N Criminal Appeal No 13 of 1951
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras Rajamannar CJ and Balakrishna Ayyar J dated 10 th April 1950 in Contempt Application No 10 of 1949
426 SP Sinha SS Prakasam with him for the appellant
R Ganapathy Iyer for the respondent
February 14
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEA J
This appeal has come up before us on special leave granted by this court on May 23 1950 and it is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated April 10 1950 by which the learned Judges found the appellant guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment for three months
The appellant is the publisher and managing editor of a Telugu Weekly known as Praja Rajyam which is edited and published at Nellore in the State of Madras
In the issue of the said paper dated 10th February 1949 an article appeared under the caption Is the Sub Magistrate Kovvur corrupt The purport of the article was that Surya Narayan Murthi the stationary Sub Magistrate of Kovvur was known to the people of the locality to be a bribe taker and to be in the habit of harassing litigants in various ways
He was said to have a broker through whom negotiations in connec tion with these corrupt practices were carried on
Several specific instances were cited of cases tried by that offi cer where it was rumoured that he had either taken bribes or had put the parties to undue harassment because they were obdurate enough to refuse the demands of his broker
The article which is a short one concludes with the fol lowing paragraph There are party factions in many villages in Kovvur Taluk
Taking advantage of those parties many wealthy persons make attempt to get the opposite party punished either by giving bribes or making recommendations
To appoint Magistrates who run after parties for a Taluk like this  is to betray the public
It is tantamount to failure of justice
Will the Collector enquire into the matter and allay the public of their fears 427 The attention of the State Government being drawn to this article an application was filed by the AdvocateGener al of Madras before the High Court on November 14 1949 under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act Act XII of 1926 praying that suitable action might be taken against the appellant as well as three other persons of whom two were respectively the editor and sub editor of the paper while the third was the owner of the Press where the paper was printed
On receiving notice the appellant appeared before the High Court and filed an affidavit taking sole responsibility for the article objected to and asserting that the article was published because of his anxiety to uphold the highest traditions of the judiciary in the land and to create popular confidence in courts the duty of which was to dispense justice without fear or favour and without any discrimination of caste creed or community
It was said that before the article was published numerous complaints had reached him from various quarters imputing corruption and disreputable conduct to this Magistrate and the only desire of the appellant was to draw the attention of the higher authorities to the state of public opinion in the matter and to invite an enquiry into the truth or otherwise of the allegations which were not asserted as facts but were based only on hearsay
The High Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the publication in question did amount to contempt of court as it was calculated to lower the pres tige and dignity of courts and bring into disrepute the administration of justice
As the appellant was not prepared to substantiate the allegations which he made and which he admitted to be based on hearsay and did not think it proper even to express any regret for what he had done the court sentenced him to simple imprisonment for three months
The other three respondents through their counsel tendered unqualified apology to the court and the learned Judges considered that no further action against them was necessary
428 The propriety of the decision of the High Court so far as it relates to the appellant has been challenged before us in this appeal and Mr Sinha who appeared in support of the same raised before us a two fold contention his first and main contention is that as the contempt in this case was said to have been committed in respect of a court subordi nate to the High Court and the allegations made in the article in question constitute an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of such a case is expressly barred under section 2 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act
The other contention advanced by the learned counsel relates to the merits of the case and it is urged that in publishing the article objected to the appellant acted in perfect good faith and as the article amounted to nothing else but a demand for enquiry into the conduct of a particular person who was believed to be guilty of corrupt practices in the discharge of his judicial duties there was no contempt of court either intended or committed by the appellant
So far as the first point is concerned the determina tion of the question raised by the appellant would depend upon the proper interpretation to be put upon section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act which runs as follows  No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subor dinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code
 According to Mr Sinha what the sub section means is that if the act by which a party is alleged to have commit ted contempt of a subordinate court constitutes offence of any description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code the High Court is precluded from taking cognizance of it
It is said that in the present case the allegations made in the article in question amount to an offence of defama tion as defined by section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred
Reliance 429 is placed in support of this proposition upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kisan Krishna Ji vs Nagpur Conference of Society of St Vincent de Paul1
This con tention though somewhat plausible at first sight does not appear to us to be sound
In our opinion the sub section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only
in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code
This would be clear from the language of the sub section which uses the words where such contempt is an offence and does not say where the act alleged to consti tute such contempt is an offence
It is argued that if such was the intention of the Legislature it could have express ly said that the High Court s jurisdiction will be ousted only when the contempt is punishable as such under the Indian Penal Code
