Appeal No 117 of 1955
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 25th March 1953 of the Madras High Court in Civil Misc
Petition No 6577 of 1952
R Ganapathy Iyer for the appellant
Sardar Bahadur for the respondent
October 31
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SK DAS J
In this appeal pursuant to special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras the question for decision is whether the appellant who claims to be an agriculturist debtor is entitled to apply for scaling down of his decretal debt under the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists  Relief Act Mad IV of 1938 hereinafter called the Act as amended by the Madras Agriculturists  Relief Amendment Act Mad XXIII of 1948 hereinafter called the amending Act
The facts which have led to this appeal are that a partnership firm briefly described as MAR Firm whose partners were Arunachalam Chetty his two sisters and Subramaniam Chetty was carrying on the business of money lending
On the death of Arunachalam Chetty on July 6 1916 Subramaniam Chetty one of the surviving partners took over the assets of the dissolved partnership firm at a valuation of Rs 25000 and carried on the business under the name and style 240 of PL section Firm of which the partners were Subramaniam Chetty Vellachi Achi and his two daughters and in 1919 Palaniappa Chetty father of the appellant joined the partnership
The amount of Rs 25000 was credited in the accounts of the new partnership
On April 19 1919 the accounts showed a balance of Rs 16369 12 as being due to the share of the deceased Arunachalam Chetty which by the year 1935 swelled up to a figure of Rs 55933 15
Subramaniam Chetty died in 1924 and the business was carried on after his death by his widow Lakshmi Achi and her daughter and Palaniappa Chetty
In 1930 Palaniappa Chetty died and his sons joined the business in his place
Disputes arose between the partners in 1935 which were referred to arbitration and under an award given on July 31 1935 Arunachalam Chetty and his sister were directed to pay to the estate of MAR Rs 34958 11 6 and the defendants now appellant and his brother a sum of Rs 20975 3 and corresponding entries were made in the account books of PLS Firm
In 1944 the plaintiff now respondent as the adopted son of Arunacbalam Chetty filed a suit for recovery of the amount which the award had directed the defendants to pay
The defendants were the two sons of Palaniappa Chetty
They denied the adoption of the respondent to Arunachalam Chetty and also pleaded the bar of limitation
The trial Court held the adoption to be invalid and upheld the plea of limitation
The plaintiff took an appeal to the High Court which held the adoption to be valid and also held the suit to be within limitation
It remitted the case to the trial Court for determining certain issues and after the findings were received the suit was decreed on March 9 1951 for a sum of Rs 26839 15 9
The appellant applied to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court and also applied for stay
Leave was granted but stay was refused as no security was furnished under the rules the High Court later revoked the certificate granting leave
During the pendency of the appeal in the High Court the Act of 1938 was amended by the amending Act by which new reliefs were given to agriculturist debtors
On October 5 1951 the appellant made an 241 application to the Trial Court for scaling down the decretal debt under section 19 2 of the Act which was added by the amending Act
The trial Court held that the decree could be scaled down under section 19 2 of the Act but it had no jurisdiction to grant that relief as the decree sought to be scaled down had been passed by the High Court
Against this order the appellant took an appeal to the High Court on July 4 1952 and also made a separate application in the High Court for scaling down the decretal debt under section 19 2 of the Act
The High Court dismissed the application on March 25 1953
The appellant then applied for leave to appeal under article 133 of the Constitution but this was refused on October 6 1953 and this Court granted special leave on April 19 1954
The ground on which the High Court refused relief under section 19 2 of the Act was that the retrospective operation of section 19 2 was controlled by section 16 of the Act XXIII of 1948  and that cl
ii of section 16 applied and as the appellant whose appeal was pending at the commencement of the amending Act did not apply for scaling down before the decree was passed although he had the opportunity to do so his application subsequent to the decree was barred by the principle of res Judicata
The provisions of section 19 2 of the Act which gave the right to obtain relief of scaling down notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the contrary were held inapplicable because a 192 of the Act was itself  limited by the provisions of section 16 of Act XXIII of 1948 
The High Court observed that although the appellant had filed an additional written statement claiming relief under the Burma Debt Laws no prayer was made for any relief under the Act
The High Court said   A party who had an opportunity to raise a plea but did not raise the Plea is precluded by principles of res judicata from raising the plea over again at a subsequent stage
But it is said that the principle of res judicata has no application to the present case as section 19 1 which is incorporated by reference in section 19 2 says that a petitioner would be entitled to the relief given to him under that section 244 order has been passed or in which the decree or order has not become final before such commencement iii all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act Provided that no creditor shall be required to refund any sum which has been paid to or realised by him before the commencement of this Act Unfortunately the language of section 16 is not very clear and lends itself to difficulties of interpretation
