ivil Appeal Nos
2263 to 2268 of 1984
From the Judgment and Order dated 2nd April  1982 of the High Court of Karnatka in Writ Appeal Nos 662 to 667 of 1982
663 Writ Petition Nos
394 405 of 1984
under Article 32 of the constitution
K Srinivasan  Raghvendra Rao  V Kumar for the Appellants
in the CA Nos
2263 68 of 1984
RP Bhatt  Swaraj Kaushal for the Respondents in CA Nos
2263 68 of 1984
B Krishnamani  Lalit Kumar Gupta  Subash Dutt  KK Pargal and Pankaj Kalra  for the Petitioner in WP No 391 40584
KL Sharma  SL Benadikar and M Veerappa for the Respondents in WP No 394 40584
C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID  J
The above appeals  by special leave are directed against the common Judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in writ appeal Nos
662 668 of 1982
In the writ petitions  the prayer is to strike down Section 7 of Karnataka Act No 13 of 1982 Sections 2 and 3 of Karnataka Act No 10 of 1984 and for a writ of mandamus to restrain the State of Karnataka from enforcing the said provisions against the Petitioners in the writ petitions
This Judgment will dispose of the appeals and the writ petitions
The facts  in brief  necessary to understand the genesis of the cases are as follows Consequent upon the abolition of octroi by the State of Karnataka  which was the main source of revenue for the local bodies  the said State enacted the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into local areas for Consumption  use or salt therein Act  1979 for short the 1979 Act in order to augment the resources of the local bodies
This Act came into force with effect from 161979 on which date it was gazetted
3A batch of 1590 writ petitions were field in the Karnataka High Court by a large number of traders challenging the constitutional validity of this Act
Writ Petition No  7039 of 1979 was one of them which was by Messrs Hansa Corporation  Bangalore
These writ petitions on reference by a learned Single Judge  were heard by a Division Bench  which by a common 664 Judgment dated 2481979T struck down the Act  allowed the writ petition and issued writs of mandamus against the State Government forbearing it from taking any proceeding under the Act
The State took the matter in appeal to this Court
However only one appeal was filed  numbered as 3049 of 1979 against writ petition No 7039 of 1979 filed by Messrs Hansa Corporation  in  pleading this Corporation alone as respondent  This Court by its Judgment dated 2591980 allowed the appeal  set aside the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act
This decision is reported in  4
While Civil appeal No 3049 of 1979 was pending before this Court  the Governor of Karnataka promulgated the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into a Local Area for Consumption  use or Sale therein Ordinance of 1980 Karnataka Ordinance No 5 of 1980 on 861980 providing for levy of entry tax on registered dealers  removing the infirmities in the 1979 Act  that were pointed out by the High Court in its Judgment while striking down the Act
This ordinance was replaced by Act No 21 of 1980 giving it retrospective effect from 8 61980  the date of the ordinance 
After this Court rendered its Judgment in the Hansa Corporation case  the Governor of Karnataka promulgated another ordinance  Ordinance No 11 of 1980 on 2510l980 re pealing the Entry Tax Act  1980  from its inception with certain other directions regarding adjustment of tax if any paid
This was followed by Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas  Use or Sale therein repeal Act of 1981  and Karnataka Act No 10 of 1981  repealing the 1980 Act
This Act  however  did not repeal ordinance No 11 of 1980
In the meantime  Karnataka Ordinance No 3 of 1981  came into force which was followed by Karnataka Act 12 of 1981 which repealed Ordinance No 11 of 1980
As a result of the combined operation of ordinance No 3 of 1981 and Act No 12 of 1981
the 1979 Act was made to be operative but only from 1 101980 and not from 161979 a originally enacted
6 After the Judgment of this Court in the Hansa Corporation ease  upholding the validity of the 1979 Act the authorities appointed under the Act  issued notices under the Act 1 ITR 1980 1 Karnataka 165 665 to all the dealers including those who had filed writ petitions earlier  calling upon them to register themselves under the Act  to file returns and to pay the amounts of tax due by them under the original Act of 1979
Aggrieved by the said notices  the original writ petitioners again filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka contending that the notices issued to them were bad inasmuch as the writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the High Court in the earlier Judgment survived and Was effective since the State had not filed appeals against them  and that the Judgment of this Court could rescue the State from taking proceedings only against the Hansa Corporation and not against them
The State met this contention with the plea that the Judgment of this Court was binding on all and no one could escape from it
The writ petitions were heard by a learned Single Judge
He dismissed them holding  among other things  that Section 3 of the Act No 10 of 1981 revived the 1979 Act and that action taken against the petitioners in the writ petitions  was therefore  valid
Appeals were filed against this Judgment
A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the appeals holding that Section 3 of the repealing Act of 1981 re enacted the 1979 Act and that  therefore  the appellants were not well founded in their challenge against the action taken by the State
The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had to consider the effect of the two decisions of this Court for deciding the questions argued before them
The decisions are the State of Punjab vs Joginder Sinnh1 and Makhanlal Waza vs J  K  State2 Strong reliance was placed by the petitioners on Joginder Singh  s case and equally strong reliance by the State on Makhanlal s case
