ns Nos 89 to 92 and 94 of 1968
Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights
MK Ramamurthi for the petitioners in all the petitions
Niren De Solicitor General and RN Sachthey for the respondent in all the petitions 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah CJ
These are five writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by persons detained under the 4 of 1950 by virtue of orders passed by the District Magistrate Tripura on February 2 1968
These detenus and another since released were arrested on February 11 1968
State Government was informed of the fact of deten sup
CI68 5 564 tion on February 13 and the grounds of detention were communicated to the detenus on February 15
State Government gave the approval on February 19 and telegraphically communicated to the Central Government the fact of the detention on February 22 under section 34
On March 11 the Advisory Board considered the cases
The present petitions were filed on March 12 1968
The Advisory Board made its report to the State Government under section 10 of the Act on April 17 1968
On April 26 1968 the State Government made the order detaining the petitioners for a period of one year
This detention is challenged before us
The petitions were argued by Mr Ramamurthy together
The law points raised by him in these cases were common and will be dealt with together
Part of the facts were also common although some special features were pointed out in some cases
We propose to deal with the commonpoints of law and facts together and then to consider the special facts separately
The points of law were 1  that the detention was illegal as the report of the District Magistrate was not submitted forthwith as required by section 33 of the Act 2 that the detention was again illegal as the order of approval of State Government under section 3 3 was not communicated to the petitioners 3 that the detention was illegal as the State Government had not reported the fact to the Central Government as soon as possible and without avoidable delay
The common points of fact are that the grounds were vague and the detention was for a collateral purpose and mala fide
The order of detention in each case was made on the 9th of February
The arrest and detention commenced from the 11th
The communication was on February 13
Section 3 3 of the Act lays down 3
The Central Government or the State Government may 1 3 When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub section 2 he shall forthwith report  the act to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention Second Amendment Act 1952 shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government
 565 The question is whether the detention became illegal because 4 days were allowed to pass from the order of detention and 2 days from the date of arrest
The third sub section quoted above uses the word forthwith 
 Explaining this word Maxwell in Interpretation of Statutes Eleventh Edn at p 341 observes as follows When a statute requires that something shall be done forthwith or immediately or even instantly it should probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it
 The word forthwith  in section 3 3 and the phrase as soon as may be  used in the fourth sub section were considered in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar vs The Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay1
In that case the delay was of 8 days
Giving proper meaning to the expression it was observed We agree that forthwith in section 3 3 cannot mean the same thing as as soon as may be in section 7 and that the former is more preemptory than the latter
The difference between the two expressions lies in our opinion in this that while under section 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient under section 3 3 what is allowed is only the period during which he could not without any fault of his own send the report
 The delay of 8 days was held explained thus What happened on the 16th and the following days are now matters of history
The great city of Bombay was convulsed in disorders which are among the worst that this country has witnessed
The Bombay police had a most difficult task to perform in securing life and property and the authorities must have been working at high pressure in maintaining law and order
It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which he had passed or lounging supinely over them
The delay such as it is is due to causes not of his making but to causes to which the activities of the petitioners very largely contributed
We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit and we hold that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by him they were sent forthwith within the meaning of section 33 of the Act
 In the present case the delay is much shorter
The 10th and 1 ith of February were close holidays
The communication was 1  at pages 658 660 566 on the 13th
Thus there was only delay because the report was not made on the 12th
Explaining the delay the District Magistrate in his affidavit says I say that 10th February 1968 was a holiday being the second Saturday of the month and 11th February 1968 was Sunday
I say that serious reports about the activities of the Mizo National Front and Sangkrak Party which are tribal groups of hostiles who had set up an independent Government and were indulging in subversive acts against the local Govern
ment and were committing dacoities murder arson etc
particularly aimed at non tribals were received at that time which kept me extremely busy during those days
Besides this I also say that I was in the midst of paddy procurements and there was very heavy rush of work in my office in those days
I say that 10th and 11th February 1968 being holidays and order being communicated on the  13th to the State Government was communicated forthwith as required by law
 In our judgment even if the meaning from the ruling is applied with strictness the delay was explained sufficiently
The District Magistrate was hard put to for time and the surrounding circumstances explain the very short delay
A much larger delay was held in this Court not to militate against section 3 3 and we think there is less room for interference in this case than existed in the former case
We accordingly reject the first of the law The second point has no force
