Civil Appeal Nos203 7 2042 of 1977 etc
From the Judgment and Order dated 21101976 of t he Rajasthan High Court in DB Special appeal Nos 8 20 2 2 26 27 and 28 of 1976
AK Sen VM Tarkunde Shanti Bhushan Sushil Kum ar Jain NDB Raju Ram Kalyan SharmaJagdish Nandware K B Rohtagi SK Dhingra RS Sodhi and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants
CM Lodha Badri Dass Sharma SD Khanduja and Ind ra Makwana for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH J
These appeals by Special Leave a nd Petitions for grant of Special Leave pertaining to agrari an reform legislation in the State of Rajasthan arise out of and are directed against the judgment dated 21st Octobe r 1976 of a full bench of the High Court of Rajasthan di s missing a batch of special appeals and affirming the jud g ment dated 2121975 of the learned Single Judge of the Hi gh Court rejecting appellants contentions against the legali ty of certain proceedings for the fixation of ceiling on agr i cultural holdings initiated and continued under the Prov i sions of Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 195 5
In the Writ petition filed directly in this Court relie fs similar to those sought before the High Court are claimed
The principal controversy before High Court in t he proceedings shorn of its niceties and embellishments w as whether the proceedings for fixation of ceiling area wi th reference to the appointed dated ie 141966 under Chapt er III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 157  1955 Act  for short could be initiated and continu ed after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act Act No 11 of 197 3  1973 Act  for short which wef111973 repealed Se c tion 56A and Chapter III B of the old Act ie  19 55 Act 
Chapter III B pertaining to imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings in the State of Rajasthan was intr o duced into the 1955 Act  by the Rajasthan Tenancy Amen d ment Act 1960
As a sequential necessity Section 5 w as amended by the introduction in it of Clause 6A whi ch defined ceiling area
The notified date as original ly fixed was 141965 but owing to the uncertainties impart ed to the implementation of the law by the challenge made to the provisions of Chapter III B before the High Court a nd the interim orders of the High Court staying the operati on of the law Government had had to re notify 141966 as t he fresh notified date after the challenge to the validity of Chapter III B had been repelled by the High Court
By the time the 1973 Act  was brought into for ce disputes touching the determination of the ceiling areas in 33471 cases had come to be decided in accordance with t he provisions of Chapter III B of the earlier 1955 Act 
After the 1973 Act  came into force on 111973 some 84 94 cases for the determination of ceiling areas  under III B of the 1955 Act  came to be initiated and were sought to be continued under said Chapter III B of the repealed 19 55 Act  on the view that the repeal of Chapter III B of t he 1955 Act by the 1973 Act  did not affect the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old law
Appellant s  principal contention is that after the coming into force of the 1973 Act which by its 40th Section repealed Chapt er III B of the  1955 Act  recourse could not be had to t he repealed law for purposes of commencement conduct a nd conclusion of any proceedings for fixation of ceiling as prescribed under the old law
This contention has be en repelled by the full bench of the High Court in the judgment under appeal
The correctness of view of the full ben ch arises for consideration in these appeals
The factual antecedents in which the controver sy arose before the High Court may be illustrated by the facts of one of the appeals
In CA 1003N of 1977 the appe l lants  claim to have entered into possession and cultivati on of certain parcels of land pursuant to alleged agreements to sell dated 2841957 said to have been executed in the ir favour by the then land holder a certain Sri Hari Sing h The sale deeds were passed only on 2281966 after t he notified date
Proceed 158 ings for the fixation of ceiling area in the hands of S ri Hari Singh were commenced under the Repealed Chapter III B of the 1955 Act 
Appellants  pruchases were held to be hit by Section 30 DD of the said Chapter III B which prescrib ed certain residential qualifications which appellants did n ot possess for the eligibility for recognition of such transfers
Appellants  contention is that if the new law had be en applied to the case of the vendor the transfers in the ir favour would have been held valid and that invoking of Chapter III B of the repealed law was impermissible
Apart from the facts of individual cases and their particularities the basic question is one of construction whether the provisions of the old law are saved and survive to govern pendi ng cases
We have heard Sri AK Sen Sri Tarkunde and S ri Shanti Bhushan learned Senior Advocates for the appellan ts and Sri Lodha learned Senior Advocate for the State of Rajasthan and its authorities
The appellant s principal contention which we perceive as one of construction of statutes is that the later law made manifest expressly a nd by necessary implication an intention inconsistent with t he continuance of the rights and obligations under the repeal ed law and that accordingly after 111973 the date of coming into force of the 1973 Act  no proceedings und er the old law could be initiated or continued
