view Petition Nos
557 564  5715941987
IN 827 CIVIL MISC
PETITION NOS
25279 13195 19336 18600 1563 15031 33 19552 206951986
IN CIVIL APPEAL NOS
3005 1599 2194 2067 158 2148 50 290286 25338622388
G Ramaswamy Additional Solicitor General AK Ganguli PP Singh RP Srivastava and P Parmeswaran for the Petitioner
J Ramamurthy B Parthasarthi VJ Francis CS Vai dyanathan SR Setia Harish N Salve Ravinder Narain D N Misra section Padmanabha Mahale Mrs Leelawati KK Gupta V Balachandran and Uma Dutta for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKIIARJI J
In these matters the question that arises for consideration is whether a learned Single Judge sitting in Chambers is competent to dismiss applica tion for condonation of delay in statutory appeals under Order XX A of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 regarding appeal under section 55 of the as well as under Order XX B re garding appeals under Section 130 E of the and Section 35 L of the Central Excises  Salt Act 1944
It appears that an application for condonation of delay came before a learned Single Judge and in the circumstances mentioned in the Review Petition No 557 of 1987 the appli cation was dismissed by the learned Single Judge
That application was dismissed by one of us on 111 I 86
That order was passed by learned Single Judge under Order VI rule 214 of the Supreme Court Rules 1966
The application had been filed for the condonation of delay along with the Statutory Appeal against the JudgmentOrder of the Customs Excises and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal
The revenue being the Collector of Central Excise Madras in this case filed a review petition on the ground that the application for condonation of delay made in Statutory Appeals arising out of final orders of the Tribunal under several Acts should be heard by a bench of at least two Judges
The matter was posted before this bench for consideration wheth er the learned Single Judge had jurisdiction to dismiss such application for condonation of delay or not
In order to decide this question it is necessary to have a cons 828 pectus of the relevant rules
In the Supreme Court Rules 1966 hereinafter referred to as the Rules  as amended in 1983 under Order XX B of the said rules provision has been made for appeals under clause b of Section 130 E of the and under Section 35 L of the 
According to Rule 1 thereof the petition of appeal shall subject to the provisions of Sections 4 5  12 of the be presented within 60 days from the date of the order sought to be appealed against or within 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the Appellate whichever is later
The time required for obtaining a copy of the order should be excluded
There is however no provision providing for limitation in the con cerned Statutes
According to Rule 2 of Order XX B Rules 1 to 7 of Order XX A of the Rules relating to appeals under Section 51 of the shall with necessary modifications and adaptations apply to appeals under that Order
Rule 3 of Order XX A provides as under After the appeal is registered it shall be put up for hearing ex parte before the Court which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue of notice to all necessary par ties or may make such orders as the circum stances of the case may require
According to this provision it appears that all such statutory appeals have to be placed before a Court for ex parte admission
According to Section 5 of the  Any appeal or any application  may be admitted after a prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not prefer ring the appeal or making an application within such a period
 Some grounds according to the appellant had been made for condonation of delay
Apparently in the facts of the case the learned Single Judge did not find any merit in those grounds and refused to condone the delay
Consequently it was contended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of delay was dismissal of the appeal following as a result thereof
The question is can the learned Single Judge do it9 The 829 learned Single Judge has done it by virtue of Rule 214 of Order VI of the said Rules
Order VI deals with the Busi ness in Chambers 
Order VI Rule 1 provides that the powers of the Court in relation to the matters enumerated thereun der would be exercised by the Registrar
Order VI Rule 2 provides that the powers of the Court in relation to certain matters may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in Cham bers
Thereafter 28 such matters are enumerated
Rule 214 of Order VI provides as follows Applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the Court and except applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions
Reading the rule simply it appears to us that it means all applications for the enlargement or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the learned Single Judge in Chambers except those applications time for which has been fixed by the Court in terms of Order VII and also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions
This appears to us to be logical and literal meaning of the said rule
The question however has been posed is this an application for condonation of delay or an application for enlargement or abridgement of time
This question it ap pears to us is concluded by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City vs RH Pandi Manag ing Trustees of Trust Bombay  There a bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to con sider this question
A question arose there as to whether the application for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal could be heard by the Judge in his Chambers
Ray CJ observed in the said judgment an argument was advanced before the Hon ble Judge in Chambers that if an application for condonation of delay was refused by the Judge in Cham bers it would amount to dismissal of the appeal by the Judge in Chambers
Therefore it was said that these applications should be heard by the Court  which alone was competent to dismiss the appeal
By Court it was urged meant a bench of two learned Judges
After giving notices to the learned Attorney General and the Bar Association the matter was discussed by this Court and it was held that in view of Order VI Rule 214 of the Rules set out hereinbefore all applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except the three cases mentioned in Order VI Rule 214 were to be heard by the Judge in Chambers