We agree with the High Court that section 16 of the amending Act controls the amendments made by that Act in the sense that those amendments apply to the suits and proceedings described in the three clauses of section 16
Sub section 2 of section 19 was one of the amendments which was inserted by the ammending Act and therefore the appellant debtor must establish that he is entitled to relief under sub section 2 of section 19 because his case comes under one of the three clauses of section 16
The High Court held that cl
ii of section 16 applied in the present case but the appellant debtor could and should have raised the plea for relief under the Act when the appeal was pending in the High Court and as he did not do so he was barred from claiming relief under section 192 on the principle of res judicata
We do not think that this view is correct and our reasons are the following
The three clauses of section 16 are independent of each other and el
i refers to suits and proceedings instituted after the commencement of the amending Act the relevant date being January 25 1949
Clause 1 has no application in the present case and need not be further considered
Clause iii it seems clear to us applies to suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed had become final but had not been executed or satisfied in full before January 25 1949 this means that though a final decree or order for repayment of the debt had been passed before January 25 1949 yet an agriculturist debtor can claim relief under the Act provided the decree has not been executed or satisfied in full before the aforesaid date
It should be remembered in this connection 241 application to the Trial Court for scaling down the decretal debt under section 19 2 of the Act which was added by the amending Act
The trial Court held that the decree could be scaled down under section 19 2 of the Act but it had no jurisdiction to grant that relief as the decree sought to be scaled down had been passed by the High Court
Against this order the appellant took an appeal to the High Court on July 4 1952 and also made a separate application in the High Court for scaling down the decretal debt under section 19 2 of the Act
The High Court dismissed the application on March 25 1953
The appellant then applied for leave to appeal under article 133 of the Constitution but this was refused on October 6 1953 and this Court granted special leave on April 19 1954
The ground on which the High Court refused relief under section 19 2 of the Act was that the retrospective operation of section 19 2 was controlled by section 16 of the Act XXIII of 1948  and that cl
ii of section 16 applied and as the appellant whose appeal was pending at the commencement of the amending Act did not apply for scaling down before the decree was passed although he had the opportunity to do so his application subsequent to the decree was barred by the principle of res judicata
The provisions of section 19 2 of the Act which gave the right to obtain relief of scaling down notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the contrary were held inapplicable because section 19 2 of the Act was itself  limited by the provisions of section 16 of Act XXIII of 1948 
The High Court observed that although the appellant had filed an additional written statement claiming relief under the Burma Debt Laws no prayer was made for any relief under the Act
The High Court said   A party who had an opportunity to raise a plea but did not raise the Plea is precluded by principles of res judicata from raising the plea over again at a subsequent stage
But it is said that the principle of res judicata has no application to the present case as section 19 1 which is incorporated by reference in section 19 2 says that a petitioner would be entitled to the relief given to him under that section 244 order has been passed or in which the decree or order has not become final before such commencement iii all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act Provided that no creditor shall be required to refund any sum which has been paid to or realised by him before the commencement of this Act 
Unfortunately the language of section 16 is not very clear and lends itself to difficulties of interpretation
We agree with the High Court that section 16 of the amending Act controls the amendments made by that Act in the sense that those amendments apply to the suits and proceedings described in the three clauses of section 16
Sub section 2 of section 19 was one of the amendments which was inserted by the ammending Act and therefore the appellant debtor must establish that be is entitled to relief under sub section
2 of section 19 because his case comes under one of the three clauses of section 16
The High Court held that cl
ii of section 16 applied in the present case but the appellant debtor could and should have raised the plea for relief under the Act when the appeal was pending in the High Court and as he did not do so he was barred from claiming relief under section 192 on the principle of res judicata
We do not think that this view is correct and our reasons are the following
The three clauses of section 16 are independent of each other and cl
1 refers to suits and proceedings instituted after the commencement of the amending Act the relevant date being January 25 1949
Clause 1 has no application in the present case and need not be further considered
