Appeal No 255 of 1954
Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and decree dated April 29 1953 of the former Pepsu High Court in R section A Nos 57 and 130 of 1952 arising out of the judgment and decree dated March 8 1952 of the Court of Addl
Judge Faridkot in Civil Appeal No 10 of 1952 against the judgment and decree dated December 4 1951 of the Court of ubJudge 11 Class Faridkot in File No 13 of 1951
Jagan Nath Kaushal and K L Mehta for the appellant
Kapur Chand Puri and Tarachand Brijmohan Lal for respondents Nos 1 to 3 1958
May 20
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J
This appeal by Special Leave against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Patiala and East Punjab States Union raises an interesting question pertaining to the Law of Preemption
881 The material facts are not in dispute and may be briefly stated The dispute relates to a land measuring 179 kanals and 2 marlas situate in village Wanderjatana
On August 26 1949 defendants 3 to 7 sold the said land to defendants I and 2 for a consideration of Rs 37611
On August 26 1950 defendants 8 to 11 instituted a suit Suit No 231 of 1950 Exhibit P 261 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge 11 Class Faridkot to pre empt the said sale on the ground among others that they bad a right of preemption
On January 6 1951 the vendees i e defendants I and 2 and the plaintiffs therein i e defendants 8 to 11 appellants in the present appeal entered into a compromise
Under the terms of the compromise the vendees admitted that they had received Rs 1700 from defendants 8 to II and that defendants 8 to 1 1 agreed to pay the balance of the consideration amounting to Rs 35911 on the 27th April 1951
It was further agreed that on the payment of the said amount they should get possession through Court
As the amount agreed to be paid was in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of the Subordinate Judge they filed the compromise deed in the Court of the District Judge and on the basis of the said compromise the District Judge made a decree dated January 23 1951
It was provided in the decree that in case defendants 8 to I I failed to pay the balance to the vendees on April 27 1951 the suit should stand dismissed and that if the said balance was paid on that date the vendees should deliver possession of the land in dispute to them
Defendants 8 to 11 deposited the balance of Rs 35911 on April 23 1951 and got possession of the land on May 17 1951
Before the said defendants 8 to 11 deposited the amount in Court under the terms of the compromise decree the resondents herein claiming to be owners of land in the same patti filed Suit No 13 of 1951 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge 11 Class Faridkot to enforce their right of pre emption
To that suit the original vendors were impleaded as defendants 3 to 7 the vendees as defendants I and 2 and the plaintiffs in Suit No 231 of 1950 as defendants 8 to 11
882 Defendants 8 to 11 contested the suit inter alia on the grounds that the plaintiffs had no right of preemption superior to that of theirs that the suit was barred by limitation and that the whole of the sale consideration had been fixed in good faith and paid
The learned Subordinate Judge found all the issues in favour of defendants 8 to 11 and dismissed the suit
On the main issue he found that the said defendants by obtaining a decree for pre emption before the rival claimants had filed their suit had become vendees through Court and so the plaintiffs could not succeed unless they had a superior right
The plaintiffs preferred an appeal to
the Additionl District Judge Faridkot against the said decree
The District Judge held that the plaintiffs and defendants 8 to 11 had equal rights of pre emption and were entitled to share the sale in the proportion of 37 and 47 respectively on payment of the proportionate amount of the consideration
On the main question he took the view that defendants 8 to 11 did not exercise their right of pre emption when the present suit was instituted for the reason that by the date of the filing of the suit they had not deposited the purchase money in Court
Both the parties filed Second Appeals against the decision of the District Judge in the High Court of Patiala questioning that part of the decree which went against them
The High Court upheld that part of the decree of the learned District Judge holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a share in the suit property but remanded the suit to the District Judge to give his findings on the following two questions 1 What was the amount paid by defendants 8 to 11 to the original vendees and whether they paid it in good faith 2 Whether the case would come under section 17C cl
e of the Punjab Pre emption Act hereinafter to be referred to as the Act
As the High Court refused to certify that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court defendants 8 to 11 preferred the above appeal by obtaining special leave of this Court
The learned Counsel for the appellants raises the following two contentions before us 1 Section 28 of 883 the Pre emption Act indicates that a property can be divided between equal pre emptors in terms of section 17 of the Pre emption Act only when both the suits are pending before the Court at the time of the passing of the decree  2 the appellants exercised their right of pre emption by obtaining a decree or at any rate when they deposited the money payable under the decree and thereby got themselves substituted in place of the original vendees and thereafter the plaintiff s can succeed only by proving their superior right to them
