section 176 177 and 253 of 1956 34 35 51 53 69 70 75 94  137 of 1957  34 58 72 90 92 106 109  115 of 1958
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of Fundamental rights
CB Aggarwal and Naunit Lal for the petitioner In Petition No 176 of 1956
Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal for the petitioner In Petition No 177 of 56
Naunit Lal for the petitioner In Petitions Nos
253 56 34 35 51 53 69 70 75 94 and 13757 34 58 92 106 109  11558
750 Radhey Lal Aggarwal and A G Ratnaparkhi for the petitioner In Petition No 9058
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India SM Sikri Advocate General for the State of Punjab Gopal Singh and T M Sen for respondent No 1 In Petition No 17656
SM Sikri Advocate General for the State of Punjab and T M Sen for respondent No 1 In Petitions Nos 177  25356 34 35 51 53 69 70 75 94  13757 34 58 72 90 92 106 109  11558
RS Gheba for respondent No 3 In Petition No 9058
Dipak Dutta Chowdhury for respondent No 3 In Petition No 17656
Udai Bhan Chowdhury for respondent No 7 In Petition No 5957 and respondent No 3 In Petition No 7057
Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh for the Interveners In Petition No 17656
December 8
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J
These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution impugn the constitutionality of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act Punj
X of 1953 which will be referred to hereinafter as the Act as amended by Act XI of 1955
The petitioners are land owners of the lands affected by the provisions of the impugned Act
The State of Punjab and its officers besides persons claiming benefits under the Act are the respondents in these several petitions
The impugned Act has a history which may shortly be set out
With a view to providing for the security of tenure to tenants the Punjab Tenants Security of Tenure Ordinance IV of 1950 was promulgated with effect from May 13 1950
That Ordinance was replaced by the Punjab Tenants Security of Tenure Act XII of 1950 which came into force on November 6 1950 on the date on which it was first published in the Punjab Government Gazette
The Act prescribed a limit of one hundred standard acres of land equivalent to two hundred ordinary acres which could be 751 held by a land owner for his  self cultivation  and it was termed permissible limit  section
23 
Any landowner having land in excess of the  permissible limit was authorized by section 3 to select for  self cultivation land out of the entire area held by him in the State of
Punjab as land owner and reserve it for his own use to the extent of the  permissible limit 
This  right of reservation  had to be exercised first in respect of land in his self cultivation and if the extent of such land fell short of the  permissible limit  he could under section 4 make up the deficiency by ejecting tenants under him in respect of such lands as fell within his reserved area
Section 5 fixed the minimum period of tenancy as four years subject to certain exceptions set out in section 6
These were some of the salient features of the Act of 1950 which itself was amended by the Punjab Tenants Security of Tenure Act Punj
V of 1951 which came into force on December 24 1951
By the amending Act the  permissible limit  was reduced to 50 standard acres equivalent to 100 ordinary acres and the minimum period of tenancy was raised to five years
It also made provisions for preferential right of pre emption section
12A and conferred a right of purchase on the tenant in respect of land in his possession section
12B subject to certain exceptionss 12C
Another legislation in this series was the Prevention of Ejectment Temporary Powers Ordinance No 1 of 1952 which came into force on June 11 1952
Then came the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act Punj
X of 1953 now impugned which repealed the aforesaid Acts XII of 1950 and V of 1951
It came into force on April 15 1953
This Act itself was amended by Act LVII of 1953 and Act XI of 1955
Though
this Act has undergone subsequent amendments in 1957 and 1958 we are not concerned with those amendments because they came into existence after this Court was moved under article 32 of the Constitution
We are concerned with the state of the law as it stood after the amendment of 1955 aforesaid
Before dealing with the grounds of attack urged against the impugned Act it is convenient to set out 752 in a nut shell the salient provisions of the Act which have given rise to the present controversy and which give an idea of the scope and nature of the legislation now under examination
The Act has a short Preamble namely  to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters 
The Act further reduces the  permissible area  section 23  in relation to a landlord or a tenant to 30 standard acres equivalent to 60 ordinary acres thus releasing a larger area for re settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under the provisions of the Act
So to say it creates a pool of surplus area section 25 a meaning thereby the area other than thereserved areain excess of the permissible area as aforesaid
Reserved area means the area lawfully reserved by the landlord under the provisions of the two Acts aforesaid which were repealed by the Act section
24
The definition of a tenant under the Act includes a sub tenant and a self cultivating lessee section
26
As already indicated a tenant also may be liable to be ejected from any area which he holds in any capacity whatever in excess of the  permissible area 
Section 10 A authorizes the State Government or any officer empowered by it in this behalf to utilize any  surplus area  for re settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under the provisions of section 91
