Appeal Nos
266 267 of 1993
From the Judgment and Order dated 8291  22391 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench New Delhi in OA No 254089  MP No 219 of 1991
KTS Tulsi Additional Solicitor General B Parthasarthy P Parmeshwaran and CVS Rao for the Appellants
Indu Malhotra for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN J
Leave granted
The respondent while working as Income Tax Officer Muktsar during the year 1982 83 completed certain assessments
A charge memorandum dated 251989 was served on him to the effect it was proposed to hold an inquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services Classification Central  Appeal Rules 1965
A statement of article of charge framed against him was to the following effect  STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST SHRI KK DHAWAN A GROUP A  NOW POSTED AS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX BOMBAY
Article I Shri KK Dhawan while functioning as ITO A 300 Ward Muktsar during 1982 1983 completed nine assessments in the case of  1 Ms Chananna Automobiles 2 Ns Gupta Cotton Industries 3 Ms Ajay Cotton Industries 4 Ms National Rice Mills 5 Ms Tek Chand Buchram 6 Ms Tilak Cotton Industries 7 Ms Chandi Ram Behari Lal 8 Ms Phuman Mal Chandi Ram and 9 Ms Modern Tractors in an irregular manner in undue haste and apparently with a view to conferring undue favour upon the assessees concemed By his above acts Shri Dhawan failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of a Govt
servant thereby violating provisions of Rules 31 i 31 ii and 31 iii of the CCS Conduct Rules 1964
This was accompanied by a statement of imputation of his misconduct or misbehaviour in support of the article of charge framed against him
In each of the nine cases of the assesses above referred to the details relating to misconduct or misbehaviour were furnished
Therefore it was charged that the respondent had violated the provisions of Rule 31i 31ii and 31iii of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules 1964
The necessary documents in support of these allegations were also enclosed
Against the said memorandum dt
251989 the respondent preferred an application OA No 254089 before the Central Administrative Tribunal New Delhi praying for a stay of the disciplinary proceedings and to consider his case for promotion on merits without resort to the sealed cover procedure
301 By its order dt
821991 Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench New Delhi directed the respondent Union of India to open the sealed cover immediately and implement the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee in so far as it pertained to the petitioner and to promote him to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax if he was found fit for promotion within two weeks from the date of said order
Thereafter by a detailed judgment dated 2231991 the Tribunal relying on SLP C Nos
2635 3689 in Civil Appeal No 4986 8790 held that the action taken by the officer was quasi judicial and should not have formed the basis of disciplinary action
Therefore the application was allowed and the impugned memorandum dated 251989 was quashed
The earlier order dated 821991 to open the sealed cover and implement the recommendations of Departmental Promotion Committee was made absolute
Aggrieved by these two orders the present special leave petitions have been preferred
The teamed counsel for the appellant Shri KTS Tulsi submits as under i That in a case where disciplinary proceedings are pending against the respondent the procedure of opening the sealed cover should not have been resorted to
Otherwise it would amount to putting a premium on misconduct
iiThe Tribunal failed to appreciate the ratio of the order in CA Nos
4986 8790
In that case the enquiry report showed that the charge framed against the officer had not been proved
That is entirely different from holding that in a case of quasi judicial action taken by the Officer no disciplinary action could be taken
The true purport of that observation is only to buttress the earlier finding that the charge had not been proved
Therefore reliance ought not to have been placed on this ruling which turned on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case
302 iiiThough nine cases were cited in the charge memorandum only one of the cases had been discussed
ivLastly it is submitted that the respondent is charged for violation of Rule 31i 31ii and 31iii of Central Civil Services Conduct Rules 1964
Therefore if the conduct of the respondent could be brought within the scope of the Rules immunity from the disciplinary action cannot be claimed
In support of these submissions reliance is placed on Union of India  Ors
vs AN Saxena  In Civil Appeal No 560 of 1991 the peculiar facts art different in disregard to the instructions of the Central Board of Direct Taxes refund of taxes was ordered
Further there was no allegation of corrupt motive or to oblige any person on account of extraneous considerations
Therefore that ruling is distinguishable
The respondent would try to support the impugned order contending that the opening of the sealed cover was correctly ordered because on the date when the Departmental Promotion Committee met in March 1989 no charge sheet had been served on the respondent
The charge memorandum dated 251989 came up to be served only on 551989
Therefore following the earlier procedure such a direction was given
This is a case in which the respondent was exercising quasi judicial functions
If the orders were wrong the remedy by way of an appeal or revision could have been resorted to
Otherwise if in every case of wrong order disciplinary action is resorted to it would jeopardize the exercise of judicial functions
The immunity attached to the officer while exercising quasi judicial powers will be lost
Rightly therefore the Tribunal relied on Civil Appeal Nos
4986 8790 where this Court took the view that no disciplinary action can be taken in respect of exercising quasi judicial functions
To the same effect in Civil Appeal No 56091 the decision relied on by the appellant namely Union of India  Ors  supra has no application to the instant case
The charge memorandum dated 251989 states as follows 303 MEMORANDUM The President proposes to hold an inquiry against Shri KK Dhawan under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services Classification Central and Appeal Rules 1965
The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry is proposed to be held is set out in the enclosed statement of article of charge
