Appeal No110 of 1961
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 14 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal from Order No 41 of 1959
C B Agarwala Rameshwar Nath section N Andley J B Dadachanj and P L Vohra for the appellant
K B Choudhuri A K Kirty and Ratna Rao for respondent No 1 870 section P Sinha and M I Khawaja for respondents Nos 2 3 and 4
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India and G C Mathur for respondent No 5
Naunit Lal for respondent No 7 1961
April 11
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated October 14 1960 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad confirming the order passed by the Civil Judge Agra directing the Official Receiver to take possession of the property of the appellant
This case illustrates how the enforcement of an interlocutory order appointing a Receiver made in the interest of all the parties concerned could be obstructed and the object of the order itself be defeated by dilatory tactics adopted by one party or other
At Agra there were three spinning mills and one flour mill all of which together were described as the Johns Mills and originally the John family or their predecessors were the owners of all these mills
At the time the present proceedings were initiated other persons had acquired interest therein
The following persons were the joint owners of the mills 1 Hiralal Patni the appellant and Munni Lal Mehrt 1940th share 2 Gambhirmal Pandiya Private Ltd 840th share 3 Messrs John  Co  1140th share and 4 IE John  240th share
Seth Loonkaran Sethiya respondent No 1 advanced large amounts to Messrs John  Co on the security of its business assets and stocks
On April 18 1949 the said Sethiya filed 0
section No 76 of 1949 in the Court of the Civil Judge Agra against John  Co for the recovery of the amount due to him by sale of the assets of the said company
To that suit the partners of Messrs John  Co for convenience described as defendants 1st set and the partners of Messrs Johns Jain  Co who were for convenience described as defendants 2nd set were made parties
Pending the suit the said Sethiya filed an application under O XL r 1 Code of Civil 871 Procedure for the appointment of a Receiver
By an order dated May 21 1949 the learned Civil Judge appointed two joint Receivers and directed them to run the three spinning mills
Hiralal Patni filed an appeal against that order to the High Court at Allahabad and the said Court by its order dated August 22 1949 modified the order of the Civil Judge confining the order of appointment of Receivers only to the share of Messrs John  Co in John Jain Mehre  Co Loonkaran Sethiya made another application in the Court of the Civil Judge for the appointment of a Receiver for the property of Hiralal Patni and the learned Civil Judge by his order dated December 1 1951 directed the Receivens to take possession of the appellant s share in the mills also Against this order an appeal was preferred to the High Court and the operation of the said order was stayed pending the disposal of the appeal
On April 5 1954 the Civil Judge passed a preliminary decree against the defendants therein directing them to deposit the decree amount in court within the prescribed time and in default the plaintiff was given a right to apply for a final decree for sale of the business assets of the defendants
The decree also gave a right to apply for a personal decree in case the sale proceeds were not sufficient to discharge the decree
The preliminary decree directed that the Receivers should continue on the property until discharged
Hiralal Patni preferred a appeal to the High Court against the said preliminary decree and applied for interim stay of its operation
On August 23 1955 the High Court discharged the Receiver appointed by the learned
Civil Judge and appointed another Receiver in their place
On March 25 1955 the learned Civil Judge prepared a scheme for running the mills and the parties preferred appeals against that scheme to the High Court
The said appeals were compromised and under the term  of the compromise the parties agreed to take different mills on lease for a period of three years from the Receiver
On January 14 1956 the Receiver executed a lease in respect of the flour mill in favour of Hiralal Patni for a 872 period of three years
Under the lease deed it was agreed that he should deliver the demised premises to the Receiver upon the expiry of the term
In due course on March 14 1956 a final decree was made in the suit for the sale of the properties but the final decree was silent in regard to the Receiver appointed earlier
On September 29 1958 Hiralal Patni applied to the High Court for extension of the lease by three years
On January 16 1959 the High Court rejected the application on the ground that the lease was only a stopgap arrangement and that it was for the Receiver to make a fresh arrangement for the future under the supervision and directions of the Civil Judge Agra
On January 17 1959 the Receiver applied to the Civil Judge for instructions whether he should proceed at once to dispossess the appellant
On notice Hiralal Patni raised various objections and claimed that he was entitled to remain in possession of the property as its owner
The learned Civil Judge disallowed his objections and held that the Receiver derived his authority from the preliminary decree and directed the Receiver to lease out the said flour mill by auction for a period of two years
Pursuant to that order an auction was held and the appellant was the highest bidder and he paid the lease amount and executed a formal lease deed
Not satisfied with the order of the Civil Judge Hiralal Patni preferred an appeal to the High Court
The High Court in an elaborate judgment considered the contentions raised on behalf of Hiralal Patni and dismissed the appeal
Hence the present appeal
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us the following three contentions which the appellant unsuccessfully raised before the High Court as well as before the Civil Judge
