Appeal Nos
2653 54 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 15291 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision Nos 2998 and 2919 of 1990
DV Sehgal and NK Aggarwal for the Appellant
GL Saghi PP Tripathi and Suchinto Chatterji for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PUNCHHI J
The point which requires determination in these two appeals arising from a common judgment and order dated February 15 1991 of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Revision Nos
2918 and 2919 of 1990 is whether the payment of alimony is admissible 957 without the relationship between the spouses being terminated
The wife appellant was married to the husband respondent on September 191972 at Amritsar in the State of Punjab
Three children were born from the wed lock and are at present living with their father
Out of them two are males their respective years of birth being 1973 and 1980 and the third is a female born in the year 1976
On 28 8 1985 a petition under section 13 B of hereafter referred to as the Act  seeking divorce by mutual consent was received by the court of the Additional District Judge Amritsar purported to have been failed jointly by the two spouses
It was stated therein that the parties had been living separately for over a year due to incompatibility of temperament and their effort to settle their differences amongst themselves or with the aid of friends and relatives had been futile
On receipt the petition was kept pending as was the requirement of section 13 B of the Act
According to the wife she was not a consenting party to the filing of such petition at all
Her version was that the husband had duped her in obtaining her signatures on blank papers on a false pretext and in turn had employed those papers in the said petition for divorce
On coming to know of the pendency of the petition she immediately filed objections before the court obstructing the grant of petition
The respective pleas of the parties were put to issue and evidence was led
According to the wife some understanding later was reached between the parties on the basis of which she was to be put back in the matrimonial home and thus the petition was got dismissed on 19 8 1987 on the basis of the joint statement of the parties before the Additional District Judge Amritsar which was to the following effect We agree that applications under sections 24 and 25 of may be dismissed
We also agree that since the parties have not been able to make a joint statement within a period of six months of the original petition the main petition under section 13B of the may be dismissed
Otherwise too the parties to the marriage do not want to proceed with their main application under section 13 of the and the same be also dismissed and the parties may be left to bear their own costs
On the basis of the above statement the court passed the following order the same day The applicant and counsel for the parties have made their statements recorded separately the main petition under section 13 and 958 also applications under sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu marriage Act are dismissed as withdrawn
The parties are left to bear their own costs
The file be consigned
 It appears that the dismissal of the petition under section 13 B led only to a temporary truce and not peace as hoped
Rehabilitation in the matrimonial home evaded the wife
The husband who in the meantime had established his business at Ghazibad in Utter Pradesh barely three months after the dismissal of the petition under section 13 B approached the District Court at Ghaziabad in a regular petition for divorce under section 13 of the Act levelling amongst others allegations of adultery against the wife
To meet the offensive the wife refuted the charge of adultery and prayed to the Ghaziabad Court grant of maintenance pendente lite which the Court fixed at Rs 1000 per month
It appears since the husband had obstacled payment of maintenance pendente lite divorce proceedings stand stayed under orders of the High Court of Allahabad until the order of grant of maintenance pendente lite was obeyed
The matter thus stands stagnated there
The wife then went in an offensive
She moved the court of Additional District Judge Amritsar on 22 3 1990 under section 15 of the for the grant of permanent alimony on the plea that she was facing starvation when her husband was a multi millionaire having cars telephone facilities and other amenities of life
Simultaneously she moved the court under section 24 of the for maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses
After a grim contest between the parties the Additional District Judge Amritsar on September 20 1990 allowed the petition under section 24 of the Act granting her a sum of Rs 6000 as litigation expenses and Rs 2000 per month as maintenance pendente lite from the date of application
The husband challenged the said order of grant in revision before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
The wife too approached the High Court in revision seeking enhancement of sums under both counts
Both the revision petitions being referred to a larger bench were disposed of by the common judgment under appeal sustaining the objection of the husband that an application under section 25 of the Act was in the facts and circumstances not maintainable the Matrimonial Court at Amritsar in the earlier litigation having not passed any decree of the variables known as Restitution of Conjugal Rights Judicial Separation Nullity of Marriage or Divorce so as to quash proceedings under section 25 and sequally quashing the order under section 24 of the Act granting litigation expenses and maintenance pendente lite
Hence these appeals
959 Section 25 of the Act as it now stands after amendment by Act 68 of 1976 is reproduced hereunder 25 PERMANENT ALIMONY AND MAINTENANCE 1 Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto on application made to it for purpose by either the wife o r the husband as the case may be order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such cross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as having regard to the respondent s own income and other property if any the income and other property of the applicant the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case it may seem to the court to be just and any such payment may be secured if necessary by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent
2If the court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub section 1 it may at the instance of either party very modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just
3If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has remarried or if such party is the wife that she has not remained chaste or if such party is the husband that he has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock it may at the instance of the other party very modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just
 It is relevant to reproduce Section 28 as well 28 APPEAL FROM DECREES AND ORDERS 1 All decrees made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall subject to the provisions of sub section 3 be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction
2 Orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act under 960 section 25 or Section 26 shall subject to the provisions of sub section 3 be appealable if they are not interim orders and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction
3 There shall be no appeal under this section on the subject of costs only
4 Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order Right from its inception at the unamended stage the words at the time of passing any decree or any time subsequent thereto posed difficulty
The majority of the High Courts in the country took the view that those words indicated that an order for permanent alimony or maintenance in favour of the wife or the husband could only be made when a decree is passed granting any substantive relief and not where the main petition itself is dismissed or withdrawn
It was also gathered that if no request for alimony was made at the time of passing the decree the same relief could be sought subsequently on an application
The relief of permanent alimony was deduced to be ancilliary or incidental to the substantive relief and it was given to the party to whom such relief was due
The expression any decree was viewed to have been used having regard to the various kinds of decrees such as decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights Judicial Separation Nullity of Marriage and Divorce which could be passed either on contest or consent
Some of the High Courts also had occasion to distinguish between the expression passing any decree referred to in section 25 1 with decrees made referred to in section 28 providing for appeals from decrees and orders made by the Court in any proceeding under the Act and such decrees being appealable as decrees of the Court made in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction
It led to the determination of the question whether the denial of relief under the Act when making a decree in the sense appealable under section 28 could be it a decree passed within the meaning of Section 25 entitling the respective spouses to claim permanent alimony thereunder
On this question too there has been rife a difference of opinion
A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Kadia Harilal Purshottam vs Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas AIR 1961 Gujarat 202 ruled that the words at the time of passing any decree or any time subsequent thereto occurring in section 25 meant passing of any decrees of the kind referred to in the earlier provisions of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any relief provided in those 961 sections or any time subsequent thereto
It was viewed that the expression any decree did not include an order of dismissal and that the passing of an order of dismissal of the petition could not be regarded as the passing of decree within the meaning of section 25
On that view a petition for permanent alimony preferred by the wife was dismissed when the petition of the husband for restitution of conjugal rights had been dismissed
In Shantaram Gopalshet Narkar vs Hirabai AIR 1962 Bombay 27 Vol
49 a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court took the view that in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court to proceed under section 251 there must be a decree as contemplated under the and one of the decrees can
be under section 101 B
And when the petition was allowed to be withdrawn there was no decree passed in favour of the husband and if there was no decree the court had no jurisdiction to pass any order granting permanent alimony to the wife under section 251
In Minarani Majumdar vs Dasarath Majumdar AIR 1963 Calcutta 428 Vol
50 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court ruled that an order dismissing a petition by the husband for divorce under section 13 is not a decree within the meaning of section 25 and as such when no substantive relief is granted under sections 9 to 14 there is no passing of a decree as contemplated by section 25 and hence no jurisdiction to make an order for maintenance under the said section
Harilal s case supra of the Gujarat High Court was noticed and relied upon
A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Shantaram Dinkar Karnik vs Malti Shantaram Karnik AIR 1964 Bombay 83 vol
51 relying on the earlier decision of that court in Shantaram Gopalshet s case supra and kadia Hiralal s case supra reaffirmed the view that the expression passing of any decree only referred to passing of any decrees provided for in section 9 to 13 of the Act even though technically speaking dismissal of a suit or a petition may be called a decree but not for the purpose of section 25 confering jurisdiction on the Matrimonial Court to grant permanent alimony
A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Akasam Chinna Babu vs Akasam Parbati  Another AIR 1967 Orissa 163 Vol
54 denied the relief of permanent alimony when the petition for divorce of the husband had been dismissed
The views of the Bombay High Court and the Gujarat High Court above referred to were taken in aid to get to that view
A three Judge full bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Durga 962 as vs Smt
Tara RaniAIR 1971 Punjab and Haryana 141 Vol