 At this stage we will refer to Rule 31i  31ii and 31iii of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules 1964 which are as under Rule 3 1  Every government servant shall at all time i maintain absolute integrity ii maintain devotion to duty and iii do nothing which is unbecoming of a government servant
The substance of the charge is the completion of nine assessments in an irregular manner hastily with a view to confer undue favour upon the various assessees
By such act the respondent failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and exhibited a conduct unbecoming of government servant
Certainly it cannot be contended that concerning the violation of these rules no disciplinary action could be taken
However what is urged is that in so far as the respondent was exercising quasi judicial functions he could not be subject to disciplinary action
The order may be wrong
In such a case the remedy will be to take up the matter further in appeal or revision
The question therefore arises whether an authority enjoys immunity from disciplinary proceedings with respect to matters decided by him in exercise of quasi judicial functions In Govinda Menon vs Union of India   it was contended that no disciplinary proceedings could be taken against appellant for acts or omissions with regard to his work as Commissioner under Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951
Since the 304 orders made by him were quasi judicial in character they should be challenged only as provided for under the Act
It was further contended that having regard to scope of Rule 4 of All India Services Discipline and Appeal Rules 1955 the act or omission of the Commissioner was such that appellant was not subject to the administrative control of the Government and therefore the disciplinary proceedings were void
Rejecting this contention it was held as under  It is not disputed that the appropriate Government has power to take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and that he could be removed from service by an order of the Central Government but it was contended that IAS Officers are governed by statutory rules that any act or omission  referred to in Rule 41 relates only to an act or omission of an officer when serving under the Government and that serving under the Government  means subject to the administrative control of the Government and that disciplinary proceedings should be therefore on the basis of the relationship of master and servant
It was argued that in exercising statutory powers the Commissioner was not subject to the administrative control of the Government and disciplinary proceedings cannot therefore be instituted against the appellant in respect of an act or omission committed by him in the course of his employment as Commissioner
We are unable to accept the proposition contended for by the appellant as correct
Rule 41 does not impose any limitation or qualification as to the nature of the act or omission in respect of which disciplinary proceedings can be instituted
Rule 41 b merely says that the appropriate Government competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against a member of the Service would be the Government under whom such member was serving at the time of the commission of such act or omission
It does not say that the act or omission must have been committed in the discharge of his duty or in the course of his employment as a Government servant
It is therefore open to the Government to take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in respect of his acts or omissions which cast 305 a reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty as a member of the service
It is not disputed that the appellant was at the time of the alleged misconduct employed as the First Member of the Board of Revenue and he was at the same time performing the duties of Commissioner under the Act in addition to his duties as the First Member of the Board of Revenue
In our opinion it is not necessary that a member of the Service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duties as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings
In other words if the act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty there is no reason why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him for that act or omission even though the act or omission relates to an activity in regard to which there is no actual master and servant relationship
To put it differently the test is not whether the act or omission was committed by the appellant in the course of the discharge of his duties as servant of the Government
The test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable connection with nature and condition of his service or whether the act or omission has cast any reflection upon the reputation of the member of the Service for integrity or devotion to duty as a public servant
We are of the opinion that even if the appellant was not subject to the administrative control of the Government when he was functioning as Commissioner under the Act and was not the servant of the Government subject to its orders at the relevant time his act or omission as Commissioner could form the subject matter of disciplinary proceedings provided the act or omission would reflect upon his reputation for integrity or devotion to duty as a member of the service
 In this context reference may be made to the following observations of Lopes LJ
in Pearce vs Foster 1866 17 OBD 536 p542
If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the 306 faithful discharge of his duty in the service it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal
That misconduct according to my view need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service of the business
It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master and the master will be justified not only if he discovers it at the time but also if he discovers it afterwards in dismissing that servant emphasis supplied Concerning the exercise of quasi judicial powers the contention urged was to the following effect  We next proceed to examine the contention of the appellant that the Commissioner was exercising a quasi judicial function in sanctioning the leases under the Act and his order therefore could not be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of the Act
The proposition put forward was that quasi judicial orders unless vacated under the provisions of the Act are final and binding and cannot be questioned by the executive Government through disciplinary proceedings
