Civil Appeal Nos
12 10 to 12 17 of 1980 etc
From the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd April 1980 of the 445 Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal Nos
499 500 to 505 of 1979 and 144 of 1980
Anil Dev Singh GB Pai K Madhva Reddy PA Choud hary Hemant Sharma P ParmeshWaran B Parthasarthi CV Subba Rao Abbas Naqvi RP Gupta NK Nair B Kanta Rao Chandrashekhar Panda ATM Sampath PN Ramalingam RD Upadhyay MsS Janani and A Subba Rao for the appearing parties
It may be noted that except in CA 304489 the Union of India is the appellant
The short common question arising in this large batch of appeals is who is the authority competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Government servants who are the parties here hereinafter referred to for conven ience as the respondents  There are two sets of appeals before us one arising out of proceedings in the Ministry of Defence and the other in the Ministry of Railways
The rules governing the former are the Central Civil Services Classification Control  Appeal Rules hereinafter re ferred to as the Civil Services rules and those governing the latter are the Railway Servants Discipline and Appeal Rules hereinafter referred to as the Railway rules 
SShri GB Pai Anil Dev Singh PA Choudhary Madhava Reddy B Kanta Rao A Subba Rao ATM Sampath RD Upadhyay and others have argued the matters at length and in great detail and we proceed to dispose of these appeals after considering all the aspects urged before us
We shall take Daniel s case CA Nos
1210 to 1217 of 1980 as illustrative of the cases under the Civil Service Rules
Though the employees in these and connected matters are Class III employees of Research Laboratories attached to the Ministry of Defence shortly referred to as DRDL DMAL DERL and DLRL they are serving in civil posts therein and hence governed by the Civil Service Rules
They had been appointed by the Director of the Laboratory
Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against them by the Director
There is therefore no possibility of any eventual viola tion of the constitutional prohibition in Article 3111 against a Government servant being dis 446 missed or removed from office by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority
Still the respondents contend that the Director is not competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against them and that it is only the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India a higher authority that can do so
This contention based on the relevant provisions of the Civil Service Rules proceeds on the following lines
Rules 12 and 13 of the Civil Service Rules deal with this topic and read as follows 12
Disciplinary Authorities 1The President may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 11 on any Government servant
2 Without prejudice to the provisions of sub rule 1 but subject to the provisions of sub rule 4 any of the penal ties specified in rule 11 may be imposed on a xx XX xx b a person appointed to a Central Civil post included in the General Central Service by the authority specified in this behalf by a general or special order of the President or where no such order has been made by the appointing authority or the authority specified in the Schedule in this behalf
Authority to institute proceedings 1 The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may a institute disciplinary proceedings against any Govern ment servant b direct a disciplinary authority to institute discipli nary proceedings against any Government servant on whom that disciplinary authority is competent to impose under I these rules any of the penalties specified in rule 11
2 A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses i to iv of 447 rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penal ties specified in clauses v to ix of rule 11 notwith standing that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties
 In these cases the disciplinary proceedings have been instituted neither by the President nor by an authority directed by him to do so nor by any other authority empow ered by him by general or special order to do so
The disciplinary authority DA in the present case there fore has to be in terms of rule 122b the appointing authority or the authority specified in the schedule in this behalf
The authority specified in the schedule in this behalf admittedly is the Scientific Adviser to the Gov ernment of India
The question next is whether the Director is the appointing authority in the case of the respond ents
This matter is dealt within Rule 91 mad with its proviso which read thus 9 Appointments to other Services and Posts 1 All appointments to the Central Civil Services other than the General Central Service Class II Class III and Class IV shall be made by authorities specified in this behalf in the Schedule Provided that in respect of Class III and Class IV civilian services or civilian posts m the Defence services appoint ments may be made by officers empowered in this behalf by the aforesaid authorities
 The appointing authority  specified in the schedule referred to in Rule 91 in the case of the respondents is again the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India
But by a notification made in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso he had authorised the Director to make appointments to Class III and Class IV posts in his establishment and it is common ground the Director had appointed the respondents in exercise of that power
In other words there is no dispute that the Director is the appointing authority of the respondents not only in the sense that he was empowered to appoint them under rule 9 but also in the sense that he actually made these appointments
