Appeal No 83 of 1956
Appeal from the judgment and order dated June 30 1954 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Order No 255 of 1952
Lal Narayan Sinha and section P Varma for the appellant
A V Viswanatha Sastri B K Saran D P Singh and K L Mehta for the respondent
September 20
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J
The State of Bihar is the appellant in this appeal which comes before us on a certificate granted by the High Court of Patna under article 1331 c of the Constitution
The principal point of law raised for decision in the appeal is whether a State is liable to be proceeded against under 0 39 r 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure when it wilfully disobeys an order of temporary injunction passed of nomine against it
There is little controversy regarding the facts but they have to be set out to appreciate some of the matters debated before US
730 The Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 which we shall refer to as the Act which provided for the transference to the State of the interests of proprietors and tenure holders in estates within the State received the assent of the President on September 11 1950 and was published in the Bihar Gazette on September 25 1950
Thereupon Rani Sonabati Kumari the respondent who was the proprietress of the Ghatwali Estate of Handwa situated within the State instituted against the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Dumka on the 20th November 1950 Title Suit 40 of 1950 inter alia for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires of the Bihar Legislature and was therefore  illegal void unconstitutional and inoperative  and that the defendant had  no right to issue any notification under the said Act or to take possession or otherwise meddle or interfere with the management of the estate in suit  and for a permanent injunction  restraining the defendant its officers servants employees and agents from issuing any notification under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act in respect of the plaintiff s estate  and also  from taking possession of the said estate and from meddling or interfering in any way with the management thereof 
Along with the plaint the respondent filed a petition for a temporary injunction in which the prayer ran  It is therefore prayed that a temporary injunction be issued against the defendant its officers employees servants or agents restraining them from issuing any notification with regard to the plaintiff s estate under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 Act XXX of 1950 and from meddling or interfering with the possession of the plaintiff to the properties in suit till the disposal of this suit 
The Court issued an ex parte ad interim injunction presumably in terms of the prayer in the petition and directed notice of the petition to be served on the State of Bihar who filed their counter affidavit on December 9 1950 opposing the grant of any interim injunction and praying that the petition be dismissed 731 with costs
The petition was heard in the presence of both the parties on March 19 1951 and the Subordinate Judge made the ad interim injunction absolute and the order went on to add  and it is ordered that the defendant shall not issue any notification for taking over possession of the suit properties under the Land Reforms Act and shall not interfere with or disturb in any manner the plaintiffs possession over these properties under any of the provision of the aforesaid Act until this suit is finally disposed of by this Court 
The order was appealable under 0 43 r 1 r of the Code but the State preferred no appeal and so it became final
On May 17 1952 an application was filed by the State for vacating the order on the ground that the validity of the Act had been upheld by this Court in another case involving the same points and that thereafter the plaintiff had no prima facie case to sustain the injunction
Before however this application invoking the powers of the Court under 0
39 r 4 of the Code came on for hearing it was actually heard on May 30 1952 when it reserved it for orders to be pronounced on June 2 1952 the State of Bihar issued on May 19 1952 a notification under section 31 of the Act declaring that the Handwa Raj Estate belonging to the respondent had passed to and became vested in the State under the provisions of the Act
The notification ran In exercise of the powers conferred by sub
section 1 of section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 Bihar Act XXX of 1950 the Governor of Bihar is pleased to declare that the Estates described in the First Schedule and the tenures described in the Second Schedule hereto annexed belonging to the proprietor and the tenure holder named in the respective schedules have with effect from the date of the publication of this notification in the Bihar Gazette passed to and became vested in the State under the provisions of this Act 
The Handwa Raj Estate with the name of the respondent as the tenure holder was specified in the Second Schedule
732 This was followed by an authentication in these terms By order of the Governor of Bihar K K Mitra Additional Secretary to Government
 On coming to know of this notification the respondent moved the Subordinate Judge on June 2 1952 for taking action against the defendant in the suit for contempt under 0 39 r 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure
When notice of this petition was served on the State it submitted an answer in these terms That in obedience to the said order the defendant begs to submit that in view of the Article 31B of the Constitution the aforesaid Notification dated 19 5 52 and published in Bihar Gazette dated 21552 is valid legal and authorised and the publication of the same does not constitute contempt of court
 The only matter here set out viz that the constitutional validity of the Act had been affirmed by an amendment of the Constitution could obviously afford no defence to the breach of an injunction order and indeed this was not sought
to be supported before us
