Appeal No 1789 of 1966
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 24 1961 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No 1302 of 1952
BC Misra GS Chatterjee and MM Kshatriya for the appellants
JP Goyal and GN Wantoo for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J
The scope of section 9 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and and Reforms
Act 1950 UP Act 1 of 1951 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act comes up for decision in this appeal by certificate
The facts relevant for deciding this appeal are no more in dispute
The respondents were Ryots under the appellants in village Nagli Abdulla a hemlet of village Machhra
The site of the building in dispute in this appeal had been taken by the father of the respondents from the appellant s ancestors over 60 years ago and thereafter the respondents put up some buildings on that site for their residential purposes
During the communal disturbances in 1947 they left the village temporarily as a measure of safety and took shelter with some of their relations in some other village at a distant place
They came back to their village in the year 1949 when the conditions improved
At that time they found the appellants occupying that site after putting up a cow shed on the site in which their residential buildings stood
Those residential buildings had been demolished and the site in question included as a part of the house of the appellants
As the appellants refused to deliver possession of the suit property the respondents instituted a suit for possession of the same on January 9 1951
On January 26 1951 the Act came into force
Section 4 of the Act provided for the vesting of the Estates in the State
It prescribes that as soon as may be after the commencement of the Act the State Government may by notification declare that as from a date to be specified all Estates situate in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified all such Estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as otherwise provided in the Act in the State free from all encumbrances
Section 6 of the Act enumerates the consequences of the vesting of an Estate in the State
Section 9 deals with the buildings in the abadi
Reading sections 4 6 and 9 together it follows that all Estates notified under s4 vest in the State free from all encumbrances
The quondam proprietors or tenure holders of those Estates lose all interests in those Estates
As proprietors  13 or tenure holders they retain no interest in respect of them whatsoever
But in respect of the land or buildings enumerated in section 6 and section 9 the State settled on the person who held them certain rights
Though in fact the vesting of the Estates and the deemed settlement of some rights in respect of certain classes of land or buildings included in the Estate took place simultaneously in law the two must be treated as different transactions first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely and free of all encumbrances
Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of some rights with the persons mentioned in sections 6 and 9
Therefore in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within sections 6 or 9 see Rana Sheo Ambar Singh vs Allahabad Bank Ltd Allahabad1
In this connection reference may also usefully be made to the decision of this Court in Shivashankar Prasad Shah and Ors
vs Vaikunth Nath Singh and Ors2 a decision rendered under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 the relevant provisions of which are similar to the provisions of the Act
In this case notification under s4 of the Act was issued on July 1 1952
Hence the vesting contemplated under section 4 took place on that date
Section 9 of the Act the section with which we are concerned in this case reads thus All wells trees in abadi and all buildings situated within the limits of an estate belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other persons whether residing in the village or not shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary or tenant or person as the case may be and the site of the wells or the buildings within the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed
 In view of that provision all buildings situate within the limits of an Estate held by an intermediary or tenant or other person whether residing in the village or not continues to be held by him and the site of the buildings within the area appurtenant thereto should be deemed to have been settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed
As seen earlier till about 1947 the respondents were lawfully holding the buildings and the site with which we are concerned in this case as Ryots
They never gave up their possession of 1  2 Civil Appeal No 36866 decided on 3 7 1969
14 the buildings voluntarily
The fact that they vacated those buildings and took shelter with their relations during the time of the communal disturbances cannot be considered as abandonment of the buildings
In law they continued to be in possession of the buildings
Hence the appellant s entry into the suit site was an unlawful act
In the eye of law they were trespassers
In demolishing the buildings put up by the respondents they committed the offence of mischief
The fact they had put up new structures cannot under the Transfer of Property Act enhance their rights to the property
We have no material before us from which we can find out the value of the buildings
demolished by them and the value of the buildings put up by them unlawfully
From the description of the buildings given in evidence it appears that the newly put up building is only cattle shed
We are not satisfied that the newly put up building is worth more than the buildings that had been demolished by the appellants
