Civil Appeal No 1402 of 1979
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16 2 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No 43070
P C Bhartari for the Appellant
L M Singhvi and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent
The Judgment of V D Tulzapurkar J and A P Sen J was delivered by Tulzapurkar J D A Desai J gave a dissenting Opinion
TULZAPURKAR J This is a tenant s appeal by special leave directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 16 1979 in Second Appeal No 430 of 1970 whereby the High Court decreed the respondents  landlords suit for ejectment against the appellant tenant and the only question of substance raised in the appeal is whether when the landlords  notice demanding arrears and seeking eviction is sent by registered post and is refused by the tenant the latter could be imputed the knowledge of the contents thereof 60 that upon his failure to comply with the notice the tenant could be said to have committed willful default in payment of rent  The question arises in these circumstances The appellant occupied shop No 5 in Ivanhoe Estate situated at Landure Cantonment Mussorie originally owned by one Parvij Waris Rasool on an yearly rental of Rs 250 payable by December 31 every year
The property at all material times was admittedly governed by the UP Cantonment Control of Rent  Eviction Act X of 1952 a Central Act and in my view all the Courts below rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by that Act and not by UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 much less by the later UP Rent and Eviction Act 1972
The respondents purchased the aforesaid Estate form its previous owner on November 27 1964 and the previous owner attorned the tenancy of the appellant to the respondents along with the rental due from him for the year 1964
The appellant continued to be the tenant of the shop during the years 1965 and 1966 as well but since he did not pay the rent the respondents on November 9 1966 gave a combined notice demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy which was refused by him on November 10 1966
On his failure to comply with the requisitions contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mesne profits
967 The suit was resisted by the appellant inter alia on the ground that the rent of the accommodation payable to the previous owner was Rs 250 per annum less 10 rebate on account of repairs that in 1964 at the intervention of some common friends he agreed to vacate and did surrender the residential portion of the shop comprising two rooms one kitchen one bath room and one varandah at the back of the shop in consideration of respondents relinquishing the rental of Rs 250 due from him for the year 1964 that for the years 1965 and 1966 the rental for the remaining shop was reduced by agreement to Rs 50 per annum less rebate for repairs and that he had sent a cheque for the amount due to the respondents
He denied that he has committed default in payment of rents and averred that no notice of demand and ejectment was served on him and consequently prayed for dismissal of the suit
On an appreciation of the evidence led by the parties before it the Trial Court came to the conclusion that initially the rent fixed was Rs 250 per year but after the respondents  purchase of the property the appellant vacated the residential portion of the shop under an agreement arrived at between the parties where under there was relinquishment of rent due for 1964 and that the rent for the main shop was fixed at Rs 100 per annum and that no rebate of any kind had been agreed to at any time on account of repairs
Regarding the arrears of rent outstanding against the appellant the Trial Court held that rent for the years 1965 and 1966 had not been paid and was due from him but it held that the notice dated November 9 1966 was not served on the appellant and hence he could not be held to have committed willful default in payment of arrears of rent
In this view of the matter the Trial Court dismissed the suit insofar as the relief of eviction was concerned but decreed it for arrears of rent at the rate of Rs 100 per annum
Aggrieved by that judgment and decree the respondents filed an appeal to the District Court Dehradun
The learned District Judge concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the rental for the year 1964 had been relinquished and that the rental of the front portion of the shop had been fixed at Rs 100 per annum
He further held that the notice was tendered to the appellant on November 10 1966 but he declined to accept it and hence there was service by refusal but in his opinion despite such service it could not be presumed that the appellant had knowledge about the contents of that notice and consequently he could not be said to have committed any willful default in the payment of rent
In the result the appeal was dismissed
The respondents preferred Second Appeal No 430 of 1970 to the High Court
In that appeal the tenant sought to reagitate the question 968 whether or not the notice was tendered to him and was refused by him on the ground that the finding had been recorded by the District Court without application of mind to the statement on oath made by him to the effect that no postman had ever gone to him with a registered letter either on 9th or 10th November 1966 and he had not declined to receive any registered letter but the High Court refused to entertain the contention inasmuch as it found that the learned District Judge had referred to this part of the appellant s evidence as also the postman s evidence on the point and that on an appreciation of such rival evidence on record he had recorded a finding that the notice was tendered to the appellant but it was refused by him in other words in the absence of animus being attributed to the postman the District Judge had preferred the postman s evidence to that of the appellant section The High Court therefore accepted the finding of fact recorded by the District Court that there was service of the notice on the appellant by refusal
On the further question as to whether when such refusal had been established the appellant could be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice the High Court following its two previous decisions in Shri Nath and another vs Smt
Saraswati Devi Jaswal and Fanni Lal vs Smt
Chironja held that when notice was tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same knowledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him
The District Judge s view in this behalf was thus reversed and since there was failure on the part of the appellant to pay the rent within one month of the service of notice upon him the High Court held that he had committed willful default within the meaning of section 14a of the Act
Accordingly the High Court allowed the appeal and the respondents  prayer for ejectment was granted but the appellant was given three months time to vacate the accommodation
The tenant has come up in appeal to this Court
Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended before us that the High Court was in error in taking the view that when service by refusal had been effected the tenant must be deemed to have knowledge about the contents of the notice for no such presumption could be drawn especially when it was clear on evidence that neither the registered envelope was opened either by the tenant or by the postman nor the contents thereof read before the same was returned to the postman
He further urged that the envelope bore the seal of Shri section P Singh Advocate and the appellant could not therefore know that the notice was from his landlords he also pointed out that the appellant was illiterate and did not know English and since the address on the envelope as 969 well as the seal of the lawyer were in English the appellant could not even know who the sender of the notice was
Counsel therefore urged that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the learned District Judge had rightly recorded a finding that the knowledge of the contents of the notice could not be imputed to the appellant and therefore the appellant could not be regarded as a willful defaulter in the matter of payment of rent
