vil Appeal No 574 NCE of I987
From the Judgment and Order dated 182
1987 of the Rajasthan High Court in SB Elec
Petn No 8 of 1985
Dr NM Ghatate SV Deshpande and Abhishek Singhvi for he Appellant
GL Sanghi
Jitender Sharma P Gaur and MK Calla for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PG NO 7 SINGH J
This appeal under Section 116 A of the Representation of People Act 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 1821987 setting aside the election of the appellant to the State Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan from Jodhpur City Assembly Constituency
Election to the State Legislative Assembly of Rajasthan from the constituency No 183 Jodhpur City was held in the year 1985 nomxination papers were filed by 821985 and the date of scrutiny was 921985
In all 45 candidates filed their nominations
After scrutiny and withdrawal 21 candidates contested the election after polling and counting of votes the appellant was declared elected having obtained majority of votes
Anand Purohit respondent who is an elector in the Jodhpur City Constituency No 183 filed an election petition before the High Court challenging the appellant s election on the ground that the result of election was materially affected on account of improper rejection of nomination papers of three candidates namely Smt
Umrao Ben Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
The respondent pleaded that Smt
Umrao Ben was an elector in Sardarpura Assembly Constituency the returning officer wrongly rejected her nomination paper without affording opportunity to her to produce a copy of the electoral roll
He further pleaded that Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi both were more than 25 years of age on the date of their nomination yet the returning officer rejected their nomination papers on the ground that they were not qualified to be a candidate as they were below 25 years of age
The appellant contested the election petition
He asserted that Umrao Ben had failed to file a certified copy of the relevant entry in the electoral roll of Sardarpura constituency along with her nomination she further failed to produce copy of the electoral roll at the time of scrutiny and therefore the returning officer rightly rejected her nomination paper
As regards Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi the appellant pleaded that none of the two candidates dates was present before the returning officer at the time cf scrutiny and since the entries contained in the electoral roll indicated that they were below 25 years of age the returning officer rightly rejected their nomination paper
The appellant further asserted that the rejection of the three nomination papers was proper and the result of the election was not materially affected on account of the rejection of the aforesaid three nomination papers
The High Court held that the nomination paper of Smt
Umrao Ben was validly rejected as she had failed to comply with Section 335 of the Act inasmuch as she had failed to produce a copy of the electoral roll or a certified copy of the relevant extract relating to entry of her name in the electoral roll in Sardarpura constituency
The High Court further held that nomination papers of Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had been rejected improperly by the returning officer as both the candidates had attained the qualifying age of 25 years on the date of nomination
On these findings the High Court set aside the appellant s election by its judgment and order dated 1821987
Aggrieved by the said judgment the appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 116 of the Act
PG NO 8 The controversy in the present appeal relates to the validity of the orders of the returning officer rejecting the nomination paper of Smt
Umrao Ben Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
We would first examine the validity of the order of the returning officer rejecting Smt
Umrao Ben s nomination paper which was questioned by the Respondent before us
There is no dispute that Umrao Ben was not an elector in the Jodhpur City Assembly Constituency No 183
She was an lector in Sardarpura Assembly Constituency
In her nomination paper she had given the details of the relevant entry contained in the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency but her nomination paper was not accompanied by a certified copy of the relevant entry in the electoral roll of Sardarpura constituency nor she had produced a copy of the electoral roll or the relevant part thereof before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny
Therefore the returning officer rejected her nomination paper
The High Court held that the returning officer had rightly rejected the nomination paper of Umrao Ben and there was no question of improper rejection of her nomination paper
Sri GL Sanghi learned counsel for the respondent challenged the correctness of the High Court s findings on this question
He urged that since the Returning Officer who was holding the scrutiny of nomination papers relating to the Jodhpur Assembly constituency was also the returning officer of Sardarpura Assembly constituencyhe should have verified the entry of Umrao Ben s name from the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency which must have been with him
He urged that Umrao Ben s request to verify entries relating to her name from the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly constituency was ignored by the returning officer and further her request for grant of time to produce electoral roll was also rejected
He urged that object of Section 35 of the Act was merely to ascertain as to whether a candidate whose nomination paper was scrutinised was an elector or not and since the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency was already with the returning officer he could have verified the entries from that electoral roll
The returning officer had acted in an unreasonable manner in refusing to do that and in rejecting her nomination paper
We find no merit in these submissions
PG NO 9 Section 33 of the Act provides for presentation of nomination paper and it further lays down the requirements of a valid nomination
Sub section 5 of the Section 33 is as under where the candidate is an elector of a different constituency a copy of the electoral roll of that constituency or of the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries in such roll shall unless it has been filed along with the nomination paper be produced before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny
 The above provision requires a candidate who is an elector of a different constituency to file a copy of the electoral roll of constituency a relevant part of that roll or a certified copy of the relevant entries along with his nomination paper
These documents are necessary to show that the candidate is an elector of a different constituency and he is eligible to contest the election
If a candidate is unable to comply with these requirements at the time of filing the nomination paper he is afforded another opportunity to prove his eligibility by producing a copy of the electoral roll of the constituency or the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entries of the roll before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny
The Legislature provides two opportunities to such a candidate for proving his eligibility to contest the election one at the stage of filing the nomination paper and the other at the stage of scrutiny
If the candidate fails of avail either of the two opportunities his nomination paper is liable to be rejected
Section 36 of the Act provides that on the date of scrutiny of nomination papers the returning officer shall examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may he made to any nomination and he may either on objection or on his own motion after holding such summary inquiry
if any reject any nomination on the grounds specified in clauses a b and c of sub section 2
