Criminal Appeal Nos
259 64 of 1987
From the Judgment and Order dated 204
1987 of the Designated Court Ahmedabad in Terrorist Criminal Case No 3 of 1985 with Terrorist Criminal Case Nos 13 of 1985 and 6 of 1986
TU Mehta AS Quereshi Salman Khurshid SH Kureshi Mrs Vimla Sinha Ifshad Ahmed Imtiaz Ahmed Gopal Singh and SM Qureshi for the Appellants
PS Poti MN Shroff Anip Sachthey Bimal Roy Kai lash Vasdev Ms A Subhashini Chava Badri Nath Babu Girish Chandra Biman Jad and Ashish Verma for the Respond ents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RM SAHAI J
Tragic trauma of ghastly in human and beastly behaviour of one community against another depicted for weeks and weeks in this criminal appeal forcefully at times emotionally still hangs heavily
What a tragedy Eight human lives roasted alive
Five in waiting for gal lows
Neighbours residing peacefully for generations sharing common happiness and sorrow even playing cricket together suddenly went mad
Blood thirsty for each other
Burning looting and killing became order of the day
Even ladies attempted to prevent fire brigade from extinguishing fire
How pathetic and sad
Still sadder was the manner in which the machinery of law moved
From accusation in the charge sheet that accused were part of unlawful assembly of 1500 to 2100 the number came down to 150 to 200 in evidence and the charge was framed against sixty three under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act 1985 in brief TADA Act and various offences including Section 302 under Indian Penal Code
Even from that fifty six were acquitted either because there was no evidence and if there was evidence against some it was not sufficient to warrant their conviction
What an affront to fundamental rights and human dignity
Liberty and freedom of these persons was in chains for more than a year
For no reason
One even died in confinement
All this generated a little emotion during submissions
But sentiments or emotions howsoever strong are neither relevant nor have any place in a court of law
Acquittal or conviction depends on proof 111 or otherwise of the criminological chain which invariably comprises of why where when how and who
Each knot of the chain has to be proved beyond shadow of doubt to bring home the guilt
Any crack or loosening in it weakens the prosecu tion
Each link must be so consistent that the only con clusion which must follow is that the accused is guilty
Although guilty should not escape
But on reliable evidence truthful witnesses and honest and fair investigation
No free man should be amerced by framing or to assuage feelings as it is fatal to human dignity and destructive of social ethical and legal norm
Heniousness of crime or cruelty in its execution howsoever abhorring and hateful cannot reflect in deciding the guilt
Misgiving also prevailed about appreciation of evi dence
Without adverting to submissions suffice it to men tion that credibility of witnesses has to be measured with same yardstick whether it is an ordinary crime or a crime emanating due to communal frenzy
Law does not make any distinction either in leading of evidence or in its assess ment
Rule is one and only one namely if depositions are honest and true Whether the witnesses who claim to have seen the incident in this case withstand this test is the issue But before that some legal and general questions touching upon veracity of prosecution version may be dis posed of
Trial under TADA Act was assailed both because of the Act being ultra vires of the fundamental right guaranteed under Constitution and absence of circumstances justifying its extension to the State of Gujarat
For the latter no foundation was laid therefore it was not permitted to be raised
And the former is awaiting adjudication before Constitution Bench from where this appeal was got delinked
Invoking of provisions of TADA Act in communal riot was attacked and it was submitted that a combined reading of Sections 3 and 4 with explanation indicated that the Legis lative intention was to confine the applicability of the Act to secessionist or insurgency activities against the State and not to ordinary crimes for which provisions exist in the Penal Code
Since the Constitution Bench is already ceased of the matter we are of the opinion that these aspects too can well be raised there
From acquittal of thirty seven accused for lack of evidence even though they were arrested in rounding off operation by the military after cordoning off the area immediately after the incident it was vehemently argued that it demonstrated that prosecution was not fair and there was deliberated attempt to rope in appellants who were well to do persons of the community not because they had any hand in 112 the crime but for extraneous reasons
It was emphasised that if persons arrested on the spot residing in the same locali ty could not be identified nor any evidence could be pro duced against them then it was clear that the case against the appellants was also not trustworthy and they were impli cated either because of enemity or for oblique motive
Although the argument did appear to be attractive on the first flush but it was dispelled soon by the learned counsel appearing for the State who submitted that the mistake in charge sheeting those accused along with appellant was bloated out of proportion
According to him the incident for which the appellants have been convicted and sentenced was part of a different transaction although it took place on the same day than the incident in which thirty seven per sons were rounded off
