78 and 79 of 1950
Application under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus
GN Joshi for the petitioners
SM Sikri for the respondent
November 8
The judgment 0 the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J
These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 1 g of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar State of Madhya Pradesh
It is contended that the law in force in the State authorizing it to prohib it the manufacture of bidis in certain villages including the one 761 wherein the applicants reside is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is conse quently void
The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufac ture of Bidis Agricultural Purposes Act LXIV of 1948 was passed on 19th October 1948 and was the law in force in the State at the commencement of the Constitution
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are in these terms  3
The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural season with respect to such villages as may be specified therein
1 The Deputy Commissioner may by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season
2 No person residing in a village specified in such order shall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis
 On the 13th June 1950 an order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engag ing in the manufacture of bidis
On the 19th June 1950 these two petitions were presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order as it prejudicially affected the petitioners  right of freedom of occupation and business
During the pendency of the petitions the season mentioned in the order of the 13th June ran out
A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season 8th October to 18th November 1950 was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms
This order was also challenged in a supplementary petition
Article 19 1 g runs as follows  All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or busi ness
 762 The article guarantees freedom of occupation and busi ness
The freedom guaranteed herein is however subject to the limitations imposed by clause 6 of article 19
That clause is in these terms  Nothing in sub clause g of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevent the State from making any law imposing in the interests of the general public reasonable restric tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause and in particular nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any pro fession or carrying on any occupation trade or business
 The point for consideration in these applications is whether the Central Provinces and Berar Act LXIV of 1948 comes within the ambit of this saving clause or is in excess of its provisions
The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Act does not impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public but totally negatives it
In order to judge the validity of this contention it is neces sary to examine the impugned Act and some of its provisions
In the preamble to the Act it is stated that it has been enacted to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas
Sections 3 and 4 cited above empower the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season
The contravention of any of these provisions is made punishable by section 7 of the Act the penalty being imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both
It was enacted to help in the grow more food campaign and for the purpose of bring ing under the plough considerable areas of fallow land
The question for decision is whether the statute under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily 763 interferes with private business and imposes unreasonable and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon lawful occupation in other words whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in article 19 1 g of the Constitution
Unless it is shown that there is a reason able relation of the provisions of the Act to the purpose in view the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it
The phrase reasonable restriction connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the public
The word reasonable implies intelligent care and deliberation that is the choice of a course which reason dictates
Legisla tion which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19 1 g and the social control permitted by clause 6 of article 19 it must be held to be wanting in that quality
Clause 6 in the concluding paragraph particularizes certain instances of the nature of the restrictions that were in the mind of the constitution makers and which have the quality of reasonableness
They afford a guide to the interpretation of the clause and illustrate the extent and nature of the restrictions which according to the statute could be imposed on the freedom guaranteed in clause g
The statute in substance and effect suspends altogether the right mentioned in article 19 1 g during the agri cultural seasons and such suspension may lead to such dislocation of the industry as to prove its ultimate ruin
The object of the statute is to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province and it could well be achieved by legislation restraining the employment of agri cultural labour in the manufacture 764 of bidis during the agricultural season
Even in point of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if it amounted to a regulation of the hours of work in the busi ness
Such legislation though it would limit the field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis and regulate the hours of the working of the industry would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of the business of manufac ture and might well have been within the ambit of clause 6
The effect of the provisions of the Act however has no reasonable relation to the object in view but is so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object
Not only are the provisions of the statute in excess of the requirements of the case but the language employed prohibits a manufacturer of bidis from employing any person m his business no matter wherever that person may be residing
In other words a manufacturer of bidis residing in this area cannot import labour from neighbouring places in the district or province or from outside the province