The points that fall for consideration in these appeals are whether a the scheme contemplated by and the different criter ia and standards for the determination of ceiling area envi s aged in the 1973 Act  and in particular having regard to the limited scope of the saving provision of Section 40 thereof which quite significantly omits to invoke a nd attract Section 6 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act 19 55 to the Repeal of Section 56A and Chapter III B of t he 1955 Act  must be construed and held to manifest an inte n tion contrary to and inconsistent with the keeping alive or saving of the repealed law so as to be invoked in relati on to and applied for the pending cases which had not be en concluded under the old law before the repeal and b that at all events even if Section 6 of the Rajasth an General Clauses Act 1955 was attracted and the old law w as saved for the purpose provisions of the old law could n ot be invoked as no right had been accrued in favour of 159 the State in relation to the surplus area determinable und er the old law nor any liability incurred by the land holde rs under the old law so as to support the initiation of t he proceedings for fixation of Ceiling area  under the old l aw after its repeal
Re Contentions a In order that this contention which is presented wi th some perspicuity is apprehended in its proper prospective a conspectus of the essential provisions of the earlier l aw and later law pertaining to prescription of ceiling on agricultural holdings is necessary
In 1955 The Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 was enacted
By the Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act for the first time provisions in Chapter III B prescribing a ceiling on hol d ings of agricultural lands got introduced into the 19 55 Act 
This amending Act of 1960 received Presidential asse nt on 12th March 1960
The Chapter III B was by an appropria te notification brought into force with effect from 15 th December 1963
The notified date under the 1955 Act  as stated earlier was 141965
Section 56A of the  1955 Act  defined Ceiling area   Ceiling area in relation to land held anywhe re throughout the State by a person in any capacity whatsoeve r shall mean the maximum area of land that may be fixed as ceiling area under section 30C in relation to such person  Section 30B in Chapter III B provided 30B Definitions For the purposes of this Chapter a family shall mean a family consisting of a husband and wife their children and grand children bei ng dependent on them and the widowed mother of the husband so dependent and b person in the case of an individual sha ll include the family of such individual
 Section 30C providing for the extent of ceiling area said 160 30C Extent of ceiling area The ceiling area for a family consisting of five or le ss than five members shall be thirty standard acres of land Provided that where the members of a family exce ed five the ceiling area in relation thereto shall be increased for each additional member by five standard acre s so however that it does not exceed sixty standard acres of land
Explanation A standard acre  shall mean the ar ea of land which with reference to its productive capacit y situation soil classification and other prescribed partic u lars is found in the prescribed manner to be likely to yield ten maunds of wheat yearly and in case of land n ot capable of producing wheat the other likely produce there of shall for the purpose of calculating a standard acre be determined according to the prescribed scale so as to be equivalent in terms of money value to ten maunds of wheat Provided that in determining a ceiling area in terms of standard acres the money value of the produce of wellirrigated chahi land shall be taken is being equiv a lent to the money value of the produce of an equal area of un irrigated barani land
 In exercise of the Rule making powers under the 1955 Act  the State Government framed and promulgated The Rajasth an Tenancy Fixation of Ceiling of Land Government Rule s 1963 which came into force on and with effect fr om 15121963
Rule 9 required that in order to enable t he Sub Divisional Officer to determine the ceiling area a p plicable to every person under Section 30C of the Act and to enforce the provisions of Section 30E every land holder a nd tenant in possession of lands in excess of the ceiling ar ea applicable to him shall file a declaration within si x months from the notified date
The law fixed 30 standa rd acres as the ceiling area
Thereafter successive amendmen ts were made to Chapter III B of the 1955 Act  which whi le maintaining the ceiling at 30 standard acres howeve r recognised certain transfers effected after 1958 which we re not originally so recognised in fixing the ceiling
Aga in by an amendment of the year 1970 Section 30 1 w as deleted
The 1955 Act itself came to be included in the IX Schedule to the Constitution by a Parliamentary law
T he challenge to 161 said inclusion was repelled by this Court
On 111973 the Governor of the State of Rajasth an promulgated The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agrilcu l tural Holdings Ordinance 1973 under Article 213 of t he Constitution of India
The Ordinance repealed the corr e sponding provisions relating to ceiling on agricultur al holdings contained in Section 56A and Chapter III B of t he 1955 Act  except to the extent indicated in the Seco nd proviso to Section 41 and Section 152 of the said Ordinance
