ppeal No 209 of 1962
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 10 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No 378 of 1960
R Ganapathy Iyer BRGK Achar and KL Hathi for the appellant
M section K Sastri and M section Narasimhan for respondents
314 1962
May 4
The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL J
This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Gujarat
The appellant was a tenant of certain residential premises situate at Anand and belonging to the respondents landlords
Under a contract between the parties he held them at Rs 75 per mensem according to Indian Calendar
In 1951 the appellant applied for fixation of standard rent
On March 31 1954 the standard rent was fixed at Us
25 per mensem
The appellant did not pay the arrears of rent from July 27 1949 to July 5 1954
On October 16 1954 the landlords gave him notice to quit the premises stating therein that rent for over six months was in arrears and that he was to quit on the last day of the month of tenancy which was Kartak Vad 30 of Samvat Year 2011
The appellant neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the premises
in December 16 1954 the respondents filed the suit for ejectment basing their claim for ejectment on the provisions of section 123 a of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act 1947 Bom
LVII of 1947 hereinafter called the Act
Within two months of the institution of the suit the appellant deposited an account of Rs 1075 in Court towards arrears of rent and with the permission of the Court the respondents withdrew a sum of Rs 900 which was the amount due for arrears up to that time
The Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment together with arrears of rent for three years and costs
An appeal against the decree for ejectment was dismissed by the appellate Court
The revision to the High Court was also uusuccessful and it is 315 against the order in revision that this appeal has been preferred
Four points were urged before the High Court 1 That the month of tenancy was not by the Indian Calendar but was by the British Calendar and that the Courts below had ignored evidence in that regard
2 Assuming that the month of tenancy was by the Indian Calendar according to the lease it would be deemed to be by the British Calendar in view of the provision of section 27 of the Act
3 As the arrears of rent had been paid within two months of the institution of the suit the appellant be deemed to be ready and willing to pay the rent and that therefore the landlord was not entitled to recover possession of the premises
4 It is discretionary with the Court to pass a decree for ejectment in a case under section 123 a of the Act as the expression used in that subclause is the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession  The High Court held that the findings of the Courts below that the month of tenancy was by the Indian Calendar was based on a consideration of the evidence on the record and therefore was binding
It also held that it could not be deemed to be by the British Calendar in view of section 27 of the Act which provided that the rent would be recovered according to the British Calendar notwithstanding anything contained in any contract and did not provide for the tenancy to be by the month according to the British Calendar even if the tenancy under the Contract was by a different Calendar
The High Court also held that the tenant s depositing arrears of rent within two months of the institution of the suit would not justify holding that the tenant was ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and that therefore the landlord was not entitled to recover possession 316 of the premises in view of sub s1 of section 12 of the Act
Lastly the High Court held that the Court is bound to pass a decree for ejectment under section 12 3 a if it be proved that the rent was payable by the month that  it had been in arrears for a period of six months and that the tenant failed to make payment of the arrears until the expiration of the period of one month after the service of notice referred to in subs
2 of that section
 As a result the revision was dismissed
Two points have been urged for the appellant in this Court
One is that the month of the tenancy was to be by the British Calender in view of section 2 7 of the Act and r 4 framed thereunder and that there could be no forfeiture of the tenancy when the arrears of rent had been paid within two months of the institution of the suit
The significance of the first question is that if the appellant s tenancy was to be by the month of the British Calendar notice to quit was a bad notice as it did not comply with the requirements of s106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that therefore there had been no determination of the tenancy which is a condition precedent for the landlord being entitled to possession and coin
sequently for instituting a suit for ejectment on any ground whatsoever including the ground of rent being in arrears
The first point to determine therefore is whether it is a condition precedent for the institution of a suit by a landlord for the recovery of possession from a tenant who has been in arrears of rent that there had been first a determination of the contractual tenancy
