ivil Appeal Nos
1454 63  1642 45 of 1981
From the Judgment and Order dated 1041981 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No 3720 of 1979
G Ramaswamy MS Ganesh section Murlidhar Sanjeev Ahuja and B Parthasarthy for the Appellants
C Sitaramaiya TVSN Chari and Mrs B Sunita Rao for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA J
These appeal are directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 10th April 1981 rendered in a batch of writ petitions reported in Ms Poddar Projects Ltd Multi Steels vs APSE Board AIR 1982 Andhra Pradesh 189
For the sake of convenience these appeals are being decided by a common judgment
In order to appreciate the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties necessary facts may be stated in brief
The appellants are some of the mini steel plants of Andhra Pradesh
Revised terms and conditions of electricity supply were notified by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board for short the Electricity Board in BP Ms No690 Coml on 17975 to be effec 628 tive from 20 October 1975 Subsequently GO Ms No 832 dated 2nd November 1977 was issued by the State Government whereby concessional tariff of 011 p per unit for the period of three years commencing from 1st November 1977 and endings with 31st October 1980 was applied in respect of the following five consumers 1
Andhra Pradesh State Corporation Limited 2
Poddar Projects Limited 3
AK Corporation Limited 4
Andhra Steels Vishakapatnam 5
AK Corporation Vishakapatnam
This concessional tariff was subsequently enhanced to 125 p by the State Government vide GO Ms No 876 dated 26th November 1977
The concessional tariff referred to above however was not extended to Ms Andhra Steel Corporation by the Electricity Board by passing a resolution in its meeting held on 26th November 1977 inasmuch as the Andhra Steel Corporation had already filed a writ petition inter alia claiming that the agreement which it had entered into with the Electricity Board for availing high tension electric supply was no longer in force
In respect of the remaining four steel plants referred to above the Electricity Board extended the concessional tariff of 122 p subject to escalations and other terms and conditions of supply and fixed minimum consumption of 403325 unitsKVA
This was done by issuing BP Ms No 78 dated 20th January 1978
These four mini steel plants were however subsequently directed by the Electricity Board vide BP Ms No 436Coml
dated 3rd May 1978 to be charged at a tariff rate of 16 p per unit instead of 122 p without reference to the maximum demand charges from 1st March 1978
The Electricity Board also sought clarification from the State Government vide its letter No DE Coml 1205 176 32 dated 27 November 1978 with regard to fixation of minimum consumption of 403325 unitsKVA and fixation of concessional tariff at 016 p per unit in view of the new levy of central excise duty and in view of the increased cost of generation
The State Government vide GO Ms No 697 dated 5th December 1978 issued a clarification that the aforesaid GO Ms
Nos 832 and 876 did not preclude the Electricity Board from applying the normal terms and conditions of supply and prescribing the monthly minimum charges and the working out of the escalated rate from time of time
Subsequently the State Government vide GO Ms No 146 dated 12th March 1979 withdrew the concessional tariff contemplated by GO Ms Nos 832 and 876 referred to above
This was done on the representation of the Electricity Board which in its turn through its BP Ms No 830 dated 2nd April 1979 cancelled BPMs
Nos 78 and 436 with effect from 12th March 1979
The State Government 629 subsequently also issued GO Ms No 10 dated 16th January 1980 whereby it was clarified that its intention in issuing the earlier GO Ms No 697 dated 5th December 1978 was to allow the concessional tariff rate notified in GO Ms no 876 without limiting the concession by imposition of minimum consumption charges till the end of March 1979
The Electricity Board felt aggreived by this GO and requested the Government to cancel it for the reasons set out in its letter dated 28th January 1980
One of the grievances of the Andhra Steel Corporation in its writ petition before the High Court was that the Electricity Board while applying the concessional tariff to the other mini steel plants was not justified in refusing the said concession to it merely because it had filed a writ petition
The action of the Electricity Board is singling it out was according to the Andhra Steel Corporation discriminatory and mala fide
This plea has been reiterated before us also and is confined to the appeal preferred by the Andhra Steel Corporation
The pleas common to all the appellants which were raise before the High Court as also before us may now be enumerated
It has been asserted that in view of the direction issued by the State Government fixing concessional tariff for the appellants it was not open to the Electricity Board to have levied minimum charges and it was bound to supply electricity to the appellants on the concessional tariff alone as fixed by the state Government
As regards the order of the State Government dated 5th December 1978 which clarified that its earlier orders fixing concessional tariff did not preclude the Electricity Board from levying inter alia minimum charges it has been asserted that the said order is illegal
