Civil Appeal No 3013 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 3071986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in AAO No 1491 of 1985
section Madhusudan Rao KK Gupta and Rakesh Kumar Gupta for the Appellant
KV Sreekumar and B Parthasarthi for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal
Shobha Rani is the appellant
Her husband is Madhukar Reddi who is respondent before us
The wife is post graduate in biological 1013 sciences
The husband is a medical doctor
They were happily married on December 19 1982
But their happiness did not last longer
They started exchanging letters with bitter feelings
Then they began to accuse each other
At one stage they thought of winding up by mutual consent
It was perhaps out of disgust
it would have been better if it had happened
But unfortunately it did not materialise
Ultimately they landed themselves in the Court
The wife moved the Court for divorce on the ground of cruelty
Before referring to further facts let us consider the law
The cruelty simpliciter is now a ground for divorce under Sec 13 of the Act 25 of 1955
Section 13 provides so far as it is material 13 Divorce 1 Any marriage solemnized whether before or after the commencement of this Act may on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party   i   i a has after the solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty or xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx Section 131i a uses the words treated the petitioner with cruelty
The word cruelty has not been defined
Indeed it could not have been defined
It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour
It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations
It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other
The cruelty may be mental or physical intentional or unintentional
If it is physical the court will have no problem to determine it
It is a question of fact and degree
If it is mental the problem presents difficulty
First the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment
Second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse
Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other
Ultimately it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse
There may however be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal
Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or 1014 considered
In such cases the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted
It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us
In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular we find a sea change
They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person
Therefore when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations the Court should not search for standard in life
A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case
The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions
It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance
We the judges and lawyers therefore should not import our own notions of life
We may not go in parallel with them
There may be a generation gap between us and the parties
It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners
It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents
Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon vs Sheldon 259 the categories of cruelty are not closed
 Each case may be different
We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar
Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty
New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of
Such is the wonderfulrealm of cruelty
These preliminary observations are intended to emphasize that the Court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life
The Court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them and consider their particular grievance
As Lord Reid observed in Gollins vs Gollins  1972 In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man or the reasonable woman
We are dealing with this man or this woman
 Chandrachud J as he then was in Narayan Ganesh Dastane vs Sucheta Narayan Dastane  978 said The Court has to deal not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife assuming any such exist but with parti 1015 cular man and woman before it
The ideal couple or a near ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for even if they may not be able to drown their differences their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures
 With these principles in mind we may now unfold the story with which the wife came to the Court seeking dissolution of her marriage
She made several grievances
We may ignore all but one
The one and the only one with which we are concerned is her complaint about the dowry demand by the husband or his parents
The dowry is a deep rooted evil in the society
It started as customary presents with love and affection
In olden days it was customary to give some presents to the bride and bridegroom and his family at the time of marriage
The parents of the bride or their relations out of affection and good intention used to provide the couple something to fall back upon in case of need
The system started at a time when girls were generally not very much educated and even if they were educated they were unwilling to take up gainful employment
There was also less opportunity for them either to supplement the family income or to become financially independent
There was yet another reason for such customary gifts
The daughter then was not entitled to a share in the joint family properties when she had a brother
Hence the father out of affection or other consideration used to give some cash or kind to the daughter at the time of marriage
The right of the father to give a small portion of even the family property as a gift to the daughter at the time of her marriage was recognised
But unfortunately over the years new practice developed
The boy or his family members started demanding cash or kind from the brides parents
They started demanding dowry as a matter of right
The demand more often extended even after the marriage
There were instance of harassment of the wife if the demand was not complied with
In order to curb this evil practice the Parliament enacted the Act No 28 of 1961
The Act prohibited the giving or taking of dowry
But in spite of this enactment the pernicious practice continued in some communities
The Joint Committee of Parliament appointed to examine the working of the remarked the evil sought to be done away with by the Act on the other hand increased by leaps and bounds and has now assumed grotesque and alarming proportions
 Again the Parliament intervened
The Dowry Prohibition Amendment Act 1984 was enacted with considerable changes in the parent Act
