Civil Appeal Nos
2826 77 and 278 of 1978 Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24 8 77 and 19 9 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in RP Nos
20376 and 31976 respectively
L N Sinha G Narayana Rao and P P Singh for the Appellants in both appeals
Vepa Parthasarathy and A 
Subba Rao for Respondent No 1 in both the appeals
P Ramachandra Reddy Adv
AP T I 
section Narasimhachari G Narayana Rao In CA282677 and Mrs Urmila Sirur for R R 2 and 4 in CA No 283677 and R 2 in CA 27878
The Court delivered the following order Respondent 1 Shri V V section Krishna Murthy may if so advised file a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for challenging the order of his compulsory retirement passed by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on September 29 1975
If he files the writ petition within three weeks from today the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the State of Andhra Pradesh whom respondent 1 proposes to implead to his writ petition shall file their counter affidavit if so advised within three weeks after the filing of the writ petition
If respondent I desires to file a rejoinder he shall do so within a week after the filing of the counter affidavit
The High Court shall take up the writ petition for hearing within six weeks after the filing of the counter affidavit
30 The learned counsel who appeared before us for the High Court as also the
learned counsel who appeared before us for the State of Andhra Pradesh agree that the High Court and the State Government will not raise any objection to the maintainability of the writ petition which respondent 1 desires to file for challenging the order of compulsory retirement either on the ground of laches or of delay or on any other technical ground
All the contesting parties before us are agreed that the writ petition to be filed by respondent 1 as aforesaid may be disposed of by the High Court on merits The Government of Andhra Pradesh shall comply with the
Order passed by this Court on March 22 1978 within four weeks from to day
We quash the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated September 19 1977 in RP No 319 of 1976
We will give our reasons in support of that conclusion later
The common Judgment in CA 282677 and CA 27878 CAV of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA J This judgment will not only dispose of this Appeal CA 2826 of 1977 but also furnish reasons in support of our short order dated August 4 1978 by which we allowed Civil Appeal No278 of 1978
Both these Appeals raise a common question with regard to the interpretation scope and impact of Article 371 D on Articles 226 229 and 235 of the Constitution
In Civil Appeal 2826 of 1977 appellant 1 is the Chief Justice and appellant 2 is the High Court of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Registrar of that Court
Respondent 1 Shri L V A Dikshitulu is a former employee of the High Court whose premature retirement is in question
Respondents 2 and 3 are the Government and the Accountant General respectively of Andhra Pradesh
Respondent 1 was a permanent employee of the former Hyderabad High Court prior to November 1 1956
He was confirmed in the post of Chief Superintendent on the establishment of that High Court on October 6 1956
At the time of his confirmation he was serving on deputation with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court as Junior Law officer in the Ministry of Law Government of India
In March 1965 with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was the 31 successor High Court to the Hyderabad High Court he was appointed as a temporary Deputy Secretary in the Law Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh
By an order dated February 6 1968 the State Government replaced his services at the disposal of the Chief Justice
On his reversion from deputation he rejoined the establishment of the High Court as Sub Assistant Registrar on February 8 1968
On that very day the High Court received a complaint petition from one Smt
Promila Reddy an Assistant Translator in the State Law Department alleging misconduct on the part of the 1st Respondent relating to the period during which he was working as Deputy Secretary in the State Government
A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the then Registrar Shri section Ramachandra Raju later Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh respondent 4 herein
The Registrar submitted his preliminary inquiry report to the then Chief Justice
After considering the report the then Chief Justice suspended the 1st respondent and ordered a departmental inquiry against him by Mr Justice Chinappa Reddy
After due inquiry the enquiring Judge found the 1st respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension from service for three years
The Chief Justice however differed with the enquiring Judge regarding the punishment and proposed to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement after issue of a show cause notice to that effect
After considering the representations made by the 1st respondent the Chief Justice by an order dated January 3 1969 compulsorily retired him from service
The 1st respondent then moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by a writ petition No 1425 of 1969 questioning the order of the State Government replacing his services with the High Court and assailing the penalty of compulsory retirement inflicted upon him by the Chief Justice
The High Court set aside the order of reversion of the first respondent from deputation to the High Court staff on the ground that there was a stigma attached thereto
It also set aside the order of compulsory retirement not on merits but on the ground that the recommendation of the enquiring Judge in regard to punishment viz stoppage of increments was not communicated to him 1st respondent
The High Court while allowing the writ petition observed that it will be open to the State Government to take action against him in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services CCA Rules pertaining to lent officers
32 After the first respondent s writ petition No 1425 of 1969 was allowed the State Government by an order dated November 10 970 reinstated the I st respondent as Deputy Secretary with effect from February 8 1968 and once again replaced his services at the disposal of the Chief Justice with effect from April 25 1968
The State Government did not take further departmental action on the complaint of Smt
Promila Reddy
The 1st respondent then filed another writ petition No 5442 of 1970 under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court impugning the order dated November 10 1970 of the State Government
But the High Court dismissed the same by a judgment dated December 30 1 970
The first respondent s appeals CA 476 and CA 1536 of 1971 against the orders of the High Court in the afore said writ petitions are pending in this Court
After the dismissal of his writ petition No 544270 the first respondent on reinstatement joined duty as Sub Assistant Registrar in the High Court
Thereafter he was promoted by the then Chief Justice as Assistant Registrar later he was promoted as Deputy Registrar
In 1975
A P Government Servants Premature Retirement Rules 1975 came into force
Under the Rules which amended Andhra Pradesh Liberalised Pension Rules 1961 and the Hyderabad Civil Service Rules employees of the State who have completed 25 years of service or completed 50 years age can be prematurely retired after 3 month s notice or grant of 3 month s pay in lieu of notice
Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Service Rules contains a similar provision
Thereafter on September 19 1975 a Committee was constituted under an order of the Chief Justice
It consisted of the Acting Chief Justice and two Judges Madhava Reddy and Ramachandra Raju JJ of the High Court
The Committee reviewed the service records of the servants and officers of the High Court who had reached the age of 50 years
The 1st respondent Sri Dikshitulu had attained the age of 50 years on March 12 1974
The Committee resolved to retire him prematurely among others in public interest
By an order dated September 26 1975 of the Acting Chief Justice purporting to have been passed under Article 229 of the Constitution read with Rule 39 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Service Rules Rule 32a of Andhra Pradesh Liberalised Pension Rules 1961Rule 292 of the Hyderabad Civil Service Rules and Rule 21 of A P Government Servants Premature Retirement Rules 1975 the 1st respondent was prematurely retired from service in public interest
On April 8 1976 33 he filed a Review Petition
The then Chief Justice rejected his Review Petition
The rejection was communicated to him by a letter dated September 13 1976
The first respondent again moved the High Court on the Judicial Side by a writ petition No 58908 of 1976 under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of his pre nature retirement
This writ petition came up for preliminary hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court which by a lengthy speaking order after hearing the Government pleader on October 29 1976 dismissed it on the preliminary ground that it was not maintainable because the jurisdiction of the High Court which was hitherto being exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution to correct orders of the Chief Justice on the administrative side with regard to conditions of service of officers of the High Court now stands vested in the Administrative Tribunal by reason of clause 61 of the Administrative tribunal order made by President and Article 371 D of the Constitution