1 On a true construction of the relevant orders the Receiver has no power to dispossess the appellant in such a way as to prevent him from working his flour mill
2 After the passing of the final decree though the Receiver may continue for the purpose of accounting and discharge of debts he cannot exercise any powers in respect of the rights of the parties
And 3 in any view as the appellant 873 acquired a right under a lease deed and continued in possession after its expiry he could be dispossessed only by a suit and not by a summary procedure
The first question turns upon the construction of the relevant orders
The Civil Judge appointed two joint Receivers by an order dated May 21 1949
It it not necessary to consider the said order as the final order that governed the rights of the Receiver and the parties was that made by the High Court on appeal on August 22 1949
After considering the contentions of the parties the High Court came to the conclusion that a Receiver should be appointed to be in charge of the entire property immoveable and move
able of the defendants 1st set for its protection and preservation
The order of the High Court described the John family as defendants 1st set to the suit and defendant 5 Hiralal Patni defendant 6 Munnilal Mehra and Messrs John Jain Mehra  Co as defendants 2nd set
This order was confined only to the properties of defendants 1st set
The High Court further proceeded to state In the finance agreement in plaintiffs favour the plaintiff was not given any right to enter into possession on non payment or to run the mills
There being no right given to the plaintiff to enter into possession and manage the mills or to have a receiver appointed a receiver can be appointed only under Order 40 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
 Adverting to the contention raised by the defendants that a Receiver could not be appointed to run the mills the High Court observed In view of the order that we propose to pass today we do not want to go into that question
In case the mills are not run under the order of the Collector under the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act or by the partners we propose to give the parties permission to move this court
In case we decide to appoint a receiver to run the mills we shall then consider whether a receiver can or cannot be appointed for the purpose of running the mills
 Then the High Court stated 110 874 We have already set out the circumstances which in our opinion make it necessary that a receiver should be appointed to take charge of the property of defendants first set whether under the finance agreement of July 1948 there was a charge created on the property moveable and immoveable or not
The Receiver will not interfere with the running of the mills except under express orders of the Court and to the extent when it becomes necessary by reason of the value of the security being jeopardized by any action of the defendants
 Then the High Court pointed out that the Collector had the power under section 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act to make arrangements for the running of the mills
Finally the High Court observed  It may be necessary from time to time to give directions to the receiver
The parties may also want portions of this order to be clarified or other directions obtained
The lower court may give such directions to the receiver or to the parties as it may consider just and proper
In case further directions are necessary or the receiver or the parties are not satisfied with the directions given they may move this court for further direction
 Shortly stated the High Court confirmed the order of the Civil Judge appointing the Receivers and directed them to take charge of the properties of defendants 1st set
The High Court expressly prohibited the Receivers from interfering with the running of the mills except under express orders of the court for at that time it did not think it necessary to direct the Receivers to do so
It may be recalled that the Receivers were not appointed for the flour mill of the appellant Hiralal Patni as he was one of the defendants belonging to the 2nd set
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this order did not put the mills in the possession of the Receivers and that the Receivers were given only a supervisory control over the share of the defendants 1st set in the mills
Whatever terminology may have been used the fact remains that the Receivers were put in charge of the entire property 875 of defendants 1st set which includes their share in the mills though it was equally made clear that the Receivers could not directly run the mills without further directions in that regard
The Civil Judge by his order dated December 1 1951 directed the Receivers to take possession of the share of defendants 2nd set also
The operative portion of that order reads For all these reasons I have come to the conclusion that it is just and convenient that a receiver should be appointed over the share of the defendant 11 set and I order that the present receivers who are in possession of the defendant 1st set share should also be appointed receivers over the share of the defendant 11 set
As for the prayer allowing the receivers to run the mills the question of running of the mills is already before the High Court as is shown by the compromise dated 8th September 1950
It is not known what has happened after this compromise
The receivers are directed to seek the direction of the Hon ble High Court on the question of the running of the mills so that there may be no chance of conflicting of orders passed by this court and the Hon ble High Court on this matter
The receivers will not interfere with the running of the mills except under express orders of this court and to the extent when it becomes necessary by reason of the value of the security being jeopardized by any action of the persons running the Mills
The receivers are appointed over the share of the defendants II set only for the purpose of preservation and protection and realization of the rent This order runs on the same lines indicated by the High Court in its earlier order in respect of the share of defendants 1st set
