Civil Appeal No 8244 of 1983
From the Judgment and Order dated 2271980 of the Kerala High Court in Second Appeal No 171 of 1976
EMS Anam of the Appellants N Sudhakaran for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RM SAHAI J
Whether a junior member of the Tarwad in Kerala who redeems the mortgage and is in possession for more than 50 years is a mortgagee holding the land comprised in a mortgage  so as to acquire rights of tenant of tenant under Section 4A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is the legal issue that arises for consideration in this appeal by successors of other members of the Tarwad who suit for partition was dismissed in second appeal by the High Court
In the year 1045 1870 a mortgage was executed by the Karnavan akin to Manager of the Tarwad somewhat like a joint family
Two junior members of the Tarwad paid the amount in the year 1061 1886 got the property released obtained possession and they or their descendants continued in possession as such
In 1967 a suit for partition was filed by sucessors of other member of the Tarwad in whose favour equity of redemption of the land in suit was transferred in a family partition in 1962
The suit was resisted amongst others on acquisition of right of tenant under Section 41a of the Land Reforms Act
Since there was no dispute on basic facts namely redemption of mortgage by two junior members and their continuance in possession for more than fifty years on the date Section 41a was added to the Land Reforms Act the rights of parties were decided more as a matter of law
According to the trial court and first appellate court the junior members as a result of getting the property released were holder of special right under Marumakkathayam Law
They could not be held to be mortgagee therefore they did not acquire any right under the Land Reforms Act
But the High Court held otherwise mainly because in 1962 when the Tarwad was partitioned the property was treated as under mortgage since equity of redemption for the same was given to the plaintiff appellant
It was found that even in the plaint it was averred that in consequence of release the mortgagee right vested in the predecessor of defendants who were junior members of the Tarwad
The High Court therefore held that the defendants being assignee of mortgage in possession for fifty years on the date the Land Reforms Act was amended and Section 41a was added by Act XXXV of 1969 were entitled to rights as tenants
The High Court thus accepted the claim of defendants because the member of the Tarwad treated the mortgage to be continuing on the date the suit was filed
This apart it was held that junior member of the Tarwad paying off the debt of Tarwad becomes a mortgagee of the excess share in his own right
But this enunciation of law was not accepted as correct by a division bench of the Kerala High Court itself in Raghavan Nair vs Anandavally Amma The question therefore is if a junior member of the Tarwad who redeems the properly and gets release is holder of special right only or he steps into the shoes of mortgagee
Nature of right of a junior member in the Tarwad a family corporation in which every member male or female possesses equal right has been explained by this Court in Kochuni vs States of Madras  Kerala  at 1099 thus  The incidents of a tarwad are so well settled that it is not necessary to consider the case law but it would be enough if the relevant passages from the book Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law by Sundara Aiyar are cited
The learned author says at p7 thus The joint family in a Marumakkathayam Nayar tarwad consists of a mother and her male and female children and the children of those female children and so on
The issue of the male children do not belong to their tarwad but to the tarwad of their consorts
The property belonging to the tarwad is the property of all the males and females that compose it
Its affairs are administered by one of those persons usually the eldest male called the karnavan
The individual members are not entitled to enforce partition but a partition may be effected by common consent
The rights of the junior members are stated to be 1 if males to succeed to management in their turn 2 to be maintained at the family house 3 to object to an improper alienation or administration of the family property 4 to see that the property is duly conserved 5 to bar an adoption and 6 to get a share at any partition that may take place
These are what may be called effective rights
Otherwise everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights
 One of the rights according to this decision which vests in the junior member is to see that the property is duly conserved
Such a right obviously includes a right to redeem the property by paying the debts outstanding against the Tarwad
It is an incidence of co ownership or co proprietorship which flows from the nature of Tarwad
But whether the person who thus conserves the property steps into shoes of mortgagee and holds the same rights and interests or he is a surety holding the property on behalf of the Tarwad subject to right of contribution has to be decided on general principles of mortgage as the customary law of Tarwad does not throw any light on it
Mortgage has been defined in Section 58 of the as transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced
The definition brings out clearly the nature of mortgage
It was understood and followed in same sense even before the Act came into force
In Gopal vs Parsotam 1883 5 All 121
137 FB it was observed  Mortgage as understood in this country cannot be defined better than by the definition adopted by the Legislature in section 58 of the IV of 1882
