Appeal No 20160
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 18 1958 of the Bombay High Court Nagpur in Misc
No 391 of 1956
MC Setalvad Attorney General for India section N Andley and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant
SN Kerdekar N K Kherdakar and A G Ratnaparkhi for the respondent No 1 1962
November 8
The judgment of the Court was delivered by 970 GAJENDRAGADKAR J
This appeal raises a  short question about the construction of clauses 23 24 and 24 A in The Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949 hereinafter called the Order
jogeshwar so Parmanand Bhishikar hereinafter called the respondent owns a house known as the Bhishikar Bhawan in Nagpur
Block No 2A had been let out by him to a firm known as the Dayalbagh Stores for carrying on business
Since the tenant was in arrears as to rent the respondent obtained from the Rent Control Authorities permission to terminate the said tenancy
Meanwhile the tenant intimated to the respondent by telegram on July 24 1955 that it had vacated the said premises on that day
Prior to the receipt of this telegram however the appellant Chimandas Bagomal Sindhi had made an application to the Addl
Commissioner Nagpur on July 15 1955 that the premises occupied by the said tenant were likely to fall vacant and prayed that the same should be allotted to him as he was a displaced person within the meaning of the Order
The Addl
D C passed an order of provisional allotment in favour of the appellant on the same day and since then the appellant has been in possession of the said premises
The respondent then came to know about the said provisional allotment and gave intimation to the Addl
D C that he needed the premises for his own purposes and so he moved for the cancellation of the said provisional allotment order
On July 23 1956 the Addl D C purporting to exercise his powers under clause 23 1 of the Order confirmed the provisional allotment in favour of the appellant
The respondent then moved the Nagpur High Court by a writ petition No 307 of 1955 for cancellation of the said order
On April 10 1956 MrJustice Bhutt set aside the order of allotment and remanded the case for disposal in accordance with 971 law
That is how the first stage of this dispute came to an end
On remand the Addl
Commissioner confirmed the earlier order
He held that the respondent did not need the premises for his own occupation and he thought that there was no going back on the earlier provisional order of allotment in favour of the appellant
This second order was challenged by the respondent by another writ petition filed in the Nagpur High Court No 391 of 1956
Meanwhile the appellant had filed a Letters Patent Appeal No 95 of 1956 against the decision of Bhutt J on the earlier writ petition filed by the respondent
By consent the said Letters Patent Appeal and the subsequent writ petition filed by the respondent were heard together by a Division Bench of the High Court The Division Bench has set aside the order of allotment passed in favour of the appellant and allowed the subsequent writ petition filed by the respondent
It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave
It appears that after remand the respondent brought it to the notice of the Addl D C that the appellant owned As 4 share in the Hind Vastra Bhandar and that he had therefore a place where he could carry on his business
This allegation was repeated by the respondent in his second writ petition and it was urged by him that in view of the fact that the appellant had a place of business of his own he was not entitled to the accommodation alloted to him by the impugned order
This plea was met by the appellant on the ground  that the business mentioned by the respondent bad been dissolved
From the affidavit filed by the appellant in that behalf it does appear that the appellant had a share in the Hind Vastra Bbandar and Krishna Watch Co both of which Partnerships carried on their business at Nagpur but on 972 April 8 1957 the said partnerships had been dissolved and so after the said date of dissolution there was no place of business to which the appellant could lay any claim
In support of this plea the appellant has filed the deed of Dissolution in question
 The High Court has held that reading the definition of the words displaced person prescribed by clause 2 2 together with the relevant clause of the Order under which the impugned allotment had been made in favour of the appellants it must be held that the appellant was not a displaced person and as such he was not entitled to the said allotment
That is how the main point which arises for our decision in the present appeal is about the construction of the said relevant clauses of the Order
The order had been passed by the Government of the Central Provinces and Berar by virtue of the powers conferred on it by section 2 of the Central provinces and Berar Act No XI of 1946
Sub clause 2of clause 2 defines A displaced person as meaning any person who on account of the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil disturbances or fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been displaced from or has left his place of residence in such area after the 1st day of March 1947 and who has subsequently been residing in India
The Appellant claims to be such a displaced person
Clause 13 provides inter alia that the landlord would be entitled to claim ejectment of his tenant if he shows that he needs the house or portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide residence provided he is not occupying any other residential house of his own it the city or town concerned
He can also obtain ejectment of his tenant if it is shown that the tenant has secured alternative accommodation or has left the area for a continuous 973 period of four months and does not reasonably need the house
Clauses 22 to 27 form part of Chapter III which deals with the collection of information and letting of accommodation
Clause 22 1 provides that every landlord of a house situate in an area to which this Chapter applies shall give intimation about the impending vacancy as specified by subclauses a and b
s Clause 22 2 lays down that no person shall occupy any house in respect of which this Chapter applies except under an order under sub clauses 1 of clause 28 or clause 24 or on an assurance from the landlord that the house is being permitted to be occupied in accordance with sub clause 2 of clause 23
It would thus be noticed that all vacancies occurring in houses governed by  Chapter III have to be filled in the manner specified by clause 22 2
Clause 231 provides that on receipt of the intimation under clause 22 the Dy
