Civil No 960 of 1987
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
GL Sanghi BA Masodkar Sunil Dogra and PH Parekh for the Petitioner
VC Mahajan K Swami and Ms A Subhashini for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA J
This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by a Judicial Member of the Central Administra tive Tribunal purports to be a sequal of this Court s deci sion in SP Sampath Kumar vs Union of India and Ors  The petitioner contends that the decision in Sampath Kumar s case supra equates the Central Adminis trative Tribunal with the High Court and therefore its Chairman has to be equated with the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Vice Chairman and Members must be equated with the sitting Judges of the High Court in all respects
It is contended that while the Vice Chairman have been equated with sitting Judges of the High Court the Members have not been so equated in their pay and other conditions of serv ice
It is further contended that a distinction has been made in the conditions of service particularly the pay and age of superannuation between the Vice Chairmen and the Members which is arbitrary and therefore the Members also should be given the same pay as the Vice Chairmen and their age of superannuation should also be the same ie 65 years as that of the Vice Chairmen
It is urged that the judicial functions discharged by the Vice Chairmen and the 949 Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal are the same and therefore the principle of equal pay for equal work applies
Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution is alleged on this basis
Part XIV A containing Articles 323 A and 323 B were inserted in the Constitution of India by the Constitution Forty second Amendment Act 1976 enabling the setting up of Administrative Tribunals and Tribunals for other matters by legislative enactments
The Central Administrative Tribunal has been constituted under Section 4 of the hereinafter referred to as the Act  with a Chairman Vice Chairmen and Members judicial and administrative
The qualifications for appointment of Chairman Vice Chairmen or other Members are prescribed by Section 6 of the Act
Sec tion 7 provides that the Vice Chairman or as the case may be such one of the Vice Chairman as the appropriate Govern ment may by notification authorise in this behalf shall act as the Chairman in the event of any vacancy in the office of the Chairman for any reason whatsoever or when the Chairman is unable to discharge his functions for any reason
Section 8 prescribes the term of office of the Chairman Vice Chairman or other Members as five years from the date on which he enters upon his office with eligibility for re appointment for another term of five years provided that no Chairman or Vice Chairman shall hold the office after he has attained the age of 65 years and any other Member the age of 62 years
Section 10 of the Act provides for the salaries and allowances and other terms and condi tions of service of Chairman Vice Chairman and other Mem bers to be such as may be prescribed by the Central Govern ment
Section 17 confers on the Tribunal the same jurisdic tion powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has under the 
But for this specific provision the Tribunal would not have the power of the High Court in this behalf
Section 18 provides for distribution of business amongst the Benches of the Tribunal
Section 28 excludes the jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tribunal Labour Court or other authority constituted under the or any other corresponding law for the time being in force in relation to matters over which the Tribunal has been conferred jurisdiction
Section 35 con tains the rule making power of the Central Government while Section 36 gives power to the appropriate Government to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and particular ly for the matters specified therein
The specified pur poses for which the Central Government can make rules speci fied in Section 352c include 950 the salaries and allowances payable to and the other terms and conditions of the Chairman Vice Chairmen and other Members
The rules framed under the Act are to be laid before the Parliament
It is not necessary to give further details of the  the provisions of which were considered at length in Sampath Kumar s case supra and now stand amended in accordance with the observations of this Court in that decision
The Central Administrative Tribunal Salaries and Allow ances and Conditions of Service of Chairman Vice Chairmen and Members Rules 1985 hereinafter referred to as the rules  were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 352c of the 
Rule 3 therein as it now exists specifies Rs9000 pm as the pay of the Chairman Rs8000 pm as the pay of the Vice Chairman and the pay scale of Rs7300 100 7600 per mensem for a Member
As earlier indicated the age of super annuation prescribed in Section 8 of the Act for the Chair man and Vice Chairman is 65 years and for any other Member 62 years
The petitioner s grievance is that the pay of any other Member of the Tribunal and his age of superannuation should be Rs 8000 pm and 65 years respectively as in the case of Vice Chairmen since the Members and Vice Chairmen discharge identical judicial functions
The question is Whether the principle of equal pay for equal work relied on by the petitioner is applicable to this situation or there is any hostile discrimination against the Members of the Central Administrative Tribunal as alleged by the petitioner
If the petitioner s contention be correct then would arise the question of relief which can be granted