But a tenant inducted on to such  surplus area  holds the land under the land owner who thus becomes entitled to receipt of rent from the tenant
Section 12 lays down the maximum rent payable by a tenant
Section 17 recognizes the rights of certain tenants to pre empt sales or fore closure of land
Section 18 which formed the subject matter of the most vehement attack on behalf of the petitioners confers upon the tenants of the description given in the several clauses of the Act the right to purchase from the land owner the land held by them subject to certain exceptions and subject to the payment in a lump sum or in six monthly instalments not exceeding ten of the purchase price to be determined in accordance with cls
2 and 3 of section 18
Section 23 invalidates any decree or order of any
court or authority or a notice 753 of ejectment which is not consistent with the provisions of the Act
Thus the Act seeks to limit the area which may be held by a land owner for the purpose of self cultivation thereby releasing  surplus area  which may be utilized for the purpose of resettling ejected tenants and affording an opportunity to the tenant to become the land owner himself on payment of the purchase price which if anything would be less than the market value
It thus aims at creating what it calls a class of  small land owners  meaning thereby holders of land not exceeding the  permis sible area  section
22
The utmost emphasis has been laid on self cultivation which means  cultivation by a land owner either personally or through his wife or children or through such of his relations as may be prescribed or under his supervision  section
29 
The arguments at the Bar on behalf of the petitioners may be put under three main heads namely 1 that the Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the Act 2 that the provisions of the Act contravene the petitioners  fundamental rights enshrined in articles 14 191f and 31 of the Constitution and 3 that certain specified provisions of the Act amount to unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners  rights to hold and dispose of property
At the outset it is necessary to deal with the question of legislative competence which was raised on behalf of some of the petitioners though not on behalf of all of them
This argument of want of legislative competence goes to the root of the impugned Act and if it is well founded no other question need be gone into
It has been argued that Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution should not be read as authorizing the State Legislature to enact a law limiting the extent of the land to be held by a proprietor or a landowner
Entry 18 is in these words  18
Land that is to say rights in or over land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rents transfer and alienation of agricultural land improvement and agricultural loans colonization
 754 It will be noticed that the Entry read along with article 2463 of the Constitution has vested exclusive power in the State to make laws with respect to  rights in or over land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant 
The provisions of the Act set out above deal with the landlord s rights in land in relation to his tenant so as to modify the landlord s rights in land and correspondingly to expand the tenant s rights therein
Each of the expressions  rights in or over land  and  land tenures  is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of land tenures limiting the extent of land in cultivating possession of the land owner and thus releasing larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants
Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged the legislative competence of the State Legislature were hard put to it to enunciate any easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule
It was baldly argued that Entry 18 aforesaid was not intended to authorize legislation which had the effect of limiting the area of land which could be directly held by a proprietor or a land owner
It is difficult to see why the amplitude of the words  rights in or over land  should be cut down in the way suggested in this argument
A similar argument was advanced in the case of The United Provinces vs Mst
Atiqa Begum 1
In that case the United Provinces Regularization of Remissions Act 1938 U P XIV of 1938 was challenged
One of the main provisions of that Act had validated remission of rent
It had been argued that the United Provinces Legislature was not competent to legislate about the remission of rent when the relevant words in Entry 21 relating to land in the Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935 were  collection of rents 
Entry 21 relating to  land  bad added certain words by way of explanation and illustration of the intention of the Constitution makers so as to indicate that the word  land  was meant to be used in its widest connotation
A member of the 11940 FCR 110
755 Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in his judgment which was the subject matter of the appeal to the Federal Court had come to the conclusion that Item No 21 aforesaid including the words  collection of rents  had not authorized the Provincial Legislature to validate remission of rent
That conclusion was not upheld by the Federal Court which held that remission of rent was a matter covered by Item No 21 and it was therefore within the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact the impugned Act and Gwyer C J in the course of his judgment observed that the Items in the several lists of the Seventh Schedule should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which could fairly  and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it
