minal Appeals Nos
25 to 27 of 1958
356 Appeals from the judgment and order dated June 25 1957 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revisions Nos
184 D 185 D and 186 D of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated October 23 1956 of the Sessions Judge Delhi in Criminal Revision Applications Nos
249 250 and 251 of 1956
Bipin Behari Lal and R H Dhebar for the appellant
G C Mathur and I N Shroff for the respondent in Cr
A No25 of 1958
A G Ratnaparkhi for the respondent in Cr A No 26 of 1958
Respondent in Cr A No 27 of 1959 did not appear
November 30
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J
These three appeals arise out of three certificates granted by the Punjab High Court in a criminal matter
They will be dealt with together as the point raised in them is common
The brief facts necessary for the purpose are these There is a Government Printing Press at Rashtrapati Bhavan known as Rashtrapati Bhavan Printing Press which is located in the President s estate in New Delhi
Jacobs was the General Foreman of this Press
Every year the budget proposals are printed at this Press under the supervision of Jacobs
As usual Jacobs supervised the printing of budget proposals in his official capacity in February 1955 also
It appears that Jacobs entered into a conspiracy to divulge the budget proposals on receiving valuable consideration for the same
Consequently the proposals were divulged to D P Chadda and were passed on to certain businessmen of Bombay including Nandlal More and Hiralal G Kothari through one A L Mehra
All this was done against the provisions of the Official Secrets Act No XIX of 1923
Further an offence was committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act No 11 of 1947 also inasmuch as money was paid to Jacobs for divulging the budget proposals
The same thing happened in February 1956 with respect to the 357 budget proposals for 1956 57
This was discovered on March 9 1956 and a case was registered under section 165 A of the Indian Penal Code section 52 of the Prevention of Corruption Act  section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and investigation started on March 10 1956
Thereafter pardon was tendered to AL Mehra by the Additional District Magistrate on March 23 1956 under section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
The four offences mentioned above were specified in the order of the Additional District Magistrate tendering pardon to Mehra
Thereafter owing to technical legal difficulties a complaint under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code was filed against the persons involved and it was stated in that complaint that proceedings with the respect to the charge under section 52 of the Prevention of Corruption Act would be taken separately
Proceedings then began before a magistrate on this complaint
It may be mentioned that no proceedings have yet started insofar as the offences under section 52 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 165 A of the Indian Penal Code are concerned
In the course of these proceedings before the magistrate the prosecution wanted to examine Mehra as an approver
Thereupon the accused persons objected that as the proceedings before the magistrate were only under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code Mehra could not be examined as an approver and in consequence the case could not be committed to the Court of Session but should be disposed of by the magistrate himself
The magistrate held that Mehra could be treated as an approver and proceedings before him were therefore in the nature of commitment proceedings
Thereupon there was a revision to the Sessions Judge who took the view that as the proceedings before the magistrate were under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and as no pardon could be tendered under section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for these offences Mehra could not be treated as an approver and had to be examined as an 46 358 ordinary witness and the proceedings must be held to be trial proceedings before the magistrate and not commitment proceedings
He therefore recommended to the High Court that the order of the magistrate be set aside
The High court upheld the view of the Sessions Judge and ordered accordingly
It granted certificates under article 1341c of the Constitution and that is how these three appeals have been filed by the State before us
The only question that has been urged before us is that the view of the magistrate is correct and Mehra could be treated as an approver and examined as such for the purposes of the proceedings before him
The question whether the case should be committed to the Court of Session does not survive now as we are told that one of the accused has asked for trial by the Court of Session as provided under section 132 of the Official Secrets Act
The High Court examined section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and came to the conclusion that a pardon under that section could only be tendered with respect to certain offences mentioned therein
It was further of the view that as section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code was not covered by the words of section 3371 and as the proceedings before the magistrate were only with respect to these offences Mehra could not be treated as an approver to whom pardon had been tendered for the purpose of these proceedings
A mere perusal of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that the view of the High Court is correct
Section 3371 provides for tender of a pardon in respect of the following offences namely i Any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of Session  ii Any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years iii Any offence under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code 161 165 165 A 216 A 369 401 435 and 477 A 359 Thus pardon can only be tendered with respect to an offence which falls in one of these categories
It is not disputed that an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code does not fall within any of these categories
So if the proceedings were with respect only to an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply and no pardon could be tendered to any person
It is urged however that section 3371 contemplates tender of a pardon on condition of the person pardoned making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission thereof and this means that the person to whom pardon is tendered is expected to tell the whole truth including details of any other subsidiary offence which might have been committed in the course of the commission of the offence for which pardon is tendered and therefore the pardon so tendered must be held to include the subsidiary offence even though if the subsidiary offence alone were committed and were not of the nature mentioned in section 337i no pardon could have been tendered for the same
Reliance in this connection is placed also on section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that where any person who has accepted pardon either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence does not comply with the Condition on which the tender was made he may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter
It is said that the specific provision for trial for any other offence which might have been committed in connection with the same matter in section 339 shows that the pardon would cover the other offence also even though it may not be an offence for which the pardon was and could be tendered
