Civil Appeal No 626 of 1981 Etc
From the Judgment and Order dated 12121980 of the Kerala High Court in Civil Revision Petition No 2939 of 1978
PS Poti G Viswanatha Iyer AK Ganguli TS Krishnamoorthy Iyer EMS Anam
R Sathish MA Firoz N Sudhakar Miss Nalini Poduval and section Balakrishnan for the appearing parties
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered NATARAJAN J
These appeals by special leave and the special leave petition have been clubbed together and listed for consideration of a common question of law involved in them viz whether against an order of a District Court in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building Lease  Rent Control Act 2 of 1965 for short the Kerala Act a further revision would lie to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
877 Though the question is not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai  1987 1 SCC 133  the appeals have been listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there is any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal s case supra and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hedge vs G Venkatesha Bhat  Ors  and whether the view taken in the earlier case requires reconsideration
Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be mentioned that Aundal Ammal s case arose under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge s case supra pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act
Since there are essential differences between the two Acts it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act came to be rendered by this Court
As per section 205 of the Kerala Act a Rent Control Court means a Court constituted under Section 3
Under Section 31 the Government may by Notification in the Gazette appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed a Munsif to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein
 Section 11 of the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant only by making an application to the Rent Control Court and it also sets out the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant
Section 18 of the Act provides for an Appeal being preferred by an aggrieved person to the Appellate Authority
The relevant portions of Section 18 are as under 18
Appeal1a The Government may by general or special order notified in the Gazette confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order
b   2   3   Explanation   878 4 The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears or rent
5 The decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20 Emphasis supplied
Then comes Section 20 which provides for Revisions and it reads as follows 20
Revision1 In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a subordinate Judge the District Court and in other cases the High Court may at any time on the application of any aggrieved party call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit
2 The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub section 1 shall be in it discretion
20A Power to remand In disposing of an appeal or application for revision under this Act the appellate authority or the revising authority as the case may be may remand the case for fresh disposal according to such directions as it may give
 The scope and effect of Section 201 read with Section 185 of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary AIR 1969 Kerala 103
The Full Bench held that since the District Court exercising revisional powers under Section 201 of the Kerala Act functions as a Court and not as a persona designata the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that Court including any right of appeal or revision will be inhered to the decision rendered by the District Court
In that view of the matter the Full Bench held that a decision of a District Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction 879 of the High Court especially when there is no provision in the Act providing for an appeal against an order of the District Court under Section 20 or in the alternative any express provision declaring the finality of the said order
The decision of the Full Bench held the field for a number of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases where the competence of the High Court to entertain a revision under Section 115 CPC against an order of a District Court passed under Section 201 of the Kerala Act was challenged the contention was repelled by reference to the judgment of the Full Bench
One such case in point is Balagangadhara Menon vs TV Peter 1984KLT 845
The question decided by the Full Bench however came to be raised before this Court in Aundal Ammal s case supra
A Bench consisting of ES Venkataramiah J and one of us Sabyasachi Mukharji J held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed s case supra cannot be approved because the High Court had not properly construed Sections 185 and 20 of the Kerala Act
The relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms In our opinion the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub section 5 of Section 18 of the Act
Sub section 5 of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act
There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question
When Section 185 of the Act specifically states that shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except in the manner provided under Section 20 it cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Produce could revise an order once again after revision under Section 20 of the Act
That would mean there would be a trial by four courts that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question
Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law s delay and justice demands finality with quick disposal of case
The language of the provisions of Section 185 read with Section 20 inhibits further revision
The courts must so construe
 880 The Bench drew support for its conclusion from an earlier decision of this Court in Veshesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad  19802 SCC 378  In that case the two questions that case the two questions that fell for consideration were 1 Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under section 115 disposing of a revision petition 2 Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under section 115 against an order of the District Court under section 25 Provisional Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition Answering both the questions in the negative it was held in so far as question No 1 is concerned as follows  
In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it
It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme
The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court would be frustrated
The scheme would in large measure lose its meaning
If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs20000 a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs20000
That was never intended at all
 The second question was answered as under The question before us arises in those cases only where the District Judge has exercised revisional power under section 881 25
Is an order so made open to revision by the High Court under section 115
Code of Civil Procedure An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self sufficient code so far as the present enquiry is concerned
For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders made by a Court of Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under section 24 and section 25 respectively
Cases in which the District Judge and High Court respectively exercise revisional power revisional powers are specifically mentioned
A complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in the Act
Moreover section 27 of the Act provides 27
Finality of decrees and orders
