ivil Appeal No 3081 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 25
1985 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No 2457 of 1985
RK Jain and Ms Abha Jain for the Appellant
KC Sharma and RK Virmani for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
Special leave granted
The appeal is disposed of herein after hearing counsel for both the parties
The appellant landlord filed a suit for possession in the Civil Court of Hissar in Haryana
The respondent is the tenant in the shop situated at Raj Guru Market which had PG NO 531 been rented out to the respondent in 1978
The suit was filed on the basis that the respondent was in arrears of rent from lst December 1982 to 3lst May 1982 and the tenancy of the respondent had been terminated by giving him notice
The suit was filed for recovery of possession on the termination or expiry of the period of tenancy
It was filed because of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
The Act was passed with the object to control the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom
For our present purpose it would suffice if we bear in mind two relevant provisions
Section 13 of the Act provides as follows  Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date its completion
 Section 13 of the Act deals with the eviction of tenants and sub section 1 thereof provides that the tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of that section
The section thereafter enumerates the statutory grounds for eviction upon which eviction is permitted which incidentally are more or less similar statutory ground all over the country
On or about 15th February 1983 the respondent tenant filed his written statement
In November 1984 the respondent tenant moved an application for dismissal of the suit of the appellant stating that the shop in question was constructed in June 1974 as such the period of ten years had elapsed by June 1984 in terms of section l3 of the Act
and as such the immunity from the application of the had expired
The suit under the Act is not maintainable and the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands barred
The learned Sub Judge Hissar
held that the decree was not necessary to be passed within the exemption period of ten years under section 13 of the Act
the learned Sub Judge accordingly dismissed the respondent s application
Aggrieved thereby the tenant respondent preferred a revision to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
The High Court held that as the suit had not been decreed within the period of ten years the building in question came within the operation of the Act and as such the Rent Act was applicable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction
In the PG NO 532 premises the learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the suit pending before the Sub Judge
Aggrieved thereby the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court
More or less identical provisions of the U P Act had come up for consideration before this Court in the case of Vineet Kumar vs
Manal Sain Wadhera l984 3 SCC 352
The only point that was urged before this Court in that decision was whether the premises which was not ten years  old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of the new Rent Act could be governed by it if ten years expired during the pendency of the litigation
The relevant provisions of the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 provided as follows 20
Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds
1 Save as provided in sub section 2
no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner
Provided that nothing in this sub section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit appeal revision or execution proceeding which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant
 In Vineet Kumar vs Mangal Sain Wadhera supra the respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction and for arrears of rent and damages inter alia on the grounds that the building in question was not covered by the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction ct 1972 in view of the exemption granted to new buildings under section 2 2 of the said Act and that the defendant appellant had defaulted in payment of rent
The tenant had resisted the claim on the ground that having regard to the date of construction of the building it was covered  by the Act that the plaint having not been amended so as to bring the suit under the Act it was barred by section 20 and that term was no default in payment of rent
As mentioned hereinbefore during the pendency of the litigation the exemption granted under section 2 2 expired
The question was whether the premises which was not ten years  old on the PG NO 533 date of the suit and was exempted from the operation of the Rent Act would be governed by it if ten years expired during the pendency of the litigation
Allowing the appeal this Court held that the appellant must get benefits of the Act which became applicable to the premises in question during the pendency of the litigation
That would not affect the cause of action in that case
It was held that the contention that the Court had to decide the case on the basis of cause of action that accrued prior to the date of filing the suit and not on a new cause of action was not sustainable
It was further held that normally amendment in plaint is not allowed if it changes the causes of action
However where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action or raise a new case but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation
This Court observed that processual justice required that the events and developments subsequent to the institution of proceedings must be taken into consideration in appropriate cases to promote substantial justice
Vineet Kumar s case supra was discussed and explained by this Court in Nand Kishore Marwah und others vs Sammundri Devi 1987 4 SC_ C 382
This Court held that in view of section 22 of the 1972 Act if an assessment is made of the newly built house then the date of completion of the building the date from which 10 years have to be computed will be the date on which the first assessment was made
Therefore the period of 10 years have to be computed from October
This Court further hold that if a tenant is entitled to the advantage of sections 39 and 40 of the Act and the period of 10 years elapses during the pendency of the eviction suit or appeal before this Court which is the continuation of the suit then the tenant would be entitled to the benefits of the Act
This Court further held that within 10 years as provided for in section 22 restriction on the institution of suit as provided for in section 20 1 will not be applicable
It was held that during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the restriction under section 20 will not be attracted as the suit had been instituted within 10 years
It is well settled that the rights of the parties will have to be determined on the basis of the rights available to them on the date of the suit
This Court pointed out that the attention of the Court had not been drawn to the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta vs Dig
