No 105 of 1973
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Kapil Sibal AK Sen PC Jain Ranbir Chandra A Minocha and Ms Indu Goswami for the Petitioners
Kuldip Singh Additional Solicitor General MM Abdul Khadar LN Sinha VC Mahajan RB Dattar AK Gangui RB Misra Ms A Subhashini DN Mukharjee RP Gupta TVSN Chart Mrs Binu Tamta Mrs B Sunita Rao Ms Manjula Gupta and Badrinath for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
The petitioner company obtained mining leases from the Government of Assam to extract sillimanite in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District
In pursuance there of three lease deeds were executed by the State Government in favour of the petitioner
The first was a lease deed dated 2541952 for a period of 15 years in respect of an area of 12960 hectares at Lalmati
The second dated 1041963 was for a period of 15 years in respect of an area of 986 77760 hectares at Nongmawait
The third one dated 861967 was for a period of 15 years and covered an area of 363 hectares at Wamsophi
The three lease deeds were to expire on 26577 9478 and 7682 respectively but there was a clause for further renewal
The petitioner company had also established a refractory Plant in 1961 near Ramgarh in District Hazaribagh
It ap pears however that petitioner faced a number of difficul ties in operating the refractory plant and was explaining its difficulties to the State of Maghalaya which was formed in 1970
Between 1970 to 1972 the Union of India through its public sector companies Hindustan Steel Ltd and Bokaro Steel Ltd negotiated with the petitioner for the purchase of its refractory plant and also for having the mining leases transferred to them
Though the refractory plant was not functioning properly and was on the verge of closure the petitioner was not willing to transfer its mining leases to the public sector companies but was willing to supply the required quantity of sillimanite to the Bakaro Steel Plant
It is also stated that some negotiations took place as a result of which the petitioner was planning to re open the factory on 611
However in the meantime on the 2nd of November 1972 the Central Government took over the management of the refractory plant under section 18 AA of the Industries Development  Regulation Act 1951
Posses sion of the plant as well as its management was also taken over by the Hindustan Steel Ltd on the same day
This take over was challenged by the petitioner company but its chal lenge was repelled by the Delhi High Court and a Special Leave Petition was filed which is pending in this Court
We are not concerned with this issue in the present case
On 1291972 the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act 1951 was amended by Act No 56 of 1972
By this amendment section 4 A was introduced in the Act which reads as follows 1 Where the Central Government after consultation with the State Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development so to do it may request the State Government to make a premature termination of a Mining Lease in respect of any mineral other than a minor mineral and on receipt of such request the State Government shall make an order making a premature termination of such mining lease and 987 granting a fresh mining lease in favour of such Government Company or Corporation owned or controlled by Government as it may think fit
2 Where the State Government after consultation with the Central Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development so to do it may be an order make premature termination of a mining lease in respect of any minor mineral and grant a fresh lease in respect of such mineral in favour of such Government Company or Co operation owned or controlled by Government as it may think fit This amendment came into effect in September 1972
At this juncture it may be mentioned that Act 37 of 1986 has further amended the 1951 Act and substituted section 4A by the following section which insofar as it is relevant for our present purposes reads as follows 4A 1 Where the Central Government after consultation with the State Government is of opinion that it is expedi ent in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development preservation of natural environment control of floods prevention of pollution or to avoid danger to public health or communications or to ensure safety of buildings monuments or other structures or for conservation of mineral resources or for maintaining safety in the mines or for such other purposes as the Central Government may deem fit it may request the State Government to make a premature termination of a prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of any mineral other than a minor mineral in any area or part thereof and on receipt of such re quest the State Government shall make an order making a premature termination of such prospecting licence or mining lease with respect to the area or any part thereof
2 Where the State Government after consultation with the Central Government is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development preservation of natural environment control of floods prevention of pollution or to avoid danger to public health or communications or to ensure safety of buildings 988 monuments or other structures or for such other purposes as the State Government may deem fit it may by an order in respect of any minor mineral make premature termination of a prospecting licence or mining lease with respect to the area or any part thereof covered by such licence or lease Provided that the State Government may after the premature termination of a prospecting licence or mining lease under sub section 1 or sub section 2 as the case may be grant a prospecting licenee or mining lease in favour of such Government company or corporation owned or controlled by Government as it may think fit 3 No order making a premature termination of a prospect ing licence or mining lease shall be made except after giving the holder of the licence or lease a reasonable opportunity of being heard