The prayer made in this petition is to direct an amendment in the and the rules framed thereunder to prescribe the same pay and age of superannua tion for the Members as in the case of the Vice Chairman
The argument of Shri BA Masodkar and Shri GL Sanghi in support of the petition is that the Members and the Vice Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal belong to the same class since they discharge identical judicial functions and there is no rational nexus of the classifica tion made between them with the object sought to be achieved
It is urged that the Tribunal is one entity com prising of the Chairman Vice Chairmen and Members which has been substituted for the High Court in respect of the juris diction conferred on the Tribunal and therefore there is no justification for discriminating between them in the matter of pay and other conditions of service
951 In the counter affidavit of the respondent it has been stated that all the functions of the Vice Chairman and the Members are not the same inasmuch as the Vice Chairman in addition to filling the casual vacancy in the office of the Chairman also discharges certain administrative functions entrusted to him by the Chairman while no such administra tive function is discharged by any Member
It is stated that the office of the Vice Chairman and any other Member cannot therefore be treated as the same or in one class
Shri VC Mahajan learned counsel for the respondent contended that Sampath Kumar s case supra does not lend any support to the petitioner s contention and in this context the observa tions made therein actually negative the petitioner s stand
It was also urged that the relief claimed for a direction to amend the aforesaid Act and the rules framed thereunder cannot be granted which alone is the relief claimed in the writ petition
was rightly not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner that the relief specifically claimed in the petition of a direction to amend the Administrative Tribu nals Act 1985 and the rules flamed thereunder to equate the Members of the Tribunal with the Vice Chairman in the matter of pay and age of superannuation cannot be granted For this reason it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the relief may be suitably moulded to grant the same benefit for the Members of the Tribunal if the allegation of hostile discrimination is accepted
it is not necessary for us to deal further with this aspect since we have no doubt that the plea of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution raised by the petitioner is untenable and must fail
The sheet anchor of petitioner s case is the decision of this Court in Sampath Kumar s case supra
We will present ly show that the decision in Sampath Kumar s case supra does not support the petitioner s claim in this petition
It is significant to note that the age of superannuation of High Court Judges is 62 years while that of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Tribunal is 65 years and of any other Member is 62 years
No attempt has been made on behalf of the petitioner to justify the fixation of age of superannua tion of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman as 65 years if they are to be equated with the Chief Justice and sitting judges of the High Court who retire at the age of 62 years only
In respect of the age of superannuation the Members of the Tribunal are at par with the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court
Obviously it is for this reason that an attempt was made to claim the equality with the Vice Chairman of the Tribunal who gets Rs8000 pm as pay like a High Court Judge but retires at the higher age of 65 years
This disparity itself indicates that 952 the Chairman Vice Chairmen and Members of the Tribunal are not equated with the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court for all purposes which in substance is the founda tion of the petition
The contention of Shri D A Masodkar learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute for the High Court for adjudicating disputes relating to service matters the Members of the Tribunal should be equated with the High Court Judges for all purposes including their pay and age of superannuation
He contends that the lower pay and age of superannuation of the Members of the Tribunal is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution
His argument is that the Members should be equated in this behalf with the Vice Chairman whose pay is equal to that of a puisne Judge of the High Court
However no attempt was made to justify on this reasoning the higher age of superannuation of the ViceChair man being 65 years against 62 years of a High Court Judge
Shri GL Sanghi supported the petition and contended that the Tribunal being one body the persons constituting it cannot be bifurcated into separate categories and the pay and age of superannuation of all of them should be the same
He adds that the Members and the ViceChairman should have the same pay and age of superannuation while the slightly higher pay of the Chairman was justified as in the case of the Chief Justce vis a vis the puisne Judges of the High Courts
In substance the contention of Shri Masodkar is for equating the Members of the Tribunal with puisne Judges of the High Courts in the matter of pay on the assumption that the Tribunal is equated with the High Court and with the Vice Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of age of super annuation on the basis of equal work
The contention of Shri GL Sanghi is slightly different
He argues that the Tribu nal being one entity there is no reason to treat its Members differently when all of them perform the same judicial function the only difference being that the Chairman has additional administrative functions to discharge
