No 179 of 1968
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of Habeas corpus
RL Kohli for the petitioners
Debabrata Mukherjee and PK Chakravarti for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami J
In this case the petitioners have
obtained a rule calling upon the respondent viz The State of West Bengal 637 to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued under article 32 of the Constitution directing their release from detention under orders passed under section 32 of the Act IV of 1950 hereinafter called the Act 
Cause has been shown by Mr Debabrata Mukherjee and other Counsel on behalf of the respondent to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given
The case of the petitioners will be considered in the following three groups 1 Petitioners nos
2 4 5 6 16 17 20 and 26 2 Petitioners nos
1 3 7 10 12 13 19 and 22 3 Petitioners nos
8 9 and 21
By the order of this Court dated October 18 1968 the cases as regards petitioners nos
11 14 15 18 23 24 25 27 to 30 were dismissed as they were reported to have been released
As regards petitioner No 5 Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta Bose the order of detention was made on January 20 1968 by the District Magistrate Howrah and reads as follows No 202C Dated Howrah the 20th January 1968 WHEREAS I am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Chandra Bose son of Shri Sishir Kumar Bose of 26 Nilmoni Mallick Lane PS and Distt Howrah that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it is necessary so to do  therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 32 of the Act IV of 1950 I make this order directing that the said Shri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Chandra Bose be detained
Given under my hand and seal of office
Sd DC Mookherjee District Magistrate Howrah
On the same date  the following grounds of detention were communicated to the detenu You are being detained in pursuance of a detention order made under sub section 2 of section 3 of the  Act IV of 1950 on the following grounds Sup C169 8 638 2
You have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by commission of offences of riotous conduct criminal intimidation and assault as detailed below  a That on 3 11 65 at about 1730 hrs
you assaulted Shri Ashutosh Dutta son of Shri Pyari Mohan Dutta of 55 MC Ghosh Lane PW Howrah at the crossing of Panchanan Tala Road and MC Ghosh Lane with knife causing bleeding injuries on his hand
b That on 8 10 66 at about 1600 hrs
while Shri Mahesh Prosad Bhagal son of Balgobinda Bhagal of 16 Belilious Road PS Howrah was playing in an open field you along with your associates demanded money from him and on his refusal you hurled cracker on him causing grievous injury on his right leg c That on 8 6 67 at about 1140 hrs
you accosted one Sushanta Kumar Ghosh son of Manmatha Ghosh of 211 Danesh Sk
Lane inside a saloon at 255 Panchanantala Road on previous grudge and being intervened by Shri Shyamal Biswas son of Sandhya Biswas of 255 panchanantala Road PS Howrah you whipped out a dagger and assaulted Shri Biswas with the dagger causing injury on his hand
d That on 23 11 67 at about 2245 hrs
you hurled cracker on ASIB Kundu of Bantra PS while he was coming to Howrah along panchanantala Road in a wireless van and caused injury to the ASI and damage to the wireless van
e That on 7 1 68 at about 1830 hrs
you threatened one Satya Narayan Prosad son of Late purusattam Prosad of 10 Debnath Banerjee Lane PS Howtab with assault at the crossing of MC Ghosh Lane and Bellilious Road
You are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government within 30 days of the receipt of the detention order and that such representation should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal Home Department Special Section Writers  Buildings Calcutta and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail in which you are detained
You are also informed that under Section 10 of the Act IV of 1950 the Advisory Board shall if you desire to be heard you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the 639 Advisory Board you should intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government
Sd DC Mookerjee District Magistrate Howrah
 On March 19 1968 the Advisory Board made a report under section 10 of the Act stating that there was sufficient cause for detention of Sri Kanta Bose alias Subhas Ch
On March 30 1968 the Governor of West Bengal confirmed the detention order under section 11 1 of the Act
Section 3 of the Act provides 3
1 The Central Government or the State Government may a If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to i the defence of India the relation of India with foreign powers or the security of India or ii the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or iii the maintenance or supplies and a services essential to the community or b if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the XXXI of 1946 that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India it is necessary so to do make an order directing that such persons be detained
2 Any of the following officers namely a District Magistrates b Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government c the Commissioner of Police for Bombay Calcutta Madras or Hyderabad d Collector in the State of Hyderabad may satisfied as provided in sub clauses 2 and 3 of clause a of sub section 1  exercise powers conferred by the said sub section
640 3 When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub section 2 he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention Second Amendment Act 1952 shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by State Government
4 When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section the State Government shall as soon as may be report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have bearing on the necessity for the order