What is to be noted is that under this order the Receivers were prohibited from  running the mills except under the specific  orders of the said court or of the High Court
On April 5 1954 a preliminary decree was made in the suit and under that decree the defendants were directed to deposit a sum of Rs 1800152 in court within the prescribed 876 date and in default the plaintiff was given a right to apply for a final decree for the sale of the assets of the spinning mills
There was a further direction that in case the nett sale proceeds of the said property were found insufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs claim the plaintiff would get a personal decree against defendants 1st set and defendants 2nd set for the balance of his claim
The Receivers were directed to continue on the property until discharged
Under the preliminary decree the plaintiff became entitled not only to the sale of the assets of the spinning mills but also to a personal decree against all the defendants for recovering any balance that might still be due to him after the sale of the said properties
What is more the Receivers were expressly directed to continue till they were discharged and as the decree did not specify the powers of the Receivers it must be held that they continued to exercise such powers as they had under the previous orders of the courts dated August 22 1949 and December 1 1951
On March 25 1955 the learned Civil Judge Agra prepared a scheme for the running of the three spinning mills and the parties preferred two appeals to the High Court against the scheme
On July 22 1955 a compromise was effected between the parties in the aid two appeals and the appeals were disposed of in terms of the compromise by order of the High Court dated August 23 1955
As the terms of this order are rather important in the context of the contentions raised before us we would read the relevant portions hereof Clause 1
That the aforesaid parties have without prejudice to their rights and litigation between them have after deliberate consideration and as a special effort to make arrangements for running the Johns Mill have decided that the three spinning Mills and Flour Mill situate in Agra should be run by the parties in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth below
vi That the lease shall be granted by the receiver on terms and conditions approved by the Court
877 ix If any lessee shall fail to run the Mill after delivery of possession or pay the lease money or fail to carry out the arrangements arrived at between the parties for a period of three months the receiver shall take possession of the Mills and with the per mission of the court shall lease out that particular mill to any of the parties excepting the party in default who may offer the highest bid in accordance with the orders passed by the Civil Judge in this matter
Clause 4     
The arrangement embodied in this document is only for the purpose of working the mills by the petitioners
Nothing contained in this document will affect the rights and obligation of the parties which are or may be the subject matter of suit No 76 of 1949 or in any litigation between the parties and notwithstanding anything contained herein but subject however to the express provision in the preceding paragraph of this clause it will be open to the petitioners to seek their remedies in any manner provided by law and without prejudice to the rights of the parties to obtain a stay order from the Hon ble High Court or any other Court
 What is the effect of this order Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this order embodies an internal arrangement between the defendants for running the mills and that it does not in any way enlarge the scope of the orders dated August 22 1949 and December 1 1951 under which the Receivers were appointed
We do not think that the scope of the orders is so limited
The combined effect of the said earlier orders was that the Receivers should take possession of the entire properties of the two sets of defendants
But the Receivers were not given the power to run the mills without specific directions to that effect by the court
The Civil Judge by his order dated March 25 1955 evolved a scheme for running the mills and by that order he laid down the conditions and directed the Receivers to advertise calling for applications from persons including the Govern ment who were willing to run the mills
This order 878 was only confined to the three spinning mills
The compromise order in the appeals covered also the flour mill
Though different mills were to be run by different defendants by obtaining lease deeds that was only a mode evolved for running the mills tinder the supervision of the court
Under the compromise the leases were to be executed in favour of the Receiver
It also provided that in case the lessees did not carry out the terms of the lease the Receiver should take possession of the mill in respect of which default was committed and with the permission of the court should lease out the mill to any of the defendants other than the defaulting party
The clauses saving the rights of the parties obviously refer to their rights which were the subject matter of the suit and they could not have any reference to the terms agreed upon under the compromise order
Under the compromise order the courts though by consent gave directions for running the mills which they left out for future consideration in their earlier orders
The result was that under the earlier orders all the properties of the defendants were put in possession of the Receivers and under the compromise order the Receiver was directed to run the mills under the agreed scheme
Pursuant to the terms of the compromise order on January 14 1956 the Receiver executed a lease in favour of the appellant in respect of the flour mill for a period of three years and under that lease deed the appellant got possession from the Receiver and agreed To yield up all the demised premises with all fixture improvement and replacements thereto in good and tenantable repair and condition in accordance with the lease covenants in that behalf herein contained upon the expiry of the term hereby created or the sooner determination of these presents as herein provided