The Ordinance brought into existence a new concept of and standards for the ceilingarea
Certain transfers ma de by the land holders even during the operation of the old l aw were recognised as valid transfers for purposes of comput a tion of ceiling area under the new dispensation broug ht about by the Ordinance
This Ordinance was replaced by t he 1973 Act which was made operative retrospectively fr om 111973 being the date of promulgation of the Ordinanc e Section 40 of the 1973 Act  repealed as did the predece s sor Ordinance both the old law in Chapter III B of t he 1955 Act  and the earlier Ordinance for which it substituted
Section 3 Section 41 Second Proviso and Section 40 of the 1973 Act require particular notice
Section 3 provides 3Act to override other laws contracts etc
The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstandi ng anything inconsistent contained in any other law for t he time being in force on any custom usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority
 The Second Proviso to the Explanation appended to Se c tion 41 of the Act says Provided further that if the ceiling area applicable to a ny person or family in accordance with this section exceeds t he ceiling area applicable to such person or family accordi ng to the provisions of law repealed by section 40 in th at case the ceiling area applicable to such person or fami ly will be the same as was under the provisions of the sa id repealed law
Section 40 provides 40Repeal and savings 1 Except as provided in seco nd proviso to sub section 1 of section 4 and in subsection 2 of Section 15 of this Act the provisions of clause 6 A of section 5 and Chapter III B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 2955 Rajasthan Act 3 of 2955 are hereby repealed except in the Rajasthan Canal Project area wherein such provisio ns shall stand repealed on the date on which this Act com es into force in that area
2 The Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricu l tural Holdings Ordinance 1973 Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1973 is hereby repealed
3 Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Ord i nance under sub section 2 anything done or any acti on taken or any rules made under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done taken or made under this Act a nd section 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act 29 55 Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955 shall apply to such repeal a nd re enactment 
Section 41 contains a statutory declaration that the Act  is for giving effect to the directive principles of State policy towards securing the principles specified in Article 39b and c of the Constitution of India
Appellants  learned counsel contend that when the re is a repeal of a statute followed by a re enactment of a n ew law on the same subject with or without modification s Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not attracted a nd the question as to the extent to which the repealed law is saved would be dependent upon the express provisions of t he later statute or what must be held to be its necessary a nd completing implications
It was urged that where the repeal is accompanied by a afresh Legislation on the same subject the new law alone will determine if and how far the old law is saved and that in the absence of an express appeal to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or of express prov i sions to similar effect in the new law itself the prov i sions of the old law must be held to have been effac ed except whatever had been done or having effect as if done
This argument has the familiar ring of what Sulaiman C J had said on the matter in Rashid Ahmad vs Mt Anis Fatima  Ors AIR 1933 All 3
But it 163 must now be taken to be settled that the mere absence of an express reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not conclusive unless such omission to invoke Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is attended with the circumstan ce that the provisions of the new law evince and make manife st an intention contrary to what would otherwise follow by the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act t he incidents and consequences of Section 6 would follow
Appellants  learned counsel submitted that the legislation in question pertaining as it did to the topic of agrarian reform was attendant with the difficulties naturally besetting a task so inextricably intermixed with compl ex and diverse and indeed often conflicting socio economic interests had had to go through stages of empirical evol u tion and that having regard to the wide diversity of policy options manifest between the earlier and the later legislations the conclusion becomes inescapable that t he later legislation made manifest an intention inconsistent with and contrary to the continuance of the rights a nd obligations under the repealed law
It was agreed that wi th the experience gained in the implementation of the policy of agrarian reforms embodied in the repealed law the n ew policy considerations reflected in the new and basical ly different thinking on some of the vital components of t he new policy were evolved and incorporated in the new law so much so that the repealed and repealing laws represented t wo entirely different systems and approaches to the policy of agrarian reforms and the two systems with their mark ed differences on basic and essential criteria underlying the ir policies could not co exist
