Appeal No 3850 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 2141978 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No 3974 of 1977
A Subba Rao G Narasimhulu and ADN Rao for the Appel lants
TVSN Chari and Ms Manjula Gupta for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA J
Leave granted
Counsel heard
As we are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh we propose to set out the few facts necessary for the appreciation of the argu ments before us very briefly
517 The parties belong to the Reddi caste in an area of Andhra Pradesh which originally formed part of the Madras Presidency
Appellant No 1 is the illatom son in law of Appellant No 2
The appellants filed their respective declarations under Section 8 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Ceiling Act
In his declaration appellant No 2 claimed an increase in the ceiling unit permitted to be held by him on the ground that appellant No 1 as his illatom son in law who had attained the age of majority had a share in the properties of his father in law appellant No 2
Appellant No 2 deposed in the inquiry held that appellant No 1 was entitled to a half share in his properties as his illatom son in law
Both of them claimed that appellant No 1 was entitled to the afore said share under an agreement Exhibit A I
The Land Re forms Tribunal Anantapur by its judgment dated May 31 1977 rejected the claim of the appellants and held that the declarant appellant No 2 held surplus holding to an extent of 04109 standard acres and directed him to surrender the excess land
Appellant No 1 was declared as not holding any land in excess of ceiling limit
The appellants preferred an appeal to the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal Anantapur which was dismissed on November 4 1977
Aggrieved by the order of dismissal made by the said Tribunal the appellants filed a Civil Revision Petition No 3974 of 1977 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by a common judgment along with other connected matters on April 21 1978
This appeal by special leave is one of the appeals directed against the common judgment of the said High Court
An illatom son in law is in a sense a creature of custom
It is well settled by a series of decisions that a custom of illatom adoption prevails among the Reddi and Kamma castes in territories which earlier formed part of the then Madras Presidency
It is stated in Mayne s Hindu Law and Usages 13th Edition Paragraph 242 in Chapter VII as follows A custom known as that of illatom adoption prevails among the Reddi and Kamma castes in the Madras Presidency
It consists in the affiliation of a son in law in consideration of assistance in the management of the family property
No religious significance appears to attach to the act
Neither the execution of any document nor the performance of any cere mony is necessary
The incidents of an illatom adoption have now become crystallized into fixed rules of law by a long course of deci sions
To constitute a person an illatom a specific agreement is necessary  
After the death of the adop 518 ter he is entitled to the full rights of a son even as against natural sons subse quently born or a son subsequently adopted in the usual manner It has also been stated by Mayne that an illatom son in law has no right to claim partition with his father in law unless there is an express agreement or custom to that effect
An illatom son in law is not an adopted son in any sense
In NR Raghavachariar s Hindu LaW 8th Edition in paragraph 176 it is stated that an illatom son in law loses no rights of inheritance in his natural family and the property he takes in the adoptive family is taken by his own relations to the exclusion of those of his adoptive father
The position as set out in Mulla s Hindu law 16th Edition is no different
Regarding the position of an illatom son in law it has been inter alia observed by Mulla at para 515 page 534 as follows He does not lose his right of inheritance in his natural family
Neither he nor his de scendants become coparceners in the family of adoption though on the death of the adopter he is entitled to the same rights and the same share as against any subsequently born natural son or a son subsequently adopted in accord ance with the ordinary law
He cannot claim a partition with the father in law and the incidence of a joint family such for instance as right to take by
survivorship do not apply
In respect of the property or share that he may get he takes it as if it were his separate and self acquired property
 To cite just a few decisions the custom of having an illatom son in law in the Kamma Castes and the Reddis in Madras Presidency has been recognised in Nalluri Kristnamma and another vs Kamepalli Venkatasubbayya and others
1918 19 LR 46 IA 168
The same custom has also been recog nised by the decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Hanumantamma vs Rami Reddi
1882 LR 4 IA Madras Series 272
In Narasayya and others vs Rammachan drayya and others AIR 1956 43 AP 209 it has been held that the institution of illatom adoption that is affiliat ing a son in law and giving him a share is purely a crea ture of custom and judicial recognition has been given to it
Learned Counsel for the appellants contends that appel lant No 1 as an illatom son in law of appellant No 2 was entitled to a half share in the property of appellant No 2
He submitted that an illatom son in law who had attained the age of majority was in the same position as a major son and hence the ceiling area permitted to appellant No 2 was liable to be increased by one ceiling unit as appellant No 1 did not hold any land independently nor in any manner specified under Section 4 A of the Ceiling Act
519 Before examining the correctness of these submissions we may refer to the relevant provisions of the Ceiling Act
The Ceiling Act which provided for a ceiling on agricultural holding in Andhra Pradesh was enacted in 1973 and amended by Act No 10 of 1977 which was reserved tot the assent of the President and received the same on April 29 1977
The said amending Act was made effective from January 1 1975
Section 3 of the said Act is the definition section