Such a prohibition on the face of it is of an arbitrary nature inasmuch as it has no relation whatsoever to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and as such cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right
Further the statute seeks to prohibit all persons residing in the notified villages during the agricultural season from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis
It cannot be denied that there would be a number of infirm and disabled persons a number of children old women and petty shop keepers residing in these villages who are inca pable of being used for agricultural labour
All such persons are prohibited by law from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis and are thus being deprived of earning their livelihood
It is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain classes of persons residing in every village who do not engage in agricultural operations
They and their womenfolk and children in their leisure hours supplement their income by engaging themselves in bidi business
There seems no reason for prohibiting them from carrying on this occupation The statute as 765 it stands not only compels those who can be engaged in agricultural work from not taking to other avocations but it also prohibits persons who have no connection or relation to agricultural operations from engaging in the business of bidi making and thus earning their livelihood
These provi sions of the statute in our opinion cannot be said to amount to reasonable restrictions on the right of the appli cants and that being so the statute is not in conformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution
The law even to the extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural labour cannot be held valid because the language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right
So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Consti tution cannot be ruled out it must be held to be wholly void
Mr Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not
This argument runs counter to the clear provisions of the Con stitution
The determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclu siveit is subject to the supervision by this Court
In the matter of fundamental rights the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and in exercising its functions it has the power to set aside an Act of the Legislature if it is in violation of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
We are therefore of opinion 98 766 that the impugned statute does not stand the test of reason ableness and is therefore void
The result therefore is that the orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th September 1950 are void inoperative and ineffective
We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the provisions con tained in section 4 of the Act against the petitioners in any manner whatsoever
The petitioners will have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions
Petitions allowed
Agent for the petitioners in Nos 78 and 79 Rajinder Narain
Agent for the respondent in Nos 78 and 79 PA Mehta


Summary:
The appellant was an assessee who derived income from a Trust
For assessment years 1964 65 and 1966 67 the Income Tax Officer disallowed deduction of two mounts claimed as interest paid by the Trust for amounts withdrawn from an Estate Account for investment on the ground that a portion of the amounts withdrawn from the Estate Account had been utilized for personal expenditure by the assessee
The appellants appeals to the Assistant Commissioner having been rejected she preferred second appeals to the Appellate Tribunal raising an additional question in respect of the assessment year 1964 65 that she was liable to tax on the net income only received by her from the Trust and not on income determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the case of the Trust
The Tribunal dis missed the appeals but at the instance of the appellant referred the two questions of law arising therein to the High Court which answered both of them against the assessee
Dismissing the appeals HELD It is not the income shown in the books of account of the Trust actually paid to the assessee after deduction of the outgoings from the income received in the hands of the Trust but the real income of the Trust has to be in cluded in the total income of the assessee after taking into consideration the different items of permissible deductions in relation to that income
869E F It is apparent from section 1611 of the Income Tax Act 1961 that a representative assessee that is to say a trus tee as regards the income In respect of which he is a representative assessee is subject to the same duties responsibilities and liabilities as if the income were income received by or accruing to or in favour of him bene ficially and he is 866 liable to assessment in his own name in respect of that income but any such assessment is deemed to be made upon him in his representative capacity only and the tax is levied upon and recovered from him in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him
And section 166 of the Act clarifies that the provisions relating to the liability of a representative assessee will not prevent either the direct assessment of the person on whose behalf or for whose bene fit income is receivable or the recovery from such person of the tax payable in respect of such income
The Income Tax Officer has the option to proceed either against the trustee or against the beneficiary but in either case the income to be assessed must be in the same figure
What the trustee receives as the income pertaining to the beneficiary is received by him under an obligation to pass on that income to the beneficiary
However in most cases administration charges and expenses have to be met out of the Trust s income and it is only the net income which reaches the beneficiary
If the income had to pass directly to the beneficiary and not under trust through a trustee the beneficiary would have equally to meet those outgoings leaving a net income in his hands which for the purposes of the Income Tax Act would have been computed after reducing the gross income by the deductions admissible under the Act
868H 869A E ii The High Court was right in deciding the question relating to the disallowance of part of the interest claimed as a deduction against the assessee
868F Padmavati Jaikrishna vs Addl
Commissioner of Income Tax Gujarat  referred to