1 of 1991
IN Writ Petition No 491 of 1991
WITH Writ Petition Nos 541  560 of 1991 etc
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
G Ramaswamy Attorney General Shanti Bhushan Ashok Desai Hardev Singh Ms Indira Jaisingh PS Poti Rajinder Sachhar MK Ramamurty RK Garg SK Garg SK Dholakia Santosh Hedge VN Ganpule Tapas Ray NB Shetye PP Rao Kapil Sibal DS Tewatia Hari Swarup Jayant Jayant Bhushan Prashant Bhushan Ms Madhoo Moolchandani Ms Kamini Jaiswal AK Srivastava EMS Anam ND Garg AM Khanwilkar and Ms A Subhashini for the Appearing Parties
The following Order of the Court was delivered This writ petition is by a body of advocates styled Sub Committee on Judicial Accountability and raises certain questions as to the validity and implementation of the action of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitting a notice of motion moved by 108 Members of Parliament under Article 1245read with the and constituting an Inquiry Committee consisting of a Judge of the Supreme Court Chief Justice of a High Court and a jurist to investigate into the allegations of misconduct made against a sitting 743 Judge of the Supreme Court pertaining to his conduct as the erstwhile Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
The main prayers in the writ petition are that the Union Government be directed to afford facilities to the Inquiry Committee to discharge its constitutional and statutory functions and for directions to the Hon ble Chief Justice of India to abstain from allocating any judicial work to the concerned Judge during the pendency of the proceedings before the Committee
In regard to the latter prayer that notice should go to the Hon ble Chief Justice of India we think that aspect of the matter should be deferred for the present and considered at the appropriate stage of the final hearing
In regard to the directions to the Union Government the Union Government by means of an affidavit subscribed to by the Joint Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice has made manifest its stand that in its view the motion initiated by the 108 Members of Parliament on which the Speaker took the decision to constitute a Committee had lapsed with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha and that nothing further remains to be done in the matter
It is in that view as averred in the affidavit that the Government of India did not advise the President to issue any notification as required by Para 9 read with Para 11bi of Second Schedule to the Constitution enabling the sitting Judge of this Court and the Chief Justice of High Court to reckon the time spent by them in functioning as members of the Committee as part of their actual service 
The contention of the petitioner is that having regard to the constitutional and statutory of the sitting Judges who function in the Committee the time spent by them in performance of such function is to be reckoned as part of their actual service  as judges and no notification under the concerned provisions by the President is necessary
It is relevant to mention here that some of the interveners who seek to oppose the writ petition have in addition to their stand against the writ petition also filed individual writ petitions of their own in which more or less they seek to endorse the stand taken by the Government raising the question as to whether the motion survives the dissolution of the Lok Sabha or not
Shri Shanti Bhushan learned counsel for the petitioner made an impassioned plea that having regard to the dire need of maintaining public confidence in the apex institution and its reputation it is necessary that the concerned Judge should abstain from discharging judicial functions during the pendency of the enquiry against him
In the alternative it is submitted that if a direction to that effect is not issued 744 it should at the least necessarily be directed that pending disposal of the writ petition on merits the Union of India shall afford to the Committee such facilities as may be necessary for its effective and prompt functioning
Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that even if ultimately the writ petition fails no loss or injury would be caused to anybody and what would have resulted would only be that the eminent body of Judges would have Occasion to look into the allegations against a sitting Judge and if they found the allegations to be baseless the concerned Judge would be cleared of the imputations and cloud against his conduct
He urged if such a direction or interim mandamus is not issued it would seriously impair the image of the Court as the apex Court in the country and affect the confidence of the people in the quality of justice dispensed by it
We have given our anxious consideration to the matter and having regard to the nature and importance of the issues involved it is appropriate that the main matter along with the connected writ petitions is heard as expeditiously as possible
We therefore direct that his matter be listed on July 9 1991 with a direction that hearing of the matters be proceeded with day to day until conclusion
We also indicated that arguments on all sides should be completed within a period of ten working days and the learned counsel for all the parties and interveners should file their written arguments in advance latest by July 1 1991