That definition has not in any way altered the law but on the contrary has only formulated in clear language the notions of mortgage as understood by all the writers of text books on Indian mortgages
Every word of the definition is borne out by the decisions of lndian Courts of Justice
 It was not different where customary law prevailed
Even in customary Marumakkathayam Law governing section of people inhabiting the West Coast the law of mortgage was understood in no different sense
Since the transfer in a mortgage is only of interest and not of the entire right and title as takes place in sale the mortgagor and the mortgagee can transfer or assign their interest
A mortgagor may assign or transfer the equity of redemption or may even create second mortgage
Similarly a mortgagee may assign his interest or create another mortgage
What happens when a mortgagee assigns his interest in favour of another person Since an assignor can pass interest that he has the assignee becomes holder of the same interest that a mortgagee has
In other words he steps into the shoes of the mortgagee
Can the same be said where a co mortgagor or anyone on behalf of mortgagor authorised under law pays the amount and brings to an end the interest the mortgagee had Mortgage is creation of an interest in the property for payment of debt
Once the mortgage debt is discharged by a person beneficially interested in equity of redemption the mortgage comes to an end by operation of law
Consequently the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee cannot subsist
What then is the status of a person paying off debt to secure the property either with consent of others or on own volition In law he becomes the owner entitled to hold and possess the property
But in equity the right is to hold the property till he is reimbursed
In other words he may hold the property in surety or he may bring the claim for contribution
In Ganeshi Lal vs Joti Pershad   it was held 
Equity insists on the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice and good conscience is bound to pay it and it is well recognised that where there are several joint debtors the person making the payment is a principal debtor as regards the part of the liability he is to discharge and a surety in respect of the shares of the rest of the debtors  Similarly the co mortgagor whose share has been got redeemed is entitled in equity to get possession over his share of property on payment of the amount of his share
In Valliamma Champaka Pillay vs Sivathanu Pillay  Ors 1980 I SCR 354 the principle was explained thus From what has been said above it was clear that where the is not in force and a mortgage with possession is made by two persons one of whom only redeems discharging the whole of the common mortgage debt he will in equity have two distinct rights Firstly to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee discharged vis a vis the non redeeming co mortgagor including the right to get into possession of the latters portion or share of the hypotheca
Secondly to recover contribution towards the excess paid by him on the security of that portion or share of the hypotheca which belonged not to him but to the other co mortgagor
It follows that where one co mortgagor gets the right to contribution against the other co mortgagor by paying off the entire mortgage debt a co related right also accrues to the latter to redeem his share of the property and get its possession on payment of his share of the liability to the former
This corresponding right of the  non redeeming  co mortgagor to pay his share of the liability and get possession of his property from the redeeming co mortgagor subsists as long as the latter s right to contribution subsists  But these rights in equity either in favour of the person 2who discharges the debt or the person whose debt has been discharged do not result in resumption of relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee
Even under subrogation a legal concept meaning substitution applied on English Law principle even earlier inserted now as Section 92 in since 1929 the rights that are created in favour of a co mortgagor as a result of discharge of debt are so far as regards redemption foreclosure or sale of such property the same rights as the mortgagee whose mortgage he redeems 
What is the meaning of expression right as mortgagee  Does a person who in equity gets subrogated becomes mortgagee Or his rights are confined to foreclosure or sale A plain reading of the section does not warrant a construction that the substitutee becomes a mortgagee
The expression is right as the mortgagee  and not right of mortgagee
The legislative purpose was statutory recognition of the equitable right to hold the property till the co mortgagor was reimbursed
And not to create relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee
The section confers certain rights on co mortgagor and provides for the manner of its exercise as well
The rights are of redemption foreclosure and sale
And the manner of exercise is as mortgagee
The word as  according to Black s Legal Dictionary means in the manner prescribed 
Thus a co mortgagor in possession of excess share redeemed by him can enforce his claim against non redeeming mortgagor by exercising rights of foreclosure or sale as is exercised by mortgagee under section 67 of the 
But that does not make him mortgagee
Therefore a co mortgagor or a Junior member of the Tarwad who continued in possession over the excess share got redeemed by him could not be deemed to be mortgagee so as to acquire right under Section 4A1a of the Kerala Land Reforms Act
