minal Appeal No 64 of 1967
927 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 3 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Applica tion No 24 of 1967
K Sen section G Sheth and I N Shroff for the appellant
N section Bindra and section P Nayyar for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat J
The appellant along with other persons is being tried for an offence under Sec
120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec
16781 of the  and Sec
5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act 1947
The offence is bailable
The appellant was released on bail under orders of Magistrates dated May 11 1960 and April 1 1961
A large number of witnesses have been examined but the trial has not yet been concluded
By an order dated March 36 1967 the High Court of Maharashtra Bombay in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction cancelled the bail orders and directed him to surrender to his bail
From this order the present appeal has been filed by special leave
In Talab Haji Hussain vs Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and another1 this Court held that a High Court has the inhe rent power to cancel a bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence where such an order is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and this power is preserved by Sec
561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
On behalf of the appellant it was strenuously argued that this case was wrongly decided
Having heard full arguments we find no reason for departing from our earlier decision
In the matter of admission to bail the Code of Criminal Procedure makes a distinction between bailable and non bailable offences
The grant of bail to a person accused of a non bailable offence is discretionary under Sec
497 of the Code and the person released on bail may again be arrested and committed to custody by an order of the High Court the Court Session and the Court granting the bail
Under See
498 of the Code the High Court and the Court of Session may release any person on bail and by a subsequent order cause any person so admitted to bail to be arrested and committed to custody
A person accused of a bailable offence is treated differently at any time while under detention without a warrant and at any stage of the proceedings before the Court before which he is brought he has the right under Sec
496 of the Code to be released on bail
The Code makes no express provision for the cancellation of a bail granted under Sec 496
Nevertheless if at any subsequent stage of the proceedings it is found that any person accused of a bailable offence is 1  9 2 8 intimidating bringing or tampering with the prosecution witnesses or is attempting to abscond the High Court has the power to cause him to be arrested and to commit him to custody for such period as it thinks fit
This jurisdiction springs from the over riding inherent powers of the High Court and can be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody
For the reasons given in Talab Haji Hussain s case1 we hold that this inherent power of the High Court exists and is preserved by Sec
561 A of the Code
The person committed to custody under the orders of the High Court cannot ask for his release on bail under sec
496 but the High Court may by a subsequent order admit him to bail again
Counsel for the appellant argued that the inherent power of the High Court is not conferred by any legislation or statute and the deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant by an order of the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers is violative of the constitutional protection under article 21 of the Constitution
article 21 is in these terms No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law
 The term law  in article 21 was the subject of an elaborate discussion in A K Gapalan vs The State of Madras 
Kania CJ at pp
111 113 said that the term law  in that Article must mean the law of the State or enacted law and not rules of natural justice
Fazl Ali J who was in the minority said at page 169 that law  must include certain principles of natural justice
Patanjali Sastri J at p 1 99 said that law  in article 21 means positive or State made law 
Mahajan J at page 226 expressed no opinion on the point
Mukherjea J at p 278 said that in article 21 the word law  has been used in the sense of State made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract or general sense embodying the principles of natural justice
 Das J said at page 309 that there is no scope for introducing the principles of natural justice in Article 21 and procedure established by law  must mean procedure established by law made by the State which as defined includes Parliament and the Legislatures of the States As explained by four of the learned Judges in A K Gapalan s case1 the expression law  in article 21 means enacted or Statemade law and not the general principles of natural _justice
In Pandit M section M Sharma vs Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and others1 this Court held that a deprivation of personal liberty of any person by a Legislative Assembly of a State in exercise 1  2  3 1959 Stipp
I SCR8 6
929 of its power to punish for its contempt is according to a procedure established by law and does not contravene article 21
Art1943 of the Constitution provides that the powers privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law and until so defined shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and of its members and committees at the commencement of this Constitution Article 1943 thus confers on the Legislative Assembly
of a State the existing inherent powers enjoyed by the British House of Commons including the power to punish for its contempt
article 208 1  empowers the Legislative Assembly to make rules regulating its procedure
As explained in Pandit Sharma s case1 these powers and the procedure prescribed by the rules has the sanction of enacted law and an order of committal for contempt of the Assembly is according to procedure established by law
Das CJ speaking for four learned Judges said at page 861  Art 1943 confers on the Legislative Assembly those powers privileges and immunities and article 208 confers power on it to frame rules
The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in exercise of its powers under that Article
It follows therefore that article 1943 read with the rules so framed has laid down the procedure for enforcing its powers privileges and im munities
If therefore the Legislative Assembly has the powers privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived of his personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges such deprivation will be in accordance with procedure established by law and the petitioner cannot complain of the breach I Actual or threatened of his fundamental right under article 21 Subba Rao J in his minority judgment in that case and the Court in Special Reference No 1 of 1964 2 did not say anything to the contrary an this point
Now the question is whether the inherent power of tile High Court is conferred by or has the sanction of enacted law
