Appeal No 247 of 1954
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 21 19 53 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Third Bench Lucknow in Appeal
No Calcutta 44 of 1952
G G Mathur for the appellant
H J Umrigar amicus curiae for the respondent 874 1956
October 23
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J
The appellant is a limited Company which had been carrying on business in crushing sugarcane at a place called Pipraich in Gorakhpur District from the year 1932
In 1946 it decided to expand its business and with that object sold its old machinery which had a crushing capacity of 160 tons per day and purchased a new one with 650 tons capacity
The new plant was installed in 1947 and it actually started working in 1948 49
During this period the sugar industry was passing through a crisis owing to shortage of sugarcane and in consequence the Government assumed control of its production and supply
The quota which was allotted to the appellant s Mill proved too small to its being worked profitably with the result that in 1948 49 and 1949 50 the Company sustained losses which according to the appellant came to Rs 267 042 7 4
After several unsuccessful attempts at setting a larger supply the management wrote to the Government on May 11 1950 either to increase their quota or to permit them to sell the Mills
In October 1950 the Government granted permission for the sale of the plant and machinery and pursuant thereto the management sold them to a Madras party
As the crushing season was then on the appellant obtained from the purchaser a lease of the Mills for the current season agreeing to deliver possession thereof on the termination of the lease
It should be mentioned that the appellant was also carrying on negotiations with the purchaser for itself dismantling the machinery and erecting it at Madras for a lump consideration expecting to perform the contract through its own workmen
When the workmen became aware of the agreement of sale their reaction to it was thoroughly hostile and acting through their union the respondent herein they decided to prevent the transaction going through as otherwise they would be thrown out of employment
With that object they moved the 875 Government to cancel the permission granted to the appellant for the sale of the Mills and they also passed a resolution on December 26 1950 to go on strike from January 12 1951 and communicated the same to the appellant
This led to correspondence between the parties and as that is the foundation of the claim for compensation put forward by the respondent and awarded by the Tribunal it becomes necessary to set it out with sufficient fulness
On January 3 1951 the Managing Director offered through the Manager of the Mills to allot 25 per cent
of the profit on the sale transaction with the Madras party on certain terms and subject to the condition that the notice of strike should be withdrawn at once and today so that arrangement of work could be made
To this the reply of the Union on January 5 1951 was as follows With reference to the assurance given by the Managing Director communicated by your goodself to us under your No 975 dated 4th January 1951 asking us to withdraw the notice of strike we regret to inform you that our fight is with the Government which is not solved with this only
Our members are bent upon keeping the Sugar mills here at any cost either by strike satyagrah etc or through any other means guided by our federation otherwise there is no assurance of employment of thousands of creatures
Then the letter proceeded to take exception to some of the terms and finally wound up by stating that the workmen were waiting for their President Kashinath Pandey to advise them in the matter
Replying to the objections raised by the respondent to some of the terms the management wrote on January 81951 that they were ready to reconsider them but insisted on the withdrawal of notice of strike as the chief point
On January 91951 Kashinath Pandey came to Pipraich and discussed the matter with the management and following upon it the General Manager wrote to the respondent on January 10 1951 that in case the strike notice was withdrawn at once he would accede to the following points raised by the Union and then the points were set down
The 876 letter concluded by stating that the amount of compensation will not be less than a lac
The respondent replied to this on the same day that the workers were waiting for the final order of Kashinath Pandey in the matter and assured the management that in the meantime the strike was not coming off from the 12th
After this the appellant did not hear from the respondent the strike also did not take place and the crushing went on till the end of January 1951 when the season came to an end
One of the points that arises for our determination in this appeal is whether on this correspondence there was a concluded
and binding agreement that the appellant should pay 25 per cent
of the profits on the sale transaction to the workmen
To continue the narration the lease having expired with the crushing season the purchaser came over to Pipraich to take delivery of the Mills and to arrange for the machinery being dismantled and removed to Madras for being erected there
The appellant who as already stated was negotiating to get the dismantling done for a lump consideration found that its workmen were as hostile to it as ever and refused to help in the work
To adopt the language of the respondent in its written statement they declined out of sentiment to dig their own graves
After fruitless attempts at getting them to co operate in dismantling the machinery the management put up the following notice on February 28 1951 The workers of Pipraich