Part XIV A of the Constitution of India containing Articles 323 A and 323 B provides for the constitution of administrative and other tribunals for the purpose of adju dication or trial by these tribunals of disputes relating to matters specified therein
Article 323 A deals with adminis trative tribunals to be constituted for adjudication of disputes with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other specified 953 authority
The law enacted by
the Parliament for this purpose may provide for all matters relating to the consti tution and functions of the Administrative Tribunals as well as for exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India with respect to the matters required to be adjudicated by the Administrative Tribunal
It is for this purpose that the has been enacted and Section 28 therein excludes the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tribunal Labour Court or other authority constituted under the or any other corresponding law for the time being in force in relation to matters which the Administrative Tribu nal is empowered to adjudicate
The Act also provides for transfer of all pending cases as provided in Section 29 of the Act
In the first place the assumption in the argument on behalf of the petitioner that the Tribunal is equated with the High Court is fallacious
It is not only the service matters required earlier to the adjudicated by the High Court but also those by the subordinate courts which are now to be adjudicated by the Administrative Tribunals
That apart Article 323 A itself clearly contemplates that the Administrative Tribunals constituted thereunder are distinct from the High Courts and it is the law enacted by the Par liament providing for establishment of an Administrative Tribunal which is to provide for all matters relating to the jurisdiction powers procedure and all supplemental inci dental and consequential matters relating to the Administra tive Tribunal
It is therefore the law enacted by the Parliament constituting the Administrative Tribunal which has to be first seen for the purpose of ascertaining the real nature and status of the Tribunal and the persons constituting it
There is no ambiguity in the provisions of the and the exact status and service conditions of the Chairman Vice Chairman and Members of the Administrative Tribunal together with the qualifications for appointment to these offices have been clearly spelt out in the Act
This Act provides expressly for the term of office of the Chairman Vice Chairman and Members in Section 8 and for the salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of service by Section 10 read with Section 352c and the rules framed thereunder
The Central Administrative Tribunal Salaries and allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman Vice Chairmen and Mem bers Rules 1985 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 352c to provide for the salaries and allowances etc
The scheme of the Act and the rules framed thereunder is quite clear and their enactment is in the manner laid down in Article 324 A of the Constitution
954 The term of office and the age of superannuation pay and allowances and other service conditions of the Chairman Vice Chairman and Members are specifically provided in this manner and from the scheme it is evident that the Chairman Vice Chairman and Members are not treated as one class for this purpose by the very enactment which provides for the establishment of the Tribunals
Such elaborate provisions were unnecessary if the Tribunal was equated with the High Courts and its Members with High Court Judges
Similarly a higher age of superannuation could not have been prescribed for the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Tribunal
Article 323 A of the Constitution itself envisages different provi sions in this behalf and not the same as
that of the High Courts which is the assumption made in the petitioner s contention
In fact the provisions of the Act indicate that there is no intention of equating the Chairman Vice Chair man and Members of the Tribunal with the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Courts for purposes other than those expressly provided in respect of jurisdiction power etc
Section 17 of the Act is a significant indication
By Sec tion 17 the Tribunal has been given the power to punish for contempt of itself and it is provided that for this purpose the Tribunal shall have and exercise the same jurisdic tion powers and authority as the High Court and the refer ences in the  tO a High Court shall be construed as including a reference to such Tribu nal
It is obvious that the need for enacting such a provi sion arose only because in the absence of such a provision conferring on the Tribunal the jurisdiction and power of a High Court for the purpose of the provisions of the  197 1 the Tribunal would not have the same jurisdiction or power while adjudicating those very matters which earlier were to be adjudicated by the High Court
Similarly Section 30 of the Act provides that all proceed ings before a Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial pro ceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code 1860
This provision also is unneces sary if the petitioner is right in contending that the Tribunal is equated with the High Court for all purposes and must be treated as a deemed High Court with all the logical consequences
It is therefore not possible for the Administrative Tribunal to shed off or abandon its heritage and substitute its genes with those of its choice of a different heritage
In our opinion this alone is sufficient to indicate that the petitioner s assumption is fallacious and his attempt to be treated as a deemed High Court Judge cannot be accepted
