vil Appeal No 215052 of 1980
From the Judgment and Order dated 2881980 of the Delhi High Court in SAO No 138 of 1979
RF Nariman PH Parekh and Suhail Dutt for the Appel lants
Ashok Grover for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
These appeals by special leave are from the judgment and order dated 28th of August 1980 of the High Court of Delhi
Three appellants Jai Bhagwan Pearey Lal and Ganpat Ram were inducted into premises No 3240 Kucha Tara Chand Daryaganj Delhi by the then land lord Shri Dina Nath
The families of the appellants con sisted of about 7 or 8 members per family living in one room each on the ground floor of the said premises
Shri Pearey Lal one of the appellants had one side store room along with the room and Shri Jai Bhagwan had one small tin shed on the first floor
The appellants were also sharing the ter race
In 1952 the land and building situated at No A 625 at Krishna Nagar Delhi was purchased by one Nathu Ram father of the appellant Ganpat Ram and Pearey Lal together with the appellant Jai Bhagwan his son in law
The building consist ed of two room two kitchens and a Barsati
Three applications were made by the appellants under Order 41 Rule 2 of CPC on or about 4th of August 1980
The High Court pronounced its judgment without disposing of these applications on or about 27th of August 1980 and proceeded to hold against the appellants on the basis of an adverse inference that the three appellants had built the house in Krishna Nagar whereas a copy of the sale deed 543 would show that the said house was bought and not built that by Nathu Ram and Jai Bhagwan and were not by the two of the three appellants
In 1958 Ganpat Ram was allotted a DDA Quarter No 3 7 at Village Seelampur Shahdara
By a notification dated 28th of May 1966
Village Seelampur Shahdara was declared to be an urban area
By Notification dated 27th March 1979 issued under section 12 of the Delhi Rent Act hereinafter called the Act  this village was subjected to the provisions of the said Act
During 1967 68 one Mrs Sushila Devi was inducted into the quarter at Seelampur consisting of a room a kitchen and a bath room
This lady had applied for the allotment of the said quarter in her name sometime in 1974
On 20th of July
the authorities in fact allotted the said quarter to her
In 1965 70 Ms Dev Karan and Kul Bhushan being the sons of Pearey Lal had been occu pying the portion of the house at Krishna Nagar together with their family members and grand father Nathu Ram
Nathu Ram died in 1969
The other portion was occupied by one Kalu Ram and his family members being brother of Jai BhagWan
There are 18 people residing at the relevant time in the said house
The present landlord the respondent herein purchased the suit premises from the erstwhile landlord Dina Nath on or about 9th April 1973
On or about 28th of September 1973 the present landlord applied to the compe tent authority under the Slum Act for permission to evict the appellants from the said premises
On 12th of December 1974 the competent authority under the Slum Act granted permission to the landlord to proceed in eviction against the three appellants
On or about the 16th of April 1975 the respondent herein filed three eviction suits against the appellants on the grounds contained in section 141ah  j of the Act
On 31st of January 1977 it was held by the Additional Rent Controller Delhi that the ground under section 141h was made out against all the three appel lants
The ground under section 141a was also upheld but the appellants were asked to deposit arrears of rent within a month from the date of the order so as to avail the bene fit of section 151 of the Rent Act which the appellants availed of
On or about 24th April 1979 the Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the decree in ejectment on appeal under section 141h of the Act against the three appellants
On further appeal the High Court construed section 141h of the Act to mean that a Building constructed by the tenant which is outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Act on the date of the application for ejectment was yet within sec tion 141h and the tenant was liable to be ejected
544 In appeal before us it was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in none of the three judgments there was any finding as to the suitability of the residence that is built allotted or of which the tenant was acquired vacant possession of
None of the courts has re examined the size of the space the distance and inconvenience that might be caused the number of persons in the tenants  families or the state of residence built or allotted by or to the ten ants
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the High Court dated 28th August 1980 the tenants have come up in appeal
In this case the learned Addl
Rent Controller had passed an order of eviction under clause h of section 141 of the said Act against all the three appellants as mentioned before
The said decision was upheld by the Tribu nal
It has been held by the courts below that the three tenants have built and acquired vacant possession of the residential house at A 625 Krishna Nagar Lal Quarter Delhi
It was held that Ganpat Ram one of the tenants appellants has been allotted residential quarter at 317 Seelampur III Shahdara Delhi
Before the High Court the judgments of the Rent Controller as well as the Tribunal were challenged on the grounds inter alia that none of the three tenants had built or acquired vacant possession of the residential house No A 6 25 Krishna Nagar near Lal Quar ter Delhi