Sagar Mills Ltd should know that we have sold our Mill to Madras party under the permission of the Government
The party has arrived for dismantling
Under the terms of agreement we are bound to help them in this work
So the workers should know that we can do this favour that we can take contract of dismantling here and erection in Madras and keep the workers engaged and request the purchasers for providing them in their concern
Hence it is notified that workers who are not ready to co operate they should consider themselves to be discharged from 1st March 1951
Fifteen days  notice is served on the workers
Those who 877 create obstructions will be deprived of benefit promised to them
But the Union could not reconcile itself to the prospect of the Mills being shifted and on March 4 1951 Kashinath Pandey wrote a letter to the Government threatening to go on hunger strike if the Mills were to be shifted from Pipraich
The workmen were thus in no mood to accept the terms contained in the notice dated February 28 1951 and so the management had to issue further notice on March 14 1951 in the following terms Whereas the workers have already been notified that we have sold our entire plant to a Madras party who have arrived to take charge of the Machines and whereas we have to hand over the plant from 15 3 1951 to the purchasers and thus there will be no work for our workers and whereas the Mazdoor Union has already refused our suggestion to engage the workers in the work of dismantling and erection at Madras
Now in pursuance of our notice dated 28 2 1951 it is notified that the following workers have been discharged from the services since 1 3 1951 subject of course to the payment of 15 days wages
The workers are hereby asked to take their wages of 15 days on the 15th and 16th instant
It appears from a notice dated March 16 1951 sent by the appellant to the respondent that after the notice dated March 14 1951 was issued Kashinath Pandey had a discussion with the management as a result of which the date of termination of service of the workers was extended from the 15th to 21st March pending the decision of the Government on the future programme of the Pipraich factory the workmen agreeing on their part to take up the dismantling of the Mill after the said date
But the Government declined by its letter dated March 21 1951 to interfere with the sale of the machinery and in accordance with the understanding reached above the workers should have co operated with the appellant in dismantling the machinery from March 21
But they declined to do so and thereupon acting in accordance with its notices dated February 28 1951 114 878 and March 14 1951 the management duly discharged them
In view of the inability of the appellant to take up the contract the purchaser entered into direct negotiations with the workmen and on 1 4 1951 concluded an agreement with them for dismantling the machinery
The net result was that the appellant lost a contract on which as admitted by the respondent it would have earned a profit of at least Rs 2 lakhs
The workers
 having taken the benefit of a direct contract with the purchaser for dismantling the machinery next turned their attention to the appellant and on the basis of the letters dated January 3 1951 and January 10 1951 sent a notice to it on April 19 1951 asking for distribution among the workers of the 25 per cent labour share of the profits on sale of machinery
By its letter dated June 19 1951 the appellant repudiated
the claim and stated Then we also refer you to our notice dated 27 2 1951 in which we appealed to the labour to cooperate
with us so that we might take the contract of dismantling here at Pipraich and erection at Etikoppaka and said definitely that those who do not co operate should consider themselves discharged
This would have given us a good saving to meet the demand of the labour but as you in spite of our appeal and notice refused to co operate we had to suffer a heavy loss for which you are directly responsible
Thereafter the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter and the result was that on November 161951 the U P Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U P Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal Whether the services of workmen if so how many were terminated by the concern known as Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd Pipraich District Gorakhpur without settlement of their due claims and improperly and if so to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled By its award dated February 281952 the Indus 879 trial Tribunal held firstly that the closure of the business and the sale of the machinery by the appellant was bona fide as it had been continuously incurring losses and the supply position of sugarcane held out no immediate prospects of improvement that the conduct of the workmen had been throughout unfair and such as to disentitle them to compensation but that the promise contained in the letters dated January 3 and 10 1951 to pay 25 per cent
of the profits realised by the sale of the Mills was binding on the management
It further held repelling the contention of the appellant that the notification dated November 16 1951 was competent notwithstanding that at that date the business had been closed
The Tribunal then proceeded to ascertain the profits made by the appellant on its sale of the Mills and held that a sum of Rs 45000 representing the 25 per cent
of the net profits was payable to the workmen
The management appealed against this decision but the same was confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order dated July 21 1953
