Appeal No 236 of 1954
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 91953 of the Patna High Court in Misc
Judicial Case No 181 of 1953
Mahabir Prasad Advocate General for the State of Bihar Bhagwat Prasad and section P Varma for the appellants
P R Das A C Roy and R R Biswas for the respondent
April 15
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 79 615 section K DAS J
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna dated October 9 1953 in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 181 of 1953 of that Court
It relates to a temple commonly known as the Baidyanath temple situate in the town of Deoghar within the limits of Santal Parganas in the State of Bihar
For the purposes of this appeal it will be necessary to refer to some earlier litigation about this temple
The history of this temple it is not disputed goes back to remote antiquity
According to Hindu tradition referred to in the Siva Purana and Padma Purana extracts from which with translations are given by Dr Rajendra Lal Mitra in his paper on the Temples of Deoghar see Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal Part 1 1883 quoted in the Bihar District Gazetteer relating to Santal Parganas 1938 edition  pp 373 376 the origin of the temple is traced to the Treta Yuga which was the second age of the world by Hindu mythology
Side by side with Hindu tradition there is a Santal tradition of the origin of the temple given by Sir William Hunter see the Annals of Rural Bengal p 191  Satistical Account of Bengal Vol
XIV p 323
But these materials afford no evidence as to when and by whom the idol was established or the temple was built
The temple sheltering the  lingam  and dedicated to Mahadeva stands in a stone paved quadrangular courtyard
The courtyard contains eleven other temples smaller in size and of less importance than that of Baidyanath
Pilgrims visit the temples in large numbers and make offerings of flowers and money in silver or gold rich people offer horses cattle palanquins gold ornaments and other valuables and sometimes rent free land in support of the daily worship
There is a high or chief priest Sardar Panda who it appears used to pay a fixed rent to the Rajas of Birbhum during the Muhammadan regime and the administration of the temple was then left entirely in the hands of the high priest
It may be here stated that about 300 families of  pandas  who belong to a branch of Maithil Brahmins were attached to the 627 temple and earned their livelihood by assisting pilgrims in performing the various ceremonies connected with the worship of the God
When the British rule began it was decided to take over the management of the temple and with this object an establishment of priests collectors and watchmen was organised in 1787 at Government expense
The revenue soon fell off as the chief priest beset the avenues to the tem ples with emissaries who induced the pilgrims to make their offerings before approaching the shrine
See the District Gazetteer ibid p 383
In 1791 Government relinquished its claim to a share of the offerings and entrusted the management of the temple to the head priest on his executing an agreement to keep the temples in repair and to perform all the usual ceremonies
This agreement was entered into by Ram Dutt the ancestor of the present respondent then high priest of the temple and Mr Keating who was then Collector of the district
According to Mr Keating the income of the temple in 1791 consisted of the offerings of the proceeds of 32 villages and 108 bighas of land which he estimated at Rs 2000 a year some years later the total income was estimated at Rs 25000 a year
Under the system introduced by the agreement of 1791 the mismanagement of the temple was a source of constant complaint the temple and  ghats  were frequently out of repair and the high priest was charged with alienating villages from the temple and treating his situation as a means of enriching himself and his family
On the death of the high priest in 1820 a dispute over the succession arose between an uncle and a nephew
The nephew Nityanand was eventually appointed but neglected to carry out the terms of his appointment
Finally Nityanand was charged with malversation of the funds and the uncle Sarbanand was appointed in his stead in 1823
There was a faction which was opposed to Sarbanand s retention in office and asked for Government interference in the internal management of the temple
In 1835 Government declined all interference in the matter and the parties were left to have recourse to the established courts of law
Sarbanand 628 died in 1837 and Iswaranund Ojha son of Sarbanand Ojha was subsequently elected Sardar Panda
Iswaranund was succeeded by his grand son Sailajanund Ojha
There were however frequent disputes between the high priest and the  pandas  regarding the control of the temple and in 1897 a suit was filed under section 539 now section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan
This was Suit No 18 of 1897 which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge of Burdwan by his judgment dated July 4 1901
Sailajanund Ojha was dismissed by the order of the court as he by his conduct and behavior and by causing loss to the Debutter properties rendered himself unfit and disqualified to hold the post of Sardar Panda and trustee of the temple of Baidyanath
It was further ordered by the learned Additional District Judge in the decree granted by him that some fit person be elected as Sardar Panda by the  pandas  of the temple and that the affairs of the temple be managed under a scheme which was framed by the learned Additional District Judge and formed a part of the decree
Under this scheme three persons were to be appointed to look after the temple and its properties and for a proper administration of the same
One of these three persons was to be elected from amongst the descendants of Ram Dutt Jha
After this Umesbanund Dutt Jha second son of Iswaranund Ojha was elected Sardar Panda
On the death of Umeshanund Dutt Jha Bhabapritananda Ojha who was the petitioner in the High Court and is now respondent before us was appointed Sardar Panda