The learned Subordinate Judge passed an order on July 31 1952 which ran  that in view of the notification constituting a breach of the injunction the property of the defendant State of Bihar shall be attached to the value of Rs 5000
The plaintiff is directed to file the list of properties of this value and necessary requisites for issue of the attachment with in seven days of this order
 From this order the State preferred an appeal to the High Court
The appeal was however dismissed by the High Court by judgment rendered on June 30 1954 and by reason of a certificate granted by the learned Judges under article 1331c the State has preferred this appeal
The arguments addressed to us by Mr Lal Narayan Sinha who appeared for the appellant State when closely analysed resolved themselves into five points 733 1 That the order of the Subordinate Judge dated March 19 1951 did not on its  plain language interdict the issue of a notification under section 31 of the Act but merely directed the State not to disturb the possession of the plaintiff
It was common ground that beyond the issue of the notification neither the State nor its officers or servants had done anything by way of interfering with the possession of the plaintiff
2 That at the worst the order of the Subordinate Judge having regard to the language employed was reasonably capable of two interpretations a that the direction to the State included a prohibition against issuing a notification under section 31 and b that there was no interdiction against notifications under section 31 but only against notifications which directly involved or authorised interference with the plaintiff s possession of her Estate
Proceedings for contempt even for the enforcement of orders of Civil Courts being quasi punitive in their nature it was urged that a party who bona fide conducted himself on the basis of one of two possible interpretations could not be held guilty of contempt
3 That the rule that the Crown or the State could not be proceeded against for a tort or wrong doing applied to the present case since disobedience of an order of injunction is virtually a wrong for which 0 39 r 23 provides the punishment or compensation
4 That a State is not bound by a Statute unless it is named therein expressly or by necessary implication and as there is no mention of a State in specific terms in 0 39 r 23 a State cannot as such be proceeded against for disobedience of an order of Court
5 Even if a State could be proceeded against for willful disobedience of an order the publication of the notification under section 31 which was the contempt alleged was not proved with certainty to be an act of the State Government and that in the absence of a definite proof of this fact the liability of the State could not arise  and that if the notification dated May 19 1952 constituted the act of disobedience 734 then only the Additional Secretary Mr K K Mitra who authenticated the notification could if at all be made liable
It would be convenient to deal with these matters in that order
The first point urged was that the order of the Subordinate Judge dated March 19 1951 did not in terms or in substance prohibit the State from issuing a notification under section 31
Section 31 of the Act runs  The State Government may from time to time by notification declare that the estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure holder specified in the notification have passed to and become vested in the State
 It was urged that the Subordinate Judge by his order directed the State  not to issue any notification for taking possession  and as the notification under section 31 does not proprio vigore affect or interfere with the possession of the proprietor or tenure holder the issue of such a notification was not within the prohibition
The same argument was addressed to the High Court and was repelled by the learned Judges and in our opinion correctly
In the first place the only notification contemplated by the provisions of the Act immediately relevant to the suit was a notification under section 31
Such a notification has the statutory effect of divesting the owner of the notified estate of his or her title to the property and of trans ferring it to and vesting it in the State
The State is enabled to take possession of the estate and the properties comprised in it by acting under section 4 but the latter provision does not contemplate any notification only executive acts by authorized officers of the State
Of course if action had been taken under section 4 and the possession of the respondent had been interfered with there would have been a further breach of the order which directed the State
not to interfere with or disturb in any manner the plaintiff s possession
What we desire to point out is that the order of the Court really consisted of two parts the earlier directed against the defendant publishing a notification which in the context of the relevant statutory 735 provisions could only mean a notification under section 31 and that which followed against interfering with the plaintiff s possession and the fact that the second part of the order was not contravened is no ground for holding that there had been no breach of the first part
In the next place the matter is put beyond the pale of controversy if the order were read as it has to be read in conjunction with the plaint and the application for a temporary injunction
Mr Sinha did not seriously contend that if the order of the Court were understood in the light of the allegations and prayers in these two documents the reference to the  notification  in it was only to one under section 31 of the Act and that the injunction therefore was meant to cover and covered such a notification
We therefore hold that this objection must fail
2 The second contention urged was that even if on a proper construction of the order read in the light of the relevant pleadings the State Government was directed to abstain from publishing a notification under section 31 of the Act still if the order was ambiguious and equivocal and reasonably capable of two interpretations a party who acted on the basis of one of such interpretations could not be held to have wilfully disobeyed the order
