Appeal No 1460 of 1969
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 16 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No 31 of 1966
ST Desai M H Chhatrapati P N Tiwari and O C Mathur for the appellants
D Y Patel and I N Shroff for respondents Nos 1 and 3
R H Dhebar B Datta and section P Nayar for respondent No 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava J
The predecessors in interest of plaintiff respondents 1 to 3 gave in 1895 land bearing Serial Nos 503 and 506 of Asarva within the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on lease for a period of 49 years at an annual rent of Rs 199  to three persons Shri Ramchandra Ambaram Pardesi Sukhlal Anandram and Mehta Bogha Mugatram
These original lessees during the currency of the lease made transfers of their rights and also granted sub leases
A number of chawls and some other buildings were constructed on the land and some of them were let out on rent
In 1945 the lessors after serving notice on the occupants to give vacant possession filed a suit for recovery of possession
The suit was decreed on 8th July 1946 on the basis of a consent decree as against some of the occupants including the four defendant appellants
In the agreement on the basis of which the decree was passed it was agreed that the defendant appellants will continue in possession of the property for a period of five years and will hand over possession after the expiry of this period of five years
For this period they undertook to pay mesne profits every month at various rates on the lands in their possession
Between them the four appellants were required to pay  Rs 227 10 0 per mensem making up an annual amount of mesne profits of Rs 2731 8 0
Similar terms were included 173 in the consent decree against other defendants who joined the compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed on 8th July 1946
The remaining defendants in the suit entered into a later compromise and as a result another consent decree was passed on  28th January 1949 against those defendants
Under this decree these remaining defendants were also entitled to continue in possession for a period of five years from the date of the decree but were required to pay mesne profits for this period
All the defendants governed by the two decrees dated 8th July 1946 and28th January 1949 had to pay between them mesne profits monthly which worked out to an amount of Rs 7314 8 0 per annum
Before the expiry of the period of five years prescribed by either of the two decrees the Custodian of Evacuee Property in 1950 took possession of all the properties as one of the decreeholders had become an evacuee
After the property was released by the Custodian of Evacuee Property an application was filed by the decree holders on 26th March 1953 for execution of the consent decree dated 8th July 1946 and in that execution possession was sought against the appellants of the property which was in their possession
Subsequently a number of suits were filed for recovery of mesne profits also
The Execution Court directed eviction of the appellants after over ruling the various objections  raised by them in the execution proceedings
The decision of the Execution Court on the objections taken by the appellants was challenged in appeal before the District Judge in second appeal before a single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat and by a Letters Patent appeal before a Division Bench
All the Courts rejected the objectic raised by the appellants and upheld the order of the Execution Court directing delivery of possession
It is against the judgment of the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeal in this execution that the appellants have come up to this Court in this appeal by special leave
It is unnecessary for us to mention all the various objections that were taken at various stages by the appellants in the Execution Court in the Court of the District Judge or before the single Judge or the Division Bench in the High Court
Only three of the points raised have been urged before us and therefore we are called upon to deal with these three points only
The first point raised is that the decree which was passed on 8th July 1946 was a nullity because it was passed in contravention of section 11  1  of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act No XVI of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act
This objection has been over ruled by the High Court on the ground that the provisions of the Act were not attracted by the lease in question on the expiry of which the suit for ejectment was decreed under the 174 consent decree dated 8th July 1946
Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that the terms of the decree passed as well as the terms contained in the lease deed of 1895 show that the Act was applicable because the land to which the suit for ejectment related was covered by the definition of premises to which the Act applies
The expression premises is defined in section 42 of the Act as meaning a any building or part of a building let separately for any purpose whatever including any land let therewith or b any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade
Admittedly the lease of 1895 was not in respect of any building or part of a building let separately for any purpose whatever
Reliance was placed on section 4 2 b of the Act on the contention that the land had been let for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade
Having gone through the documents relied upon by counsel for the appellants we are unable to accept this submission
In the plaint of the suit as well as in the decree dated 8th July 1946 there is no mention of the purpose for which the land was let out by the lease of 1895
