Civil Appeal No 266 of 1974
C From the Judgment and order dated 721973 of the Kerala High Court in SA No 763 of 1970
section Padmanabhan and N Sudhakaran for the Appellant
G Vishwanatha Iyer and Miss Lily Thomas for the Respondent N and 5
DM Nargolkar for the Respondent No 1
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated February 7 1983 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Second Appeal No 763 of 1970
Under the family partition deed exhibit 1 executed on August 2 1950 the properties under A  schedule were allotted to Maharaja Pillai and after his death his widow was given the right to take the income therefrom
One of the sons of Maharaja Pillai filed a suit claiming his right to take 13rd share in those properties
The trial court while construing the terms of exhibit 1 held that the widow got absolute right over A  schedule under section 141 of the 
The appellate court however took a different view
The appellate court held that the widow could get only a restricted right under Section 142 of the 
Upon further appeal the High Court agreed with the view taken by the appellate court
The 782 High Court however granted a small share to the widow stating that according to law in force in the erstwhile Travancore State the widow would have inherited the share which would have fallen to any of the sons
The question for our consideration is whether the widow got absolute right or only a restricted right over the A  schedule after the coming into force of the 
The answer to the question turns upon the scope and meaning to be given to the terms of exhibit 1 the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder  3
As it was decided by us to partition our family properties providing to maintain Kothamachiyar Ammal who is the wife of executant No 1 and mother of others and the aforesaid Lakshmi Ammal this partition deed is written with the stipulation mentioned below and it is fully agreed by us to abide by the provisions contained herein
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 9
During the life time of the 1st executant as and when the marriage of the said Lakshmi Ammal is decided to be conducted the first executant himself shall meet the expense in connection with that and conduct her marriage and if her marriage happened to be conducted after the death of 1st executant executants Nos 2 and 3 shall have right to encumber the A  schedule property for an amount up to Rs2 to meet the expenses for marriage ceremonies and for dowry and gold ornaments and the A schedule proper ties shall be liable for so much amount
Kothamachi kyar Ammal the wife of first executant and mother of other executants may reside in the building included in the A Schedule during her life time and take the income of the properties included in the A schedule after the death of the 1st executant after the death of the 1st executant the successor in interest of the 1st executant shall have no right to create any document except in the manner stated in paragraphs 9 above encumbering A schedule properties so as not to affect the right of enjoyment of the said person but this provision will not be binding on the 1st executant as regards his absolute right over the A schedule properties
783 The first executant referred to above was Maharaja Pillai
The widow we are concerned was his wife
On August 31 1955 Maharaja Pillai died
There after A  schedule items in the partition deed were being enjoyed by the widow
While she was in possession of those properties the of 1956 came into force
Subsequently the widow had gifted those properties in favour of her daughter
The case of the plaintiff was that after the death of Maharaja Pillai the said properties would devolve upon his heirs and he would be entitled to 13rd share
It has been urged by Mr Vishwanath Iyer learned counsel for the respondents that the properties in A schedule would remain in possession of the widow with the right to utilise the income therefrom for her maintenance but the properties were not given to her in lieu of maintenance
It was also urged that Maharaja Pillai had absolute power of disposal over the properties during his life time and it would be therefore not proper to hold that the widow got the properties in lieu of her maintenance
We are unable to agree with these contentions
It is not necessary for us to examine what would have happened to the rights of the wife if Maharaja Pillai had disposed of the A  schedule
The fact remains that he did not
During the life time of Maharaja Pillai the wife was residing in the house allotted to her husband
She was being maintained by her husband
After the death of husband she was in exclusive possession of the A  schedule
She was taking the income from those properties
She had a right to utilise that income for her maintenance
That right was conferred on her under exhibit D1
The children also were allotted separate properties under exhibit D1
They had taken their respective shares from the family properties
In our opinion the properties possessed by the widow fairly and squarely fall under Section 141 of the 
Section 14 provides  1
Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limitedl owner Explanation In this sub section Property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or any other manner what so 784 ever and also any such property held by her as stridhan A immediately before the commencement of this Act
2 Nothing contained in sub section 1 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a degree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted state in such property
 The property possessed by a female referred to under Section 141 includes property both movable and immovable property
It may be acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance etc
The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance
It is not an act of charity the husband does
It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her
The right to maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband
If therefore the wife is put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance
The very right to receive maintenance which is inherent in her is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full ownership under Section 141 of the 
