Criminal Appeal No 26 of 1989
From the Judgment and Order dated 1741984 of the Gujarat High Court in Crl
Appeal No 1097 of 1980
VB Ganatra and VN Ganpule for the Appellant
Girish Chandra MN Shroff and MN Goswami for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 142 VENKATACHALIAH J
By this petition for grant of Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution coming up after notice to the State of Gujarat the applicant seeks leave to appeal to this Court from the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No 1097 of 1980 restoring the conviction and sentence passed by the Chief Judicial Magis trate Valsad against the petitioner in Criminal Case of 48 of 1979 for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulter ation Act 1954
 Act  for short Special Leave is granted and the appeal is taken up for final hearing heard and disposed of by this judgment
Appellant was charged before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Valsad by the Food Inspector Navasari Munici pality with the offence of selling Kesari coloured sweet supan sali alleged to have been adulterated with Yellow basic coal tar dye
The learned Magistrate found the appel lant guilty of the offence and imposed a sentence of an year s simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs2000 both of which were the statutorily compulsory minimum sentences under Section 161Ai of the Act
Learned Sessions Judge Valsad by his judgment dated 1431980 in Criminal Appeal 32 of 1979 preferred by the appellant however set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the appellant of the charge
On further appeal by the State against the said acquit tal the High Court of Gujarat allowed the State s appeal and in reversal of the judgment of acquittal of the learned Sessions Judge restored the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
Appellant is a tradesman carrying on business within the limits of Navsari Municipality
On 7121978 respondent No 2 the  food inspector of Navsari Municipality pur chased from the appellant 600 gins
of kesari coloured sweet supari sali and after complying with the procedural formalities packed and sealed the supari into three sepa rate packages of 200 gins
each and one of them was sent to the Public Analyst who by his report dated 20121978 Ext 12 affirmed that the sample contained a yellow basic coal tar dye and that it did not conform to the standard laid down under the Rules
On 1911979 the Food Inspector with the prior sanction of the District Health Officer Valsad Ext14 filed a complaint in the Court of the 143 Chief Judicial Magistrate Valsad
The prosecution culminat ed as aforesaid in the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and later restored by the High Court
Appellant now seeks to assail the legality of the conviction
We have heard Sri VB Ganatra learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Girish Chandara and Sri MV Goswami learned counsel for Respondents
1 and 2 respectively
Though a number of grounds are taken in the memorandum of the Petition for special leave however at the hearing Sri Ganatra confined his submission only to one aspect of the matter which if accepted as correct would go to the root of the case for the prosecution
Apparently this contention in the form in which it is presented here was not placed before the High Court as we find no reference to it in the judgment
Appellant s Learned Counsel contended that Supari or Betel nut is basically and essentially an yield of the Areca Palm and must therefore be held to fall under Fruit products within the meaning of Rule 29f of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1955  Rules  for short and accordingly the use of permitted coal tar food colours in it is not prohibited by law
It was further urged that the Public Analyst had not held that the Yellow basic coal tar dye found in the sample was not one of those food colours prohibited under Rule 28 and that there fore its use in supari which was a Fruit product cannot be said to be prohibited
Alternatively Sri Ganatra con tended that the supari in this case was a flavouring agent within the meaning of Rule 29m in which case also the use of permitted coal tar food colours was not prohib ited
On the contentions urged at the hearing the points that fall for consideration are first whether the supari concerned in this case was a Fruit product or alterna tively a Flavouring Agent within the meaning of Rule 29f or m respectively and accordingly the use in it of permitted coal tar dyes or food colours was not prohibited and secondly whether even if after an elaborate enquiry it was held that supari was not a Food product appellant having acted bonafide on a possible and not an unreasonable view of the nature and classification of the goods was at all events entitled to the benefit of the doubt
It was not disputed that supari was an article of food