Bhabapritananda is the grand son of Sailajanund Ojha and we
shall hereinafter refer to him as the respondent
The scheme which was framed as a result of the decision in Civil Suit No 18 of 1897 was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court and the decision of the High Court is reported in Shailajananda Dut Jha vs Umeshanunda Dut Jha 1
This scheme was modified in a subsequent litigation in 1909 when one of the members of the committee applied to the District Judge 1 19O5 2 CLJ 460
629 for a modification of the scheme
The application was first dismissed but the matter was taken to the Calcutta High Court and on September 8 1910 that Court on the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Prayag Doss vs Tirumala 1 and with the consent of counsel on both sides directed the insertion of two clauses in the decree  by one of these clauses liberty was reserved to any person interested to apply to the District Court of Burdwan with reference to the carrying out of the directions of the scheme and by the other clause liberty was reserved to any person interested to apply from time to time to the Calcutta High Court for any modification of the scheme that might appear necessary or convenient
Under these two clauses the members of the committee subsequently applied to the District Judge of Burdwan that certain directions might be given to the high priest  the high priest opposed the application on the ground that it was in essence an application for modification of the scheme and could be entertained only by the High Court
The learned District Judge overruled this objection
The matter was again taken to the Calcutta High Court and that Court directed 1 that the committee must prepare ail annual budget of the income and expenditure 2 that provision must be made for quarterly audit and annual inspection of the accounts 3 that provision should be made for joint control of the temple funds after they have been realised  4 that there must be no undue interference on the part of the committee with the high priest in the internal management of the temple and 5 that no one who has any pecuniary interest in the temple properties or is a creditor of the endowment should serve on the committee
The High Court further directed that clauses embodying the aforesaid five directions should be inserted in the scheme
This decision of the High Court is reported in Umeshananda Dutta Jha vs Sir Ravaneswar Prasad Singh 2
We now come to more recent events which gave rise to Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 181 of 1953 in the 1 196 ILR 2 630 Patna High Court
The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act 1950 Bihar I of 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act received the President s assent on February 21 1951 and came into force on August 15 1951
This Act established the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts to discharge the functions assigned to the Board by the Act
Sometime in August 1952 the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts acting under section 59 of the Act asked the respondent to furnish a statement in respect of the Baidyanath temple and the
properties appertaining thereto
The respondent wrote back to say that the administration of the temple and its properties was in the hands of a committee constituted under a scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court and these Courts being outside the jurisdiction of the Bihar Legislature the Act did not apply to the temple and the respondent was not in a position to carry out the directions of the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts which might be in conflict with those of the Calcutta High Court
The Board however proceeded to assess and demand payment of Rs 1684 6 6 as fee payable by the respondent in respect of the Baidyanath temple to it under section 70 of the Act
The respondent then made an application under article 226 of the Constitution to the High Court of Patna which application gave rise to Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 181 of 1953
On various grounds stated therein the respondent con
tended that the Act was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature  he further contended that even if intra vires the Act properly construed did not apply to the Baidyanath temple and the properties appertaining thereto by reason of the circumstance that the said temple and its properties were administered under a scheme made by the court of the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court both of which are situate outside the territorial limits of Bihar
The State of Bihar the Bihar State Board of Reli
gious Trusts and the President thereof now appellants before us contested the application
Relying on the 631 principles 1 that there should be as far as possible no conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities and 2 that no intention to exceed its own jurisdiction can be imputed to the Bihar Legislature and of two possible constructions of the Act the one that would make it intra vires should be preferred the High Court came to the conclusion that the expression  religious trust  as defined in section 2 1 of the Act must be construed not in the plain and grammatical sense but must be cut down so as to exclude such religious trusts as are administered under a scheme made by a court situate outside the territorial limits of Bihar and therefore the Act did not apply to the Baidyanath temple and the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction to take any proceedings against the respondent under the provisions of the Act
Accordingly the High Court allowed the application of the respondent quashed the proceedings taken against him by the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and issued a writ prohibiting the said Board from taking any further proceedings against the respondent under any of the provisions of the Act
The State of Bihar the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and its President obtained a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution from the High Court and the present appeal has been filed by them in pursuance of that certificate