 Section 7 is to the following effect 7 1 When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order the authority making the order shall as soon as may be but not later than five days from the date of detention communicate to him the grounds on which order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity if making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government
2 Nothing in sub section 1 shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose
 It will be noticed that before an order of detention can be validly made by the detaining authorities specified by section 32 of the Act the authority must be satisfied that the detention of the person is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any prejudicial manner as indicated in cls
i to iii of section 31 a
It is well settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority to which section 31 a refers is a subjective satisfaction and so is not justifiable
Therefore it would not be open to the detenu to ask the Court to consider the question as to whether the said satisfaction of the detaining authority can be justified by the application of objective tests
It would not be open for instance to the detenu to contend that the grounds supplied to him do not necessarily or reasonably lead to the conclusion that if he is not detained he would indulge in prejudicial activities
The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law the adequacy of the material on 641 which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law
That is the effect of the true legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by section 31a of the Act See the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya1
But there is no doubt that if any of the grounds furnished to the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of cls
i to iii of section 31a and in that sense arc foreign to the Act the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order liable to be quashed
Similarly if some of the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation that again may make the order of detention invalid
If however the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under section 3  1   a  of the Act it would not be open to the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on any of the said grounds
It is also necessary to emphasise in this connection that though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by section 3 1 a is the subjective satisfaction of the said  authority cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides
The detenu may say that the passing of the order of detention was an abuse of the statutory power and was for a collateral purpose
In support of the plea of mala fides the detenu may urge that along with other facts which show mala fides the grounds served on him cannot rationally support the conclusion drawn against him by the detaining authority
It is only in this incidental manner that this question can become justifiable otherwise the reasonableness or propriety of the said satisfaction contemplated by section 31a cannot be questioned before the Courts
The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds a b and e served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to the maintenance of public order
All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order
In the present case we are concerned with detention under section 3 1  of the which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
Does the expression public1  642 order take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof
It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder
When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder
Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order
The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order it must affect the community or the public at large
In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest
A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act
A District Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action under section 3 1  of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances
In Dr Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar1 it was held by the majority decision of this Court that the expression public order was different and does not mean the same thing as law and order
The question at issue in that case was whether the order of the District Magistrate Patna under Rule 301b of the Defence of India Rules 1962 against the petitioner was valid
Rule 30 1 b provided that a State Government might if it was satisfied with respect to a person that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order  it is necessary to do so order him to be detained
The order of the District Magistrate stated that he was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of law and order  it was necessary to detain him
Prior to the making of the order the District Magistrate had however recorded a note stating that having read the report of the Police Superintendent that the petitioner s being at large was prejudicial to public safety  and maintenance of public order  he was satisfied that the petitioner should be detained under the rule
The petitioner moved this Court under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus directing his release from detention contending that though an order of detention to prevent acts prejudicial to public order may be justifiable an order to prevent acts prejudicial to law and order would not be justified by the rule
It was held by the majority judgment that what was 1   643 meant by maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature whereas the expression maintenance of law and order  meant prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance
At page 746 of the Report Hidayatullah J as he then was observed as follows in the course of his judgment It will thus appear that just as public order  in the rulings of this Court earlier cited was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting security of State  law and order  also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order 
One has to imagine three concentric circles
Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State
It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State
By using the expression maintenance of law and order  the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules
 The order no doubt mentioned another ground of detention namely the prevention of acts prejudicial to public safety and in so far as it did so it was clearly within the rule
But the order of detention must be held to be illegal though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order of detention could have been based because it could not be said in what manner and to what extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his subjective satisfaction
It was accordingly held that the order of detention made by the District Magistrate was invalid and the petitioner should be set at liberty
In our opinion the principle laid down in this case governs the decision in the present case also and the order of the District Magistrate Howrah dated January 20 1968 must be held to be ultra vires and illegal
The difference between the concepts of public order  and law and order  is similar to the distinction between public  and private  crimes in the realm of jurisprudence
In considering the material elements of crime the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal
Dr Allen has distinguished public  and private  crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest while others directly injure the public interest and affect indivi 644 duals only remotely
see Dr Allen s Legal Duties p 249
There is a broad distinction along these lines but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test
The learned author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences 203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs
The argument was however stressed by Mr Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent that the other grounds viz c and d mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate dated January 20 1968 are more serious in character and may be held prejudicial to public order
We shall assume in favour of the respondent that grounds c and d are matters prejudicial to public order
But even upon that assumption the order of detention must be held to be illegal
It is now well established that even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction is irrelevant the order of detention would be invalid even if there were other relevant grounds because it can never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority concerned or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them See the decisions of this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena vs The State of Uttar Pradesh1 and Dr Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar2
For these reasons we hold that the order of detention made by the District Magistrate Howrah under section 32 of the Act dated January 20 1968 against petitioner Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta Bose and the consequent order made by the Governor dated March 30 1968 confirming the order of detention under section 11 1  of the Act must be declared to be illegal and accordingly the petitioner
Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta Bose is entitled to be released from custody forthwith
In the case of petitioner 2 Sukumar Chaudhury No 4 Tarapada Bhowmick No 6 Golam Rasul Molliek No 16 Sk
Sharafat No 17 Hanif Mirza No 20 Sk
Mann and No 26 Chittaranjan Majhi the orders of detention suffer from the same defect as that in the case of petitioner No 5 Subhas Chandra Bose alias Kanta Bose
For the reasons already given we hold that the orders of detention made under section 32 of the Act and the orders of confirmation by the State Government under section 11 1  of the Act in the case of all these petitioners are illegal and ultra vires and these petitioners are also entitled to be set at liberty forthwith
We pass on to consider the case of the petitioner mentioned in Group 2
As regards Pushkar Mukherjee petitioner No 1  2  645 the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate 24 Parganas on September 19 1967 and reads as follows Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Pushkar Mukherjee son of Late Jaladhar Mukherjee Madhyamgram Bireshpally PS Baraset Dist
24 Parganas that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order it is necessary so to do
And therefore in exercise of the power conferred by Section 32 of the Act IV of 1950 I make this oder directing that the said Shri Pushkar Mukherjee son of Late Jaladhar Mukherjee be detained
B Majumdar District Magistrate 24 Parganas The grounds of detention were served upon the detenu on the same date and are to the following effect Grounds for detention under sub section 2 of section 3 of the Act IV of 1950
To Shri Pushkar Mukherjee so Late Jaladhar Mukherjee of Madhyamgram Bireshpally PS Baraset District 24 Parganas
In pursuance of the provision of Section 7 of the Act IV of 1950 as amended by the Preventive Detention Amendment Act 1952 and 1954 you Shri Pushkar Mukherjee so Late Jaladhar Mukherjee of Madhyamgram Bireshpally PS Baraset 24 Parganas are hereby informed that you are being detained under section 31aii of the on the following grounds  1
That you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by the commission of offences of riotous conduct criminal intimidation and assault as detailed below  i That on 26 3 1967 at about 1100 hrs
you along with your associates Harisikesh Samadder and others being armed with dagger spear and iron rods demanded money for drinks from Shri Joy Nath Roy in his Khatal at Katakhal Ganga Nagar PS Baraset and on his refusal to pay the money you along with your associates dragged him out of his room and assaulted  him and his friend Sudhir Ghose causing injuries on their persons