In support of this contention strong reliance was placed by him on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vaman Vithal Kulkarni and Ors
vs Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar where the following observations of Beaumont C J appear at page 251 In case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed and service  is alleged to have been refused
In fact the refusal was not proved as the postman who took the letter and brought it back was not called
But in any case even if the refusal had been proved I should not be prepared to hold that a register ed letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopened was well served
There are I know some authorities in this Court to the contrary but it seems to me impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter is addressed if the agent for service states that in fact the notice was not served although the reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept it
One cannot assume that because an addressee declines to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents  Counsel also referred to some other decisions including that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahboob Bi vs Alvala Lachmiah but these other decisions do not touch the aforesaid aspect of visiting the addressee with the knowledge of the contents
Of the refused notice but have expressed the view that refusal of registered notice without more may not amount to proper service and hence it is unnecessary to consider them
But placing strong reliance upon the observations of Chief Justice Beaumont quoted above counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court ought to have confirmed the finding of the learned District Judge that the appellant could not be presumed to have known the contents of the notice or that the notice was one demanding arrears of rent simply because he refused to accept the same
On the other hand counsel for the respondents contended before us that both under section 27 of the General clauses Act 1897 and section 114 of 970 the Indian Evidence Act presumption of due service could arise if the notice was sent to the tenant by properly addressing the same prepaying and sending the same by registered post and it was pointed out that in the instant case as against the denial by the appellant there was positive oath of postman Kund Ram PW 2 who was examined by the respondents to prove the fact that the registered letter containing the notice was tendered to the appellant and when he declined to accept it the postman had made endorsement in his hand on the envelope Refused
Returned to the sender
Counsel therefore urged that in view of such positive evidence of postman led by the respondents which had been accepted by the learned District Judge the High Court was justified in holding that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice
In this behalf counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the Privy Council decision in Harihar Banerji and Ors
vs Ramshashi Roy and Ors and Madras decision in Kodali Bapayya and Ors
vs Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors and the two decisions of the Allahabad High Court relied upon by the High Court
Counsel pointed out that the Madras High Court in Kodali Bapayya s case supra and the Allahabad High Court in its Full Bench decision in Ganga Ram vs Smt
Phulwati have dealt with the Bombay decision and have expressed their disagreement with the view expressed therein
Section 27 of the deals with the topic Meaning of service by post  and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post then unless a different intention appears the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing pre paying and posting it by registered post a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post
The section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing pre paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not
It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without any thing more
Similar presumption is raised under Illustration f to section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court 971 may presume that the common course of business has been followed in h a particular case that is to say when a letter is sent by post by pre paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee
Undoubtedly the presumptions both under section 27 of the as well as under section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise
In the instant case additionally there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10 1966 but the appellant refused to accept
In other words there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal
In such circumstances we are clearly of the view that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept
It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because in our view the presumption raised under section 27 of the as well as under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice
It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else
Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope
It would therefore be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed
with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under section 27 of the and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act
Turning to the Bombay decision in Vaman Vithal s case supra We would like to point out two aspects that emerge clearly from the very observations which have been strongly relied upon by counsel for the appellant
In the first place the observations clearly show that the refusal to accept the notice was not satisfactorily proved in the case inasmuch as the postman who took the letter and brought it back had not been examined consequently the further observations made by the leaned Chief Justice were unnecessary for decision on the point and as such will have to be regarded as obiter
972 Secondly while making those observations the learned Chief Justice WAS himself conscious of the fact that there were some authorities of that Court taking the contrary view
Having regard to these aspects it is difficult to hold that the concerned observations lay down the correct legal position in the matter
In any event we approve of the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in its three decisions namely Sri Nath s case Fanni Lal s case and Ganga Ram s case supra and would confirm the High Court s finding on the point in favour of the respondents
Counsel for the appellant then faintly argued that the respondents suit was not maintainable under section 141 of the Act inasmuch as no permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained by the respondents before filing the suit as required by section 14 and in this behalf reliance was placed on section 14a of the Act which ran thus 14
Restrictions on eviction
No suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds namely a that the tenant has willfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord
 According to counsel for the appellant the aforesaid provision clearly shows that under the Act two safeguards were available to a tenant i eviction could not be had by any landlord except on one or more of the grounds specified in cls
a to f of section 14 and ii no suit for eviction even on those grounds specified in cls
a to f could be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate and admittedly the landlords in the instant case had filed the suit against the appellant without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate
He therefore urged that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the decree was without jurisdiction
It must be observed that no such contention was raised by the appellant in any of the Courts below presumably because the appellant as well as this lawyer knew how an identical provision contain ed in section 31 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 an allied enactment had been judicially interpreted by in this Court in Bhagwan Dass vs Paras Nath Section 3 of the UP Act 3 of 1947 ran thus 973 3
