s Nos 114 216 223 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights
CB Agarwala and K P Gupta for the petitioners in WPs Nos 114 216 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967 RV section Mani and K P Gupta for the petitioner in WP No 223 of 1966
Niren De Solicitor General B R L lyengar and R N Sachthey for the respondents in WPs
Nos 114 and 216 of 1966
Niren De Solicitor General R H Dhebar and R N Sach they for respondents Nos 1 to 5 in WP No 223 of 1966 and the respondents in W P No 85 of 1967
R N Sachthey for respondent No 9 in W P No 223 of 1966
M K Ramamurthi Vineet Kumar and Shyamala Pappu for respondents Nos
12a to 12d in WP No 223 of 1 966
45 V A 
Seyid Muhammad and R H Dhebar and R N Sachthey for respondents Nos
1 to 5 in W P No 252 of 1966
PC Bhartari for the intervener in WP No 114 of 1966
The Judgment of WANCHOO CJ BACHAWAT and MITTER JJ was delivered by MITTER J The dissenting opinion of SHELAT and VAIDIALINGAM JJ was delivered by SHELAT J Mitter J Ms is a group of five Writ Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution challenging in four cases the validity of land acquisition proceedings started by a notification dated November 13 1959 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and declarations contained in other notifications dated March 18 1966 onwards under section 6 of the said Act and for other incidental reliefs including the issue of appropriate writs for the purpose
Various persons
have joined as petitioners in three of the applications
In Writ Petition No 114 of 1966 the petitioners number 61
They all own lands in village Mandawali Fazilpur on Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi the notification of the declaration under section 6 having been made on March 18 1966
in Writ Petition No 216 of 1966 there are 71 petitioners who also own lands in the same village
Their complaint is based on the same notification under section 4 and a notification dated July 12 1966 under section 6 of the Act
In Writ Petition No 223 of 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila Ram who owned lands in villages Masjid Moth Raipur Khurd and Shahpur Jat respectively within the union territory of Delhi
His complaint is based on a section 4 notification dated September 3 1957 a notification dated April 15 1961 under section 6 of the Act and several awards of Land Acquisition Col lector Delhi made in 1961
In Writ Petition No 252 of 1966 there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village Kotla at Patparganj Road within the union territory of Delhi
Their grievance is against section 4 notification dated November 13 1959 and a notification dated June 14 1961 under section 6 of the Act
In Writ Petition No 85 of 1967 the sole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned land in village Kilokri on the Delhi Mathura Road within the union territory of Delhi
His grievance is against section 4 notification dated November 13 1959 a notification dated July 27 1961 under section 6 of the Act and an award dated February 16 1962
Although there are some distinctive features in some of the petitions to be mentioned later the common attack is based on the judgment of this Court delivered on February 9 1966 in State of
Madhya Pradesh vs V P Sharma1
That case arose out of proceedings for acquisition of land in eleven villages in Madhya Pradesh for the steel plant at Rourkela
There a notification had been issued under section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act on May 16 1  46 1949 declaring that lands in eleven named villages were likely to be needed for a public purpose ie the erection of an iron and steel plant
Thereafter notifications were issued under section 6 from time to time and some lands in village Chhawani were acquired in the year 1956
In August 1960 a fresh notification under section 6 of the Act was issued proposing to acquire Ac
486 17 of land in the said village
Some owners of the land in the village who were affected by the notification filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the notification under section 6
The High Court accepted their contention whereupon the State of Madhya Pradesh came up to this Court in appeal
It was held by this Court that sections 4 5 A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were integrally connected and that acquisition always began with a notification under section 41 followed by consideration of all objections thereto under section 5 A and a declaration under section 6
According to this Court once a declaration under section 6 was made the notification under section 41 was exhausted and the latter section was not a reservoir from which the Government might from time to time draw out land and make declaration with respect to it successively
The ultimate conclusion was that there could be no successive notifications under section 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under section 41 and in the result the appeal of the State was dismissed
The present Writ Petitions were all filed after the said judgment of this Court
The omnibus notification under section 4 in four of these cases dated November 13 1959 covered an area of Ac
34070 00 marked as blocks Nos
A to T and X in a map enclosed with the notification excepting therefrom certain classes of lands namely a Government land and evacuee land b land already notified either under section 4 or under section 6 of the Act for any Government scheme c land already notified either under section 4 or under section 6 for house building co operative societies mentioned in annexure iii to the notification and the land under graveyards tombs shrine  and those attached to religious institutions and wakf property The notification stated that land was required by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose namely the planned development of Delhi
As already noted there were several notifications under section 6 made from time to time the earliest one in this series of petitions being dated June 14 1961
It is clear that on the basis of the judgment of this Court the validity of the notifications under section 6 of the Act after the first of the series could not be upheld in A court of law
On January 20 1967 an Ordinance was promulgated by the President of India styled The Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1 of 1967
The scheme of the Ordinance was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was to have effect subject to the amendments specified in sections 3 and 4 of the Ordin 47 ance
Section 3 purported to amend section 5 A of the Land Acquisition Act hereinafter referred to as the principal Act by enabling different reports to be made in respect of different parcels of land under section 5 A of the Act
Similarly section 4 of the Ordinance purported to amend section 6 of the principal Act by enabling different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under section 4
Section 5 of the Ordinance purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the Ordinance notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any court to the contrary
On April 12 1967 Parliament passed an Act Act 13 of 1967 styled The Land Acquisition Amendment and Short Title Validation Act 1967
Section 2 of this Act purported to amend section 5 A of the principal Act to allow the making of more than one report in respect of land which had been notified under section 41
Section 3 similarly purported to amend section 6 of the principal Act by empowering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under section 41 irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been made under section 5 A sub section
Clause ii of section 3 inserted a new proviso to section 61 reading Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4 sub section 1 published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication As a good deal of argument turns on the interpretation of section 4 of the Amending Act it is necessary to set the same out in extenso  4
1 Notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any court to the contrary a no acquisition of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 and no action taken or thing done including any order made agreement entered into or notification published in connection With such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid merely on the ground i that one or more Collectors have performed the functions of Collector under the principal Act in respect of the land covered by the same notification under sub section 1 of section 4 of the principal Act iithat one or more reports have been made under sub section 2 of section 5 A of the principal Act whe 48 ther in respect of the entire land or different parcels thereof covered by the same notification under sub section 1 of section 4 of the principal Act iii that one or more declarations have been made under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under sub section 1 of section 4 of the principal Act b any acquisition in pursuance of any notification published under sub section 1 of section 4 of the prin cipal Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 may be made after such commencement and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done including any order made agreement entered into or notification published whether before or after such commencement in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the grounds referred to in clause
a or any of them
2 Notwithstanding anything contained in clause b of sub section 1 no declaration under section 6 of the principal Act in respect of any land which has been notified before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 under sub section 1 of section 4 of the principal Act shall be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the said Ordinance
3Where acquisition of any particular land covered by a notification under sub section 1 of section 4 of the principal Act published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 is or has been made in pursuance of any declaration under section 6 of the principal Act whether made before or after such commencement and such declaration is or has been made after the expiry of three years from the date of publication of such notification there shall be paid simple interest calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum on the market value of such land as determined under section 23 of the principal Act from the date of expiry of the said period of three years to the date of tender of payment of compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquisition of such land  Provided that no such interest shall be payable for any period during which the proceedings for the acquisition of any land were held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a court 49 Provided further that nothing in this sub section shall apply to the acquisition of any land where the amount of compensation has been paid to the persons interested before the commencement of this Act
 Section 5 of the Amending Act repealed the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 and further pro vided that notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act as amended by_this Act as it this Act had come into force on the 20th January 1967
The petitions before us were amended by leave of the Court so that the Validation Act of 1967 could
be challenged
Mr C B Agarwala who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos 114 216 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967 raised the following points in support of the petitions  1 The Validation Act does not revive the notification under section 4 which had become exhausted
after the first declaration under section 6 and no acquisition could be made without a fresh notification under section 4
2 The Validation Act violated article 31 2 of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under section 4 thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of the dead notification under section 4
It was argued that once a notification under section 4 was exhausted Government had to make a fresh one under the said section as a result thereof compensation had to be assessed on a different basis altogether
3 The Validation Act violated article 14 of the Constitution in various ways a It made discrimination inasmuch as a notification under section 4 made before the commencement of the Ordinance had to be followed by a declaration under section 6 within two years of the said  date whereas if a notification under section 4 was made after 20th January 1967 ie the date of the Ordinance the declaration under section 6 could be made within a period of three years from the date of the notification under section 4
The discrimination lay in the fact that whereas a declaration under section 6 had to be made in respect of a notification under section 4 bearing date subsequent to 20th January 1967 within three years a much longer period of time might elapse between a date of declaration under section 6 and a notification under section 4 issued prior to the date of the Ordinance
b If a notification under section 4 was made after the date of the Ordinance compensation had to be paid on the basis of such notification but if a notification had been made under section 4 of the Act before the date of the Ordinance compensation would be awarded on the basis of the exhausted notification under section 4 however much time might have elapsed since the date of the dead notification
50 cIf compensation had not been paid before the Ordinance interest at 6 had to be paid to the owner of the land on the amount of compensation fixed but if the owner had received compensation before the date of the Ordinance he had no claim to interest although the acquisition in both cases flowed from the same notification under section 4
d It was open to Government to make a fresh notification under section 4 after the lapse of three years from the date of the Ordinance and such notification might be issued after every period of three years in any case where acquistion was not completed
In such cases owners of land would be substantially benefited by the new notification under section 4
But if a notification had been made before the date of the Ordinance the owner of the land would receive compensation based on the old notification although a period much longer than three years might elapse between the date of the notification under section 4 and a declaration under section 6 his only solatium being interest at 6 pa on the amount of the compensation
This would result in discrimination inasmuch as a person affected by a section 4 notification prior to the date of the Ordinance would be treated
very differently from another person whose land was acquired in terms of a notification made after the commencement of the Ordinance
On the first point it was argued by Mr Agarwala that sections 2 and 3 of the Amending Act had no retrospective operation that there was no law which purported to validate retrospectively any but the first report made under section 5 A of the principal Act or any but the first declaration issued under section 6 of the Act and consequently there was no legal basis for the validation of such past acts by the operation of section 4 of the Amending Act
It was therefore argued that the defect in the principal Act as pointed out by this Court in V P Sharma s case1 was not removed by section 4 of the Amending Act
It was urged that Acts seeking to validate past transactions can only be effective if the amendment introduced had retrospective operation so as to cure the lacuna in the enactment from a date anterior to that of the impugned transactions
If the Amending Act had no retrospective operation it could not protect past transactions which would still have to be declared invalid inasmuch as the notification under section 4 made on November 13 1959 having exhausted itself after the first declaration under section 6 was not resusciated by any provision of the Amending Act
On the second point the broad contention urged was that the amendment was hit by article 312 of the Constitution inasmuch as its whole purpose was to avoid payment of enhanced compensation which would be necessitated if a fresh notification had to be issued under section 4
