ivil Appeal No 11 of 1950
Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay Bhagwati and Dixit JJ dated 16th December 1948 in Second Appeal No 1226 of 1945 confirming a judg ment and decree of the District Judge of Dharwar in Appeal No 123 of 1943
The facts of 404 the case and the arguments of the counsel appear in the judgment
B Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu N C Shaw with them for the appellant
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India V N Lokur with him for the respondents Nos 1 and 2
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India G N Joshi with him for respondent No 3 the State of Bombay 1952
January 30
Judgment was delivered by BOSE J PATANJALI SASTRI CJ and DAS J agreed with Bose J Bose J
The plaintiff appeals
The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay
The plaintiff claims to be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim
The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiff s family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay Province of Bombay at the date of the suit
The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4 a of Bombay Act X of 1876 Bombay Revenue Juris diction Act
The following genealogical tree will show the relation ship between the parties Bhujangrao Appasaheb British grantee Daulatrao I died 24 7 1864 Bhujangrao I Malojirao Yeshwantrao alias died 1881   Annasaheb    widow Krishnabai Daulatrao III Bhujangrao II Daulatrao II Del 1 Def 2 died 8 5 1931  Bhujangrao III Plaintiff 405 The facts are as follows
A common ancestor of the present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saran jam some time before the advent of the British
When they arrived on the scene they decided as far as possible to continue such Saranjams jagirs and inams as had been grant ed by the earlier rulers and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 The Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 to regulate the mode of recognition and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams which are analogous to jagirs
In compliance with this the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the Brit ish Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate
He may for convenience be termed the British Grantee
The Register exhibit P 53 shows that the estate consisted of 26 villages
We do not know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows  Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British conquest viz Bhujangrao Appasaheb the first British Grantee son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade
 On the death of the British Grantee Bhujangrao Appa saheb he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who died on the 24th of July 1864
This Daulatrao I left three sons Bhujangrao I Yeshwantrao and Malojirao
In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yesh wantrao alias Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession of this Saranjam
A question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the property in British India was partible
They further declared that Bhujangrao I was the head of the family and as such was entitled to a special assignment which was not to exceed a quarter share for the expenses and duties which might devolve on him by virtue of his position and that after this had been set aside each of the three brothers was entitled to an equal one third Share in the landed property in India
This judgment 406 is reported in The duties enumerated at page 170 included the keeping up of armed retainers for the fort of Gajendragad and for the improvement of that vil lage which was the chief seat of this branch of the Ghor pade family and also to enable him to distribute on ceremo nial occasions the customary presents to the junior members of the family
 The judgment is dated the 12th of October 1868
As a consequence a division of the property was ef fected
Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages
The other two brothers continued joint and took the remainder
But this was only with respect to property situate in British India
The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur
That was left undivided
Bhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother Yesh wantrao alias Annasaheb claimed to succeed as the sole heir
The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao I s widow Krishnabai to adopt a a boy from the family and recog nised him as the heir in respect of that portion of the estate which lay within the Principality of Kolhapur
This was on the 3rd of February 1882
The Bombay Government followed a similar course regarding the property in British India
On the 26th of April 1882 they passed a Resolution embodying the follow ing decision 1 The adoption was to be recognised and the adopted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father that is to say he was to get one third of the property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family
2 Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession
3 Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb was given the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or separating
Finally the Resolution Concluded 407 The two brothers will hold their respective shares as their private property in virtue of the decree of the High Court and the Jahagir will henceforth be restricted to the portion awarded by the High Court to Bhujangrao which the adopted son will now inherit
It should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court is not to be held as a precedent and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed
 This position was emphasised by Government in the same year on the 22nd August 1882
Krishnabai who had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao II asked that her husband s one third share in the estate be also treated as private property in the same way as the shares of the other two brothers
This prayer was refused and Government stat ed It should be plainly understood that Government allow the adoption to be made by her only in consideration of Bhujangrao s one third share as well as the portion assigned to him as head of the family being continued to the adopted son as indivisible Jahagir Estate descending in the line of male heirs in the order of primogeniture and subject to no terms whatsoever as to the enjoyment of the same by Krishna bai during her lifetime