Restrictions on evictions
Subject to any order passed under sub section 3 no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds a that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand
 This Court in Bhagwan Dass case Asupra has explained at page 305 of the report the legal position arising on a grammatical construction of section 31 thus Section 3 1 does not restrict the landlord s right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in cls
a to g of that sub section
But if he wants to sue his tenant for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in those clauses then he has to obtain the permission of the District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order passed under sub section
3 of section 3 by the Commissioner
These are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant
 It would be conducive to judicial discipline to interpret an identical provision contained in section 141 of the UP Cantonment Control of Rent  Eviction Act 1952 in a similar manner
In other words under section 141 of the concerned Central Act permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of his tenant on any ground other than those specified in cls
a to f and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in cls
a to f
If may be stated that both the enactments have since been repealed
It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the instant suit filed by the respondents against the appellant could not be entertained by the Civil Court
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed
However having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs and we grant the appellant six months time to vacate
DESAI J I have very carefully gone through the judgment prepared by my learned brother Mr Justice V D Tuzapurkar but I regret my inability to agree with the same
974 The relevant facts leading to the appeal by special leave have been succinctly set out in the main judgment and therefore I would straightway proceed to deal with the three important questions raised in this appeal
The first and the principal question which goes to the root of the matter is about the construction of section 202 a of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent  Eviction Act 1972  Rent Act  for short
It reads as under 20
Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds 2 A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds namely a that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a demand  There is a proviso to this sub section which is not material for the purpose of this appeal
A brief resume of concurrently found facts which would high light the question of construction would be advantageous
Appellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises by its former owner on a rent of Rs 250 per annum in the year 1964 on a request by the then landlord appellant tenant surrendered a portion of the premises comprising two rooms a kitchen a bathroom and a verandah at the back of the shop retaining only possession of the shop consequently reducing the rent by agreement between the parties at the rate of Rs 100 per annum
It is thus an agreed and incontrovertible fact that the appellant tenant is a tenant of a shop on an yearly rent of Rs 100  payable at the end of every year
The focus should immediately be turned to the provision of law under which the landlord seeks to evict this tenant
According to respondent landlord she served notice dated November 9 1966 terminating the tenancy of the appellant as the appellant tenant was a defaulter within the meaning of section 202 a and therefore she all was entitled to a decree for eviction as she has satisfactorily proved all the requirements or ingredients of section 202 a
Accepting the finding of fact that the appellant is a tenant liable to pay rent 975  Rs 100 per annum the crux of the matter is whether his case is covered by section 202 a
What does section 202 a postulate and what are its components which when satisfied the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant  On analysis following ingredients of section 202 a would emerge each of which will have to be satisfied before the landlord 1 would be eligible to obtain a decree for eviction viz i Tenant must be a tenant of premises governed by the Rent Act ii That the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months iii That such a tenant has to pay rent in arrears within a period of one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand
In this case the tenant is a tenant of premises governed by tho Rent Act
The crucial question is whether the second ingredient as extracted above is satisfied by the landlord
The attention has to be focused on the expression in arrears of rent for not less than four months 
What does this expression signify  As contended on behalf of the respondent that whatever be the default in payment of rent the notice can be served after the default has continued for a period of four months and failure to comply with the requisition in the notice would disentitle the tenant to the protection of Rent Act
Alternatively it was contended that the expression in arrears of rent for not less than four months  on a literal grammatical construction would signify that rent is payable by the month and that the tenant has committed a default in payment of four months  rent and further failed to comply with the requisition made in the notice within the stipulated period of one month and only then the protective umbrella of the Rent Act would be removed and the tenant would be exposed to a decree for eviction
The two rival constructions raised a question of construction of a sub section in a statute primarily enacted as can be culled out from the long and short title of the Rent Act being regulation of letting and rent and arbitrary eviction of tenant from the premises to which the rent Act would apply
It is a socially beneficent statute and in construing such statute certain well recognised canons of construction have to be borne in mind
Undoubtedly the dominant purpose in construing the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legisla 976 ture
This intention and therefore the meaning of the statute is primarily to be sought ill the words used in the statute itself which must if they are plan and unambiguous be applied as they stand however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not re present the real intention of legislature see Inland Revenue Commissioner vs Hinchy
In approaching the matter from this angle it is a duty of the Court to give fair and full effect to statute which is plain and unambiguous without regard to the particular consequence in a special case
Even while giving liberal construction to socially beneficent legislation if the language is plain and simple the making of a law being a matter for the legislature and not courts the Court must adopt the plain grammatical construction see River Wear Commissioners vs Adamson The Court must take the law as it is
And accordingly it is not entitled to pass judgment on the propriety or wisdom of making a law in the particular form and further the Court is not entitled to adopt the construction of a statute on its view of what Parliament ought to have done
However when two constructions are possible and legitimate ambiguity arises from the language employed it is a plain duty of the Court to prefer and adopt that which enlarges the protection of a socially beneficent statute rather than one which restricts it
In Mohd Shafi vs Additional District  Sessions Judge VII Allahabad and Others this Court while interpreting the explanation iv to section 21 of the Rent Act observed that where the language is susceptible of two interpretations the Court would prefer that which on larges the protection of the tenants rather than one which restricts it
It was further observed that the construction that the Court adopted would be more consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for eviction
Similarly in Gurucharan Singh vs Kamla Singh  Ors
while interpreting the provision of section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 this Court observed that the Court was called upon to interpret a land reforms law are not just an ordinary state and therefore the socioeconomic thrust of the law in these areas should not be retarded by judicial construction but filliped by the legal process without parting from the object of the Act
It must also be emphasised that where two constructions are possible the one that must be preferred is one which would accord with reason and justice see H H Maharaja 977 dhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior  Ors
vs Union of India  Another
Bearing in mind this interpretative approach let us hark back to the expression used in s202a and ascertain whether the exception is susceptible of one construction only or more than one construction and whether there is ambiguity and if so in which direction the interpretative jurisprudence must move
The expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months may suggest that the tenant is in arrears of rent for one or any number of months and that the arrears have fallen due four months back meaning thereby that within four months there was no attempt on the part of the tenant to pay up the arrears and cure the default
This construction would imply that if the tenant is in arrears of rent for one month only an action under the relevant clause can be commenced against him if this infault has continued for a period of four months even if the tenant has paid rent for subsequent months and on the expiry of the period of four months from the date on which the rent had become due and payable for one month a notice of demand can be served and on the failure of the tenant to comply with the requisition made in the notice he would be liable to be evicted
In other words a period of four months must elapse between the date of default and the service of notice irrespective of the fact whether the default is in payment of one month s rent or more than one month s rent
In this constriction it is implicit that failure to pay rent for four different months is not a sine qua non for commencing action under section 202 a
What is of the essence of matter is that a period of four months must elapse between the date of default complained of and service of notice under section 202 a
It was said that the legislature has given locus poenitentiae to the tenant to repair the default within the period of four months
This approach overlooks the obvious that before action can be commenced under section 202 a a notice has to be served and tenant is given locus poenitentiae to repair the default within one month
It appears that by section 43 of the Rent Act the United Provinces Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947  Repealed Act  for short was repealed
Section 3 of the Repealed Act enumerated grounds on which a tenant could be evicted
Sub clause a of section 3 provided that the landlord would be entitled to eviction of a tenant if the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than three months  and had failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand
The language employed in the repealed provision led 978 the Court to hold that whatever be the default in payment of rent a period of three months should have expired from the date of default whereafter alone the landlord would be entitled to serve a notice as provided in the relevant sub clause
It was so held by the Allahabad High Court in Ram Saran Das vs L Bir Sain but this decision was overruled in Jitendra Prasad vs Mathur Prasad
In order to avoid ally such controversy in the Repealing statute the expression arrears of rent for more than three months  has been substituted by the expression arrears of rent for not less than four months 
This is contemporaneous legislative exposition which clearly brings out the legislative intention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is in arrears for not legs than four months
Therefore it would clearly imply that before the landlord can commence action under sub clause a the tenant must have committed default in payment of rent for a period of four months
Therefore the first suggested construction is not borne out by the language employed in the section
The question still remains what does the expression in arrears of rent for not less than four months  signify  It is implicit in the expression that the rent must be payable by month
Irrespective of the fact whether the tenancy is a yearly tenancy or a monthly tenancy it is implicit in sub clause a that either by the contract of lease or by oral agreement or by long usage the tenant is liable to pay rent at the end of every month
In other words the unit for computation of rent is one month that is rent becomes due and payable every month
It is only such a tenant who may fall in arrears for a period of four months
Every month the tenant would be liable to pay the rent in the absence of a contract to the contrary
Thus the rent becomes due and payable at the end of every month
As soon as the month is over the rent becomes due and payable and failure on the part of the tenant to pay the same would dub him as a tenant in arrear of rent for one month
If this process goes on meaning thereby that a period of four months having expired and for each of the four months the rent when It became due and payable was not paid then alone the tenant could be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months
Two definite ingredients emerge from the expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months  i that the rent is payable by month and ii the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for four different months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the landlord invokes the 979 provision of clause a and proceeds to serve a notice of demand
Again if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the notice the tenant pays up the arrears of rent he does not lose the protection of the Rent Act
The legislature clearly intended to cover those cases of default in payment of rent under clause a where the contract of lease provided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liability to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed upon for payment of rent and that they differ the facility to pay the same has accrued
As stated earlier this is implied in the expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months
In this connection one can profitably refer to section 123 a of the Bombay Rents Hotel  Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 which reads as under Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases it such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub section 2 the 2 Court shall pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession
 The expression used there is that the rent is payable by month and the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months
In the Rent Act under discussion a conjoint expression is used that a tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of not less than four months
It only means that where the rent is payable by month and the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and that is the clearest intention discernible from the language used in the relevant clause
It was however contended that this construction would give an undeserved advantage to the defaulting tenant where the rent is not payable by month
The contention is that a landlord who had agreed to accept rent on an yearly basis would be at the mercy of the tenant because even if the default is contumacious the landlord would not be entitled to evict the tenant and that such could not be the intention of the legislature
It was therefore said that the expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four 980 months  is also susceptible of the meaning that where the rent is payable by year and after the year is over and the rent has become due and payable if the tenant has not paid the rent for four months his case would be covered by clause a