There is no provision in the Act that such an approval must be communicated to the detenu
The argument is that this must be implied from the object of the Act
The detaining authority is answerable to the State Government Sub section 3  gives validity to the order for a period of 12 days even without approval
The approval was done within the time and began to operate as soon as made
It was contended that the approval ought to have been communicated to the detenu and without this communication the detention could not be legal
Reliance was placed upon certain cases to show that persons affected by an order must be communicated that order if it is to be effective
In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another1 a case under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 it was held that the award of the Collector must be communicated and that this was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice
The Court was considering a question of limitation Which ran from the date of the Collector s 1 1962 1 SCR 676
567 award  in the proviso to section 18 and was not prepared to construe those words in a literal ormechanical way
The reason which prevailed for making a distinction between an order passed and an order communicated do not obtain here
In Bachhittar Singh vs The State of Punjab1 an order of dismissal of a public servant passed by the Minister on the file was not communicated and it was held that it was only provisional fill communicated
This case is not in point
The next case Biren  Dutta and others vs Chief Commissioner of Tripura and another2 deals with detention under the Defence of India Rules 1962 rules 301b and 30A8
The reason of rule 30A8 was stated by this Court to be that it is in the nature of an independent decision and further detention can be justified only if the decision is recorded as required by the rule and it must be in writing clearly and unambiguously to indicate the decision
It was further observed that the decision must be communicated
This case is really no authority in the context of the present ease
Section 3 3  of the does not specify that the order of approval is anything more than an administrative approval by the State Government
If this be so the necessity of communication of the approval does not arise with that strictness as does the decision under Rule 30A8 of the Defence of India Rules
The Solicitor General on that occasion conceded this position
The dispute then narrowed to the question whether article 166 applied
This point was not decided by this Court but basing itself on the admission that the deeision to continue the detention must be in writing this Court considered whether there was substantial compliance with this requirement
A brief memorandum was produced which merely recorded that a decision was reached
This Court held that the memorandum could not reasonably be said to
include a decision that the detention of the detenus was thought necessary beyond six months
Sueh orders were held not to contain a written record of the decision with appropriate reasons
In our opinion the provisions of the cannot be equated to those of the Defence of India Act and the Rules
While we are of opinion that even in detention under the it would be fair to inform the detenu of all the stages through which his detention passes and a provision to that effect should be included in it we are not satisfied that in view of the state of the existing law we can import the strict rule here
The scheme of the is merely to approve the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order with the added approval and what the detenu can question if he be so minded is the original detention and not the approval thereof
See in this connection also 1 1962 Supp 3 SCR 713
2  568 Mohammed Afzal Khan vs State of Jammu  Kashmir1
We accordingly consider the ruling inapplicable
It is next contended that the State Government was also guilty of undue and unreasonable delay in reporting to the Central Government
The State Government communicated the decision on February 22
State Government received the communication from the District Magistrate on February 13 and approved the action on February 19
The communication to the Central Government on February 22 was not so much delayed that it is not covered by the expression as early as may be  explained by this Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar vs The Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay s2 case
Mr Ramamurthy desired us to calculate the time from February 9 but we do not think that is possible
Time can only be calculated from the moment the matter reached the State Government
The State Government took a week to consider these cases and it is reasonable to think that there might be a few more cases which are not before us
Having reached the decision on the February 19 the action of the State Government in communicating the matter to the Central Government on February 22 cannot be said to be so delayed as to render the detention illegal
Various things have to be done before the report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3 days is understandable
We see no forces in this point
This brings us to the merits of the detention
Here the charge is that the grounds furnished to the detenus were vague and the detention itself mala fide
The grounds are practically the same except for very minor changes to which attention will be drawn when we deal with individual cases
We may set down the grounds of detention from Petition No 89 of 1968 as sample
You are being detained in pursuance of the Detention order made under sub clauses ii and iii of clause a of sub section 1 of section 3 as you have been acting in manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and supplies essential to the community as evidenced by the particulars given below  1
That you have been instigating the loyal villagers particularly the tribals living in and around the Forest Reserve areas to damage the forest plantation and to do Jhuming in Reserve Forest areas in violation of forest laws
Towards the end you have been attending a number of secret meetings in which it was decided to urge the public to start campaign against the Forest Department and to destroy the forest plantation
That you have by your activities created resentment against 11957 SCR 63