Section 362b provides for the rejection of the nomination paper on the candidate s failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33 or Section 34 of the Act
Section 335 read with Section 362b makes it apparent that if a candidate who is an elector of a different constituency fails to prove his eligibility in the manner prescribed by Section 335 of the Act his nomination paper is liable to be rejected for the non compliance of Section 335 of the Act
These provisions are plain which admit of no other interpretation
PG NO 10 Non compliance with Section 335 is fatal to the nomination and no other mode is prescribed by the Act for proving the eligibility of the candidate
Section 355 prescribes a particular made to prove eligibility of a candidate to contest election and Section 362b provides penal consequences
Therefore Section 355 is mandatory in nature
There is no dispute that Umrao Ben failed to comply with the requirement of Section 335 of the Act as she had neither filed a copy of the electoral roll of the constituency or the relevant part thereof or the certified copy of the relevant entries along with her nomination paper
Nor she had produced any of the three documents before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny
In the circumstances the returning officer rightly rejected Umrao Ben s nomination paper
Shri GL Sanghi learned counsel then urged that Section 335 of the Act was directory and itwas open to a candidate to prove his eligibility by any other mode
He urged that Umrao Ben s request to the returning officer to verify her entry from the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency which was in his custody as he was the returning officer of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency also was ignored and he refused to grant her time to produce the necessary documents
In the election petition there was no pleading that Umrao Ben had made any such request or that the returning officer had refused to grant her time
The High Court has on appreciation of evidence held that no request for time was made by Smt
Umrao Ben and no request for verifying the entry relating to her from the electoral roll of Sardarpura assembly Constituency was made
But even assuming that the returning officer had refused to verify the relevant entries relating to Umrao Ben from the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency he had acted in accordance with law
No exception could be taken to his conduct
Section 335 of the Act lays down a mandatory requirement for a valid nomination
The purpose of Section 335 of the Act is to satisfy the returning officer that the candidate is eligible to contest the election and if he fails to satisfy the returning officer in the manner prescribed by Section 335 of the Act the penalty and the consequences which are specified in Section 362b must follow
Section 335 is not directory instead it is mandatory in nature
An elector of a different constituency is under a mandatory duty to prove his eligibility in the manner prescribed by Section 335 of the Act and if he fails to do that he must suffer the consequences contemplated by Section 362b of the Act
It is not open to a candidate who fails to comply with Section 335 of the Act to put the blame on the returning officer for the rejecting his nomination paper
The retuning officer is under no legal obligation to make amends for the omission of a candidate especially when the omission relates to a mandatory requirements
Apart from this legal aspect even on facts the Returning Officer in his testimony before the High Court had stated that the electoral roll of Sardarpura Assembly Constituency was not with him at the time he had taken up the scrutiny of nomination paper of Jodhpur City Constituency
The law does not enjoin the returning officer to send for the electoral roll from his office to verify the eligibility of a candidate
The law casts a duty on the candidate to satisfy the returning officer by following one of the three modes prescribed in Section 335 of the Act and if he fails to do that the returning officer is bound to reject the nomination paper he has no option in the matter
The law does not require the returning officer to send for the electoral roll of a different constituency for the purpose of verifying the eligibility of a candidate
PG NO 11 In Sri Babu Ram vs Shrimati Prasanni  Ors
 this Court interpreted Section 335 and Section 362b and observed as under Section 335 requires the candidate to supply the prescribed copy and Section 362b provides that on his failure to comply with the said requirement his nomination paper is liable to de rejected
In other words
this is a case where the statute requires the candidate to produce the prescribed evidence and provides a penalty for his failure to do so
In such a case it is difficult to appreciate the relevance or validity of the argument that the requirement of Section 335 is not mandatory but is directory because the statute itself has made it clear that the failure to comply with the said requirement leads to the rejection of the nomination paper
Whenever the statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence it would be difficult to accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequences
 PG NO 12 Repelling the argument that failure to comply with the requirement of Section 335 was not a defect of substantial nature and the returning officer could be satisfied by other modes that the candidate s name was entered as an elector in another constituency the Court held that the satisfaction of the returning officer was required to be made in accordance with the statutory requirement and if a candidate failed to comply with that requirement the returning officer could not be satisfied by any other mode
The Court further held that the failure to comply with the requirement of Section 335 was a defect of substantial nature which could not be ignored under Section 364 of the Act
The view taken in Sri Babu Ram s case supra has been followed in Narbada Prasad vs Chaggan Lal  Ors I969 1 SCR 499 Parmar Himat singh Jugatsingh vs Patel Harmanbhai Narsibhai 1974
3 SCR 453 and Avadh Raj Singh vs Jugal Kishore Gupta l979 4 SCC 328
Learned counsel for the respondent sought support from a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Ranjit Singh vs Pritam Singh  Ors1966 3 SCR 543 for his submission that failure to comply with section 335 Was not a defect of substantial character
We have carefully gone through the decision but we do not find anything therein to support the respondent s contention instead it supports the view taken by us
In Ranjit Singh s case supra a candidate who was not an elector of the constituency had filed three nomination Papers
Along with one of his nomination paper he had filed a copy of the electoral roll of the constituency when his name was entered as an elector with a view to comply with the requirement of Section 335 of the Act
He had not filed similar copies along with other two nomination papers
The nomination paper with which the candidate had filed a copy of the electoral roll was rejected on the ground of some technical defect But the other two nominations were rejected on the ground that copy of the electoral roll was not filed along with them
This Court held that the returning officer was wrong in not looking at the copy of the electoral roll filed with one of the nomination papers
The Court further held Section 335 did not require that a copy must be filed with each nomination paper or that any copy should be filed at all as it was open to a candidate to produce the copy before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny
The Court held that the purpose of filing the copy is ensure that the returning officer was able to check whether the candidate concerned was qualified or not and that purpose would be effectively served even if only one copy was filed with one nomination paper and no copies were filed along with the other nomination papers