If a tenant is under a contract with the landlord to pay rent at the end of a specific year agreed to between the parties could he be said to be a tenant arrears for not less than four months even if he has defaulted in payment of rent at the end of one year l How can a tenant who is to pay rent on the expiry of a specified year be in arrears of rent for not less than four months  And if that construction is adopted a tenant who has committed default in payment of rent for one month and the default has continued without repair for a period of Four months even though he has paid rent for subsequent months he would be liable to be evicted a construction which ought to be rejected on legislative exposition by change in expression adopted in the repealed Act and substituted in the present Act discussed herein above
If that construction is rejected it would be difficult to accept the construction that even of the rent is payable by year once the year is over and a period of four months has elapsed he could be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months
The language does not admit of this construction
Therefore where the rent is payable by the year clause a is not attracted
Now the wild apprehension expressed on behalf of the landlord that such a construction would give an unfair advantage to a tenant who is liable to pay yearly rent need not detain us because the wisdom of enacting a law in a certain manner is for the legislature to decide and not for the court to impose
It may be that the legislature would have intended that such landlords who relied on the income from rent month after month must have a sanction which can be applied if the tenant commits default in payment of rent of four different months but a landlord who apparently does not depend upon the rental income by agreeing to accept yearly rent need not have that sanction and it would be still open to such a landlord to file a suit merely for recovery of rent and not for eviction
Such a thing is not unknown to law because in permanent tenancy and in tenancies of long duration the landlords can only sue for rent and not for eviction on the tenant committing default in payment of rent
Therefore on examining both the rival constructions one which extends the protection deserves to be accepted in view of the fact that the legislature never intended to provide a ground for eviction for failure to pay rent in case of leases where yearly rent was reserved
Rent Act was enacted to fetter the right of re entry of landlord and this construction accords with the avowed object of the Rent Act
981 In the instant case the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate of Rs 100 per annum
In such a case it could not be said that this tenant was in arrears of rent for not less than four months
His case would not be covered by section 202 a of the Rent Act and therefore the landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole ground on which eviction has been ordered
The second contention is that the High Court was in error in interfering with the concurrent finding of facts while hearing second appeal in February 1979 and that too without framing the point of law which arose in the appeal
The disputed finding of fact is about the service of notice
If a landlord seeks eviction on the ground of tenant s default in payment of rent under section 202 a it is obligatory upon him to serve a notice of demand of the rent in arrears On the tenant and can only seek eviction if the tenant fails to comply with the requisition made in the notice
The appellant tenant in terms contended that no notice was served upon him
On the assertion of the respondent landlord that notice dated November 9 1966 was served upon the appellant tenant on November 10 1966 but he refused to accept the same and the refutation thereof by the tenant that no notice was offered to him by the postman nor was any notice refused by him a triable issue arose between the parties
The learned trial judge framed Issue No 7 on the question of service of notice
He recorded a finding that the appellant tenant was not served a notice of demand and of ejectment and answered the issue in favour of the appellant tenant
On appeal by the respondent landlord the appellate court framed point No 2 on the question of service of notice and answered it by observing that the defendant tenant refused to accept the registered notice but no knowledge can be attributed to him of the contents of the registered envelope and therefore the tenant could not be said to be guilty of wilful default on the expiry of one month after the service of notice
He accordingly confirmed the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff landlord is not liable to a decree of eviction on the ground mentioned in section 202a
The landlord approached the High Court in second appeal
When this appeal was heard section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code after its amendment of 1976 was in force
It restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law
Sub section 4 cast a duty on the court to formulate such a substantial question of law and the appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated
It would also be open to the respondent 982 at the hearing of the appeal to contend that the case does not involve such a question
Even prior to the amendment of Section 100 the High Court ordinarily did not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact
This position has been repeatedly asserted and one need not go in search of precedent to support the proposition
However one can profitably refer to R Ramachandran Ayyar vs Ramalingam Chettiar
After examining the earlier decisions and the decision of the Privy Council in Mst
Durga Chaudhrain vs Jawahar Choudhary Gajendragadkar J speaking for this Court in terms spelt out the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal as under But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by lower appellate Court however erroneous the same conclusions may appear to be to the High Court because as the Privy Council observed how ever gross or in excusable the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under section 100 to correct that error
This view was re affirmed in Goppulal vs Dwarkadhishji wherein after reproducing the concurrent finding of fact this Court observed that this concurrent finding of fact was binding on the High Court in second appeal and the High Court was in error in holding that there was one integrated tenancy of six shops
In the facts of this case there was a concurrent finding that the statutory notice as required by section 202 a was not served upon the tenant and therefore the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact
However it is not necessary to base the judgment on this conclusion because it was rightly said on behalf of the respondent that whether the notice was offered to the petitioner tenant and he refused to accept the same the finding is not concurrent because the appellate court has held that the notice was offered but the tenant refused to accept the same and therefore on the refusal to accept the notice there was no concurrent finding
This contention is legitimate because the appellate court held that notice as required by law was not served because even if the tenant refused to accept the notice the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope not opened by him cannot be imputed to him and therefore there was no service of notice as required by section 202 a
The first appellate court was of the view that in the absence of knowledge of the demand of rent in arrears as alleged in the notice the tenant cannot be said 983 to be guilty of wilful default so as to be denied the protection of the Rent Act
This accordingly takes me to the third contention in this appeal
