Appeal No 410 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 31 1958 of the Judicial Commissioner s Court Himachal Pradesh at Simla in Civil Misc
First Appeal No 2 of 1958
KL Misra Advocate General for the State of U P and section section Shukla for the appellant
Achhru Ram and Ganpat Rai for respodent No 1 1958
October 17
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
This appeal arises out of an election petition filed by the respondent No 1 Hira Singh Paul whom we shall hereinafter refer to as the respondent
The other respondent to this appeal is the Election Commission but it has not appeared presumably because it is not interested in the result of the appeal which involves no claim against it
The only question that it involves is whether the appellant was guilty of a corrupt practice the details of which will be set out later within the meaning of section 1237 of the Representation of the People Act 1951
In the 1957 General Elections ten candidates filed their nomination papers to contest the election from the Mahasu double member constituency in Himachal Pradesh
One of the two seats for this constituency 215 was reserved for a scheduled caste candidate
Two of the candidates withdrew from the contest and the remaining eight went to the poll
These eight included the appellant the respondent and one Nek Ram
Nek Ram was declared elected to the reserved seat and the appellant to the general seat
The respondent polled the next largest number of votes to the appellant
After the results had been declared the respondent filed the election petition on August 3 1957 challenging the validity of the election of the appellant on the ground that he had committed various corrupt practices
The Election Tribunal framed 18 issues in respect of the various corrupt practices alleged in the petition but answered all the issues excepting issues Nos
81 8ii and 11 against the respondent
Issue No 81 raised the question whether one Amar Singh said to be a member of the armed forces of the Union of India worked and canvassed for the appellant
Issue No 8ii was whether Amar Singh was appointed his polling agent by the appellant
Issue No 11 was in the following terms In case one or more of Issues Nos
8 to 10 is or are decided in the affirmative whether the respondent No 1 obtained procured or abetted or attempted to obtain procure by himself by his agents and by his supporters the assistance of the Government servants as specified under the said issues for the furtherance of the prospects of his election  The Tribunal found against the appellant on Issues Nos
81 8ii and 11 and thereupon declared his election void
The appellant then went up in appeal to the judicial Commissioner Himachal Pradesh who by his judgment dated July 31 1958 set aside the finding of the Tribunal on Issue No 81 but maintained its findings on the other two issues and confirmed the declaration that the appellant s election was void
The appellant has come up to this Court by special leave in appeal against that judgment
As will have been seen from what has been earlier stated the only questions 216 that survive are those raised by Issues Nos 8ii and 1 1
The facts are not now in dispute and may be stated as follows The constituency was divided into 606 polling stations and for each polling station three polling agents could be appointed
The appellant was thus entitled to appoint 1818 polling agents
On April 28 1957 he signed a very large number of the forms prescribed by the rules framed under the Act for appointing polling agents in blank and without setting out therein the name of any polling agent as he had not then been able to make up his mind in view of the large number of polling stations as to who would be his polling agents at the various polling stations
He made over these forms to Kalyan Singh who passed on three of them to Kashmira Singh having inserted therein the words  polling station No 13 Sheopur 
Kashmira Singh filled in the name of Amar Singh as the polling agent in one of these forms on May 25 1957 the day of polling and made it over to the latter to enable him to act as the appellant s polling agent at polling station No 13 Sheopur
Amar Singh then duly signed the form as required by the rules and filed it with the presiding officer at polling station No 13 Sheopur and on the strength of it acted as the polling agent of the appellant at that station for about two hours when objection having been taken to him on the ground that he was a member of the armed forces he withdrew and left the polling station
Amar Singh was on the polling day in fact a member of the armed forces though this was not then known to the appellant
Kalyan Singh and Kashmira Singh acted in all that they did under the authority of the appellant
These facts may be taken to have been established on the evidence adduced
The learned Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh who appeared for the appellant first sought to contend that Amar Singh had not really been appointed the appellant s polling agent
He said that under section 46 of the Act a polling agent can be appointed only by the candidate himself or by his election agent and Amar Singh could not on the facts found for reasons to 217 be stated presently be said to have been appointed a polling agent either by the appellant or his election agent
Therefore according to him Amar Singh had not been appointed the appellant s polling agent at all and hence the charge of corrupt practice against him for having so appointed Amar Singh must fail
First it seems to us that this argument is not open to the learned Advocate General
He himself appeared for the appellant before the learned Judicial Commissioner and there conceded that the factum or the validity of the appointment of Amar Singh as the appellant s polling agent could not be questioned by him
We do not think that we should permit the appellant to withdraw a concession expressly made by his counsel in the Court below in a matter of this kind
This is all the more so as the present argument does not seem to have been raised when the matter was before the Tribunal either
Secondly it seems to us that the contention is without substance
