vil Appeal No 2 147 of 1984
From the Judgment and Order dated 163
1984 of the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal New Delhi in Appeal No EDSB No 42582 C Order No 15 1 of 1984
J Sorabjee MA Rangaswamy and Ms Radha Rangas wamy for the Appellant
AK Ganguli K Swami and CV Subba Rao for the Re spondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 217 VENKATACHALIAH J
This appeal under Section 35 L of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 ACT by Messrs Siddesh wari Cotton Mills P Ltd preferred against the appellate order dated 1631984 of the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal New Delhi raises a short question whether the appellant which manufactures cotton fabric on power looms which is otherwise exempt from duties of excise and the additional duties of excise respectively under Notification No 23077 and 23177 dated 1571977 looses the benefit of exemption by process of calendering  on a calendering plant situated in the appellant s premises
The Notification 23077
CE dated 1571977 issued by Central Government under Rule 81 of the Central Excise Rules 1944 exempts from the whole of the duty of Excise unprocessed  cottonfabric falling under sub item 1 of item No 19 of the First Schedule to the Act which is manufactured on power looms without spinning or processing plants installed and worked with the permission of the Textile Commissioner
Likewise Notification No 23177
CE dated 1571977 exempts such cotton fabric from payment of the additional duties of excise
The question in the appeal is whether such cotton fabric ceases to be unprocessed cotton fabric if it is subjected to calendering
The Tribunal has held in the affirmative and has upheld the levy of duty imposed on the appellant
We have heard Sri Soli J Sorabjee learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri AK Ganguly learned Senior Counsel for the Revenue
The facts which are not in dispute may briefly be stated
The Central Excise authorities held appellant to have contravened the provisions of the relevant rules by manufacturing and removing between 145
1981 and 199198160984847 Sq
Metres of calendered cottonfabric falling under item 19 lb of the First Schedule to the Act without payment of Rs26276704 leviable thereon as excise duty
The Collector of Central Excise Calcutta directed the appellant to pay the said duty and also imposed on the appellant a penalty of Rs 100000 under rule 173 Q The Central Board of Excise and Customs by its order dated 2481982 partly allowed the appellant s appeal and while 218 affirming the levy of the duty however set aside the imposition of the penalty
The further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal preferred by the appellant against the confirmation of the levy and the duty came to be dismissed by the Tribunal s order dated 1631984 now under appeal
Before the Appellate Tribunal it was contended for the appellant that the process of plain calendering to which the cotton fabric was subjected though might in itself be a process in the larger and general sense of that term would not however fall under any other process  within the meaning of Sec
2fv the Act
It was contended that even after the calendering the cotton fabric remained an unproceased cotton fabric and the expression any other process in Sec
2fv must be considered ejus dem gener is so as to partake of the nature and character of the processes and belong to the same genus as those envisaged in the preceding expressions in that clause
2fv  reads in relation to goods comprised in Item No 19 I of the Schedule to the  includes bleaching merce rising dyeing printing water proofing rubberising shrink proofing organdie proc essing or any other process or any one or more of these processes The Appellate Tribunal did not accept this contention
It held  
There is prima facie nothing in the language employed in Section 2f and item 19 1 of the CET to suggest that the words any other process will take within sweep only such processes as are of the same class or genus as the specifically enumerated process es
It may be that for the enumerated process es some extreneous substance may be required
That however would not make the processes a class
They enumerated processes from a group of disparate and dissimilar processes for example bleaching and rubberising or dyeing and organdie processing
Sigficantly what follows the enumerated process is not an expression like any other like process or any such process in which case it could be argued that the non enumerated process should of the same genus or class as the enumera 219 ted ones    
Admittedly calendering is a fin ishing process
The machine employed may be a simple or complex one
The effect ought to be brought about may be simple or not
That however would not mean that calendering is not a process
In fact from the sample pro duced by the appellants before us it was seen that the appellants had stamped cotton sarees as calendered
It was stated before us that the sarees were sold as calendered
Saree calendering will thus fail within the ambit of the expression any other process occurring in Section 2f and Item 19 I CET particularly when sub item b of Item 19 1 is read in juxta position with sub item a which covers cotton fabrics not subjected to any process
In this view of the matter the Appellate Tribunal did not accept the contention that though calendering might be a process it is not any process  that satisfies the requirement of any other process occurring in sec
2fv but only those processes that partake of the same common characteristic of and belong to same genus as the processes such as bleaching mercerising dyeing printing waterproofing rubberising shrink proofing or organdie processing occurring in Section 2fv
The Appellate Tribunal held that it was not necessary for the process  process of calendering in  the present case to be a process which belongs to the same genus as those enumerated in sec
2fv to take the cotton fabric out of the exemption and that it would be sufficient that if calendering is a process of cotton fabric even if it does not partake of the other processing specifically enumerated in the preceding expressions in Section 2fv
According ly the Appellate Tribunal did not specifically examine the alternative position whether the process of calendering of the type and kind adopted by the appellant really shared the common element or characteristic possessed by the other processes specifically enumerated
