C No 1269 of 1989
2 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
KM Sharma petitioner in person
Soli J Sorabjee Attorney General Santosh Hegde Additional Solicitor General AK Sen Manbir Singh Girish Chandra and Ms A Subhashini for the Respondents
The Court delivered the following order ORDER Two contentions were raised by the petitioner in this writ petition challenging the appointment of Respondent No 1 Shri Devi Lal as Deputy Prime Minister of India i that the oath administered to him as Deputy Prime Minister was not the oath in accordance with the prescrip tion of the Constitution and ii he was still functioning as the Chief Minister of Haryana when the oath of office of his new assignment was administered to him
Pursuant to notice two affidavits have been filed one by the Respondent No 1 and the other on behalf of the Union of India
In the affidavit of Respondent No 1 certain precedents have been relied upon and the practice which has been followed eversince the Constitution came into force has been referred to
Learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the Union of India has stated that the form prescribed in the Third Schedule pursuant to the requirement of Article 754 of the Constitution is only for a Minister of the Union and there is no separate form even for the Prime Minister
Since the Prime Minister is also a member of the Council of Minis ters he takes the same oath as the other ministers are required to take
He maintains that yet in view of the fact that the Constitution describes him as the Prime Minister while being sworn into office he describes himself as Prime Minister and this practice is in vogue eversince 1950
The oath register is by the incumbent signed as Prime Minister and all other ministers sign as Ministers
He further indi cates that describing Shri Devi Lal as Deputy Prime Minister is descriptive only and for all purposes he is a Minister and there is no 3 constitutional sanction for the post of Deputy Prime Minis ter as such
Relying on a bench decision of this Court in the case of Virji Ram Sutaria vs Nathalal Premji Bhavadia  Ors  learned Attorney General further contends that the prescribed oath should be divided into two parts one which is descriptive and the other which contains the sub stantial part
And according to him as long as the substantial part is properly followed a mere mistake or error in the descriptive part would not vitiate the oath
This Court in the reported decision said In this case as we have already noted the essential requirement of Article 173 read with Form VII A was that the person taking the oath or making the affirmation would bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India
The words which precede this portion are merely descriptive of the person and of his nomination as a candidate
 In view of the clear statement
made by the learned Attorney General that Respondent No 1 is just a Minister like other members of the Council of Ministers though he has been described as Deputy Prime Minister but the description of him as Deputy Prime Minister does not confer on him any powers of the Prime Minister along with his other submis sions we think the first contention raised by the petition er has no force
So far as the second contention is con cerned the petitioner himself does not press it
We accordingly reject the writ petition for the reasons indicated above
No costs
PS S Petition dismissed


Summary:
The respondents claimed to be the owners of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed in their favour by one Navinchand who had purchased the property from his predecessor in interest Smt
Raj Rani on 1181952
The appellant s father Misri Lal was her tenant
In 1959 a suit was filed by Navinchand for eviction of Misri Lal which was resisted by the tenant on the ground that Smt
Raj Rani had earlier transferred the house to a Trust and as such she could not later convey any title to Navinchand
The Trial Court rejected the defence and passed a decree against Misri Lal
Misri Lal filed an appeal
During its pendency the parties resolved their dispute by entering into a compromise
A deed Ext
P 20 creating a fresh lease in favour of Misri Lal under Navinchand as lessor was executed wef 1121962
A compromise petition exhibit P 21 was filed and the case decreed in terms of the compromise exhibit P 22 Misri Lal continued to occupy the house till he died in 1972 leaving behind his son the appellant
A fresh dispute started after Navinchand sold the suit property to the respondents plaintiffs on 4173 who gave notice of the sale to the appellant on 14373
As the appellants refused to recognise them as owners the respond ents terminated the tenancy and filed a suit for ejectment against the appellants
This suit was resisted on the same old plea that Smt
Raj Rani having transferred the suit property to a Trust was not competent to retransfer the property to Navinchand the vendor of the respondents
The trial court disbelieved the defence version holding that although Smt