The learned counsel explained with help of Colonel Sudhakar PW 21 s statement and in our opinion rightly that these arrests were made in conse quence of action taken by the military on a different mob as it included many ladies who did not form part of earlier mob while attempting to bring situation under control after the incident
Therefore it is not possible to draw any adverse inference against prosecution on this score
Time place background and manner in which dastardly crime was committed on 9th June 1985 in broad daylight at 230 pm was by and large not in dispute
What started as agitation in February 1985 against government policy of reservation in the State of Ahmedabad turned into communal riots between Hindus and Muslims in March 1985 which went on continuously for long spell resulting in enormous loss of life and property of both the communities
Situation deteriorated so much that military had to be called and stationed in sensitive areas in April 1985 including Dhabgarwad a large area with Hindus and Muslims residing at places side by side and others exclusively
In March 1985 riot of shocking magnitude had taken place in this area resulting in mass exodus of Dabgars a Hindu community who earned their livelihood by manufacturing musical instruments such as drums and also umbrellas and kites
When calm was partially restored due to the military being stationed some of them returned and some used to visit their houses in day time to look after their property or business
Maniben a dabgar whose one of the daughters had married a muslim but was having strained relations with him continued to live in her house either because she had no other place to go or she was confident that she shall not be harmed
Howev er despite stationing of military incidents went on whenever or wherever least opportunity was available with the result that curfew was clamped continuously in the area from 7th June 1985
As ill luck would have it the military stationed in 113 the area left for some other place at about 130 pm on 9th June 1985
Taking advantage of the vulnerability due to absence of military
members of minority community converged from two sides and when they intermingled in the corner somewhere near the house of Maniben or electric power sub station they indulged in most cowardly and shameful act of pushing open the door of her house setting fire to it and then chaining it from outside resulting in death of the lady her two daughters
four grand children and son of a neighbour
Next house set ablaze was of Navin and then many others
Prosecution version can thus be divided in three parts one entry of mob from two sides one from Magadom Pole and other kalupur Panchpatti shouting kill  cut  pelting stones throwing acid bulbs and flambeaus on houses of Hindus while approaching towards Nani Ali Pole
The second was meeting of the two groups on the corner of Nani Ali Pole and then pushing open the door of Maniben s house by five appellants armed with burning flambeau iron pipe stick kerosene and bottle of petrol sprinkling of kerosene or petrol inside the house setting it ablaze then coming out of the house closing and shutting the door and chaining it from outside
The third was entry of appellants thereafter in the house of Navin setting it on fire and then entering in Nani Ali Pole with other members of mob and attacking houses of Kantilal Kalidas and others
To prove it the prosecution examined twenty two witness es which were grouped by the trial judge in seven 
One and the main group consisted of Navin PW 1 Ambalal PW 8 Rati lal PW 9 and Kalidas PW 13
These were the witnesses who were said to have collected at the house of Ambalal from where they witnessed the occurrence and the participation of the appellants in it
The second group consisted of Kalidas PW 7 Ramanlal PW 10 Manchharam PW 12 who were said to have witnessed the incident from the house of Kalidas Chha ganlal
The third group consisted of Arun Kumar PW I 1 Jaswantlal PW 14 Dilip Kumar PW 17 and Sanmukhbhai PW 20 who were witnesses who are said to have arrived on hearing the shouts and commotion and witnessed the occurrence from near Dabgarwad Police gate
The other groups comprised of official witnesses
No witness was examined from any of the house situated on either side of road from where the two mobs entered or from any of the houses situated on the route through which the
mob passed before it reachedthe comer of Nani Ali Pole to establish identity of accused
Mod which entered from Magadom Pole side was admitted by 114 Ambalal to have passed fromthe front of his house
But he stated that he could not recognise anyone out of them
Appellants according to prosecution were in the mob which came from Kalupur Panchpatti
From the place from where the mob entered and to the corner of Nani Ali Pole the mob had to pass from a long route which is inhabited by houses on both sides but not one witness was produced from any of these house nor it was clearly brought out that inmates of all these houses were of minority community only
For the second group of witnesses who according to prosecution saw the occurrence from the house top of Kanti Lal the Judge himself found that they were not in a position to see the road in front of house of Navin nor they were in a position to see the road in front of house of Maniben
He therefore observed that so far evidence of these witnesses in respect of attack by the mob on house of Maniben and Navin was concerned it could be relevant only generally that they set fire to the house
