149 and 167 of 1950
758 Application under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus I Bawa Shiv Charan Singh for the petitioner in petition No 149
Bindra for the petitioner in Petition No 167
BK Khanna Advocate General of the Punjab for the respondent in both the petitions
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India for the Union of India Intervener in Petition No 149
February 23
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J
The earlier of the two petitions has been filed by one Ujagar Singh under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of habeas corpus and for an order of release from detention
The latter petition is a similar one by one Jagiit Singh
In both the petitions the respondent is the State of Punjab
The orders of deten tion were made under the preventive Detention Act IV of 1950
The petitions are not connected with each other except that they raise the same grounds
In petition No 149 of 1950 Ujagar Singh was originally arrested and detained under the East punjab Public Safety Act on 29th September 1948He was released on 28th March 1949 but on the same date there was an internment order against him
On 29th September 1949 he was rearrested
On 2nd March 1950 an order of detention under the  was served on him and on 3rd April 1950 he was served with the grounds of detention dated 11th March 1950
Both in September 1949 and in March 1950 the ground alleged was  You tried to create public disor der amongst tenants in Una Tehsil by circulating and dis tributing objectionable literature issued by underground communists
 Additional grounds were furnished in July 1950
In petition No 167 of 1950 Jagjit Singh was arrested on 24th July 1948
under the provisions of the 759 Punjab Safety Act 1947
After the East Punjab Public Safety Act 1949 came into force a fresh detention order dated 14th May 1949 was served on him and he continued to be kept in jail
Grounds of detention were given to him on 7th September 1949
A fresh order of detention under the Pre ventive Detention Act IV of 1950 dated 2nd March 1950 was served on 7th March 1950
Grounds of detention dated 11th March 1950 were served on him on 3rd April 1950
Both in September 1949 and April 1950 the same ground was given ie In pursuance of the policy of the Communist Party you were engaged in preparing the masses for violent revolutionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to give effect to this programme
 Additional or supplementary grounds were served on 5th August 1950
Several contentions were advanced on behalf of the petitioners challenging the legality of their detention and urging that as the detention was unlawful and the petition ers  fundamental right of personal liberty had been in fringed they should be set at liberty
The points taken on their behalf can be briefly summarised as follows_ As the ground of detention now mentioned was the same as the ground specified in 1948 or 1949 ie months earlier under the Provincial Acts the order of detention was made mechanical ly and was really mala fide in the sense that there is nothing to show that were was any fresh satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority that detention was necessary in the interests of public order
Secondly the grounds were not given as soon as may be which is required under section 7 of the Act and as an unusually long period of time elapsed between the order of detention and the giving of the grounds the detention must be held to be unlawful after the lapse of a reasonable time
Thirdly the grounds given originally were so vague that they could not be said to be grounds at all such as would enable the detenu to make any representation against the order
Fourthly supplemen tary grounds could not be furnished and should not be taken into account in considering whether the 760 original order was lawful or whether the detention became unlawful after a particular period of time
Two other points of a subsidiary nature were also raised namely that the order was bad as the period of detention was not specified therein as appears to be required by section 12 and that the grounds given did not purport to state that the authority making the order was the Governor of the State
There is no substance in the last two points
Section 12 of the Act does not require that the period of detention should be specified in the order itself where the detention is with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
The section itself provides that he can be detained without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period longer than three months but not exceeding one year from the date of detention
Normally the detention period shall not exceed three months unless an Advisory Board reports before the expiration of the said period that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention
See arti cle 22 clause 4 sub clause a of the Constitution
Under sub clause 7 a of the same article Parliament may by law prescrib the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law provid ing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub clause a of clause 4
 Therefore detention for more than three months can be justified either on the ground of an opinion of the Advisory Board sanctioning or warrant ing longer detention or on the ground that the detention is to secure the due maintenance of public order in which case it cannot exceed one year in any event as stated
in sec tion 12 of the 
It is thus clear that the period is not to exceed three months generally but may go up to one year in certain special cases
