N Criminal Appeal Nos
274 275 of 1974
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27 11 73 and 11 1 1974 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No 7867 and CrlNo 8073 respectively
R K Garg V J Francis and D K Garg for the Appellant
Soli J Sorabji Addl
 R N Sachthey for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM J
These appeals are by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No 78 of 1967 and Order dated 11th January 1974 in Cr
SCA No 80 of 1973
The appellant was chargesheeted on 26th December 1963 for an offence under section 120 B Indian Penal Code for entering into a criminal conspiracy with one Sirajuddin and one Rehman to accept from them illegal gratification in the discharge of his official duties
He was also charged with specific offences of accepting Rs 6000 and Rs 4000 from Sirajuddin and Rehman being offences punishable under section 161 Indian Penal Code read with section 52 and Section 51 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947
He was also charged for the offence punishable under section 52 read with section 51 a of the Prevention of Corruption Act that in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy he during the period from 1955 to 1961 habitually accepted illegal gratification from the said two co accused persons
The Special Judge who tried the case acquitted the appellant by his order dated 19th January 1967 holding that neither the charge of conspiracy nor any other charge against the accused was proved
But the Special Judge held that the assets of the appellant from 1st July 1955 to 30th April 1961 had exceeded his income by Rs 3358834 and they were disproportionate to the known sources of income of the petitioner
The learned Judge however found that as section 53 of the Act had been repealed on 18th December 1964 and as specific instances of payment of bribe to the petitioner could not be proved the accused could not be held guilty of the charges
Aggrieved by the decision the State preferred an appeal to the Delhi High Court on 11th April 1967
Pending 819 the appeal before the High Court Act No 16 of 1967 received the assent of the President on 20th June 1967 and came into effect on 5 5 1967 reintroducing section 53 in the Act wef 18 12 1964
In the High Court the appellant challenged the vires of Act No 16 of 1967 on the ground that survival of section 53 of the Act and making it applicable retrospectively was void and unconstitutional as it was in violation of article 14 and 201 of the Constitution
A Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi by its judgment dated 27th November 1973 allowed the appeal upholding the validity of Act No 16 of 1967 and remanded the case to be tried from the stage at which it was pending on 18th December 1964
Criminal Appeal No 274 of 1974 is against the order of the High Court remanding the case for fresh trial and Criminal Appeal No 275 of 1974 is against the order of the High Court refusing to grant a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court
Mr R K Garg the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since section 53 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was repealed on 18th December 1964 the Courts below cannot take into account the provisions of section 53 of the Act after the date of its repeal on 18th December 1964
It was further submitted that Act No 16 of 1967 which gave retrospective operation to section 53 of the Act is violative of articles 14 and 201 of the Constitution
In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act
Section 51 of the Prevention Act of 1947 states when a public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct
The section before the amendment Act No 16 of 1967 consisted of four clauses a b c and d
The appellant was charged for an offence under section 51a and section 51 d punishable under section 52 of the Act
Section 51a and section 51d and section 52 read as follows 51 A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty a if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code
b     c     820 d If he by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
5 2 Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine Provided that the Court may for any special reasons recorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year
Section 52 provides for the punishment of any public servant who commits criminal misconduct as specified in clauses a and d of section 51
Section 53 prescribed a rule of evidence which runs as follows 53 In any trial of an offence punishable under sub section 2 the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession for which the accused person cannot satisfactorily account of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be proved and as such proof of the Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that the accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption
Section 53 was repealed on 18th December 1964 by Act 40 of 1964
The Act also introduced a new section section 5 1 e which reads as follows e if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has at any time during the period of his office been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income Thus on the date when the Special Judge pronounced his order on 19th January 1967 section 53 was not in existence and the Special Judge acquitted the appellant on the ground that the presumption under section 53 was not available for the prosecution on that date
Subsequently on 5th May 1967 Act No 16 of 1967 came into force
Section 2 of the Act provided as follows 2Amendment of Anti Corruption Law in relation to certain pending trials
1 Notwithstanding a the substitution of new provision for sub section 3 of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act by section 62c of the Anti Corruption Laws Amendment Act 1964 hereinafter referred to as the 1964 Act and b any judgment or order of any court the said sub section 3 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed always to have applied to and in relation to trial of offences punishable under sub section 2 of section 5 of the 1947 Act pending before any court immediately before such commencement as if no such new provisions had been substituted for the said sub section 3 2 The accused person in any trial to and in relation to which sub section 1 applies may at the earliest opportunity available to him after the commencement of this Act demand that the trial of the offence should proceed from the stage at which it was immediately before the commencement of the 1964 Act and on any such demand being made the court shall proceed with the trial from that stage
