section 86 147 and 155 of 1952 under article 32 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus
Petitioners in person in petitions Nos 86 147 and 157 of 1952
Rajani Patel for the petitioner in petition No 155
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India G N Joshi with him for the respondents
R Ganapathi Iyer for the intervener State of Hydera bad
May 26
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J
This petition and three others namely peti tions Nos
147 155 and 157 of 1952 raise issues regarding the vires and applicability to these cases of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Amendment Act 1952
This judg ment is confined to those points and will govern these cases only in so far as they raise those points
The remaining points which do not touch these issues will be dealt with by another Bench
The only exception is a point raised in petition No 155 of 1952 with which the other petitions are not concerned
We will deal with that separately
The present petition No 86 of 1952 was argued very ably and with commendable conciseness by the petitioner in person
The fact that he has not been able to persuade us to his view is not due to any defect in his presentation of the case
The petitioner was arrested on the 15th of November 1951 and an order of detention under the Preventive Deten tion Act of 1950 was served on him the same day and he was given the grounds of detention on the following day the 16th
His case was placed before an Advisory Board and on the 8th of February 1952 the Bombay Government confirmed and continued the detention under section 11 1 of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950
This Act as it originally stood was due to expire on the 1st of April 1951 but in that year an amending 686 Act was passed which among other things prolonged its life to the 1st of April 1952
The order of detention in this case was passed under the Act of 1950 as amended by the Act of 1951
According to past decisions of this Court the detention would have expired on the 1st of April 1952 when the Act of 1950 as amended in 1951 would itself have expired
But a fresh Act was passed in 1952 Act XXXIV of 1952 the Preventive Detention Amendment Act 1952
The effect of this Act was to prolong the life of the Act of 1950 for a further six months namely till the 1st of Octo ber 1952
The question is whether that Act also prolonged the detention and whether it had the vires to do so
It was contended that the mere prolongation of the life of an Act does not by reason of that alone prolong the life of a detention which was due to expire when the Act under which it was made expired
Therefore as the Act under which the present detention was made was due to expire on the 1st of ApriL 1952 the mere prolongation of its life by the amending Act did not affect a prolongation of the detention
Accordingly the petitioner should have been released on the 1st of April 1952 and as there is no fresh order of detention he is entitled to immediate release
We need not express any opinion on that point because there is present in the amending Act something more than a mere prolongation of the life of the old one
There is section a which is in these terms Validity and duration of detention in certain cases Every detention order confirmed under section 11 of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commence ment of this Act shall have effect as if it had been con firmed under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act and accordingly where the period of detention is either not specified in such detention order or specified by whatever form of words to be for the duration or until the expiry of the principal Act or until the 31st day of March 1952 such detention order shall continue to 687 remain in force for so long as the principal Act is in force but without prejudice to the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at any time
 It will be noticed that the concluding part of this section states that the detention order shall remain in force for so long as the principal Act is in force Sec tion 2 of the amending Act defines the principal Act to mean the Act of 1950
Therefore it was argued as the Act of 1950 was due to expire on the 1st of April 1952 the present detention also came to an end on that date and so in the absence of a fresh order of detention the petition er s detention after that date was illegal
This argument though ingenious is fallacious
The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we mast first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction
The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself or a part of itself into the earlier then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed except where that would lead to a repugnancy inconsistency or absurdity as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all
This is the rule in Englandsee Craies on Statute Law 5th edition page 207 it is the law in Amenca see Crawford on Statutory Construc tion page 110 and it is the law which the Privy Council applied to India in Keshoram Poddar vs Nundo Lal Mallick1
Bearing this in mind it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments
Therefore the moment the Act of 1952 was passed and section 2 came into operation the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2 that is to say the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1st of October 1952
11927 54 IA 152 at 155
688 Turning now to section 3 whose vires is questioned and examining it clause by clause we first get these words Every detention order confirmed under section 11 of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act
 According to the rule of construction just examined the words principal Act mean the Act of 1950 as amended by the Acts of 1951 and of 1952 that is to say the Act of 1950 due to expire on the 1st of October 1952
Incidental ly in the particular context it could not mean the Act of 1950 as it stood in 1950 because no order confirmed under it as it then stood could have been alive at the commencement of this Act namely on the 15th of March 1952