Nevertheless it is said he is not the appointing authori ty  in the case of the respondents within the meaning of rule 122b
In support of this argument attention is drawn to rule 2 which contains 448 the definitions of various expressions for the purposes of the rules which will be applicable in the absence of any thing to the contrary in the relevant context
Rule 2a reads a appointing authority  in relation to a Government servant means i the authority empowered to make appointments to the Service of which the Government servant is for the time being a member or to the grade of the service in which the Government servant is for the time being included or ii the authority empowered to make appointments to the posts which the Government servant for the time being holds or iii the authority which appointed the Government servant to such Service grade or post as the case may be or iv where the Government servant having been a permanent member of any other Service or having substantively held any other permanent post has been in continuous employment of the Government the authority which appointed him to that Service or to any grade in that Service or to that post
whichever authority is the highest authority
 It will be noticed that this clause refers to two classes of persons a the authority empowered to make appointments to the service grade or post with which we are concerned sub clauses i and ii and b the authority who actually appointed the Government servant to the service grade or post in question sub clauses iii and iv
Each of these is sub divided into two categories but we need not for the purposes of the present cases bother about this sub divi sion
Stopping here it will be seen as pointed out al ready that the Director falls under both the above catego ries as he is empowered to appoint the respondents by virtue of the power delegated to him under the proviso to rule 91 and as he has also factually appointed them
But it is said the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India notwithstanding his having delegated his power to the Direc tor under the proviso also continues to be an authority empowered to appoint persons to the posts in question under rule 91 read with the schedule
So under the 449 first category of persons indicated above as referred to in rule 2a there are two authorities the Scientific Adviser and the Director and under the second category we have the Director
And here comes the crucial point on which the respondents bank their entire case the last few words of rule 2a make it clear and specific that the expression appointing authority  means the highest of the authorities mentioned in sub clauses i to iv
So it is said the appointing authority  for purposes of rule 122b in the instant case will be the highest of the three authorities we have referred to above viz the Scientific Adviser to the Government of India
In short it is contended that by using the last few significant words in rule 2a the Civil Rules seek to ensure that though the power to appoint persons to a particular post grade or service may be dele gated under the proviso to rule 91 such delegation should not extend to the exercise of disciplinary powers
It is the clear intention of the rule makers it is argued that disciplinary powers should continue to vest in the appoint ing authority mentioned in the schedule read with rule 91 and should not be allowed to be exercised by his delegate under the proviso
The emphasis it is said is not on the person who has made or is empowered to make the appoint ment of the particular civil servant in question it is on the person Who makes or is empowered to make appointment of persons generally to the post grade or service to which the civil servant in question belongs
It is therefore urged that though one Class III servants in the laboratory may be appointed by the Director and another by the Scien tific Adviser who can make such appointment despite the delegation the disciplinary authority for both and indeed for all class III servants in the Laboratory must be the same and cannot be different
This interpretation of rule 2a it is said is not only quite plain on the language used but has also received the approval of this Court in Dharam Der vs Union  Further force is sought to be lent to the argument by pointing out that the expression appointing authority  is used only in rules 2 10 12 and 24 of and the schedule to the Civil Service rules and that to refuse to give effect to the definition for purposes of rule 12 is to render the definition clause virtually otiose
This plea was upheld by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Danial s case and following it in the other cases before us
A similar view has been taken in the Delhi High Court in Murishwar vs Union 1976 Service Law Cases 82 in Union vs Tarlok Singh cited there in and by the Calcutta High Court in Union vs Choudhury But a contrary view has been taken by the MP High Court in Chaudhury vs Union 1977 All India Services Journal 1 and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in WA 79383 and WP 244179
450 The position in respect of ordnance factories which has to be considered in some of the cases is identical except for the nomenclatures of the respective authorities and does not need any separate discussion
To turn next to the railway cases we are concerned with appointees to Group C and Group D of the services which correspond to class III and class IV of the Civil Services
