Appeal No 693 of 1957
Appeal from the judgment and Order dated the 25th May 1956 of the Punjab High Court in FAC No 89D of 55
N C Chatterjee section K Kapur N H Hingorani and Ganpat Rai for the appellants
H J Umrigar and T M Sen for the respondent
January 20
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J
On May 3 1937 Ms Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd who will herinafter be referred to as the Agents were under an agreement in writing appointed by the Governor General for India in Council as from October 1 1937 agents for purchasing ghee required for the use of the Army personnel
The Government of India by cl 12 of the agreement undertook to pay to the Agents the actual expenses incurred for purchasing ghee cost of empty tins expenses incurred on clearance of Government tins from the railway export land customs duty levied on ghee purchased and exported from markets situated in Indian States octroi duty terminal tax or other local rates on ghee and certain other charges incurred 796 by the Agents
The Government also agreed to pay to the Agents at rates specified in the agreement 1 the financing and overhead mandi charges incurred in the buying markets
2 the cost of establishments and contingencies provided by the Agents on the Government s account for carrying out the purchase and supply of ghee and 3 the buying remuneration
In consideration of the Government paying to the Agents a sum of rupee one and anna one only per one hundred pounds nett weight of finally accepted ghee as combined financing and overhead mandi charges the Agents by cl 13 undertook to provide the working capital and also to bear the costs charges and expenses including financing and overhead charges incurred by them in buying ghee in the market
The Agents also undertook by cl 14 to bear the establishment and contingency charges for the duo performance by them of the terms of the agreement and the Government agreed to pay in consideration thereof annas 14 and pies 6 per every hundred pounds of ghee accepted
The Government also agreed to pay to the Agents remuneration for services rendered in purchasing ghee at the rate of one rupee per one hundred pounds nett weight of accepted ghee
Pursuant to the agreement the Agents supplied from time to time ghee to the Government of India as required
In September 1939 the World War 11 broke out and there was an enormous increase in the demand by the Government of ghee
On June 20 1942 the original agreement was by mutual consent revised and in respect of the establishment and contingencies the uniform rate of annas 14 and 6 pies per hundred pounds of accepted ghee was substituted by a graded scale for the first 5 thousand tons the Agents were to be paid at the rate of Re 0 14 6 per hundred pounds for the next five thousand tons at the rate of annas 8 per hundred pounds and at the rate of annas 4 per hundred pounds for supplies exceeding ten thousand tons
Even ill respect of 797 remuneration for services a graded scale was substituted for the first five thousand tons remuneration was to be paid at the rate of Re 1 per hundred pounds at the rate of annas 8 per hundred pounds for the next five thousand and annas 4 per hundred pounds for supplies exceeding ten thousand tons
This modification in the rates became effective from September 11 1940
By their communication dated December 6 1943 the Agents demanded that the remuneration establishment and contingencies and mandi and financing charges be enhanced
In respect of the buying remuneration they proposed a 25 per cent increase in respect of establishment and contingencies they proposed an increase of 20 per cent and in respect of mandi and financing charges an increase of 112 per cent
This revision of the rates was claimed on the plea that the existing rates fixed in peace time were entirely superseded by the totally altered conditions obtaining in war time
 To this letter no immediate reply was given by the Government of India and the Agents continued to supply ghee till May 1945
On May 17 1945 the Government of India purporting to exercise their option under cl 9 of the agreement served the Agents with a notice of termination of the agreement
On May 22 1945 the Chief Director of Purchases on behalf of the Government of India replied to the letter dated December 6 1943 and informed the Agents that normally no claim for revision of rates could be entertained during the currency of the agreement and especially with retrospective effect but a claim for ex gratia compensation to meet any actual loss suffered by an agent might be entertained if the Agents established circumstances justifying such a claim
The Chief Director of Purchases called upon the Agents to submit the report of their auditors on the agency accounts for the ghee supplied as also a statement in detail showing the actual expenditure incurred
The notice dated May 17 1945 was waived by mutual consent and under an arrangement dated May 16 1946 the Agents agreed to supply five 798 thousand tons of ghee by October 31 1946 on which date the agreement dated May 3 1937 was to come to an end
By their letter dated July 1 1946 the Agents claimed that a dispute had arisen under the contract and appointed one Nigam to be arbitrator on their behalf to adjudicate upon the dispute pursuant to cl 20 of the terms of the agreement dated May 3 1937 and
called upon the Government of India to appoint their arbitrator
The Government of India by their letter dated July 10 1946 nominated one Rangi Lal to be arbitrator on their behalf
Before the arbitrators the Agents made their claim under four heads 1 The Agents claimed that the agreement dated June 20 1942 was not binding upon them and they were entitled to Rs 2308372 8 0 being the difference between the buying remuneration establishment and contingency charges due under the agreement dated May 3 1937 and the amount actually received