 The position was re examined by Government in 1891 and its decision was embodied in the following resolution dated the 17th of March 1891 It appears to Government that the whole Gajendragad Estate is a Saranjam continuable as hereditary in the full est sense of the word as interpreted by the Court of Direc tors in paragraph 9 of their Despatch No 27 dated 12th December 1855
It is continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British con quest and should Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars
The property should be dealt with like Other Saranjams in the Political Department
 53 408 In the year 1901 the adopted son Daulatrao II sued Yeshwantrao s son Bhujangrao II for partition
It will be remembered that in the litigation of 1866 which ended in the Bombay High Court s judgment reported in 5 Bom
HCR 161 Malojirao alone separated and the other two brothers continued joint
The litigation of 1901 put an end to that position
High Court s judgment dated the 12th of March 1908 makes it clear that as Government was not a party to that litigation its rights against either or both of the parties were not affected
But as between the parties inter se they were bound by the previous decision and so the adopted son was entitled to partition and separate posses sion of such properties as might fall to his share
After this decision was given the two partitioned the property between themselves amicably
In or about the year 1930 a Record of Rights was intro duced in fourteen of the villages in the Gajendragad Jaha gir and a dispute arose again between the three branches of the family
The District Deputy Collector after inspecting the records found that the name of the Khatedar Saran jamdar alone has found place in the village Inam register in the Saranjam list and the land alienation register while in the other village records the various members of the family were entered according to the actual wahivat or enjoyment After due consideration he thought that the interest of Government and the Saranjamdar would be sufficiently safeguarded by allowing the same position to continue
He ordered the entries to be made accordingly
The order also discloses that the matter had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government
In the meanwhile on the 5th of May 1898 a set of Rules framed under Schedule B Rule 10 of the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and published in the Bombay Gazette
These Rules were republished probably with some modification in the Gazette of 8th July 1901
The portions applicable here were as follows 409 I Saranjams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by Government in each case
A Saranjam which has been decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative in the order of primogeniture of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British Gran tee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest
But Government reserve to themselves their rights for suffi cient reason to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the said family or as an act of grace to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Government
V Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate
It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Gov ernment unencumbered by any debts or charges save such as may be specially imposed by Government itself
No Saranjam shall be capable of sub division
Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of certain members of the family enumerated in the Rule
If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is not carried out Government may whatever the reason may be direct the Saranjam or a portion of it to be resumed 
Provision for the members of the Saranjam dar s family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed
 After the District Deputy Collector s orders were passed on the 20th of May 1930 Daulatrao II died on the 8th of May 1931 and the matter was again taken up by Government
This time it passed the following 410 Resolution on the 7th of June 1932
The Resolution was headed Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No 91 of the Saranjam List
 It reads Resolution  The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder
The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar
The Governor in Council agrees with the Commis sioner Southern Division that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should be continued to them as at present
 The Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the plain tiff who is shown as Bhujangrao III in the genealogical tree
The defendants were evidently aggrieved by this for they filed Suit No 23 of 1934 against the present plaintiff and the Secretary of Stateor India in Council praying inter alia that the properties in that suit viz the villages allotted to their shares were their independent and private properties and in case they were held to be Saranjam proper ties they be declared as independent Saranjams separate and distinct from the one held by the present plaintiff
 This suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action against the present plain tiff but not against the Secretary of State for India in Council
According to defendants 1 and 2 this was pursuant to an arrangement between the Government and themselves that Government would issue a fresh Resolution in terms of the earlier Resolution dated the 17th of March 1891
411 This was done
On the 25th of February 1936 Government passed the following Resolution  Resolution  After careful consideration the Governor in Council is pleased to confirm the decision in Government Resolution Political Department No 1769 dated the 17th of March 1891and to declare that the whole of the Gajendragad Estate shall be continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam on the conditions stated in the said Resolution
Having regard however to the manner in which different portions of the estate have been held by different branches of the family the Governor in Council in modification of the orders contained in Government Resolution No 8969 dated the 7th June 1932 is pleased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade respectively shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives respectively of three branches of the Ghorpade family