Sub section c of Section 3 defines the term ceiling area  after the amendment as meaning the extent of land specified in Section 4 or 4A to be the ceiling area
Sub section 5 of Section 3 defines the term family unit and clause i thereof provides that in case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses such individual the spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters if any constitute his family unit
Section 4 provides for the ceiling area
After Section 4 of the said Act the following Section 4A was inserted in the Act
4A Increase of ceiling area in certain cases  Notwithstanding anything in section 4 where an individual or an individual who is a member of a family unit has one or more major sons and any such major son either by himself or together with other members of the family unit of which he is a member holds no land or holds an extent of land less than the ceiling area then the ceiling area in the case of said individual or the family unit of which the said individual is a member computed in accordance with section 4 shall be increased in respect of each such major son by an extent of land equal to the ceiling area applicable to such major son or the family unit of which he is a member or as the case may be by the extent of land by which the land held by such major
son or the family unit of which he is a member falls short of the ceiling area
 Section 5 prescribes how the standard holding for dif ferent categories of land is to be computed
Section 8 provides for declaration of holding by persons whose holding on the notified date together with the other lands mentioned therein exceeds the specified limit
Section 9 provides for the determination of the ceiling area by the Tribunal
Section 10 inter alia provides that if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area the person shall be liable to surrender the land held in excess
The question which arises is whether for the purposes of Section 4A 520 of the Ceiling Act an illatom son in law can be regarded as a major son that is whether an illatom son in law is covered in the definition of the term major son  as em ployed in Section 4A of the Ceiling Act
It has been ob served in the impugned judgment that an illatom son in law is a creature of custom and hence his rights are such as recognised by the custom or under an agreement duly proved
It has been pointed out in the impugned judgment that the Land Reforms Tribunal held on consideration of the evidence that half share in property of appellant No 2 was bequeathed to him and hence he would be entitled to half share only after the demise of appellant No 2
It was further pointed out that all the lands stood registered in the name of appellant No 2 and hence appellant No 1 was not entitled to any share in the properties of appellant No 2 during the life time of appellant No 2
It has been held in the impugned judgment that appellant No 1 who is the illatom son in law could not be regarded as a son of appellant No 2 although he had some rights which were similar to the rights of a natural born son or an adopted son
The agreement Exhibit A which was set up by the appellants and under which appellant No 1 given a share the land belonging to appellant No 2 in presenti has not been accepted by the courts below on consideration of the evi dence
It has been held that the said agreement was a document brought into existence merely with a view to avoid the ceiling law
In this appeal we are not inclined to interfere with these findings of the appeal
It was also held in the impugned judgment that in the aforestated cir cumstances the ceiling limit of appellant No 2 was not liable to be increased on the ground that appellant No 1 was his illatom son in law who had attained majority on the relevant date
Coming to the position in law the discussion in the text books which we have referred to in some detail earli er makes it clear that although an illatom son in law has some rights similar to those of a natural son born F after the adoption of the iliatom son in law his rights are not identical to those of conferred by law on a son or an adopt ed son
To cite two main differences he does not succeed to the properties of his father in law by survivorship but only on account of custom or an agreement giving him a share in the property of his father in law
His position is not identical to that of an adopted son because he does not lose his rights in his natural G family on being taken as an iliatom son in law and continues to be entitled to a share in the property of his natural father
It is therefore difficult to regard an iliatom son in law who has attained majority as a major son for the purposes of Section 4A of the Ceiling Act
Learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Peechu 521 Ramaiah vs Government of Andhra Pradesh 1976 2 HC Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 278 where it has been held that after the death of the father in law an iliatom son in law is entitled to the rights of his son
If there is an agree ment to that effect the illatom son in law is also entitled to half share in the property of the adoptive father in law even during his lifetime
The Division Bench in the impugned judgment has not accepted the correctness of the aforesaid judgment
In our opinion the view taken by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment appears to be correct
From the texts which we have cited earlier it is clear that the general recognised position is that an illatom son in law becomes entitled to a share in the property of his father in law as his heir that is on his death it being well settled in law that there can be no heir to a living person
Moreover in Peechu Ramaiah vs Government of Andhra Pradesh the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the illatom son in law was entitled to a half share in presenti that is even during the lifetime of his father in law was based on an agreement to that effect which was duly proved
In the present case the agreement Exhibit A has been disbelieved by the authorities below as well as the High Court