In respect of these persons the relevant provi sions are as follows 21a Appointing Authority  in relation to railway servant means i the authority empowered to make appointments to the service of which the railway servant is for the time being a member or to the grade of the Service in which the railway servant is for the time being included or ii the authority empowered to make appointments to the post which the Railway servant for the time being holds or iii the authority which appointed the Railway servant to such Service grade or post as the case may be or iv where the Railway servant having been a permanent member of any other Service or having substantively held any other permanent post has been in continuous employment under the Ministry of Railways the authority which appoint ed him to that service or to any grade in that Service or to that post whichever authority is highest authority
21c Disciplinary Authority  means i in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a Railway Servant the authority competent under these rules to impose on him that penalty ii in relation to rule 9 and clauses a and b of sub rule 1 of Rule 11 in the case of any Gazetted Railway servant an authority competent to impose any of the penal ties specified in rule 6 451 iii in relation to rule 9 in the case of any non gazetted Railway servant an authority competent to impose any of the major penalties specified in rule 6 iv in relation to clauses a and b of sub rule 1 of Rule 11 in the case of a non gazetted Railway servant an authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 6
Disciplinary authorities 1 The President may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 on any Railway Servant
2 Without prejudice to the provisions of sub rule 1 any of the penalties specified in Rule 6 may be imposed on a Railway servant by the authorities as specified in Schedules I II and III
3 The disciplinary authority in the cases of a Railway Servant officiating in a higher post shall be determined with reference to the officiating post held by him at the time of taking action
Authority to institute proceeding 1 The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may a institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant b direct a disciplinary authority to institute discipli nary proceedings against any Railway servant on whom that disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant on whom that disciplinary authority is competent to impose under these rules any of the penalties specified in rule 6
2 A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses i to iv of Rule 6 may subject to the provisions of clause c of subrule 1 of rule 2 institute disciplinary proceedings against any Railway servant for imposition of any of the penalties 452 specified in clauses v to ix of rule 6 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties
Schedule II referred to in rule 72 lays down that an order of compulsory retirement removal or dismissal from service may be ordered in the case of a Group C or Group D Railway servant by the appointing authority or authority equivalent in rank or any higher authority and Note 2 to the Schedule mentions that such an authority may also impose any tower penalty
Under rule 275 of the Railway Establishment Code Vol
I which deals with the recruitment training and promotion of Group C and Group D railway servants the authority competent to make a first appointment is the General Manager or any lower authority to whom he may dele gate the power
The General Manager of each Railway has delegated his powers under several heads
One set of the Schedule of Delegation of Powers by the General Manager of the Southern Railway in Establishment Matters has been set out in some detail in the order of the Central Administra tive Tribunal CAT in the case of Gafoor Mia and Ors
vs Director DMRL  which is one of the orders in appeal before us It is neither useful nor neces sary to repeat them here in extenso
Here also the argument is that notwithstanding the delegation of powers of ap pointment of Group C and Group D employees to various other zonal officers the General Manager has
not divested him self of the power to make such appointments and continues to be the appointing authority 
Being the highest among the various appointing authorities he alone stands vested with the power to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties
It is therefore submitted that the disciplinary proceedings in the cases under this batch initiated by the Divisional Superintendent and like officers were without jurisdiction and were rightly quashed by the CAT in Gaffoor Mia s case already referred to and the decisions in the other matters before us following the said decision
This in crux is the argument for the respondents
Before dealing with this argument it will perhaps be help ful to steer clear of certain minor arguments addressed by either side a Sri Kanta Rao submitted that the same view as in Gafoor Mia had been taken by the CAT in Supriya Roy s case and that this Court has already on 21988 dismissed SLP Nos
9956 57 of 1988 filed against the said order
This appears to be correct but the dismissal in limine of that SLP 453 cannot preclude us from considering the issue in these appeals on merits
It is seen that in CA 396388 an application has been filed for revocation on this ground of the leave granted by this Court
We dismiss this applica tion
b Much store is set on behalf of the respondents by the decision of this Court in Dharam Dev s case supra
It is no doubt true that the decision refers to the provisions of Rule 2a and applies the same to the case before it
But the context in which the case arose was a very simple and straight forward one
In that case the employee in question had in fact been appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India CAG and he was the highest authority in regard to the service in question