While considering Section 335 and364 of the Act the Constitution Bench held that Section 335required that it was the copy produced by the candidate which should show that he was qualified or not and that purpose a copy produced by the candidate should be complete whether it was of the roll or of the relevant part thereof
To such a case Section 364 had no application
Section 364 provided that returning officer should not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect which was not of a substantial character
Non production of copy of the relevant part was a defect of a substantial character for it made it impossible to decide whether the candidate was qualified or not
Since qualification for contesting election was a matter of substantial character the failure to produce a copy of the electoral roll which was incomplete was a defect of a substantial character it would invalidate the nomination paper
In this view we agree with the High Court that there had been no improper rejection of the Umrao Ben s nomination paper as the accidental circumstances that the returning officer was also the returning officer of the other constituency should not make any difference
PG NO 13 As regards the rejection of the nomination paper of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi are concerned the High Court has held that none of the two candidates was present before the returning Officer at the time of scrutiny nor any person on their behalf Was present
In his nomination paper exhibit 2 Hukmi Chand had given a declaration that he had completed 26 years of age while Suraj Prakash Joshi had given declaration in his nomination paper exhibit 3 that he had completed 25 years of age
At the time of scrutiny no objection was raised against their nomination paper by any party and none appeared on behalf of the aforesaid two candidate
The Returning Officer found that according to the entries in the electoral roll the age of Hukmi Chand was 23 years similarly in the case of Suraj Prakash Joshi the entry in the electoral roll indicated that on the relevant date his age was 22 years
On the basis of the entries contained in the electoral roll the Returning Officer held that the two candidates did not possess the requisite qualification of age as required by Article 173 of the Constitution to contest the election
Accordingly he rejected both the nomination papers
Before the High Court a controversy was raised as to whether the two candidate were present at the time of scrutiny but on the evidence on record the High Court has held that neither of the two candidates nor any body on their behalf was present at the time of scrutiny
Placing reliance on the oral and documentary evidence produced by the respondent the High Court has recorded findings that Hukmichand as well as Suraj prakash Joshi both had attained the age of 25 years on the relevant date 111984 and their nomination papers had been rejected improperly by the Returning officer which materially affected the result of the election
PG NO 14 Dr Chitale learned counsel for the appellant urged that on the admitted facts and circumstances the Returning Officer could not be held to have acted improperly in rejecting the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
He urged that since at the time of the scrutiny neither of the two candidates nor their proposer nor anybody else appeared before the returning officer or placed any material before him showing that either of the two candidates was qualified to contest the election having attained the age of more than 25 years the returning officer had no option but to rely on the entries contained in the electoral roll and therefore the rejection of the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi could not be said to be improper
Learned counsel further urged that if the returning officer did not act improperly in rejecting the nomination paper of the aforesaid candidates appellants s election could not be set aside on the basis of fresh or additional material placed before the High Court
Section 36 provides that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination the candidate his election agent proposer or any other person duly authorised in writing by the candidate may attend the proceedings at the time and place fixed for scrutiny
The returning officer is required to give them all reasonable facility for examining the nomination paper of all the candidates
Section 362 requires the returning officer to examine the nomination papers and to decide all objections which may be made to any nomination
He may either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary inquiry if any as he may think necessary reject any nomination on any of the grounds specified under clauses aband c
Clause d empowers the returning officer to reject nomination paper of a candidate if on the date fixed for the scrutiny of the nomination the candidate is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the provisions of Articles 84102173 and 191 of the Constitution
Article 173 lays down constitutional qualification for being a Member of the state Legislature according to which a person is not qualified to be chosen to full a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he is not less than 25 years of age
During the scrutiny the Returning Officer is under a statutory duty to satisfy himself that the candidate who may have filed nomination paper possesses the necessary constitutional qualification for contesting the election
In the instant case none of the two candidates appeared nor any body on their behalf appeared or placed any material before the returning officer to show that the candidates were not less than 25 years of age on the date of scrutiny 111984
No doubt in the nomination papers both the candidates had made a declaration that they were not less than 25 years of age but entries pertaining to them in the electoral roll clearly indicated that they were less than 25 years of age
The returning officer placing reliance on the entries contained in the public document ie the electoral roll rejected the nomination paper of the two candidates on the ground that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi were not qualified to contest the election
In the absence of any material before the returning officer the returning officer was not wrong in taking the entries in the electoral roll into consideration and acting on them
But his decision is not final
In an election petition it is open to an election petitioner to place cogent evidence before the High Court to show that the candidate whose nomination paper was rejected had in fact attained the age of 25 years on the relevant date
It is open to the High Court to take a final decision in the matter notwithstanding the order of the returning officer rejecting the nomination paper
If on the basis of the material placed before the High Court it is proved that the candidate whose nomination paper had been rejected was qualified to contest the election it is open to the High Court to set aside the election
Enquiry during scrutiny is summary in nature as there is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that stage
Therefore it is open to n party to place fresh or additional material before the High Court to show that the Returning Officer s order rejecting the nomination paper was improper
It should be borne in mind that the proceedings in an election petition are not in the nature of appeal against the order of the returning officer
It is an original proceeding
In the instant case it was open to the respondent election petitioner to place material before the High Court to show that the two candidates were qualified and their nomination paper was improperly rejected
PG NO 15 The question then arises whether the respondent has proved in accordance with law that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi whose nomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer had attained the age of 25 years on 111984
In the election petition the respondent pleaded that Hukmi Chand s nomination paper was improperly mentioned his age as 23 years while his correct date of birth was 1351956 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the Head Master of the New Government School Jodhpur
