Appeal No 4568 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 30189 of the Punjab  Haryana High Court in LPA No 1251 of 1987
WITH CA Nos 4569 468691 482 M Chandra Sekhar Additional Solicitor General GL Sanghi Hatbans Lal Har Dev Singh SP Goyal Harinder Pal Singh Ms Naresh Bakshi SM Sarin PN Puff MK Dua Ms Madhu Moolchandani Manoj Swamp DrMs Meera Agarwal RC Mishra MN Krislmamam KP Sunder Rao Attar Singh SN Terdal Hemant Sharma TC Sharma ND Garg Ms Kusum Chowdhary and SP Sarin for the appearing parties
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA J
Leave granted
Counsel heard
As the controversy before us is a limited one and relates only to the question of granting of benefit of the provisions of Section 231 A introduced into the Land Acquisition Act 1894 hereinafter referred to as the said Act by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 referred to hereinafter as the Amendment Act of 1984 only a few facts are necessary for the appreciation of the submissions made before us
This appeal arising out of SLP Civil No 14297 of 1990 by Special Leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No1251 of 1987
The other appeals before us are connected appeals filed by the Union of India or the claimants
The respondent was the owner of a piece of land in one of the villages in District Bhatinda in Punjab
Land admeasuring 74375 acres situated in various villages in Bhatinda District including the land of the respondent was acquired by the appellants under the said Act
The Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act were published on May 101979 and March 27 1981 re spectively
The Special Land Collector made and declared his award of compensation in respect of the acquisition of the said land and several other plots of land on March 311981
Being aggrieved by the said award the respondent and other landowners filed Reference applications under Section 18 of the said Act which were decided by the learned District Judge concerned in 1985 and 1986
The land acquired was classified into various grades and compensation awarded accordingly
In the case before us and several other similar cases the benefits under Section 231 A of the said Act were granted to the land owners
The State appealed to the High Court
In several other cases where the land owners were not satisfied with the compensation awarded including the cases where the benefits conferred by Section 231 A were not awarded the land owners filed appeals before the High Court
483 What is relevant for our purpose is that a learned Single Judge of the High Court confirmed the grant of bene fits under Section 231 Aof the said Act where such bene fits had been granted by the learned District Judge and awarded the same where that had not been done by the learned District Judge
Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the State being dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Single Judge
It was submitted on behalf of the Union of India before the Division Bench deciding the Letters Patent Ap peals that the claimantsland owners were not entitled to the benefit of Section 231 A of the said Act introduced by the said Amendment Act 1984 as aforestated
It was submit ted on behalf of the appellants that the right to get addi tional amount at the rate of 12 per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of Notification under Section 4 of the said Act and till the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession whichever is earlier conferred under the provisions of Section 231 A of the said Act was available only in cases where the Collector made his award after 30th day of April 1982 being the date of the introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 in the House of the People whereas in the present case the Collector had made his award on March 31 1981
Reliance was placed on the Judgment of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Punjab vs Krishan Lal AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 222
The Divi sion Bench repelled this contention and pointed out that the learned Chief Justice HN Seth who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishan Lal s case supra had explained that judgment in the subsequent decision rendered in Maya Devi and Others vs The Union Territory of Chandigarh Punjab Law Journal 1988 189
and pointed out that the land owner was entitled to the additional amount in terms of Section 231 A of the Amendment Act of 1984 if the proceedings for determination of compensation were decided after September 24 1984 and since the Regular First Appeal in respect of the proceedings for determination of the compensation was decided after September 24 1984 the Court while adjudi cating upon the amount of compensation payable to the claim ant was bound to grant the additional amount in terms of Section 231 A of the said Act
The Division Bench in its impugned judgment gave to the claimant the benefit of the added amount referred to in Section 231 A of the said Act
The same submissions have been made on behalf of the respective parties before us
Before discussing the submissions of the respective parties it would not be out of place to set out the rele vant provisions of the said Act
The said Act namely the Land Acquisition Act 1894 provides for compulsory acquisition of land
The term Award  has not been defined in 484 the said Act
Sub clause d of Section 3 the definition section defines the expression Court  as follows dthe expression Court  means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed as it is hereby empowered to do a special judi cial officer within any specified local limits to perform the function of the Court under this Act  Part II of the said Act deals with the question of acquisition of land
Section 11 of the said Act deals with the enquiry and award of compensation by the Collector
Section 11 A which was introduced into the said Act by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 Act No68 of 1984 provides for the period within which the award shall be made
Generally speaking it prescribes that the period for making the award is limited to two years and the section provides that if the award is not made within that period the entire proceedings for acquisition of land shall lapse
There is a proviso to the said section and an Explanation but it is not necessary to consider the same for the purpose of this case
Sub section 1 of Section 18 which is includ ed in Part III of the said Act runs as follows 18
Reference to Court 1 Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determina tion of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land the amount of compensation the person to whom it is pay able or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested Section 23 deals with the matters to be considered by the Court for determining the compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the said Act