The same Item 21 in List II Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935 came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Federal Court of India in Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhi 1 affirming the judgment of the Lahore High Court
In that case the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act Punj
IV of 1938 had been challenged as ultra vires
By that Act the Legislature had provided for redemption of mortgages on terms much less onerous than the terms of the mortgage deeds
Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council repelled the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the words of Item No 21 were not wide enough to comprehend the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of agricultural land
Their Lordships observed that Item 21 aforesaid forming a part as it did of the Constitution should on ordinary principles receive the widest construction unless for some reasons it is cut down either by the terms of that item itself or by other parts of the Constitution which have naturally to be read as a whole and then proceeded to make the following very significant observations  1 1946 LR 74 IA 12 756  As to item 21  land  the governing word is followed by the rest of the item which goes on to say that is to say 
These words introduce the most general concept  rights in or over land 
Rights in land  must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights
Rights over land  would include easements or other collateral rights whatever form they might take
Then follow words which are not words of limitation but of expla nation or illustration giving instances which may furnish a clue for particular matters thus there are the words relation of landlord and tenant and collection  of rents 
Thus their Lordships concluded that the Item 21 relating to land would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject
Another branch of the same argument was that Entry 18 could not cover the determination of the relation of landlord and tenant which is envisaged by some of the provisions of the Act particularly section 18 which has the effect of converting the tenant into a land owner himself by virtue of the purchase
This argument is also disposed of by the judgment of the Federal Court in United Provinces vs Atiqa Begum 1
It was next contended that Entry 18 has got to be read with article 195 in order to determine the legislative competence in enacting the impugned statute
In other words it was contended that cl
5 of article 19 of the Constitution is in the nature of a proviso to the Entry  and that the Entry so read along with article 195 lays down the test of the legislative competence
This argument is easily disposed
of with reference to the provisions of article 31 A of the Constitution
If it is held that the provisions of the impugned statute lay down the law for the modification of rights in estates as defined in sub article
2 of article 31A none of the grounds of attack founded on any of the provi sions of articles 14 19 or 31 can avail the petitioners
As will presently appear the Act lays down provisions which are in the nature of modifications of rights in estates within the meaning of article 31A1
That being 1 757 so article 195 is wholly out of the way in this case
In view of all these considerations it must be held that there is no legal foundation for the contention that the impugned Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature
Having dealt with the question of legislative competence we have to deal with the several contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners with reference to the provisions of articles 14 19 and 31 of the Constitution
On this part of the case it has rightly been conceded on behalf of the petitioners that if the impugned Act comes within the purview of any of the clauses of article 31A the law will be immune from attack on any of the grounds based on the provisions of articles 14 19 and 31
But it has been argued that the provisions of article 31A1a which are admittedly the only portions of the Article which are relevant to the present inquiry are not attracted to the impugned Act
It has been conceded on behalf of the respondents that the Act does not provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights in any estate
Hence the crucial words which must govern this part of the controversy are the words  the extinguishment or modification of any such rights  that is to say we have to determine whether or not the impugned Act provides for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in  estates 
article 31A2 defines what the expression II estate  used in article 3 1 A means
According to that definition  the expression  estate  shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include any jagir inam or Muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right
It is common ground that we have to turn to the definition of an estate as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act XVII of 1887
Section 31 of that Act has the following definition 1  estate  means any area a for which a separate record of rights has been made or 758 bwhich has been separately assessed to land revenue or would have been so assessed if the land revenue had not been released compounded for or redeemed  or cwhich the State Government may by general rule or special order declare to be an estate 
Clause c of the definition is out of the way because it has not been claimed that the State Government has made any declaration within the meaning of that clause
Estate therefore for the purposes of the present controversy means any area or which a separate record of rights has been made or which has been separately assessed to land revenue omitting the unnecessary words