The respondent had further pleaded that the nomination paper of Suraj Prakash Joshi was rejected on the sole ground that in the electoral roll his age was recorded as 23 years on 111984 but the entries contained in the electoral roll were not final and conclusive
The date of birth of Suraj Prakash Joshi was not mentioned in the election petition and there was no further pleading that on the date of filing his nomination Suraj Prakash Joshi had actually attained the age of 25 years
However it was pleaded that since Suraj Prakash Joshi had given a declaration that he had completed 25 years of age there was no reason to disbelieve him as no objection had been raised against the declaration made by him and therefore the returning officer acted improperly in rejecting his nomination nation paper
In his written statement the appellant denied the allegations made by the election petitioner and asserted that the Returning Officer acted rightly in rejecting the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi as they were not qualified to contest the election as they had not completed 25 years of age on the date of nomination
The respondent produced oral and documentary evidence to support his contention
Even before the High Court none of the two candidates whose nomination papers were rejected appeared nor their parents were examined by the respondent nor any person having special knowledge about the dates of birth of the two candidates was examined by the respondent
As regards Hukmi Chand the respondent produced exhibit 8 a copy of scholars register exhibit 9 counter foil of certificate of Board of Secondary Education exhibit 10 mark sheet of Hukmi Chand exhibit 11 a copy of counter foil of certificate of Board of Secondary Education relating to Suraj Prakash Joshi and exhibit 12 Tabulation record of marks obtained by Suraj Prakash Joshi
These documents were sought to be proved by Anant Ram Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chand Taparia PW  is a copy of the scholars register issued by the Head of the Government Higher Secondary School and entries contained therein show that Hukmi Chand had joined Government Middle School Palasani on 246
1972 and he had left the same on 1061976 after having passed Viiith class
In this document 136
l956 is mentioned as the date of birth of Hukmi Chand son of Sardar Mal
exhibit 9 is a certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan certifying that Hukmi Chand Bhandari son of Sardar Mal Bhandari passed Secondary School Examination of 1974 from New Government Higher Secondary School Jodhpur it also shows 136
1956 as date of birth of Hukmi Chand
exhibit 10 is a tabulation record containing the details of the marks obtained by Hukmi Chand at the Secondary School Examination 1974
In this document also his date of birth is mentioned as 136
Placing reliance on these three documents the High Court held that Hukmi Chand s date of birth was 1361956 and therefore his age on 1 1 1984 was more than 15 years
The High Court further held that view of the entry in exhibit 11
certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan Suraj
Prakash was born on 113
1959 and therefore the was qualified to contest the election as he was not less than 25 years of age
On these findings the High Court held that the respondent had successfully proved that the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and
Suraj Prakash Joshi had been wrongly rejected
PG NO 16 Before the High Court appellant raised a contention that there was no evidence to prove that exhibit 8 9 10 11 and 12 related to Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi and therefore the documents could not be pressed into service
A further contention was raised that the election petitioner had failed to place any evidence before the Court to show that entries of age in the documents exhibit 8 9 10 11 and 12 had been made on the basis of information furnished either by the parents or by any one else having special knowledge about the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
In the absence of such evidence the entries in the documents had no evidentiary or probative value
The High Court rejected this submission on the ground that the appellant had raised no such plea in his written statement nor he produced any evidence to prove that the documents did not pertain to Hukmi Chand or Suraj Prakash Joshi or that any other persons having the same parentage by the name of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi existed
The High Court committed error
The question of appreciation of evidence is not to be pleaded instead it was the duty of the Court to consider whether the documents produced by the respondent proved the facts in issue
As regards the evidentiary value of exhibit 8 9 10 11 and 12 the High Court took note that there was no evidence as to who gave the information regarding the date of birth of Hukmi Chand at the time of his admission in Government Middle School Paslasani and even the initial application form for admission to the school was not produced and subsequent form for admission to the Government Multi purpose Higher Secondary School Jodhpur from where he passed the Secondary examination was also not produced as it observed No attempt was made by the parties to get the application form for admission and transfer certificate produced from the New Government Higher Secondary School Jodhpur and similarly no application form for admission was got produced from the Government Middle School Palasni
But still it can be presumed that the date of birth recorded in the Scholar s Register is based on the date of birth given in the application form initially submitted a Palasni continued in the transfer certificate and the same was mentioned at the time of admission in the Government Multipurpose Higher Secondary School Jodhpur emphasis supplied
After making the aforesaid observations the High Court held that these documents were public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act and therefore there was a presumption about the correctness of the date of birth mentioned therein
The High Court was conscious of the fact that in the absence of the evidence of the person who may have given information regarding the date of birth the entries contained in the scholar s register or certificate had no probative value as would be clear from the following observations It is true that it would have been better if the person who gave the information regarding the date of birth would have been examined but failure to examine such a person would not in any way affect the genuineness of the entries and also their probative value unless in comparison to these entries any other weighty evidence having greater probative value is produce emphasis supplied
The entry in the scholar register may be contradicted by the birth entry or entry in the vaccination register or reliable horoscope or any other reliable or weighty oral or documentary evidence but in the absence of such contradicting weighty evidence the entries in the scholar register and other records of the educational institution would in my opinion certainly enjoy such probative value
 PG NO 18 After making aforesaid observations the High Court held that in view of the exhibit X 9 10 11 and I1 the election petitioner had discharged the burden in proving that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi both had attained the age of 25 years on the relevant date
The High Court drew adverse inference against the appellant on the ground that though Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had been cited as witnesses by the appellant but they were not examined
The High Court proceeded on the assumption that if these witnesses had been examined they would not have supported the respondent
After drawing adverse inference against the appellant and placing reliance on the aforesaid documentary evidence the High Court held that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi both were qualified to contest the election as they had completed 25 years of age on 1 1198 and the returning officer had improperly rejected their nomination papers which materially affected the result of the election
