249 of 1956
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights
R Ramamurthi Aiyar and B K B Naidu for the petitioners
Purshottam Tricumdas P Ramaswamy Advocate 2 Bombay High Court with special permission and 1
N Shroff for the respondent No 1
Y Kumar for the interveners
C K Daphtary Solicitor General of India and B Sen for the Attorney General of India To assist the Court
March 19
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J
This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution
The petitioner is a private limited company having its registered office at No 201 Mount Road Madras
The company is the proprietor of a daily newspaper called  The Hindu  which is published at Madras and has a large circulation in India and abroad
The shareholders of the company are all citizens of India
The first respon dent Shri N Salivateeswaran is a journalist of Bombay and he has been supplying news to various newspapers and journals one of which was the Hindu
The supply of news by the first respondent to the Hindu was under an agreement under which he was being paid a fixed monthly honorarium
Contrary to the advice and instructions of the petitioner the first respondent left India for Zurich on May 1 1956
The petitioner thereupon relieved him of his duties and terminated with effect from March 1 1956 the arrangement under which he was supplying news to the Hindu
He returned to India in July 1956 and requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision but the petitioner did not think that any case for reconsideration had been made out
Thereupon the first respondent made an application to the Labour Minister of the State of Bombay under section 17 of the Working Journalists Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1955 Act 45 of 1955 hereinafter referred to as the act
On receiving this application the State of Bombay nominated Shri M R Meher 1
C section Retired second respondent as the authority under section 17 of the act for the purpose of enquiry into the first respondent s application and requested him to examine the claim made by the first 3 respondent and in case he was satisfied that any money was due to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector of Bombay for further action as provided under section 17
A copy of the application was served on the petitioner by order of the second respondent and a covering letter addressed to the petitioner called upon him to file his written statement in reply to the first respondent s claim
By his application the first respondent had claimed a sum of Rs 157172 8 0 from the petitioner
In his written statement the petitioner disputed the whole of the claim made by the first respondent and traversed all the material allegations made by him in support of his claim
The petitioner also contended that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to go into the matters arising from the first respondent s application
It was also urged by the petitioner alternatively that even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to deal with the matter he had the discretion to decline to consider the matter and leave it to be tried in the ordinary courts
The petitioner requested the second respondent to exercise his discretion and direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the appro priate civil court
The petitioner s written statement was filed on October 18 1956
The second respondent decided to deal with the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue
He heard both the parties on this preliminary issue and by his order dated November 12 1956 he recorded his conclusion that he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that it was unnecessary to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court
Accordingly the matter was adjourned to December 1 1956 for hearing on the merits
It is this order which is challenged by the petitioner before us by his present petition under article 32 of the Constitution
The petitioner s case is that section 17 of the act provides only for a mode of recovery of any money due to a working journalist
It does not empower the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to act as a forum for adjudicating 4 upon the merits of the disputed claim
That being so the second respondent has no jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the first respondent s claim against the petitioner
In the alternative the petitioner contends thatif section 17 confers jurisdiction on the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to adjudicate upon disputed claims mentioned in the said
section the said section would be ultra vires and void
On these alternative pleas two alternative reliefs are claimed by the petitioner
The first relief claimed is that a writ in the nature of the writ of prohibition or other suitable writ or direction be issued restraining the second respondent from exercising any powers under section 17 of the act and proceeding with the enquiry into the application filed by the first respondent and forwarded to him by the State Government and issue him a certificate
The other relief claimed is that this court should be pleased to order and direct that section 17 of the act is ultra vires and void on the grounds set out in the petition
It would be necessary and convenient to construe section 17 of the act first and determine its true scope and effect
The larger question about the vires of this act and the validity of the decision of the Wage Board set up by the Central Government under section 8 of the act have been considered by us in the several petitions filed by several employers in that behalf before this Court
We have held in those petitions that with the exception of section 5 1 a iii which deals with the payment of gratuity to employees who voluntarily resign from service the rest of the act is valid
That is why the question about the vires of section 17 need not be considered in the present petition over again
The main point which remains to be considered however is Does section 17 constitute the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government into a forum for adjudicating upon the merits of the claim made by newspaper employee against hip employer under any of the provisions of this act  Section 17 provides  Where any money is due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions 5 of this Act whether by way of compensation gratuity or wages the newspaper employee may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the State