If it is not a condition precedent it will not be necessary to determine whether the month of the tanancy continued to be according to the Indian Calendar according to the contract or had been according to the British 317 Calendar in view of a 27 of the Act when a tenancy is created under a contract between the landlord and the tenant that contract must hold good and continue to be in force till according to law or according to the terms of contract it comes to an end
Section III of the Transfer of Property Act states the various circumstances in which a lease of immovable property determines
Clause b provides for the determination of the lease on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease or to quit or of intention to quit the property leased duly given by one party to the other
There is nothing in the act which would give a right to the landlord to determine the tenancy and thereby to got the right to evict the tenant and recover possession
This Act was enacted for the purpose of controlling the rents and repair of certain premises and of evictions due to the tendency of landlords to take advantage of the extreme scarcity of premises compared to the demand for them
The Act intended therefore to restrict the rights which the landlords possessed either for charging excessive rents or for
evicting tenants
A tenant stood in no need of protection against eviction by the landlord so long as he had the necessary protection under the terms of the contract between him and the landlord
He could not be evicted till his tenancy was determined according to law and therefore there was no necessity for providing any further protection in the Act against his eviction so long as his tenancy continued to exist under the contract
Sub section1 of section 12 of the Act provides that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases if any and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the 318 provisions of the Act
It creates a restriction on the landlords right to the recovery of possession
When the landlord will have such a right is not provided by it
Ordinarily the landlord will have a right to recover possession from the tenant when the tenancy had determined
The provisions of this section therefore will operate against the landlord after the determination of the tenancy by any of the modes referred to in a III of the Transfer of property Act
What this section of the Act provides is that even after the determination of the tenancy a landlord will not be entitled to recover possession though a right to recover possession gets vested in him so long as the tenant complies with what he is required to do by this section
It is this extra protection given by this section which will be useful to the tenant after his tenancy has determined
The section does
not create a new right in the landlord to evict the tenant when the tenant does not pay his rent
It does not say so and therefore it is clear that a landlords right to evict the tenant for default in payment
of rent will arise only after the tenancy is determined and the continued possession of the tenant is not account of the contractual terms but on account of the statutory right conferred on him to continue in possession so long as he complies with what sub s1 requires of him
The landlord is restricted from evicting the tenant till the tenant does not do what he is required to do for peaceful possession under sub s1 of section 12
We are therefore of opinion that where a tenant is in possession under a lease from the landlord he is not to be evicted for a cause which would give rise to a suit for recovery of possession under s12 if his tenancy has not been determined already
It follows that whenever a tenant acts in a way which would remove the bar on the landlord s right to evict him it is necessary for the landlord to serve him with
a notice 319 determining his tenancy and also serve him with a notice under sub s2 of section 12 of the Act
In this connection reference may be made to what wag stated in Dr K A Dhairyawan vs J R Thakur 1
In that case the landlord granted a lease of a parcel of land to the lessees for a certain period
The lessee was to construct a building on that land
On the termination of the lease the lessees were to surrender and yield up the demised promises including the building to the lessors
After the expiry of the period of the lease the lessor sued for a declaration that they were entitled to the building and were entitled to claim possession of the same
The lessees pleaded that they were also lessees of the building and were protected from eviction therefrom by the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and lodging House Control Act 1947 and that the covenant for delivering possession of that building could not be enforced as the lease in respect of the land could not be terminated on account of the protection given by the Act
It was held that under the lease there was a demise only of the land and not of the building and consequently the provisions of the Act dit not apply to the contract of delivery of possession of the building
It was contended that even in such a case possession of the building could not be given until the lease bad been determined which in law could not be determined so long as the respondents could not be evicted from the demised land of which they were tenants within the meaning of the Act
This contention was repelled
It was said at p 808 This contention is without force as the provisions of the Act do not provide for the continuation of a lease beyond the specified period stated therein
All that the Act does is to give to the person who continues to 1  320 remain in possession of the land although the period of the lease had come to an end the status of a statutory tenant