In the alternative it is asserted that if clarificatory orders could be issued by the State Government with regard to its orders fixing concessional tariff the subsequent clarification made by order dated 16th January 1980 had to prevail over the earlier clarification dated 5th December 1978
The order of the State Government dated 12th March 1979 withdrawing the concessional tariff with effect from that date had also been assailed on the ground that it was passed on the representation of the Electricity Board without giving any opportunity to the appellants to show cause against the said representation and consequently the said order was in violation of principles of natural justice
Pleas of promissory estoppel and right based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation have also been raised
630 As regards the submission made on behalf of the Andhra Steel Corporation about singling it out in the matter of grant of concessional tariff on the basis of the order issued by the State Government for the period ending 12th March 1979 Shri Shanti Bhushan learned counsel for the Electricity Board has very fairly stated that the Electricity Board would extend to the Andhra Steel Corporation also the same benefit which was extended to the other four mini steel plants in the matter of grant of concessional tariff for the said period ending 12th March 1979
In this view of the matter it is not now necessary to deal with this plea
As regard the plea that in view of the direction issued by the State Government fixing concessional tariff for the appellants it was not open to the Electricity Board to have levied minimum charges as it was bound to supply electricity to the appellants on the concessional tariff alone as fixed by the State Government it was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that not only it was specifically stated in the GO dated 26th November 1977 that the directions contend there were issued under section 78A of the Act it was accepted even by the Electricity Board to be a direction under Section 78A of the Act as is apparent from its proceedings dated 20th January 1978
According to learned counsel for the appellants a direction issued under Section 78A of the Act was of a compulsive nature and was binding on the Electricity Board
The only dispute which the Electricity Board could raise was as envisaged and in the manner provided by Sections 78A2 of the Act about the direction being a matter of policy
The Electricity Board according to learned counsel not having taken raucous to the procedure contained in Section 78A2 of the Act was precluded from asserting before the High Court that the Government orders granting concessional tariff to the appellants did not fall within the purview of Section 78A of the Act
The contention of the learned counsel for the Electricity Board on the other hand has been that a direction under Section 78A of the Act can be only with regard to a matter of policy vis a vis the consumers generally or of a particular class or category as distinguished from individual consumers and even such a direction does not have a binding force and is calculated only to guide the Electricity Board in the discharge of its statutory functions
Learned counsel for the parties were at variance even on the question as to whether the power of fixing tariff under Section 49 of the Act could be regulated by a direction under Section 78A thereof
In support of the submission that a direction issued by the Government is compulsive in nature learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the State of Andhra Pradesh drew or attention to 631 certain decisions and principles of administrative laws laying down the scope of a direction
Having considered the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties on this point we are of the opinion thaton the facts of the instant appeals it is not necessary to go into the rival contentions referred to above on this point
Here the Electricity Board as is apparent from its proceedings dated 20th January 1978 proceeded to implement the directions with regard to fixation of concessional tariff issued by the State Government and resolved to realise electricity charges from the appellants only at the concessional tariff of 122 p as fixed in the Government Order dated 26th November 1977
It however took the further view in the said proceedings that the directions issued by the Government did not have any bearing on the obligation of the appellants to pay minimum charges which they were bound to pay under the agreements executed by them even though such minimum charges were to be calculated at the rate of 122 p per unit subject to escalation as indicated in the Government Orders in question
Such minimum charges were payable even if no electricity was consumed by the appellants for any reason whatsoever
It is in this context that we are of the opinion that the question with regard to the nature of a direction issued under section 78A of the Act is only of academic value in these appeals