In this connection it is also necessary to refer to the definition of a holding in section 33 in the following terms 3 holding means a share or portion of an estate held by one landowner or jointly by two or more landowners 
It was not controverted at the Bar that in Punjab there are very few estates as defined in section 31 quoted above in the sense that one single land owner is seized and possessed of an entire estate which is equated with a whole village
In other words in Punjab an estate and a village are inter changeable terms and almost all villages are owned in parcels as holdings by co sharers most likely descendants of the holder of a whole village which came to be divided amongst the co sharers as a result of devolution of interest
The parties were also agreed that the impugned Act deals with holdings as defined in the Land Revenue Act or shares or portions thereof
The argument on behalf of the petitioners to get over the provisions of article 31A is that the Act does not deal with any estate or any rights therein but only with holdings or shares or portions thereof
This argument proceeds on the assumption that holdings are not any rights in an estate
If the petitioners are right in their contention that the immunity granted by article 31A of the Constitution is available only in respect of entire estates and not portions of estates then the argument on behalf of the respondents that the Act is saved by the 759 provisions of that Article fails in limine
If on the other hand it is held that article 31A applies not only to entire estates or any rights therein but also to shares or portions of an estate or rights therein then all the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners founded on the provisions of Arts 14 19 and 31 are thrown overboard
Therefore it becomes necessary to consider the amplitude of the expression  any estate or of any rights therein  in article 31A1a
Rights in an estate may be either quantitative or qualitative
That is to say rights in an estate may be held by persons having different qualities of rights in lands constituting an estate as a result of sub infeudation
Generally speaking and omitting all references to different kinds of land tenures prevailing in different parts of India it may be said that at the apex of the pyramid stands the State
Under the State a large number of persons variously called proprietors zamindars malguzars inamdars and jagirdars etc hold parcels of land subject to the payment of land revenue designated as peshkash quit rent or malguzari etc representing the Government demands by way of land tax out of the usufruct of the land constituting an estate except where Government demands had been excused in whole or in part by way of reward for service rendered to the State in the past or to be rendered in the future
An estate thus is an area of land which is a unit of revenue assessment and which is separately entered in the Land Revenue Collector s register of revenue paying or revenue free estates
A single estate unless governed by the Rule of Primogeniture would in course of time be hold by a number of persons in the same rights as co sharers in the estate
Those several co sharers are all jointly and severally liable for the payment of the Government demands if any though by an arrangement with the Revenue Department they may have had a distribution made of the total Government demands as payable in respect of aliquot portions of the estate
Generally speaking in the first instance each sharer in an estate is liable to pay his portion of the landrevenue but if for any reasons the Government 760 demands cannot be realized from any defaulting share primarily liable for them the entire estate including the shares of those who may not be the defaulting proprietors is liable to be sold or otherwise dealt with for the realization of those demands
Thus the unity of assessment of land revenue in respect of the entire estate remains intact
In actual practice the holder of each specified portion or share of an estate holds his portion for his own exclusive use and occupation
Such a sharer in an estate in Punjab is known as the land owner of a  holding 
But such a holding still continues to be a portion or a share of the estate out of which it has been carved
Such a division of an estate is quantitative or a vertical division of an estate
But there may also be a horizontal or qualitative division of the lands in an estate effected by the process of sub infeudation
Continuing the illustration of the pyramid generally speaking the lands in an estate may in their entirety or in portions be let out to what in Eastern India are known as tenure holders for example patnidars in areas covered by the Permanent Settlement
Tenure holders were persons who took lands of an estate not necessarily for the purpose of self cultivation but also for settling tenants on the land and realizing rents from them
These patnidars may have darpatnidars under them and darpatnidars sepatnidars and in this way the sub infeudation went on
All these classes are included within the terms  tenure holders   sub proprietors  or  under proprietors 
The persons who are inducted on to the land for bringing it under their direct cultivation are generally known in Eastern India as raiyats with rights of occupancy in the land held by them
But raiyats in their turn may have inducted tenants under them in respect of the whole or a portion of their holding
The tenant holding under a raiyat is known as an under raiyat and an under raiyat may induct a tenant under himself and he will be an under raiyat of the second degree
Thus in each grade of holders of land in the process of subinfeudation described above