Legal position explained above does not alter either because during partition equity of redemption in respect of property redeemed by junior members was transferred or because in the plaint it was claimed that mortgage subsisted
None of these actions could effect the operation of law
In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed
The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the trial court decreeing the suit for partition is restored
Parties shall bear their own costs
NPV Appeals allowed
STATE bank of india and anr
vs V PARTHASARATHY ETC
NOVEMBER 9 1992 KULDIP SINGH AND PB SAWANT JJ Civil Services State Bank of India Promotion to the post of Head Clerk Circular No 42 Clause Three options Outside the city within city and within the same office Debarment on refusal of third and final offer Local Head Office and five other offfices to be considered as one Unit Final offer made in one such office Whether valid and debars the optees permanently on refusal to accept
The appellant Bank issued Circular No 42 containing an understanding reached with the Staff union laying down the policy for promotion of clerks to the post of Head Clerks
As per clause 1d of the Circular the employees who decline to accept Head Clerk s post at a branch office outside the city in which they work will have a further option when a vacancy arises at any one of the Bank s offices within that city
However this was subject to the condition that at the material time there was no other senior employee who had similarly declined the post outside his branch office in which case the senior most would have the first choice
It was further provided that if an employee declines to accept the post of Head Clerk at an office within the same city his case would be considered only when a vacancy arises at his office
This was also subject to the condition that there was no senior employee similarly situated at the material time
If the third and final offer is declined there would be a permanent debarment of promotion
Since there were six offices at the Madras Local Head Office a common seniority was maintained and all the six offices were considered as one office viz local Head Office of which the other five offices were only parts
The Respondents declined their first second and final offers though indisputably the final offer was made to them for being posted in an office forming part of the local Head Office
Both the Respondents moved the High Court by way of Writ Petitions and the High Court took the view that the final offer made was not in the same office and so they were entitled to be posted as Head Clerks in the same office
Being aggrieved by the said two decisions of the High Court the appellant Bank preferred the present appeals
On the question of interpretation of clause 1d of the circular in question Allowing the appeals this Court HELD 1
The High Court s interpretation of cl 1d of the Circular that the third offer made was not in the office where the Respondents were working and therefore their refusal to accept the post did not exhaust the third option and they were entitled to be posted as Head Clerks in the Office where they were working is incorrect in view of the fact that the local Head Office was split into six different offices which together constituted one unit
By refusing to accept the third and final offer the Respondents had clearly exhausted all the three options and had become permanently debarred from seeking promotion to the post of Head Clerk
366 E G 2
This Court does not intend to interfere with the appointment of the respondents to the post of Head Clerk in the Regional Office in the facts and circumstances of these matters which show that in one case a fortuitous appointment had arisen due to death of an employee within almost a month of the Respondent s refusal to accept the offer and in the other case the Respondent has already been accommodated in the post of Head Clerk in the Regional Office itself
However this would not be treated as a precedent and this would not affect the interpretation of clause 1d of the Circular placed by this Court
366 H 367 A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos
4799 4800 of 1992
From the Judgments dated 431992 and 841992 in Madras High Court in WP No 24692 and WA No 349 of 1992
G Ramaswamy Attorney General K Sankaran A Rangananthan and AV Rangam for the Appellants
MK Ramamurthi MA Krishnmoorthy MA Chinnaswamy H Subramaniam and Ms C Ramamurthi for the Respondents
Rajendra Sachhar Ambrish Kumar and MD Pandey for the Inter vener
The Order of the Court was delivered Intervention application is allowed
Leave granted
Civil Appeal No 4799 of 1992
The controversy in this case is in a narrow compass
The appellant Bank issued Staff Circular No 42 containing an understanding reached with the Bank staff union laying down the policy for promotion of clerks to the post of Head Clerks
Clause 1d of the said circular states as follows Employees who decline to accept Head Clerk s post at a Branch Office outside their place of service ie outside their city will again be offered the appointment only when a vacancy arises at any one of the offices within that city provided that at the material time there is no other senior employees at that office who had earlier declined a posting outside his Branch as a Head Clerk in which case the senior most employee will first be offered the appointment
Also if an employee declines to accept the post of a Head Clerk at an office within the same city his case for appointment as Head Clerk will be considered only when a vacancy arises at his office in the order of his seniority