In pursuance of the 1972 amendment the State Government passed an order terminating the mining leases granted to the petitioner and granted fresh leases over the same areas in favour of Ms Hindustan Steel Ltd a Government company fully owned by the Central Government
The order made in the name of the Governor reads as follows Dated Shillong 7th Dec 1972
No MG
13372 Whereas the Central Govt having consulted the Govt
of Meghalaya is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of mineral regulation and development that the mining leases of sillimanite mentioned below held by Ms Assam Sillimanite Ltd having its Registered Office at 13 AT Road Gauhati in Meghalaya are terminated forth with And whereas in terms of Sec
4A of the Mines and Minerals Regulation  Development Act 1957 as amended by the Mines and Minerals Regulation  Development Amended Act 1972 the Central Govt
has requested the Govt
of Meghalaya to make a premature 
termination of the said mining leases held by Ms Assam Sillimanite Ltd 989 Now therefore the Govt
of Meghalaya in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec
4A1 of the Mines and Minerals Regulation  Development Act 1957 as amended by the Mines  Minerals Regulation  Development Amendment Act 1972 hereby terminates prematurely the mining leases of sillimanite mentioned below held by Ms Assam Sillimanite Ltd with immediate effect and grants fresh mining leases over the same areas in favour of Ms Hindustan Steel Ltd a Government Company fully owned by the Central Government
Lease Locality Area in Period of Date of No hecteres Lease expiry 5
Lalmati 12960 15 years 2441977 6
Nongmawait 77760 do 941978 7
Wamsophi 36300 do 761982 The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Gauhati High Court against the order dated 712
1972 but it was not able to obtain any ex parte interim orders
The petition was withdrawn from the Gauhati High Court and the present peti tion under Article 32 has been filed in this Court
On 53
1973 this Court issued rule nisi and also directed the maintenance of the status quo pending notice
It however appears that Hindustan Steel Ltd had taken possession of the properties in question and the interim stay was also vacated on 20th of January 1987
The present position therefore is that the mining leases have been granted to the Hindustan Steel Ltd and they have also been operating the mines for the past several years
Though several objections have been raised to the action of the State Government in the writ petition including a challenge to the validity of section 4A the arguments before us were restricted by Shri PC Jain to only two aspects
He submitted that admittedly no notice had been issued by the State Government before terminating the leases prematurely
This according to him amounts to denial of natural justice and vitiates the order dated 712
The second contention is that the order does not fulfil the requirements specified in section 4 A justifying the prema ture termination of leases in pursuance thereof
990 This writ petition came up for hearing on earlier occa sions but it was adjourned from time to time as the same issue was pending decision in this Court in the case of State of Haryana vs Ram Kishan  Ors Civil Appeals Nos
1472 77 of 1987
Our task in the present writ petition has been considerably simplified because the above civil appeals have been disposed of by this Court by its judgment dated 6th May 1988 which is reported in  Shri PC Jain learned counsel for the petitioner company submits that the first point raised by him has been squarely decided in his favour in the above case and that therefore he is entitled to succeed in the present writ petition
Learned counsel also referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court reported in Dharam Veer vs Union of India AIR 1989 Delhi 227 which has followed the decision in Ram Kishan s case
In that case a similar order of premature termination was set aside by the High Court and the lessees were directed to be put back in possession of the leased premises which had been taken away from them in pursuance of their unlawful order
Learned counsel submits that in the present case having regard to the comparatively long peri ods of leases and the lapse of time be would not pray for the petitioner being put back in possession of the leased premises but he contends that the least that could be done is to award compensation to the petitioner company for what has now to be held to be the wrongful premature termination of the leases
He submits that the petitioner is willing to have this aspect of the matter referred to arbi tration by any arbitrator appointed by this Court
On the other hand Shri RB Datar learned counsel for the Union of India submits that in the State of Haryana vs Ram Kishan and Others   the Central Government had expressed its willingness to reconsider the matter after hearing the parties concerned and that there fore the decision of this Court in that case is distin guishable