the holder is a tenant under his superior holder the landlord and also the 761 landlord of the holder directly holding under him
Thus in Eastern India the interest of intermediaries between the proprietor of an  estate  at the top and the actual tiller of the soil at the bottom is known as that of a  tenure holder  and the interest of tenants other than tenure holders is given the generic name of a  holding 
A holding in Eastern India thus indicates the interest of the actual tiller of the soilraiyat or under raiyat unlike the  holding  in Punjab where as indicated above its signifies the interest of the holder of a share in an estate
Thus holdings in Punjab are vertical divisions of an estate whereas in Eastern India they represent a horizontal division connoting a lesser quality of an estate in land than the interest of a tenure holder in his tenure or of a land owner in his estate or portion of an estate
It is not necessarily true that there should be intermedia ries in every estate or a portion of an estate
Very often the holder of an estate may be holding his entire estate directly in his possession by way of khudkasht zeerat kamath or neezjote or it may be that the proprietor has only raiyats under him without the intermediation of tenure holders and the raiyats may not have any under raiyats under them
The process of sub infeudation described above naturally varies with the size of the estate
It appears to be common ground in this case that in Punjab an estate means the whole village whereas in Eastern India an estate may comprise a whole district or only a cluster of villages or a single village or even a part of a village
The larger the size of an estate the greater the process of sub infeudation and vice versa
In Punjab as there was no permanent settlement of Revenue as in Bengal Bihar Orissa and other parts of Eastern India the unit of revenue assessment has been the village
Thus a holding in Punjab means a portion of a village either big or small
That portion may be in the direct possession of the landowner himself or he may have inducted tenants on a portion or the whole of his holding
The interest of the tenant in Punjab appears to have been a precarious tenure even more precari ous than that of an under raiyat in Eastern India
The 96 762 Punjab Legislature realising that the interest of a tenant was much too precarious for him to invest his available labour and capital to the fullest extent so as to raise the maximum quality and quantity of money crops or other crops naturally in the interest of the community as a whole and in implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy thought of granting longer tenures and as we have seen above the period has been progressively increased until we arrive at the stage of the legislation now impugned which proposes to create a large body of small land owners who have a comparatively larger stake in the land and consequently have greater impetus to invest their labour and capital with a view to raising the maximum usufruct out of the land in their possession
Keeping in view the background of the summary of land tenures in Punjab and elsewhere we have to construe the amplitude of the crucial words  any estate or of any rights therein  in article 31A 1 a
Soon after the coming into effect of the Constitution the different States in India embarked upon a scheme of legislation for reforming the system of land holding so as 1 to eliminate the intermediaries that is to say those who hold interest in land in between the State at the apex and the actual tillers of the soil in other words to abolish the class of rent receivers and 2 to create a large body of small landholders who have a permanent stake in the land and who are therefore interested in making the best use of it
As the connotation of the term  estate  was different in different parts of the country the expression  estate  described in el
2 of article 31 A has been so broadly defined as to cover all estates in the country and to cover all possible kinds of rights in estates as shown by sub cl
b of cl
2 of article 31A which is in these terms shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor sub proprietor under proprietor tenure holder raiyat under raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue
 The expression  rights  in relation to an estate has been given an all inclusive meaning comprising both 763 what we have called for the sake of brevity the  horizontal  and  vertical  divisions of an estate
A proprietor in an estate may be the proprietor holding the entire interest in a single estate or only a co sharer proprietor
The provisions aforesaid of article 31A bearing on the construction of the expression  estate  or rights in an estate have been deliberately made as wide as they could be in order to take in all kinds of rights quantitative and qualitative in an area co extensive with an estate or only a portion thereof
But it has been suggested that the several interests indicated in sub cl
b quoted above have been used with reference to the area of an entire estate but knowing as we do that a raiyat s or an under raiyat s holding generally is not co extensive with the area of an entire estate but only small portions thereof it would in our opinion be unreasonable to hold that the makers of the Constitution were using the expression  estate  or  rights  in an estate in such a restricted sense
Keeping in view the fact that article 31A was enacted by two successive amendments one in 1951 First Amendment and the second in 1955 Fourth Amendment with retrospective effect in order to save legislation effecting agrarian reforms we have every reason hold that those expressions have been used in their widest amplitude consistent with the purpose behind those amendments