 The first respondent then on November 16 1976 moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal impugning the order of his compulsory retirement
In that petition the first respondent inter alia contended that Mr Justice M Ramachandra Raju who sat in the Committee to consider the case of the 1st respondent for premature retirement was biased against him and that the impugned order dated September 26 1975 on his premature retirement was arbitrary and capricious
The Tribunal however set aside the impugned order of the 1st respondent s premature retirement made by the Chief Justice on the sole ground that it is arbitrary and amounts to a penalty of dismissal or removal from service and is hit by Article 311 2 of the Constitution
Against the aforesaid order dated August 24 1977 the appellants have now come in appeal before us by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution
Now the relevant facts giving rise to Civil Appeal No 278 of 1978 may be set out
G The 1 st respondent Shri V V section Krishnamurthy in that appeal was at the material time a member of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service
He attained the age of SO years on November 24 1974
He was prematurely retired in public interest by an order dated September 29 1975 of the State Government on the recommendation of the High Court
Before the Government passed this order a Committee of Judges appointed by the High Court considered the entire 34 service record of the 1st respondent and records of other Judicial officers and decided to prematurely retire the first respondent in public interest
The first respondent filed a petition before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal challenging the order of his premature retirement made by the State Government
It was contended by him that his service record has throughout been good
Before the Tribunal the High Court resisted the respondent s petition on the ground that the order of premature retirement be based upon the over all performance of the respondent and the order had been passed in public interest and was in accordance with the Rules
On behalf of the 1st respondent a memorandum was filed in which it was contended that since according to the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service Rules the High Court in the case of Subordinate Judges is the appointing authority the Governor has no power or jurisdiction to pass an order of premature retirement of a member of the State Judicial Service
The tribunal accepted this contention and allowed the Respondent s petition without considering the other contentions raised in the petition and set aside the order of the respondent s premature retirement
Against that order of the Tribunal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh came in appeal CA 278 of 1978 by special leave to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
The first contention of Shri Lal Narain Sinha appearing for the appellants is that in the context of basic and fundamental principles underlying the Constitution relating to the judiciary including the High Court officers and servants of the High Court and members of the judicial services are outside the scope of Article 371 D of the Constitution
It is urged that the general expressions indicating class or classes of posts in Article 371 D3 must be given a restricted interpretation which is in harmony with this basic scheme of the Constitution
The thrust of the argument is that in the absence of clear unequivocal words in Article 371 D3 showing a contrary intention the Article cannot be construed as taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to review administrative action against a member of the High Court staff or the Subordinate Judiciary
Any other construction proceeds the argument will militate against the exclusiveness of the control vested in the Chief Justice under Article 279 and in the High Court under Article 235 over the High Court staff or the Subordinate Judiciary as the case may be and will make such control subject and subservient to the wishes of the Executive 35 Government which in terms of the Presidential order constituting the A Administrative Tribunal is the ultimate authority to confirm vary or annul the orders passed by the Tribunal
In support of his contention that the basic scheme of the Constitution seeks to ensure the independence of the High Court staff and the judiciary from executive control learned counsel has referred to Pradyat Kumar Bose vs The Hon ble the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court1 M Gurumoorthy vs Accountant General Assam  Nagaland  Ors2 State of West Bengal vs Nirpendra Nath Bagchi3 Baldev Raj Guliani  Ors
vs The Punjab  Haryana High Court  Ors4 and State of UP vs Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi  Anr5
As against the above Shri Vepa Sarathy appearing for the respective first respondent in CA 2826 of 1977 and in CA 278 of 1978 submits that when his client filed a writ petition No 58908 of 1976 under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for impugning the order of his compulsory retirement passed by the Chief Justice he had served in accordance with Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court original Side Rules notice on the Chief Justice and the Government Pleader and in consequence at the preliminary hearing of the writ petition before the Division Bench the Government Pleader appeared on behalf of all the respondents including the Chief Justice and raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable in view of Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal order made by the President under Article 371 D which had taken away that jurisdiction of the High Court and vested the same in the Administrative Tribunal
This objection was accepted by the High Court and as a result the writ petition was dismissed in limine
In these circumstances proceeds the argument the appellant is now precluded on principles of res judicata and estoppel from taking up the position that the Tribunal s order is without jurisdiction
But when Shri Sarathy s attention was invited to the fact that no notice was actually served on the Chief Justice and that the Government Pleader who had raised this objection had not been instructed by the Chief Justice or the High Court to put in appearance on their behalf the counsel did not pursue this contention further
Moreover this is a pure question of law depending upon the interpretation of Article 371 D
If the argument holds good it will make the decision of the 1  2 1971 Supp
SCR 420
3  4  5 36 Tribunal as hearing been given by an authority suffering from inherent lack of jurisdiction
Such a decision cannot be sustained merely by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel as urged in this case
In the alternative Shri Sarathy submitted that the subject matter of this case will fall within the purview of sub clause c of Clause 3
Of Article 371 D because i compulsory retirement is a condition of service and ii the 1st respondent was a person appointed to a post in a civil service of the State within the contemplation of the said Clause
According to Shri Sarathy even if an order issued by the President under Clause 3 of article 371 D abridges curtails or takes away the powers vested in the Chief Justice under Article 229 or in the High Court under Articles 226 and 235 or is contrary to the constitutional scheme of securing independence of the judiciary such a result was intended to be brought about by the amendment of the Constitution as is clear from the non obstante provision in Clause 10 of this Article
Shri Sarathy further invited our attention to the definition of the expression public post given in the order of the President issued under Article 371 D3
This definition according to the learned counsel is wide enough to include all posts held by the staff of the High Court and the Subordinate Judiciary
To appreciate the contentions canvassed before as it is necessary at the outset to have a look at the constitutional scheme delineated in Chapters V and VI Part IV in general and the content of Article 229 and 235 in particular
Chapter V is captioned The High Courts in the States
It provides for various matters relating to High Courts such as constitution of High Courts Article 216
Appointment and Conditions of the office of a Judge article 217 Salaries of Judges article 221 Transfer of Judges article 222 Jurisdiction of existing High Courts and the powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court including the power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court article 225
Article 226 gives power to High Court to issue certain Writs against any Government for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for the redress of any substantial injury arising by reason of any substantive or procedural illegality Article 228 confers power on a High Court to withdraw to its own file cases involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