In the the circumstances of the case all that can be said is that the old buildings have been substituted by the new building
Therefore the owners of the old buildings continue to be the owners of the new building
In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether if a stranger builds a building on the land of another the true owner of the land is entitled to recover the land with the building on it
Equitable considerations persuade us to hold that when the respondents came back to their village in 1949 they were entitled to recover not only the site but also the building constructed on it by the appellants
Hence it should be held that on the date of vesting the respondents were the owners the building in question
In law they were holding the same
The controversy between the parties in this appeal is as to the meaning to be attached to the word held in s9 of the Act
Is the holding contemplated therein lawful holding or a mere holding lawful or otherwise
It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the dictionary meaning of the word held merely means to have a possession of s 9 merely contemplates Physical possession and nothing more on the date of the vesting they were in physical possession of the site as well as the building therefore the building must be deemed to have been settled with them
On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the word held in section 9 of the Act means lawfully held and that section does not confer any benefit on a trespasser
The meaning of the word held in s9 came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Agarwala and Chaturvedi JJ
in Pheku Chamar and Ors
vs Harish Chandra and Ors1
In that case the learned 1 AIR 1953 All 406 15 judges held that the legislature has deliberately used the word held and that word connotes the existence of a right or title in the holder
They further opined that section 9 does not confer a right on the persons having no title to the land
The settlement contemplated by the section is confined in its application to the case where the building is lawfully held by the person in possession
The learned judges also observed that in enacting s9 the legislature never meant to deprive the citizens of their lawful rights over the lands merely because a trespasser has succeeded in making some construction on it
Section 9 does not mean that if a person has made some construction whatsoever over any land lying within the limits of an estate however wrongful or recent the possession might be that construction must be deemed to have been settled with him by the State Government
The meaning of the word held in s9 again came up before another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Desai and Takru JJ
in Bharat and anr
vs Ch
Khazan Singh  ant1 The learned judges declined to follow the decision in Pheku Chamar s case2
They came to the conclusion that the legislature used a wide language in s9 and it covers the case of buildings belonging to persons who constructed them lawfully or unlawfully
It is unfortunate that the latter
Division Bench should have thought it proper to sit in judgment over the correctness of a decision rendered by a Bench of co ordinate jurisdiction
Judicial propriety requires that if a bench of High Court is unable to agree with the decision already rendered by an other coordinate bench of the same High Court the question should be referred to a larger bench
Otherwise the decisions of High Courts will not only lose respect in the eyes of the public it will also make the task of the sub ordinate courts difficult
The question of law referred to hereinbefore again arose for decision in this case
When this case came up in the second appeal before Sahai J he referred it to a Full Bench in view of the conflict of opinion noticed earlier
The Full Bench was presided over by Dasai CJ who was a party to the decision in Bharat s case1
The other members of the bench were Mukerji and Dwivedi JJ
Mukerji and Dwivedi JJ
agreed with the view taken in Pheku Chamar s case2
Desai CJ in his dissenting judgment did not deal with the meaning of the word held in section 9 but on the other hand opined that the suit should have been dismissed because of the fact that the buildings put up by the respondents were not there on the date of vesting and hence the respondents were not entitled to the benefit of s9
Before considering the meaning of the word held in section 9 it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the lawmakers who are the representatives of the people enact laws 1 AIR 1958 All
2 AIR1953 All 406 which the society considers as honest fair and equitable
The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare
In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on Statutory Constructions the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason
Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation
Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly
ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason in most instances it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law makers
In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent
We are unable to persuade ourselves to believe that the legislature intended to ignore the rights of persons having legal title to possession and wanted to make a gift of any building to a trespasser howsoever recent the trespass might have been if only he happened to be in physical possession of the building on the date of vesting
We are also unable to discern any legislative policy in support of that construction