His case cannot be considered for a vacancy at any of the other offices in the city
It will be apparent from the above provision of the said clause that those employees who decline to accept the Head Clerk s post at a branch office which is outside the city in which they work will have a further option
Such employees would be offered the post of Head Clerk again but only when a vacancy arises at any one of the Bank s offices within that city
This is of course subject to the condition that at the material time there is no other senior employee who had similarly declined the post outside his branch office in which case the senior most would have the first choice
The further provision of this rule and with which we are concerned in the present case is as follows
If an employee declines to accept the post of Head Clerk at an office within the same city his case for appointment as Head Clerk would be considered only when a vacancy arises at his office
This is also subject to the condition that there is no senior employee similarly situated at the material time
If the third and the final offer for the post of Head Clerk is declined there is a permanent debarment of the promotion
One more thing necessary to be stated before we come to the facts of the present case is that the appellant Bank has a local Head Office at Madras
In 1972 it was split into two the local Head Office and Madras Main Branch
In 1976 77 there was a further splitting up of the local Head Office and the Main Branch and ultimately in 1979 the Madras Local Head Office was divided into following six offices as part of the same Head Office i Local Head Office ii Madras Main Branch iii Overseas Branch iv Regional Office which is called Zonal Office v The Commercial Branch vi Siruthozhil Branch 4
There is no dispute that as far as the Clerks and the Head Clerks in all the six parts of the same local Head Office are concerned a common seniority list is maintained
The effect of the aforesaid arrangements for the purposes of the clause 1d is that the employees in the said clause means the employees in all the said six parts of the local Head Office
In other words if a vacancy for a Head Clerk occurred at any of the said six offices it was considered to be a vacancy in one office viz
the local Head Office of which the other five offices were only parts
It appears that respondent Parthasarathy was working as a clerk in the Madras Regional Office now called Zonal Office which is as will be clear from above a part of the Local Head Office itself
On 21st August 1973 he was offered the post of Head Clerk at Deva Kottain which is outside Madras city
This offer was declined by him
On 1st July 1980 he was offered the post of Head Clerk in the Sowkarpet branch office in the same city which was less than 2 kms from his Regional office where he was working
He declined the said offer too
He was then entitled to be considered for posting as Head Clerk only in his office which meant in any of the six parts of the local Head Office that being the third and the final offer that could be made to him
The third offer was made to him for the post of Head Clerk at the Overseas branch and that being part of the same local Head Office he was bound to accept it
However he declined the third and the final offer also and issued a lawyer s notice to the Bank contending that the Overseas branch was different from the Regional office where he was working and therefore the offer given to him was contrary to the said clause 1d
The allegations made in the notice were of course denied by the bank
On 6th September 1983 one A Nizamuddin who was working as Head Clerk in the Regional office passed away and that post became vacant
On 24th September 1983 the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court for quashing the third and the final offer made to him on 4th August 1983 and for a direction for posting him in the Regional office where the vacancy had occurred
The High Court took the view that the third offer made was not for the post of the Head Clerk in the same office where the respondent was working and therefore his refusal to accept the post did not exhaust the third option and he was entitled to the vacancy created by Nizamuddin s death in the Regional office where the respondent was working
We are afraid this interpretation is incorrect in view of the position explained above with regard to the local Head Office which was split into six different offices which together constituted one unit
The respondent when he was offered the third option in the Overseas branch was offered the post in the same office where he was working the Regional office being as much a part of the Head Office as the Overseas branch
By refusing to accept the said third and the final offer the respondent had clearly exhausted all his three options and had become permanently debarred from seeking promotion to the post of Head Clerk
We however do not interfere with the appointment of the respondent to the post of Head Clerk in the Regional office in the facts and circumstances of the case which show that a fortuitous appointment had arisen within almost a month of his refusal to accept the offer
This however will not be treated as a precedent nor does it affect the interpretation that we have placed on the clause 1d as above
Civil Appeal No 4800 of 1992 In this case also the respondent Sampath was working as a Clerk in Madras Regional Office
The first offer of the post of Head Clerk was made to him on 6th August 1973 at Mudukulathur branch which is in Madras city
This was declined by him
On 12th May 1980 he was given the second offer for the post of Head Clerk at Air Force Station branch Tambaram which was in Madras city