We may mention here that under the general scheme of the said Act the landowner whose land has been acquired is entitled to be paid the market value of the land acquired as prevailing at the time of the publication of the notification under Section 4 issued together with the solatium at the prescribed rate in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition
Prior to the coming into effect of the Amendment Act of 1984 solatium was fixed at the rate of 15 per centum
Sub section 1 A which was introduced into Section 23 of the said Act by the Amendment Act of 1984 runs as follows In addition to the market value of the land as above provided the Court shall in every case award an amount calcu 485 lated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publi cation of the notification under Section 4 subsection 1 in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier
 By the said Amendment Act of 1984 the expression thirty per centum was substituted in place of the expression fifteen per centum in sub section 2 of Section 23 of the said Act
Sub section 2 of Section 23 now runs as follows 2 In addition to the market value of the land as above provided the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition lmo
These amendments were effected in the Land Acquisition Act the said Act by the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 the Amendment Act of 1984 as set out earlier
Sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 30 of the Amendment Act of 1984 run as follows 30 Transitional Provisions 1 The provisions of sub section 1 A of Section 23 of the principal Act as inserted by Clause a of Section 15 of this Act shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to a every proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April 1982 the date of intro duction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill 1982 in the House of the People in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date b every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the com mencement of this Act
2 The provisions of sub section 2 of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act as amended by Clause b of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively shall apply and shall be deemed to have applied also to and in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against 486 any such award under the provisions of the principal Act later the 30th day of April 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill
1982 in the House of the People and before the commence ment of this Act
 emphasis supplied by us On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed by learned Counsel on the decision of this Court in Union of India and Others vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama 1990 1 SCC 277
The respondent on the other hand placed strong reliance on the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P Sardesai and etc
vs Government of Goa Daman Diu and Another etc AIR 1987 Bombay 214
On the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the Bombay High Court it was submitted by the respondentclaim ant that a wide and liberal interpretation should be given to the provisions of sub section 1 A of section 23 and the amount calculated as set out in the said sub section awarded in all cases where any proceeding was pending in any court including the High Court or this Court in connection with the determination of compensation for the land acquired
We may mention that both the parties referred us to the deci sion of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India and Another etc
vs Raghuvir Singh dead by Lrs etc  We propose to discuss these decisions a little later but before doing so we propose to analyse the relevant provisions of the said Act and the effect thereof
A perusal of the provisions of sub section 1 A of Section 23 makes it clear that the said sub section deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub section in the circumstances set out therein
Similarly sub section 2 of Section 23 also confers a substantive right on the claimant to a higher solatium
Under the well settled rules of interpretation the said provisions of the said Act being substantive in nature can have only prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are couched read in the context shows that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospec tive effect to them
The language of sub section lA of Section 23 shows that a duty is cast on the court tO award an amount calculated as stated therein in addition to the market value of the land acquired for the period commencing from the date of the publication of the Section 4 Notifica tion to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession whichever is earlier
Emphasis supplied The expression award used in section 23 I A suggests that the 487 intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said subsection applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award or the Trial Court heating the Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub section on September 30 1984
The expression award is to be distinguished from the expression decree and hence it appears that in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the said Act the provisions of sub section would not come into play where the award had been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the Refer ence Court but ton the date of coming into effect of the said sub section an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a court
In that case the Court would not be awarding any amount but would be making a decree for an amount
By reason of the provision of section 301a of the Amendment Act of 1984 the provisions of section 231 A of the said Act were by a deeming provision made also ap plicable to every proceeding for the acquisition of land under the said Act where the Collector had not made his award by April 301982
On a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 23 1 A read with section 301a of the Amendment Act of 1984 an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in section 231 A is also payable in those cases where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 30 1982 even in cases where the court might have made its award before September 24 1984
It is true that the aforesaid construction we are giving to the provisions of Section 231 A and Section 301a will in a sense limit the benefits strictly conferred by Section 301a to only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984 but in our view that cannot be helped as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of the clear language used in the relevant provisions
We are of the opinion that we would not be justified in giving an unduly restricted meaning to the provisions of Section 231 A unwarranted by the plain language of that sub section as appears to have been done in the case of Union of India and Others vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama discussed more particularly hereinaf ter in order to give a wider meaning of the provisions of Section 301a
