ivil Appeal No 3927 of 1986
From the Judgment and Order dated 186
1986 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No 10 of 1980
SK Dholakia AM Khanwilkar and Mrs VD Khanna for the Appellant
VM Tarkunde Karanjawala Mrs Karanjawala and HS Anand for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
This appeal by leave is from a decision of the Bombay High Court which allowed the respond ent s petition for a writ of certiorari
In so doing the court quashed departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent and the resultant order terminating his services
The facts are substantially undisputed and may briefly be stated as follows Respondent Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan was at the rele vant time the Deputy Registrar of the Marathwada University
One Mr Yelikar was working then as Controller of Examina tions
In or about April 1976 Mr Yelikar proceeded on leave and the present respondent was directed to discharge the duties of the Controller of Examinations
Accordingly he joined his new assignment and continued to hold 458 that post when the controversy which culminated in his dismissal took place
It is said that one Mr Swaminathan from Madras was entrusted with the printing works needed to conduct annual examinations of the University for the years 1974 and 1975
Mr Swaminathan submitted his bills amounting about Rs600000 for the work performed by him
The bills were not cleared immediately and Mr Swaminathan complained to the University authorities
He also submitted a petition to the Prime Minister of India which was forwarded to the University for immediate action
This led to an enquiry to find out whether the bills were deliberately kept pending with any ulterior motive
The Executive Council of the University appointed a four member committee including the Vice Chancellor to enquire into the matter
The committee after investigation submitted a report in November 1977 making some prima facie observations against the respondent
Thereupon the Executive Council desired to have the matter thoroughly examined by another committee
It appointed Mr NB Chavan for the purpose
Mr Chavan made a detailed enquiry but found nothing against the respondent
On Decem ber 23 1978 he submitted a report stating inter alia that there was no delay in clearing the said bills and if there was any delay it was justified in the circumstances
He has stated that the University utilised the time for internal audit in which it was found that the claim of Mr Swamina than was excessive to the extent of Rs48000 and odd
The report of Mr Chavan thus gave a clean chit to the respond ent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Control ler of Examinations
If the Executive Council had accepted the report and closed the matter that would have been better
But unfortu nately it was not done and another chapter was opened
On March 22 1979 the report of Mr Chavan was placed before the Executive Council which without taking any decision entrusted the question to the Vice Chancellor
The Vice Chancellor was present in that meeting and agreed to take a decision in about a month
But what he did was entirely different
Purporting to act under the powers given to him by the Executive Council he directed departmental enquiry against the respondent
He appointed Mr Motale Advocate as an Inquiry Officer who flamed three charges First charge impeached the respondent of intentionally delaying the clearance of the bills of Mr Swaminathan and thus tarnish ing the image of the University
Second charge alleged that the respondent did not place before the Executive Council the letters  addressed by the Chancellor of the University on July 23 1976 and 459 August 19 1976
Third charge accused the respondent for not producing all the available papers for scrutiny by the one man committee headed by Mr Chavan
On October 25 1979 Mr Motale submitted his  enquiry report to the Vice Chancellor holding the respondent guilty of the charges
After a usual procedure of giving show cause notice and considering the reply thereto the Vice Chancel lor decided to dismiss the respondent
On January2 1980 he accordingly made an order
The matter did not rest there
The respondent moved the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal
When the writ petition first came up for hearing in November 1985 the High Court took a very curious stand
It observed that the entire matter be placed before the Executive Council for taking an appropriate decision
As per this observation the matter came up before the Executive Council in the meeting held on December 2627 1985
The Executive Council passed a resolution inter alia ratifying the action taken by the Vice Chancellor and confirming the dismissal of the respondent
This has added a new dimension to the case
At the final disposal of the writ petition the High Court however examined the merits of the matter
The High Court held that the action taken by the Vice Chancellor was without authority of law
As to the ratification made by the Executive Council the High Court held That the acts done by the Vice Chancellor remain the acts without any authority or powers and that defects cannot be cured by the subsequent resolution With these conclusions the High Court quashed the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent and also the order of termination of his services
Being aggrieved by the judgment the Marathwada Univer sity by obtaining special leave has appealed to this Court