 Whatever ambiguity there may have been this lease deed dispels it for under the lease deed the appellant admits the legal possession of the Receiver takes a lease under him and agrees to put him back in possession after the expiry of the lease
On September 29 1958 the appellant again applied to the court for extension of the lease for three more years thereby 879 accepting his possession under the Receiver though the court on January 161959 dismissed that application on the ground that the lease was only a stopgap arrangement and that it was for the Receiver to make a fresh arrangement for the future under the supervision and directions of the Civil Judge under whose preliminary decree he derived authority
It is manifest from the aforesaid orders that the Receiver was put in possession of the entire property of the defen dants that he was not empowered to run the mills personally that by subsequent orders he was directed to lease out the mills to the parties in the manner prescribed and that under the final order he was to take over possession and make other arrangements for running the mills
In the premises we find it very difficult to accept the argument of learned counsel that the Receiver was not put in possession of the mills but the mills continued to be in the possession of tile defendants
We hold on a construction of the relevant orders that the flour mill of the appellant was also put in the possession of the Receiver and that the appellant was running the said mill under the compromise formula
The second contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the Receiver appointed in the suit ceased to be a Receiver qua the rights of the parties when the final decree was made by the Court
This contention leads us to the consideration of the question whether a Receiver appointed in a suit ceases to be such automatically on the termination of the suit
Neither section 51d nor Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes for the termination of the office of receivership
We must therefore look for the solution elsewhere
Some of the authoritative text books on receivers may usefully be consulted in this connection
In Halsbury s Laws of England 3rd edn Vol 32 Lord Simonds at p 386 under the heading Duration of appointment by court the following statement occurs When a receiver is appointed for a limited time as in the case of interim orders his office determines on the expiration of that time without any 880 further order of the court and if the appointment is until judgment or further order  it is brought to an end by the judgment in the action
The judgment may provide for the continuance of the receiver but this is regarded as a now appointment
If a further order of the court though silent as to the receivership is inconsistent with a continuance of the receiver it may operate as a discharge
When a receiver has been appointed on an interlocutory application without any limit of time it is not necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment in the final judgment
The silence of the judgment does not operate as a discharge of the receiver or determination of his powers
So also the appointment of a receiver generally by the judgment in an administration action need not be continued by the order on further consideration
 In Kerr on Receivers 12th edn in chapter XII under the heading Discharge of a Receiver the legal position is explained thus The appointment of a receiver made previously to the judgment in an action will not be superseded by it unless the receiver is appointed only until judgment or further order In High on the Law of Receivers 4th edn the following observations appear at p 985  The functions of a receiver usually terminate with the termination of the litigation in which he was appointed
And when the bill upon which the appointment was made is afterwards dismissed upon demurrer the duties of the receiver cease as between the parties to the action  
And although as between the parties to the litigation his functions have terminated with the determination of the suit he is still amenable to the court as its officer until he has complied with its directions as to th e disposal of the funds which he has received during the course of his receivership  
But an order of discharge does not necessarily follow in all
cases because of the determination of the suit and the court may upon sufficient cause shown 881 either discharge or continue the receiver according to the exigencies of the case
 The learned author makes a further distinction at p 986 between the following two classes of cases Since the final decree in the cause is generally decisive of the subject matter in controversy and determines the right to the possession of the fund or property held by the receiver it is usually the case that such decree supersedes the functions of the receiver since there is then nothing further for him to act upon although it would seem to be still necessary that a formal application be made for his discharge
But when the court by its decree does not attempt to decide the main question in controversy and leaves the receiver s possession undisturbed it cannot be held to have the effect of operating as a discharge or of superseding his functions
 Woodroffe in The Law relating to Receivers in British India 4th edn states at p 22 thus O XL r 1a now expressly provides that a receiver may be appointed whether before or after decree
As long as the order appointing a receiver remains unreversed and as long as the suit remains a lis pendens the functions of the receiver continue until he is discharged by order of the Court
 The law may briefly be stated thus 1 If a receiver is appointed in a suit until judgment the appointment is brought to an end by the judgment in the action
2 If a receiver is appointed in a suit with
out his tenure being expressly defined he will continue to be receiver till he is discharged