That is they could not be taken to be witnesses to prove that appellants broke open the door of Maniben s house or set fire to it or chained it from outside
Nor is the evidence of third group of witnesses helpful as they had collected near the gate of police outpost
Distance between the gate and place of incident appears to be not less than 200 to 250 feet
Moreover they collected after the house of Maniben was set on fire
And it was admitted by PW 1 8 9 and 13 that the house of Navin Kantilal Ambalal could not be seen from police outpost
Their testimony thus cannot be taken into account for prov ing second part of the incident which resulted in death of inmates of Maniben s house
Fate of the appellants therefore hangs on credibility of first group of witnesses
For its better appreciation it is necessary to set out topography of the place of the incident
From the map it is clear that the house of Maniben alongwith cluster of six other houses in surrounded on all sides by lanes and roads
Immediately above her house is house of Navin in North
Then there are two houses parallel to each other in south of her house
There are three more houses one after the other in south
On west side of these is lane
So is a lane in north side after which there is electric sub station
On the left of substation there is gap and then there is one house and in its north is the house of Kantilal
On the east of Maniben s house is the Dabgarwad road which runs somewhat in semi circle running from Kalupur Panchpatti situated in extreme south east towards west taking turn from near Dabgarwad Police outpost in the South moving up towards 115 north east in angle tilting slightly from somewhere near cluster of houses round Maniben s house and then proceeding towards Daryapur
House of Ambalal from where first set of witnesses had seen the occurrence is on this road from where the road tilts
It was admitted by PW 1 that house of Amba lal was obliquely situated
That is clear from the map as well
If from the two ends of the house south and north facing the road straight lines are drawn towards west they shall pass through the lane in front of Navin s house and power station respectively
Navin PW 1 whose house is situ ated in north of Maniben s house admitted that electric sub station was in front of Ambalal s house
Rati Lal PW 9 stated that on one side of the road was his house and on other of Ambalal
The house of Ambalal was thus above Mani ben s house towards north east
To bring home the guilt the prosecution was required to prove the presence of witnesses possibility of seeing the incident by them and identification of the appellants
Importance of first arose as due to riots in March 1985 there was mass exodus of Hindus from Dabgatwad
Therefore presence of these witnesses was attempted to be challenged as curfew having been imposed from 7th June and Col Sudha kar PW 21 incharge of Military stationed in the area having stated that no passes were issued to anyone it was not probable that any of the witnesses who claim to have seen the occurrence could have been present
But it appears to be devoid of any merit in view of unimpeachable testimony of the witnesses that they were present in their houses either because they had come earlier after restoration of partial calm or they had come on the day of occurrence to see their business and they were not prevented by the police even if they did not have any pass
The Judge had examined this aspect in detail and found from various circumstances namely restoration of partial calm due to presence of military personnel death of eight persons in Maniben s house including children rescuing of many persons trapped in the house of Kalidas Chhagan which too was set on fire admission by accused in their statements under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code etc
that presence of these witness es could not be doubted
Further if the Dabgads had not returned and the area was deserted then where was the occa sion for the mob to indulge in this vendetta
But mere presence of witnesses was not sufficient
More important was if they saw the incident
It assumed impor tance due to two reasons one because entire set of witnesses saw the incident from house of Ambalal which was situated upwards on the road towards north east as compared to the house of Maniben and second that each 116 of the witnesses including Ambalal admitted that the exteri or of Maniben s or even Navin s house could not be seen from interior of the house
From the location of Ambalal s house it is clear that one could see front of Maniben s house only if he stood in front of it with face towards west south
But that is not the prosecution case
In fact prosecution is silent on this aspect
There is no whisper of the place from where the incident was seen by the witnesses
Was it front of house of Ambalal or inside or roof
Prosecution did not make any effort to remove this defect obviously because the investigation itself suffered from this flaw
Although the defence also did not make any attempt to get it clari fied may be as a part of clever design as to from where these witnesses saw the occurrence but the disadvantage if any is of prosecution
As stated earlier this was very relevant as every witness admitted that from interior of Ambalal s house the front of neither Maniben s nor Navin s house could be seen
Evidence thus regarding possibility of seeing the appellant from house of Ambalal is very shaky
The prosecution left an important lacuna