58 in a different context while determining the question whether a party to a decree or divorce could apply for maintenance under sub section 1 of section 25 of the Act after which decree has been granted ruled that the proceedings for grant of permanent alimony were incidental to the main proceeding and as such an application for alimony could be made even after the grant of the decree for divorce
A learned Single Judge of that Court however in Gurcharan Kaur vs Ram chand AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 206 Vol
66 even while relying on the full bench decision afore referred went on to deny permanent alimony to the wife hose claim for decree of Nullity of Marriage stood dismissed and on that basis the petition for alimony was held not maintainable
In Darshan Singh vs Mst
Daso AIR Vol
67 a learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court made a distinction between the expression passing any decree occurring in section 25 and the expression decree made under section 28
He viewed that the former expression meant granting any relief of the nature stated in sections 9 to 13 while the later meant granting or refusing the relief
In other words it meant that passing of any decree as to mean granting any relief and the making of any decree was to mean granting or refusing any relief
A Division Bench of the Delhi High court too in Smt
Sushma vs Shri Satish Chander AIR 1984 Delhi 1 Vol
71 taking stock of the above referred to views of the Rajasthan Orissa
Bombay Calcutta and Gujarat High Courts affirmedly took the view that the passing of the decree in section 25 meant the passing of a decree of divorce Nullity Restitution of Conjugal Rights or Judicial Separation and not the passing of a decree dismissing the petition
It was further held that if the petition fails then no decree is passed ie the decree is denied to the applicant and therefore alimony cannot be granted in a case where a decree is refused because in such a case the marriage subsists
The word decree in matrimonial cases was held to have been used in a special sense different from that in which it is used in the Civil Procedure Code
Following Delhi High Court s decision in Sushma s case supra a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Vinod Chandra Sharma vs Smt
Rajesh Pathak AIR 1988 Allahahad 150 Vol
75 opined that when an application for divorce is dismissed there is no decree passed and obviously therefore alimony cannot he granted because in such a case the marriage subsists
963 A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Ranganatham vs Shyamla AIR 1990 Madras 1 Vol 77 too following the above decisions held that the existence of any of the decrees referred to in sections 9 to 13 is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under section 25 1 of the Act and the granting of ancilliary relief for permanent alimony and maintenance when the main petition was dismissed was not permissible
A divergent view however was struck by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt
Swaran Lata vs Sukhvinder Kumar1986 1 Hindu Law Reporter 363 taking the view that when the rights of the parties stand determined conclusively with regard to matters in controversy irrespective as to whether relief is granted or not it culminates in a decree and on the basis of that decree the wife would be entitled to claim maintenance or permanent alimony under section 25 of the Act
Not only was on such interpretation of sections 25 and 28 the view taken but liberality of interpretation was injected to justify the view
It was expressed that when the right of the wife to maintenance was assured under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 and section 18 of the and when that right of the wife was not being disputed the court in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings could give effect to that right wherever possible in a proceeding under section 25 of the Act itself
There the objection of the husband to the jurisdiction was termed as technical and the maintainability of claim under section 25 was upheld
A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Sadanand Sahadeo Rawool vs Sulochana Sadanand Rawool AIR 1989 Bombay 220 Vol
76 also took a similar view and based his decision on necessity of the times expressing that technicalities should not be allowed to away any court
In the situation the dismissal of petition for divorce was held to be no bar to grant maintenance under section 25 to the successful spouse
Then in Surendra Singh Chaudan vs Mamta Chauhan II1990 Divorce  Matrimonial Cases 208 a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court taking the view that the dismissal of a petition amounts to passing of a decree for the purposes of Section 25 of the Act held that claim for permanent alimony was maintainable
The learned Judge ruled that there appeared to be no justification for curtailing the ambit of the words to go on to hold that a decree is not a decree for the purposes of section 25 of the Act though a decree for the purposes of section 28 of the Act
Here again the intention of the legislature was gathered avoiding multiplicity of proceedings
so that every dispute between the parties particularly connected with matters like maintenance etc should be settled in the 964 same proceedings
A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Modilal Kalaramji Jain vs Lakshmi Modilal Jain AIR 1991 Bombay 440 Vol
78 omitting the word passing from the expression interpreted the expression any decree to include an order refusing to grant matrimonial relief and on that basis held adjudication of claim of permanent maintenance to be within the jurisdiction of the matrimonial court
Same is the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shilla Jagannadha Prasad alias Ram vs Smt
Shilla Lalitha Kumari 1988 1 Hindu Law Reporter 26 and some other cases which need not be multiplied
The preamble to the suggests that it is an Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus
Though it speaks only of the law relating to marriage yet the Act itself lays down rules relating to the solemnization and requirements of a valid Hindu marriage as well as Restitution of Conjugal Rights Judicial Separation Nullity of Marriage Divorce legitimacy of children and other allied matters
Where the statute expressly codifies the law the court as a general rule is not at liberty to go outside the law so created just on the basis that before its enactment another law prevailed
Now the other law in the context which prevailed prior to that was the unmodified Hindu law on the subject
Prior to the year 1955 or 1956 maintenance could be claimed by a Hindu wife through court intervention and with the aid of the case law developed
Now with effect from December 21 1956 the is in force and that too in a codified form
Its preamble too suggests that it is an Act to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus
Section 18 1 of the entitles a Hindu wife to claim maintenance from her husband during her life time
Sub section 2 of section 18 grants her the right to live separately without forfeiting her claim to maintenance if he is guilty of any of the misbehaviours enumerated therein or on account of his being in one of objectionable conditions as mentioned therein
So while sustaining her marriage and preserving her marital status the wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her husband
On the other hand under the  in contrast her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the  and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce 965 with or without her consent
Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her
On or at the time of the happening of that event the court being siezen of the matter invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony
Not only that the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief
The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances
Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage
And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife as the case may be dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act
In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption
The wife s claim to maintenance necessarily has then to be agitated under the which is a legislative measure later in point of time than the  though part of the same socio legal scheme revolutionizing the law applicable to Hindus
Section 41 of the Evidence Act inter alia provides that a final judgment order or decree of a competent court in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character or which declares any person to be entitled to such character is relevant
And that such judgment order or decree is conclusive proof as to the conferral accrualor taking away of such
legal character from a point of time as declared by the court
Such judgments are known as judgments in rem binding the whole world
But the judgment of that kind must have done something positive onwards
This provision is indicative of the quality of matrimonial jurisdiction
We have thus in this light no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the  affection or disruption to the marital status has come by at that juncture while passing the decree it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance if that power is invoked at that time
It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief
And such order in all events remains within the jurisdiction of that court to be altered or modified as future situations may warrant
In contrast without affectation or disruption of the marital status a Hindu wife sustaining that status can live in separation from her husband and 966 whether she is living in that state or not her claim to maintenance stands preserved in codification under section 18 1 of the 
The court is not at liberty to grant relief of maintenance simplicitor obtainable under one Act in proceedings under the other
As is evident both the statutes are codified as such and are clear on their subjects and by liberality of interpretation inter changeability cannot be permitted so as to destroy the distinction on the subject of maintenance
Relief to the wife may also be due under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure whereunder an order of maintenance can be granted after contest and an order of interim maintenance can be made at the outset without much contest
This provision however has two peculiar features i the provision applies to all and not only to Hindus and ii maintenance allowance cannot exceed a sum of Rs 500 per mensem
But this is a measure in the alternative to provide destitute wives
This court has ruled that if the language used in a statute can be construed widely so as to salvage the remedial intendment the court must adopt it
Of course if the language of a statute does not admit of the construction sought wishful thinking is no substitute and then not the court but the legislature is to blame for enacting a damp squib statute
These are the observations of VK Krishna Iyer J in Carew and Company vs Union of India  at pages 803 804
Towards interpreting statutes the court must endeavour to see its legislative intendment
Where the language is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning the court must sympathetically and imaginatively discover the true purpose and object of the Provision by filling gaps clearing doubts and mitigating hardships harshness or unfair consequences
See Motor Owners  Insurance Company Limited vs Jadavji Keshavji Modi and others 1981 4 SCC 660 paras 14
15 and 16
These principles were pressed into service by learned counsel for the appellant contending that if the claim of the wife for maintenance was otherwise justified on fact and law the procedures and the for a should not stand in her way and let her cash on her claim over ruling all objections
It was asserted that the Amritsar court had jurisdiction to grant relief as asked for because once upon a time it was seisin of the petition for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent though such petition was withdrawn
On the afore analysis and distinction drawn between the fora and perceptives 967 it is difficult to come to the view that a claim which is ancilliary or incidental in a matrimonial court under the could be tried as an original claim in that court a claim which may for the moment be assumed as valid otherwise agitable in the civil court under the 
As said before these two enactments keeping apart the remaining two ie and Hindu Minority and and Guardianship Act 1956 are a package of enactments being part of one socio legal scheme applicable to Hindus
When distinctive claims are covered distinctly under two different statutes and agitable in the courts conceived of thereunder it is difficult to sustain the plea that when a claim is otherwise valid choosing of one forum or the other should be of no consequence