Then comes the crucial provision in Article 229 which is the fulcrum of the scheme of this Chapter
Article 229 bears the marginal heading officers and Servants and the expenses of High Courts
Clause 1 of the Article provides that appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief 37 Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the Court as he A may direct
Then there is a proviso to this clause with which we are not concerned in the instant case
Clause 2 empowers the Chief Justice or some other Judge or officer authorised by him to make rules prescribing the conditions of service of officers and servants of the High Court
This power of course is subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of the State
Then there is a proviso to this Clause also which requires that the Rules made by the Chief Justice or the Judge or officer authorised by him under this Clause shall so far as they relate to salaries allowances leave or pensions require the approval of the Governor of the State
Clause 3 makes the administrative expenses of a High Court including all C salaries allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of the officers and servants of the Court a charge upon the Consolidated Fund of the State
Now let us see what is the ambit and scope of the power of appointment in Article 2291
In the context of article 229 read as a whole this power is of wide amplitude
The word appointment in Article 229  1  is to be construed according to axiom that the greater includes the less
This cardinal canon of interpretation underlies Section 16 of the General Clauses Act which has been made applicable by Article 3171 of the Constitution
Construed in the light of this juristic principle the power of appointment conferred by Article 2291  includes the power to suspend dismiss remove or compulsorily retire from service
In short in regard to the servants and officers of the High Court Article 229 makes the power of appointment dismissal removal suspension reduction in rank compulsory retirement etc including the power to prescribe their conditions of service the sole preserve of the Chief Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with the exercise of that power by the Chief Justice or his nominee except to a very limited extent indicated in the Provisos
In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers on the Chief Justice the object which the Founding Fathers had in view was to ensure independence of the High Court
The nature and scope of the powers of the Chief Justice under Article 229 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court
In Pradyat Kumar Bose vs The Hon ble the Chief Justice of Calcutta supra two questions among others came up for consideration i Whether the Chief Justice of a High Court has the power to dismiss from service an officer of the High Court
ii If so whether the Chief Justice could pass an order of such dismissal without previous 38 consultation with the Public Service Commission as provided by Article 320 of the Constitution
The Court answered both the questions in the affirmative
Dealing with the second question the Court pointed out that members of the High Court staff are not persons serving under the Government of a State and that this phrase used in Article 3203c seems to have reference to such persons in respect of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Government functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor
It was held that the servants and officers of the High Court do not fall within the scope of this phrase because in respect of them the administrative control is clearly vested in the Chief Justice
who under the Constitution has the power of appointment and removal and of making rules for their conditions of service
It was further observed The fact that different phrases have been used in the relevant sections of the Government of India Act 1935 and the Constitution relating to the constitutional safeguards in this behalf appears to be meant to emphasise the differentiation of the services of the High Court from other services 
Therefore both on the ground that Article 3203 c would be contrary to the implication of Article 229 and on the ground that the language thereof is not applicable to the High Court staff we are of the opinion that for the dismissal of the appellant by the Chief Justice prior consultation with the Public Service Commission was not necessary
 It was however conceded that for the purposes of Article 311
the phrase a person who is a member of a civil service of a State used in that Article includes the officers and servants of the High Court
The powers of Chief Justice under Article 229 again came up for consideration before this Court in M Gurumoorthy vs Accountant General Assam  Nagaland  Ors
supra
The Stenographers Service in the High Court was reorganised
Under the reorganisation scheme one of these posts created with the sanction of the State Government was to be that of Selection Grade Stenographer
On May 7 1959 the Chief Justice appointed the appellant as Secretary cum Selection Grade Stenographer after merger of the two posts
The State Government objected that the post of Secretary could not be merged with that of Selection Grade Stenographer
The Accountant General under the Government s instructions withheld the appellant s pay slips
The appellant moved the High Court by a writ petition which was dismissed
On appeal this Court held that the Government 39 had authority to sanction the post but it could not interfere with the A choice of the incumbent which undoubtedly was to be of the Chief Justice under Article 229 of the Constitution
In that context Grover J speaking for the Court neatly summed up the position which being apposite to the point under discussion may be extracted The unequivocal purpose and obvious intention of the framers of the Constitution in enacting Article 229 is that in the matter of appointments of officers and servants of a High Court it is the Chief Justice or his nominee who is to be the supreme authority and there can be no interference by the executive except to the limited extent that is provided in the Article
This was essentially to secure and maintain the independence of the High Courts
The anxiety of the constitution makers to achieve that object is fully shown by putting the administrative expenses of a High Court including all salaries allowances and pensions payable to or in respect of officers and servants of the court at the same level as the salaries and allowances of the judges of the High Court nor can the amount of any expenditure so charged be varied even by the legislature
Clause 1 read with clause 2 of Article 229 confers exclusive power not only in the matter of appointments but also with regard to prescribing the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court by Rules on the Chief Justice of the Court
This is subject to any legislation by the State Legislature but only in respect of conditions of service
In the matter of appointments even the legislature cannot abridge or modify the powers conferred on the Chief Justice under clause 1
The approval of the Governor as noticed in the matter of Rules is confined only to such rules as relate to salaries allowances leave or pension
All other rules in respect of conditions of service do not require his approval
Even under the Government of India Act the power to make rules relating to the conditions of service of the staff of the High Court vested in the Chief Justice of the Court under Section 2424 read with Section 241 of the Government of India Act 1935
 In the result this Court held that any restrictions imposed by the Government while communicating the sanction of the post could not bind the Chief Justice in view of Article 229 of the Constitution
We now turn to Chapter IV
It is captioned Subordinate Courts
It consists of Articles which provide for matters relating inter alia to appointment and control of persons who man posts in the 40 subordinate judiciary
According to the scheme of this Chapter subordinate judiciary has been classified into i District Judges and members of the Judicial Service 
Article 236 defines the expression district judge to include judge of a city civil court additional district judge joint district judge assistant district judge Chief judge of a small cause court chief presidency magistrate additional chief presidency magistrate sessions judge additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge
The Article defines judicial service to mean a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge
 Article 233 gives the High Court an effective voice in the appointment of District Judges
Clause  1  of the Article peremptorily requires that appointments of persons to be and the posting and promotion of district judges shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court Clause 2 of the Article provides for direct appointment of District Judges from advocates or pleaders of not less than seven years standing who are not already in the service of the State or of the Union
In the matter bf such direct appointments also the Governor can act only on the recommendation of the High Court
Consultation with the High Court under Article 233 is not an empty formality
An appointment made in direct or indirect disobedience of this constitutional mandate would be invalid
