il Appeal No 2341 of 1978
From the Judgement and Decree dated 16111977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No 358 of 1976
Altaf Ahmed Additional Solicitor General P Parmeshwaran and Dilip tandon for the Appellant
128 AS Nambiar and B Parthasarthy for the Respondent
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by AHMADI J
This appeal on certificate is directed against the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was quashed the imposition of duty and levy of penalty on the ground that the show cause notice was issued after the expiry of the period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action
The facts leading to this appeal are as follows The respondent Ms Ramdev Tobacco Company a sole proprietory concern was at all material times a dealer in tobacco having a licenced warehouse at Guntur
The dealer was liable to pay duty on the tobacco received at his warehouse and transported to another dealer
On August 30 1972 the appellant issued a notice calling upon the respondent to show cause why duty should not be demanded under Rule 160 of Central Excise Rules 1944 the Rules  hereafter on 64444 kgs
of VFC Farmash Tobacco removed from his warehouse and not accounted for in the warehouse register maintained under the Rules
The respondent was also asked to show cause why penalty should not be imposed for infraction of Rules 151 and 321 of the Rules for illicit removal of the aforementioned quantity of tobacco
This show cause notice was founded on the allegation that in 1970 the respondent obtained six transport permits TP 2 dated January 13 1970 February 10 1970 March 26 1970 May 16 1970 July 24 1970 and August 5 1970 and transported under each permit more than the quantity of tobacco allowed thereunder in contravention of the aforementioned rules
The respondent sent a detailed reply to the said show cause notice on November 4 1972
After giving a personal hearing to the respondent on September 18 1973 the appellant came to the conclusion that the respondent had evaded payment of duty on 1272 bags weighing 48304 Kgs of VFC Farmash tobacco and issued a demand under Rule 160 in the sum of Rs16616576 under adjudication order No 17374 dated April 9 1974
In addition thereto the appellant imposed a penalty of Rs 100 for contravention of Rules 151 and 321 of the Rules
Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition No2600 of 1974 under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the aforesaid order of the appellant
This writ petition was heard and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who took the view that the appellant s action was time barred inasmuch as it was initiated after the expiry of the period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action
According to the learned Judge under section 129 402 of the the  hereinafter no suit prosecution or other legal proceeding could be instituted for anything done or ordered to be done under the law after the expiration of six months from the accrual of the cause of action
Since a period of more than six months had indisputably expired from the dates on which the excess tobacco was transported under the six transport permits in question the action was clearly time barred
In this view of the matter the writ petition was allowed and the demand made under the impugned adjudication order both in respect of duty and penalty was quashed
The present appellant questioned the correctness of this view in appeal Writ Appeal No 358 of 1976 but in vain
The Division Bench found the view taken by the learned Single Judge in accord with its view in Writ Petition No 2516 of 1974 decided on April 1 1976
It therefore dismissed the appeal but since it had granted a certificate to appeal in the case relied on it also granted a similar certificate which has given rise to this appeal
Sub section 2 of section 40 of the as it stood at the relevant point of time before its amendment by Amendment 22 of 1973 read as under No suit prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted for anything done or ordered to be done under the after the expiration of six months from the accrual of the cause of action or from the date of the act or order complained of
Before we proceed to analyse this sub section it would be advantageous to bear in mind that sub section 1 of this section bars the institution of any suit prosecution or other legal proceeding against the Central Government or its officer in respect of any order passed in good faith or any act in good faith done or ordered to be done under the 
The second sub section prescribes a period of limitation for suits prosecutions and other legal proceedings instituted lodged or taken for anything done or ordered to be done under the 
That is why in Public Prosecutor Madras vs RRaju  Anr etc  it was urged on a conjoint reading of the two sub sections that sub section 2 applied only to Government and could not come to the rescue of a tax payer
Rejecting this contention this Court held The two sub sections operate in different fields
The first sub section contemplates bar of suits against the Central Government or against the officers by protecting them in 130 respect of orders passed in good faith or acts done in good faith
It is manifest that the second sub section does not have any words of restriction or limitation of class of persons unlike sub section 1
Sub section 2 does not have any words of qualification as to persons
Therefore sub section 2 is applicable to any individual or person
 This the appellant s contention that sub section 2 was confined only to the Government officers was found to be unwarranted on the plain words of the provision and was also repelled by reference to other comparable statutes which went to show that whenever the legislature intended to limit the application against the Government officers the Legislature had chosen appropriate words of limitation to restrict the operation of the provision
It follows therefore that the application of the sub section extended to any person not being a Government Officer against whom any suit prosecution or other legal proceeding was commenced for anything done or ordered to be done under the 
The next contention convassed in that case by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the words anything done or ordered to be done employed in the sub section would not include anything done in violation of the 
This Court after referring to the definition of the word act  in the  which extended to illegal omissions also and the case law on the subject observed at page 820 as under These decisions in the light of the definition of the word act  in the establish that non compliance with the provisions of the statute by omitting to do what the act enjoins will be anything done or ordered to be done under the 
