Civil Appeal No 1155 of 1971
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17 11 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No 17861
section C Manchanda Sadhu Singh R N Kapoor Mrs Nirmala Gupta Uzzal Singh and J M Khanna for the appellant
Gobind Das P P Rao Girish Chandra and section P Nayar for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG J
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court given by it on 17th November 1969 dismissing a plaintiff s first appeal arising out of an original suit for a declaration that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income tax Lucknow on 2nd April 1956 reducing the appellant in rank from the post of an Income tax Officer to that of an Income tax Inspector was void and inoperative
It appears that the appellant was in service upto 30th April 1958 when he was prematurely retired
The appellant also claimed Rs 20904 as arrears of salary but he reduced this claim to Rs 1656129
The appellant was originally appointed on 22nd November 1922 as Lower Division Clerk and thereafter promoted as Income tax Inspector in 1942
He was promoted to the post of Income tax Officer in 1945
His case was that he had worked to the entire satisfaction of his immediate superior officers and higher authorities and had earned a number of certificates highly appreciative of his work
He was confirmed early in 1952 as an Income tax Officer
He was however placed under suspension on 30th September 1953 by the Commissioner of Income Tax UP Lucknow on the basis of a preliminary enquiry on allegations involving corruption and violation of service rules
582 Charges were framed on 30th December 1953 by Shri A K Bose Deputy Director of Investigations who was appointed by the Commissioner of Income tax as the Inquiring Officer
The preliminary enquiry had been conducted by Shri G section Srivastava Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income tax Meerut
That first charge was that the appellant had entered into partnership with others under the name of Gautam Cycle Mart Meerut in 1939 in contravention of the Government Servants  Conduct Rules
The second charge was that he had made various investments in the name of various members of his family far in excess of and disproportionate to the known sources of his income
His high standard of living and expenditure were also mentioned there
The third and the last charge gave particulars of thirteen assessment cases in which the appellant was alleged to be either grossly negligent careless inefficient andor corrupt in the performance of his duties as Income tax Officer
The appellant s defences included alleged confused nature of charges characterized by him as vague over lapping intermingled and wrongly joined together
He also pleaded that there had been an enquiry in 1949 by Shri A R Sachdeva Asstt
Inspecting Commissioner into some of the matters mentioned in the charges and about others in 1952 by Shri R N Srivastava another Inspecting Commissioner and that the appellant had been exonerated of the allegations and imputations made against him on each occasion
One of his defences was that a fresh enquiry into the same charges was not permissible under the Departmental rules and was also barred by rules of natural justice
He also complained of failure to give him opportunity to produce nine witnesses in his defence with some documents
It is evident that the questions raised by the appellant depended on findings of fact
All relevant facts had been examined by the officer who held the enquiry and by the punishing authority
No malafides against either the Inquiring Officer Shri A K Bose Deputy Director Investigation or against the punishing authority was alleged
There are however suggestions that Shri G section Srivastava and Shri R N Srivastava Inspecting Assistant Commissioners were pursuing the appellant for some unknown reason which we do not find stated anywhere
We fail to see how these two officers who neither conducted the actual departmental trial nor could have any influence over the punishing authority could cause any miscarriage of justice or do anything to vitiate the departmental trial merely because they held preliminary inquiries before framing charges
The defence of the appellant seemed something similar to the much too common a defence of the accused in criminal trials attributing all their misfortunes to the hostility of the police
583 The question whether the appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard or not is largely a question of fact
It is only when an opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial
Prejudice to the government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved
The plea that the appellant has been subjected to trial on allegations which had been the subject matter of previous enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of any previous enquiry
Therefore the two authorities cited The State of Assam  Anr
vs J N Roy Biswas and R T Rangachari vs Secretary of State do not help the appellant
If an inquiry is held at a particular stage possibly to determine whether regular proceedings should be drawn up or started it does not debar a departmental trial
That was the nature of the previous enquiries
It appears that it is only after the appellant s activities had become more notorious that further enquiry was undertaken and regular charges framed
It is possible that the appellant may have been emboldened by the failure of officers to report earlier that charges should be framed and tried
In any case this could not stand in the way of the first regular enquiry in the course of which charges were actually framed and fully enquired into by Officers whose integrity and sense of justice is not challenged
As for the denial of the opportunity to produce nine witnesses in defence all that is suggested is that these witnesses could only state what opinions they had formed about the work efficiency and integrity of the appellant
They could not say anything about the particular instances which formed the subject matter of the charges against the appellant
It is not uncommon for astute Govt
servants facing such enquiries to give long lists of witnesses and documents so as to either prolong an enquiry or to prepare grounds for future litigation
Unless the exclusion of evidence is of a kind which amounts to a denial of natural justice or would have affected the final decision it could not be material
In the case before us it has not even been shown how the witnesses whose production was said to have been disallowed could help the appellant s case on specific charges
Indeed we do not know whether any evidence which the appellant tried to produce was really wrongly excluded and at what stage and for what reasons
All these are questions of fact which should be initially raised in the departmental trial
After that if there was any patent error a writ petition lay
Finally the 584 trial Court and the High Court had considered at some length all relevant questions raised
Learned Counsel for the appellant has handed over a very carefully and laboriously prepared statement of facts of the case to show us that the evidence did not support the charges levelled against the appellant
It was also submitted that apart from the charges relating to partnership in the Gautam Cycle Mart no other charge was found substantiated
Furthermore it was submitted that after the inquiring officer had found that the Gautam Cycle Mart was started in 1942 and not in 1939 the appellant should have been given a further opportunity to meet a new case
No rule was cited in support of such a technical objection to the nature of the charge which would cover the starting of the Gautam Cycle Mart at any time subsequent to 1939 also
In any case it was for the appellant to satisfy the Departmental authorities which had looked into the case upto its final stages that he had suffered some injustice which to be set right
He had been given a second opportunity by the punishing authority before it inflicted the punishment of demotion
Nothing further was required by law