It seems to us that the reason for not using such language in the sub section may be that the expression contempt of court has not been used as descrip tion of any offence in the Indian Penal Code though certain acts which would be punishable as contempt of court in England are made offences under it
It may be pointed out in this connection that al though the powers of the High Courts in India established under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superi or Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted it was a controversial point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 as to whether the High Court could like the Court of King s Bench in England punish contempt of courts subordi nate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
The doubt has been removed by Act XII of 1926 which expressly declares the right of the High Court to protect subordinate courts against contempt but 1 1943 AIR 1943 Nag
430 subject to this restriction that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court
This seems to be the principle underlying section 23of the Contempt of Courts Act
What these cases are need not be exhaustively determined for purposes of the present case but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the provision of section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code which empowers any civil criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any offence under sections 176 178 179 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court
We are not prepared to say as has been said by the Patna High Court in Jnanendra prasad vs Gopal1 that the only section of the Indian Penal Code which deals with contempt committed against a court of justice or judicial officer is section 228
Offences under sections 175 178 179 and 180 may also as section 480 of the Criminal Proce dure Code shows amount to contempt of court if the public servant referred to in these sections happens to be a judicial officer in a particular case
It is well known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is to deter men from offering any indignities to a court of justice and an essential feature of the proceeding is the exercise of a summary power by the court itself in regard to the delin quent
In the cases mentioned in section 480 of the Indian Penal Code the court has been expressly given summary powers to punish a person who is guilty of offending its dignity in the manner indicated in the section
The court is competent also under section 482 of the Criminal Proce dure Code to forward any case of this description to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try it if it considers that the offender deserves a higher punishment than what can be inflicted under section 480
Again the court is enti tled under section 484 to discharge the offender on his submitting an apology although it has already adjudged him to punishment under section Pat
172 431 or forwarded his case for trial under section 482
The mode of purging contempt by tendering apology is a further char acteristic of a contempt proceeding
It seems therefore that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Actbut it would not be correct to  say that the High Court s juris diction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of which is alleged to constitute contempt is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code
This view has been taken and in our opinion quite rightly in a number of decisions by the Calcutta1 Patna2 Allahabad3 and Lahore4 High Courts
The only authority which Mr Sinha could cite in support of his contention is the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Kisan Krishna Ji vs Nagpur Conference of Society of St Vincent de Paul
The authority is undoubtedly in his favour as it proceeds upon the assumption that the idea underlying the provision of section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act is that if a person can be punished by some other tribunal then the High Court should not entertain any proceeding for contempt
It is to be noticed that the learned Judge who decided this case himself took the opposite view in the case of Subordinate Judge First Class Hoshangabad vs Jawaharlal6 and definitely held that the prohibition contained in section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act refers to offences punishable as contempt of court by the Indian Penal Code and not to offences punishable otherwise than as contempt
This decision was neither noticed nor dissented from in the subsequent case and it is quite possible that 1 Narayan Chandra vs Panehu Pramanik AIR  Naresh Kumarv
Umaromar AIR 1951 Cal
2Kaulashia vs Emperor 12 Pat 1
3 State vs Brahma Prakash AIR 1950 All 556 Emperor vs Jagannath AIR 1938 All 358
4 Bennett Coleman vs G section Monga ILR 5 AIR 1943 Nag
6 AIR 1940 Nag
56 432 the attention of the learned judge was not drawn to this earlier pronouncement of his in which case the matter would certainly have been more fully discussed
We think further that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in VM Bason vs A H Skone1 which was the basis of the decision of the learned Judge in the subsequent case does not really support the view taken in it
In the Calcutta case what happened was that a clerk of the Attorney who appeared for the respondent decreeholder went to serve a notice under Order 21 Rule 371 of the Civil Procedure Code upon the appellant judgment debtor
The judgmentdebtor refused to take the notice and abused and assaulted the Attorney s clerk
Upon that contempt proceedings were started against him and Mr Justice CC Ghosh sitting on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta held the appellant guilty of contempt and fined him Rs 200
On appeal this judgment was affirmed by the appellate Bench and there was a general observation made by Chief Justice Sanderson at the close of his judgment that it is not desirable to invoke the special inherent jurisdiction of the High Court by way of proceeding for contempt if ordinary proceedings in a Magistrate s court are sufficient to meet the requirements of a case
This was not a case under section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act at all and no question either arose or was decided as to whether if an act is otherwise punishable as an offence under the Indian Penal Code the jurisdiction of the High Court under that section would be ousted
Undoubtedly the High Court had jurisdiction in that case and whether such jurisdiction which is certainly of a special character and is exercised summarily should be called in to aid in the circumstances of a particular case would depend upon the discretion of the court
This has however no bearing on the point that has arisen for consideration before us
We would hold therefore that the right view was taken by the learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court in the earlier case and not in the later one 1 IL R 433 It is next urged by Mr Sinha that even assuming that this view is correct the language of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code is wide enough to cover a case of contempt of court