At the relevant time the three matters included inter alia deposit of security
This Court observed in the said decision that an important exception was the application for condonation of delay in 830 filing special leave petitions
It was observed that Order XLVII Rule 3 of the Rules stated that the Court might en large or abridge any time appointed by these rules or fixed by any order enlarging time for doing any act or taking proceedings upon such terms if any as the justice of the case might require and any enlargement might be ordered although the application therefore was not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed
A petition of appeal was required under Order XV of the Rules to be presented within 60 days from the grant of certificate of fitness
The time to present the petition of appeal was fixed by the Rules of this Court
It was observed there fore that Order XLVII Rule 3 should apply with regard to enlargement or abridgement of any time appointed by the Rules for doing any act
This Court was of the view that Order VI Rule 214 spoke of the applications for enlarge ment or abridgement of time
Here the words enlargement or abridgement of time took in applications for enlargement of time appointed by the Rules that is to say according to this Court fixed by the Rules
The significant feature of the Rules was that applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions were excepted from the busi ness of a Chamber Judge
The natural presumption was that but for the exception the Rule would have to be included also applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions
Any application for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal was therefore included in applica tions for enlargement or abridgement of time
This Court noted that the practice of the Chamber Judge hearing appli cations for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by the Rules of this Court had been followed ever since 1966
Cursus curiae est lex curiae
The practice of this Court is the law of the Court
See Broom s Legal Maxims at p 82
Where a practice had existed it was convenient to adhere to it because it was the practice
It was noted that the power of each Court over its own process is unlimited it is a power incident to all Courts
Reliance was placed on the observations in Cooker vs Tempest Therefore this Court held that applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal were within the Chamber business under Order VI Rule 214
Learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the aforesaid decision requires reconsideration
He submit ted that a prior decision of this Court and a decision of Calcutta High Court were not adverted to
He further submit ted that this Court spoke of enlargement or abridgement of time fixed by the Rules
Therefore it could not be con tended that the application for condonation of delay would come within this purview
Furthermore it was argued that if the exceptions in favour of special leave petitions are maintained there would be hostile discrimi 831 nation without any basis namely special leave petitions being amenable to be dealt with by the two Judges while the learned Single Judge will dispose of the application for condonation of delay under Statutory Appeals
This it was submitted is irrational and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the Rules should not be so construed
The Learned Additional Solicitor General therefore submitted before us that we should hold that as dismissal of applica tion for condonation of delay amounts to dismissal of the appeal it should be heard in terms of Order VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions namely it should be heard by not less than two Judges
He submitted that if we were not inclined to accept this submissions in view of the decision of this Court in C 1
T Bombay City vs RH Pandi Manag ing Trustees of Trust Bombay supra we should refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the matter
We have considered the matter
We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General
We accept the reasoning to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income tax vs RH Pandi supra
We find that was the practice of the Court
That has been sanctified by the judicial decision
We also see reason in the decision and the practice
We do not find any reason for holding that the practice of this Court followed since 1966 requires to be altered
Arranging the business of the Court is within the domain of the Court
These Rules have been framed by this Court with the approval of the President of India
Under Order I Rule 21g of the Rules Court  means the Supreme Court of India
Sub rule 14 of Rule 2 of Order VI empowers a Single Judge to decide certain matters which speaks of applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by the Court and except inter alia applications for condonation of delay in filing special leave petitions
On a proper reading it appears to us that the exception made only in favour of the time fixed by the Court means Court functioning judicially in terms of Order VII Rule 1 as well as time fixed by the Rules of the Court
All other applications for enlargement or abridgement of time could be heard by the learned Single Judge
As is clear Order VI demarcates the power of the Registrar and the learned Single Judge and Order VII demarcates the con stitution of the Division Courts powers of a Single Judge and the Vacation Judge
This is arranging the business of the Court
This is within the power of the Court
Two deci sions were referred to us by the learned Additional Solici tor General
Our attention was drawn to the observations in the Division Bench Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Promotho Nath Roy vs WA Lee AIR 1921 Calcutta 415
There the Court was concerned 832 with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code Section 109
The Court observed that an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation prescribed therefore after further refusing an application under section 5 of the to admit the appeal after the prescribed time was passed on appeal  under Section 109
Sanderson CJ doubt ed the said conclusion but observed that this involved a substantial question of law
That was an application by the defendant for a certificate that the decree of this Court from which the appeal was sought to the Privy Council in volved a claim of Rs 10000 and that the appeal involved some substantial question of law