Each of the said de facto shares shall be continuable hereditarily as such as ii it were a separate Saranjam estate in accordance with the rules made for the continuance of Saranjams by the Governor in Council in exercise of the powers referred to in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act 1852 and section 2 3 of the Bombay Summary Settlement Act VII of 1863 and such special orders as the Governor in Council may make in regard to the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or in regard to the said share
The recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records as separate shares shall not be deemed to amount to a recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any manner partible or alienable and shall not in any way affect the right of Government to treat the said estate as an entire impartible and inalien able Saranjam estate
The Governor in Council further directs that the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of 412 sub division and shall not in any way be alienated or encum bered except in accordance with the rules and orders re ferred to above  The present suit is an attack on the action of Govern ment in passing this Resolution
The first and second defendants are the present representatives of the other branches of the family and the third defendant is the Prov ince of Bombay now the State of Bombay
The plaint states 9
Government can have no jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full bene fit of all the rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam
The Order of Government of the 8th February 1936 is therefore ultra vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff 10
Defendants 1 and 2 therefore are not entitled to any rights or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saran jam which according to the GR is continuable as an inali enable and impartible Saranjam  such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers in any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam
The cause of action arose in April 1938 and the resolution and the entry being ultra vires is not binding 12
As this is a suit claiming for relief primarily against defendants 1 and 2 defendant 3 is made a party to the suit in order to enable Government defendant 3 to give proper effect to the decision of Government of the 17th March 1891 and of 7th June 1932 as against defendants 1 and 2 who have no right to the position which they claim  The reliefs prayed for are a That it be declared that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to go behind the order of the Government as per Reso lution No 8969 of 7th June 1932 under which plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as the sole Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by them as mere potgi holders
413 b That in consequence of his position of a sole Saran jamdar the plaintiff alone at any rate during his lifetime has the sole right to the rights and privileges appertaining to the post of a sole Saranjamdar to wit to be consulted in the appointment of the village officers in all the villages appertaining to the Saranjam estate but assigned to defendants 1 and 2 for potgi c Defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from doing any acts or taking any steps in contravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff
d That it be declared that defendant 3 Government have no right to change the Resolution No 8969 of 7th June 1932 and at any rate during the lifetime of the plaintiff
 The first Court dismissed the plaintiff s claim on the merits holding that Government had the right to amend its Resolution in the way it did
The lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on three grounds 1 that the two previous decisions of 1868 and 1908 operate as res judicata 2 that the impugned Resolution is intra vires and 3 that section 4 a and d of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court
In second appeal the High Court only considered the question of jurisdiction and agreeing with the lower appel late Court on the point dismissed the appeal but it granted the plaintiff leave to appeal to this Court
The only question we have to consider is the one of jurisdiction
Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act 1876 Bombay Act X of 1876 runs Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to a claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam  It was strenuously contended that this is not a claim against the Crown but one against the first and second defendants
That in my opinion is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and reliefs aand d
In any event Mr Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant 414 and those portions of the plaint which sought relief against it
He said he was not prepared to do so
I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party
I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4a
The next question is whether assuming that to be the case it is also one relating to lands held as Saranjam
 So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned that is clearly the case
Paragraph 9 of the plaint challenges Government s jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff of the full benefit of all rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam
These rights cannot exist apart from the lands which form part of the Saranjam estate and the implication of the prayer is that Government has for example no right to resume the Saranjam either under Rule V on the death of the last Saran jamdar or under Rule IX during his lifetime
It is to be observed that a resumption under Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance of those entitled to it out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed
 These revenues can only come out of the land
Relief d in the prayer clause seeks a declaration that Government has no right to change Resolution No 8969 dated the 7th of June 1932
That Resolution directly relates to the land because it directs that the Gajendragad Saranjam be resumed and the Collector is directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saran jam estate etc
It is impossible to contend that this is not a claim relating to lands held as Saranjam