The complaint against the respondents was that they wanted to evade payment of duty
Evasion was by using and affixing cut and torn banderols
Books of account were not correctly maintained
There was shortage of banderols in stock
Unbanderolled matches were found
These are all infraction of the provisions in respect of things done or ordered to be done under the 
 It is therefore clear from the above observation that any omission or infraction of the statutory provision would also fall within the ambit of the provision
Non payment of duty or dues which a dealer is under an obligation to pay under the statute was therefore held to fall within 131 the scope of the provision
In that case the complaint against the respondents was that to evade the payment of duty they had used and affixed cut and torn banderols and had failed to maintain the accounts correctly resulting in shortage in stocks
The respondents were prosecuted for contravention of the Rules punishable under sections 9b and 9d of the as also under section 420 read with section 511 and 109 IPC The respondents pleaded the bar of section 40 of the as it then stood
The High Court upheld the contention that the prosecution was barred by the rule of limitation incorporated in section 40 as the same was instituted after the expiry of six months from the date of the commission of the alleged offences
This Court on the aforesaid line of reasoning affirmed the High Court s decision
But the question is whether the issuance of a show cause notice and the initiation of the consequential adjudication proceedings can be described as other legal proceedings  within the meaning of sub section 2 of section 40 of the  If the said departmental action falls within the expression other legal proceeding  there can be no doubt that the action would be barred as the same indisputably was initiated six months after the accrual of the cause action
So the crucial question is whether the issuance of the show cause notice dated August 30 1972 and the passing of the impugned order in adjudication proceedings emanating therefrom constitutes other legal proceeding  within the meaning of section 402 of the to fall within the mischief of that sub section which bars such proceedings if commenced after a period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action
The learned Additional Solictor General submitted that the expression other legal proceeding  must be read ejusdem generis with the proceeding expressions suit  and prosecution  and if so read it becomes crystal clear that the department s action cannot come within the purview of other legal proceeding 
How valid is this contention is the question which we are called upon to answer in the present appeal
The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus is required to be determined
By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words constituting a genus is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them unless the context otherwise requires
General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect
Courts 132 have also limited the scope of the general words in cases where a larger meaning is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results
To put it differently the general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specific things constituting a genus unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning
The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statute gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words
But unless there is genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words there can be no question of invoking this rule
Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words
There can be little doubt that the words other legal proceeding  are wide enough to include adjudication and penalty proceedings under the 
Even the learned Additional Solicitor General did not contend to the contrary but what he said was that since this wide expression is preceded by particular words of a certain genus namely words indicating reference to proceedings taken in courts only the wide words must be limited to things ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding words and should therefore receive a limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type in question
There can be no doubt that suit  or prosecution  are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority even if a statutory one
The use of the expression instituted  in section 402 strengthens this belief
Since this sub section has been construed by this Court in Raju s case supra not to be confined in its application to only Government servants but to extend to others including the assessees and since the words for anything done or ordered to be done under this  are found to be comprehensive enough to include acts of non compliance or omissions to do what the and the Rule enjoin the limitation prescribed by section 402 would undoubtedly hit the adjudication and penalty proceedings unless the expression other legal proceeding  is read ejusdem generis to limit its ambit to legal proceedings initiated in a court of law
The scope of section 402 as it stood before its amendment pursuant to Raju s case came up for consideration before a Division 133 Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Universal Cables Ltd vs Union of India 1977 ELT J92 wherein the question raised for determination was whether penalty procedings taken under Rule 173Q for the infraction of Rule 173C with a view to evading payment of duty fell within the expression other legal proceeding  used in the said sub section
The High Court conceded that the expression when read in isolation is wide enough to include any proceeding taken in accordance with law whether so taken in a court of law or before any authority or tribunal but when read with the preceding words suit  or prosecution  it must be given a restricted meaning
This is how the High Court expressed itself at page J 106 Now the language of section 40 2 is no suit prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted 
Suit  and prosecution  which precede the expression other legal proceeding  can be taken only in a Court of Law
After stating the expanse of the ejusdem generis rule as explained in Amar Chandra vs Excise Collector Tripura AIR
at 1868 Sutherland Volume 2 pages 399 400 the High Court observed that there was no indication in the said sub section or elsewhere in the that the said general words were intended to receive their wide meaning and were not to be construed in a limited sense with the aid of the ejusdem generis rule