The question was whether such application should be allowed
A point was taken on behalf of the plaintiff that the decree of the High Court was not one passed on appeal  within the meaning of clause a of Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code
There it appears that the order of Mr Justice Greaves against which the appeal was directed was made on 26th July 1918
On the 30th August 1918 being the last date of sitting of the Court at about 500 PM after the Court of Appeal had risen an application was made to Mr Justice Chaudhuri sitting on the Original Side for leave to file the memoran dum of appeal without a copy of the order against which the defendant desired to appeal
The learned Judge granted leave to the defendant to file the memorandum of appeal subject to any objection which might be taken on behalf of the plain tiff
When the matter came before the appeal Court the plaintiff took the point that the appeal was out of time
The appeal Court decided that the appeal was out of time being barred by the  and the Court further refused an application under Section 5 of the to admit the appeal after the prescribed time and the appeal was dismissed
Having regard to the above mentioned facts Sanderson CJ observed that it cannot be held that the order was not one passed on appeal 
Sanderson CJ had some doubts on that proposition but agreed with Woodroffe J that the appeal involved substantial question of law
In that appeals a certificate was granted
In our opinion this decision is not relevant for the issue before us
Whether an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in case of Statutory Appeal is an order or appeal is not quite in issue here and is not decisive of the mat ter
It does not solve the question whether a learned Single Judge can dismiss an application for condonation of delay in a statutory appeal
After all the Court functions by its arrangement under the Rules
Order VI mentions the Chamber Business and the Business to be transacted by the Registrar and Single Judge sitting in Chambers
The powers of the Court that is to say the whole Court and the powers of Division Bench normally except those mentioned in Order VI will be as enjoined by Rule
1 of Order VII 833 that is to say a bench consisting of not less than two Judges
In that view of the clear provisions of the Rule we are of the opinion that the said decision of the Calcutta High Court upon which reliance has been placed does not in any manner detract the decision of this Court in C 1
T Bombay City vs RH Pandi
Our attention was also drawn to a decision of this Court in Ms Mela Ram  Sons vs The Com missioner of Income Tax Punjab  There the appellant firm had filed appeals against orders assessing it to income tax and super tax for two years 1945 46 and 1946 47 beyond the time prescribed by Section 302 of the Income Tax Act
The appeals were numbered and notices were issued for their hearing under Section 31 of the Income Tax Act 1922
At the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the Department took the objection that the appeals were barred by time
The appellant prayed for condonation of delay but that was refused and the appeals were dismissed as time barred
The appellant then preferred appeals against the orders of dismissal to the Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act and the Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assist ant Commissioner were in substance passed under Section 302 and not under Section 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay against them under Section 33 of the Act
This Court observed that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal and an order dismissing it as time barred is one passed in appeal 
Section 31 of the Act was the only provision relat ing to the hearing and disposal of appeals and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation as in the present case is one passed in appeal it must fall within Section 31 and as Section 33 confers a right of appeal against all orders passed under Section 31 it must also be appealable
These observations in our opinion were made entirely in different statutory context and cannot be used in the context in which the question has arisen before us in the present case
Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted before us that in view of the fact that these two decisions were not considered by this Court in C 1
T Bombay City vs RH Pandi supra and in view of the fact that this argument in favour of statutory appeals to be heard by the learned Single Judge while the applications for condonation of delay in respect of the special leave peti tions to be heard by the bench of two learned Judges will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as such this contention should be heard by a larger bench
We are unable to accept this submission
This Court had occasion to consider the situation in which question settled by this Court can be reviewed
Refer ence may be made to the observations of Gajendragadkar CJ in the Keshav Mills Co Ltd 834 vs CIT Bombay North  at page 921 the learned Chief Justice observed In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this Court in the New Jehangir Mills 1960 1 SCR 249 case and the Petlad Ltd case 1963 Supp 1 SCR 871 should be reconsidered and revised by us we ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases
Mr Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that in a proper case this Court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions and so the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this Court or not need not detain us
In exercising this inherent power however this Court would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so
It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving ques tions of construing statutory or constitutional provisions two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views the process of decision making is often very difficult and delicate
When this Court hears appeals against decisions of the High Courts and is required to consider the propriety or correctness of the view taken by the High Courts on any point of law it would be open to this Court to hold that though the view taken by the High Court is reasonably possible the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is better and should be preferred