All that the decision pointed out was that in view of this and of Article 311 no authority lower in rank to the CAG was competent to take action against the appellant before the Court
The Court had no occasion to consider the type of controversy that has arisen here and did not consider either the interaction of sub clauses i and iii of clause a of rule 2 or the situation as to whether there could be more than one author ity empowered to appoint persons to a post grade or service within the meaning of sub clause i or ii of clause a itself
This decision is therefore not helpful and certain ly not conclusive to solve the issue arising before us
The same is the position in regard to the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta vs Union AIR 1975 SC 1265 which seems to have been relied on for the Union before the CAT
In that case the appellant was a temporary Government servant not holding a specified post
All that this Court pointed out was that if the definition in rule 2a was not applicable to such a person the word appointing authori ty  understood in its plain and natural meaning would mean the authority which appointed him viz
the Director General of the Geological Survey of India
If on the other hand the terms of rule 2a were applicable the person empowered to appoint the appellant being one Sri Moghe and the person who appointed him being the Director General the latter who was the higher authority would be the appointing authority 
This again was an instance of a simple and direct application of the rule involving no complications as here and cannot be treated as deciding the issue before us
c On behalf of the appellant the Union of India reliance is placed on section 16 of the 
It is argued 454 that irrespective of the provisions in the rules a person who makes an appointment has always an implied power of suspending or dismissing him vide Heckett Engineering Co vs Workmen  There are three difficul ties in accepting this argument
In the first place even if the argument is valid it confers on the factual appointing authority in terms only a power to suspend or dismiss and not a power to conduct disciplinary proceedings or impose the various other kinds of penalties envisaged in the rules
To say that the latter power also comes within section 16 one would need to make a further assumption that the power to suspend or dismiss is a more comprehensive power which would include the power to impose smaller penalties too and this assumption is said to run counter to the rules which deal with the two powers separately
Secondly section 16 app
lies only unless a different intention appears
If the con struction placed on the Civil Service Rules and the Railway rules on behalf of the respondents is correct then the rules express a different intention and it would therefore not be possible to rest on the general principle enunciated by section 16
The contention has therefore to be examined independently and section 16 cannot be an answer to it
Thirdly section 16 applies only where a general power of appointment is conferred under an Act or Regulation
Here the Act or Regu lation ie the Rules envisage the power of appointment conferred by them on certain authorities being delegated
The power conferred on the delegatees is circumscribed by the instrument of such delegation and cannot be extended beyond its ambit as observed by the CAT in Gafoor Mia s case supra
section 16 therefore does not come to the rescue of the appellants
d An argument was raised at the earlier stages that the words whichever is the highest authority governs only subclause iv of rule 2a of the Civil Service Rules and not the other sub clauses
This contention cannot bear a moment s scrutiny both because the above words occur in the Rules separately from the four sub clause but also because the terms thereof clearly envisage a determination of one who among several authorities is the highest
It there fore clearly means that the authorities  falling under the definitions in sub clauses i to iv have to be ascer tained and the highest among them taken as the disciplinary authority for purposes of rule 122b
The above discussion narrows down the controversy before us to a very short issue Can it be said where the appoint ing authority under 455 rule 91 has delegated his powers of appointment under the proviso that both the authorities should be treated as the authority empowered to appoint persons to the post grade or service or does this expression get restricted only to the latter ie the delegatee authority If both fail under the above description within the meaning of sub clause i the respondent s plea that the definition in rule 2a will mark out only the Scientific AdviserGeneral Manager would be correct
On the other hand if the second of the above interpretation is correct the appellant s stand will have to be upheld
Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contend that the authority specified under the schedule read with rule 91 does not lose his authority to appoint merely by the act of delegating his powers to a subordinate authority
Such delegation no doubt empowers the subordinate authority to appoint but does not take away the power of appointment conferred on the authority specified in the schedule read with rule 91
Before dealing with the above contention we may make reference to certain decisions cited by counsel on the consequences of such delegation
In Roop Chand vs State 1963 Suppl
1 SCR 539 the petitioner had filed an appeal from the order of the Settlement Officer to the State Gov ernment under section 214 of the relevant Act
But the State Government having delegated under section 411 of the Act the right to hear and dispose of the appeals made to it to the Assistant Director Consolidation the petitioner s appeal was disposed of by the said Officer who allowed the same
