Appeal No 2471 of 1972
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th March 1972 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No 17972
MK Ramamurthi KB Rohatagi VK Jain and MM Kashyap for the Appellant
SN Andley BP Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH J
This appeal by special leave is di rected against the judgment and order dated March 28 1972 of the High Court of Delhi dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the appellant herein
The facts essential for the purpose of this appeal are The appellant was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on temporary basis in the pay scale of Rs 68 170 which was subsequently revised to Rs 118 225 in the Primary School Northern Railway Colony II run by the Education Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi with effect from October 1 1958
He was confirmed on the said post on September 30 1959
On August 28 1964 he was transferred to the Senior Basic Middle School of the Corporation in Panna Mamirpur Narela 11
In September 1967 he was assigned the work of teaching certain subjects to both the sections of Class V In section A of Class V there 200 was at that time a student named Surinder Kumar son of Dhan Raj
On September 6 1967 Dhan Raj made a written complaint to the Education Officer of the Corporation a copy of which he endorsed to the Head Master of the School alleging therein that the appellant bad sensually misbehaved with his son Surinder Kumar in the School Premises during the recess time on 2nd and 4th September 1967
On October 5 1967 the Education Officer suspended the appellant
On April 15 1968 the Assistant Education Officer Rural North Zone was directed by his superior to prepare a charge sheet against the appellant whereupon a charge sheet was drawn up and served on the latter on November 16 1968
Therefore the Director of Inquiries who was deputed to enquire into the matter proceeded to hold the enquiry and on consideration of the evidence adduced before him he submitted a report on May 20 1969 holding that the charge levelled against the appellant had been established
On receipt of the report and perusal thereof the Deputy Commissioner Education of the Corporation passed the following order on May 20 1969 I have gone through the report of the Inquiry Officer and agree with his findings
The Inquiry Officer has held the charge of committing an immoral act with a student of Class V levelled against Shri Tara Chand Khatri AT Respondent as proved
Such an act on the part of a teacher is most unbecoming serious and reprehensible
I propose to impose the penalty of dismissal  from service which shall be a disqualification for future employment on the respondent Consequent upon the passing of this order a notice was issued to the appellant requiring him to show cause why the penalty of dismissal from service be not imposed on him
On July 11 1969 the appellant submitted his representation in reply to the show cause notice
By order dated July 30 1968 the Deputy Commissioner rejected the representation of the appellant and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service upon him
Aggrieved by this order the appellant preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of the Corporation on August 29 1969 under regulation 11 of the Delhi Munici pal Corporation Service Control and Appeal Regulations 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Regulations  Which was rejected by the Commissioner on September 13 1969
On October 11 1971 the appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No 1032 of 1969 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the aforesaid order of his dismissal from service The High Court allowed the petition on the ground that the order of the Appellate Authority was made in violation of the re quirements of regulation 15 of the Regulations and directed the Appellate  Authority to dispose of the appeal afresh on merits keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case as also the requirements of Regulation 15 of  the Regulation
While disposing of the writ petition the learned Judge added that if the appellant still felt ag grieved by the decision of the Appellate Authority he would be at liberty in appropriate proceedings not only to chal lenge the order of the Appellate Authority but the order of the disciplinary authority as well
On remand the Commis sioner of the Corporation who happened to be an officer different from the
one who rejected the appellant s appeal on the former occasion heard the appe 201 llant at considerable length but rejected the appeal by an elaborate order dated January 5 1972
The appellant thereupon filed writ petition No 179 of 1972 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the order dated July 30 1969 of the Deputy Commissioner Education as well as the order of the Appellate Authority dated January 5 1972
This petition was as already stated summarily dismissed without the issue of a notice to the respondents
The appellant then made an application to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court but the same was also rejected
Appearing in support of the appeal Mr Ramamurthi has vehemently contended that the appointing authority of the appellant being the Commissioner under section 92 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the Act  his dismissal from service by the Deputy Commissioner Education an authority subordinate to the Commissioner is illegal
The counsel has next urged that regulation 7 of the Regulations and the Schedule referred to therein conferring power on the Deputy Commissioner to dismiss a municipal officer or other employee drawing a monthly salary of less than Rs 350 being inconsistent with section 95 of the Act is void and consequently the impugned order of the appellant s dismissal from service passed in exercise of that power is also illegal and invalid