Save as provided by this Act a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be final
 The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act
It is a point for consideration that had section 25 in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh continued in its original form the High Court would have exercised the revisional power under section 25 and no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional power of the High Court under section 115 of the Code
All the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure
By way of abundant caution section 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of sections 96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act
Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act
Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take effect
No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under section 25 before the proviso was added was now entrusted to the District Judge
It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the 882 burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act
We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold notwithstanding the amendment effected in section 25 that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final order of remedies and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute
 Taking the same view of the Kerala Act which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal s case supra that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC
 Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of the High Court and of this Court pertaining to Section 50 read with Section 486 of the said Act it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood before and after the amendments effected by the Amendment Act 31 of 1975
The relevant portions of Section 48 and 50 as they stood before the amendment and after the amendment are as under Before the Amendment After the Amendment 48
Appeals 1Notwithstanding Appeals 1 omitted
anything contained in any law for the time being in force every person aggrieved by an order under section 14 Section 16 Section 17 or section 21 passed by the Controller or the Court may within thirty days from the date of the order prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisd iction over the area in which the premises are situate
2  2   3  3   4  4   5
The appellate authority 5
The appllate authority shall send for the records shall send for the records of 883 of the case from the Courtthe case from the Controller and or the Controller as the caseafter giving the parties an oppor may be and after giving thetunity of being heard and if parties an opportunity of beingnecessary after making such further heard and if necessary afterenquiry as it thinks fit either itself making such further enquiry asor through the Controller shall it thinks fit either itself ordecide the appeal
through the Court or the Contro ller as the case may be shall decide the appeal
Explanation    6
Subject to any decision of the6
An order of the court or the High Court under section 50 theController shall subject to the decision of the District Judge shalldecision of the District Judge or th e be final and an order of the CourtHigh Court under section 50 or of or the Controller shall subject tothe relevant appellate authority the decision of the relevant appel under this Act be final and shall late authority under this Act or ofnot be liable to be called in questio n the High Court under section 50in any court of law whether in a be final and shall not be liable tosuit or other proceeding or by way be called in question in any courtof appeal or revision
of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision
Revision by the High Court50
Revision
The High Court may at any1The High Court mayat any time call for and examine timecall for examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the i the records relating to anycourt of Civil Judge under this Act decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con taken by the District Judgetroller under sections 1415 16or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself ii any order passed or proceed as to the legality or correctness of ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference Controller under section 14thereto as it thinks fit
section 15 or section 16
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit 2
The costs of and incidental2
The District Judge may at any all proceedings before the Hightime call for and examine any order Court shall be in its distretionpassed or proceeding taken by the 884 Court of Munsiff referred to in sub clauseiiiof clause d of section3for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit
the order of the District Judge shall be final
The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge as the case may be
 On a reading of the provisions it may be seen that under Section 48 as it stood prior to the amendment an appeal lay to the District Judge against an order passed under Sections 14 16 17 or 21 by the Rent Controller or the Court and thereafter a revision lay to the High Court under Section 50 of the Act
Sub section 6 of Section 48 further provided that the decision of the District Judge shall subject to the decision of the High Court under Section 50 be final and the order of the Court or the Controller shall subject to the decision of the relevant Appellate Authoirty under the Act or of the High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision
One of the changes effected by the Amending Act was to confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in the place of District Munsifs in respect of house rent control cases arising in the city of Mangalore
Another change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control Court by deleting sub section 1 of Section 48
The third change effected is of a two fold nature
The first is to restrict the High Court s powers of revision under Section 50 to only those cases decided by the city Civil Judges and the second is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect of cases decided by the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in areas outside the city of Bangalore
Thus what the legislature had done was to do away with the remedy of an appeal so as to save the litigants from a large segment of time and much expenses
The resultant position is that as against the orders of District Munsifs acting as Rent Controllers a right of appeal to the District Judge and a further revision to the High Court has been taken away and instead only a right of revision to the District Court is provided
In so far as the cases disposed of by the Civil Judges in the city of Bangalore are concerned a right of revision is provided to the High Court
Notwithstanding the changes effected 885 Section 486 inter alia provided that an order of the Court or the Controller shall subject to the decision of the District Judge or the High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision
In the background of the changes made by the legislature a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court went into the question in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar  Others ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 whether by reason of Section 486 a further revision against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under Section 502 of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to the High Court under Section 115 of CPC Venkataramiah J as he then was who spoke for the Full Bench held that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation Indore  and Krishnadass Bhatija vs AS Venkatachala Shetty SLP Civil No 913 of 1978 decided on 13th February 1978 the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 CPC to revise an order of the District Judge passed under Section 502 will stand unaffected