Reliance was however placed on one of the pleadings in the plaint which had been reproduced in the decree in which the plaintiff respondents recited one of the terms of the lease in the following words  On the expiry of the period of 49 years the land shall be handed over without raising any dispute or objection or causing any obstruction after removing whatever structures that might have been erected thereon and after making it as clear as it is The argument was that this pleading indicates that the land was let out for making structures and those structures could only be utilised by being let out on rent
This purpose would constitute business or trade
We are unable to see any justification for such an inference
The mere fact that there was a mention that structures that might have been erected will be removed can in no way lead to a reasonable conclusion that the principal purpose of the lease was the use of the land for business or trade
Reference in this connection was also made to the terms of the lease of 1895 but we are unable to hold that it establishes the case of the appellants that the lease was taken principally for the purpose of using the land for business or trade
All that the lease mentions is that it is for constructing houses and at a later stage 175 there is a mention that in the said fields the lessees could construct houses in any manner or use it in any manner
 The other parts of the lease on which reliance has been placed are as follows  1On the land of those fields we can build houses in any manner and we will receive income thereof and you will not raise any dispute or obstruction in respect thereof
We can spend any amount on the construction of those houses which we will not demand from you for whatever reason nor we will have the right to deduct from rent payable to you
2If any houses are constructed thereon we will remove the superstructures
If we do not remove the structures then you will be the owners of the said structures
If you take them then we and our heirs and representatives will not object
 We are unable to find even in these quotations from the lease any mention that the land is going to be used principally for the purpose of business or trade
The lease does mention that it was being taken for constructing houses Mere was no mention at all however of the manner in which the constructed houses were to be utilised
Further there is a clear option given to the lessees that they could us  the land in any manner if they did not construct any houses
These are terms on the basis of which it cannot be said that the land was being let out for business purposes
The submission of counsel for the appellants was that if the purpose was to construct houses and let them out on rent that would constitute the use of the land for the purpose of business inasmuch as the lessees would be earning income from letting out those houses
We are unable to accept this submission because we do not think that the word business  or trade used in the definition of premises in section 4 2 b of the Act comprehends within it a lease which is merely for constructing houses
Learned counsel cited before us a number of decisions of Indian and English Courts including decisions of the Privy Council and this Court in which the scope of the word business was interpreted
That interpretation was given in connection with the word business as used either in income tax law or in the terms of a covenant or the Companies Act etc
We do not consider that it will be at all profitable to refer to them when interpreting the word business or trade as used in section 42 b of the Act because none of those interpretations will cover a case similar to the one before us where the lease was merely a permissive one giving a right to the lessees to construct houses and let them out or to use the land in any manner
When the purpose of the lease 176 was expressed in this way it is impossible to hold that the principal use to which the land was to be put by the lessees was business or trade
As a consequence of this interpretation it has to be held that the Act was not applicable to the lease of 1895 and therefore no question arises of the decree of 8th July 1946 being invalid on the ground of contravening section 11  1  of the Act
The second point urged by learned counsel was that by the consent decree itself a new tenancy was created which was to continue for five years and in the meantime the Bombay Rents Hotel  Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 came into force and the appellants were protected from ejectment under the provisions of that Act
The consent decree does not state that a new tenancy is being created
The argument was that the terms of that consent decree should be interpreted as indicating an intention to create a new tenancy  We are unable to find any such terms
On the face of it all that the consent decree envisaged was that though the judgment debtors were liable to immediate eviction the decree holders agreed to let them continue in possession for a period of five years
Since this concession was being granted as a special case the decree holders insisted that mesne profits should be paid at a much higher rate so much so that between all the defendants governed by the two decrees of 8th July 1946 and 28th January 1949 the amount payable as mesne profits became Rs 7314 8 0 per annum which had no relation with the original rent of Rs 199 per annum for the entire land fixed by the lease of 1895 In fact the decree holders sought further protection by requiring the judgment debtors to pay the mesne profits in monthly instalments and the instalments were so fixed that the mesne profits due for five years were to be paid within a period of three years
There was the further clause that in case of default of payment of the mesne profits the defaulting judgment debtors could be immediately called upon to deliver possession
These terms can in no way be interpreted as creating a new tenancy constituting the decree holders as landlords and the judgmentdebtors as their tenants
The terms of the consent decree neither constituted a tenancy nor a licence