The notification dated November 13 1959 1  51 having spent itself a fresh one in the normal course would have to be issued and compensation be paid not on the basis of valuation on November 13 1959 but on that prevailing at least 8 or 9 years afterwards which would be substantially higher
It was argued that acquisition on the basis of any declaration under section 6 of the Act after the first one would in effect be providing for compensation on the basis of a notification under section 4 which had no relation to the acquisition
In other words the date of the earlier notification under section 4 must be treated to be an arbitrary date divorced from and completely alien to the acquisition sought to be made by a subsequent declaration under section 6
In such circumstances the ratio of a number of decisions of this Court starting from that of The State of West Bengal vs Mrs Bela Banerjee1 to a recent judgment in Union of India vs
Kamalabai Harjivandas Parekh and others2 would apply
It is not necessary to examine all these decisions in detail
The notable decisions to which reference was made at some length are P V Mudaliar vs Dy Collector3 Jeejeebhoy vs Asstt
Collector4and State of Madras vs D Namasivaya Mudaliar5
It was argued that though the Land Acquisition Act was saved by article 315 a of the Constitution any amendment thereto after the coming into force of the Constitution had to pass the test of article 13 and article 312 would apply with full force to any amendment of the Land Acquisition Act if as a result thereof a person expropriated was being deprived of compensation ie the just equivalent of the property acquired
The point sought to be made was that the notification of November 13 1959 having exhausted itself the value of the property at or about that date would be illusory com pensation in violation of article 312 in respect of a declaration under section 6 made after the first one of the series
Reference was made to proceedings for compulsory acquisition of land in England under the Lands Clauses Acts under which once the undertakers or authority are authorised to purchase the next step in the normal course is to serve a notice to treat see Halsbury s Laws of England third edition Vol
10 page 60 article 97
It is pointed out in article 102 of the said book that The effect of serving a notice to treat is to establish a relation analogous in some respects to that of a purchaser and vendor a relation which binds the undertakers to take the land and binds the land owner to give up the land subject to his being paid compensa tion but until the price is ascertained the land remains the property of the l andowner
Both parties have the 1  2 CA 15641966 decided on 7 9 1967
3  4  5  52 right to have the price ascertained and the purchase completed in manner provided by the Lands Clauses Acts
 It was said that the English procedure ensured the payment of just equivalent of the property to the person who was deprived of it and that issue of a declaration under section 6 made years after the notification under section 4 the date of which alone was to be considered for fixing the value of the property ignored the rights of the person to the lawful compensation aimed at by article 312 of the Constitution
Reference was made to the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ezra vs Secretary of State for India1 where on a reference to the sections of the Land Acquisition Act as they then stood it was observed  that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing a value should be possessed of all the information in the hands of the department and should at the same time avail himself of all that is offered at the enquiry his ultimate duty being not to conclude the owner by his so called award but to fix the sum which in Ms best judgment is the value and should be offered
 On the question of violation of article 14 of the Constitution besides the general argument already referred to it was urged that in Writ Petition No 85 of 1967 there was a further point as to discrimination
The facts laid in this petition are as follows
The petitioner was the owner of land measuring Ac
10 62 in village Kilokri
He wanted to develop the land by establishing a residential colony and selling the same out in plots
For this purpose he had spent a good deal of money and taken enormous trouble and divided the area after development into 78 residential plots
In 1956 he had submitted a lay out plan of the land in question for necessary sanction to the Delhi Development Provisional Authority
On June 18 1956 he was informed by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority that the final lay out plan had been approved by the said authority
In September 1957 the said authority demanded from the petitioner a security for Rs 12850 25 as a guarantee for carrying out the development of the colony in accordance with the approved standards and this sum was duly deposited by the petitioner
On September 15 1958 the petitioner submitted service plans in respect of his colony and these were duly checked and found to be in order  the case was ordered to be Placed before the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation for approval
By December 24 1958 the Standing Committee referred the case R 32 Calcutta 605 at 629
53 back to the Town Planner for a scrutiny of the ownership documents
The question relating to the proof of ownership was settled on March 19 1961
In the meantime the notification dated November 13 1959 had been issued under section 41 of the Act
The petitioner duly filed his objections under section 5 A of the Act
By a notification dated July 1 1960 published by the Delhi Administration the Chief Commissioner Delhi withdrew the land of 16 colonies from the acquisition out of the area covered by the notification of November 13 1959 on the ground that their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and as per general decision of the Standing Committee Delhi Municipal Corporation the petitioner was asked by the Town Planner by letter dated April 16 1960 to submit a de notification certificate to the effect that the land comprising the proposed lay out of his colony was excluded from the purview of the notification issued under section 4 of the Act
On June 14 1961 the Deputy Housing Commissioner Delhi Administration issued the first notification under section 6 of the Act in respect of 97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in village Kilokri as required by the Government for a public purpose at the public expense namely the planned development of Delhi
The petitioners land was not covered by this notification
The Deputy Housing Commissioner Delhi Administration purported to issue another noti fication dated 2627th July 1961 under section 6 of the Act declaring that land specified therein in village Kilokri was required to be taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose
This notification covered the petitioners land in question in village Kilokri
On January 9 1962 the petitioner was informed by a letter issued by the office of the Town Planner Municipal Corporation Delhi that the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation by its resolution No 1190 dated December 18 1961 had rejected the lay out plan of the petitioner s colony
According to the petitioner this resolution went to show that his land was sought to be acquired because it had not been de notified along with the land of the other colonies on the ground that the Standing Committee had rejected the lay out plan of his colony
Thereafter the Land Acquisition Collector Delhi made an award No 1276 dated February 16 1962 with respect to the petitioner s said land
In March 1965 the petitioner learnt about the notification issued by the Delhi Administration on July 1 1960 under section 481 of the Act withdrawing the land of the 16 colonies mentioned therein from the acquisition out of the area covered by the notification dated November 13 1959 on the ground that their lay out plan had been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation
By letter dated March 10 1965 the petitioner asked the Deputy Housing Commissioner Delhi Administration for restoration of his land on the same basis because his lay out plan 54 had been sanctioned before the section 4 notification
This request was however turned down by letter dated May 14 1965 on the ground that the petitioner s land had already been acquired and could not be released
According to the petitioner there was no basis for treating his land in a manner different from that of the 16 colonies
This differential treatment has resulted in violation of article 14 of the Constitution so far as the petitioner s colony is concerned
Mr Agarwala also tried to make a subsidiary point in this connection and urged that acquisition of petitioner s land was a colourable exercise of the power under the Act inasmuch as the petitioner was out to do the same thing as was sought to be achieved by proceedings under Land Acquisition Act the only difference being that whereas the sales effected by him were at reasonable rates those fetched at auction of lands acquired under the Act were for much higher figures and the State was really making revenue out of such acquisitions
Mr R V section Mani who appeared for the petitioner in Writ Petition No 223 of 1966 adopted the arguments of Mr Agarwala in general but sought to make a special point of his own
In substance the additional ground urged by him was that by the Validating Act the Legislature had sought to encroach into the domain of the Judiciary
Mr Mani contended that although there was no clear separation of legislative and judicial powers in our Constitution nevertheless the Constitution did not confer unlimited powers on the legislature and it was for the Judiciary to declare the limits of the legislative powers enshrined in the Constitution
To quote Mr Mani s words  The Legislature exercises judicial power if its legislative action retroacts on past controversies and overrides or reverses the decisions of the Judiciary
 Such an act argued Mr Mani bad to be struck down in courts of law
Mr Mani s main argument was that inasmuch as sections 2 and 3 of the Amending Act had not been given retrospective effect the validation sought to be effected by section 4 with respect to the past transactions was of no avail as the impugned actions ie the subsequent declarations under section 6 of the Act had no legal basis
In our opinion no useful purpose will be served by referring to the clear demarcation between the judicial powers and legislative powers in America and attempt to engraft the said principle in the working of our Constitution
This development of the 55 law as pointed out in A K Gopalan vs State was due to historical reasons
In that case it was pointed out by Das J see at p 286 that the Supreme Court of the United States under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall assumed the power to declare any law unconstitutional on the ground of its not being in due process of law It is thus that the Supreme Court established its own supremacy over the executive and the Congress
In India the position of the Judiciary is somewhere in between the Courts in England and the United States
While in the main leaving our Parliament and the State Legislatures supreme in their respective legislative fields our Constitution has by some of the articles put upon the Legislature certain specified limitations 
Our Constitution unlike the English Constitution recognises the Court s supremacy over the legislative authority but such supremacy is a very limited one for it is confined to the field where the legislative power is circumscribed by limitations put upon it by the Constitution itself
Within this restricted field the Court may on a scrutiny of the law made by the Legislature declare it void if it is found to have transgressed the constitutional limitations
 It will not serve any useful purpose to note the decisions of this Court where reference has been made to the distinction between the Indian Constitutional law and the American Constitutional law on this subject
Mr Mani sought to rely on a statement of the law made by Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations 7th ed p 137 as quoted in Willoughby s Constitution of the United States second edition Vol 3 at page 1651 that If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce it must be done by statute and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts which leaves the law unchanged but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it not according to the judicial but according to the legislative judgment 
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views it is very plain it cannot do so directly by setting aside their judgments  compelling them to grant new trials ordering the discharge of offenders or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry
1  at 198
56 According to Willoughby Retroactive legislation which does not impair vested rights or violate express constitutional prohibitions is valid and therefore particular legal remedies and to a certain extent rules of evidence may be changed and as changed made appli cable to past transactions
But substantial rights may not thus be interfered with
 Willoughby seeks to fortify his statement quoting from Cooley again  The legislature does or may prescribe the rules under which the judicial power is exercised by the courts and in doing so it may dispense with any of those formalities which are not essential to the jurisdiction of the court and whatever it may dispense with by statute anterior to the proceedings we believe it may also dispense with by statute after the proceedings have been taken if the court has failed to observe any of those formalities
But it would not be competent for the legislature to authorize a court to proceed and adjudicate upon the rights of parties without giving them an opportunity to be heard before it and for the same reason it would be incompetent for it by retrospective legislation to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties
 Relying on the above Mr Mani proceeded to argue that the wording of section 4 of the Amending Act was not a question of mere form and that it was a decree purporting to operate as such
According to him unless section 3 was  retrospective section 4 would be meaningless and should be struck down
Mr Mani relied particularly on the decision of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose vs King Emperor1 where it was held by this Court that Ordinance No III of 1944 did not take away the power of the court to investigate and interfere with orders of detention or deprive the court of its power to pass orders under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the court was still at liberty to investigate whether an order purporting to have been made under r 26 of the Defence of India Rules and deemed to be made under the Ordinance or a new order purporting to be made under the Ordinance was in fact validly made in exactly the same way as immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance and if on a consideration the Court came to the conclusion that it was not 1 57 validly made on any ground other than the ground that r 26 of the Defence of India Rules was ultra vires section 10 of the Ordinance would no more prevent it from so finding than section 16 of the Defence of India Act did
We shall deal with the argument based on this case later on
The learned Solicitor General first dealt with the question as to whether Parliament was competent to pass the Validating Act and whether section 4 of the Amending Act could be given effect to unless the legislature gave retrospective operation to section 3
According to the Solicitor General and that is undoubtedly the position in law the legislative competence of Parliament is only circumscribed by the scope of the entries in the appropriate Lists under the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution
The power of Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India is dealt with by the Constitution in articles 245 to 250 252 and 253
Acquisition and requisitioning of property is an entry in List III and Parliament is competent to make laws enumerated in that list under article 2462 of the Constitution
As early as in the year 1878 it was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in The Queen vs Burah1 that the Indian Legislature when acting within the limits prescribed by the Act of the Imperial Parliament which created it had plenary powers of legislation as much and of the same nature as those of Parliament itself and If what has been done is legislation within the general scope of the affirmative words which give the power and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power is limited in which category would of course be included any Act of the Imperial Parliament at variance with it it is not for any Court of Justice to inquire further or to enlarge constructively those conditions and restrictions
 In that case the question before the Judicial Committee was whether Act XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which ex cluded the jurisdiction of the High Court within certain specified districts was not inconsistent with the Indian High Courts Act or with the Charter of the High Court and so in its general scope within the legislative power of the Governor General in Council
Under section 4 of that Act the territory known as Garo Hills was removed from the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature and from the control of the officers of revenue constituted by the regulations
of the Bengal Code and the Acts passed by any Legislature established in British India as well is 1 LR 5 IA 178 at 194
L4Sup
CI68 5 58 from the law prescribed for such courts or officers by the Regulations and Acts aforesaid
This section further provided that no Act thereafter passed by the Council of the Governor General for making laws and regulations shall be deemed to extend to any part of the said territory unless the same was specially named therein
Under section 9 of the Act the Lieutenant Governor was authorised by notification in the Calcutta Gazette to extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of the Act to the Jaintia Hills the Naga Hills and such portion of the Khasi Hills as might for the time being form part of British India
The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal acting under powers conferred by section 9 extended the provisions of Act XXII of 1869 to the territory of Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluded therefrom the jurisdiction of the courts of civil and criminal judicature
The High Court of Calcutta held that the 9th section was not legislation but was a delegation of legislative power
This was not accepted by the Judicial Committee and it was observed at p 195   it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor large as they undoubtedly are as if when they were exercised the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the GovernorGeneral in Council
Their whole operation is directly and immediately under and by virtue of this Act XXII of 1869 itself Reference was made by counsel to the case of Abeyesekra vs Jayatilake1
The question there arose as to whether an Order in Council of 1928 amending another of 1923 making provision that the action of a common informer brought to recover penalties under the Order in Council of 1923 be dismissed and further amending the 1923 Order so as to except the office held by the respondent from its operation was valid and constituted all effective defence to the action although it was retrospective in operation
In upholding the validity of 1928 Order it was observed by the Judicial Committee that legislators have certainly the right to prevent alter or reverse the consequences of their own decrees
 The effect and validity of retrospective legislation has had to be considered by the Federal Court of India and this Court on a number of occasions
In the case of The United Provinces V Atiqa Begum2 a question arose as to whether the Regularisation of Remissions Act 1938 of the United Provinces Legislature 1 2 59 was within its competence
There was an Act in force namely the Agra Tenancy Act 1926 the purpose whereof was to consolidate and amend the law relating to agricultural tenancy and certain other matters
Section 73 of that Act provided that when for any cause the Local Government or any authority empowered by it remitted or suspended for any period the whole or any part of the revenue payable in respect of any land a Collector might order that the rents of the tenants should be remitted or suspended to an amount which shall bear the same proportion to the whole of the amount payable in respect of the land as the revenue of which the payment has been so remitted or suspended bears to the whole of the revenue payable in respect of such land
 In 1931 there was a catastrophic fall in agricultural prices followed by threats on the part of tenants to withhold rent on a large scale
The Government of the United Provinces devised a scheme for the systematic reduction of rents varying with the circumstances of the different districts followed later by consequential adjustments in land revenue
The Allahabad High Court had held in Muhammad Abdul Qaiyum vs Secretary of State for India1that remissions made in pursuance of the orders of Government had no legal effect
In 1938 the Provincial Legislature passed the Regularisation of Remissions Act which precluded any question as to the validity of the orders of remission being raised in the courts of law
The Allahabad High Court took the view that the Act was contrary to the provisions of section 292 of the Gov ernment of India Act 1935 because it amounted to an attempt to legislate retrospectively
Section 2 of the Act of 1938 provided that notwithstanding anything in the Agra Tenancy Act 1926   or in any other law for the time being in force where rent has been remitted on account of any fall in the price of agricultural produce which took place before the commencement of this Act under the order of the Provincial Government or any authority empowered by it in that behalf such order whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue court
 Referring to the case of Queen vs Burah2 Gwyer CJ said that there was nothing in section 292 which suggested any intention on the part of Parliament to impose a fetter against retrospective legislation
According to the learned Chief Justice the impugned Act was an Act with respect to remission of rents although it might also be an act with respect to something else that is to say the validation of doubtful executive orders
The learned Chief Justice said  1 ILR 1938 Allahabad  114
2 LRIA 178
60 It is true that Validation of executive orders or any entry even remotely analogous to it is not to be found in any of the three Lists but I am clear that legislation for that purpose must necessarily be regarded as subsidiary or ancillary to the power of legislating on the particular subjects in respect of which the executive orders may have been issued
 His Lordship further opined that powers of the court were not affected merely because certain executive orders were not allowed to be questioned in any court
In Piare Dusadh  others vs The Kink Emperor1 one of the questions raised was whether it was competent for the Legislature by retrospective legislation to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties
In this case the facts were as follows
The appellants had been convicted by courts functioning under the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance Ordinance No 11 of 1942
On 4th June 1943 the Federal Court held that the courts constituted under that Ordinance had not been duty invested with jurisdiction in view of the nature of the provisions contained in sections 5 10 and 16 of that Ordinance
The next day the Governor General made and promulgated another Ordi nance Ordinance No XIX of 1943 whereby Ordinance No 11 of 1942 was repealed and certain provisions were made in respect of sentences which had been passed by the special courts and in respect of cases which were pending before them on that date
By sub section
2 of section 3 of the new Ordinance a right of appeal against sentences which had already been passed by the special courts was given and appeals were accordingly preferred to the High Court in some cases
In certain other cases applications for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus were made
In both sets of cases it was contended on behalf of the accused that the new Ordinance did not and in any event could not give validity on the sentences which had been passed by the special courts and it was claimed that the sentences should be treated as void or set aside
Section 4 of the new Ordinance provided that Where the trial of any case pending before a court constituted under the said Ordinance has not concluded before the date of the commencement of this Ordinance the proceedings of such court in the case shall be void and the case shall be deemed to be transferred to the ordinary criminal courts for enquiry or trial in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure
Section 3 of the Ordinance provided as follows 1 61 lm15 aAny sentence passed by a Special Judge a Special Magistrate or a Summary Court in exercise of jurisdiction conferred or purporting to have been conferred by or under the said Ordinance shall have effect and subject to the succeeding provisions of this section shall continue to have effect as if the trial at which it was passed had been held in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by a Sessions Judge an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magistrate of the first class respectively exercising competent jurisdiction under the said Code
2Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law any such sentence as is referred to in sub section 1 shall whether or not the proceedings in which the sentence was passed were submitted for review under section 8 and whether or not the sentence was the subject of an appeal under Section 13 or Section 19 of the said Ordinance be subject to such rights of appeal as would have accrued and to such powers of revision as would have been exercisable under the said Code if the sentence had at a trial so held been passed on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance
3Where any such sentence as aforesaid has been altered in the course of review or on appeal under the said Ordinance the sentence as so altered shall for the purpose of this section be deemed to have been passed by the Court which passed the original sentence
 Learned counsel for the accused conceded that the principle of validation by subsequent legislation was quite applicable to judicial as to ministerial proceedings but relying on Cooley s Constitutional Limitations 8th ed p 205 and also pp
773 776 they contended athat while such legislation might seek to aid and support judicial proceedings the legislature could not under the guise of legislation be permitted to exercise judicial power and b that it was not competent to the legislature by retrospectivelegislation to make valid any proceedings which had been held inthe courts but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties
Spens C J observed see at p 100 As a general proposition it may be true enough to say that the legislative function belongs to the legisla 62 ture and the judicial function to the judiciary
 Such differentiation of functions and distribution of powers are in a sense part of the Indian law as of the American law
But an examination of the American authorities will show that the development of the results of this distribution in America has been influenced not merely by the simple fact of distribution of functions but by the assumption that the Constitution was intended to reproduce the provision that had already existed in many of the State Constitutions positively forbidding the legislature from exercising judicial powers 
One result of the application of this rule in the United States has been to hold that legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past controversies and to reverse decisions which the courts in the exercise of their undoubted authority have made
 The reason given is that this would not only be the exercise of judicial power but it would be its exercise in the most objectionable and offensive form since the legislature would in effect sit as a court of review to which parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the ruling of the courts 
In India however  the legislature has more than once enacted laws providing that suits which had been dismissed on a particular view of the law must be restored and retried
 The learned Chief Justice referred to the Australian case Federal Commissioner of Taxation vs Munro1 where a Board of Appeal constituted under an Act of 1922 had given certain decisions in appeals in income tax matters
The law courts declared that the Australian Parliament had no power to invest this Board of Appeal with judicial power
A later Act established what was described as a Board of Review and assigned to it functions which were held to be different in character from those assigned to the former Board of Appeal
This Act however went on to provide that decisions which had already been pronounced by the Board of Appeal should be deemed to be and at all times to have been decisions of a Board of Review given in pursuance of the provisions of the later Act
 This later Act was challenged as vesting judicial power in the Board of Review but this contention was overruled
Reference may be made to the judgment of Starke J quoted by Spens CJ that Parliament simply takes up certain determinations which exist in fact though made without authority and prescribes not that they shall be acts done by a Board 1 63 of Review but that they shall be treated as they would be treated if they were such acts
The sections no doubt apply retrospectively but they do not constitute an exercise of the judicial power on the part of the Parliament
 The learned Chief Justice observed that this aptly described what had happened in the case before the Federal Court and answered the argument that it was an impossible feat to convert what was not a trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure into a trial under the Code According to the learned Chief Justice the real question was whether the Ordinance was covered by any of the entries in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act It was not contended said the Chief Justice that the mere absence of a specific provision about validating laws was by itself of much significance
 As observed by this Court in Atiqa Begum s case1 the power of validation must be taken to be ancillary or subsidiary to the power to deal with the particular subjects specified in the Lists
 There is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose s case  2  which detracts from the propositions of law laid down in Atiqa Begum s case1 or Piare Dusadh s case3
In Basant Chandra Ghose s case2 Cl
2 of section 10 provided  If at the commencement of this Ordinance there is pending in any Court any proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by virtue of section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance is called in question that proceeding is hereby discharged
Spens CJ said with regard to this clause that here there has been no investigation or decision by any Tribunal which the legislating authority can be deemed to have given effect to
It is a direct disposal of cases by the legislature itself see at p 309
It was pointed out that the nature of the provision considered in Piare Dusadh s case3 was essentially different from cl
2 of section 10 of the impugned Ordinance
The question has engaged the attention of this Court in a number of cases and we may refer to the case of West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co Ltd vs State of Madras 4 by way of 1 2 3 4 1963 2 SCR747 64 illustration