The correctness of this view was questioned before another Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in MM Yaragatti vs Vasant  Others AIR 1987 Karnataka 186
The Full Bench took the view that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases viz Aundal Ammal s case supra and Vishesh Kumar s case supra the law laid down in Krishnaji s case supra cannot be considered good law any longer and as such a further revision to the High Court under Section 115 CPC will not lie against an order passed by a District Judge in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 502 of the Karnataka Act
The correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench in Yaragatti s case supra fell for consideration by this Court in Shyamaraju s case supra
A Bench of this Court held that in so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned the relevant provisions warranted invoking the ratio in Chhaganlal s case supra and Krishna Das Bahtija supra and therefore the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji s case supra is the correct one and not the view taken in Yaragatti s case supra
The position therefore is that so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned an order of a District Judge under Section 502 though conferred finality under the Act is nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by means of a further revision under Section 115 CPC by the aggrieved party
886 What now falls for consideration is whether there is any conflict between the decision in Aundal Ammal s case supra and Shyamaraju Hegde s case supra and whether the ratio in the former case requires reconsideration
Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different
However to clarify matters further we may point out the differences between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity
Under the Kerala Act against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided over by a District Munsif the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal under Section 18
The Appellate Authority has to be a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge
The Appellate Authority has been conferred powers co extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having over riding effect
Having these factors in mind the Legislature has declared that in so far as an order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority and in so far as an Appellate Authority is concerned its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20
As regards Section 20 a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and the District Court
In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18 the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority
It is only in other cases ie where the decision sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge the High Court has been constituted the Revisional authority
The revisional powers conferred under Section 20 whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 CPC Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality regularity or propriety of the orders sought to be revised
Not only that the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have been expressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20A of the Act
Therefore a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case before the Rent Control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz the District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge
The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before 887 three courts viz the Trial Court the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court there was no need to make the revisional order of the District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code
It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal s case supra that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms of Section 20 read with Section 185 in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion
According to the Full Bench a revisional order of a District Court under Section 20 laid itself open for further challenge to the High Court under Section 115 CPC because of two factors viz 1 there was no mention in the Act that the order would be final and 2 there was no provision in the Act for an appeal being filed against a revisional order under Section 20
The Full Bench failed to notice certain crucial factors
In the first place Section 20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court
Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under Section 20 will not have finality because the Section does not specifically say so then it will follow that a revisional order passed by the High Court under Section 201 also will not have finality
Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of its powers of revision under Section 201 can be subjected to further revision because Section 201 has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that Section
Secondly the terms of Section 201 have to be read in conjunction with Section 185
Section 185 as already seen declares that an order of a Rent Control Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20
When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective states unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 201 by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality
The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20
These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 CPC to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court 888 under Section 20 of the Act
This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal s case supra
As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar s case the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court and for determining the legislative intent the Court must as far as possible construe a statute in such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it
A thought may occur to some whether by a rigid construction of Section 201 read with Section 185 the High Court s power of superintendence over the District Court even when it functions as a revisional court under Section 201 of the Kerala Act will not stand forfeited
We may only state that legislative history would indicate that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 CPC appear to have been conferred and vested because the supervisory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition over Subordinate Courts in the mofussil could not be exercised and hence it would be reasonable to hold that it was intended   to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue the high prerogative writs and the power of supervision under the Charter Act and its successor provisions in the Constitution Acts vide para 10 SS Khanna vs Dillon  Incidentally we may also point out that the Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution over all courts and tribunals which are within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercise its jurisdiction
Having said so much it is really not necessary for us to dwell at length about the decision in Shyamaraju s case restoring the ratio in Krishnaji s case and disapproving the decision in Yaragatti s case
Even so we cannot but refer to the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely taken away and the entire proceedings are sought to be limited to a two tier system viz the Rent Control Court and the Revisional Court whereas under the Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz the Rent Control Court the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court