It was urged that the stat e ment of objects and reasons appended to the 1973 Bill reco g nised that the legislative policy and technique underlyi ng the old law were ineffective in removing the great dispari ty that persisted in the holdings of agricultural lands or in diluting the concentration of agricultural wealth in t he hands of a few and recognised the necessity to reduce su ch disparity and to re fix the ceiling area on the agricultur al holdings so that agricultural land may be available f or distribution to land less persons
It was pointed out th at material criteria relevant to the effectuation of the ne w policy made manifest an intention contrary to the surviv al of the policy under the old law
The wide changes in t he policy of the later law which reflected a new and basical ly different approach to the matter included i a fundament al rethinking on the concept of the ceilling area by reduci ng the 30 standard acres prescribed in the old law to 18 stan d ard acres ii the re definition of the very concept of family  and separate unit  iii the point of time wi th reference to which the composition and strength of t he family would require to be ascertained iv a re 164 thinking and a fresh policy as to the recognition of tran s fers made by land holders including even those transfe rs made during the period of operation of the old law v t he point of time of the vesting of the surplus land in Gover n ment vi the re defining of the principles and prioriti es guiding the distribution of the surplus land to landle ss persons and vii the amount to be paid to the land holde rs for the excess land vesting in the State under the new law 
It was submitted that the two laws the old and t he new envisaged two totally different sets of values a nd policies and were so disparate in their context and effe ct as to yield the inevitable inference that the policy a nd scheme of the later law by reason alone of the peculiar i ties and distinction of its prescriptions should be held to manifest an intention contrary to the saving of the old l aw even respective pending cases
The ceiling laws it w as submitted envisage and provide an integrated and inte r connected set of provisions and the marked distinctions in the vital provisions in the two sets of laws rendered t he continued applicability of the old law to any case n ot already finally concluded thereunder as impermissible in law as unreasonable in its consequences if permitted
It w as urged that Section 3 of the 1973 Act was a clinching indic a tor in this behalf when it provided that the provisions of the later law shall have effect notwithstanding anythi ng inconsistent contained in any other law for the time bei ng in force or any custom usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other authority underlining supplie d and that the old Act even if it was otherwise held to be in force in relation to pending cases was clearly ove r borne by Section 3 of the new law
When there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by reenactment of a law on the same subject the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into not for t he purpose of ascertaining whether the consequences envisag ed by Sec6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not Sec 6 would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation man i fests a contrary intention but only for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in the new statute ind i cate a different intention
Referring to the way in whi ch such incompatibility with the preservation of old rights and liabilities is to be ascertained this Court in State of Punjab vs Mohar Singh  said Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant prov i sions of the new Law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material
The provision of Sec6 of 165 the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal ev en if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary inte n tion can be gathered from the new enactment
Of course the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the Act will app ly only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed 
Addressing itself to the question whether having rega rd to the particular provisions of the 1973 Act the inferen ce that the new law manifests such contrary intention cou ld justifiably be drawn the High Court observed We have therefore to examine whether the n ew law expressly or otherwise manifests an intention to wi pe out or sweep away those rights and liabilities which h ad accrued and incurred under the old law   Having carefully gone through all the authoriti es cited by the parties as referred to above we are of opini on that the new Act of 1973 does not have the sweeping effe ct of destroying all the rights accrued and liabilities i n curred under the old law    10
One of the indicia that the old law was not effac ed is in sec152 of the new Act
It provides that if t he State Government was satisfied that the ceiling area  in relation to a person as fixed under the old law had be en determined in contravention of that law a decided ca se could be re opened and inquired into it and the ceilin g area  and the surplus area  determined afresh in accordan ce with the provisions of the old law