It was so held in Pyarali K Tejani vs MR Dange 1974 2 SCR 154
It was also not disputed that if supari did not admit itself of being classified 144 under Fruit products or under Flavouring Agents under Rule 29f or 29m respectively the use in supari of even a coal tar food colours permitted under rule 28 would amount to adulteration
The argument that Supari
or Betel nut is a Flavou ringAgent has clearly no substance
The first contention therefore narrows itself down to whether supari in the form in which it was offered for sale though vegetative in origin and is derived from the usufruct of areca palm can be said to be a Fruit Product in the sense in which that expression is used and is required to be understood in Rule 29f
To appreciate Sri Ganatra s contention the scheme of the relevant rules in particular rules 23 28 and 29 requires notice
Rule 23 prohibits the addition of any colouring matter to any article of food except as specifi cally permitted by the rules
Rule 28 provides that no coal tar food colour or a mixture thereof except the food colours specifically enumerated in rule 28 shall be used in food
Item 2 of the list of food colours permitted under Rule 28 includes Sun set Yellow FCF 
We shall proceed on the premise that the basic yellow coal tar dye found in the supari by the Public Analyst is amongst those enumerated food colours excepted from the prohibition under Rule 28 and is therefore permitted to be used
Then Rule 29 prohibits the use of even the coal tar food colours permitted under rule 28 in or upon any food other than those enumerated in rule 29
Fruit Products is one such item of food so enu merated under clause f of rule 29
The result is that permitted coal taar food colours ie foodcolours permitted by Rule 28 can be used if the food articles in question are Fruit Products as understood in Rule 29f
But this exception from prohibition in favour of Fruit Products is further subject to such exceptions or restrictions as are otherwise made in Appendix B 
Sri Ganatra s contention is that there having been no provision otherwise made in Appen dix B  in respect of supari and supari being includible in Fruit Products the use in it of permitted coal tar food colours is prohibited
Shri Ganatra submits that the legis lation being penal the expression Fruit Products in rule 29f should receive a reasonably liberal construction and that so construed supari would reasonably admit of being considered such a Fruit Product
We have had our attention drawn by Sri Ganatra to certain passages in Common Trees of India  by Dr Santatau at page 111 in Wealth of India Raw Materials Vol
I A pages 390 402 03 and certain passages in the Dravya Guna Vignyan  Part II  III at page 145 672 in support of Sri Ganatra s contention that Supari or Betelnut being the usufruct of Areca tree must be held to be a FruitProduct
Sri Ganatra says that having regard to the accepted cannons of construction appropriate to penal statutes supari or Betel nut which was derived from the usufruct of Areca palm admits of being classified amongst Fruit Products in Rule 29f
At all events says learned counsel such a construction being a plausible one the appellant who had conducted his affairs on such a plau sible meaning of the statute should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt
In Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol 3 p 55 1 with reference to Betel nut it is mentioned The name betel is applied to two different plants which in the east are very closely associated in the purposes to which they are applied
The betel nut is the fruit of the areca or betel palm Areca catechu    For chewing the fruits are annually gathered between the months of August and November before they are quite ripe and deprived of their husks
They are prepared by boiling in water cutting up into slices and drying in the sun by which treatment the slices assume a dark brown or black colours     
Betel nuts are used as a source of inferior catechu gv its chief alkaloid is arecoline to which anthelmintic properties are attributed
The drug finds some use in veterinary medicine as an anthelmintic
 There is no dispute that supari is derived from and pre pared out of the usufruct of the Areca palm
But the ques tion as to what is the context of the idea of Fruit Products in Rule 29f
The argument no doubt is somewhat attractively presented but we are afraid it is more attractive than sound
The fact that a particular article of food as indeed most of the articles of food of vegetative origin are was of plant origin did not render that article necessarily a Fruit Product
Even products derived from or associated in their origin with fruits need not ipso facto be Fruit Products for purposes and within the meaning of rule 29f
What were envisaged as Fruit Products in rule 29f will be indicated by the array of items dealt with in Appendix B  under item 16 Fruit 146 Products though the list was in the nature of an exception of R29