The learned Counsel for the respondents countered the aforesaid argument by stating that the plaintiffs being pre emptors of equal degree have got a statutory right under section 17 of the Pre emption Act to share the land with the appellants and the appellants having been substituted in place of the original vendees pendente lite are hit by the doctrine of lis _pendens and therefore they cannot claim higher rights than those possessed by the original vendees at the time of the filing of the suit
Before attempting to give a satisfactory answered to the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to notice and define the material incidents of the right of pre emption
A concise but lucid statement of the law is given by Plowden J in Dhani Nath vs Budhu 1 thus A preferential right to acquire land belonging to another person upon the occasion of a transfer by the latter does not appear to me to be either a right to or a right in that land
It isjus ad rem aliens acquirendum and not a jus  In re aliena 
A right to the offer of a thing about to be sold is not identical with a right to the thing itself and that is the primary right of the pre emptor
The secondary right is to follow the thing sold when sold without the proper offer to the pre emptor and to acquire it if he thinks fit in spite of the sale made in disregard of his preferential right The aforesaid passage indicates that a pre emptor has two rights 1 inherent or primary right ie a right 1136 P R 1894 at p 5ii
884 to the offer of a thing about to be sold and 2 secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold
Mahmood J in his classic judgment in Gobind Dayal vs Inayatullah 1 explained the scope of the secondary right in the following terms  It right of pre emption is simply a right of sub stitution entitling the pre emptor by means of a legal incident to which sale itself was subject to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which lie derived his title
It is in effect as if in a sale deed the vendee s name were rubbed out and pre emptor s name inserted in its place
The doctrine adumbrated by the learned Judge namely the secondary right of pre emption is simply a right of substitution in place of the original vendee has been accepted and followed by subsequent decisions
The general law of pre emption does not recognize any right to claim a share in the property sold when there are rival claimants
It is well established that the right of pre emption is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold in preference to other persons See Mool Chand vs Ganga Jal 2
The plaintiff is bound to show not only that his right is as good as that of the vendee but that it is superior to that of the vendee
Decided cases have recognized that this superior right must subsist at the time the pre emptor exercises his right and that that right is lost if by that time another person with equal or superior right has been substituted in place of the original vendee
Courts have not looked upon this right with great favour presumably for the reason that it operates as a clog on the right of the owner to alienate his property
The vendor and the vendeeire therefore permitted to avoid accrual of the right of pre emption by all lawful means
The vendee may defeat the right by selling the property to a rival pre emptor with preferential or equal right
To summarize 1 The right of pre emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold
i All 775 809
2 Lah
258 273
885 This right is called the primary or inherent right
2 The pre emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold
3 It is a right of substitution but not of re purchase i e the pre emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original vendee
4 It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold
5 Preference being the essence of the right the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place
6 The right being a very weak right it can be defeated by all legitimate methods such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place
The next question is whether this right is modified or otherwise enlarged by the  provisions of the Act
Relevant provisions of the Act material to the present purpose read thus Section 4  The right of pre emption shall mean the right of a person to acquire agricultural land or village immovable property or urban immovable property in preference to other persons and it arises in respect of such land only in the case of sales and in respect of such property only in the case of sales or of foreclosures of the right to redeem such property
Section 13  Whenever according to the provisions of this Act a right of pre emption vests in any class or group of persons the right may be exercised by all the members of such class or group joint and if not exercised by them all jointly by any two or more of them jointly and if not exercised by any two or more of them jointly by them severally
Section 17  Where several pre emptors are found by the Court to be equally entitled to the right of preemption the said right shall be exercised aif they claim as co shares in proportion among themselves to the shares they already hold in the land or property  bif they claim as heirs whether co sharers or not in proportion among themselves to the shares in which but for such sale they would inherit the land or property in the event of the vendor s decease without other heirs 886 cif they claim as owners of the estate or recognised subdivision thereof in proportion among themselves to the shares which they would take if the land or property were common land in the estate or the subdivision as the case may be dif they claim as occupancy tenants in proportion among themselves to the areas respectively held by them in occupancy right ein any other case by such pre emptors in equal shares