In that case the Madras Legislature had passed an Act 43 of 1949 on January 24 1950 for the acquisition of undertakings supplying electricity in the Province of Madras
In pursuance of section 41 of the Act the State of Madras passed an order on May 17 1951 declaring that the appellant undertaking shall vest in the respondent from September 21 1951
The Chief Electrical Inspector took over possession of the appellant and all its records etc
The State paid to the appellant Rs 834000 and odd as compensation
According to the appellant about Rs 100000 still remained to be paid
Some of the electrical undertakings in Madras which had  been taken over filed writ petitions in the High Court which upheld the validity of the impugned Act in so far as it related to the licencees other than municipalities
In Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd vs The State of Madras1 this Court had held that the impugned Act of 1949 was ultra vires on the ground that it went beyond the legislative competence of the Madras Legislature inasmuch as there was no entry in any of the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act 1935 relating to compulsory acquisition of any commercial or industrial undertaking
After the decision in this case the Madras Legislature passed Act XXIX of 1954 which received the assent of the President on 9th October 1954
This Act incorporated the main provisions of the earlier Act and purported to validate action taken under the earlier Act
The appellant then filed a writ petition alleging that to the extent to which the Act purported to validate acts done under the earlier Act of 1949 it was ultra vires
It was further urged that the three bases of compensation as laid down by the Act were inconsistent with the requirement of article 31 of the Constitution
Section 24 of the Act ran as follows Orders made decisions or directions given notifications issued proceedings taken and acts or things done in relation to any undertaking taken over if they would have been validly made given issued taken or done had the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings Acquisition Act 1949 Madras Act XLIII of 1949 and the rules made thereunder been in force on the date on which the said orders decisions or directions notifications proceedings acts or things were made given issued taken or done are hereby declared to have been validly made given issued taken or done as the case may be except to the extent to which the said orders decisions directions notifications proceedings acts or things are repugnant to the provisions of this Act 1  65 It was held by this Court that this was a saving and validating provision and it clearly intends to validate actions taken under the relevant provisions of the earlier Act which was invalid from the start
The fact that section 24 does not use the usual phraseology that the notifications issued under the earlier Act shall be deemed to have been issued under the Act does not alter the position that the second part of the section has and is intended to have the same effect
 The contention that the impugned notification contravened article 311 because of want of existence of an antecedent law depriving the citizen of his property was turned down with the observation In our opinion this argument is not well founded
If the Act is retrospective in operation and section 24 has been enacted for the purpose of retrospectively validating actions taken under the provisions of the earlier Act it must follow by the very retrospective operation of the relevant provisions that at the time when the impugned notification was issued these provisions were in existence
That is the plain and obvious effect of the retrospective operation of the statute
 Reference was made to the cast of the United Provinces vs Mst
Atiqa Begum1 Piare Dusadh vs The King Emperor2 and also to the decision in Union of India vs Madan Gopal Kabra3 and it was finally said at p 766  there is no doubt about the competence of the Legislature to enact a law and make it retrospective in operation in regard to topics included within the relevant Schedules of the Constitution
 Reference may also be made to the case of Rai Ramkrishna vs
The State of Bihar4
All these decisions lay down that the power to legislate for validating actions taken under statute which were not sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose is only ancillary or subsidiary to legislate on any subject within the competence of the legislature and such Validating Acts cannot be struck down merely because courts of law have declared actions taken earlier to be invalid for want of jurisdiction
Nor is there any reason to hold that in order to validate action without legislative support the Validat ing Act must enact provisions to cure the defect for the future 1 2 3  at 544
4  66 and also provide that all actions taken or notifications issued must be deemed to have been taken or issued under the new provisions so as to give them full retrospective effect
No doubt legislatures often resort to such practice but it is not absolutely necessary that they should do so so as to give full scope and effect to the Validating Acts
By way of illustration reference may be made to the following Acts
1 The Professions Tax Limitation Amendment and Validation Act 1949 where section 3i provided that Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force i no tax on circumstances and property imposed before the commencement of this Act under clause ix of sub section 1 of section 128 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act 1916 or clause b of section 108 of the United Provinces District Boards Act 1922 shall be deemed to be or ever to have been invalid merely on the ground that the tax imposed exceeded the limit of Rs 50 per annum prescribed by the said Act and the validity of the imposition of any such tax shall not be called in question in any Court 2The Act 19 of 1960 was passed to obviate the short comings in the Hindu Marriage Act pointed out by the Punjab High Court in Janak Dulari vs Narain Das AIR 1959 Punjab 50
There the High Court held that the court of an additional Judge cannot be regarded as a principal court of civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act and that a District Judge to whom a petition under the Act is presented cannot transfer it to an additional Judge for trial
The object of the Validation Act was to validate all proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed by any of the Courts specified in cl
2 exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act
Section 21 ran as follows  All proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed before the commencement of this Act by any of the Courts referred to in sub section 2 exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction under the shall notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any court be deemed to be as good and valid in law as if the court exercising or purporting to exercise such jurisdiction had been a district court within the meaning of the said Act
 The courts referred to in sub section 1 are  the court of an additional Judge additional district Judge etc
67 In our opinion the contentions raised about the invalidity of the Amending Act on the ground that section 3 thereof was not made expressly retrospective or that it encroached upon the domain of the judiciary by seeking to nullify judicial decisions cannot be sustained
The American doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powers has no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute which seeks to validate invalid actions is bad if the invalidity has already been pronounced upon by a court of law
In view of the decisions of the Judicial Committee the Federal Court and this Court referred to above it must be held that the absence of a provision in the Amending Act to give retrospective operation to section 3 of the Act does not affect the validity of section 4 as contended for
It was open to Parliament to adopt either course eg a to provide expressly for the retrospective operation of section 3 or b to lay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid because inter alia of the making of more than one report under section 5 A or more than one declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act not withstanding any judgment decree or order to the contrary
Parliament was competent to validate such actions and transactions its power in
that behalf being only circumscribed by the appropriate entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights setforth in Part III of the Constitution
As shown above there have been instances where the latter course had been adopted by the Indian Parliament in the past
Section 4 of the Amending Act being within the legislative competence of Parliament the provisions thereof are binding on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments orders or decrees to the contrary rendered or made in the past
We find ourselves unable to accept the contention about the violation of article 312 of the Amending Act
It is not suggested that the Validating Act in express words enacts
any law which directly affects compensation payable in respect of the property acquired or lays down any principles different from those which were already in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894
After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the question of adequacy of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the law provides that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his property or lays down the principles for the determination thereof
There is not a word about compensation in section 4 of the Validating Act
Indirectly however it would affect a person s right to compensation inasmuch as but for the Validating Act the notification under section 4 issued on 13th November 1959 could 68 not be resorted to for the purpose of making more than one declaration under section 6 of the Act
Schemes of the magnitude of the plan for the development of Delhi or for the establishment of an iron and steel plant did not have to be considered in pre Constitution days
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 contained sufficient measures to allow acquisition of small parcels of property for the different schemes of the extent and magnitude which had to be considered in the past
Even then the law with regard to compensation did not remain static from the days of the Act of 1870 to 1923
In the Act of 1894 the date of declaration under Is 6 was made to take the place of the date in section 24 of the Act of 1870
Under the Act of 1870 the market value of the land at the time of awarding compensation was the criterion
The date for the assessment of compensation was further shifted to the date of the notification under section 4 only in 1923
The Legilature might well have provided in the Act of 1894 that it would be open to the appropriate government after issuing a notification under section 4 to consider objections raised under section 5 with regard to different localities from time to time enabling different reports to be made under section 5 A with consequent adjustments in section 6 providing for declarations to be made as and when each report under section 5 A was considered
By the validation of actions taken under section 6 more than once in respect of a single notification under section 4 the original scheme of acquisition is not altered
The public purpose behind the notification under section 4 remains the same
It is not as if a different public purpose and acquisition of land for such purpose were being interpolated by means of the Validating Act
The principle of compensation remains the same under the Validating Act as it did under the principal Act of 1894
Only the shortcomings in the Act as to want of provision to enable more than one declaration under section 6 are being removed
In our opinion the Validating Act does not fall within the mischief pointed out by this Court in various decisions starting from the State of West Bengal vs Mrs Bela Baner jee1  Entry 42 in List III of the Seventh Schedule before its amendment read Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined and the forms and the manner in which such compensation is to be given
 In Mrs Bela Banerjee s case1 section 8 of the impugned West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 provided that the com 1  69 pensation to be awarded for acquisition of land was not to exceed the market value thereof on December 31 1946
This provision was held to be arbitrary by this Court inasmuch as it fixed the ceiling on compensation by reference to the market value of the land on the above mentioned date no matter when and how long afterwards the acquisition took place
Similarly in dismissing the appeal of the State in State of Madras vs D Namasivaya Mudaliar 1 where the Madras Act XI of 1953 provided that compensation was payable on the basis of the valuation of the land on April 28 1947 together with some improvements made thereon up to the date of notification under section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act because of the discovery of the presence of lignite in certain taluks in 1947 and the announcement by Government by a press note that it proposed to undertake legislation to compel persons purchasing such lands after a date to be prescribed in 1947 it was held that a law which authorises acquisition of land not for its true value but for value frozen on some date anterior to the acquisition on the assumption that all appreciation in its value since that date is attributable to purposes for which the State may use the land at some time in future must be regarded as infringing the fundamental right and there was no true relation between the acquisition of the land and the fixation of compensation based on their value on the market rate prevailing on April 28 1947
 Referring to the provision in the Land Acquisition Act for assessment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land not on the date on which the interest of the owner was extinguished under section 16 but to the date of the notification under section 41 it was observed that any princi ple for determination of compensation denying to the owner all increments in value between a fixed date and the date of issue of the notifications under section 41 must prima facie be regarded as denying to him the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated
In our opinion the Amending Act cannot be said to lay down any principle which suffers from the vice of the Act struck down in the above decisions
The date of valuation is that of the issue of notification under section 41 a principle which has held the field since 1923
It is true that the underlying principle of the Act of 1894 was that all increments due to the setting on foot of the acquisition proceedings were to be ignored whereas due to the ever spiralling of all prices all over India land values are mounting up all the time in all the States specially round about big cities an occurrence quite unconnected with the issue of a notification under section 41 but it cannot be said that because owners of land are to be deprived of all the increments due to the latter phenomenon it must be held that there is a Violation of article 312
Legislative competence to acquire land under the provisions of 1  70 the Land Acquisition Act cannot be challenged because of constant appreciation of land values all over the country due to the prevalent abnormal inflation
There must be some time lag between the start and conclusion of land acquisition proceedings and in principle there is nothing wrong in accepting the said start as the date for valuation
Sections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by article 315 a of the Constitution
Only sections 5 A and 6 of the Act have been amended
The amendments do not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act nor contravene article 31 of the Constitution in any way
The Amending Act does not really derogate from the principle that the valuation on the date of issue of notification affords the criterion for determining compensation of all lands to be acquired