That is to say although the lease had come to an end but the lessee continued to remain in possession without the consent of the lessor he would nonetheless be a tenant of the land and could not be evicted save as provided by the Act
 This means that the provisions of the Act did not affect the terms of the lease according to which the lease came to an end after the expiry of the period for which it was given
The lessee s possession after the expiry of the lease was by virtue of the provisions of the Act and not by virtue of the extension of the period of the lease
It is a necessary consequence of this view that the restriction on the landlord s right to recover possession under section 12 of the Act operates after he has determined the tenancy and that till then the rights between the parties with respect to eviction would be governed by the Ordinary law
It was said in Ragbubir Narayan Lotlikar vs Fernandez 1
Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act Bom Act LVII of 1947  In our opinion s28 applies only to those suits between a landlord and a tenant where a landlord has become entitled to possession or recovery of the premises demised
Under the Transfer of Property Act a landlord becomes entitled to possession when there is a determination of tenancy
A tenancy can be determined in any of the modes laid down in section 111 and once the tenancy is determined under s108 q the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property
It 1  511 321 is therefore only on the determination of the lease or the tenancy that the landlord be comes entitled to the possession of the pro perty and when he has so becomes entitled to possession if he files a suit for a decree for possession then section 28 applies and such a suit can only be filed in the Small Causes Court
 Again it was said at the same page Section 12 postulates the fact that landlord is entitled to recovery of possession and he is only entitled to possession under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
It is only when he so becomes entitled that the Legislature steps in and prevents the enforcement of his right by the protection which it gives to the tenant
No question of the application of section 12 can arise if a landlord is not entitled to possession at all
 A similar view was expressed in Karsandas vs Karsanji 1 It was said  that a tenancy must be duly determined either by a notice to quit or by efflux of time or under one or the other of the clauses of section III T P Act before a landlord can one to evict his tenant on any of the grounds contained in the clauses of s 13 1 of the Bombay Rent Act as applied to Saurashtra
Therefore a notice determining the tenancy and calling upon the tenant to quit was in this case a necessary prerequisite to the institution of the suit
 The cases reported as Rai Brij Raj Krishna vs section K Shaw and Brothers 2 and Shri Hem Chand vs Shrimati Sham Devi 3 are distinguishable
In the former case s11 of the Bihar Buildings 1 AIR 1953 Sau
113 118
2  150
3 ILR 1955 Punj
322 Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act 1947 III of 1947 came for interpretation by this Court and in that connection it was said Section II beings with the words Not withstanding anything contained in any agree ment or law to the contrary  and hence any attempt to import the provisions relating to the law of transfer of property for the inter pretation of the section would seem to be out of place
Section 11 is a self contained sec tion and it is wholly unnecessary to g o outside the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not and under what conditions he can be evicted
It clearly provides that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions and one of the conditions laid down for the eviction of a month to month tenant is non payment of rent
 In the present case section 12 of the Act is differently worded and cannot therefore be said to be a complete Code in itself
There is nothing in it which overrides the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
Shri Hem Chand s Case 1 dealt with the provisions of s13i of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act XXXVIII of 1952
This section provided that no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any promises shall be passed by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any con tract
It was held that the Rent Control Act provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment and that being so the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of property Act had no relevance in considering an application for ejectment 1 ILR 1955 Punj 36
323 made under that Act
There is nothing in the Act corresponding to the provisions of section 131 of the Delhi Ajmer Merwara Act
It is unnecessary for us to consider whether Shri Hem Chand s case was rightly decided or not
In Meghji Lakhamahi and Brothers V Furniture Workshop 2 the Privy Council dealt with an application for possession under section 16 of the Increase of rent Restriction Ordinance No 23 of 1949 Kenya whose relevant portion is  1 No order for the recovery of possession of any premises to which this Ordinance applies or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom shall be made unless  k the landlord requires possession of the premises to enables the reconstruction or rebuilding thereof to be carried out  It was said  In the present case the only question is whether section 16i k is so framed as to envisage or make provision for such an order