Another indicium is in Sec401 read with the Second Proviso to Sec41 o f  1973 Act  which provides that if the ceiling area applicab le to a person or a family in accordance with the said Se c 41 exceeds the ceiling area  applicable to such perso ns or family under the old law then the ceiling are a  applicable to such person or family would be the same as w as provided under the provisions of the old law
The High Court relied upon and drew sustenance for i ts conclusion from what it called the internal evidence in the Act which according to the High Court indicated th at pending cases were governed only by the old law
The Hi gh Court referred to sec152 inserted by Act No 8 of 19 76 and what according to it necessarily flowed from it in support of its conclusion
152 inserted by Act No 8 of 1976 166 2 Without prejudice to any other remedy that m ay be available to it under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 19 55 Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955 if the State Government aft er calling for the record or otherwise is satisfied that a ny final order passed in any matter arising under the prov i sions repealed by Section 40 is in contravention of su ch repealed provisions and that such order is prejudicial to the State Government or that on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to its notice such order is required to be re opened it ma y at any time within five years of the commencement of th is Act direct any officer subordinate to it to re open su ch decided matter and to decide it afresh in accordance wi th such repealed provisions Emphasis Supplied
The High Court referring to the opening words of t he above provisions observed The opening words of the section without prejudice to a ny other remedy that may be available to it under the Rajasth an Tenancy Act 1955 Act No 3 of 1955  clearly show th at the pending cases have to be governed by the old law
If transactions past and closed have to be reopened and decid ed afresh under the provisions of the repealed law and t he ceiling area under Chapter III of the Rajasthan Tenancy Ac t 1955 has to be fixed under its repealed provisions then it must follow as a necessary corollary that the pending cas es must be decided under the old law
Sri Lodha learned counsel for the State of Raja s than submitted that the ceiling area  had to be fixed wi th reference to the notified date ie 141966 by the statut o ry standards prescribed under the Chapter III B of the 19 55 Act 
The two legislations are complementary to each oth er and constitute two tier provisions
So far as the cases th at attracted and fell within Chapter III B of 1955 Act as on 141966 would continue to be governed by that law as t he fights and obligations created by the said Chapter III B amounted to create rights and incur liabilities
Shir Lod ha submitted that the view taken by the High Court was unexce p tionable
On a careful consideration of the matter we are i n clined to 167 agree with the view taken by the High Court on the poin t
The reliance placed by appellants  learned counsel on t he provisions of Sec 3 of 1973 Act as detracting from t he tenability of the conclusion reached by the High Court on the point is in our opinion somewhat tenuous
The conte n tion of the learned counsel is that the expression notwit h standing anything inconsistent contained in any other l aw for the time being in force in Section 3 of the 1973 A ct would exclude the operation of Chapter III B of the 19 55 Act  which according to the contention even if kept ali ve would yet be a law for the time being in force  and ther e fore be excluded by virtue of Section 3
This contention has been negatived by the High Court and in our opini on rightly by placing reliance on the pronouncements of th is Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr vs The State of Vindhya Pradesh  and  Chief Inspector of Mines vs KC Thapar  The High Court he ld that the expression law for the time being in force do es not take within its sweep a law deemed to be in force  and that accordingly the opening words of Sec 3 relied up on by the Appellants  learned counsel will not have an overri d ing effect so as to exclude the old law
A saving provision in a repealing statute is n ot exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or t he rights that survive the repeal
It is observed by this Court in 1T Commissioner UP vs Shah Sadiq  Sons at 1221   In other words whatever rights are expressly saved by the savings  provision stand saved
Bu t that does not mean that rights which are not saved by t he savings  provision are extinguished or stand ipso fac to terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing t he old statute is enacted
Rights which have accrued are sav ed unless they are taken away expressly
This is the princip le behind Sec6c  
We agree with the High Court that the scheme of the 1973 A ct does not manifest an intention contrary to and inconsiste nt with the saving of the repealed provisions of sec56 A and Chapter III B of 1955 Act  so far as pending cases a re concerned and that the rights accrued and liabilities i n curred under the old law are not effaced
Appellant s co n tention a is in our opinion insubstantial
Re Contentionb This takes us to the next question whether in the prese nt cases 168 even if the provisions of Sec 6 of the Rajasthan Gener al Clauses Act 1955 are attracted the present cases did n ot involve any rights accrued or obligations incurred so as to attract the old law to them to support initiation or continuation of the proceedings against the land holde rs after the repeal