Learned counsel for the appellant put his contention in two ways First he said that on the true construction of the relevant provisions of the Marathwada University Act 1974 the termination of services of the respondent cannot be assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the part of the Vice Chancellor
Counsel next said that if the order was defective or without authority the ratification by the Executive Council has rendered it immune from any challenge
In order to appreciate these submissions we must outline the 460 statutory provisions of the Marathwada University Act 1974 called shortly the Act
Section 8 specifies the officers of the University
The Vice Chancellor is one of the offi cers
Section 10 provides for appointment of the Vice Chan cellor
He shall be appointed by the Chancellor and shall ordinarily hold office for a term
of three years
Section 11 reads so far as material as follows 111 The Vice Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shah in the absence of the Chancellor preside at the meetings of the Senate and at any Convocation of the Universi ty   113 It shah be the duty of the Vice Chancellor to ensure that the provisions of this Act the Statutes Ordinances and Regulations are faithfully observed
The Chancellor shall for this purpose have the power to issue directions to the Vice Chancel lor who shall give effect to any such direc tions
 114 If there are reasonable grounds for the Vice Chancellor to believe that there is an emergency which requires immediate action to be taken he shall take such action as he thinks necessary and shall at the earliest opportunity report in writing the grounds for his belief that there was an emergency and the action taken by him to such authority or body as would in the ordi nary course have dealt with the matter   116a It shall be lawful for the Vice Chancellor as the principal executive and academic officer to regulate the work and conduct of the officers and of the teaching academic and other employees of the Universi ty in accordance with the provisions of this Act the Statutes Ordinances and Regulations 117 The Vice Chancellor shah exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as are prescribed by the Stat utes Ordinances and Regulations
 Section 19 enumerates the authorities of the University
The Executive Council is one of the authorities specified thereunder
Section 23 to the extent necessary is in the following terms 461 231 The Executive Council shall be the principal executive authority of the University and shall consist of the following members namely i the Vice Chancellorex officio Chairman
 Section 24 deals with the powers and duties of the Executive Council
These powers and duties are wide and varied and it is sufficient if we read sub sections 1 xxix and xii of sec
They are as follows 241 Subject to such conditions as are prescribed by or under this Act the Executive Council shall exercise the following powers and perform the following duties namely    241xxix appoint officers and other employees of the University prescribe their qualifications fix their emoluments define the terms and conditions of their service and discipline and where necessary their duties 241x1i delegate subject to the approval of the Chancellor any of its powers except the power to make Ordinances to the Vice Chancellor the Registrar or the Finance Officer or such other officers or authority of the University or a committee appointed by it thinks fit Two other provisions are material namely secs
37 and 84
Section 37 omitting the unnecessary is in these terms Sec
37 Subject to the conditions prescribed by or under this Act the Senate may make the Statutes to provide for all or any of the following matters namely xvi The term of office duties and condi tions of service of officers teachers and other employees of the University the provi sions of pension insurance and provident fund and the manner of termination of their service and other disciplinary action and their quali fications except those of teachers
 Section 34 is as follows Delegation of powers Subject to the provi sions of 462 this Act and Statutes any officer or authority of the University may by order delegate his or its powers exceptthe power to make Stat utes Ordinances and Regulations to any other officer or authority under his or its control and subject to the conditions that the ulti mate responsibility for the exercise of the powers so delegated shall continue to vest in the officer or authority delegating them
 With these provisions we turn to consider the first question urged for the appellant
The question is whether the Vice Chancellor was competent to direct disciplinary action against the respondent
In this context we may make a few general observations about the position and powers of the Vice Chancellor
The University Education Commission in its report Vol
I December 1948 to August 1949 has summarised the powers and duties as fol lows at 421 Duties of Vice Chancellor A Vice Chancellor is the chief academic and executive officer of his university
He presides over the Court Senate in the absence of the Chancellor Syndicate Executive Council Academic Council and numerous committees including the selection committees for ap pointment of staff
It is his duty to know the senior members of the staff intimately and to be known to all members of the staff and students
He must command their confidence both by adequate academic reputation and by strength of personality