646 ii That on 19 6 1967 evening you along with your associates threatened Sushil Kumar Chakravorty of Madhyamgram with assault when he was returning home from New Barrackpore Rly Station apprehending that he might inform the police for your arrest in connection with Baraset PS Case No 56 dated 24 3 1967 us 302394 IPC which was pending investigation
iii That on 8 7 1967 at about 2200 hrs
you along with your associates Kalyan Chakraborty and others again threatened Shri Sushil Kumar Chakraborty of Madhyamgram with assault out of previous grudge when he was returning to his house from New Barrackpore Rly Stn
iv That you were detained for your rowdy activities us 301 of the DI Rules 1962 from 22 4 1964 under Govt
Order No 1233 HS dated 15 4 1964 and was released from detention on 4 10 1965
v That for your rowdy activities you were detained on 19 9 1966 under PD Order No 16366 which was confirmed under Govt
Order No 8999 HS dated 26 11 1966 and you were released from such detention on 13 3 1967 under Order No 1095 HS dated 13 3 1967 during General release
Thus from your activities subsequent to your release from detention under the PD Act on 13 3 1967 it appears that the detention did not produce the sobering effect on you
You have become a menace to the society and there have been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of Baraset and Khardah PS areas under 24 Parganas District and the inhabitants thereof are in constant dread of disturbances of public order
For the above reasons I am satisfied that you are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and order and therefore I have passed an order for your detention to ensure the maintenance of Public Order
You are further informed that you have right to make a representation in writing against this order under which you are detained
If you wish to make such a representation you should address it to the Assistant Secretary Govt
of West Bengal Home Special Department Writers  Buildings Calcutta through the Superintendent of your Jail as soon as possible
Your case will be submitted to the Advisory Board within 30 days of your detention and your representation if received later may not be considered by the Board
V You are also informed that under Section 10 of the Act IV of 1950 the Advisory Board shall if you desire to be heard hear you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you should 647 A intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government
B MAJUMDAR
District Magistrate 9 9 67
24 Pargan as
 On May 23 1968 the Advisory Board reported that there was sufficient cause for detention of the detenu
On June 12 1968 the Government of West Bengal confirmed the order of detention under section 11  1  of the Act
It appears to us that ground No 2 is extremely vague
Ground No 2 states You have become a menace to the society and there have been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of Baraset and Khardah PS areas under 24 Parganas District and the inhabitants thereof are in constant dread of disturbances of public order
 It is manifest that this ground is extremely vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard provided under Art 22  5  Reference may be made in this connection to the decision of this court in the state of Bombay vs Alma Ram ion of this Court in The State Sridhar Vaidva1 in which Kania of Bombay vs Atma Ram CJ observed as follows What is meant by vague  Vague can be considered as the antonym of definite 
If the ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague
It is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague
It must vary according to the circumstances of each case
It is however improper to contend that a ground is necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained person can be to deny it
That is a matter of detail which has to be examined in the light of the circumstances of each case
If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enable the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention it cannot be called vague
The only argument which could be urged is that the language used in specifying the ground is so general that it does not permit the detained  person to legitimately meet the charge against him because the only answer which he can make is to say that he did not act as generally suggested
In certain cases that argument may support the contention that having regard to the general language used in the ground he has not been given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention
It  cannot be disputed that the represen 1  648 tation mentioned in the second part of article 225
must be one which on being considered may give relief  to the detained person
 It was however argued by Mr Debabrata Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent that even though ground No 2 may be vague the other grounds supplied to the detenu are not vague and full and adequate particulars have been furnished
But it is well established that the constitutional requirement that the grounds must not be vague must be satisfied with regard to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege under cl
6 of article 22 of the ConstitUtion and therefore even though one ground is vague and the other grounds are not vague the detention is not in accordance with procedure established by law and is therefore illegal See the decision of this Court in Dr Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs The State of Delhi1
For these reasons we hold that the order of detention made against the petitioner Pushkar Mukherjee by the District Magistrate 24 Parganas on September 19 1967 and the consequent order of the Governor of West Bengal dated June 12 1968 confirming the order of detention were illegal and ultra vires and the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty forthwith