Likewise the Indian Penal Code was amended by introducing of an entirely new offence hitherto unknown to criminal jurisprudence
Sec 1016 tion 498 A has been introduced in the following terms 498 A Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine
Explanation For the purposes of this section cruelty means a Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman or b harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand A new dimension has been given to the concept of cruelty
Explanation to Sec
498 A provides that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide would constitute cruelty
Such wilful conduct which is likely to cause grave injury or danger to life limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman would also amount to cruelty
Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security would also constitute cruelty
We are however not concerned with criminal offence either under the or under the Indian Penal Code
We are concerned with a matrimonial conduct which constitutes cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage
Such cruelty if not admitted requires to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities as in civil cases and not beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases
This Court has not accepted the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
As said by Chandrachud J in Dastane case Ibid at p 976 Neither section 10 of the Act which enumerates the 1017 grounds on which a petition for judicial separation may be presented nor section 23 which governs the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in any proceedings under the Act requires that the petitioner must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt
Section 23 confers on the court the power to pass a decree if it is satisfied on matters mentioned in clauses a to e of the section
Considering that proceedings under the Act are essentially of a civil nature the word satisfied must mean satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities and not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
Section 23 does not alter the standard of proof in civil cases
 Let us now turn to the evidence in this case
It consists of that of wife as PW 1 as against the evidence of husband as RW 1
The parties have also produced the letters exchanged between them
There appears to be no doubt that the husband or his parents were demanding dowry from the appellant
The husband in his letter exhibit Al dated August 28 1983 wrote to the wife Now regarding Dowry point I still feel that there is nothing wrong in my parents asking for few thousand rupees
It is quite a common thing for which my parents are being blamed as harassment
 The wife in her evidence before the Court has stated My Mother in law always used to make demand for money from my parents
I used to tell my parents about what was happening to me in that house
I used to keep silent when my mother in law made demands for money
The respondent also sometimes used to make demands for money
I used to tell him as to why should I ask money from my parents and I also used to tell him that I would not ask my parents
But he used to reply that such things were only there in olden times and not now and that therefore I should ask money from my parents
There were fixed deposits receipts in my name in the Bank upto one and a half to two lakhs
Besides this there was house plot in my name at Jubilee Hills
I was afraid of telling my husband and my parents in law that I would not ask my parents for money
1018 This I was afraid because I had an apprehension that something would be done to me either physically or mentally if I told them so
I entertained this apprehension because this went on regularly every day that is their demands for money
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx I was afraid to go back again to the respondent s house because I felt that the pestering for money will go on like this
I therefore developed aversion for going back to the respondent
For that reason I joined as a school teacher
 The trial court or the High Court did not state that there was no demand for money
The case of the wife was however rejected on the ground that there was no satisfactoy evidence that the demands were such as to border on harassment
The trial court said Though one would not justify demands for money it has to be viewed in this perspective
The respondent is a young up coming doctor
There is nothing strange in his asking his wife to give him money when he is in need of it
There is no satisfactory evidence that the demands were such as to border on harassment
 In regard to the admission by the husband in his letter dated August 28 1983 as to the dowry demanded by his parents the trial court observed The letter should be read as a whole
The respondent has an explanation to make and has made one in the cross examination
He is trying to confess
It is clear from the attitude of the petitioner that she is prone to exaggerate things
That is evident from her complaint of food and the habit of drinking
 xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx Either because of her over sensitivity or because of her habit of exaggeration she has made a mountain of mole hill
Further for the reasons best known to her the petitioner 1019 has not examined her father
There is no explanation why he has not been examined in support of her contention that the respondent and his parents were harassing her for money
 The High Court also went on the same lines
The High Court said that the wife appears to be hypersensitive and she imagines too much and too unnatural things
The High Court then observed Though one would not justify demands for money it has to be viewed in the circumstances from a proper angle
The respondent is a doctor if he asks his rich wife to spare some money there is nothing wrong or unusual
 This is not a case where the husband requested his wife to give some money for his personal expenses
The High Court appears to have misunderstood the case
It has evidently proceeded on a wrong basis
It proceeded on the ground that the husband wanted some money from his wife for his personal expenses
If the demand was only of such nature we would have thrown this appeal away
The wife must extend all help to husband and so too the husband to wife
They are partners in life
They must equally share happiness and sorrow
They must help each other
One cannot take pleasure at the cost of the other
But the case on hand is not of a failure on that front
It has been admitted by the husband himself in his letter dated August 28 1983 addressed to the wife that his parents demanded dowry
But he wrote to the wife that there was nothing wrong in that demand of his parents
This is indeed curious
He would not have stated so unless he was party to the demand