Stated in these terms the contention appears unexceptionable
For its being accepted in any particular case however two conditions have to be satisfied 1 that the order was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation 2 that the party being proceeded against in fact did not intend to disobey the order but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order
We are clearly of the view that the case before us does not satisfy either condition
In dealing with the first contention urged by learned Counsel we have pointed out the true construction of the order and in our opinion that is the only construction which it could reasonably bear
But this apart even if the order was equivocal as learned Counsel puts it still it is of no avail to the appellant unless the State Government understood it 94 736 in the sense that the order was confined to acts by which the possession of the plaintiff was directly interfered with and the notification was issued on that understanding and belief
There are two pieces of conduct on the part of the State Government which are wholly inconsistent with the theory that the order was understood by them as learned Counsel suggested
The first is that before the notification under section 31 was issued they applied to the Court to vacate the order of injunction so that they might issue notification and it was during the pendency of this application that the notification was issued without waiting for the orders of the Court on their petition
The second is even more significant
When notice was issued to the defendant to show cause why it should not be committed for contempt one would naturally expect if the point urged has any validity the defence to be based on a denial of disobedience by reference to the sense in which the order was understood
We have already extracted the relevant paragraph of the counter affidavit and in this there is no trace of the plea now put forward
Even in the memorandum of appeal to the High Court against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge under 0 39 r 23 there is no indication of the contention now urged and though a faint suggestion of inadvertence on the part of some officer appears to have been put forward during the stage of argument before the High Court the point in this form was not urged before the learned Judges of the High Court as seen from the judgment
The question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner and has conducted himself in accordance with such a construction is primarily one of fact and where the materials before the Court do not support such a state of affairs the Court cannot attribute an innocent intention based on presumptions for the only reason that ingenuity of Counsel can discover equivocation in the order which is the subject of enforcement
The argu ment being in effect that a party who had bona fide misconstrued the order and acted on that basis could not be held to have wailfully and deliberately disobeyed 737 the order such a plea could obviously be urged only when it is proved that a party was in fact under a misapprehension as to the scope of the order but this was never the plea of the Government right up to the stage of the hearing before the High Court
Besides if the case of the State was that acting bona fide it had committed an error in construing the order one would expect an expression of regret for the unintentional wrong but even a trace of contrition is singular lacking at any stage of the proceedings
We are clearly of the opinion that there is no factual basis for sustaining the second ground urged by learned Counsel
3 Turning to the next point urged learned Counsel amplified it in these terms
No doubt having regard to article 300 of the Constitution which practically reproduces the earlier statutory provisions in that behalf going back to 1858 States are not immune from liability to be sued
Learned Counsel added that he would not dispute that Title Suit 40 of 1950 was properly laid and that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain it as also jurisdiction to pass the order of temporary injunction against the defendant State pending
the decision of the suit
But learned Counsel urged that it did not automatically follow that the State was amenable to proceedings for disobedience of the injunction
Proceedings for contempt even for enforcing an order of a Civil Court he submitted were really a punishment for wrong doing and in essence therefore quasi criminal
For this reason he contended that article 300 which permitted suits to be filed against the Union and the States could not be held to authorise proceedings of such a quasi criminal nature and that as a result the Common Law rules that the King could do no wrong and that the Crown could not be sued for a tort were attracted
In this connection learned Counsel invited our attention to the decisions in District Board of Bhagalpur vs Province of Bihar1 and Tarafatullah vs section N Maitra 2
In the first of these cases a large number of English and Indian decisions on the liability of the Crown in 1 AIR 1954 Pat 529
2 AIR 1952 Cal
919 927
738 tort were discussed
The question for consideration before the learned Judges was whether the suit before the Court against the Government could be legally maintainable and as to the scope and limits of the rule respondent superior in such actions against the State but both these matters are far removed from the pale of the controversy before us
In regard to the other ruling of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court learned Counsel relied not so much on the decision itself but on the following observations of Mukerji J 1  A State as such cannot be said to commit contempt
In the case of the State the allegation must be against a particular officer or officers of the State
Where as in this case an order was obtained against the State