The third contention is that even if this Court agrees with the High Court in holding that the notice in question was tendered by the postman to the appellant tenant and he refused to accept the same n and therefore this refusal amounts to service within the meaning of section 202a yet as the knowledge of the contents of the notice would reflect on subsequent conduct as wilful or contumacious it is not sufficient that a notice is served or tendered and refused but it must further be shown that in the event of refusal the tenant did it with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope and his subsequent conduct is motivated
The question then is What would be the effect of a notice sent by registered post and refused by a tenant on the question of his knowledge about the contents of the notice and his failure to act Would it tantamount to an intentional conduct evidencing wilful default on his part This aspect cannot be merely examined in the background of some precedents or general observations
One has to examine this aspect in the background of Indian conditions or in the words of Krishna Iyer J the legal literacy in rural areas and the third world jurisprudence  Before we blindly adhere to law bodily imported from western countries we must not be oblivious to the fact that the statutes operating in the western countries are meant for a society if not 100 per cent
 99 per cent
literate
We must consciously bear in mind that our society especially in the semi urban and rural areas is entirely different and wholly uncomparable to the western society
A literate mind will react to a problem presented to him in a manner other than an illiterate mind because illiteracy breeds fear and fear oriented action cannot be rationally examined on the touchstone of legal presumptions
To articulate the point as it arises in this case let one put his feet in the shoes of a rural illiterate person to whom a registered envelope by a postman is presented
Does it require too much of imagination to conclude that he will be gripped with fear and he may react in a manner which will be his undoing He would believe that by refusing to accept the registered envelope he would put off the evil rather than accept the same and approach a person who can advise him and meet the situation
Can this action of fear gripped mind inflict upon the person an injury flowing from the assumption that he not only refused the registered envelope with the conscious knowledge of the fact that it contained a notice by a lawyer on behalf of his landlord and that it accused him of wilful 984 default in payment of rent and that if he would act rationally he would repair the default by tendering the rent within the period of one month granted by the statute If he is deemed to have acted consciously is it conceivable that he would invite injury by sheer refusal to accept the registered envelope rather than know the con tents or make them knowable to him and meet the charge of wilful default
As was said again by Krishna Iyer J which bears quotation The Indian Courts interpret laws the Anglo Indian way the rules of the game having been so inherited
The basic principles of jurisprudence are borrowed from the sophisticated British system with the result that there is an exotic touch about the adjectival law the argumentative method and the adversary system not to speak of the Evidence Act with all its technicalities
Lord Devlin recently said If our business methods were as antiquated as our legal methods we would be a bankrupt country
There is need for a comprehensive enquiry into the rules of our procedure backed by a determination to adopt it to fit the functions of the welfare State
This is much more apposite in the conditions of our society and this was noticed by Beaumost C J way back in fourth decade of this century in Waman Vithal Kulkarni  Others
vs Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar
An exactly identical question arose before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
The facts found were that the registered letter containing the notice was sent to defendants 4  5 duly addressed and service was alleged to have been refused
The contention was two fold that the refusal was not proved but alternatively it was contended that even if it was proved the addressee could not be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope
The pertinent observation is as under In the case of defendants 4 and 5 a registered letter containing the notice was sent to them duly addressed and service is alleged to have been refused
In fact the refusal was not proved as the postman who took the letter and brought it back was not called
But in any case even if the refusal had been proved I should not be prepared to hold 985 that a registered letter tendered to the addressee and refused and brought back unopened was well served
There are I know some authorities in this Court to the contrary but it seems to me impossible to say that a letter has been served so as to bring the contents to the notice of the person to whom the letter is addressed it the agent for service states that in fact the notice was not served although the reason may have been that the addressee declined to accept it
One cannot assume that because an addressee declines to accept a particular sealed envelope he has guessed correctly as to its contents
Many people in this country make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters a practice based I presume on their experience that such documents usually contain something unpleasant
To that it is clear that this notice was not served on three of the defendants
Learned counsel for the respondent tried to distinguish this decision by observing that the court did hold that the refusal was not proved therefore the rest of the observation was obiter
It is not far a moment suggested that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is binding on this Court but the reasoning which appealed to the Division Bench in 1935 is all the more apposite at present
The Division Bench noticed that in the society from which the defendants came there was a feeling that such registered letters usually contained something unpleasant
Is there anything to suggest that this feeling is today displaced or destroyed The Division Bench further noticed that many people in India make a practice of always refusing to accept registered letters and the practice according to the Division Bench was based on their experience that such documents usually contained something unpleasant
The reaction is to put off the evil by not accepting the envelope
Could such ignorant illiterate persons be subjected to a legal inference that the refusal was conscious knowing the contents of the document contained in the registered envelope To answer it in the affirmative is to wholly ignore the Indian society
And this concept that the registered envelope properly addressed and returned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is wholly borrowed from the western jurisprudence
I believe it is time that we ignore the illusion and return to reality
Reference was also made to Appabhai Motibhai vs Laxmichand Zaverchand  Co but that case does not touch the point
In Mahboob Bi vs Alvala 986 Lachmiah an almost identical question figured before the Andhra Pradesh High Court
In that case the Rent Controller issued a notice in respect of the proceedings initiated before him by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant to the tenant by registered post and the envelope was returned with the endorsement of refusal and the Rent Controller set down the proceedings for ex parte hearing and passed a decree for eviction
The tenant under the decree of eviction preferred an appeal in the City Small Causes Court
A preliminary objection was raised by the respondent landlord that the appeal was barred by limitation as it was filed six days after the time allowed for filing the appeal
The appellant tenant countered this by saying that he had no knowledge of the proceedings before the Rent Controller and that he was never served with the notice of proceedings before the Rent Controller
The relevant rule permitted service of notice by registered post