It was urged before us by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the legislature with a view to put a stop to any controversy as to any rights in or over any building directed that whoever was in physical possession of a building on the date of vesting shall be deemed to be the settle of that building
He further urged that it would have been a hard and laborious
task for the State to investigate into disputed questions relating to title or possession before making the settlement contemplated by section 9 and therefore the legislature cut the Gordian Knot by conferring title on the person who was in possession of the building
We see no merit in this argument
The settlement contemplated by section 9 is a deemed settlement
That settlement took place immediately the vesting took place No inquiry was contemplated before that settlement
If there is any dispute as to who is the settle the same has to be decided by the civil courts
The State is not concerned with the same
Section 9 merely settles the building on the person who was holding it on the date of vesting
It is true that according to the dictionary meaning the word held can mean either a lawful holding or even a holding without any semblance of a right such as holding by a trespasser
But the real question is as to what is the legislative intent Did the legislature intend to settle the concerned building with a person who was lawfully holding or with any person holding lawfully or otherwise Mr Misra contended that there is no justification for us to read into the section the word lawfully before the word held
According to him if the legislature intended 17 that the holding should be a lawful one it would have saidlawfully held
He wanted us to interpret the section as it stands
It is true that the legislature could have used the word lawfully held in place of the word held in section 9 but as mentioned earlier one of the dictionary meanings given to the word held is lawfully held
In Webster s New Twentieth Century Dictionary Second Edition it is stated that in legal parlance the word held means to possess by legal title
In other words the word held is technically understood to mean to possess by legal title
Therefore by interpreting the word held as lawfully held we are not adding any word to the section
We are merely spelling out the meaning of that word
It may further be seen that the section speaks of all buildings  within the limits of an Estate belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person 
The word belonging undoubtedly refers to legal title
The words held by an intermediary also refer to a possession by legal title
The words held by tenant also refer to holding by legal title
In the sequence mentioned above it is proper to construe the word held in section 9 when used in relation to the words other person as meaning lawfully held by that person
That interpretation flows from the context in which the word held has been used
We have earlier mentioned that the said interpretation accords with justice
The expression held has been used in the Act in various other sections see sections 21c 13 17 18 21 144 204 240A 298 304 and 314 to connote possession by legal title
Mr Misra learned Counsel for the appellants does not deny that the expression held in those sections means held lawfully
But according to him that is because of the context in which the word is used
Mr Misra is right in saying so but he overlooks the context in which that expression is used in section 9
We have already made reference to that context
He failed to point out to us any section in the Act leaving aside section 9 for the time being where the word held has been used as meaning mere holding lawful or otherwise
In KK Handique vs The Member Board of Agricultural Income Tax Assam1 this Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the word holds in sections 12 and 13 of  the Assam Agricultural Income Tax Act
Subba Rao J as he then was  speaking for the Court observed that the expression holds includes a two fold idea of the actual possession of a thing and also of being invested with a legal title though some times it is used only to mean actual possession
After reading sections 12 and 13 together he observed that the word holds in those sections means holding by legal title
In Eramma vs Verrupanna  Ors2 this Court considered the meaning of the word 1 AIR 1966 SC 1191
2 1966 2 SCR 626 possessed in section 14 1  of the Hindu Succession Act which laid down that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner
It held that the property possessed by a female widow as contemplated in the section is clearly a property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act
It is true that in arriving at that conclusion the Court took into consideration the language of the provision as a whole and also the explanation to the section
The scheme of the Act is to abolish all Estates and vest the concerned property in the State but at the same time certain rights were conferred on persons in possession of lands or buildings
It is reasonable to think that the persons who were within the contemplation of the Act are those who were in possession of lands or buildings on the basis of some legal title
Bearing in mind the purpose with which the legislation was enacted the scheme of the Act and the language used in section 9 we are of opinion that the word held in section 9 means lawfully held
In other words we accept the correctness of the view taken by Mukerji and Dwivedi JJ
For the reasons already mentioned we are unable to agree with Desai CJ that the fact that the appellants had demolished the buildings put up by the respondents and put up some other building in their place had conferred any rights on them under section 9
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs
GC Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondents being Ryots of the appellants were granted over sixty years ago a village site by the ancestors of the appellants on which they built their residential houses
During the 1947 riots the respondents in order to seek safety fled from the village temporarily and came back in 1949
They found that their residential buildings on the aforesaid site had been demolished and that in their place the appellants had raised a cow shed
The appellants refused to give back possession of the site and building to the respondents whereupon on January 9 1951 the respondents filed a suit for possession
The appellants based their defence on the provisions of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 Act 1 of 1951 which came into force on January 26 1951
According to section 4 of the Act with effect from the notified date ie July 1 1952 all Estates became vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh
The lands and buildings enumerated  in sections 6 and 9 were however settled on the persons who held  them
The contention of the appellants was that they held  the buildings on the relevant date and therefore the buildings were deemed to be settled on them by the State Government
In the Allahabad High Court there was conflict of opinion as to the meaning of the word held  in section 9
In Pheku Chamar s case a Division Bench of the Court held that the word held  in section 9 connotes the existence of a right or title in the holder
However in Bharat s case another Division Bench of the Court declined to follow Phekhu Chamar s case and came to the conclusion that the legislature used wide language in section 9 and it covers the case of buildings belonging to persons who constructed them whether lawfully or unlawfully
When the present case came up in second appeal before the High Court it was referred to a Full Bench
The majority of judges adopted the view taken in Phekhu Chamar s case and decided against the appellants the dissenting judge took the view that since the buildings constructed by the respondents did not exist on the date of vesting they were not entitled to the benefit of section 9
In appeal to this Court by certificate HELD 1 Though in fact the vesting of the Estate and the deemed settlement of some rights in respect of certain classes of lands or buildings included in the Estate took place simultaneously in law the two must be treated as different transactions first there was a vesting of the Estates in the State absolutely and free of all encumbrances
Then followed the deemed settlement by the State of some rights with the persons mentioned in sections 6 and 9
Therefore in law it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those interests not coming within sections 6 or 9
13 B C Rana Sheo Ambar Singh vs Allahabad Bank Ltd Allahabad  and Shivashankar Prasad Shah  Ors
vs Vaikunth Nath Singh  Ors CA No 36866 decided on 3 7 1969 referred to
ii It was unfortunate that the Division Bench in Bharat s case should have thought it proper to sit in judgment over the correctness of a decision rendered by a Bench of co ordinate jurisdiction
Judicial propriety requires that if a bench of a High Court is unable to agree with the decision already rendered by another co ordinate bench of the same High Court the question should be referred to a larger bench
Otherwise the decisions of High Courts will not only lose respect in the eyes of the public it will also make the task of the subordinate courts difficult
15 E iii Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation
Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conception of justice and reason in most instances it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law makers
16 B In the present case it was hard to believe that the legislature in enacting section 9 intended to ignore the rights of persons having legal title to possession and wanted to make a Rift of any building to a trespasser howsoever recent the trespass might have been if only he happened to be in physical possession of the buildings on the date of vesting
It is difficult to discern any legislative policy in support of that construction
16 D According to Webster s New Twentieth Century Dictionary the word held  is technically understood to mean to possess by legal title
Therefore by interpreting the word held  as lawfully held  there was no addition of any word to the section
According to the words of section 9 and in the context of the scheme of the Act it is proper to construe the word held  in the section as lawfully held 
The appellants contention in this regard must be rejected
17 B D Pheku Chamar  Ors
vs Harish Chandra  Ors
AIR 1953 All 406 approved
Bharat and Anr
vs Ch
Khazan Singh  Anr
AIR 1958 All 332 disapproved
KK Handique vs The Member Board of Agricultural Income tax Assam AIR 1966 SC 1191 and Eramma vs V Verrupanna  Ors  applied
iv When the respondents left the village owing to communal disturbances they could not be said to have abandoned their residential buildings
The appellants unlawfully demolished them and entered the land as trespassers
The cow shed they erected on the land was not greater in value than the respondents residential buildings
On equitable considerations it must be held that when the respondents came back to their village in 1949 they were entitled to recover not only the site but also the building constructed on it by the appellants
Hence it should be held that on the date of vesting the respondents were the owners of the building in question for in law they were holding the same
14 A E Question whether if a stranger constructs a building on the land of another the true owner of the land is entitled to recover the land with the building on it left open 14 D 12