Commissioner may within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said intimation order the landlord to let the vacant house to any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or to any Person holding it post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board or to a displaced person or to an evicted person and thereupon  notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary the landlord shall let the house to such person and place him in possession thereof immediately if it is vacant or as soon as it becomes vacant
The proviso to this sub clause gives right to the landlord to plead that he needs the house for his own occupation and if such a plea is accepted by theDy
Commissioner the landlord would be allowed to occupy the same
In other words in cases falling underclause 23 1 before the DCmakes an order directing the landlord to let the house to one of the personsspecified
in the different categories by that clause it would be open to the landlord to urge 974 his own need and if that need is established an order  under clause 2311 would not be passed against him
Clause 232 provides that if no order is passed and served upon the landlord within the period specified in sub clause 1 he shall be free to let the vacant house to any person
Clause 24 provides for the penalty for noncompliance with the requirements of clause 221
Under this clause the Dy
Commissioner is empowered to order the landlord to let the house forthwith to any of the persons falling under the categories specified by that clause
Since the power conferred on the D C to make an order under this clause is intended in a sense to punish the landlord for his contra vention of clause 22 it prima facie appears that the landlord is not given an opportunity to  prove his own need as under the proviso to 23 1
Clause 24 A deals with cases where the Dy
Commissioner receives information to the effect that a house is likely to become vacant or available for occupation by a particular date  and in such cases it empower the Dy
Commissioner to make an
order on the same lines as provided by clause 231
This clause lays down that the order passed under it shall be complied with by the landlord unless the house does not become vacant or available for occupation within one month from the date of receipt by him of the said order or the landlord applies for the cancellation of the said order stating his grounds thereof
This provision means that an order passed under clause 24A can be challenged by the landlord by pleading that he needs the premises for himself That in brief is the scheme of the relevant provisions
The High Court has taken the view that in allotting the premises in question to the appellant  the Addl D C has failed to notice the fact that on July 15 1955 when the provisional allotment order 975 was passed the appellant had a place of business of his own inasmuch as he was a 4 annas sharer in a partnership which had its place of business
According to the High Court as soon as it appeared that the appellant had a place of business of his own he ceased to be a displaced person within the meaning of clause 231 and the other relevant clauses
This conclusion proceeded on the basis that though the appellant may be taken to have satisfied the require ments of the definition of the expression displaced person under clause 22 that definition had to be read in the light of the context of clause 231 and its meaning had to be controlled by the said context
Clause 2 begins with the words that in this Order unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context the defined terms will carry the meaning assigned to them by the respective definitions
The whole object of enabling the Dy
Commissioner to make an order of allotment in respect of the persons specified in different categories by the relevant clause is to provide accommodation to those persons who were without any accommodation
Since that object is implicit in the relevant provision the definition must be construed in the light of the said implicit assumption of the relevant provision
It is on this view that the impugned order has been set aside by the High Court
It may be conceded that prima facie the view taken by the High Court appears to be attractive
It does appear to be reasonable that provisions of the kind contained in Chapter III would normally be expected to assist persons of specified categories to obtain accommodation and that would impliedly postulate that such persons have no accommodation which they can claim their own
If the words of the relevant provision are ambiguous or if their effect can reasonably be said to be a matter of doubt it may be permissible to construe the said provisions in the light of the assumption made by the High 976 Court
But arc the words of the relevant in any sense ambiguous or is the effect of those words doubtful  In our opinion the answer to these questions must be in the negative
Clause 23 1 refers to the persons in the specified categories and empowers the DC to make an order of allotment in their favour
There are no terms of limitation qualifying the said persons and the scheme of the relevant provisions does not seems to contemplate any such limitations It is significant that the said persons are not entitled as a matter of right to an order of allotment
What clause 231 does is to confer power on the DC to make an order of allotment if he thought it OX expedient fair to do so in a particular case
it is only where an order is made by the DC that an obligation is imposed on the landlord to let the premises to the person named in the order
Having regard to the words used in describing the persons and the categories it seems plain that the provision Contemplated that a person belonging to one of those categories may be entitled to claim its benefit on the ground that accommodation already available to him was patently insufficient or unsuitable  When such a plea is made the D C may have to consider it Arid in doing so he may have to examine the contentions raise landlord against such a plea as Well as the claim that the landlord may make for his own personal occupation
The enquiry which would thus become necessary would be in the nature of a enquiry and the power conferred on  the D C may have to be exercised in a flair and just manner
We do not think that clause 23 1 as well as clauses 24 and 24 A necessarily exclude the cases 1 of person s specified in them on the grounds that the said persons already have an accommodation which they can call their own
Persons there specified would no doubt have a much better claim for accommodation if is shown that they have no accommodation at all
But 977 even if such persons have accommodation their claims cannot be ruled out on the preliminary ground that the very fact that they have accommodation takes them out of the provisions of the respective clauses
It is quite true that if a person belonging Ca to the specified categories has suitable and sufficient accommodation he would normally not be entitled to claim the benefit of clause 231
That however is a matter to be considered by the Dy
Commissioner on the merits