The Respondent thereupon sought to invoke a power conferred on the State Government under section 42 of the Act to revise the orders passed by the authorities under the Act
On a writ petition filed before it the Supreme Court quashed the revisional order passed by the State Government on the simple logic that the order passed under section 411 read with section 214 was an order of the State Government though in fact passed by a delegate and could not be revised by the State Government itself under section 42
The Andhra Pradesh High Court speaking through PA Choudary J in Daniel s case since reported in thought that the principle of the case was of no avail to the Union of India which appears to have contended on the strength thereof that though the disciplinary action was initiated by the Director it must be treated as having been taken by the Scientific Adviser himself because the action of the Director being that of a delegate must be regarded in law as that of the principal himself
The learned Judge repelled the argument observing 456 The ratio of the aforesaid case is that the action of the delegate can be treated as that of the princi pal himself
Applying the ratio of the above case to the facts of our case it can be said at the most that the orders of appointments made by the Director by reason of the statutory delegation made by the Scientific Adviser under Rule 91 are those of the Scientific Adviser him self on the basic that the exercise of the power delegated to an authority may be treated as an exercise of the power by the principal himself
Accepting the principle we cannot agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that the Director s exer cise of the disciplinary power against the petitioners should be treated as an exercise of disciplinary authority by the Scientific Adviser himself
The reason is too simple
Firstly the statute deals throughout its provisions with the disciplinary power as a different and separate power from the power to appoint
Secondly the disciplinary power is never delegated by the Scientific Adviser to the Director either under Rule 91 or any other rule of the CCA Rules
It follows therefore that the theory of imputation to the principal the acts of the delegate can have no application to such a situation as the one before us
We therefore find that the Roop Chand s case is of no avail to the re spondents Though Sri Choudhary who appeared before us for the re spondents seemed to have second thoughts about this we are of opinion that the observations extracted above set out the correct position and that the Roop Chand decision is of no help
An attempt has been made before us to invoke the Roop Chand principle in a different way to support the case of the employees and argue that their appointments made by the Director should be treated as appointments made by the Scientific Adviser himself and that therefore no discipli nary action can be initiated against them by any one other than the Scientific Adviser himself
We do not think that this argument can be accepted
As observed in Kishore Ku mar s case a delegation of power does not enhance or improve the hierarchical status of the delegate
The rule in Roop Chand as to the nature and character of the power exercised by a delegate was enunciated in a particular context
It cannot be treated as a general principle ap plicable to all situations
In particular in the context of rules 2a and 122 with which we are concerned and which outline a contrast between the person who is empowered to 457 appoint and the person who actually appoints it is impossi ble to treat the Scientific AdviserGeneral Manager as the person who appointed the respondents
Reference has not been made to Daluram Pannalal Modi vs Commissioner This was a case as to the interpretation of the scope of a delegate s power
section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act 1958 empowers the Commis sioner if he is satisfied that any sale or purchase of goods has escaped assessment to make a reassessment
section 30 of the Act however enabled the Commissioner to delegate any of his powers and duties under the Act and the Commis sioner exercising this power delegated to the Assistant Commissioner his powers and duties to make an assessment or reassessment and to exercise all other powers under Sections 18 19 and 20
An assessee challenged a reassessment notice issued by an Assistant Commissioner contending that what had been delegated was only the power of reassessment but not the duty of being satisfied that there was an escapement which according to the assessee still remained with the Commissioner
This argument was repelled and it was held that the requirement of being satisfied was an adjunct of the power to initiate reassessment proceedings
That princi ple cannot apply here as it is doubtful how far in the context of the service rules which make a clear distinction between the power to appoint and the power to take discipli nary proceedings the latter can be said to be adjunct or ancillary to the former
This leads us to the question whether the appointing authority specified in the schedule can exercise his power of appointment to a post cadre or service even after he has delegated that power to a subordinate authority under the proviso
An answer to this question in the affirmative is contended for on the strength of certain authorities which may now be considered
In Godawari section Parulekar vs State of Maharashtra 14 the appellant had been de tained by an order passed by the State Government under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules
1t was contended on behalf of the appellant inter alia that the State Government had earlier issued a notification delegating its powers under rule 30 to the District Magistrate and was so not competent to make the order of detention in question
