ivil Appeal Nos
97  98 of 1981
From the Judgment and order dated 2541980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CW No 2512 of 1979
VM Tarkunde and NS Das Behl for the Appellants
Kapil Sibal P Gaur and Jitendra Sharma for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment dated April 25 1980 of the High Court of Punjab  Haryana in civil writ No 3512 of 1979
The revised policy of allotment of industrial sites for the establishment of printing presses in Chandigarh has been called into question in the aforesaid writ petition
The printing presses are now scattered all over Chandigarh
They are situated either in residential premises or in small shops in different localities
The Chandigarh administration wanted them to be located in an industrial area
For that purpose they earmarked forty three sites in the industrial area phase II
The sites are comparatively of bigger dimensions
In 1975 the authorities invited applications for allotment of those sites
Several persons submitted applications
The appellants in Appeal No 97 of 1981 were some of them
They applied with deposit of earnest money of Rs1000 each
That would be ten per cent of the premium payable for the site
All the applications were processed for final allotment
In the meantime it is said that the appellants were called upon to deposit 25 per cent of the premium calculated at the rate of Rs 15 per square yard
The appellants appear to have complied with that demand also
Since there were more applicants than the sites available the authorities decided to draw the lots
In October 1977 the lots were drawn and the lady luck smiled at the appellants
But the authorities did not issue letters of allotment
The reason was obvious
The authorities had a second look at the scheme of allotment of sites for printing industries
The authorities wanted to 161 accommodate as many applicants as possible
But they could not accommodate all those applicants for want of adequate number of sites in the industrial area phase II
The authorities were also of the view that for setting up the printing industry larger sites such as those earmarked earlier would not be necessary and smaller sites would meet the requirements
Consequently the sites proposed in the industrial area phase II were given up and a lay out of smaller sites in the industrial area phase I was formed
There about 131 of sites were reserved for allotment to printing press owners
The appellants and other like applicant were intimated by letters that the said sites would be allotted at the rate of RS35 per square yard
They were also informed that the allotment would be made by draw of lots on October 3 1979
The appellants however did not participate in the proceedings
They moved the High Court with a petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the revised policy for allotment of smaller sites
It was contended inter alia that they had a right to take possession of bigger plots in respect of which the lots were earlier drawn in their favour
The High Court issued rule Nisi in the petition but allowed the authorities to draw the lots as proposed
The High Court also permitted the appellants to deposit the premium demanded without prejudice to their rights in the writ petition
That is all at the preliminary hearing of the writ petition
In the final hearing the High Court did not give substantial relief to the appellants
The High Court was of the view that there was nothing illegal in the revised policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration since the appellants did not acquire right to get bigger sites in the industrial area phase II
The High Court however felt that the appellants would be liable to pay only at the rate of 
Rs 15 per square yard and not Rs35 per square yard
Accordingly a direction was issued to the authorities
It is against this judgment that the present appeals have been preferred
Civil appeal No 9781 is by the printing press owners
Civil Appeal No 9881 is by the Chandigarh administration
The Chandigarh administration is aggrieved by the direction issued by the High Court as to the premium to be recovered from the allottees
We may first dispose of the appeal preferred by the Chandigarh administration
We do not find any substance in this appeal
If the applicants had been allotted sites as per the original proposal and as 162 per the first draw in 1977 they would have been liable to pay only at the rate of Rs 15 per square yard
In fact the other entrepreneurs who were allotted sites from industrial area phase II paid the premium only at the rate of Rs 15 per square yard
Why then there should be a higher rate payable by these persons
They did not ask for sites in the Industrial area phase I Their applications for sites in the industrial area phase II were not rejected
The same applications appear to have been considered for sites in the industrial area phase I
Secondly the applicants were not responsible for the delay in the allotment of sites
The delay was entirely due to the change of policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration
Thirdly there is no evidence that the Chandigarh administration had to incur more expenditure for forming new sites in phase I
It is therefore not proper that these applicants should be asked to pay the premium at a higher rate
The High Court in our opinion was justified in directing the authorities to recover only at rate of Rs 15 per square yard
Before considering the contentions urged in the appeal of printing press owners we may briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the enactment bearing on the contentions
The disposal of building sites in Chandigarh has been regulated by the Capital of Punjab Development and Regulation Act 1952 which may be termed as The Act
The Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Building Rules 1973 are the relevant rules which may be referred to as The Rules
Section 3 of the Act provides power to the authorities to sell lease or otherwise transfer any land or building belonging to the Government
They could be disposed of by auction allotment or otherwise
Rule 4 provides that Chandigarh Administration may demise sites and building on lease for 99 years
The procedure for allotment has been prescribed under rule 8
Rule 8 so far as it is material provides Rule 8
Lease by allotment Procedure for 1In case of allotment of site or building the intending lessee shall make an application to the Estate officer in Form A 