Section 231 A refers clearly to the duties of the Court
As we have already pointed out the court is defined by Section 3d as the principal court of original jurisdiction except in the circumstances set out in the said sub section which would be the court having jurisdiction to decide the reference under Section 18 of the said Act
There is therefore no warrant to read in the place of the word 488 Court in Section 231 A the word Collector
Moreover the decision of such a court determining compensation is regarded as an award under the said Act
In the light of these provisions there is no warrant to give an unduly restricted meaning to Section 231 A of the said Act as pointed out above
Coming now to the decisions cited before us we find that in the case before the Full Bench of the Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P Sardesai and etc
vs Govern ment of Goa Daman and Diu and Another etc
AIR 1987 Bombay 214 the facts were that the Notification under Section 4 of the said Act was published on October 3 1969 in the Gov ernment Gazette of the Government of Goa
The Notification under Section 6 was published on June 10 1971 The Land Acquisition Officer declared his award on August 2 1972
All these events undoubtedly occurred prior to April 30 1982
However on a Reference made under Section 18 of the said Act on December 24 1973 the Civil Court investigated the claim and gave its award on June 24 1985
The award was therefore made by the Court not before April 30 1982 but after September 30 1984 when the provisions of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 1984 had already come into effect
It was therefore strictly speaking not necessary for the court to make any observation regarding the legal position in a case where both the Collector as well as the Court in a Reference under Section 18 had made their respective awards before April 301982
Moreover we find that the judgment appears to proceed on a somewhat unwarranted assumption
This is clear from the following observations which appear at paragraph 5 of the aforesaid Report p 217 It is not in dispute that where on the date of the commencement of the amending Act any proceedings for determination of compensation were pending before the Collector under Sec tion 11 of the Act or before the Court under reference under Section 18 of the Act or before the High Court in appeal under Section 54 of the Act then the amended section 23 I A would be applicable to such proceedings in absence of subsection 1 of Section 30
 In our view it was erroneously taken as undisputed that had the provisions of sub section 1 of Section 30 not been in existence the provisions of the amended section 231 A would have applied to a case where the Collector as well as the Court had already made their award before April 30 1982 but an appeal was pending in the High Court on April 30 1982 or on the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act
As we have already pointed out the cor rectness of this as 489 sumption is very much in dispute before us
In these circum stances we find ourselves unable to accept as correct the view taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court to the extent that it extends the operation of the provisions of section 231 A even to cases where the Collector as well as the Reference Court had made their awards before April 30 11982 in the case before the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P Sardesai and etc
vs Government of Goa Daman and Diu and Another etc AIR 1987 Bombay 214
As far as the decision of a Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in Union of India and Others vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama 1990 1 SCC 277 strongly relied upon by the appellants is concerned we find that in that case the Land Acquisition Officer made his award determining the compensation on March 5 1969
On a reference under Section 18 the Civil Court made its award on May 28 1985 that is even after Septem ber 241984 when the Amendment Act of 1984 came into ef fect
The view taken by the Division Bench is that as the Collector had made his award before April 30 1982 then the additional amount referred to in section 23 1 A could not be awarded
This view has been taken on the basis that sub section 1b of Section 30 of the said Act provides that the provisions of section 231 A shall be applicable to every acquisition proceeding commenced after April 3 O 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made the award on or before September 24 1984 and that sub section 1 of Section 30 does not refer to court award and the court award is used only in sub section 2 of Section 30
See para 21 of the said report
We find that on the plain language of section 231 A itself which we have set out earlier the duty was cast on the Court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed therein which would mean that it is directed to be awarded by the court namely the Reference Court in all cases which are pending before that court on September 11984
Sub section 1a of Section 30 undoubtedly lays down that the provi sions of section 231 A of the Act are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the said Act pending on April 30 1982 where no award had been made by the Collector before that date
At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred to in section 23 1 A could not be awarded where the Col lector had made his award before April 30 1982
But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits avail able to the claimants on a plain reading of section 231 A
This is clear from the use of the word also in the opening pan of section 301
In our opinion the view taken by the Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow and unduly cuts down the operation of the benefit conferred under the 490 plain language of section 23 1 A of the said Act
As far as the provisions of section 302 are concerned we do not feel that we are called upon to interpret the same in this decision
In our view therefore the said decision cannot be accepted as good law in so far as it lays down that in order to bring the provisions of section 231 A of the said Act into play the Collector must have made his award after April 30 1982
Coming to the decision in Union of India and Another vs Raghuvir Singh dead by Lrs
Supra referred to earlier we find that it mainly concerned itself with the provisions of section 302 of the said Amendment Act with which we are not directly concerned here and in that connection the Constitution Bench of this Court has made the following observations p 779 In construing section 302 it is just as well to be clear that the award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act and the award made by the Court is the award made by Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act