in a civil proceeding restraining certain acts of the State and it is alleged by the complainant or the petitioner that there has been a contempt by breach of that order the petitioner for contempt will have to take out the Rule for contempt against the particular officer or officers who has or have disobeyed that order
In such a petition for contempt the Rule must be asked against an individual and not against the State
Article 300 of the Constitution of India provides for proceedings by way of suit against the State or the Union of India and cannot be extended to apply to contempt proceedings 
In order however to appreciate the observations it is necessary to consider briefly the facts of the case
The decision was concerned with an application to commit the respondents for contempt for disobedience to an order of ad interim injunction granted by a single Judge of the High Court on a petition for the issue of a writ of Certiorari under article 226 of the Constitution
No doubt the order of temporary injunction was issued against the Government but the disobedience complained of was not any act of the Government as such but of certain officers
Not with
standing this the Secretary to Government who had been formally impleaded as representing the Government was sought to be proceeded against personally 1 AIR 1952 Cal
927 739 for contempt and the prayer being that he as representing the Government should be committed to prison
As Chakravartti C J pertinently pointed out a more ridiculous prayer could not be imagined
The learned Judges further found that as a fact no disobedience of the order had been proved
The question therefore whether the Government could be liable to be proceeded against for contempt for disobedience of an order which a Court has jurisdiction to pass and which bound the Government the act constituting the contempt being unmistakably an act for which Government could not as such disclaim responsibility did not arise for consideration in that case
Having regard to the findings of fact reached by the Court the observations regarding the scope of the liability of Government were wholly orbiter
In regard to the passage relied on we need only say that observations about the ambit of article 300 of the Constitution are too widely expressed and do not take into account the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 0
21 r 32  0
21 r 3923 which directly bear on the matter and which we shall discuss presently
Further they cannot also apply to those cases where the disobedience takes the form of a formal Government order as in this case
In this connection we prefer the approach to the question indicated by the learned C J who said  I do not say that in fit cases a writ for contempt may not be asked for against a corporation itself or against a Government
In what form in such a case any penal order if considered necessary is to be passed and how it is to be enforced are different matters which do not call for decision in this case
In England there is a specific rule providing for sequestration of the corporate property of the party concerned where such party is a corporation
I am not aware of any similar rule obtaining in this country but I do not consider it impossible that in a fit case a fine may be imposed and it may be realised by methods analogous to sequestration which would be a distress warrant directed against the properties of the Government or the Corporation 740 Learned Counsel laid considerable stress on the proceedings under 0 39 r 23 being quasi criminal in an attempt to establish that the State could not be proceeded against for such a criminal wrong
Though undoubtedly proceedings under 0 39 r 23 Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect as is evident from the condemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order
This is clearly brought out by their identity with the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction
Order 21 r 32 sets out the method by which such decrees could be executed and cl
1 enacts  where the party against whom a decree   for an injunction has been passed has had an opportunity for obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it the decree may be enforced in the case of a decree    for an injunction by his detention in the civil prison or by the attachment of his property or by both Clauses 2 and 3 of this rule practically reproduce the terms of cls 4 and 3 respectively of 0 39 r 2 and the provisions leave no room for doubt that 0 39 r 23 is in essence only the mode for the enforcement or effectuation of an order of injunction
While on the provisions of 0 21 r 32 it may be pointed out that learned Counsel for the State does not contend that a State Government against whom a decree for a permanent injunction has been passed is not liable to be proceeded against under this provision of the Code in the event of the decree not being obeyed by them
No doubt the State Government not being a natural person could not be ordered to be detained in civil prison On the analogy of Corporations for which special provision is made in 0 39 r 5 but beyond that both when a decree for a permanent injunction is executed and when an order of temporary injunction is enforced the liability of the State Government to be proceeded against appears to us clear
The third point urged lacks substance and is rejected
Some point was sought to be made of the fact that 741 as the State was a juristic entity merely the wrong which constituted the disobedience must have been the act of some servant or agent of the Government and that except on the principle of vicarious liability the State could not be liable
This argument which is partly based on the observations of Mukherji J in the passage already extracted would if accepted deny that there could be any action by the State at all is really part of the last submission and could conveniently be dealt with along with it
Besides it need only be mentioned that the fact that officers and servants of Government could be dealt with as individuals bound by the orders passed against the defendant Government nor the fact that they would be liable in  contempt is no ground at all for holding that the State Government itself would not be liable for their own act