The wife has stated in her evidence that there were repeated demands for money from her monther in law
Her evidence cannot be brushed aside on the ground that she has not examined her father
It was not the case of the wife that the dowry was demanded directly from her father
The evidence of the father was therefore not material
It is also not proper to discredit the wife as hypersensitive or prone to exaggeration
That would be judging the wife by our style of manners and our standard of life
That we cannot apply
We must try to understand her feelings and then search for the nugget of truth in the entire evidence
The contents of exhibit Al should not be read in isolation
It must be viewed against the background of accusations in the letter dated December 26 1983 written by advocate for the wife to his counter part
The relevant portion of the letter reads 1020 In the background of these the worst form of ill trestment that is meted out to our client was constant harassment for monies
It may be brought to your notice that prior to marriage on demand by your client s father a sum of Rs 17000 was given and also a Scooter thereafter
It may be brought to your notice that one other main reason for your client to dowry deaths which are very frequently seen now a days in papers
It may be pointed out that your clients philosophy is that since our client s are financially sound there is no wrong for your client s parent to ask for few more thousands
It may be pointed out and brought to your notice that it appears your client s sole object of marriage was to get the monies standing in the name of our client transferred to his name
It would be better to understand that money that stand in our client s name are somwhere about two lakhs
It is not out of place to mention that your client s behaviour and treatment with our client could only be said to be a pointer for seeking these monies alone and marriage was a device   The cumulative effect of all the circumstances and the evidence of parties lead to the conclusion that the demand of dowry went on with the support of the husband
The High Court while dealing with this part of the case has observed that there is no evidence to show that the demands were such as to cause harassment to the wife
The High Court appears to have misconstrued the scope of cruelty in matrimonial affairs
The evidence as to harassment to the wife to meet any unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute cruelty in criminal law
It is the requirement of the offence of cruelty  defined under sec
498A of the Indian Penal Code
131i a of the provides that the party has after solemanization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty
What do these words mean What should be the nature of cruelty Should it be only intentional wilful or deliberate Is it necessary to prove the intention in matrimonial offence we think not
We have earlier said that cruelty may be of any kind and any variety
It may be different in different cases
It is in relation to the conduct of parties to a marriage
That conduct which is complained of as cruelty by one spouse may not be so for the other spouse
There may be instance of cruelty by the unintentional but inexcusable conduct of any party
The cruel treatment may also result by the cultural conflict of the spouses
In such cases even if the act of cruelty is established the intention to commit cannot be 1021 established
The aggrieved party may not get relief
We do not think that that was the intention with which the Parliament enacted sec
131i a of the 
The context and the set up in which the word cruelty  has been used in the section seems to us that intention is not a necessary element in cruelty
That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs
If the intention to harm harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of cruelty could be easily established
But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case if by ordinary sense in human affairs the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty
The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill treatment
The same is also the line of reasoning adopted by the House of Lords in Gollins vs Gollins  at 976 where Lord Evershed said I am unable to accept the premise that cruelty in matrimonial proceedings requires or involves of necessity the element of malignity though I do not of course doubt that if malignity be in fact established it would be highly relevant to a charge of cruelty
In my opinion however the question whether one party to a marriage has been guilty of cruelty to the other or has treated the other with cruelty does not according to the ordinary sense of the language used by Parliament involve the presence of malignity or its equivalent and if this view be right it follows as I venture to think that the presence of intention to injure on the part of the spouse charged or which is as I think the same thing proof that the conduct of the party charged was aimed at the other spouse is not an essential requisite for cruelty
The question in all such cases is to my mind whether the acts or conduct of the party charged were cruel according to the ordinary sense of that word rather than whether the party charged was himself or herself a cruel man or woman  
Bearing in mind the proper approach to matrimonial offence we are satisfied that the facts and circumstances brought out by the appellant in this case do justify an inference that there was demand for dowry
The demand for dowry is prohibited under law
That by itself is bad enough
That in our opinion amounts to cruely entitling the wife to get a decree for dissolution of marriage
1022 In the result we allow the appeal and in reversal of the judgments of the courts below we grant a decree for dissolution of the marriage
In the circumstances of the case however we make no order as to costs
NPV Appeal allowed


Summary:
 The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh took on lease the premises belonging to the respondent for the purpose of running a Training Centre
The respondent landlord gave a notice of termination of the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and filed a suit for recovery of possession
The appellant claimed that the suit was not maintainable and that the respondent s remedy if any was only to seek eviction in the circumstances and in the manner outlined in the Uttar Pradesh Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972
The respondent sought to overcome this hurdle by contending that the premises in question was not one of the classes of building  covered by the aforesaid Rent Act and in support thereof relied on the exclusion clause incorporated in Section 21a of the Rent Act