The third and final offer was made to him on 4th August 1983 to the post of Head Clerk in the Stationery department of the Madras Local Head Office
There is no dispute that Stationery department of the Local Head Offfice and the Regional Office form part of one unit viz Madras Local Head Office
The respondent declined this offer as well and on 23rd January 1984 filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing the third offer and for posting him in his office viz Regional Office as the Head Clerk
The learned Single Judge of the High Court quashed the order making the third offer and allowed the petition following the earlier decision in Parthasarathy s case with which we have dealt with earlier
The Division Bench of the High Court also confirmed the order
For the reasons we have given in CANo 4799 of 1992 we are unable to accept the interpretation given by the High Court on clause 1d of Staff Circular No 42
However if in the present case the respondent has already been accommodated in the post of Head Clerk in the Regional Office itself we do not intend to interfere with the same
It is nonetheless made clear that it is the interpretation that we have placed on the said clause that will prevail and not the interpretation placed by the High Court
With these observations the appeals are allowed only to the extent that the interpretation placed by the appellant Bank on clause ld of the Staff Circular No 42 is correct and the decision of the High Court on the point is incorrect
There will be no order as to costs


Summary:
The appellant was appointed to the Indian Administrative Service KARNATAKA Cadre in 1957 and on May 5 1990 he was holding the post of Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of KARNATAKA and by a Notification dated May 5 1990 was appointed a Chief Secretary to the KARNATAKA Government until further orders
In the State of KARNATAKA there was originally one post of Chief Secretary to the Government
An ex cadre post of Additional Chief Secretary was created with a declaration under Rule 91 of IAS Pay Rules that the status and responsibilities of the said post were equivalent to the cadre post of Chief Secretary and this post was thereafter encadred by Notification dated January 30 1987 with the same pay as of the post of Chief Secretary
The post of Secretary High Power Committee was created by the State Government of Karnataka in 1989 with the designation Chairman Hyderabad Karnataka Development Board by order dated September 27 1989 and was declared equivalent to the status and responsibilities to the cadre post of Additional Chief Secretary under Rule 9 of IAS Pay Rules
The posts of Chief Secretary Secretary High Power Committee and Additional Chief Secretary thus carried equal pay
On January 3 1991 the Cabinet Government of Karnataka took a decision to the effect that a change of the Chief Secretary should be effected and pursuant thereto the Chief Minister on January 41991 took the following three decisions and passed consequential orders viz i declaring that the post of Secretary High Power Committee was equivalent in status and responsibilities to the post of Chief Secretary to the Government ii transferring the appellant to the post of Secretary High Power Committee with immediate effect and iii appointing the 4th respondent who was senior to the appellant to the post of Chief Secretary to the Government
The Notification giving effect to the above orders of transfer was issued on January 4 1991 but the authenticated Government order declaring the equivalent of the two posts under Rule 9 of lAS Pay Rules was issued on the next day viz January 5 1991
The appellant made an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal Bangalore for quashing the order dated January 4 1991 transferring and posting him as Secretary High Power Committee for Development of Hyderabad Karnataka area Bangalore and for a direction to allow him to continue as the Chief Secretary
The order was challenged mainly on two grounds 1 that such order was not passed bona fide for the exigencies of the administration but the same was passed mala fide by the Chief Minister of Karnataka who became displeased with the appellant on account of his unfavourable attitude and resistance to some of the proposals of the Chief Minister in the matter of posting of senior officers of the State to different posts and 2 that the transfer order was vitiated because of non compliance of the procedural formalities for a valid transfer of the appellant as there was no declaration under Rule 91 of IAS Pay Rules 1954 that the post of Secretary High Power Committee was equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary
The respondents viz State of Karnataka the Chief Minister as also respondent No 4 denied the allegations relating to the malice of facts and contended that they were mischievous malicious scandalous and vexatious and such allegations were deliberately made to malign the respondents and contended that the post of Secretary High Power Committee was equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary and such declaration had been made long back and the post of Additional Chief Secretary and the post of Chief Secretary were also equivalent and interchangeable and that the appellant can have no grievance against the said orders of transfer and that there is also no occasion to contend that the declaration required as under Rule 91 of IAS Pay Rules had not been made