It was further submitted that in any case the respondent landlady was not entitled to claim eviction under clause h on the grounds of waiver and laches
Counsel submitted before the High Court that Ganpat Ram had not been allotted the quarter at Seelampur and that in any case he was not in possession of the same
He further submitted that the Act was not applicable to the quarter alleged to have been allotted to Ganpat Ram tenant and as such grounds covered by clause h were not available to the landlady
Lastly it was submitted that all the three ingredients mentioned in clause h of section 14 of the Act were ap plicable to the landlord
Section 14 of the Act is in Chap ter III and controls eviction of the tenants
The said section stipulates that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against the tenant
Clause h deals with the situation where the tenant has whether before or after the commence ment of the Act built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence
The High Court noted the apparent purpose of providing clause h of sub section 1 of section 14
The High Court was of the opinion that on account of rapid growth of popu lation of Delhi landlords were 545 tempted to terminate the tenancies of the existing tenants and ask for their eviction in order to let out the premises to the pew tenants at high rents
Rent Control Legislation for Delhi and New Delhi was passed for the first time during the second world war and since then there has been Rent Control Legislation applicable to various urban areas in the Union Territory of Delhi
The Rent Control Act was enacted to provide for the control of rents and evictions
The object of clause h as is apparent is not to allow the tenant more than one residence in Delhi
Therefore it provided that in case that tenant builds a residence the landlord could get his house vacated
It also provided that if the tenant acquires vacant possession of any other resi dence he is not protected
Lastly it also stipulated that if a residential premises has been allotted to a tenant he is not entitled to retain the premises taken on rent by him
In the instant case on the three causes on which the land lord can claim eviction were present against the tenant the High Court held that these causes are not joint
These need not be conjointly proved or established
These were in the alternative
Therefore if the landlord is successful in proving any one of the causes he is entitled to an order of eviction against the tenant
Counsel for the appellants sought to urge before the High Court that if a tenant built a house he must acquire its vacant possession before he can be evicted under clause h
Similarly it was submitted that if residential accommodation was allotted to a tenant then he must obtain vacant possession of the same
The word or  showed according to the High Court that these were different circumstances in which tenant was liable to be evicted
These were i if the tenant had built a new resi dence or ii if he had acquired vacant possession of it or iii if he had been allotted a residence
The words built  and allotted  do not mean that after building residence or after allotment of a residence the tenant must also acquire its possession
If a tenant builds a house and does not occupy it he is liable to eviction according to the High Court
Similarly if a residence is allotted to a tenant but he does not occupy it and allows others to occupy the same he is not protected according to the High Court
The Act provides that building of a house by tenant or allotment of residence to him is a ground of eviction available to the landlord against his tenant
The learned Judge of the High Court was of the view that it is not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the tenant has built and acquired vacant possession of the building or that he has been allotted and taken possession of the allot ted premises
The landlady in the eviction application alleged that the tenants 546 had built and acquired vacant possession of a residential house at A 6 25 Krishna Nagar near Lal Quarter Delhi
It was denied by all the tenants but the Controller and the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence on record concluded that the three tenants have built and have also acquired vacant possession of the said residential premises
It was further held that the relatives of the three tenants were in actual physical possession of the said house at Krishna Nagar
It transpired from the record that Dev Karan
Kul Bhushan and Kalu Ram were admittedly related to the three tenants and were in occupation of house at Krishna Nagar as licensee of the three appellants tenants
This is a finding of fact and could not have been challenged in second appeal before the High Court
Learned counsel for the tenants then submitted before the High Court that the landlady was a purchaser of the property from one Dina Nath and she and her vendor had also been aware that the tenants were owners of the house in Krishna Nagar
On account of this knowledge it was argued that the landlady respondent had waived her rights under clause h of section 141 of the Act
The High Court found that there was no substance in the argument
There was no plea that the landlady ever waived or was guilty of laches
No evidence was led by the parties