See Chandra Mohan vs State of UP1 Chandramouleshwar vs Patna High Court 2  Service  which under Clause 1 of Article 233 is the first source of recruitment of District Judges by promotion means the judicial services  as defined in Article 236
The word posting  as used in Article 233 in the context of appointment  and promotion  means the first assignment of an appointee or promotee to a position in the cadre of District Judges
It cannot be understood in the sense of transfer 
See Ranga Muhammad s case 3
Article 234 enjoins that the rules in accordance with which appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State are to be made shall be framed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission
The expression judicial service in this Article carries the same connotation as
defined in Article 236
1 2  3  41 Article 235 is the pivot around which the entire scheme of the Chapter revolves
Under it the control over district courts and court subordinate thereto including the posting and promotions of and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of State is vested in the High Court
The interpretation and scope of Article 235 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court
The position crystallised by these decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature comprehensive in extent and effective in operation
It comprehends a wide variety matters
Among others it includes a i Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment dismissal removal reduction in rank of District Judges and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges
In the exercise of this control the High Court can hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary impose punishment other than dismissal or removal subject however to the conditions of service and a right of appeal if any granted thereby and to the giving of an opportunities of showing cause as required by Article 3112
ii If Article 235 the word control  is accompanied by the word vest which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary
The control vested in the High Court being exclusive and not dual an inquiry into the conduct of a member of judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority
State of West Bengal vs Nripendra Nath Bagchi supra Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab1 Punjab and Haryana High Court vs State of Haryana sub nom Narendra Singh Rao 2 iii Suspension from service of a member of the judiciary with view to hold a disciplinary inquiry
b Transfers promotions and confirmation of such promotions of persons holding posts in the judicial service inferior is that of District Judge
State of Assam vs section N Sen 3 State of Assam vs Kuseswar Saikia4  
c Transfers of District Judges State of Assam vs Ranga Muhammad supra Chandra Mouleshwar vs Patna High Court supra 
1  3 2  4 4 520SCI78 42 d Award of Selection grade to the members of the judicial service including District Judges it being their further promotion after their initial appointment to the cadre
State of Assam vs Kuseswar Saikia supra
e Confirmation of District Judges after their initial appointment
or promotion by the Governor to the cadre of District Judges under Article 233 on probation or officiating basis
Punjab  Haryana High Court vs State of Haryana supra
f Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Court and of Subordinate Courts State of UP vs Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi  Anr
supra
Since in both these appeals orders of the premature retirement of the Respondents viz Of Shri Dikshitulu made by the Chief Justice and of Shri Krishnamoorthy by the Governor in consonance with the decision of the High Court are in question it will be appropriate to amplify the point a little
It is well settled that compulsory retirement simpliciter in accordance with the terms and conditions of service does not amount to dismissal or removal or reduction in rank under Article 31 l or under the Service Rules because the Government servant does not lose the terminal benefits already earned by him See Tara Singh vs State of Rajasthan 1 State of Haryana vs Inder Prakash Anand 2
In the last mentioned case the Government servant was officiating in the cadre of District Judges
The High Court recommended that he should be reverted to his substantive post of Senior Subordinate JudgeChief Judicial Magistrate and as such allowed to continue in service till the age of 58 years
Contrary to the recommendation or the High Court the State Government passed an order under Rule S32c of the Punjab Civil Service Rules compulsorily retiring him from service at the age of 55 years
Holding that the order of compulsory retirement was invalid this Court stressed that the power of deciding whether a judicial officer should be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years upto the age of 58 years vests in the High Court and to hold otherwise will seriously affect the independence of the judiciary and take away the control vested in the High Court
The formal order of retirement however is passed by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the High Court
that being the broad basis of Article 235
It was explained that in such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution that the Governor as the 1  2  43 head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the A High Court
It was concluded that the vesting of complete control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State
In other words while in form the High Court s decision to compulsorily retire a subordinate judicial officer in the exercise of its administrative or disciplinary jurisdiction under Article 235 is advisory in substance and effect it is well nigh peremptory
Recently in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi1 this Court succinctly summed up the whole position as follows The ideal which inspired the provision that the control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto shall vest in the High Courts is that those wings of the judiciary should be independent of the executive
It is in order to effectuate that high purpose that article 235 as construed by the Court in various decisions requires that all matters relating to the subordinate judiciary including compulsory retirement and disciplinary proceedings but excluding the imposition of punishments falling within the scope of Article 311 and the first appointments and promotions should be dealt with and decided upon by the High Courts in the exercise of the control vested in them
 In sum the entire scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI epitomised in Articles 229 and 235 has been assiduously designed by the Founding Fathers to insure independence of the High Court and the subordinate judiciary
The stage is now set for noticing the provision of Article 371 and the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal order 1975 made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 3 and 4 of this Article
Article 371 was inserted in the Constitution with effect from July 1 1974 by the Constitution Thirty second Amendment Act 1973
This Article as its heading shows makes special provisions with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh
 Clause 1 of the Article authorises the President to provide by order for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State in matters of public employment and education
Clause 2 particularises the what an order made by the 1 19782 SCC 102
44 President under clause  I  may require to be done
Clause 3 is crucial for the purpose of the instant case and may be extracted in full
It reads as under 3 The President may by order provide for the constitution of an Administrative Tribunal for the State of Andhra Pradesh to exercise such jurisdiction powers and authority including any jurisdiction power and authority which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution Thirty second Amendment Act 1973 was exercisable by any Court other than the Supreme Court or by any tribunal or other authority as may be specified in the order with respect to the following matters namely a appointment allotment or promotion to such cases or classes of posts in any civil service of the State or to such class or classes of civil posts under the State or to such class or classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State as may be specified in the order b Seniority of persons appointed allotted or promoted to such class or classes of posts in any civil service of the State or to such class or classes of civil posts under the State or to such class or classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State as may be specified in the order
c Such other conditions of service of persons appointed
allotted or promoted to such class or classes of posts i civil service of the State or to such class or classes of posts under the State or to such class or classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State as may be specified in the order
emphasis supplied