It only keeps alive the said notification for sustaining more than one declaration under section 6 to meet the exigencies of the situation where it was not possible to make one comprehensive declaration under section 6 and where the State has been obliged to validate actions which could not be supported under the principal Act
It cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary date for the valuation of the property which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings
At the same time when the notification under section 4 was issued on 13th November 1959 the State had considered that a very large area round about Delhi would have to be acquired so that the development of the city could proceed in an orderly manner step by step not only Lo meet the immediate needs of the then
population of the city but with an eye to the ever increasing demands of the exploding population in all cities in India and specially in its capital
It was before November 1959 that the State had to consider the acquisition of a large tract of land for the purposes of development of Delhi but it was not possible to take up simultaneously all schemes for the future development of the city
It was also not practically possible to take up all schemes in all directions at the same time
The resources of the State were not adequate to take up the schemes for improvement of the city by the acquisition of an area like Ac
3400000 at the same time keeping in mind not only the need of land for housing purposes but also for other purposes like education industry and manufacture not to speak of amenities for recreation entertainment etc
Of necessity the area under the proposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and the development of one or more blocks at a time could only be taken up in consonance with the resources available
Even contiguous blocks could be developed gradually and systematically
If a particular area say block A  was meant to provide lands for building houses for residential purposes only a block contiguous thereto say block B  might be set apart for industrial purposes
There may be nothing common between 71 Block A and Block B to require their simultaneous development although both the Blocks would form part of a composite whole to serve the needs of a growing city
Can it be said that acquisition of lands for Block A and Block B must be made simultaneously and is the law to be struck down because it enables a declaration under section 6 with respect to Block B to be made some time after a similar declaration in respect of Block A  In such a case it would be incongruous to award compensation for lands acquired in Block B on a basis different from that in respect of lands in Block A covered by an earlier declaration under section 6
The scope of article 312 as amended was considered by this Court in P V Mudaliar vs Deputy Collector1
It was there pointed out that after the amendment what is excluded from the courts  jurisdiction is that the said law cannot be questioned on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate and if a law lays down principles which are not relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the property at or about the time it is acquired it may be said that they are not principles contemplated by article 312 of the Constitution
 In that case it was also observed by this Court that in the context of continuous rise in land prices from year to year depending upon abnormal circumstances it cannot be said that fixation of average price of over five years is not a principle for ascertaining the price of the land in or about the date of acquisition
 The decision is also an authority for the proposition that the omission of one of the elements that should properly be taken into account in fixing the compensation might result in the inadequacy of compensation but such omission in itself did not constitute fraud on power
it is also to be noted that in this case this Court upheld the Land Acquisition Madras Amendment Act 1961 although the said Act substituted a new clause for the first clause in section 23  1  of the Land Acquisition Act
The substituted clause provided for pay ment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 41 or an amount equal to the average market value of the land during the five years immediately preceding such date whichever was less
It is significant that the Act which was a postFourth Constitution Amendment Act was upheld although by its own terms and independently of the Land Acquisition Act it provided for payment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 41
It may therefore be inferred that in upholding the Land Acquisition Madras Amendment Act 1961 this Court was of the view that the principle of fixing compensation on the basis of the price prevailing on the date of the notification under section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act was a relevant principle
In 1  72 the result the court turned down the contention about the violation
of article 312 because of the modification of some of the principles for assessing compensation laid down in section 23 of the Act
In the present case there has been no variation of the law formulated in section 23 of the Act
As such in our opinion there has been no violation of article 312 merely because the actions already taken have been sought to be validated
Nor are we satisfied that there has been any colourable or fraudulent exercise of legislative power
With regard to the question as to discrimination violative of article 14 it goes without saying that whenever an Amending Act is passed there is bound to be some difference in treatment between transactions which have already taken place and those which are to take place in the future
That by itself will not attract the operation of article 14
Again even with respect to transactions which may be completed in the future a reasonable classification will not be struck down as was held by this Court in Jalan Trading Co vs Mazdoor Union1
If the classification is not patently arbitrary the Court will not rule it discriminatory merely because it involves hardship or inequality of burden
With a view to secure a particular object a scheme may be selected by the Legislature wisdom whereof may be open to debate it may even be demonstrated that the scheme is not the best in the circumstances and the choice of the Legislature may be shown to be erroneous but unless the enactment fails to satisfy the dual test of intelligible classification and rationality of the relation with the object of the law it will not be subject to judicial interference under article 14
Invalidity of legislation is not established by merely finding faults with the scheme adopted by the Legislature to achieve the purpose it has in view
 Before scrutinising the provisions of the Amending Act we must examine the objects of the Act
 They may be summed up as follows  a To amend the Act for the future by empowering the making of more than one declaration under section 6
b To validate completed acquisitions on the basis of more than one declaration under that section
c To authorise more than one declaration under the said section in cases where there is already in existence a notification under section 4
11967 1 SCR 15 at 36
73 dTo prescribe a time limit for future acquisitions as also pending proceedings not yet completed and e To provide additional compensation by way of interest in all cases where acquisition has not yet been completed and where a declaration under section 6 is issued more than three years after the notification under section 4
There is nothing arbitrary or irrational about the said objects
It is well known that in some cases there has been unusual delay in the issue of declaration under section 6 after a notification under section 4
The Amending Act puts an end to this harsh treatment by providing that in respect of notifications under section 4 made before the date of the Ordinance ie 20th January 1967 a declaration under s  6 must be made within two years after that date
If such a declaration is not made then it will not be open to Government to make use of the old section 4 notification and the State would be obliged to issue a fresh notification under section 4
The Act also limits the time within which a declaration under section 6 may be made when a notification under section 4 is issued after 20th January 1967
This period is limited to three years there having been no time limit in the past
We are not impressed by the argument that a person whose land may be covered by a notification under section 4 issued more than one year before 20th January 1967 would seemingly be treated differently from a person whose land comes under the notification under section 4 after that date
The Legislature has sought to improve upon the existing provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and there is no discriminatory treatment which should be struck down as violative of article 14
The Legislature in its wisdom thought that some time limit should be fixed in respect of section 4 notifications issued before 20th January 1967 and that a time limit should also be fixed for acquisition where such a notification is issued after that date
No fault can be found with the Legislature because it has provided for a period of two years in one case and three years in the other
As was pointed out in Jalan Trading Co vs Mazdoors Union1
Equal protection of the laws is denied if in achieving a certain object persons objects or transactions similarly circumstanced are differently treated by law no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law
 It is not possible to say that because the legislature thought of improving upon the Act of 1894 by prescribing certain limits of time as from 20th January 1967 the difference in treatment in cases covered by notification before the said date and after the said date denies equal protection of laws because the transactions are not similarly circumstanced
Some of the notifications 1  LA Sup
CI68 6 74 issued under section 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before 20th January 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as notifications issued afterthat date
article 14 does not strike at a differentiation caused by the enactment of a law between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so governed
As was pointed out by this Court in Hatisingh Manufacturing Co Ltd vs Union of India1
When Parliament enacts a law imposing a liability as flowing from certain transactions prospectively it evidently makes a distinction between those transactions which are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act because they were completed before the date on which the Act was enacted
 With respect the dictum can also be applied as between cases where the transaction was in the course of completion and those which had to be started after a particular date
On the whole the Amending Act seeks to improve the legislation which covered the field of acquisition of land
The Legislature might have made more liberal provisions for improvement but it is not for this court to strike down a piece of legislation because the improvement falls short of the expectation of the litigants
With regard to the provision for payment of interest in addition to compensation or by way of additional compensation no grievance can be made in that interest is not allowed in respect of transactions which have been already completed and compensation taken
The Legislature felt that because there has been unreasonable delay in the payment of compensation interest should be allowable where the period of three years has already expired or may expire between the date of section 4 notification and the date of declaration under section 6
No grievance can be made because interest is denied to persons who have already taken the compensation
Even here the classification is not unreasonable and cannot be said to be unrelated to the object of the Act
As regards violation of Art14 in the case of Sohan Lal who filed Writ Petition No 85 of 1967 the learned solicitor drew our attention to a few facts which are not clearly brought out in the affidavit in opposition and will be referred to presently
Here the attack is on an executive act namely the differential treatment meted out to 16 colonies whose lands were covered by the notification dated 13th November 1959 but in respect of which de notification orders were issued subsequently
It would appear that some of the letters which were received by Sohan Lal did not bring out the full facts and the policy underlying the ap parent discrimination in this case
It is pointed out in paragraph 36 of the affidavit in opposition 1  at 543
75 After the issue of the notification No
F1511159LSG dated 13 11 1959 it was decided by the Government that the colonies in respect of which the layout and service plans had been sanction before the date of notification viz 13 11 1959 may be released from the purview of acquisition  The petitioner s colony known as Kanwal Park could not be released from the purview of acquisition because in its case only the layout plans had been sanctioned and not the service plans
 This policy is corroborated by the records of the Land and Housing Department Delhi Administration which were made available to us at the hearing
It appears from that record that after the notification of 13th November 1959 private owners of land who wanted to lay out colonies and had taken steps in respect thereof by making some arrangement and spent money threon had approached the Administration for release of their lands from the notification and a proposal for de notification of the colonies was considered at a high level
It appears that a meeting was held on 29th June 1960 at which were present a number of persons including the Chief Secretary Vice Chairman Delhi Development Authority Engineer Member Architect Town Planning Organisation Deputy Commissioner Delhi Municipal Corporation Architects of Delhi Municipal Corporation Secretary Local Self Government and Under Secretary to the State Government
The records show that the case of each notified colony was considered separately and it was felt that cases in which the layout and service plans had been finally approved in all respects before 13th November 1959 should be recommended for de notification
On 1st of July 1960 the Commission Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter and recommended that All those colonies in respect of which both lay out plans and service plans h ad been approved by the Delhi Development Provisional Authority the Delhi Development Authority or the Delhi Municipal Corporation may be de notified irrespective of whether security was demanded or not and whether the time limit for completion of development was imposed or not and irrespective of whether security has been paid or not and  whether development has been completed or not According to this recommendation 16 colonies named therein  fell in this category
Sohan Lal s colony was not one of those sixteen
It is unfortunate that the petitioner who submitted the lay out plan of the colony as early as June 18 1956 had not the service plan approved before 13th November 1959
It is clear from 76 the annexures to the petition that the details of the lay out of the colony were submitted on 30th August 1956
The petitioner submitted service plans on 15th September 1959
There was nothing wrong with the plans intrinsically except that there were more than one small pocket of land within the colony to which the petitioner could not prove his ownership statisfactorily
Mr Agarwala appearing for the petitioner submitted that the only difficulty was that in respect of the small pockets they were owned not by the petitioner alone but in co ownership with others and the petitioner subsequently excluded these pockets from the pur view of his lay out plan but this was done only on March 19 1961 The petitioner s subsequent efforts to have his colony denotified were of no avail even though he had excluded these pockets on 20th January 1960