Government or such authority as the State Government may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due it shall issue a certificate for that  amount to the collector and the collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue
 It is clear that the employee s claim against his employer which can form the subject matter of an enquiry under section 17 must relate to compensation awardable under section 4 of the act gratuity awardable under section 5 of the act or wages claimable under the decision of the Wage Board
If the employee wishes to make any other claim against his employer that would not be covered by section 17
As the marginal note shows the section deals with the recovery of money due from an employer
The employee contends that the process of recovery begins with the making of an application setting out the claim and ends with the actual recovery of the amount found due
On this construction the dispute between the employee and his employer in regard to any claim which the employee may make against his employer would fall to be determined on the merits right up from the start to the issue of the certificate under this section
In other words if a claim is made by the employee and denied by the employer the merits of the claim together with the other issues that may arise between the parties have to be considered under this section
On this argument section 17 provides a self contained procedure for the enforcement of the claims covered by it
On the other hand the case for the petitioner is that the section provides for a procedure to recover the amount due from an employer not for the determination of the question as to what amount is due
The condition precedent for the application of section 17 is a prior determination by a competent authority or the 6 court of the amount due to the employee from his employer
It is only if and after the amount due to the employee has been duly determined that the stage is reached to recover that amount and it is at this stage that the employee is given the additional advantage provided by section 17 without prejudice to any other mode of recovery available to him
According to this view the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government has to hold a summary enquiry on a very narrow and limited point Is the amount which is found due to the employee still due when the employee makes an application under section 17 or has any amount been paid and if yes how much still remains to be paid It is only a limited enquiry of this type which is contemplated by section 17
Within the scope of the enquiry permitted by this section are not included the examination and decision of the merits of the claim made by the employee
When the section refers to the application made by the employee for the recovery of the money due to him it really contemplates the stage of execution which follows the passing of the decree or the making of an award or order by an appropriate court or authority
In our opinion the construction suggested by the petitioner should be accepted because we feel that this construction is more reasonable and more consistent with the scheme of the act
It is significant that the State Government or the specific authority mentioned in section 17 has not been clothed with the normal powers of a court or a tribunal to hold a formal enquiry
It is true that section 3 sub section
1 of the Act provides for the application of the  to or in relation to working journalists subject to sub section
2 but this provision is in substance intended to make working journalists workmen within the meaning of the main 
This section cannot be read as conferring on the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under section 17 power to enforce attendance of witnesses examine them on oath issue commission or pass orders in respect of discovery and inspection such as can be passed by the boards courts 7 or tribunals under the 
It is obvious that the relevant provisions of section 11 of the  which confer the said powers on the conciliation officers boards courts and tribunals cannot be made applicable to the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under section 17 merely by virtue of section 31 of the act
In this connection it would be relevant to remember that section 11 of the act expressly confers the material powers on the Wage Board established tinder section 8 of the Act
Whatever may be the true nature or character of the Wage Board whether it is a legislative or an administrative body the legislature has taken the precaution to enact the enabling provisions of section 11 in the matter of the said material powers
It is wellknown that whenever the legislature wants to confer upon any specified authority powers of a civil court in the matter of holding enquiries specific provision is made in that behalf
if the legislature had intended that the enquiry authorised under section 17 should include within its compass the examination of the merits of the employee s claim against his employer and a decision on it the legislature would undoubtedly have made an appropriate provision conferring on the State Government or the specified authority the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively holding such an enquiry
The fact that the legislature has enacted section 11 in regard to the Wage Board but has not made any corresponding provision in regard to the State Government or the specified authority under section 17 lends strong corroboration to the view that the enquiry contemplated by section 17 is a summary enquiry of a very limited nature and its scope is confined to the investigation of the narrow point as to what amount is actually due to be paid to the employee under the decree award or other valid order obtained by the employee after establishing his claim in that behalf
We are reluctant to accept the view that the legislature intended that the specified authority or the State Government should hold a larger enquiry into the merits of the employee s claim without conferring on the State Government or the 8 specified authority the necessary powers in that behalf
In this connection it would be relevant to Point out that in many cases some complicated questions of fact may arise when working journalists make claims for wages against their employers