The High Court in our opinion committed serious error of law in appreciating the evidentiary value of the documentary evidence produced by the respondents as a result of which its findings are not sustainable
PG NO 18 We would now consider the evidence produced by the respondent on the question of age of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
The respondent examined Anantram Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chandra Taparia PW5
Anantram sharma PW 3 has been the Principal of New Government Higher Secondary School Jodhpur since 1984
On the basis of the scholar s register he stated before the High Court that Hukmi Chand joined school on 246
1972 in 9th class and his date of birth as mentioned in scholar s register was 1361956
He made this statement on the basis of the entries contained in the scholar s register exhibit 8
He admitted that entries in the scholar s register are made on the basis of the entries contained in the admission form
He could not produce the admission form in original or its copy
He stated that Hukmi Chand was admitted in 9th class on the basis of transfer certificate issued by the Government Middle School Palasni from where he had passed 8th standard
He proved the signature of Satya Narain Mathur the then Principal who had issued the copy of the scholar s register exhibit 8
Satya Narain Mathur was admittedly alive but he was not examined to show as to on what basis he had mentioned the date of birth of Hukmi Chand in exhibit 8
The evidence of Anantram Sharma merely proved that exhibit 8 was a copy of entries in scholar s register
His testimony does not show as to on what basis the entry relating to date of birth of Hukmi Chand was made in the scholar s register
Kailash Chandra Taparia PW 5 was Deputy Director Examination Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan he produced the counter foil of Secondary Education Certificate of Hukmi Chand Bhandari
a copy of which has been filed as exhibit 9
He also proved the tabulation record of the Secondary School Examination 1974 a copy of which has been filed as exhibit 10
In both these documents Hukmi Chand s date of birth was recorded as 1361956
Kailash Chandra Taparia further proved exhibit 11 which is the copy of the tabulation record of Secondary School Examination of 1977 relating to SuraJ Prakash Joshi
In that document the date of birth of Suraj Prakash Joshi was recorded 1131959 Kailash Chandra Taparia stated that date of birth as mentioned in the counter foil of the certificates and in the tabulation form exhibit 12 was recorded on the basis of the date of birth mentioned by the candidate in the examination form
But the examination form or its copy was not produced before Court
In substance the statement of the aforesaid two witnesses merely prove that in the scholar s register as well as in the Secondary School examination records the date of birth of a certain Hukmi Chand was mentioned as 1361956 and in the tabulation record of Secondary School Examination a certain suraj Prakash Joshi s date of birth was mentioned as 1131959
No evidence was produced by the respondent to prove that the aforesaid documents related to Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi who had filed nomination nation papers
Neither the admission form nor the examination form on the basis of which the aforesaid entries relating to the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi were recorded was produced before the High Court
No doubt Exs 8 9 10 11 and 12 are relevant and admissible but these documents have no evidentiary value for purpose of proof of date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi as the vital piece of evidence is missing because no evidence was placed before the Court to show on whose information the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and the date of birth of Suraj Prakash Joshi were recorded in the aforesaid document
As already stated neither of the parents of the two candidates nor any other person having special knowledge about their date of birth was examined by the respondent to prove the date of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents
Parents or near relations having special knowledge are the best person to depose about the date of birth of a person
If entry regarding date of birth in the scholars register is made on the information given by parents or some one having special knowledge of the fact the same would have probative value
The testimony of Anantram Sharma and Kailash Chandra Taparia merely prove the documents but the contents of those documents were not proved
The date of birth mentioned in the scholar s register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined
The entry contained in the admission form or in the scholar register must be shown to be made on the basis of information given by the parents or a person having special knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned
If the entry in the scholar s register regarding date of birth is made in the basis of information given by parents the entry would have evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of birth such an entry will have no evidentiary value
Merely because the documents Exs 8 9 1
11 and 12 were proved it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved
Mere proof of the documents Exs 8 9 10 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents
Since the truth of the fact namely the date of birth of HukmiChand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents
The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue namely the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence ie by the evidence of those persons who could vouch safe for the truth of the facts in issue
No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts
namely the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi
In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted
PG NO 20 The High Court held that in view of the entries contained in the exhibit 8 9 10 11 and 12 proved by Anantram Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chandra Taparia PW 5 the date of birth of Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was proved and on that assumption it held that the two candidates had attained more than 25 years of age on the date of their nomination
In our opinion the High Court committed serious error
Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any public official book register record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty specially enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact
To render a document admissible under Section 35 three conditions must be satisfied firstly entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book register or record secondly it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and thirdly it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding to the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded
In Raja Janaki Nath Roy  Ors
vs Jyotish Chandra Acharya Chowdhury a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court discarded the entry in school register about the age of a party to the suit on the ground that there was no evidence to show on what material the entry in the register about the age of the plaintiff was made
The principle so laid down has been accepted by almost all the High Courts in the country see Jagan Nath vs Moti Ram Moti Ram  Ors 1951 Punjab 377 Sakhi Ram  Ors
vs Presiding Officer Labour Court North Bihar Muzzafarpur  Ors
 1966 Patna 459 Ghanchi Vora Samsuddish Isabhai vs State of Gujarat1970 Gujarat 178 and Radha Kishan Tickoo  Anr
vs Bhushan Lal Tickoo  Anr 1971 J  K 62
In addition to these decisions the High Courts of Allahabed Bombay Madras have considered the question of probative value of an entry regarding the date of birth made in the scholar s register or in school certificate in election cases