On these facts we cannot hold that the petitioner was subjected to any discrimination
There was a policy behind the de notification and it has not been suggested that the policy was vitiated by any malafides on the part of the authorities
All the points urged by the petitioners therefore fail and the petitions will stand dismissed
There Will be no order as to costs
Shelat J
The facts in these five writ petitions have been sufficiently set out by our learned brother Mitter Jin his judgment and therefore need not be repeated here
Though they differ in some particulars the contentions raised by Counsel for the petitioners are common except the additional contentions raised by Mr Mani in Writ Petition 223 of 1966 and by Mr Agarwala in Writ Petition 85 of 1967
These writ petition arise as a result of and challenge inter alia the validity of the following notifications
No November 13 1959 the Chief Commissioner Delhi issued a notification under sec
4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 hereafter referred to as the Principal Act notifying that land measuring 34070 acres marked in blocks A to T and X in the map enclosed there with was required by the Delhi Administration for the planned development of Delhi
In pursuance of that notification the Delhi Administration issued sec
6 notification dated June 14 1961 in respect of the land situate in village Kilkori measuring 97 bighas 14 biswas only from out of the said notified area
The notification directed the Collector to take order for its acquisition under section 7 of the Act
The Collector thereafter made his award on August 31 1961 in respect of the said 97 bighas of land at Rs 2500 a bigha the total amount including the solatium awarded being Rs 28088750
Nothing thereafter was done till March 18 1966 when another notification under sec
6 was issued in 77 respect of 17522 bighas of land situated in Mandawali Fazilpur Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas
On February 9 1966 this Court delivered its judgment in M P State vs V P Sharma 1 where facts were similar to the facts in the present cases and where the land was required for the erection of a steel plant in public sector
In that case the notification under sec 4 covering land in eleven villages was issued in May 1949
This was followed by several notifications under sec
6 the last of them being in
After examining the provisions of secs
4 5A and 6 of the Act this Court declared as follows  At the stage of sec
4 the land is not particularised but only the locality is mentioned at the stage of section 6 the land in the locality is
particularised and thereafter the notification under section 41 having served its purpose exhausts itself
The sequence of events from a notification of the intention to acquire under section 4 to the declaration under sec
6 leads to the conclusion that once a declaration under section 6 particularising the area is issued the remaining non particularised area in the notification under section 41 stands automatically released
The intention of the legislature was that one notification under section 41 should be followed by survey under
section 42 objections under section 5A heard and thereafter one declaration under sec
6 issued
If the Government requires more land in that locality there is nothing to prevent it from issuing another notification under section 41 making a further survey if necessary hearing objections and then making another declaration under section 6 whereas there is likely to be prejudice to the owner of the land if there is great delay between the notifications under section 41 and section 6
 One of the contentions urged in that case was that where the land is required for a small project and the area is not large the government may be able to make up its mind once for all what land it needs but where land is required for a large project requiring a large area of land government may not be able to make up its mind at once
This contention was rejected on the ground that even if it be so there is nothing to prevent the government from issuing another notification under sec
4 followed by a notification under sec
6 that the government s power to acquire land in a particular locality is not exhausted by issuing one notification under sec
41 followed by a notification under s6 and that it can proceed to do so by a fresh notification under Section 41 and a fresh declaration under sec
6 and that such a procedure would be fair to all concerned
1  78 Sarkar J who delivered a separate judgment also repelled the contention by observing that he could not imagine a government which has vast resources not being able to make a complete plan of its project at a time
Indeed I think when a plan is made it is a complete plan
I should suppose that before the government starts acquisition proceedings by the issue of a notification under sec
4 it has made its plan for otherwise it cannot state in the notification as it has to do that the land is likely to be needed
Even if it had not then completed its plan it would have enough time before the making of a declaration under section 6 to do so
I think therefore that the difficulty of the government even if there is one does not lead to the conclusion that the Act contemplates the making of a number of dec larations under sec
 In the view taken Sharma s case1 sec 6 notification dated March 18 1966 was invalid as sec
4 notification dated Nov ember 13 1959 on which it was founded ceased to be efficacious and became exhausted after sec
6 notification dated June 14 1961 wag issued and the rest of the land not covered by it became as a result released from acquisition
Depending on the declaration of law made in this decision the petitioners filed these writ petition in April 1966 and thereafter
Realising that if the view taken in Sharma s case1 were to stand the government would have to issue a fresh sec
4 notification and would have to pay compensation on the basis of the market value of the land on the date of such new notification instead of on November 13 1959 the government promulgated an Ordinance dated January 20 1967 called the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1 of 1967
It is not necessary to set out the provisions of the Ordinance as it has been substituted by Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Act 13 of 1967 hereafter referred to as the Amendment Act passed on April 12 1967
There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act were enacted with the object of setting at naught the decision in Sharma s case1
Section 2 of the Amendment Act substituted the following words in sec
5A 2 viz Submit the case for the decision of an appropriate government together with the record of the proceedings held by him and a report containing his recommendations on the objections by the following words viz 1 79 either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under sec
4 sub sec
1 or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land
 Section 3 added the following words in sec
61 after the words certify its orders  viz and different declaration may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under sec
4 sub sec
1 irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made wherever required under sec
5A sub section 2
 Section 3 also substituted the existing proviso to sec
61 by the following   provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under sec
41 published after the commencement of the said ordinance after 20 1 1967 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication
 Sec 41 of the Amendment Act is a validating provision
By clause a it provides that no acquisition purporting to have been made before the commencement of the said Ordinance ie before 20 1 67 and no action taken or thing done including any notification published in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have become invalid on the ground that ione or more collectors have performed the functions of collector in respect of the entire land covered by section 4 notification
ii one or more reports have been made under s5A2 whether in respect of the entire land or different parcels thereof covered by the same notification and iii that more than one declaration are made under sec 
6 in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under sec
Clause b of sec
41 provides that any acquisition in pursuance of a sec
4 notification published before 20 1 67 may be made after that date and no such acquisition and no action taken or thing done including any order agreement or notification made or published whether before or after 20 1 67 in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be invalid merely on the said grounds mentioned in clause a
Sub sec
2 of sec
4 provides that no declaration under sec
6 shall be made in respect of land covered by sec
4 notification published before 20 1 67 after the expiry of two years from that 80 date that is 20 1 69
43 provides for payment of interest in the circumstances set out therein
The result of the Amendment Act clearly is that an area of land notified under sec
41 can be acquired piecemeal at any time the only restriction being that under sec
3 in the case of land covered by a sec
4 notification published after 20 1 67 sec
6 notification can be issued within 3 years from the date of such notification and in respect of land notified under sec
41 before 20 1 67 within two years after 20 1 67
The direct consequence of the Amendment Act is that the unitary character of acquisition by a single inquiry a single report  a single declaration and a single award under the Principal Act is done away with
The government can freeze an area by issuing a sec
4 notification and can subject to the limitations in sec
3 and sec
4 2 of the Amendment Act go on acquiring parcels of such area at its convenience irrespective of the time when it makes up its mind to acquire and pay compensation on the basis of the Value at the date of sec
4 notification
In the case of land notified under sec
41 after 20 1 67 the owner is deprived of appreciation in the value of his land during three years by reason of limitation prescribed in sec
3 but in the case of land notified before 20 1 67 such deprivation  can be for an uncertain period from the date of sec
4 notification up to two years from 20 1 67 ie up to 20 1 69 depending upon when its acquisition is made
As has happened in the instant cases the entire area of 34070 acres was frozen for the purpose of computation of compensation as from Nov 13 1959 portons of that area were acquired as late as 1966 and the remaining area can still be acquired until 20 1 769 each owner being thus deprived of the appreciation in value of his land depending upon when during all this long period the government decides to acquire it
Thus if the land is notified in 1959 and is acquired in 1960 the loss of appreciation in value is only of one year
But the owner of another plot even if it is contiguous to it if the government decides to acquire it in 1969 would be deprived of the appreciation in value which has taken place right from 1959 to 1969
The entire area is in the meantime frozen both for the purpose of compensation and as pointed out in Sharma section Case1 from its full beneficial enjoyment the owner not knowing until government chooses to make sec
6 declaration Whether it will ultimately be acquired or not
Under the Principal Act as construed in Sharma s Case1 once a sec
6 notification is issued sec
 4 notification would become exhausted and the land not declared as needed thereunder would be relieved from acquisition
If government then desires to acquire any land in addition to
the one so declared it would have to be notified a fresh and the government would be obliged to pay compen 11966 3 SCR 557 81 sation at the market rate prevailing on such date
The practical effect of the Amendment Act is that by keeping alive sec
4 notification and by declaring the declarations made after the first declaration valid the legislature dated back the basis of compensation which would have been put for this validation the rate prevailing at the date of sec
4 notification howsoever belatedcessary
The real purpose of enacting sec4 is thus to enable government to freeze an unlimited area by first notifying it under sec
4 and then to acquire bit by bit and pay compensation at the rate prevailing at the date of sec
4 notification howsoever belatedly it may choose to acquire such bits provided it does so before 20 1 69 where the land is notified before 20 1 67 and before the expiry of three years where section 4 notification is issued after 20 1 67 and thus avoid compensating the appreciation in value in the meantime to which the owner would have been entitled to
Though in form the Amendment Act purports to validate acquisitions in cluding orders and declarations made therefor the real purpose of enacting the Amendment Act is to avoid having otherwise to compensate for the appreciation in the land value during the intervening period
It is a well settled principle that in determining the constitutionality of a provision impugned on the ground of its being
an invasion on a fundamental right the court must weigh not its form which may apparently look innocuous but its real effect and impact on such fundamental right
Re Kerala Education Bill1 Gajapati Deo vs State of Orissa 2 It will be seen that
2 and 3 which enable piecemeal and multiple inquiries and reports of a Collector or Collectors under s 5A diverse declarations and awards in respect of different Parcels of land covered by sec
4 notification are prospective
It is only sec
4 which is made retrospective
But it merely seeks to nullify the decision in Sharma s Case3 and purports to keep alive sec
4 notifications which would have otherwise lost their efficacy and validates acquisitions including orders and see
6 declarations purported to have been made on the basis of such sec
4 notifications
Section 4 however does not contain any provision retrospectively amending sec
4 or sec
5A or sec
6 and merely seeks to revitalise sec
4 notifications already exhausted
The section does not also provide that an acquisition or an order or declaration under sec
6 made on the basis of such exhausted notification will be deemed to have been made or issued under secs
2 and 3 of the Amendment Act and as if the Amendment Act was in force at that date as is usually done in such validating Acts
A notification under sec
4 having exhausted itself after a declaration under sec
6 in respect of a part of the land covered by it and the rest of the land being relieved from acquisition 1 1959 SCR 995
2 3  82 there would be prima facie no basis for a sec
6 declaration or acquisition unless such notification is retrospectively validated by a supporting amendment of sec
4 of the Principal Act or by making secs
2 and 3 of the Amendment Act retrospective
and by a fiction deeming it to have been made under such amending provision
Counsel for the petitioners raised the following conten tions 1 that Act 13 of 1967 does not revive sec
4 notification dated November 13 1959 which became exhausted after the first sec
6 declaration in 1961 was made and therefore no acquisition in respect of the rest of the land could be made without a fresh sec
4 notification
The contention was that secs
2 and 3 being prospective they did not resuscitate the sec
4 notification though subsequent acquisitions including orders and declarations under sec
6 are validated and that such validation has no efficacy as there would be no basis by way of a sec
4 notification for such acquisition or order or declaration
2 that Act 13 of 1967 is in derogation of the requirements of article 312 as it purports to authorise acquisition without a fresh sec
4 notification thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of an exhausted sec
4 notification and on the value of the land prevailing on the date of such exhausted notification
3 that the Amendment Act is in violation of article 14 in that a where a sec
4 notification is made before 20 1 1967 sec
6 declaration can be made within 2 years from the said date ie on or before 20 1 69
But where the land is notified after 20 1 67 sec