We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of clause 231 and clauses 24 and 24A impliedly postulate that the persons belonging to the respective categories specified by them can receive allotment only if they have no previous accommodation of their own
That being so we must hold that the appellant s case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he had other accommodation by virtue of the fact that he was a partner in two concerns to which we have already referred
This conclusion cannot however finally dispose of the appeal before us because it seems to us that after the remand order was passed by Mr justice Bhutt the Addl
DC has not dealt with the matter in accordance with law as he was required to do
He appears to have taken the view that since a provisional order had already been passed there was no going back upon it
He thought that after remand the scope of the enquiry was confined to the examination of the question as to whether the respondent proved that he needed the premises for his own occupation
It is true that he has incidentally mentioned the fact that the appellant owned a 4 share in the business which was carried on in Nagpur but he has added that the said fact does not preclude him from obtaining a shop for starting a business exclusively of his own
This observation shows that the Addl
DC did not properly appreciate the scope and effect of the 978 provision contained in the relevant clause
Besides reading the order as a whole it is quite clear that he took an unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which he was bound to hold as a result of the remand order and that has vitiated his final conclusion
We therefore think that it is necessary that the matter should be sent back to the Addl
Commissioner Nagpur with a direction that he should consider the case on the merits afresh
We wish to make it clear that the question as to whether the appellant should be given allotment of the premises in question should be determined by the Addl
D C in the light of the position as it stood on July 15 1955
We are making this observation because there has been some controversy before us as to whether the appellant has lost his right in the premises belonging to the partnership of which admittedly he was a member by reason of the fact that the said partnership is alleged to have been dissolved on April 8 1957
The learned Attorney General has contended that if the matter has to go back the Addl
DC should be free to consider the subsequent events that have taken place and the appellant s case should therefore be dealt with on the basis that he has no longer any shares in the said partnerships
We are not inclined to accept this contention
The fact that the present proceedings have been protracted would not entitle the appellant to ask the Addl
DC to take subsequent events into account
It is clear that the dissolution of the partnership took place long after the appellant obtained the provisional allotment from the Addl
DC and it is by no means clear that if the Addl
DC had been then told that the appellant had a place of business of his own he would have granted accommodation to him in the present premises on the same day that he moved him in that behalf
We are satisfied that the question about the propriety and validity of the said provisional order must be judged in the light of the facts as they obtained on that day
979 Mr Kherdekar for the respondents wanted to argue before us that under cl
22 the appellant was not a displaced person on that day and he has relied on the fact that the appellant had been carrying on business in several places in India since 1945
This point has not been considered either by the Addl
DC or the High Court
If so advised the respondents may take this point before the Addl
DC and we have no doubt that if raised it would be dealt with by the Addl
DC in accordance with law
The result is the appeal is allowed the order passed by the High Court on the writ petition is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Addl
Commissioner Nagpur with a direction that he should deal with the dispute between the parties afresh in accordance with law
Costs incurred by the parties so far would be costs in the final order which may be passed after remand
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The respondent had let out his house to a firm against whom he obtained permission from the Rent Control Authority to terminate the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent
Meanwhile the tenant intimated to the respondent by telegram that he had vacated the premises but prior to the receipt of the telegram the appellant bad applied to the Additional Deputy Commissioner that since the premises were likely to fall vacant they should be allotted to him as he was a displaced person and provisional allotment was made in his favour and he continued to be in possession since then
The respondent then moved for the cancellation of the said allotment on the ground that he needed the premises for his own use but the allotment was confirmed in favour of the appellant by the Additional Deputy Commissioner
The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court for cancellation of the said order which was set aside and the case was remanded for disposal in accordance with law against this the appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal
On remand the earlier order was confirmed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner against which the respondent filed another writ petition in the High Court
The Letters 969 Patent Appeal and the subsequent writ petition were heard together and the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of allotment in favour of the appellant on the ground that as soon as it appeared that the appellant had a place of business of his own he ceased to be a displaced person within the meaning of cl
231 and the other relevant clauses
Held that cl
231 refers to the persons in the specified categories and empowers the Deputy Commissioner to make an order of allotment in their favour
There are no terms of limitation qualifying the said persons and the scheme of the relevant provision does not seem to contemplate any such limitation
Clause 231 as well as cls
24 and 24A do not necessarily exclude the cases of persons specified in them on the ground that the said persons already have an accommodation of their own and the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of cis
23124 and 24A impliedly postulated that the persons belonging to the respective categories specified by them could receive allotment only if they had no previous accommodation of their own
Held further that after remand the Additional Deputy Commissioner did not properly appreciate the scope and effect of the provision contained in the relevant clause and he took an unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which he was bound to hold as a result of the remand order and that has vitiated his final conclusion