The section contin ues shall have effect as if it had been confirmed under the provisions of the principal Act as amended  by this Act
 The underlined words as amended by this Act were relied on to show that wherever the words the principal Act were referred to they meant the unamended original Act of 1950 otherwise these words would have been unnecessary
In our opinion they were unnecessary in the sense that their absence would not have made any difference to the interpretation though it would have made the section harder to follow and understand
We say that for this reason
Without the underlined words the section paraphrased would read Every detention order confirmed under the original Act shall have effect as if confirmed under its provisions
 If this were to be read literally it would lead to an absurdity for if the order is actually confirmed under the original unamended Act it would be pointless to introduce a fiction and say that the order shall be deemed to be con firmed under that Act as unamended
But even apart from a strictly technical construction the language of the section is accurate because as we 689 have said the rule is that an amended Act must be read as if the words of amendment had been written into the Act except where that would lead to an inconsistency and this would be one of those cases unless the words are construed in a sensible and commonsense way
The draughtsman there fore had either to leave the words as they were with an apparent inconsistency or make his meaning clear by adding the words he did
But we do not think the addition made any difference to the result
We now turn to the second half of section 3 that is to say to the words following the semi coon
It is important to note here that this part is consequential on the first and merely explains the effect of the first half
It is also relevant to note that it deals with four different kinds of orders different that is to say in the form of the words used though in the end they all come to the same thing
It deals with the following kinds of order 1 an order in which the period of detention is not specified at all in that event the detention would end at midnight on the night of the gist of March 1952
It is clear that in this context the words the principal Act cannot mean the Act expiring on the 1st of October 1952 because it envisages an order made before the Act of 1952 was in being and so on the date of its making the order could only refer to the Act then in being 2 an order in which the period is stated to be for the duration of the principal Act that is to say till the 31st of March 1952  3 an order in which the period is specified to be until the expiry of the principal Act which again brings us back to the 31st of March 1952 as the last day of deten tion 4 an order in which the period is specified to be till the 31st of March 1952
In all these four cases the section says that the detention order shall continue to remain in force for so long as the principal Act is in force that  is to say till the 1st October 1952
690 That follows from the first part of the section because that is the meaning which the law directs shall be placed on these words unless the context otherwise directs and the context does not direct otherwise here
This part of the section is only explanatory
But we wish to found deeper than this
It is the duty of Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used that is to say if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section and even the same sentence have to be construed differently
Indeed the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided
See the speech of Lord Wens leydale in Grey vs Pearson 1 quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Narayana Swami vs Emperor 2 also Salmon vs Duncombe3
The rule is also set out in the text books See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 9th edition page 236 and Craies on Statute Law 5th edition pages 89 to 93
The meaning of section 3 is quite plain and only desperate hair splitting can reduce it to an absurdity
Courts should not be astute to defeat the provisions of an Act whose meaning is on the face of it reasonably plain
Of course this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be recast
It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for out of the words actually used
We hold that there is no difficulty of construction
It was next argued that in any event the extended deten tion became a fresh detention because of the Act of 1952 from the date the Act came into force and reliance was placed upon the judgments of two of us Mahajan and Das JJ
in section Krishnan vs The State of Madras4
It is enough to say that was not the 1 r at 106
3 11 App
627 at 634
2 AIR 1939 PC 47
4  at 635 and 640
691 decision of the Court in that case and further that the two Judges who held it was a fresh detention nevertheless considered that a fresh order with its concomitant fresh grounds and a fresh reference to the Advisory Board were not required therefore either way the petitioner must fail
Reference was made to the equality clause in article 14 of the Constitution but that argument is easily met because the classification which section 3 makes is reasonable
In one class it places all those whose cases have already been considered by the Advisory Board and in the other those whose cases have yet to go before it also the law is fair or at any rate as fair as detention laws can be despite this distinction because power is left to the appropriate Government to revoke or modify these orders or any of them at any time
Substantially therefore there is no differenti ation
Article 14 was considered at length in The Slate of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar 1 and according to the law laid down there the Court must be satisfied on two points before it can strike at a law on the ground of unlawful discrimination
