ivil Appeal Nos
2959 60 of 1980
WITH Writ Petition Nos
5548 50 of 1980
From the Judgment and Order dated 99
1980 of the Karnataka High Court in WP Nos
20298 of 1979 and 1031 of 1980
Soli J Sorabjee Rajinder Sachhar H Raghavendra Rao and Vineet Kumar for the AppellantsPetitioners
M Veerappa KH Nobin Singh and PR Ramasesh for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
The two appeals and the three writ petitions challenge the validity of the provisions of the Mysore Silkworm Seed and Cocoon Regulation of Production Supply and Distributions Act 1959 Act No 5 of 1960 hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act 
The challenge was repelled by the Karnataka High Court by its common judgment dated 99
1980 in two writ petitions which is the subject matter of appeals
It is perhaps in view of this judgment that writ petitions No 5548 5550 of 1980 have been filed directly in this Court raising a similar contention
At the outset it is necessary to clarify two important points
The first is that the validity of the Act above mentioned and certain notifications issued thereunder were challenged in Civil Appeal Nos 450 and 451 of 1966 and 542 of 1964
These Civil appeals were disposed of 308 by a judgment of this Court dated 611967 in State of Mysore  Ors
vs Hanumiah
By the said judgment this Court repelled the contentions then put forward
The validity of certain provisions of the impugned Act had then been challenged on the footing that the said provisions as well as the rules made and the notifications issued thereunder imposed unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business under Article 191g of the Constitution
Again the Mysore High Court in Mohammed Hussain vs State of Mysore WP 45 of 1971 and this Court in Syed Ahmed Agha vs State A I R were called upon to consider contentions as to the validity of certain amendments effected by Mysore Act 29 of 1969 to the impugned Act in the light of the provisions of Articles 301 to 304 of the Constitution of India
The contentions were repelled with the result that the statutory regulations providing for protection to readers by the establishment of regulated cocoon markets and forbidding the sale or purchase of silk worm cocoons except in such markets were held to be valid
The present challenge however is on different grounds
The contention now is that certain amendments effected to the impugned Act by Karnataka Act No 33 of 1979 have to be struck down as the State Legislature was not competent to enact the same
Thus the contention now addressed is different from those which were considered by this Court on the earlier occasions
The second aspect which we wish to clarify at the outset is that though several grounds were raised before the High Court as well as in the writ petitions the argument before us was limited to a single contention
This was that the impugned provisions lack legislative competence after the enactment by Parliament of the Central Silk Boards Act Act 61 of 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Central Act  which contains a declaration contemplated under Entry 52 of List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India
We shall be addressing ourselves only to this argument
Mysore Act 5 of 1960 was passed since it was considered expedient to consolidate the laws providing for the regulation of the production supply and distribution of silk worm seed and cocoon in the State of Mysore
This Act contained several restrictions in regard to the production supply and distribution of silk worm seed and cocoon
Basically sections 3 4 5 6 7 and 8 of the Act required a person to obtain a licence for production sale and distribution of silkworm seed for rearing silkworms from silkworm seed for possession of silkworm seed for disposal of silkworm cocoons for reeling or for reproduction for sale or purchase of silkworm cocoons for reeling and for carrying on the business of reeling silk worm cocoons
Section 10 enabled the 309 Government to specify the manner of marketing the above goods the places at which cocoon markets cocoon market yards and cocoon stores could be located specify the sericultural areas to be served by each cocoon market assign zones and markets in which any licensed buyer could carry on his business
It also provided that all transactions involving the sale or purchase of cocoons in a cocoon market shall be by weight in open auction and in cash
The above Act and in particular the provisions contained in Sections 6 and 7 was amended by the Karnataka Act 29 of 1969
But these amendments are not relevant for our present purposes
There were further amendments effected to the Act by Karnataka Act 33 of 1979
The petitioner is challenging the amendments carried out by this Act
The principal amendments carried out were briefly these
References to Mysore  were replaced by references to Karnataka 
In the preamble in addition to the silk worm seed  and cocoon  reference was added to silk yarn 
Definition of silk yarn  and various categories thereof were inserted Section 5A was introduced under which no person could be in possession of silk yarn in excess of a prescribed quantity unless he is a reeler a licensed trader a twister a weaver or a person authorised in writing by the prescribed officer
Section 10A provided for the establishment of silk exchanges at specified places
It enabled the Government to appoint for each silk exchange a silk Market Officer and also to constitute a marketing committee with the Market Officer as the Chairman and with representatives of reelers twisters and traders for regulating the conduct of business in the exchange