Under the relevant head in Appendix B  items referred are Fruit Juice Tomato Juice Fruit Syrup Fruit Squash Fruit Beverage or Fruit Drinks Tomato Sauce Tomato Ketchup Tomato RelishMarmalade Fruit Chatni and Sauce etc
The object and the purpose of the Act are to eliminate the danger to human life from the sale of unwholesome arti cles of food
The legislation is on the Topic Adulteration of Food Stuffs and other Goods  Entry 18 list III Seventh Schedule
It is enacted to curb the wide spread evil of food adulteration and is a legislative measure for social defence
It is intended to suppress a social and economic mischief an evil which attempts to poison for monetary gains the very sources of sustenance of life and the well being of the community
The evil of adulteration of food and its effects on the health of the community are assuming alarming proportions
The offence of adulteration is a socio economic offence
In Municipal Corpn
vs Kacheroo Mal  Sarkaria J said The Act has been enacted to curb and remedy the widespread evil of food adulteration and to ensure the sale of wholesome food to the people
It is well settled that wherever possible without unreasonable stretching or straining the language of such a statute should be construed in a manner which would suppress the mischief advance the remedy promote its object prevent its subtle evasion and foil its artful circumvention    Emphasis Supplied The construction appropriate to a social defence legis lation is therefore one which would suppress the mischief aimed at by the legislation and advance the remedy
The offences under the Act  are really acts prohib ited by the police powers of the State in the interests of public health and wellbeing
The prohibition is backed by the sanction of a penalty
The offences are strict statutory offences
Intention or mental state is irrelevant
In Good fellow vs Johnson at 944 referring to the nature of offences under the Food and Drugs Act 1955 it was said As is well known section 2 of the Food and Drugs Act 1955 constitutes an absolute offence
If a person sells to the 147 prejudice of the purchaser any food and that includes drink which is not of the nature or not of the substance or not of the quality demanded by the purchaser he shall be guilty of an offence
The forbidden act is the sell ing to the prejudice of the purchaser   Smedleys Limited vs Breed is a case both interesting and illustrative
Smedleys Ltd were manu facturers of canned peas of repute
Out of the three and a half million tins of peas the company produced in the year 1971 only 4 complaints were received about the presence of extraneous matter in the tins
One of them had been pur chased by a certain Mrs Voss from a well known stores
On opening the tin Mrs Voss found a small larva of a moth in the tin
The commendable civic zeal of Mrs Voss who report ed the larva infestation of the peas to the local authority had the effect of arraigning Smedleys Ltd before court on charge of violation of the Food and Drugs Act 1955
Section 33 of the Act enabled a defence which the company raised that the extraneous matter was an unavoidable consequence of the process of collection or preparation The company it would appear from the facts appearing in the report had installed and elaborate system of spot checking of the peas by mechanical screening process before canning which elimi nated extraneous matter of significantly higher or lower specific gravity than that of the peas
This process was also strengthened and supplemented by visual inspections by properly trained and experienced employees who worked for short periods to enable sustained concentration along the conveyer belt carrying the peas to the canning site
To the strange ill luck and embarrassment of Smedleys the larva which had a specific gravity and size similar to that of the peas beat the screening machine and also managed by virtue of its colour and shape to escape the surveillance of the alert visual inspectors who it is said were also paid a bonus if they detected and extracted any extraneous matter
The peas incidentally would be pressure cooked for 20 minutes at 250xF which would render the larva harmless to human health even if consumed
The company contended that the existence of the larva was despite every possible pre caution and was an unavoidable consequence of the process of collection and preparation within the meaning of Section 33 of the Act
The defence did not succeed
Smedleys as well as the seller were convicted
The House of Lords con firmed the conviction
Lord Hailsham said   
This innocent insect thus deprived of its natural destiny was in fact entirely harmless since prior to its 148 entry into tin it had been subjected to a cooking process of 20 minutes duration of 250xF and had she cared to so Mrs Voss could have consumed the caterpillar without injury to herself and even perhaps with benefit    p 24 Thereafter the caterpillar achieved a sort of posthumous apotheosis