It must be satis fied 1 that the law in fact discriminates and 2 that such discrimination is not permissible on the principle of a rational classification made for the purposes of the legislation
The argument here was that section a discriminated against those detenus whose cases had been referred to the Advisory Board and whose detention was confirmed on the strength of its report under section 11 1 before the amending Act of 1952 was passed
The reason given was that these detentions are automatically extended up to the 1st of October 1952 by section 3 without further reference to an Advisory Board whereas in other cases that is to say in the case of those who were detained before the amending Act but whose cases had not been referred at the date it came into force and in the case of those detained after the 11952 ScR284 692 amending Act the Advisory Board is called into play and individual attention is given to each case with the result that many of those detentions might not be for as long as six months
They might for example be only for one month or two
It was urged that this was discrimination of a kind which cannot be supported by any principle of permissible classification because classification into the above catego ries has no reasonable relation to the objects of the legis lation such as security of the State maintenance of public order and so forth
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning
To say that section
3 automatically extends the detention of persons in the petitioner s position to the 1st of October 1952 and stops there is only to make a partial statement of the effect of section 3 because the extension is subject to the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at any time
In other words the automatic con tinuation of the detention till the 1st of October is not absolute and irrevocable but is made dependent on the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at its discretion under section 13 of the Act
The State may or may not continue the detention for the whole of the extended period
In both classes of cases the duration the deten tion within the overall limit of the life of the Act is left to the discretion of the State
The only difference is that in the one class of cases the discretion is exercised after the period has been extended by the amending Act in the other the appropriate Government fixes the period itself in its discretion and can again at its discretion revoke or modify it
In both cases the substance of the law is that the period of detention is left to the discretion of the State and so there is no substantial discrimination
It was argued that however fair this may look on paper in practice there will be grave discrimination because as a matter of fact the State will not apply its mind in the majority of cases like the petitioner section That is an argument we cannot accept and no material Was placed before us t0 justify such a conclusion 693 We turn now to the next point
It was contended that sec tion 3 offends the Constitution because article 22 4 and 7 do not envisage the direct intervention of Parliament in a whole batch of cases
The protection guaranteed is that there shall be individual attention and consideration to each separate case by some duly specified and constituted authority
In our opinion this is not accurate
Article 22 4 guarantees that there shall be no preven tive detention for more than three months unless the law authorising it makes provision for an Advisory Board and the Board after considering each individual case separately reports that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention
To that extent there must be individual consideration of each case but once the report is made and is unfavourable to the detenu then the detention can be for a longer period provided it does not exceed the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub clause b of clause 7
 Sub clause b of clause 7 empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may in any class or    of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive deten tion
 Parliament is accordingly empowered to specify a class
It has done so
The class is all persons whose cases have already been considered by an Advisory Board
It is empowered to prescribe a maximum period
That also it has done
The extended detention that is to say for more than three months can then be under any law providing for preventive detention
 A law made by Parliament falls within these words
Parliament is equally authorised to say who shall determine the period of detention and as there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent it can itself exer cise the authority it is empowered to delegate to others
Stress was laid on the words any person in subclause b of clause 7 and it was contended that this contem plates individual attention in each case
But 694 if that is so then it means that Parliament must itself direct the maximum period for each separate person falling within the class individually
The words are we think reasonably plain and we hold that Parliament can prescribe the maximum for a class taken as a whole as it has done in section 3
It was next argued that once the power given under clause 7 to fix a maximum period has been exercised the power exhausts itself and cannot be exercised again in respect of the same detention
In our opinion no such limitation is imposed upon Parliament by the Constitution
Then it was said that section 3 stands on a footing different from section 12 of the amending Act of 1951 as it introduces the idea of potentially indefinite detention and accordingly is repugnant to the Constitution and in any event is a fraud upon it
In so far as this means that section a fixes no time limit the contention is unsound because the section specifies the exact period of the deten tion namely till the expiry of the Act of 1950 that is to say till the 1st of October 1952
In so far as it means that Parliament is enabled to continue detentions indefi nitely by the expedient of periodic amendments in the Act of 1950 the answer is that Parliament has the power