The basic question which falls for our consideration however is as to whether the obligation of the appellants to pay minimum charges under the agreement executed by them ceased to be operative on account of the directions issued by the State Government fixing concessional tariff as has been asserted by learned counsel for the appellants
As indicated earlier the case of the electricity Board in this behalf has been that the directions in question did not have any bearing on the obligation of the appellants to continue to pay minimum charges of course to be calculated on the basis of the concessional tariff of 122 p per unit
A plain reading of the Government Orders dated 2nd Movement 1977 and 26th November 1977 makes it clear that there is no specific direction contained therein that the appellants would not be bound to pay minimum charges or that the obligation to pay minimum charges under the agreements executed by them would remain suspended during the period when the concession tariff would be operative
What was however urged by learned counsel for the appellants was that the very purpose of fixing concessional tariff by the State Government would be frustrated if the appellants are held to be bound to continue to pay minimum charges in pursuance of the agreements entered into by them
With regard to this submission it is at the outset necessary to appreciate the genesis of 632 prescription of minimum charges
To put it succinctly the purpose of prescribing minimum charges is to ensure that no undue loss is caused to the Electricity Board because the absence of minimum charges is likely to create a tendency in a prospective consumer to have connection for an inflated requirement and having agreed to meet such requirement the Electricity Board would be under an obligation to maintain the supply upto that requirement even if no or very little energy is consumed
In Amalgamated electricity Co vs Jalgaon Borough Municipality 1975 2 SCC Page 508 it was held in paragraph 9 of the Report Moreover it is obvious that if the plaintiff company was to give bulk supply of electricity at a concessional rate of 05 anna per unit it had to lay down lines and to keep the power ready for being supplied as and when required
The consumers could put their switches on whenever they liked and therefore the plaintiff had to keep everything ready so that power is supplied the moment the switch was put on
In these circumstances it was absolutely essential that the plaintiff should have been ensured the payment of the minimum charges for the supply of electrical energy whether consumed or not so that it may be able to meet the bare maintenance expenses
 In Bihar State Electricity Boara vs Green Rubber Industries 1990 1 SCC Page 731 while dealing with the question whether the stipulation to pay minimum guarantee charges irrespective of whether energy was consumed or not is reasonable and valid it was inter alia held that considered by the test of reasonableness it cannot be said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity to consumer involves incurring of overhead installation expenses by the Board which do not very with the quantity of electricity consumed and the installation has to be continued irrespective of whether the energy is consumed or not
The purpose of prescribing minimum charges being as stated above can it be said that while issuing the direction to the Electricity Board to supply electricity to the five mini steel plants at concessional rate the State Government was oblivious of the said purpose and required the Electricity Board not only to supply electricity on the concessional rate but also incur undue loss in maintaining the required bulk of energy stipulated in the various agreements even if the concerned mini plants either used no energy or used very little energy
633 In our opinion on the material placed before us it is not possible to take the view that such was the intention of the State Government in directing supply to be made to the appellants on concessional tariff
That it was not the intention of the State Government to do so was subsequently clarified by the State Government itself vide Government Order dated 5th December 1978
In this view of the matter the submission made on behalf of the appellants that with the grant of concessional tariff the agreements in so far as they required the appellants to pay minimum charges ceased to be operative or that the purpose of granting concessional tariff was likely to be frustrated if they were required to continue to pay minimum charges cannot therefore by accepted
In granting concessional tariff obviously it does not appear to be the purpose to compel the Electricity Board to maintain the supply of the contracted load of electricity to the appellants by incurring losses in the manner stated above
The only purpose in directing supply of energy at concessional rates was reduce the charges of actual energy consumed by the appellants and this purpose could not be frustrated till the Electricity Board complied with the direction of supplying electricity to them at the concessional rate
In this view of the matter it is apparent that the direction of the State Government to the Electricity Board to supply electricity to the appellants at concessional rate did not either expressly or by necessary implication grant immunity to the appellants from payment of of minimum charges