The matter now comes before us
in appeal under article 136
As the appeal raised questions of importance and as the respondent was unrepresented we requested Mr Umrigar to assist us and we are indebted to him for his learned and comprehensive argument
Two contentions have been urged in support of the appeal 1 The notification dated November 16 1951 referring the dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal is ultra vires and the reference and the award therein are in consequence void and 2 there was no concluded or binding agreement by the appellant to pay the workmen any share of profits in the sale transaction and the award is therefore bad on the merits
Taking the first contention the provision of law under which the impugned notification dated November 16 1951 was issued by the State is section 3 of the Act which runs as follows If in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of 880 public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment it may by general or special order make provision d for referring any industrial disputes for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order
An industrial dispute as defined in section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 and by force of section 2 that definition applies to the Actmeans any dispute or difference between employers and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person
Now the contention of the appellant is that it is a condition precedent to the exercise by the State of its power under section 3 of the Act that there should be an industrial dispute that there could be no industrial dispute according to this definition unless there is a relationship of employer and employee that in the present case as the appellant sold its Mills closed its business and discharged the workmen on March 21 1951 paying to them in full whatever was due in accordance with the standing orders
there was thereafter no question of any relationship of employer and employees between them that accordingly there was no industrial dispute at the date of the notification on November 16 1951 and that it was therefore incompetent
Reliance was placed in support of this position on the observation in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation vs Industrial Tribunal Madras1 that the definition of an industrial dispute presupposes the continued existence of the industry and on the decision in K N Padmanabha Ayyar vs The State of Madras2 that there could be no industrial dispute with regard to a business which was not in existence
It cannot be doubted that the entire scheme of the Act assumes that there is in existence an industry 1 AIR 1953 Mad 98 102
2 881 and then proceeds on to provide for various steps being taken when a dispute arises in that industry
Thus the provisions of the Act relating to lock out strike lay off retrenchment conciliation and adjudication proceedings the period during which the awards are to be in force have meaning only if they refer to an industry which is running and not one which is closed
In Messrs Burn and Co Ltd Calcutta vs Their Workmen1 this Court observed that the object of all labour legislation was firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen and secondly to prevent disputes between employers and employees so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the public might not suffer
Both these objects again can have their fulfillment only in an existing and not a dead industry
The view therefore expressed in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation vs Industrial Tribunal Madras supra and K N Padmanabha Ayyar vs The State of Madras supra that the industrial dispute to which the provisions of the Act apply is only one which arises out of an existing industry is clearly correct
Therefore where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that the closure is real and bona fide any dispute arising with reference thereto would as held in K N Padmanabha Ayyar vs The State of Madras supra fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act
And that will a fortiori be so if a dispute arises if one such can be conceived after the closure of the business between the quondam employer and em ployees
In the light of the principles stated above we must examine the nature of the dispute which is the subject matter of the reference under the impugned notification
The claim of the workmen is that the promise made by the management in its letters dated January 3 1951 and January 10 1951 is a binding agreement and that they are entitled to be paid in accordance therewith
Now if this contention is well founded the dispute relates to a claim which arose 1 Civil Appeal No 325 of 1955 decided on October 11 1956
882 while the industry was in existence and between persons who stood in the relationship of employer and employees and that would clearly be an industrial dispute as defined in the Act
But it is argued for the appellant that even so the notification dated November 16 1951 would be incompetent as the industry had been closed before that date and there was therefore no relationship of employer and employee at that point of time
In other words the power of the State to make a reference under section 3 will depend according to the appellant not only on the dispute having arisen in an existing industry but further on the continued existence of that industry on the date of the notification
We do not find anything in the language of section 3 of the Act to warrant the imposition of this additional limitation on the power of the State to make a reference