A departmental proceeding like penalty proceedings were therefore placed outside the scope of the said sub section
This view was quoted with approval by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in CC Industries  Others vs HN Ray and Another at 453
These two cases therefore clearly support the view canvassed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General
We have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions
In considering the scope of the expression other legal proceeding  we have confined ourselves to the language of sub section 2 of section 40 of the before its amendment by 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision
On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression other legal proceeding  must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words suit  and prosecution  as they constitute a genus
In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication 134 proceedings in question did not fall within the expression other legal proceeding  employed in section 40 2 of the as it stood prior to its amendment by 22 of 1973 and therefore the said procedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the said sub section
Mr Nambiar the learned counsel for the respondents strongly argued that we should not entertain the submission based on the ejusdem generis rule since it was not raised before the High Court
That indeed is true but being a pure question of law we have though it fit to entertain the same
We therefore do not entertain this objection
In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench which affirmed it and dismiss the respondent s writ petition itself
We also set aside the order by which the appellant was directed to pay costs
We restore the adjudication order dated April 4 1974 and all consequential orders if any passed thereunder
Interim stay granted on August 16 1979 is vacated and the appellant will be entitled to recover the dues from the security furnished pursuant to that order
The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs
RSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
The respondent was appointed on 1821977 as an Assistant Auditor under the Local Funds Audit Examiner of State of UP on ad hoc temporary basis for the term fixed in the order of his appointment and his services were liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reason
After his initial appointment his services were extended from time to time till 2821981
He was awarded an adverse entry in his character roll for the year 1977 78 both regarding his conduct as also his work
The respondent alongwith one Rajendra Prasad Pandey another Sub Auditor were deputed to audit the accounts of Raja Raghbar Dayal Inter College Sitapur in respect of the year 1979 80
It is alleged that while auditing the account they acted in excess of their authority in as much as they audited the Boys Fund Accounts  issued audit note and also irregularly demanded and collected Rs 2000 as audit fee and issued receipt under their signature
On complaint a preliminary enquiry was held and the allegations were found to be correct
After the preliminary inquiry report the respondent was relieved from his duties from Sitapur and directed to join his duty at Allahabad
Whereupon the respondent proceeded on leave and did not join his duty at Allahabad
The respondent s services were therefore terminated by order dated 2391980 and by another order services of Pandey were also terminated
Both of them filed writ petitions in the High Court contending that their termination orders were illegal having been passed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution
Whereas the writ petition filed by Pandey was dismissed the one filed by the respondent was allowed
The High Court held that since juniors to the respondent were retained in service while the respondent s services were terminated the order of termination was discriminatory in nature
The High Court further held that the order of termination was founded on an adverse entry awarded to the respondent hence it was not in good faith the punishment awarded to the respondent was not proportionate to the alleged offence
Against the 30 said order the State of UP filed a appeal after obtaining special leave
The question involved for consideration is whether the order terminating the services of the respondent is vitiated in law Allowing the appeal this Court HELD Holding of preliminary inquiry does not affect the nature of the termination order
42C In the instant case the respondent was a temporary Government Servant and there was adverse regarding his work which was reflected in the adverse remarks made for the year 1977 78
The competent authority held a preliminary inquiry in regard to the allegations of improper conduct in carrying out unauthorised audit of Boys Fund of educational institution
On result of the preliminary inquiry no charges were framed against the respondent no officer was appointed for holding the departmental inquiry instead the competent authority chose to terminate the respondent s services in exercise of its powers under the terms of contract a well as under the relevant rules applicable to a temporary Government servant
42A C The principle last come first go  is applicable to a case where on account of reduction of work or shrinkage of cadre retrenchment takes place and the services of employees are terminated on account of retrenchment
But this principle is not applicable to a case where the services of a temporary employee are terminated on the assessment of his work and suitability in accordance with term and conditions of his service
On the admitted set of facts the order of termination in the instant case could not be rendered illegal or unjustified on the ground of juniors being retained in service
The view taken by the High Court is not sustainable in law
33D H Appeal allowed High Court order set aside as it interfered with order of termination in a casual manner
42D Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union of India
1958 SCR 828 The State of Orissa  Anr
vs Ram Narayan Das   RC Lacy vs The State of Bihar  Ors CANo 59062 decided on 23101963 Champaklal Chimanlal Shah vs The Union of India 1964 AIR SC449 AG Benjamin vs Union of India CA No 134166 decided on 13121966 Shamsher Singh  Anr
vs State of Punjab 1975 1 SCR 814 State of Punjab  Anr
vs Shri Sukh Raj Bahadur 1968 3 SCR 31 234 RK Misra vs UP State Handloom Corporation  referred to
Nepal Singh vs State of UP  Ors 1985 1 SCC 56 Ishwar Chand Jain vs High Court of Punjab  Haryana  Anr  distinguished