Civil Appeal No 2999 of 1980
From the judgment and order dated the 22nd April 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in CR Petition No 336 of 1979
GL Sanghi Mr AK Verma and section Kashwa for the appellant
DD Thakur PH Parekh PK Menon and RK Sharma for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA J
The landlord whose application for eviction of the tenant respondent before us was rejected by the High Court by reversing the order of the eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller has come before this Court on obtaining special leave and the short point arising for consideration is as to the true meaning of a clause in the rent deed
The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises in question under a lease deed dated 5th January 1968
Clause 12 thereof provided That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of ResidentialPersonal office only and Not for commercial purposes
underlinings are our own The landlord appellant before us applied to the Controller on March 14 1972 for eviction of the respondent under Section 14 1 e of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958  the Act  for short
The tenant obtained leave to contest and pleaded inter alia that the premises were let out both for residential as also office and the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of residential accommodation
The Controller did not accept the defence and passed an order for eviction
Thereupon the tenant carried a revision to the Delhi High Court and reiterated his defence that the tenancy was not for residential purpose
The High Court found that there was no infirmity in the finding about the bona fide requirement but adverting to the conclusion on the letting purpose held It is well known that premises may be let out for residence only for use as an office for use as a shop and for other com 54 mercial purpose
Once any of the latter purposes is combined with the purpose of use as residence the premises let out for a composite purpose and for residence only
The meaning of the word office  not defined in the Act in the Chamber s dictionary is a place where business is carried oh
Office is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only
And ultimately concluded by saying Clause e of Section 141 is available as a ground to seek eviction of tenants only among other requirements if the premises were let out for residence only and once the letting purpose is shown to be composite an eviction petition under Section 141 e without more must fail
 The High Court rejected the landlord s submission that the use of the word personal  before office  was intended to convey the idea that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business
Counsel for the appellant took us to the terms of clause 12 of the lease agreement and emphasised on the feature that commercial purposes were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and authorised the location of a personal office
He also relied upon the description of the premises as residential in the application made by the tenant to the controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the very premises
The word office  is used in different senses and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with the language used
In Volume 67 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 96 the following statement appears The term office  is one which is employed to convey various meanings and no one definition thereof can be relied on for all purposes and occasions
This Court has approved the observation of Lord Wright in Macmillan vs Guest 1 where it was stated The word office  is of indefinite content
Its various meanings 55 cover four columns of the New English Dictionary  See Smt
Kanta Kathuria vs Manak Chand Surana1
In this view of the position the High Court was not right in picking one of the meanings given to the word in the Chamber s dictionary and proceeding to the conclusion that office  is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only
Section 2i of the Act defines premises  to mean any building or part of a building which is or is intended to be let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose   Respondent s counsel has argued that tenancy under the Act can be for three purpose 1 residential 2 commercial and 3 for any other purposes depending upon the use for which the premises are let out
Conceding that the definition is capable of such an argument being built up a reference to the pleadings in this case shows that the permission in the rent deed of locating a personal office had been stated to be a commercial purpose
Great care seems to have been taken by the landlord while inducting the tenant under the rent deed to put a total prohibition to commercial user of the premises
That is why in clause 12 it has been specifically stated that it is not for commercial purposes
In the back drop of such a provision in the lease agreement the true meaning of the words personal office  has to be found out
Law is fairly settled that in construing a document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the document itself
See Krishna Biharilal vs Gulabchand and Ors
2 This Court in DDA vs DC Kaushish3 observed There at pages 28 29 Construction of Deeds and Statutes  by Odger s 5th ed
1967 the First General Rule of Interpretation formulated is the meaning of the document or of a particular part of it is therefore to be sought for in the document itself 
That is undoubtedly the primary rule of construction to which Sections 90 to 94 of the Indian Evidence Act give statutory recognition and effect
Of course the document  means the document  read as a whole and not piecemeal
56 The rule stated above follows logically from the Literal Rule of Construction which unless its application produces absurd results must be resorted to first
This is clear from the following passages cited in Odgers  short book under the First Rule of Interpretation set out above  Lord Wensleydale in Monypenny vs Monypenny 1 said the question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed but what is the meaning of the words used in that deed a most important distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards of which often leads to erroneous conclusions
Brett LJ in Re Meredith ex parte Chick 2 observed  I am disposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke
They said that in construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties but to the meaning of the words which they have used
 Since we agree with this exposition of the law reference to the oral evidence or even to the tenant s documents would be wholly out of place
The terms of the document if they make any good meaning must be given effect to
All the provisions of the lease deed have to be read and in fact with the assistance of counsel we have read the same more than once during the hearing
The parties to the document were anxious enough and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises confined to residential purpose that is why it was expressly stipulated in the lease to prohibit commercial user
Even while permitting an office to be located equal care was taken to put the word personal  before office  to convey the idea that the tenant would not be entitled to transact official business connected with his avocation
Although ordinarily an office would mean the place where official business is transacted a personal office in contradistinction to an office simpliciter or a commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally 57 be admitted commercial transactions would not take place there would be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the like
Such a place if referred to as personal office would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into the present lease deed the parties were not trying to create a lease of premises for any other purposes as now contended by Mr Thakur for the respondent