A piece of validating enactment purposely introduced into the Constitution with a view to saving that kind of legislation from attacks on the ground of constitutional invalidity based on articles 14 19 and 31 should not be construed in a narrow sense
On the other hand such a constitutional enactment should be given its fullest and widest effect consistently with the purpose behind the enactment provided however that such a construction does not involve any violence to the language actually used
Another branch of the same argument was that if the makers of the Constitution intended to include within the purview of article 31A not only entire estates but also portions thereof nothing would have been easier than to say so in terms and that in the absence of any specific mention of  portions of an estate 764 we should not read that article as covering  portions of an estate  also
In our opinion there is no substance in this contention because they must be attributed full knowledge of the legal maxim that  the greater contains the less  Omne Majus continet in se minus
In this connection our attention was invited to the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of State of Punjab vs section Kehar Singh 1 to the effect that a holding being a part of an estate was not within the purview of article 31A of the Constitution
In this connection it is necessary to state the conflict of views in that High Court itself
In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand vs State of Punjab 2 the validity of the very Act impugned before us was challenged on grounds based upon Articles 14 19 and 31 of the Constitution
The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench unanimously held that the impugned Act did not infringe those provisions of the Constitution and the restrictions on the right of land holding imposed by the Act were reasonable and that the classification did not exceed the permissible limit
But they also held that the Act was saved by article 31A of the Constitution which applied equally to an entire estate or to a portion thereof
Besides giving other reasons which may not bear close scrutiny they made specific reference to the doctrine that the whole includes the part
Thus the Full Bench specifically held that article 31A of the Constitution applied equally to portions of estates also
This decision of the Full Bench was followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court consisting of Bhandari C J and Dulat J in the case of Hukam Singh vs The State of Punjab 3
That Bench was concerned with the provisions of another Act Punjab Village Common Lands Regulation Act 1954
In that case the Division Bench naturally followed the decision of the Full Bench in so far as it had ruled that the I whole  includes the part and that where an Act provides for rights in an estate it provides for rights in a part of an estate also
The later Full 1 1958 60 PLR 461
2 AIR 1954 Pun
3 765 Bench case referred to above was decided by three Judges including Bhandari C J who agreed with the judgment of the Court delivered by Grover J
Perhaps the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench when it was found that a Full Bench of three Judges was inclined to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of equal strength
Such a course becomes necessary in view of the fact that otherwise the subordinate courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another both equally binding upon them
In our opinion the view taken by the earlier Full Bench is the correct one
The learned Chief Justice who was a party to both the conflicting views on the same question has not indicated his own reasons for changing his view
The Full Bench has accepted the force of the legal maxim that the greater contains the less referred to above but has not it must be said with all respect given any good reasons for departing from that well established maxim
The judgment of the Full Bench on this part of the case is based entirely upon the definition of an estate as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act set out above
It has not stopped to consider the further question why a holding which is a share or a portion of an estate as defined in the Punjab Act should not partake of the characteristics of an estate
Keeping in view the background of the legislative history and the objective of the legislation is there any rational reason for holding that the makers of the Constitution thought of abolishing only intermediaries in respect of an area constituting one entire estate but not of a portion thereof  On the other hand as indicated above they have used the expression  estate in an all inclusive sense
They have not stopped at that they have also added the words  or any rights therein 
The expression  rights  in relation to an estate again has been used in a very comprehensive sense of including not only the interests of proprietors or sub proprietors but also of lower grade tenants like raiyats or under raiyats and then they added by way of further emphasizing their intention the expression  other intermediary  thus clearly showing that 766 the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative and not exhaustive
If the makers of the Constitution have thus shown their intention of saving all laws of agrarian reform dealing with the rights of intermediaries whatever their denomination may be in our opinion no good reasons have been adduced in support of the view that portions or shares in an estate are not within the sweep of the expression  or any rights therein 
