Criminal Appeal Nos 365 of 1986 and 245 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 2112
1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl
Writ Petition No 399 of 1983 and 25 1 of 1983
Mahabir Singh NP and Dalveer Bhandari for the Appel lants
AK Goel for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section RATNAVEL PANDIAN J
Leave granted in Special Leave Petition Criminal No 1158 of 1985
The State of Haryana has preferred these two appeals against the Judgment and Order of the Punjab  Haryana High Court dated 2112
1984 in Writ Petition Nos
39983 and 25 183 respectively passing similar orders directing the State Government to consider the cases of the respondents for premature release
The facts which lie in a very narrow compass may be stated thus The respondents were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge Karnal which sentence inflicted on each of them was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment on mercy petitions
It seems that the State Government issued various execu tive instructions from time to time either altering or amending the existing instructions by fresh executive in structions specifying the minimum period of actual detention to be undergone by a convict sentenced to life imprisonment before his case for premature release could be considered by the State Government
To appreciate the case of the respec tive parties it would be apposite to make reference to the relevant instructions
At the outset the instructions contained in paragraph 5 16 B of Punjab Jail Manual which are in the nature of executive instructions by way of guid ance may be referred to which instructions are based on a Government of India resolution No 159 167 dated 6th 434 September 1905
The aforesaid paragraph reads thus 516 Ba With the exception of females and who were under 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence the cases of every convicted prisoner sentenced to i imprisonment for life         iv         a who has undergone a period of detention in jail amount ing together with remission earned to 14 years shall be submitted through the Inspector General of Prisons Punjab for the orders of the State Government
The substance of the above paragraph is that the case of a male lifer who was above 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence sentenced to life imprisonment and who has undergone detention in jail amounting together with remission earned to 14 years should be submitted to the State Government for consideration of his premature release
It further appears in the year 1971 the State Government after a considerable deliberation took a policy decision and issued instructions through its Memorandum No 133 11 6J J 71 39656 dated 10th of November 1971 providing that a period of actual sentence of 8 12 years in the case of adult life convicts and 6 years in the case of female con victs as well those male convicts below 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence should be regarded as the qualifying period of consideration for premature release
This memorandum was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their premature release in the light of the said policy decision with effect from 2nd November 1971
Thereafter in January 1976 the question of releasing prematurely life convicts whose death sentence has been committed was again considered by the State Government and it took a policy decision that cases of such life convicts should be considered for premature release only after com pletion of 14 years of actual imprisonment and in that behalf Memorandum No 403 6JJ 763456 dated 30th January 1976 containing the necessary instructions was issued by the State Government
It is culled out from the impugned judg ment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No 365 of 1986 arising out of Writ Petition 435 No 39983 that the State Government with a view to libera lise the policy of premature release of prisoners decided that such cases might be reviewed by a State Level Committee comprising of four members inclusive of Minister for Prisons and directed the concerned Superintendent of Jail to submit cases of life convicts two months before they completed 812 years substantive sentence and sentence of 1410 years including remission along with his comments to the Inspector General of Prisons Haryana who thereupon would put up all cases along with his recommendations for consideration before the Committee and further directed the Inspector General of Prisons to submit a copy of the decision taken by the said Committee along with the roll of each prisoner to Government within one week
Be that as it may the Parliament introduced Section 433A by the code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 1978 45 of 78 with effect from 18121978
According to Section 433A that a person who has been sentenced to death and whose death sentence has been commuted into one of imprisonment for life and persons who have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law should undergo actual imprisonment of 14 years in jail
We are referring to Sec tion 433A in this judgment only for a limited purpose of showing that after the introduction of this section the life convicts failing within the purview of Section 433A has to undergo the mandatory minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment
It may be mentioned at this juncture that no one has got a vested fight to claim premature release on the ground that he has suffered the minimum actual imprisonment as prescribed under Section 433A because a sentence of imprisonment for life  is incarceration until death that is for the remaining period of convicted person s actual life vide Kishori Lal vs Emperor AIR 1945 Privy Council 64 Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State of Maharashtra and Others   Maru Ram Etc
vs Union of India  Anr
   Kartar Singh and Others vs State of Haryana  and Sadhu Singh vs State of Punjab  There is no question of releasing such a lifer early in the absence of an order of commutation under Section 55 IPC by the appropriate Government which term is defined under Section 55A IPC or under Section 433b of Criminal Proce dure Code of 1973 by the appropriate Government or on a clemency order in exercise of power under Article 72 or 16 1 of the Constitution of India
Incidentally it may be stated that Section 54 empowers the appropriate Government to commute the sentence of death for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code
436 Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives the power to the appropriate Government either to suspend or to remit the sentences
The meaning of the expression appro priate Government  occurring in Section 432 and 433 is given under sub section 7 of Section 432
The Constitution Bench of this Court in Maru Ram Etc
vs Union of India  Anr
  after thoroughly examining the intendment of Section 433A con cluded by formulating its various findings one of which is as follows We declare that section 433A in both its limbs ie both types of life imprisonment specified in it is prospective in effect
To put the position beyond doubt we direct that the mandatory minimum of 14 years  actual imprisonment will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December 1978 directly or ratro actively as explained in the judgment when section 433A came into force
All lifers  whose conviction by the Court of first instance was entered prior to that date are entitled to consideration by Government for release on the strength of earned remissions although a release can take place only if Government makes an order to that effect  Now coming to the facts of case on hand admittedly the conviction of the respondents was recorded early to the introduction of Section 433A and therefore as per the ratio laid down in Maru Rarn s case ibid these two re spondents are entitled for consideration of release by the appropriate Government as per the prevailing rules or execu tive instructions
After the judgment dated 11111980 in Maru Ram s case a number of life convicts filed batch of writ petitions in Writ Petition Nos
