Appeal No 401 of 1956
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 8 1956 of the Travancore Cochin High Court at Ernakulam in ITR No 24 of 1954
A V Viswanatha Sastri section R Ganapathy Iyer J B Dadachanji and G Gopalakrishna for the appellant
K N Rajagopala Sastri R H Dhebar and D Gupta for the respondent
October 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
The appellant who was a Superintendent of Police in the service of the former Travancore State retired sometime in 1940
After retirement he was spending his time in studying Vedanta philosophy and expounding the same to such persons as were keen on understanding it
He soon gathered about him a number of disciples one of whom was J H Levy of London UK Levy along with others used to receive instructions in Vedanta from the appellant
He used to come to Travancore from England at regular intervals and stay there for a few months at a time and attend the discourses given by the appellant and so had the benefit of his teachings on Vedanta
Levy had an account in Lloyd s Bank at Bombay
On December 13 1941 Levy transferred the entire balance standing to his credit in this account amounting to Rs 241103 11 3 to the credit of an account which he got the appellant to open in his name in the 135 same bank
Thereafter from time to time Levy put in further sums into the appellant s aforesaid account in Lloyds Bank Bombay
It appears that the payments so made up to August 19 1951 amounted to about Rs 450000 
From time to time the appellant got moneys transferred from his account at the Lloyd s Bank Bombay to his account in a bank at Trivandrum in Travancore
This appeal arises out of orders for assessment to income tax passed against the appellant for the assessment years 1122 1123 and 1124 all according to the Malayalam era
The respective accounting periods according to the Gregorian calendar were from August 17 1945 to August 16 1946 August 17 1946 to August 16 1947 and August 17 1947 to August 16 1948
It appears that during these periods Levy bad deposited in the appellant s account at Lloyd s Bank in Bombay the following respective sums Rs 13304  Rs 29948 and Rs 19983 
During the same periods the appellant had obtained transfers of the following respective sums from his Bombay account to his Trivandrum account Rs 81200  Rs 47000 and Rs 37251 
The Income tax Officer Trivandrum assessed the appellant to tax on the latter amounts as foreign income ie income arising in India and brought into Travancore State in the relevant periods
We are not concerned in this case with the assessment made on other income of the appellant
Tile appellant appealed from these assessment orders to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who consolidated them into one appeal
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeal and confirmed the orders of the Income tax Officer
The appellant then went up in appeal to the Appellate Tribunal but that appeal also failed
The appellant thereafter obtained an order from the Tribunal referring the following Questions to the High Court of Travancore Cochin for decision i Whether the aforesaid receipts from John H Levy constitute income taxable under the Travancore Income tax Act 1121  and 136 ii Whether there are materials for the Tribunal to hold that the deposits into the assessee s bank
account in Bombay by John H Levy from 1941 as aforesaid represented income that accrued to the assessee outside Travancore State   The High Court answered the first question in the affirmative
It however answered the second question in favour of the appellant holding that he was carrying on a vocation or occupation in that State and the income derived therefrom should be considered as having arisen in Travancore and that therefore the appellant was liable to be taxed not on the amounts which he brought into Travancore but on the amounts which had been paid to the credit of his account at Bombay by Levy during the relevant periods
The appellant has now come up to this Court in appeal by special leave against the answer given by the High Court to the first question
We are not concerned in this appeal with the answer given to the second question as it had been decided in favour of the appellant and there has been no appeal against it by the revenue authorities
We do not think that the case presents any difficulty
It has to be decided on the terms of the Travancore Income tax Act 1121 Malayalam Era but as the provisions of that Act are for
the present purpose identical with those of the Indian Income tax Act 1922  it would be more convenient to refer to the provisions of the latter
Mr Sastri appearing for the appellant has stated that the case involves really two points
First was the appellant carrying on a vocation  And secondly if he was can the amounts with which we are concerned be said to be profits or gains of the vocation  We agree with his view of the case and proceed to discuss these points
The first question is whether the appellant was carrying on a vocation
Under section 10 of the Income tax Act 1922 tax is payable by an assessee in respect of the profit or gains of any profession or vocation carried on by him
The facts found are that the appellant was studying Vedanta philosophy himself and 137 imparting the knowledge acquired by him as a result of his studies to such as cared to come and imbibe it
There is no evidence to show that the appellant had made it a condition that he would impart such knowledge only to those who were prepared to pay for it
We have therefore to proceed on the basis that the appellant was teaching his disciples Vedanta without any motive or intention of making a profit out of such activity
We find no difficulty in thinking that teaching is a vocation if not a profession
It is plainly so and it is not necessary to discuss the various meanings of the word vocation  for the purpose or to cite authorities to support this view
Nor do we find any reason why if teaching is a vocation teaching of Vedanta is not
It is just as much teaching and therefore a vocation as any other teaching
It is said that in teaching Vedanta the appellant was only practicing religion
We are unable to see why teaching of Vedanta as a matter of religion is not carrying on of a vocation
In any case the question does not really arise for Whether the appellant was in teaching Vedanta practicing religion is of course a finding of fact
It may be that Vedanta could be taught as a practice of religion but it could of course also be taught as any other philo sophy or school of thought
The statement of case in this
case does not contain any finding that in teaching Vedanta the appellant was practicing religion