He must know his university well enough to be able to foster its points of strength and to foresee possible points of weakness before they become acute  He must be the keeper of the university s conscience  both setting the highest standard by example and dealing promptly and firmly with indiscipline and malpractice of any kind
All this he must do and it can be done as constitutional ruler he has not and should not have autocratic power
Besides this he must be the chief liaison between his univer sity and the public he must keep the univer sity alive to the duties it owes to the public which it serves and he must win support for the university and understanding of its needs not merely from potential benefactors but from the general public and its elected representa tives
Last he must have the strength of character to resist unflinchingly the many forms of pressure to relax standards of all sorts which are being applied to universities today
 463 This has been approved by the Education Commission 1964 66
In the report of the Education Commission 1971 pages 610 11 para 1332 it was stated The person who is expected above all to embody the spirit of academic freedom and the principles of good management in a university is the Vice Chancellor
He stands for the commitment of the university to schol arship and pursuit of truth and can ensure that the executive wing of the university is used to assist the academic community in all its activities
His selection should there fore be governed by this overall considera tion
 Dr AH Homadi in his wise little study about the role of the Vice Chancellor in the university administration in developing coun tries has this to state at 49 The President or the Vice Chancellor The President must be willing to accept a definition of educational leadership that brings about change to the academic life of the institution
He must be fired by a deep concern for education
He should instil a spirit and keeness about growth and develop ment in such a way that the professiriate feels that their goals are interlinked with those of the University that their success depends upon the success of the University
The professors should be given detailed infor mation about the jobs that they have to per form and their good performance should be given due recognition by administration lead ership
Even such small encouragement will boost theft morale to greater heights
The President should have faith in his own abili ties as well as on the abilities of other professors and administrators and should provide guidelines about the kind of efforts he would like his professors and administra tors to make setting an example by his own actions and exercises
The negative force of fear when used and no one denies that an element of hard headedness is some times required as a persuasive inducement to profes sors and administrators of university should be employed judiciously
Under no circum stances should the apathy and belligerence of the professors and administrators be aroused
These call for strong but sympathetic leader ship in the President
 464 The Vice Chancellor in every university is thus the conscious keeper of the University and constitutional ruler
He is the principal executive and academic officer of the University
He is entrusted with the responsibility of overall administration of academic as well as nonacademic affairs
For these purposes the Act confers both express and implied powers on the Vice Chancellor
The express powers include among others the duty to ensure that the provisions of the Act Statutes Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned
Section 113
The Vice Chancellor has a right to regulate the work and conduct of officers and teaching and other employees of the University Section 116a
He has also emergency powers to deal with any untoward situation Section 114
The power conferred under sec
114 is indeed significant
If the Vice Chancellor believes that a situation calls for immedi ate action he can take such action as he thinks necessary though in the normal course he is not competent to take that action
He must however report to the concerned authority or body who would in the ordinary course have dealt with the matter
That is not all
His pivotal position as the principal executive officer also carries with him the im plied power
It is the magisterial power which is in our view plainly to be inferred
This power is essential for him to maintain domestic discipline in the academic and non academic affairs
In a wide variety of situations in the relationship of tutor and pupil he has to act firmly and promptly to put down indiscipline and malpractice
It may not be illegitimate if he could call to aid his implied powers and also emergency powers to deal with all such situations
Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the Vice Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the University implies as well the power to take disciplinary action against officers
We are unable to agree with this contention
Firstly the power to regulate the work and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal
Secondly the Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally includes the power to remove
This power is located under sec
241xxix of the Act
It is therefore futile to contend that the Vice Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council
It is a settled principle that when the Act pre scribes a particular body to exercise a power it must be exercised only by that body
It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated
The law must also provide for such delegation
Halsbury s Laws of England Vol14th Ed para 32 summarises these principles as follows 465 32
