ivil Appeal No 2413 of 1989
From the Judgment and Order dated 310198812101988 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Hyderabad in OA No 307 of 1987
Anil Dev Singh B Parthasarthy Hemant Sharma and CV Subba Rao for the Appellants
Mrs Kitty Kumaramangalam Ms Vijayalaxmi Kailash Vasdev P Parmeshwaran and ATM Sampath for the Respond ent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI J
The Central Administrative Tribunal Hydera bad by its order dated 3rd October 1988 held that the Divisional Railway Manager BG SC Railway Secunderabad was not competent to pass the impugned order dated 25th April 1986 retiring the railway servant Shaik Ali from service under Rule 2046hii of Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume II Pension Rules hereinafter called the Code 
The Union of India feeling aggrieved by the said order has come in appeal to this Court by special leave
The respondent Shaik Ali joined the erstwhile Nizam State Railway Service as Pointsman in 1953 or thereabouts and secured promotions from time to time in the course of his service the last promotion being as Yard Master in the revised scale of Rs550 750 on 31st January 1986
The facts show that he was on duty between 1400 and 2200 hours on 23rd February 1986 at Sanatnagar Station
As his reliever did not turn up at 2300 hours he was compelled to perform 459 duty from 2200 hours to 0800 hours of 24th February 1986
At about 2315 hours he permitted the staff working under him to have their meals and report for duty as soon as possible
As the staff members did not return to duty within a reasonable time he went towards the cabin where they usually took their meals
At that time the Divisional Safety Officer A Bharat Bhushan came down from the cabin and inquired of the respondent s identity
The respondent coun tered by inquiring about the identity of the said officer
It is the respondent s say that as he did not know the said officer he asked for his identity before disclosing his identity
The officer was annoyed at the behaviour of the respondent and threatened him with dire consequences
It is the respondent s case that immediately thereafter he was placed under suspension
When he went to meet the officer at the suggestion of the Station Superintendent the said officer behaved rudely and refused to listen to his explana tion
By a subsequent order dated 19th March 1986 the respondent was kept under further suspension wef 4th March 1986
He was not charge sheeted nor was any inquiry held against him but he was visited with the order of prema ture retirement dated 25th April 1986 the relevant part whereof reads as under Whereas the Divisional Railway Manager BG Secunderabad is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause hii of Rule 2046 of Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume II Pension Rules the Divisional Railway Manager BG Secunderabad hereby retires Shri Shaik Ali Assistant Ward Master Sanatnagar with immediate effect that he having already completed 30 years of qualify ing service
It was further directed that the respondent should be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for a period of three months in lieu of three months notice calculated at the rate at which he was drawing salary imme diately before his retirement
The respondent challenged this order of premature retirement by preferring an applica tion under Section 19 of the 
The Central Administrative Tribunal after reading the relevant Rule 2046hii with Para 620ii of the Railway Pension Manual came to the conclusion that the Divisional Railway Manager who passed the impugned order of premature retirement was not competent to make such an order
In taking this view the Tribunal relied on an earlier 460 decision of the Full Bench in AISLJ wherein it held that the highest authority among_ the appointing authorities alone was competent to impose any of the punish ments specified in Article 311 of the Constitution
In this view that the Tribunal took the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of premature retirement dated 25th April 1986
It is against the said order that the Union of India has preferred this appeal
Under Rule 2046a of the Code ordinarily every railway servant would retire on the day he attains the age of 58 years
However notwithstanding the said provision Rule 2046h entitles the appointing authority to retire him before he reaches the age of superannuation
Rule 2046h insofar as it is relevant for our purposes reads as under 2046h
Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the appointing authority shall if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so have the absolute right to retire any railway servant giving him notice of not less than three months in writ ing or three months  pay and allowances in lieu of such notice i if he is in Class I or Class II service or post and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty five years after he has attained the age of fifty years
ii in any other case after he has attained the age of fiftyfive years
 Since the respondent was indisputably in Class III service at the time the impugned order came to be made his case was governed by the second clause of Rule 2046h
The impugned order recites that the respondent had already completed thirty years of qualifying service but it does not state that he had attained the age of fifty five years
The re spondent s contention was that he could not be prematurely retired under clause ii of Rule 2046h since he had not attained the age of fifty five years on the date of the impugned order
According to him he was running 54th year on that date
That obviously took his case out of the purview of the said rule