It is said that in order that an activity may be called a vocation for the purposes of the Act it has to be shown that it was an organised activity and that it was indulged in with a motive of making profit  that as the appellant s activity in teaching Vedanta was neither organised nor performed with a view to making profit he could not be said to
be carrying on a vocation
It is said that as the word vocation  has been used along with the words business and profession  and the object of a business and a profession is to make a profit only such activities can be included in the word vocation  the object of which likewise is to make a profit
We think that these contentions 18 138 lack substance
We do not appreciate the significance of saying that in order to become a vocation an activity must be organised
If by that a continuous or as was said a systematic activity is meant we have to point out that it is well known that a single act may amount to the carrying on of a business or profession
It is unnecessary to discuss this question further as we find no want of system or continuity in the activity of the appellant
He had gathered a large number of disciples around him and was instructing them in Vedanta regularly
Levy came all the way from England at regular intervals to obtain such instructions
All this clearly indicates Organisation and system
Again it is well established that it is not the motive of the person doing an act which decides whether the act done by him is the carrying on of a business profession or vocation
If any business profession or vocation in fact produces an income that is taxable income and none the less because it was carried on without the motive of producing any income
This we believe is too well established on the authorities now to be questioned
It was decided as early as 1888 in the case of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs Incorporated Council of Law Reporting1 and followed ever since that  it is not essential to the carrying on of a trade that the people carrying it on should make a profit nor is it even necessary to the carrying on of the trade that the people carrying it on should desire or wish to make a profit
If that were not so a person carrying on what otherwise would be a business may say that he did not carry on a business because it was not his intention to make any income out of it
That would of course be absurd
The question is whether the activity has actually produced an income and it matters not whether that activity is called by the name of business profession vocation or by any other name or with what intention it was carried on
The observation of Rowlatt J in Stedeford vs Beloe 2 to which we were referred by Mr Sastri that there could be no tax on pension granted to a retired 1 18883 Tax Cas 105 113
2 139 headmaster as there is no background of business in it  was clearly not intended to lay down that without a profit motive there could be no business profession or vocation
The pension could be taxed only if it had arisen out of the office and the only point decided was that it had not so arisen as the headmaster held no office having retired earlier at the date the pension had been granted see the same case in the House of Lords1
We think therefore that the teaching of Vedanta by the appellant in this case can properly be called the carrying on of a vocation by him
Then the other point to be decided is whether the payments made by Levy were income received by the appellant from his vocation of teaching Vedanta
A very large number of authorities both Indian and English have been pressed upon us in tile course of the argument
These cases illustrate the application of the well settled principle that in the case of a voluntary payment no tax can be levied on it if it bad been made for reasons purely personal to the donee and unconnected with his office or vocation while it will be taxable if it was made because of the office or vocation of the donee
We do not consider it profitable to discuss them in this case
Also it seems to us that the present case is too plain to require any authority
The only point is whether the moneys were received by the appellant by virtue of his vocation
Mr Sastri contended that the facts showed that the payments were purely personal gifts
He drew our attention to the affidavit of Levy where it is stated  all sums of money paid into his account by me have been gifts to mark my esteem and affection for him and for no other reason
But Levy also there said  I have had the benefit of his teachings on Vedanta 
It is important to remember however that the point is not what the donor thought he was doing but why the donee received it
So Collins M R in Herbert vs McQuade referring to Inland Revenue vs Strong said at p 649  Now that judgment
whether or not the 1 2 3 140 particular facts justified it is certainly an affirmation of a principle of law that a payment may be liable to income tax although it is voluntary on the part of the persons who made it and that the test is whether from the standpoint of the person who receives it it accrues to him in virtue of his office  if it does it does not matter whether it was voluntary or whether it was compulsory on the part of the persons who paid it
That seems to me to be the test and if we once get to this that the money has come to or accrued to a person by virtue of his office it seems to me that the liability to income tax is not negatived merely by reason of the fact that there was no legal obligation on the part of the persons who contributed the money to pay it
 It is well established that in cases of this kind the real question is as Rowlatt J put it in Reed vs Seymour 1  But is it in the nature of a personal gift or is it a remuneration an observation which was quoted with approval by Viscount Cave L C when the case went up to the House of Lords with the addition  If the latter it is subject to the tax  if the former it is not  see Seymour vs Reed 2
We find it impossible to hold in this case that the payments to the appellant had not been made in consideration of the teaching imparted by him
Levy admitted that he had received benefit from the teaching of the appellant
It is plain to us that it was because of the teaching that the gift had been made
It is true that Levy said that he made the gifts to mark his esteem and affection for the appellant
But such emotions and therefore the gifts were clearly the result of the teaching imparted by the appellant
Mr Sastri contends that that may be so but we have no right to follow the successive causes and as a result thereof link the gift with the teaching
An argument of this kind seems to have been advanced in Blakiston vs Cooper 3 and dealt with by Lord Ashbourne in the following words It was suggested that the offerings were made as personal gifts to the Vicar as marks of esteem and 1 2 3 1909 AC 104
