Civil Appeal No 2976 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 2331987 of the Allahabad High Court in CMWP No 4397 of 1986
SN Singh and TN Singh for the Appellant
LN Sinha and LR Singh for the Respondents
The following Order of the Court was delivered O R R Special leave granted
Appellant passed Bachelor s examination in law from the Banaras Hindu University securing 544 marks and was placed in the second division
He applied for admission in the Master s Course in Law in the academic session 197980
The University had prescribed a minimum of 55 marks on the average of three years of the degree course as the qualifying requirement
Appellant claimed weightage on the basis that members of his family had donated lands and houses to the University and cited the case of Shri Anant Narain Singh as a precedent
As he failed to secure admission he again applied for taking admission in the academic session 1983 84 but was not granted admission
Ultimately he filed a writ petition before the Allahabad 943 High Court
On 2871986 the said writ petition was taken up for hearing by a Division Bench and when hearing was concluded judgment was dictated in open Court allowing the writ petition and direction to the University to admit the petitioner was ordered
The appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment but was told that the matter was again in the hearing list and would be heard afresh
The matter continued to appear in the hearing list from September 1986 till 521987 when the particular Division Bench which had heard the matter released the case to be taken up by another Bench
On 23rd of March 1987 the writ petition was dismissed by the new Division Bench
Two contentions have been raised before us
It is maintained that once the judgment was delivered in open Court it became operative and could not be changed
The dismissal of the writ petition after it had been once allowed was therefore without jurisdiction it was also contended that on the facts of the case the appellant should have been given admission
There is no dispute that on 2871986 a Division Bench heard the writ petition and disposed it of
The order sheet of that day reads thus Sri Aditya Narain for the petitioner Sri Siddheshwar Pd
for the respondents Petition heard finally
Writ Petition disposed of
Subsequently there is an endorsement without anybody s signature to the following effect Under signature illegible Listed for further hearing
On February 5 1987 the same learned Judges who had allowed the writ petition gave the following directions We release this case but we direct that this case be placed before the Hon ble the Chief Justice for getting it listed before the appropriate bench as the matter was once heard by us and judgment dictated but later on was not signed and was ordered to be listed for further hearing As prayed by counsel for University the petition
may be listed if possible on 25th February 1987
944 There is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed by judgment pronounced in open Court on 2871986 after hearing was concluded
According to the appellant the judgment once pronounced in open Court became operative even without signature of the learned Judges and could not be altered
Reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Surendra Singh  Ors
vs The State of Uttar Pradesh The facts of that case show that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court sitting at Lucknow consisting of Kidwai and Bhargava JJ
heard a criminal appeal and on 11th of December 1952 judgment was reserved
Before it could be delivered Bhargava J was shifted to Allahabad
While there he dictated a judgment treating it to be a judgment of both
He signed every page of the judgment as well as at the end but did not put the date
He sent it to Kidwai J at Lucknow
On the 24th of December 1962 before the judgment was delivered Bhargava J passed away
On the 5th of January 1953 Kidwai J delivered the judgment of the Court
He signed it had dated it
The question as to whether the judgment was a valid one came up for consideration
While dealing with such a question Bose J spoke for the Court thus In our opinion a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal pronouncement or delivery in the open court
It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way
Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague
All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded the way in which it is to be authenticated the signing and the sealing all the rules designed to secure certainity about its content and matter can be cured but not the hard core namely the formal intimation of the decision and its content formely declared in a judicial way in open court
The exact way in which this is done does not matter
In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out in some only the operative portion is pronounced in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection An important point therefore arises
It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a 945 declaration of the mind of the court as it is at the time of pronouncement
We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery as that is not of the essence except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open court
But however it is done it must be an expression of the mind of the court at the time of delivery
We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the court performs after the hearing
Everything else uptil then is done out of court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion
Judges may not often do discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion
That is not their judgment
They may write and exchange drafts
Those are not the judgment either however heavily and often they may have been signed
The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the court
That is what constitutes the judgment   Bose J continued to say As soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court
The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authtenticated and made certain
The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable
Thus if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment if it can be shown to have been validly delivered would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication After the judgment has been delivered provision is made for review
One provision is that it can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change should that be necessary provided it has not been signed
Another is that after signature a review properly so called would lie in civil cases but none in criminal but the review when it lies is only permitted on very narrow grounds   946 The above observations were made as already mentioned in a case where the judgment had been signed but not pronounced in the open court
In the present case we are concerned with a judgment that had been pronounced but not signed
The provision in order 20 rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates the position in such cases
It permits alterations or additions to a judgment so long as it is not signed
This is also apparently what has been referred to in the last paragraph of the extract from the judgment of Bose J quoted above where it has been pointed out that a judgment which has been delivered can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality except notice to the parties and re hearing on the point of change should that be necessary provided it has not been signed
 It is only after the judgment is both pronounced and signed that alterations or additions are not permissible except under the provisions of section 152 or section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure or in very exceptional cases under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
But while the Court has undoubted power to alter or modify a judgment delivered but not signed such power should be exercised judicially sparingly and for adequate reasons
When a judgment is pronounced in open court parties act on the basis that it is the judgment of the Court and that the signing is a formality to follow
We have extensively extracted from what Bose J spoke in this judgment to impresss upon everyone that pronouncement of a judgment in court whether immediately after the hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of the court with reference to the case
Bose J emphasised the feature that as soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court
That would mean that the judgment to be operative does not await signing thereof by the court
There may be exceptions to the rule for instance soon after the judgment is dictated in open court a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts from the record
In such a case the court may give direction that the judgment which has just been delivered would not be effective and the case shall be further heard
There may also be cases though their number would be few and far between where when the judgment is placed for signature the court notices a feature which should have been taken into account
In such a situation the matter may be placed for further consideration upon notice to the parties
If the judgment delivered is intended not to 947 be operative good reasons should be given
Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is complete by listening to submissions of counsel and perusal of records and a definite view is reached by the court in regard to the conclusion
Once that stage is reached and the court pronounces the judgment the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or a review is asked for and is granted
When the judgment is pronounced parties present in the court know the conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement they proceed to conduct their affairs
If what is pronounced in court is not acted upon certainly litigants would be prejudiced
Confidence of the litigants in the judicial process would be shaken
A judgment pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if there be any such the same should apear from the record of the case
in the instant matter we find that there is no material at all to show as to what let the Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment in open court not to authenticate the same by signing it
In such a situation the judgment delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition should not have been placed for fresh hearing
The subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not available to be made once it is held that the writ petition stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on 2871986
The record of the proceedings of the High Court which is before us does not contain the judgment delivered in court on 2871986 but there is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed
On the conceded position that the appellant s writ petition was allowed by the High Court the University is directed to admit the appellant to the Master s Course in Law in the current session
We understand that the University s courses of study have now been changed
The University shall take such steps as are practicable to give effect to this decision
The appeal is accordingly allowed
There will be no order for costs
SL Appeal allowed


Summary:
 The husband of the petitioner had been detained by an order dated 15th May 1987 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980
The grounds served on the detenu for making the detention order alleged that the detenu had undertaken contract works of various types under the South Central Railway and indulged in clandestine business of diversion of levy cement meant for use in the Masonary Ballast Wall alongwith the railway track and had thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement an essential commodity
The facts mentioned that on the receipt of information that levy cement was being transferred into non levy bags for its diversion to works not intended the Inspector of Police Vigilance Cell made a surprise visit and found that the information passed on to him was correct
He conducted a raid and recovered 400 bags of levy cement