It is not unlikely that the status of the working journalist the nature of the office he holds and the class to which he belongs may themselves be matters of dispute between the parties and the decision of such disputed questions of fact may need thorough examination and a formal enquiry
If that be so it is not likely that the legislature could have intended that such complicated questions of fact should be dealt with in a summary enquiry indicated by section 17
Section 17 seems to correspond in substance to the provisions of section 20 sub section
1 of the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act 1950 which has now been repealed
Under this section any money due from an employer under any award or decision of an industrial tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money under that award or decision
It is clear that the proceedings under section 20 sub section
1 could commence only if and after the workman had obtained an award or decision in his favour
We are inclined to think that the position under section 17 is substantially similar
In this connection we may also refer to the provisions of section 33C of the 14 of 1947
sub section
1 of section 33C has been added by Act 36 of 1956 and is modelled on the provisions of section 17 of the present Act
Section 33C sub section
2 however is more relevant for our purpose
Under section 33C sub section
2 where any workman is entitled to receive from his employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount at which such benefit may be computed may subject to any rules made under this act be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the amount so determined should be recovered as provided for in 9 sub section
Then follows sub section
3 which provides for an enquiry by the Labour Court into the question of computing the money value of the benefit in question
The Labour Court is empowered under this sub section to appoint a commissioner who shall after taking such evidence as may be necessary submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case
These provisions indicate that where an employee makes a claim for some money by virtue of the benefit to which he is entitled an enquiry into the claim is contemplated by the Labour Court and it is only after the Labour Court has decided the matter that the decision becomes enforceable under section 33C1 by a summary procedure
It is true that in the present case the Government of Bombay has specified the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act and the as specified authorities under section 17 to deal with applications of newspaper employees whose wages are less than Rs 200 per month or more respectively but there can be no doubt that when the second respondent entertained the first respondent s application he was acting as the specified authority under section 17 and not as an industrial tribunal
It is clear that under section 17 the State Government would be entitled to specify any person it likes for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the said section
The powers of the authority specified under section 17 must be found in the provisions of the act itself and they cannot be inferred from the accidental circumstance that the specified authority otherwise is a member of the industrial tribunal since there is no provision in the act which confers on the specified authority the relevant and adequate powers to hold a formal enquiry it would be difficult to accept the position that various questions which may arise between the working journalists and their employers were intended to be dealt with in a summary and an informal manner without conferring adequate powers on the 2 10 specified authority in that behalf
The second respondent himself was impressed by this argument but he was inclined to hold that the necessary power could be assumed by him by implication because he thought that in the absence of such implied power his jurisdiction under section 17 could not be effectively exercised
In our opinion this approach really begs the question
If the legislature did not confer ad
equate powers on the specified authority under section 17 a more reasonable inference would be that the nature and scope of the powers under section 17 is very limited and the legislature knew that for holding such a limited and narrow enquiry it was unnecessary to confer powers invariably associated with formal and complicated enquiries of a judicial or quasi judicial character
We must accordingly hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent s application at this stage
It appears from the order made by the second respondent that he took the view that though he had jurisdiction to deal with the application it would have been open to him to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction and to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court
He however thought that he need not exercise that power in the present case
We are satisfied that the second respondent was in error in both these conclusions
If he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under section 17 it is difficult to appreciate how in the absence of any provision in that behalf he could have directed the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court
Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondent s failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him
Besides if section 17 had really given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the second respondent on the merits of this case it would obviously have been a case which should have been referred to the ordinary civil court
This however is now a matter of purely academic interest
The question which still remains to be considered is What would be the proper order to make on the present petition in view of our conclusion that the 11 second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent s application
The present petition purports to invoke our jurisdiction under article 32 of the Constitution and it was a valid and competent petition in so far as it challenged the vires of section 17 itself but once section 17 is held to be valid and in order the competence of the petition under article 32 is naturally open to serious jeopardy
No question about the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under article 32
This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner
He however argued that if we construe section 17 in his favour and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent s application his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under article 32 of the Constitution