From local authority to the Dorchester magistrates from the Dorchester magistrates to a Divisional Court presided over by the Lord Chief Justice of Englandfrom the Lord Chief Justice to the House of Lords the immolated insect has at length plodded its methodical way to the highest tribunal in the land
It now falls to me to deliver my opinion on its case p 24 Referring to the nature of the penalties under laws against food adulteration Lord Chancellor said My Lords as has been pointed out by my noble and learned friend Lord Diplock the expres sion absolute offence  is imprecise
Clearly the offence contemplated in section 21 of the Food and Drugs Act 1955 is an absolute offence if all that is meant by that is an absence of mens rea
It is one of those offences de scribed by Wright J in Sherras vs De Rutuzen which are not criminal in any real sense but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty  p 26 Confirming the conviction Lord Chancellor held    sympathise as one may with a manu facturer with a reputation and record as excellent as that of the appellants to con strue the Food  Drugs Act 1955 in a sense less strict than that which I have adopted would make a serious in road on the legisla tion for consumer protection which Parliament has adopted and by successive Acts extended over a period now of more than a century     p29 In Pyarali K Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange 1974 2 SCR 154 this court held that what constitutes the offence under the 149 Act  is nothing more than the actus reus  and mens rea need not separately be established
In Criminal Law by JC Smith  Brian Hogan 5th Edn referring to offences in their social context the authors say The courts are greatly influenced in their construction of the statute by the degree of social danger which they believe to be in volved in the offence in question
They take judicial notice of the problems with which the country is confronted
The greater the degree of social danger the more likely is the offence to be interpreted as one of strict liability
Inflation drugs road accidents and pollution are constantly brought to our attention as pressing evils and in each case the judges have at times invoked strict li ability as a protection for society p9 2 9
We now come to the specific question whether supari is includible under Fruit Products under rule 29f
Sri Girish Chandra says that in arriving at the meaning of Fruit Products it is not the technical or scientific sense but the sense as understood in commonparlance that matters
That sense is one Sri Girish Chandra says which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it
The words must be understood says counsel in their popular sense in their common commercial understanding for the legislature does not suppose our merchant to be naturalists or geologists or botanists
 The standard of the test for ascertaining the meaning of words in common parlance is set by the Candanian case in Planters Nut and Chocolate Co Ltd vs The King Would a house holder when asked to bring home fruits or vegetables for the evening meal bring home salted Peanuts cashew nuts or nuts of any sort The answer is obviously NO 
 This test has been referred to with approval by this court
See Ramavatar Budhai Prasad vs The Assistant Sales Tax Officer XII STC 286 Sri Girish Chandra says that in the context of the Indian House holder we may with justifica tion add Betel nut to the list of salted pea nuts cashew nuts etc
150 10
The distinction between literal and legal meaning of statutory language lies at the heart of the problem of interpretation of statutes
The court is not entitled to decline to determine the legal meaning of a statute on the principle non liquet 
In the present case a wider con struction of Fruit Products in clause f which is in the nature of exception to Rule 29 results automatically in a corresponding narrower construction of the substantive provision in Rule 29
This is not a case of a relieving provision excepting from the definition of an offence where the Rule of construction against doubtful penalisation operates
The offence is really a violation of a prohibition imposed on a penalty as a social defence mechanism in a socio economic legislation
No form of words have ever yet been framed with regard to which some ingenious counsel could not suggest a difficulty
But in the context of the present statute it would be a strain on the statutory language and the statutory scheme to include supari in the form in which it was sold within Fruit Products as under stood in clause f of Rule 29
The first contention has accordingly no substance
The second contention is that petitioner had acted bona fide on a particular understanding of the Rule 29f which could not be said to be wholly implausible and that therefore even if that understanding is found to be defec tive he should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt
The question of what a word means in its context within the Act  is a question of legal interpretation and therefore one of law
The choice of the proper rule of construction to be applied to ascertain the meaning is again a matter of law
To countenance the contention of Sri Ganatra would be to contradict one of the fundamental postulates of a legal order that Rules of law enforce objective meanings to be ascertained by the courts and to substitute the opinion of the person charged with the breach of the law for the law itself
 Otherwise the consequence would be that whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought that the law was thus and so he is to be treated as though the law was thus and so that is the law actually is thus and so
See Criminal Law Smith  Hogan p 70
Justice Holmes in United States vs Wurzbach  at 399 said Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides
The precise course of the line maybe uncer tain but no one can come near it without knowing that he does so if he thinks and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make him take the risk
 151 Referring to the principles that guide the matter learned authors in Criminal Law Smith  Hogan say    for in the great majority of cases it is irrelevant whether he knows it or not
It must usually be proved that D intended to cause or was reckless whether he caused the event or state of affairs which as a matter of fact is forbidden by law but it is quite immaterial to his conviction though it may affect his punishment whether he knew that the event or state of affairs was forbidden by law   p68   
It was held that a Frenchman might be guilty of murder in the course of duelling in England even if he did not know that duelling was against English law   p68 12
The plea in the last analysis reduces itself to one of ignorance of the law
This would be no justification
Ten thousand difficulties it is said do not make a doubt
As the learned authors supra put it
One who being ignorant of the law sells goods at a price in excess of the miximum fixed by the statute could hardly be said to have been led astray by his conscience while the harm prescribed  lacks objective wrongness
The Statute we are concerned with prescribes a strict liability without need to establish Mens Rea
The Actus Reus is itself the offence
There might be cases where some mental element might be a part of the Actus Reus itself
This is not one of those cases where anything more than the mere doing of the prescribed act requires to be proved
There is thus no merit in the second point either
The appeal would therefore require to fail
The sen tence which is the statutory minimum cannot also be light ened by the court
But there is one poignant aspect on which learned counsel made an impassioned plea
Sri Ganatra pointed out the hardship of a small time tradesmen who as here purchase the goods from big manufac turers and sell them in retail
Very often the manufactur ers or wholesalers are not touched but the small fry are exposed to prosecution
152 Indeed in Ganeshmal Jashraj vs Govt
of Gujarat and Anr
  Bhagwati J had occasion to say   
It is common knowledge that these small tradesmen purchase the food stuff sold by them from the wholesalers and sometimes even directly from the manufacturers and more often than not the adulteration is made either by the wholesalers or by the manufacturers
Ordinarily it is not the small retailers who adulterate the articles of food sold by them
Yet it is only the small retailers who are caught by the food inspectors and the investi gative machinery of the food department does not for some curious and inexplicable reason turn its attention to the wholesalers and manufactures
The small tradesmen who eke out a precarious existence living almost from hand to mouth are sent to jail for selling food stuff which is often enough not adulterated by them and the wholesalers and manufacturers who really adulterate the food stuff and fatten themselves on the misery of others escape the arm of the law    p 1117   
The result is that a wrong impres sion is being created on the public mind that the law is being properly enforced whereas in fact what is really happening is that it is only
the small tradesmen who are quite often not themselves responsible for adulteration who are caught and sent to jail while there is no effective enforcement of the law against the real adulterators
This is a failing which we notice in the implementation of many of our laws
It is only the smaller flies which get caught in the web of these law while the bigger ones escape    p1118   
The implementation of the law does create an impression that it is a law meant to be operative only against the smaller men and that the rich and the well to do are beyond its reach
Moreover the law operates very harshly against the small tradesmen because a minimum sentence is provided and the small tradesmen are liable to be sent to jail    p 1118 9 Emphasis Supplied 153 Krishna Iyer J in Inderjeet vs UP State  said   