Though Section 486 of the Karnataka Act as amended also speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control Court subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under Section 50 in more or less the same terms as in Section 185 of the Kerala Act the force underlying the words shall be final 889 and shall not be liable to be called in question etc
has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspections
It is in that situation it was found in Shyamaraju s case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal s case and Krishnadas Bhatija s case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar s case and Aundal Ammal s case
In fact it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah J who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji s case was a party to the judgment in Aundal Ammal s case and the learned judge while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji J who spoke for the Bench has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji s case
There is therefore no conflict between the decision rendered in Aundal Ammal s case supra and Shyamaraju s case supra
As to the question whether a fresh thinking is called for on the scope of Section 20 read with Section 185 of the Kerala Act we do not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in Aundal Ammal s case and on the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal s case
An argument was advanced that since the decision in Vareed vs Mary had been good law for a number of years in Kerala State and since the High Court had been entertaining revision petitions under Section 115 CPC against the revisional orders of District Courts under Section 201 of the Kerala Act the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court
We are unable to countenance this argument in the circumstances of the case and the reason therefore can be set out by refering to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein
In West Ham Union vs Edmonton Union 13 at page 4 Lord Loreburn LC spoke as under Great importance is to be attached to old authorities on the strength of which many transactions may have been adjusted and rights determined
But where they are plainly wrong and especially where the subsequent course of judicial decisions has disclosed weakness in the reasoning on which they were based and practical injustice in the consequences that must flow from them I consider it is the duty of this House to overrule them if it has not lost the right to do so by itself expressly affirming them 890 In Robinson Brothers Brewers Ltd vs Houghton  Chesteric Street Assessment Committee 12 1937 2 All ER 298 affirmed in  the members of the Court having concluded that a decision on a question of rating pronounced some forty years previously by a Divisional Court was plainly wrong overruled it accordingly although the earlier decision had without doubt been frequently acted on in rating matters in the meantime and although no judicial doubt had previously been cast on its correctness
These decisions have been referred to and followed in Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd vs Poole Corporation All ER 1958 1205
On similar lines this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed vs Mary supra as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the relevant Sections in the Act and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar supra
In the light of our conclusion all the appeals must succeed in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under Section 115 CPC is concerned
In Civil Appeal Nos
626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985 the High Court allowed the revision petition under Section 115 CPC and ordered the eviction of the tenant
In Civil Appeal No 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order of eviction
In Civil Appeal No 1619 of 1986 the District Court allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court has confirmed the said order in the revision preferred to it
In Civil Appeal No 7505 of 1983 the District Court reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and ordered eviction and order of the District Court has been confirmed by the High Court
In Special Leave Petition No 4311 of 1985 the Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under Section 113 of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Control Court for deciding the question whether the tenant is entitled to resist the claim for eviction on the basis of the second proviso to Section 113 of the Act
The order of remand was confirmed by the District Court and the High Court
In accordance with our pronouncement it follows that the order of the High Court under Section 115 CPC in each of the appeals concerned viz Civil Appeal Nos
626 of 1981 624 of 1985 2079 of 1981 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of 1983 will stand set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case will stand restored and become operative
As the appeals are directed only against the order 891 of the High Court passed in revision the appeals will stand disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines
In Special Leave Petition Civil No 4311 of 1985 also the order of the High Court under Section 115 CPC is not sustainable but even so we do not find any merit in the petition because the finding of the Appellate Authority and the order of remand passed by it have been confirmed by the District Court and as such there are no merits in the petition accordingly it is dismissed
Interim orders if any passed in the appeals and the special leave petition will stand vacated
The parties in all the cases are directed to bear their respective costs
section RANGANATHAN J 1
I find on a cursory perusal of various State enactments on rent control that while a number of them do confer s 
cific jurisdiction on the State High Court some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments
Thus though we are concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these cases a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other States as well
It is in view of this importance of the question raised that I have considered it necessary to state my views in a separate order
The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest a power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders
The question in these matters is whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC can be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge
This question has been answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai a decision under the Kerala Act but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde vs Venkatesha Bhat  a decision under the Karnataka Act and hence this reference to a larger Bench
My learned brothers are of the view that there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments are not in pari materia and that so far as the Kerala Act is concerned Aundal Ammal should be followed
With respect I am unable to agree
Normally a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the CPC against any order of the District JudgeCourt
The fact that the order may have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contains expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District JudgeCourt or a subordinate authority or Court have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction
This is the effect 892 of the decisions in Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation Indore   a case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act and in Krishandas Bhatija vs Venkatachala Shetty SLP No 913 of 1978 decided on 1321978 and Shyamaraju s case supra which are direct decisions under the Karnataka Act
In my opinion there is no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also