This was precisely the power exercised in the amending Act of 1951 and upheld by this Court in section Krishnan vs The State of Madras1
The present Act is no different from that in this respect
So far we have dealt with the facts in petition No 86 of 1952
The facts in the other three petitions naturally differ in their details but they all conform to the same general pattern so far as the points discussed above are concerned so there is no need to discuss them individually
We hold that section 3 of the amending Act of 1952 is intra vires and that the detentions are not bad on any of the grounds discussed above
The rest of the points raised in each individual case are left open except for one point which 1  695 arises in petition No 155 of 1952
That point is as fol lows
The first ground of detention given to the petitioner in this case reads Being the President of Jamat of Agris you have used your position as such to increase your influence over the residents of Uran Peta have created a band of obedient and trusted associates have inflicted heavy fines on villagers in Uran Peta who have disregarded your wishes and have imposed on them boycott or excommunication in cases of their refusal to pay the fines
 It was argued that at the very outset these allegations import nothing more than an exercise of functions such as the infliction of fines and excommunication which the peti tioner as head of the caste had authority to do
They do not touch any of the matters covered by section 3 1 a of the  under which the petitioner is detained
For example they do not touch the security of the State or the maintenance of public order or any of the other matters specified in section 3
They are therefore irrelevant to the detention and as it is impossible to say how far these irrelevant matters influenced the detention the petitioner is entitled to release
Reliance was placed upon certain observations of the Federal Court in Rex vs Basudev1
We think it unnecessary to examine this point because we do not think the ground is irrelevant nor do we agree that it means what the petitioner says
In our opinion the grounds of detention must be regarded as a whole and when that is done the relevance of the first ground becomes plain
The gravamen of the charge against the petitioner is that he aimed at setting up a parallel government in the Uran Peta area and that in order to achieve that end he did various acts such as intimidating the workers in the salt pans with threats of murder and his own workers with threats of death unless they carried out his 1 at 651
696 orders and among the lesser instances given to illustrate the exercise of parallel governmental authority are the ones set out in the first ground namely the infliction of fines with the sanction of excommunication and boycott to ensure their payment and due obedience to his orders
This point has no force and is decided against the petitioner
It will not be open to him to re agitate this afresh when his case is reheard on the remaining issues
All the four cases will now be set down for hearing on the remaining points which arise in them
As they do not involve constitutional issues they need not go before a Constitution Bench
Agent for the petitioner in Petition No 155 MSK Sastri for PG Gokhale
Agent for the respondents and IntervenerP A Mehta


Summary:
By a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 the State of Bombay now Maharashtra sought to acquire certain lands including those of the petitioner which were likely to be needed by a company manufacturing steel bars and rods for its factory and buildings and appointed a Special Land Acquisition Officer to function as a Collector under section 5A of the Act
The petitioner by an objection filed before the said officer denied that the lands were required for a public purpose and prayed that the proceedings be quashed
By his petition to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner challenged the legality of the notification under section 4 of the Act on the ground that it did not in terms say that the acquisition was for a public purpose and that the acquisition proceedings infringed articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution
Held that it is not essential that a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 should expressly state that 129 the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose
Where the land is required for a company the requirement of the law will be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government is satisfied on a report under section 5A2 or by an enquiry under section 40 of the Act that the purpose of the acquisition is the same as contemplated by section 40 of the Act
It is apparent from the definitions of the expressions com pany  and public purpose  contained in section 3 of the Act that the former is used in a very comprehensive sense and the latter is used in its generic sense including any purpose which may benefit even a fraction of the community and such purposes as are mentioned in section 40 of the Act must fall within its ambit
State of Bombay vs Bhanji Munji 1955 1 SCR 777 referred to
A notification under section 4 of the Act envisages a preliminary investigation and it is only under section 6 that the Government makes a firm declaration
It is not therefore correct to say that a defect in the notification can be fatal to the acquisition proceedings and particularly where the acquisition is for a company and investigation has to be made under section 5A or section 40 after the issue of the notification
In this view of the matter the present application must be premature
Clause 6 of the article 31 has obviously no application to the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and so it is saved by article 315a of the Constitution even if it contemplates acquisition for a company which may or may not be for a public purpose
Lilavati Bai vs State of Bombay   referred to
The attack under article 19if of the Constitution must also fail in view of the decision of this Court in State of Bombay vs Bhanji Munji 1955 1 SCR 777