We are of opinion that no such inference could be drawn from the use of these words in section 339 for that 360 section deals with a different contingency altogether namely whether the conditions of the pardon had been complied with
It is to be remembered that a pardon tendered under section 337 is a protection from prosecution
Failure to comply with the conditions on which the pardon is tendered removes that protection
All that section 339 says provided the requisite certificate under that section is given by the Public Prosecutor is that the person to whom the pardon is tendered can be prosecuted for the offence for which the pardon was tendered as also any other offence of which he appears to be guilty in connection with the same matter
This would be just the same as if section 339 merely stated that on failure to comply with the conditions of the pardon such pardon would be for feited
 The words of section 339 therefore are of no help in construing section 337 and we must look to the words of 337 in deciding whether a pardon could be tendered for an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code
The fact that in the application in which the police requested the Additional District Magistrate for tender of pardon or in the order of the Additional District Magistrate tendering pardon section 5 of the Official Secrets Act was mentioned along with other offences for which pardon could be tendered would not mean that a pardon could be tendered for an offence under that Act if under the law as provided in section 3371 no pardon could be tendered for an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act
As we read section 3371 it is to our mind perfectly clear that pardon can only be tendered under that provision with respect to the three categories of offences mentioned therein and already indicated above and none other
As section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code does not fall within any of these categories no pardon can be tendered with respect to that offence
Therefore Mehra to whom pardon has been tendered could not be examined as an approver in the proceedings which are concerned only with an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code
361 Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to three cases in support of the view that a pardon under section 3371 could be tendered not only for the offences of the kind enumerated therein but also other offences which might be committed in the course of the commission of the offences enumerated therein but which might not be within the terms of section 3371
These cases are Queen Empress vs Ganga Charan 1  Harumal Parmanand vs Emperor 2 and Shiam Sunder vs Emperor 3
These cases however refer to different circumstances altogether and were not concerned with the interpretation of section 3371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
In all these cases the question that arose before the courts was whether an approver who was prosecuted under section 339 for certain offences could be or should be so prosecuted
They also turned on the terms of the pardon granted in those particular cases
It was there held that where a question arose how far a pardon would protect an approver it
should not be treated in a narrow spirit bearinG in mind that in countenaiicing tender of pardons to accomplices the law does not invite a cramped and constrained statement by  the approver but requires a thorough and complete disclosure of all the facts within his knowledge bearing upon the offence or offences as to which he gave evidence
The considerations which apply when a trial is taking place tinder section 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are entirely different
The proviso to section 339 shows that at his trial an approver is entitled to plead that he has complied with the condition upon which tender of pardon was made and if he succeeds in proving that he has complied with the conditions upon which the tender was made he is protected from prosecution with respect to all offences which appear to have been committed in connection with the matter giving rise to the offence for which pardon was tendered
These three cases really turn on the question whether the accused had complied with the conditions upon which the pardon was tendered to him and it was held that be had so complied
1 ILR 11 All
2 AIR 1915 Sind 43 3 AIR 1921 All
234 362 In those circumstances the trial under section 339 was held to be bad
We are not concerned in the present case with section 339
What we have to decide is whether a pardon under section 3371 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be granted in the case of an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code
To that there can be only one answer on the terms of section 3371 namely that no pardon can be granted for an offence of this nature
Therefore as the present proceedings before the magistrate are only for an offence under section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code Mehra cannot be examined as an approver in that court
There is no force in these appeals and they are hereby dismissed
Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules
The High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires as offending article 14 of the Constitution
The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under article 1321 of the Constitution which was rejected on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case
Thereafter the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under article 1322 of the Constitution which was granted with liberty to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability of the appeal
There was no controversy between the parties in regard to the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution and the dispute centered round the question whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable classification
The respondents raised a preliminary objection that special leave under article 1322 of the Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and that since in the present case the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution was not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court and no question of law much less a substantial question of law could arise for consideration no special leave could be granted under the said Article
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever a question of classification was raised that by itself involved the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution so far as the impugned classification was concerned
Held that the principle underlying article 1322 of the Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court
With that object that Article is freed from other limitations imposed under articles 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
The interpretation of a provision means the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood
Where 347 the parties agree as to the true interpretation of a provision or do not raise any question in respect thereof the case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
A substantial question of law cannot arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court
In the instant case the question raised does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
TM Krishnaswami Pillai vs Governor General in Council 1947 52 CWN FR 1 Bhudan Choudury vs The State of Bihar   Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs Union of India   Ram Krishna Dalmia vs justice Tendolkar  and Mohammad Haneef Quayeshi vs State of Bihar 1959 SCR629 relied on