2 1950 SCR 569 the forest departments and the Forest Laws under Teliamura PS thereby endangering the maintenance of public order
That you have been instigating the loyal cultivators from delivering the paddy to the Government which has been requisitioned under the Tripura Foodgrains Requisition Order for the maintenance of sup plies of foodgrains to the people in lean months
You have been instigating and inciting the people to offer organised and violent resistance against the paddy procurement staff
Towards this end you have been attending a number of secret meetings in which it was decided to urge the public to start campaign against the procurement of paddy
You have been directly in citing the people in a number of mass meetings also
That you have by your speeches and activities induced the people of certain areas to offer violent resistance to paddy procurement thereby preventing the Government from maintaining supplies essential to the community during times of need
The above reports are evident from the facts that on 12 11 67 you artended a mass meeting at Kalyanpur a secret meeting on 13 11 67 at Asha rambari again mass meetings at Teliamura on 28 11 67 at Moharchhara Bazar on 16 12 67 on 6 1 68 at Telia mura and on 21 1 68 at Stable ground Agartala
Because of your activities and incitement on 2 2 68 the procurement staff were offered a strong and violent resistance by an unruly mob at Chalitabari P section Telia mura
 It is submicted that the grounds do not give anydetails since no particulars of time place and circumstances have been mentioned and relevant and irrelevant matters have been included
Reference is made to two cases decided recently by this Court in which the grounds were found insufficient
They are Rameshwar Lal Patwari vs State of Biharx and Motilal Jain vs State of Bihar  Others2
We find no such vagueness in the grounds as was found established in the two cases
The grounds begin by stating generally what the activities were
They consisted of instigation of tribal people to practise jhuming and preventing the authorities from delivering paddy to Government under the procurement schemes
This instigation it is said was through mass and secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Government
Having said this the grounds then specify the places where and the dates on which the meetings were held and the date on which and place at which the resistance took place
In our judg 1  2  570 ment more detailed information was not necessary to give the detenus an opportunity to make their representations
The grounds here are specific and very unlike those in the cases relied upon
We reject the contention
As regards mala fides and collateral purpose alleged to be the real reason the averment is that the detention was ordered to prevent the detenus from actively campaigning for the Panchayat elections that were to take place on the 19th and 20th February 1968
This has been denied and looking to the circumstances of this area which are notorious there is no doubt in our minds that the affidavit of the District Magistrate is reliable
This ends the submissions which are common to these five cases
We now pro ceed to discuss individual objections
Writ Petition 89 of 1968
There is no special objection in Writ Petition 89 of 1968 beyond what has been discussed above and it is accordingly dismissed
Writ Petition 90 of 1968 Here too there is no special ground urged before us and the petition is accordingly dismissed
Writ Petition 91 of 1968 The first objection is that there is a mistake of identity
The petitioner claims to be Dasrath so Kfishna Deb whereas in the order of detention and other papers is described as Dasrath so the Late Krishna Chandra Deb Barrna
It is also submitted that Krishna Chandra Deb is alive and there fore the order of detention concerned some other person
It is denied by the District Magistrate that the order was not passed against the present detenu himself
The addition of Barma is explained by the District Magistrate as a popular suffix to the name
The District Magistrate has further said that in Tripura it is usual to have Barma in addition to Deb in the surname and that this ground of identity has been raised for the first time in this Court
The address of the petitioner is accurate and the I father s name is also correct
Nothing much turns on the fact that the father was described as dead
The petitioner has not objected till he reached this Court and the authorities would hardlybe expected to hold a wrong man and let the real man go free
We reject this contention
The next contention concerns the discrepancy in the dates of meetings and what happened as a result of his activitiesand incitement
The two sets of dates may be put side by side Meetings Result 25 11 67 18 6 67 16 12 67 21 6 67 26 12 67 24 6 67 27 12 67 25 6 67 30 12 67 23 12 67 3 1 68 21 1 68 571 It is argued that the results in all but two dates could not follow activities which were later
The explanation is simple
The results were said to be because of the activities of the peritioner
The mention of dates of meetings is merely some evidence to show the kmd of activity
We are concerned with preventive detention
Ordinarily what we have to satisfy ourselves about is the satisfaction of the authority and the absence of mala fides and whether all the opportunities of making representation were given
There were enough instances cited of the conduct on which detention was ordered for the petitioner to make an effective representation
The situation in this area was already bad and the later activities would not make it any better
We do not think that the detention suffers from any defect
The petition will be dismissed
Writ Petition 92 of 1968
The objection here is of the same character as in Writ Petition 8991
An additional complaint here is that he is supposed to  have instigated people to go on strike and prevented the motor drivers and rickshaw pullers from plying their vehicles on the  roads and
government employees from going to office and threatened individual shop keepers to keep their shops closed but no details are supplied
It is submitted that this brings the case within the rulings of this Court
We think this case is distinguishable from the case of a black marketer who is charged with having sold contraband articles or at higher prices or hoarded goods