All that the decree holders did was to allow the judgment debtors to continue in possession for five years on payment of mesne profits as a concession for entering into a compromise
The argument advanced must therefore be rejected
Reference was made by learned counsel for the appellants in support of his argument to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Gurupadappa Shivlingappa Itgi vs Sayad Akbar Sayad Budan Kadri1 but that case in our opinion has no application
In 1 52 BLR 143 177 that case in the consent decree itself the first clause was that the defendant admits that he is a monthly tenant of the plaintiff and is to continue in possession till January 31 1948
This clause specifically and clearly in the language used made it manifest that the defendant was a monthly tenant and was to continue in that capacity in possession
It was in these circumstances that it was held that a new tenancy had been created from the date of the consent decree
In the case before us the terms of the consent decree are in no way comparable with the terms used in the consent decree in that case
The language used in the consent decree in the present case contains no indication of any intention to create a tenancy so that the Bombay Rent Control Act
1947 could never apply to the case of the appellants
The third point raised by learned counsel was that since there was one single suit based on the lease of 1895 for ejectment of persons in possession there could be only one single decree in that suit and the Court was incompetent to pass two separate decrees on 8th July 1946 and 28th January 1949
Counsel in this connection relied on the provisions of rules 1 and 12 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure which relate to the pronouncement of judgment and the Court passing a decree in a suit
These rules have really no relevance
On the other hand rule 3 of Order XXIII CPC clearly envisages a decree being passed in respect of part of the subject matter of the suit on a compromise and rule 6 of Order XII CPC permits the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions
Thus it is clear that in the same suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages
In the present case the first decree of 8th July 1946 was based on a compromise between the plaintiffs and some of the defendants while the second decree dated 28th January 1949 decided the rights of the remaining defendants
Th  two decrees were separate and independent and neither of them could be treated as a nullity
In these circumstances the Execution Court was right in re jecting all the objections raised by the appellants and in directing delivery of possession
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
VPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The predecessors in interest of the respondents leased certain land at an annual rent of Rs 199 in 1895 for 49 years
The lease was a permissive one and gave right to the lessees to construct houses and let them out or to use the land in any manner
The original lessees during the currency of the lease made transfers of their rights and also granted sub leases
A number of chawls and other buildings were constructed on the land and were let out
The respondents terminated the lease and sued for recovery of possession in 1945
A compromise was entered into with the appellants who were some of the occupants and a consent decree was passed on 8th July 1946
Another consent decree was passed against the remaining defendants on 28th January 1949
Under the two decrees the defendants were allowed to remain in possession for 5 years from the dates of the respective decrees and they bad also to pay monthly mesne profits which worked out to more than Rs 7000 per annum and that amount was so fixed that the mesne profits due for the 5 years were to be paid in 3 years
There was also a clause that in case of default the defaulting judgment debtors could be immediately called upon to deliver possession In 1953 the respondents sought possession by executing the consent decree dated 8th July 1946
On the questions  1 Whether the decree contravened the provisions of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act 1939 as the leased land was premises  within the meaning of section 42b of that Act 2 whether the consent decree created a new tenancy which was protected by the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 and 3 whether the passing of two separate decrees was illegal as the court was not competent to do so
HELD  1 Premises  is defined in section 42 b as any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade
The words business or trade  do not comprehend a lease which is merely for constructing houses
The terms of the lease in the present case do not establish that the lease was taken principally for using the land for business or trade  174 C D  175 G H The mere fact that there was a mention in the pleadings that any structure that might have been erected would have to be removed would in no way lead to the conclusion that the principal purpose of the lease was to build structures and that the structures should be utilised for being let out on rent and thus constitute business or trade
Therefore tile decree did not contravene the provisions of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act
174 F G 175 D E 176 A 172 2On the face of it all that the consent decree envisaged was that though the judgment debtors were liable to immediate eviction the decree holders agreed to let them continue in possession for a period of 5 years and since the concession was granted as a special case the decree holders insisted on payment of mesne profits at a much higher rate
The terms of the consent decree could in no way be interpreted as creating a new tenancy constituting the decree holders as landlords and the judgment debtors as their tenants
176 C E F G 3Order 23 r 3 and 0 12 r 6 of the Civil Procedure Code envisage that in the same suit there can be more than one decree passed at different stages 177 D F