That section only requires apart from other conditions with which we are not concerned that there should be an industrial dispute before there can be a ref erence and we have held that it would be an industrial dispute if it arises out of an existing industry
If that condition is satisfied the competence of the State for taking action under that section is complete and the fact that the industry has since been closed can have no effect on it
Any other construction would in our opinion result in serious anomalies and grave injustice
If a workman improperly dismissed raises an industrial dispute and before action is taken by the Government the industry is closed what happens to the right which the Act gives him for appropriate relief if the Act vanishes into thin air as soon as the industry is closed If the contention of the appellant is correct what is there to prevent an employer who intends for good and commercial reason to close his business from indulging on a large scale in unfair labour practices in victimisation and in wrongful dismissals and escaping the consequences thereof by closing down the industry We think that on a true construction of section 3 the power of the State to make a reference under that section must be determined with reference not to the dateon which 883 it is made but to the date on which the right which is the subject matter of the dispute arises and that the machinery provided under the Act would be available for working out the rights which bad accrued prior to the dissolution of the business
It was next argued that even on this view the notification dated November 16 1951 was incompetent inasmuch as the management had offered by its letter dated January 3 1951 to pay the workmen 25 per cent
of the profits on the sale transaction only on April 30 1951 and the right to the amount thus accrued to the workmen only after the closure of the business on March 21 1951
But this argument proceeds on a misapprehension of the correct position on the facts
The true scope of the promise contained in the letter dated January 3 1951 is that the workmen acquired thereunder a right in praesenti to 25 per cent
of the profits but that the amount became payable only on April 30 1951 the reason obviously being that it could be precisely determined only after the transaction was completed
In this view as the claim for share of profits arose on January 3 1951 and January 10 1951 when the industry was working the reference dated November 16 1951 would be valid notwithstanding that the business was closed on March 21 1951
That brings us on to a consideration of the second question as to whether there was a concluded agreement binding the appellant to pay 25 per cent
of the profits in
the sale transaction to the workmen
The Tribunal has answered it in the affirmative and its finding was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal as being one of fact it had to be under section 7 of the Industrial Dispute Appellate Tribunal Act No XLVIII of 1950
It is argued by Mr Umrigar that following the usual practice of this Court in special appeals not to disturb findings of fact by Tribunals unless there were exceptional grounds therefore we should not interfere with the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that there was a concluded and enforceable agreement
But our difficulty is that the Tribunal has spoken in two voices and has given inconsistent 884 and conflicting findings and it has consequently become necessary for us to determine which of its findings should be accepted as supported by materials
We start with the letter dated January 3 1951 wherein the management made an offer to pay 25 per cent
of the profits of the sale transaction to the workmen
It was expressly subject to the condition that the strike should be called off at once and today
That was not done
On the other hand the respondent made certain counter proposals in its letter dated January 5 1951 and the management replied on January 8 1951 that it would reconsider its terms provided the strike notice was withdrawn
Thus the offer contained in the letter dated January 3 1951 was not accepted and lapsed
Then on January 10 1951 the management renewed its offer subject again to the condition that the strike notice was withdrawn at once
The respondent passed no resolution withdrawing the notice and in its reply dated January 10 1951 it made it clear that it was waiting for Kashinath Pandey for it to come to a final decision 
There was no further communication from the Union
We do not see bow on this correspondence it could be held that there was a concluded agreement between the parties and that is the view which the Tribunal itself took of it when it observed that no final agreement could be arrived at  and consequently the management served a notice on 28th February 1951
But then it went on to observe that in fact the workmen did not go on strike on January 12 1951 and continued in service till they were served with notice of discharge on February 28 1951 that that was consideration for the promise made by the agreement which must therefore be taken to have become a term of service and that in consequence the promise of the management as contained in the letters of 3rd and 10th January 1951 is a binding agreement under which the workmen are entitled to compensation for termination of their services on the closure of the Mills
This argument rests on a confusion of thought
The question whether there was consideration
for the promise made by the 885 management in its letters dated January 3 and January 10 1951 arises only if the offer contained in the letters had been accepted by the respondent so as to ripen into an agreement