The details of this claim were set out in Sch
A 2In the event of the arbitrators holding the agreement dated June 20 1942 was binding a revision of the rates for establishment and contingencies and an additional amount of Rs 691600 4 0 at such revised rates as set out in Sch
B 3Revision of the rates fixed under the agreement dated June 20 1942 of the mandi charges and an additional amount of Rs 1447204 6 3 at the revised rates as set out in Sch
C 4Damages for wrongful termination of the agreement in the month of October 1946 amounting to Rs 241235 as set out in Sch
The arbitrators did not arrive at any agreed decision and the dispute was referred to Lala Achru Ram who was nominated an umpire
The umpire was of the view that the agreement dated June 20 1942 was valid and the claim as set out in Sch
A was untenable that the claims set out in Sch
B and Sch
C did not arise out of the agreement and he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same and that as the claim set out in Sch
D was outside the scope of 799 the Reference he was incompetent to give any finding on that claim
This Award was filed in the court of the Sub ordinate Judge First class Delhi
The Agents applied to set aside the Award on the grounds that the umpire was guilty of misconduct in that he failed to give an adequate opportunity to the Agents to present and substantiate their case before him and that in holding that the claims as described in Schedules B C and D either did not arise out of the agreement or were outside the scope of the Reference the umpire erred
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the umpire was in error in leaving undetermined claims described in Sch
B and Sch
D which were within the scope of the Reference and that the claim described in Sch
C was properly left undecided as it was outside the scope of the Reference
He also held that the Award was vitiated on account of judicial misconduct because the Agents were not allowed by the umpire sufficient opportunity to place their case
The learned Subordinate Judge in that view proceeded to set aside the Award but he declined to supersede the Reference and left it to the parties to appoint other arbitrators in view of cl 20 of the agreement for settling the dispute
 Against the order of the Subordinate Judge the Union of India appealed to the High Court of East Punjab
Khosla J who heard the appeal confirmed the order passed by the court of first instance
The learned Judge agreed with the view of the Subordinate Judge that the umpire bad been guilty of judicial misconduct
The learned Judge observed in his judgment that the claim of the Agents as described in Schedules B and C was not beyond the arbitration agreement
In so observing presumably the learned Judge committed some error
The Subordinate Judge had come to the conclusion that the claim described in Sch
C was beyond the arbitration agreement and no reasons were given by Khosla J for disagreeing with that view
Appeal 31 of 1953 under the Letters Patent against the judgment of Khosla J was dismissed by a 102 800 Division Bench of the High Court of East Punjab observing that the claim detailed in Sch
B arose out of the contract but that it was unnecessary to decide whether the claim described in Sch
C for an increase in the financing and overhead mandi charges was properly ruled out by the umpire
In the meantime by letter dated August 9 1952 the Agents called upon the Government of India to appoint their arbitrator under cl 20 of the agreement dated May 3 1937 for a fresh adjudication of the dispute and intimated that they had again appointed Nigam to be their arbitrator
The Government of India informed the Agents by their letter dated August 14 1952 that they had filed an appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge Delhi and in the circumstances the question of appointing an arbitrator did not arise until the final disposal of the appeal
The Government however without prejudice to their rights including the right to prosecute the appeal again appointed Rangi Lal to be arbitrator on their behalf
After the Appeal under the Letters Patent was decided by the East Punjab High Court on Decemher 16 1953 the arbitrators entered upon the reference
On March 1 1954 the Agents submitted their claim contending that the supplementary agreement dated June 20 1942 was void and not binding upon them and that in any event on the representations made on December 6 1943 and from time to time thereafter they were assured by the Chief Director of Purchases that the claim made by them would be favourably considered by the Government of India and relying on these assurances they continued to supply ghee in quantities demanded by the Government after incurring  heavy extra expenditure
They also claimed that they were constantly demanding an increase in the mandi and financing charges but the Chief Director of Purchases who was duly authorized in that behalf by the Government gave repeated verbal assurances that their demands would be satisfied and requested them to continue supplies for the successful prosecution of the war
Contending 801 that the Government of India was estopped from repudiating their claim set out in Schedules B and C in view of all the facts and circumstances stated in the petition the Agents prayed for a declaration that the supplementary agreement dated June 20 1942 was void and not binding upon them and for a decree for payment of Rs 2748515 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent
per annum from March 1 1954 and in the alternative for a decree for Rs 2563037 7 3 with interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annual from March 1 1954 till recovery