It was next argued that if that be the case the claim against Government can be dismissed and the plaintiff can at least be given the reliefs claimed against the other two defendants
These it was contended do not relate to land and in any event are not claims against the Crown
415 In my opinion this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately
That is evident enough from paragraph 10 of the plaint
In para graph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is challenged and in paragraph 10 the plaintiff explains that therefore the first and second defendants are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar
One of those rights as we have seen from Rules VII and IX is to take the revenues of the entire estate in order that he might fulfil his obligation regarding the payment of maintenance to certain members of the family and if the defendants claim to hold their lands under the orders of Government and the plaintiff insists on retaining Government as a party in order that it may be bound by the decree he wants against the other defendants it is obvious that his claim against these defendants cannot be separated from his claim against the Government
In any event if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders
There are two decisions of the Bombay High Court which have taken this view
Basalingappagouda vs The Secretary of State for India1 was a Watan case
Government had recog nised the second defendant as the Watandar
Plaintiff sued Government and the second defendant and sought a declaration and injunction
On being faced with the dilemma that the suit against Government did not lie because of section 4 a 3 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876 he asked the Court as here to leave the Government out of consider ation and decree his claim against the second defendant alone
The learned Judges held that that would amount to striking out the main relief sought against both the defend ants and would entirely 1 28 Born
LR 651
54 416 change the character of the suit and added that as long as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit such a decla ration could not be granted
 In the other case Basangauda vs The Secretary State1 Beaumont CJ and Baker J took the same view
They said Mr Gumaste who appears for the appellant says that his claim is not a claim against the Government but in that case he ought to strike out the Government
He is not pre pared to strike out the Government because if he does they will not be bound by these proceedings and will follow the decision of their revenue tribunals
Therefore he wants to make the Government a party in order that they may be bound
But if they remain a party it seems to me that there is a claim against them relating to property appertaining to the office of an hereditary officer although no doubt it is quite true that the appellant does not desire to get any order against the Government as to the way in which the property should be dealt  with or anything of the sort and he only wants a declaration as to his title which will bind Government They held that the jurisdiction of the courts was oust ed
It was next contended on the strength of a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Province of Bombay vs Horrnusji Manekji2
that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether Government acted in excess of its powers and that that question must be decided first
In my opinion this decision does not apply here
Their Lordships were dealing with a case falling under section 4 b of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876
That provides that  no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to  b objections to the amount or incidence of any assess ment of land revenue authorised by the Provincial Govern ment
 1 2 74 I A 103 417 As pointed out by Strangman KC on behalf of the plaintiff respondent authorised must mean duly autho rised and in that particular case the impugned assessment would not be duly authorised if the Government Resolution of 11 4 1990 purporting to treat the agreement relied on by the respondent as cancelled and authorising the levy of the full assessment was ultra vires under section 211 of the Land Revenue Code
Thus before the exclusion of the Civil Court s jurisdiction under section 4 b could come into play the Court had to determine the issue of ultra vires
Consequently their Lordships held that that question was outside the scope of the bar
But the position here is different
We are concerned here with section 4 a and under that no question about an authorised act of Government arises
The section is general and bars all claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam
 That is to say even if the Government s act in relation to such lands was ultra vires a claim impugning the validity of such an act would fall within the scope of the exclusion in clause a provided it relates to such land
There is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only relief sought against Government is a declaration
One set of decisions holds that that does not amount to a claim against Government
 Dattatraya Vishwanath vs The Secretary of State for India1 is typical of that view
On the other hand Daulatrao vs Government of bombay2 a case relating to the Gajendragad estate took the other view
In my opin ion the latter view is correct
In my opinion the decision of the High Court was right and I would dismiss the appeal with costs
PATANJALI SASTRI CJ I agree
SR DAS J I agree
Appeal dismissed
Agent for respondents Nos 1  2 MSK Sastri
Agent for respondent No 3 PA Mehta
1ILR 1948 Born
809 at 820


Summary:
The lands of the respondent and other land owners were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894
Notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were published on 1051979 and 2731981 respectively
The respondent and other land owners filed Reference Applications us 18 of the Act against the award before the District Judge
The District Judge classifying the acquired land into various grades awarded compensation and also granted bene fits us 231 A of the Act to the respondent and other land Owners
Hence the State appealed to the High Court
Those land owners who were not satisfied with the compensation awarded and those to whom benefit us 231 A were not granted also appealed to the High Court
