On the above materials it is safe to hold that the main object of the Amendment Actis to counteract the recent mischief of circumvention of theprovisions of the original Act in order to evict tenants on even bona fide requirements specified under the law of device of transfer of premises held under the occupation of tenants
Although the Amendment Act has not completely barred institutions of suits by transferee landlords postponement of litigation for a period of three years from acquisition of the premises was provided for under subsection 3A
This had a twofold purpose namely to enable tenants a reasonable respite to arrange their affairs and also to discourage speculative acquisitions with an ulterior motive
This salutary pro vision for the general body of tenants cannot be called unreasonable
But the question is whether by applying the provision to pending suits and appeals has that object been achieved in the interest of the general body of tenants which would certainly constitute the general public within the meaning of clause 5 of Article 19 From the fact  and circumstances extra fed above from the two judgments of the High Court
it is not possible to bold that the interest of the general body of tenants would be served by application of sub section 3A to pending suits and appeals
If the mischief was of recent origin there is no reason to overshoot the mark and outstretch the long rope of the law beyond the 798 requirements of the situation
It is clear that in trying to include old actions that may be surviving in courts per chance because of laws  proverbial delay section 13 of the Amendment Act has gone far in excess of the actual needs of the time and problems and the provisions thereof cannot be said to impose a reasonable restriction on the right of the transferee landlords albeit a well defined class amongst tile landlords to hold and enjoy their property in the interest of the general public
Such transferee landlords with pending old sections in suits or in appeals are as observed by the High Court not likely to be of a large number and necessarily so the tenants of such a sub sec class
It is not in the general interest of the large body of tenants to impose such restrictions on a few transfree landlords of this sub class subject to unbearable delay in litigation understandably not on their own account
If relief in the shape of postponement of a landlord s suit were the object of sub section 3A in giving retrospectivity to it the law did not take count of the inevitable long delay that takes place in pending litigation of this type as a result of man made laws of procedure in courts such as has even been clearly demonstrated by the cases at hand
The law that misses its object cannot justify its existence
Besides it will be a sterile relief if tenants have to face a fresh summons next day
Hard cases will be on both sides of the line
law contemplates in terms of generality and is not intended to hit a few individuals by making invidious distinction
Article 19 of the Constitution confers protection of rights specified therein belonging to all citizens
Any individual citizen may complain of encroachment of his rights and freedom guaranteed under the Article
Law s encroachment upon such rights and freedom of citizens can survive challenge if it passes the tests laid down in the six saving clauses of Article 19
Coming now to article 191f with which we are concerned in these appeals the said provision confers upon each individual citizen the right to acquire hold and dispose of property This right is subject to clause 5 which we may read so far as material for our purpose Nothing in sub clauses d e and f of the said clause shall  prevent the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses  in the interests of the general public 
Even a single citizen may complain against violation of his fundamental rights under Article 19 1 f and his vindication of his right may be defeated only if the impugned infringement brought upon by the law can be considered as a reasonable restriction and the aid restriction is also in the interests of the general public
It is manifest therefore under the Constitution
that an individual s right will have to yield to the common weal of the general community
That general community may be in broad segments but even then must form a class as a whole
A few individuals cannot take the place of a class and for the matter of that the general public In the present case the particular relief contemplated by the Amendment Act is in favour 799 of tenants in general and the restriction under sub section 3A must be viewed in that context
It cannot be said that the legislature in applying sub section 3A restrospectively has achieved that avowed object at all
The matter would have been different it in view of any prevailing conditions a reasonable date for giving retrospective effect were fixed under the law in the light of the known mischief
In its
absence applicability of the blanket ban to pending suits and appeals cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public
It may help a few tenants in litigation but will prejudice the right of transferee landlords locked up in old and costly litigation
The gain of the few as opposed to the general public cannot be the touchstone for justifying reasonableness of the restriction imposed on the rights of the transferee landlords in applying subsection 3A to pending suits and appeals
In the social combat between the interests of a few and the general welfare of the community the latter is the clinching factor to be reckoned and hard cases of a few individuals cannot be assigned a higher place and status than they deserve to the detriment of the fundamental rights of even a single individual
Therefore the retrospectivity so far as sub section 3A is concerned with regard to institution of suits made applicable to pending suits and