The counsel has further contended that the impugned order of the appellant s dismissal from service being a quasi judicial order is vitiated as the disciplinary authority has neither recorded its findings with respect to the charge drawn up against the appellant as required by regulation 89 of the Regulations nor has it given its reasons for passing the order
The counsel has lastly urged that the High Court ought not
to have dismissed the petition in limine without calling upon the respondents to file the return as it raised not only arguable points of law but also contained allegations of male fides against the respondents
We shall deal with these points seriatim
But before embarking on that task we consider it apposite to refer to a few provisions of the Act and regulations which have an important bearing on the case
Under section 921b of the Act as in force at the relevant time the power of appointing municipal officers and other municipal employees whether temporary or permanent to posts carrying a minimum monthly salary exclusive of allow ances of less than three hundred and fifty rupees was vested in the Commissioner
Subsection 1of section 95 of the Act provided that every municipal officer or other municipal employee shall be liable   to be cen sured reduced in rank compulsorily retired removed or dismissed for any breach of any departmental regulations or of discipline or for carelessness unfitness neglect of duty or other misconduct by such authority as may be
pre scribed by regulations
The first proviso
to this sub section however contained the following rider Provided that no such officer or other employee as aforesaid shall be reduced in rank compulsorily retired removed or dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed
 202 Section 491 of the Act which is in the nature of an enabling provision provided as under The Commissioner may by order direct that any power conferred or any duty imposed on him by or under this Act shall in such circumstances and under such conditions if any as may be specified in the order be exercised and performed also by any officer or other municipal employee specified in the order
 It is admitted by the appellant that in exercise of the power conferred on him under section 491 of the Act the Commissioner had vide his order No 158 Law Corp 1 dated April 7 1958 directed that all the powers conferred on him under the various provisions of
the Act would be exercised also by the Deputy Commissioner subject to his supervision control and revision
Regulation 7 of the Regulations and the Schedule referred to therein read as under Regulation 7 The authority specified in column 1 of the Schedule may impose on any of the municipal officers
or other municipal employees specified there against in column 2 thereof any of the penalties specified there against in column 3 thereof
Any such officer or employee may appeal against the order imposing upon him any of those penalties to the authority specified in column 4 of the said Schedule SCHEDULE Description of posts Authority Penalties Appellate competent Authority to impose penalties Posts whose minimum Deputy All Commissioner monthly salary exclu Commissioner sive of allowances is less than three hund red and fifty rupees
Any municipal officer i  ii Deputy Co or employee mmissioner to whom po wers to im pose penal ties is de legated under section 491
It would also be advantageous to refer to regulation 8 of the Regulations in so far as it is relevant for the purpose of this appeal
Regulation 8    203 9 The Disciplinary Authority shall if it is not the Inquiring Authority consider the record  of inquiry and record its findings on each charge
10 If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on the charges is
of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in regulation 6 should be imposed it shall  a furnish to the municipal officer or other municipal employee a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement if any with the findings of the Inquiring Authority and b give him a notice stating the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make against the proposed action
11 The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation if any made by the municipal officer or other municipal employee in response to the notice under subregulation 10 and determine what penalty if any should be imposed on the municipal officer or other municipal employee and pass appropriate orders on the case
12 Orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall be communicated to the municipal officer or other municipal employee who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement if any with the findings of the Inquiring Authority unless they have already been supplied to him
 Having noticed the relevant provisions we now pass on to
consider the contentions raised on behalf of the appel lant
Adverting to the first two contentions raised before us on behalf of the appellant it may be stated that neither of them appear from the record to have been raised before the High Court
It was not the case of the appellant in the petition filed by him under Article 226 of the Consti tution that since his appointment as an Assistant Teacher was actually made by the Commissioner the Deputy Commis sioner was
not competent to dismiss him from service
What was asserted by him at that stage is contained in ground No VI of the petition and  may be reproduced below for facility of reference Because in any
case respondent No 3 has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal
Under section 92 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 the petitioner could be 204 appointed only by the Commissioner and under section 95 of the said Act he should be the dismissing authority
In the present case however the Commissioner had by notification under section 491 of the said Act delegated his power to the Deputy Commissioner under Circular NO
418 Law Corp 1 dated 741958
The dismissing order was made by the Deputy Commissioner as delegatee ie as exercising the powers of the Commissioner
The Commissioner therefore could not sit in appeal on such an order
Only the Standing Committee of the Corporation could have heard the appeal
 The omission to make the aforesaid averments in the writ petition regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Commis sioner to pass the impugned order of dismissal from service and invalidity
of regulation 7 of the Regulations appears to be due to the
fact that the appellant fully realised that none of these pleas could be tenable in view of the aforesaid order No 1 58 Law Corp 1 dated April 7 1958 made by the Commissioner delegating all his powers to the Deputy Commissioner his actual appointment as an Assistant Teacher by the Deputy Commissioner and regulation 7 of the Regulations which far from being repugnant to section 95 of the Act is perfectly consistent with it as sub section 1  of that section itself makes a municipal employee liable to be compulsorily retired removed or dismissed etc
by such authority as may be prescribed by the Regulation
The prohibition contained in the first proviso to this Sub section is confined in its operation only to a case where an officer or employee of the Corporation is retired re moved or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed
In the instant case the appel lant s appointment having been made by the Deputy Commis sioner who possessed plenary powers in that behalf by virtue of the aforesaid delegation order there was neither any legal bar to the appellant s dismissal from service by that very authority nor a breach of the first proviso to sub section 1  of section 95 of the Act
The decision of this Court in The Management of DTUv
Shri BBL Halelay  Anr1 sought to be relied upon by Mr Ramamurthi related to an appointment which rested on a deeming provision and is not at all helpful to the appel lant
Rospondent No 2 in that case was Originally employed as a driver in the Delhi Road Transport Authority which had been constituted under the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act 1950
By section 5161a of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act1957 which came into force in January 1958 the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act 1950 was repealed and the functions of the Delhi Road Transport Authority were taken over by the Corporation by virtue of several other provisions of the Act
Under section 511 of that Act ie the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 every officer and employee of the Transport Authority including respondent No 2 stood transferred and become an officer and employee of the Corporation and under section 921 b read with section 5162 a of the Act the said respondent was 1  205 to be deemed to have been appointed by the General Manager Transport
The respondent in that case thus being re quired by fiction of law to be taken to have been appointed by the General Manager he could not have been removed from service in May 1963 by the Assistant General Manager an authority subordinate to the General Manager in view of the firstproviso to sub section 1 of section 95 of the Act despite the fact that the functions of the General Manager had been delegated to the Assistant General Manager in May 1961
In that case it was made clear by this Court that the only consequence of the delegation order was that if after 1961 the Assistant General Manager had made the appointment of respondent No 2 he would have no doubt been entitled to remove him from service but the position had to be deter mined with reference to the time when he was absorbed in the Corporation which was in January 1958
The judgment of this Court in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Ram Pratap Singh1 is also not helpful to the appellant as in that case the appointment was in fact made by the Commissioner white the dismissal was by the Deputy Commissioner
In view of the foregoing discussion the first two contentions raised on behalf of the appellant which are totally misconceived are repelled
The third contention advanced by Mr Ramamurthi that the impugned order of the appellant s dismissal from service is vitiated as the disciplinary authority has neither recorded its findings with respect to the charge drawn up against the appellant as required by regulation 89 of the Regulations nor has it given its reasons for passing the order cannot also be countenanced as
it overlooks the decisions of this Court which fully cover the case
Regarding the first limb of the contention it may be stated that although it may be necessary for the discipli nary authority to record
its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upto the delinquent officer to show cause why the
proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it differs from the findings arrived at by the enquiring officer with regard to the charge it is not obligatory to do so in case the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the enquiring officer
We are supported in this view by two decisions of this Court in State of Orissa vs Govinddas Panda2 and State of Assam  Anr
vs Bimal Kumar Pandit3
In Govinddas Panda s case supra where the notice issued under  Article 3112 did not expressly state
that the State Government had accepted the findings record ed by the enquiring officer against the Government servant in question and where even the nature of the punishment which was proposed to be inflicted on