The Courts have consistently held that the date of birth mentioned in the scholars register or secondary school certificate has no probative value unless either the parents are examined or the person on whose information the entry may have been made is examinedsee Jagdamba prasad vs Sri Jagannath Prasad  Ors  K Paramalali vs LM Alangam  Anr and Krishna Rao Maharu Patil vs Onkar Narayan Wagh 14ELR 386
PG NO 21 In Brij Mohan Singh vs Priyu Brat Narain Sinha  Ors
  a question arose whether the returned candidate had attained the age of 35 years on the date of his nomination
The High Court had set aside the election of the returned candidate on the ground that he was below the age of 25 years on the date of filing the nomination
This Court set aside the order of the High Court and upheld the election of the returned candidate on the ground that the burden of proving that the returned candidate had not attained the age of 25 years on the date of his nomination was on the election petitioner and since he had failed to prove that the election of the returned candidate could not be set aside
This Court held that an entry recorded in the birth register maintained by an illiterate Chowkidar by somebody else at his request was not admissible and had no probative value within Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act
In Ram Murti vs State of Haryana AIR 1970 SC 1029 the date of birth of a girl mentioned in the school certificate was not accepted
However in Mohd Ikram Hussain vs State of UP  Ors  this Court accepted the date of birth of a girl as mentioned in the school certificate as the date of birth mentioned therein was supported by an affidavit filed by the father of the girl
PG NO 22 The appellant was declared elected aS he had polled majority of valid votes
His election could not be set aside unless the respondent election petitioner was able to prove that Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had attained the age of 25 years on the date of nomination by producing cogent and reliable evidence before the High Court
The burden to prove that fact was on the respondent throughout and he could not and did not discharge that burden merely by producing the documentary evidence exhibit 8 9 10 11 and 12 or on the basis of oral testimony of Anantram Sharma PW 3 and Kailash Chandra Taparia PW 5
As discussed earlier these documents do not conclusively prove the dates of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi
The entries regarding dates of birth contained in the scholar s register and the secondary school examination have no probative value as no person on whose information the dates of birth of the aforesaid candidates was mentioned in the school record was examined
In the absence of the connecting evidence the documents produced by the respondent to prove the age of the aforesaid two candidates have no evidentiary value
The High Court committed serious documents
In our view the High Court s entire approach in considering the question of dates of birth was wholly misconceived
The burden to prove the fact in issue namely the dates of birth of Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was on the respondent who was the election petitioner
The respondent could not succeed if no evidence was produced by the appellant on the question of age of the aforesaid candidates and his election could not be set aside merely on the ground that the respondent had made out a prima facie case that the entry contained in the electoral roll regarding the age of two candidates was incorrect
It appears that in his list of witnesses the appellant had included the name of Suraj Prakash Joshi and his father Maghdutt Joshi as witnesses but they were not examined by him
Similarly Hukmi Chand was also cited by the appellant but he was also not examined instead Navratan Mal Bhandari brother of Hukmi Chand was examined as PW 4 and Ghanshyam Chhangani was examined as PW 6 by the appellant who supported the appellants case that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi had not attained the age of 25 years on the date of nomination
Since the appellant had not examined Hukmi Chand
Suraj Prakash Joshi or their parents the High Court drew adverse inference against him
The High Court committed serious error in doing so
There was no question of drawing adverse inference against the appellant as the burden to prove the age of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash joshi was on the election petitioner and since he had failed to prove the same by cogent evidence no adverse inference could be drawn against the appellant
In fact
burden was on the respondent to prove his case by producing the Hukmichand and Suraj Prakash Joshi or their parents to prove and corroborate the dates of birth as mentioned in the school register and the certificate
If he failed to do that he could not succeed merely because appellant had not produced them
In the circumstances no adverse inference was at all possible to be drawn against the appellant for not examining Hukmi Chand and suraj Prakash Joshi or their parents
In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that Umarao Ben s nomination paper was rightly rejected and further the respondent has failed to prove that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi possessed the necessary age qualification as required by Article 173 of the Constitution
Therefore the returning officer was justified in rejecting their nomination paper
In this view the High Court wrongly set aside the appellant s election
We accordingly allow the appeal set aside the order of the High Court and dismiss the election petition
The appellant is entitled to costs which we quantify at Rs5000


Summary:
Disallowing request for exemption from levy of electricity duty under sub section 4 of section 3 of the UP Electricity Duty Act 1952  the Act  as amended the appellants issued notice of demand asking respondent No 1 Renusagar Power Co to pay electricity duty on the energy supplied by it to respondent No 2 Hindalco for industrial purposes
Being aggrieved by the decision of the State Government the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court
The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the impugned order of the State Government was not maintainable in law and quashing the order as well as the notice of demand abovesaid
The State Government was also directed to consider the request of the respondents for exemption in accordance with the directions issued by the High Court in the earlier Writ Petition No 4521 of 1972 filed by the respondents
Being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellants moved this Court for relief
Disposing of the appeal the Court  HELD Per Sabyasachi Mukharji J There were two different aspects of the case to be considered
One was whether the respondent No 1 the Renusagar Power Co Ltd was own  source of generation of electricity for respondent No 2 the Hindalco under section 31c of the Act
The second aspect was whether the order passed by the State Government was in accordance with the principles of natural justice in so far as the same were applicable to the case
646C 628 From 1952 to 1970 no duty was payable if electricity was generated from own source of energy
From 1970 to 1973 duty of one paisa was payable in respect of electricity supplied from own source of generation
After 1973 no duty was payable in respect of electricity supplied from own source of generation
646D Renusagar a 100 subsidiary of Hindalco wholly owned and controlled by Hindalco was incorporated in March 1964
Hindalco had established the power plant through the agency of Renusagar to avoid complications in the case of a possible take over of the power plant by the State Electricity Board as power generation is generally not permitted in normal conditions in the private sector
The respondents highlighted that the sanction under section 28 of the  given to Renusagar and its amendment established that Renusagar was not a normal type of sanction under Section 23 of the 1910 Act as the holder could supply power only to Hindalco