4 The invocation of the rule of construction that the Crown was not bound by a statute unless by express words or by necessary implication the intention so to bind was manifested was the next submission of learned Counsel reliance being placed for the position on the recent decision of this Court in Director of Rationing  Distribution vs Corporation of Calcutta 1
We shall proceed to consider the soundness of the contention that on a proper construction of the Civil Procedure Code the State of Bihar is not within 0 39 r 23
Article 300 of the Constitution permits suits which before the Constitution could have been filed against the Central and Provincial Governments respectively to be filed against the Union and the State
As already stated there is no dispute that  having regard to the cause of action alleged in the plaint Title Suit 40 of 1950 could be properly laid against the State and the plaintiff could if she was able to make good her allegations of fact and law be entitled to be granted the reliefs prayed for in her suit including the relief for a permanent injunction restraining the State from issuing a notification under a 31 of the Act and from interfering with her possession of 1  742 the estate of Handwa
It is also admitted that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to pass the order of temporary injunction against the State Government and that the order bound them
What is contended however is that the method of enforcing that order provided for in 0 39 r 23 of the Code is not available against the State Government because the State Government is not named in that sub rule expressly or even by necessary implication
An examination however of the provisions of the Code and the Scheme underlying it in relation to proceedings against Government establishes that this submission is wholly untenable
The Code of Civil Procedure does not determine whether any particular suit or class of suits could be filed against the Government or not these being matters of substantive law
But when in law a suit could be properly filed against Government be it the Union or the State it makes a complete provision for the procedure applicable to such suits and the type of orders which Courts could pass in such suits and how these orders could be enforced
Part IV of the Code comprising sections 79 to 82 sets out the details of the pro cedure to be followed in suits against Government
Section 79 prescribes what the cause title of suits against Government should be the expression Government  being used to designate both the Union as well as the State Governments
Section 80 provides making a special provision not applicable to suits against private parties for a two months  notice prior to suit
If Government were a party to a suit it necessarily follows that where the plaintiff succeeds there might be a decree against the Government the Union or the State and section 82 lays down special rules for the execution of such decrees
In the 1st Schedule to the Code there is a separate chapter Chapter XXVII dealing with suits against Government in which provision is specially made for adequate time being granted to it for conducting the various stages of the proceedings before Courts
The foregoing in our opinion makes it clear that the State is bound by the Code of Civil Procedure the 743 scheme of the Code being that subject to any special provision made in that regard as respects Governments it occupies the same position as any other party to a proceeding before the Court
We are further satisfied that even apart from the Scheme of the Code the State as a party defendant is plainly within the terms of 0 39 r 23 of the Code
There is here no controversy that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to pass the interim order of injunction against the State on the terms of 0 39 r 21 which reads In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing injury of any kind whether compensation is claimed in it or not the plaintiff may at any time after the filing of the suitapply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the injury complained of     The reference to the  defendant  in the sub rule precludes any argument against the State being exempt from or being outside the statute
The entire argument on this part of the case was based on the difference between the language employed in cl
1 extracted above and cl
3 of the rule making provision for the manner in which disobedience to orders passed under cl
1 could be dealt with
Clause 3 runs In case of disobedience or of breach of any such terms the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime the Court directs his release Learned Counsel urged that cl
3 discarded the use of the expression  defendant  employed in cl
1 which would have included the  State in cases where the State was a party defendant and had designated the party against whom the injunction order could be enforced as the person guilty of the disobedience  and with a further provision empowering the 95 744 Court to order the detention of such person  in Civil prison
The word  person it was urged was at the best a neutral expression which in the absence of compelling indication was not apt to include  a State  and particularly so in the light of the rule of Construction approved by this Court in The Director of Rationing vs Corporation of Calcutta 1
It was further pressed upon us that the construction suggested would not render injunction orders passed on the State when it was a defendant brutum fulmen because the State as a juristic person could act only through human agency and there would always be some officer a natural  person guilty of disobedience  in every case where orders passed against a State were disobeyed
We are clearly of the opinion that the entire argument should be rejected
We feel wholly unable to accept the construction suggested of the expression  person guilty of disobedience  in the clause
The reason for the variation in the phraseology employed in cls
1 and 3 of 0 39 r 2 is not far to seek