1252 64 etc
captioned Sant Ram etc
vs Union of India  Ors etc
 and those writ petitions were disposed of by an order of this Court dated December 10 1980
Ram Diya the respondent in Criminal Appeal No 365 of 1986 was one of the petitioners in the connected batch of Writ Petition Nos
1532 1539 of 1980
The common order passed in all those petitions reads thus All of these Writ Petitions except Writ Petition Nos 1477 and 1478 of 1980 shall stand disposed of in accordance with the judgment of this Court dated November 11 1980 in 437 Maru Ram Etc
vs Union of India  Anr WP No 86579 etc
All persons who were released on bail shall sur render to their sentence and the respective State Govern ments will pass appropriate orders in each individual case or generally in any group or class of cases in the light of the judgment aforesaid within six months from today
If in particular cases orders of release have been passed prior to the introduction of Section 433A Criminal Proce dure Code the accused need not surrender to their bail
 From the impugned judgment of the High Court it is seen that the respondent Ram Saran also filed a Criminal Writ Petition seeking direction to the State Government to con sider his case for premature release and the same was dis posed of by an order dated December 10 1980 in accordance with the decision in Maru Ram s case and that Ram Saran who is said to have undergone 16 years 1 month and 28 days of imprisonment including 5 years 8 months and 27 days remis sions as on July 21 1982 was released on bail
It appears the Government have issued letter No 4315783 JJ2 dated February 27 1984 clarifying the earli er instructions dated November 28 1977 and reiterating their inapplicability to life convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment on their mercy peti tions and further stating that consideration of premature release of such convicts shall continue to be considered in the light of the Government policy decision dated December 12 1967 thereby making it obligatory for them to undergo 14 years substantive sentence
Admittedly the State Government did not take up the cases of the respondents for premature release within six months of the Order of the Supreme Court dated 10th December 1980 and deferred the consideration of premature release till the respondents had completed 14 years of substantive sentence
In the written statement filed by the Inspector General of Prisons it is averred as follows It is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner during his confinement in the jail was satisfactory but it is irrelevant as far as the consideration of his premature release case is concerned
According to the Government policy his premature release case is to be considered when he has 438 undergone 14 years substantive sentence and 20 years sen tence including remission
His jail conduct will be consid ered when he has completed 14 years substantive sentence   In Sadhu Singh s case ibid it has been urged on behalf of the lifers that the State Government relying upon the executive instructions issued on 30176 had erroneously made a distinction between cases of prisoners who had been sentenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions had been commuted to life imprisonment and cases of prisoners who had been straightaway sentenced to life imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for premature release and that it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions dated 30176 for making the distinction and postponing the consideration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them
This argument was answered by this Court holding thus The second contention also must fail in view of the admit ted position that cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions has been commuted to life imprisonment who constitute a distinct class will now be governed by the 1976 instructions
Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Mehar Singh supra that the 1976 instructions issued on 30th of January 1976 will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that date is not tenable
Clearly existing cases of life convicts falling within that category will be governed by those instructions
 So far as these cases are concerned premature release of the respondents has to be considered in view of the directions given by this Court in the Order dated December 10 1980 in the batch of writ petitions which instructions admittedly have not been complied with merely on the ground that the respondents have not completed 14 years of actual imprisonment since these respondents constitute a distinct class in that they have been initially sentenced to death which has been commuted on their mercy petitions
This argument is not available to the appellant because the respondents  premature release is required to be considered as per the directions of this Court vide Order dated 10121980
Hence it has become obligatory for the State to consider the cases of premature release of these respondents in 439 accordance with the rules or executive instructions prevail ingand applicable to them at the relevant time ie between the period 10121980 and 961981
The plea of the appel lant as reflected from the written statement filed by the Inspector General of Police that the premature release of the respondents was not considered since they have not completed 14 years of substantive imprisonment is in viola tion of the directions of the Order dated 10th December 1980 of this Court and so the appellant cannot be permitted to make such a plea on the strength of the executive instruc tions overlooking and ignoring the above directions
In the premises we see no infirmity in the judgments of the High Court calling for interference
For the aforementioned reasons we uphold the impugned Judgment and Order of the High Court and dismiss these appeals as devoid of any merit
GN Appeals dis missed


Summary:
Rule 5 of the AP Police Service Rules 1966 makes a person ineligible for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police unless he has completed the age of 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made
The appellant Service Commission notified on August 25 1983 a combined examination for Grade I Services of the State to be held in November 1983 wherein the minimum age prescribed for selection to the post of Deputy Superintend ent of Police was 21 years as on July 1 1983 as against 18 years for other posts
The respondent who was 19 days short of 21 years as on July 1 1983 was not considered for appointment to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police
He was however select ed as Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies
He filed a petition before the State Administrative Tribunal seeking a direction to the appellant to select him to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police contending that the date for attaining the minimum age prescribed under the notifica tion was contrary to Rule 5 of the Police Service Rules in as much as it ought to be the date of preparation of the list of selected candidates and not any date anterior to it
The Tribunal accepted that contention
Allowing the appeal by the Service Commission the Court HELD The word selection  occurring in Rule 5 of the AP Police Service Rules 1966 cannot be construed only as the factum of preparation of the select list
467B The process of selection which begins with the issuance of 464 advertisement and continues through scrutiny of applica tions rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates conducting examinations calling for interview or viva voce ends with preparation of the select list for appointment
Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps
When such were the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age for suit ability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date
If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs
The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must therefore be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications
466F 467A