Clause 4 of the Article further provides that an order made under clause 3 may a authorise the Administrative Tribunal to receive representation for redress of grievances relating to any matters within its jurisdiction as the President may specify and to make such orders thereon as the Tribunal may deem fit b contain provisions with respect to the powers and authorities and procedure of the Administrative Tribunal c provide for the transfer to the Administrative Tribunal proceedings relating to classes of posts within its jurisdiction pending before any Court other than the Supreme Court or tribunal or other authority d contain supplemental incidental and consequential provisions including those relating to fees limitation evidence 45 Under Clause 5 the order of the Administrative Tribunal finally disposing of any case shall become effective upon its confirmation by the State Government or on the expiry of three months from the date on which the order is made whichever is earlier Then there is a Proviso to this Clause a most extraordinary provision which says Provided that the State Government may by special order made in writing and for reasons to be specified there in modify or annul any order of the Administrative Tribunal before it becomes effective and in such a case the order of the Administrative Tribunal shall have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect as the case may be
This clause shows that unlike a Civil Court or a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 prior to the enactment of Article 371D the Administrative Tribunal set up by an order under clause 3 of the Article is not competent to pass definitive or final orders in the sense that all its decisions or orders are subject to confirmation modification or annulment by the State Government
The Tribunal s order has no force proprio vigore unless confirmed by the State Government either expressly within three months of the date on which it was made or impliedly by not interfering with that order for the said period of three months
Then there is no provision in the Article requiring the State Government to give an opportunity of hearing to the parties before modifying or annulling the order of the Tribunal
Clause 6 requires every special order of the Government made under Clause 5 to be laid before the State Legislature
Clause 7 clarifies that the High Court or any other Court other than the Supreme Court or tribunal shall have no jurisdiction power or authority in respect of any matter subject to the jurisdiction power or authority of or in relation to the Administrative Tribunal Clause 8 gives power to the President to abolish the Administrative Tribunal if he is satisfied that its continued existence is not necessary
Clause 9 is a validating provision
As will be presently seen it was enacted to get over the difficulties created by the judicial decisions on Mulki Rules
46 Clause 10 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Article 371D and to the Presidential orders made thereunder by enacting 10 The provisions of this article and of any order made by the President thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force
 In the context we may also have a look at the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal order 1975 dated the 19th May 1975 published as per GOMs
No 323 General Administration SPF D 22nd May 1975 made by the President in exercise of his powers under Clauses 3 and 4 of Article 371 D Paragraph 2 of this order contains definitions of various expressions used in therein
Clause d of this paragraph defines person employed to mean an individual in relation to whom the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of the matters specified in paragraph 6 of this order Paragraphs 3 to 5 are not material to the points under consideration
Paragraph 6 is important
It provides in regard to Jurisdiction powers and authority of the Tribunal
It confers on the Tribunal all the jurisdiction powers and authority which immediately before the commencement of this order were exercisable by all Courts except the Supreme Court with respect to appointment allotment or promotion to any public post seniority of persons appointed allotted or promoted to such post and all other conditions of service of such persons
 Sub para 2 provides that nothing in sub paragraph 1 of this paragraph shall apply to or in relation to a persons appointed on contract for a specified term or purpose b member of the All India Services c persons on deputation with the State Government or any local authority within the State being persons in the services of the Central or any other State Government or other authority d persons employed on part time basis and e village officers
Sub para 3 is not relevant
Sub para 4 makes the law in force immediately before the commencement of this order with respect to the practice procedure and disposal of petitions for the issue of directions orders or writs under article 226 of the Constitution by 47 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh applicable with modifications if any made by the Tribunal to the disposal of petitions by the Tribunal
There is a proviso to this sub paragraph which is not relevant for our purpose
The Explanation appended to this Sub paragraph defines for the purpose of Paragraph 6 public post to mean a all classes of posts in all civil services of the State b all classes of civil posts under the State and c all classes of posts under the control of any local
authority within the State
Paragraph 7 empowers the Tribunal to receive representations from persons aggrieved relating to matters within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Then there is a proviso directing the Tribunal not to admit any such representation a unless the person concerned has availed of the remedies under the relevant rules for making such representation to the State Government or the local authority as the case may be or to any other officer or other authority under the State Government or local authority and has failed or b if a period of more than six months has elapsed after a final order rejecting the representation
The next material provision is in sub paragraph 3 which provides that where a representation has been admitted by the Tribunal all proceedings for redress of such grievance pending before the State Government or local authority shall abate
Paragraph 8 is not relevant
Paragraph 9 mandates the Tribunal that when it passes a final order disposing of any case it shall forward the proceedings thereof to the State Government
Paragraph 14 provides for transfer of proceedings from the High Court and other Courts to the Tribunal in matters in relation to which jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal by this order
The rest of the provisions of the order are not relevant to the problem before us
The ground is now clear for considering the question
Whether the officers and servants of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and persons holding posts in the judicial service of the State  including District Judges  are subject to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal order 1975 made by the President in exercise of his powers under Clauses 3 and 4 of Article 371D 48 We have seen that the substantive provision is in Clause 3
This clause defines the extent and delimits the area of the jurisdiction power and authority with respect to certain matters mentioned therein which may be conferred wholly or in part on the Administrative Tribunal by an order made by the President thereunder
Clause 4 only subserves and elucidates the substantive Clause 3
It is undisputed that compulsory retirement is a condition of service
The question therefore narrows down into the issue
Do the posts held by officers and servants of the High Court and members of the subordinate judiciary fall under any of the class or classes of posts mentioned in sub clause c of Clause 3 of Article 371D  For reaching a correct finding on this issue it is not necessary to dilate on the Administrative Tribunal order made by the President or to explore the scope of the expression public post defined in Paragraph 6 thereof for the order has merely for the sake of convenience adopted this brief expression to cover compendiously all the three phrases commonly employed in sub clauses a b and c of Clause 3 of the Article
Though the content of the first limb of each of the sub clauses a b and c varies the rest of the language employed therein is identical
Each of these three sub clauses in terms relates to glass or classes of i posts in any civil service of the State or ii civil posts under the State or iiiposts under the control of any local authority with in the State
It is manifest that posts on the establishment of the High Court or held by the members of the judiciary are not posts under the control of any local authority
Neither the Chief Justice nor the High Court can be called a local authority within the meaning of clause iii
As regards ii it is conceded even by Shri Vepa Sarathy that persons holding posts on the staff of the High Court or in the subordinate judiciary do not hold their posts under the control of the State Government and as such those class or classes of posts do not fall within the purview of phrase ii either
The compass of the problem thus further gets reduced into whether the phrase posts in the civil services of the State commonly occur ring in sub clauses a  b and c of Article 371 D 3 covers posts held by the High Court staff and persons belonging to the subordinate judiciary  This phrase is couched in general terms which are susceptible of more than one interpretation