General allegations there without concrete instances would be difficult to represent against
Here the matter is different
It is an integrated conduct of instigation against law and order which is being charged
Several aspects of it are mentioned
They range from jhuming in forests and resistance to procurement to arranging for strikes
Instances Of mass and secret meetings are furnished and the ramifications of conduct in other directions are mentioned
In these circumstances the petitioner is expected to represent against the instances and if he convinces that he took no part in the agitation the other aspects of his activity will be sufficiently answered
A_case of this type stands on slightly different footing from the cases of black marketing earlier decided by this Court
In our judgment no successful ground has been  made out and the petition must fail
It will be dismissed
Writ Petition 94 of 1968
The petitioner in this case has complained that the order of detention and the grounds supplied to him were in English and he knows only Bengali and Tripuri
He refers to Harikisan vs The State of Maharashtra  Others1
In that case the detenu had asked for a Hindi translation and had been denied that facility
1 1962 2 Supp
SCR 918
572 We find that this objection was taken here but no request was
made at any earlier time
The original petition did not contain any such objection
It was raised for the first time in the rejoinder
The petitioner does not seem to have suffered at all
He has filed the petition in English and questioned the implications of the language of the order and the grounds
Of course he had the assistance of the other detenus who know English
If there had been the slightest feeling that he was handicapped we would have seriously considered the matter but in his case it appears that this point was presented not to start with but after everything was over
We cannot entertain such a belated complaint
The petition will be dismissed
In conclusion all the petitions fail and will be dismissed
GC Petitions dismissed


Summary:
The petitioners were arrested and detained on February 11 1968 under the by the orders of the District Magistrate Tripura
They challenged their detention on the following among other grounds i that the District Magistrate passed the orders of detention on February 9 1968 but made his report to the State Government only on February 13 and therefore the report was not made forthwith  as required by section 33 ii that the State Government did not communicate the approval to the detenus and without such communication the order could not be effective iii that the State Government recorded its approval under section 33 on February 19 but communicated it to the Central Government only on February 22 and this was not done as soon as may be  within the meaning of section 34 iv that the grounds supplied were vague v that the detention order was mala fide
One of the petitioners also relied on the fact that the grounds were supplied to him in English which he did not understand
HELD i The word forthwith  has been interpreted by this Court in Joglekar s case to mean the period during which the detaining authority could not without any fault of his own send the report
In the present case the order of detention passed on February 9 was communicated to the State Government on February 13 but the District Magistrate in his affidavit had explained that he was occupied with urgent official work and that 10th and 11th were holidays
Thus the re was delay only because the report was not made on the 12th
Even if the meaning from the ruling in Joglekar s case is applied strictly the delay was explained sufficiently
565 C 566A D Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar vs The Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay  at p 658 60 applied
ii There is no provision in the Act that the approval under section 33 must be communicated to the detenu
Section 33 does not specify that the order of approval is anything more than an administrative aproval by the State Government
If this be so the necessity of communication of the approval does not arise with that strictness as does the decision under r 30A 8 of the Defence of India Rules
Although it may be fair even under the to inform the detenu of all the stages through which his detention passes and it may be desirable to have a provision to that effect included in it the existing state of the law did not justify the importation of the strict rule to cases under this Act
D G 563 The scheme of the is merely to approve the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order with the added approval and what the detenu can question is the original detention and not the approval thereof
567 H Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs Deputy Land Acquisition Officer 1962 1 SCR 676 Bachhittar Singh vs State of Punjab1962 Supp
3 SCR 713 and Biren Dutta  Ors
vs Chief Commissioner of Tripura  Anr
 19641 8 SCR 295 distinguished
iii The State Government having reached its decision on February 19 its communication under section 34 to the Central Government on February 22 was not so delayed that it is not covered by the expression as early as may be  which was explained in Joglekar s case to mean what is reasonably convenient 
Various things have to be done before the report to the Central Government can be made and a gap of 3 days is understandable
568 D iv The grounds in the present case had been supplied to the detenu with sufficient particularity to enable them to make an effective representation
The cases of Rameshwar Lal Patwari and Motilal Jain were distinguishable
569 F 570 A Rameshwar Lal Patwari vs State of Bihar  and Motilal Jain vs State of Bihar  distinguished
v On the facts and circumstances of the case the allegation of mala fides against the detaining authority could not be accepted
570 B vi The objection that the grounds of detention were given in a language which the detenu did not understand was raised in this Court for the first time
The Court could not entertain this belated complaint especially when the detenu did not seem to have suffered at all for this reason
If there was the slightest feeling that he had been handicapped the court would have seriously considered the matter
572 A B Harikisan vs State of Maharashtra  Ors 1962 2 Supp
SCR 918 referred to