The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench understood the principle enunciated in the two decisions differently
They were under the impression that the action taken by the State would have been invalid  but for the saving provision contained in the repealing Act  notwithstanding the Judgment in Hansa Corporation  case
What falls for decision in these appeals is the resolution of the conflict between the approach made by the learned Single l  2 l971 3 SCR 832
666 Judge and the Division Bench to the two cases referred to above and to examine the ratio of the two decisions  since  in our opinion  these appeals can be disposed of on the short ground whether the Hansa Corporation Judgment validated the action taken by the State We will now briefly set out the facts of the two cases In Juginder Singh s case  four employees who were absorbed in Government service filed four separate writ petitions before the High Court of Punjab challenging certain executive powers and rules as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
All the four petitions were allowed by the High Court by a common order by which the rules challenged were struck down
The State of Punjab filed only one appeal before this Court against this common order and that against Joginder Singh
At the hearing of the appeal  a preliminary objection was raised on his behalf that the appeal was incompetent since the State had not filed appeals against the three other petitioners and that therefore  any variation by this Court of the Judgment in the appeal would result in inconsistent decisions in respect of the same matter
In Makhanlal s case  an order made by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir providing for reservation of posts for certain communities was challenged before this Court as violative of Article 16 of the Constitution
This Court accepted the challenge and invalidated the promotions of respondents 3 to 83 in that case
By its Judgment  this Court directed the State Government to devise a scheme consistent with the constitutional guarantee for reservation of appointment to posts and to pass appropriate orders
The State Government instead of complying with the directions given by this Court  attempted to circumvent the same by continuing those whose promotions were invalidated  giving the posts a different name
The same petitioners again moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the action of the State Government
The State Government justified its action contending that there were many persons who were not parties to the earlier writ petitions and who had been promoted prior to andor subsequent to this Court s decision and that they were not bound by the earlier Judgment
This contention was repelled by this Court
It was held that the law declared by this Court was binding on the respondent State and its 667 Officers irrespective of the fact whether those who would be affected by its pronouncement were parties to the Judgment A or not
Now we will see how the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench understood the two Judgments of this Court
The learned Single Judge extracted the relevant portions from Joginder Singh s case and observed that the said Judgment  according to him  settled two firm propositions which in his words are as follows i An appeal filed against only one person though his writ petition was disposed of by common order along with other cases filed by others notwithstanding the fact that appeals arc not filed against some cases  would be competent and ii an order made by the Supreme Court in such an a appeal would bind the parties to appeal and would not affect the validity of the order made in the other cases
 He  then  distinguished that case from the case before him by R stating thus But that is not the position in these cases
The precise question that arises for determination in these cases is whether an Act of Legislature struck down by the High Court on certain grounds is reversed by the Supreme Court and the Act declared to be constitutionally valid  thereafter a validation Act is also passed rendering the Judgment of the High Court in the other cases as ineffective  sic
On that  the enunciation made in Joginder Singh s case does not bear on the point and assist the Petitioner   11
After considering the facts of the Makhan Lal s case  the learned Single Judge observed thus This later enunciation by a larger Bench however without noticing the earlier decision in Joginder Singh s 668 case  in unmistakable terms  has ruled that the declaration made by it or enunciation made by it  is binding on all authorities courts and persons whether they are parties or not
Shri Srinivasan urged that the above enunciation in Makhanlal Waza s case was made by the Supreme Court in the context of a binding order made against Government and not against those who were not parties to its earlier order and therefore  the principles stated in that case has no principles stated in that case has no application to the question that arises for determination
In my view the attempt made by Shri Srinivasan to distinguish the enunciation made in Makhanlal Waza s case is without a d difference and has no merit at all
The enunciation made is not based on any such distinction and difference
On the application of the principles enunciated in Makhanlal Waza section case it follows that the declaration made by the Supreme Court in Messrs Hansa Carporation s case upholding the validity of the Act is binding on all Courts authorities and persons in the State of Karnataka notwithstanding the fact that the State had filed only one appeal and had not filed appeals in the other cases  From the above discussion  it would appear that the learned Single Judge felt that Joginder Singh s case indicated a different view
Now we will see how the Division Bench understood the above propositions