49 The phrase Civil service of the State remains more or less an h amorphous expression as it has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution
Contrasted with it the expressions judicial service of the State and District Judge have been specifically defined in Article 236 and thus given a distinctive definite meaning by the Constitution makers
Construed loosely in its widest general sense
this elastic phrase can be stretched to include the officers and servants of the High Court  as well as members of the Subordinate Judiciary
Understood in its strict narrow sense in harmony with the basic constitutional scheme embodied in Chapters V and VI Part VI and centralised in Articles 229 and 235 thereof the phrase will not take in High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary
Shri Vepa Sarthy canvasses for adoption of the expansible interpretation which will cover the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary while Shri Lal Narain Sinha urges for acceptance of the restricted but harmonious construction of the said phrase
A choice between these two rival constructions of the phrase civil services of the State is to be made in the light of well settled principles of interpretation of Constitutional and other statutory documents
The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory provision should be construed according to the intent of they that made it Coke
Normally such intent is gathered from the language of the provision
If the language or the phraseology employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal terms the same must be given effect to regardless of the consequences that may follow
But if the words used in the provision are imprecise protean or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent
In such a case in order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and phrases employed it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well recognised rules of construction such as its legislative history the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole each portion throwing light on the rest the purpose of the legislation the object sought to be achieved and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in preference to the other possible interpretation
Where two alternative constructions are possible the Court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth harmonious working and eschew the other which leads to absurdity confusion
Or friction contradiction 50 and conflict between various provisions or undermines or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment
These canons of construction apply to the interpretation of our Constitution with greater force because the Constitution is a living integrated organism having a soul and consciousness of its own
The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of its basic framework can be felt all over its body even in the extremities of its limbs
Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture nor a mere exercise in grammar
As one of us Chandrachud J as he then was put it in Keshvananda Bharati s case while interpreting words in solemn document like the Constitution one must look at them not in a school masterly fashion not with the cold eye of a lexicographer but with the realization that they occur in a single complex instrument in which one part may throw light on the other  so that the construction must hold a balance between all its parts
 Keeping in mind the principles enunciated above we will first leave a peep into the historical background of the provisions in Article 371 D
The former State of Hyderabad comprised of three linguistic areas Telengana Marathwada and Karnatak
In 1919 the Nizam issued a Firman promulgating what came to be known as Mulki Rules
The Nizam confirmed these Rules by another Firman issued in 1949
Those Rules provided inter alia 15 years  residence in the State as an essential qualification for public employment
In 1955 the Rajpramukh in exercise of his powers under Article 309 Proviso of the Constitution framed the Hyderabad General Recruitment Rules 1955 in supersession of all the previous rules o the subject
One of these Rules laid down that domicile certificate would be necessary for appointment to a State or subordinate service and the issue of such certificate depended upon residence in the State for a period of not less than 15 years
On November 1 1956 as a result of the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act the State of Hyderabad was trifurcated
Telengana region became a part of the newly formed State of Andhra Pradesh while Marathwada and Karnatak regions ultimately became parts of Maharashtra or Mysore States
With these prefatory remarks we may now notice the Statement of objects and Reasons for the Bill which became the Constitution 32nd Amendment Act 1972
This Statement may be quoted in extenso When the State of Andhra Pradesh was formed in 1956 certain safeguards were envisaged for the Telengana area in the matter of development and also in the matter of 51 employment opportunities and educational facilities for that residents of that area
The provisions of clause 1 of Article 371 of the Constitution were intended to give effect to certain features of these safeguards
The Public Employment Requirement as to Residence Act 1957 was enacted inter alia to provide for employment opportunities for residents of Telengana area
But in 1969 in the case A V section N Rao vs Andhra Pradesh   the Supreme Court held the relevant provision of the Act to be unconstitutional in so far as it related to the safeguards envisaged for the Telengana area
Owing to a variety of causes the working of the safeguards gave rise to a certain amount of dissatisfaction sometimes in the Telengana area and sometimes in the other areas of the State
Measures were devised from time to time to resolve the problems
Recently several leaders of Andhra Pradesh made a concerted effort to analyse the factors which have been giving rise to the dissatisfaction and find enduring answers to the problems with a view to achieving fuller emotional integration of the people of Andhra Pradesh
On the 21st September 1973 they suggested certain measures generally known as the Six Point Formula indicating a uniform approach for promoting accelerated development of the backward areas of the State so as to secure the balanced development of the State as a whole and for providing equitable opportunities to different areas of the State in the matter of education employment and career prospects in public services
This formula has received wide support in Andhra Pradesh and has been endorsed by the State Government
This Bill has been brought forward to provide the necessary constitutional authority for giving effect to the Six Point Formula in so far as it relates to the provision of equitable opportunities for people of different areas of the State in the matter of admission to educational institutions and public employment and constitution of an Administrative Tribunal with jurisdiction to deal with certain disputes and grievances relating to public services
The Bill also seeks to empower Parliament to legislate for establishing a Central University in the State and contains provisions of an incidental and consequential nature including the provision For the validation of certain appointments made in the past
52 As the Six Point Formula provides for the discontinuance of the Regional Committee constituted under clause 1 of article 371 of the Constitution the Bill also provides for the repeal of that clause Parenthesis and emphasis in Para 1 added
It will be seen from the above extract that the primary purpose of enacting Article 371D was two fold i To promote accelerated development of the backward areas of the State of Andhra so as to secure the balanced development of the State as a whole and ii to provide equitable opportunities to different areas of the State in the matter of education employment and career prospects in public service
To achieve this primary object Clause 1 of Article 371D empowers the President to provide by order for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State in the matter of public employment and in the matter of education
Clause 2 of the Article is complementary to Clause 1
It particularises the matters which an order made under Clause 1 may provide
For instance its sub clause c i enables the President to specify in his order the extent to which the manner in which and the conditions subject to which preference or reservation shall be given or made in the matter of direct recruitment to posts in any local cadre under the State Government or under any local authority
Sub clause c further makes it clear that residence for a specified period in the local area can be made a condition for recruitment to any such local cadre
Thus Clause 4 also directly is designed to achieve the primary object of the legislation
From the foregoing conspectus it is evident that the evil which was sought to be remedied viz inequitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh in matters of public employment and education had no causal nexus whatever with the independence of the High Court and subordinate judiciary which the Founding Fathers have with solemn concern vouchsafed in articles 229 and 235