He sought to contend on the strength of observa tions made by this Court in The Barium Chemicals Ltd and Anr
vs Company Law Board and Others 1966 Suppl
SCR 311 as well as the decision in RS Dass vs Union of India and Others that rules of natural justice can be statutorily excluded either expressly or by necessary implication
In the present case he submits that it became expedient in the interest of regulation of mines and mineral development to have the mining operations in respect of raw materials necessary for the production of iron and steel entrusted to public sector companies and a policy decision to this effect had been taken by the Govern ment
In this context he submits the grant of an opportu nity to the lessee would be totally meaningless and futile
He 991 says that the object and purpose of the statute clearly excludes the provision of an opportunity to the lessees before termination of the leases
If at all he submits it will be open to a lessee whose lease is prematurely termi nated under section 4 A to challenge the order of premature termination after it was passed on the ground that it did not satisfy the conditions set out in section 4 A but that the section should not be construed as envisaging a hearing of the lessees before an order of premature termination is made
Referring to the amendment of section 4 A in 1986 which specifically provides for an opportunity of hearing under sub section 3 Shri Datar says that this provision became necessary because the grounds for premature termina tion set out in the new sub section 1 of section 4 A were made wider and made more comprehensive
Under the new sub section premature termination of leases was permissible in various other circumstances such as preservation of natu ral environment control of floods prevention of pollution avoidance of danger to public health or communications ensuring of safety of buildings monuments and other struc tures conservation of mineral resources maintenance of safety in mines and such other purposes as the Central Government may deem fit
These were purposes in respect of which an opportunity of hearing to the lessee would be really needed and helpful but that in the context of earli er sub section which was much narrower no such opportunity of hearing was at all contemplated
We do not propose to reconsider this matter as in our opinion the contention raised by Shri PC Jain is directly and squarely concluded by the decision in Ram Kishan s case supra
It is no doubt true that in that case the Central Government appears to have been willing to reheat the par ties but the court did not proceed on the basis of any concession
The court discussed the provisions of section 4 A at great length and held that there was no suggestion in the section to deny the right of the affected persons to be heard and that the section must be interpreted to imply that the person who may be affected by such a decision should be afforded an opportunity to prove that the proposed step would not advance the interest of mines and mineral develop ment
Not to do so it was held would be violative of the principles of natural justice
The court concluded that the lessee respondents were entitled to be heard before a deci sion to prematurely terminate their leases was taken and that since it was not done the High Court was right in quashing the order passed under section 4 A
In our opinion the decision in Ram Kishan s case fully covers the present case and should be followed by us
In fact we think that the 992 subsequent amendment in 1986 lends support to the plea of the petitioners
Though it is true that the scope of section 4 A 1 has been widened the insertion of sub section 3 clearly reflects a statutory intention that an opportunity of hearing must be given before the order of termination is passed presumably as such an order widely affects the rights of the lessees
We are not able to agree with Shri Datar that under section 4 A as it stood before 1986 no useful purpose would have been served by the giving of such an opportunity
Several situations and circumstances can be conceived of where given an opportunity of hearing the lessee may be able to either dissuade the Government from terminating the leases prematurely or in persuading the government to do it subject to certain safeguards for its benefit
For example the lessee may be able to show that the public sector corporation to whom it is proposed to entrust the working of the mines is not yet adequately equipped to exploit the mines and that atleast for some more time the status quo should continue or again if there is only a short period before the leases are to expire in the normal course the lessee may be able to persuade the Government that no great advantage would be derived by premature termination of the lease
These are only illustra tive
Several such other situations can be thought of
It is very difficult therefore to accept the contention that because an order under section 4 A is to be passed in order to give effect to a policy of the Government it is not necessary or useful to provide the lessees whose leases are about to be terminated an opportunity of hearing
We therefore hold respectfully following the decision in Ram Kishan s case supra that the order passed under section 4 A dated 7121972 is null and void as it violated the principles of natural justice and was passed without giving an opportunity to the lessees of being heard