An application for possession under section 16 presupposes that the contractual tenancy of the demised premises has been determined
It is not possible to determine it as to part and keep it in being as to the remainder
In the present case the tenancy of the entire demised premises had been determined
 The right to possession is to be
distinguished from the right to recover possession
The right to possession arises when the tenancy is determined
The right to recover possession follows the right to possession and arises when the person in possession does not make over 1 ILR 1955 Punj
2 90 324 possession as he is bound to do under law and there arises a necessity to recover possession through Court
The cause of action for going to Court to recover possession arises on the refusal of the person in possession with no right to possess to deliver possession
In this context it is clear that the provisions of section 12 deal with the stage of the recovery of possession and not with the stages prior to it and that they come into play only when the tenancy is determined and a right to possession has come in existence
Of course if there is not contractual tenancy and a person is deemed to be a tenant only on account of a statute giving him right to remain in possession the right to possession arises on the person in possession acting in a manner which according to the statute gives the landlord right to recover possession and no question for the determination of the tenancy arises as really speaking there was no tenancy in the ordinary sense of that expression
It is for the sake of convenience that the right to possession by virtue of the provisions of a statute has been referred to as statutory tenancy
In Ebner vs Lascelles 1 It was said dealing with the provisions of Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act 1920 10 and 11 Geo 5 c 17  It has been truly said that the main rights conceded to a tenant under these Acts are first a right to hold over or status of irremovability  and next a right not to have his rent unduly raised
The right to hold over is a right that comes into existence after the expiration of the contractual tenancy
During the contractual tenancy the tenant being in possession under the protection of his contract has no need of the protection of the Act to enable him to retain possession but 1 497 325 during that tenancy the Act protects him in regard to rent by providing that notwith standing any other agreements which he may make with his landlord as to rent he is not to be charged a higher rent than the law allows and if he is charged a higher rent than that he can have it reduced
The right to hold over after the termination of the con tractual tenancy
and the right to protection during the contractual tenancy are two right s which must be kept distinct from each other
 It may be mentioned that section 5 of the aforesaid Act of 1920 provided that no order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling house to which the Act applied or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom would be made or given unless the case fell within one of the clauses mentioned in sub
s1
We are therefore of opinion that so long as the contractual tenancy continues a landlord cannot sue for the recovery of possession even if s12 of the Act does not bar the institution of such a suit and that in order to take advantage of this provision of the Act he must first determine the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act
It is now necessary to determine whether a notice served on the appellant to quit the tenancy on October 16 1954 the last date of the month according to the Hindu Calendar as October 16 happened to be Kartik Vad 30 of section Y 2011 the tenancy having commenced from Kartik Sud 1 of SY 1963
It is not disputed that originally the tenancy was according to the Hindu Calendar
The contention for the appellant is that this month to month tenancy according to the Hindu Calendar was 326 converted to a similar tenancy according to the British Calendar in view of the provisions of s27 of the Act and r 4 of the Rules framed under the Act
Section 27 of the Act reads 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any contract custom or local usage to the contrary rent payable by the month or year or portion of a year shall be recovered according to the British Calendar
2 The State Government may prescribe the manner in which rent recoverable according to any other calendar before the coming into operation of this Act shall be calculated and charged in terms of the British Calendar
 Rule 4 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House hates Control Rules 1948 hereinafter called the Rules reads Calculation of rent according to British Calender
If before the Act comes into force the rent in respect of any premises was chargeable according to a calendar other than the British Calendar the landlord shall recover from the tenant rent for the broken period of the month year or portion of the year immediately preceding the date on which the Act comes into force proportionate amount according to the aforesaid Calendar month year or portion of the year at which the rent was then chargeable
After such date the landlord shall recover rent according to the British Calendar
The rent chargeable per month according to the British 327 Calendar shall not exceed the rent which was chargeable per month according to the other calendar followed immediately before such date