Nor did the public agitation which led to the enactment of Article 371D make any grievance against the basic scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution
The Statement of objects and Reasons does not indicate that there Was any intention whatever on the part of the legislature to impairer derogate from the scheme of securing independence of the Judiciary as enshrined in Articles 229 and 235
Indeed the amendment or 53 abridgement of this basic scheme was never an issue of debut in Parliament when the Constitution 32nd Amendment Bill was considered
One test which may profitably be applied to ascertain whether the High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary were intended to be included in Clause 3 of Article 371D is Will the exclusion of the judiciary from the sweep of this Clause substantially affect the scope and utility of the Article as an instrument for achieving the object which the Legislature had in view The answer cannot but be in the negative
The High Court staff and members of the Subordinate Judiciary constitute only a fraction of the number of persons in public employment in the State
Incidently it may be mentioned that one of the primary purposes of this Article viz to secure equitable share in public employment to people of certain local areas in the State on the basis of the Mulki Rules requiring 15 years residence in those areas could be achieved under those Rules which as subsequently clarified by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh
vs V V Reddy1 continued to be in force as valid law in the territories of the former State of Hyderabad State even after the constitution of the State of Andhra Pradesh
Let us now apply another test which in the circumstances of the case will be decisive
In that connection we have to see what consequences will flow if we give this general undefined and flexible phrase Civil services of the State in Article 371D3 the wider construction so as to include in it the High Court staff and the members of the subordinate judiciary
The inevitable result of such an extensive construction will be that the control vested in the Chief Justice over the staff of the High Court and in the High Court over the Subordinate Judiciary will become shorn of its substance efficacy and exclusiveness and after being processed through the conduit of the Administrative Tribunal will pass on into the hands of the Executive Government
which under Article 371D5 is the supreme authority having full power to confirm or not to confirm modify or annul the orders of the Tribunal
Such a construction will lead to internecine conflict and contradiction rob Articles 229 and 235 of their content make a mockery of the Directive Principle in Article 50 and the fundamental concept of the independence of the judiciary which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious concern built into the basic scheme of the Constitution
Parliament we are sure could never have intended such a strange result
In our quest for the true intention of Parliament therefore we must eschew this wide literal interpretation 1 AIR 1973 SC 823 54 which will defeat or render otiose the scheme of Chapters IV and V Part VI particularised in Articles 229 and 235 and instead choose the alternative interpretation according to which members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary will not fall within the purview of the phrase civil services of the State
Such a restricted construction will ensure smooth working of the Constitution and harmony amongst its various provisions
It is true that this very phrase in the context of the provision in Article 311 includes the employees of the High Court and members of the judicial services
But it must be remembered that the provisions of Article 311 are of a general nature
They give constitutional recognition to a fundamental principle of natural justice by making its protection available uniformly tc all Government servants
That is why in the context of that Article this phrase has been spaciously construed
As against this Article 371D is a special provision which marks a departure from the general scheme of the Constitution
The area of the departure cannot be extended beyond what is unmistakably and specifically delineated by the words employed therein
A phrase used in the context cf a general provision may not carry the same meaning when employed in the context of a special provision particularly when that phrase has no where been defined in the enactment
Words used with reference to one set of circumstances said Lord Blackburn in Edinburn Street Tramways Co vs V Torbin1 may convey an intention quite different from what the self same set of words used in reference to another set of circumstances would or might have produced
This holds true even when the same words are used in different contexts in the same enactment
Therefore in a special provision like Article 371D as its heading itself proclaims which derogates from the general scheme of the Constitution for a specific purpose general undefined phrases are not to be interpreted in their widest amplitude but strictly attuned to the context and purpose of the provision
Conversely had it been the intention of Parliament to include officers and servants of the High Court  and members of the judicial services of the State  and of the cadre of District Judges  in the phrase civil services of the State  occurring in Clause 3 of Article 371D and thereby depart from the basic scheme of Chapters V and VI Part VI the language commonly employed in the sub clauses should have read like this Class or classes of posts in the civil services of the State including posts
in the judicial service of the State  11877 3 Appeal Cases 58 68 55 and of District Judges in the State class or classes of posts of officers and servants of the High Court   In our opinion non use of the phrases judicial service of the State and District Judges which have been specifically defined in Article 236 and officers and servants of the High Court which has been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229 respectively to differentiate them in the scheme of the Constitution from the other civil services of the State gives a clear indication that posts held by the High Court staff or by the Subordinate Judiciary were advisedly excluded from the purview of Clause 3 of Article 371D
The scope of the non obstante clause in sub article 10 which gives an overriding effect to this Article is conterminous with the ambit of the preceding clauses
The officers and servants of the High Court  and the members of the Judicial Service including District Judges being outside the purview of Clause 3 the non obstante provision in Clause 10 cannot operate to take away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or of the High Court as the case may be under Articles 229 235 and 226 of the Constitution in regard to those public servants in matters or disputes falling within the scope of the said Articles
Clause 10 will prevail over any provisions of the Constitution other than those which are outside the ambit of Article 371 D such as Articles 229 and 235
Provisions not otherwise covered by Article 37t D cannot be brought within its sweep because of the non obstante Clause 10
It follows as a necessary corollary that nothing in the order of the President constituting the Administrative Tribunal confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to entertain deal with or decide the representation by a member of the staff of the High Court or of the Subordinate Judiciary
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the impugned order dated August 24 1977 of the Administrative Tribunal having been passed without jurisdiction is a nullity
Accordingly we allow Civil Appeal No 2826 of 1977 leaving the parties to pay and bear their own costs
The reasons given above apply mutatis mutants to the case of Krishnamurthy in Civil Appeal No 278 of 1978 and furnish the basis of our short order dated August 4 1978 by which we had accepted that appeal
In this Appeal CA No 27878 however the respondent s costs in this Court will be borne by the appellant in terms of this Court s order dated 10 2 78 in SLP Civil No 626 of 1978
In view of the orders dated 28th November 1977 and 22nd March 56 1978 passed in stay applications Nos
4804 of 1977 and 1744 of 1978 respectively and in terms of those orders we direct that since the appeals have been allowed the excess payment if any made pursuant to the stay orders shall be adjusted towards pension that may be due to the respondents
The adjustment shall be made in easy convenient and reasonable instalments
NVK Appeals allowed


Summary:
Article 371 D 3 inserted by the Constitution Thirty Second Amendment Act 1973 empowers the President to constitute an Administrative Tribunal for the State of Andhra Pradesh to exercise such jurisdiction powers and authority which immediately before the amendment was exercisable by any Court tribunal or authority in respect of appointment allotment or promotion to posts in the Civil Services of the State under the State or under the control of any local authority within the state
Clause 10 provides that the provisions of the Article and any order made by the President thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force