It has been pointed out by the Land Reforms Tribunal that the half share to which appellant No 1 would be entitled was bequeathed to him in the Will of appellant No 2 and he would be entitled to that share only on the death of appellant No 2
In fact it was fairly conceded by learned Counsel for the appellants that he was not in a position to show any evidence on the basis of which it could be said that there was a custom applicable to the parties by which appellant No 1 as an illatom son in law of appellant No 2 was entitled to a share in the property of appellant No 2 during the latter s lifetime
In our opinion it is not possible to equate an iliatom son in law who has attained majority with a major son for the purposes of Section 4A of the Ceiling Act
As pointed out in Penumatsa Koti Ramachandra Raju vs State of AP 1980 1 HC Andhra Pradesh Law Journal 307 it is quite apparent from the language of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 10 of 1977 whereby Section 4A was in serted in the Ceiling Act that Section 4A was inserted in order to obviate the hardship caused to the Muslims and Christians among whom the concept of a joint family did not obtain and even major sons did not have any share in the ancestral property during the lifetime of the father unlike in the case of Joint Hindu Families
It appears that the intention which lay behind the amendment was to put Muslims and Christians at par with Hindus in respect of the ceiling law
It was with this point of view that it was provided in Section 4A of the Ceiling Act that although the limit of the father s holding would be increased on the ground of his having a major son that increase would 522 be limited to the extent by which the land holding of the major son and his family unit fell short of the ceiling unit
In our opinion the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said amending Act whereby Section 4A was inserted into the said Act lends support to the view that we are taking that an illatom son in law who does not lose his rights in his own family cannot be regarded as a major son of his father in law for the purposes of the Ceiling Act
If he was so regarded there would be a double benefit in the sense that because of his presence the ceiling area of his father in law would be increased as well as the ceiling area of his natural father and that certianly could not have been the intention behind the amendment inserting Section 4A
Since there is no custom of having an illatom among Muslims and Christians such a construction would lead to disparity between the position of Muslims and Christians on the one hand and Hindus on the other
That would be contrary to the very purpose for which the amendment was made
In the result we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal and it must fail
Appeal dismissed
However looking to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs
VPR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant wife filed an application for maintenance against respondent husband under section 125 of the Code of Criminal procedure 1973
The respondent contested the application on the ground that appellant was not his legally wedded wife since their marriage was void on account of subsistence of respondent s earlier marriage
The Magistrate awarded a monthly maintenance of Rs 400 to the wife by holding that the respondent has not proved his first marrige
The order of the magistrate was set aside by the High Court in revision accepting the respodent s plea that his first marriage was subsisting when the respodent married the appellant
In appeal to this court it was contented on behalf of the respodent that the High Court had no material before it for arriving at the finding that there was an earlier valid marriage on the date respondent married the appellant
Allowing the appeal this Court
HELD1 Section 125 of the code of Criminal Procedure is meant to achieve a social purpose
The object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution
it provides a speedy remedy for the supply of foodclothing and shelter to the deserted wife
The term wife includes a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried
The woman not having the legal status of a wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of the term Wife consistent with the objective
Howeverunder the law a second wife whose marriage is void on account of the survival of the first marriage is 905 not a legally wedded wife and isthereforenot entitled to maintenance under this provision
Therefore the law which disentitles the second wife from receiving maintenance from her husband for the sole reason that the marriage ceremony though performed in the customary from lacks legal sanctity can be applied only when the husband satisfactorily proves the subsistence of a legal and valid marriage particularly when the provision in the Code is ameasure of social justice intended to protect women and children
Accordingly when an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting her as a kept mistress on the specious plea that he was already married the court should insist on strict proof of the earlier marriage
907D H 2
The respondent has not discharged the heavy burden by tendering strict proof of the fact in issue
He clearly admitted his marriage with the appellant acording to Hindu rites
But there is no clear admission of his earlier marriage to dispense with the proof of subsisting valid first marriage when the second marriage was solemnised
In the absence of such an admission the statement that the respondent was living with another woman as husband and wife cannot persuade was court to hold that the marriage duly solemnised between the appellant and the respondent suffers from any legal infirmity
906C H 3
The nomination in the Insurance Policy and Entry in the Identity Card referred to by the High Court are not conclusive of the subsistence of a valid marriage between the respondent and his earlier wife
The High Court has failed to consider the standard of proof required and has proceeded on no evidence whatsoever in determining the question against the appeallant
Accordingly the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Magistrate is restored
907B C