 Section 19  When any person proposes to sell any agricultural land or village immovable property or urban immovable property or to foreclose the right to redeem any village immovable property or urban immovable property in respect of which any persons have a right of preemption lie may give notice to all such persons of the price at which he is willing to sell such land or property or of the amount due in respect of the mortgage as the case may be
Such notice shall be given through any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such land or property or any part thereof is situate and shall be deemed sufficiently given if it be stuck up on the chaupal or other public place of the village town or place in which the land or property is situate
 Section 20  The right of pre emption of any person shall be extinguished unless such person shall within the period of three months from the date on which the notice tinder section 19 is duly given or within such further period not exceeding one year from such date as the court may allow present to the Court a notice for service on the vendor or mortgagee of his intention to enforce his right of pre emption
Such notice shall state whether the preemptor accepts the price or amount due on the footing of the mortgage as correct or not and if not what sum he is willing to pay  When the Court is satisfied that tile said notice has been duly served on the vendor or mortgagee the proceedings shall be filed
 Section 28  When more suits than one arising out of the same sale or foreclosure are pending the plaintiff 887 in each suit shall be joined as defendant in each of the other suits and in deciding the suits the court shall in each decree state the order in which each claimant is entitled to exercise his right
The Act defines the right and provides a procedure for enforcing that right
It does not enlarge the content of that right or introduce any change in the incidents of that right
Section 4 embodies the preexisting law by defining the right as a right of a person to acquire land in preference to other persons in respect of ales of agricultural lands
Section 13 cannot be read as we are asked to do as a statutory recognition of a right of preemptors of equal degree to exercise their rights piece meal confined to their shares in the land
Section 13 confers on a group of persons in whom the right of preemption vests to exercise that right either jointly or severally that is to say either the group of persons or one of them may enforce the right in respect of the entire sale
Section 17 regulates the distribution of preempted land when the Court finds that several pre emptors are equally entitled to the right of pre emption
But this Section applies only where 1 the right is yet to be exercised and 2 the pre emptors are found by the Court to be equally entitled to exercise the right
The section does not confer the right on or against a person who has already exercised the right and ceased to be a preemptor by his being legitimately substituted in place of the original vendee
See Mool Chand vs ganga Jal 1 at p 274 and Lokha Singh vs Sermukh Singh 2
Sections 19 and 20 prescribe the procedure for the exercise of the primary right while section 28 confers a power on the Court to join together two or more suits arising out of the same sale so that suitable directions may be given in the decree in regard to the order in which each claimant is entitled to exercise the right
This section is enacted presumably to avoid conflict of decisions and finally determine the rights of the various claimants
The aforesaid provisions do not materially affect the characteristics of the right of pre 1 Lah
113 2 AIR 1952 Punj
206 207
888 emption as existed before the Act
They provide a convenient and effective procedure for disposing of together different suits arising out of the same transaction to avoid conflict of decisions to fix the order of priority for the exercise of their rights and also to regulate the distribution of the preempted land between rival pre emptors
The provisions do not in any way enable the preemptor to exercise his right without establishing his superior right over the vendee or the person substituted in his place or to prevent the vendor or the vendee by legitimate means to defeat his right by getting substituted in place of the vendee a pre emptor with a superior right to or an equal right with that of the plaintiff
Nor can we accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that section 28 precludes the Court from giving a decree for pre emption in a case where the two suits were not joined together but one of the suits was decreed separately
Section 28 enacts a convenient procedure but it cannot affect the substantative rights of the parties
We do not see that if the plaintiffs were entitled to a right of pre emption they would have lost it by the appellants obtaining a decree before the plaintiffs instituted the suit unless it be held that the decree itself had the effect of substituting them in place of the original vendees
We cannot therefore hold that the plaintiffs  suit is in any way barred under the provisions of the Act