him was not specifi cally and clearly indicated this Court while reversing the conclusions of the Orissa High Court that the notice was defective and so that provisions of Article 3112 had been contravened observed 1 CA No 2249 N of 1969 decided on 8 1 1976
2 CA No 412 of 1958 decided on 10 12 1962
3  206 In the context it must have been obvious to the respondent that the punishment proposed was removal from service and the respondent was called upon to show cause against that punishment
On a reasonable reading of the notice the only conclusion at which one can arrive is that the appellant the State accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Tribunal and asked the respondent to show cause against the proposed punishment namely that of removal from service In Bimal Kumar Pandit s case supra while reversing the judgment and order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent against his reduction in rank on the ground that the notice served upon him under Article 311 2 of the Constitution was void as it did not expressly and specifically indicate either the conclusions of the dismissing authority or the findings recorded by the enquiring officer or that the dismissing authority accepted the findings of the enquiring officer and unless that course was adopted it would not be clear that the dismissing authority had applied its mind and had provisionally come to some conclusion both in regard to the guilt of the public officer and the punishment which his misconduct deserved the Constitution Bench of this Court observed It may be conceded that it is desirable that the dismissing authority should indicate in the second notice its concurrence with the conclusions of the enquiring officer before it issues the said notice under Article 3112
But the question which calls for our decision is it the dismissing authority does not expressly say that it has accepted the findings of the enquiring officer against the delinquent officer does that introduce such an infirmity in the proceedings as to make the final order invalid  We are not prepared to answer this question in the affirmative
It seems to us that it would be plain to the delinquent officer that the issuance of the notice indicating the provisional conclusions of the dismissing authority as to the punishment that should be imposed on him obviously and clearly implies that the findings recorded against him by the enquiring officer have been accepted by the dismissing authority otherwise there would be no sense or purpose in issuing the notice under Article 3112
 At another place the Court observed We ought however to all that if the dismissing authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should be specified in the second notice
It may be that the report makes findings in favour of the delinquent officer but the dismissing authority disagrees with the said findings and proceeds to issue the notice under Article 311 2
In 207 such a case it would obviously be necessary that the dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delinquent officer
Without such an express statement in the notice it would be impossible to issue the notice at all
There may also be cases in which the enquiry report may make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on other issues
That is precisely what has happened in the present case
If the dismissing authority accepts all the said findings in their entirety it is another matter but if the dismissing au thority accepts the findings recorded against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the action proposed to be taken on its own conclusions it would be necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice
In this category of cases the action proposed to be taken would be based not only on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer in the enquiry report but also on the view of the dismissing authority that the other charges not held proved by the enquiring officer are according to the dismissing authority proved
In order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under article 3112 it is essential that the conclusions provisionally reached by the dismissing authority must in such cases be specified in the notice
But where the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against the delinquent officer after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety it cannot be said that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report
As we have already indicated it is desirable that even in such
cases a statement to that effect should be made
But we do not think that the words in article 311 2 justify the view that the failure to make such a statement amounts to
contravention of article 3112  
There is no doubt that after the report is received appropriate authority must apply its mind to the report and must provisionally decide whether the findings recorded in the report should be accepted or not
It is only if the findings recorded in the report against the Government servant are accepted by the appropriate authority that it has to provisionally decide what action should be taken against him
But this does not mean that in every case the appropriate authority is under a constitutional obligation to state in the notice that it has accepted the adverse findings recorded by the enquiring officer before it indicates the nature of the action proposed to be taken against the delinquent officer
 In the instant case the incorrectness of the first limb of the contention is apparent from a bare reading of the aforesaid order passed 208 by the Deputy Commissioner on May 20 1969 which clearly states that he agrees with the findings of the enquiring officer
