vil Appeal No 3 108 of 1989
From the Judgment and Order dated 27186 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in RSA No 1510 of 1977
Harbans Lal and Ashok K Mahajan for the Appellant
Jitender Sharma for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
We grant leave in the Special Leave Peri 612 tion and proceed to dispose of the appeal on the merits after hearing both sides
The appellant is the successor in interest of the mort gagor of the suit property
The suit property was mortgaged on 225
In the normal course the suit for redemption should have been filed on or before 225
1946 the limita tion for such a suit being 60 years under the Limitation Act 1908
The appellant however filed the suit for re demption only on 2812
He sought to meet the plea of limitation by urging that the son of the original mortgagee while selling the property on 11119 13 had specifically acknowledged the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property
It was claimed that this acknowledgment constitut ed a fresh starting point for computing the period of limi tation
If the plea of the mortgagor were right and the Limita tion Act 1908 had continued to be operative the suit for redemption could have been filed on or before the 1st of November 1973
However in the meantime the replaced the of 1908
The period of limitation for a suit for redemption was reduced under the new Act to 30 years
Section 30 of the Act however provid ed as follows section 30
Provision for suits etc for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act 1908
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act a any suit for which the period of limita tion is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act 1908 may be instituted within a period of seven years next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act 1908 whichever period expires earlier By virtue of this provision the suit for redemption could have been filed if the appellant s plea that the sale deed dated 1111913 constituted a fresh starting point for computation of the period of limitation is accepted on or before the 1st of January 1971 having regard to the fact that the came into force on 111964
613 The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the sale deed of 11119 13 contained an acknowl edgement by the original mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption on the part of the mortgagor as on the date of the sale deed viz 11119 13
The sale deed contained the following recitals Now I of my own accord have sold all my mortgagee rights along with the original mortgage consideration and interest which according to the terms of the aforesaid mort gage deed has accrued and is payable to the instant vendor  
The rights and interest regarding recovery of original mort gage money and interest according to mortgage deeds executed by Jangi Khan original mortga gor deceased and redemption of the mortgaged land which hence to fore vested in the instant vendor stand vested in the purchaser   underlining by us On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that the words extracted above clearly contained a specific acknowl edgement by the mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemp tion in the mortgagor
On the other hand
for the respond ents it is contended and this contention was accepted by the High Court that the recitals mentioned above do not serve as an acknowledgment
The High Court observed The mortgagee Mool Raj gave the description of the mortgage only with a view to showing his status but nowhere did he acknowledge his liability for redemption of the mortgage
According to the recital in the deed whatever rights as a mortgagee he had in the suit land were transferred to the vendee
There was nothing more than this
The right of the mortgagor to redeem the land and his liabili ty to redeem the same was nowhere acknowl edged
 The respondents strongly rely on this finding and also rely on the decision of this court in Tilak Ram vs Nathu AIR 1967 SC 935
We are of the opinion that the High Court erred in accepting the above contention
It is true as pointed out in Tilak Ram vs Nathu that the period of limitation cannot be extended by a mere passing recital regarding the factum of the mortgage but that the statement on which the plea of an acknowledgement is based must relate to a subsisting liability
The words used must indicate the jural relation ship between 614 the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made with the intention of admitting such jural relation ship
But in our opinion the recitals in the sale deed on 1111913 fulfil_ the above requirements
The fact of Nanak Chand having obtained a mortgage with possession had already been recited in an earlier part of the sale deed
The pass sages in the sale deed which have been extracted by us above contain two specific recitals
The first is that the original consideration and interest under had accrued and Was payable to the instant vendor
 These words acknowledge that the mortgage had not been redeemed and that the mort gage moneys remained outstanding to the mortgagee From the mortgagor as on the  date of the sale deed
The second recital is even more specific
It says that what stands transferred to the purchaser is not only the fight of the mortgagee for recovering the principal amounts and interest according to the mortgage deed which as earlier stated still remained outstanding but also the rights and inter est regarding the redemption of the mortgaged land
These words are of course a little inappropriate because the right of redemption is in the mortgagor and not in the mortgagee