Under the law when an order of injunction is passed that order is binding on and enforceable not merely against the persons eo nomine impleaded as a party to the suit and against whom the order is passed but against  the agents and servants etc of such a party
If such were not the law orders of injunction would be rendered nugatory by their being contravened by the agents and servants of parties
For that reason the law provides that in order that a plaintiff might seek to enforce an order against a servant or an agent of the defendant these latter need not be added as defendants to the suit and an order obtained specifically against the man order against the defendant sufficing for this purpose
If such agents or servants etc are proved to have formal notice of the order and they disobey the injunction they are liable to be proceeded against for contempt without any need for a further order against them under 0 39 r 21
This legal position is brought out by the terms of an injunction order set out in Form 8 of Appendix F to the Code which 1  745 readsThe Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant C D his servants agents and workmen from   
It is not suggested that the form which the order of the Subordinate Judge took in this case departed from this model
If such is the scope of an order for injunction it would be apparent that the expression  person  has in 0 39 r 23 been employed merely compendiously to designate everyone in the group  Defendant his agents servants and workmen  and not for excluding any defendant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed
It would therefore follow that in cases where the State is the defendant against whom an order of injunction has been issued it is  expressly  named in the clause and not even by necessary implication and the rule of construction invoked does not in any manner avail the appellant
The matter may also be approached from a broader angle
Where a Court is empowered by statute to issue an injunction against any defendant even if the defendant be the State the provision would be frustrated and the power rendered ineffective and unmeaning if the machinery for enforcement specially enacted did not extend to every one against whom the order of injunction is directed
Apart therefore from a critical examination of the phraseology of 0 39 r 23 the obligation on the part of the State to obey the injunction and be proceeded against for disobedience if it should take place would appear to follow by necessary implication
As Maxwell 1 puts it  The Crown is sufficiently named in a statute when an intention to include it is manifest 
The only point remaining for consideration is as to whether the publication of the notification under section 31 which was treated by the Subordinate Judge to be the disobedience had been established to be  the act  of the State
The entirety of the argument on this part of the case was rested on the terms of article 1541 of the Constitution reading 1 Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edition P 140
Moore V SMith  746  The executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution
It was urged that the publication of the notification was  an executive act  an exercise of the executive power of the State and since such a power could be exercised either by the Governor directly or through officers subordinate to him it could not be predicated from the mere fact that the notification was purported to be made in the name of the Governor in Conformity with the provisions of article 1661 that it was the Governor who was responsible for the notification and not some officer subordinate to him
On this reasoning the further contention was that unless the respondent proved that it was the Governor himself who had authorised the issue of the notification the State or the State Government could not be fixed with liability therefore so as to be held guilty of disobedience of the order of injunction
The submission of learned Counsel is correct to this extent that the process of making an order precedes and is different from the expression of it and that while article 1661 merely prescribes how orders are to be made the authentication referred to in article 1662 indicates the manner in which a previously made order should be embodied
As observed by the Privy Council in King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerji 1with reference to the term  executive power  in Ch
2 of Part 3 of the Government of India Act 1935 corresponding to Part VI Ch
11 of the Constitution  the term executive  is used in the broader sense as including both a decision as to action and the carrying out of the decision 
Section 31 of the Act confers the power of issuing notifications under it not on any officer but on the State Government as such though the exercise of that power would be governed by the rules of business framed by the Governor under article 1663 of the Constitution
But this does not afford any assistance to the appellant
The order of Government in the 1 1945 L R 72 I A 241 747 present case is expressed to be made  in the name of the Governor  and is authenticated as prescribed by article 1662 and consequently  the validity of the order or instrument cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor 
Authorities have no doubt laid down that the validity of the order may be questioned on grounds other than those set out in the Article but we do not have here a case where the order of the Government is impugned on the ground that it was not passed by the proper authority
Its validity as an order of Government is not in controversy at all
The only point canvassed is whether it was an order made by the Governor or by someone duly authorised by him in that behalf within article 1541
Even assuming that the order did not originate from the Governor personally it avails the State nothing because the Governor remains responsible for the action of his subordinates taken in his name