The next question is regarding the relief to be granted to the petitioner
Shri Datar submits that in the writ petition the only prayer made by the petitioners is for the quashing of the order dated 712
1972 and that no further claim has been made in the writ petition
He submits that if the petitioners are aggrieved because of the premature termination of the leases it is open to them to file a suit or take other appropriate remedies for obtaining compensa tion in respect of the unlawful termination
We do not think that this a fair course to be adopted in this case
The writ petition was filed by the petitioner company as early as in February 1973 and has been pending in this Court for about 17 years
It is true that the petitioner could have filed a suit for the same purpose with a prayer for additional relief by way of compensation or damages
But we do not think that it should now be 993 asked to go back to file a suit for compensation or damages which may be barred by limitation
After the lapse of such a long time in our opinion the proper course is to adopt some method for deciding the quantum of relief that could be granted to the petitioner by way of compensation and dam ages which can at once be simple and expeditious and which will avoid further unnecessary litigation
We think that the request of the learned counsel that the matter may be re ferred to arbitration is a fair one and indeed this course is also not seriously resisted by the respondents
The short question that remains to be decided is whether the petition ers have suffered any damages as a result of the premature termination of the three leases in their favour either in the shape of loss of profits for the unexpired periods of the leases or in any other material respect
We however direct that having regard to the circumstances of the case the compensationdamages should be restricted to a period of five years from the date of termination of the leases or upto the date of expiry of the original lease deeds referred to above whichever is less and not for the entire unexpired period of all the leases
We refer this issue to arbitra tion
Shri Justice section Natarajan retired Judge of this Court is appointed as Arbitrator to decide the above issue
The Union of India has promised to place the services of a mining engineerexpert at the disposal of the arbitrator to assist him on the technical aspects of the matter
The name of the nominee should be communicated to the arbitrator within four weeks from today
It will be open to the arbi trator to avail himself of the services of such nominee
Parties may settle the terms of arbitration with the arbi trator
The company and Union of India should however deposit Rs 10000 each with the arbitrator as soon as the terms are settled to enable him to start the proceedings without delay
The Arbitrator may enter upon the reference within four weeks of the date of communication of this order to him
He may make his award within a period of four months thereafter
He will not be obliged to give reasons for his conclusions
A copy of this order may be sent to the learned Arbitrator by the Registry
The writ petitions disposed of in the above terms
In the circumstances we make no order as to costs
RSS Petition disposed of


Summary:
Clause f of sub section
2 of the empowers the Central Government to require any person dealing in any essential commodity to sell the whole or specified part of such commodity to it or the State Government or to a nominee of such Government
Sub section 3 provides for payment to such a seller a the price agreed upon consistently with the controlled price if any fixed under the section b the price calculated with reference to the controlled price if any and c where none of these applies a price calculated at 910 the market rate prevailing in the locality at the date of the sale
Subsection 3 A deals with orders made with a view to controlling the rise in prices or preventing the hoarding of any foodstuff in any locality and determination of price for payment to the seller notwithstanding anything contained in sub s3
Sub section 3 C lays down that where any producer is required by an order made with refer ence to cl
f of sub section
2 to sell any kind of sugar and either no notification in respect of such sugar has been issued under sub section
3 A or any such notification having been issued has ceased to remain in force by efflux of time then notwithstanding anything contained in sub section
3 there shall be paid to that producer an amount therefore which shall be calculated with reference to such price of sugar as the Central Government may by order determine having regard to a the minimum price if any fixed for sugarcane by Central Government under this section b the manufac turing cost of sugar c the duty or tax if any paid or payable thereon and d the securing of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar and different prices may be determined from time to time for different areas or for different factories or for different kinds of sugar
The Central Government by notifications dated 28th November 1974 and 11th July 1975 issued in exercise of the power under sub section
3 C of section 3 of the Act fixed the prices of levy sugar for 1974 75 production