All these steps for the expansion of the power in Renusagar so as to match the power requirement of Hindalco s expansion were taken by Hindalco even though Renusagar had been incorporated
Applications for all the necessary sanctions and permissions were made by Hindalco
Permissions and sanctions were first intimated to Hindalco even though Renusagar was in existence
Changes in the sanctions andor permissions were obtained by Hindalco and not Renusagar
The expansion of the power plant in Renusagar was to exactly match the requirements of Hindalco for the production of Aluminium
The expansion of the power plant in Renusagar was part and parcel of the expansion of the aluminium plant of Hindalco
All the steps to set up the power plant in Renusagar and its expansion were taken by Hindalco
Hindalco consumed about 255 MW power out of which 250 M W came from Renusagar
There was only one transmission line going out of Renusagar and that went to Hindalco which had complete control over Renusagar
The agreement between Renusagar and Hindalco indicated this was not a normal sale purchase agreement between two independent persons at arms length
The price of electricity was determined according to the cash needs of Renusagar
This covenant also showed complete control of Hindalco over Renusagar
All persons and authorities dealing and conversant with this matter had consistently treated Renusagar as own source of generation of Hindalco
In the power cuts matter under section 22B of cut was imposed on Hindalco on the footing that it had its own source of generation
All the authorities including the State and Board had all along treated Renusagar as own source of generation of Hindalco
It was thus contended that Renusagar must he treated as alter ego of Hindalco ie 629 Own source of generation of Hindalco within the meaning of section 31c of the Duty Act and that consumption clearly fell within that section
653C H 655C F Own source of generation  is an expression connected with the question of lifting or piercing the corporate veil
The appellants contended that in this case there was no ground for lifting the corporate veil urging that there was no warrant either in law or in fact to lift the corporate veil and treat Renusagar s plant as Hindalco s own source of generation
657B C In the expanding horizon of modern jurisprudence lifting of corporate veil is permissible
Its frontiers are unlimited
It must however depend primarily on the realities of the situation
The aim of legislation is to do justice to all the parties
The horizon of the doctrine of lifting corporate veil is expanding
In this case indubitably it is correct that Renusagar was brought into existence by Hindalco in order to fulfil the condition of industrial licence of Hindalco through production of aluminium
It was also manifest from the facts that the model of the setting up of power station through the agency of Renusagar was adopted by Hindalco to avoid complications in case of takeover of the power station by the State or the Electricity Board
All the steps for establishing and expanding the power station were taken by Hindalco and Renusagar was wholly owned subsidiary of and completely controlled by Hindalco
Even the today affairs were controlled by Hindalco
Renusagar had never indicated independent volition
Whenever felt necessary the State or the Board themselves had lifted the corporate veil and treated Renusagar and Hindalco as one concern and the generation in Renusagar as the own source of generation of Hindalco
Indubitably the manner of treatment of the power plant of Renusagar as the power plant of Hindalco and the Government taking full advantage of the same in the case of power cuts and denial of supply of 100 power to Hindalco underlined the facts and implied acceptance and waiver of the position that Renusagar was a power plant owned by Hindalco
In this view of the matter the corporate veil should be lifted and Hindalco and Renusagar be treated as one concern and Renusagar s power plant must be treated as the own source of generation of Hindalco and should be liable to duty on that basis
In the premises the consumption of such energy by Hindalco will fall under section 31c of the Act
667E H 688A B The veil of corporate personality even though not lifted sometimes is becoming more and more transparent in modern company juris 630 prudence
The ghost of the case of Aron Salomon vs A Salomon  Co Ltd  at 27 30 31 still visits frequently the hounds of Company Law but the veil has been pierced in many cases
However the concept of lifting the corporate veil is a changing concept and is of expanding horizon
668C D The appellant was in error in not treating Renusagar s power plant as the power plant of Hindalco and not treating it as the own source of energy
The respondent was liable to duty on the same and on that footing alone this was evident in view of the principles enunciated and the doctrine now established by way of decision of this Court in Life Insurance Corpn
Of India vs Escorts Ltd  ors 1985 Suppl
3 SCR 909 that in the facts of this case sections 31c and 41c of the Act are to be interpreted accordingly
The person generating and consuming energy were the same and the corporate veil should be lifted
Hindalco and Renusagar were in extricably linked up together
Renusagar had in reality no separate and independent existence apart from and independent of Hindalco
Consumption of energy of Hindalco is consumption of Hindalco from its own source of generation
Rates of duty applicable to own source of generation had to be applied to such consumption 1 paisa per unit for the first two generating sets and nil rate in respect of 3rd and 4th generating sets
In the facts of this case the corporate veil must be lifted and Hindalco and Renusagar should be treated as one concern and the consumption of energy by Hindalco must be regarded as consumption by Hindalco from own source of generation
The appeal directed against this finding of the High Court was rejected
668D H669A B Coming to the challenge to the order quashed by the High Court the dominance of public interest is significant according to the provisions of sub section 4 of Section 3
In view of the ceilings prescribed the power conferred upon the State under Section 31 of the Act by itself is valid and does not amount to excessive delegation
The primary purpose of the Act was to raise the revenue for development projects
Whether in a particular situation rural electrification and development of agriculture should be given priority or electricity or development of aluminium industry should be given priority or which is in public interest are value judgments and the legislature is the best judge
What was paramount before introduction of the development programme and how the funds should be allocated and how far the government considers a negligible increase and rise in the cost of aluminium for the purpose of raising monies for other development activities are matters of policy to be decided by the Government
It is 631 true that the question regarding public interest and need to promote indigenous industrial production was related with the question of exemption of duty but a matter of policy should be left to the Government
In its order the Government had adverted itself to all the aspects of sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act
Certain amount of encouragement was given to Hindalco to start the industry in a backward area
After considerable period a very low rate of duty was charged
If other sectors of growth and development are needed for example food shelter water rural electrification the need for encouragement to aluminium industry had to be subordinated by a little high cost because it is a matter on which the Government as representing the will of the people is the deciding factor