This claim of the Agents was resisted by the Government of India
Inter alia it was denied that any assurances were given by the Director of Purchases or that the Agents continued to supply thee relying upon such alleged assurances
It was asserted that the Agents continued to supply thee without insisting upon any modification of the agreement because they found and it must be presumed that they found it profitable to do so under the terms fixed under the supplementary contract dated June 20 1942
The claims made for the additional buying remuneration for mandi charges and for establishment and contingency charges were denied
It was urged that in any event the claim for additional buying remuneration and for mandi charges and for reimbursement of establishment and contingencies was not covered by cl 20 of the agreement under which the submission to arbitration was made and the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those claims
On the claim made by the Agents and the denial thereof the arbitrators incorporated the points of contest in the form of certain issues
On May 2 1954 the arbitrators made an award rejecting the primary claim on the view that the supplementary agreement dated June 20 1942 was for consideration and the same was valid and binding upon the Agents
On the alternative claim they awarded under the head of establishment and contingencies Rs 80994 12 6 being the actual loss which in their view the Agents had suffered and Rs 1127965 11 3 in addition to the amounts received by the Agents from the Government 802 for mandi and financing charges
The arbitrators accordingly awarded an amount of Rs 1303676 12 6 with future interest from November 15 1949 till the V date of realization and costs
The Union of India The award was filed in the court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge Delhi on June 2 1954
The Government of India applied under sections 30 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act to set aside the award on the grounds that it was invalid that it had been improperly procured and that it was vitiated on account of judicial misconduct of the arbitrators
The Commercial Subordinate Judge held that the arbitrators had committed an error apparent on the face of the award in ordering the Union to pay to the Agents additional remuneration and financing and overhead charges but in his view specific questions having been expressly referred for adjudication to the arbitrators the award was binding upon the parties and could not be set aside on the ground of an error apparent on the face thereof
The learned Judge accordingly rejected the application for setting aside the award
Against the order made by the Subordinate Judge an appeal was preferred by the Union of India to the High Court of East Punjab at Chandigarh
At the hearing of the appeal counsel for the Agents sought to support the award on the plea that certain questions had been specifically referred to the arbitrators and it was open to the arbitrators to make the award which they made on the basis of quantum meruit
The High Court held that there was no specific reference of any questions of law to the arbitrators and the decision of the arbitrators was not conclusive and was open to challenge because it was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the award
The High Court reversed the order passed by the Subordinate Judge and set aside the award of the arbitrators holding that there was no legal basis for awarding any compensation to the Agents for any loss which they might have sustained
This appeal has been filed with leave of the High Court under el 133 1a of the Constitution
803 The extent of the jurisdiction of the court to set aside an award on the ground of an error in making
the award is well defined
The award of an arbitrator may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face thereof only when in the award or in any document incorporated with it as for instance a note appended by the arbitrators stating the reasons for his decision there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous Champsey Bhara and Company vs Jivaraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Limited 1
If however a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it the fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside In the matter of an arbitration between King and Duveen and Others 2  and Government of Kelantan vs Duff Development Company Limited 3
Was the reference made by the parties to the arbitrators a specific reference that is a reference inviting the arbitrators to decide certain
questions of law submitted to them If the reference is of a specific question of law even if the award is erroneous the decision being of arbitrators selected by the parties to adjudicate upon those questions the award will bind the parties
In the reference originally made to the arbitrators by the letter of the Agents on July 1 1946 and the reply of the Government dated July 10 1946 a general reference of the dispute was made in terms of el 20 of the agreement
Even though the award made on that reference was set aside by the Subordinate Judge the arbitration was not superseded and the reference was expressly kept alive reserving an opportunity to the parties to appoint fresh arbitrators pursuant to the agreement for settling the dispute and by letters respectively dated August 2 1952 and August 14 1952 a general reference was again made to the arbitrators
Paragraph 14 of the letter written by the Agents on August 2 1952 evidences an intention to serve the notice under cl 20 1 LR 5o IA 324
2 LE 1913 2 KBD 32
3 LR 1923 AC 395
804 of the agreement
Issues were undoubtedly raised by the arbitrators but that was presumably to focus the attention of the parties on the points arising for adjudication