We will assume that the learned Advocate General is right in his contention that under the Act a polling agent can be appointed only by the candidate himself or by his election agent and not by the candidate acting through any other agent
The learned Advocate General s contention is that on the facts found the only possible conclusion is that Amar Singh had not been appointed polling agent by the appellant himself but by one or other of his agents namely Kalyan Singh or Kashmira Singh and as none of them was his election agent the appointment was invalid
It is not in dispute that neither Kalyan Singh nor Kashmira Singh was his election agent
In fact it appears that the appellant had no election agent at all
In our view however this does not matter as the present is not the case of an appointment by any agent but by the appellant himself
We have come to this view because here the appointment was made by the document signed per sonally by the appellant
The fact that the name of the polling agent was written in the document by another person after the appellant had signed it does not make the appointment of the polling agent under 28 218 that document an appointment by some other person acting as the agent of the appellant
On the language of the document and the appointment was not purported to have been made in any other
way than by the document it was an appointment made by the appellant himself
The other person only wrote the name in the document which he had authority to do
He did not purport to make any appointment at all
It is impossible to read the document as the making of the appointment by an agent of the appellant acting for him
The true view of the matter plainly is that the appellant himself appointed by the document as his polling agent a person whose name had been written therein by another with his authority
We therefore hold that Amar Singh had been appointed his polling agent by the appellant himself
It was thus even on the learned Advocate General s construction of section 46 a proper appointment
We then come to this that the appellant appointed Amar Singh a member of the armed forces his polling agent and the latter acted as such
The question is Did this amount to a corrupt practice by the appellant  The respondent s contention which has been accepted by the Courts below is that it is a corrupt practice within section 1237 of the Act
That provision so far as is relevant and the explanation to it are in these terms
Section 123
The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act  7 The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or by any other person any assistance other than the giving of vote for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate s election from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes namely  c members of the armed forces of the Union Explanation 1 2 For the purposes of clause 7 a person shall be 219 deemed to assist in the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate s election if he acts as an election agent or a polling agent or a counting agent of that candidate
 The learned Advocate General contends that the procuring or obtaining by a candidate of any assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from a person in the service of the Government as a member of the armed forces would not amount to a corrupt practice unless that candidate knew that the person was in such Government service
He says that the words procuring orobtaining  import such knowledge and that this view of the matter receives great strength from the word I for  in the phrase  for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate s election 
According to him without such knowledge the candidate cannot be said to have procured or obtained any assistance for no one can obtain or procure a thing unless he knows that he is doing so
He then points out that there is evidence that neither the appellant nor Kalyan Singh nor even Kashmira Singh knew that Amar Singh was a member of the armed forces
He therefore says that the appellant cannot in the absence of such knowledge be said to have procured or obtained the assistance of a member of the armed forces for furthering the prospects of his election
It is true that neither the appellant nor Kalyan Singh nor even Kashmira Singh knew at the date of the appointment of Amar Singh that he was a member of the armed forces but the point now raised by the learned Advocate General is in our view none the less unsustainable
It overlooks the provisions of the second explanation to the section which we have already set out
Under that explanation if a person acts as the polling agent of a candidate it must be held without more that he assisted in furtherance of the prospects of that candidate s election
In the present case therefore it has to be held that Amar Singh who acted as the appellant s polling agent thereby assisted in the furtherance of the prospect  of his election
Now under the provisions of the Act no one can act as the polling agent of a candidate unless he has been appointed as such and we have already held that the appellant 220 himself had appointed Amar Singh as his polling agent
It follows in view of the explanation that the appellant procured and obtained the assistance of Amar Singh for the furtherance of the prospects of his election
All the requirements of the section are thus satisfied and the appellant must therefore be held to have committed the corrupt practice thereby constituted
All that the section requires is that assistance shall be procured for furthering the election
Where the explanation applies as it does in the present case if a candidate has appointed a person to act as his polling agent and he accordingly does so act a statutory presumption arises that the candidate thereby procured that person s assistance in furtherance of the prospects of his election and this irrespective of whether he intended to procure such assistance or not