After considering the facts of the case and extracting the relevant portions of this Courts Judgments  the Division Bench observed as follows In our opinion  there is no conflict between the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court
As rightly pointed out by Shri Srinivasan  in Makhanlal Waza s case the decision
turned on the fact that the direction in the earlier Judgment of the 669 Supreme Court was made against the State Government and not against promotees who were not parties in the earlier writ petition
The State Government which was a party in the earlier writ petition  was bound by the Judgment of the Supreme Court therein and could not disregard the direction of the Supreme Court on the ground that the promotees were not parties in the earlier writ petition
Thus  the decision of the Supreme Court in Makhanlal Waza s case is distinguishable on facts
As the material facts of the present cases are similar to those in Joginder Singh s case the law laid down by the Supreme Court in that case  is squarely applicable to these cases
 From the above conclusion  it appears that the Division Bench felt that the law laid down in Joginder Singh s case applied to the appeals before it and that the decision of the Supreme Court in Makhanlal s case was distinguishable on facts
As indicated above  the appeals were dismissed relying upon 1 Section 3 of the repealing Act of 1981
We will now consider the submissions made before us with reference to the above two decisions of this Court and examine the correctness of the findings entered by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
The main thrust of the submission made by the learned counsel for appellants in these appeals is that the writ of mandamus issued by the High Court in their favour was effective since the Judgment in their favour was not challenged by filing appeals before this court
It is submitted that the law laid down by this Court would apply only against the Hansa Corporation  against whom alone the State had filed an appeal In support of this contention the following passage at page 177 in Joginder Singh s case was relied upon All the four petitions were delt with together and were disposed of by a common Judgment so that relief according to Joginder Singh  the respondent before us  in Writ application No 1559 of 1960 was also granted to the other three petitioners
The State  however  has preferred no appeal against the orders in the other three 670 petitions  and Mr Agarwal  learned counsel for the respondent  raises the contention that as the orders in the other three petitions have become final  any order passed in this appeal at variance with the relief granted in the other three petitions would create inconsistent degree in respect of the same matter and so we should dismiss the present appeal as incompetent
We  however  consider that this would not be the legal effect of any order passed by this Court in this appeal and that there is no merit in this objection as a bar to the hearing of the appeal
In our opinion  the true position arising  if the present appeal by the State Government should succeed  would be that the finality of the orders passed in the other three writ petitions by the Punjab High Court would not be disturbed and that those three successful petitioners would be entitled to retain the advantages which they had secured by the decisions in their favour  not being challenged by an appeal being filed
That however  would not help the present respondent  The respondent would be bound by our Judgment in this appeal and besides  so far as the general law is concerned as applicable to everyone other than the three writ petitioners who would be entitled to the benefit of the decisions in their favour having attained finality the law will be as laid down by this Court
We  therefore overrule the preliminary objection
In our opinion  reliance on this passage by the appellants in support of their contention is not justified
The only question that fell to be decided in Joginder Singh s case was whether the appeal filed by the State was competent in the adsence of appeals against the other petitioners
This was answered by the Court in the affirmative as follows 
We  however  consider that this would not be the legal effect of any order passed by the Court in this appeal and that there is no merit in this objection as a bar to the hearing of the appeal
 It is this observation that disposes of the preliminary objec 671 tion and the finding of the Court on this objection is contained in the above passage
The sentences that followed  relating to the effect of the orders passed by the High Court in the other three writ petitions can only be treated as obiter and therefore cannot be relied upon by the appellants to press a case that the law declared by this Court in Hansa Corporation s case did not bind them
The same principle is laid down in Makhanlal Waza s case
In that case  the State of Jammu and Kashmir attempted to circumvent the law declared by this Court in Trilok Nath and another vs State of Jammu Kashmir and others1 by which the State policy of reservation to certain communities was declared bad by this Court with the plea that the vice of that Judgment operated only so far as the parties to the Judgment was concerned and not against those who were not parties thereto
This Court repelled the contention and held as follows 
As regards the other respondent teachers who did not figure in the earlier petition  they were all promoted to the gazetted cadre prior and subsequent to the previous decision in complete defiance of the law laid down by this Court
Such a course has been sought to be justified on the tenuous ground that they were not parties to the previous petition and therefore their cases would not be governed by the decision given in that petition
It may be observed immediately that such a position is wholly untenable and misconceived