The Agents had made their claim before the arbitrators and the claim and the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to adjudicate upon the claim were denied
The arbitrators were by the terms of reference only authorized to adjudicate upon the disputes raised
There is no foundation for the view that a specific reference submitting a question of law for the adjudication of the arbitrators was made
We agree therefore with the view of the High Court that the reference made was a general reference and not a specific reference on any question of law
The award may therefore be set aside if it be demonstrated to be erroneous on the face of it
The original agreement dated May 31937 was modified by the supplementary agreement dated June 20 1942 and the arbitrators have held that the modified agreement was binding upon the Agents
By the agreement as modified a graded scale was fixed for the establishment and the contingencies to be paid to the Agents and also for the mandi charges and overhead expenses
The arbitrators still proceeded to award an additional amount for establishment and contingencies and an additional amount for mandi charges
By el
14a read with el
12b 2 of the agreement the rate at which establishment and contingency charges were to be paid was expressly stipulated and there is no dispute that the Government of India have paid to the Agents those charges at the stipulated rate for thee actually purchased
The award of the arbitrators shows that the amount actually received from the Government totalled Rs 604700 9 0 whereas according to the accounts maintained by the Agents they had spent Rs 677542 0 3
Granting that the Agents had incurred this additional expenditure under the head  establishment and contingencies  when the contract expressly stipulated for payment of charges at rates specified therein we fail to appreciate on what ground the arbitrators could ignore the express 805 covenants between the parties and award to the Agents amounts which the Union of India had not agreed to pay to the Agents
The award of the arbitrators awarding additional expenses under the head of establishment and contingencies together with interest thereon is on the face of it erroneous
Before the arbitrators a number of arhatias who supplied thee to the Agents appeared and produced extracts from their books showing the amounts actually due to them from the latter
Detailed charts showing the total amount due under each head of expenditure to each arhatia were produced
The arbitrators were satisfied that the statements produced reflected a general rise in prices and cost of labour
Taking into consideration the fact that the other persons were buying thee at rates considerably in excess of the stipulated rates the arbitrators held that the Agents were entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of Rs 1127965 11 3
But the terms of the contract stipulating the rate at which the financing and overhead charges were to be paid under el
13a read with cl
12b remained binding so long as the contract was not abandoned or altered by mutual agreement and the arbitrators had no authority to award any amount in excess of the amount expressly stipulated to be paid
Mr Chatterjee on behalf of the Agents submitted that the circumstances existing at the time when the terms of the contract were settled were entirely displaced by reason of the commencement of hostilities in the Second World War and the terms of the contract agreed upon in the light of circumstances existing in May 1937 could not in view of the turn of events which were never in the contemplation of the parties remain binding upon the Agents
This argument is untrue in fact and unsupportable in law
The contract was modified on June 20 1942 by mutual consent and the modification was made nearly three years after the commencement of the hostilities
The Agents were fully aware of the altered circumstances at the date when the modified schedule for payment of overhead charges contingencies and buying remuneration was agreed 806 upon
Again a contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which the contract was made are altered
Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act provides  A contract to do an act which after the contract is made becomes impossible or by reason of some event which the promiser could not prevent unlawful becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful Performance of the contract had not become impossible or unlawful the contract was in fact performed by the Agents and they have received remuneration expressly stipulated to be paid therein
The Indian Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof and to claim payment of consideration for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates on some vague plea of equity
 The parties to an executory contract are often faced in the course of carrying it out with a turn of events which they did not at all anticipate a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices a sudden depreciation of currency an unexpected obstacle to execution or the like
Yet this does not in itself affect the bargain they have made
If on the other hand a consideration of the terms of the contract in the light of the circumstances existing when it was made shows that they never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situa tion which has now unexpectedly emerged the contract ceases to bind at that point not because the court in its discretion thinks it just and reasonable to qualify the terms of the contract but because on its true construction it does not apply in that situation