A recent decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narain Nedhi vs The State of Bombay 1 dealt with the constitutionality of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amendment Act 1956 which contains similar provisions with a view to doing away with intermediaries and establishing direct relationship between the State and tillers of the soil
In that case also the contention had been raised that the expression  estate  had reference to only alienated lands and not to unalienated lands and this Court was invited to limit the meaning of the expression in the narrower sense
This Court repelled that contention in these words the context of the Code is thus clear and unambiguous as comprising both the types of lands there is no reason why a narrower construction as suggested by the petitioners should be put upon the expression  estate   
Even if there was any ambiguity in the expression the wider significance should be adopted in the context of the objectives of the Act as stated above
 These observations apply with full force to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in the present cases also
Another branch of the same argument as to why the provisions of article 31A do not apply to the Act is that the Act did not have the effect of either extinguishing or modifying any rights in any estate assuming that the expression  estate  includes reference also to parts of an estate
In this connection it is contended that the provisions of the Act impugned in these cases did not amount to the extinguishment of 1 1959 SUPP
1 SCR 489
767 the interest of the land owners in estates or portions thereof and that what the Act did was to transfer some of the rights of the land owners to their tenants
In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in the case of Thakur Raghubir Singh vs Court of Wards Ajmer 1 where Mahajan J as he then was speaking for the Court observed that the expressions  extinguishment  and  modification  used in article 31A of the Constitution meant extinguishment or modification respectively of a proprietary right in an estate and should not include within their ambit a mere suspension of the right of management of an estate for a time definite or indefinite
Those observations must be strictly limited to the facts of that case and cannot possibly be extended to the provisions of Acts wholly dissimilar to those of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act XLII of 1950 which was the subject matter of the challenge in the case then before this Court
This Court held on a construction of the provisions of that Act that they only suspended the right of management but did not amount to any extinguishment or modification of any proprietary rights in an estate
The provisions of the Act then under consideration of this Court have absolutely no resemblance to those of the Act now before us and it is impossible to put a similar interpretation on these provisions
In the recent decision of this Court not yet reported this Court had been invited to apply the observations of this Court referred to above to the provisions of the Bombay Act
It was pointed out in that case that those observations of Mahajan J as he then was must be read as limited to an Act which only brings about a suspension of the right of management of an estate and could not be extended to the provisions of an Act which either extinguishes or modifies certain rights of a proprietor in an estate or a portion thereof
In this connection it was further argued that extin guishment of a right does not mean substitution of 1   1055 1056
Since reported as Sri Ram Narain Modhi vs The State of Bombay 1959 SUPP 1 SCR 489
768 another person in that right but total annihilation of that right
In our opinion it is not necessary to discuss this rather metaphysical argument because in our opinion it is enough for the purpose of this case to bold that the provisions of the Act amount to modification of the landowner s rights in the lands comprised in his  estate  or  holding 
The Act modifies the land owner s substantive rights particularly in three respects as indicated above namely 1 it modifies his right of settling his lands on any terms and to anyone he chooses 2 it modifies if it does not altogether extinguish his right to cultivate the  surplus area as understood under the Act and 3 it modifies his right of transfer in so far as it obliges him to sell lands not at his own price but at a price fixed under the statute and not to any one but to specified persons in accordance with the provisions of the Act set out above
Thus there cannot be the least doubt that the provisions of the Act very substantially modi the land owner s rights to hold and dispose of his property estate or a portion thereof
It is therefore clear that the provisions of article 31A save the impugned Act from any attack based on the provisions of articles 14 19 and 31 of the Constitution
That being so it is not necessary to consider the specific provisions of the Act which it was contended were unreasonable restrictions on the land owner s rights to enjoy his property or whether he had been unduly discriminated against or whether the compensationif any provided for under the Act was illusory or at any rate inadequate
Those grounds of attack are not available to the petitioners
In the result all these petitions are dismissed with costs the State of Punjab and its officers being entitled to only one set of hearing fees in all the petitions
Petitions dismissed


Summary:
Bhavani Tea and Produce Co a Public Ltd Company is engaged mainly in plantations of Tea Coffee Cardamom Rubber and some other plantions in the western ghats comprising RS Nos 23 31 and 51 in Sholyar village Mannarghat Taluk of Palghat District Kerala known as Siruvani Group of Estate of four divisions namely Siruvani Varddymalai Elamali and Halton with the total area in its possession being 3 15120 acres
