l Appeals Nos
51 and 5261 Appeals from the judgment and decree dated September 23 1959 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench at Lucknow in C M Applications Nos 15 OJ and 16 OJ of 1957 respectively
C B Agarwala and C P Lal for the Appellants in both the appeals
A V Viswanatha Sastri and K L Arora for Respondent No 1 in both the appeals
February 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
These two appeals have been heard together
The appellants in each case are the State of Uttar Pradesh for short called U P and some of its officers and the respondents in one appeal are Lakshmi Ice Factory and certain of its workers and in the other the Prakash Ice Factory and certain of its workers
These appeals involve a question of construction of certain provisions of the U P  hereafter referred to as the Act
By a Notification issued on February 10 1956 the Government of U P referred certain disputes which had cropped up between each of the Ice Factories and its respective workmen to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
The details of these disputes are not material for these appeals
The Tribunal heard the matters but failed to pronounce its award in open court
Instead on November 8 1956 the Registrar of the Tribunal informed the Ice Factories that the award of the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government
On December 15 1956 the award was published in the U P Gazette and it appeared from this publication that the award was dated November 8 1956
On December 26 1956 the Regional Conciliation Offi cer appointed under the Act  called upon the Ice 61 Factories to implement the award immediately
Thereupon the Tee Factories moved the High Court at Allahabad on January 3 1957 under article 226 of the Constitution for writs quashing the award and prohibiting the Government and the workmen from taking steps to implement it
They contended that the award sought to be enforced was a nullity as it had not been pronounced in open court as required by certain rules to which reference will presently be made
By a judgment passed on September 23 1959 the High Court allowed the petitions of the Ice Factories and issued writs quashing the Notification publishing the award
The appeals are against this judgment of the High Court
Section 3 of the Act gives the Government power in certain circumstances to make provisions by general or special order 1 for appointing Industrial courts 2 for referring any industrial dispute for adjudication in the manner provided in the order and 3 for matters incidental or supplementary to the other provisions of the order
Under this power the Government had issued an Order dated July 14 1954 and this Order is hereafter called the Statutory Order
 It was under powers conferred by the Act read with the Statutory Order that the Government had issued the Notification of February 10 1956
In exercise of powers conferred by el 8 of the Statutory Order the Government had set up the Tribunal
Clause 9 of the Statutory Order provides for the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal
Sub clause 7 of this clause is in these terms The decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be pronounced in open court and dated and signed by the member or members of the Tribunal as the case may be at the time of pronouncing it
 Clause 11 of the Statutory Order gives power to Government to refer any industrial dispute to the Tribunal
Sub clause 9 of el 9 of the Statutory Order 62 gives power to the Tribunal to make Standing Orders relating to its practice and procedure
Under this sub clause the Tribunal framed certain Standing Orders
Standing Order No 36 provided
Judgment shall be pronounced in open court either immediately after the close of the arguments or on a subsequent date of which previous notice shall be given to the parties
It shall then be signed and dated by the Tribunal
 Acting presumably under Standing Order No 36 the Tribunal in the present case bad fixed a date on which it would pronounce its judgment in open court
This date does not appear on the record but on September 25 1956 the Tribunal informed the parties that the date for pronouncing the award had been changed to October 9 1956
On that date however the award was not pronounced in open court nor was any intimation of any other date for its pronouncement given to the parties
The lee Factories first came to know of the making of the award from the letter of the Registrar of the Tribunal dated November 8 1956 earlier referred to
The award had in fact never been pronounced in open court
The first question is whether the provisions in sub el
7 of el 9 are imperative
The High Court held that they were and thereupon quashed the Notification publishing the award
The appellants contend that the High Court was in error and that the provisions are only directory and that the failure of the Tribunal to pronounce the award in open Court did not result in the award becoming void
The Ice Factories contend for the contract view
Mr Aggarwala for the appellants referred us to the rule of construction stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th ed
at p 381 which is as follows  Where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and 63 where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the Legislature such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed or in other words as directory only
Ho said that sub el
7 of cl 9 of the Statutory Order imposed a public duty on the Tribunal and as none of the contesting parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal had any control over it the provision in the Statutory Order as to how the Tribunal is to discharge its duty must be regarded as merely directory and therefore a disregard of that provision by the Tribunal would not render the thing done by it a nullity
It seems to us that the rule read from Maxwell is not applicable to this case
It applies only when to hold the prescriptions in a statute as to the performance of a public duty to be imperative would work injustice and hardship without serving the object of the statute
None of these conditions are present ill the statute now before us
The rule may be illustrated by reference to the case of Montreal Street Railway Co vs Normandin1 which is cited in Maxwell s book
That was a case in which certain Statutory provisions as to how the jury list was to be revised had not been followed and the question arose whether the verdict of a jury empannelled out of a list revised in disregard of the provision was a nullity
It was hold that the verdict was not a nullity as the provision regarding the revision of the jury list was merely directory