Clause iii it seems clear to us applies to suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed had become final but had not been executed or satisfied in full before January 25 1949 this means that though a final decree or order for repayment of the debt had been passed before January 25 1949 yet an agriculturist debtor can claim relief under the Act provided the decree has not been executed or satisfied in full before the aforesaid date
It should be remembered in this connection 245 that the word I debt  in the Act has a very comprehensive connotation
It means any liability in cash or kind whether secured or unsecured due from an agriculturist whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise etc
It is therefore clear that the word I debt  includes a decretal debt
On the view that cl
iii applies in those cases only where a final decree or order for repayment of the debt had been made before January 25 1949 it has no application
in the present case because the decree for repayment of the debt was passed on March 9 1951 which was after January 25 1949
We then go to el
This clause is in two parts and talks of two different situations one is when no decree or order has been passed and the other is when the decree or order passed has not become final
There is however a common element and the common element is that el
ii refers to suits and proceedings instituted before January 25 1949
Now the argument which learned counsel for the appellant has presented is this
He says that the common element referred to above is satisfied in the present case because the suit was instituted long before January 25 1949
He then says that no decree or order for repayment of the debt having been passed before March 9 1951 the first situation envisaged by el
ii arose in the present case and the appellant debtor was entitled to avail himself of all or any of the amendments made by the amending Act including the amendment made in section 19 by the insertion of sub section
2 thereof
In the alternative he says that if the word decree or order  means any decree or any order even then cl
ii applies because the decree of dismissal passed in the suit had not become final on January 25 1949 for an appeal was then pending
We do not think it necessary to consider the alternative argument of learnd counsel for the appellant because we are of the view that having regard to the other provisions of the Act the words  decree or order occurring in el
ii must mean decree or order for repayment of a debt
What then is the position before 248 passed but did not do so
The legislature may not have realised that this would be so but as the amendments stand it is clear that in cases covered by cl
ii of section 16 of the amending Act a party is entitled to ask for relief under the Act at two stages before a decree for repayment of the debt has been passed and also after such a decree has been passed
Different considerations will however arise if a party asks for relief under the Act at the pre decree stage and that relief is refused on the ground that the Act does not entitle him to any relief under it
If a party even after such refusal makes a second application then the principle laid down in Narayanan Chettiar vs Rathinaswami Padayachi 1 will apply and the second application must fail on the ground that it has already been decided in his presence that he is not entitled to any relief under the Act
One other point has to be referred to in this connection
On behalf of the respondent creditor it has been pointed out to as that on the date the application for relief under section 192 was made in the High Court no suit or proceeding was actually pending the High Court having passed a decree much earlier namely on March 9 1951
Asa matter of fact the application for relief under section 192 for scaling down the decree was made in the High Court sometime in 1952
We are of the view that cl
ii of section 16 describes the nature of suits or proceedings in which the amendments shall apply and the pendency of a suit or proceeding on a particular date after January 25 1949 is not the true test
The true test is whether the suit or proceeding was instituted before January 25 1949 and whether in that suit or proceeding no decree or order for repayment of a debt had been passed before that date
That test having been fulfilled in the present case el
ii of section 16 of the amending Act did not stand in the way of the appellant when he asked for relief under section 192 of the Act
We now turn to such authorities as have been placed before us
The authorities are not all consistent and the language of cls
ii and iii of section 16 of the amending 1 AIR 1953 Mad
421 245 that the word I debt  in the Act has a very comprehensive connotation
It means any liability in cash or kind whether secured or unsecured due from an agriculturist whether payable under a decree or order of a civil or revenue court or otherwise etc
It is A therefore clear that the word I debt  includes a decretal debt
On the view that cl
iii applies in those cases only where a final decree or order for repayment of the debt had been made before January 25 1949 it has no application in the present case because the decree for repayment of the debt was passed on March 9 1951 which was after January 25 1949
We then go to cl
This clause is in two parts and talks of two different situations one is when no decree or order has been passed and the other is when the decree or order passed has not become final
There is however a common element and the common element is that cl
ii refers to suits and proceedings instituted before January 25 1949
Now the argument which learned counsel for the appellant has presented is this
He says that the common element referred to above is satisfied in the present case because the suit was instituted long before January 25 1949