The facts were that the respondent landlady purchased this property from Dina Nath on 9th of April 1973
There was nothing on record to show that Dina Nath was ever aware of the fact about building or acquiring a house at Krishna Nagar by the three tenants
The landlady on the 28th September 1973 filed applications against the three tenants under section 19 of the Slum Area Improvement  Clearance Act 1956 seeking permission to institute eviction proceedings
The required permission was granted by the competent authority on 12th of December
1974 and the present eviction application out of which this appeal arises was filed on 16th of April 1975
Therefore there was no question of laches on the part of the landlady
She filed an application for permission after about six months from the date of purchase and she filed an eviction application after about four months from the date of the grant of permission by the Slum authority
The landlady claimed eviction of Ganpat Ram appellant tenant on another ground also namely that he has been allotted residential quarter at 317
Seelampur III
Shahda ra Delhi
This fact was denied by the tenant
AW 1 Naresh Chand an Official of the DDA brought the official record relating to the allotment of this quarter
It was proved that the said quarter was allotted to him in 1958 and that possession was delivered to him
It was deposed that it was residential in nature
On behalf of the tenants it was submitted before the High 547 Court that the same was in possession of Sushila Devi
Sushila Devi had appeared as a witness
She admitted that the said quarter was allotted to the tenant Ganpat Ram the appellant
After allotment Ganpat Ram was entitled to occupy the allotted accommodation and possession was delivered to him
According to the said witness he was not now in possession and somebody else was in possession
Evidence was adduced on behalf of the tenant that he was not in possession and somebody else was in possession
According to the High Court if once the condition stipulated in clause h was fulfilled by the tenant he was disentitled to protection under the Act He cannot thereafter claim that he should be protected
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right
It was further alleged that Seelampur area known as Seelampur where the allotted quarter was situated was not governed by the Act and therefore ground covered by clause h was not available to the landlady
There is no plea and the High Court found taking into consideration all the relevant materials that there was no evidence to show that it was situated within the area which was not governed by the Act
We are in agreement with the learned Judge of the High Court
Before us in appeal however several points were sought to be urged
It was urged that on a proper construction there must be a suitable residence that is to say a good substitute for the petitioners or the landlord and a reason able substitute
Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Goppulal vs Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji and another   There the Court was concerned with the sub letting before the coming into force of the Act and was concerned with section 131e of the relevant Act which used the expression has sublet
The present perfect tense contemplated a completed event connected in some way with the present time
The words took within their sweep any sub letting which was made in the past and had continued up to the present time
Therefore this Court held that it did not matter that the sub letting was either before or after the Act came into force
The Delhi High Court in the case of Ved Prakash vs Chunilal 1971 Delhi Law Times Vol 7 59 where the expression has  in the Delhi Rent Control Act
1958 in section 141h came up for consideration
It was held that the word has in clause h carries in itself the force of the present tense
It has therefore to be interpreted in terms of the words employed in the opening part of the proviso which are to the 548 effect that the Controller may on an application made to him in the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of the premises and those words meant that on the date of the application the tenant must be having a residence either because he might have built the same or might have acquired vacant possession thereof or it might have been allotted to him
Either of the three situations must be there on the date of the application
If that is not so then clause h of the proviso to sub section 1 of section 14 of the Act would have no application
According to the learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court the word has  applied with the same force and veloc ity to the words built  acquired vacant possession of  and been allotted 
The last words a residence  again relate to all the three contingencies
The word has  con tains in itself the meaning of presently possessing some thing
The ordinary English dictionaries while giving the meaning of word has  refer to the word have  which in turn means to hold  possess 
The words has built  or has acquired  or has been allotted  clearly mean that the tenant has already built acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists
It was therefore held that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause h lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of the application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him
In Smt
Revti Devi vs Kishan Lal 1970 Rent Control Reporter Vol