Realising this difficulty an attempt was made by the department to fall back on paragraph 620ii of the Railway Pension Manual which reads as under 461 620ii
The authority competent to remove the railway servant from service may also require him to retire any time after he has completed thirty years  qualifying service provided that the authority shall give in this behalf a notice in writing to the railway servant at least three months before the date on which he is required to retire or three month s pay and allowances in lieu of such notice
 Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Union of India vs R Narasimhan  in support of the contention that a railway servant governed by the Railway Pension Manual may be prematurely retired by the authority competent to remove him from service  on his completing thirty years of qualifying service
Under this rule power is conferred on the authority competent to remove him from service to retire a railway servant who has completed thirty years of quarrying service regardless of his age
The Tribunal took the view that although Rule 2046hii would not be attracted in the absence of evi dence that the incumbent had attained the age of fifty five years the department would be entitled to rely on para 620ii to support the order if it can show that the officer who passed the order was competent to do s0 under the said paragraph
The Tribunal was however of the opinion that since the power under paragraph 620ii could be exercised only by the authority competent to remove the railway serv ant from service the Divisional Railway Manager not being such authority was not competent to pass the impugned order and hence the order was clearly void and inoperative in law
In taking this view the Tribunal relied on an earlier Full Bench decision referred to above
We were told that as the said Full Bench decision of the Tribunal was under scrutiny by this Court this Civil Appeal should be tagged on with similar matters pending in this Court
However the learned counsel for the respondent employee submitted that it was not necessary to tag on this matter with other matters arising out of the Tribunal s Full Bench decision since in the instant case she proposed to support the Tribunal s order on the twin grounds i that paragraph 620ii was ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and ii that the impugned order was punitive in nature and could not have been passed without a proper enquiry
Insofar as the first contention is concerned she placed reliance on this Court s decision in Senior Superintendent of Post Office  Ors
vs Izhar Hussain  wherein a similar Rule 22 of the Liberalised Pension Rules 1950 was struck down as offending Article 14 of the Constitution
So far as the second limb of her submission is concerned she stated that the respondent had been promoted to the post of Yard Master on 31st 462 January 1986 and hence there was no occasion to prematurely terminate his service by the impugned order
In Izhar Hus sain s case the Court was concerned with FR 56j and Rule 22 of the Pension Rules
FR 56j is substantially the same as Rule 2046hii of the Code and Rule 22 is sub stantially the same as paragraph 620 with which we are concerned
Since Rule 22 has been struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution paragraph 620ii would meet the same fate
The learned counsel for the Railway Administration realising this difficulty tried to support the impugned order on the ground that it was in public interest to retire the respondent
Counsel for the respond ent contended that the railway administration has been shifting its stand it first passed the impugned order under Rule 2046hii of the Code and then relied on Rule 22 of the Pension Rules and when that was found to be of no as sistance switched over to paragraph 620ii of the Railway Pension Manual and is now trying to support the order on an extraneous ground which does not find a mention in the impugned order
We think the criticism is well founded
We are therefore of the view that apart from the competence of the Divisional Railway Manager to pass the order the impugned order cannot be supported under paragraph 620ii for the aforesaid reason
We next find that the learned counsel for the responden temployee is on terra firma so far as the second limb of her contention is concerned
The facts clearly reveal that after the respondent joined the Nizam
State Railway service in 1953 he secured promotions in due course and was appointed an Assistant Yard Master by an order dated 22nd August 1984
Thereafter he was promoted to the next higher post of Yard Master by the order of 31st January 1986
While he was discharging duties as Yard Master On 24th February 1986 the incident in question occurred which is said to be form ing the basis for the impunged order of 25th April 1986
We find from the facts that the Divisional Safety Officer was annoyed by the fact that the respondent had demanded that he disclose his identity before he the respondent did so
The respondent was immediately placed under suspension and the said officer refused to listen to his explanation
The suspension order was further extended by the order of 19th March 1966
This was followed by the impugned order of retirement dated 25th April 1986
The order was passed under Rule 2046hii of the Code without verifying whether or not the incumbent had attained the age of fiftyfive years
Even if the order was intended to be under Rule 22 of the Pension Rules this requirement had to be satisfied
The immediate and proximate reason for passing the impugned order was undoubtedly the unfortunate incident of 2324th February 1986
But for that 463 incident there was no occasion for the Review Committee to examine the case of the respondent
