LP Civil No 8896 of 1985
From the Judgment and Order dated 1812
1984 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No 5539 of 1983
WITH CMP No 28592 of 1988
488 RF Nariman JP Pathak MB Shivraj and PH Parekh for the Petitioner
TS Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mrs section Dikshit for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAYACHANDRA REDDY J
We have heard both the sides and the matter is being disposed of at the admission stage
This petition is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court confirming the order passed by the Subordinate Judge Nilgiris
The matter arises under the  Act  for short and the facts that give rise to the petition are as follows The testatrix Mary Aline Browne was the wife of Herbet Evander Browne who was the eldest son of one John Browne
The testatrix had a daughter of the name of Zoe Enid Browne and she died on 8101977
The respondent claiming to be the beneficiary to the estate of Mary Aline Browne who died on 2831972 under the terms of a will said to have been exe cuted by her on 123
1962 filed an application for letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed in the Sub Court Nilgiris
The same is numbered as OS No 23 of 1980
Alongwith the application the respondent also filed an affidavit of an attestor of the Will
In that proceeding the petitioner and her deceased husband lodged a caveat on the ground that the said Mary Aline Browne did not execute any will and the will propounded by the respondent was a fictitious and forged one intended to disentitle Zoe Enid Browne daughter of the testatrix from claiming interest in the estate of her mother
The petitioner also claimed that Zoe Enid Browne executed a will dated 2361975 in favour of the petitioner and that she also executed a gift deed in her favour
The petitioner also claimed that she was a trustee of John Browne Trust and that therefore the peti tioner has caveatable interest
Thus they opposed the pro bate of the will
Before the Sub Court several documents were filed
The respondent herein contested the caveat stating that the petitioner herein has no interest in the estate
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the peti tioner is not in any manner related either to Mary Aline Browne or Zoe Enid Browne
The learned Single Judge of the High Court in an elaborate order having considered the rival contentions dismissed the Civil Revision Petition holding that the 489 petitioner cannot claim to be a person who has a caveatable interest in the estate of the deceased testatrix Mary Aline Browne
We are told that the will has subsequently been probated and the letters of Administration have been grant ed
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that both the courts below have erred in holding that the peti tioner has no caveatable interest
It is submitted that the petitioner is executor and legatee of the will dated 2361975 executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne daughter of Mrs Mary Aline Browne and that Miss Zoe has also executed a registered gift deed dated 2931974 in respect of the second item of the estate and that the petitioner was also appointed a trustee of John Browne Trust on 1161975 and therefore in law the petitioner has an interest in the property which is the subject matter of the will and thus have caveatable interest
Under Section 283 of the  the District Judge or District Delegate may if he thinks proper issue citations calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of administration
Section 284 provides for lodging caveat against grant of probate or administration
Section 285 lays down that no proceeding shall be taken on a petition for probate or letters of administration after a caveat against the grant thereof has been entered until the notice has been given to the caveator
Section 286 deals with the power of a District Delegate and lays down that he shall not grant probate or letters of administration in any case in which there is contention as to the grant or in which it otherwise appears to him that probate or letters of administration ought not to be granted in this Court
Under Section 288 where there is contention or where the District Delegate thinks that probate or letters of administration should be refused the documents shall be returned to the applicant
In the instant case the Sub Judge comes within the meaning of the District Delegate and the necessary powers were conferred on him by a notification which is not in dispute
According to the learned counsel the petitioner duly lodged a caveat against the grant of probate and that both the courts below have not properly appreciated the effect of such a contention and erred in striking off the petitioner s caveat
In Nabin Chandra Guha vs Nibaran Chandra Biswas and Ors AIR 1932 Calcutta 734 the Division Bench held that a person who has a real interest in the estate which is or is likely to be prejudicially 490 affected or adversely affected by the will can oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration
In Gourishan kar Chattoraj vs Smt
Satyabati Debi AIR 1931 Calcutta 470 it is held that the petitioner therein who was related to the deceased through a common ancestor can be said to have interest in opposing the application for probate
In Shanti Devi Aggarwalla vs Kusum Kumari Sarkar  Ors  Justice Ranganath Misra as he then was held that the vendor legatee is entitled to enter caveat and the purchaser having stepped into the shoes of vendor is also entitled to enter the caveat
In Narayan Sah vs Smt
Davaki AIR 1978 Patna 220 considering the locus standi of a person to oppose grant it is held that any interest however slight and even a bare possibility of an interest is suffi cient to entitle a person to enter caveat in a probate proceeding
Relying on these decisions the learned counsel urged that the petitioner in the instant case has substantial interest in the estate
The learned counsel for the respond ent did not dispute the legal position
He however con tended that there was absolutely no material before the Courts below to substantiate the alleged interest of the petitioner in the estate
It is submitted that the so called will said to have been executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne daughter of Mrs Mary Aline Browne has not been filed
Likewise the gift deed also was not filed