In support of the plea that the order of the State Government dated 5th December 1978 which clarified that its earlier orders fixing concessional tariff did not preclude the Electricity Board from levying minimum charges and the subsequent order dated 12th March 1979 withdrawing the concessional tariff were invalid it was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that those orders were in violation of principles of natural justice as also the doctrine of promissory estoppel
In so far as this submission is concerned what is of significance is that by the Government Order dated 2nd November 1977 and 26th November 1977 concession was granted to the appellants
This is manifest from the aforesaid Government Orders themselves which expressly used the expression concessional power tariff or concessional tariff
At no stage does it appear to have been disputed by the appellants that what was extended to them by the said Government Orders was by way of concession
In the context of granting exemption from sales tax certain observations were made by this Court in Shri Bakul Oil Industries vs State of Gujarat 1987 1 SCC Page 31 which would keeping in view the principle laid down therein with regard to 634 the grant of concession be in our opinion useful in considering the above stated submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants
It was held Viewed from another perspective it may be noticed that the State Government was under no obligation to grant exemption from sales tax
The appellants could not therefore have insisted on the State Government granting exemption to them from payment of sales tax What consequently follows is that the exemption granted by the government was only by way of concession
Once this position emerges it goes without saying that a concession can be withdrawn at any time and no time limit can be insisted upon before the concession is withdrawn
The notifications of the government clearly manifest that the State Government had earlier granted the exemption only by way of concession and subsequently by means of the revised notification issued on July 17 1971 the concession had been withdrawn
As the State Government was under no obligation in any manner known to law to grant exemption it was fully within its powers to revoke the exemption by means of a subsequent notification
This is an additional factor militating against the contentions of the appellants
 It was further held The exemption granted by the government as already stated was only by way of concession for encouraging entrepreneurs to start industries in rural and undeveloped areas and as such it was always open to the State Government to withdraw or revoke the concession
We must however observe that the power of revocation or withdrawal would be subject to one limitation viz the power cannot be exercised in violation of the rule of promissory estoppel
In other words the government can withdrawn an exemption granted by it earlier if such withdrawal could be done without offending the rule of promissory estoppel and depriving an industry entitled to claim exemption from payment of tax under the said rule
If the government grants exemption to a new industry and if on the basis of the representation made by the government an industry is established in order to avail the benefit to exemption it may then follow that the new industry can legitimately raise a grievance that 635 The exemption could not be withdrawn except by means of legislation having regard to the fact that promissory estoppel cannot be claimed against a statute
 This being the law with regard to grant of concession we are of the opinion that neither of the two orders mentioned above can be said to be illegal on the ground that they were passed in violation of principles of natural justice
Who only question in this connection which survives is that of promissory estoppel
With regard to this plea it would be seen that it is not the case of the appellants that they established their mini plants after the grant of concessional tariff by the two Government Orders referred to above and but for the grant of such concessional tariff they would not have established their mini plants
The necessary facts so as to sustain the plea of promissory estoppel are not in our opinion to be found to have been either pleaded or established by the appellants
To take it by way of an illustration reference may be made to the special leave petition giving rise to Civil Appeal Nos
1454 1463 of 1981 filed by Ms Andhra Steel Corporation Ltd The plea with regard to promissory estoppel is to be found in ground noi which reads  Whether in view of the fact that the Petitioner had acted upon the Government orders dated 2111977 and 26111977 and thus altered its position as without the concessions being granted to the Petitioner they would not have possibly run the industry since it was bound to suffer huge losses is the State Government stopped from revoking or modifying the same before the full period of concession had run out of efflux of time that is by 31 10 1980 emphasis supplied Almost identical is ground noi in the special leave petition giving rise to Civil Appeal Nos 1642 1645 of 1981