In Emperor vs Sibnath Banerji 1 already referred to Lord Thankerton pointing out the distinction between delegation by virtue of statutory power therefore and the case of the exercise of the Governor s power by authorized subordinates under the terms of a 491 of the Government of India Act 1935 corresponding to article 1541  said  Sub a
5 of section 2 of the Defence of India Act 1939 provides a means of delegation in the strict sense of the word namely a transfer of the power or duty to the officer or authority defined in the sub
section with a corresponding divestiture of the Governor of any responsibility in the matter whereas under section 491 of the Act of 1935 the Governor remains responsible for the action of his subordinates taken in his name
 This last point also is therefore without force and has to be rejected
Before concluding we consider it proper to draw attention to one aspect of the case
It is of the essence of the rule of law that every authority within the State 1 1945 LR 72 IA 241
748 including the Executive Government should consider itself bound by and obey the Law
It is fundamental to the system of polity that India has adopted and which is embodied in the Constitution that the Courts of the land are vested with the powers of interpreting the law and of applying it to the facts of the cases which are properly brought before them
If any party to the proceedings considers that any Court has committed any error in the understanding of the law or in its application resort must be had to such review or appeals as the law provides
When once an order has been passed which the Court has jurisdiction to pass it is the duty of all persons bound by it to obey the order so long as it stands and it would tend to the subversion of orderly administration and civil Government if parties could disobey orders with impunity
If such is the position as regard private parties the duty to obey is all the more imperative in the case of Governmental authorities otherwise there would be a conflict between one branch of the State polity viz the executive and another branch the Judicial
If disobedience could go unchecked it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have any meaning and judicial power itself becoming a mockery
When the State Government obeys a law or gives effect to an order of a Court passed against it it is not doing anything which detracts from its dignity but rather invests the law and the Courts with the dignity which are their due which enhances the prestige of the executive Government itself in a democratic set up
We consider that on the facts of this case there was no justification legal or otherwise for the State Government to have rushed the notification under section 31 when its application to modify or vacate the order for interim injunction was pending before the Subordinate Court
But more than that when possibly by failure to appreciate their error the notification had been published and the propriety and legality of its action was brought up before the Court by an application under 0 39 r 23 the attitude taken up by the State Government and persisted in upto hearing before us has been one which we can 740 hardly commend
If the Government had deliberately intended to disobey the order of the Court because for any reason they considered it wrong their conduct deserves the severest condemnation
If on the other hand it was merely a case of inadvertence and arose out of error nothing would have been lost and there was everything to be gained even in the matter of the prestige of the Government by a frank avowal of the error committed by them and an expression of regret for the lapse and it is lamentable that even at the stage of the hearing before us there was no trace of any such attitude
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In eases depending circumstantial evidence courts should safeguard themselves against the danger of basing _their conclusions suspicions howsoever strong
Rex V Hodge  and Nargundkar vs State of Madhya Pradesh 1952 SCR 1091 referred to 95 To establish a charge under section 201 Indian Penal Code it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed mere suspicion that it has been committed is not sufficient that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed  and that with the requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment the accused caused the evidence thereof to disappear or gave false information respecting such offence knowing or having reason to believe the same to be false
Where the evidence showed that a person had died that his body was found in trunk and was discovered in a well and that the accused took part in the disposal of the body but there was no evidence to show the cause of his death or the manner or circumstances in which it came about Held that the accused could not be convicted for an offence under section 201
A statement that contains self exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession if the exculpatory matter is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed
A confession must either admit in terms the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts that constitute the offence
Narayanaswami vs Emperor 1939 66 IA 66 referred to
It is a well accepted rule regarding the use of confessions and admissions that these must either be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole and that the court is not competent to accept only the inculpatory part while rejecting the exculpatory part as inherently incredible
Emperor vs Balmukand All 1011 followed
Where the statement made by the accused contained an admission that she had placed the dead body of her husband in a trunk and bad carried it in a jeep and thrown it into a well but with regard to the cause of the death the statement made by her was that her husband bad accidently taken a poisonous substance which was meant for washing photos erroneously thinking it to be a medicine Held the statement read as a whole was exculpatory in character and the whole statement was inadmissible in evidence and the High Court acted erroneously in accepting the former part of it and rejecting the latter part as false
Judgment of the High Court of Punjab reversed