And if there was no concluded agreement between the parties as the Tribunal itself had held then the further question as to whether it was supported by consideration would not arise nor would there be any question of its becoming one of the terms of the service
It was argued that though a formal resolution withdrawing the strike was not passed in fact there was no strike and that must be taken to be acceptance of the offer by conduct
That would not be acceptance as required by the appellant and that alone would be sufficient to reject the contention of the respondent
But this contention must fail even on the merits
In its letter dated January 10 1951 the respondent while stating that the strike was not taking place on the 12th made it clear that this was pending the final decision of the Union
That clearly is not an acceptance of the offer
The matter does not rest there
 The object of the strike was it should be remembered not anything directly connected with the terms of employment but something collateral to it
It was to prevent the Mills from being removed from Pipraich to Madras
When the management offered to part with 25 per cent
of the profits of the sale transaction its object was clearly to disarm the opposition of the workmen and to get the machinery dismantled and delivered to the purchaser peacefully
Did the workmen ever agree to it As late as March 5 1951 Kashinath Pandey wrote to the Government that if the Mills were to be shifted from Pipraich he would go on hunger strike
Even after the Government had informed him that the sale could not be interfered with the workmen did not co operate with the management in the dismantling of the machinery with the result that the appellant had to give up the contract with reference thereto and to lose Rs 2 lakhs profits
To crown all the workmen having successfully prevented the appellant from getting the contract for dismantling themselves 886 entered into it directly with the purchaser and undoubtedly intercepted a part if not the whole of the profits which the appellant would have earned
It is impossible to hold on these facts that there was a concluded agreement between the parties binding the appellant to give the workmen a share of the profits of the sale transaction
It was next contended by Mr Umrigar that even if there was no concluded agreement by the management to pay the workmen a share of profits on the sale transaction it would have been open to the Tribunal to have awarded compensation for the termination of their services treating it as retrench ment and that the award of compensation of Rs 45000 which was what the management itself had suggested might be sustained on that footing
This contention assumes that the termination of the services of workmen on the closure of a business is retrenchment
But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment
It is however contended by Mr Umrigar that the definition of retrenchment in section 2oo of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 is wide enough to include discharge consequent on the closure of business and that under section 25 F compensation could be awarded therefore Our attention has been invited on behalf of the appellant to the decision in J K Hosiery Factory vs Labour Appellate Tribunal1 where it was held that retrenchment as defined in section 2oo does not comprehend discharge on the closure of business but Mr Umrigar contends that it is erroneous
We do not consider it necessary to decide this question as the definition of retrenchment in section 2oo of Act XIV 1947 and section 25 F therein were inserted by the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act No XLIII of 1953 and we have held in Messrs Burn and Co Ltd Calcutta vs 1 A IR 1956 All 498
887 Their Workmen supra that this Act has no retrospective operation
The rights of the parties to the present appeal must therefore be decided in accordance with the law as it stood on March 21 1951 when the workmen were discharged
It was next contended on the strength of the decisions in Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta vs Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta1 and Messrs Benett Coleman  Company Ltd vs Their Employees2 that even prior to the enactment of Act XLIII of 1953 the Tribunals had acted on the view that retrenchment included discharge on closure of business and had awarded compensation on that footing and that the award of the Tribunal in the present case could be supported in that view and should not be disturbed
In Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta vs Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta supra the Tribunal observed at P 576 as follows Ordinarily retrenchment means discharge from service of only the surplus part of the labour force but in the case of closure the whole labour force is dispensed with
In substance the difference between closure and normal retrenchment is one of degree only
As in the case of retrenchment so in the case of closure the workmen are not responsible for closing their jobs
In both the cases what is called compensation by way of retrenchment relief should be admissible
We are unable to agree with these observations
Though there is discharge of workmen both when there is retrenchment and closure of business the compensation is to be awarded under the law not for discharge as such but for discharge on retrenchment and if as is conceded retrenchment means in ordinary parlance discharge of the surplus it cannot include discharge on  closure of business
Moreover there was no question of closing of business in Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta vs Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation 1 1953 LAC 563
