Appeal No 4075 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 3121990 of the Calcutta High Court in Second Appeal No 1063 of 1982
DN Mukherjee NR Choudhary and Ranjan Mukherjee for the Appellant
Manoj Swarup Ms Lalita Kohli Ms Sarla Chandra and SK Mitra for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN J
Leave granted
This appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for eviction arises from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dismiss ing his appeal against the judgment of the 1st appellate court allowing the defendant s appeal against the decree of the trial court
The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to evict the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement specified under Section 131ff of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 the Act
Reversing that finding the 1st appellate court held that the plain tiff was not the owner of the premises and was therefore not entitled to seek eviction
This finding was affirmed by the High Court by the judgment under appeal
The only question which arises in the present appeal is whether or not the plaintiff is the owner of the suit prem ises for the purpose of instituting a suit for eviction in terms of the Act
The dispute concerns a flat allotted to the plaintiff by the Kadamtola Housing Co operative Society Calcutta the Society
This was one of the 16 flats held by the Society under a 99 years lease granted by the Calcut ta Metropolitan Development Authority under a registered document
The Society in turn allotted these flats to its members among whom the appellant is one by a sub lease for a term of 99 years
The appellant being an allottee is thus a sub lessee under the Society with a heritable and transferable title
The 248 appellant subsequently inducted the respondent into the flat on a rent of Rs 110 per month
On 29101976 a notice of termination of the tenancy was issued by the appellant to the respondent calling upon him to vacate the premises not later than December 1976
Since the respondent did not vacate the premises title suit No 16577 was instituted by the appellant on the ground of default of payment of rent as specified under Section 131i of the Act and also on the ground of reasonable requirement for occupation as provided under Section 131ff
The trial court found that the premises were reasonably required by the appellant and the suit was accordingly decreed on the ground mentioned under Section 131ff
It was however held that the tenant was not in arrears of rent
It is important to note that the defendant in his writ ten statement did not question the plaintiff s title or claim of ownership
No issue regarding ownership had been framed as it was never questioned by the defendant at any stage of the proceedings in the trial court
On appeal by the defendant the 1st appellate court examined the plain tiffs title and held that since he was only a lessee under a 99 years lease granted by the Society which itself was a lessee holding a 99 years lease from the Metropolitan Devel opment Authority he was not an owner  within the meaning of Section 131ff of the Act and was therefore not entitled to seek eviction under that provision
Accordingly the merits of the plaintiffs claim were not examined by the 1st appellate court
This finding was affirmed by the High Court and like the 1st appellate court it also did not consider the merits of the plaintiffs case for eviction
Section 13 protects a tenant from eviction except on one or more of the grounds specified thereunder
That Section in so far as it is material reads S131 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds namely fl  Subject to the provisions of sub section 3A where the premises are reasonably re quired by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommo dation
249 On the facts of this case the provision of sub section 3A of this Section are not attracted
Clause ff is attracted as a ground for eviction if the landlord is in a position to prove that the premises are required by him for his own occupation if he is the owner of the premises or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such other person as the case may be is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation
The landlord  is defined by Section 2 in wide terms so as to include any person who for the time being is enti tled to receive or but for a special contract would be entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether or not on his own account  This definition shows that even if the rent is received by a person not on his own account but on account of any other person such as his principal or his ward he is for the purpose of the Act a landlord
Any such person is therefore entitled to institute a suit for eviction
But to attract clause fl  the requirement of the landlord must be either for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held
This clause is of course available only when no reasonably suitable accommodation is available to the person for whose occupation the eviction is sought
It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the appellant although a landlord  within the meaning of Section 2 is not an owner so as to be able to seek eviction on the ground specified under clause ff of sub section 1 of Section 13
The contention is that the appellant is only a lessee and that too in terms of a sub lease of 99 years granted by a Society which is itself holding a lease for the same period
Such a lessee is not an owner for his rights are not absolute
He cannot claim to be an owner for the purpose of seeking eviction by recourse to the provisions of an Act which is intended to protect the tenant and prevent eviction except on specified grounds
The expression owner should be so strictly construed as to exclude any person having less than full ownership right
Ownership denotes the relation between a person and an object forming the subject matter of his ownership
It consists in a complex of rights all of which are rights in rem being good against all the world and not merely against specific persons 
Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th ed Ch 8 p 246 et
seq
There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case