6 declaration would have to be made within 3 years from the date of such notification
In the former case a much longer period is provided for a sec
6 declaration than in the latter case b where a sec
4 notification is made after 20 1 67 compensation would be fixed on the basis of the value on that date but where a sec
4 notification is made before 20 1 67 compensation would be on the basis of the value on the date of the exhausted notification howsoever long a period has elapsed since such notification cif compensation has not been paid before 20 1 67 interest has to be paid on the compensation amount but if compensa tion has been paid before 20 1 67 no interest is payable though acquisition in both the cases springs from the same sec
4 notification 83 din the case of sec
4 notification issued after 20 1 67 if Sec
6 declaration is not made within three years a fresh sec
4notification is necessary and compensation would be on the basis of the value on the date of such fresh notification but where a section 4 notification is issued before 20 1 67 there is no defined period and sec
6 declaration can be made until 20 1 69
Therefore the owner gets compensation on the value at the date of section 4 notification howsoever long the intervening period may be
A person affected by see
4 notification issued after 20 1 67 is thus differently treated than the one who is affected by such a notification issued  before 20 1 67
In Writ Petition No 85 of 1967 an additional point was raised viz that though 16 colonies in village Kilkori were denotified under section 48 the land of the petitioner though situate within the same notified area was not denotified thuswrongly discriminating him
In Writ Petition No 223 of 1966Mr
Mani contended that the Amendment Act merely seeks to reverse the decision of this Court that the Act is not a legislative but a judicial act and that though the Constitution has not brought about separation of powers nonetheless it does not confer unlimited powers on the legislature to encroach upon the judicial power
In other words the legislature seeks to control the courts function by requiring of them a construction of law according to its views
The legislative action cannot be made to retroact upon past transactions and controversies and reverse decisions which the courts in exercise of their undoubted authority have madefor that would mean not only exercise of a judicial function but in effect to sit as a court of review to which the past transactions and controversies are referred to
The question as formulated by him is whether a statute which simply validates acts and orders pronounced upon by a court as invalid is sustainable without a retrospective law providing that such acts and orders are deemed to have been made under the validating Act and as if such validating Act was in existence at the date of such acts and orders
On the question whether the Amendment Act is in derogation of the requirements of article 312 the contention of the Solicitor General was that it is not the law contemplated by Art312 as it merely amends sections 5A and 6 of the Principal Act and does not touch either section 4 or section 23 which deal with compensationthat it amends only the procedural provisions and that sec
4 thereof merely validates acquisitions including orders and notifications purported to have been made or passed to get over the difficulty create by Sharma s Case1The impugned Act does not frankly deal with compensation
But as already stated it is not the form of a statute under 1 19661 3 SCR 557
84 challenge which matters but its substance and the direct impact it has on the constitutional requirements
Though sees
2 and 3 amend sections 5A and 6 of the Principal Act enabling multiple inquiries reports and declarations in respect of different parcels of land notified under section 4 the validating provisions of section 4 have a direct impact on the question of compensation payable under the Act
Where a sec
4 notification has been issued at any time before 20 1 67 as has happened in the instant cases a large area can be notified under sec
4 say in 1959 and yet sec
6 declarations can be made by reason of section 4 of the impugned Act at different times and as late as 1969
Yet the compensation would be on the value in 1959 irrespective of the fact that such value has appreciated in the meantime due to the general spiralling of prices and not as a consequence of its having been notified under sec
It is manifest that but for the validating provisions of section 4 of the Amendment Act government would have had either to proceed with the acquisition of the whole of the notified land or to proceed with part of it and thus exhaust the sec
4 notification and release the rest of the land from acquisition
If further land is subsequently needed a fresh notification under section 4 would have been necessary and compensation would have to be paid on the basis of the value on that date
The impugned Act enables government to acquire the land once it is notified under sec
4 in different parcels and if the notification is of a date prior to 20 1 67 pay the same compensation depriving the owner of the appreciation of value during the intervening period
Such appreciation would have had to be compensated for but for sec
4 of the impugned Act 
Each parcel of land in an area notified under sec
4 would thus be dealt with differently depending on at what point of time it is acquired
A piece of land would fetch compensation at X amount even though its market value has doubled by the time sec
6 declaration in respect of it is made
Another piece of the very same land would be awarded the same compensation even if the appreciation in its value is four fold only because government can now acquire it at a subsequent date
The deprivation of the appreciated value to different owners or to the same owner if both the parcels of land belong to the same would vary depending upon when government chooses to acquire each of such parcels
Therefore from the mere fact that the impugned Act does not amend sec
4 or sec 23 it is not possible to say that it is not an Act dealing with or affecting compensation
Besides by amending sees
5A and 6 and validating acquisitions orders and declarations the Amendment Act brings about changes of a fundamental character in the Act by converting the unitary character of an acquisition into a diversified one in that instead of one inquiry and one report by the same officer
one declaration under sec
6 and one award it permits several inquiries and several reports by different officers several declarations and even 85 several awards thus altering the very structure of the Principal Act
It is thus impossible to say that the impugned Act is not the law of acquisition contemplated by article 312
 It was however contended that even so 1 the impugned Act does not alter the principle in section 23 of the Act that compensation is to be fixed on the basis of market value at the date of section 4 notification and that such mode of compensation is based on a long standing principle that the owner is not entitled to any increase in value as a result of the land having been notified and 2 that the basis of compensation emerging from the Amendment Act has a bearing on the adequacy of compensation and hence the court is barred under the amended article 312 from making any scrutiny
The principle on which compensation is to be ascertained has undergone changes from time to time
In the Act of 1870 section 24 provided that it should be fixed on the basis of the value at the time of paying compensation
That was changed in the Act of 1894 under which the date of section 6 notification was madethe crucial date for ascertaining compensation
This was changed in 1923 when the market value on the date of section 4 notification was made the measure of compensation
This was done as section 5A was then introduced for the first time in the Act
It was felt that the insertion of section 5A would create a time
gap between the notification under section 4 and the actual acquisition
The date of section 4 notification was accepted as the crucial date on the principle that in calculating compensation it was fair to exclude appreciation due to the land having been notified for a scheme for which it was sought to be acquired
The principle on which appreciation in value after the issuance of section 4 notification was
excluded is no longer valid or in accord with the present day realities for it is a notorious fact that prices of properties have been continuously rising for reasons into which it is neither ne cessary nor relevant to go into
The principle excluding appreciation as a result of section 4 notification has been there for a long time
But the argument that section 23 is not altered by the Amendment Act does not lead us any further for the inquiry is what is the impact of the impugned Act on the question of compensation payable to the expropriated owner
If the impugned Act had not nullified the decision in Sharma s Case1 and had not ruled that section 4 notification would not become exhausted fresh notification under section 4 Would have become necessary and higher compensation would have become payable than now
The fact that neither section 4 nor section 23 is altered therefore does not make any difference
1  86 The impugned Act being a legislation after the 4th Consti tution amendment of 1955 the question as to the adequacy of compensation is no longer amenable to judicial scrutiny but the amendment of article 312 in 1955 has not affected the constitutional requirement that no property can be compulsorily acquired except under a law providing for compensation or which provides principles fixing such compensation
As to what the term compensation in article 31 means has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and the term has as a result acquired a well settled interpretation
In Bela Banerjee s Case1 Patanjali Sastri CJ in repelling the contention that compensation in Entry 42 of List III could not mean full cash equivalent laid stress on the distinction between the word compensation  in article 31 and the said Entry and the words the acquisition of property on just terms in section 51 XXXI of the Australian Constitution Act and held that compensation meant just equivalent and the principles which should govern the determination of compensation amount to be given to the expropriated owner must ensure that what is determined must be such compensation ie just equivalent
In striking down the proviso to section 8 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act XXI of 1948 he observed that the fixing of an anterior date which has no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired may be many years later cannot but be regarded as arbitrary
Similarly in Namasivaya Mudaliar s Case 2 this Court held following Bela Banerjee s Case1 that any principle for determination of compensation denying the owner all increments in  value between a fixed date and the date of section 4 notification must be regarded as denying to the owner the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated and that it is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on the market value on an anterior date does not constitute violation of the constitutional guarantee
This decision was in respect of a law before the 1955 amendment and the court expressed no opinion on the question whether it was possible by enacting legislation after the 1955 amendment to provide that compensation may be fixed on the basis of value prevailing on a certain anterior date
Jeejeebhai vs Assist
Collector3
It was thus well settled before the amendment of article 312 in 1955 that there could not be a valid acquisition unless the law authorising it provided
compensation ie just equivalent or principles fixing such compensation ie just equivalent of what the owner is deprived of The question as to the impact of the 1955 amendment of article 312 on this principle arose in 1  at p 563 64
3  2  87 P Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Deputy Collector1
This decision laid down the following propositions  i whether the principles laid down in an impugned Act take into account all the elements to make up the true value of the property and exclude matters which are to be included is a justiciable issue ii that the law fixing compensation or laying down princi ples governing its fixation cannot be questioned on the ground of inadequacy iiithat the connotation of compensation and the question of justiciability are distinct concepts and should be kept apart while considering the validity of the impugned provision iv that the fact that the amended Article uses the same words viz compensation and principles shows that Parliament used them in the sense in which they were construed by this Court and v that the legislature must provide for a just equivalent or lay down principles fixing such just equivalent and if that is done such a law cannot be questioned on the ground of inadequacy of compensation
As to how and in what manner the question of adequacy would arise was illustrated by giving various examples
Article 312 as amended means therefore that if the impugned Act either fixes just equivalent as compensation or lays down principles for fixing such just equivalent it cannot be impeached on the ground that such compensation is inadequate or that when working out those principles the resultant compensation is inadequate
But this does not mean that the amendment permitted the legislature to fix inadequate compensation or to lay down principles fixing compensation which is not just equivalent
Such a theory attributes an intention to the legislature to enact a law in terms of
contradiction for compensation which is not just equivalent is no compensation as interpreted by this Court and understood when article 312 was amended and giving any such meaning to that Article would be contrary to the well settled principle of construction that where the legislature uses in an Act a legal term which has received judicial interpretation it must be assumed that it is used in the sense in which it has been judicially interpreted unless a  contrary intention appears
At p 629 of the report it has clearly been laid down that If the legislature though ex facie purports to provide for compensation or indicates the principles for ascertaining the same but in effect and substance takes 1  88 away a property without paying compensation for it it will be exercising power which it does not possess
If the legislature makes a law for acquiring a property by providing for an illusory compensation or by indicating the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within a reasonable proximity Of the date of acquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide for compensation at all one can easily hold that the legislature made the law in fraud of its powers
 Following this decision this Court held in the Union of India vs Metal Corporation of India1 that the principles laid down in the impugned Act were not in accord with article 312 and that an acquisition law to justify itself has to provide for the payment of a just equivalent to the property acquired or lay down principles which are not arbitrary but which are relevant to the fixation of compensation
It is only when the principles stand this test that the adequacy of the resultant compensation falls outside the judicial scrutiny under the second limb of article 312
 It is true that in Vajravelu s Case2 it was held that in the context of the continuous rise in land prices fixation of an average price over 5 years amounted to ascertaining the price of the land in or about the date of acquisition and that omission of one of the elements which should properly be taken into account for fixing compensation though resulting in inadequacy of compensation would not constitute fraud on power
But there is no analogy between the provisions of the impugned Act in that case and  the instant cases
Though that Act varied the method of ascertainment of compensation provided by section 23 of the Principal Act it provided for taking the average of prices prevailing during the 5 years in or about the date of acquisition