Unfortunately each witness  not only stated that he saw the appellants but they went on to describe with remarkable similarity in detail the article which each accused had in his hand What is surprising is that accused had come from Kalupur side therefore they could not have been seen prior to their arrival near electric sub station before which everyone had entered house of Ambalal yet it is they and they alone who could be identified from the entire mob
PW 1 admitted that when he rushed from his house in fear the mob of Kalupur side was 40 or 50 feet away
He also admitted that he saw these accused for the first time from the house of Ambalal from a distance of 20 feet
No subsequent witness tried to explain it
Others had reached admittedly prior to Navin
Therefore they could not have had occassion to see the Kalupur mob and if they saw then it must have been at a longer distance
Statement of PW 9 therefore that the appellants were leading the mob is very difficult to be accepted
And if they saw for the first time from house of Ambalal as stated by Navin and not improved upon by others then it is very difficult to accept that they could have identified these appellants
PW 1 further admitted that if anyone stood with his face towards house of Maniben his then his back only could be visible from Ambalal s house
That is clear from map as well
Therefore identification of accused from out of the mob even if they were known from before becomes highly doubtful
Out of persons who had collected at house of Ambalal only four were examined
It was admitted by every witness that the last to enter 117 the house were Navin and his father
Time of entry as given by witnesses was before mixing of the mob at the corner except Ambalal who stated that he came after the mob had collected
But that appears to be improbable as he was so scared that he ran with his father without even closing door of his house
And if he would have come out when mob had collected then it is difficult to believe that he would have been spared when his house too was burnt
Navin was the first witness to be examined
He stated categorically that when he entered the house of Ambalal it was closed from inside
It was attempted to be improved upon by Ambalal who stated that he kept the door ajar
But apart from normal human behaviour to close the door for protection in the background of incident of March and fear generated by shout of kill  and cut  the other witnesses PW 9 and PW 13 too stated that the door was closed after entry of Navin
In any case the incident having taken place after entry of Navin and the door having been closed thereafter or even ajar or half closed it was necessary for prosecution to establish how did the witnesses see the occurrence when they admitted that the exterior of Maniben s house or even of Navin could not be seen from inside of Ambalal s house
The deficiency in prosecution version was attempted to be explained by the judge by adverting to evidence of PW 13 that Ambalal was opening and closing the door every now and then therefore there was nothing improbable in witnesses having seen the occurrence
But the approach was both faulty and illegal
The conclusion by picking up isolated sentence without adverting to other parts of his statement where he admitted that after entry of all the doors of the house were closed and he was able to identify the appellants when they were effecting entry in house of Maniben and that he did not identify anyone out of the mob till he entered the house of Ambalal was contrary to rule of appreciation of evidence
Reading the whole statement together makes it consistent with evidence of other witnesses and leaves no room for doubt that opening and closing the door was resort ed to let in the persons who were reaching house of Ambalal due to fear of mob
And the exercise of opening and closing being over after entry of Navin seeing the mob or identify ing the accused in process of opening and closing was out of question
The finding of the judge thus that it is not as if that once the door of the house of Ambalal was closed it was never opened again at any time before these persons escaped from the house of Ambalal  
Therefore even though the house of Ambalal is slightly obliquely situated as compared to the house of Maniben it would not at all be difficult for these witnesses who had hid themselves in the house of Ambalal to have correctly identified the accused  is not based on appreciation of evidence but on imagination
118 Thus prosecution version suffered from serious infirmi ty
Its failure to bring on record evidence which could establish the possibility or even probability of the witness seeing the occurrence demolishes the whole structure
Since it was admitted to all the PWs that the exterior of Mani ben s house could not be seen from interior of Ambalal s house the prosecution could succeed in establishing its case only if it could prove that witnesses even then could have seen the occurrence
The only possibility of seeing the occurrence could be either from the road or standing in front of Ambalal s shop or if there was any source from inside house of Ambalal
Evidence is lacking for either
Possibility of the first two alternative from where incident could have been seen is out of question
Witnesses were so terrified due to incident of March 1985 that they could not remain outside
PW 1 was so afraid that he rushed with his father without even closing door of his house
And if he would have come out when mob had reached house of Maniben was stated by Ambalal then there would have been every possibility of his being attacked
