Appeal No 361 of 1958
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 11 1957 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Revision No 702 of 1956 against the judgment and order dated August 10 1956 of the Court of the Second Extra Assistant Judge Belgaum in Misc
Appeal No 36 of 1955 arising out of the order dated September 1 1955 of the 1st Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Belgaum in Regular Civil Suit No 197 of 1955
M M Gharekhan and I N Shroff for the appellant
D D Chawla and G Gopalakrishnan for the respondent
B Sen and T M Sen for the intervener Attorney General of India
February 13
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
This is an appeal from the judgment passed by the High Court at Bangalore on a petition in revision
The question is whether a certain suit should be stayed under section 34 of the  214 The appellant carries on business as a supplier of electrical energy in Belgaum
It obtained a licence from the Government under section 3 of the  authorising it to supply the energy in that area
The respondent who is the plaintiff in the suit obtained supply of electricity from the appellant
The respondent felt that he was being overcharged by the appellant for the electricity so supplied
He thereupon filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Belgaum on or about the 8th of June 1955 claiming a refund of the amount paid in excess of what he thought was the legitimate charge
The appellant then applied under section 34 of the for a stay of the suit on the ground that the matter was referable to arbitration under the provisions of the 
The application was dismissed by the Civil Judge and his decision was confirmed by the Extra Assistant Sessions Judge on appeal and lastly by the High Court in revision
The appellant has now come to this Court
The appellant contends that this matter is referable to arbitration under the provision contained in cl
XVI of the Sixth Schedule of the Act of 1948
A few of the provisions of these Acts will now have to be referred to
Under the Act of 1910 the business of supplying electrical energy can be carried on only with the sanction of the Government
Section 3 of that Act makes provision for the grant of a licence for supplying electrical energy
The appellant obtained a licence in 1932
A form of the licence is set out in the rules framed under the Act of 1910 and that form prescribes the maximum limit which a licensee is entitled to charge a consumer for the electrical energy supplied
The Act of 1948 made a somewhat different provision with regard to these charges
It provided by section 57 as follows section 57
1 The provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Table appended to the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee not being a local authority from the date of the commencement of the licensee s next succeeding 215 year of account and from such date the licensee shall comply therewith accordingly and any provisions of such licence or of the  or  any other law agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall in relation to the licensee be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this section and the said schedule and Table
2         
This section had therefore the effect of incorporating in the licence the terms of these two Schedules and provided that they would prevail over the terms of any previously granted licence or the provisions of the Act of 1910 or any other law agreement or instrument inconsistent with these Schedules
The Sixth Schedule made new provisions about the charges that a licensee was entitled to realise for the current supplied
Clause XVI of that Schedule contains a provision for arbitration and it is on that that the appellant relies
That clause is in these terms Any dispute or difference as to the interpretation or any matter arising out of the provisions of this Schedule shall be referred to the arbitration of the Authority
 The appellant contends that the dispute covered by the respondent s suit is one of the kind mentioned in this clause and therefore must be referred to arbitration under its terms
We will assume that the dispute is of the kind mentioned in cl
XVI of the Sixth Schedule
We are however unable to see that it is a dispute which is referable to arbitration under that clause
It is not the appellant s case that el
XVI is a clause in any contract between it and the respondent
That being so the only other way in which it is possible for the appellant to contend that the respondent is bound to refer the dispute to arbitration under this clause is by showing that it is a statutory provision for arbitration
No doubt if it were so then in view of the provisions of section 46 of the the appellant would be entitled to apply for a stay of the suit under section 34 of that Act
We are however wholly unable to agree that cl
XVI is such a statutory provision
The only 216 statutory provision that we find on the subject is that contained in section 57 and its effect is that the terms of cl
XVI and the other clauses in the Sixth Schedule are to be deemed incorporated in a licence granted by the Government under section 3 of the Act of 1910 and the licensee is to comply with the terms of that Schedule
Therefore all that we get is that the licence which is granted by the Government to a supplier of electricity like the appellant is to contain a clause that certain disputes would be referred to arbitration
The licence is an engagement between the Government and the licensee binding the parties to it to its provisions
It is unnecessary to decide whether this engagement is contractual or statutory for in either case it is between the two of them only
An arbitration clause in an instrument like this can only be in respect of disputes between the parties to it
Such an arbitration clause does not contemplate a dispute between a party to the instrument and one who is not such a party
We are unable to read section 57 as making cl
XVI in the Sixth Schedule a statutory provision by which certain disputes between any and every person have to be referred to arbitration
It was said on behalf of the appellant that the licence is a statutory document  That in our view is a loose way of putting the thing
By that the utmost that can be meant is that it is issued under the terms of a statutory provision and must comply with the provisions thereof
But that cannot convert it into a statutory provision for reference to arbitration of disputes irrespective of the parties between whom the disputes may exist
In our view therefore cl
XVI of the Sixth Schedule of the Act of 1948 contains no provision for arbitration statutory or otherwise for reference of the dispute of the nature we have before us between a licensed supplier of electricity and a consumer of it from him
In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellants were alleged to have kidnapped wrongfully confined and raped S the daughter of PWs 5 and 6
They were prosecuted for offences punishable under section 363 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code