This leads us to the main question in this case namely whether the appellants having obtained a consent decree oil January 23 1951 in their suit against the vendees and having paid the amount due under the decree and having taken delivery of the property and thus having got themselves substituted in place of the original vendees can legitimately defeat the rights of the plaintiffs who by reason of the aforesaid substitution were only in the position of pre emptors of equal degree vis a vis the appellants and therefore ceased to have any superior rights
The learned Counsel for the respondents contends that the appellants are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and 889 therefore the act of substitution which was effected on April 23 1951 could not be in derogation of their right of pre emption which they have exercised by filing their suit on February 15 1951
It is now settled law in the Punjab that the rule of lis pendens is as much applicable to a suit to enforce the right of pre emption as to any other suit
The principle on which the doctrine rests is explained in the leading case of Bellami vs Sabine 1 where the Lord Chancellor said that pendente lite neither party to the litigation can alienate  the property so as to affect his opponent
In other words the law does not allow litigant parties pending the litigation to transfer their rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the other party
As a corollary to this rule it is laid down that this principle will not affect the right existing before the suit
The rule with its limitations was considered by a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mool Chand vs Ganga Jal 2
In that case during the pendency of a pre emption suit the vendee sold the property which was the subject matter of the litigation to a person possessing a right of pre emption equal to that of the pre emptor in recognition of that person s right of pre emption
This re sale took place before the expiry of the period of limitation for instituting a pre emption suit with respect to the original sale
The Full Bench held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied to preemption suits but in that case the resale in question did not conflict with the doctrine of lis pendens
Bhide J gave the reason for the said conclusion at page 272 thus  All that the vendee does in such a case is to take the bargain in the assertion of his pre existing pre emptive right and hence the sale does not offend against the doctrine of lis pendens 
Another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court accepted and followed the aforesaid doctrine in Mt Sant Kaur vs Teja Singh 3
In that case pending the suit for pre emption the vendee sold the land purchased i   2 Lah 258 273
3 ILR 1946 Lah
467 890 by him to a person in recognition of a superior right of pre emption
Thereafter the second purchaser was brought onrecord and was added as a defendant to the suit
At the time of the purchase by the person having a superior right of pre emption his right to enforce it was barred by limitation
The High Court held that that circumstance made a difference in the application of the rule of lis pendens
The distinction between the two categories of cases was brought out in bold relief at page 145 thus  Where the subsequent vendee has still the means of coercing by means of legal action the original vendee into surrendering the bargain in his favour a surrender as a result of a private treaty and out of Court in recognition of the right to compel such surrender by means of a suit cannot properly be regarded as a voluntary transfer so as to attract the application of the rule of lis pendens
The correct way to look at the matter in a case of this kind is to regard the subsequent transferee as having simply been substituted for the vendee in the original bargain of sale
He can defend the suit on all the pleas which he could have taken had the sale been initially in his own favour   However where the subsequent transferee has lost the means of making use of the coercive machinery of the law to compel the vendee to surrender the original bargain to him a re transfer of the property in the former s favour cannot be looked upon as anything more than a voluntary transfer in the former s favour of such title as he had himself acquired under the original sale
Such transfer has not the effect of substituting the subsequent transferee in place of the vendee in the original bargain
Such a transferee takes the property only subject to the result of the suit
Even if lie is impleaded as a defendant in such suit he cannot be regarded as anything more than a representative in interest of the original vendee having no right to defend the suit except on the pleas that were open to such vendee himself 
This case therefore expressly introduces a new element in the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens 891 to a suit to enforce the pre emptive right
If the right of the pre emptor of a superior or equal degree was subsisting and enforceable by coercive process or otherwise his purchase would be considered to be in exercise of that pre existing right and therefore not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens
On the other hand if he purchased the land from the original vendee after his superior or equal right to enforce the right of preemption was barred by Limitation he would only be in the position of a representative in interest of the vendee or to put it in other words if his right is barred by limitation it would be treated as a non existing right
Much to the same effect was the decision of another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mohammad Sadiq vs Ghasi Ram 1
