Appeal No 754 of 1957
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 29 1954 of the Deputy Custodian General Evacuee Property in Revision Petition No 321 RADCG53
Achhru Ram and K L Mehta for the appellant
Bishan Narain TN Sethia A N Arora and K R Choudhury for respondent No 1 1961
March 14
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the Additional Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi dated September 29 1954 setting aside the order dated August 25 1952 of the Additional Custodian Rural Jullundur confirming that of the Deputy Commissioner Ambala dated May 12 1951
The appellant belongs to a group of evacuees which may for convenience be described as Dhawan Group
Diwan Chaman Lal respondent No 1 was a displaced person from West Pakistan where he owned considerable properties
On September 1 1949 in lieu of land left behind in Pakistan he was allotted 1529 acres of land in village Kharwan in Tehsil Jagadhri District Ambala
The appellant and his 299 group also owned large extents of properties in West Pakistan
Each one of that group was allotted different extents of land in the same village
Before possession was taken by the allottees two persons namely Hari Chand and Khilla Ram filed applications dated November 14 1949 and November 11 1949 respectively for re allotment on the ground that the soil of the village was not of uniform quality and the allotment on the basis of blocks was not justified
The Additional Deputy Commissioner Ambala re commended the splitting of the land into four blocks and the said recommendation was accepted by the Director General Rural Rehabilitation by his order dated December 2 1949
Thereupon the village was divided into four blocks and was re allotted
On account of the re allotment the 1st respondent could not get his entire allotment in village Kharwan in one block and he was given instead land in different blocks and different villages
Aggrieved by this order the first respondent filed a review application before the Deputy Commissioner Ambala on September 27 1950 praying for the restoration of his original allotment made on September 1 1949
The Deputy Commissioner Ambala rejected that application on May 12 1951
Against that order the first respondent preferred a revision to the Additional Custodian who dismissed the same on August 25 1952
Against that order of dismissal the first respondent filed a revision to the Custodian General on October 30 1952
To that revision only the Custodian was made party but the appellant and the members of his group were subsequently made parties by an order of the Deputy Custodian General dated August 25 1953
Thereafter notices were issued to them
The appellant and others on their being made parties raised various contentions
The Deputy Custodian General cancelled the allotment made in favour of the Dhawan Group in respect of the excess area allotted to them and directed the land obtained by means of this cancellation to be utilised for the consolidation of the allotment of the first respondent in village Kharwan
He also gave further consequential directions
The present 300 appeal is preferred by Purshotam Lal Dhawan a member of the Dhawan Group against the said order
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us the following two points 1 The revision to the Deputy Custodian General was barred by time
2 On the date when the allotment made to the appellant was cancelled the Deputy Custodian General had no power to cancel the allotment
To appreciate the first contention some relevant dates may be given
The order of the Additional Custodian was passed on August 25 1952
The said order was communicated to the first respondent on September 11 1952
The revision was filed on October 10 1952
On the date of the filing of the revision only the Deputy Custodian was made a party but later on the Dhawan Group was impleaded in the revision in October 1953
No application for excusing delay in preferring the revision against the said persons was made
It was contended before the Deputy Custodian General that the revision petition was barred by time against the Dhawan Group but the Deputy Custodian General rejected that argument and disposed of the petition on merits
The first question for consideration is whether the revision was barred by limitation in so far as the Dhawan Group was concerned
Some of the relevant provisions regulating the power of revision of the Custodian General may be noticed
Section 27 of the Act says The Custodian General may at any time either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf call for the record of any proceedings in which any Custodian has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit
Under the proviso to that section the Custodian General shall not pass an order under the sub section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 56 of theAct the Central Government made the following rules among others 301 Rule 31
5 Any petition for revision when made to the Custodian General shall ordinarily be made within sixty days of the date of the order sought to be revised
The petition shall be presented in person or through a legal practitioner or a recognized agent or may be sent by registered post
The petition shall be accompanied by a copy of the order sought to be revised and also by a copy of the original order unless the Revising Authority dispenses with the production of any such copy
In contrast to the said provisions rule 311 dealing with appeals says All appeals under the Act shall when they lie to the Custodian be filed within thirty days of the date of the order appealed against and when they lie to the Custodian General within sixty days of such date
Section 27 of the Act confers a plenary power of revision on the Custodian General and it empowers him to exercise his revisional powers either suo motu or on application made in that behalf at any time
