vil Appeal Nos 2436 to 2438 of 1989
From the Judgment and Orders dated 7483 and 25
1986 of the Orissa High Court in OJC Nos 108 and 109 of 1986 and 6 of 1984 respectively
TU Mehta Gobind Das and Vinoo Bhagat for the Appellants
GL Sanghi RK Mehta and AK Panda for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA J
Special leave granted
These three appeals raise a common question about the interpretation of the term family in Section 37b of the Orissa Land Reforms Act 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act
According to clause a of Section 37 of the Act the term person includes inter alia family
Clause b of Section 37 being the clause under consideration may usefully be reproduced
It reads b family in relation to an individual means the individual the husband or wife as the case may be of such individual and their children whether major or minor but does not include a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September 1970 According to the appellants in these three appeals partition in their respective families had been taken place in the year 1965
The Act except Chapters III and IV came into force on Ist October 1965
Chapter IV of the Act which contains the provisions relating to ceiling and disposal of surplus land came into force on 7th January 1972
Suo motu proceedings under Section 42 of the Act for declaration of surplus land and consequential purposes were initiated in the year 1974
Objections were filed asserting inter alia that in view of the partition in the families of the appel lants in the year 1965 the land in the ancestral properties which fell in the share of the appellants could not be club 607 bed with those of their father
This contention however was not accepted on the definition of the term family contained in Section 37b of the Act
Such of the major married sons who as such had separated by partition before the 26th day of September 1970 as contemplated by the definition of the term family were allotted separate ceiling units but so far as the appellants are concerned their shares were clubbed with those of their father and only one ceiling unit was allotted as contemplated by the relevant provision of the Act
The appellants having failed to get relief in the ap peals and revisions filed by them under the Act challenged the orders passed by the various authorities under the Act in writ petitions before the High Court of Orissa
These writ petitions were dismissed relying on the decision of a Full Bench of that Court in Nityananda Guru vs State of Orissa and others A1R 1983 Orissa Page 54 FB
It is these orders of the High Court which have been challenged in these appeals
The validity of Section 37b of the Act does not appear to have been challenged before the High Court nor has it been seriously challenged even before us except by making a faint submission that even if by virtue of the said provision being incorporated in the 9th Schedule it may be immune from challenge in view of Article 3lB of the Consti tution the protection under Article 31C would not be avail able to it and it would be hit by Article 14 unless it was established that it had nexus with the policy of the State towards securing any of the principles laid down in Part IV of the Constitution
This submission even if it is permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court has obviously no substance in view of the undisputed position that the Act aims at agrarian reform and the provisions with regard to declaration of surplus land and its distribution among the have nots namely landless persons is apparently to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle laid down in Article 39b of the Constitution occurring in Part IV thereof and Section 37b has a clear nexus with that policy
The aforesaid submission has there fore no substance
At this place it may also be pointed out that validity of analogous provisions dealing with laws for declaration and distribution of surplus land framed by the States of Andhra Pradesh Haryana and Maharashtra has already been upheld by this Court after rejecting challenges to them on various grounds in Tumati Venkaish etc
vs State of Andhra Pradesh   Seth Nand Lal  Anr
vs State of Haryana  Ors
  and Waman Rao  Ors etc
vs Union of India and Ors
  608 The main attack against the judgment of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nityananda Guru supra relying on which the writ petition filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High COurt has been on the ground that partition in the respective families of the appellants in the year 1965 having been accepted Section 37b of the Act had to be read in such a manner as to exclude the land which had fallen to the share of the appel lants even though they did not fall within the category of a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September 1970 as contemplated by the definition of the term family in the said section
It was urged that this purpose could be achieved by adding the word or between the words major and married
According to learned counsel if that is done the term individual would not include a major son who had separated by partition before the 26th day of September 1970 even if he had not married prior to that date
We find it difficult to take recourse to this mode of interpretation of Section 37b in view of its plain language
1n British India General Insurance Co Ltd vs Captain Itbar Singh and Others sub section 2 of Section 96 of the was sought to be interpreted by the learned Solicitor General in a manner which involved addition of certain words
The submission was repelled and it was held The learned Solicitor General concedes this and says that the only word that has to be added is the word also after the word grounds
But even this the rules of inter pretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning neither of which we think it is
 On a plain reading of the definition of the term fami ly in Section 37b of the Act we are of the view that the said definition as it stands is neither meaningless nor of doubtful meaning
In this connection it may be pointed out that keeping in view the agrarian reform which was contem plated by the Act and particularly the provisions of Chapter IV relating to ceiling and disposal of surplus land which were calculated to distribute the surplus land of big tenure holders among the overwhelming have nots of the State the Legislature in its wisdom gave an artificial meaning to the term family
The main provision containing the definition of the term is to be found in the first part of Section 37b namely family in relating to an individual means the individual the husband or wife as the case may be of such individual and their children whether major or minor
The later part of Section 609 37b namely but does not include a major married son who as such had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September 1970 does not on the face of it contain a matter which may in substance be treated as a fresh enactment adding something to the main provision but is apparently and unequivocally a proviso containing an exception
This admits of no doubt in view of the words but does not include
In the Commissioner of Income Tax Mysore vs The Indo Mercantile Bank Limited 1959 Supp 2 SCR 256