3 But after the final disposal of the suit as between the parties to the litigation the receiver s functions are usually terminated he would still be answerable to the court as its officer till he is finally discharged 4 The court has ample power to continue the receiver even after the final decree if the exigencies of the case so require
Let us now apply the said principles to the facts of the instant case
The order appointing the Receivers III 882 did not expressly state that the Receivers  term would expire on the termination of the suit
Under the preliminary decree the plaintiff became entitled to apply for the passing of the final decree for the sale of the property charged and also to get a personal decree against the defendants 1st set and 2nd set for the balance of his claim remaining due after the sale The preliminary decree expressly directed the Receivers to continue until discharged
Pursuant to the preliminary decree a final decree for sale of the said properties was made but the said decree did not in any way modify the direction given in the preliminary decree in respect of the Receivers
The combined effect of the two decrees is that the final decree did not terminate the suit for the plaintiff would still be entitled to get a personal decree in case the sale proceeds were not sufficient to pay off his dues
It cannot therefore be said that the suit has be finally an disposed of
That apart the preliminary decree in express terms directed the Receivers to continue till they were discharged
In the circumstances we are definitely of the opinion that the Receivers continued by the preliminary decree are entitled to function in that capacity till they are discharged
The third contention of learned counsel for the appellant raises the question whether in the circumstances of this case the Receiver could recover possession from the appellant only by instituting a regular suit against him for eviction
The facts germane to this contention may be briefly recapitulated
On January 14 1956 the appellant executed a lease deed in respect of the flour mill in favour of the Receiver and there was an express recital therein that the lessee would deliver possession to the Receiver of all the demised premises upon the expiry of the term of lease
The said lease was executed as a part of a com promise scheme for running the mills
The term of the lease had expired
Thereafter the court directed the Receiver to take possession of the property and auction the same to the highest bidder
The question is whether under the circumstances a court can dispossess the appellant under a summary process or 883 whether it could only do so by directing the Receiver to file a suit for eviction
The material provisions of Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure read Rule 1
1 Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient the Court may by order       b remove any person from the possession or custody of the property       d confer upon the receiver all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization management protection preservation and improvement of the property the collection of the rents and profits thereof 2 Nothing in this rule shall authorize the Court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove
Under this Order a receiver is an officer or represen tative of the court and he functions under its directions
The court may for the purpose of enabling the receiver to take possession and administer the property by order remove any person from the possession or custody of the property
Sub r
2 of rule 1 of the Order limits that power in the case of a person who is not a party to the suit if the plaintiff has not a present right to remove him
But when a person is a party to the suit the court can direct the receiver to remove him from the possession of the property even if the plaintiff has not a present right to remove him
In the present case the appellant was a party to the suit and the court through the Receiver took possession of the mill and thereafter the Receiver during the course of the administration of the property under a compromise arrangement for running the mills leaned out the flour mill to the appellant with an express condition that the appellant should redeliver the property to the Receiver on the expiry of the lease
Aamittedly the term of the lease had expired and the court directed the Receiver to take possession of the mill
The court in our view 884 was legally competent to confer a power on the Receiver under Order XL r 11d of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover the property from the appellant
The decisions cited at the Bar are not of much relevance to the present case
Krista Chandra Ghose vs Krista Sakha Ghose 1 is a case where a lease was granted by a Receiver acting under an order of court and the possession of the property had been given to the lessee and subsequently certain parties applied to the court for a declaration that the lease was invalid on the ground that it was obtained by collusion
There the court held that no summary order could be passed to set aside the lease and the proper remedy would be by a suit against the Receiver and also against the lessee
In that case the lessee though he was a party to the suit acquired a leasehold right under the lease deed and third parties who offered a higher rent sought to question the lease on the ground of collusion
Woodroffe J held that the dispute could only be decided in a properly instituted suit
The Rajasthan High Court in Nanakchand vs Pannalal 2 held that a Receiver could not recover the rent from a lessee in a summary order of the court but should file a suit just like any other landlord
The Allahabad High Court in Loonkaran vs I N John 3 though it conceded that where a lease had been executed by the Receiver the lessee may ordinarily be evicted from the demised property only by a regular suit held that where after the expiry of the term of the lease granted by a Receiver the sub
lessee in possession gave an undertaking to the court that he would vacate the premises in favour of the prospective lessee if no fresh lease was granted in his favour the court has power to eject the sub leessee in its summary jurisdiction
