Civil Appeal No 1998 of 1969
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated 3 10 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in LPA No 34864
V C Mahajan Mrs Urmila Kapoor and Mrs Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants
Hardev Singh for the Respondent
465 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA J
This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated October 3 1968 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
The facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants are partners of a firm Bharat Industries Chheharta
By a Notification dated May 15 1946 the Chheharta Municipal Committee levied a profession tax under Section 611b of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911
Initially the tax was Rs 15 per annum and was levied on all the partners of the said firm
By a Notification dated July 4 1958 the annual tax for trade profession or calling for the owner of a factory registered under the Indian Factories Act was raised to Rs 200 per annum and each of the six partners of the said firm were assessed to annual tax of Rs 200 by the Municipal Committee
On October 30 1960 the appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant Committee from realising the profession tax demanded by it per letters Nos
15 to 20 dated May 31 1960 amounting to Rs 1200 
The appellants challenged the validity of the assessment contending that construed in the light of the definition given in section 240 of the Punjab General Clauses Act the term person occurring in section 61b of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 includes a firm  and since the trade carried on by the firm  is one the tax could be levied only on the firm and not on the partners individually
On these premises it was pleaded that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under Section 611b of the Municipal Act
The trial court dismissed the suit
On appeal by the plaintiffs the Additional District Judge Amritsar reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit
The Municipal Committee carried a further appeal to the High Court
The learned Single Judge who heard the appeal affirmed the judgment and decree of the first appellate court on the reasoning which may be summed up as under The term person in Section 611b of the Municipal Act interpreted in the light of the definition given in Section 240 of the Punjab General Clauses Act includes a partnership 
Under clause b of Section 611 of the Municipal Act the basis on which the liability to pay tax arises is the trade profession or business and if the 466 trade and business is one carried on by several persons collectively in partnership then the partnership alone and not the individual partners are liable to pay the tax that the liability on the partners will fall twice which is not contemplated by the scheme and language of the Municipal Act even though all the partners are jointly and severally liable to any tax for the partnership business
In support of his conclusion that the tax was on trade and not on persons the learned Judge by way of analogy referred to clauses a c d e and f of sub Section 1
He also referred to two Madras decisions in The Municipal Commissioners of Nagapatam vs Sadaya Pillay1 and Davies vs President of the Madras Municipal Commission2 and found himself in entire agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges in those cases
Aggrieved the Municipal Committee preferred a Letters Patent Appeal
The Appellate Bench of the High Court held that to import the definition of the term person occuring in Section 240 of the Punjab General Clauses Act into Section 611 b of the Municipal Act will be repugnant to the subject
In the opinion of the Bench under the scheme of the statute in question the tax cannot be levied on a firm or factory as such but only on the individual owners of the factory or of the firm
On this reasoning the Bench reached the conclusion that under Section 611 b of the Act it is the individual who is to be assessed and is liable to pay the tax mentioned therein and so the assessment as well as the demand of the tax from each of the plaintiffs does not suffer from any legal infirmity
 The Bench further held that since the Committee in imposing the tax on the appellants herein has not acted outside the provisions of the statute it would on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan Deceased represented by Hari Kishan  Ors
vs Administrator Municipal Committee Ludhiana3 which also dealt with the provisions of the Municipal Act follow that the impugned assessment could only be questioned under the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of tax levied or the assessment made is excluded
In the result the appeal was allowed and the trial court s decision dismissing the suit was restored
Before us Mr V K Mahajan learned counsel for the plaintiffs appellants has adopted the reasons given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
In support of his contentions he has relied upon the 467 aforesaid Madras decisions
His argument is that if the interpretation placed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court is allowed to stand it will lead to anamolous and unconstitutional results
Mr Mahajan concedes that the individual partners are also persons  within the meaning of clause b of Section 611
He however maintains that the firm also is a person  within the contemplation of this provision and as such liable to be taxed that if in respect of the one trade which is being carried on by the firm apart from each of the individual partners the firm also is separately assessed to Rs 200 per annum not only the incidence of the tax will fall twice the total liability therefor will far exceed the ceiling of Rs 250 per annum fixed by Article 2762 of the Constitution
In these premises it is contended that an interpretation of Section 611 b which may lead to unconstitutional on irrational results should be eschewed
With regard to the question of jurisdiction it is contended that since the Municipal Committee had in the exercise of its powers clearly acted beyond its jurisdiction the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court
Section 611b of the Municipal Act so far as material for this case reads as under Subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in this behalf and the rules any committee may from time to time for the purposes of this Act and in the manner directed by this Act impose in the whole or any part of the municipality any of the following taxes namely 1 a    i to iii     b a tax on persons practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality
Explanation
A person in the service or person holding an office under the State Government or the Central Government or a local or other public authority shall be deemed to be practising a profession within the meaning of this sub section
 From a plain reading of the extracted provision it is clear that a tax leviable under clause b is in terms a tax on persons
The expression persons undoubtedly includes natural persons