PW 9 and 13 too were afraid and rushed to Ambalal s house
Every time these witnesses reached the door was opened and after entry it was closed
Last man to enter was Navin Chandra
No witness has stated that it was opened thereafter even once to look outside
How did then these witnesses see pushing open of Maniben s door by appellants setting fire to her house and chaining from outside
It was for prosecution to explain
It could not be taken for granted merely because each witness repeated that they knew the appellant from childhood and each of them was armed with articles mentioned in their hand
Ambala1 did state that the door of his shop had seven planks joined by hinges
But the prosecution stopped there
It did not dare to come out with the case that the witnesses saw from the crevices
Therefore the prosecution version suffered from a lacuna which was fatal
The doubt thus created if the witnesses saw the occurrence at a11 is strengthened by subsequent conduct and behaviour of these witnesses
The prosecution version was that the moment the mob moved from house of Maniben to house of Navin Chandra towards Nani Ali Pole side the witness came out of Ambalal s house and dashed towards police gate where large number of persons had collected
But strangely not one of them told it to anyone present there or even to police personnel that Maniben s house was burnt by appellants
It was against normal human behaviour as all the appellants were known from before
The incident had taken place due to communal frenzy
It is therefore difficult to believe that once these witnesses reached Dabgarwad Police gate they would not have shouted at top of their voice that the appellants known as Lallewallas had killed Maniben
What is further surprising is that they did not disclose the 119 names even to Manchharam whose son had been burnt alive in house of Maniben nor to anyone in the hospital and kept their mouth sealed till 11th June 1985 and opened it for the first time in the Police Station when their statement was recorded giving graphic description step by step
Not only that the PW 9 and 13 broke down in cross examination and admitted that they had not seen the appellants setting fire to the house of either Maniben or Navin
They were saying so by inference as they had seen smoke coming from the houses
Thus witnesses and circumstances both are against prosecu tion version
Although there are contradiction on material aspects in statement of these witnesses and arguments were addressed on late recording of evidence failure to produce the Chief Fire Officer to establish if house was chained from outside delay in preparation of panchnama of Mani ben s house etc
but we consider it unnecessary to discuss them as the prosecution in our opinion failed to prove beyond shadow of doubt that the dreadful crime was committed by appellants
There is thus no option but to acquit these accused
We however hope that our order shall bring good sense to members of both the communities residing in Dabgar wad and make them realise the disaster which such senseless riots result in and they shall in future take steps to avoid recurrence of such incidents and try to resort to the atmos phere that prevailed before March 1985
For the reasons stated above all these appeals succeed and are allowed
Reference No 1 of 1987 for confirmation of death sentence is discharged
The conviction and sentences of appellants herein under section 32i of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act 1985 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 302 Indian Penal Code read with sections 34436149 449 143 and 148 of Indian Penal Code are set aside
The conviction and sentence of Haroon So Kalubhai Laliwala under section 32ii of the TADA Act 1985 is also set aside
The appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith unless they are required in any other connection
RSS Appeals allowed


Summary:
The appellant a retired army subedar and also a dis placed person from west Pakistan purchased the Land in public auction conducted by The Rehabilitation Department by offering the highest bid of Rs9500
The laud in dispute measured 7 Kanals  4 Marlas and was owned by one Vinod Kumar
Having paid the purchase money with the sincere hope of his rehabilitation he had to be in protracted litigation for 22 years during which he earned nothing out of the land because the State did not honour its final commitment made in the sale certificate in favour of the appellant
The State confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant in 1969 but issued sale certificate on 23 June 1973 being effective from September 15 1969 without waiting for the final out come of the second respondent s revision application to the Chief Settlement Commissioner and further consequent pro ceedings thereon
It was submitted by the second respondent that the said land was in his cultivatory possession since 1956 and as per public records he was sub lessee under Budha Singh Lessee and the Lease in favour of Budha Singh was cancelled in 1958 by the Rehabilitation Department and thereafter he became a sub tenant holding over on the date he applied for allotment in 1961 under Rule 34C of the Rules
The decision rejecting his first application was not communicated to him
So he made his second application which was rejected by The Chief Settlement Officer vide his order dated July 24th 1969
Then he moved a revision application before the Chief Set tlement Commissioner who remanded the case to the Managing Officer for fresh decision by his order dated July 29 1970