Coming to the trust of John Browne it is submitted that the trust does not exist and got extinguished
The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that except mentioning these three aspects in a bare manner no other material was placed before the Court
Having gone through both the orders we are reclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respond ent that the petitioner did not establish her caveatable interest
We have perused the entire order of the trial court in this context
Admittedly neither the original nor a copy of the will said to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne was filed
Now coming to the trust it is in the evidence of PW 1 that John Browne Trust has come to an end in March 1972 and the same was not in existence
The trial court has considered both the documentary and oral evidence in this regard and has rightly held that the petitioner has no existing benefit from the trust
Likewise the registered gift deed or a copy of it has not been filed
Before the learned Single Judge of the High Court also same contentions were put forward
The learned Judge observed that from the objections filed by the caveator she desires the Court in the probate proceedings to uphold her title on the strength of a gift deed and the Trust deed
It is observed Equally the petitioner has not placed before the Court 491 the will dated 236
1975 stated to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne to establish that under the will dated 123
1962 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne some interest given to the petitioner under the will dated 2361975 of Zoe Enid Browne is liable to be in any manner affected or otherwise displaced by the grant of letters of administration in respect of the will dated 1231962 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline Browne Accordingly the learned Judge held that the petitioner has not established that she has a caveatable interest justify ing her opposition to the probate proceedings for grant of letters of administration
In this state of affairs we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the petitioner has caveatable interest
Learned counsel however submitted that the will exe cuted by Zoe Enid Browne on 2361975 in favour of the petitioner though not filed but was subsequently probated in the year 1989 and the fact that probate is granted can be taken into consideration by this Court as a subsequent happening as the appeal before this Court is only a re hearing or the continuation of the matter
Reliance is placed on Section 227 of the which reads thus Effect of Probate Probate of a will when granted estab lishes the will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such
 It is submitted that since the will executed by Zoe Enid Browne in favour of the petitioner is probated it must be deemed that it was existing since the death of the testatrix namely Miss Zoe Enid Browne and that validates all interme diary acts
According to the learned counsel the effect of such a probate is that the petitioner s interest in the estate gets established even on the date of entering caveat
We are unable to see any force in this submission
The said probate admittedly took place in a court in the Madras City
We do not know whether the citations were issued to all the persons interested
This probate also admittedly was granted when the special leave petition was pending in this Court yet the respondent had no notice about this probate proceeding
Under these circumstances exercising our juris diction under Article 136 we do not see that it is expedient to acknowledge this probate proceeding and re open the matter
492 Lastly an attempt was made to show that the Sub Court has no jurisdiction but we find that there a necessary notification issued by the High Court conferring powers on the Sub Court
We see no force in any one of these submis sions
The learned counsel however lastly submitted that the petitioner inspite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her right to prove that the alleged will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne is not a genuine one and that it is a fictitious one
We must point out that by granting a probate the court is not deciding the disputes to the title
Even with regard to a probate granted it can be revoked as provided under Section 263 of the in any one of the cases mentioned therein
But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings of the Sub Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable interest will come in the petitioner s way in seeking revocation of the grant of probate
It is needless to say that the findings regarding the caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are relevant only to the extent of grant ing of probate
But they cannot deprive his right if he has any to invoke Section 263 of the and it is upto the petitioner to satisfy the Court
With these observations the special leave petition is dismissed
TNA Petition dismissed


Summary:
The respondents were holding class III civil posts in the Research Laboratories attached to the Ministry of De fence
Under the Central Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules 1965 their appointing authori ty  was the Scientific Adviser
But the appointing authori ty the Scientific Adviser delegated his power of appoint ment to the Director under Proviso to Rule 91
Pursuant to the delegated power
the Director appointed the respondents
Subsequently the Director initiated disciplinary proceed ings against the respondents
Similarly for the respondents in the connected appeals belonging to Group C and D employees of the Railways the competent authority prescribed under the Railway Establish ment Code
to make appointments was the General Manager
But the General Manager delegated his power of appointment to Zonal OfficersDivisional Superintendents
Pursuant to the delegated power the Divisional Superintendents appointed the respondents
Subsequently disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondents by the Divisional Superin tendents
The respondents challenged the disciplinary proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal contending that they were without jurisdiction since the Director and the Divisional Superintending were not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings
The Central Administrative Tribu nal accepted the plea and quashed the proceedings
In appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the respondents i that the Director was not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them and only the Scientific Adviser a higher authority could do so the expression whichever authority is the high 442 est authority in Rule 2a governs only sub clause iv of Rule and this expression seeks to ensure that though the power to appoint may have been delegated under the Proviso to Rule 91 such delegation does not extend to the exer cise of disciplinary powers ii that appointments made by the Scientific Adviser should be treated as appointments made by the Scientific Adviser himself with the result that a subordinate authority could not initiate disciplinary action against the respondent
Also in the connected railway cases it was contended on behalf of the respondents that notwithstanding the delegation of powers of appointment by the General Manag er he being the highest amongst the various appointing authorities was alone competent to institute disciplinary proceedings
On behalf of the appellant Union of India it was contended i that on a proper interpretation of the rules the Director Zonal OfficerDivisional Superintendents were competent to initiate the proceedings and ii that irre spective of the provisions in the rules a person who makes an appointment has always an implied power of suspending or dismissing the appointee under section 16 of the 
Disposing of the appeals this Court HELD 1
The delegation of the power of appointment under the Proviso to rule 91 does not necessarily deprive the disciplinary authority specified in the main part of the rule from exercising the delegated power of appointment in any case or class of cases
459B Godawari section Parulekar vs State of Maharashtra   followed
Ramachandra Rao vs State  Hals bury s Laws of England 4th Edn pare 32 Wade on Adminis trative Law 6th Edn P 365 referred to
King Emperor vs Shibnath Banerjee 72 IA 241 Huth vs Clarke  cited
A proper and harmonious reading of rules 2a and rule 9 shows that sub rule a of rule 2 only envisages the authority to whom the power of appointment has been delegat ed under rule 9 and not both the delegator and the delega tee
Rule 2a directs the ascertainment of the authorities specified in such of clauses i to iv of the rule as may be applicable to a particular case and designates the high est of them as the appointing authority 
It envisages only one authority as failing under each of these clauses and not more
An inter pretation of clause 443 i or ii as contemplating more than one authority runs counter to the tenor of the rule
The said rule does not contemplate any authority other than the one empowered to appoint a person belonging to the post or grade which the concerned government employees holds
In that sense the two parts of clause i and clause ii are not to be read disjunctively to ascertain the authority empowered to make appointments a to the service b to the grade and c to the post and consider the highest of them
One has to re strict oneself to the post or grade of the government serv ant concerned and invoke clause i or ii as the case may be
459F H 460C D Dharma Dey vs Union of India   Om Prakash Gupta vs Union of India AIR 1975 SC 1265 explained and held inapplicable
Murishwar vs Union  Union vs Choud hary  Choudhary vs Union  cited
21 In Rule 2a not only do the words whichever is the highest authority occur in the Rules separately from the four sub clauses but the terms thereof also clearly envisage a determination of one who among several authori ties is the highest
It therefore clearly means that the authorities  falling under the definition in sub clauses i to iv have to be ascertained and the highest among them taken as the disciplinary authority for purposes of rule 122b
449B 3
The appointing authority under the Schedule is a high ranking authority and in an organisation like the Railways for instance it will be virtually impossible for him to consider each and every case of appointment of or disciplinary action against all the Class III or Class IV employees in the organisation
It is indeed this realisation that has rendered necessary a delegation of the power of appointment and cannot be ignored in the absence of compel ling reasons in the matter of disciplinary powers
461C D 4
In the context of rules 2a and 122 which outline a contrast between the person who is empowered to appoint and the person who actually appoints it is impossible to treat the Scientific AdviserGeneral Manager as the person who appointed the respondents
456H 457A Roop Chand vs State 1963 Supp 1 SCR 539 held inapplicable
444 B Daniel  Ors
vs Union of India  referred to
41 A delegation of power does not enhance or improve the hierarchical status of the delegate
456G Krishna Kumar vs Electrical Engineer Central Railway  Ors  referred to
It is doubtful how far in the context of the service rules which make a clear distinction between the power to appoint and the power to take disciplinary proceedings the latter can be said to be adjunct or ancillary to the former
457D E Daluram Pannalal Modi vs Commissioner 1964 2 SCR 286 held inapplicable
Section 16 of the confers on the factual appointing authority in terms only a power to suspend or dismiss and not a power to conduct disciplinary proceedings or impose the various other kinds of penalties envisaged in the rules
To say that the latter power also comes within section 16 one would need to make a further assump tion that the power to suspend or dismiss is a more compre hensive power which would include the power to impose small er penalties too and this assumption is said to run counter to the rules which deal with the two powers separately
The said section applies only unless a different intention appears
It applies only where a general power of appoint ment is conferred under an Act or Regulation
Here the Act or Regulation ie the Rules envisage the power of appoint ment conferred by them on certain authorities being delegat ed
The power conferred on the delegatees is circumscribed by the instrument of such delegation and cannot be extended beyond its ambit
454B E Heckett Engineering Co vs Workmen   Gafoor Mia and Ors
vs Director DMRL  referred to
The dismissal in limine of the Special Leave Petition cannot preclude the Tribunal or Court from considering the issue in the appeals on merits452H 453A