The appellant contended successfully before the Additional District Judge but unsuccessfully before the trial court and the High Court that the premises in question was not a public building  with the meaning of section 30 read with section 21a of the Rent Act as amended from July 5 1976 and hence the respondent s remedy for eviction of the appellant was not by way of suit in a Civil Court
Dismissing the Appeal to this Court 949  HELD 1
The building in question is one taken on lease by the State Government and so it falls squarely within the definition of public building  in Section 30 of the Act
It is therefore exempt from the application of the Act by reasons of section 21 as it stood at the relevant time
It would follow therefore that the respondent s remedy to recover possession lay under the general law and had to be enforced by a suit for recovery of possession which is exactly what he has done955B 2
Sub sections 1 1A and 8 of section 21 have to be read together
Though section 21a excluded public buildings  which has to interpreted to include buildings in which the Government is only a tenant s21A incorporates an exception to this exclusion
Notwithstanding anything contained in section 2 it permits an application for eviction being moved under section 211a of the Act by a landlord against any tenant but in the limited circumstances set out in that sub section viz that the landlord has been in occupation of a public building but had to vacate it as he had ceased to be in the employment of the Government Local Authority or Corporation958C D 3
The landlord of a building in which the Government is a tenant could have moved an application under section 211 read with section 211A
This is what is prohibited by section 218 absolutely in view of clauses ii and iv of Explanation 1 to sub section 1 being non existent
section 218 makes it clear that while a landlord who is compelled to vacate a public building occupied by him due to cessation of his employment can proceed under the Act to evict any tenant occupying his property so that he may use his own property for his residential purposes he will not be able to do so where his tenant is the Government a local authority or a public Corporation
Thus read section 218 does not become otiose or redundant by accepting the wider interpretation of section 30958D F 4i The interpretation placed by the Full Bench of the High Court on section 30 in Punjab National Bank vs Suganchand 19851 ARC 214 equates the position under the statute after the amendment of 1976 to the position both as it stood prior to the 1976 amendment and also as it stood after the 1983 Ordinance
Such an approach fails to give any effect at all to the change in language deliberately introduced by the 1976 amendment956H 957A ii Prior to the amendment only buildings of which the Government was owner or landlord were excluded from the Act
But the Legislature clearly intended a departure from the earlier position
If the 950 intention was merely to extend the benefit to premises owned or let out by public corporation it could have been achieved by simply adding a reference to such corporations in section 21a and b as they stood earlier
957A B iii Reading section 21a  b as they stood before amendment and the definition in section 30 side by side the departure in language is so wide and clear that it is impossible to ignore the same and hold that the new definition was just a re enactment of the old exemption957B C iv The amendment significantly omitted the crucial words present in the earlier legislation which had the effect of restricting the exclusion to tenancies created by the Government either as owner or as landlord
957D v Though the Ordinance of 1977 made its amendment retrospective from 5776 these later amendments are all specifically given effect to from 1851983
The effect of the decisions rendered remained untouched till then
The fact that the 1976 amendment marked a departure from the more restricted exclusion available earlier and the fact that the said restricted exclusion was again restored with effect only from 1851983 militate against the correctness of adhering to a narrow interpretation even during the interregnum from 551976 to 1851983
957F G vi Full effect must therefore be given to the new definition in section 30 and to the conscious departure in language in reframing the exclusion
959D 5
There are situations in which Courts are compelled to subordinate the plain meaning of statutory language
Not unoften Courts do read down the plain language of a provision or give it a restricted meaning where to do otherwise may be clearly opposed to the object and scheme of the Act or may lead to an absurd illogical or unconstitutional result
959D E 6
This mode of construction is not appropriate in the context of the present legislation for a number of reasons
In the first place such an interpretation does not fit into the legislative history
It does not explain why the legislature should have while enacting the 1976 amendment omitted certain operative words and used certain wider words instead
Secondly the Rent Act is a piece of legislation which imposes certain restrictions on a landlord and confers certain protections on a 951 tenant
Thirdly while it is true that the result of the interpretation this Court favours would be to facilitate easy eviction of Government local authorities and public corporations there is nothing per se wrong about it because with their vast resources or capacity to augment their resources these bodies would not be in as helpless a position as ordinary tenants for whose benefit the legislation is primarily intended
Fourthly the legislature has applied its mind to the situation more than once
If its intention in carrying out the amendment had been misunderstood by the High Court or found ambiguous the legislature was expected to rectify the situation by a piece of retrospective or declaratory legislation
The 1977 Ordinances was but the later Ordinances and the 1985 Act are not of this nature
They neither are nor purport to be declaratory or retrospective from 5776
At least if the 1985 Act had been made retrospective from 5776 one could have thought it was a clarificatory piece of legislation
But the Legislature has advisedly given these enactments effect only from 1851983
This means that the amendment of 1976 was intended to be effective between 5776 and 18583 and it also means that the amendment of 1983 onwards is not intended to be read back for that period
Lastly the interpretation this Court favours will create no lasting difficulties for the Government and other organisations which are tenants only since after 1851983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities available to other tenants under the Act
959E G 960B G Punjab National Bank vs Sugan Chand 19851 ARC 214 overruled