3 For the removal of doubt it is hereby provided that any court i before which an appeal or application for revision against any judgment or order or sentence passed or made in any trial to which sub section 1 applies is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act or ii before which an appeal or application for revision against any judgment order or sentence passed or made before the commencement of this Act in any such trial is filed after such commencement shall remand the case for trial in conformity with the provisions of this section
 The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Act No 16 of 1967 is an ex post facto legislation creating a new offence retrospectively
We will first consider the effect of repeal of section 53 of the Prevention of Corruption Act Act 2 of 1947
The nature of section 53 has been considered by this Court in several decisions
In Sajjan Singh vs The State of Punjab this court referring to the sub 822 section held that the sub section provided an additional mode of proving an offence punishable under sub section 52 for which an accused person is being tried
This Court negatived the contention that section 53 created a new kind of offence of criminal misconduct by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty
It held that the section merely prescribed a rule of evidence for the purpose of proving the offence of criminal misconduct as defined in section 51 for which an accused person is already on trial
The court followed the view held by this Court in CDS Swamy vs The State and in Surajpal Singh vs State of UP
The question that arises is what is the effect of repeal of the provision under section 53
By Act 40 of 1964 section 53 was repealed prospectively
The statute does not say that the section shall be deemed not to have been in force at all
Mr R K Garg the learned counsel for the appellant relying on the dissenting judgment of Fazal Ali J in Keshavan Madhava Menon vs The State of Bombay 3 submitted that the effect of a repeal will be that it should be construed as the Act not having been in existence at all
The view of Tindal C J that a repeal of the statute obliterated it completely from the records of Parliament as if it had never been passed was followed by Fazal Ali J Mahajan J speaking for the majority disagreed with the view holding that it would be more consonant with reason and justice to say that the law existed and was good at the time when it was passed but that since the date of its repeal it has no longer any effect whatsoever
 The view taken by the Chief Justice Jindal was abrogated by the enactment of the Interpretation Act 1889
Section 32 of the Interpretation Act deals with the effect of repealing an Act after August 30 1889
Such repealing Acts are unless contrary intention appears not to effect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered under any enactment so repealed or effect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any penalty forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege obligation liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes 12th Ed p17
In India the  contain similar provisions as in the Interpretation Act 1889
Section 6 of the runs as follows 823 6Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not a revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect or b affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or c affect any right privilege obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or d affect any penalty forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed or e affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege obligation liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted continued or enforced and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed
 Section 6 provides that the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed unless a different intention appears
The operation of all the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act would continue in so far as the offences that were committed when section 53 was in force
The offences that were committed after the date of the repeal will not come under the provisions of section 6b of the Section 6c also preserves all legal proceedings and consequences of such proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed
In this view it is clear that whether Act 16 of 1967 had been brought into force on 20th June 1967 or not the rule of evidence as incorporated in section 53 would be available regarding offences that were committed during the period before the repeal of section 53
Mr R K Garg the learned counsel submitted that the provisions of Act 16 of 1967 by virtue of which the rule of evidence enacted in section 53 is deemed to have always been in existence is violative of article 201 of the Constitution
Article 201 of the Constitution is as follows 824 No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence
Article 201 deals with ex post facto laws though that expression has not been used in the Article
Usually a law prescribes a rule of conduct by which persons ought to be governed in respect of their civil rights
Certain penalties are also imposed under the criminal law for breach of any law
Though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates article 201
In the well known case of Phillips vs Eyre and also in the American case of Calder vs Bull the principle underlying the provision has been fully discussed
All that article 201 prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission which was considered innocent when done
It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to a penalty under ex post facto laws
In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh  Anrvs The State of Vindhya Pradesh the Court pointed out that what is prohibited under article 201 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof
Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence or by a Court different from that which had competence at the time cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional
A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial by a particular Court or by a particular procedure except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved
 Thus the appellant cannot object to a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence
The offence that was committed was when section 53 was in force and by Act 16 of 1967 the procedure is revived
It is not as if the procedure is brought into force for the first time
Where an Act is repealed and the repealing enactment is then repealed by another which manifests no intention that the original Act shall continue repealed the common law rule was that the repeal of the second Act revived the first ab initio
 Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 825 12th Ed p19