In our opinion there is considerable force in this contention
We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent s application but since the petition itself is not competent under article 32 we would direct that the petition fails on this technical ground and must be dismissed
There would be no order as to costs
Petition dismissed


Summary:
This appeal by special leave was directed against the Judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant s writ petition challenging the order dispensing with his services
The appellant was appointed as Addl
District and Sessions Judge on probation for two years
While he was on probation there were certain complaints against him and an inquiry was held by a Judge of the High Court as a result whereof the High Court by its resolution recommended the termination of the appellant s services to the State Government
The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the said resolution of the High Court
The High Court dismissed the writ petition whereupon the State Government issued orders terminating the appellant s services
Aggrieved the appellant moved this Court challenging the orders of the High Court and the State government above said
The appellant contended that since the High Court had resolved that his services should be terminated on the basis of the inquiry report the constitutional protection available to him under Article 3112 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice had been violated
Counsel for the High Court submitted that the inquiry held was merely to judge the appellant s suitability for service and the appellant was not entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 3112 of the Constitution or to any opportunity of hearing before taking the decision regarding the termination of his probationary period
Allowing the appeal the Court 397  HELD The High Court had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the appellant s work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary period
The material taken into consideration was non existent while the other material was not relevant and the allegations taken into consideration against him remained unsubstantiated
The High Court erred in holding the appellant s work and conduct to be unsatisfactory and in terminating his services
401 A C In one case adverse remarks made against the appellant by the High Court Bains J had been directed by this Court in appeal to be expunged as they were found to be unjustified and unwarranted
In another case members of the Bar Association had passed a resolution condemning the appellant on a trifling matter without applying their mind to the question involved
The members of the Bar practising before the Court should be aware of the legal position and they should not have passed the resolution condemning the appellant without there being any justifiable cause
If the members of the Bar Association pass resolutions against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts without any justifiable cause it would be difficult for the judicial officers to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities in an objective and unbiased manner
The High Court instead of protecting the appellant distressingly took the Bar resolution into consideration in assessing the appellant s work and conduct
402B 404B D The complaints against the appellant were enquired into by Justice Surinder Singh Vigilance Judge and his report had formed the foundation for the action taken by the High Court against the appellant
An analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge showed that out of four complaints in respect of two of them the Vigilance Judge had expressed the opinion that the matter needed further investigation and enquiry and he was not in a position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those complaints
As regards the third complaint officers had committed no wrong in postponing the pronouncement of the order with a view to give time to the parties to compromise
As regards the fourth matter Khem Chand s complaint the Vigilance Judge had not expressed any opinion
The report of the Vigilance Judge did not show that the work and conduct of the appellant were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a judicial officer
The complaints in respect of which the Vigilance Judge had observed that the same needed further inquiry could not at all be considered against the appellant
The High Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding that the appellant s work and conduct was not satisfactory
407H 408A D 398 So far as the annual entry on the appellant s confidential roll was A concerned there was no material against him to show that his work and conduct was unsatisfactory
408G H While considering complaints of irregularities against the judicial officer on probation the High Court should have kept in mind that the incidents related to the very first year of appellant s service
Every Judicial officer is likely to commit mistakes of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service which a mature judicial officer would not do
If the orders are passed without any corrupt motive the same should be overlooked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him
If after the warning and guidance the officer on probation is not able to improve his services may be terminated
409C E While exercising control over the subordinate judiciary under the Constitution the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers
An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries
If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side and if the judicial officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints no judicial officer would feel secure and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner
An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for the Rule of law
It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect its honest judicial officers by ignoring ill conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants
409E G In this case the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by others were motivated which did not deserve credit
Even the Vigilance Judge did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially
409H 410A The orders of the High Court and the State Government were set aside
The appellant was directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other benefits
410B C