Therefore if it is to be held that the expression any other process in Sec
2fv must be understood and construed ejus dem generis then the question whether the process of calendering employed in the present case belongs to the same genus as the processes envisaged in the preceding expressions in the section would have to be examined afresh
220 6
The definition of manufacture obtaining in Sec
2f of the Act was amended by Act 5 of 1986 giving it an extended meaning
In repelling the contention that the extended meaning was introduced as an artificial concept of manufacture not belonging to but outside Entry 84 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution this Court in Empire Industries vs Union of India 1985 Suppl
1 SCR 292 held As has been noted processes of the type which have been incorporated by the impugned Act were not so alien or foreign to the con cept of manufacture that these could not come within that concept p323 If accordingly the processes such as bleaching merce rising dyeing printing water proofing rubberising shrink proofing organdie processing are not unrelated to the concept of manufacture and bring about such a change in the cotton fabric as to render it a commercially different product then by parity of reasoning any other process in Sec
2fv which is a part of the scheme of the extended meaning of manufacture must also share the same character istic of those other expression
That apart even if the amendment is beyond Entry 84 of List 1 and is supportable under or referrable to the residuary Entry 97 of List 1 on the principles of construction appropriate to the provision in Sec
2fv is any other process in Sec
2fv though otherwise of wide import must share the characteris tics of and be limited by the preceding expressions
The expression ejus dem generis of the same kind or nature  signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the test with more limited words are by implication given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding
If a list or string or family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping up words then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words
In Statutory Interpretation  Rupert Cross says  
The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted    Page 116 221 The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extent to objects of a wholly different kind
This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication
But the preceding words or expressions of re stricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class
If no class can be found ejus dem gener is rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured
As a learned author puts it    if a class can be found but the specific words exhaust the class then rejec tion of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unneces sary if however the specific words do not exhaust the class then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary
 See Construction of Statutes by EA Driedg er p95 quoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction page 829 and 830
Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction observed For the ejus dem generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus even though not specified as such in the enactment
Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate
The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it   p  830  It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist Unless you can find a catego ry  said Farwell L J there is no room for the application of the ejus dem generis doc trine  p 831 In SS
Magnild Owners vs Macintyre Bros  Co Mc Cardie J said 222 So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category
By this I understand that the speci fied things must possess some common and dominant feature
 In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar vs Union of India  the Court said   
This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words in view of the other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect if possible that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be super fluous   p 740 In UPSE Board vs Hari Shanker  it was observed   
The true scope of the rule of ejus dem generis is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified
But the rule is one which has to be applied with caution and not pushed too far    p  73 8
The preceding words in the statutory provision which under this particular rule of construction control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members
If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus
In the present case the expressions bleaching merceris ing dyeing printing water proofing rubberising shrink proofing organdie processing  which precede the expression or any other process  contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise Any other process  in the section must share one or the other of these incidents
The expression any other process is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression unprocessed in the exempting notification draws 223 its meaning from that context
The principle of construction considered appropriate by the Tribunal in this case appears to us to be unsupportable in the context in which the ex pression or any other process has to be understood
It was then contended by Sri Sorabjee that plain calendering process neither adds anything to the cotton fabric nor the effect brought about by it is lasting
It is according to learned counsel nothing more than pressing the cotton fabric by running it between plain Rollers to improve its appearance
Learned counsel submitted that it was purely a temporary finish and that having regard to the nature of the process it is plainly manifest that it does not impart to the fabric either of the two ingredients necessary to bring the process into the family of processes envisaged by the preceding expressions in the section
Sri AK Ganguly learned counsel for Revenue however submitted that this aspect requires investigation of the factual aspects and that since the Appellate Tribunal had not specifically exam ined this aspect and recorded its finding thereon it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh disposal of the appeal in the light of the pronouncement of this Court on the proper rule of construc tion to be applied in the understanding of the expression any other process in Sec