The Single Judge of the High Court confirmed the grant of benefits us 231 A of the Act and also granted such benefits to those cases where such benefits were not given by the District Judge
The State preferred the Letters Patent Appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court contending that the respondent and 479 other land owners were not entitled to the benefit of sec tion 231 A of the Act that the section 231 A was intro duced by the Land AcquisitionAmendment Act 1984 that as the Collector had made his award on 3131981 the provisions of section 231 A of the Act was not applicable to the cases of the respondent and other land owners
The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeals of the State
Hence the present appeals by special leave were filed by the State before this Court
The parties before this Court made the same submissions which were made before the High Court
Dismissing the appeal CA No4568 of 1991 this Court HELD 1
A perusal of the provisions of sub section1 A of section 23 makes it clear that the said sub section deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub section in the circumstances set out therein
Similarly sub section2 of Section 23 also confers a substantive right on the claimant to a higher solatium
486 E F 2
The provisions of the Act being substantive in nature can have only prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are couched read in the context shows that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them
The language of sub section1 A of section 23 shows that a duty is cast on the court to award an amount calculated as stated therein in addition to the market value of the land acquired for the period commencing from the date of the publication of sec tion 4 of the Notification to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession whichever is earlier
486 F G 3
The expression award used in section 231 A suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said sub section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the Trial Court hearing the Reference under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act has still to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub section on September 30 1984
486 H 487 A 480 4
The expression award is to be distinguished from the expression decree and hence it appears that in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the Act the provisions of subsection1 A of section 23 would not come into play where the awards had been made by the Collec tor earlier as well as by the Reference Court but on the date of coming into effect of the said sub section an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a court
In that case the court would not be awarding any amount but would be making a decree for an amount
487 B C 5
By reason of the provision of section 301a of the Amendment Act of 1984 the provisions of section 231 A of the Act were by a deeming provision made also applica ble to every proceeding for the acquisition of land under the Act where the Collector had not made his award by
April 301982
On a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 231 A read with section 301a of the Amendment Act of 1984 an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in section 231 A is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 301982 but the Court might have made its award before September 241984
487 D E 6
The construction that is being given to the provi sions of section 231 A and section 301a will in a sense limit the benefits strictly conferred by section 301a to only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards between April 301982 and September 24 1984
That cannot be helped as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of the clear language used in the relevant provisions
487 E F 7
The Court would not be justified in giving an unduly restricted meaning to the provisions of section 231 A unwarranted by the plain language of the sub section
487 F 8
Section 231 A refers clearly to the duties of the court
The court is defined by section 3d as the principal court of original jurisdiction except in the circumstances set out in the said subsection which would be the court having jurisdiction to decide the reference under section 18 of the Act
There is therefore no warrant to read in the place of the word Court in Section 231 A the word Collector
Moreover the decision of such a court deter mining compensation is regarded as an award under the Act
In the light of the provisions there is no warrant to give an unduly restricted meaning to section 231 A of the Act
487 G 488 A 481 9
On the plain language of section 231 A itself the duty was cast on the court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed therein which would mean that such amount is directed to be awarded by the court namely the Reference court in all cases which are pending before that court on September 1 1984
Sub section 1a of Section 30 lays down that the provisions of section 231 A of the Act are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisi tion of any land under the said Act pending on April 301982 where no award had been made by the Collector before that date
At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred to in section 231 A could not be awarded where the Collector had made his award before April 301982
But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the claimants on a plain reading of section 23t A
This is clear from the use of the word also in the opening part of section 301
489 E H 10
In the present case as the Reference court has made its award after September 241984 the benefit of the provi sions of Section 231 A was clearly available to the claim ant
491 D Jaiwant Laxman PSardesai etc
vs Government of Goa Daman and Diu and Another etc AIR 1987 Bombay 214FB and Union of India  Others vs Filip Tiago De Gama of lied era Vasco De Gains 1990 1 SCC 277 overruled
State of Punjab vs Krishan Lal AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 222FB and Maya Devi and Others vs The Union Territory of Chandigarh  ap proved
Union of India and Another etc
vs Raghuvir Singh dead by Lrs
   K Kamala Jammannia varu vs Special Land Acquisition Officer 1985 I SCC 582 and Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandigarh   referred to