The petitioners owners of sugar mills operating in the State of Uttar Pradesh in areas classified for the purpose of determining the price of levy sugar as West and East zones challenged the validity of the said orders on the grounds that they were ultra vires the Act and violative of their fundamental rights as the prices of levy sugar had been determined arbitrarily with reference to the average cost profiles of factories grouped together in zones without regard to their individual capacity and cost characteris tics that although the Government has the discretion to fix different prices for different areas or for different facto ries or for different kinds of sugar such wide discretion has to be reasonably exercised that the words having regard to  occurring in sub section
3 C is a mandatory require ment demanding strict compliance with clauses a to d that the ingredients of the said clauses should therefore have been examined with reference to each producer as a condition precedent to the determination of the price of sugar that the Central Government had not applied its mind to the relevant questions to which they were expected to have regard to in terms of thesub section and that the expression determine  used in sub section 3 C indicates 911 that the order to which that expression referred to is quasi judicial amenable to judicial review
For the inter veners it was contended that the cost incurred by units having lower crushing capacity should be neutralised by giving them an incremental levy price
For the respondents it was contended that the division of the country into zones and the method adopted by the Government in fixing price of levy sugar was fully supported by the recommendations of various expert bodies and the Tariff Commission and was upheld in Anakapalle Co op
Agri cultural  Industrial Society Ltd Etc
vs Union of India  Ors
  and the Panipat Co op
Sugar Mills
The Union of India 1973 2 SCR 860 that the cost of manufacturing sugar depends not only on recovery from the sugarcane duration of crushing season crushing capacity of the plant the sugarcane price paid and the capital em ployed but also to a considerable extent on the conditions of the plant and machinery quality of management invest ment policy relations with cane growers and labour finan cial reputation etc that to group together factories having a high cost profile and to determine a price special ly applicable to them is to put a premium on incompetence if not mismanagement and that the orders determining the price of sugar in terms of sub section 3 C were of general application and therefore legislative in character and the omission if any to consider the peculiar problems of individual producers was not a ground of judicial review
Dismissing the writ petitions the Court HELD 1
The notifications dated 28th November 1974 and 11th July 1975 issued under sub section
3 C of section 3 of the are intra rites the Act
There is no merit in the challenge
950F 918F G 21 Sub section 3 C is attracted whenever any producer is required to sell sugar by an order made with reference to sub section
2f and no notification has been issued under sub section
3 A or any such notification having been issued has ceased to be in force
It operates notwithstanding anything contained in sub section
This means the compensa tion payable to the seller in the circumstances attracting sub section
3 C is not the price postulated in sub section
Nor is it the price mentioned under sub section
3 A for that sub section cannot be in operation when sub section
3 C is attract ed
What is payable under sub section
3 C is an amount calcu lated with reference to the price of sugar
930F H 912 The Panipat Cooperative Sugar Mills vs The Union of India 1973 2 SCR 860 referred to
22 The price of sugar is determined by the Central Government having regard to the factors mentioned in cls
a to d of sub section
3 C
This is done with reference to the industry as a whole by a process of costing in respect of a representative cross section of manufacturing units and not with reference to any individual seller
The order notifying the price is required by sub sections
5 and 6 to be notified in official gazette and laid before both Houses of Parliament
931H 932A 936G 931G 3
The words having regard to  in sub section
3 C are the legislative instruction for the general guidance of the Government in determining the price of sugar
They are not strictly mandatory but in essence directory
They do not mean that the Government cannot after taking into account the matters mentioned in cls
a to d consider any other matter which may be relevant
The expression is not having regard only to but having regard to
These words are not a fetter they are not words of limitation
936D 934E Union of India vs Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh  Ors   Commissioner of Income Tax vs Williamson Diamonds Ltd  Commissioner of Income Tax West Bengal Calcutta vs Gungadhar Banerjee  Co P Ltd   Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd etc 
vs Union of India   State of Karnata ka  Anr etc
vs Shri Ranganatha Reddy  Anr
   State of U P  Ors
vs Renusagar Power Co  and O May  Ors
vs City of London Real Property Co Ltd  referred to
41 In considering the reasonableness of the order made by the Government  in exercise of its power under sub section
3 C the Court will not strictly scrutinise the extent to which matters mentioned in cls
a to d or any other matters have been taken into account by the Government in making its estimate of the price
There is sufficient com pliance with the sub section if the Government has addressed its mind to the factors which it may reasonably consider to be relevant and has come to a conclusion which any reason able person placed in the position of the Government would have come to