But read as a whole the second sentence we have quoted here from the sale deed clearly manifests an inten tion on the part of the mortgagee to acknowledge that his right to recover the moneys under the mortgage deed as well as his liability to have the property redeemed by the mort gagor in the event of his paying off the moneys due under the instrument both stand vested in the purchaser
We are of the opinion that it is not correct to treat the recitals in the document as a mere narration of the previous mortgage that had been created on the property
The words spell out a clear intention that the moneys due under the mortgage still remained unpaid and also that the mortgagor had a subsisting right of redemption which he could enforce against the mortgagee
In this view of the matter the contention on behalf of the appellant that the recitals in the document of 1111913 constituted an acknowledgement of liability for redemption within the meaning of section 19 of the Limita tion Act deserves to be accepted
On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that even if the above position is accepted the suit should have been filed on or before 141971 but that it was actually insti tuted only on 1841973
Our attention is drawn to the cause title of the suit in the trial court where the suit is described as Case Civil Suit No 204 of 1973 and the date of institution is set out as 281219681841973
It is sub mitted that perhaps the suit had been flied on 28121968 with defects and that the defects had been rectified subse quently so that the suit can be properly said to have been instituted only on 1841973
It has been numbered 615 only as a suit of 1973
It is therefore contended that in any event the suit was barred by limitation being beyond 141971
This contention is without force
This point does not appear to have been specifically taken either in the trial court or in the first appellate court
On the other hand in the trial court the plaintiff had adverted to the provisions of the Limitation Act and the position that the suit should have been filed within 7 years of the applica tion of the new Act and urged that the suit was within time
This contention was accepted by the trial court
It could not have been so accepted if the suit had in fact been instituted Only in 1973 as at present submitted
That apart the High Court in the course of its judgment has pointed out that the present suit had been filed on 28th of December 1968
In this state of the record we have to proceed on the basis that the suit had been filed on 28th of December 1968 and therefore hold for the reasons stated earlier it had been filed in time
For the reasons above mentioned we set aside the order of the High Court confirming the order of the Additional District Judge and restore the decree for redemption passed by the trial court
We would only like to clarify that there were two mortgage deeds the redemption of which had been sought by the plaintiff in the suit
We are concerned in this appeal only with the property mortgaged under the deed of mortgage dated 2251986 by Jangi Khan in favour of Nanak Chand and sold on 1111913 by Mool Raj son of Nanak Chand to the predecessor in interest of the present respondent
The concurrent findings of the three courts in respect of the other mortgage are not in any way disturbed by our judgment
The appeal therefore stands allowed and the appellant will be entitled to his costs
RSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant plaintiff sued for declaration that inclu sion of the disputed property in the land records of the respondent Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested under the provisions of the Delhi Land and Reforms Act 1954 was wrong void and without jurisdiction and for a further declaration that she was entitled to bhumidhari rights in the property under section 11 of the Act
In paragraph 4d of the plaint it was pleaded that the suit land was not land  and was not banjar waste and did not come within section 1541i to vii of the Act and therefore there was no vesting in law
The proprietor according to the plaintiff grew fuel wood and partly used the property as ghatwars and used the stones for building purposes
The suit was decreed in the trial court and the said decree was affirmed in appeal but at the instance of the respondent defendant No Gaon Sabha the High Court in second appeal reversed the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the suit
The High Court found that the property came within the definition of land  and therefore was subjected to the legal incidence of the statutory provisions
In regard to the relief of bhumidhari rights it held that the plain tiffs  suit was not maintainable
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD The definition of land  in section 313 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 is wide
A land on which fuel wood is grown would 592 constitute groveland
In view of the inclusive definition of land  the finding of the High Court that the dispute property constituted land cannot be said to be wrong
594C D Nemi Chand vs Financial Commissioner Punjab  Anr  Rajinder Prashad  Anr
vs The Punjab State  Ors AIR 1966 53 Punjab 185 Munshi Ram  Ors
vs Financial Commissioner Haryana  Ors
   Haiti vs Sunder Singh  referred to
It is impermissible to rely on definitions containing meanings different from the definition under the Delhi Land Reforms Act 1954 for a proper resolution of the dispute
595A The High Court therefore came to the correct conclu sion when it held that the disputed property Constituted land  under the Act and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act
595B