We shall hereinafter refer to them compendiously as the appellants
We have had before us a number of appeals in which the validity of the Act has been challenged on several grounds and in some of these appeals further questions were raised as to the application of the Act to private religious trusts and even to public trusts some properties of which are situate outside the State of Bihar
These appeals we put in four categories
They have been heard one after another and though we are delivering judgment in each category separate ly it has been made clear that the reasons for the decision on points which are common to all or some of the appeals need not be repeated in each judgment
In Civil Appeals Nos 225 226 228 229 and 248 of 632 1955 1 which fall in the first category we have con sidered the questions if the Act is bad on the ground that its several provisions infringe the appellants  fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14 article 19 1 f andor articles 25 26 and 27 of the Constitution or on the ground that it imposes an unauthorised tax
We have given reasons for our conclusion that the Act is not bad on any of the aforesaid grounds
These reasons we do not wish to repeat here they govern the present appeal also in so far as the Act is challenged on the self same grounds
In Civil Appeal No 343 of 1955 2 which is in the second category we have dealt at length with the definition clause of the expression  religious trust  in the context of other provisions of the Act and have come to the conclusion that the Act does not apply to private trusts
In the appeal under consideration in this judgment the admitted position is that the Baidyanath temple is a public trust so it was held in the earlier litigation to which we have already referred and the scheme was formulated on that footing in Suit No 18 of 1897
In Civil Appeal No 230 of 1955 3 which is the third category we have considered the question if the Act suffers from the vice of extra territoriality by reason of the provisions in section 3 which says that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts whether created before or after the commencement of the Act any part of the property of which is situate in the State of Bihar
We have held therein that two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of the Act a the religious trust or institution itself must be in Bihar and b part of its property must be situated in the State of Bihar
Those two conditions are fulfilled in this case the Baidyanath temple is in Bihar and it is admitted that the properties belonging to the temple lie mainly in Bihar though there are some properties in the districts of Burdwan Murshidabad and Birbhum in the present State of West Bengal
Now we come to the points which have been 1 Mahant Moti Das vs section P Sahi see p 563 ante
2 Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs section P Sahi see P 583 ante
3 State of Bihar vs Charusila Dasi see p 601 ante
633 specially raised in this appeal which is in the fourth or last category
On behalf of the appellants it has been very strongly contended that the High Court was in error in relying on the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions and cutting down the scope of the Act on such a doctrine
It has been submitted that the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions has no application to the facts of the present case and there is no possibility of any conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities
It is pointed out that item 28 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is  Charities and charitable institutions charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions 
It is argued that the Bihar Legislature has therefore full legislative competence to enact the statute in question and it has been submitted that if the Act does not suffer from the vice of extra territoriality then it is good and all courts must obey it
Under section 4 5 of the Act section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 has ceased to apply to any religious trust as defined in the Act  therefore no action under section 92 Code of Civil Procedure can be taken after the commencement of the Act in respect of religious trusty in Bihar which are governed by the Act and there can be no question of any conflict of jurisdiction in respect of such trusts as between the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and a court in
Bihar on one side and the courts outside the State of Bihar on the other
On these submissions learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the real question for decision is if the Act or any of its provisions suffer from the vice of extra territoriality and if that question is answered in favour of the appellants then the High Court was in error in cutting down the scope and ambit of the Act by invoking the doctrine of comity of Jurisdictions
At this stage it is convenient to set out in brief the argument which Mr P R Das learned counsel for the respondent has advanced in support of the judgment of the High Court
In one part of its judgment the High Court has referred to the principle that every 80 634 statute should be so interpreted and applied in so far as its language admits as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established rules of international law and has referred to certain decisions in support of that principle
Mr P R Das has frankly conceded before us that no question of any inconsistency with  the comity of nations or with the established rules of international law arises in the present case and he does not contend that the Act or any of its provisions violate any established rule of international law
Therefore it is unnecessary to consider this part of the judgment of the High Court
Before us Mr P R Das has developed his argument in the following way