After examining the relevant rule the Court accepted the contention of the tenant observing as under Moreover nothing has been placed before me to show that there is any duty cast upon any person to receive every letter or notice sent by registered post nor does the refusal to receive has been made the subject matter of any presumption which may arise under sec
114 of the Evidence Act
Then again there is the practical difficulty of having to import the knowledge of the date of hearing or the precise proceedings with which the registered notice is concerned in the case of a mere refusal to receive a registered notice
The Court thus was of the view that even if refusal amounted to service yet it is not service as required by law to fasten a liability on the tenant because no presumption can be raised that the refusal war with the conscious knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope
Undoubtedly our attention was also drawn to a contrary view taken by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Fannilal vs Smt
Chironja
It was contended that even if the registered letter was refused no presumption of knowledge of the contents of the letter could in law the raised against the tenant
In support of the submission reliance was placed on Amarjit Singh Bedi vs Lachchman Das an unreported decision of a single judge of the Allahabad High Court and the decision of Beaumont CJ in Waman Vithal Kulkarni s case
The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court did not accept the view of Beaumont CJ The Court was of the opinion that a presumption of fact would arise under 987 section 114 of the Evidence Act that the refusal was with the knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope
The Court has not considered the specific Indian conditions the approach of rural Indians to registered letters and has merely gone by the technical rules of Evidence Act which as experience would show could sometimes cause more harm and lead to injustice through law
The contrary Allahabad decision does not commend to me
On the contrary the Bombay view is in accord with the conditions of society in rural India and I do not propose to make any distinction even with regard to urban areas where also there are a large number of illiterates Even in the case of a semi literate person who is in a position to read and write he could not be accused of legal literacy
Therefore it is not possible to accept the submission that mere refusal would permit a presumption to be raised that not only the service was legal but the refusal was the conscious act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the letter
How dangerous this presumption is can be easily demonstrated and how it would lead to miscarriage of justice can be manifestly established
Once knowledge of the contents of the registered envelope is attributed to a person to whom a registered envelope is sent and who has refused to accept the same that this was an act accompanied by the conscious knowledge of the contents of the letter he who may be an innocent defaulter or presumably no defaulter at all would be charged with a contumacious conduct of being a wilful defaulter
The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter That is why a provision for notice has been made
If even after notice the default continues the tenant can be condemned as wilful defaulter
Could he be dubbed guilty of conscious wilful contumacious intentional conduct even when he did not know what was in the registered envelope In my opinion it would be atrocious to impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of refusing to accept the registered notice
Where service of notice is a condition precedent a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness box after a long interval to say that the offered the envelope to the addressee and he refused to accept the same would be travesty of justice
And if this condition precedent is not fully satisfied the consequent conduct cannot be said to be wilful
In a slightly different context in Commissioner of Income tax Kerala vs Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Rapasi decd this Court held that service of the notice under 988 section 341a of the Income tax Act 1922 within the period of limitation being a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction if no notice is issued or if the notice issued is shown to be invalid then the proceedings taken by the Income tax Officer without a notice or in pursuance of an invalid notice would be illegal and void
It was however contended that if the Court accepts the legal contention as canvassed on behalf of the appellant it would be impossible tc serve the notice as statutorily prescribed
This wild apprehension is wholly unfounded
The notice is required to be served in the manner prescribed by section 106 of Transfer of Property Act which inter alia provides for affixing a copy of the notice on the premises in possession of tenant
Therefore it cannot be said that the approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with the statutory requirement of service of notice before Commencing the action for eviction
Having therefore examined the three vital contentions in my opinion the suit of the landlord must fail on the ground that the rent was not payable by month and therefore section 202 a is not attracted
And further even if it is attracted as the statutory notice as required by section 202 a was not served a decree for eviction cannot be passed on the only ground of default in payment of rent
I would accordingly allow this appeal and dismiss the suit of the respondent for eviction but with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case
SR Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was inducted in the year 1964 as a tenant of the suit premises on an yearly rental payable by December 31 every year
Since the appellant did not pay the rent for the years 1965 1966 a combined notice dated November 9 1966 demanding payment of arrears and seeking ejectment on termination of tenancy was sent by registered post by the respondents
The appellant refused to receive the notice on November 10 1966
On his failure to comply with the requisitions contained in the notice the respondents filed a suit against the appellant seeking eviction as well as recovery of rents and mensne profits
Having lost before the trial court and the first appellate court the respondents came up before the High Court in second appeal
The High Court accepted the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court that there was service of the notice on the appellant by refusal and held that when notice was tendered to the tenant and when the latter refused to accept the same know ledge of the contents of the notice must be imputed to him
The High Court allowed the landlords  appeal and granted three months time to the appellant to vacate the shop
Hence the tenant s appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court
Dismissing the appeal the Court  HELD By majority Per Tulzapurkar J On behalf of A P Sen J and himself
The presumptions that are raised under section 27 of the and section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act make it clear that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof
971 E F 12
Before the knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed it is not necessary that the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contend should be read over to him by the post man or someone else
Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope
971 D E 963 Vaman Vithal Kulkarni and Ors
vs Khanderao Ram Rao Sholapurkar  explained and dissented from
Mahboob Bi vs Alvala Lachmiah AIR 1964 AP 324 held inapplicable
Shri Nath and another vs Smt
Saraswati Devi Jaiswal AIR 1964 All 52 Fanni Lal vs Smt
Chironja  Ganga Ram vs Smt
Phulwati  Kodali Bapayya and Ors
vs Yadavalli Venkataratnam and Ors AIR 1953 Mad 884 approved
Harihar Banerji and Ors
vs Ramshashi Roy and Ors AIR 1918 PC 102 referred to
The suit under section 141 of the UP Cantonment Control of Rent  Eviction Act Central Act X of 1952 in the instant case was maintainable