it was held Ordinarily the effect of an excepting or a qualifying proviso is to carve something out of the preceding enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be in it and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and proper ly construed without attributing to it that effect Emphasis supplied That apart the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants would also lead to an anomalous situation if the word or is added between the words major and mar ried
Not only a major unmarried son who had separated by partition before the 26th day of September 1970 would get excluded from the definition of the term family even a minor married son would get so excluded
The result would be that even though marriage of a minor son is prohibited by law such son would be placed at an advantageous position to a minor son who was law abiding and had not married
Further the submission made by learned counsel for the appellants completely ignores the words as such used in the later part of Section 37b which contains the exception referred to above
Given its proper meaning the words as such can only be interpreted to mean that it is only such son who would get the benefit of the exception who had separated by partition or otherwise before the 26th day of September 1970 as major married son
The submission by counsel for the appellants that the words as such qualify only son and not major married son and are meant to distinguish son from brother or uncle etc
is misconceived on the plain language of Section 37b which contemplates clubbing of land of spouse and children only and not of brother and uncle etc
So the question of using the words as such to distinguish son from brother or uncle etc does not arise
Further for accepting this submission the words major married will have to be omitted as superfluous which 610 cannot be done in the garb of interpretation
Learned counsel for the appellants also urged that a son who had separated by partition or otherwise from his father was himself an individual and if his land was clubbed with that of his father he will be subjected twice to the provi sions relating to declaration of surplus land
This submis sion too is equally untenable
Land of such son alone who does not fall within the exception is to be clubbed with that of his father and with regard to land which had been so clubbed the son obviously cannot be treated as another individual in his own right for purposes of declaration of surplus land
Only such son who falls within the exception will be liable to be dealt with as an individual in his own right as his land has not been clubbed with that of his father
Even on the facts of these appeals nothing has been brought to our notice to indicate that the land of the appellants which was clubbed with that of their father was subjected twice to the provisions relating to declaration of surplus land treating the appellants also as individuals
It was then urged by learned counsel for the appellants that according to the definition of the term family as contained in Section 37b of the Act land of a married daughter is liable to be clubbed twice firstly with that of her father and secondly with that of her husband
Ac cording to him it is against the spirit of the law dealing with the question of declaration of surplus land
Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that none of appellants in these appeals is a married daughter and as such we do not find it necessary to go into this question
We may also point out that dealing with an almost similar submission with regard to interpretation of Section 1237 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 it was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rananjaya Singh vs Baijnath Singh and others 1955 SCR Page 671 at 676 The learned advocate however contended that such a construction would be against the spirit of the election laws in that candidates who have rich friends or relations would have an unfair advantage over a poor rival
The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made thereunder
If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary
grammatical and natural meaning of their language 611 they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this Court
 In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opin ion that the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Nityananda Guru supra lays down the correct law
One more submission has been made by learned counsel for the appellants in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP Civil No 9079 of 1986
It has been urged that certain Home Stead urban land of the appellants not connected with agricultural lying inside Udala Notified Area Council has wrongly been included as agricultural land in the draft statement
This submission does not appear to have been made either before the High Court or before the authorities under the Act
In the counter affidavit filed by the Additional District Magistrate Land Reforms Mayurbhanj Orissa it has been stated in reply to paragraphs 21 to 24 of the SLP that there is no Home Stead land and no non agricultural land belonging to the appellant land holders in the Notified Area Council of Udala
It has also been stated in paragraph 3c of the said counter affidavit that no Notification as contemplated by Section 73c of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has been made by the State Government
It has further been stated therein that the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976 has not been made applicable so far to the Udala Notified Area Council
In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to record any finding with regard to this submission and consequently we express no opinion in this behalf
In the result we find no merit in any of these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs
RSS Appeals dismissed


Summary:
An institution being fully funded by the respondent Administration was taken over and the affected stuff ab sorbed in its services in the time scale of pay
The peti tioners who comprised the said staff were not given pension ary benefits upon retirement
They therefore filed these writ petitions
This court in a petition by one of the affected employ ees Smt
Rekha Mehta vs Delhi Administration WP C No 539 of 1987 decided on April 4 1988 had directed payment of pensionary benefits
However the case of the respondent was that the said decision having been rendered in a partic ular case it would not be applicable to the petitioners in the instant case
Allowing the writ petitions HELD The services in an institution under the control of and fully funded by the respondent Administration having been taken over by it and the staff absorbed in the time scale of pay it could not be said that they would not be entitled to ordinary facilities like the pensionary benefits available to other staff
602D The case of one of the employees having been decided by this court it was expected that without resorting to any of the methods the other employees identically placed would have been given the same benefit
602G The petitioners to be paid pensionary benefits within three months
The matter to be considered at the appropriate level to see that such things do not happen in future so that unnecessary litigation is avoided and cost to the public exchequer is saved