2No application under sub rule l shall be valid unless it is accompanied by 10 per cent of the premium as earnest money in the prescribed form of payment
3When 10 per cent of the premium has been so tendered the Estate officer shall subject to such directions 163 as may be issued by the Chief Administrator in this behalf allot a site of the size applied for or a building or which particulars are given in the application and shall intimate by registered post the number sector approximate area premium and the rent of the site or building allotted to the applicant
4The applicant shall unless he refuses to accept the allotment within 30 days of the date of the receipt of the allotment order deposit within that period and in the prescribed mode of payment further 15 per cent of the premium
The remaining 75 per cent of the premium shall be paid as provided in Rule 12
 The scheme provided under these Rules for allotment of sites is like this Sub rule 1 of Rule 8 provides for making an application to the Estate officer for allotment of site
The application shall be accompanied with 10 per cent of the premium as earnest money
That amount must be tendered to the Estate officer
The allotment of a site shall be intimated to the applicant by registered letter giving the particulars of number sector approximate area premium and the rent of the site or building allotted to the applicant
It would be open to the applicant to accept the allotment or not
If he accepts the allotment he must deposit 15 per cent of the premium and the remaining 75 per cent of the premium shall be paid as provided under Rule
Relying on these provisions it was urged that the appellants had a right to obtain transfer of sites in respect of which the lots were first drawn in their favour
We are unable to accept this contention
Admittedly at that stage there was no intimation of allotment of sites to the appellants
There was no official communication to them as required under sub rule 3 of Rule 8
Such intimation alone confers right on the appellants to obtain possession of the sites
The intimation must be sent by a registered letter giving particulars of the sites allotted and the premium payable in respect thereof
In the absence of any such communication the appellants cannot be held to have the right to get transfer of sites in their favour
The next step in the argument was that the Estate officer ought to have allotted the sites upon the receipt of applications of the appellants
The reliance was placed and emphasis was put on the word shall used in sub rule 3 of Rule 8
Sub rule 3 of Rule 8 provides 164 that when 10 per cent of the premium has been tendered the Estate officer shall subject to such directions as may be issued by the Chief Administrator in that behalf allot a site of the size applied for
We do not think that there is much force in this contention also
Generally the use of the word shall prima facie indicates that the particular provision is imperative
But that is not always so
The meaning to be given to a word depends upon the context in which it is used
The word takes the colour depending upon the context
We must ask what does the word mean in its context We must examine why the Rule making authority has chosen that word
After examining the purpose and scope of the rule we must give such meaning as to render the rule workable in a fair manner
We must give that meaning which would promote the purpose and object of the rule
When there is a choice of meanings there is a presumption that one which produces an unjust or inconvenient result was not intended
Let us now take a brief look at Rule 8
If sub rule 3 of Rule 8 is construed as mandatory then every person who applies for a site with earnest money must be allotted a site
That means the administration must receive only equal number of applications as there are sites available for allotment
That would be impracticable
The administration cannot restrict the number of applications to be received when the public are notified
Secondly the sites are required to be disposed by auction or allotment
If it is by allotment it should be after considering all applications
The sites cannot be allotted by private arrangement
All the applications received must be considered and if there are more applications than the available sites some reasonable procedure should be adopted for consideration and elimination
In our opinion the right of every applicant under sub rule 3 of Rule 8 is only the right to have his application considered
The acceptance of application does not create a right for allotment of a site
The word shall used in sub rule 3 must therefore be considered as not mandatory
The imperative meaning would defeat the purpose of the rule
It was next urged that the Chandigarh administration was estopped from revising the policy of allotment after taking several steps for allotment of sites
The steps taken like demanding 25 per cent of the premium payable and drawing the lots would lead to an assurance that they would be allotted bigger plots
It was stated that the appellants upon the assurance of getting bigger plots had placed orders for heavy machinaries for their printing presses
These averments were also made in the writ petition before the High Court
The High Court rejected the plea of estoppel on the ground that there was no evidence 165 of heavy investment on machinaries
Mr VM Tarkunde learned counsel for the appellants urged that there is no need to produce any such evidence to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel
The counsel is right in this aspect
The party invoking the doctrine of estoppel need not prove any detriment as such
It may be sufficient if he has relied upon the assurance made to him
This court in the Delhi Cloth  General Mills Ltd vs Union of India Civil Appeal No 223 of 1974 disposed of on October 8 1987 to which one of us was a member said It is true that in the formative period it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered detriment  or prejudice 
It was often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment
But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over
All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him must have relied upon the representation made to him
It means the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation
The alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine
It is not necessary to prove further any damage detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel
The Court however would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting
The entire doctrine proceeds on the promise that it is reliance based and nothing more And said The concept of detriment as we now understand is whether it appears unjust unreasonable or inequitable that the promisor should be allowed to resile from his assurance or representation having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation
 It was further said It is however quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the 166 public bodies or the Government to carry out the rep resentation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority of power In the first place we do not know under what provision the authorities asked the appellants to pay 25 per cent of the premium payable in respect of the sites even before allotment
Apparently that procedure appears to be irregular with no statutory sanction
Secondly we do not find any specific assurance or representation made by the authorities promising to allot the sites applied for
Thirdly even if there was any such assurance we do not think that it would give rise to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the instance case
The authorities cannot give assurance contrary to the statutory rules
The sites are required to be disposed of by auction allotment or sale as per the procedure prescribed
The authorities who are bound by the rules of procedure cannot make any representation or promise to allot particular sites to the applicants
Even if they make such promise or assurance the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel them to carry out the promise or assurance which is contrary to law
The next contention urged for the appellants related to the revised policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration for allotment of smaller sites
It was said that the sites in phase II ought to have been allotted when there were enough to go round the appellants
It was also said that the other entrepreneurs who had filed applications along with the appellants had been allotted sites in phase II and there was no good reason to exclude the appellants for being considered for smaller sites in phase I The procedure followed by the authorities has been assailed as arbitrary and contrary to article 14 of the Constitution
Of course if there were enough plots to accommodate all the applicants in the industrial area phase II it would not be proper for the authorities to revise the policy and allot smaller sites in phase I
But no material has been placed before us to come to the conclusion that there were enough industrial plots to accommodate as far as possible all those applicants
It appears from the record that the authorities for want of plots in phase II formed another lay out in phrase I The action of the authorities appears to be bona fide and we have no reason to doubt it
This takes us to the question whether the revised policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration to allot smaller sites to these appellants was discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the 167 Constitution
The true meaning and scope of article 14 has been stated and restated in a string of decisions of this Court
It is now well established that article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation
In order however to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely i that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and ii that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question
The classification may be founded on different basis namely geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration
SR Oas CJ speaking for this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice SR Tendolkar  others  has formulated the various aspects of article 14 and out of them we may refer to the following proposition a article 14 condemns discrimination not only by substantive law but by a law of procedure b article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification c In permissible classification mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required d The classification may be founded on different basis namely geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like e If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons and f Even a single individual may form a class by himself on account of some special circumstances or reason applicable to him and not applicable to others
This Court speaking through Chandrachud CJ
in Re The Special Courts Bill 197819792 SCR 476 reformulated in detail the propositions on article 14
The following are relevant for the 168 present case and may be extracted i The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its law sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula
Therefore classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things
The Courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case
Classification is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary
ii The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience
It can recognise even a degree of evil but the classification should never be arbitrary artificial or evasive
iii The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational that is to say it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation
There is yet another facet of article 14
This Court speaking through Bhagwati J in EP Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu and in Maneka Gandhi case AIR 1978 SC 597 held that the basic principle which informs both articles 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination
Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other to the whim and caprise of an absolute monarch
Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of article 14
Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment
This in our opinion is more fundamental
Article 14 unlike other articles in Part III of the Constitution is an injunction against the State that it shall not discriminate person to person unless the action is supported by well known principles
There is thus no doubt or dispute about the principles
The question is only the application of the principles to a given case
In the present case however we do not find that the revised policy of the Chandigarh administration suffers from any act of arbitrariness 169 either in classifying the appellants as a separate group or in considering them for allotment of smaller sites in phase I The appellants formed a separate class