Reading the order as a whole it becomes crystal clear that the disciplinary authority held the charge drawn up against the appellant as proved
The second limb of the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant which also overlooks the decisions of the Constitution Bench this Court does not commend itself to us
In this connection we would like to make it clear that while it may be necessary for a disciplinary or admin istrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons
It cannot also in our opinion be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non speaking order simply because it is brief and not daborate
Every case we think has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances
Reference in this connection may be made with advantage to a catena of decisions
In Bimal Kurnar Pandit s case supra it was categorically laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court that it was not a requirement of Article 3112 that in every case the punishing authority should in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause give not only the punishment proposed to be inflicted on him but also the reasons for coming to that conclusion
In that case it was clarified that the view is not justified that the appropriate authority must state its own grounds or reasons for proposing to take any specific action against the delin quent Government servant
In State of Madras vs AR Srinivasan1 the Constitution Bench this Court while repelling the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that the State Government s order compulsorily retiring him from service was bad as it did not give reasons for accepting the findings
of the enquiring tribunal and imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement observed as follows Mr Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue that the impugned order gives no reasons why the appellant accepted the findings of the Tribunal
Disciplinary proceedings taken against the respondent says Mr Setalvad are in the nature of quasi judicial proceedings and when the appellant passed the impugned order against the respondent it was acting in a quasi judicial character
That being so the appellant should have indicated some reasons as to why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal and since no reasons are given the order should be struck down on that ground alone
We are not prepared to accept the argument
In dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on the 1 AIR 1966 SC 18271966 2 SCWR 524
209 State Government to give reasons in support of the order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer we cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against such a delinquent officer begin with an enquiry conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf
That enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service Commission is consulted where necessary
Having regard to the material which is thus made available to the State Government and which is made available to the delinquent officer also it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the State Government must record its reasons why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal
It is conceivable that if the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer it should give reasons why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal though even in such a case it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate
But where the State Government agrees with the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinquent officer we do not think as a matter of law it could be said that the State Government cannot impose the penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to show why the said findings were accepted by it
The proceedings are no doubt quasi judicial but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted we do not think an obligation can be imposed on  the State Government to record reasons in every case In Som Datt Datta vs Union of India  Ors
1 while approv ing the English law and practice and overruling 1he conten tion advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the orders of the Chief of the Army Staff confirming the proceedings of the Court Martial under section 164 of the Army Act and the order of the Central Government dismissing the appeal of the petitioner under section 165 of the Army Act were illegal and ultra vires as they did not give reasons in support Of the orders the Constitution Bench of this Court summed up the legal position as follows  Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implication there is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal should give reasons for its decision
There is also no general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision
In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union of India  Ors2 this Court repelled the contention of counsel for the appellant that every order appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution must be a speak 1 1969 SCR 176
SCR 466 AIR 1458SCI76 210 ing order and the omission to give reasons for the decision is of itself a sufficient ground for quashing it and held that an order of an administrative tribunal rejecting a revision application cannot be pronounced to be invalid on the sole ground that it does not give reasons for rejection
While distinguishing the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd vs Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala1 where the Central Government reversed the decision of the State Government without giving reasons for reversal this Court pointed out that there was a vital difference between the order of reversal by the appellate authority and the order of affirmance by the revising authority and that if the revising authority re jects a revision application stating that there was no valid ground for interference with the order of the subordinate authority in such a case it could not be held that the order was arbitrary or that there was no trial of the revi sion application