He has first submitted that Suit No 18 of 1897 which was instituted in the court of the District Judge of Burdwan in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties is still pending and the administration of the temple and its properties is being carried on by a committee appointed under a scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and later approved and modified by the Calcutta High Court therefore the District Judge of Burdwan and the Calcutta High Court are in full seizin of the trust and its properties and the Bihar Legislature cannot take away or interfere with the jurisdiction of either the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court
In this connection he has referred to cl 39 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court particularly to item a of the first proviso thereto
That clause is in these terms  And We do further ordain that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in any matter in which jurisdiction is by these presents given to the High Court of Judicature at Patna  shall cease from the date of the publication of these presents and that all proceedings pending in the former Court on that date in reference to any such matter shall be transferred to the latter Court Provided first that the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall continue to exercise jurisdiction a in all proceedings pending in that Court on 635 the date of the publication of these presents in which any decree or order  other than an order of an interlocutory nature has been passed or made by that Court or in which the validity of any such decree or order is directly in question and b in all proceedings not being proceedings referred to in paragraph a of this clause pending in presents under the 13th 15th 22nd 23rd 24th 25th presents under the 13th 15th 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 32nd 33rd 34th or 35th clause of the Letters Patent bearing date at Westminster the Twenty eighth day of December in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and sixty five relating to that Court and c in all proceedings instituted in that Court on or after the date of the publication of these presents with reference to any decree or order passed or made by that Court Provided secondly that if any question arises as to whether any case is covered by the first proviso to this clause the matter shall be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and his decision shall be final 
His argument is that the scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and later approved by the Calcutta High Court can be modified only by the Calcutta High Court and that High Court continues to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the scheme under item a of the first proviso to clause 39 referred to above and cl
41 of the Letters Patent does not empower the Bihar Legislature to amend any of the clauses of the Letters Patent
He has also submitted that on February 9 1917 the Calcutta High Court decided that any application for enforcement of the scheme would lie to the District Judge of Burdwan and not to the Deputy Commissioner of Dumka
It may be stated here that Burdwan is in the State of West Bengal and Dumka in the State of Bihar
Mr P R Das has contended that in so far as the provisions of the Act interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside Bihar they have extra territorial operation and must be held to be bad 636 on that ground because under article 245 of the Constitution the Bihar Legislature may make laws for the whole or any part of the State of Bihar but it cannot make any law which will have extra territorial operation
He has drawn our attention to the provisions of sections 3 4 5 and 28 of the Act and has laid particular emphasis on the provisions of section 29 of the Act which provisions according to him have extra territorial operation
Having set out in some detail the arguments which have been advanced before us on behalf of the appellants and the respondent we proceed now to consider them on merits
We agree with learned counsel for the parties that no question arises in this case of any conflict or inconsistency with the doctrine of comity of nations or with any established rule of international law
The question which really arises for decision is if any of the provisions of the Act have extra territorial operation
This question has two aspects
First there is section 3 which says inter alia that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts any part of the property of which is situated in the State of Bihar
The argument is that the Bihar Legislature has no power to legislate about trust property which is outside the territorial limits of Bihar and section 3 of the Act in so far as it seeks to operate on trust property outside Bihar makes the Act bad on the ground of extra territorial operation
This part of the argument has been fully dealt with and rejected in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust Civil Appeal No 230 of 1955 1
The second facet of the argument is what Mr P R Das has specially emphasised before us in this appeal
His argument in substance is that the Act by some of its provisions seeks to interfere with the jurisdiction of courts which are outside Bihar and this in effect is the vice of extra territorial operation from which according to him the Act suffers
We are unable to agree with him in this contention
Section 3 we have already referred to
Sub section 5 of section 4 states inter alia that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 shall not apply to any religious trust 1 State of Bihar vs Charusila Dasi see p 601 ante
637 in the State of Bihar as defined in the Act
We have considered the effect of this sub section in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust ibid and have held that the Act applies when the trust itself temple or deity or math is situate in Bihar and also some of its property is in Bihar
We have pointed out therein that the trust being situatedin Bihar that State has legislative power over it and over its trustees and their servants or agents who must be in Bihar to administer the trust  therefore there is really no question of the Act having extra territorial operation
In our opinion this reasoning is equally valid in respect of the argument of Mr P R Das