141 respect
Such reasons no doubt played their part in obtaining and increasing the amount of the offerings but I cannot doubt that they were given to the vicar as vicar
and that they formed part of the profits accruing by reason of his office
 We have no doubt in this case that the imparting of the teaching was the causa causans of the making of the gift it was not merely a causa sine qua non
The payments were repeated and came with the same regularity as Levy s visits to the appellant for receiving instructions in Vedanta
We do not feel impressed by Mr Sastri s contention that the first payment of Rs 241103 11 3 was too large a sum to be paid as consideration
In any case we are not concerned in this case with that payment
We are concerned with payments which are of much smaller amounts and as to which it has not been said that they were too large to be a consideration for the teaching
And one must not forget that these are cases of voluntary payments and the question of the appraisement of the value of the teaching received in terms of money is not very material
If the first payment was too big to have been paid for the teaching received it was too big to have been given purely by way of gift
In the view that we take namely that the payments with which we are concerned were income arising from the vocation of the appellants a teacher of Vedanta no question of exemption under section 43vii of the Act arises
In order that a payment may be exempted under that section it has to be shown that it did not arise from the exercise of a vocation
In the result we have come to the conclusion that this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs in this Court
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant company was maintaining a large eucalyptus plantation for captive consumption in its production of Rayon Grade Pulp
The State of Kerala claimed that as a consequence of the Kerala Private Forests Vesting and Assignment Act 1971 the eucalyptus plantation being a private forest  stood transferred to and vested in it
The company resisted the State s claim on the ground that the term private forest  excludes the eucalyptus plantation
The High Court decided the question in favour of the State and against the appellant
402 In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since the eucalyptus plantation was covered by the expression any other agricultural crop  in section 247iv of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1963 the similar expression used in section 2f1iC of the Vesting Act 1971 must also carry the same meaning
Dismissing the appeal this Court
HELD 1
Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construc tion of the same words in another statute unless the stat utes are pari materia legislations
408G 11 The definition of private forest  in the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not just the same as the definition of private forest  in the Vesting Act
Indeed there is a vast difference between the two
Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of Pri vate Forests Act 1949 applied immediately before the ap pointed day the second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala
The definition of private forest  as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act ap plied and exempts there from lands described under sub clauses A to D
This significant reference to this Act in the definition of private forest  in the Vesting Act makes all the difference in the case
The scheme of this Act appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the Act came into force it would continue to be a forest even if there was subsequent re plantation
408H 409A D 12 The lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force
Therefore it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning accorded to private forest  from the Kerala Land Reforms Act to the Vesting Act
409E F State of Kerala vs Anglo American DTT Co and State of Kerala vs
KC Moosa Haji AIR referred to
Malankara Rubber and Produce Co vs State of Kerala  Ors
   Held inapplicable
403 State of Kerala vs Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Ltd   referred to
The term agriculture  and agricultural crop  have wider as well as narrower connotation
The wider concept covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent operations
It takes within its fold among other things the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce including forest products such as timber sal and piyasal trees casuarina plantations tendu leaves coconuts etc
Of course there must be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultivation of the land in the sense of tilling of the lands sowing of the seeds planting and similar work done in the land
The forest growth or spontaneous growth of any product plants or trees however would be outside the characteristic of agricultural products or operations
407D F Commissioner of 1
T West Bengal vs Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy   referred to
21 Under Section 31 private forests vest in Govern ment
Subsection 2 however excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation
Cultivation for this purpose includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species 
The explanation to sub section 2 makes this aspect beyond doubt
The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree fruit bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under section 3 sub section 2
The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under section 3 sub section 2 the trees of every variety
But while pro viding for exclusion under sub clause C of section 2f1i the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds
It seems to have considered only fruit bearing trees and not of other species
Sub clause C refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit bearing trees
It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agri cultural crop
If the legislature had intended to  use the term agricultural crop  in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit bearing or other wise it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denot ing only the cashew or other fruit bearing trees
Therefore there is no indication that the words any other agricultur al crop  in sub clause C are quite wide enough to compre hend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations
These words exclude only fruit bearing trees
410H 41 1A D State of Kerala vs Amalgamated Malabar Estates AIR 1980 404 Ker 137 State of Kerala vs Malayalam Plantation Ltd AIR 1981 Ker 1 and State of Kerala vs
KC Moosa Haji  Ors AIR  approved
In seeking legislative intention judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen atten tively to what the legislature does not say
410G H