Apart from the obvious fallacy already indicated the peti tioner s claim if accepted would result in appointment of some 955 deemed High Court Judges contrary to the express provision made in the Constitution for appointment of High Court Judges
During the course of heating it was pointed out that mere substitution of a different forum for adjudication of a dispute does not result in conferring on the new forum the status of the substituted forum for purposes other than the jurisdiction and power to adjudicate that dispute unless their status be otherwise equal
To illustrate Section 115 CPC by amendment in some states empowers the District Courts instead of the High Court to decide revisions thereunder but that does not equate the District Court with the High Court
No attempt was made on behalf of the petitioner to answer this
The slightly modified argument of Shri G L
Sanghi for achieving the same purpose also does not bear close scruti ny
The  itself makes a distinction between the Chairman Vice Chairman and Members
The age of superannuation of the Chairman and Vice Chairman is 65 years while that of the Members is 62 years
Similar ly there is difference in their salaries
They are not treated to be in one class for this purpose by the Act itself
It cannot therefore be said that all of them constitute one class since the Tribunal is one
The case of the Chairman was distinguished by learned counsel on the basis that his position was akin to that of the Chief Jus tice of the High Court
However the age of superannuation of the Chief Justice and the puisne Judges of the High Court is the same which pattern is not maintained in the Act
A provision is made in the Act for discharge of certain admin istrative functions of the Chairman by the Vice Chairman and not by the Members and similarly there is provision only for the Vice Chairman to fill a casual vacancy
The founda tion of initial equality on which the argument of discrimi nation is based is non existent
The parent statute itself shows that they were not born equals
There is also no merit in the casual argument that there is a proposal for higher pay and age of superannuation for Members of Tribunals for other matters constituted in ac cordance with Article 323 B of the Constitution
The basic fact to be remembered is that Articles 323 A and 323 B themselves require the law constituting these Tribunals to provide for the pay and other conditions of service of its Members and therefore the same would be governed in the case of each Tribunal by the provisions of the statute giving birth to the Tribunal
These statutes being differ ent the provisions therein in this behalf can also be different which has been left to the legislative wisdom to decide
956 Considerable emphasis was laid on behalf of the peti tioner on SP Sam path Kumar s case supra to contend that the Tribunals constituted under Article 323 A have been equated with the High Courts
It is sufficient to say that in Sam path Kumar supra the question before us in the present petition did not arise for consideration and the observation therin cannot be torn out of context
On the contrary certain observations in para 22 of that judgment indicate that the retiring age of 62 years or 65 years for the Members Chairman and Vice Chairman was treated to be in accord with the pattern of the enactment on the basis that the Members and Chairman or Vice Chairman were in different categories
Equation of the Tribunal with the High Court therein was only as the forum for adjudication of disputes relating to service matters and not for all purposes such as the one arising for decision in the present case
We are unable to accept that the decision of this Court in SP Sampath Kumar supra supports the contention before us in this petition
As a result of the aforesaid discussion we have no hesitation in holding that the equality claimed by the Members of the Administrative Tribunal with the Judges of the High Courts or even the Vice Chairman of the Tribunal in the matter of pay and age of superannuation does not exist being contrary to the pattern and scheme of the parent statute establishing the Tribunal and therefore the very foundation for the argument of discrimination being non existent the petition must fail
Consequently the petition is dismissed
In the circum stances of the case the parties will bear their own costs
RSS Petition dismissed


Summary:
The respondent a statutory body corporate constituted under the Bombay Port Trust Act 1879 a State Act  who had appointed an Assistant Estate Manager as their power of attorney holder to lease out its property from time to time terminate the leases and to lay action for ejectment etc leased out the suit property to the appellant
826 The appellant was served with a notice under Section 106 read with Section 111h of the terminating the tenancy in terms of the covenants of lease and directing delivery of possession of the demised property giving one month s time from 22nd January 1975
The notice was served on the tenants on January 28 1975 and became effective from 28th February 1975
In the meanwhile the Major Port Trust Act 1963 a Central Act  was made applicable to the Bombay Port Trust by operation of Section 1332A thereof with effect from February 1 1975
After the expiry of one month from the suit notice an ejectment application was filed under Section 41 of the Bombay as amended under the Maharashtra 1963 Amendment Act and a direction was sought for delivery of possession
After the Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976 came into force suits were laid against the three other tenants of the demised property