He then says that no decree or order for repayment of the debt having been passed before March 9 1951 the first situation envisaged by cl
ii arose in the present case and the appellant debtor was entitled to avail himself of all or any of the amendments made by the amending Act including the amendment made in section 19 by the insertion of sub section
2 thereof
In the alternative he says that if the word decree  or order  means any decree or any order even then cl
ii applies because the decree of dismissal passed in the suit had not become final on January 25 1949 for an appeal was then pending
We do not think it necessary to consider the alternative argument of learned counsel for the appellant because we are of the view that having regard to the other provisions of the Act the words  decree or order occurring in cl
ii must I mean decree or order for repayment of a debt
What then is the position before 248 passed but did not do So
The legislature may not have realized that this would be so but as the amendments stand it
is clear that in cases covered by cl
ii of a 16 of the amending Act a party is entitled to ask for relief under the Act at two stages before a decree for repayment of the debt has been passed and also after such a decree has been passed
Different considerations will however arise if a party asks for relief under the Act at the pre decree stage and that relief is refused on the ground that the Act does not entitle him to any relief under it
If a party even after such refusal makes a second application then the principle laid down in Narayanan Chettiar vs Rathinaswami Padayachi 1 ill apply and the second application must fail on the ground that it has already been decided in his presence that he is not entitled to any relief under the Act
One other point has to be referred to in this connection
On behalf of the respondent creditor it has been pointed out to
as that on the date the application for relief under section 192 was made in the High Court no suit or proceeding was actually pending the High Court having passed a decree much earlier namely on March 9 1951
As a matter of fact the application for relief under section 192 for scaling down the decree was made in the High Court some time in 1952
We are of the view that el
ii of section 16 describes the nature of suits or proceedings in which the amendments shall apply and the pendency of a suit or proceeding on a particular date after January 25 1949 is not the true test
The true test is whether the suit or proceeding was instituted before January 25 1949 and whether in that suit or proceeding no decree or order for repayment of a debt had been passed before that date
That test having been fulfilled in tile present case cl
ii of section 16 of the amending Act did not stand in the way of the appellant when he asked for relief under section 192 of the Act
We now turn to such authorities as have been placed before us
The authorities are not all consistent and the language of cls
ii and iii of section 16 of the amending 1 AIR 1953 Mad
249 Act has perhaps led to some of the difficulties of inter pretation referred to therein
The earliest decision brought to our notice is the decision in Velagala Sriramareddi and others vs Karri Sriramareddi 1
This is a full bench decision of the Madras High Court
to which we have already referred in an earlier part of this judgment
The next decision is that of Venkataratnam vs Sesharma 2 which is also a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court
It deals with the construction of clauses ii and iii of section 16 of the amending Act with particular reference to the view expressed in certain earlier cases of the same High Court with regard to cl
iii of section 16
The view expressed in the earlier cases to which the learned Judges who decided the case out of which the present appeal has arisen were parties was that el
iii of section 16 had no application to proceedings in which the decrees and orders had become final before January 25 1949
The Full Bench did not accept that view as correct
Satyanarayana Rao J who delivered the judgment of the Court said It cannot be doubted that the two clauses ii and iii are entirely independent and are intended to provide for different situations  The view taken by the learned Judges in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals already referred to was that while the two clauses are independent clause iii has no application to proceedings in which the decrees and orders have become final before the commencement of the Act
It is this view which is also pressed now before us by the learned Advocate for the respondent
While we agree with the learned Judges in holding that the two clauses are independent we are unable with great respect to accept the view that clause iii applied only to cases in which the decrees and orders have not become final
If the decree or order has not become final before the commencement of this Act clause iii in our opinion seems to be un necessary and as such the case would be covered by clause ii
Further it would be difficult to imagine 1 IL R 1042 Mad
32 2 ILR  498
499 250 that a decree or order which has not become final can be finally executed or can be finally satisfied
No doubt it is true that even when an appeal is pending a decree may be executed and satisfaction may be entered
But all that is only subject to the result of the appeal
If the appeal succeeds or the amount due by the defendant to the plaintiff is increased by the Appellate Court fresh execution has to be started the satisfaction must be reopened and the execution must proceed