2 888 Limited Calcutta supra as what happened there was that one of the units of the company that at Calcutta was closed and that would be a case of retrenchment and the observations quoted above were purely obiter
They were however quoted and followed without discussion by the Appellate Tribunal in Messrs Benett Coleman  Company Ltd vs Their Employees supra which further remarked at p 27 Thus whether the closure was justified or not the workmen who have lost their jobs would in any event get compensation
If it was not bona fide or not justified it may be that the measure of compensation would be larger than if it was otherwise
For the reasons given above we cannot assent to these observations
It should be mentioned that in Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd vs Their Employee supra there was no closure of business but winding up of the Calcutta unit by a newspaper publishing company which had its headquarters at Bombay
We must accordingly overrule this contention also
We should add that the Tribunal was of the opinion that apart from agreement the workmen should not in view of their conduct be awarded compensation and we entirely agree with it
And as we have found against the agreement we must allow this appeal and set aside the award of compensation to the workmen made by the Tribunal
In the circumstances the parties will bear their own costs throughout
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant company could not work its Mills to full capa city owing to short supply of sugar cane and got the permission of the Government to sell its machinery but continued crushing cane under a lease from the purchaser
The workmen s Union in order to frustrate the transaction resolved to go on strike and communicated its resolution to the company
There wag correspondence between the parties in course of which the company offered to pay to the workmen 25 per cent
of the profits of the sale on condition that the strike notice must immediately be withdrawn
The workmen did not fulfill the condition and made certain counter proposals
The company insisted that the condition must first be fulfilled before the counter proposals could be considered and renewed its offer
Although the workmen did not actually go on strike they did not withdraw the strike notice and did not co operate with the management in the dismantling and delivery of the machinery to the pur chaser with the result that the company lost heavily
On the expiry of the lease and closure of the industry the services of the workmen were duty terminated by the company on March 21 1951
The workmen thereafter claimed the share of profits on the basis of the offer made by the company in the correspondence and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication by the UP Government by a notification under section 3 of the UP Industrial Disputes Act of 1947
The Tribunal held that the company was bound by the offer it had made and awarded a sum of Rs 45000 to the workmen as representing their share of the profits
On appeal the award of the Industrial Tribunal was affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
It was contended on behalf of the appellant company that the notification was ultra vires and the reference and the award void in consequence and that there having been no concluded agreement between the parties it was not bound to pay
Held that the definition of an industrial dispute contained in section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 and adopted by the UP Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947 contemplated the 873 existence of an industry and a subsisting relationship of employer and employee between the parties and therefore there could be no industrial dispute within the meaning of those Acts where the industry had been closed and the closure was real and bona fide if the dispute arose on such closure or thereafter if that could be conceived
Section 3 of the UP Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 only required that there must be an industrial dispute before the Government could make a reference under that section arid consequently in the instant ease where the claim in dispute had arisen if at all prior to the closing of the industry the Government was fully competent to issue the notification
Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation vs Industrial Tribunal Madras AIR and E N Padmanabha Ayyar vs The State of Madras 1954  approved
Messrs Burn and Co Ltd Calcutta vs Their Workmen Civil Appeal No 325 of 1955 decided on October 11 1956 referred to
In the instant case however as the findings of the Tribunal were inconsistent and conflicting the court examined the correspondence and held that it did not establish that there was a concluded agreement between the parties whereby the workmen could be entitled to any share of the profits and consequently the award made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal must be sot aside
Nor was the award sustainable as one for compensation for termination of the services of workmen on closure of the industry as such discharge was different from discharge on retrenchment which implied the continuance of the industry and discharge only of the surplusage and the workmen were not entitled either under the law as it stood on the day of their discharge or even on merits to any compensation
Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta vs Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited Calcutta 1953 LAC 563 and Messrs Benett Coleman  Company Ltd vs Their Employees 1954 LAC 24 distinguished and disapproved