Under section 141 of the Central Act which in pari materia with section 31 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 permission of the District Magistrate was required if the landlord sought eviction of the tenant on any ground other than those specified in clauses a to f and not when it was sought on any of the grounds specified in clauses a to f
973 E P Bhagwan Dass vs Paras Nath   followed
All the courts rightly dealt with the matter as being governed by the UP Cantonments Control of Rent  Eviction Act X of 1952 a Central Act and not by UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 much less by the later UP Rent  Eviction Act 1972
966 E F Per Desai
J Contra
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent  Eviction Act 1972 is a socially beneficient statute and should be construed according to well recognised canons of construction
The words used in the statute if they are plain and unambiguous must be applied as they stand however strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent the real intention of the legislature
However if two constructions are possible and legitimate ambiguity arises from the language employed that which enlarges the protection of a socially beneficient statute rather than one which restricts it should be preferred and adopted
In other words the construction which would be more consistent with the policy and attainment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant unless the landlord establishes a ground for eviction should be preferred
Further where two constructions are possible the one which would accord with reason and justice must be preferred
975 G H 976 A D G Inland Revenue Commissioners vs Hinchy  H L at 767 1960 1 All India Reports 505 at 512 River Wear Commissioners vs Adamson  765 quoted with approval
Mohd Shafi vs Additional District  Sessions Judge VII Allahabad and Others  Gurucharan Singh vs Kamla Singh  Ors
  H H Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior  Ors
vs Union of India  Another 1971 1 SCC 85 reiterated
964 21
The substitution of the expression arrears of rent for not less than four months in sub clause a of sub section 2 of section 20 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent  Eviction Act 1972 is a contemporaneous legislative exposition bringing out clearly the legislative intention that the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant if the rent is in arrears for not less than four months
Before the landlord can commence action under sub clause a i the tenant must have committed default in Payment of rent for a period of four months and ii a notice has to be served giving the tenant locus poeniteniae to repair the default within month
978 B C 22
Two ingredients emerge from the expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months i that the rent is payable by month and ii the tenant has committed default in payment of rent for four different months and that this default subsists and continues on the date when the land lord invokes the provision of clause a and proceeds to serve a notice of demand
Again if within a period of one month from the date of receipt of notice the tenant pays up the arrears of rent he does not lose the protection of the Rent Act
978 G H 979 23
It is implicit in the expression the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months that the legislature clearly intended to cover those cases Of default in payment of rent under clause a where the contract of lease provided for payment of rent every month meaning thereby that the unit for liability to pay rent is one month and secondly the tenant has committed default on four different occasions of four different months or four different units agreed upon for payment of rent and that too after the liability to pay the same has accepted
979 A C 24
Section 202a of the Rent Act 1972 does not attract cases where the landlords accept rent on an yearly basis
The language of the section does not admit of a construction namely that even if the rent is payable by year once the year is over and a period of four months has elapsed he could be said to be a tenant in arrears of rent for not less than four months
In the instant case the parties are ad idem that the rent is payable by year at the rate of Rs 100 per annum
In such a case it could not be said that this tenant was in arrears of rent for not less than four months
His case would not be covered by section 202 of the Rent Act and therefore the landlord would not be entitled to a decree for eviction on this ground and that was the sole ground on which eviction has been ordered
980 C D 981 A B 3
The amended section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal only if the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law
Sub section G4 cast a duty on the court to formulate such substantial question of law and the appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated
It would also be open to the respondent at the hearing of he appeal to contend that the case does not involve such a question
Thus the High Court ordinarily cannot and did not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below
981 G H 982 A In the facts of this case there was a concurrent finding that the statutory notice as required by section 202a was not served upon the tenant and therefore the High Court was in error in interfering with this finding of fact
982 B C 965 R Ramachandran Ayyar vs Ramalingam Chettiar  Mst
Durga Chaudhrain vs Jawahar Choudhary 1890 LR 17 IA 122 Goppulal vs Dwarkadhishji 1969 3 SCR 989 reiterated
Mere refusal of a registered letter would not permit a presumption to be raised that not only the service was legal but the refusal was the conscious act flowing from the knowledge of the contents of the letter
987 C 42
This concept that the registered envelope properly addressed and returned with an endorsement of refusal must permit a rebuttable presumption that the addressee refused it with the knowledge of the contents is wholly borrowed from the western jurisprudence
Not considering the specific Indian conditions and the approach of rural Indian to registered letters but merely going in with the technical rules of Evidence Act would cause more harm and lead to injustice through law
985 G H 986 A 43
The Rent Act does not seek to evict a mere defaulter
That is why a provision for notice has been made
If even after notice the default continues the tenant can be condemned as willful defaulter
He could not be dubbed guilty of conscious willful contumacious intentional conduct even when he did not know what was in the registered envelope
It would be atrocious to impute any such knowledge to a person who has merely been guilty of refusing to accept the registered notice
Where service of notice is a condition precedent a dubious service held established by examining the postman who must be delivering hundreds of postal envelopes and who is ready to go to the witness box after a long interval to say that he offered the envelope to the addressee and he refused to accept the same would be travesty of justice
And if this condition precedent is not fully satisfied the subsequent conduct cannot be said to be willful
987 E G Fannilal vs Smt
Chironja 1972 All
Law J 499 DB dissented to
Appabhai Motibhai vs Laxmichand Zaverchand  Co AIR 1954 Bom
159 held inapplicable
Mahboob Bi vs Alvala Lachmiah AIR 1964 AP 314 Amarjit Singh Bedi vs Lachman Das Waman Vithal Kulkarni  Others vs Khandera Ram Rao Sholapurkar AIR 1935 Bom
247 quoted with approval
The argument that it would be impossible to serve the notice as statutorily prescribed once it is held that no knowledge of the contents of the refused letter could be imputed to the tenant is incorrect
The notice is required to be served in the manner prescribed by section 106 of Transfer of Property Act which inter alia provides for affixing a copy of the notice on the premises in possession of the tenant
Therefore it cannot be said that the approach of the Court would render it impossible for the landlord to meet with the statutory requirement of service of notice before commencing the action for eviction 1988 C 966