It also provided that all transactions involving sale or purchase of silk yarn in a silk exchange should be by weight by open auction and in cash
Section 8A placed certain restrictions on reelers twisters and traders after the establishment of a silk exchange
It prohibits a reeler or twister from selling or agreeing to sell silk yarn reeled or twisted by him
It permitted only licensed traders to purchase or agree to purchase silk yarn from a reeler or a twister and that too only in a silk exchange and in accordance with such conditions and in such manner as may be prescribed
Sub section 2 of section 8A provided that no person shall except in such silk exchange use or permit the use or assist in the use of any building room tent enclosure vehicle vessel or place for the sale of silk yarn by or purchase of silk yarn from a reeler or a twister or in any manner aid or abet the sale or purchase of silk yarn
To put it very shortly the amendments of 1979 imposed on the production supply distribution and sale of silk yarn restrictions in a manner more or less analogous to those that earlier existed in respect of silk worm seeds and cocoons
310 The short point made on behalf of the petitioners is that any legislation in respect of silk industry  can be enacted only by Parliament and the State Legislature is incompetent to legislate on this matter
This is because Section 2 of the Central Silk Board Act which reads as follows It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the silk industry
 enacts a declaration in terms of Entry 52
This removes the silk industry  from the purview of the State s legislative powers thus rendering the State legislature incompetent to legislate thereafter on this topic
In this context it is emphasised that originally the Central Act and the declaration in section 2 had been restricted to raw silk industry  but by an amendment of 1953 effective from 2531954 their scope was widened to include the entire silk industry 
The long title of the Central Act is that it is an Act to provide for the development under Central control of the silk industry and for that purpose to establish a Central Silk Board
Under Section 4 the Central Government is empowered to constitute a Board to be called the Central Silk Board with a constitution as set out in sub section 3
The functions of the Board are set out in section B which may be set out 1 It shall be the duty of the Board to promote the development of the silk industry by such measures as it thinks fit
2 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision the measures referred to therein may provide for a undertaking assisting or encouraging scientific technological and economic research b devising means for improved methods of mulberry cultivation rearing developing and distributing healthy silkworm seeds reeling or as the case may be spinning of silkworm cocoons and silk waste improving the quality and production of raw silk if necessary by making it compulsory for all raw silk to be marketed only after the same has been tested and graded in properly equipped raw silk conditioning houses 311 c x x x x x d improving the marketing of raw silk e the collection of statistics from such persons as may be prescribed f carrying out any other duties which may be vested in the Board under rules made under this Act
 The Board has also a duty to advise the Central Government on all matters relating to the development of the raw silk industry and to prepare and furnish such reports relating to the industry as the Central Government may call for from time to time
Two further provisions of the Central Act which need to be referred to are Ss 10 and 13
section 10 enables the Central Government to levy and collect as a cess a duty of excise on all filature raw silk and on all spun silk reeled in the territories of India
D Section 13 empowers the Central Government by notification to make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act
Sub section 2 specifies certain enumerated matters in relation to which rules could be framed but these mostly relate to the functioning of the Board the only two topics on which such rules could be framed which may be relevant purposes are those contained in clause xviii xix and xx which read as follows xviii the collection of any information or statistics in respect of raw silk or any product of silk xix the manner in which raw silk shall be graded and marketed xx any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed
In the context of these provisions the short argument which has been pressed before us was dealt with by the High Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 which can be conveniently set out 13
The first question to be examined in this context is whether the amending legislations are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature
It was urged that silk industry is a controlled industry declared by Parliament 312 by law to be expedient in the public interest under Entry 52 of List 1
By section 2 of the Central Silk Boards Act 1948
Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the Public interest that the Union should take under its control the silk industry
Again by Section 2 of the Industries Development and Regulation Act 1951 Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the first Schedule to the Act
Item 234 of the first Schedule thereunder specifies textile including those dyed printed or otherwise processed made wholly or part of silk including silk yarn and hosiery