Indeed as Mr Achhru Ram appearing for the respondent pointed out the explanation clearly shows that the candidate s intention is irrelevant for such presumption arises even when a candidate has procured another person to act as his counting agent and it is very difficult to imagine that the appointment of a counting agent can further the prospects of any election for the counting agent acts after the polling is over and only when the votes already polled are counted
Therefore it seems to us that in the case of the appointment of a polling agent which comes within the explanation as the present case does the intention of the candidate in procuring the assistance is irrelevant
If that is so it is clear that the knowledge of the candidate whether the person whose service as his polling agent he has procured is a member of the armed forces or any of the other specified class of Government servants or not is equally irrelevant
We think therefore that the learned Advocate General s contention must fail
What we have said just now also disposes of the other argument of the learned Advocate General namely that a corrupt practice is in the nature of a criminal act and cannot therefore be established unless mens rea or criminal intention is established and that the appellant cannot be said to have committed 221 a corrupt practice for he had no mens rea in appointing Amar Singh his polling agent since he did not know that Amar Singh was a member of the armed forces
On this point we were referred to certain passages from English text books on election law of which it will be enough to refer to one for all state the law in substantially the same terms
In Schofield s Parliamentary Elections 2nd Edn which is one of the text books to which we were referred it is stated at p 402 There is an elementary distinction between a corrupt and an illegal practice
To establish the former it is essential to show that a corrupt intention is present
A corrupt practice is a thing the mind goes along with whereas an illegal practice is a thing the legislature is determined to prevent whether it is done honestly or dishonestly
The view thus formulated is founded on the English law of election and is clearly of no assistance to us
It is based on particular English statutes and the language employed therein
We have already shown that our statute in the case at least of a corrupt practice of the kind in hand does not concern itself with any question of intention
Mr Achhru Ram with his usual industry made available to us the English statutes on which the statement of law set out in the text books referred to by counsel for the appellant had been based and pointed out that under these statutes the acts therein made corrupt practices had to be done corruptly and that corrupt practices were always made offences punishable as crimes
It may be of use here to point out that the relevant provisions in our statute were amended in 1956 and that has done away with the distinction between illegal and corrupt practices
In fact we have now only corrupt practices and no illegal practices
The present case it may be pointed out is governed by the amended statute
No question of mens rea or intention or knowledge of the candidate arises in this case
We therefore come to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of a corrupt practice by appointing Amar Singh a member of the armed forces his polling 222 agent whereby the latter was enabled to and did act as such
The appellant s election was consequently in our opinion rightly declared void
The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs


Summary:
Notifications No 24 and 25 of 1984 under rule 1 of the Central Excise Rules were issued on 131984 in respect of paper and paper board falling under item 171 of the first schedule to the 
While notification No 24 of 1984 restricted the excise duty on certain items notification No 25 of 1984 provided for a concession in respect of paper and paper boards manufactured out of pulp containing not less than 50 per cent by weight of pulp made from materials other than bamboo hardwoods softwoods reeds or rags and cleared on or after the 1st day of April in any financial year subject to certain important conditions set out in the provisoes to the notifi cation
Under the provisoes the concessional rates were applicable only if the factory did not have plant attached to it for making bamboo wood pulp and the exemption would not apply to cigarette tissue glassing paper grease proof paper coated paper including waxed paper and paper of a substance not exceeding 25 grammes per square metre
Another notification No 45 of 1985 dated 1731985 was also issued prescribing rates on paper and paper board failing under the aforesaid item including coated paper
The appellant assessee had a factory in which different varieties of paper and paper board were being manufactured using waste paper and cereal straw containing more than 50 per cent by weight of pulp made from the unconventional raw materials
The factory did not have a bamboo pulp plant
The assessee was manufacturing art paper and chromo paper
These two types of paper generally fell under catego ry of printing and writing paper
These two articles also fell under the description coated 798 paper used in the second proviso to the notification No 25 of 1984
The appellant initially paid excise duty on the goods manufactured by it in terms of notification No 24 of 1984 but later claimed concessional rates prescribed by notification No 25 of 1984
Since coated paper was taken out of the purview of notification No 25 of 1984 by the proviso the Excise Department refused to permit the asses see to avail of this concession in respect of its manufac tured goods
This was confirmed by the Central Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal
In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appel lantassessee it was contended that though the expression coated paper  had generally a wide connotation and included coated papers of all varieties it should be given a re stricted meaning in the context in which it appeared in the proviso that in the paper business paper was broadly two varieties industrial paper and cultural paper that while paper used for printing or writing was treated as cultural paper that used for various purposes broadly described as industrial purposes such as wrapping packing sanitary use and the like was industrial paper that since a common strain ran through all the five categories men tioned in the proviso inasmuch the first three varieties admittedly fell under the category of industrial paper and the last one was invariably used for industrial purposes and so found by the Tribunal the word coated paper  must be read in that context and should be interpreted by apply ing the principle of Noscitur A Sociis or on the analogy of the Ejusdem generis principle and that even if the words of the proviso were capable of being construed in a wider manner so as to deny exemption to all kinds of coated paper the Court should apply the well established principle of construction of taxing statutes that an ambiguous provi sion should be interpreted in favour of the subject
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that there was no principle of interpretation by which the plain and natural meaning of the word coated paper  could be abridged nor was there anything in the context to warrant such a limitation that there was no clear cut distinction between industrial and cultural paper and that it could not be said that light paper could only be industrial paper
Allowing the appeals this Court HELD 1 Coated paper  in the second proviso to notifi cation No 25 of 1984 refers only to coated paper used for industrial purposes and not to coated varieties of printing and writing paper
The 799 appellant is therefore entitled to concessional rates specified in the notification
812F G 21 The expression coated paper  in the proviso should draw colour from the context in which it is employed and receive an interpretation consistent therewith than its literal one which in its widest sense may be comprehensive enough to include all coated paper industrial or otherwise 809G H 22 The concession of the notification is denied to five kinds of paper
Three of them are varieties of industrial paper
The fourth is light paper not exceeding a particular weight
Light paper is by and large industrial paper and is also used occasionally for cultural purposes also
The five varieties of paper are found in serial Nos 3 and 4 of the 1985 notification and serial Nos 1 and 3 reflect a con trast between coated paper and light paper used for cultural purposes item No 1 and that used for other industrial purposes item No 3
On this basis it is clear that four out of the five varieties of paper which are denied the benefit of the concession constitute industrial paper
In fact even if only three of these items are of the indus trial variety while the other two could be either it will not still be unreasonably though may be a little less plausible to draw an inference that only industrial paper falling in those two categories are intended to be compre hended in the classification rather than assume for no detectable reason that all paper of these two varieties alone are excluded from the concession 809E G 23 Though no meticulous reasons can always be made available or discovered for variations in rates of duty as between various types of goods and the absence of some common thread  in relation to a set of goods treated alike may not necessarily render the classification irrational or arbitrary it can legitimately be postulated that the denial of a concession to a group proceeds on the basis of some aspect or feature common to all items in the group
If such a principle can be conceived of which would rationalise the inclusion of all the items it would be quite reasonable and proper to give effect to a construction of the notification as will accord with that principle
808F G 24 In interpreting the scope of any notification the Court has first to keep in mind the object and purpose of the notification
All parts of it should be read harmonious ly in aid of and not in derogation of that purpose
811F 800 Collector of Central Excise vs Parle Exports P Ltd  and Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd vs
CCE   referred to
In the instant case the aim and object of the notifica tion is to grant a concession to small scale factories which manufacture paper with unconventional raw materials
If the proviso had referred only to coated paper no special object or purpose would have been discernible and perhaps there would have been no justification to look beyond it and enter into a speculation as to why the notification should have thought of exempting only coated paper manufactured by these factories from the purview of the exemption
But the notifi cation excepts not one but a group of items
If the items mentioned in the group were totally dissimilar and it were impossible to see any common thread running through them again it may be permissible to give the exceptions their widest latitude
But when four of them undoubtedly at least three of them can be brought under an intelligible classifi cation and it is also conceivable that the Government might well have thought that these small scale factories should not be eligible for the concession contemplated by the notification where they manufacture paper catering to indus trial purposes there is a purpose in the limitation pre scribed and there is no reason why the rationally logical restriction should not be placed on the proviso based on this classification
811H 812A C The only reasonable way of interpreting the proviso is by understanding the words coated paper  in a narrower sense consistent with the other expressions used therein
812D 3
The principle of statutory interpretation by which a generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well established
The expression noscitur a sociis simply means that the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps 810A B In the context of the instant case this principle can be legitimately drawn upon
However the latin maxims and precedents are not to be mechanically applied they are of assistance only in so far as they furnish guidance by com pendiously summing up principles based on rules of common sense and logic
811E F State vs Hospital Mazdoor Sabha   Rainbow steels Ltd vs
CST  and Lethang vs Coopex   referred to 801 The Dictionary of Paper published by the American Paper and Pulp Association Second Edition referred to