II 71 Deshpande J of the Delhi High Court had occasion to construe section 141h of the Act
The landlord there applied for eviction of his tenant on the ground that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of another residence within the meaning of section 141h of the Act
The tenant defended that he had not acquired any residence and that the alleged residence had in fact been acquired by his wife and his sister in law jointly
The Rent Control Tribunal held that the view that under section 141h the tenant was liable to be evicted only if he himself had acquired the vacant possession of another resi dence and not by any other member of his family including the wife
The question which came up before the Court for decision was whether the acquisition of a separate residence by the wife of the 549 tenant was sufficient ground for the eviction of the tenant by the landlord under proviso h of sub section 1 of section 14 That however is not the question here
In Naidar Mal vs Ugar Sain Jain and another AIR 1966 Punjab 509 the court had to construe inter alia section 131h of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
There under section 131h of the said Act in order to be liable for eviction the tenant must have built a suitable residence
The Court was of the opinion that merely because the tenant had built a house would not be a ground for ejectment within the meaning of section 131h
The words suitable residence  must be read with all the terms namely built  acquired vacant possession of  or been allotted 
Although the onus to prove facts within the special knowl edge of a party must be on him a landlord bringing a suit for eviction under section 131h of the said Act must first allege the existence of grounds entitling him to a judgment
The residence of the tenant must be suitable one
In Siri Chand vs Jot Ram Punjab Law Reporter Vol LXIII 1961 at page 915 the Punjab High Court had to construe the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 and it was held that on the date of the suit for ejectment of the tenant in order to succeed all that the landlord had to show was that he was the landlord and secondly
 that de fendant was his tenant and thirdly the tenant has whether before or after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act either built a suitable residence or been allotted a suitable residence
The decision of the Delhi High Court in Govindji Khera vs Padma Bhatia Attorney 1972 Rent Control Reporter Vol 4 195 to which our attention was drawn does not advance the case any further
Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively either that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence
It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence whether it is suitable or not and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts
The other aspect is that apart from the question 550 of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accru al of the cause of action and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant
In the light of these we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time
But quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time this is a beneficial legislation beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant
It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent
It also ensures certain limit ed rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies
The next aspect of the matter is which article of the would be applicable
Reference was made to Article 66 and Article 67 of the hereinafter called the  which stipulates that for possession of immovable property the cause of action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition
Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined
Article 113 deals with suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule
On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well settled now
Determination by notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary
It is well settled that time begins to run from the date of the knowledge
See in this connection the decision of Harbans Singh and another vs Custodian of Evacuee Property P  Block and others A I R 1970 Delhi 82 though that was a case under a different statute and dealt with a different article
See also Ujagar Singh vs Likha Singh and another at page 30
The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdass deceased
v Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari Punjab Law Re porter Vol
85 184 held that in a suit for possession under Article 113 of the  material date is one on which the right to sue for possession arises
In KV Ayyaswami Pathar and another vs
MR Ry
Manavik rama Zamorin Rajah and others AIR 1930 Madras 430 it was held that where a claim is based upon a forfeiture of a lease by reason of alienation of the demised land and noth ing else the article applicable for the purpose of limita tion was clearly Article 143 and the limitation commences to run from the date of the alienation
Here 551 accrual of the right of the landlord is not challenged
The knowledge is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any point of view
There is no question of limitation in this case
In the premises we are of the view that the High Court was right and the appeals must fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs
NPV Appeals dis missed


Summary:
The respondent purchased the suit premises in April 1973 and in September 1973 applied to the Competent Author ity under the Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act 1956 for permission to evict the appellants who were induct ed into the premises by the erstwhile landlord
The permis sion was granted in December 1974 and three eviction suits were filed in April 1975 on the grounds contained in Sec tion 141a h and j of the Delhi Rent Control Act
1958 and the Additional Rent Controller held that the ground under Section 141h was made out against all the three appellants
The Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the decree
Before the High Court in revision it was submitted that when the landlady purchased the property she and her vendor had also been aware that the tenants owned a house and that on account of this knowledge the respondent had waived her rights under clause h of Section 141 of the Act that if a tenant built a house or has been allotted a residential accommodation he must acquireobtain vacant possession before he was evicted under clause h and that the area where the allotted quarter was situated was not governed by the Act 540 and therefore the ground covered by clause h was not available to the landlady
The High Court construed Section 141h of the Act to mean that a building constructed by the tenant which is outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the date of application for ejectment was yet within Section 141h and held that the word or  showed the different circumstances in which a tenant was liable to be evicted that it was not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the tenant had built a house and acquired vacant pos session of the building or that he had been allotted and taken possession of the allotted premises and that there was no substance in the argument advanced by the tenants that on account of the knowledge of the landlady that the tenants owned a house she had waived her rights under clause h of Section 141 of the Act and dismissed the Revision Petitions
In the appeals it was submitted that there must be a suitable residence one which is a good and a reasonable substitute for the appellants or the landlord before evic tion could be ordered under Section 141h of the Act
Dismissing the appeals by special leave this Court HELD 1
The Rent Control Act is a beneficial legisla tion to both the landlord and the tenant
It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent
It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession in stated contingencies
550B C 21 The words has built  or has acquired  or has been allotted  in clause h of Section 141 clearly mean that the tenant has already built acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right to reside therein exists
Therefore the High Court was right in holding that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause h lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of application the tenant must be possessing a clear right to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him
The words built  and allotted  did not mean that after building a residence or after allotment of a residence the tenant must also acquire its possession
548D F 22 The landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must 541 establish one of the alternative facts positively either that the tenant has built or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence
It is essential that the three ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence whether it is suitable or not and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts
549F H 23 The landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant
550A B 24 The High Court was right in holding that once the condition stipulated in clause h was fulfilled by the tenant he was disentitled to protection
He cannot there fore claim that he should he protected
547B C 31 Article 66 of the stipulated that for possession of immovable property the cause of action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition
550C D 32 On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply in this case because no determination is necessary as determination by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary
550D E In the instant case the landlady purchased the property on April 9 1973
She filed an application for permission after about six months from the date of purchase and filed eviction application after about four months from the date of the grant of the permission by the Slum Authority
Time begins to run from the date of the knowledge
Knowledge in this case is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any point of view
There is therefore no question of limitation in this case
55OH 551A Ved Prakash vs Chunilal 1971 Delhi Law Times Vol 7 59 Smt Revti Devi vs Kishan Lal 1970 Rent Control Re porter Vol
II 71 Naidar Mal vs Ugar Sain Jain and anoth er
AIR 1966 Punjab 509 Siri Chand vs Jot Ram Punjab Law Reporter Vol
LXIII 1961 915 Govindji Khera vs Padma Bhatia Attorney 1972 Rent Control Repor 542 ter Vol
4 195 Harbans Singh and another vs Custodian of Evacuee Property P  Block and others AIR 1970 Delhi 82 Ujagar Singh vs Likha Singh and another AIR 1941 Allaha bad 28 30 Somdass deceased vs Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari Punjab Law Reporter Vol 85 184 and KV Ayyaswami Pathar and another vs MR Ry
Manavikrama Zamorin Rajah and others AIR 1930 Madras 430 referred to