It was argued that an appeal is provided under S294 of the Act against the order of the Commissioner granting sanction to a lease and that it is open to any party aggrieved to file such an appeal and question the legality or correctness of the order of the Commissioner and that the Government also may in revision under S99 of the Act examine the correctness or legality of the order
it was said that so long as these methods were not adopted the Government could not institute disciplinary proceedings and reexamining the legality of the order of the Commissioner granting sanction to the leases
 That was rejected as under The charge is therefore one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions of S29 and the Rules thereunder in sanctioning the leases
On behalf of the respondents it was argued 307 both by Mr Sarjoo Prasad and Mr Bindra that the Commissioner was not discharging quasi judicial functions in sanctioning leases under S29 of the Act but we shall proceed on the assumption that the Commissioner was performing quasi judicial functions in granting leases under S29 of the Act
Even upon that assumption we are satisfied that the Government was entitled to institute disciplinary proceedings if there was prima facie material for showing recklessness or misconduct on the part of the appellant in the discharge of his official duty
It is true if the provisions of S29 of the Act or the Rules are disregarded the order of the Commissioner is illegal and such an order could be questioned in appeal under S29 4 or in revision under S99 of the Act
But in the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner
The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his functions he acted in utter disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules
It is the manner in which he discharged his functions that is brought up in these proceedings
In other words the charge and the allegations are to the effect that in exercising his powers as Commissioner the appellant acted in abuse of his power and it was in regard to such misconduct that he is being proceeded against
It is manifest therefore that though the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary action if there is proof that the Commissioner had acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power
We see no reason why the Government cannot do so for the purpose of showing that the Commissioner acted in utter disregard of the conditions prescribed for the exercise of his power or that he was 308 guilty of misconduct or gross negligence
We are accordingly of the opinion that the appellant has been unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case
 The above case therefore is an authority for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the government servant even with regard to exercise of quasi judicial powers provided  i The act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the government servant for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or iithere is prima facie material manifesting recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty or iiithe officer had failed to act honestly or in good faith or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of statutory power
We may also usefully refer to two English decisions
Thayre vs The London Brighton and South Coast Railway Company states Dishonesty  included dishonesty outside the service of the company as well as dishonesty towards the company In Thompson vs British Berna Motor Lorries Limited 33 TLR 187 at page 188 it has been held as under  It was the duty of the servant to render proper full and clear accounts to his principals and it was the duty of a servant to render prompt obedience to the lawful orders of his master
in this case the plaintiff had failed in both respects
There was no question as to the plaintiff s honesty but he had been negligent
 The Tribunal has chosen to rely on Civil Appeal Nos
4986 8790
The order in that case clearly shows the ultimate conclusion was that the charge framed against the delinquent officer had not been established
In support of that conclusion it was observed as under 309 We are also of the view that the action taken by the appellant was quasi judicial and should not have formed the basis of disciplinary action
 We do not think where to buttress the ultimate conclusion this observation was made that could ever be construed as laying the law that in no case disciplinary action could be taken if it pertains to exercise of quasi judicial powers
Then we come to Civil Appeal No 56091 to which one of us Mohan J was a party
The ruling in this case turned on the peculiar facts
Nevertheless what we have to carefully notice is the observation as under  On a reading of the charges and the allegations in detail learned Additional Solicitor General has fairly stated that they do not disclose any culpability nor is there any allegation of taking any bribe or to trying to favour any party in making the orders granting relief in respect of which misconduct is alleged against the respondent
 The above extract will clearly indicate that if there was any culpability or any allegation of taking bribe or trying to favour any party in exercise of quasi judicial functions then disciplinary action could be taken
We find our conclusion is supported by a following observations found in the said order at page 3 In our view the allegations are merely to the effect that the refunds were granted to unauthorized instructions of the Central Board of Direct Taxes
There is no allegation however either express or implied that these actions were taken by the respondent actuated by any corrupt motive or to oblige any person on account of extraneous considerations
In these circumstances merely because such orders of refunds were made even assuming that they were erroneous or wrong no disciplinary action could be taken as the respondent was discharging quasi judicial function
If any erroneous order had been passed by him correct remedy is by way of an appeal or revision to have such orders set aside
 310 In the case on hand article of charge clearly mentions that the nine assessments covered by the article of charge were completed i in an irregular manner ii in undue haste and iii apparently with a view to confer undue favour upon the assessees concerned
Emphasis supplied Therefore the allegation of conferring undue favour is very much there unlike Civil Appeal No 56091
If that be so certainly disciplinary action is warranted
This Court had occasion to examine the position