The learned Judge observed at p 59 thus By giving an undertaking to the court that he would vacate the Mill in favour of the prospective lessee and by bidding in the court auction the appellant in our view submitted himself to the 1 Cal
2 AIR 1951 Raj
3 AIR 1961 All
885 jurisdiction of the court
The appellant could therefore be ejected by summary process instead of by a suit
 So too the High Court of Travancore Cochin in Sivarajan vs Official Beceiver Quilon District 1 held that where the period of the lease granted to the receiver had already expired and as per the express stipulation in the lease deed the lessee was bound to surrender possession of the property without raising any objection at all the Court could summarily evict him
The learned Judge made the following observations at p 39 Even though the lease deed stands in favour of the receiver the express undertaking given by the lessee for an unconditional surrender of the property is in favour of the court 
The summary enforcement of the undertaking thus taken by the court is only a step towards the discharge of the duties of the court in the management of the estate and it cannot be said that the court has lost its jurisdiction in that direction merely because the property has been in the possession of a lessee
 Further citation would be redundant
These and such decisions seem to hold that a court cannot evict a lessee from a receiver whether he is a party to the suit or not in exercise of its summary jurisdiction unless the lease expressly conferred a right of re entry under the lease deed on the receiver
It is not necessary to demarcate the boundaries of the summary jurisdiction of a court in managing an estate through a receiver for in this case we are clearly of the opinion that the appellant was in possession of the mill under an agreed and integrated scheme for running the mills by the different partners though he was put in possession under a document described as a lease deed
In effect the Receiver during the course of the management entrusted each mill to one of the partners so that the mills might be properly worked under experienced hands
The appellant expressly agreed to put the Receiver in possession of the mill after the expiry of three years
No question of 1 ILR 886 deciding the conflicting claims of a lessee and a third party arises in this case nor is the court called upon to pronounce on the vested rights of a lessee in conflict with those of the Receiver
But this is a simple case of a court in the course of its administration of the estate through the agency of a receiver making a suitable provision for the running of the mills
As the agreed term had expired the court in our view could certainly direct the appellant to put the mill in the possession of the Receiver
Lastly it has been brought to our notice that an application for the discharge of the Receiver is pending in the lower court
Any observations that we have made in this judgment are not intended to affect the merits one way or other in the disposal of that application
That application will be disposed of in accordance with law
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The John Mills comprising of three textile mills and one flour mill were jointly owned by several persons
The financier of the Mills filed a suit for recovery of the amount due to him
During the pendency of the suit a receiver was appointed to take possession of the flour mills but he was not empowered to run the mills directly without further directions of the court
A preliminary decree was passed in the suit directing among other things that the receiver was to continue until discharged
Thereafter an arrangement was made for running the mills and the court directed that the appellant who was one of the co owners of the mills be given a lease of the flour mill for three years by the receiver
In the lease deed the appellant undertook to deliver back possession to the receiver upon the expiry 869 of the three years
Shortly thereafter a final decree was passed in the suit but it was silent in regard to the receiver appointed earlier
On the expiry of the three year term of the lease the court directed the receiver to take back possession of the flour mill from the appellant
The appellant contended i that after the passing of the final decree the receiver ceased to be a receiver in respect of the rights of the co owners and could not dispossess the appellant and ii that the appellant could only be dispossessed by a suit filed by the receiver and not by a summary procedure
Held that the receiver continued by the preliminary decree was entitled to function till he was discharged
The legal position with regard to the continuance of receivers is that i if a receiver is appointed in a suit until judgment the appointment is brought to an end by the judgment in the suit ii if a receiver is appointed in a suit without his tenure being expressly defined he will continue till he is discharged iii even after the final disposal of the suit though as between the parties to the suit his functions are usually terminated the receiver con tinues to be answerable to the court till he is finally discharged and iv the court has ample power to continue the receiver even after the final decree if the exigencies of the case so require
The final decree in the present case did not finally dispose of the suit and did not bring the appointment of the receiver to an end
Held further that the court was entitled to direct the appellant to give back possession of the flour mill to the receiver
The court was merely making suitable arrangement for the running of the mill in the course of its administration of the estate through the receiver
The mill had been leased out to the appellant with an express condition that he should redeliver the property to the receiver on the expiry of the lease and the court was competent under 0
4o r 11d Code of Civil Procedure to confer a power on the receiver to recover the property from the appellant
It was not necessary for the receiver to file a suit for the recovery of the property