It was further held that the object of the provision was to distribute the burden of jury equally between all liable to it to secure effective jurors likely to attend and lastly to prevent packing of the jury
It was said that It does far less harm to allow cases tried by a jury formed as this one was 1  64 with the opportunities there would be object to any unqualified man called into the box to stand good than to hold the proceedings null and void
So to hold would not of course prevent the courts granting new trials in cases where there was reason think that a fair trial had not been had P 176
The case in hand is wholly different
The proceedings that were had before the Tribunal would not become null and void if we hold el
97 of the Statutory Order to be imperative
A view that the provision was imperative would cause no serious hardship to any one
The Government can always require the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court extending if necessary for the purpose
he time fixed for giving its decision
Either party of the proceeding can also ask the Government to call upon the Tribunal to pronounce its award in open court
There is no doubt that the Government will go call upon the Tribunal when the defect s brought to its notice for the Government itself referred the matter to the Tribunal for if decision
As soon as the Tribunal pronounces it award in open court the proceedings will become fully effective
It is also an accepted rule of construction that enactments regulating the procedure in courts are usually imperative  Maxwell on Interpretation of statues 10th ed
p 379
It further appears to us that the object of the legislature would be defeated by reading cl
97 of the Statutory Order as containing a provision which is merely director vs We now proceed to ascertain that object from the other provisions in the Statutory Order the Act and connected legislation
Section 6 of the IT
P Act provides as follows  1 When an authority to which an industrial dispute has been referred for 65 adjudication has completed it enquiry it shall within such time as may be specified submit its award to the State Government
2 The State Government may enforce for such period as it may specify all or any of the decisions in the award
It was under this section that the Tribunal submitted it award to the Government and the Government issued the Notification in the Gazette dated December 15 1956 earlier mentioned and directed that the award be enforced for a period of one year from the date of the publication
Since the award has to be submitted to the Government by the Tribunal under section 6 of the Act the award has to be in writing for a verbal award cannot obviously be submitted to the Government
It would therefore appear that the provision in sub cle
7 of el 9 of the Statutory Order that the decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing is imperative This would be an indication that the other provisions in the same sub clause connected with it were intended to be equally imperative
Then we find that el
18 of the Statutory Order is in these terms  The Tribunal or the adjudicator shall hear the dispute and give its or his decision within 180 days excluding holidays but Dot annual vacations observed by courts subordinate to the High Court from the date of reference made to it or him by the State Government and shall thereafter as soon as possible supply a copy of the same to the parties to the dispute  
Provided that the State Government may extend the said period from time to time
 It seems to us that the provision in this clause in clearly mandatory
The Tribunal has no power to make an award after the time mentioned in it if it had the proviso to el
18 would be wholly unnecessary
The result therefore is that it is 66 obligatory on the Tribunal to give its decision within 180 days from the date of the reference
A decision given that is an award made beyond this period would be a nullity
Now when cl 18 talks of giving a decision it can only mean giving it in the manner indicated in sub cl 7 of cl 9 of the Statutory Order that is by pronouncing it in open court for that is the only manner of giving a decision which that order contemplates
It would follow that the terms of cl
97 were imperative for otherwise no one would know whether the terms of el 18 of the Statutory Order had been complied with that is to say no one would know whether the award was void or not
The provisions of cl
IS may thus be rendered nugatory by holding el
97 to be only directory
It would follow that unless the provision as to the pronouncement of the award in open court was mandatory the intention of the framers of the Statutory Order would be defeated
Sub clause 2 of cl 24 of the Statutory Order also leads to the same conclusion
That sub clause is in these terms  Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in decisions or awards or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omis sion may within one month of giving the decision or award be corrected by the Tribunal or the adjudicator either of its or his own motion or on the application of any of the parties
 Under this rule therefore clerical or arithmetical errors or slips may be corrected within one month of the giving of the decision and the parties have the right to apply for such corrections within that time
The Tribunal has no right to correct an error beyond that time
Nor has a party a right to move the Tribunal for making any such corrections after the time has expired
In order that the intention of cl 24 2 may be given effect to it is necessary that the date of the 67 giving of the decision should be known
It cannot promptly be known to the parties unless the award is pronounced in open court
If any other Manner of the giving of the decision was permissible as would be the result if it was not obligatory to pronounce the decision in open court then a party may be deprived of its right under cl 24 to move the Tribunal for correction of errors
It is for this reason that cl
97 provides that the decision shall be dated and signed at the time of pronouncing it in open court
This signing and dating of the award after its pronouncement in open court makes it possible to see whether the terms of cls
18 and 24 2 have been complied with in any case
The third thing which to our mind indicates that pronouncement in open court is essential is cl 31 of the Statutory Order
That clause is in these terms  Except as provided in this Order and in the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act 1950 every order made or direction issued under the provisions of this Order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned by any party thereto in any proceedings