The Judgment which was delivered did not merely declare the promotions granted to the respondents in the petition filed at the previous Stage as unconstitutional but also laid down in clear and unequivocal terms that the distribution of appointments  posts or promotions made in implementation of the communal policy was contrary to the constitutional guarantee of Articie 16
The law so declared by this Court was binding on the respondent State and its officers and they were bound to follow it whether a majority of the present respondents were parties or not to the previous petition
In our opinion  both these decisions lay down identical 1 1969 I SCR 103
672 principles and there is nothing to distinguish between the two
In the earlier case  this Court  on its facts  overruled the preliminary objection that absence of appeals against the three petitioners left out  would not render the appeal before this Court incompetent  holding thereby that the effect of the decision in that appeal would be binding on the appellant therein
In the latter case  this Court in unmistakable terms laid down that the law laid down in the earlier case  namely  Triloknath s case  applied even to those who were not parties to the case
These two decision were given by two Constitution Benches of this Court
We find that Joginder Singh s case was not noted by the Bench that decided Makhanlal Waza s case
This does not create any difficulty
As we have already held  the two decisions  on the principles laid down by them  speak the same voice  ie that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all  notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a private party and that it is binding on even those who were not parties before the Court
Since it is necessary to make the position of law clear and free from ambiguity  we would set out our reasons for our conclusion clearly
Though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act  all those writ petitions were grouped together  heard together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common Judgment
No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition  not common to others
To be precise  the dispute in the cause or controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal on peculiar to each petitioner
The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners
This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common Judgment and it was this common Judgment that was the subject matter of appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation s case
When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid  it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation s case alone  but all petitions in which the High Court issued mandamus on the none existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid
It is  therefore  idle to contend that the law laid down by this Court in that Judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal
To do so is to ignore the binding nature of a Judgment of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution
673 Article 141 reads as follows A The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India  A mere reading of this Article brings into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature
In cases like this  where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common Judgment and only one appeal is filed  the parties to the common Judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the Court to hear them also
They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by this Court behind their back or profess a ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common Judgment
We would like to observe that  in the fitness of things  it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the Judgment  of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before this Court by them
We do not find fault with the State for having filed only one appeal
It is  of course  an economizing procedure
The Judgment in the Hansa Corporation case rendered by one of us Desai  J concludes as follows As we are not able to uphold l the contentions which found favour with the High Court in striking down the impugned Act and the notification issued thereunder and as we find no merit in other contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent for sustaining the Judgment of the High Court  this appeal must succeed
Accordingly  this appeal is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs throughout
 To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the Judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory
By setting aside the common Judgment of the High Court  the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases
674 19A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has always been understood to mean a command issuing from the Court  competent to do the same  to a public servant amongst others  to perform a duty attaching to the office  failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action
In this case  the petitioners appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly enacted
In other words  a writ of mandamus was predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid
Consequently the court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners
The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by this Court
The Act  therefore  was under an eclipse  for a short duration but with the declaration of the law by this Court  the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus disappeared and the Act revived with its full figure  the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by the Judgment of this Court
If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid  effective and binding by the Supreme Court  the mandamus for bearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to perform a negative duty
