tition Crl No 8193A of 1981
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India R K Garg V J Francis Sunil Kumar Jain and D K Garg for the Petitioner Ranga 59 R K Jain and P K Jain for the Petitioner Billa
N C Talukdar and R N Poddar for Respondent No 1
L N Sinha Attorney General and Miss A Subhashini for Attorney General
K Parasaran Solicitor General M K Banerji Additional Solicitor General and Miss A Subhashini for Union of India
N Nettar for the State of Karnataka
Raju Ramachandran for Applicantintervener Chhaganlal Aggarwal
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD C J
The question as regards the scope of the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion
This clearly is not that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by article 72 the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence
Therefore we see no justification for saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence the President has in any manner transgressed his discretionary power under article 72
Undoubtedly the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a court into a lesser sentence and as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan  Sons v United States the executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law and that the administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt
But the question as to whether the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case
The necessity or the justification for exercising that power has therefore to be judged from case to case
In fact we do not see what useful purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by 60 ensuring the imposition of any severe judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of a case may require
After all the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence not for enhancing it
We need not however go into that question elaborately because in so far as this case is concerned we are quite clear that not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the President to interfere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner in view particularly of the considerations mentioned by us in our judgment in Kuljeet Singh  Ranga vs Union of India  Anr
We may recall what we said in that judgment that the death of the Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears a professional stamp that the survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security and that they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society
The petition is accordingly dismissed
We have heard Shri R K Jain as amicus on behalf of the accused Billa
We see no substance in Shri Jain s contentions also
The order of stay of execution of the death sentence which we had passed in favour of the accused Ranga and Billa as also the general order of stay are hereby vacated If in any specific case or cases there is an express order of stay it will not be affected by the order which we are passing today
SR Petition dismissed


Summary:
Dismissing the petition the Court  HELD 1
Whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 of the Constitution
the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon the petitioner in The instant case is that of death and no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence
Not even tho most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded tho President to interfere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner in view particularly of the considerations mentioned in KS
Ranga vs Union of India and Anr 1981 3 SC R 512
Therefore in refusing to commute the sentence the death imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence the President has not in any manner transgressed his discretionary power under Article 72
59 D E 60 B C 2
Undoubtedly the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by Court into a lesser sentence
But tho question as to whether the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case
59 E G 3
After all the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence not for enhancing it
Therefore no useful purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by ensuring the imposition of any severe judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of a case may require
59 H 60 A James Shewan  Sons vs United Stares  at 535 referred to