There before the institution of the suit for pre emption an agreement to sell the property had been executed by the vendee in favour of another prospective pre emptor with an equal degree of right of pre emption subsequent to the institution of the suit in pursuance of the agreement a sale deed had been executed and registered in the latter s favour after the expiry of the limitation for a suit to enforce his own pre emptive right
The Full Bench held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied to the case
The principle underlying this decision is the same as that in Mt Sant Kaur vs Te a Singh 2 where the barred right was treated as a non existent right
The same view was restated by another Full Bench of the East Punjab High Court in Wazir Ali Khan vs Zahir Ahmad Khan 3
At p 195 the learned Judges observed  It is settled law that unless a transfer pendente lite can be held to be a transfer in recognition of a subsisting pre emptive right the rule of lis pendens applies and the transferee takes the property subject to the result of the suit during the pendency where of it took place
The Allahabad High Court has applied the doctrine of lis pendens to a suit for pre emption ignoring the limitation implicit in the doctrine that it cannot affect i AIR 1946 Lah
2 ILR  3 AIR 1949 East Punj
93 892 a pre existing right
See Kundan Lal vs Amar Singh 1
We accept the view expressed by the Lahore High Court and East Punjab High Court in preference to that of the Allahabad High Court
In view of the aforesaid four Full Bench decisions three of the Lahore High Court and the fourth of the East Punjab High Court a further consideration of the case is unnecessary
The settled law in the Punjab may be summarized thus The doctrine of lis pendens applies only to a transfer pendente lite but it cannot affect a pre existing right
If the sale is a transfer in recognition of a pre existing and subsisting right it would not be affected by the doctrine as the said transfer did not create now right pendente lite  but if the pre existing right became unenforceable by reason of the fact of limitation or otherwise the transfer though ostensibly made in recognition of such a right in fact created only a new right pendente lite
Even so it is contended that the right of the appellants to enforce their right of pre emption was barred by limitation at the time of the transfer in their favour and therefore the transfer would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens
This argument ignores the admitted facts of the case
The material facts may be recapitulated Defendants 3 to 7 sold the land in dispute to defendants 1 and 2 on August 26 1949 and the sale deed was registered on February 15 1950
The appellants instituted their suit to pre empt the said sale on August 26 1950 and obtained a compromise decree on January 23 195 1
They deposited the balance of the amount payable on April 23 1951 and took possession of the land on May 17 1951
It would be seen from the aforesaid facts that the appellants  right of pre emption was clearly subsisting at the time when the appellants deposited the amount and took possession of the land for they not only filed the suit but obtained a decree therein and complied with the terms of the decree within the time prescribed thereunder
The coercive process was still in operation
if so it follows that the appellants are not hit by the iAIR 1927 All
VI 893 doctrine of lis pendens and they acquired an indefeasible right to the suit land at any rate when they took possession of the land pursuant to the terms of the decree after depositing in Court the balance of the amount due to the vendors
We shall briefly touch upon another argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants namely that the compromise decree obtained by them whereunder their right of pre emption was recognized clothed them with the title to the property so as to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal right of pre emption
The right of pre emption can be effectively exercised or enforced only when the pre emptor has been sub stituted by the vendee in the original bargain of sale
A conditional decree such as that with which we are concerned whereunder a pre emptor gets possession only if he pays a specified amount within a prescribed time and which also provides for the dismissal of the suit in case the condition is not complied with cannot obviously bring about the substitution of the decreeholder in place of the vendee before the condition is complied with
Such a substitution takes effect only when the decree holder complies with the condition and takes possession of the land
The decision of the Judicial Committee in Deonandan Prashad Singh vs Ramdhari Chowdhri 1 throws considerable light on the question whether in similar circumstances the pre emptor can be deemed to have been substituted in the place of the original vendee
There the Subordinate Judge made a pre emption decree under which the pre emptors were in possession from 1900 to 1904 when the decree was reversed by the High Court and the original purchaser regained possession and in 1908 the Privy Council upon further appeal declared the pre emptors  right to purchase but at a higher price than decreed by the Subordinate Judge
In 1909 the pre eimptors paid the additional price and thereupon again obtained possession
The question arose whether the pre emptors were not entitled to mesne profits for the period between 1904 to 1909 ie during the period the judg i1916 L R 44 1
A 80
894 ment of the first appellate Court was in force