Reliance was placed for this argument on the observations of the Judicial Committee in King Emperor vs Shibnath Banerjee 72 IA 241
These observations were distinguished and the above conten tion was repelled
It was held that by issuing the notifica tion in question the State Government had not denuded itself of the power to act under r 30 vide Willis J in 458 Huth vs Clarke 1890 25 QBD 39 1
Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Ramachandra Rao vs State This case does hold that a power which is delegated can be exercised both by the delegator and the delegatee though the Supreme Court decisions cited therein as deciding this issue do not seem to help
Halsbury 4th Edn para 32 citing Huth vs Clarke supra summarises the English Law on the subject thus In general a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority
The delegating body will retain not only the power to revoke the grant but also power to act concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except in so far as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate
However the following passage from Wade on Administrative Law Sixth Edition at p 365 would seem to indicate that the position is not quite clear and may need detailed con sideration in an appropriate case A statutory power to delegate will normally include a power to revoke the delegation when desired
While the delegation subsists it may be arguable whether the delegating authority is denuded of its power or is able to exercise it concur rently with the delegate
This question arose where under statutory authority the executive committee of a county council delegated to a sub committee its powers to make regulations for the control of rabies but before the sub committee had done anything the executive committee without revoking the delegation itself issued regulations for the muzzling of dogs
These regulations were upheld but on inconsistent grounds one judge holding that the executive committee had resumed its power and the other that it had never parted with them and that the word delegate means little more than an agent
In a later case the latter view prevailed on the ground that one cannot divest oneself of one s statutory duties 
But the contrary was held by the Court of Appeal where a minister had formally delegated to local authorities his power to requisition houses
By doing this he had for the time being divested himself of his powers so that an invalid requisition by the local authori ty could not be cured by their acting in his name and the court rejected the contention that 459 delegation was a form of agency
The Local Government Act 1972 expressly preserves the powers of a local authority concurrently with those delegated to its commits etc
 We do not think it is necessary to go into this question
In view of the decision in Godawari supra we shall accept the general proposition that the delegation of the power of appointment under the proviso to rule 91 does not neces sarily deprive the disciplinary authority specified in the main part of the rule from exercising the delegated power of appointment in any case or class of cases
Still the basic question that remains is whether in the context of rule 2a read with rule 91 the reference to the authority empowered to make the appointment is to the authority mentioned in the proviso to rule 9 or to both the authorities falling under the main part 01  rule 91 as well as the proviso
The sheet anchor of the respondent s case is that the expression appointing authority  is used in very few of the rules
One of them is rule 12 and there can therefore be no valid reason to refuse to apply the definition clause in the context of those rules
It is urged that by holding the person specified in the schedule also to be the appointing authority  as defined in rule 2a none of the other rules relating to appeal revision etc
become redundant as urged on behalf of the appellants
We agree with the respondents that the expression appointing authority  in rule 12 should have the meaning attributed to it in rule 2a
But what is the real and true interpreta tion of Rule 2a What does that sub rule talk of when it refers to a person empowered to make the appointment  in question These words clearly constitute a reference to rule 9
Does rule 2a refer then to the authority empowered by the schedule to make the appointments or the authority to whom he has delegated that power or both We think on a proper and harmonious reading of rule 2a and rule 9 that sub rule a of rule 2 only envisages the authority to whom the power of appointment has been delegated under rule 9 and not both the delegator and the delegate
We have come to this conclusion for a number of reasons
In the first place it is clear on the plain language of rule 2a that it directs the ascertainment of the authorities specified in such of clauses i to iv of the rule as may be applicable to a particular case and designates the highest of them as the appointing authority 
It envisages only one authority as falling under each of these clauses and not more
The respondent s contention which involves interpretation of clause i or ii as contemplating more than one authority runs counter to the tenor of the rule
Secondly the strict ly literal meaning of rule 2a insisted upon by the re spondents 460 would render the rules unworkable
For instance under clause i one of the authorities to be considered is the authority empowered to make appointments to the service of which the government servant is for the time being a mem ber 
The respondents belong to one of the Central Civil Services