There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by section 302 in respect of an award made by the collector between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984 Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by section 302 to the case of an award made by the Court between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984 even though it be upon reference from an award made before April 30 1982
 The Court went on to point out that p780 Section 302 of the Amendment Act extends the benefit c the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before September 24 1984 or after that date
All that is material is that the award empha sis supplied by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984
We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion reached by this Court in K Kamalajammanniavaru vs Special Land Acquisition Officer and 491 find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandigarh  The expanded meaning given to section 30 2 in the latter case does not in our opinion flow reasonably from the language of that sub section
It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word such  in the collocation any such award  in section 302
Due significance must be at tached to that word and to our mind it must necessarily intended that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between April 30 1982 and September 24 1984
 We find that this decision which was rendered by a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising 5 learned Judges runs in no way counter to the view which we have taken and in fact it leads some support to the view which we are taking
In the case before us as the Reference Court has made its award after September 24 1984 the benefit of the provisions of section 231 A was clearly available to the claimant as held in the impugned judgment
In the result the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition Civil No14297 of 1990 in Union of India vs Zora Singh must be dismissed with costs
As far as the other appeals filed by the Union of India which have been heard together with the Zora Singh s case are concerned learned Counsel for the Union of India has not drawn our attention to any material difference in the relevant facts therein from the facts in Zora Singh s case
In fact the arguments proceeded on the footing that all the relevant facts were the same as in the case of Zora Singh
In a result all these appeals must also be dismissed however with no order as to costs
As far as the appeals before us which have been filed by the claimants are concerned the same will have to be placed before appropriate Benches of this Court for disposal in the light of this decision
VPR Appeals dis missed


Summary:
These Writ Petitions filed before this Court challenged the liberalisation for private sector operations in the Road Transport field under the 
The petitioners were the existing operators on different routes
On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the issue of more permits on the same route adversely affected their rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India
It was further contended that though imposition of limit for grant of inter State permits was permissible under Section 885 of the Act it was not so in respect of intra region permits and hence it is discrimina tory that in public interest the grant of intra region permits should be limited
Dismissing the Writ Petitions this Court HELD 11
Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the 429 concentration of business in the hands of few persons there by giving rise to a kind of monopoly adversely affecting the public interest
The apprehensions of the petitioners that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis
The transport business is bound to be ironed out ultimately by the rational of demand and supply
Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment
The intending operators are likely to be con scious of the economics underlying the profession
Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable
In any case the transport system in a State is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public
The policy to grant permits liberally under the new Act is directed towards the said goal
438 A C
12 The petitioners are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article 191g of the Constitution of India
There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators
There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statu tory rights
More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system
Over crowded buses passengers standing in the aisle persons clinging to the bus doors and even sitting on the roof top are some of the common sights in this country
More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine old upholstery uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of blacksmoke from the exhaust pipe
It is there fore necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronise the operator who is providing the best service
Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting per mits
437 EH 438 A
Hans Raj Kehar  Ors
vs The State of UP and Ors   followed
Jasbhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar  Ors   Saghir Ahmad vs The State of UP and Ors   relied on
Rameshwar Prasad  Ors
vs State of Uttar Pradesh  0rs1983 2 SCC 195 distinguished
It is only the State which can impose reasonable res tric 430 tions within the ambit of Article 196 of the Constitution of India
Section 473 and S7 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the right under Article 191g so far as the motor transport business was concerned
The said re strictions have been taken away and the said provisions have been repealed from the Statute Book
The new Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business
The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Article 191g of the Constitu tion of India
When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 196 of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 191g there can be no cause for complaint
440 B D
The three categories of permit seekers in respect of interegion intra region and inter State permits cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class
Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories
It is not the case that Section 80 brings about discrimination in the matter of grant of permits between applicants belonging to the same class
442 B Hans Raj Kehar  Ors
vs The State of UP and Ors
  relied on
Matters such as conditions of roads social status of the applicants possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators conditions of hilly routes fuel availability and pollution control are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities
The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds
It is not disputed that the Regional Trans port Authority has the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons
It is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits
The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of
power in granting permits under the liberalised policy
444 D F