 The Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act 1950 provides for appeals from decisions of certain Industrial Tribunals to the Appellate Tribunal established under it
Clause 31 therefore makes a decision of the Tribunal on a reference to it final subject to an appeal if any allowed under the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act 1950
Under a 7 of the Act of 1950 an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal concerning certain specified matters
Now an Industrial Tribunal mentioned in section 7 includes a Tribunal set up under a State law which law does not provide for an appeal  see a 2oiii of the Act of 1950
The U P Act does not provide for any appeal expressly but cl 31 of the Statutory Order makes a decision of the Tribunal final subject to 68 the provisions of the Act of 1950
It would therefore appear that an appeal would lie under the Act of 1950 to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under it from a decision of a Tribunal set up under the Statutory Order
Now under a 10 of the Act of 1950 an appeal is competent if preferred within thirty days from the date of the publication of the award where such publication is provided for by the law under which the award is made or from the date of the making of the award where there is no provision for such publication
Now the UP Act or the Statutory Order does not provide for any publication of an award
Therefore an appeal from the Tribunal set up under the Statutory Order has to be filed within thirty days from the making of the award
Hence again it is essential that the date of the making of the award shall be known to the parties to enable them to avail themselves of the right of appeal
This cannot be known unless the judgment is pronounced in open court for the date of award is the date of its pronouncement
Hence again pronouncement of the judgment in open court is essential
If it were not so the provisions for appeal might be rendered ineffective
For all these reasons it seems to us that the clear intention of the legislature is to make it imperative that judgments should be pronounced in open court by the Tribunal and judgments not so pronounced would therefore be a nullity
In the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to deal separately with Standing Order No 36
The provisions of that Standing Order and cl
97 of the Statutory Order are substantially the same
They should therefore be interpreted in the same way
In any case since we have held the el
97 of the Statutory Order to be imperative
it would not matter whatever view is taken of the Standing Order for the latter cannot affect the former
69 Mr Aggarwala then argued that cl
97 of the Statutory Order and Standing Order No 36 were ultra vires as being in conflict with the Act under which they had been framed
His contention was this  Under section 6 of the Act all that the Tribunal has to do is to submit its award to the Government after the conclusion of the enquiry before it
The section does not require the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court
The provisions in the Statutory Order and the Standing Order both of which were made under powers contained in the Act were therefore in conflict with section 6 and of no effect
Hence he contended that the question whether the provisions of cl
97 of the Statutory Order or of the Standing Order No 36 were imperative did not really arise
It seems to us that this contention of Mr Aggarwala is without any foundation
Section 6 when it requires that the Tribunal shall submit its award to the Government necessarily contemplates the making of the award
Neither section 6 nor any other provision in the Act provides how the award is to be made
Under section 3g however the Government has power by general or special
order to provide for incidental or supplementary matters necessary for the decision of an industrial dispute referred for adjudication under any order made tinder section 3 rho provision as to the pronouncement of the decision in open court in 197 of the Statutory Order clearly is within the power contemplated in section 3g
Section 6 does not prohibit the making of such a provision
Its main purpose is to direct that the Tribunal shall submit the award to the Government so that it may be enforced
It has nothing to do with the manner in which the Tribunal is to make 70 its award
A rule duly framed under the Act requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court is therefore not in conflict with section 6
The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs
Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 3 of the UP  and the Statutory orders framed thereunder referred certain
disputes between the respondent Ice Factories and the respective workmen to an Industrial Tribunal
The Tribunal heard the matters but failed to pronounce its award in open court as required under the clause 9 7 of the Statutory Orders
Instead the Registrar of the Tribunal informed the Ice Factories that the award of the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government
The award was published in the UP Gazette and the Regional Conciliation officer called upon the Ice Factories to implement the award immediately
The Ice Factories moved the High Court at Allahabad alleging that the award was a nullity as it had not been pronounced in open court as required under the clause 9 7 of the Statutory Orders and asking for writs to quash it
High Court issued the writs quashing the Notification publishing the award
The questions are whether the provisions of sub cl
7 of cl 9 of the Statutory Orders are imperative or merely directory and whether that sub clause is ultra vires as being in conflict with the Act under which it had been framed
Held that the clear intention of the legislature is to make it imperative that judgments should be pronounced in open court by the Tribunal and a judgment not so pronounced would therefore be a nullity
The provision in sub cl7 of cl 9 of the Statutory Order is imperative and not directory
Held further that the provisions as to the pronouncement of the decision in open court contained in cl 9 7 of the Statutory Order was clearly within the powers contemplated in section 3 g of the Act and section 6 of the Act does not prohibit the making of such provisions
A rule duly framed under the Act requiring the Tribunal to pronounce its decision in open court is therefore not in conflict with section 6 of the Act
Montreal Street Railway Co vs Normandin   referred to