The respondent pleaded in the said suit that it was a successor ininterest of the Port Trust Board under the State Act and was entitled to eject the tenants and to take possession of the demised portions
The appellant contended in his written statement that the suit was not maintainable since the State Act ceased to be operative with effect from February 1 1975 the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section 111h of the became ineffective and without determining the tenancy afresh the suit was not validly laid
It was further submit ted that the respondent had promised that on deposit of a certain amount which the appellant tenant did he would be given to lease a portion in the reconstructed building and consequently the respondent was estopped by promissory estoppel to have the tenant ejected
One suit was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not duly determined as per law while the other suits were decreed
No appellate forum had been prescribed under the Maha rashtra Amendment Act of 1963 but a substantive suit on the original side provided was available but such a right to appeal was incorporated by the Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the other tenants filed regular appeals to a Bench of two Judges of the Small Causes Court which were pending
827 In the writ petition of the appellant petitioner challenged the vires of sections 23 and 4 of the Maharashtra Amending Act 1963 introducing Section 42A in Chapter VII of the and deleting Sections 45 to 47 from the Principal Act and of amendment of SectiOn 49 thereof as well as Section 462 of the as amended by the Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1976 as offending Article 14 of tile Constitution
When the matter came up before the Single Judge of the High Court it was referred to the Division Bench which upheld the constitutional validity of the said sections and remitted the matter to the Single Judge for disposal on merits
The Single Judge considered the matter and negatived the two points raised by the appellant petitioner regarding validity of the notice terminating tile tenancy and also the plea of promissory estoppel and dismissed the writ petition
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave under Article 136
It was contended on behalf of the appel lant that the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section IIIh of the was invalid and that by issue of the said notice no right accrued to the respondents and that the termination of tenancy became operative only on expiry of one month given thereunder ie February 28 1975 by which date the State Act became inop erative as from February 1 1975 the Central Act had come into force that termination of tenancy was an act inter vivos by operation of Section 106 read with Section IIIh of the  and that under Section 109 the respondent not being a living person was not entitled to the benefit of the quit notice as its operation was not saved by Section 2d and Section 5 of the said Act
It was also contended that the respondents were estopped from ejecting the appellant and other tenants who were similarly situated on the principle of promissory estoppel as the Estate Manager of the respondent in his letter dated April 3 1972 directed the tenant to deposit Rs 11000 for grant of tenancy after reconstruction of the flats therein and placing reliance thereon the tenants having deposited the amount demanded from them and acted upon the promise to their detriment the respondents shall be declared to be estopped from ejecting the tenants from the demised respec tive portions leased out to them
The appeal was contested on behalf of the respondents by contending that when right title and interest in immovable property stood transferred by operation of law the spirit behind Section 109 of the 828 will apply and the successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor and that as the Estate Manager had no authority to give a promise and that even assuming that he had such a power it was a conditional one namely approval by the Board and that the Board having resolved to reject the claim and on reconstruction decided to allot to its own employees out of administrative necessity the principle of promissory estop pel cannot be applied
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
When right title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law the spirit behind Section 109 of the per force would apply and successor ininterest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor
This is what the Single Judge of the High Court has held and the view is approved as correct
The notice terminating the tenancy of Vasantkumar would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ejectment
836H 837A B NPK Raman Menon vs Collector of Malabar AIR 1924 Madras 908 Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar vs Assaram Hiraman Patil  Ors 1962 Suppl
1 SCR 700 Hitkarini Sabha vs The Corporation of City of Jabalpur  Anr and Lower vs Sorrell  1963 1 Queen s Bench Division 959 referred to
Gurumurthappa vs Chickmunisamappa AIR  over ruled
Halsbury s Laws of England 4th Edition Vol
27 p 193 Hill and Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant 17th Edition Vol
I p 488 p 405 Mulla Transfer of Property Act 6th Edition p 676 and Chitaley s  4th Edn
1969 Vol
III Note 35 referred to
2i The functionaries under both the State Act and the Central Act are the same
The notice was issued by the Assistant Estate Manager by virtue of his official function as power of attorney agent on behalf of the respondent The Board of Trustees have the right to terminate the lease under Section 26 of the State Act and these rights stood transferred and vested under Section 291 of the Central Act
Therefore the termination of tenancy and laying the action for ejectment are integrally connected with their official capacity