If as we have held it is open to the Bihar Legislature to legislate in respect of relgious trusts situate in Bihar then that Legislature can make a law which says as in sub section
5 of section 4 of the Act that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to any religious trust in the State of Bihar
If sub section
5 of section 4 of the Act is valid as we hold it is then no question really arises of interfering with the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Burdwan or of the Calcutta High Court in respect of the Baidyanath temple inasmuch as those courts exercised that jurisdiction under section 92 Code of Civil Procedure which no longer applies to the Baidyanath temple and the properties appertaining thereto after the commencement of the Act
It is true that the Act does put an end to the jurisdiction under section 92 Code of Civil Procedure of all courts with regard to religious trusts situate in Bihar but that it does by taking these trusts out of the purview of section 92
In other words the Act does not take away the jurisdiction of any court outside Bihar but takes the religious trusts in Bihar out of the operation of section 92 so that a court outside Bihar in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 92 will decline to deal with a religious trust situate in Bihar just as it will decline to entertain a suit under that section regarding a private trust of religious or charitable nature
Civil Procedure including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution is item 13 of the Concurrent List
It has not been disputed before us that it is open to the Bihar 638 Legislature to amend the Code of Civil Procedure while legislating in respect of religious endowments and religious institutions in Bihar and the President s assent having beep received to the Act the law made by the Bihar Legislature shall prevail in that State under
article 2542 of the Constitution in respect of all religious trusts situate in Bihar
In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider the further questions if Suit No 18 of 1897 is still pending the proper scope and effect of cl 39 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court and which authority can amend the Letters Patent
Even if Suit No 18 of 1897 is deemed to be still pending though we do not so decide any further action under the scheme in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties can be taken either by the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court only if the jurisdiction under section 92 Civil Procedure Code is still preserved in respect of it
If that jurisdiction has come to an end in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties then no question of any conflict of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities arises at all apart altogether from the more debatable question as to whether the Bihar Legislature on one side and the courts in Bengal on the other can be said at all to be equally competent authorities in respect of a religious trust situate in Bihar
The question really boils down to this
Is the Act bad on the ground of extra territorial operation because it takes certain religious trusts situate in Bihar out of the purview
of section 92 Code of Civil Procedure  If the answer to this question is in the negative then all the hurdles created by the argument of Mr P R Das must disappear because if the Act is good it must be bindingonall courts and no question of any conflict of jurisdiction can arise Learned counsel for the respondent has made a pointed reference to sections 28 and 29 of the Act Section 28 deals with the general powers and duties of the Board
We have examined these powers and duties in our decision in connected Civil Appeals Nos
225 226 228 229 and 248 of 1955 1 and have held that 1 Mahant Moti Das vs SP Sahi see P 563 ante
639 there is nothing in these powers and duties which can be said to have extra territorial operation
Our attention has been drawn to el
j of section 28 2 which empowers the Board to sanction on the application of a trustee or any other person interested in the religious B trust the conversion of any property of such trust into another property if the Board is satisfied that such conversion is beneficial for the said trust
We have pointed out that these powers and duties are really for the fulfillment of the trust and they do not in any way contravene the rights of the trustees
Section 29 states   291
Where the supervision of a religious trust is vested in any committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent Court or authority such committee or association shall continue to function under the general superintendence and control of the Board unless superseded by the Board under subsection 2
2 The Board may supersede any committee or association referred to in sub section 1 which in the opinion of the Board is not discharging its funetions satisfactorily and if the Board does so any decree or order of a Court or authority by which such committee or association was constituted shall be deemed to have been modified accordingly Provided that before making any order under this sub section the Board shall communicate to the committee or association concerned the grounds on which they propose to supersede it fix a reasonable period for the committee or association to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanations and objections if any
3 Such committee or association or any other person interested in the religious trust may within thirty days of any order of the Board under sub section 2 make an application to the District Judge for varying modifying or setting aside such order but subject to the decision of the District Judge on any such application the order of the Board shall be final and binding upon the applicant and every person interested in such trust
640 4 Where such committee or association has been superseded under sub section 2 the Board may make such arrangements as may be necessary for the administration of the religious trust concerned
 It has been argued that section 29 in terms gives the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts power to interfere with a committee appointed by the founder or by a competent court or authority