What is said is that if a libel is published against a judge in respect of his judicial functions that also is defamation within the meaning of section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and as such libel constitutes a contempt of court it may be said with perfect propriety that libel on a judge is punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code
We do not think that this contention can be accepted as sound
A libellous reflection upon the conduct of a judge in respect of his judicial duties may certainly come under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code and it may be open to the judge to take steps against the libeller in the ordinary way for vindication of his character and personal dignity as a judge but such libel may or may not amount to contempt of court
As the Privy Council observed in Surendra Nath Banerjee vs The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court1 although contempt may include defamation yet an offence of contempt is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character
 When the act of defaming a judge is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law it would certainly amount to contempt
TIle offence of con tempt is really a wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of courts of law which exist for their good
As was said by Willmot CJ2 attacks upon the judges excite in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determi nations and whenever man s allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken it is the most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice and in my opinion calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever not for the sake of the judges as private indi viduals but because they are the channels by which the King s justice is conveyed to the people
1 ILR at 131
2 Willmot s Opinions page 256 Rex vs Davies 30 at p 40 41 434 What is made punishable in the Indian Penal Code is the offence of defamation as defamation and not as
contempt of court
If the defamation of a subordinate court amounts to contempt of court proceedings can certainly be taken under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act quite apart from the fact that other remedy may be open to the aggrieved officer under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code
But a libel attacking the integrity of a judge may not in the circumstances of a particular case amount to a contempt at all although it may be the subject matter of a libel pro ceeding
This is clear from the observation of the Judicial Committee in the case of The Matter of a Special Reference from the Bahama Islands1
The first contention of Mr Sinha therefore fails
The second point raised by the learned counsel does not appear to us to have any real substance
The article in question is a scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty of a judicial officer
Specific instances have been given where the officer is alleged to have taken bribes or behaved with impropriety to the litigants who did not satisfy his dishonest demands
If the allegations were true obviously it would be to the benefit of the public to bring these matters into light
But if they were false they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and bring judiciary into disrepute
The appel lant though he took sole responsibility regarding the publication of the article was not in a position to sub stantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein
He admitted that the statement was based on hearsay
Ru mours may have reached him from various sources but before he published the article it was incumbent upon him as a reasonable man to attempt to verify the informations he received and ascertain as far as he could
whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies
He does not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction
As the appel lant did not act with reasonable care and caution he cannot be said to have acted 1 435 bona fide even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt
What is more he did not express any regret for what he had done either in the High Court or before us and his behaviour does not show the least trace of contrition
In these circumstances we think that the appeal cannot succeed and must be dismissed
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The Company after regular enquiry and pending permission of the Industrial Tribunal under section 33 of the  suspended some workmen without pay whereupon the workmen filed applications under section 33A of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal on the ground that their suspension without pay beyond ten days was against the provisions of the Standing Orders governing their conditions of service to the effect that an employee might be suspended provided the suspension without pay whether as punishment or pending enquiry did not exceed ten days
The Tribunal dismissed the workmen s applications under section 33A and granted permission to the Company to dismiss the workmen concerned
The workmen appealed
The Appellate Tribunal upheld the order granting permission to dismiss the workmen but came to the conclusion that the words  pending enquiry  in cl 27 Of the Standing Orders included proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal and that there was breach of the Standing Orders
Held that the employer could apply under section 33 Of the  for permission to dismiss an employee when after a regular enquiry he had come to the finding that the case against the employee was proved and that the punishment of dismissal was the proper punishment
The Industrial Tribunal had not to enquire into the conduct of the employee or the merits of dismissal but see whether a Prima facie case had been made out and a fair enquiry made by the employer
The time taken before the Tribunal in such proceedings was beyond the control of the employer
Standing Orders were concerned with employers and employees and not with Tribunals
In the instant case the words  pending enquiry  in cl 27 of the Standing Orders referred only to the enquiry by the employer and not to the pro ceedings before the Tribunal
The principle laid down in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mill s case that workmen would not be entitled to payment of wages during the whole period of suspension if the Tribunal gave permission to dismiss them would apply only to cases where there was a ban under section 33 and the employer had to apply under that section for lifting the ban after completing the enquiry
720 Rampalat Chamay vs The Assam Oil Co Ltd 195 4 LAC 78 dissented from
The Automobile Products of India Ltd vs Rukamji Bala  referred to
Lakshmi Devi SugaR Mills Ltd vs Pt
Ram Sarup   followed and explained