S was examined before the Magistrate where she stated that because of the threat given by the appellants and as instructed by them she lodged a false report at the police station implicating some other persons whereas infact she was kidnapped wrongfully confined and raped by the appellants
The Magistrate discharged the first appellant and committed the second appellant alone to take his trial
On a revision preferred against the order of discharge of the first appellant both the appellants were 314 put up for trial before the third Additional Sessions Judge Bhopal
During the said trial both appellants were on bail
The case was fixed for 2181972 on which date the victim S was to be examined as a prosecution witness
While the matter stood thus S lodged a report at the Police Station complaining that the second appellant had forcibly entered into the backyard of her house but took to his heels when she raised a hue and cry
However it was alleged that on the night of 20872 ie immediately before the day when the case was fixed and victim S was to be examined as a prosecution witness the first appellant armed with a pistol and the second appellant with a farsa  entered into the house of S and the first appellant fired a shot causing instantaneous death of section The appellants were prosecuted for murder
The Sessions Judge acquitted both the appellants
The State preferred an appeal before the High Court
The High Court allowed the appeal set aside the acquittal order and convicted the first appellant under Section 302 and the second appellant under section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life
The appellants preferred an appeal to this Court under section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 2 a of the and it was contended on their behalf i that the High Court erred in reviewing the evidence and reversing the order of acquittal ii that the prosecution has failed to prove the motive of the crime iii the victim s parents were inimical towards the appellants and their evidence cannot be relied upon because they were interested witness
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD  1
The Trial Court was wrong in jettisoning the entire evidence in a very scanty and unsatisfactory manner with unsound reasoning
Whilst the Trial Court s conclusion was arrived at by abjuring the unimpeachable and reliable evidence of parents of the deceased on speculative reasons and unreasonable grounds the contrary conclusion of the High Court based on the evolution of the evidence does not suffer from any illegality or manifest error or perversity nor is it erroneous
Further independent analysis of the evidence by this Court shows that there are absolutely no substan 315 tial and compelling reasons to brush aside the testimony of these two eye witnesses and to take a contrary finding to that of the High Court
331 C D F G 11 The organic synthesis of the events circumstances and facts of the case lead only to one conclusion namely that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved the guilt of the accused beyond any shadow of doubt and consequently the judgment of the High Court does not call for any interference
334 C D E Tarachand vs State of Maharashtra     Kishan and Ors
vs State of Maharashtra
  Mahebub Beg and Ors
vs State of Maharashtra SC  Babu vs State of UP
  2 SCR 771 Podda Narayana and Ors
vs State of Andhra Pradesh  1975 Supp
SCR 84 Ram Kumar Pande vs The State of Madhya Pradesh  3 SCC 815 Rajendra Prasad State of Bihar A I R SC 10 59   19773 SCR 68 Kishore Singh and Anr
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1977 SC 2267  1978 1SCR 635 Bhajan Singh and Ors
vs State of Punjab 1978 4 SCC 77 Dinanath Singh  Ors
vs State of Bihar AIR 1980 SC 1199   Pattipati Venkaiah vs State of Andhra Pradesh  Sita Ram and Ors
vs State of UP 1979 2 SCC 656 Rajput Ruda Meha and Ors
vs State of Gujarat  referred to
Roop Singh and ors
vs State of Punjab     Dargahi and ors
vs State of UP AIR 1973 SC 2695   Barati vs State of UP   1974 3 SCR 570 GB Patel vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 135    Kanwali vs State of UP  referred to 2
There is overwhelming evidence both oral and documentary in clearly establishing a strong motive for the appellants to put an end to the life of the deceased
The several impelling circumstances attending the case namely the prior incident of kidnapping and rape the conduct of the deceased in giving her statement supporting the case of the prosecution the lodging of the complaint by S against the second appellant and lastly the posting of the case for recording the evidence of S when taken in conjunction with the evidence of parents of the victim unevasively and unerringly show that these two appellants had strong motive to snap the life thread 316 of the victim so that she could not give evidence on the next date in the case of kidnaping and rape
327 C D E 328 A D C State of Punjab vs Pritam Singh  relied on
Interested witnesses are not necessarily false witnesses though the fact that those witnesses have personal interest or stake in the matter must put the court on its guard that the evidence of such witnesses must be subjected to close scrutiny and the Court must access the testimony of each important witness and indicate the reasons for accepting or rejecting it and that no evidence should be at once disregarded simply because it came from interested parties
330 A B Siya Ram Rai vs State of Bihar  Sarwan Singh vs State of Punjab  Birbal vs Kedar     Gopal Singh v State of UP A I R 1979 SC18221978 3 SCC 327 Hari Obulla Reddy  Ors
vs State of Andhra Pradesh  Anvaruddin  Ors
vs Shakoor  Ors 1990 2 Judgments today SC 83 relied on
31 The evidence of parents of the deceased cannot be thrown over board simply on the ground that their evidence is of the interested party because when the occurrence had taken place inside the house that too at dead of night it would be futile to expect of the prosecution to produce independent outsiders as witnesses
The parents of the victim are the natural and probable eye witnesses as the incident had occurred in the odd hours inside their house
Being the parents of the victim they would be the least disposed to falsely implicate the appellants or substitute them in place of the real culprit
330 D 328 E 331 E 32 The chronology of events narrated and the factual conspectus recounted by the parents of the deceased are unshakable and the intrinsic quality of the evidence of these two witnesses compel this Court to implicitly rely on their testimony and to accept the same
In spite of the fact that these two witnesses have been subjected to intensive and incisive cross examination nothing tangible has been brought for discarding their testimony
No doubt the earlier conduct of the appellants in kidnapping and forcibly raping their daughter the victim should have inflicted deeper wounds in minds of these two witnesses but that cannot in any way destroy the value of their evidence which is cogent and trustworthy
330 H 331 A B 317