The class of such taxable persons has been indicated by the Legislature with reference to their occupational activity
Thus in order to be authorised a tax under clause b of Section 611 must satisfy two conditions 468 First it must be a tax on persons
Second such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality
There can be no dispute that the appellants are persons and as such satisfy the first condition
Even the learned counsel for the appellants has candidly conceded that the individual partners are also persons within the meaning of the said clause b
Controversy thus becomes narrowed down into the issue Whether persons collectively doing business in partnership in the municipality fulfil the second condition  That is to say do such persons carry of any trade or calling in the municipality within the contemplation of clause b  In our opinion for reasons that follow the answer to this question must be in the affimative Partnership  as defined in Section 4 of the  is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all
The Section further makes it clear that a firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the partners
Firm is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm
The crucial words in the definition of partnership  are those that have been underlined
They hold the key to the question posed above
They show that the business is carried on by all or any of the partners
In the instant case admittedly all the plaintiff appellants are carrying on the business in partnership
All the six partners are sharing the profits and losses
All the partners are jointly and severally responsible for the liabilities incurred or obligations incurred in the course of the business
Each partner is considered an agent of the other
This being the position it is not possible to hold that each of the six partners is not carrying on a trade or calling within the purview of clause b of Section 611 of the Municipal Act
At the most it can be said that each of these six persons is severally as well as collectively carrying on a trade in the Municipality
There is nothing in the language of Section 61 or the scheme of the Municipal Act which warrants the construction that persons who are carrying on a trade in association or partnership with each other cannot be individually taxed under clause b of Section 611
On the contrary definite indication is available in the language and the scheme of this statute that such partners can be taxed as persons in their individual capacity
As noticed already clause b makes it clear in no uncertain terms that this is a tax on persons  Its incidence falls on individuals who belong to a class practising any profession or art or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality
469 To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed individually would be to read into the statute words which are not there
There are no words in clause b or elsewhere in the statute which expressly or by necessary implication exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals
To attract liability to a tax under this clause it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others
Thus both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause b of subsection 1 of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case
The appellants are persons and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality
In the view we take we do not think it necessary to go further into the question whether the definition of person  given in Section 240 of the Punjab General Clauses Act can be imported into the statute under consideration so as to include a contractual firm also within the purview of the expression persons  used in clause b of Section 611
Indeed the entire effort to import the definition of person  given in the General Clauses Act into Section 611b of the Municipal Act is directed to find a foundation for the argument that the construction adopted by the High Court could lead to double taxation and even unconstitutional results
But in the instant case nothing of this kind has happened
The firm has not been assessed
No question of double taxation or exceeding the Constitutional ceiling of Rs 250 fixed by Article 2762 of the Constitution arises on the facts of the present case
The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants on this aspect of the matter are merely hypothetical and speculative
This takes us to the second question whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit
Section 841 of the Punjab Municipal Act provides that an appeal against the assessment or levy of any tax under this Act shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf
Then there is a proviso to this sub section which says that when the Deputy Commissioner or such other officer as aforesaid is or was when the tax was imposed a member of the Committee the appeal shall lie to the Commissioner of the Division
Sub section 2 is important
It provides 842
If on the hearing of an appeal under the section any question as to the liability to or the principle of assessment of a tax arises on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable dobut he may either of his own 470 motion or on the application of any person interested draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court
 Section 86 mandates that no objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act
 From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86 it is plain that the Municipal Act gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment
The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which analogous to that provided in Section 66 2 of the Indian Income tax Act 1922
Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act
It is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum in a particular way it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded
Construed in the light of this principle it is clear that sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar by inevitable implication the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act
In the view we take we are fortified by the decision of this Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan vs Administrator Municipal Committee Ludhiana supra wherein sections 84 and 86 of this very Punjab Municipal Act 1911 came up for consideration
Therein the Municipal Committee Ludhiana imposed a terminal tax on Sambhar salt and assessed the appellant therein to a sum of Rs 5893 towards that tax at the rate of Rs 10 per maund under item 69 of the Government Notification by which the terminal tax was imposed
The assessee filed a suit against the Municipal Committee in the Civil Court contending that Sambhar salt ought to have been assessed at the rate of 3 pies per maund under item 68 that he had been illegally assessed under item 69 at the higher rate and claimed refund of the amount paid by him with interest
The Committee inter alia contended that Sambhar salt was not common salt and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit
The trial court held that Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68 of the Schedule that 471 the imposition of tax on it under item 69 of the Schedule was illegal and therefore the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit by virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
On appeal the High Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and dismissed the suit
The assessee came in appeal to this Court by certificate granted by the High Court and contended that since the impugned levy was not made under the Municipal Act but in derogation thereof the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit
Delivering the judgment of the Court Subba Rao J as he then was repelled this contention observing that the rate of the tax to be levied depended upon the character of the salt and it was not possible to say that in ascertaining this fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Municipal Act even if they wrongly applied item 69 of the schedule that the mistake in applying the wrong item of the Schedule to the tax could be corrected only in the manner prescribed by the Act and the aggrieved person cannot file a suit in the Civil Court in that regard the Civil Court s jurisdiction having been excluded by the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act
The Court distinguished that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a tax or committing an Act clearly acts outside or in abuse of its powers under the Municipal Act and explained that it is only in such cases the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not apply
Can the case before us be said to belong to that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a Tax acts beyond or in abuse of its powers under the Act  The answer to this question must be in the negative
By no stretch of imagination can it be said in the facts and circumstances of the case that in assessing the appellants individually and not collectively to the tax in question the Municipal Committee abused its powers under the Act
We have already discussed and held that in levying this tax the Municipal Committee did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of Section 611b of the Act
In short the present case is one where the Municipal Committee acted under the Act
It follows therefore that the Civil Court s jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred even if the dispute raised therein related to the principle of assessment to be followed
For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
VDK Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Under section 611b of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 the respondent by its Notification dated May 15 1946 levied a profession tax of Rs 15 per annum on each of the partners of a firm
Bharat Industries Chheharta ie the appellants in the appeal
By the Notification dated July 4 1958 the tax was raised to Rs 200 per annum
The validity of the demand made by the respondent at the rate of Rs 200 from each of the partners of the firm was challenged pleading that the Municipal Committee in levying the tax on the individual partners had exceeded its statutory powers under section 611b of the Municipal Act in as much as the term person  occurring in section 611b of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 construed in the light of the definition given in section 240 of the Punjab General Clauses Act included a firm  and since the trade carried on by the firm is one the tax could be levied only on the firm and not on the partners individually
The Trial Court dismissed the suit
First appellate court reversed the decree and the High Court in Second Appeal confirmed it
A Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the respondent was allowed and the Trial Court s decision dismissing the suit was restored
Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court  HELD 1
It is clear from a plain reading of Section 611b that a tax leviable under clause b is in terms a tax on persons  which expression includes natural persons
Its incidence falls on individuals who belong to a class practising any profession or art or carrying on a trade or calling in the municipality
To hold that persons who are collectively carrying on a trade in the municipality cannot be taxed individually would be to read into the statute words which are not there
There are no words in clause b or elsewhere in the statute which expressly or by necessary implication exclude or exempt persons carrying on a trade collectively in the municipality from being taxed as individuals
To attract liability to a tax under this clause it is sufficient that the person concerned is carrying on a trade in the municipality irrespective of whether such trade is being carried on by him individually or in partnership with others
467G 468H 469A B 2 Partnership  as defined in Section 4 of the  is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them for the benefit of all
A firm or partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct from the partners
Firm 464 is only a compendious description of the individuals who compose the firm
The business being carried on by all or any of the partners all of them are jointly and severally responsible for the liabilities incurred in the course of the business as each one is considered as an agent of the other
Such partners can be taxed as persons in their individual
468 D H 3
In order to be authorised a tax under clause b of Section 611 must satisfy two conditions First it must be a tax on persons
Second such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in the municipality
Both the conditions necessary for levying a tax under clause b of sub section 1 of Section 61 of the Municipal Act existed in this case
The appellants are persons  and they are carrying on a trade in Chheharata Municipality
467H 468A C 4i Where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum in a particular way it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded
470D E ii From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86 it is plain that the Municipal Act gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment
The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which is analogous to that provided in Section 662 of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act
Therefore Sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar by inevitable implication the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under the Act
470B D E F iii In the facts and circumstances of the case it is clear a that in assessing the appellants individually and not collectively to the tax in question the Municipal Committee did not abuse its powers under the Act b in levying the profession tax it did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of sections 611b of the Act and c that the Committee acted under the Act
The Civil Courts jurisdiction therefor to entertain and decide the suit was barred
471E G Firm Seth Radhakishan vs Administrator Municipal Committee Ludhiana  followed