It was contended that even if the prov i sions of the old Act were held to have been saved it cou ld not be said that there was any right accrued in favour of the State or any liability incurred by the land holders in the matter of determination of the ceiling area  so as to attract to their cases the provisions of the old law
T he point  emphasised by the learned counsel is that the exces s land would vest in the State only after the completion of the proceedings and upon the land holder signifying h is choice as to the identify of the land to be surrendere d Clauses c and e of Sec6 of the Rajashtan Gener al Clauses Act 1955 provide respectively that the repeal of an enactment shall not unless a different intention a p pears affect any right privilege obligation or liabil i ty acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege obligatio n liability fine penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid
 For purposes of these clauses the right must be accrued and not merely an inchoate one
The distincti on between what is and what is not a right preserved by Secti on 6 of the  it is said is often one of great fineness
What is unaffected by the repeal is a rig ht acquired  or accrued  under the repealed statute and n ot a mere hope or expectation of acquiring a right or liber ty to apply for a right
In Lalji Raja vs Firm Hansraj  th is Court dealing with the distinction between the abstra ct rights and specific rights for the purpose of the oper a tion of Sec 6 of said That a provision to preserve the right accru ed under a repealed Act was not intended to preserve t he abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act 
It only applied to specific rights given to an individual up on happening of one or the other of the events specified in statute  See Lord Atkin s observations in Hamilton Gell vs White The mere right existed at t he date of repealing statute to take advantage of provisio ns of the statute repealed is not a right accrued  within t he meaning 169 of the usual saving clause see Abbot vs Minister for Land s and G Ogden Industries pry Ltd vs Luca s 15
To ascertain whether these were accrued  rights and incurred  liabilities a reference Section 30E of the r e pealed law is necessary
30 E of 1955 Act provides 30 E Maximum land that can be held and restri c tion on future acquisitions 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in this A ct or in any other law for the time being in force no pers on shaH as from a date notified by the State Government in this behalf a Continue to hold or retain in his possessi on in any capacity and under any tenure whatsoever land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or b acquire by purchase gift mortgage assig n ment lease surrender or otherwise or by devolution or bequest any land so as to effect an increase in the exte nt of his holding over the ceiling area applicable to him Provided that different dated may be so notifi ed for different areas of the State
2 Every person who on such date is in posse s sion of land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him or who thereafter comes into possession of any land by acquisition under clause b of sub section 1 shal l within six months of such date or within three months of acquisition as the case may be make a report of su ch possession or acquisition to and shall surrender su ch excess land to the State Government and place it at t he disposal of the Tehsildar within the local limits of who se jurisdiction such land is situate
   Omitted as unnecessary 170 3 Any person failing intentionally to make a report or to surrender land as required by sub section  2 shall on conviction be punishable with a fine which m ay extend to one thousand rupees
4 Without prejudice and in addition to su ch conviction and fine the person retaining possession of a ny land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him sha ll be deemed to be a trespasser liable to ejectment from su ch excess land and to pay penalty in accordance with clause  a of sub section i of section 183 Provided that the lands from which a person sha ll be so ejected shaH as for as may be un encumbered lands
5 All lands coming to the State Government by surrender under sub section 2 or by ejectment under su b section 4 shall vest in it free from all encumberances
  Omitted as unnecessary The rights and obligations under this provision had h ad to be determined with reference to the notified date i e 141966
Referring to analogous provision of the Maharas h tra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act 1961 th is Court in Raghunath vs Maharashtra  at 57 observed The scheme of the Act seems to be to determine t he ceiling area of each person including a family with refe r ence to the appointed day
The policy of the Act appears to be that on and after the appointed day no person in t he State should be permitted to hold any land in excess of t he ceiling area as determined under the Act and that ceili ng area would be that which is determined as on the appoint ed day 
Again in Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal dead by LRs Orsvs Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed  Ors 18 at 228 it was observed A close reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act shows that the determination of the extent of su r plus land of a holder has to be made as on the appointed day