Subba Rao J as he then was speaking for himself in that case observed  Ordinarily the appellate or revisional tribunal shall give its own reasons succinctly but in a case of affirmance where the original tribunal gives adequate reasons the appellate tribunal may dismiss the appeal or the revision as the case may be agreeing with those reasons In Judicial Review of Administrative Action Second Edition Prof SA de Smith has observed at page 418 as follows  If the record is incomplete eg because reasons or findings of material fact are omitted has the court power to order the tribunal to complete its record It is common ground that the court has no inherent power to compel a tribunal to give reasons for its decisions  
If of course a tribunal is required by statute to declare its reasons or its findings on the material facts an order of mandamus may be obtained to compel the tribunal to perform its legal duty 
Where a tribunal that is not expressly obliged to give reasons for its decisions chooses not to give any reasons for a particular decision it is not permissible to infer on that ground alone that its reasons for that decision were bad in law
Even if it gives reasons which are ex facie insufficient in law to support its decision the court will not necessarily assume that these are the sole reasons on which the tribunal has based its decision
See Cf
Davies vs Price at 440 and Rv
Minister of Housing and Local Government ex
P Chichester RDC
Before concluding the discussion in regard to the third contention we may point out that none of the decisions viz Sardar Govindrao  Ors
vs State of Madhya Pradesh2 Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors
3 Travancore Rayon Ltd vs Union of India4 Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs State of UP  Ors5Rangnath vs Daulat Rao  Ors
6 and Siemens Engineering  Manufacturing Company of India Ltd vs The Union of India7 on which Mr Ramamurthi has 1  2 1965 1 SCR678
3  4  5  6  7  211 heavily leaned has anything to do with disciplinary proceed ings
At such they have little bearing on the point with which we are at present concerned
We would also like to point out that the observations in Travancore Rayon Ltd vs Union of India supra that in Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors
supra
 this Court in effect overruled the judgment of the majority in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union of India  Ors
supra seem to have crept therein through some oversight
A careful perusal of the decision in Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors
supra would show that this Court did not make any observations therein which can be interpreted as overruling the majority judgment in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union of1 India  Ors
supra
It is also worthy of note that in Bhagat Raja s case Supra the amendment of rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules1960 introduced in July 1965 laid down a special procedure in regard to revisions
It required the Central Government to send copies of the application for revision to all the impleaded parties including the person to whom a lease had been granted calling upon them to make such comments as they might like to make within three months from the date of the issue of the communication and on receipt of the comments from any party to send copies thereof to the other parties calling upon them to make further comments as they might like to make within one month from the date of the issue of the communication
It also provided that the revision appli cation the communications containing comments and counter comments referred to above would constitute the record of the case
Thus under the amended rule the party whose application was rejected got an ample opportunity of showing to the Central Government by reference not only to the record which was before the State Government but by refer ence to the fresh material as well that the State Government was misled in its consideration of the matter or that its decision was based on irrelevant considerations
This is evident from the following observations made in Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors
supra The old rule 55 was replaced by a new rule which came into force on 19th July 1965
Whereas the old rule directed the Central Government to consider comments on the petition of review by the State Government or other authority only the new rule is aimed at calling upon all the parties including the State Government to make their comments in the matter and the parties are given the right to make further comments on those made by the other or others
In effect the parties are given a right to bring forth material which was not before the State Government
It is easy to see that an unsuccessful party may challenge the gram of a lease in favour of another by pointing out defects or demerits which did not come to the knowledge of the State Government
The order in this case does not even purport to  show that the comments and counter comments which were before the Central Government in this case had been considered
 The above observations leave no manner of doubt that it was in view of the amendment in rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules 212 1960 that the decision in Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors
supra was different from Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union of India  Ors
supra which had been ren dered on the unamended rule 55 of the said Rules