The Central Administrative Tribunal after considering the facts and circumstances came to the finding that the freedom to choose a person as the Chief Secretary to the liking of the Chief Minister and the Cabinet on whom there is absolute confidence is undisputed prerogative and such decision becomes unassailable when it is made in bona fide manner following the statutory formalities applicable to such selection and appointment and that the appellant had no subsisting right to remain as Chief Secretary and it was the prerogative of the Chief Minister and the Cabinet to take a decision to appoint a person to the post of Chief Secretary
The Tribunal also held that the appellant had failed to establish that he had been transferred with the ulterior motive of placing him in a lower post and thereby permanently preventing him from continuing in the position and status of Chief Secretary
The application was accordingly dismissed
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of dismissal the appellant appealed to this Court by Special leave and contended that the declaration of equivalence under Rule 91 of IAS Pay Rules 1954 is an essential statutory requirement and without such declaration of equivalence no member in the cadre of IAS can be transferred to a non cadre post and after encadrement of the post of Additional Chief Secretary the declaration of equivalence which was made earlier lost its force and that equivalence is referable only to an ex cadre post and ex hypothesi declaration of equivalence cannot come in inter se posts within the cadre
It was also submitted that the order of transfer of the appellant and also the order of posting of respondent No 4 had taken place simultaneously in undue haste even without making a declaration of equivalence and this only indicates that there had not been any bona fide and proper exercise to find out the most suitable person for the post of Chief Secretary in the normal way
The Attorney General appearing with the Advocate General of the State of Karnataka for respondent Nos 1 and 3 namely the State of Karnataka and the Chief Minister of Karnataka opposed the appeal and submitted that the post of Chairman Karnataka Hyderabad Development Board was created on September 1 1989 and respondent No 4 was holding a very high and responsible office at the relevant time and senior to the appellant as a member of the Indian Administrative Service and that since the Cabinet and the Chief Minister had taken a decision to relieve the appellant from the post of Chief Secretary there had been a necessity to find out a competent senior officer in the Indian Administrative Service Cadre in the State that as no departmental proceedings had been pending against him the Cabinet and the Chief Minister had taken a decision to appoint Respondent No 4 being the seniormost person in the Indian Administrative Service cadre in the State having a long experience in different administrative set up and conversant with the problems of the State as Chief Secretary and such decision is not ex facie perverse and unjustified
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
The appellant has not been able to lay any firm foundation warranting a finding that the impugned order of transfer was passed mala fide andor an oblique purpose in order to punish the appellant andor to humiliate him
387 E In the instant case the pleadings of the appellant before the Central Administrative Tribunal only indicate that some of his suggestions in the matter of posting of senior bureaucratic officers of the State had not been accepted by the present Chief Minister of the State
Such facts alone do not constitute any foundation for a finding that because the appellant was not agreeable to oblige the Chief Minister he had incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister and the impugned orders had been passed not on administrative exigencies but only to malign the appellant and to humiliate him387 F 2
It is an admitted position that the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister had differences of opinion on a number of sensitive matters
If on that score the Cabinet and the Chief Minister had taken a decision to relieve the appellant from the post of Chief Secretary and post a very senior officer of their confidence to the post of Chief Secretary it cannot be held that such decision is per se illegal or beyond the administrative authority
388 B 3
It may not always be possible to demonstrate malice in fact with full and elaborate particulars and it may be permissible in an appropriate case to draw reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established
But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of insinuation surmise or conjecture
387 G 4
So far invalidity of the impugned order of transfer for want of declaration or equivalence under Rule 91 of IAS Pay Rules is concerned it is indicated that here had already been a declaration when the re designated post of Secretary High Power Committee was established that the said post was equivalent to the post of Additional Chief Secretary
It is the positive stand of the State Government that the post of Chief Secretary and the Additional Chief Secretary are equivalent
388 C D 5
Prior to the impugned orders a decision to declare the post of Secretary High Power Committee equivalent to the post of Chief Secretary of the State had been taken
Since the impugned order of transfer was implemented with immediate effect the formal publication could not be made on the very same day but was made on January 51991 viz on the very next day
In such circumstances the formal declaration made on January 51991 does not invalidate the impugned order of transfer
388 E Fl EP Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1974 SC 555 relied on