And it was probably because the appellant was absolved of charges involving corruption in the discharge of his duties that he was given the lesser punishment of demotion and neither dismissed nor removed from service
A suit challenging the validity of departmental proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings in the departmental proceedings or the punishment inflicted upon the Govt
servant even if these are erroneous
A question which could effect the result in a civil suit has to be of such nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction and the conduct of the department trial and vitiates the result
It is only if the departmental proceeding in null and void that a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain the relief he had asked
We are unable to see what point had been raised by the appellant which could have had that effect upon the departmental proceedings
In Smt
Ujjam Bai vs State of  Anr
 this Court said at P 835 A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry
But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required ie has jurisdiction to determine
After citing a passage from Halsbury s Laws of England 3rd Edn
11 page 59 this Court held at p 836 585 The characteristic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that it binds whether it be right or wrong
An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi judicial body cannot in general be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a mauer on which the jurisdiction of that body depends
These princi ples govern not onnly the findings of inferior courts stricto strictio also the findings of administrative bodies which are deemed be acting in a judicial capacity
Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction and provided that they keep within those limits their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal
Learned Counsel for the appellant said all that could possibly be said on behalf of his client
He pointed out that the High Court had given its judgment eight months after it had heerad argumenst
He urged that the result was that the High Court did not deal with a number of submissions made because they had apparently been forgotten
The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and the delivery of a judgment
Nevertheless we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted
It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers importan may have escaped notice
But what is more important is the litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation
This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments
Justice as we have often observed must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done
On 4th March 1971 however the High Court refusing the certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court observed that questions had been attempted to be raised before it in asking for certification which had not been argued at the time when the first appeal was heard by the High Court
We find that one of the learned Judges who dismissed the application for a certificate of fitness of the case had also heard the arguments in the first appeal
There is no affidavit before us that any particular points argued before the Division Bench had not been referred to or dealt with by the Bench
Moreover the Division Bench had probably not dealt with all arguments on questions of fact because it did not consider it necessary to do so
After all it was not hearing an appeal against the findings of the departmental authorities
It pointed this out
Furthermore after hearing the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant we are ourselves unable to see any point which could be raised on behalf of the appellant capable of vitiating the departmental proceedings
Unless such a point could be raised there could be no declaration that the departmental proceedings were null and void
There is also an application before us for revocation of grant of special leave to appeal by this Court on the ground that some material 586 facts were suppressed or misrepresented for the purpose of obtaining special leave
Although the special leave petition does not state that all the points sought to be raised by it were not argued before the Division Bench this is not enough to merit cancellation of the special leave to appeal which was granted by this Court
At the time of grant of special leave the order refusing grant of certificate of fitness of the case for appeal to this Court must have been before this Court
We are unable now to see the point on which special leave was granted
But that too would not by itself merit a revocation of special leave at this stage after hearing arguments
We therefore dismiss both the appeal and the application for revocation of special leave
Parties will bear their own costs
PBR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
After holding a departmental enquiry on certain charges of contravention of Government Servants  Conduct Rules the appellant was reduced in rank
His suit for a declaration that the impugned action was void and inoperative was dismissed
The High Court dismissed his appeal
On appeal it was contended that the departmental enquiry was vitiated on account of material irregularities and that as a result of excessive delay between the date of hearing and delivery of judgment by the High Court it did not deal with a number of submissions made by him and thereby caused prejudice
Dismissing the appeal to this Court  HELD 1a The question whether the appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and was sufficiently heard or hot is largely a question of fact
It is only when an opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial contravenes mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial
Prejudice to the Government servant from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved583C b The plea that the appellant had been subjected to trial on allegations which had been the subject matter of previous enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of any previous enquiry
If an enquiry was held at a particular stage possibly to determine whether regular proceedings should be drawn up or started it did not debar a departmental trial
583D State of Assam  Anr
vs J N Roy Biswas  and R T Rangachari vs Secretary of State AIR 1937 PC 27 held inapplicable
c It was not shown whether any evidence which the appellant tried to produce was really wrongly excluded and at what stage and for what reasons
All these are questions of fact which should be raised in the departmental trial
After that if there was any patent error a writ petition lay
584A d A suit challenging a departmental proceeding cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings in those proceedings or against a punishment inflicted upon the Government servant even if these were erroneous
A question which could affect the result in a civil suit has to be of such a nature that it goes to the root of the jurisdiction that the conduct of the departmental trial illegally and vitiates the result
It is only if the departmental proceeding is null and void that a plaintiff could obtain the reliefs he had asked for
584E F Smt
Ujjam Bai vs State of UP  Anr
1963 1 SCR 778  835 836 referred to
e Unless a point could be raised on behalf of an appellant which is capable of vitiating the departmental proceedings there could be no declaration that the departmental proceedings were null and void
585H 581 2 The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period between the hearing of arguments and the delivery of a judgment
Nevertheless an unreasonable delay between the hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances is highly undesirable even when written arguments were submitted
It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considered important might have escaped notice
But what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation
This confidence tends to be shaken if there excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments