Appeal No 16 of 1952
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated February 6 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras Rajamannar C J and Somasundaram J in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No 11307 of 1950 arising out of Order dated November 10 1950 made in C No 2216 A 3 49 on the file of the Regional Transport Authority Tanjore
G R Jagadisa Iyer for the appellant
V K T Chari Advocate General of Madras V V Baghavan with him for the respondent
December 5
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GHULAM HASAN J
This appeal brought by special leave under article 136 1 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated February 6 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dismissing the petition of the appellant under article 226 praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated November 10 1950 passed by the respondent in the following circumstances  The appellant is the lessee of a site in the town of Tanjore in the State of Madras upon which he has a bus stand
The bus stand originally belonged to the Tanjore Municipality and the appellant merely held a licence from that authority
Later on the title of the Municipality to the site was questioned by a third party and in a civil litigation which ensued the title of the Municipality was negatived
Thereupon the appellant obtained the lease hold right of the site from the true owner and constructed a bus stand conforming to the design approved by the Municipality
Besides sheds for passengers and vehicles it provided other amenities
It was situate near the Railway Station and most of the buses leaving Tanjore for 38 292 out station journeys used this bus stand both as the starting point and as the terminus
It appears that the site was approved as convenient and suitable for the bus stand both by the Municipality and the District authorities for buses plying from and into Tanjore
The appellant held the licence for running the bus stand year after year
In 1939 the Municipality granted him a licence for four months only instead of one year as required by section 270 c of the Madras Municipalities Act V of 1920 and the appellant succeeded in vindicating his right for a whole year s licence in the Civil Court by obtaining the relief for injunction and an order directing the issue of a licence against the Municipality for 1940 41
The appellant carried on the business without let or hindrance until 1950 when the Municipality refused to renew his licence whereupon he obtained a mandatory injunction from the Civil Court directing the Municipality to grant him a licence for the year 1950 51
This decree was passed on October 7 1950
On February 21 1950 however the Regional Transport Authority Tanjore which is the respondent in the present appeal declared the bus stand as unsuitable with effect from April 1 1950 and altered the starting and the terminal points from that date
This order resulted in the closing of the appellant s bus stand
This decision which was given by means of a resolution was confirmed subsequently by another resolution passed on March 31 1950
The appellant challenged the validity of these resolutions by a petition under article 226 before the Madras High Court on the ground that they were passed without jurisdiction and were contrary to the principles of natural justice as they were passed without notice to the appellant and without giving him an opportunity to defend his right
The resolutions purported to have been passed under section 76 of the  which runs thus  The Provincial Government or any authority authorized in this behalf by the Provincial GovernMent  may in consultation with the local authority 293 having jurisdiction in the area concerneddetermine places at which motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time and may determine the places at which public service vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time and may determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers The Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and another learned Judge quashed the two orders as prayed for by the appellant on the grounds that the orders were passed ex parte and that section 76 did not authorize the respondent to close the bus stand
In the opinion of the Bench section 76 deals with provision for parking places and halting stations and has no applica tion to a permanent bus stand which is a sort of a radiating centre of all the bus traffic for the town
It was held therefore that the Regional Transport Authority could not under section 76 fix starting and terminus places for motor buses
Reference was made in the course of the arguments to rule 268 Madras Vehicles Rules 1940 and the learned Judges observed that though the rule does empower the Transport Authority to fix starting places and termini between which public service vehicles other than motor cars shall be permitted to be used but that this could be done only if starting places and termini had not already been fixed in accordance with the provisions of any statute
In the present case as these had already been fixed in accordance with rule 27 D Motor Vehicles Rules 1923 the Transport Authority could not fix new starting places and termini under rule 268 of the Rules passed in 1940
The Bench pointed out that the rule was defective and would lead to an impasse if the starting places and termini already fixed become unsuitable and have to be shifted
Accordingly they suggested that the rule should be amended and a provision introduced conferring on the appropriate 294 authority the requisite power to alter from time to time the starting places and termini
See T E Ebrahim Saheb vs The Regional Transport Authority Tanjore1
It appears that within two months of the decision of the High Court rule 268 was amended by the Government
Before the decision of the High Court was given the bus stand was shifted to a place belonging to the Municipality in another area
Rule 268 as it originally stood ran thus  In the case of public service vehicles other than motor cabs if starting places and termini have not been fixed in accordance with the provisions of any statute the transport authority may after consultation with such other authority as it may deem desirable fix starting places and termini between which such vehicles shall be permitted to be used within its jurisdiction
A list of such places shall be supplied by such authority to every holder of a permit for such vehicles
When such places have been fixed every such vehicle shall start only from such places
 By the amendment the words  if starting places and termini have not been fixed in accordance with the provisions of any statute  were deleted and the words  and after notice to the parties affected fix or alter from time to time for good and proper reasons were added
As amended the rule runs thus  268
In the cage of public service vehicles other than motor cabs the transport authority may after consultation with such other authority as it may consider desirable and after notice to the parties affected fix or alter from time to time for good and proper reasons the starting places and termini between which such vehicles shall be permitted to be used within its jurisdiction
A list of such places shall be supplied by such authority to every holder of a permit for such vehicles at the time of grant of or renewal of permits
1 AIR 951 Mad 419
295 When such places have been fixed every such vehicle shall start only from such places
 The respondent then issued a notice to the appellant on October 25 1950 to show cause why the bus stand should not be shifted the grounds given being that it was not satisfactorily maintained and was situated in a limited space which was inadequate to accommodate all the buses using the stand and that it did not permit of any improvements being carried out
The appellant filed a long written statement objecting to the notice and challenging the grounds whereupon the respondent issued a fresh notice on November 2 1950 in which the original grounds were dropped and were substituted by the ground from  the point of convenience of the travelling public
After hearing the appellant and the Municipality the Board passed a resolution on November to 1950 that for good and proper reasons namely the convenience of the travelling public the Transport Authority had resolved to alter the starting places and termini of all public service vehicles other than motor cabs arriving at and proceeding from Tanjore from the existing bus stand owned by the appellant to the Municipal bus stand in another area of the town
This order led to another petition being filed in the High Court at Madras praying for a writ of certiorari under article 226
The appellant questioned the jurisdiction of the Transport Authority to pass the order in question
It was contended before the High Court that rule 268 as amended was itself ultra vires firstly because it was beyond the rulemaking power conferred by section 68 sub section r of the  and secondly because it was repugnant to article 191g of the Constitution
Both these contentions were rejected by the High Court and the petition was dismissed
The contentions raised before the High Court have been repeated before us
We are satisfied that there is no good ground for differing from the view taken by the High Court
The contains 10 Chapters
Chapter IV of the Act deals with 296 control of transport vehicles
Section 4 7 1 lays down that the Regional Transport Authority shall in deciding whether to grant or refuse a stage carriage permit have regard to the following matters namely a the interest of the public generally b to f       
Section 48 says that the Regional Transport Authority after consideration of the matters set forth in section 47 may attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the following conditions
Various conditions are set out one of which v is material for our purposes
It is to the effect  that within Municipal limits and in such other areas and places as may be prescribed passengers shall not be taken up or set down at or except at specified points
 The material portion of section 68 may be set out here 1 A Provincial Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter
2 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power rules under this section may be made with respect to all or any of the following matters namely r prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers by stage or contract carriages at specified places or in specified areas or at places other than duly notified stands or halting places     It is obvious from a plain reading of sub section 1 that the Government has got full power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions contained in Chapter IV relating to the control of transport vehicles and according to subsection 2 without prejudice to this power the Government has the power to frame rules with respect to matters set out in sub sections 2 a
to 2 za
It is significant to note that the Act does not follow the ordinary mode of providing at the end of the Act that the Government is empowered to make rules for the 297 purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act but at the end of each of the Chapters including Chapter IV the power has been reserved to the Provincial Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter
The purpose of Chapter IV is described by the compendious expression control of transport vehicles and the Provincial Government is invested with plenary powers to make rules for carrying out that purpose
Keeping in view the purpose underlying the Chapter we are not prepared to hold that the fixing or alteration of bus stands is foreign to that purpose
It was contended that section 68 sub section 2r does not confer the power upon the transport authority to direct the fixing or the alteration of a bus stand and that rule 268 of the rules framed under that section was therefore ultra vires
We are not prepared to accede to this contention
Sub section 2r clearly contemplates three definite situations
It prohibits the picking up or setting down of passengers i at specified places ii in specified areas and iii at places other than duly notified stands or halting places
If the power to make rules in regard to these matters is given to the Government then it follows that a specified place may be prohibited from being used for picking up or setting down passengers
This will inevitably result in the closing of that specified place for the purpose of picking up or setting down of passengers
Similarly a specified area may be excluded for the same purpose
The expression duly notified stands is not defined in the Act but it is reasonable to presume that a duly notified stand must be one which is notified by the Transport Authority and by none other
