Appeal No 1914 of 1968
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 12 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No 301 of 1966
CK Daphtary R N Banerjee P N Tiwari and 0
C Mathur for the appellant
SC Agarwala R K Garg and section Chakravarty for respon dents Nos 1 and 3
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat J
On May 9 1956 the appellant company appointed respondent 3 as a foreman on probation for a period of six months
On expiry of that period the probationary period was extended from time to time and ultimately respondent 3 was transferred to the labour office of the company
On May 29 1957 while respondent 3 was still serving his probationary period the company terminated his service
The matter was thereupon taken up by respondent 1 before the Regional Conciliation Officer Bareilly who registered the case as Case No 83B57
For the reasons hereinafter stated no conciliation could be arrived at and the State Government declined to make a reference for adjudication under the UP hereinafter called the Act
On the said refusal respondent 3 filed a writ petition in the High Court for a mandamus
The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the decision of the State Government to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication was a matter of its discretion
By about the end of 1962 the respondent union made further representation to the State Government and by its order dated August 28 1963 the Government made a reference of the dispute regarding the said termination of the service of respondent 3 to the Labour Court for adjudication
By its order dated March 22 1965 the Labour Court rejected the reference on the ground that there was no industrial dispute and therefore the reference was not maintainable
Respondents I to 3 thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by a learned Single Judge
An appeal against the said order filed by 373 the appellant company was dismissed
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court dismissing the appellant company s writ petition
Counsel for the appellant company in support of the appeal raised the following points  1 Was it possible for the respondent union to validly espouse the cause of respondent 3 when he was not a member at the date when his service was terminated Even if it was was there in fact an espousal so as to convert his individual dispute into an industrial dispute  2 Do the words at any time in section 4k of the Act have any limitations or can the Government refer a dispute for adjudication after the lapse of about six years as in this case after the accrual of the cause of the dispute  3 In what circumstances can the Government refer such a dispute for adjudication after it has once refused to do so  The definition of industrial dispute  in section 2lof the Act is in the same language as that in section 2k of the 
The expression industrial dispute  therefore must bear the same meaning as it is assigned to that expression in the Central Act
It is now well settled by a long series of decisions that notwithstanding the wide language of the definition in section 2k of the Central Act the dispute contemplated there is not an individual dispute but one involving a substantial number of work men
However a dispute though originally an individual dispute may become
an industrial dispute if it were to be espoused and made a common cause by workmen as a body or by a considerable section of them
Section 4k of the Act therefore must be held to empower the Government to make a reference of such a dispute only for adjudication
It provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute for adjudication to a labour court or to a tribunal depending upon whether the matter
of the industrial dispute falls under one or the other Schedule to the Act
The first question that falls for determination is whether where a dispute is originally an individual dispute but becomes an industrial one as a result of its being espoused by a union ora substantial number of workmen the concerned workman should have been a member of such union at the time when the cause of such dispute arises
It appears that at one time there was a conflict of judicial opinion on this question
Some of the High Courts took the view that in order that an individual dispute may be converted into an industrial dispute on as aforesaid its being espoused by a substantial number of workmen the concerned workman must be a member of the union at the time of the accrual of the cause of the dispute
Thus in Padarthy Ratnam  Co vs Industrial Sup
CINP70 9 374 Tribunal1 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman might develop into an industrial dispute if the cause is espoused by a union of which he is a member and that the membership of the union which would give it the jurisdiction to espouse his cause must be anterior to the date of the dismissal and not subsequent to it
A similar view was also taken by the High Courts of Kerala and Punjab
see Shamsuddin vs State of Kerala  and Khadi Grainodyog Bhawan Workers  Union vs E Krishnamurthy Industrial Tribunal 
In a later decision however the High Court of Punjab appears to have taken a contrary view
In Muller  Phipps India P Ltd vs Their Employees  Union  the dispute related to the retrenchment of a workman and the failure of the employer to re employ him in spite of its having re employed two other employees out of their turn as against the turn of the con cerned workman
The High Court rejected the employer s con tention that the espousal of the union was not valid as it was made after the retrenched workman had ceased on his being retrenched to be a member of the union on the ground that if that contention were to be upheld it would mean that no union can ever espouse the cause of a retrenched workman
In Workmen vs Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Iron and Steel Co Ltd  the union which espoused the causE of the workman came into existence after his dismissal
The workman naturally became its member after his dismissal
The High Court disagreed with the Tribunal which had rejected the reference and held that even if oN the date of the dismissal of a workman the dispute was an individual dispute it may under some circumstances become an industrial dispute on the date of the reference and that the validity of the reference has to be judged on the facts as they stand on the date of the reference and not at the date of the dismissal
Therefore even if there was no union at the date of the workman s dismissal to espouse his cause if such a union comes into existence before the reference and the dismissed workman becomes its member and the union thereupon espouses his cause that would be sufficient
It also held that there was no principle in support of the view that the union must be in existence at the time of the dismissal
After the decision by this Court in Workmen vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate there can be no doubt that though the words any person in the definition of an industrial dispute in section 2 k of the Central Act are very wide and would on a mere literal interpretation include a dispute relating to any person considering the scheme and the objects of the Act all disputes are not industrial disputes and that a dispute becomes an industrial dis 1 19581 2 3 AIR 1966 Pun
4 5 6 19581 SCR 1156
375 pute where the person in respect of whom it is raised is one in whose employment non employment terms of employment or
conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest
The question therefore which would arise in cases where the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged is whether there was between the parties to the reference ie the employer and his workmen an industrial dispute
The parties to the industrial dispute are obviously the parties to the reference and therefore the dispute must be an industrial dispute between such parties
It follows therefore that though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute the workmen may make that dispute as their own that is to say espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and are directly and substantially interested in the employment non employment or conditions of work of the concerned workman
This premise pre supposes that though at the date when the cause of the dispute arises that dispute is an individual dispute such a dispute can become an industrial dispute if it is spoused by the workmen or a substantial section of them after the cause of the dispute eg dismissal has taken place
It may be that at the date of such dismissal there is no union or that the workmen are not sufficiently organised to take up the cause of the concerned workman and no espousal for that or any other reason takes place at the time when such cause occurs
But that cannot mean that because there was no such union in existence on that date the dispute cannot become an industrial one if it is taken up later on by the union or by a substantial section of the workmen
If it is insisted that the concerned workman must be a member of the union at the date of his dismissal the result would be that if at that period of time there is no union in that particular industry and it comes into existence later on then the dismissal of such a workman can never be an industrial dispute although the other workmen have a community of interest in the matter of his dismissal and the cause for which or the manner in which his dismissal is brought about directly and substantially affects the other workmen
The only condition for an individual dispute turning into an industrial dispute as laid down in the case of Dimakuchi Tea Estate is the necessity of a community of interest and not whether the concerned workman was or was not a member of the union at the time of his dismissal
The parties to the reference being the employer and his employees the test must necessarily be whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest even though such a dispute relates to a single workman
It must follow that the existence of such an interest evidenced by the espousal by them of the cause must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs otherwise as aforesaid in some 1  376 cases a dispute which was originally an individual one cannot become an industrial dispute
Further the community of interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or not at the date when the cause occurred for without his being a member the dispute may be such that other workmen by having a common interest therein would be justified in taking up the dispute as their own and espousing it
Any controversy on the question as to whether it is necessary for a concerned workman to be a member of the union which has espoused his cause at the time when that cause arose has been finally set
at rest by the decision in Bombay Union of Journalists vs The Hindu Bombay  where this Court laid down that the test whether an individual dispute got converted into an industrial dispute depended on whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up and supported by the union of workmen of the employer against whom the dispute was raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of such workmen
see also Workmen vs Ms Dharampal Premchand 2  and Workmen of Indian Express P Ltd vs The Management I
The argument therefore that the reference in this case was not competent on the ground that the concerned workman was not a member of the union at the date when the cause giving rise to the dispute arose and that therefore the union could not have espoused the dispute to convert it into an industrial dispute is not correct and cannot be upheld
The next question is whether the expression at any time in section 4k means what its literal meaning connotes or whether in the context in which it is used it has any limitations
Counsel for the company argued that the concerned workman was admittedly not a member of the respondent union in the beginning of 1959 when the State Government refused to make the reference that he became a member of the respondent union in July 1962 that it was thereafter that the respondent union revived the said dispute which had ceased to be alive after the Government s said refusal and that it was at the instance of the Union that the Government later on changed its mind and in August 1963 agreed to make the reference
The contention was that the Government having once declined to refer the dispute could not change its mind after a lapse of nearly six years after the dispute arose and that though the expression at any time does not apparently signify any limit it must be construed to mean that once the Government had refused to make the reference after considering the matter and the employer thereupon had been led to believe that the dispute was not to be agitated in a tribunal and had consequently made his own arrangement the Government cannot on a further agitation by the 1  2 3 1991 1 SC Cases 228
377 union take a somersault and decide to refer it for adjudication
It was argued that if it were so it would mean that a workman who after termination of his service has already obtained another employment can still go to the union become its member and ask the union to agitate the dispute by espousing it
Such an action if permitted would cause dislocation in the industry as when the employer has in the meantime made his own arrangement by appointing a substitute in place of the dismissed workman on finding that the latter had already found other employment
The legislature the argument proceeded could not therefore have used the words at any time to mean after any length of time
From the words used in section 4k of the Act there can be no doubt that the legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to the discretion of the Government
But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication
No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Gov ernment decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended
Therefore the expression at any time
though seemingly without any limits is governed by the context in which it appears
Ordinarily the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report
But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed
In an urgent case it can at any time ie even when such proceedings have not begun
or are still pending decide to refer the dispute for adjudication
The expression at any time thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed
As already stated the expression at any time in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended
No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is hot an industrial dispute or even if it is so it no longer exists or is not apprehended forinstance where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence
In the State of Madras vs C P Sarathy1 this Court held on construction of section 1 0  1  of the Central Act that the function of the appropriate Government thereunder is an administrative function
It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication so that the industrial relations bet 1 19531 SCR 334 at 346
378 ween the employer and his employees may not continue to remain disturbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible
In the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or be cause it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference
But where it reconsiders its earlier decision it can make the reference only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard to that and no other industrial dispute
Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd vs Industrial Tribunal 
Such a view has been taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh Madras Allahabad Rajasthan Punjab and Madhya Pradesh
see Gurumurthi G V Ramulu K  Vasudeva Rao vs State of Mysore  Rawalpindi Victory Transport Co P Ltd vs State of Punjab  Champion Cycle Industries vs State of UP 5 Goodyear India Ltd Jaipur vs Industrial Tribunal 6 and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd vs Industrial Tribunal Jabalpur  7  
The reason given in these decisions is that the function of the Government either under section 10l of the Central Act or a similar provision in a State Act being administrative principles such as res judicata applicable to judicial Acts do not apply and such a principle cannot be imported for consideration when the Government first refuses to refer and later changes its mind
In fact when the Government refuses to make a reference it does not exercise its power on the other hand it refuses to exercise its power and it is only when it decides to refer that it exercises its power
Consequently the power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when it has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage
There is thus a considerable body of judicial opinion according to which so long as an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that is so the fact that it had earlier refused to exercise its power does not preclude it from exercising it at a later stage
In this view the mere fact that there has been a lapse of time or that a party to the dispute was by the earlier refusal led to believe that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference
It appears that there was a controversy before the High Court whether there was at all any espousal of the dispute by the respon 1 19681  839
2 3 4 19641 5 6 7 AIR 19691 MP 174
379 dent union and if there was at what stage
The High Court therefore got produced before it the record before the conciliation officer
Strictly speaking in a proceeding for certiorari under article 226 the record which would be produced before the High Court would be that of the Tribunal whose order is under challenge
But if the High Court got produced in the interests of justice the file of the conciliation officer which alone could show whether there was espousal by the union or not no one could reasonably object to the High Court calling for that record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the stand of the union that it had taken up the cause of respondent 3 was correct or not
As the High Court has said that file showed that on July 2 1957 one Har Sahai Singh the then President of the union had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4 1957 which was counter signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably therefore on behalf of the union
The record also indicated that on that very day ie September 4 1957 the Conciliation Officer recorded an order that the conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with as no authorised agent of the union appeared before him
Presumably the Conciliation Officer in course of time must have made his failure report
From these facts the following conclusions must emerge  1 that the Conciliation Officer had taken cognisance of the dispute 2 that he took that dispute as having been espoused by the union through its president 3 that thereupon he fixed September 4 1957 as the date for holding the conciliation proceedings and informed the parties to attend before him and 4 that as no authorised agent on behalf of the union appeared before him he recorded that the conciliation proceedings could not go on
These facts clearly go to show that the then president of the union had not made the said complaint in his personal capacity but as the president representing the union
This is borne out to a certain extent by a subsequent resolution of the executive body of the union dated February 28 1963 which recites that the executive committee of the union will continue to take up the cause of respondent 3 as it had been so far doing
But Mr Daphtary emphasised that even this resolution did not mean that the union had taken up the cause of respondent 3 as its own since the resolution uses the word pairavi  and not espousing or sponsoring the workman s cause
Pairavi according to him means acting as the agent of a party to a proceeding and not being a party to the proceeding which would be the position had the union taken up the Complaint as its own
In our view we need not look at the said resolution in so narrow a manner for the facts taken as a whole indicate that the union had in fact taken up the cause of the workman
The President evidently could not have countersigned the 380 written statement of the concerned workman and the Conciliation Officer could not have given a notice to the union to appear before him and could not have recorded that he did not proceed with the conciliation proceedings as no authorised agent of the union appeared before him unless every one understood that the union had taken up the cause of the workman
The notice dated August 2 1957 issued by the Conciliation Officer after the union President had lodged his said complaint is on record and shows that it was issued to the management and the union calling upon both of them to appoint their respective representatives on the conciliation board as required by the Government Order dated July 14 1954
It also shows that the Officer treated the dispute as having been espoused by the union as the notice recites the dispute as an industrial dispute
The subsequent facts would seem to indicate that the Govern ment declined to make the reference presumably because of the report of the Conciliation Officer that in spite of the said notice no authorised agent of the union had appeared before him and therefore no conciliation had been possible
As already stated a writ petition to compel the Government to make the reference proved unsuccessful
It may be that the respondent union may have decided to press for the reference after the concerned workman became its member
That fact however is irrelevant for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Government under section 4k
One fact however is clear that the respondent union carried on correspondence with the Labour Ministry and also passed the said resolution dated February 28 1963
The correspondence which was carried on from about November 1962 shows that the union pressed the Government to make the reference and the Government ultimately made the reference in August 1963
That correspondence further shows that the Government at one stage pointed out that the union had in 1957 failed to appear before the Conciliation Officer although it had espoused the dispute and that that fact had influenced the Government s refusal then to refer the dispute for adjudication
The union pointed out 1 that at the time when the said complaint was lodged in 1957 before the Conciliation Officer the union s president was one Varma 2 that in the meantime elections for the union s office bearers took place when the said Har Sahai Choudhury and one Girish Chandra Bharati were elected president and working president respectively  3 that the above mentioned individuals appeared before the conciliation officer but the said Varma did not as he had failed in the elections 4 that dispute arose about the said elections and the Registrar of the Trade Union  refused to recognise the new office bearers and  I that the conciliation officer also refused to recognise the said Har Sahai Choudhary and Bharati a the duly elected president and working president and therefore although both of 381 them attended the meeting fixed by that officer the latter recorded that no authorised agent of the union had appeared before him and no conciliation therefore could be arrived at
It thus appears from the correspondence that following the espousal of the said dispute by the union two of the office bearers of the union did appear before the conciliation officer but were not recognised as the authorised agents of the union on account of the said disputes about the elections
If the Government therefore had refused then to make the reference on the ground that though the union had espoused the workman s cause it had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings the Government s decision refusing to make the reference was clearly on misapprehension
If the Government subsequently found that its earlier decision was based on such a misapprehension and on facts brought to its notice it reconsiders the matter and decides to make the reference it is difficult to say that it exercised the discretion conferred on it by section 4 k in any inappropriate manner
But that does not mean that if section 4k is construed to mean that the Government can reconsider its earlier decision
such a construction would result in unions inducing workmen to join them as members or to shift their membership from one to the other rival union on promises by such union to revive disputes which are already dead or forgotten and then press the Government to make a reference in relation to them 
There is no reason to think that the Government would not consider the matter properly or allow itself to be stampeded into making references in cases of old or stale disputes or reviving such disputes on the pressure of unions
It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen
Such a consideration would we should think
be taken into account by the Government whenever in exercise of its discretion it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it
These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its juris diction under section 4k of the Act
Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and therefore in construing the expression at any time in section 4k it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it
In the present case though nearly four years had gone by since the earlier decision not to make the reference if the Government 382 was satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a mis apprehension of facts and therefore required its reconsideration neither its decision to do so nor its determination to make the reference can be challenged on the ground of want of power
The fact that the dispute between the concerned workman and the management had become an industrial dispute by its having been espoused by the union since 1957 cannot be disputed
The fact that the workman was then not a member of the union does not preclude or negative the existence of the community of interest nor can it disable the other workmen through their union from making that dispute their own
The fact that the Government refused then to exercise its power cannot mean that the dispute had ended or was in any manner resolved
In the absence of any material it Is not possible to say that with the refusal of the Government then and the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court in March 1959 the dispute which was already an industrial dispute had ceased to subsist or that on respondent 3 joining the union in July 1962 the union revived a dispute which was already dead and not in existence
His becoming a member in July 1962 was as immaterial to the power of the Government under section 4k as the fact of his not being a member at the time when his cause was espoused in 1957 by the union and the dispute becoming thereupon an industrial dispute