The phrase at any time indicates that the power of the Custodian General is uncontrolled by any time factor but only by the scope of the Act within which he functions
The Central Government cannot obviously make a rule unless section 56 of the Act confers on it an express power to impose a time fetter on the CustodianGeneral s power
We do not find any such power conferred on the Central Government under section 56 of the Act
So the rule can only be read consistent with the power conferred on the Custodian General under section 27 of the Act
That must have been the reason why rule 315 does not prescribe any limitation on the Custodian General to exercise suo motu his revisional power
Even in the case of an application for revision filed before him it is said that ordinarily it shall be filed within sixty days
The use of the word ordinarily indicates that the period of sixty days is not a period of limitation but only a rule of guidance for the petitioners as well as for the CustodianGeneral
It is within the discretion of the CustodianGeneral to entertain revision petitions after sixty days 302 but the rule indicates to him that the reasonable period for entertaining a revision is sixty days
The difference in the phraseology of sub rules 1 and 5 of rule 31 of the Rules also leads to the same conclusion for in the matter of appeals a period of limitation of thirty days when made to the custodian and sixty days when it lies to the Custodian General is prescribed whereas no such rigid period has been laid down in the case of a revision
If rule 315 is so read its provisions will not conflict with those of section 27 of the Act and in that event they would be valid
The construction suggested by learned counsel for the appel lant may lend scope to the argument that the rule is ultra vires the statute for when a section says that there is no time limit for entertaining a revision section rule cannot say that it shall be filed within a particular time
The argument that the principle underlying section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to a petition for revision under section 27 of the Act has no force
Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal for which a period of limitation is prescribed and it empowers the court to admit the appeal after the period of limitation if the applicant satisfied it that he has sufficient reason for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time
The principle thereunder cannot be made applicable to a revision petition under section 27 of the Act in respect of which no period of limitation is prescribed
At the same time we must make it clear that the powers of the Custodian General under section 27 read with rule 315 are not intended to be exercised arbitrarily
Being a judicial power he shall exercise his discretion reasonably and it is for him to consider whether in a particular case he should entertain a revision beyond the period of sixty days stated in rule 315
In this case we cannot say that the Custodian General had acted perversely or unreasonably in entertaining the revision
The revision was filed in time
The Dhawan Group was made party at the subsequent stage as the Custodian General rightly thought that any order he would make in favour of the appellant might prejudice the Dhawan Group
After giving them a reasonable opportunity 303 of being heard within the meaning of the proviso to section 271 of the Act he made the order
The CustodianGeneral therefore acted reasonably within his powers
This objection is overruled
The second contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the Custodian General had no power to cancel an allotment made on or before July 22 1952
Let us recapitulate the relevant facts
The original order of allotment was made in favour of the appellant s group and of the first respondent on September 1 1949
There as re allotment on December 21949
There allotment was cancelled by the Deputy Custodian General by his order dated September 29 1954
The question is whether the Deputy Custodian General can set aside the allotment made on December 2 1949
The question raised falls to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder
Section 11 of the Act confers on the Custodian the power to cancel any allotment made by him whether such allotment was made or entered into before or after the commencement of the Act
Rule 14 of the Rules narrates the grounds on which an allotment can be cancelled and also the procedure to be followed for cancelling such an allotment
If a custodian makes an order either cancelling or refusing to cancel an allotment the Custodian General can under section 27 of the Act set aside that order if he is satisfied that it is not legal or proper and he may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit
But it is said that rule 146 limits the power of the Custodian General in respect of allotments made under the Act
As the argument turns upon that rule it would be convenient to read the material parts of it
Rule 14
6 Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the Custodian of Evacuee Property in the State of Punjab shall not exercise the power of cancelling any allotment of rural evacuee property on a quasi permanent basis or varying the terms of any such allotment except in the following circumstances      
After narrating the circumstances with which we are 304 not now concerned the subrule contains a proviso which reads Provided further nothing in this sub rule shall apply to any application for revision made under section 26 or section 27 of the Act within the prescribed time against an order passed by the lower authority on or before 22nd July 1952