In view of these provisions the non specification of any definite period 761 in the detention order is not a material omission rendering the order itself invalid
Under section 3 of the  the authority to make the order is the State Government
Sec tion 166 1 of the Constitution provides that all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor
The orders of deten tion expressly state that the Governor of Punjab was satis fied of their necessity and that they were made by his order
The orders are signed no doubt by the Home Secre tary but this is no defect
The communication of the grounds need not be made directly by the authority making the order
Section 7 does not require this
The communica tion may be through recognized channels prescribed by the administrative rules of business
Let us now turn our attention to the main contentions
There is nothing strange or surprising in the fact that the same grounds have been repeated after the lapse of several months in both the cases when it is remembered that the petitioners were under detention and in jail during the whole of the intervening period
No fresh activities could be attributed to them
There could only be a repetition of the original ground or grounds whether good or bad
It does not follow from this that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was purely mechanical and that the mind did not go with the pen
The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account when making a detention order and as a matter of fact it is largely from prior events showing the tendencies or inclinations of the man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
If the authority satisfied himself that the original ground was still available and that there was need for detention on its basis no mala fides can be attributed to the authority from this fact alone
The Act does not fix the time within which the grounds should be furnished to the person detained
762 It merely states that the communication must be as soon as may be
This means reasonable despatch and what is reasona ble must depend on the facts of each case
No arbitrary time limit can be set down
The delays in the communication of the grounds in the two petitions have been adequately explained by the Home Secretary who says in this affidavits that grounds had to be supplied to nearly 250 detenus and that the printing of the necessary forms occupied some time
According to him he made an order even on 11 3 1950 for the supply of the grounds
The extreme vagueness of the grounds is alone left as the chief line of attack
As stated already the original ground communicated in Petition No 149 of 1950 is to create public disorder amongst tenants in the Tehsil by circulating and distributing objectionable literature issued by underground communists
 In the other petition the ground is In pursuance of the policy of the Communist Party you were engaged in preparing the masses for violent revolu tionary campaign and attended secret party meetings to give effect to this programme
 We shall leave aside for the moment the supplementary grounds furnished later
There can be little doubt that in both the cases the grounds furnished in the first instance were highly vague
If we had only Iswar Das s case to go by Petition No 30 of 1950 such vagueness by itself would constitute a justifica tion for release of the petitioners
Since the date of that decision however
this Court had to consider the question at great length in two cases from Bombay and Calcutta re spectively Cases Nos 22 and 24 of 1950 where the subject of the meaning and scope of section 7 of the and article 22 sub clauses 5 and 6of the Constitution of India
came up for elaborate consideration
The said cases were decided on 25th January 1951 and we are now governed by the principles laid down in these judg ments
It was held by a majority of the Judges in Case No 22 of 1950 1 State of Bombay vs Atmaram Sridhar Vaidya 1951 SCR 167
763 a that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself and without leading to an inference of mala fides or lack of good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of law for the necessity of making  the order inasmuch as the ground or grounds on which the order of detention was made is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or of the detaining authority b that there is nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time so that he may have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order what is reasonable time being dependent on the facts of each case c that failure to furnish grounds with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportunity against the detention order can be considered by a court of law as an
invasion of a fundamen tal right or safeguard guaranteed by the Constitution viz being given the earliest opportunity to make a representa tionand d that no new grounds could be supplied to strengthen or fortify the original order of detention
We are not concerned so much with the earlier history of the detenus as with what happened to them under the Preven tive Detention Act 1950
OverloOking the fact that the ground mentioned In March 1950 was the same as that given in September 1949 and condoning the vagueness in the original ground furnished in both the cases to support the making Of the order it is impossible to justify the delay of nearly four months in furnishing what have been called additional or supplementary grounds Let us take up Petition No 149 first