The Privy Council held that during that period the preemptors were not entitled to mesne profits
The reason for that conclusion was stated at page 84 thus  It therefore follows that where a suit is brought it is on payment of the purchase money on the specified date that the plaintiff obtains possession of the property and until that time the original purchaser retains possession and is entitled to the rents and profits
This was so held in the case of Deokinandan vs Sri Ram 1 and there Mahmud J whose authority is well recognized by all stated that it was only when the terms of the decree were fulfilled and enforced that the persons having the right of pre emption become owners of the property that such ownership did not vest from the date of sale notwithstanding success in the suit and that the actual substitution of the owner of the pre empted property dates with possession under the decree 
This judgment is therefore a clear authority for the position that the pre emptor is not substituted in the place of the original vendee till conditions laid down in the decree are fulfilled
We cannot therefore agree with the learned Counsel that the compromise decree itself perfected his clients  right in derogation to that of the plaintiffs
But as we have held that the appellants complied with the conditions laid down in the compromise decree they were substituted in the place of the vendee before the present suit was disposed of
In the aforesaid view the other questions raised by the appellants do not arise for consideration
In the result the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with cost  throughout
Appeal allowed
1 All


Summary:
With a view to preventing the petitioner detenu from indulging in activities that were prejudicial to the mainte n ance of public Order in Greater Bombay the Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Sub Section 2 of Section 3 of the read with clause 4 of the National Secu rity Conditions of detention Maharashtra Order 1980 passed on Order of detention pursuant whereof the Petition er detenu was detained in Central Prison Nasik
He was furnished with copies of grounds of detention and other material on the basis of which the detaining authority based his subjective satisfaction
In order to challenge the legality and validity of the detention Order the detenu filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed
Against the Order of the High Court the detenu petitioner has filed criminal appeal after obtaining special leave
He has also filed a separate Writ Petition in this Court challenging his deten tion
Both were heard together by this Court
Counsel for the appellant raised several contentions assailing the legality of the detention order one of which being that there was inordinate and unexplained delay caused by the Union of India in considering and disposing of his representation dated 26 9 88 as such his continued deten tion was unconstitutional and illegal being violative of Article 225 of the Constitution
Allowing the appeal as also the Writ Petition this Court 192 HELD The detenu has an independent constitutional right to make his representation under Article 225 of the Con stitution of India
Correspondingly there is a Constitution al mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu forwards his representation questioning the correct ness of the detention Order clamped upon him and requesting for his release to consider the said representation within reasonable dispatch and to dispose the same as expeditiously as possible
198H 199A B Jayanarayan Sukul vs State of West Bengal   A bdul Karim  Ors
vs State of West Bengal   Pankaj Kumar Chakravarty  Ors
vs State of West Bengal  This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect but if this constitutional imperative is observed in breach it would amount to negation of the constitutional obligation rendering the continued detention constitutional ly impermissible and illegal since such a breach would defeat the very concept of liberty the highly cherished right which is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution
199B C The use of the word as soon as may be occurring in Article 225 of the Constitution reflects that the repre sentation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with due promptitude and diligence and with a sense of urgency and without avoidable delay
What is reasonable dispatch depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard
199D Rashik Sk
vs State of West Bengal Smt
Shalini Soni  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors
   In the instant case the gap between the receipt and disposal of the representation is 28 days but upon the date of service of the order of rejection on the detenu the delay amounts to 32 days
The only explanation offered by the 3rd respondent is that further information required from the State Government was received by the third respondent on 17 10 88 after a delay of nearly 14 days and then the repre sentation of the detenu was disposed of on 27 10 88 within which period there were certain holidays
There is an inor dinate and unreasonable delay and the explanation given by the third respondent is not satisfactory and acceptable
Detenu directed to be set at liberty forthwith
199F H 200A B 193 B Sundar Rao  Ors
vs State of Orissa  Jnanendra Nath Roy vs The State of West Bengal  Frances Coralie Muffin vs WC Khambra and Others   Vijay Kumar vs State of Jammu and Kashmir State of Uttar Pradesh and another  and Mohinuddin alias Moin Master and Ors vs DM Beed   referred to