A criminal case under Clauses 12 and 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Levy Cement Distribution Licensing and Regulation Order 1982 read with 974 Section 7 and 8 of the was commenced and further investigation proceeded
Both the detenu and his servant absconded and were ultimately arrested on 18th March 1987 when the detenu confessed before the Inspector of Police
The detenu was released on bail the following day ie 19th March 1987
On the consideration of the aforesaid circumstances the District Magistrate was of the opinion that the mere launching of a criminal case against the detenu would not effectively prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement and therefore ordered detention which order was later confirmed by the Advisory Board The detenu filed his first representation on 20th May 1987 which was rejected by the State Government as also the Advisory Board later
writ petition was filed before the High Court on 18th June 1987 challenging the detention order while the writ petition in this Court was filed on 13th June 1987
second representation on behalf of the detenu was filed by his cousin on 5th June 1987 for revocation of the detention order
This representation remained unattended until the State Government reminded the Central Government in this regard after filing of the writ petition in this Court and it was only then that the Central Government rejected the same on 2nd September 1987
The High Court dismissed the writ petition on 18th July 1987
In the Special Leave Petition as also the writ petition under article 32 the order of detention was challenged on the grounds of 1 delay of about 5 months in passing the order 2 the allegation against the detenu of diverting levy cement for private use was incorrect 3 the second representation filed by the detenu s cousin remained undisposed by the Central Government for about 3 months 4 the sponsoring officer s default in not placing relevant facts before the detaining authority before the impugned order was passed and 5 the detention order was passed on the basis of a solitary incident
Dismissing the Writ Petition and Special Leave Petition  HELD 1
Delay cannot by itself vitiate the decision to detain a person
980G 975 Rajendra Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another  Smt
Hemlata Kantilal Shah vs State of Maharashtra  and Malwa Shaw vs The State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC 957 referred to
In the instant case there is no doubt that in the police records the detenu was considered to be an absconder throughout till his arrest on 18th March 1987
The affidavit of the District Magistrate filed before the High Court indicates that further investigation in the case continued even after the arrest of the detenu and that other relevant information could be collected only after and thus the investigation was complete on 13th May 1987
The matter was placed before the District Magistrate on 14th May 1987 who passed the impugned order in these circumstances here is no doubt that the respondents have satisfactorily explained the delay in passing the detention order
980E F 2
The sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority is not to be examined by the Court
This Court while considering the petitioner s writ application is not sitting in appeal over the detention order and it is not to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority
A detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be quashed but that is not so in the present case
982C 981E 3
Section 14 of the Act clothes the authority with the power of revoking the detention order but the duty to exercise it arises only where new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light
There is no right in favour of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be formally disposed of again
No period of limitation is fixed for disposal of an application under Section 14
982D F Haradhan Saha and another vs The State of West Bengal and others   Sat Pal vs The State of Punjab 1982 1 SSC 12 and State of Uttar Pradesh vs Zavad Zama Khan 1984 3 SSC 505 referred to 4
It has long been established that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the factual existence of the condition on which the order of the detention can be made namely the grounds of detention constitute the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining 976 authority is based
Nor can the court on a review of the grounds substitute its own opinion for that of the authority
983D In the instant case the ground of detention is only one namely that the detenu was acting prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity ie levy cement essential to the community by diverting it to the open market
The grounds of detention served alongwith the order are nothing but a narration of facts
The question wheher the detentu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community is a matter of inference to be drawn from facts
It could not be said that there was no material upon which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could be based
It appears from the grounds ie the facts set out that the detenu had made a statement admitting that he had diverted 600 bags of levy cement issued to him for use in the masonary ballast wall along the railway track and therefore the District Magistrate was justified in coming to the conclusion that he the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of the commodity essential to the community
983E H 5
If materials and vital facts  which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order are not placed it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal
That is not so in the instant case
There was ample material before the District Magistrate for him to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing the detention order
984C Asha Devi vs K Shiveraj Addl
Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat and another   Mohd Shakeel Wahid Ahmed vs State of Maharashtra and others   Kurjibhai Dhanjibhai Patel vs State of Gujarat and Pushpadevi M Jatia vs ML Wadhawan Additional Secretary Government of India and others   referred to