appeals is clearly very wide of a reasonable mark and is thus an imposition of an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the transferee landlords in pending suits which had been instituted prior to the Amendment Act and in appeals arising therefrom and it is not saved by the protective clause 5 of Article 19 of the Constitution
Sub section 3A so far as it is retrospective and as such applicable to pending suits including appeal is ultra vires Article 19 1f of the Constitution
The provision is valid only prospectively
So far as the retrospectivity of section 131f and ff the position is entirely different
Clearly further reliefs have been sought to be given to the tenants as a class by these provisions in the Amendment Act
These further reliefs are in the general interests of tenants and can be applied without any difficulty to pending suits including appears
There is nothing unreasonable about such a retrospectivity in applying these provisions for the general welfare of tenants in securing for them a safe and sure tenure as far as practicable untrammelled by inconvenient litigation
It is well established that the legislature in enacting laws can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively
Section 131f and ff are therefore not ultra vires Article 191 f of the Constitution
With regard to another contention of the appellants that the right of tile landlords that is affected by sub section 3A is only a mere right to sue and at best a right of reversion and hence it is not a right to property under Article 191f of the Constitution it is sufficient to state that the question is covered by two decisions of this Court in The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt1 and Swami 1  800 Motor Transport P Limited and Another vs Sri Sankaraswamigal Butt and Another1
The right to own and hold property in order to make an effective right under the Constitution must include tine right to possession of the property including the right to evict tenants in accordance with law
The submission is therefore without any force
The position therefore is that in a pending suit or even in a pending appeal a landlord may be given an opportunity to adduce evidence to establish such of the new requirements in 131 f or ff as are relevant to the proceedings
In that case the tenant will have also an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal
If the matter arises in a pending suit it will be disposed of by the trial court
If however the matter arises in appeal it will be open to the appellate court in order to shorten the life of litigation to remand the matter to the appropriate court to return a finding on such additional issues as may be framed to meet the requirements of f andor ff as the case may be under order 41 rule 25 Civil Procedure Code
In the result these appeals are partly allowed
The judgment of the High Court with regard to invalidity of sub section 3A so far as it is retrospective and applicable to pending suits and appeals is upheld
The orders dismissing the appeals are however set aside and the appeals are remanded to the High Court for disposal in the light of the observations with reference to section 131f andor f whichever is applicable
The landlords may now be given by the High Court an opportunity if they so wish to adduce evidence with regard to such further requirements under f andor ff as may be applicable and the High Court will call for a finding from the appropriate court in that behalf and thereafter dispose of the appeals on merits
Since success is shared there will be no orders as to costs in these appeals
ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment the appeals are allowed with costs the cases are remanded to the High Court and the High Court is directed to dispose of the case in the light of the directions and observations made in the majority judgment
It will be open to the Court seised of the matter to direct in its discretion amount of costs to be incurred hereafter
PBR 1 1963 Supp 1 SCR 282


Summary:
Section 131f of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 Act XII of 1956 enacted that no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against the tenants except among others on the ground that the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for the purpose of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held
Section 134 of the Act provides that where a landlord requires the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in cl
1f and the Court is of opinion that such requirement may be substantially satisfied by ejecting the tenant from a part only of the premises the Court shall pass a decree accordingly
In 1969 the Act was amended by West Bengal Premises Tenancy Second Amendment Act
Section 13 of the original Act was amended by introducing sub section 3A in it
This sub section prohibits institution of a suit for ejectment of a tenant by a landlord who has purchased the premises for his own use within three years of the purchase
The Amending Act also enacted that the said Act shall apply to suits and appeals which are pending at the date of the commencement of the Act
The respondent purchased the suit premises in which the appellant was a tenant and instituted a suit for ejectment of the tenant under s131f of the original Act
The suit was decreed by the lower court and affirmed by the lower appellate court
A single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal
When the Letters Patent Appeal was pending before the High Court the Amending Act of 1969 was passed whereupon the tenant appellant invoked the provisions of the new sub sec
3A and contended that since the landlord had instituted a suit the ejectment within three years of the purchase the suit should be dismissed