 There is nothing irk the aforesaid rule or the section about the conversion of the month of the tenancy from the month according to the Hindu calendar to the month according to the British Calendar
They only provide for the recoverability of the rent according to the British Calendar
Since the enforcement of the Act on February 13 1948 the monthly rent would be for the month according to the British Calendar
The monthly rent could be recovered after the expiry of a month from that date or the rent for the period from the 13th February to the end of the month could be recovered at the monthly rate and thereafter after the expiry of each Calendar month
There is nothing in the section or the rule in regard to the date from which the month for recovery of rent should commence
This provision was made probably as a corollary to the statute providing for standard rents
Standard rents necessitate standard months
There are a number of calendars in use in this country
The Hindus themselves use several calendars
The Muslims use a different one
Some calendars are used for particular purposes
It appears to be for the sake of uniformity and standardisation that a common calendar was to govern the period of the month of the tenancy and the date for the recovery of the rent
Rule 4 provided a procedure for adjustment of the recovery of the rent according to a calendar other than the British Calendar and further provided that the rent chargeable per month according to the British Calender would not exceed the rent which was chargeable per month according to the other calendar followed immediately before that date
In the absence of any specific provision in the Act with respect to any alteration to be made in the period of the month of the 328 tenancy it cannot be held merely on the basis of an alteration in the period for the recovery of rent that the monthly period of tenancy had also been changed
The tenancy can be from month to month and the recoverability of the rent may not be from month to month and may under the contract be based on any period say a quarter or half year or a year
There is nothing in law to make the month for the period of recovering rent synchronize with the period of the month of the tenancy
The tenancy must start on a particular date and consequently its month would be the month from that date according to the calendar followed
The month of tenancy according to that calender are settled by contract from the commencement of the tenancy
The tenancy under a lease for a certain period starts from a certain date be it according to the British Calendar or any other Calendar
The period of lease
and consequently the tenancy comes to an end at the expiry of that period according to the calendar followed by the parties in fixing the commencement of the tenancy
A lease even according to the British Calendar can start from any intermediate date of the calendar month
There is nothing in section 27 to indicate that the month of the tenancy to such a lease will start from the first of a regular month
Section 27 simply states that the rent would be recovered according to the British Calendar without fixing the first date of the month as the date from which the month for the purposes of the recovery of the rent would be counted
It follows that the month of the tenancy which commences on the 14th of a month would be from the 14th to the 13th of the next month according to the British Calendar
The rent would be recoverable with respect to this period of a month
No interference with any such term of the contract has been made by any provision of the Act and therefore we hold that the provisions of section 27 of the Act and r 4 of 329 the Rules do not in any way convert the month of the tenancy according to the Indian Calendar to the month of the British Calendar
The High court said in his judgment that Mr Parghi who was appearing for the appellant was unable to cite any decision in support of the contention raised by him
Our attention however has been drawn to two cases decided by the Bombay High Court
They are Civil Revision Applications Nos 247 of 1956 and 1583 of 1960 decided by Dixit and Tendolkar JJ and Patwardban J on February 22 1957 and August 16 1961 respectively
The latter decision had to follow the earlier one
In the earlier case the notice to quit required the tenant to give possession on May 1 1953
The tenancy had commenced according to the Hindu Calendar
The notice was given according to the British Calendar
The High Court held the notice to be valid agreeing with the contention that  the effect of the provisions of a 27 of the Act was lo make the tenancy which was originally according to the Hindu Calendar a tenancy according to the British Calendar
The ratio of the decision in the words of the learned Judges is  Now rent is payable for occupation by the defendant and therefore the tenancy must be deemed to be one according to the British Calendar from the first of the month to the end of the month   
Here is a local law which by section 27 makes the tenancy as one according to the British Calendar
We are of opinion that this view is wrong
We therefore hold that the notice to quit issued to the appellant was therefore a valid notice as held by the Court below and determined the tenancy of the appellant
330 The second contention that the appellant s having paid the arrears of rent within 2 months of the institution of the suit there would be no forfeiture of the tenancy has no force in view of the provisions of section 12 of the Act