If 171 any person has at any time after the fourth day of Augus t 1959 but before the appointed day held any land includi ng any exempted land in excess of the ceiling area su ch person should file a return within the prescribed peri od from the appointed day furnishing to each of the Collecto rs within whose jurisdiction any land in his holding is situa t ed in the form prescribed containing the particulars of a ll land held by him
If any person acquires holds or com es into possession of any land including any exempted land in excess of the ceiling area on or after the appointed da y such person has to furnish a return as stated above with in the prescribed period from the date of taking possession of any land in excess of the ceiling area   
A contention similar to the one urged for the appellan ts here that the title respecting the surplus land would ve st in the Government upon such land being taken possession of by Government after the declaration regarding the surpl us was noticed in that case
But it was held that the liabil i ty to surrender the surplus land would date back to t he appointed day
This Court said  Any other construction would make t he Act unworkable and the determination of the extent of su r plus land of a holder ambulatory and indefinite  
This was again reiterated in State of Maharashtra vs Ann a purnabai and Ors 1985 SuppSCC 273 at 275
This Cou rt said Section 21 of the Act no doubt states that t he title of the holder of the surplus land would become vest ed in the State Government only on such land being taken po s session of after a declaration regarding the surplus land is published in Official Gazette
But the liability to surre n der the surplus land relates back to the appointed day in case of those who held land in excess of the ceiling on t he appointed day
Therefore even if the holder dies befo re declaration of any part of his land as surplus land t he surplus land is liable to be determined with reference to his holding on the appointed day  
It is therefore seen that the right of the Sta te to take over excess land vested in it as on the appoint ed day and only the quantification remained to be worked out
As observed by Lord Morris in 172 Director of Public Works vs Ho Po Sang 1961 2 AllE R 721
It may be therefore that under some repealed enactment a right has been given but that in respect of it so me investigation or legal proceeding is necessary
The right is then unaffected and preserved
It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary
But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether so me right should be or should not be given
On a repeal t he former is preserved by the Interpretation Act
The latter is not
The above passage was referred to with approval in M section Shivananda vs KSRT Corpn  at 81 18
We agree with the High Court that the right of the State to the excess land was not merely an inchoate rig ht under the Act but a right accrued within the meaning of sec6 c of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act 1955 a nd the liability of the land owner to surrender the excess la nd as on 141986 was a liability incurred also within t he meaning of the said provision
There is no substance in contention b either
These Appeals Special Leave Petitions and t he WritPetition accordingly fail and are dismissed
In t he circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs
NPV Appeals  Petitions dismissed


Summary:
Section 131 of the Finance Act 1950 provided If immediately before the 1st day of April 1950 there is in force in any Part B State any law relating to income tax or supertax or tax on profits of business that law shall cease to have effect except for the purposes of the levy assessment and collection of income tax and super tax in respect of any period not included in the previous year for the purposes of assessment under the Indian Income tax Act 1922 for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1951 or for any subsequent year or as the case may be the levy assessment and collection of the tax on profits of business for any chargeable accounting period ending on or before the 31st day of March 1949
 The appellant a merchant carrying on his business in the erstwhile States of Travancore and Cochin was assessed to income tax for the two accounting years 1122 M E 1946 1947 and 1123 M E 1947 1948 under the income tax law in force there namely the Travancore Income tax Act of 1121 M E and the Cochin Income tax Act of 1117 M E Between 1947 and 1950 there were constitutional changes resulting in the integration of the two States formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin accession of the latter to the Dominion of India and finally its acceptance of the Constitution of India whereby it became a Part B State within the Constitution of India
The question of financial integration was considered by the Indian States Finances Enquiry Committee and on the basis of the recommendations made by it a financial agreement was entered into on February 25 1950 between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of the State of Travancore Cochin
By article 277 of the Constitution taxes leviable under the Travancore Income tax Act or the Cochin Income tax Act continued to be so levied until provision to the contrary was made by Parliament by law
Such provision was made by the Finance Act 1950 which extended the Indian Income tax Act 1922 to the State of Travancore Cochin but by section 131 saved certain provisions of the Travancore and Cochin Income tax Acts