From its very inception the High Court has possessed and enjoyed its inherent powers including the power to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court within its jurisdiction and to secure the ends of justice
These powers inherent in the High Court and spring from its very nature and constitution as a court of superior jurisdiction
All the existing powers of the High Courts were preserved and continued by legislation from time to time
561 A of the Criminal Procedure Code declared that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary 1 1959 Supp1 SCR 806
2  9 30 to give effect to any order passed under this Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice
 The section was inserted in the Code by Act XVIII of 1923 to obviate any doubt that these inherent powers have been taken away by the Code
In terms this section did not confer any power it only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of the High Court see King Emperor vs Khwaja Nazir Ahmad1
Then came other enactments which were framed differently
2 2 of the Government of India Act 1935 provided  Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act to the provisions of any Order in Council made under this or any other Act and to the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Act the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the court including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in division courts shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act The Section enacted that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Act
The statute confirmed and re vested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers
Then came the Constitution
article 225 of the Constitution provides  225
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
The proviso to the article is not material and need not be read
The irticle enacts that the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and the powers of the judges thereof in relation to administration of justice shall be the same as immediately before the cornmencement of the Constitution
The Constitution confirmed and 1 LR 61 IA 203213
931 re vested in the High Court all its existing powers and jurisdiction including its inherent powers and its power to make rules
When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent powers and jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an enacted saw within the meaning of article 21 as explained in A K Gopalan sl case
The inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Sec
561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are thus vested in it by law within the meaning of article 21
The procedure for invoking the inherent powers is regulated by rules framed by the High Court
The power to make such rules is conferred on the High Court by the Constitution
The rules previously in force were continued in force by Article 372 of the Constitution
The order of the High Court canceling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personal liberty is according to procedure established by law and is not violative of article 21
The High Court cancelled the previous bail orders as it found that the appellant was intimidating and tampering with certain German citizens whom the prosecution intended to examine as witnesses
This finding is challenged by the appellant
Normally it is not the practice of this Court to re examine findings of fact in an appeal under article 136 of the Constitution
Having heard full arguments we are not inclined to interfere with the findings of the High Court
The High Court reserved liberty to the appellant to move the High Court on or after June 26 1967 for a fresh order of bail
It was contemplated that within the time so fixed the prosecution will examine the German witnesses
On March 13 1967 the appellant surrendered to his bail and since then he is in jail custody
The prosecution has been given ample opportunity to examine the witnesses before June 26 1967 without any interference from the appellant
From the correspondence placed before us it appears that during the pendency of this appeal the prosecution has refrained from taking steps for the examination of the German witness
This Court did not pass any order staying the proceedings or admitting the appellant to bail
The delay in the examination of the witnesses is caused entirely by the laches of the prosecution
Even if the prosecution cannot now examine the witnesses by June 26 1967 we see no reason why the appellant should remain in custody after that date
We direct that the appellant be released on bail on June 26 1967 whether or not the prosecution witnesses are examined by that date
The bail will be given to the satisfaction of the Presidency Magistrate 23rd Court Esplanade Bombay before whom the case is pending
Subject to this modification the appeal is dismissed
Order modified and Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant along with others was being tried for an offence under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with section 167 81 of the  and section 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act 1947
Although he was at first released on bail by the Presidency Magistrate the High Court by an order dated March 6 1967 in the exercise of its inherent powers cancelled the previous bail orders as it found that the appellant was interfering and tampering with certain foreigners whom the prosecution intended to examine as witnesses
The High Court however reserved liberty to the appellant to move the court on or after June 26 1967 far a fresh order of bail as it was contemplated that within the time so fixed the prosecution would examine the foreign witnesses
In the appeal to this Court the appellant challenged the order of the High Court on the ground that the inherent powers of the High Court were not conferred by any legislation or statute and the deprivation of the personal liberty of the appellant by an order of the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers was violative of Art  II of the Constitution HELD  The High Court has the inherent power to cancel bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence
This jurisdiction should be invoked in exceptional cases only when the High Court is satisfied that the ends of justice will be defeated unless the accused is committed to custody
928A B The order of the High Court cancelling the bail and depriving the appellant of his personal liberty was according to procedure established by law was not violative of article 21
931C The existing powers and jurisdiction of the High Court including its inherent powers had been confirmed and continued by section 223 of the Government of India Act 1935 and article 225 of the Constitution
When the Constitution or any enacted law has embraced and confirmed the inherent power and the jurisdiction of the High Court which previously existed that power and jurisdiction has the sanction of an en acted law  within the meaning of article 21
929H 93A B Case law discussed
On the facts the court noted that there had been unnecessary delay in the examination of the foreign witnesses and directed that the appellant should be released on bail on June 26 1967