Appeals Nos 19  20 of 1963
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated July 31 1959 of the Patna High Court in Appeals from Original Decree Nos 30 and 40 of 1953 respectively
section T Desai and R C Prasad for appellant
Sarjoo Prasad and D Goburdhan for the respondents Nos1 to 4 In C A No 19 of 1963
Sarjoo Prasad and K K Sinha for respondents Nos
5 7 and 9 In C A No 19 of 1963 and 1 3 and 5 In C A No 20 of 1963
2 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat J
One Ramyad Singh was a member of a joint family and has eight annas interest in the joint family properties
He was a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law
He died issueless leaving his widow Mst
Bhagwano Kunwar
The date of his death is in dispute
After his death Bhagwano Kunwar filed the present suit for partition of the joint family properties claiming eight annas share therein
She contended that Ramyad Singh died in 1939 after the passing of the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act 1937 and she was entitled to maintain the suit for partition
The defendants contended that Ramyad Singh died ill 1936 before the passing of the Act and she was entitled to maintenance only
The trial Court accepted the plaintiff s contention aid decreed the suit
The defendants filed two separate appeals to the High Court
On December 15 1958 Bhagwano Kunwar died
The High Court passed orders substituting one Ram Gulam Singh in her place
Later the High Court recalled these orders as it was conceded that Ram Gulam Singh was not her legal representative
By a deed dated March 14 1958 Bhagwano Kunwar had sold lands measuring 1 bigha 5 kathas to the appellant
The High Court allowed the appellant s application for substitution under 022 r 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and proceeded to hear the appeals
The High Court accepted the defendants  contention reversed the decree passed by the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit
The appellant has now filed these appeals under certificates granted by the High Court
The main point in controversy is did Ramyad Singh die in 1936 or did he die in 1939 If he died in 1936 Bhagwano Kunwar was not entitled to maintain the suit for partition and the suit was liable to be dismissed
But if he died in 1939 she was entitled to eight annas share in the joint estate and was entitled to maintain the suit for partition under the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act 1937 read with the Bihar Hindu Women s Rights to Property Extension to Agricultural Land Act 1942
Moreover it is conceded by counsel for the respondents that in that event after 1956 she held her eight annas share in the joint estate as full owner by virtue of section 14 of the  and on the strength of the sale deed dated March 14 1958 executed by Mst
Bhagwano Kunwar the appellant was entitled to continue the suit for partition after her death
There is conflicting oral evidence with regard to the date of death of Ramyad Singh
The appellant relied strongly upon an admission made by the main contesting defendants Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh in a plaint signed and verified by them and filed in Title Suit No 3 of 1948
In that plaint Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh claimed partition of the joint family properties implead 3 ing Bhagwano Kunwar as defendant No 8 and other members of the joint family as defendants Nos
1 to 7
In this plaint Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh stated 2
That the properties described in Schedule 1 to 2 in the plaint belong to the joint family
As the said Babu Ramyad Singh died in 1939 the defendant No 8 also became entitled to life interest in the properties of the joint family
The defendant No 8 surrendered her life estate to the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos 1 to 7 and she gave up her possession of the joint family properties
The plaintiffs and the defendants Nos 1 to 7 have been coming in joint possession of the properties under partition
That the defendant No 8 is also made a defendant in this suit as she is entitled to maintenance The plaint contained a clear admission that Ramyad Singh died in 1939
The High Court ruled that Bhagwano Kunwar could not rely on this admission
The High Court said that she could not rely upon the statement that Ramyad Singh died in 1939 as she was not prepared to admit the correctness of the statement that she had surrendered her estate and was entitled to maintenance only
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning
It is true that Bhagwano Kunwar relied only upon the statement that Ramyad Singh died in 1939 and was not prepared to accept the statement that she had surrendered her share to the other members and was entitled to maintenance only
But she tendered the entire plaint and she did not object to the admissibility or proof of any of the statements made therein
All the statements in the plaint are
therefore admissible as evidence
The Court is however not bound to accept all the statements as correct
The Court may accept some of the statements and reject the rest
In the presented suit it is common case that Bhagwano Kunwar did not surrender her share in the estate
We must therefore reject the statement with regard to the alleged surrender and the consequential allegation that she was entitled to maintenance only
The statement in the plaint as to the date of death of Ramyad Singh must be read as an admission in favour of Bhagwano Kunwar
The High Court also observed that an admission in a pleading can be used only for the purpose of the suit in which the pleading was filed
The observations of Beaumont CJ in Ramabai Shriniwas vs Bombay Governmentl lend some countenance to this view
But those observations were commented upon and explained by the Bombay High Court in D section Mohite vs section I Mohite2
An admission by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him in a prior suit is an admission within the meaning of section 17 of the Indian 1 AIR 196O Bom
2 AIR 1941 Bom
4 Evidence Act 1872 and may be proved against him in other litigations
The High Court also relied on the English law of evidence
In Phipson on Evidence 10th Edn article 741 the English law is thus summarised Pleadings although admissible in other actions to show the institution of the suit and the nature of the case put forward are regarded merely as the suggestion of counsel and are not receivable against a party as admissions unless sworn signed or otherwise adopted by the party himself Thus even under the English law a statement in a pleading sworn signed or otherwise adopted by a party is admissible against him in other actions
In Marianski vs Cairns1 the House of Lords decided that an admission in a pleading signed by a party was evidence against him in another suit not only with regard to a different subject matter but also against a different opponent
Moreover we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English law