The declaration of the law is binding on everyone and it is therefore  futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed
The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by looking at the submissions made from a slightly different angle
Assume for arguments sake that the mandamus in favour of the appellants survived notwithstanding the Judgment of this Court
How do they enforce the mandamus  The normal procedure is to move the Court in contempt when the parties against whom man damus is issued disrespect it
Supposing contempt petitions are filed and notices are issued to the State
The State s answer to the Court will be Can I be punished for disrespecting the mandamus  when the law of the land has been laid down by the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued  which law is equally binding on me and on you 
Which Court can punish a party for contempt under these circumstances  The answer can be only in the negative because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective 675 and unenforceable when the basis on which it was issued falls  by the declaration by the Supreme Court  of the validity of 1979 Act
In view of this conclusion of ours  we do not think it necessary to refer to the other arguments raised before the High Court and which the learned counsel for the appellants attempted to raise before us also
The appeals can be disposed of on this short point stated above
The Judgment of this Court in the Hansa Corporation s case is binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the Judgment or not
We would like to make it clear that there is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder Singh s case and Makhanlal Waza s case
The ratio is the same and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh s case for the reasons indicated above
In the writ petitions the challenge is against Section 7 of Act No 10 of 1981 and they contain certain other prayers also
We do not think it necessary to deal with the contentions raised in them since it would be an unnecessary exercise  in view of the revival of the parent Act of 1979 by the Judgment of this Court
In the result  the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed with costs cost quantified at Rs 2000 in each case
SR Appeals  Petitions dismissed


Summary:
That Constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for consumption  use or sale therein Act  1979  which came into force with effect from 1 61979 was challenged in the Karnataka High Court by a large number of traders though a batch of 1590 writ petitions including writ petition No 703979 by Ms Hansa corporation Bangalore
A Division Bench of the Court by a common judgment dated 24879 reported in ILR 1980 1 Karnataka 165 allowed all the writ petitions and issued writs of mandamus against the State Government forbearing it from taking any proceedings under the Act
The State took the matter in appeal in this Court
However  only one appeal was filed  numbered as 3049 of 1979 against writ petition No 170 39 of 1979 filed by Ms Hansa Corporation  impleading this Corporation alone as respondent
This Court by its judgment dated 25980 which is reported in   allowed the appeal  set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act
During the pendency of the civil appeal No 3049 of 1979 Governor of Karnataka enacted the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into a Local Area 660 for Consumption  use or sale therein Act with retrospective effect from 8680 removing the infirmities in the 1979 Act
After the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Hansa Corporation s case the Governor of Karnataka promulgated another ordinance  Ordinance No 11 of 1980 on 25101980 repealing the Entry Tax Act  1980 from its inception with certain other directions regarding adjustment of tax if any paid
This was followed by Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas  Use or Sale therein Act  of 1981  and Karnataka Act No 10 of 1981  repealing the 1980 Act
however  did not repeal ordinance No 11 of 1980
In the meantime  Karnataka Ordinance No 3 of 1981 came into force which was followed by Karnataka Act 12 of 1981 I which repealed Ordnance No II of 1980
As a result of the combined operation of ordinance No 3 of 1981 and Act No 12 of 1981  the 1979 Act was made to be Operative but only from 11080 and not from 1679 as originally enacted After the judgment of the Hansa Corporation s case upholding the validity of the 1979 Act  the authorities appointed under the Act  issued notices under the Act to all the dealers including those who had filed writ petition earlier  calling upon them to register themselves under the Act  to file returns and to pay the amounts of tax due by them under the original Act of 1979
Aggrieved by the said notices  the original writ petitioners again filed writ petitions before the High Court of Karnataka contending that the notices issued to them were bad in as much as the writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the High Court in the earlier judgment survived and was effective since no state appeals were performed against them and that the judgment of the Supreme Court could rescue the State from taking proceedings only against the Hansa Corporation and not against them
The Statement this contention with the plea that the judgment of the Supreme Court was binding on all and no one could escape from it
The writ petitions were dismissed by a single judge holding among other things  that section 3 of the Act No 10 of 1981 revived the 1979 Act and that action taken against the petitioners in the writ petitions was  therefore  valid
Appeals were filed against the judgment and a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the appellants holding that section 3 of the re pealing Act of 1981 re enacted the 1979 Act and that  therefore  the appeals were not well founded i 1 their challenge against the action taken by the State