We are disturbed that it is possible that small men become the victims of harsh law when there is no executive policy which guides prosecution of offenders    p 257   
Even otherwise there is a general power in the Executive to commute sentences and such power can be put into action on a principled basis when small men get caught by the law p 257 Emphasis Supplied The present case as Sri Ganatra rightly pointed out is one where bigger offenders who manufactured the supari and who distributed them to the retailers have gone scot free
Unfortunately appellant did not and perhaps could not invoke the benevolent provisions of Section 192 of the Act
The offence was ten years ago and the appellate court had acquitted the appellant
The expression Fruit Products in the context of what the Delegated legislative authority really meant and wanted to convey was not a model of preci sion
The degree of precision should be such that not only those who read it in good faith understand but also that those who read it in bad faith do not misunderstand
Indeed this somewhat imperfect definition of Fruit Products in Rule 29f has since been amended enumerating precisely the specific products in which the food colours permitted by Rule 28 could be used leaving no room for the possibility of any argument of the kind advanced in this case
This amendment which came into force with effect from 15111984 deleted the expression Fruit Products and in its place specifically enumerated the items under Rule 29f in which the use of permitted coal tar food colours was allowed
It is for these reasons that we think we should hold that this is a fit case in which the appropriate Government should exercise its executive powers of remission of the substantive sentence of imprisonment though not of the fine under Section 432 Cr
PC or under other law appro priate to the case
We therefore direct that the 154 imposition of the substantive sentence of imprisonment shall be postponed till appellant s prayer for remission which appellant shall make within a month from now before the appropriate Government or Authority is considered and disposed of taking into account the observations made in this judgment
Subject to these circumstances the appeal is dismissed
PSS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In Civil Appeal No 1118 of 1975 the respondent asses see s husband gifted certain lands and buildings to his two spouses by three gift deeds dated 2641962 2651962 and 1781962
The gifts were chargeable to gift tax and were accordingly assessed to gift tax In the assessment year 1963 64
In the proceedings for assessment to wealth for the assessment year 1967 68 it was claimed on behalf of the estate of the assessee s husband who had later died on 16121968 that as the gifts were chargeable to gift tax the proviso to section 41a was attracted and the assets so transferred were not includible in the net wealth of the deceased for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March 1964
The Wealth Tax Officer rejected this claim
On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the assessment
Allowing the assessee s further appeal the Appellate Tribunal on a particular construction of the proviso held that the assets transferred which had attracted gift tax were not includible in the net wealth of the deceased for the assessment year 1964 65 onwards
On a reference made at the Instant of the Revenue the High Court agreed with the construction placed on the provi so by the Tribunal
The Revenue filed an appeal by Special leave In this Court
156 The appellant assessee in Civil Appeal Nos
1226 and 1227 of 1975 made a gift of certain amount to her minor daughter on 7101959
The assets so transferred were in cluded in the assessee s wealth for the two assessment years 1964 65 and 1965 66 under section 41aii of the Wealth tax Act
The claim of the assessee that the proviso to section 4Ia operated to exclude the asset from the net wealth of the assessee as the transfer was chargeable to gift tax was not accepted by the Wealth tax Officer
The Appellate As sistant Commissioner rejected the assessee s appeal
However the Appellate Tribunal accepting the conten tion of the assessee allowed the assessee s appeal and held that on a true construction of the proviso so long as the gift was chargeable to or exempt under section 5 from gift tax to that extent section 41a ceased to have operation and the statutory fiction embodied in it was not attracted and that since the gift was chargeable to gift tax at the relevant time the exemption was to operate from the assessment year commencing after 31 3 1964
The High Court on a reference made at the instance of the Revenue reversed the Tribunal s view
Hence the asses see filed the appeal by certificate in this Court