The High Court therefore went wrong in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller by merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed
It is relevant to note the description of the premises as given in the lease deed itself
Paragraph 2 of the document described the premises thus  The lessor hereby leases to the lessee the following described premises of the entire house built on plot No 125
Greater Kailash I New Delhi comprising of three bed rooms with two bath rooms drawing cum dining room one kitchen one front and central veranda front and back lawn garage servant quarter above garage a servant WC and terrace
 There was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant
nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation
As indicated above it was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office
Every lessee or for the matter of that every person maintaining an acceptable standard of living does set apart a portion of the accommodation available to him which can answer the description of a personal office
Mr Thakur placed reliance on another clause of the lease deed which reads as follows That the lessor shall pay all the taxes of any kind whatsoever including house tax ground rent as are of may hereinafter be assessed on the demised premises by the municipality or any other authority whatsoever provided the premises are used for residence only
 We do not think the terms of this clause support the stand of the lessee
As contemplated under the Transfer or Property Act a document of lease normally provides the rights and obligations of both the 58 lessor and the lesses
In stipulating the rent payable for the use and occupation of the premises the lessor had undertaken the liability of payment of taxes as described therein as long as the premises were used for residence only
This clause necessarily means that what had been stipulated was only residential user
It is appropriate to take note of the admission of Mr Thakur that the lessor had been paying the taxes and the lessee has not been called upon to share the burden
This clause is an added provision to clinch the point in dispute against the tenant
We are therefore of the view that the High Court clearly erred in law in reversing the decision of the Controller allowing the eviction
The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Additional Rent Controller is restored
Parties are directed to bear their respective cost throughout
This is a litigation which began in 1970
The tenant has been in occupation and continuing for about 14 years now after the application for eviction had been filed
Ordinarily we would not have allowed any time to the tenant keeping this aspect in view
But Mr Thakur has urged upon us to take judicial notice of the fact that these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find
We allow time to the tenant until 30th December 1984 to vacate the premises subject to furnishing usual undertaking within four weeks from today
In the absence of the undertaking the tenant becomes liable to eviction after four weeks
SR Appeal allowed


Summary:
Prem Chand Sharma was admitted into tenancy of the suit premises under a lease deed dated 5th January 1968 clause 12 thereof provided
That the lessee shall use the premises for the purpose of Residential Personal office only and not for commercial purposes
 The landlord appellant applied to the Rent Controller on March 4 1972 for eviction of the Respondent under section 141 e of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958
The respondent tenant obtained leave to contest and pleaded inter alia that the premises were let out both for residential as also for office and the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of residential accommodation
The Controller did not accept the defence and passed an order for eviction
In revision however the High Court rejected the land lord s submission holding that the use of the word personal before office was intended to convey the idea that the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business and reversed the decision of eviction
Hence the appeal by the landlord after obtaining special leave of the Court
Allowing the appeal the Court  HELD 1 The word office is used in different senses and in each case that meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with the language used
Therefore in the instant case the High Court was not right in picking one of the meanings given in the chamber s dictionary and proceeding to the conclusion that office is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence only
54 A 55A B Macmillan vs Guest  Smt
Kanta Kathuria vs Manak Chand Surana  referred to
52 21
Law is fairly settled that in construing a document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the document itself
55 D E Krishna Biharilal vs Gulab Chand and Others 1971 Supp
SCR 27 DDA vs DC Kaushish 1974 1 SCR 535 Monypenny vs Monypenny   In re Meredith ex parte Chick  referred to
In the instant case it is clear that the parties to the document were anxious enough and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises confined to residential purpose that is why it was expressly stipulated in the lease to prohibit commercial user
Even while permitting an office to be located equal care was taken to put the word personal  before Office  to convey the idea that the tenant would not be entitled to transact official business connected with his avocation
Although ordinarily an office would mean the place where official business is transacted a personal office in contradistinction to an office simpliciter or a commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally be admitted commercial transactions would not take place there would be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the like
Such a place is referred to as personal office would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into the present lease deed the parties were not trying to create a lease of premises for any other purposes
In para 2 of the document there was no description of any existing office room and available for such use to the tenant nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accommodation
It was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office
Every lessee or for the matter of that every person maintaining an acceptable standard of living does set apart a portion of the accommodation available to him which can answer the description of a personal office
Even the clause relating to payment of tax by the lessor do not support the stand of the lessee
As contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act a document of lease normally provides the rights and obligations of both the lessor and the lessee
In stipulating the rent payable for the use and occupation of the premises the lessor had undertaken the liability of payment of taxes as described therein as long as the premises were used for residence only
This clause necessarily means that what had been stipulated was only residential user
In fact the lessor had been paying the taxes and the lessee had not been called upon to share the burden
This clause is an added provision to clinch the point in dispute against the tenant
Therefore the High Court went wrong in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller by merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed
55C 56F G 57A B D E GH 58 A B 3
Though the fact that the tenant has been in occupation for more than 14 years after the litigation began will disentitle him to any further time to vacate taking judicial notice of the fact that these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find the Court considered it appropriate to grant time to the Respondent to vacate the premises upto 31st December 1984 subject to furnishing usual undertaking within four weeks or to face eviction after four weeks