In such a case the choice is between the view taken by the High Court whose judgment is under appeal and the alterna tive view which appears to this Court to be more reasonable and in accepting its own view in preference to that of the High Court this Court would be discharging
its duty as a Court of Appeal
But different considerations must inevita bly arise where a previous decision of this Court has taken a particular view as to the construction of a statutory provision as for instance Section 664 of the Act
When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an ade quate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably 835 possible view the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable
In reviewing and revising its earlier decision this Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised
When this Court decides questions of law its decisions are under Article 141 binding on all courts within the territory of India and so it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and conti nuity in the interpretation of law in the country
Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable may inci dentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided
That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous it should hesitate to correct the error but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous the Court must be satis fied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified
It is not possible or desirable and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions
It would always depend upon several relevant considerations What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based On the earlier occasion did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed
Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view What would be impact of the error on the general administra tion of law or on public good
Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts
And would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience hardship or mischief
These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earli er decisions
 836 This view was again reiterated by this Court in the Pillani Investment Corporation Ltd vs Income Tax Officer A Ward Calcutta and Another1972 In the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the provisions of the said Rules as noticed before we cannot say that we are satisfied that the earlier decision of this Court in CIT Bombay City vs RH Pandi supra was clearly erroneous
In that view of the matter it is not necessary to refer this question to a larger bench or to disturb the settled practice of this Court
There is no substance in the contention of any discrimi nation under Article 14 of the Constitution or in Order VII rule 214
Applications under Article 136 is a special class and are sui juris
These are and should legitimately be treated separately other than all other applications including applications under Statutory Appeals
If a sepa rate and distinct provision is made for application of condonation of delay under Article 136 of the Constitution we do not see any conceivable ground which can be taken for contending that it is violative of Article 14 of the Consti tution
After all Article 136 is the residuary power of this Court to do justice where the Court is satisfied that there is injustice
These are class apart
The practice of the learned Single Judge disposing of in Chambers applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals is just fair and reasonable
Every court has the right to arrange its own affairs
We find no reason either to upset that practice or to cast doubt on the propriety of such practice
In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in PN Eswara lyer etc etc
vs The Registrar Supreme Court of India where this Court upheld the circulation system for the disposal of the Review Petitions and held that early hearing was the essential requirement if a review petition is found devoid of substance
Such different treatment in respect of different applications has always been within the domain of Court s arrangement of business
These do not involve any violation of the fundamental right
In the premises we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed
We hold that a Single Learned Judge in Chambers is and was always competent to dismiss all applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals
We find nothing repugnant in the same and no substance in the contention that otherwise the same would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitu tion
The Review Petitions therefore fail and are dis missed
NPV Petitions dismissed


Summary:
The petitioners who had served the respondent Corpora tion for long periods on daily wage basis prayed for regu larisation of services and grant of time scale pay from their dates of initial appointment on the ground that others similarly placed had been granted these benefits
The Court after noticing that there were discrepancies in the factual position adopted by the parties DIRECTED The matter to be examined is with reference to factual position as to when the 19 persons in Annexure A  were initially employed and when they have been regularised as against the initial employment of each of the petition ers
This can be done only by reference to appropriate records
We direct that a senior officer of the Corporation shall be named by respondent No 1 to look into these alle gations and at the time the question is examined by such officer the petitioners shall be given appropriate opportu nity of being heard if asked for through counsel also and all relevant documents should be looked into to ascertain whether the claim of the petitioners that they have been discriminated against in the facts indicated in their writ petition particularly with reference to Annexure A  is correct and in case it is found that the petitioners have not been given the benefit which has given to the 19 daily rated Conductors specified in Annexure A  petitioners may be conferred the same benefit as has been extended to those 19 persons unless the respondent is able to assign satisfac tory and cogent reasons and states as to why petitioners are not entitled to the same benefit
This would be so on the footing that regularisation does not require a specified period of service to have been put in
939E H