The Legislature in our opinion when it enacted these two provisions must have intended that even in the case of decrees or orders which have become final having regard_ to the provisions of the new Act relief should be had by the judgment debtor so long as the decree or order was not executed or was not satisfied in full before the commencement of the Act
If however a decree was executed in part and before it was fully satisfied the debt was scaled down under the provisions of the Act as a result of which the creditor was found to have received more than what he was entitled to the proviso enacts that in such a situation the creditor should not be required to refund any sum which has been paid to or realised by him before the commencement of this Act
The question is asked and legitimately as to which are the kinds of decrees or orders which have become final and which are sought to be excluded by implication in clause ii of section 16
It is of course not easy to grive an exhaustive list of such decrees and orders
It may be that the legislature contemplated that decrees and orders of a declaratory nature and which are not executable and which have become final before the commencement of the Act need not be reopened
A reading of the two clauses together would suggest that clause iii would apply exclusively to executable decrees or orders which though they have become final before the commencement of the Act are still in the stage of unfinished execution and at the stage at which satisfaction was not fully received
The view which we take in our opinion reconciles both the clauses and does not make any of the clauses unnecessary
We concur in the view expressed above that cl
iii of 251 section 16 applies to decrees or orders which though they had become final before January 25 1949 are still in the stage of unfinished execution and at the stage at which satisfaction has not been fully received and cl
ii applies to suits and proceedings which were instituted before January 25 1949 but in which no decree or order had been passed or the decree or order passed had not become final before that date
We consider it unnecessary in the present case to go into the further question whether cl
ii refers to decrees and orders of a declaratory nature which are not executable but which have become final before January 25 1949
That is a question which does not fall for decision in the present case and we express no opinion thereon
In Kanakammal vs Muhammad Kathija Beevi 1 it was observed  The mere fact that the judgment debtor raised an objection to the executability of the whole decree on the ground that it has to be scaled down is no ground for scaling down the decree and the court will not be justified in so scaling down without a separate application
This is also another ground for holding that the judgment debtor is not barred from filing the application to scale down the decree even though he had not raised the question at an earlier stage of the execution proceedings
We are therefore definitely of opinion that an application under section 19 of the Act is not one which comes under section 47 Civil Procedure Code and therefore the principle of res judicata in execution cannot apply to the facts of the present case
 The decision in Narayanan Chettiar vs Rathinasami Padayachi 2 related to a different point altogether namely successive applications under section 19 or section 20 of the Act
In that case the question was whether the judgment debtor not having filed an application under section 19 within the prescribed time from the date of the stay order under section 20 passed on his prior application was precluded from again filing another application under section 20 followed by an appli cation under section 19
It was held that he was not so entitled
In Jagannatham Chetty vs Parthasarathy 1 AIR 1953 Mad 188 189
2 AIR 1953 Mad
421 252 Iyengar1 the question as to the meaning of the word proceedings  in section 16 as considered and it was observed that the word I proceedings  ins
16 must relate to proceedings instituted for repayment of a debt and not to execution proceedings which are for enforcement of a decree or order
We greatly doubt whether that is the correct view to take particularly when the expression debt  includes a decretal debt but as the question does Dot arise in the present case we refrain from making any final pronouncement
In Hemavathi vs Padmavathi 2 it was held that the amending Act was retrospective so as even to apply to a debt which had already been scaled down once by the application of the Act and even where the rights of the parties had been finally adjudicated by decree or order of a court provided that the decree or order had not been executed or fully satisfied
That was held to be the effect of el
iii of section 16 of the amending Act
In Lingappa Chettiar vs Chinnaswami Naidu 3 the view taken by Subba Rao and Somasundaram JJ
the same Judges who decided the present case in an earlier decision that a party who had an opportunity of getting the beneficent provisions of the Act applied to him before the amendment but did not avail him self of the same is disentitled to invoke the provisions of sub section
2 of section 19 as dissented from and Govinda Menon J who gave the judgment of the Court said  We do not find any difficulty in holding that sub section
2 of section 19 is applicable to cases like the present and the retrospective nature of that sub section as contemplated by clause iii of section 16 of Act XXIII of 1948 cannot be restricted or circumscribed by any other clause in that section
 In T N Krishna Iyer vs Nallathambi Mudaliar and others 4 Krishnaswami Nayudu J said that the object of section 16 of the amending Act was to render the application of the amendments to a wide range of suits both to suits instituted before and after the commencement of the amending Act and to such suits in which the decrees have not only become final but have 1 AIR 1953 Mad