Having regard to these provisions and Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule the State Legislature as urged for the petitioners has no power to enact the impugned Acts 14
It seems to us that this argument is bereft of substance
It is now well settled by a series of pronouncements of the Supreme Court commencing with Tika Ramji and Others vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1956 SC page 676 down to the decision in Ganga Sagar Corporation Ltd vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 1980 SC page 286 that merely because an industry is controlled industry as declared by Parliament under Entry 52 in List I the State is not deprived of its legitimate power to legislate within its own sphere in respect of such industry
Referring to the scope of Entry 52 of List 1 in the context of legislation dealing with regulation of supply and purchase of sugar cane required for use in sugar factories
Supreme Court in Tika Ramji s AIR 1956 SC page 676 case observed Ibid Note 12 pages 695 6961 Industry in the wide sense of the term would be capable of comprising three different aspects 1 raw materials which are an integral part of the industrial process 2 the process of manufacture or production and 3 the distribution of the products of the industry
The raw materials would be goods which would be comprised in Entry 27 of List 2
The process of manufacture or production would be comprised in Entry 24 of List 2 except where the industry was a controlled industry when it would fall within Entry 52 of List 1 and the products of the industry 313 would also be comprised in Entry 27 of List 2 except where they were the products of the controlled industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of List 3
 It is clear from the above observations that it is not all aspects of the industry that fall within the scope of Entry 52 of List 1
It is only one aspect of the industry that is the process of manufacture or production that falls under Entry 52 of List 1
It does not include raw materials used in the industry or the distribution of the products of the industry
This view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and Others vs Union of India and Others AIR 1970 SC page 1453 and in the Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd vs The State Of Kerala AIR 1972 SC 2301 and Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd vs The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1980 SC 286
The question that arose in those cases was the scope and effect of Entry 52 of List I in relation to Entries 24 and 27 of List 11 and Entry 33 of List III
The effect of these decisions is that though expressions in legislative entries refer to broad topics and fields of legislation and require a liberal construction and though the particular expression industries  in Entry 52 of List I in its wide sense may comprise many aspects however having regard to the scope of other entries in the other lists the ambit of Entry 52 of List I should be limited and confined only to the process of manufacture or production of an industry  The impugned legislations do not fall into this category and we therefore reject the contention urged for the petitioners
 It will at once be seen that the point raised by the petitioners appellants has been repelled by the High Court on the basis of a series of decisions of this Court regarding scope of Entry 52 of List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
The High Court has pointed out that when Entry 52 talks of control of industry it does not mean all aspects of the industry in question
An industry comprises of 3 important aspects i raw materials ii the process of manufacture or production and iiithe distribution of the products of the industry
314 Legislation in regard to raw materials would be permissible under Entry 27 of List 2 notwithstanding a declaration of the industry under Entry 52 to be one within the purview of parliamentary legislation
The process of manufacture or production can be legislated on by States under Entry 24 of List 2 so long as the industry is not a controlled industry within the meaning of Entry 7 or Entry 52 of List I So far as the third aspect viz the distribution of the products of the industry are concerned the State Legislature would be quite competent to legislate thereto in regard thereto under Entry 27 of List II
However when the industry is also a controlled industry legislation in regard to the products of the industry would be permissible by both the Central and the State Legislatures by virtue of Entry 33 of List 3
This in short is the decision of the High Court based as already pointed out on a series of decisions of this Court
Observations by this Court to a like effect in Calcutta Gas Co P Ltd vs State 1962 Supp 3 SCR 1 may also be seen
We entirely agree with this view
On behalf of the appellantspetitioners Shri Soli Sorabji contended that the validity of the enactment has now to be tested in the light of the decision of this Court in ITC Ltd  Ors
vs State of Karnataka  Ors
 19851 Supp
SCC 476 where in in a similar context a State legislation was held to be ultra vires
He also brings to our notice that the correctness of this decision has been doubted by a Bench of this Court and the matter has been referred to a larger Bench and is pending consideration by such a larger Bench
He therefore submits that we should either hold following the above decision that the State legislation in this case is also incompetent or we should refer this matter also to a larger Bench