Vijendrapal Gupta  This Court referred to the words used in section 20 of the said Act which emphasised that no suit shall be instituted for eviction This clearly indicates that the restriction put under section 20 of the said Act is to the institution of the suit itself and therefore it is clear that if the provision of PG NO 534 this Act applies then no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds specified in the sub sections of that section of the Act
This applies more so in the instant case where the section 13 of the Act provides that the tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this section
Those provisions would not be applicable to a suit instituted within 10 years from the date of the completion of the building in question
That is the plain meaning of the expression use
It was further to be borne in mind that in finding out the plain meaning of the expression usez the language the background the context the purpose these all have to be borne in mind
In Ram Saroop Rai vs Lilavati   Krishna lyer J has explained the section 22 of the U P Act as follows  The legislature found that rent control law has a chilling effect on new building construction and so to encourage more building operations amended the statute to release from the shackle of legislative restriction new constructions  for a period of ten years
So much so a landlord who had let out his new building could recover possession with out impediment if he instituted such proceedings within ten years of completion   It is well settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure
Broom has stated the maxim actus curiam neminem gravabit an act of Court shall prejudice no man
Therefore having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication the 10 years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally
It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within 10 years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of
That will make the 10 years holidays from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses
The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated
Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else
Judicial time and energy is more often than not consumed in finding what is the intention of the Parliament or in other wards the will of the people
Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his inten tions at PG NO 535 the time when the law was made by signs most natural and probable
And these signs are either the words the context the subject matter the effects and consequence or the spirit and reason of the law
Underlined by the Court
See Commentaries on the Laws of England facsimile of lst edition of 1765 University of Chicago Press 1979 Vol 1 p 59
Mukherjea J as the learned Chief justice then was in Poppatlal Shah vs State of Madras  said that each word phrase or sentence was to be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself
But words must be construed with imagination of purpose behind the said Judge Learned Hand long time ago
It appears therefore that though we are concerned with seeking of intention we are rather looking to the meaning of the words that the legislator has used and the true meaning of what words as was said by Lord Reid in Black Clawson International Ltd vs Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg A G 1975 Appeal Cases 591 at 613
We are clearly of the opinion that having regard to the language we must find the reason and the spirit of the law
If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depended upon the ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of 10 years which is in reality ability then there would be empty reasons
In our opinionbearing in mind the well settled principle that the rights of the parties crystallise on the date of the institution of the suit as enunciated by this Court in Om Prakash Gupta vs Dig Vijendrapal Gupta supra the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of 10 years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated
Such suit or proceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of 10 years
Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be in accordance with law
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in the view it took
The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the order of the learned Sub Judge is restored
The suit will now proceed in accordance with law in the light of the observations herein as expeditiously as possible
The costs of the appeal will be the costs of the suit
NVK Appeal allowed


Summary:
The petitioner before his appointment as a Judge of the Rajasthan High Court was a member of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service
He was later transferred and appointed as a Judge of the High Court of Delhi
He retired on July 21 1984
The petitioner had opted
for the purpose of his pension for Part 111 of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges Conditions of Service Act 1954
Under this provision the petitioner was entitled to a basic pension as admissible under the ordinary rules of his Service if he had not been appointed a Judge and an additional pension for each completed year of service as a Judge of the High Court
The High Court Judges Conditions of Service Amendment Act 1986 and 1988 brought about improvements in the service conditions
including pension of the High Court Judges
The Government of India subsequently issued a scheme for rationalisation of pension structure for pre January 1 1984 pensioners
Pursuant there to the Ministry of Law  Justice Government of India issued letter dated December 18 1987 giving directions to the Accountants GeneralPay and Accounts Officers as to the manner in which the basic pension of the High Court Judges governed by the provisions of Part 111 of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges Conditions of Service Act 1954 may be revised with effect from 111986 as in the case of the employees of Central Government or from some other date the respective State Government may decide to adopt these orders or an independent order issued by them
PG NO 496 PG NO 497 The petitioner has claimed higher pension on the ground that service Judges with lesser service who belonged to Higher Judicial Service of some other States have been granted higher pension while he has been subjected to a discriminatory treatment in the matter
Allowing the Civil Miscellaneous Petition it was HELD 1 This Court fails to appreciate the propriety of the letter dated December 111 1987 of the Ministry of Law  Justice giving liberty to different State Governments to deny the benefit of the revised pension to the Service Judges consequently upon the enactment of the High Court Judges Conditions of Service Amendments Acts
1986 and 1988 read along with Office Memoranda issued by the Government of Pension  Pensioners Welfare dated April 14 1987and April 16 1987 and rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules 1956
Such a direction is constitutionally impermissible as offending Art14 of the Constitution
It is tantamount to denial of equal treatment to persons belonging to the same class without any rational basis
503F H 504A  2 While the salary of Judges of the High Court is charged on the Consolidated Fund of the States the pension of High Court Judges is charged on the Consolidated Fund of India
500E