As the forest officials undertook survey over the Company s plantations under the Kerala Private Forests Vesting  Assignment Act 1971 which had come into force on 1051971 to locate and determine the forest area in the estate that would vest in the State the Company moved an application under section 8 of the Act before the Tribunal asserting that no portion of the land in the estate as shown in the schedule to the application was liable to vest in the state
An advocate commissioner was appointed by the state as vested forests
The Advocate Commissioner in his final report found an area of 139760 acres indentified as plots nos
1 to 69 claimed by the State as vested forests
551 The Company thereupon amended its application showing these 69 plots as schedule B  to the application
Out of the total 315120 acres 175360 acres are admitted not to have vested under the Act
Of the remaining 1 39760 acres 60991 acres are admitted to be private forest on the periphery of the Estate and hence vested under the Act
This covers plots Nos 11 18 25 28 30 and 63
Out of the remaining plots the Tribunal allowed 33 plots totalling 20606 acres and declared total area of 1 18468 acres as vested forests
Both parties preferred appeals to the High Court which by its impugned judgment partly allowed the appeal of the company as well as of the State
Both side have again preferred appeals by special leave to this court
The result of the High Court s judgment is that the dispute before this Court is now confined only to an area of 64173 acres covered by plots nos
1213141516262729333637383940414446505155 565859616264 and 65
On behalf of the company it has been argued that these disputed plots must be held to have been principally used for cultivation of tea coffee rubbers and cardamom etc
and for purposes ancillary thereto that if these plots are not exempted the plantation will be broken down in unity economy and contiguity and that the plantation must be taken as a whole and not piece by piece or plot by plot
The argument on behalf of the State was to emphasise the objects and purposes of the vesting Act namely to distribute agricultural land to landlords agriculturistslabourers so as to reduce the scarcity of such land and not to allow few individuals to remain in control
It was also contended that vesting Act did not use the word plantation  and therefore private forest has to be determined on the basis of land where upon forest stands irrespective of its size
Keeping in view the detailed findings of the Tribunal as well as the High Court this Court comes to the conclusion that out of the plots which are in dispute now as pointed out above plot nos
33394044465051555859 and 61 also have to be treated as not to have vested in the state under the vesting Act
As regards the existing roads falling within the vested areas these shall have such margins on either side of the road as required under the PWD rules of the state and shall be maintained and controlled by the company
But no construction of new roads by the company in or through the vested areas shall be permissible
Thus in partly allowing the rival appeals by modifying the judgment of the High Court to the extent indicated above this Court 552 HELD If the land was not private forest but plantation under the Madras preservation of Private Forest Act and was similarly not private forest but plantation on 1051971 it could not without anything more become private forest thereafter even though it was not under the same efficient or successful plantation as it was earlier
Whether the plantation yielded any crop or not was not for the owners to decide and not by the authority under the Vesting Act unless it did made specific provisions to cover such a situation
We have not been shown any such provision or any provision as to such land reverting to nature
Nature according to Collins English Dictonary means all natural phenomena and plant and animal life as distinct from man and his creations a Wild primitive State untouched by man or Civilzation
According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary natural vegitation means self sown or planted land not cultivated uncultivated or undomesticated plants or animals
There is no finding as to prevalence of such a condition in these plots570F 571A While we are not inclined to agree that the entire estate of the Company was required to be taken as one whole we find it difficult to agree that wherever some forest was found under the Company s estate the Vesting Act would apply
We find that MPPF Act the Kerala Forest Act the Kerala Reforms Act considered the plantations as Units by providing that they would include the land used for ancillary purposes as well
Therefore while applying the Vesting Act to such plantations the same principle would be applicable
It is on record that the estate of the Company is divided into four divisions
In conformity with the idea of plantations it would be reasonable to take each division as a Unit subject of course to natural and geographical factors
573 A C Balmadies Plantation Ltd  Anr
vs State of Tamil Nadu   The Kannan Devan Hills Produce vs The State of Kerala and Anr   State of Kerala  Anr
vs The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Ltd etc
   V Venugopala Verma Rajaa vs Controller of Estate Duty Kerala  State of Kerala vs Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co Ltd  Malankara Rubber  Produce Co  Ors etc
vs State of Kerala  Ors
   State of Kerala  Anr
vs Nilgiri Tea Estate Ltd 1988 Supp SCC 79 State of Kerala  Anr
vs KC Moosa Haji  Ors and Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Ltd vs The Custodian of Vested Forests Palghat  Anr   referred to