The High Court held that s3A was valid prospectively but that the restriction imposed by the sub section
giving it retrospective effect was violative of article 11 f of the Constitution
Per Beg and Krishna Iyer JJ Allowing the appeals and remitting the case to the High Court HELD  1 a There is no violation of article 191 f read with article 195 of the Constitution in the Amending Act and s13 of the original Act as amended is valid
The evil corrected by the Amendment Act is to stop the influx of a transferee class of evictors of tenants and institution of litigation to eject and rack rent or re build to make large profits
Apparently the inflow of such suits must have been swelling slowly over the years and when the stream became a flood the Legislature rushed with an amending bill
Had it made the law merely prospective those who had in numbers already gone to Court and induced legislative attention would have escaped the inhibition
This would defeat the object and so the application of the additional ban to Pending actions could not be called unreasonable
There is no foundation for the assumptions made by the High Court that there may be cases of ejectment instituted prior to 1956 or that a number of suits and decrees perhaps decades old
will unjustly be nullified by the previous operation of the new ban
Recondite instances and casual hardships cannot deflect constitutional construction of social legislation 775 if the main thrust of the statute relates to a real social evil of dimensions deserving to be antidoted by antedated legislative remedy
Questions such as whether those cases which were filed several years ago should have been carved out of the category of transferees hit by the Act and at what point of time the evil assumed proportions were best left to legislative wisdom and not to courts commonsense
788C D 787F G 783F 787H In the instant case the two landlord respondents had purchased the buildings in the early sixties but while considering the constitutionality the Court would not be moved by such accidental instances
The substantial evil has been substantially met by a broad application of the new ban to pending proceedings
788C Section 13
fairly read directs that the amendment made by section 4 shall have effect in respect of suits including appeals pending at the commencement of the Act
The Court is therefore bound to give effect to section 4 in pending actions regardless of isolated anomalies and individual hardships
788G bWhere two interpretations are possible that which validates the statute and shortens litigation should be preferred to the one which invalidates or proliferates it
Although the old cl
f is substantially similar to the present clsf and ff the latter imposes more severe restrictions protecting the tenants
Much more has to be proved by the landlord now before he can get eviction than when he was called upon to under the earlier corresponding provision of the basic Act
Moreover the three year prohibition against institution of the suit is altogether new
It follows therefore that on the present allegation and evidence the landlord may not get a decree his suit having been instituted at a time when he could not have foreseen the subsequent enactment saddling him with new conditions
789C 789B Though therefore the suit as originally brought in would be defective since it did not and could not contain the averments complying with the new cls
f and ff of section 131 it is made effective by construing the term institute  in a natural and grammatical way
789D c To institute is to begin or commence 
The prohibition clamped down by sub section 3A carefully read is on suits for recovery of possession by transferee landlords on any of the grounds mentioned in cl
f Qr cl
ff of sub section 1
789G In the instant case the suits were not for recovery on grounds contained in clauses f and ff
They were based on the repealed clf of s13 of the basic Act
Strictly speaking sub section 3A brought in by section 4 of the Amending Act applies only if a the suit is by a transferee landlord b it is for recovery of possession of premises and c the ground for recovery is what is mentioned in cls
f and ff of sub section 1
Undoubtedly the third condition is not fulfilled and therefore sub section
3A is not attracted
789H dBut since the new clsf and ff were included by the Amendment Act in s13 of the basic Act and since the suits did not seek eviction on those grounds they will have to be dismissed on account of the omnibus inhibition on recovery of possession contained in section 13 itself
790C Per Goswami J  1a In trying to include old actions that may be surviving in courts because of laws  proverbial delay section 13 of the Amended Act has gone far in excess of the actual needs of the time and problems and the provisions therefore cannot be said to impose a reasonable restriction on the right of the transferee landlords albeit a well defined class amongst the landlords to hold and enjoy their property in the interest of the general public
Such transferee landlords with pending old actions in suits or in appeals are not likely to be of a large number
The imposition of such restrictions on a few transferee landlords cannot be in the general interests of the large body of tenants
If relief in the shape of postponement of the landlord s suit were the object of sub section 3A in giving retrospectivity to it
the law did not take count of the inevitable long 776 delay that takes place in pending litigation as a result of man made laws of procedure in courts such as have been clearly demonstrated by the cases at hand
The lawthat misses its object cannot justify its existence
Besides it will be a sterilerelief if tenants have to face a fresh summons next days
