87 of 1957
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights
B D Sharma for the petitioner
N section Bindra R H Dhebar and T M Sen for the respondents
March 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J
In this petition under article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner contends that the provisions of the XXXI of 1950 and in particular those of section 2 d and sub section
4 of section 40 are unconstitutional
According to him the effect of the order passed against him by the Custodian of Evacuee Properties under sub section
4 of section 40 of the Act is to take away his 191 property without the authority of law
He further contends that the order of the Custodian amounts to discrimination in practice against the petitioner
These are the two main heads under which the arguments advanced before us could be classified
The relevant facts may now be stated
The petitioner purchased 195 51 acres of land in the former Bhopal State from one Babu Rehmatullah on June 23 1950 for a consideration of Rs 3500
Rehmatullah was declared to be an intending evacuee by the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property
Eventually he left India for Pakistan on June 20 1951
On June 12 1951 the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why the land which he had purchased from Rehmatullah should not be declared to be evacuee property
After hearing the petitioner the property was declared to be evacuee property on August 8 1951
The petitioner challenged that order in appeal as well as in revision as provided in the Act but was unsuccessful
A writ petition preferred by him before the Judicial Commissioner Bhopal was dismissed in limine on July 14 1954
He has therefore come up to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution
The first point pressed before us by Mr B D Sharma on behalf of the petitioner is that the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act and particularly those of sections 2 d and 40 4 are unconstitutional because they enable the State to take away property without paying any compensation therefore as required by article 31 2 of the Constitution
The short answer to this contention is that the provisions of a law made in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Government of India and the Government of any other country or otherwise With respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property will not be affected by the provisions of cl 2 of article 31
This is clear from the provisions of article 315biii which rules is thus Nothing in clause 2 shall affect 192 b the provisions of any law which the State may hereafter make iii in pursuance of any agreement entered into between the Government of the Dominion of India or the Government of India and the Government of any other country or otherwise with respect to property declared by law to be evacuee property
Mr Sharma however contends that the protection afforded by the aforesaid clause must be limited to a law which itself declares any property to be evacuee property and not to a law which empowers an authority to declare any property as evacuee property
We cannot accept the contention
The words property declared by law to be evacuee property would necessarily include property which could be declared as evacuee property
A law relating to evacuee property would concern itself with laying down the criteria for determining what property is to be considered as evacuee property and could not be expected to specify the particular properties which are to be treated as evacuee properties
The protection afforded by the constitutional provision which we have quoted above is not restricted as suggested by Mr Sharma but extends to a law which provides for the determination of the criteria for declaring property to be evacuee property
The next argument of learned counsel is that the property in question is not evacuee property and that the provisions of article 311 of the Constitution are a bar against taking it away
It is difficult to appreciate the argument
What article 311 prohibits is deprivation of property save by authority of law
No doubt the petitioner can say that he is deprived of his property because of the declaration made by the Custodian that it is evacuee property
But then this declaration has been made in pursuance of a law enacted by Parliament
If as contended by him we had held that the law is unconstitutional the position would have been different
The next contention of learned counsel is that cls
a and c of section 40 sub section
4 are ultra vires because 193 they confer arbitrary power upon the Custodian
The reason for raising the contention is that an application made by the petitioner to the Custodian under section 40 for confirming the sale in his favour was rejected by him on the ground that the evacuee did not act  in good faith in effecting the sale
Sub section
4 of section 40 Preads thus The Custodian shall hold an inquiry into the application in the prescribed manner and may reject the application if the is of opinion that a the transaction has not been entered into in good faith or for valuable consideration or b the transaction is prohibited under any law for the time being in force or c the transaction ought not to be confirmed for any other reason
 We are concerned here only with cl
a of section 404 to which the Custodian resorted and not with cl
We would therefore limit our remarks to el
Subsection 4 of section 40 enables the Custodian to hold an inquiry regarding the genuineness or validity of a transaction sought to be confirmed and cl
a empowers him to refuse to confirm it if he finds that it was not entered into in good faith
According to learned counsel the words good faith are vague and slippery and do not furnish any standard or a norm which has to be conformed to by the Custodian
Apart from the fact that the words good faith occur in a number of statutes and have acquired a definite meaning in courts of law it may be pointed out that the power conferred by sub section
4 of section 40 is in the nature of a judicial power and therefore the absence of a standard for the determination of the question would not render the provision unconstitutional
Learned counsel wanted to contend that the absence of good faith on the part of the transferee was not sufficient and could not be regarded as a ground for refusing recognition to the transfer and that unless it is shown that the transferee was also lacking in good faith the transfer had to be confirmed under sub section
4 of section 40
He however did not press the contention 194 when it was pointed out to him that in Rabia Bai vs The Custodian General of Evacuee Property 1 this Court has upheld the order of the Custodian refusing to confirm the transfer on the ground that the evacuee had effected it in bad faith
The last contention of learned counsel is that he has been discriminated against by the Custodian in the matter of confirmation of the transaction
He said that prior to the sale of the land to him by Rehmatullah the latter had sold a house to some nurses and that sale was found to be for inadequate consideration but in spite of that it was confirmed by the Custodian while the sale in his favour though found to be for an adequate consideration was not confirmed
We would repeat that the order of the Custodian is a judicial order and merely because he may have gone wrong in dealing with one case we cannot hold that the petitioner has been discriminated against
The petition is wholly without basis and is accordingly dismissed without costs
Petition dismissed


Summary:
The appellant and the respondent entered into a written partnership with respect to the managing agency business of two mills the terms of which were inter alia that the management shall be carried on in rotation once in four years the appellant to manage for the first four years and thereafter the respondent to manage for the next four years and in the same way thereafter
999 It further provided that the partners and their heirs and those getting their rights shall carry on the management in rotation
Soon after disputes arose between the partners and the appellant gave notice to the respondent terminating the partnership treating it as a partnership at will and the directors of the mills in their turn terminated the managing agency on the ground that the quarrels between the partners were detrimental to the good management of the mills
Thereafter the respondent brought a suit against the appellant and the mills for dissolution of the partnership firm and damages alleging that dissolution of the partnership by the appellant by notice was fraudulent and connived at by the mills
The trial court held that the partnership was at will and the termination of the managing agency was legal and disallowed damages
On appeal by the respondent the High Court held that the partnership was not a partnership at will and could not be dissolved by notice by the appellant
The termination of the managing agency was also held to be illegal
appeal by the appellant with a certificate of the High Court Held that considering the provision that the management would be carried on in rotation between the partners in four yearly periods and that the heirs of the partners would also carry on the business in rotation the intention was obviously to have a partnership of some duration though the duration was not expressly fixed in the agreement
The duration of a partnership may be expressly provided for in the contract but even when there is no express provision courts have held that the partner
ship will not be at will if the duration can be implied
Grawshay vs Manle Swans 495   followed
The contract in this case disclosed a partnership the deter mination of which was implied namely the termination of the managing agency and therefore under section 7 of the Partnership Act it was not a partnership at will and was not legally terminable by the notice given by the appellant
In view of the strained atmosphere between the partners there was sufficient reason for the mill to terminate the managing agency and the resolution of the board of directors terminating the managing agency agreement confirmed by the general meeting of the shareholders did terminate the managing agency
There was neither any fraud nor collusion by the mills with the appellant
Morarji Gokuldas and Co vs Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd and Others and Commissioners of Inland Revenue vs Sansom  referred to
The partnership in the present case must be deemed to have determined on the date of the passing of the resolution by the board of directors terminating the managing agency
Sections 10 and 13f of the Partnership Act have no application to the facts of the case