3 1955 i MLJ i 5
2 ILR 4 1955 i MLJ 215
253 not been executed or satisfied and so loin as something remains to be done out of the decree the Act could be made applicable
It seems to us that both on authority and principle the correct view is that the appeallant was entitled to the benefit of section 192 of the Act read with section 16 cl
ii of the amending Act
These are our reasons for holding that the view taken by the High Court is not correct and the appeal must therefore be allowed and the case sent back to the High Court for consideration on merits in accordance with law
The appellant will get his costs of this Court  costs incurred in the High Court before and hereafter will be dealt with by the High Court at the time of the final decision
There were two applications filed by the appellant debtor for the relief which be claimed
One AN as filed in the trial court and the other in the High Court
The trial court dismissed the application on the ground that the High Court alone had jurisdiction to give such relief The appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court and also filed an application there
The question which is the proper court to give relief to the appellant is a matter on which we are making no pronouncement
That is a matter which will be dealt with by the High Court
Appeal allowed
Case remanded


Summary:
The appellant was appointed as a non official member of the State Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal for a period of two years from 1771958 under sub section2 of Section 4 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act 1957
The appointment was extended from time to time and continued upto 821972
By a letter dated 821972 the respondent intimated the appellant that he had been granted 52 days Earned Leave as terminal leave from 9th February 1972
The appellant represented for grant of superannuation pension
This was rejected by the Govern ment on the ground that he was not eligible for pension
The appellant s writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court who held that rule 64 of the Karna taka Sales Tax Rules 1957 was applicable to him and that he was not eligible to claim superannuation pension
This was upheld by the Division Bench
In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended that as a non official member of the Tribunal he was a government servant and as such like other Government servants he was entitled to grant of pension in accordance with Mysore Civil Service Rules that he was retired from service after reaching the age of super annuation that his appointment was not a contract appoint ment that he was paid traveling allowance under the Mysore Civil Service Rules and that Rule 646 of Mysore Sales Tax Rules inserted in 1964 and substituted in 1971 not being in existence at the time of his appointment could not be made applicable to him as to deprive him of the benefit of superannuation pension as provided in the Mysore Civil Service Rules
208 Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
The terms and conditions of service of the appellant who was appointed as a non official member in the Karnataka Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal under sub section 2 of Section 4 of Karnataka Sales Tax Act 1957 and was given last extension of the period of service under clause b of sub rule 1 of Rule 64 of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules 1957 will be governed by the Mysore Sales Tax Rules and not by the provisions of Mysore Civil Services Rules
Since sub rule 6 of rule 64 of Mysore Sales Tax Rules was substitut ed in place of original subrule 6 before the appellant retired from service on expiry of his period of service this rule applies to him and he is not entitled to get any superannuation pension
211D E G 21 Sub rule 2 of Rule 2 of Mysore Civil Service Rules 1957 clearly says that in cases where special provisions have been made by or under any law for the time being in force the Mysore Service Rules do not apply
Furthermore Rule 283 of the said Rules states that a superannuation pension is granted to a Government Servant who is compelled by Rule to retire at a particular age
Rule 95 provides that the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years and the Government servant may be retained upto 60 years of age with the sanction of Government but not after the age of 60 years
212C E F 22 Rule 646of the Mysore Sales Tax Rules 1957 clearly says that the non official member of the Sales Tax Tribunal will become ineligible for any pension
Henceprovisions relating to pension as provided in Mysore Civil Service Rules 1957 will not apply to a non official member
212D E 23 In the instant case the appellant was appointed as a member of the Tribunal for a period of two years initial ly and thereafter his tenure was extended periodically and he left the service as non official member of the Tribunal after he crossed the age of 61 years
There was no specific order that the appellant was due to retire at the age of 55 years
There is no rule for a non official member to retire at a particular age
Moreover the Government sanctioned certain terms and conditions of his appointment
It is periodical and not upto a maximum age nor it is a whole time service but a part time one and the appellant was permitted to take up audit of any person firm institution etc
on certain restrictions
A Government servant has to render whole time service
Therefore the Mysore Civil Service Rules 1957 do not apply to the 209 appellant and he is not eligible for superannuation pen sion
212F G 213C D