Raj Rani had executed a trust deed in 1936 but the same was not acted upon and that the trust did not appear to have come into existence
The suit was accordingly decreed
535 On appeal the first appellate court reversed the above finding and held that the defendant could not be estopped from challenging the title of the plaintiffs
In second appeal the High Court reversed the decree of the First Appellate Court and held that the defendants were estopped from challenging the decree Ext
P 22 which would bind the parties since it was founded on a compromise and not on an adjudication by the court on the question of title
It also observed that the statement made in the compromise petition exhibit P 21 in the earlier suit supported the case of the plaintiffs independently of the compromise decree and that the defence plea had to be rejected in view of the deed Ext
P 20 creating a fresh lease
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that having regard to the limited scope of a second appeal under section 100 CPC the High Court was not justified in setting aside the finding of the Appellate court on the question whether the property had been alienat ed in 1936 in favour of the trust or not that having reached a conclusion against the defendant on the basis of the lease deed exhibit P 20 the compromise petition exhibit P 21 and the compromise decree Ext
P 22 it should not have proceeded to decide the dispute relating to title on merits on the basis of evidence
It was further contended that the appellanttenant cannot be estopped from challenging the derivative title of the plaintiffs as he was not inducted into the house by them
Dismissing the appeal the Court HELD 1
The doctrine of estoppel ordinarily applies where the tenant has been let into possession by the plain tiff
Where the landlord had not himself inducted the tenant into the disputed property and his rights are founded on a derivative title for example as an assignee donee vend ee heir etc the position is a little different
539D 2
A tenant already in possession can challenge the plaintiff s claim of derivative title showing that the real owner is somebody else but this is subject to the rule enunciated by section 116 of the Evidence Act which does not permit the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy to deny that his landlord had at the beginning of the tenan cy a title to the property
The rule is not confined in its application to cases where the original landlord brings on action for eviction
539E 536 3
A transferee from such a landlord also can claim the benefit but that will be limited to the question of the title of the original landlord at the time when the tenant was let in
So far as claim of having derived a good title from the original landlord is concerned the same does not come under the protection of the doctrine of estoppel and is vulnerable to a challenge
The tenant is entitled to show that the plaintiff has not as a matter of fact secured a transfer from the original landlord or that the alleged transfer is ineffective for some other valid reason which renders the transfer to be non existent in the eye of law
539F G 4
In a case where the original landlord had the right of possession and was therefore entitled to induct a tenant in the property but did not have any power of dispo sition the tenant can attack the derivative title of the transferee plaintiff but not on the ground that the trans feror landlord who had initially inducted him in possession did not have the right to do so
Since the impediment in the way of a tenant to challenge the right of the landlord is confined to the stage when the tenancy commenced he is not forbidden to plead that subsequently the landlord lost this right
These exceptions however do not relieve the tenant of his duty to respect the title of the original landlord at the time of the beginning of the tenancy
539H 540A B 5
The tenancy under section 116 does not begin afresh every time the interest of the tenancy or of the landlord devolves upon a new individual by succession or assignment
541E 6
In the instant case the acquisition of title by the plaintiffs from Navinchand if he be presumed to be the rightful owner is not impugned that is the derivative title of the plaintiffs is not under challenge
What the appellant wants is to deny their title by challenging the title of their vendor Navinchand which he is not entitled to do
540D 7
The appellant in the instant case does not contend that Navinchand had subsequently lost his title or that there is any defect in the derivative title of the plain tiffs
His defence is that Navinchand did not own the property at all at any point of time and this he cannot be allowed to do
He cannot be permitted to question his title at the time of the commencement of the tenancy created by Ext
P 20
541F Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo vs Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd  Ors  Mangat Ram and Another vs Sardar Meharban Singh and Others  D Satyanara 537 yana vs
P Jagdish  and Tej Bhan Madan vs 11 Addl
District Judge  Ors   distin guished