There can be no objection in law to the revival of the procedure which was in force at the time when the offence was committed
The effect of the amendment is that sub section 3 of section 5 as it stood before the commencement of 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have always applied in relation to trial of offences
It may be if by this deeming provision a new offence was created then the prohibition under Article 201 may come into operation
But in this case as already pointed out what is done is no more than reiterating the effect of section 61 of the 
Mr Garg the learned counsel submitted that by amending procedure drastically and giving it retrospective effect a new offence may be created retrospectively
It was contended that by shifting the burden of proof as provided for in section 53 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 a new offence is created
It is unnecessary for us to consider the larger question as to whether in certain circumstances giving retrospective effect to the procedure may amount to creation of an offence retrospectively
In the present case the old procedure is revived and no new procedure is given retrospective effect
The procedure given effect to is not of such a nature as to result in creation of a new offence
In the result all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant fail and these appeals are dismissed
SR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant who was charged for the offences a under section 120B IPC b under section 161 IPC read with section 52 and 51 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and c under section 52 read with section 51 a of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was acquitted by the special judge holding that neither the charge of conspiracy nor any other charge against the accused was proved
But the special Judge held that the assets of the appellant from 1st of July 55 to 30th April 1961 had exceeded his income by Rs 3358834 and they were disproportionate to the known sources of income of the petitioner
The trial Judge however found that as section 53 of the Act had been repealed on 18 12 1964 and as specific instances of payment of bribe to the petitioner could not be proved the accused could not be held guilty of the charges
Aggrieved by the decision the State preferred an appeal to the Delhi High Court on 11th April 1967
Pending the appeal before the High Court Act No 16 of 1967 came into force on 5th May 1967 re introducing section 51e in the Act
In the High Court the appellant challenged the vires of Act No 16 of 1967 on the ground that revival of section 53 of the Act and making it applicable retrospectively was void and unconstitutional as it was in violation of article 14 and 201 of the Constitution
A Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi by its judgment dated 27th November 1973 allowed the appeal upholding the validity of Act No 16 of 1967 and remanded the case to be tried from the stage at which it was pending on 18th December 1964
In appeals by special leave it was contended that a Since section 53 of the P O F A 1947 was repealed on 18 12 64 the Court below cannot take into account the provisions of section 53 of the Act after the date of its repeal on 18 12 64 and b Act No 16 of 1964 which gave retrospective operation to section 53 of the Act is violative of Articles 14 and 201 of the Constitution
 HELD 1
Whether Act 16 of 1967 had been brought into force on 20th June 1967 or not the rule of evidence as incorporated in section 53 of the POFA 1947 would be available regarding offences that were committed during the period before the repeal of section 53
823 G 2
Section 53 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 provided an additional mode of proving an offence punishable under sub sections 52 for which an accused person is being tried and therefore prescribes a rule of evidence
Section 53 does not create a new kind of offence of criminal misconduct by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty
821 H 822 A
817 GDS Swamy vs State   Surajpal Singh vs State of UP  and Sajjan Singh vs State of Punjab   applied
While repealing section 53 by Act 40 of 1964 the statute did not say that the section shall be deemed not to have been in force at all
Section 6 of the provides that the repeal shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed unless a different intention appears
The operation of all the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act would continue in so far as the offences that were committed when section 53 was in force
The offences that were committed after the date of the repeal will not come under the provisions of section 6b of the 
Section 6c also preserves all legal proceedings and consequences of such proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed
822 C 823 E F
Keshavan Madhava Menon vs State of Bombay 1951 2 SCR followed
Article 201 of the Constitution deals with ex post facto laws though that expression has not been used in the Article
Usually a law prescribes a rule of conduct by which persons ought to be governed in respect of their civil rights
Certain penalties are also imposed under the criminal law for breach of any law
Though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates article 201
All that article 201 prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission which was considered innocent when done
It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to a penalty under expost facto laws
824 B D
In the instant case the appellant cannot object to a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence
The offence that was committed was when section 53 was in force and by Act 16 of 1967 the procedure is revived
It is not as if the procedure is brought into force for the first time
824 F G
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh  Anr
vs The State of Vindhya Pradesh  applied Phillips vs Eyre  at pp
23 and 25 and Calder vs Bull   at 649 quoted with approval
There can be no objection in law to the revival of the procedure which was in force at the time when the offence was committed
The effect of the amendment is that sub section 3 of section 5 as it stood before the commencement of 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have always applied in relation to trial of offences
It may be if by this deeming provision a new offence was created then the prohibition under Article 201 may come into operation
In this case what is done is no more than reiterating the effect of section 61 of the 
825 A B
818 6
In the present case the old procedure is revived and no new procedure is given retrospective effect
The procedure given effect to is not of such a natural as to result in creation of a new offence
825 D