They may include a right to possess use and enjoy the thing owned and a right to consume destroy or alienate it
Such a right may be indeterminate in duration and residuary in character
A person has a right to possess the thing which he owns even when he is not in possession but only retains a rever 250 sionary interest ie a right to repossess the thing on the termination of a certain period or on the happening of a certain event
All that a plaintiff needs to prove is that he has a better title than the defendant
He has no burden to show that he has the best of all possible titles
His ownership is good against all the world except the true owner
The rights of an owner are seldom absolute and often are in many respects controlled and regulated by statute
The question however is whether he has a superior right or interest vis a vis the person challenging it
The plaintiff is an allottee in terms of the West Bengal Co operative Societies Act 1983 See Sections 87 and 89
He has a right to possess the premises for a period of 99 years as a heritable and transferable property
During that period he has a right to let out the premises and enjoy the rental income therefrom subject to the statutory terms and conditions of allotment
The certificate of allotment is the conclusive evidence of his title or interest
It is true that he has to obtain the written consent of the Society before letting out the premises
But once let out in accord ance with the terms of allotment specified in the statute he is entitled to enjoy the income from the property
Al though he is a lessee in relation to the Society and his rights and interests are subject to the terms and conditions of allotment he is the owner of the property having a superior right in relation to the defendant
As far as the defendant is concerned the plaintiff is his landlord and the owner of the premises for all purposes dealt with under the provisions of the Act
In view of what we have stated above the High Court and the 1st appellate court were wrong in setting aside the decree of the trial court solely on the question of the appellant s title
The appellant s title was never an issue at any stage of the trial
There was no plea to that effect and no issue was therefore framed on the question
This being the position the appellant s claim has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings ie on the basis that he is the owner of the premises in question
Accordingly we set aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the 1st appellate court and remand this case to the 1st appellate court for fresh disposal of the respond ent tenant s appeal on the merits
This appeal is accordingly allowed with costs of the appellant throughout
NPV Appeal allowed


Summary:
Under the provisions of Delhi Sugar Dealers Licensing Order 1963 a person was entitled to keep only upto a maxi mum of 10 quintals of sugar without licence and sugar means any form of sugar including Khandsari sugar containing more than 90 of Sucrose
The appellant s business premises were raided and 80 bags of sugar viz 53 bags of Khandsari 18 bags of Khand sari dust and 9 bags of Khandsari sulphur were seized in his presence
Two samples each from all the three varieties of Khandsari were taken and three samples of sugar were sent for analysis to the public analyst who reported that the samples contained sucrose 935 942 and 9716 respective ly
The Collector passed an order confiscating the entire seized stock of sugar as the same was kept without any licence
Against the order of the Collector the appellant filed an appeal before the Lt Governor Delhi which was dismissed
The writ petition filed against the order of Lt Governor was dismissed in limine by the High Court
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that a only two samples each out of the three bags were taken from the entire lot of Khandsari and this could at the most show that only three quintals of Khandsari was sugar  and the same being less than 10 qtls
 there was no violation of the Licensing Order b it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the appellant was in possession of more than 10 quintals of sugar and this could only be done by taking samples from all the bags of Khand sari if it wanted to show that other bags of Khandsari also contained more than 90 of sucrose c the possibility cannot be excluded that those bags from which samples were not taken did not contain sucrose more than 90
Dismissing the appeal this Court 139 HELD A large quantity of 80 quintals of Khandsari was found in the appellant s premises whereas only 10 quintals of sugar was allowed to be kept without licence
At the time of seizure of the goods two samples each were taken sepa rately from three different varieties of Khandsari at the instance of the appellant
It was proved by the public analyst that all the three samples contained sucrose more than 90
it was not disputed by the appellant at the time of taking samples or thereafter that the samples taken would not represent the correct quantity of sucrose in those bags of Khandsari from which samples were not taken
In his written reply to the show cause notice issued by the Collec tor no such objection was raised by the appellant
In the circumstances of the ease if the Collector was satisfied that 80 quintals of sugar was found in the appellant s premises without licence it cannot be held that the order of confiscation passed by the Collector was arbitrary or based on no material
It was quite reasonable for the Col lector to hold that there was more than 10 quintals of Khandsari having more than 90 sucrose and this violated the Sugar Licensing Order
Therefore there was sufficient justification for him to pass the order of confiscation
Accordingly the order of confiscation passed by the Collec tor is maintained
142 C 141 F H 142A C D Suraj Bhan Sharad Kumar vs Delhi Administration Criminal Revision No 104 of 1980 decided on 25th September 1980 by Delhi High Court distinguished
In the instant case more than 10 years have already elapsed to the alleged commission of the offence
Therefore it would be against the interests of justice to further continue any criminal proceedings in the case
Accordingly it is directed that the criminal proceedings launched and pending against the appellant should be dropped
142 E