In the appeals before this Court it was submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the words for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March 1964 could in the context only refer to the gift and gift tax assessments that only that class of gifts which were chargeable to gift tax for any assessment year 1964 65 or thereafter hut subject to the time limit fixed by the 1971 amendment which would otherwise fail under section 41a were eligible for the benefit of exemption and that where the enactment was clear and admitted of only one meaning and did not admit of two or more meanings it would be the plain meaning that should be given effect to and no resort could be had to any rules of construction which would denude the provision of its plain and ordinary meaning
On behalf of the assessees it was contended that the date of the  gift was immaterial and as long as the transfer was chargeable to gift tax or was exempted under section 5 what ever may be the year in which the gift was made the exemp tion from a gift tax must commence for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March 1964 that these words should not be read as part of the first part of the proviso relating to gift tax assessments but as part of the second part denoting the commencement of the operation from Wealth tax and that a construction which promoted its constitutionality has to be preferred to the 157 one which if accepted would expose the proviso to the vice of discrimination and unconstitutionality
Allowing the appeal of the Revenue and dismissing the appeal of the assessee
HELD 1
On a reading of the plain words of the proviso to section 41a of the  the clause for any assessment year commencing after 31st day of March 1964 can only be read as relating to gift tax assesssments and not to the wealth tax assessments
165E The amendment introducing the proviso was brought about by an amending Act of 1964 but the date of the commencement of its operation was left to be fixed by a Notification
If the construction that the clause should be read as part of the second part denoting the commencement of the operation of exemption from Wealth tax is accepted effect of the Notification issued bringing the proviso into effect from 141965 would be wholly ignored and the introduction of the words but before the 1st day of April 1972 by a later amendment would operate to take away the benefit of the exemption after 141972 and the exemption confined only to the assessment years between 1964 65 and 1972 73
165C D Therefore the gifts in question though chargeable to gift tax would not attract the benefit of exemption and would be liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessees
163A T Saraswathi Achi vs CIT  CWT vs Seth Nand Lal Ganeriwala  MG Kol lankulam vs CIT ITR 160 Kerala Malti Harseey vs CWT and CWT vs Rasesh N Mafatlal approved
21 One of the pillars of statutory interpretation viz the literalrule demands that if the meaning of the Statuto ry Interpretation is plain the Courts must apply regardless of the result
165G 22 The very concept of interpretation connotes the introduction of elements which are necessarily extrinsic to the words in the statute
Though the words Interpretation and construction are used interchangeably the idea is somewhat different
165H 23 The rule of construction that if the statutory provision is susceptible or admits of two reasonably possi ble views then the one 158 which would promote its constitutionality should be pre ferred on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of its own jurisdiction is subject to the further rule that it applies only where two views are reasonably possible on the statutory language
If the words of the statute on a proper construction can be read only in a particular way then it cannot be read in another way by a court of construction anxious to avoid its unconstitu tionality
166G H 24 In a case as here where a reference arises under Act  the question of the constitutionality of the Act cannot be examined and pronounced upon by this Court
That is the task of the Court in judicial review
However the rule of preference of a particular construction amongst the alternatives in order to avoid unconstitutionality is unavailable in the instant case
166H 167A F 3
In a taxing measure the legislature enjoys a wider latitude and its dispensations are based on an interaction of diverse economic social and policy considerations
Further if the proviso is bad for discrimination it would follow that the converse situation brought about by the later amendment a discrimination as between gifts made as between the 31st of March 1972 and on 1st April 1972 might also become bad
This Court is required to notice the provi sion as it stood at the relevant time
167D E State of Punjab vs Prem Sukhdas  and Attorney General vs Carlton Bank  re ferred to
Dr Patrick Devlin Samples of Law Making Oxford Uni versity Press p 70 71 and Max Radin Statutory Interpreta tion 43 Hat
LR 863 868 referred to