798A C bUnder the Constitution an individual s right will have to yield to the commonweal of the general community That general community may be in broad segments but even then must form a class as a whole
A few individuals cannot take the Place of a class and for the matter of that the general public
798H In the present case the relief contemplated by the Amendment Act is in favour of tenants in general and the restriction under sub section 3A must be viewed in that context
It cannot be said that the legislature in applying sub section 3A retrospectively has achieved that avowed object at all
The applicability of the blanket ban to pending suits and appeals cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction in he interest of general public
799A B cSub section 3A so far as it is retrospective and as such applicable to pending suits including appeals is ultra vires article 191 f of the Constitution
The provision is valid only prospectively
The retrospectivity so far as subsection 3A in concerned with regard to institution of suits made applicable to pending suits and appeals is clearly very wide of a reasonable mark and is an imposition of an unreasonable restriction on the right of the transferee landlords in pending suits which had been instituted prior to the amendment Act and in appeals arising therefrom and it is not saved by the protective clause 5 of article 19 of the Constitution
799D E 2On the terms of only section 13 3A it is difficult to hold that it would bring old actions within the mischief of section 133A which imposes a ban expressly on institution of suits within three years of the acquisition of ownership of the premises subject to the relaxation contained in the proviso thereto
796B C 3Section 131f and ff are not ultra vires of article 191f of the Constitution
Further reliefs have been sought to be given to the tenants as a class by these provisions in the Amendment Act
These further reliefs are in the general interests of tenants and can be applied without any difficulty to pending suits including appeals
There is nothing unreasonable about such a retrospectivity in applying these provisions for the general welfare of tenants in securing for them asafe and sure tenure as far as practicable untrammelled by inconvenient litigation799F G Arguments for theappellants In CA 206373 by P C Chatterjee There is no vestedright to eject on determination of the tenancy but it is conditioned by section 13 Cl
a to k and therefore right to eject is not vested in the landlord until a decree is passed
Upto that stage it is contingent depen ding on the satisfaction of cl
a to k of s13
If there is no vested property right no question of article 191f of the Constitution will arise
By denying the right to eject for three years from the date of purchase the right to property is not restricted or burdened
The approach of the High Court of separately treating prospectivity and retrospectivity is not correct
The correct approach adopted by this Court is that in considering the reasonableness of any provision retrospectivity of the law is a factor to be considered
Retrospective operation is not bad because it covers a period of 10 years or so
For respondent In CA 1304 of 1973 The object of the new sub section 3A being to give protection to tenants for a limited period of three years from the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord by giving retrospective effect to  the said sub section the period limited by the subsection cannot be enlarged
Therefore s13 of the Amending Act which gives retrospective effect to the said sub section 3A should be construed in a manner so as to keep the effect of retrospectively within the period 777 limited by the said new sub section 3A Sections 4 and 13 of the Amending Act have to be construed harmoniously keeping the object of the Act in view and in doing that if the court has to supply some words to make the meaning clear it should prefer the construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice
at 745
The language of sub section
3A and the object and reason for introduction of the said sub section make it clear that Only Prospective effect could be given to the sub section and in any case its effect cannot go beyond three years of purchase of the premises by the landlord
If s13 of the Amending Act means that section 4 of the Amending Act applies to all pending suits including appeals filed by a transferee landlord after the principal Act came into force then it is clearly violative of art 191f of the Constitution
The High Court therefore rightly struck down s13 giving retrospective effect to section 4 of the  Act
Further no law can impose restrictions retrospectively on fundamental rights
Arguments for the respondent in CA No 2063 of 1973
The impugned section cannot be so interpreted as to give it retrospective effect so as to bring within its mischief all suits and proceedings including appeals which may be pending since the enforcement of the Act
This Court can depart from the general rule to apply the law as it is on the date of institution of the suit and apply the law as on the date when the appeal comes up for disposal specially because no injustice is going to be caused between the parties and as such a course would avoid multiplicity of proceedings
Section 13 of the Amending Act is ultra vires of article 19 because construed literally the section cannot give protection to such of the tenants against whom proceedings are pending for more than 10 years or so a protection for a period more than what is envisaged by the Amending Act
This is clearly not what is intended or contemplated by the legislature
Giving retrospective effect to the section would only benefit a few and is not in the public interest of the tenants of the transferee landlords
The restriction is arbitrary and invades the right to property and is not saved by cl
5 of article 19
The restriction is not reasonable