2fv and to consider whether the particular process of calendering adopted by the appel lant would satisfy that requirement
We think we should accept this submission of Sri Ganguly
In the result this appeal is allowed the order under appeal is set aside and the appeal No 151 of 1984 before the Appellate Tribunal is remitted to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law
There will be no order as to costs in this appeal
GN Appeal allowed


Summary:
The UP Legislature enacted in 1973 the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act
On or about 11th Septem ber 1974 Lucknow had been declared to be a development area by a notification
The Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 was made effective from 24th September 1984
Notifications under section 41 and a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 were issued on 8th December 1984 in respect of the Housing Scheme Gomti Nagar Phase II on the 28th December 1984 in respect of Dalibagh Housing Scheme and on the 21st February 1980 in respect of the Housing Scheme Gomti Nagar Phase III
The owners of the land which were sought to be acquired by the aforesaid notifications filed writ petitions in the High Court and obtained stay orders in respect of taking over of possession of the diverse lands on the ground that the notifications under section 41 and section 6 of the Act have been passed simultaneously
A Notification under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was issued on the 6th May 1985 declaring that the lands of the respondents were needed for a public purpose viz construc tion of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Samiti
The Notification further contained a declaration that since there was urgency for the acquisition the provisions of action 17IA and section 174 of the Act shall apply and the provisions of section 5A shall not apply
On the same day ie on 6th May 1985 another Notification was issued under section 6 making a declaration 93 that the laud was required for the public purpose viz construction of a market yard
That Notification also con tained direction as contemplated in section 171 and IA authorising the Collector to take possession of the land even before the declaration of the award under section 11
Aggrieved by the acquisition the respondents filed two writ petitions and contended before the Division Bench of the High Court that in view of the amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 the declaration as contemplated under section 6 could not have been made on the same day on which the Notification under section 4 was published and that after the amendment the Notification under section 6 of the Act can only be issued after the Notification under section 4 was published
The High Court was of the view that prior to the amend ment a declaration under section 6 could be made simultane ously with the publication of the Notification under section 41 but after the amendment a declaration can only be made after the date of publication of the Notification under section 41 and came to the conclusion that there must be difference of dates between the date of the publica tion of the Notification under section 4 and section 6
The High Court held that the notification under section 6 was therefore rendered illegal and as such the appellants were not entitled to take possession of the respondents  land
It accordingly quashed the Notification dated 6th May 1985 issued under section 6 of the Act
In the appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the State appellants that the amendment of section 174 by the words after the date of the publication of the notification was necessitated because of the change of the expressions in sub section 1 of section 4 which for the first time gave a definition of the date of the publication of the notification
Similarly in section 62 the last date of the publication as enjoined in section 6 had been defined as the date of publication
For this purpose it was necessary to introduce the expression after the date of the publication of the notification under sub section 4 of section 17
On the question whether the declaration under section 6 of the Act would be issued simultaneously along with a notification under section 4 of the Act in view of the amendment made by section 174 of the Act Dismissing the Appeals 94 HELD la The words after the date of the publication of the notification in sub section 4 of section 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that declaration under section 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification
There is nothing in the the scheme of the Act which militates against such a construction
106F G lb No alteration in meaning by alteration of language can result unless the requirement of the English language demand it or those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it
107A B 2
At times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in sections 4 and 6 of the Act
106G H Smt
Somawanti  Ors
vs State of Punjab Babu Singh  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors AIR 1979 SC 1713 Collector District Magistrate Allahabad  Anr
vs Raja Ram Jaiswal  referred to
The basic principle of construction of every statute is to find out what is clearly stated and not to speculate upon latent imponderables
The scheme of the Act also must be looked into
In interpreting the statutes it is safer to rely on the obvious meaning rather than to investigate the imponderables
106D Shri Balaganesan Metals vs MR Shanmugham Chetty  Ors   Raja Satyendra Narayan Singh  Anr
vs State of Bihar  Ors referred to
It is the job of the Court to interpret the intention of the legislature by the words used
The fairest and the most rational method to interpret the will of the legisla ture is by exploring intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most natural and probable
These signs are either the words the context the subject matter the effects and the consequence or the spirit and reason of the law
The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification
107C D Lord Howard de Walden vs IRC   Hopes vs Hopes
1948 2 AIR 920 referred to
95 Blackstone Commentaries in the Laws of England Vol
1 p 59 referred to
It will be open to the appellants to issue a fresh declaration under section 6 if so advised within the period contemplated in the proviso to section 61 of the Act read with its first Explanation
107F