There is a reasonable connection between the impugned acts and officials duty
Thereby they are the acts done under the Central Act
839C E 829 2ii The notice under Section 106 and Section IIIh of the is an act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity as Power of Attorney holderAssistant Estate Manager on behalf of the respondent Board of Trustees the right to lay the suit on expiry of one month s period prescribed in the notice namely on or after February 28 1975 had accrued to the respondent
It is an act done or purported to have been done under the Central Act in exercise of the official function
The right to lay the suit on determination of the tenancy by notice dated January 20 1975 under the State Act is a transfer of inter est by operation of Section 291 of the Central Act to the respondent under Section 109 of the 
Thereby the quit notice is valid
The suit laid pursu ant thereto is valid and legal
Accordingly order of eject ment passed by the Small Cause Court is perfectly legal and unassailable
840B E Commissioner for the Court of Calcutta vs Abdul Rahim Osman  Co Trustees of Port of Bombay vs The Premier Automobiles Ltd  Anr   referred to
3i The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of administrative law
This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice
It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel
Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law
This doctrine would be displaced in a case where equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it
But the Government must be able to show that in view of the facts as have been transpired public interest would not be prejudiced
Where the Government is required to carry out the promise the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government s carrying out the promise made to the citizens which helps citizens to act upon and alter  his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies
841B 842G H 843A 3ii The doctrine of promissory estoppel would equally apply to a private individual as well as a public body like a Municipal Council
It cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law
It cannot be invoked to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law
There may be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative functions
843B C 3iii Promissory estoppel cannot be used for compelling the 830 Government or a public authority to carry out a representa tion or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make
It being an equitable doctrine it must yield place to the equity if larger public interest so requires and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it
844B D 3iv Promissory estoppel should not be extended though it may be rounded on an express or implied promise stemmed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the State or public authority when it was obtained to play fraud on the Constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the Constitutional goals
844D Union of India vs Indo Afgan Agencies   Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co Ltd vs Ulhasnagar Municipal Council 1970 3 SCR 854 Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs State of Uttar Pradesh   Jeet Ram vs State of Haryana   Union of India vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd 1985 Supp
3 SCR 123 at 144 State of Bihar vs Usha Martin Industries Ltd 1987 65 STC 430 and Asstt
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Dharwar vs Dharmendra Trading Co etc
   referred to
Before making the public authority responsible for act of its subordinate it must be established that the subordinate officer did in fact make the representation and as a fact is competent to make a binding promise on behalf of the public authority or the Government ultra vires acts do not bind the authority and insistence to abide by the said ultra vires promise would amount to putting premium and legitimacy to ultra vires acts of subordinate officers
847D E Howell vs Falmouth Boat Construction Co Ltd and Attorney General for Ceylon vs
AD Silva  referred to
The letter dated April 3 1972 written by the Estate Manager is a conditional one namely that on fulfilling certain conditions indicated in that letter he would make recommendation to the Board for grant of lease condition precedent being that the tenant would deposit the required sum of about Rs 11000 and odd with the respondent
Un doubtedly the tenants completed that part of the obliga tion
Thereafter it was placed before the Board who by resolution dated 831 September 10 1974 considered
it but was rejected on the ground that after reconstruction the building would be required by its staff
845C E 6
The Estate Manager is merely an intermediary to collect the material between the respondent Port Trust and its tenants and to place the material for consideration to the Board
Thereby the Estate Manager is not clothed with any authority much less even ostensible authority to create a promise so as to bind the respondent that the respondent would allot the rooms on reconstruction to the tenants
The promise of him is an ultra vires act though conditional and therefore
it does not bind the respondent
Though the executive necessity has not been satisfactorily established the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be extended in favour of the appellant and other tenants
847E G 7
When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration unless there is a fulldressed argument addressed by either side before this Court no satisfactory resolution could be made
Mere paraphrasing the judgment of the High Court in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making
849A B