In the case of petitioners No 3 Barun Kumar Hore No 7 Karfick Dey No 10 Ajit Basak No 12 Sk
Idris No 13 Shamsuddin Khan No 19 Khokan Mitra and No 22 Ranjit Kumar Ghosal the orders of detention suffer from the same legal defect as the order of detention in the case of petitioner No 1 Pushkar Mukherjee
For the reasons already stated we hold that the orders of detention and the orders of confirmation made by the State Government under section 11 1  of the Act in the case of these seven petitioners also are illegal and ultra vires and these petitioners are also entitled to be set at liberty forthwith
As regards the cases of the remaining petitioners nos 8 9 and 21 Chandan P Sharma Sk
Sahajahan and Bind Parmeshwar Prasad alias Bindeshwari Prosad respectively we have persued the orders of detention and the grounds supplied to these petitioners
It is not shown by learned Counsel on their behalf that there is any illegality in the orders of detention or in the subsequent procedure followed for confirming these orders
In our opinion no ground is made out for grant of a writ of habeas corpus so far as these petitioners are concerned
Their applications for grant of a writ of habeas corpus are accordingly rejected
We desire to say that we requested  Mr Kohli to assist us on behalf of the petitioners and we are indebted to him for his assistance
YP Petitions dismissed


Summary:
In petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under article 32 of the Constitution for release from detention under orders passed under section 32 of the Prevention of Detention Act HELD The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law
But if any of the grounds furnished to the detent are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of cls
i to iii of section 31a of the Act and in that sense are foreign to the Act the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order liable to be quashed
640 H 641 C Even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction was irrelevant the order of detention would be invalid even if there were other relevant grounds because it could never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority concerned or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them
Similarly if some of the ground supplied to the detent are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detent of his statutory right of making a representation that again may make the order of detention invalid
If however the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under section 31a of the Act it would not be open to the detenu to challenge the order of detention by arguing that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is not reasonably based on any of the said grounds
Though the satisfaction of the detaining authority contemplated by section 31a is the subjective satisfaction of the said authority cases may arise where the detenu may challenge the validity of his detention on the ground of mala fides
641 B F 644 C D In the present case 1 with respect to some of the petitioners three of the grounds of detention related to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers
It could not be held that these grounds had any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order
Therefore the orders of detention of these petitioners were illegal and ultra virex
The expression public order in section 3 1 of the Act does not take in every kind of infraction of law
When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder
Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the 636 ground that they were disturbing public order
The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order it must affect the community or the public at large
A line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest must be drawn and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest
A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act
A District Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action under section 3 1  of the Act to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances
The difference between the concepts of public order  and law and order  is similar to the distinction between public  and private  crimes in the realm of jurisprudence
In considering the material elements of crime the historic Jests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal Public  and private  crimes have been distinguished in the sense that some Offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely
641 H 642 D 643 G H The State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya   Dr Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar   Shibban Lal Saksena vs The State of Uttar Pradesh   followed
2 One of the grounds of detention supplied to some of the other petitioners stated that they had become a menace to the society and there had been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of the locality and that the inhabitants thereof were in constant dread of disturbances of public order
The ground was extremely vague and gave no particulars to enable the petitioners to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and this infringed the Constitutional safeguard provided under article 225
Therefore the orders of detention of these petitioners were illegal and ultra vires
The Constitutional requirement that the ground must not be vague must be satisfied with regard to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained subject to the claim of privilege under el
6 article 22 of the Constitution and therefore even though one ground was vague and the other grounds were not vague the detention was not in accordance with procedure established by law and was therefore illegal
648 B C Dr Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs The State of Delhi   followed