6 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order 1975 issued by the President setting up the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal provides that the Tribunal shall have all the jurisdiction powers and authority exercisable by all Courts with respect to appointment allotment or promotion to any public post seniority of persons appointed
allotted or promoted to such post and all other conditions of service of such persons  The first Respondent in CA No 282677 was a former employee of the High Court
He originally belonged to the High Court service
After being on deputation with the Central and State Governments for some years he re joined the High Court service as Assistant Registrar and was later promoted as Deputy Registrar The Chief Justice of the High Court in exercise of his powers under Article 229 of the Constitution read with the relevant rules passed an order dated January 3 1969 compulsorily retiring the respondent from service who by then had attained the age of 50 years
His writ petition assailing the orders of compulsory retirement was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the jurisdiction of the High Court which was hitherto being exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution to correct orders of the Chief Justice on the administrative side with regard to conditions of service of officers of the High Court vested in the Administrative Tribunal by reason or clause 6 1 of the AP Administrative Tribunal order made by the President under Article 371 D of the Constitution
The respondent thereafter moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal which set aside the impugned order on the ground that it was arbitrary
27 and amounted to a penalty of dismissal or removal from service and as such as hit by Article 3112 of the Constitution
The respondent in CA No 27878 was a member of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service working as a Subordinate Judge
He was prematurely retired in public interest by an order of the State Government on the recommendation of the High Court
The respondent s contention that in the case of Subordinate Judges the High Court being the appointing authority the Governor had no power or jurisdiction to pass an order of premature retirement of a member of the State Judicial Service was accepted by the Tribunal and the impugned order was set aside
In the appeals against both the orders of the Administrative Tribunal it was contended before this Court by the appellants that Article 371 D of the Constitution should be construed harmoniously with the basic scheme underlying Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution and so construed the general expression such as class or classes of posts  Civil Services of the State etc
in Clause 3 of this Article will not include postsmembers of the High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary with the result that the impugned orders of the Administrative Tribunal are without jurisdiction and nullities
On the other hand the respondents contended that
the phrase any Civil Service of the State in clause 3 of this Article interpreted in its widest sense includes the members of the High Court staff and the Subordinate Judiciary that even it such an interpretation is contrary to the Constitutional scheme of securing independence of the judiciary such a result was intended to be brought about by insertion of Article 371 D the non obstante provision in Clause 10 of which gives it an over riding effect
Allowing the appeals  HELD 1
The entire scheme or Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution epitomised in articles 229 and 235 has been assiduously designed by the Founding Fathers to ensure independence of the High Court and the Subordinate Judiciary
43F a In regard to servants and officers of the High Court Article 229 of the Constitution makes the power of their appointment dismissal removal suspension reduction in rank compulsory retirement etc
including the power to prescribe their conditions of service the sole preserve of the Chief Justice and no extraneous executive authority can interfere with the exercise of that power by the Chief Justice or his nominee except to a very limited extent mentioned in the provisos
In conferring such exclusive and supreme powers on the Chief Justice the object which the Founding Fathers had in view was to ensure the independence of the High Court
37F G b The control over the Subordinate Judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 23 5 is exclusive in nature comprehensive in extent and effective in operation
It comprehends a wide variety of matters and is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in me matter of appointment dismissal or removal
41B C 28 c Since retirement simpliciter in accordance with the terms and conditions of service does not amount to dismissal or removal or reduction in rank under Article 311 or under the service rules it is for the High Court in the exercise of its control  under Article 235 to decide whether or not a judge of the Subordinate Judiciary should be prematurely or compulsorily retired
Though in form such an administrative decision of the High Court is advisory in substance and effect
it is well nigh peremptory
42D 43B M Gurumoorthy vs Accountant General Assam and Nagaland and Ors  Chandra Mohan vs State of Uttar Pradesh  Chandramouleshwar vs Patna High Court   State of Assam vs Ranga Mohammed   State of West Bengal vs Nripendra Nath Bagchi   Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab   Punjab and Haryana High Court vs State of Haryana Sub nom Narendra Singh Rao   State of Assam vs section N Sen  State of Assam vs Kuseswar Sukla State of UP vs Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Anr
 Tara Singh vs State of Rajasthan   State of Haryana vs Inder Prakash Anand  referred to
The phrase any civil service of the State commonly employed in sub clauses a b and c of clause 3 of Article 371 D is a general undefined and flexible expression and is capable of bearing meaning more than one
If it is construed loosely in its widest sense so as to include in it the High Court staff and the members of the Subordinate Judiciary the result will be that the control vested in the Chief Justice over the staff of the High Court and in the High Court over the subordinate judiciary will become shorn of its substance efficacy and exclusiveness and after being processed through the conduit of the Administrative Tribunal will pass on into the hands of the Executive Government which under clause 5 of Article 371 D is the supreme authority having full power to confirm or not to confirm modify or annul the orders of the Tribunal
Such a construction will lead to internecine conflict and contradiction rob Articles 229 and 235 of their content make a mockery of the Directive Principles in Article 50 and the fundamental concept of the independence of the judiciary which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious concern built into the basic scheme of the Constitution
Parliament could never have intended such a strange result
53E H 3
a In its strict narrow sense the phrase Civil service of the State
will not take in members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary
49 A C b Non use of the expressions judicial service of the State and District Judges which have been specifically defined in Article 236 and Officers and Servants of the High Court which have been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229 respectively to differentiate these in the scheme of the Constitution from the other Civil Services of the State gives a clear indication that posts held by the High Court Staff or by the Subordinate Judiciary have been advisedly excluded from the purview of Clause 3 of Article 371 D 55 B C 4
In such a situation
the Court must eschew the wide literal interpretation which will defeat or render otiose the scheme of Chapters V and VI Part VI particularised in Articles 229 and 235 and instead choose the alternative interpretation according to which members of the High Court Staff and the Subordi 29 nate Judiciary will not fall within the purview of Clause 3 of Article 371 D A Such a restricted construction will ensure smooth working of the Constitution and harmony among its various provisions
53H 54A B 5
The officers and servants of the High Court and the members of the Judicial Service including District Judges being outside the purview of Clause 3 the non obstante provision in Clause 10 of Article 371 D cannot operate to take away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or of the High Court as the case may be under Articles 229 235 and 226 of the Constitution in regard to a dispute or matter relating to the conditions of service of a member of the High Court Staff or of the Subordinate Judiciary
55D 6
In view of the above nothing in the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order 1975 issued by the President confers jurisdiction power and authority on the Administrative Tribunal to entertain deal with or decide the representation by a member of the High Court Staff or of the Subordinate Judiciary
The impugned orders
therefore of the Administrative Tribunal in both these appeals were without jurisdiction null and void
55 F G