Sub delegation of powers
In accordance with the maxim delegatius non potest delegare a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided unless sub delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication
There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative judicial or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub delegation and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind
 The counsel for the appellant next submit ted that the Executive Council in the instant case had delegated its disciplinary power to the Vice Chancellor and the Act provides for such delegation
In support of the contention he relied upon the following resolution of the Executive Council Full power be given to the Vice Chancellor to take a decision on this question and the Vice Chancellor informed the Executive Council that he will take decision in about a month On this decision Shri Gangadhar Pa thrikar gave his opinion that the Executive Council should take a decision on the note dated 161
1979 submitted by him and other two members and since it was not accepted he does not agree with the above decision This resolution in our opinion is basically faulty at least for two reasons
It may be recalled that the Executive Council without considering the report of Mr Chavan wanted the Vice Chancellor to take a decision thereon
It may also be noted that the Vice Chancellor was present at the meeting of the Executive Council when the resolution was passed
He was given full power to take a decision which in the context was obviously on the report of Mr Chavan and not on any other matter or question
He said that he would take a decision in about a month
In our opinion by the power delegated under the resolution the Vice Chancellor could either accept or reject the report with intimation to the Executive Council
He could not have taken any other action and indeed he was not authorised to take any other action
The other infirmity in the said resolution goes deeper than what it appears
The resolution was not in harmony with the statutory requirement
Section 84 of the Act provides for delegation of powers and 466 it states that any officer or authority of the University may by order delegate his or its power except power to make Ordinance and Regulations to any other officer or authority subject to provisions of the Act and Statutes
Section 241xii provides for delegation of power by the Executive Council
It states that the Executive Council may delegate any of its power except power to make Ordinances to the Vice Chancellor or to any other officer subject to the approval of the Chancellor
underlying is ours
The approval of the Chancellor is mandatory
Without such ap proval the power cannot be delegated to the Vice Chancellor
The record does not reveal that the approval of the Chancel lor was ever obtained
Therefore the resolution which was not in conformity with the statutory requirement could not confer power on the Vice Chancellor to take action against the respondent
This takes us to the second contention urged for the appellants
The contention relates to the legal effect of ratification done by the Executive Council in its meeting held on December 2627 1985
The decision taken by the Executive Council is in the form of a resolution and it reads as follows Considering the issues the Execu tive Council resolved as follows 1
The Executive Council at its meeting held on March 22 1979 had by a resolution given full authority to the Vice Chancellor for taking further proceedings and decision in both the cases of the defaulting officers
In exercise of above authority the Vice Chancellor appointed an Inquiry Officer and as suggested by the Inquiry Offi cer issued Show Cause notices obtained re plies from the Officers and lastly issued orders for terminating their services XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX It was further resolved that i There has been no inadequacy in the pro ceedings against both the officers ii The punishment ordered against both the officers is commensurate with the defaults and allegations proved 467 against both the officers and iii The Executive Council therefore whol ly endorses the actions taken by the then Vice Chancellor against both the officers
 By this resolution we are told that the Executive Council has ratified the action taken by the Vice Chancellor
Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent
In Friedman s Law of Agency Fifth Edition chapter 5 at p 73 theprinciple of ratifica tion has been explained What the agent  does on behalf of the principal  is done at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist hence the use in this sentence but not in subsequent ones of inverted commas
The agent in fact has no authority to do what he does at the time he does it
Subse quently however the principal on whose behalf though without whose authority the agent has acted accepts the agent s act and adopts it just as if there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly what the agent has done
The interesting point which has given rise to considerable difficulty and dispute is that ratification by the principal does not merely give validity to the agent s unauthorised act as from the date of the ratification it is antedated so as to take effect from the time of the agent s act
Hence the agent is treated as having been authorised from the outset to act as he did
Ratification is equivalent to an antecedent authority  