 Under this sub rule there is a ban on the exercise of the power of the Custodian to cancel an allotment of a rural evacuee property on a quasi permanent basis except under certain circumstances
his sub rule was substituted for the old sub rule by SRO 1290 of July 22 1952
A Custodian under the Act cannot set aside an allotment except under thecircumstances mentioned in the sub rule
But the second proviso to that sub rule lifts the ban in the case of an application made for revision under section 26 or section 27 of the Act
It may be mentioned that the words or section 27 after the words section 26 were added in the sub
rule on August 26 1953 ie before the order of the Custodian General in the present case
Section 26 of the Act as it then stood conferred revisional jurisdiction on the Custodian Additional Custodian or Authorized Deputy Custodian against the orders of subordinate officers
Section 27 as we have already noticed confers a similar power of revision on the CustodianGeneral
By reason of the proviso the CustodianGeneral can in exercise of his powers under section 27 of the Act cancel an allotment made by a lower authority on or before July 22 1952
The only limitation on that power is that he must do so in a revision filed within the prescribed time
What is the prescribed time for a revision under section 27 of the Act Prescribed has been defined in the Act to mean  prescribed by rules made under this Act
Rule 315 prescribes that a revision to the Custodian General shall ordinarily be made within sixty days of the order sought to be revised
In considering the first point we have explained the scope of the rule and we have held that the said rule is only a rule of guidance and that in law a revision can be entertained at any time even after sixty days if the Custodian General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain it
The prescribed time in 305 the context of a revision to the Custodian General can only mean sixty days or such other time within which the Custodian General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain the revision
As the allotment in the present case was made before July 22 1952 the Custodian General was within his rights in cancelling the same
Before we close it is necessary to notice another contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents
The argument was that there was no allotment made in favour of the appellant and therefore there was no scope for invoking the provisions of rule 14 of the Rules
The basis of the argument is the following observations of the Deputy Custodian General in his order dated September 29 1954 The petitioner has rightly contended that the Dhawan Group had no verified claim for the allotment of this excess area and in spite of an opportunity afforded by me to them to produce the copies of their Parcha Claim they have failed to do so
The reports of the Land Claims Officer dated 7th August 1952 and 11th August 1952 on pages 147 and 151 of the record show that although the allotment had been made to Dhawan Group but a search had been made for their claims which were not traceable
On page 129 of the record a report by the Department dated 21st August 1952 shows that no order of allotment to Dhawan Group was forthcoming These observation do not record a clear finding that there was no allotment in favour of the appellant
Indeed the factum of allotment to the appellant was never questioned throughout the proceedings
In the circumstances we must dispose of this appeal on the basis that there was an allotment in favour of the appellant
This contention is therefore rejected
No other point was raised before us
In the result he appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant and the respondent who were displaced persons from West Pakistan were allotted lands in the same village
At the instance of certain persons the first allotment was cancelled and there was a re allotment
The respondent was aggrieved by this order and on September 27 195o he filed a review application before the Deputy Commissioner for restoration of the original allotment but it Was dismissed on May 12  1951 Against this order the respondent preferred a revision application to the Additional Custodian
who dismissed the same on August 25 1952
Thereupon the respondent filed a revision application before the Custodian General on October 30 1952
To this revision on the Custodian was made a party but the appellant was made a party by order of the Custodian General on August 25 1953
After bearing the parties the Custodian General on September 29 1954 cancelled part of the re allotment made in favour of the appellant
appellant contended i that the revision application to the Custodian General was barred by time and iithat the  Custodian General had no power to cancel the allotment
Hold that the revision application was not barred by time
Rule 315 provides that a revision petition to the Custodian General shall ordinarly be made within sixty days of the 38 298 order sought to be revised
This rule is only a rule of guidance and not one of limitation and in law a revision can be entertained even after sixty days if the Custodian General in his discretion thinks fit to entertain it
In the present case the revision was filed within the time but the appellant was impleaded after the period of sixty days had expired
But it could not be said that the Custodian General acted perversely or unreasonably in entertaining the revision
Held further that the Custodian General had the power to cancel the allotment made on December 2 1949
Under r 146 the Custodian could not after July 22 1952 cancel an allotment except under certain specified circumstances but the second proviso to r 146 permitted the Custodian General in exercise of his powers of revision under section 27  to cancel an allotment made by a lower authority on or before July 22 1952