The argument is that the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts can now interfere with the committee appointed under the scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court and can even supersede it
The answer to this argument is the same as that given before
Either the Act is bad on the ground of extra territorial operation or it is not
If the Act is bad on the ground of extra territorial operation then there is good reason for cutting down the scope and ambit of section 29 of the Act so that it will apply only to committees appointed by a competent court or authority in Bihar
If however  in respect of a religious trust in Bihar the Bihar Legislature can amend the Civil Procedure Code and take the trust out of the purview of section 92 Civil Procedure Code then there is no good reason why the ambit of section 29 should be out down in the manner suggested by the High Court
It is true that the legislation of a State is primarily territorial and the general rule is that extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur
There is however no departure from that general rule when the trust itself is in Bihar and in legislating about that trust the legislature lays down what should be done to fulfil the objects of the trust and for that purpose puts an end to an old jurisdiction in the sense explained above and creates a new one in its place
The doctrine of territorial nexus which arises in this connection has been commented on before us at great length by learned counsel for the respondent
That doctrine and the decisions bearing on it we have considered at some length in our decision relating to the Charusila Trust Civil Appeal No 230 of 1955
We do not wish to repeat what we have said therein
641 The conclusion at which we have arrived is that the Act and its several provisions do not suffer from the vice of extra territoriality in the sense suggested by B learned counsel for the respondent and there is no such conflict of jurisdiction as learned counsel for the respondent has suggested
Accordingly the Act is good and applies to the Baidyanath temple and the properties a pertaining thereto
The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs
The judgment and order of the High Court dated October 9 1953 are set aside and the petition under article 226 of the Constitution made by the respondent must stand dismissed with costs
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The assessee participated in an All India Highway Motor Car Rally and on being declared a winner received an amount of Rs 22000 as prize money
The Income tax officer included the prize money in his income for the relevant assessment year relying upon the definition of income in clause 24 of Section 2 of Income Tax Act
On an appeal preferred by the respondent assessee the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that as the Rally was not a race the prize money cannot be treated as income within the meaning of section 224 ix
The Tribunal on an appeal by the Revenue held that the Rally was not a race and as it was a test of skill and endurance it was not a game  within the meaning of Sec 2 24 ix
As the prize money received was casual in nature it fell outside Sec
103 of the Act
The High Court on a reference at the instance of the Revenueupholding the findings of the Tribunalobserved that the expression winnings  cannotes money won by betting or gambling and therefore the prize money not represent winnings 
Inasmuch as the amount in question was obtained by participating in a rally which involved skill in driving the vehicle it held it cannot he included in the assessee s income also because it fell outside the preview of s10 3
Allowing the Appeal the Court HELD1
The expression income  must be construed in its widest sense
The definition of income  is an inclusive one
Even if a receipt does not fall within sub clause ix or any of the sub clauses of Sec224 of the Act it may yet constitute income
Hence the prize money received by the respondent 329 assessee constitutes income  as defined in clause 24 of Section 2 of the Act
335 C 2The High Court erred in reading several sub clauses in Sec
224 as exhaustive when the statute expressly says that the definition is inclusive
Even if a receipt does not fall within the ambit of any of the sub clauses in Sec
224 it may still he income if it partakes of the nature of income
The idea behind providing inclusive definition in Sec
224 is not to limit its meaning but to widen its net
This Court has repeatedly said that the word income  is of widest amplitude and that it must he given its natural and grammatical meaning
335 D Kamakshya Narayan Singh vs CLT PC Navin Chandra Mafatlal vs CIT Bombay 26 ITR SCand Bhagwan Das Jain vs Union of India SC followed
Gopal SaranNarain Singh vs Commissioner of Income Tax 3ITR237 PC referred to
3If the monies which are not earned in the true sense of the word Constitute income it is difficult to appreciate why do monies earned by skill and to not constitute income The Rally was a contest if not a race
The Respondent assessee entered the contest to win it
The Prize money which he got in return for winning the contest was a reward for his skill and endurance
It does constitute his income which expression must be construed in its widest sense
335 B 4The sub clause ix of Sec
224 is not confined to games of gambling nature alone
Some of them are games of skill
State of Bombay vs RM D Chamarbaugwala   and Stale of Andhra Pradesh vs K Satyanarayan   followed
5As the definition of income in Sec
224 is an inclusive one its ambit should be the same as that of the word income  occurring in Entry 82 of list 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India
334 B 6Even casual income is income as is evident from Sec
103
A casual receipt which should mean in the context casual income is liable to be included in the total income if it is in excess of Rs 1000 by virtue of clause 3 330 of Sec 10
The Tribunal erred in its finding that the prize money fell outside the purview of Sec
10 3 inspite of holding that the receipt in question was casual in nature
335 E