Though they belong to class III or class IV there are class and class II officers as well therein
Rule 8 declares that only the President can make appointments to Class I in the service
If each of the clauses is read as envisaging a plurality of authorities as contended for and if clause i is literally interpreted it will also include the President who is one of the authorities empowered to make appointments to the service of which the concerned employees is a member
This will render the entire gamut of the rules unworkable
On this interpretation the President will be the only appointing authority under rule 2a in all cases being the highest of the authorities envisaged there in
This cannot clearly be correct
Rule 2a does not contemplate any authority other than the one empowered to appoint a person belonging to the post or grade which the concerned government employee holds
In that sense the two parts of clause i and clause ii are not to be read distributively to ascertain the authority empowered to make appointments a to the service b to the grade and c to the post and consider the highest of them
One has to re strict oneself to the post or grade of the government serv ant concerned and invoke clause i or ii as the case may be
Thirdly the whole purpose and intent of rule 2a is to provide that appointing authority means either the de facto or the de jure appointing authority
It will be appreciated that generally speaking only the de jure authority can make the appointment but occasionally a superior authority or even a subordinate authority with his consent could have made the appointment
Again it is possible that the authority empowered to make the appointment at the time when relevant proceedings in contemplation may be higher or lower in rank to the authority which was empowered to make the appointment or which made the appointment at a different point of time
The whole intent or purpose of the definition to safeguard against an infringement of article 3111 and ensure that a person can be dealt with only by either a person competent to appoint persons of his class or the person who appointed him whoever happens to be higher in rank
That rule is not infringed by the interpretation placed by the appellants
The provisions of Schedule II in the case of the Railways which specify the appointing au thority or an authority of equivalent rank or any higher authority as the disciplinary authority are also consistent with this interpretation
Fourthly the interpretation sought to be placed by the respondents on rule 2a is artificial and strained
It amounts to saying that a person who is 461 empowered to appoint a government servant as the Director DERL for example undoubtedly is and who has also appoint ed him will not be the appointing authority because theo retically even a more superior authority could have ap pointed him despite having delegated his authority in this regard to a subordinate
On the contrary the interpretation urged by the Union will not adversely affect the few employ ees if any who may be appointed by a superior scheduled authority despite delegation of such power to a subordinate authority
For in such a case the superior authority would be the person who has factually appointed such an employee and he will clearly be the appointing authority  by virtue of rule 2a
Lastly the interpretation sought for by the Union is consistent with practical consideration
The ap pointing authority under the Schedule is a high ranking authority and in an organisation like the Railways for instance it will be virtually impossible for him to consid er each and every case of appointment of or disciplinary action against all the Class III or Class IV employees in the organisation
It is indeed this realisation that has rendered necessary delegation of the power of appointment and cannot be ignored in the absence of compelling reasons in the matter of disciplinary powers
On behalf of the respondents it is contended that the intention of the rules is to restrict powers of discipline from being exercised by all appointing authorities
Central isation it is urged is the object
This contention is not borne out by the table of innumerable disciplinary authori ties set out in the schedule not to speak of those on whom factual or special powers have been conferred by the Presi dent as was indeed done in many of these very cases later
As against this Sri Pai for the appellants pointed out that if one has regard to the strength of the railway staff or the other class III or IV staff employed in various civil services the interpretation urged on behalf of the respond ents would cast an impossible burden of work on the authori ties specified in the schedule to whom alone the respondents seek to confine the power to take disciplinary proceedings
There is force in this contention
It has been brought to our notice that notifications have since been issued for example on 29th August 1979 in the case of the DERL and 2187 in the case of Ordnance factories by the President under rule 12 empowering certain authorities to exercise disciplinary powers
We need hardly say that any disciplinary proceedings initiated by such authorities from the date when such notifications came into effect will be perfectly valid
It has also been brought to our notice that in some cases for example CA Nos
1443 1444 and 434088 the CAT has 462 also gone into the merits of the cases and set aside the penalties or punishments imposed on the concerned respond ent
We do not propose to review the finding on this aspect of the matter under Article 136
CA No 144488 we are told has also abated as the appellant has taken no steps to bring on record the legal representatives of the respondent but in view of the Tribunal s findings on merits it is unnecessary to go into this question now