Section 17 of the makes no dis tinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions
Under the Indian law an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits
In other suits this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive and it is open to the party to show that it is not true
The explanation of Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh that the plaint was drafted by their lawyer Ramanand Singh at the instance of the panchas including one Ramanand and they signed and verified the plaint without understanding its contents cannot be accepted
There is positive evidence on the record that the plaint was drafted at the instance of Janki Singh and was filed under his instructions
The plaint was signed not only by Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh but also by their lawyer Ramanand Singh
Neither Ramanand Singh nor the panch Ramanand was called as a witness
Even in this litigation Ramanand Singh was acting as a lawyer on behalf of some of the defendants
Kailashpati Singh is a Homeopathic medical practitioner and knows English
The plaint was read over to Janki Singh
Both Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh signed the plaint after understanding its contents and verified all the statements made in it as true to their knowledge
They then well knew that Ramyad Singh had died in 1939 after the passing of the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act
It is not shown that the admission in the plaint as to the date of death of Ramyad Singh is not true or that it was made under some error or misapprehension
This admission must be regarded as a strong 1 5 piece of evidence in this suit with regard to the date of death of Ramyad Singh
Bhagwano Kunwar and her witnesses Ram Gulam Singh Ram Saroop Singh and Sheo Saroop Singh gave evidence in Sep tember 1952
They all swore that Ramyad Singh died 13 years ago
In agreement with the trial Judge we accept their testimony
Learned counsel commented on the testimony of Sheo Saroop Singh who had said that the last earthquake took place 15 to 16 years ago and Ramyad Singh died 2 years 8 months thereafter
The last earthquake took place on January 15 1934 and counsel therefore argued that Ramyad Singh could not have died in 1939
Clearly there is some confusion in the evidence of Sheo Saroop Singh
He gave evidence in September 1952 and his statement that the earthquake took place 15 to 16 years ago could not be correct and his further statement that Ramyad Singh died 2 years 8 months after the earthquake was not accurate
He swore positively that Ramyad Singh died 13 years ago
Bhagwano Kunwar said that there were receipts to show that Ramyad Singh died 13 years ago
On her behalf rent receipts for 1339 1341 1342 1343 1345 1348 1356 and 1359 faslis were tendered
The rent receipts are in respect of certain lands held by her as a tenant
The first four rent receipts show that Lip to 1343 fasli corresponding to 1936 the rent used to be paid by her through Ramyad Singh
Payment of the rent for 1345 fasli was made in 1346 fasli corresponding to 1939 through Janki
The rent for the subsequent years was paid through Janki and other persons
The High Court thought that the rent receipts showed that Ramyad Singh died in 1936 and because of his death rent was subsequently paid through other persons
But the rent receipt for 1344 fasli is not forthcoming and it is not known who paid the rent for 1344 fasli 1937
Moreover assuming that Ramyad Singh did not pay rent in 1937 and 1938 it does not follow that he must have died in 1936
Kailashpati Singh Janki Singh and other witnesses called on behalf of the defendants said that Ramyad Singh had died 16 years ago
In agreement with the trial Court we do not accept their testimony
Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh gave false explanations with regard to the admission made by them in the plaint in the previous suit
Moreover for the purpose of defeating the title of Bhagwano Kumar they set up a compromise decree passed in that suit
The trial Court found that the compromise decree was obtained by them by practising fraud on Mst
Bhagwano Kunwar and this finding is no longer challenged
We therefore hold and find that Ramyad Singh died in 1939
It follows that Bhagwano Kunwar was entitled to eight annas share in the joint family estate and was entitled to maintain the Suit
The trial Court therefore rightly decreed the suit
6 But in view of the death of Bhagwano Kunwar during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court the decree passed by the trial Court must be modified
The appellant purchased from Bhagwano Kunwar 1 bigha 5 kathas of land under the deed dated March 14 1958 and he can claim only the rights of an alienee of a specific property from a co owner on a general partition of the undivided properties
All the parties appearing before us conceded that on such a partition the appellant is entitled to allotment and separate possession of the lands purchased by him under the deed dated March 14 1958
The deed is not printed in the Paper Book
It will be the duty of the trial Court now to ascertain full particulars of the aforesaid lands
The appeals are allowed with costs in this Court and in the High Court
The decree passed by the High Court is set aside
There will be a decree in favour of the appellant allotting to him the lands purchased by him under the deed dated March 14 1958 and awarding to him separate possession thereof
The trial Court will draw up a suitable decree after ascertaining the particulars of the aforesaid lands
Y P Appeals allowed


Summary:
The plaintiff tendered in evidence a plaint in an earlier suit and relied on an admission made by the defendants with regard to a fact in issue in the later suit
The High Court ruled that the plaint was not admissible in evidence on two grounds viz i the plaintiff could not rely on a state ment in the plaint as an admission as she was not prepared to accept the correctness of the other statements in the plaint and ii an admission in a pleading could be used only for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading was filed
On appeal to this Court
HELD  1 All the statements in the plaint are admissible in evidence
The plaintiff can rely upon a statement in the plaint with regard to a matter in issue as an admission though she is not prepared to accept the correctness of the other statements in the plaint
Nor is the Court bound to accept all the statements as correct
The court may accept some of the statements as correct and reject the rest
3 F 2 Section 17 of the makes no distinction between a admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions
An admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits
In other suits this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive and it is open to the party to show that it is not true
4 D D section Mohite vs section I Mohite AIR 1960 Bom
153 Marianski vs Cairns and Ramabai Shriniwas vs Bombay GovernmentAIR  referred to