 In Bowstead on Agency 14th Ed at p 39 it is stated Every act whether lawful or unlaw ful which is capable of being done by means of an agent except an act which is in its inception void is capable of ratification by the person in whose name or on whose behalf it is done  
The words lawful or unlawful however are included primarily to indicate that the doctrine can apply to torts
From them it would follow that a principal by ratification may retrospectively turn what was previously an act wrongful against the princi ple eg an unauthorised sale or against a third party eg a wrongful distress into a legitimate one or become liable for the tort of another by ratifying
 468 These principles of ratification apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions
The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity
It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified
The counsel for the appellant however invited our attention to the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta vs The Union of India  It was a case of termina tion of services of the Secretary of a Company
The Board of Directors decided to terminate the services of the Secre tary
The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact termi nated his services
Subsequently in the meeting of the Board of Directors the action taken by the Chairman was confirmed
In the suit instituted by the Secretary challeng ing the termination of his services the Court upheld on the principle that the action of the Chairman even though it was invalid initially could be validated by ratification in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors
Ma thew J while considering this aspect of the matter ob served at pp
307 and 308 Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Direc tors passed on December 16 1953 to terminate his services it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the BOard of Directors
The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so because he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution
Therefore it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Direction to ratify that action which though unauthorised was done on behalf of the Company
Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on December 17 1953
The appellant was not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him and the trial court as well as the High Court was right in dismissing the claim
 These principles of ratification governing transactions of a company where the general body is the repository of all powers not be 469 extended to the present case
We were also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barnard vs National Dock Labour Board 1953 1 All Eng
Law Reports 1113 and in particular the observation of Denning LJ at 1118 and 1119 While an administrative function can often be delegated a judicial function rarely can be
No judicial tribunal can dele gate its functions unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication
In Local Government Board vs Arlidge 2 the power to delegate was given by necessary implication but there is nothing in this scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and it cannot be implied
It was suggested that it would be impracticable for the board to sit as a board to decide all these cases but I see nothing impracticable in that
They have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange for two members one from each side employers and workers to be responsible for one week at a time
Next it was suggested that even if the board could not delegate their functions at any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager but if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager they can have no power to ratify what he has already done
The effect of ratifica tion is to make it equal to a prior command but as a prior command in the shape of dele gation would be useless so also is a ratifi cation
 These observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delega tion of power to the Vice Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent
There was no subsequent delegation either
Therefore neither the action taken by the Vice Chancellor nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
NVK Appeal dis missed


Summary:
Prem Chand accused respondent had married Veena Rani deceased in the year 1973
Veena Rani was then employed in the State Bank of Patiala
Soon after their marriage the accused resigned his job as Prosecuting Sub inspector and started his practice at Sangrut
Veena Rani got herself transferred to Sangrur and the couple set up house there
From the very beginning Veena Rani had an unhappy married life because the accused constantly tormented her to get more money from her parents
The accused was also given to heating her frequently
Veena Rani gave birth to a male child
Even after child birth the accused did not stop iII treating her
Unable to bear the iII treatment Veena Rani took leave on loss of pay and went away to her parents
She later filed an application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court at Patiala for restitution of conjugal rights
At this stage a compromise was brought about between the parties and Veena Rani came back to live with the accused at San grur
But nothing changed and the accused continued to torment her for money
The immediate provocation for the accused stepping up his illtreatment of Veena Rani was his demand of Rs 1000 to pay the balance amount of the scooter price which he had purchased
Veena Rani had no funds of her own
She there fore wrote to her brother and mother narrating her woes and requesting them to send Rs 1000