The order of the CAT in such cases will therefore stand notwithstanding our conclusion being different from that of the CAT on the main issue discussed above On the other hand in most cases the CAT because of the view taken by it on the main ques tion has not dealt with the merits of the proceedings
For example it was mentioned that in CA 31681 the respond ent has been removed from service by the Deputy Director an authority subordinate to the Director who had appointed him
This aspect has not been considered and will have to be considered now
Similarly in CA 304489 filed by the employee it is pointed out that the appellant had been appointed by the Director of Ordnance Services in 1964
The power of appointment was delegated to Commandants in 1971 and the respondent was penalised by the Commandant a subor dinate authority to whom disciplinary powers were delegate by the President only in 1979
Though this point does not appear to have been raised before the Tribunal it goes to the root of the matter and we therefore think that it should be left open to be considered by the Tribunal now
As the cases before us are many and were decided princi pally on the point of law discussed earlier we have not touched upon the facts or merits of individual cases
We set aside the orders of the CAT in all cases except CA Nos
1443 and 434088 which stand dismissed as mentioned above and direct the TribunalHigh Court
to pass fresh orders disposing of the applications filed before them in the light of our judgment
Where disciplinary proceedings have been stayed at the stage of initiation or later because of the view taken by the Tribunal they should now be con tinued and finished without delay in accordance with law
The appeals are disposed of accordingly
TNA Appeals disposed of


Summary:
Some employees belonging to West Bengal Civil Service Executive filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for a direction to the State Government to frame appropriate seniority rules
The High Court passed an inter im order directing the State Government to frame seniority rules and determine the inter se seniority on that basis within one month of the order
On an application moved by the petitioners the same Judge passed an interim order that the seniority rules framed pursuant to the Court s order would not be given effect to without leave of the Court and without notice to the writ petitioners
On another applica tion moved by the writ petitioners the same Judge re strained the State Government from taking any further action on the basis of the draft rules of seniority
Later the Judgment was delivered allowing the writ petition holding that the draft rules were ultra vires
Aggrieved the State Government preferred an appeal before a Division Bench
The Division Bench stayed the operation of the judgment and decree passed by the Single Judge
The Division Bench also directed that the State Government may proceed with the final assessment of the seniority rules
Aggrieved against the said order the writ petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition which was dismissed with a request to the High Court to dispose of the pending writ petition expeditiously within two months
The High Court extended the stay till the disposal of the appeal and directed status quo
Against this order the original respondents in the writ petition filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court
This Court passed an interim order to the effect that the order passed by this Court earlier would hold the field not with standing any contrary order passed by the High Court
Later granting special leave this Court observed 377 that in view of the interim order no further order need be passed
The present application has been filed by the State for clarification of the two orders of this Court in the context of the order dated 1591989 of the High Court
Disposing of the application this Court
HELD 11 It is the settled principle of law that any order or direction pronounced by this apex Court in exercise of its jurisdiction in any matter pending before it that order or direction is binding on all courts within the territory of India and should be implemented and executed in all its rigour
484D 12 From the report sent by the Division Bench of the High Court dated 15th September 1989 it seems the latter Division Bench extended the 8 weeks stay on the grounds firstly that the Order of this Court dated 2981989 has not prevented the Division Bench from passing such order and secondly that the 8 weeks stay stood vacated wef 4th September 1989
But in fact the Order of the Court dated 2981989 has restored the order of the first Division Bench of the High Court dated 1071989 on the expiry of 8 weeks and that the 8 weeks stay had expired only by 991989 and not on 491989
484E F 13 It is open to the State Government to act in accord ance with the order dated 1071989 of the High Court
The Order of this Court dated 791989 in SLP No 1067089 has clarified the position to the effect that the Order of this Court dated 2981989 shall hold the field notwithstanding the contrary order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
The contrary order mentioned in the order dated 791989 refers to the order dated 49199
The resultant position is that this Court by the order dated 791989 has rendered the order of the second Division Bench of the High Court dated 491989 inoperative and ineffective
Subse quently SLP No 1067089 was disposed of after grant of leave
Thus the matter now stands concluded that from 1091989 onwards the order of the first Division Bench dated 1071989 has become operative and executable and the interim direction given by that order is brought back to life and resuscitated
484G H 485A B