It was however urged for the respondents that Section 141 does not take within its fold every property that comes into possession
Of the widow
It must be a limited estate in the sense of ownership without the right of disposal
It should be a specific property given to her in lieu of her right to maintenance
Similar contentions have been considered and rejected in a recent decision of this Court in Gulwant Kaur  Anr
vs Mohinder Singh  Ors Civil Appeal No 112 of 1980 date 20787 to which one of us was a party K Jagannatha Shetty J  
There it was observed It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restriction no limitation on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy as a full owner property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin that is to say if she has a vestige of a title
It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or device or at a 785 partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by pruchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever
The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under Section 141 in respect of property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance
The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance
Subsection 2 of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 141 and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedents right
 It was urged that the view taken in above case was contrary to the decision in Bai Vajia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai  Ors  We do not agree with this contention also
Indeed a similar contention was urged in Gulwant Kaur s case and it was rejected by observing We do not understand that court as laying down that what was enlarged by sub section 1 of Section 14 into a full estate was the Hindu women s estate known to Hindu law
When the Court uses the word limited estate the words are used to connote a right in the property to which the possession of the female Hindu may be legitimately traced but which is not a full right of ownership
If a female Hindu is put in possession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance it cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position is accepted it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership under Sec
141 of the Act
That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of Sec
141 of the Act
 Bai Vijia s case has not laid down any different principle
It has expressly accepted the view taken in V Tulsamma vs Sesha Reddi  at 310 this Court summarised the scope of Section 14 as follows 786 1 The Hindu female s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurist starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu
Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom
If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female the said right becomes a legally enforceable one
At any rate even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre existing rights
2 Section 141 and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible term and must be liberally construed in favour of the female so as to advance the object of 1956 Act and promote the socio economic ends sought to be achieved by this long need legislation
3 Sub section 2 of section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of section 141 materially
The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by section 141 or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX In the instant case the property under A Schedule was allotted against the share of Maharaja Pillai
The same property was given to the possession of the widow with a right to take the income for her maintenance
This is sufficient to call into aid Section 141 of the 
In the result we allow the appeal set aside the judgment OF the High Court and also the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court
SL Appeal allowed


Summary:
Regulation No 132 of Pension Regulation for the Army 1961 Part I prescribes minimum qualifying colour service of fifteen years for earning service pension
Regulation No 126 provides for counting of former service
The petitioner s representation for pension was rejected on the ground that he had not been in the Army service for a period of 15 years as required under the Army Pension Rules
In the writ petition the petitioner claimed that he had served in the Army from November 1939 to August 1948 when he was released in the rank of Havaldar that he was again recalled and served in the Army Supply Corps MT from July 1948 to July 1953 in the rank of Havaldar when he was again recalled by the Kumaon Regiment and served in the Lok Sahayak Sena from July 1953 to July 1956 in the rank of Havaldar
He further stated that service rendered by him in the LSS third spell should be treated as services in the army and he having served for more than 15 years m the army was entitled to pension
His claim that he was in the army service for over 19 years was contested by the respondents who stated that the petitioner was enrolled in the Army on November 24 1940 and discharged from service with effect from October 26 1946 that he was subsequently re enrolled in ASC MT with Army on March 8 1948 and discharged from there on May 20 1952 and that he has re enrolled with the Kumaon Regiment on March 2 1955 for Lok Sahayak Sena and discharged from there on September 2 1957
It was further stated that the service rendered by him in LSS was not countable towards pension and that his service in the first two spells was 10 years and 54 days only
The petitioner could not produce relevant documents in support of his statement
770 Dismissing the writ petition  HELD The petitioner has not rendered 15 years of army service to be able to get the benefit of army pension as required under the army rules
772F The statements of the petitioner regarding the periods of service rendered by him in the first and the second spell are inconsistent with his record of service produced by the respondents at the hearing
772D E His service in the National Volunteer Force LSS cannot be treated as army service countable towards pension
772D