The relevant provisions of the two enactments have been extracted in the order of Natarajan J and need not be set out again Under the Karnataka Act after its amendment in 1975 rent control matters are decided in the first instance by the District Munsiff or the Civil JudgeRent Controller according as the case arises outside or inside the city of Bangalore
There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision
This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the District Judge
The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the Civil JudgeRent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff
Section 502 specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final
The Kerala pattern is the same except that an appeal intervenes before the revision
Section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank
Section 20 provides for revision
The revisional power is to be exercised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the Subordinate Judge and the High Court in other cases
Section 20 does not provide as does Section 50 of the Karnataka Act that the decision of the District Judge shall be final
It is true that section 185 of the Kerala Act lays down that the order of the Rent Control court or where there is an appeal the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court of law except as provided in section 20 but the language of section 485 of the Karnataka Act is even stronger
It provides that the order of the Court or the Rent Controller shall subject to the decision in appeal or of the District Judge or the High Court in revision under section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called into question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision
 If the much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 as has been held in the two cases referred to above it is difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act
893 5
This poses then the question of a choice between the two views of this court the one in Shyamaraju and the one in Aundal Ammal
As has already been pointed out Shyamaraju follows the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal and Krishnadas Bhatija
The only other decision of this Court which has relevance in the present context is Vihesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad  which has been relied upon in Aundal Ammal
I am in agreement with the view expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally different statutory context
That decision turned largely on the legislative history of section 115 of the CPC and section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh
I am therefore inclined to lean in favour of the view that has commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of revision over the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well
Aundal Ammal has pointed out that such an interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four courts under the Kerala Rent Control Act viz the court of the first instance the appellate court the district court and then the High Court whereas under the Karnataka Act there are only three courts viz the court of the first instance the district court by way of revision and the High Court by way of further revision
This is no doubt true but can this alone be a reason why identical statutory language should be given different interpretation under the two enactments I think not
That apart the result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court in rent control matters and this if I am right in thinking that the two Acts are pari materia will leave the litigant in Karnataka with only a right of revision to the District Court
I venture to doubt whether in the absence of clear language the Legislature can be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important branch of the law
Moreover to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 would only encourage the recourse by aggrieved parties to articles 136 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the conclusion may not even result in reducing the spate of litigation under the Rent Control Acts in the High Courts and Supreme Court
I am therefore not inclined to attach muct importance to this circumstance as a guide to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute
The above interpretation will not render the language and scheme of section 185 read with section 20 totally redundant as was suggested in arguments before us
Section 20 is necessary because 894 though at present Subordinate Judges have been constituted as the appellate authorities under the Act the appellate authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and but for such a specific statutory provision there would be no remedy to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority
Section 185 is a provision of a general nature intended to prevent the orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged in the courts
These provisions in my opinion do not and cannot preclude the applicability of section 115 of the CPC to an order passed by the District Court not as a persona designata but as a civil court of the land
In this view of the matter sections 18 and 20 have a vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115
One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem is this
In the State of Kerala as early as in Vareed vs Mary AIR 1969 Ker 101 a view was taken that the High Court can entertain a second revision and though Shri Potti suggested that this view has been often challenged the above Full Bench decision hold the field till Aundal Ammal was decided
In Karnataka the maintainability of a second revision appears to have been taken for granted untill a doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act
This doubt was dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji s case ILR 1978 Kar
1585 that the High Court could maintain a second revision
This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in Yaragatti s case in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju s case
In the result the position has been that right through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala the prevalent view has been in favour of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court
I think that in a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary
I would therefore hold that the revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable and that the matters before us should be disposed of accordingly
However the petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers
SL Appeals and petitions disposed of


Summary:
The appellant was charged under section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and section 1678i of the Sea Customs Act i878 which were bailable offences and was released on bail by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
An application made subsequently by the complainant for cancellation of the bail was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that under section 496 he had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail
The complainant invoked the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A of the Code and the High Court took the view that under that section it had inherent power to cancel the bailand finding that on the material produced before the Court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large it cancelled the bail
On appeal to the Supreme Court Held that though under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial if his conduct subsequent to his release is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial he forfeits his right to be released on bail and such forfeiture can be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A of the Code
But the inherent power has to be exercised sparingly carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself
Lala jairam Das  Others vs King Emperor 1945 LR 72 IA 120 distinguished