All the persons who have applied for industrial sites for establishing printing presses were grouped together
They were considered together
They could not have been accommodated in phase II for want of enough sites
So another lay out was formed in phase I We are told that most of the applicants have now been allotted sites and they have since taken possession
The appellants were also allotted sites in phase I
We are therefore
Of the opinion that the grievance of the appellants about discrimination is not justified on the facts and circumstances of the case
In the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed but we make no order as to costs
SL Appeals dismissed


Summary:
 In the year 1974 the then landlords of the property in dispute Bhonri Lal and others filed a suit for eviction against the tenants appellants on the ground of bona fide need material alterations in the premises and default in payment of the rent
During the pendency of the suit the present respondents purchased the property in 1979 and v continued with the suit for eviction
The trial Court passed a decree for eviction on the ground of material alterations construction of a wooden balcony Dochhatti made in the premises by the appellants under section 131c of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950
The decree of the trial Court was affirmed in Second Appeal by the High Court
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellants appealed to this Court by special leave
Allowing the Appeal the Court  HELD The first notice in the case given to the tenantsappellants on behalf of the then landlord Bhonri Lal was through an Advocate and there was no mention of the objection about any construction or material alteration at all
Another notice dated 1381974 given just a little before the filing of the suit for eviction also did not contain any mention of any material alteration or construction of the balcony Dochatti
There was a reference to some damage to the floor of the property in dispute in that notice but the same was given up and not pressed
It was therefore plain that if the balconyDochatti which was a wooden structure was a construction without the permission and consent of the landlord he would have made it a ground for termination of the lease or a ground of eviction mentioned in any one of the two notices above said if not both
It was a significant factor that in the two notices that construction was not mentioned as a ground
In his cross examination Bhonri Lal admit 125 ted that no notice about the balcony had been given and explained away the reasons therefor
131A D The present respondents purchased the property in dispute during the pendency of the suit
The statement of Bhonri Lal in cross examination showed that he had given up his objection to the balcony and it was also clear from his evidence that the cost of a window constructed in the year 1964 to give light and air to the balcony had been borne by the landlord himself
In the context of that evidence it was significant that even in the plaint it had not been clearly stated that the balcony had been constructed in the year 1972 as was now alleged
It was also significant that what was now alleged that the balcony was supported on beams fixed in the walls and pillars fixed in the floor was also not alleged in the plaint at all
It was also not alleged in the plaint as to how the structure in question which was a wooden structure easily removable according to the appellants could be said to be a material alteration or how the same had impaired or damaged or lowered the value of the property involved
It is true that section 131c of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 as it stands does not require that in addition to the material alteration being there it should be to lower or reduce the value of the property but it was significant that all the three Courts below had not considered the omission of that allegation in the notices and the statement of Bhonri Lal and other discrepancies in the pleadings and had come to the conclusion which could not be reached
The only possible conclusion from these facts could be that either the balcony had been constructed with the implied consent of the landlord or that after seeing it the landlord had decided to waive his objection to it on an assurance given by the tenant and therefore had not made it a ground for termination of the lease in his notices given before the suit the landlord had waived his right to file a suit on that ground
All the three Courts had failed to look into these conclusions appearing in evidence and appreciate the matter in this light
If a party gives up the advantage he could take of a position of law it is not open to him to change and say that he can avail of that position
131F H 132A D H In the context of the conclusion that the Court had reached in the facts and circumstances that it could not be held that the tenants had constructed the wooden balcony or Dochhatti without the consent express or implied of the landlord it was not necessary for the Court to dilate on the question of waiver any further
133C 126 If the Courts below have while coming to a conclusion of fact omitted to consider material pieces of evidence and have drawn inferences without looking into that evidence which proves circumstances on the basis of which a contrary inference could be drawn then such findings are not binding on this Court and in this view of the matter the conclusions reached by the Courts below could not be accepted
133E In the light of the test laid down by this Court in Om Prakash vs Amar Singh and another AIR 1987 SC 617 it was clear that the construction of the balcony Dochhatti which was a wooden structure did not amount to a material alteration which could give a cause of action to the respondents landord for filing a suit for eviction
The judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below set aside and suit filed by the respondents dismissed
137C E  Om Prakash vs Amar Singh and another AIR 1987 SC 617 Dawsons Bank Ltd vs Nippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish Japan Cotton Trading Co Ltd AIR 1935 Privy Council 78 and Babu Manmohan Das Shah and Ors vs Bishun Das   relied upon
Venkatlal G Pittle  Anr
vs Ms Bright Bros Pvt Ltd 3 SC 139 referred to