If the service record of the respondent was so bad as is now sought to be made out he would not have been promoted to the post of Assistant Yard Master on 22nd August 1984 and later to the post of Yard Master on 31st January 1986
We are therefore satis fied that the impugned order of premature retirement is punitive in nature and having been passed in flagrant viola tion of the principles of natural justice cannot be allowed to stand
For the above reasons different from the one on which the Tribunal rounded its decision we are of the opinion that the ultimate order passed by the Tribunal does not require interference
We therefore dismiss this appeal with costs
Cost quantified at Rs3000
Before we part we may observe that the concerned author ities will do well to amend Rule 22 of the Pension Rules and Paragraph 620ii referred to above so as to incorporate therein the requirement of public interest that is to say the premature retirement on completion of qualifying service of thirty years can be ordered in public interest only
GN Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Ravinder Kaur daughter of Gurbachan Singh was married to Satpal Singh in November 1962
She died on 25th June 1983 at about 230 PM
It was alleged she committed sui cide because of the harassment constant taunts and cruel behaviour of her in laws towards her and persistent demand for dowry and insinnuations that she was carrying an ille gitimate child
It is alleged provoked by the aforesaid conduct and behaviour she committed suicide
The father in law mother in law and the husband of the deceased have been the abetters of the crime and the deceased died of second to third degree burns
The learned Additional Sessions Judge on the totality of evidence on record held that the accused were guilty of abetment to suicide and as such punishable under Section 306 of the IPC
On appeal by the accused the High Court was of the view that the guilt of the accused had not been proved and as such acquitted them
The complainant and father of the deceased aggrieved by the order of the High Court preferred these appeals by way of special leave to appeal
This Court holding that the order of acquittal made by the High Court is not sustainable and affirming the conviction of the accused under section 306 of IPC and the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge Amritsar HELD Per Sabyasachi Mukharji J  Abetment is a sepa rate and distinct offence provided the thing abetted is an offence
Abetment does not involve the actual commission of the crime abetted it is a crime apart
295G Criminal charges must be brought home and proved beyond all reasonable doubts
While civil case may be proved by mere preponderance of evidence in criminal cases the prose cution must prove the 293 charge beyond reasonable doubt
There must not be any re asonable doubt  of the guilt of the accused in respect of the particular offence charged
The courts must strictly be satisfied that no innocent person innocent in the sense of not being guilty of the offence of which he is charged is convicted
even at the risk of letting of some guilty per sons
Even after the introduction of section 493A of the IPC and section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act the proof must be beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt
There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases but there is no absolute standard in either of the cases
296C F The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent man which of course may vary from case to case circumstances to circumstances
Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts of lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence
Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent
Let ting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law
296F Per BC Ray J Circumstantial evidence as well as the prosecution witnesses in the instant case clearly prove beyond doubt that the accused instigated and abetted Ravind er Kaur deceased in the commission of the offence by com mitting suicide by burning herself
306G The findings arrived at by the Trial Court after consid ering and weighing the entire evidences are unexceptional
The findings arrived at by the High Court without consider ing properly the circumstantial evidence as well as the evidences of the prosecution witnesses cannot be sustained
As such the findings of the High Court are liable to be reversed and set aside
306H 307A The suicide having been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage in accordance with the provisions of Section 113A the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by the husband and his relations
Therefore the findings arrived at by the Additional Ses sions Judge are quite in accordance with the provisions of this section and the findings of the High Court that the accused persons could not be held to have instigated or abetted the commission of offence is not sustainable in law
308C D Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act was inserted in the Statute Book by Act 46 of 1983 whereas the offence under Section 306 IPC was committed on June 23 1983 ie prior to the insertion of the 294 said provisions in the Indian Evidence Act
308E Bardendra Kumar Ghosh Mancini vs Director of Public Prosecutions Woolmington vs The Director of Public Prosecutions   Bater vs Bater 1950 2 AET 458 at 459
Wazir Chand and Anr
vs State of Haryana with State of Haryana vs Wazir Chand and Anr
 1989 I SCC 244 Sat Pal vs Delhi Administration  at 30
Blyth vs Blyth Herridge  vs Herridge 1966 I AER 93 Brij Lal vs Prem Chand  Anr
 Halsbury s Laws of England 4th Edn
 P 574 refered to