The second respondent s second application was rejected on March 22 1973
The second appeal to the Settlement Commis sioner was also rejected on May 13 1973 as he could not prove his continuous cultivator possession as a sub lessee under Budha Singh from January 1956 till the termination of the latter s lease
Thereafter second 15 respondent instituted a suit against Budha Singh for decla ration of his continuous possession of the land and got a decree in his favour as being in continuous possession of the land
The second respondent again filed a revision against the appellate order of the Settlement Commissioner which was remanded to the Managing officer and he got land allotted under Rule 34C of the Rules vide order dated January 6th 1978
The appellant s appeal therefrom was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner but in his revision application therefrom the allotment order in favour of the second respondent was quashed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner vide his order dated January 1 1979 declaring the appellant to be the auction purchaser and therefore the true owner of the Land
The second respondent s revision was rejected by the Financial Commissioner on Oct 23 1979
Thus all au thorities in the successive rounds found the facts against the second respondent
Therefore the second respondent filed a writ petition challenging the Financial Commissioner s order in the High Court
High Court remanded the case to the Financial Commis sioner for fresh decision on January 7 1983
The Financial Commissioner vide his order February 2 1988 held that the second respondent was eligible for allotment of land under rule 34C of the rules holding that being a sub lessee in continuous possession since January 1 1956 and thereafter he had a superior claim to the allotment of the land and quashed the auction sale made in favour of the appellant on August 11 1967
The Financial Commissioner found that since 1953 to 1961 the second respondent was in possession of the land and again in 1964 65 65 66 the records also bore out this fact
The absence of records for 1961 62 62 63 due to their illegibility due to mutilation should not be held against him and his continuous possession since 1962 can be presumed entitling him to an allotment under Rule 34 C of the Rules
This was a conclusion on facts which the High Court declined to interfere with and dismissed the appellant s writ peti tion in limine on August 24 1988
Allowing the Appeal the Court HELD In the instant case the appellant as a bone fide purchaser of the disputed land for value at public auction under Rule 34H of the rules on August 11 1967 should have been put in the same position which he would have been had his auction purchase as evidenced by the 16 Sale Certificate been effective from the date of purchase
Rule 90 of the Rules prescribes the procedure for sale of property by public auction
Sub rule 15 of Rule 90 provides for issue of sale certificate and Rule 92 prescribes the procedure for setting aside the sale
but once the sale certificate was issued in favour of the appellant he became the true owner and it had the effect of taking away the land from pool of evacuee properties and thereafter so long that was not cancelled according to law it was not open to the Rehabilitation Department to deal with the sale
The diffi culty in the present case has arisen because the State confirmed the sale in favour of the appellant in 1969 whereas it issued sale certificate to him on June 231973 with effect from September 15 1969 without waiting for the final outcome of the second respondent s revision applica tion to the Chief Settlement Commissioner  further proceed ings thereafter
Thus the odd situation resulted in creating equities favour of both the parties with no fault of the appellant or the second respondent
If the State had held over the auction until the second respondent s application had been finally disposed of or had held the auction subject to the result of the application the second respondent could have challenged the auction in favour of the appellant but perhaps misguidedly he was concentrating on getting an allotment under section 34C
So both the parties had to suffer and indulge in lengthy protracted litigation for 22 years
Had the Rehabilitation authorities acting under the Act and the Rules decided the competing claims of the appel lant as well as the second respondent as to the disputed land and provided an equal extent of land with equal bene fits to both the parties justice may appear to be done but that being uncertain the availability of land being limited
the court can only look towards equity for solution
The dilemma that equity is to be better than justice and yet not quite opposed to justice but rather a kind of justice and the distinction between commutative justice and distributive justice discussed
24E F I I 23G H 26B 25C Passages from justinian gustav Radbrach Aristotle and Cardozo referred to
Considering the facts the extent of land and the pur poses of the Act and the Rules and the reality that land must have become scarce and much more expensive than in 1967 to meet the ends of justice on the basis of facts the Court directed that the disputed land be divided by the Financial Commissioner into two equal halves and one half and one half be given possession of to the appellant by dint of his being auction purchaser and the other half be allotted and given possession of to the second respondent under Rule 34C of the Rules
This order be carried out accordingly within three months
26C D 17