In spite of Veena Rani writing to her brother and mother the accused did not relent in the immediate compliance of his demand
On 1591975 the day of the tragedy the accused and Veena Rani had a quarrel and thereupon both of them went to the house of Shri Hari Om Advocate who advised the accused not to torment Veena Rani
613 There in the presence of Hari Om the accused went to the extent of saying that Veena Rani may go to hell but he should get the money forthwith
Veena Rani reacted by saying that she preferred death to such life
The accused far from expressing regret for his conduct drove her to despair by further saying that she can provide him relief quicker by dying on the very day
Thereafter the accused left Veena Rani at their house and went to court at about 900 am
At 1015 am shrieks were heard from their house and when people rushed in they found Veena Rani lying on the ground with extensive burn injuries
Before her death in the hospi tal Veena Rani told the doctor that she had been tortured at home and that she wanted to die as early as possible
The Additional Sessions Judge found the accused guilty under section 306 IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for four years
The Judge held that the accused had been tormenting and also physically assaulting Veena Rani and that Veena Rani had committed suicide by reason of the accused s instigation
The High Court on appeal acquitted the accused holding that even though Veena Rani had committed suicide on account of her unhappy married life there was nothing on the record to show that the appellant in any manner instigated the deceased to commit suicide
In this Court two special leave petitions have been filed one by the father of Veena Rani and the other by the State of Punjab
On behalf of the appellants it was contend ed that the High Court had completely erred in its apprecia tion of the evidence and in its application of the law
On behalf of the accused it was contended that even if the prosecution evidence was accepted in full there was no material to show that the suicidal death of Veena Rani was abetted in any manner by the accused
Allowing the appeals and restoring the conviction of the accused under section 306 this Court HELD 1 Veena Rani s death was undoubtedly due to suicide and not due to any accident or homicide
621A 2 There is overwhelming evidence in the case to estab lish that Veena Rani s life was made intolerable by the accused by constantly demanding her to get him money and also beating her frequently
620G 614 3 Viewed in the background of Veena Rani s plight during the few days preceding her death and the events that took place on the morning of the tragedy the utterances by the accused to the effect that she can provide him relief quicker by dying on the very same day would have certainly been seen by Veena Rani as an instigation to her to commit suicide
621D 622B 4 No mother however distressed and frustrated would easily make up her mind to leave her young child in the lurch and commit suicide unless she had been goaded to do so by someone close to her 622B C 5 When the evidence is of so compulsive and telling in nature against the accused the High Court it is regretted to say has dealt with the matter in a somewhat superficial manner and acquitted the accused on the basis of imaginary premises
The High Court has failed to comprehend the evi dence in its full conspectus and instead has whittled down the evidence by specious reasoning
624E F 6 As to what constitutes instigation would depend upon the facts of each case
Therefore in order to decide wheth er a person has abetted by instigation the commission of an offence or not the act of abetment has to be judged in the conspectus of the entire evidence in the case
The act of abetment attributed to an accused is not to be viewed or tested in isolation
627A B 7 Such being the case the instigative effect of the words used by the accused must be judged on the basis of the distraught condition to which the accused had driven Veena Rani
627B C 8 In the instant case the abetment of the commission of suicide by Veena Rani is clearly due to instigation and would therefore fail under the first clause of section 107 IPC
626E F 9 The degradation of society due to the pernicious system of dowry and the unconscionable demands made by greedy and unscrupulous husbands and their parents and relatives resulting in an alarming number of suicidal and dowry deaths of women has shocked the Legislative conscience to such an extent that the Legislature has deemed it neces sary to provide additional provisions of law procedural as well as substantive to combat the evil and has consequently introduced Sections 113A and 113B in the Indian Evidence Act and section 498A and 304B in the Indian Penal Code
627E G 615 10 It is not a case where Veena Rani had wanted to commit suicide for reasons of her own and the accused had facilitated her in the commission of suicide as would attract Explanation II to Section 107 IPC
626A Sri Ram vs State of UP  distin guished
11 Taking all factors into consideration including the fact that more than 11 years have elapsed since the High Court acquitted the accused and the accused is now leading a settled life the Court considered the plea of leniency and while restoring the conviction of the accused under section 306 modified the sentence to the period already undergone and enhanced the fine to Rs20000 out of which Rs 18000 were to be given to the father of the deceased for being utilised for the maintenance of Veena Rani s son
628E