In our opinion therefore the observations made in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd vs Union of India  Ors
supra contain a correct statement of law
In view of the foregoing we do not find any merit in the third contention raised on behalf of the appellant
This brings us to the last contention raised by Mr Ramamurthi that the writ petition should not have been dismissed by the High Court in limine in view of the fact that it contained allegations of mala fides against the respondents
We are unable to accept this contention
It has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investiga tion into the allegations of mala fides if necessary partic ulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition
Keeping in view the well estab lished rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant in regard thereto we do not think that they could be considered as sufficient to establish malus animus
The High Court was therefore not wrong in dismissing the petition in limine on seeing that a prima facie case requiring investigation had not been made out
In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs
PBR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant a school teacher under the Delhi Munici pal Corporation
was dismissed from service by the Deputy Commissioner Education after following the procedure prescribed under the Regulations
His appeal to the Commis sioner of the Corporation was dismissed and his writ peti tion was dismissed in limine by the High Court
On further appeal to this Court it was contended that I  the order of dismissal was invalid for the reason that the Commissioner being the appointing authority the Deputy Commissioner was incompetent to dismiss him and the regulation conferring power on the Deputy Commissioner to dismiss a municipal employee drawing less than Rs 350 being inconsistent with section 95 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957 is void 2 since the disciplinary authority had neither recorded its findings nor given its reasons in the order of dismissal it is vitiated and 3 the petition should not have been dismissed in limine by the High Court
Dismissing the appeal HELD 1  The appellant s appointment having been made by the Deputy Commissioner who possessed plenary powers in that behalf by virtue of the delegation of power to him there was neither any legal bar to his dismissal by that authority nor a breach of the first proviso to section 951
In his writ petition before the High Court the appellant failed to make any averment regarding the incompetence of the Deputy Commissioner to pass the impugned order and the invalidity of the regulation
None of his pleas was tenable in view of the order of the Commissioner delegating his powers to the Deputy Commissioner his actual appointment as an Assistant Teacher by the Deputy Commissioner and regula tion 7 being consistent with section 951 of the Act
204 EC The Managment of DTU vs Shri BBL Hajeley  Ant  and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs Ram Partap Singh Civil Appeal No 2449N of 1969 delivered on January 8 1976 held inapplicable
2a Although it may be necessary for the disciplinary authority to record its provisional conclusions in the notice calling upon the delinquent officer to show cause why the proposed punishment be not imposed upon him if it dif fers from the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer with regard to the charge it is not obligatory to do so in case the disciplinary authority concurs with the findings of the enquiring officer
205 F In the instant case it is apparent from the order of the Deputy Commissioner that he agreed with the findings of the Enquiring Officer
208 A State of Orissa vs Govinddas Pande Civil Appeal No 412 of 1958 decided on December 10 1962 and State of Assam  Anr
vs Vimal Kumar Pandit AIR followed
b While it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusions arrived at and the recommendations made by 199 the enquiring officer in view of the scheme of a particular enactment or the rules made thereunder it would be laying down the proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons
it cannot be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non speaking order simply because it is brief and not elabo rate
Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts
208 B Sardar Govindrao  Ors
vs State of Madhya Pradesh   Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  Ors   Travancore Rayon Ltd vs Union of India   Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs State of UP  Ors
  Rangnath vs Daula trao  Ors  and The Siemens Engineering  Manufacturing Co of India Ltd vs TIre Union of India  Anr   inapplicable
c MP Industries Ltd vs Union of India  contains a correct statement of law
In Bhagat Raja vs The Union of India  this Court did not make any observations which can be interpreted as overruling the majority judgment in the former case
In view of the amendment of r 55 of the  Mineral Concession Rules 1960 the decision in Bhagat Raja s case was differ ent from MP Industries case which had been rendered on the unamended r 55 of the Rules
212 A 211 B 3 The High Court was not wrong in dismissing the writ petition
in limine because a prima jacie case requiring investigation had not been made out by the appellant
The High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on inves tigation into the allegations of mala fides if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition
Since the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges them and the allegations made
in regard thereto in the writ petition were not sufficient to establish malus animus
The High Court was justified in dismissing the petition without issuing notice to the other side
212 C D