Hence the appeals by special leave and also writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
Dismissing the appeals and the writ petition  the Court  HELD 11 The judgment of the Supreme Court in Hansa Corporations  case reported in  is binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the judgment or not To contend that the conclusion therein applies only to the partly before the Supreme Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory
By setting aside the common judgment of the High Court  the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases675 673 H 12 In the instant case  though a large number of writ petitions were filed challenging the Act  all those writ petitions were grouped together  heard 661 together and were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment
No petitioner advanced any contention peculiar or individual to his petition  not common to others
To be precise  the dispute in the cause or controversy between the State and each petitioner had no personal or individual element in it or anything personal or peculiar to each petitioner
The challenge to the Constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners
This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment that was the subject matter of appeal before Supreme Court in Hansa Corporations  case
When the Supreme Court repealed the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporation s case alone  but all petitioners in which the High Court issued mandamus on the non existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid
Therefore  to contend that the law laid down by Supreme Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal  is to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution
673B C 13 A mere reading of Article 141 bring into sharp focus its expanse and its all pervasive nature
In cases like this  where numerous petitions are disposed of by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed  the parties to the common judgment could very well have and should have intervened and could have requested the court to hear them also
They cannot be heard to say that the decision was taken by the Supreme Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed by the State against the common judgment673B C 2
There is no inconsistency in the finding of the Supreme Court in Joginder s case and Makhanlal Waza s case the ratio Is the same and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain decisions made by this Court in the earlier case
Both the decisions in Joginder s and Makhanlal Waza s case lay down identical principles and there is nothing to distinguish between the two
in the earlier case the Supreme Court  on its facts  overruled the preliminary objection that absence of appeals against the three petitioners let out
would not render the appeal before the Supreme Court incompetent  holding thereby that the effect of decision in that appeal would be binding on the appellant therein
In the latter case  the Supreme Court in unmistakable terms laid down that the law laid down in the earlier case  namely  Triloknath s case applied even to those who were not parties to the case
These two decisions were given by two Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court  the fact that Joginder Singh s case was not noted by the Bench that decided Makhanlal Waza s case does not create any difficulty
The two decisions  on the principles laid down by them  speak the same voice that is the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all  notwithstanding the fact that it is against the State or a private party and that it is binding on even those who were not parties before the court  State of Punjab vs Joginder Singh  Makhanlal Waza vs J  K State  discussed and followed
662 OBSERVATION In the fitness of things  it would be desirable that the State Government also took out publication in such cases to alert parties bound by the judgment  of the fact that an appeal had been preferred before Supreme Court by them
Here the State Government cannot be find fault with for having filed only one appeal
It is  of course  an economising procedure
673C D 31 A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has always been understood to mean a command issuing from the Court  competent to do the same  to a Public servant amongst others  to perform which leads to the initiation of action
32 In this case  the petitioners appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validity enacted
In other words  a writ of mandamus was predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid
Consequently the Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court
The Act  therefore  was under an eclipse  for a short duration but with the declaration of the law by the Supreme Court  the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus disappeared and the Act revived with its full the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by the judgment of the Supreme Court
If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid  effective and binding by the Supreme Court  the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to perform a negative duty
The declaration of the law is binding on everyone
And therefore  the mandamus would not survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed
774B E 33 Further  assuming that the mandamus in favour of the appellants survived not withstanding the judgment of this Court  the normal procedure to enforce the mandamus is to move the court in contempt when the parties against whom mandamus is issued disrespect it and if contempt petitions are filed and notices are issued to the State the States  obvious answer will be a reference to Article 141 and taking protection thereunder
No Court can punish a party for contempt under these circumstances  because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it has issued falls by the declaration by the Supreme Court of the validity of 1979 Act
674E G H