The use of the word possible is obviously indicative of lack of specific averment with regard to principle of estoppel
Even such an averment has not been made qua the Electricity Board
With regard to the plea based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation suffice if to say that except invoking the said doctrine nothing substantial was brought to our notice on the basis of which the appellants could be held entitled to any relief
In so far as the Government Order dated 16th January 1980 on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the appellants in 636 The alternative is concerned it may be pointed out that the said order even though in substance amounts to a clarification of the earlier order of clarification dated 5th December 1978 states nothing as to why the clarification contained in the order dated 5th December 1978 in categorical terms did not express the real intention of the State Government in issuing the earlier Government Orders granting concessional tariff
As already indicated above the orders granting concessional tariff in our opinion did not either expressly or by necessary implication grant immunity to the mini steel plants from their obligation to pay minimum charges and this having been categorically stated by the State Government in its clarificatory order dated 5th December 1978 there was apparently no basis for issuing the second clarificatory order dated 16th January 1980
Further the said order dated 16th January 1980 had been issued on some representation made on behalf of the mini steel plants at a point of time when writ petitions on their behalf had already been filed in the High Court and the matter was subjudice
In such a situation  apart from the propriety of issuing the second clarificatory order datd 16th January 1980 it is obvious that what was contained in this order is analogous to an averment made by the State Government in replay to the writ petitions filed on behalf of the appellants
In our opinion in the circumstances poinited out above the order dated 16th January 1980 has no bearing in finding out the true import of the orders of the State Government granting concessional tariff
In view of the foregoing discussion we do not find any substance in these appeals
They are accordingly dismissed
No costs


Summary:
Civil Appeal Nos 931 of 1977 and 200 of 1978 relate to the same dispute though arose from two suits and separate judgements
Civil Appeal No 931 of 1977 arose out of the suit for possession by the Gram Panchayat against the descendants of the grantee of inam
The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and was confirmed by the High Court and the High Court granted leave under Art133
Civil Appeal No 200 of 1978 arose out of the suit for possession and mesne profits which was laid by the descendants of the grantee of inam
The pleadings are the same in both cases
A Zamindar granted 100 acres of land inam to dig preserve 532 and maintain a tank in favour of the predecessors of the respondents of CA No 93177
In 1700 ADie
 1190 Fasli the tank was dug by the villagers and ever since the villagers were using the tank for their drinking purpose and perfected their right by prescription
In course of time the tank was silted up and fresh water existed only in and around 30 acres
The grantee s descendants respondents did not make any repairs Grass and trees had been grown in the rest of the area and was being enjoyed
Under section 3 of the APInams  Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act  Act XXXVII of 1956 Ryotwari Patta was granted to the respondents in individuals capacity and on appeal the Revenue Divisional Officer confirmed the same and it became final as it was not challenged any further
On 771965 the Gram panchayat the appellant in CA No 93177 took unilateral possession of the tank and ever since  it was exercising possession supervision and control over it
After the expiry of three year from the date of dispossession the respoondents filed a suit for possession based on title
Earlier thereto the appellant Gram Panchayat had filed a suit for possession
The Trial Court found that the tank was a public trust  the appellants would be hereditary trustees and could be removed only by taking action under section 77 of the AP Hindu Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1966 and that the respondents had acquired title by adverse possession
Accordingly the suit for possession was decreed relegating the filing of separate application for mesne profit
On appeal the High Court reversed the decree and held that the tank was a public tank and the tank and the lands stood vested in the Gram Panchyat under AP Gram Panchayat Act1964
Since the Gram Panchayat was in possession from July 7 1966 though dispossessed the respondents forcibly and as the suit was not under section 6 of the  but one based on title it called for interference and dismissed the suit
This court granted leave to appeal under article 136
533 The respondents in CA No 93177 the appellants in CA No 20078 contended that in view of the entries of the Inam Fair Register the tank was a public trust and not a public tank they could not be dispossessed until recourse made under section 77 of the AP Charitable and Religious Institutions and Endowments Act that under the Gram Panchayat Act the lands did not vest in the gram Panchayat and that since the grant of ryotwari patta under the Inams Act had become final section 14 thereof barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit
The appellant Gram Panchayat in CA No 93177 the respondents in CA No 20078 contended that the tank and the appurtenant land was correctly held as public tank by the High Court that by operation of sections 85 and 64 of the Gram Panchayat Act the land and the tank stood vested in the Panchayat that the entries in the Inam Fair Register established that the grant of land was for preservation maintenance and repairs of the tank and therefore the grant should be in favour of the institution i e the tank and the respondents thereby did not acquire any title that ryotwari patta was only for the purpose of land revenue that the Gram Panchayat acquired absolute right title and interest in the land and the suit was not a bar in the facts of the case
Dismissing both appeals this Court HELD 101
Any property or income which belongs to or has been administered for the benefit of the villagers in common or the holders in any of the village land generally or of land of a particular description or of lands under particular source of irrigation shall vest in Gram Panchayat and be administered by it for the benefit of the villagers or holders
The lands or income used for communal purpose shall either belong to the Gram Panchayat or has been administered by the Gram Panchayat
It is not the case of the Gram Panchayat nor any finding recorded by the courts below to that effect
section 64 is not attracted though the villagers acquired prescriptive right to use the water from the tank for their use and of their cattle
554D F 102
All public water courses springs reservoirs tanks cisterns etc
and other water works either existing on the date of the Act or made thereafter by the Gram Panchayat or otherwise including those used by the public ripened into prescriptive right for the use and benefit of the public and also adjacent or any appurtenant land not being private property shall vest in the Gram Panchayat under section 851 and be subject to its control
554F G 534 201
The wordvesting  in section 85 would signify that the water courses and tanks lands etc
used by the public to such an extent as to give a prescripvtive right to their use are vested in the Gram Panchayat and placed them under the control and supervision of the Gram Panchayat
It confers no absolute or full title
It was open to the Government even after vesting to place restriction upon the Gram Panchayat in the matter of enjoyment and use of such tanks and appurtenant lands etc
The assumption of management by the Government would be subject to the prescriptive right of the villagers if any
The vesting of the tanks etc
in the Gram Panchayat was with absolute rights and the village community rights would over ride against rights of the Government
546C F 202
The tank is a public tank and not a public trust and that under section 851 and section 64 the vesting of the tanks the appurtenant land and the common land is only for the purpose of possession supervision control and use thereof for the villagers for common use subject to the over riding title by the Government and its assumption of management should be in terms of sub section
3 of section 85 of the Act and subject to the prescriptive right in the water water spread tank for common use
547A B Gram Panchayat Mandapaka  Ors
V Distt
Collecctor Eluru  Ors  approved
Anna Narasimha Rao  Ors
vs Kurra Venkata Narasayya  Ors  OVER RULED 301
Under AP Land Encroachment Act 1905 Talengana Area Land Revenue Act relevant Abolition Acts like AP Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 Inams Abolition Act etc
give absolute rights or vesting in the State over the forest land tanks rivers mines poramboke land etc
free from all encumbrances and the preexisting rights in the other land stood abolished and will be subject to the grant of Ryotwari Patta etc
546F H 302 Grant of Ryotwari patta is not a title but a right coupled with possession to remain in occupation and enjoyment subject to payment of the land revenue to the State
546H 303
The entries in the Inam Fair Register are great acts of the State and coupled with the entries in the survey and settlement record 535 furnishes unimpeachable evidence
On construction of these documents it would clearly emerge that the original grant was made for the preservation and maintenance of the tank and tax free Inam land was granted for that purpose though it was in the name of the individual grantee
The grant was for the preservation and maintenance of the tank
548C D 304
The grant was for the institution
Under section 3 of the Inams Act the enquiry should be whether 1 a particular land is Inam land 2 Inam land in a Ryotwari Zamindar or Inam Village and 3 is held by any institution
In view of the finding that the grant was for the preservation and maintenance of tank the Inam land in an inam village was held by the institution namely the tank
Ryotwari patta shall therefore be in favour of the institution
Undoubtedly the ryotwari patta was granted in favour of the descendants
548D F 305