In respect of the assessment for the accounting year 1124 M E the Income tax Officer of Ernakulam rejected the appellant s books of account as unreliable and made a  best of judgment  assessment by his order dated January 11 1952
On February 12 1952 the Income tax Officer Ernakulam issued four notices to the appellant two under section 44 Of the Cochin Income tax Act and two under section 47 of the Travancore Income tax Act stating therein that in consequence of definite information which had come into his possession he had discovered that the income of the appellant 753 for the assessment years 1123 and II24 M E had been under assessed and that he proposed to re assess the said income  and the appellant was asked to submit a return in respect of his total world income for the two years in question
The appellant challenged the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer to re assess his income and contended 1 that the assessment order dated January 11 1952 made by the Income tax Officer for the accounting year 1124 M E being the only document on which the Income tax Officer relied for issuing a notice to the appellant the requisite conditions for the application of the statutory provisions were lacking 2 that section 131 of the Finance Act 1950 did not have the effect of saving the provisions of the Travancore Income tax Act or the Cochin Income tax Act for the purpose of re assessment of income tax and 3 that the financial agreement made between the President of India and the Raj pramukh dated February 25 1950 which received constitu tional sanctity in article 278 of the Constitution rendered the initiation of such re assessment proceedings unconstitutional and void  Held 1 that though the meaning of the phrase  definite information  in section 44 1 Of the Cochin Income tax Act and section 471 Of the Travancore Income tax Act must depend on the circumstances of each case there must be a casual connection between the information and the discovery referred to in the sections  but discovery does not mean a conclusion of certainty at the stage of notice  it is enough if the Income tax Officer forms an honest belief
Accordingly the assessment order dated January 11 1952 which disclosed a definite and systematic pattern of transactions for avoidance of tax not only in respect of the year covered by the order but spread over years anterior to it amounted to information which if honestly believed would reasonably support the opinion of the Income tax Officer that there was a discovery of  escaped  income etc within the meaning of the sections  Firm jitanyam Niymalram vs Commissioner of Income tax A 1
R 1952 Pat
163 approved
2that the expression  levy assessment and collection of income tax  in section 131 Of the Finance Act 1950 was wide enough to comprehend re assessment proceedings under section 47 of the Travancore Income tax Act and section 44 Of the Cochin Income tax Act Commissioner of Income tax Bombay Presidency and Aden vs Khemchand Ramdas 1938 L R 65 1
A 236 explained
Firm L Hazari Mal vs Income tax Officer Ambala A 1
R 1957 Punjab 5 approved
3that on a true construction of the recommendations of the Indian States Finances Enquiry Committee the financial 754 agreement between the President of India and the Rajpramukh did not render the impugned proceedings unconstitutional or void
In the connected appeals the respondents who were merchants doing business in the State of Mysore were assessed to income tax under the Mysore Income tax Act 1923 for the years prior to the integration of Mysore with India
But subsequent to the integration of Mysore notices under section 34 Of the Mysore Income tax Act were issued against them for re assessment of income tax for the years prior to the integration
The respondents contended that the Income tax Officer had no jurisdiction to issue such notices on the grounds 1 that under the Finance Act 1950 the Mysore Income tax Act 1923 stood repealed on and from April 1 1950 and section 131 of the former Act kept alive the Mysore Act for the purpose of levy assessment and collection of income tax etc for the period mentioned therein but did not save section 34 Of the Mysore Income tax Act for the purpose of re assessment of income tax and therefore the notices issued under section 34 were without jurisdiction and authority 2 that the financial agreement between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of Mysore dated February 28 1950 rendered the initiation of such re assessment proceedings unconstitutional and void and 3 that the jurisdiction under section 34 Of the Mysore Income tax Act was limited to ascertainment of extra income not assessed and the section did not confer jurisdiction to make a new assessment under the Act
Held 1 that the Finance Act 1950 empowered the Income tax Officer to take proceedings under section 34 Of the Mysore Income tax Act for re assessment for the prior years of the under estimated or escaped income 2that the financial agreement dated February 28 1950 did not render the proceedings for re assessment unconstitu tional or void and 3that though there was a distinction between an original or normal assessment under section 23 and a re assessment under section 34 of the Mysore Income tax Act the expression  levy assessment and collection of income tax  in section 131 of the Finance Act 1950 had been used in a comprehensive sense so as to include the whole procedure for imposing liability upon the assessee