In the grounds furnished in July 1950 there are several which do not apparently relate to the original ground
You were respon sible for hartal by labourers working on Bhalera Dam in October 1947 You instigated labourers working in Nangal in 1948 to go on strike to secure the acceptance of their demands After release you absconded yourself from your village and 99 764 remained untraced for a considerable period  When you were re arrested on 29 9 1949 lot of objectionable communist literature was recovered from your personal search are instances of new grounds and they have to be eliminated therefore from consideration
In Jagjit Singh s petition No 167 of 1950 the supplemental grounds which are as many as ten in number are dated 31 7 1950 but they were served on him on 5 8 1950 that is two days after he had prepared his petition to this court under article 32 of the Constitution
The grounds may be taken as particulars of the general allegation made against him on 3 4 1950 when the original grounds of detention were served
But the time factor to enable him to make a representation at the earliest opportunity was not borne in mind or adhered to
In the affidavit of Shri Vishan Bhagwan Home Secretary to the Punjab Government dated 6th September 1950 no explanation has been offered for this abnormal delay in the specification of the particulars
This delay is very unfor tunate indeed
But for its occurrence the petitioner would not have been able to urge that one of the valuable rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution has been violated
It is not alleged by the Home Secretary that the detenu was furnished with these particulars when he was arrested and detained under the Provincial Act and that consequently it was considered unnecessary to give him the same particu lars once over
On the other hand the detenu s complaint has throughout been that he was given no particulars at all till the 5th August 1950
As the petitioners were given only vague grounds which were not particularised or made specific so as to afford them the earliest opportunity of making representations against their detention orders and their having been inex cusable delay in acquainting them with particulars of what was alleged
the petitioners have to be released the rules being made absolute
Ordered accordingly
765 PATANJALI SASTRI J
I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother Chandrasekhara Aiyar J DAS J
In view of the majority decision in Case No 22 of 1950 The State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Acharya I concur in the order proposed by my learned brother
Order accordingly
Petition No 194 of 1950 Agent for the petitioner RR Biswas
Agent for the intervener PA Mehta
Petition No 167 of 1950 Agent for the petition RS Narula


Summary:
Non specification of any definite period in a detention order made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950 is not a material omission rendering the order invalid in view of the provisions contained in clauses 4 a and 7 a of article 22 the Constitution and section 12 of the Act
An order of detention which expressly states that the Government of the State concerned was satisfied of the necessity of 757 making such an order and that it was made by the order of the Governor is not defective merely because it is signed by Home Secretary
Communication of the grounds of the order need not be made directly by the authority making the order but may be made through recognized channels prescribed by the adminis trative rules of business
The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account in making a detention order and as a matter of fact it is largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
If the authority making an order is satisfied that the ground on which the detenue was detained on a former occasion is still available and that there was need for detention on its basis no mala fides can be attributed to the authority from the fact that the ground alleged for the second detention is the same as that of the first detention
Whether grounds have been communicated as soon as may be must depend on the facts of each case
No arbitrary time limit can be laid down
The recent rulings of the Supreme Court establish a that mere vagueness of grounds standing by itself and with out leading to an inference of mala fides or lack of good faith is not a justiciable issue in a court of law for the necessity of making the order inasmuch as the ground or grounds on which the order of detention was made is a matter for the subjective satisfaction of the Government or of the detaining authority b that there is nothing in the Act to prevent particulars of the grounds being furnished to the detenu within a reasonable time so that he may have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention order what is reasonable time being dependent on the facts of each case c that failure to furnish grounds with the speedy addition of such particulars as would enable the detenu to make a representation at the earliest opportu nity against the detention order can be considered by a court of law as an invasion of a fundamental right or safe guard guaranteed by the Constitution viz being given the earliest opportunity to make a representation and d that no new grounds could be supplied to strengthen or fortify the original order of detention
Where the petitioners against whom detention orders were made were given only vague grounds and there was inex cusable delay of nearly 4 months in acquainting them of the particulars held that their detention was illegal and they should be released