Price fixation which is ultimately the basis of rise in cost because of the rise of the electricity duty is not a matter for investigation of Court Sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act in the set up is quasi legislative and quasi administrative in so far as it has power to fix different rates having regard to certain factors and in so far as it has power to grant exemption in some cases is quasi legislative in character
Such a decision must be arrived at objectively and in consonance with the principles of natural justice
With regard to the nature of the power under section 34 of the Act when power is exercised with reference to any class it would be in the nature of subordinate legislation but when the power is exercised with reference to individual it would be administrative
If the exercise of power is in the nature of subordinate legislation the exercise must conform to the provisions of the statute
The High Court was right only to the limited extent that all the relevant considerations must be taken into account and the power should not be exercised on irrelevant considerations but singular consideration which the High Court had missed in this case is the factors namely the prevailing charges for the supply of energy in any area the generating capacity of any plant the need to promote industrial production generally or any specified class thereof and other relevant factors cannot be judged disjointly
These must be judged in adjunct to the public interest and that public interest is as mentioned in the preamble to raise revenue
All that the section requires is that these factors should be borne in mind but these must be subordinate to the executive decision of the need for public interest
The power conferred on the State Government of administrative nature must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice to a limited extent
671F G 672D E 673D H The exercise of power whether legislative or administrative will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary
Similarlyif the power has 632 been exercised on a non consideration or non application of mind to relevant factors the exercise will be regarded as manifestly erroneous
If a power legislative or administrative is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous such exercise of power will stand vitiated
This case related to the particular facts and circumstances of an individual Hindalco
The facts and circumstances of the case had been examined in consonance with the principles of natural justice and considered subject to public interest
Hindalco had made profits much more than it had before the imposition of the duty
The adequacy of the profits or whether it made much more profits is not a consideration which must prevail over public interest and the Government having taken into consideration this factor did not commit any error and the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the Government
The cost of power to a similar industry in other States was a relevant factor and the State was under a mandatory duty to consider the same
The State had taken note of all these factors and considering the prevailing practice of levy of electricity duty in other States as well as the provisions of section 34 the Government came to the conclusion that there was no justification for allowing exemption from electricity duty to Hindalco and did not commit any error
The factor of assurance of cheap power by the Government did not fore close the public interest of raising public revenue
The impugned order did not suffer from the vice of non application of mind or non consideration of the relevant factors
The High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the Government in the manner it did
676G H 677A H 678A Natural justice in the sense that a party must be heard before hand need not be directly followed in fixing the price
l here is scope for trial and error in the sphere of price fixation which is more in the nature of a legislative measure
Judged by that standard the impugned order in this case was not bad
The Government did not act in violation either of the principles of natural justice or arbitrarily or in violation of the previous directions of the High Court
678F 679D 680C The High Court should have allowed the claim of Hindalco for the reduced rate of bill on the basis that Renusagar Power plant was its own source of generation under section 31c and the bills should have been made by the Board on that basis
The High Court was in error in upholding the respondents  contention that the State Government acted improperly and not in terms of section 34 of the Act and in violation of the principles of natural justice
The Judgment of the High Court was set aside to the extent indicated above and State Government s impugned order was restored subject to the modification of the bills on 633 the basis of own source of generation Hindalco must be given the benefit of the rate applicable to its own source of generation from Renusagar plant
680D F Per section Ranganathan J Concurring Agreeing his Lordship held that on the second issue it was difficult to define the precise nature of the power conferred on the State under Section 34 of the Electricity Duty Act and expressed doubts whether the sub section could at all be interpreted as conferring a right on individual consumers to require that in the light of the material adduced by them the rates applicable to them should have been fixed differently or that they should have been exempted from duty altogether
However his Lordship observed that it was unnecessary to pursue this aspect further as his Lordship agreed with the conclusion of Sabyasachi Mukharji J that in this case the respondent s representations had been fully considered and the requirements of natural justice had been fulfilled and that there was no warrant to interfere with the order of the State Government
680H 681A B Chiranjit Lal Anand vs State of Assam  Anr 1985 Suppl
2 SCR 385 State of UP vs Hindustan Aluminium Corpn
Ltd   J K Cotton Spinning  Weaving Mills Co Ltd vs State of VP  Ors  Ms Girdharilal  Sons vs
BalbirNath Mathur  Ors  at 241 246 State of Tamil Nadu vs Kodaikanal Motor Union P Ltd at 100 D Sanjeevayya vs Election Tribunal AP  Ors   492 Western Coalfields Ltd vs Special Area Development Authority Korba  Anr  at 17 Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn
vs The lTO  Anr   Tamlin vs Hannaford  Aron Salomon vs A Salomon  Co Ltd  at 27 30 31 Western Coalfields Ltd in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper vs Union of India  at 555 Bank Voordel En Scheepvaart N V vs Stalford  Kodak Ltd vs Clark  DHN Food Distributors Ltd  Ors
vs London Borough of Tomer Hamlets  Harold Holdsworth  Co Wakefield vs Caddies  Scottish Co operative Wholesale Society Ltd vs Meyer and Anr  Charterbridge Corpn
Ltd vs Lloyds Bank Ltd  Anr
  Mrs hall Richards Machine Co Ltd vs Jewitt HM Inspector of Taxes  52 525 Ms Spencer  Co Ltd Madras vs The Commissioner of Wealth Tax  Turner Morrisson  Co Ltd vs Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd  Life Insurance Corpn
Of India vs Escorts Ltd  Ors 1985 634 Suppl
3 SCR 909 Devi Das Gopal Krishnan  Ors
vs State of Punjab  Ors
   Ram Bachan Lal vs The State of Bihar   Panama Canal Company vs Grace Line  2 Lawyers  Edn 788 Vincent Panikurlangara vs Union of India  others 1987 2 SCC 165 Union of India  Anr
vs Cynamide India Ltd  Anr
  PJ Irani vs State of Madras  at 179 180 181 182 Ryote of Garabandho and Ors
vs Zamindar of Parlakimedi  Anr AIR 1943 PC 164 Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd etc
vs Union of India   A K Kraipok vs Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150 Ms Travancore Rayons Ltd vs Union of India AIR 1971 SC 862 Amal Kumar Ghatak vs State of Assam  Ors AIR 1971 Assam 32 Commissioner of Income Tax vs Mahindra  Mahindra Ltd  Ors  at 786 787 Prag Ice 293 Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd vs Union of India  Laxmi Khandsari etc
vs State of UP  Ors
   State of Orissa vs Miss Binapani Devi   Mohd Rashid vs State of UP   section L Kapoor vs Jagmohan  Ors AIR 1979 SC 592 Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 India Sugars  Refineries Ltd vs Amrawathi Service Co operative Society Limited  Ors
   referred to