The question of his membership therefore haS to be kept apart from the right of the other workmen to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under section 4k
It may be that his becoming a member in 1962 may have been the cause of the union s subsequent efforts to persuade the Government to reconsider its decision and make a reference on proper facts being placed before it and its earlier misapprehensions re moved
But that again has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Government under section 4k of the Act
In our view the appellant company fails on both the points and its appeal against the High Court s decision becomes unsustainable
Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs
VPS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant terminated the service of a workman in 1957
At that time he was not a member of the respondent union
The respondent however espoused the cause of the workman and took up the matter before the Conciliation Officer
Two of the union s office bearers appeared before the Conciliation Officer but the Conciliation Officer did not recognise them as authorised agents of the union because there were some disputes regarding their election
He therefore recorded that the conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with on the ground that no authorised agent of the union appeared before him at the proceedings
The State Government assumed that though the union had espoused the workman s cause it had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings at all and refused to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication
In 1962 the workman became a member of the respondent union and the union again took up the matter with the Government
After some correspondence in which it was pointed out that in fact two officers of the union did appear at the conciliation proceedings the State Government in 1963 referred the dispute for adjudication
On the question of the validity of reference HELD  1 Under section 4k of the UP  if the State Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended it may at any time refer the dispute for adjudication
The expression of any time  does not confer an unfettered or arbitrary discretion on the Government
At whatever time the Govern ment decides to refer a dispute for adjudication there must at that time exist an industrial dispute or such a dispute must be apprehended
373 F 377 F G 2Though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute the other workmen may espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and that they are directly and substantially interested in the employment non employment or conditions of employment of the concerned workman
Therefore when the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged the test is whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest
The espousal by the other workmen may be at the time when the cause of the dispute occurs or later because the workmen may not at the time when the dispute occurs be sufficiently organised to espouse his cause or there may not have been a union at that time
Since no reference is contemplated by section 4k when the dispute is not an 371 industrial dispute or even if it is so it no longer exists or is not apprehended the existence of the community of interest evidenced by the espousal converting an individual dispute into an industrial dispute must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs
Further the community of interest does not depend on whether theconcerned workman was a member or not of the union at the date whenthe cause occurred
The question of the work man s membership has tobe kept apart from the right of the other Work men to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under section 4k
In the present case the reference was competent because the fact that the workman was not a member of the union on the date when the cause of the dispute arose did not preclude or negative the existence of
the community of interest nor did it disable the other workmen through their union from making that dispute their own
375 B E G H 376 A B D 382 A B D E Workmen vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate 1958 SCR 1156 Bombay Union of Journalists vs The Hindu Bombay
 Workmen of Indian Express P Ltd vs The Management 1969 1 SC Cases 228 and Workmen vs Dharampal Premchand  followed
Muller  Phipps India P Ltd vs Their Employees Union and Workmen vs Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Tata Iron  Steel Co Ltd  referred to
Padarthy Ratnam  Co vs industrial Tribunal  Shamsuddin vs State of Kerala 1961 1 LLJ 77 and Khadi Gramodyog Bhawan Workers  Union vs E Krishnamurthy AIR 1966 Punjab 173 overruled
3The Government s function is to refer a dispute for adjudication so thatindustrial relations may not continue to remain disturbed and not todecide the merits of the dispute
Therefore it cannot be held that once the Government has refused to refer a dispute to adjudication it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference
Where however it reconsiders its earlier decision and makes a reference it can do so only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference must be with regard to only that industrial dispute
Further though it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make a reference before doing so the Government should take into account the lapse of time and any inconvenience to the employer and should not allow itself to be stampeded into making References in cases of old or stale disputes or allow the revival of such disputes on the pressure of outside agencies
378 A C 381 B E In the present case the Government s refusal to make a reference at the earlier stage on the ground that the union had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings was based on a misapprehension
Therefore if the Government subsequently found that its earlier decision was based on such a misapprehension and on facts brought to its notice it reconsidered the matter and decided to make the reference since the dispute was still subsisting it could not be said that the exercise of the discretion was improper merely because four years had elapsed since its earlier decision not to make the reference
381 F H 382 B D 372 State of Madras vs C P Sarathy  346 and Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd vs Industrial Tribunal  839 followed
Gurumurthi vs Ramulu  Vasudeva Rao vs State of Mysore  Rawalpindi Victory Transport Co P Ltd vs State of Punjab 1964 1 LLJ 644 Champion Cycle Industries vs State of UP  Goodyear India Ltd Jaipur vs Industrial Tribunal and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd vs Industrial Tribunal AIR 1969 MP 174 approved