When it is said that in such circumstances the court reaches a conclusion which is just and reasonable  Lord Wright in Constantine s case1 or one which justice demands  Lord Sumner in Hirji Mulji vs Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd 2 this result is arrived at by putting a just construction upon the contract in accordance with an implication  from the 1  186
2  510 807 presumed common intention of the parties  speech of Lord Simon in British Movietonews Ltd vs London and District Cinemas Ltd 1
There is no general liberty reserved to the courts to absolve a party from liability to perform his part of the contract merely because on account of an uncontemplated turn of events the performance of the contract may become onerous
That is the law both in India and in England and there is in our opinion no general rule to which recourse may be had as contended by Mr Chatterjee relying upon which a party may ignore the express covenants on account of an uncontemplated turn of events since the date of the contract
Mr Chatterjee strenuously contended that in England a rule has in recent years been evolved which did not attach to contracts the same sanctity which the earlier decisions had attached and in support of his contention he relied upon the observations made in British Movietonews Ld
vs London and District Cinemas Ld
In that case Denning LJ is reported to have observed    no matter that a contract is framed in words which taken literally or absolutely cover what has happened nevertheless if the ensuing turn of events was so completely outside the contemplation of the parties that the court is satisfied that the parties as reasonable people cannot have intended that the contract should apply to the new situation then the court will read the words of the contract in a qualified sense it will restrict them to the circumstances contemplated by the parties it will not apply them to the uncontemplated turn of events but will do therein what is just and reasonable  But the observations made by Denning LJ upon which reliance has been placed proceeded substantially upon misapprehension of what was decided in Parkinson  Co Ld
vs Commissioners of Works 3 on which the learned Lord Justice placed considerable reliance
The view taken by him was negatived in 1 LR 1052 AC 166 at pp 185  186
2 1951 1 KBD 19O 201 3 1949 2 KB D 632
103 808 appeal to the House of Lords in the British Movietonew s case 1952 AC 166 already referred to
In lndia in the codified law of contracts there is nothing which justifies the view that a change of circustamences  completely outside the contemplation of parties at the time when the contract was entered into will justify a court while holding the parties bound by the contract in departing from the express terms thereof
Parkinson and Co Ld
vs Commissioners of Works 1 was a case in which on the true interpretation of a contract it was held though it was not so expressly provided that the profits of a private contractor who had entered into a contract with the Commissioners of Works to make certain building constructions and such other additional constructions as may be demanded by the latter were restricted to a fixed amount only if the additional quantity of work did not substantially exceed in value a specified sum
The Court in that case held that a term must be implied in the contract that the Commissioners should not be entitled to require work materially in excess of the specified sum
In that case the Court did not proceed upon any such general principle as was assumed by Denning LJ in the British Movietonews Ld vs London and District Cinemas Ld
We are therefore unable to agree with the contention of Mr Chatterjee that the arbitrators were justified in ignoring the express terms of the contract prescribing remuneration payable to the Agents and in proceeding upon the basis of quantum meruit
Relying upon section 222 of the Indian Contract Act by which duty to indemnify the agent against the consequences of all lawful acts done in exercise of the authority conferred is imposed upon the employer the arbitrators could not award compensation to the agents in excess of the expressly stipulated consideration
The claim made by the Agents was not for indemnity for consequences of acts lawfully done by them on behalf of the Government of India it was a claim for charges incurred by them in excess of those stipulated
Such a claim was not a claim for 1 1949 2 KPD 632
2 1951 1 KBD 190 201
809 indemnity but a claim for enhancement of the rate of the agreed consideration
Assuming that the Agents relied upon assurances alleged to be given by the Director in charge of Purchases in the absence of an express covenant modifying the contract which governed the relations of the Agents with the Government of India vague assurances could not modify the contract
Ghee having been supplied by the Agents under the terms of the contract the right of the Agents was to receive remuneration under the terms of that contract
It is difficult to appreciate the argument advanced by Mr Chatterjee that the Agents were entitled to claim remuneration at rates substantially different from the terms stipulated on the basis of quantum meruit
Compensation quantum meruit is awarded for work done or services rendered when the price thereof is not fixed by a contract
For work done or services rendered pursuant to the terms of a contract compensation quantum meruit cannot be awarded where the contract provides for the consideration payable in that behalf Quantum meruit is but reasonable compensation awarded on implication of a contract to remunerate and an express stipulation governing the relations between the parties under a contract cannot be displaced by assuming that the stipulation is not reasonable
It is therefore unnecessary to consider the argument advanced by Mr Chatterjee that a claim for compensation on the basis of quantum meruit is one which arises out of the agreement within the meaning of cl 20