We are of the opinion that it is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case to consider the contentions raised in the I T C case supra
That was a case in which the State enactment was held to be competent by the High Court on the narrow ground that the central legislation covered only virginia tobacco and did not deal with the industry in so far as it related to other varieties of tobacco
On a consideration of the provision of the Act this Court came to the conclusion that this interpretation of the Act was not correct and that the central legislation did purport to regulate and control the entire tobacco industry
In the light of this conclusion the court declared the State law to be incompetent having regard to the provisions of Entry 52 of List I and the declaration in the Indian Tobacco Act under that provision
In the present case however the matter is on a totally different footing
It is true that the Central Silk Board Act purports to 315 control the raw silk industry in the territory of India
But as pointed out by the High Court in the light of the earlier decisions of this Court therein referred to the control of the industry vested in Parliament was only restricted to the aspect of production and manufacture of silk yarn or silk
It did not obviously take in the earlier stages of the industry namely the supply of raw materials
For instance as already pointed out even in regard to the silk industry the reeling production development and distribution of silkworm seeds and cocoons was regulated by Act 5 of 1960
These items can be perhaps legitimately described as the raw materials of the silk industry
The control being vested in Parliament under Entry 52 of silk industry did not in view of the earlier ruling of this Court affect the control over these raw materials
This is perhaps the reason why the industry did not challenge the provisions of the 1959 Act when it was originally enacted on the ground that is now being put forward
The present legislation as a result of the amendments controls the supply and distribution of the goods produced by the industry
As rightly pointed out by the High Court this is the third aspect of the industry which falls outside the purview of the control postulated under Entry 52
In other words though the production and manufacture of raw silk cannot be legislated upon by the State Legislature in view of the provisions of the Central Act and the declaration in section 2 thereof that declaration and Entry 52 do not in any way limit the powers of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of the goods produced by the silk industry To interpret Entry 52 otherwise would render Entry 33 in List 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution otiose and meaningless
In this view of the matter the limitation contained in Entry 52 does not affect the validity of the present legislation
This is an aspect which was not touched upon and which did not arise in the Indian tobacco case
There both the Central Act and the State Act purported to legislate in regard to the industry namely in regard to the production and manufacture of tobacco
In view of our conclusion above the State legislation would be quite valid unless it is repugnant to the provisions of a Central legislation on the subject
A persual of the Central Act makes it clear that the pith and substance of the legislation is the constitution of a silk Board for research into the scientific technological and economic aspects of the industry
It does not have anything to do with the aspects covered by entry 33 in List III
There is therefore no infirmity in the legislation under consideration
316 In this view of the matter we agree with the conclusion reached by the High Court
As this is the only point that was argued before us we dismiss the appeals and writ petitions but make no orders regarding costs
GN Appeals and Petitions dismissed


Summary:
On April 26 954 the appellant was arrested for offences under sections 420 482 483 485 and 486 Indian Penal Code and bidis alleged to bear counterfeit trade marks were seized from him
On this a complaint was filed on May 26 against the appellant that he was in possession of counterfeit bidis wrappers and labels
After investigation the police submitted a charge sheet on September 30 1954 and summons was ordered to the appellant on July 22 1955
The appellant raised a preliminary objection before the Magistrate that the proceedings were barred by section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act
He contended that the offence was discovered on April 26 1954 when he was arrested and the prosecution which commenced with the issue of process against him on July 22 1954 was beyond the period of one year provided by section 15
Held that the prosecution was not barred by section 15 as the prosecution commenced on the presentation of the complaint which was within one year of the discovery of the offence and not on the issuing of the process
It is settled law that unless there is something to the contrary in the statute when a private complaint is presented it is the date of presentation thereof that marks the commencement of the prosecution
The period of limitation is intended to operate against the complainant and not against the Court
It will defeat the object of the Act and deprive traders of the protection of the law if it were held that the complaint should be thrown out unless process was issued within one year
of the discovery of the offence