The pattas were obtained in the individuals name the trustees of an institution cannot derive personal advantage from the administration of the trust property
The grant of patta was for the maintenance of the trust
548G 306
The descendants though enjoyed the income from the properties did not effect the repairs and neglected the maintenance and upkeep of the tank
They rendered the tank disused and abandoned
By operation of section 85 of the Act the lands and tank stood vested in the Gram Panchayat for control management and supervision
550E F 307
A hereditary trustee is entitled to be the Chairman of a Board of Trustees if any constituted under the Endowment Act or else be in exclusive possession and management of the public trust registered thereunder until he is removed as per the procedure provided therein
Since the tank always remained a public tank and not being a public trust the Endowment Act does not apply
Therefore the question of initiating action under section 77 of the Endowment Act for removal of the descendants as trustees does not arise
550F G Arunachalam Chetty vs Venkatachalpathi Garu Swamigal AIR 1919 PC 62 at P 65 Syed Md Mazaffaral Musavi vs Bibi Jabeda  Ors AIR 1930 Pc 1031 Bhojraj vs Sita Ram  Ors AIR 1936 PC 60 M Srinivasacharyulu  Ors
V Dinawahi Pratyanga Rao  Ors  Ravipati Kotayya  Anr
vs Ramaswamy Subbaraydu  Ors  referred to
536 KV Krishna Rao vs Sub Colletor Ongole   followed
Nori Venkatarama Dikshitulu  Ors
vs Ravi Venkatappayya  Ors  approved
Krishan Nair Boppudu Punniah  Ors
vs Sri Lakshmi Narasimhaswamy Varu  Bhupathiraju Venkatapathiraju  Ors
V The President Taluq Board Narsapur  Ors 1913 19 1C 727 Mad DB distinguished
Tagore Law Lecture Hindu Religious Endowments and Institutions at p 6 distinguished
In the laws made to restructure the social order creating rights in favour of the citizens and conferring power and jurisdiction on the hierarchy of Tribunals or the authorities constituted thereunder and giving finality to their orders or decisions and divested the jurisdiction of the established civil courts expressly or by necessary implication Departure in the allocation of the judicial functions would not be viewed with disfavor for creating the new forums and entrusting the duties under the statutes to implement socio economic and fiscal laws
Courts have to consider when questioned why the legislature made the departure
The reason is obvious
The tradition bound civil courts gripped with rules of pleading and strict rules of evidence and tardy trial four tier appeals endless revisions and reviews under CPC are not suited to the needed expeditious dispensation
The adjudicatory system provided in the new forums is cheap and rapid
The procedure before the Tribunal is simple and not hide bound by the intricate procedure of pleadings trial admissibility of the evidence and proof of facts according to law
Therefore there is abundant flexibility in the discharge of the functions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness
552D H 402
In order to find out the purpose in creating the Tribunals under the statues and the meaning of particular provisions in social legislation the Court would adopt the purposive approach to ascertain the socials ends envisaged in the Act to consider scheme of the Act as an integrated whole and practical means by which it was sought to be effectuated to achieve them
Meticulous lexographic analysis of words and phrases and sentences should be subordinate to this purposive approach
The dynamics of the interpretative functioning of the Court is to reflect the contemporary needs and the prevailing values consistent with the constitutional and legislative declaration of the policy envisa 537 ged in the statute under consideration
552H 553B 403
The law should therefore respond to the clarion call of social imperatives evolve in that process functional approach as means to subserve social promises   set out in the Preamble Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution
553d 404
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 provides that whenever a question arises before the Civil Court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate
In cases where exclusion of the civil court s jurisdiction is expressly provided for the consideration as to the scheme of the statue in question and the adequacy of sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive
Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication such consideration would be very important and inconceivable circumstances might become even decisive
553G 554B 405
The jurisdiction of a Tribunal created under statute may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon existence of some particular fact
Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the Tribunal has to try and the determination whether it existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question which the Tribunal has to consider
At the inception of an enquiry by a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction when a challenge is made to its jurisdiction the Tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not
There may be Tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends but subject to that the Tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with regard to collateral fact give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise have except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction when the statue not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly
If it has jurisdiction to do right it has jurisdiction to do wrong
It may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order would become final
554B F 406
The Inams Act did not intend to leave the decisions of the revenue courts under section 3 read with section 7 to retry the issue once over in the civil court
561D E 538 407
The glimpse of the object of the Inams Act scheme scope and operation thereof clearly manifest that Inams Act is a self contained code expressly provided rights and liabilities prescribed procedure remedies of appeal and revision excluded the jurisdiction of the civil court notwithstanding anything contained in any law given primacy of Inams Act though inconsistent with any law or instrument having force of law
The jurisdictional findings are an integral scheme to grant or refuse ryotwari pattta under section 3 read with section 7 and not collateral findings
It was subject to appeal and revision and certiorari under Art 226
The decision of the Revenue Tribunal are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right title or interest through them
The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive
The civil suit except on grounds of fraud misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable
The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is not maintainable when the decree directly nullifies the ryotwari patta granted under section 3 of the Inams Act
561E 562A Deena vs Union of India 1984 ISCR referred to
Kamala Mills Ltd vs State of Bombay   Secretary of State vs Mask  Co 1940 LR 67 IA 222 Raleigh Investment Co Ltd V Governor General in Council LR 74 IA 50 Firm and Illuri Subbayya Chetty  Sons vs State of Andhra Pradesh   Deesika Charyulu vs State of Ap AIR 1964 SC 807 Dhulabhai  Ors vs State of MP  Anr   Hati vs Sunder Singh   Muddada Chayana vs Karam Narayana and Anr
   T Munuswami Naidu vs R Venkata Reddy AIR 1978 AP 200 O Chenchulakshmamma  Anr
vs D Subramanya Reddy   A Bodayya  Anr
V L Ramaswamydead by Lrs  Doe vs Bridges at p 359 Premier Automobiles Ltd vs Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and Ors   State of Tamil Nadu vs Ramalinga Samigal Madam   Syamala Rao vs Sri Radhakanthaswami Varu  Jyotish Tahakur  Ors
vs Tarakant Jha  Ors 1963 Suppl
1 SCR 13 Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam vs K Gopalaswami Aiyangar 1964 3 SCR 763 Sri VEdagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple vs Induru Pattabhirami Reddy   Shree Raja Kandragula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Panthulu Bahadur Garu vs State of Andhra Pradesh   Dr Rajendra Prakash Sharma vs Gyan Chandra  Ors   Anne Basant National Girls High School vs Dy
539 Director of Public Instruction  Ors  Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava dead by Lrs
vs Union of India 1988 2 SCR 352 Pabbojan Tea Co Ltd etc
vs the Dy
Commissioner Lakhimpur etc
  and K Chintamani Dora  Ors
vs G Annamnaidu  Ors   distinguished
DV Raju vs BG Rao  Anr  approved
Ppedagovindayy vs Subba Rao  over ruled
The word vest  clothes varied colours from the context and situation in which the word came to be used in a statue of rule
545B C 502
The word vest  means to give an immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment to accrue to to be fixed to take effect to clothe with possession to deliver full possession of land or of an estate to give seisin to enfeoff
545C D 503
The word vest  in the absence of a context is usually taken to mean vest  in interest rather than vest in possesion 545E F 504
Vest 
generally means to give the property in  
545E F 505
The word vested  was defined as to the interest acquired by public bodies created for a particular purpose in works such as embankments whcih are vested  in them by statute  545D E 506
Vesting   in the legal sense means to settle secure or put in fixed right of possession to endow to descend devolve or to take effect as a right 
545C Chamber s Mid Century Dictionary at P 1230 Blacks Law Dictionary 5th Edition at P 1401 Stroud s Judicial Dictionary 4th Edition Vol 5 at P 2938 Item 12 at P 2940 Item 4 at P 2939 Port of London Authority vs Canvey Island Commissioners 1932 1 Ch
446 Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union vs Delhi Improvement Trust   referred to
Under the Gram Panchayat Act the statutory interposition of vesting the tank and the appurtenant land in the Gram Panchayat made it to retain possession control and supervision over it though the Gram Panchayat unlawfully took possession
The need to grant decree for possession in favour of the Gram Panchayat is thus redundant
The suit 540 of the descendants normally to be decreed on the finding that ryotwari patta under section 3 of the Inams Act was granted in their favour and that they were unlawfully dispossessed
Since the grant of ryotwari patta though in the name of individuals was to maintain the public tank whcih stood vested under section 85 of the Act in the Gram panchayat the descendants are divested of the right and interest acquired therein
Thus the suit of the descendants also is liable to be dismissed
562A C