Granting that a claim for compensation on the basis of quantum meruit may be adjudicated upon by the arbitrators in a reference made under el 20 of the agreement in the circumstances of the case before us compensation on that basis could not be claimed
The plea that there was a bar of res judicata by reason of the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal No 31 of 1953 has in our judgment no force
The Subordinate Judge set aside the award on the ground that there had been judicial misconduct committed by the umpire and also on the view that the claims made as described in Schedules B and D were not outside 810 the competence of the arbitrators
The High Court in appeal under the Letters Patent did confirm the order setting aside the award but there was no binding decision between the parties that the claim described in Sch
B that is the claim for establishment and contingency charges was within the competence of the arbitrators in reference under el
20It may be observed that according to the High Court of East Punjab in the Appeal No 31 of 1953 under the Letters Patent it was not necessary to express any opinion whether the claim in Sch
C was within the competence of the arbitrators and the claims described in Sch
D does not appear to have been agitated in the second arbitration proceeding
We accordingly agree with the view of the High Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award
In this view the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Section 3 of the UP Special Powers Act 1932 XIV Of 1932 provided as follows Whoever by word either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise instigates expressly or by implication any person or class of persons not to pay or to defer payment of any liability and whoever does any act with intent or knowing it to be likely that any words signs or visible representations containing such instigation shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to any person or class of persons in any manner whatsoever shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine extending to Rs 250 or with both
 The appellant who was prosecuted under the section for delivering speeches instigating cultivators not to pay enhanced irrigation rates to the Government applied to the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground amongst others that the said section was inconsistent with article 191 a of the Constitution and as such void
The High Court decided in favour of the appellant and he was released
The State appealed to this Court and the question for determination was whether the impugned section embodied reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order and was thus protected by article 192 of the Constitution
Held that even though in a comprehensive sense all the grounds specified in article 192 of the Constitution on which any reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech must be based can be brought under the general head public order that expression inserted into the Article by the Constitution First Amendment Act 1951 must be demarcated from the other grounds and ordinarily read in an exclusive sense to mean public peace safety and tranquility in contradistinction to national upheavals such as revolution civil strife and war affecting the security of the State
Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras   Brij Bhushan vs
The State of Delhi
  The State of Bihar vs Shailabala Devi  and Cantewell vs Connecticut
  discussed
822 It is well settled by decisions of this Court that in a restriction in order to be reasonable must have a reasonable relation to the object the Legislation has in view and must not go beyond it
Restrictions therefore meant to be in the interest of public order which have no proximate relationship or nexus with it but can be only remotely or hypothetically connected with it cannot be reasonable within the meaning of article 192 of the Constitution
Rex vs Basudeva AIR1950 FC 67 applied
Ramji Lal Modi vs The State of UP and Virendra vs The State of Punjab   explained
So judged it cannot be said that the acts prohibited under the wide and sweeping provisions of section 3 of the Act can have any proximate or even foreseeable connection with public order sought to be protected by it and consequently that section being violative of the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by article 191 a of the Constitution must be struck down as unconstitutional
It would be incorrect to argue that since instigation by a single individual not to pay taxes might ultimately lead to a revolution resulting in distruction of public order that instigation must have a proximate connection with public order
No fundamental rights can be restricted on such hypothetical and imaginary consideration
Nor is it possible to accept the argument that in a demo cratic set up there can be no scope for agitational approach or that any instigation to break a bad law must by itself constitute a breach of public order for to do so without obvious limitations would be to destroy the right to freedom of speech on which democracy is founded
It is not possible to apply the doctrine of severability relating to fundamental rights as enunciated by this Court to the provisions of the impugned section since it is not possible to precisely determine whether the various categories of instigation mentioned therein fall within or without the constitutionally permissible limits of legislation and separate the valid parts from the invalid
RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India 1957 SCR 93o explained and distinguished
Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras  and Chintaman Rao vs The State o Madhya Pradesh
1950 SCR 759 referred to