In Union of India  Ors
vs AN Saxena  to which one of us Mohan J was a party it was held as under  It was urged before us by learned counsel for the respondent that as the respondents was performing judicial or quasi judicial functions in making the assessment orders in question even if his actions were wrong they could be corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken regarding such actions
In our view an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings is not correct
It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant
The initiation of such proceedings it is true is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence
Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions
But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all
Where the 311 actions of such an officer indicate culpability namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken
 This dictum fully supports the stand of the appellant
There is a great reason and justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action could be taken
It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice that it must be free from bias of any kind
Certainly therefore the officer who exercises judicial or quasi judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge
Accordingly the contention of the respondent has to be rejected
It is important to bear in mind that in the present case we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer
The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act
But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules
Thus we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases i Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty iiif there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty iiiif he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant ivif he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers v if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party  vi if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago though the bribe may be small yet the fault is great
 312 The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive
However we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances disciplinary action is not warranted
Here we may utter a word of caution
Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated
In view of the foregoing discussion the appeals will stand allowed
There will be no order as to costs
We make it clear that it is open to the respondent to put forth all defenses open to him in the departmental inquiry which will be considered on its merit
VPR Appeals allowed


Summary:
The appellant and the fourth respondent along with others were applicants for a stage carriage permit
The Regional Transport Authority after hearing the applicants granted the permit to the appellant
On appeal by the fourth respondent the Central Road Traffic Board set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit to the fourth respondent
The appellant moved the State Government in revision but to no effect
He thereafter moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board and the State Government
The single judge who heard the matter quashed 228 the said orders and directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which was constituted in place of the Central Road Traffic Board to dispose of the appeal according to law
On a Letters Patent appeal by the fourth respondent the Appellate Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the single judge and restored the order of the Central Road Traffic Board
Hence this appeal by special leave
The point for determination in the appeal was whether the order granting the permit to the appellant made by the Regional Transport Authority on the basis of an order issued by the State Government under section 43A of the  as amended by the Motor Vehicles Madras Amendment Act 1948 could be set aside on the basis of another order imposing new restrictions issued thereunder while the appeal was pending before the Central Road Traffic Board and thus involved the question as to whether an order or direction issued by the State Government under section 43A of the Act had the force of law so as to create a vested right in the appellant
Held per jafer Imam and Subba Rao jj that section 43A of the  as amended by the Motor Vehicles Madras Amendment Act 1948 properly construed must be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdiction it conferred on the State Government must be confined to administrative functions
An order or direction made thereunder by the State Government therefore could not have the status of law regulating rights of parties and must partake of the character of an administrative order
C section section Motor Service Tenkasi vs The State of Madras ILR and Gopalakrishnan Motor Transport Co Ltd vs Secretary Regional Transport Authority Krishna District Vijayawada  approved
Consequently in the instant case the appellant could not be said to have acquired a vested right that was defeated by a new law enforced pending the appeal and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board could not be set aside merely on the ground that it had decided the appeal on the basis of an order issued subsequent to the grant of the permit if such order was otherwise in public interest
Per Sarkar J It could hardly be said that the rule that a court hearing an appeal from a decision should not ordinarily take into consideration a law passed subsequent to that decision had application where a quasi judicial tribunal heard an appeal from another such tribunal
Consequently in the instant case it could not be said that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record so as to attract a writ of certiorari and the appeal must fail on that ground
No applicant for a permit under the could have a substantive right to the permit vested in him and 229 the granting or refusal of a permit by the Regional Transport Authority could not operate as res judicata
It was unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to decide what kind of orders could be issued by the State Government under section 43A of the Act for whatever its nature administrative or otherwise if an order under that section entitled a person to its observance and there was hardly any doubt as to that it would be a law a mistake of which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance
The Mayor of Rochester vs The Queen 1858 EL
 EL   referred to
Nagendra Nath Bora vs The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam   distinguished