936E F 42 In the instant case the material brought to the notice of the Court does not support the arguments at the bar that the Central Government had not applied its mind to the relevant questions to which 913 they were expected to have regard in terms of the statute
Nor any data has been furnished to show that the prices determined by the Government would have been different had the ingredients of cls
a to d of the sub section been examined with reference to each individual producer instead of a representative cross section of manufacturing units
947A 934D 51 Judicial decisions are made according to law while administrative decisions emanate from administrative policy
Quasi judicial decisions are also administrative decisions emanating from adjudication but they are subject to some measure of judicial procedure such as rules of natural justice
Legislative orders can be distinguished from rest of orders by reference to the principle that the former are of general application
They are made formally by publica tion and for general guidance with reference to which indi vidual decisions are taken in particular situations 937C 939E 938A B HWR Wade  Administrative Law 6th ed 47 referred to
52 An instruction may be treated as legislative even when it is not issued formally but by circular or a letter or the like
What matters is the substance and not the form or the name
Where an authority to whom power is delegated is entitled to sub delegate his power be it legislative executive or judicial then such authority may also give instructions to his delegates and these instructions may be regarded as legislative
However a judicial tribunal cannot delegate its functions except when it is authorised to do so expressly or by necessary implication
938B C D E Griffith and Street  Principles of Administrative Law 5th ed p 65 and Bernard  Ors
vs National Dock Labour Board  Ors  at 40 referred to
53 What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual will be definitely touched by it while adjudication operates con cretely upon individuals in their individual capacity
938F Davis  Administrative Law Text 3rd ed p 123 referred to
54 A statutory instrument such as a rule order or regulation emanates from the exercise of delegated legisla tive power which is a 914 part of the administrative process resembling enactment of law by the legislature
It affects the rights of individuals in the abstract
939D E C Bernard Schwartz  Administrative Law 1976 p 144 and Davis Administrative Law Text p 123 referred to
55 When the function is treated as legislative a party affected by the order has no right to notice and bearing unless of course the statute so requires
It is neverthe less imperative that the action of the authority should be inspired by reason
It being of general application engulf ing a wide sweep of powers applicable to all persons and situations of a broadly identifiable class the legislative order may not be vulnerable to challenge merely by reasons of its omission to take into account individual peculiari ties and differences amongst those failing within the class
939F 943C 939F G Union of India  Anr
vs Cynamide India Ltd  Ant 1987 2 SCC 720 and Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd vs Union of India   referred to
56 The orders in the instant case duly published in the official gazettes notifying the prices determined for sugar of various grades and produced in various zones and applicable without exception to all producers failing within well defined groups can be legitimately characterised as legislative
No rule of natural justice is applicable to any such order
941H 942A 943B C Union of India  Anr
vs Cynamide India Ltd  Anr 1987 2 SCC 720 State of UP  Ors
vs Renusagar Power Co   Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd etc
vs Union of India   Prag Ice  Oil Mills  Anr etc
vs Union of India  and Bates vs Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone  Ors  referred to
It is with reference to predetermined prices of sugar that subsection 3 C postulates the calculation of the amount payable to each producer who has sold sugar in compliance with an order made with reference to cl
f of sub section
The calculation of such amount is in contradis tinction to the determination of price of sugar a non legislative act
The individual orders to that effect being administrative orders rounded on the mechanics of price fixation they must be left to the better instructed judg ment of the executive and in regard to them the principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable All that is 915 required is reasonableness and fair play which are in es sence emanations from the doctrine of natural justice
942B 936F G 943A B The Panipat Cooperative Sugar Mills vs The Union of India 1973 2 SCR 860 AK Kraipak  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors and State of UP  Ors
vs Renusagar Power Co   referred to
Union of India  Anr
vs Cynamide India Ltd  Anr 1987 2 SCC 720 distinguished
71 Any Act of the repository of power whether legisla tive or administrative or quasi judicial is open to chal lenge if it is in conflict with the Constitution or the governing Act or the general principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it
946C EP Royappa vs State of TamilNadu  Anr
   State of UP  Ors