The actual hearing time to each of the counsel will be appointed at the commencement of the hearing on July 9 1991
In this view of the matter we think it appropriate not to embark upon an examination of the contentions in support of and the prayer for interlocutory relief
We however make it clear that our disinclination to issue any interlocutory orders at this stage shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the merits of the issues either way and shall not also be construed as an interdiction of the functioning of the Committee if the Committee otherwise considers appropriate to proceed with the matter
We also make it clear that during the pendency of these matters before this Court no proceeding pending or filed hereafter in any other court shall be heard or any order passed therein relating to the issues involved in these matters
NVP Petition dispose of


Summary:
The appellant instituted a suit against the third respondent inter alia for a declaration that she was his lawfully married wife alleging that though the fact of her marriage was known to all who knew him he was trying to suppress the facts in such a way that the members of his family should conclude that she was not his Nikah wife that he refused to openly acknowledge her as his legally wedded wife and that this conduct on his part had cast a cloud on her status as such wife and was affecting the rights of the issue of the marriage her three daughters
The third respondent filed his written statement admitting the claim but on the same date respondents i and 2 made an application under 0
i r 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded in the suit as defendants on the grounds that they were respectively the wife and son of the third respondent that they were interested in denying the appellant s status as wife and the status of her children is the legitimate children of the third respondent that the suit was the result of a collusion between the appellant and the third respondent and that if the appellant was declared to be lawfully wedded to the third respondent the rights and interests of respondents i and 2 in the estate of the third respondent would be affected
The application was contested by both the appellant and the third respondent
The trial court allowed the application and the order was confirmed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction
The question was whether the lower courts did not exceed their powers in directing the addition of respondents i and 2 as parties defendants in the action  Held per Sinha and Kapur jj
Imam J disscenting that in view of the averments in the plaint which showed that not only the third respondent but the other members of his family including respondents i and 2 were interested in denying the appellant s status as a legally wedded wife respondents i and 2 were proper parties to the suit
The question of addition of parties under O I r 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally not one of initial Jurisdiction of the court but of a judicial discretion  in a suit for a declaration as regards status or a legal character under section 42 Of 1112 the Specific Relief Act the rule that in order that a person may be added as a party he must have a present or direct interest in the subject matter of the suit is not wholly applicable and the rule may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy
In such suits the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant if the court has reasons to insist upon clear proof apart from the admission
A declaratory judgment in respect of a disputed status will be binding not only upon the parties actually before the court but also upon persons claiming through them respectively within the meaning of section 43 Of the Specific Relief Act
The word  respectively  in the section has been used with a view to showing that the parties arrayed on either side are really claiming adversely to one another so far as the declaration is concerned
Per Imam J
The facts of the present case do not justify the addition of respondents i and 2 as defendants under the provisions of 0
i r 1O2 of the Code of Civil Procedure because  1There is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that respondents 1and 2 were denying the appellant s status as wife of the third respondent and the court ought not to compel the plaintiff to add parties to the suit where on the face of the pleadings plaintiff has no cause of action against them
2Under the Mohammedan law a man is entitled to have four wives at one and the same time and consequently as the third respondent has admitted that the appellant was married to him respondents i and 2 have no locus standi to make any representation in the suit that there was collusion between the appellant and the third respondent
3During the lifetime of the third respondent neither the appellant nor her children on the one hand nor respondents i and 2 on the other have any rights in his estate under the Mohammedan law
4Assuming that a declaration in the suit would be binding upon respondents i and 2 which is doubtful having regard to the terms of section 43 of the Specific Relief Act that would be no justification for their being impleaded in the suit where the issue is not one of inheritance but one of marriage between the appellant and the third respondent