These are not mere procedural technicalities or irregularities as termed by one line of reasoning by some of the High Courts
These are matters which go to the root of the jurisdiction
The matrimonial court a court of special jurisdiction is not meant to pronounce upon a claim of maintenance without having to go into the exercise of passing a decree which implies that unless it goes onwards moves or leads through to affect or disrupt the marital status between the parties
By rejecting a claim the matrimonial court does make an appealable degree in terms of section 28 but neither affects nor disrupts the marriage
It certainly does not pass a decree in terms of section 25 for its decision has not moved or done anything towards or led through to disturb the marriage or to confer or take away any legal character or status
Like a surgeon the matrimonial court if operating assumes the obligation of the post operatives and when not leaves the patient to the physician
On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge Amritsar for rant of maintenance under section 25 of the was ill advised
The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances
It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora
The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted and others which have been left out which are not in line with our view are over ruled
The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration something unfortunate from the precedential point of view
The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs
Before we part with this judgment we need to mention that while this judgment was reserved an Interlocutory Application was received by the Registry which unnumbered Interlocutory Application was duly transmitted to us
It is for directing the appellant to pay arrears of maintenance
While granting leave 968 this Court on 8th July 1991 had ordered that during the pendency of the appeal but without prejudice to the respective stands of the spouses the husband shall pay a sum of Rs 1000 per mensem by way of maintenance to the wife month to month by bank draft
In the Interlocutory Application there is an allegation that this Court s orders have not been complied with
Let notice on the application separately be issued to the respondent returnable within six weeks to show cause why payment of arrears of maintenance be not secured to the wife forthwith
UR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondents were small scale manufactures of fertilizers
They were entitled to payment of subsidy on meeting prescribed standard in the manufacture of single super phosphate SSP
The Government of Madhya Pradesh requested PDIL a consultancy and R D Organisation to test the rock phosphate at Hirapur mines for determining disability allowance payable to SSP producers
On the basis of this report the payment of subsidy was withheld and a show cause notice issued to the respondents
A writ petition filed in the High Court was allowed by a Division Bench which quashed the show cause notice and ordered that the subsidy be paid
It found that the PDIL report had been made without notice to the manufacturers or inviting their participation and that the laboratory report  furnished by the manufacturers on which the payment of subsidy was dependent had not been questioned
On appeal before this Court the questions to be decided were whether the withholding of payment of subsidy to the respondent was justified whether the High Court committed any error in interfering at the stage of show cause in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction and whether tile report of PDIL prepared behind the back of the respondents could be used to reject the standard fertilizer of the respondent
It was contended for the appellants that a detailed technical examination was pending and the subsidy worked out had on in been provisional and that PDIL had carried out the examination
PDIL being independent and reputed it was not required to here the manufacturers
Further the non release of 761 subsidy was also on the basis of input cost data
It was urged that the High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice and issuing directions for paying the subsidy without giving the department an opportunity to verify if the respondents had in fact compiled with the Control Order
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD  1
PDIL was engaged to rind out the grade of phosphate from Hirapur mines to enable the manufacturers to claim disability allowance and not whether they were producing fertilizer in accordance with the standard provided in the Control Order
The purpose being entirely different the report could not be utilised for a different purpose
767 G 2
There is no evidence to doubt the authority of the reports submitted by the inspectors appointed under the Control Order that the fertilizer produced was of specified standard
768 B 3
On facts in the absence of any reliable data or any material the inference drawn by the appellants in the notice that the fertiliser was not of a specified standard was baseless
The entire exercise was therefore vitiated being tainted with arbitrariness
770 F G 4
The High Court should normally not interfere at the stage of show cause notice
But where from the facts it is apparent that there was no material available with the department to doubt the statement on behalf of the respondent it would be failing to exercise jurisdiction if the Court does not discharge its constitutional obligation of protecting the manufacturers who are in perilous condition as they are not able to meet their liabilities to pay to financial institutions and various other authorities and are facing proceedings on various counts and have virtually closed their unit
The authorities did not realise either the purpose of granting subsidy or the harassment to which the manufacturers have been exposed
Entire litigation appears to be a sad plight for those who have set up small scale units in the hope that they will stand on their own on the subsidy given by the Government as admittedly the price of manufacturing fertilisers is much more than the price fixed by the Government for which it assured to pay subsidy
771 B D 762