vs Renusagar Power Co   Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd vs Union of India   Mrs Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India  Anr 1978 1 SCC 248 Ramana Dayaram Shetry vs The International Airport Authority of India  Ors   Ajay Hasia  Ors
vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi  Ors   DS Nakara  Ors
vs Union of India   The Barium Chemicals Ltd  Ant
vs The Company Law Board  Ors 1966 Supp
SCR 311 Leila Mourning vs Family Publications Service   36 L Ed
2d 318 Kruse vs Johnson 1988 2 QB 91 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs Wednesbury Corporation   Westminster Corporation vs London and North Western Railway  Mixnam Properties Ltd vs Chertsey UDC  Commissioners of Customs ney vs Forde 1971 AC 632 HL Carltona Ltd vs Commis sioners of Works  Point of Ayr
Col lieries Ltd vs Lloyd George  Scott vs Glasgow Corporation  Robert Baird LDv
City of Glasgow  Manhattan General Equipment Co vs Commissioner   Yates Arthur  Co Pty Ltd vs Vegetable Seeds Committee   Bailey vs Conole   Boyd Builders Ltd vs City of Ottawa  Re Burns  Township of Haldimand and Lynch vs Tilden Produce Co   referred to
916 72 Where a question of law is at issue the Court may determine the rightness of the decision of the authority on its own independent judgment
If the decision does not agree with that which the Court considers to be the right one the finding of law by the authority is liable to be upset
Where it is a finding of fact the Court examines only the reason ableness of the findings
When the finding is found to be rational and reasonably based on evidence then judicial review is exhausted even though the finding may not neces sarily be what the Court would have come to as a trier of fact
944C E 73 Whether an order is characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi judicial or whether it is a deter mination of law or fact the judgment of the expert body entrusted with power is generally treated as final and the judicial function is exhausted when it is found to have warrant in the record and a rational basis in law
944E F Rochester Tel Corp vs United States 1939 307 US 125  Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd vs Wednesbury Corporation  and Chief Constable of the North Wales Police vs Evans  at 1160 referred to
74 The orders in the instant case are undoubtedly based on an exhaustive study by experts
They are fully supported by the recommendations of the Tariff Commission in 1969 and 1973 and are not shown to be either discriminatory or unreasonable or arbitrary or ultra vires
946D E 81 Judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy
Nor is price fixation within the province of the Courts
The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its agents as to matters within the province of either
The Court does not supplant the feel of the experts by its own views
When the legis lature acts within the sphere of its authority and delegates power to an agent it may empower the agent to make findings of fact which are conclusive provided such findings satisfy the test of reasonableness and are consistent with the laws of the land
948F 949B 948F G Ms Gupta Sugar Works vs State of UP  Ors 1987 Supp
SCC 476 Railroad Commission of Texas vs Rowan  Nichols Oil Company 311 US 570 577 85 L ed
358 and Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company vs United States of America 292 US 282 290   referred to
917 82 In the instant case sufficient power has been delegated to the Central Government by sub section
3 C to formulate and implement its policy decisions by means of statutory instruments and executive orders
Classification of sugar factories with due regard to geographical cum agro economic considerations for the purpose of determining the price of sugar in terms of the said sub section is a policy decision based on exhaustive expert conclusions
Such clas sification cannot in the absence of evidence to the con trary be characterised as arbitrary or unreasonable or not rounded on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by sub section 3 C
949E 947B D The Panipat Cooperative Sugar Mills vs The Union of India 1973 2 SCR 860 and T Govindaraja Mudaliar etc
vs The State of TamilNadu  Ors   applied
Federal Power Commission vs Hope Gas Co   Union of India  Anr
vs Cynamide India Ltd Anr 1987 2 SCC 720 and Ms Gupta Sugar Works vs State of UP  Ors 1987 Supp
SCC 476 referred to
83 If the petitioners nevertheless incur losses such losses need not necessarily have arisen by reason of geo graphical zoning but for reasons totally unconnected with it such as the condition of the plant and machinery quali ty of management investment policy labour relations etc
These are matters on which they have not furnished data
The decisions in Anakapalle  and Panipat 1973 2 SCR 860 do not require reconsideration
947D E 950E F 84 Whether the policy should be altered to divide the sugar industry into groups of units with similar cost char acteristics with particular reference to recovery from sugarcane duration of the crushing season size and age of units and capital cost per tonne of output without regard to their location is a matter for the Central Government to decide
What is best for the sugar industry and in what manner the policy should be formulated and implemented bearing in mind the fundamental object of the statute is again a matter for decision exclusively within the province of the Central Government
Such matters do not ordinarily attract the power of judicial review
949E G Secretary of Agriculture etc
vs Central Roig Refining Company etc  94 L ed
391 392 referred to