Sub section 2 permits the landlord to institute a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of non payment of rent after the expiration of one month from the service of the notice demanding the arrears of rent and cl
a of sub s3 empowers the Court to Pass a decree in case the rent had been payable by the month there was no dispute about the amount of standard rent the arrears of rent had been for a period of six months and the tenant had neglected to make the payment within a month of the service of the notice of demand
The tenant s paying the arrears of rent after the institution of the suit therefore does not affect his liability to eviction and the Court s power to pass a decree for eviction
It is true that the expression used in el
a of sub s3 is the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession  but this does not mean as contended for the appellant that the Court has discretion to pass or not to pass a decree for eviction in case the other conditions mentioned in that clause are satisfied
The landlord became entitled to recover possession when the tenant failed to pay rent and this right in him is not taken away by any other provision in the Act
The Court is therefore bound in law to pass the decree when the requirements of sub s 2 of s12 are satisfied
This is also clear from a comparison of the language used in cl
a with the language used in cl
b of sub section
3 which deals with a suit for eviction which does not come within cla and provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed in such a suit if on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix the tenant pays or tenders in Court the 331 standard rent then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court
It is clear that where the legislature intended to give some benefit to the tenant on account of the payment of the arrears during the pendency of the suit it made a specific provision
In the circumstances we are of opinion that the Court has no discretion and has to pass a decree for eviction if the other conditions of subs
2 of section 12 of the Act are satisfied
The result therefore is that this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was a tenant of the respondents in respect of certain residential premises
The tenancy was by the Indian Calendar
The appellant did not pay arrears of rent for about 5 years and the landlords gave him notice to quit as he was in arrears of rent for more than six months and asked him to quit on the last day of the Indian month
On the appellant s failure to comply the landlords filed a suit for ejectment under section 12 3 a of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947
Within two months of the institution of the suit the appellant deposited the arrears of rent
The suit for ejectment was decreed
The appellant contended that in view of section 27 of the Act and r 4 the tenancy was deemed to be by the British Calendar and the notice to quit expiring with the end of the Indian month was invalid and that he should have been relieved against forfeiture
The landlords contended that no notice to quit was necessary for filing the suit that the notice given was valid and that there could be no relief against forfeiture
Held that the suit for ejectment was rightly decreed
it was incumbent upon the landlords to determine the contractual tenancy by a proper notice before they could file a suit for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of non
payment of arrears under section 123 a of the Act
The Act did not create a new right in the landlord to evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent the right to evict was dependent upon a proper termination of the tenancy
The Act gave extra protection to the tenant which he could avail of after his tenancy was determined
There was nothing in section 12 of the Act which overrode the provisions of the transfer of Property Act
The right to possession had to be distinguished from 313 the right to recover possession
The right to possession arose on the determination of the tenancy and the right to recover possession arose under the Act after the right to possession had arisen
Dr KA Dhairyawan vs JR Thakur   Baghubir Narayan Lotlikar vs Fernandiz 1952 Bom
LR 505 Karsandas vs Karsanji AIR 1953 Sau
113 Meghji Lakhamahi vs Furniture Workshop and Ebner vs Lascelles  referred to
Bai Brij Bai Krishna vs SK Shaw and Bros 1951 SCR 145 and Shri Hem Chand vs Shrimati Sham Devi ILR 1955 Punj
36 distinguished
The notice to quit was a valid notice
The original tenancy was according to the Indian Calendar and there was nothing in section 27 of the Act or in r4 which converted it into a tenancy according to the British Calendar
Section 27 and r 4 merely provided for the recoverability of rent according to the British Calendar
In view of the provisions of section 12 there could be no relief against forfeiture in the present case
Section 123a empowered the court to pass a decree for eviction in case of rent payable month by month if the arrears of rent had been for a period of six months and the tenant had neglected to make the payment within a month of the service of the notice of demand
The payment of arrears after institution of the suit did not affect his liability to eviction and the court s power to pass the decree
The Court was bound to pass the decree when the requirments of the section were satisfiedwhere the  legislature intended to give relief against forfeiture it made a specific provision