By striking the average of prices during those 5 years the Act actually took into account the appreciation in value during the 5 years preceding the acquisition for fixing the compensation
The position in the instant cases is quite different
The impugned Act does not provide for any such average price as was done in Vajravelu s Case2 Though section 4 apparently validates  acquisitions orders and notifications made on the basis of section 4 notification issued before 20 1 67 in effect and substance it seeks to treat such a notification under section 4 which had lost its efficacy and had become exhausted where section 6 declaration has been made 1   2  89 for a part of the land covered by such section 4 notification as still outstanding
This is sought to be done without any legislative provision in the impugned Act revitalising the notification which had become dead and inefficacious
Such a thing could not be done by merely validating acquisitions orders and declarations without revitalising by some provision the notifications under section 4 which had become exhausted and on which such acquisitions including orders and declarations are founded
Nor could it validate inquiries and reports under section 5A and declarations under section 6 all of which are made on the basis of a notification which was no longer alive except by retrospectively amending section 4 and declaring such section 4 notification as having been made under such amended section 4
Not having so done the direct result of the validating provisions of section 4 of the impugned Act is to fix compensation on the basis of the market value existing on the date of section 4 notification which had exhausted itself
By validating the acquisitions orders and declarations made on the basis of such an exhausted notification the impugned Act saves government from having to issue a fresh section 4 notification and having to pay compensation calculated on the market value as on the date of such fresh notification and depriving the expropriated owner the benefit of the appreciated value in the meantime
The real object of section 4 of the impugned Act is thus to save the State from having to compensate for such appreciation under the device of validating all that is done under an exhausted section 4 notification and thus in reality fixing an anterior date ie the date of such a dead s4 notification for fixing the compensation
We apprehend that section 4 of the impugned Act suffers from a two told vice  i that it purports to validate acquisitions orders and notifications without resuscitating the notification under section 4 by any legislative provision on the basis of which alone the validated acquisitions orders and declarations can properly be sustained and 2 that its provisions are in derogation of article 312 as interpreted by this Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value on the date of notifications under section 4 which had become exhausted and for keeping them alive no legislative provision is to be found in the impugned Act
It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the purpose of section 4 is to fill in the lacuna pointed out in Sharma s Case1 nor with the view that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation
The section under the guise of validating the acquisitions orders and notifications camouflages the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of values frozen by notifications under section 4 which by part acquisitions thereunder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the Test of the land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such fresh notifications
1  L4Sup
CI68 7 90 In this view it is not necessary to go into the other questions raised by the petitioners and we refrain from expressing any opinion on them
We would declare section 4 as invalid and allow the petitions with costs
ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the petitions are dismissed
No order as to costs


Summary:
In the State of Madhya Pradesh vs V P Sharma  this Court held that once a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was made the notification under section 41 of the Act was exhausted and there could be no successive notifications under section 6 with respect to land in a locality specified in one notification under section 41
Relying on the above judgment the present writ petitions were filed in order to challenge successive notifications under section 6 following a single notification under section 41 in respect of land belonging to them
Meanwhile in order to meet the situation created by the judgment in V P Sharma s case the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1 of 1967
The Ordinance was later followed by the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Act 1967
Section 2 of this Act purported to amend section 5 A of the principal Act by allowing the making of more than one report in respect of land which had been notified under section 41
Section 3 purported to amend section 6 of the principal Act by empowering different declarations to be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification under section 41 irrespective of whether one report or different reports had been made under section 5 A sub section
Section 4 of the Act purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or purporting to have been made under the principal Act before the commencement of the ordinance namely January 10 1967 notwithstanding that more than one declaration under section 6 had been made in pursuance of the same notification under section 41 and notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any court to the contrary
The Amending Act also laid down time limits for declarations under section 6 of the principal Act after the notification under s 41 had been issued in respect of notifications made after January 20
1967 the time limit was three years in respect of notification made before that date the time limit was to be two years after that date
Provision was also made for payment of interest on compensation due to persons in respect of whose land declarations under section 6 had been delayed beyond a specified period no interest was however to be paid to those to whom compensation had already been paid
The petitioners by leave of Court amended their petitions to attack the validity of the
aforesaid Validating Act on the following main grounds  1 By seeking to validate past transactions of a kind which had been declared invalid by this Court without retrospectively changing the substantive law under which the past transactions had been effected the legislature was encroaching over the domain of the judicial power vested by the Constitution in the judiciary exclusively ii The Validating Act did not L4Sup
CI1684 42 revive the notification under section 4 which had become exhausted after the first declaration under section 6 and no acquisition following thereafter could be made without a fresh notification under section 4 iii The Validating Act violated article 312 of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported to authorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under section 4 thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of the said 
notification under section 4 without allowing for increase in the value of land thereafter iv The Validating Act violated article 14 of the Constitution in various ways
HELD Per Wanchoo CJ Bachawat  Mitter JJ i The American doctrine of well defined separation of legislative and judicial powers has no application to India and it cannot be said that an Indian Statute which seeks to validate invalid actions  is bad if the invalidity has already been pronounced upon by a court of law
AK Gopalan vs State   referred to
ii The absence of a provision in the amending Act to give retrospective operation to section 3 of the Act does not affect the validity of section 4
It was open to Parliament to adopt either course eg a to provide expressly for the retrospective operation of section 3 or b to lay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken before the Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Ordinance 1967 shall be deemed to be invalid or even to have become invalid because inter alia of the making of more than one declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act notwithstanding any judgment decree or order to the contrary
Parliament was competent to validate such actions and transactions its power in that behalf being only circumscribed by appropriate entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule and the fundamental rights set forth in Part III of the Constitution
Section 4 of the Amending Act being within the legislative competence of Parliament the provisions thereof are binding on all courts of law notwithstanding judgments orders or decrees to the contrary rendered or made in the past
67 C F Case law referred to
iii The impugned Act does not violate article 312
The Act does not in express terms enact any law which directly affects compensation payable in respect of property acquired nor does it lay down any principles different from those which were already in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894
After the amendment of the Constitution in 1955 the question of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the law provides that a person expropriated must be given compensation for his property or lays down the principles therefor
67 G H The Legislature might well have provided in the Act of 1894 that it would be open to the appropriate Government after issuing a notification under section 4 to consider objections raised under section 5 with regard to the different localities from time to time enabling different reports to fie made under section 5 A with consequent adjustments in section 6 providing for declarations to be made as and when each report under section 5A was considered
By the validation of action taken under section 6 more than once in respect of a single notification under section 4 the original scheme of acquisition is not altered
The public purpose behind the notification remains the same
It is not as if a different public purpose and acquisition of land for such purpose were being interploated by means of the Validating Act
Only the shortcoming in the Act as to want to provision to enable more than one decla ration under section 6 are being removed
68 D F 43 The date of valuation under the Validation Act is that of the issue of notification under section 41 a principle which has held the field since 1923 Legislative competence to acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be challenged because of constant appreciation of land values all over the country due to the prevalent abnormal inflation
There must be some time lag between the commencement and conclusion of land acquisition proceedings and in principle there is nothing wrong in accepting the said commencement as the date of valuation
Sections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by article 315 a of the Constitution
Only sections 5 A and 6 of the Act have been amended
The amendment does not alter the principle of compensation fixed by the Act nor contravene article 31 of the Constitution in any way
69 G 70 B It cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was fixing an arbitrary date for the valuation of the property which bore no relation to the acquisition proceedings
The population in Indian cities especially in the capital is ever increasing
The State has to plan the development of cities and it is not possible to take up all schemes in all directions at the same time
The resources of the State may not be sufficient to acquire all the area required by a scheme at the same time
Of necessity the area under the proposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and the development of one or more blocks at a time could only be taken up in consonance with the resources available
Even contiguous blocks could be developed gradually and systematically
In view of such factors it cannot be said that the principle of fixing compensation on the basis of the price prevailing on the date of the notification under section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act was not a relevant principle which satisfied the requirements of article 31270 C 71 H The State of West Bengal vs Mrs Bela Banerjee   State of Madras vs D Namasivaya Mudaliar  and PV Mudaliar vs Deputy Collector   considered
iv The validating Act was not violative of article 14
Whenever an Amending Act is passed there is bound to be some difference in treatment between transactions which have already taken place and those which are to take place in the future
That by itself will not attract the operation of article 14
Again even with respect to transactions which may be completed in the future a reasonable classification will not be struck down
72 C Jalan Trading Co vs Mazdoor Union   relied on
It is not possible to say that because the Legislature thought of improving upon the Act of 1894 by prescribing certain limits of time as from 20th January 1967 the difference in treatment in cases covered by the notification before the said date and after the said date denies equal protection of laws because the transactions are not similarly circumstanced
Some of the notifications issued under section 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before 20th January 1967 and such cases obviously could not be treated in the same manner as notifications issued after that date
article 14 does not strike at differentiation caused by the enactment of a law between transactions governed thereby and those which are not so governed
73 H 74 B Hatisingh Manufacturing Co Ltd vs Union of India  No grievance can be made because interest is denied to persons who have already taken the compensation
Even here the classification is not unreasonable and cannot be said to be unrelated to the object of the Act
74 E F 44 Per Shelat and Vaidialingam JJ
dissenting By validating the acquisition orders and declarations made on the basis of an exhausted notification under section 4 the impugned Act saves government from having to issue a fresh notification and having to pay compensation calculated on the market value as on the date of such fresh notification and depriving the expropriated owner of the benefit of the appreciated value in the meantime
The real object of section 4 of the impugned Act is thus to save the State from having to compensate for such appreciation under the device of validating all that is done under an exhausted section 4 notification and thus in reality fixing an anterior date ie the date of such a dead section 4 notification for fixing the compensation
The impugned Act thus suffers from a two fold vice  i that it purports to validate acquisitions orders and notifications without resuscicating the notification under section 4 by any legislative provision on the basis of which alone the validated acquisitions orders and declarations can properly be sustained and ii that its provisions are in derogation of article 312 as interpreted by this Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value on the date of notifications under section 4 which had become exhausted and for keeping them alive no legislative provision is to be found in the impugned Act
It is therefore not possible to agree with the view that the purpose of section 4 is to fill the lacuna pointed out in Sharma s case nor with the view that it raises a question of adequacy of compensation
The section under the guise of validating the acquisitions orders and notifications camouflages the real object of enabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of values frozen by notifications under s 4 which by part acquisitions thereunder had lost their efficacy and therefore required the rest of the land to be notified afresh and paying compensation on the date of such fresh notifications
The fact that neither section 4 nor section 23 of the principal Act are altered does not make any difference
89 D H 85 H Section 4 of the Amending Act must therefore be struck down as invalid
90 A