There is no warrant for the presumption that it must be notified by the Municipality  Reference was Made to section 270b 270c 298 270e 1 2  3 of the Madras District Municipalities Act V of 1920 and it was argued that the authority which is clothed with a power to fix a stand is the Municipality
Section 270b empowers the Municipal Council to construct or provide halting places and cart stands and the latter according to the Explanation appended to the section includes a stand for motor vehicles as well
Section 270c merely says that where a Municipal Council has provided a public landing place halting place or cartstand the executive authority may prohibit the use for the same purpose by any person within such distance thereof as maybe determined by the Municipal Council of any public place or the sides of any public street
Section 270e lays down that no person can open a new private cart stand or continue to keep open a private stand unless he obtains from the Council a licence to do so
These provisions do not affect the power of the Transport Authority to regulate traffic control or impose restrictions upon the licence of any such cart stand
If rule 268 is therefore within the power of the rule making authority it follows that it cannot be challenged as being void because it is not consistent with some general law
Reliance was placed on a passage at page 299 of Craies on Statute Law as laying down that a by law must not be_repugnant to the statute or the general law
But by laws and rules made under a rule making power conferred by a statute do not stand on the same footing as such rules are part and parcel of the statute itself
Section 68 subjection 2r involves both s general prohibition
that the stand will cease to exist as well as a particular prohibition namely that passengers shall not be picked up or set down at a specified point
The order passed by the Transport Authority properly construed falls within the ambit of section 68 sub section 2r
Rule 268 under which the order impeached was passed is rule framed under the plenary rule making 299 power referred to in section 68 sub section 1
Sub section 2 za says that a rule may be made with respect to any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed
This shows the existence of residuary power vested in the rule making authority
It follows therefore that rule 268 is within the scope of the powers conferred under section 68 of the Act
The next contention was that the order is repugnant to article 19 1 g of the Constitution according to which all citizens must have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business
It cannot be denied that the appellant has not been prohibited from carrying on the business of running a bus stand
What has been prohibited is that the bus stand existing on the parti cular site being unsuitable from the point of view of public convenience it cannot be used for picking up or setting down passengers from that stand for outstations journeys
But there is certainly no prohibition for the bus stand being used otherwise for carrying passengers from the stand into the town and vice versa
The restriction placed upon the use of the bus stand for the purpose of picking up or setting down passengers to outward journeys cannot be con sidered to be an unreasonable restriction
It may be that the appellant by reason of the shifting of the bus stand has been deprived of the income he used to enjoy when the bus stand was used for outward journeys from Tanjore but that can be no ground for the contention that there has been an infringement of any fundamental right within the meaning of article 19 1 g of the Constitution
There is no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on business wherever he chooses and his right must be subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by the executive authority in the interest of public convenience
The restriction may have the effect of eliminating the use to which the stand has been put hitherto but the restriction cannot be regarded as being unreasonable if the authority imposing such restriction had the power to do so
Whether the abolition of the stand 39 300 was conducive to public convenience or not is a matter entirely for the transport authority to judge and it is not open to the court to substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the authority which is in the beat position having regard to its knowledge of local conditions to appraise the situation
It was next contended that rule 268 if it is held to be intra vires was not complied with as the Transport Authority could pass such an order only after consultation with such other authority as it may deem desirable
It is admitted that the Transport Authorityconsulted the Municipality before passing the order in question
Rule 268 therefore was fully complied with
But then it is urged that the Municipality was not the proper authority in the circumstances as it was a partisan to the dispute and had been endeavouring to oust the appellant from the bus stand in order to set up its own bus stand
The Municipality is a public body interested in public welfare and if it sought the assistance of the Government or the Transport Authority to shift the busstand it was actuated only by the demands of public interest
It was possible for the Transport Authority to consult the District Board or the Panchayat as suggested for the appellant but it was not bound to do so
We do not think that in consulting the Municipality the Transport Authority acted otherwise than within the scope of its powers
Further according to the language employed the consultation is not obligatory but only discretionary
It was suggested that the act of the Municipality was mala fide and reference was made to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the appellant s affidavit dated November 20 1950
They refer merely to the vagueness of the ground of public convenience and to he amendment of the rule not being bona fide
There is however no material to support this suggestion
The mere fact that in the first notice certain grounds were mentioned which were not adhered to in the second notice and convenience of the travelling public was alone mentioned as the ground cannot lead to the 301 inference that the order was mala fide
The rule was amended in pursuance of the suggestion of the High Court in order to overcome the difficulty which arose in the absence of requisite power to alter the busstands
It is significant that no allegation about mala fides was made before the High Court and the question was never discussed there
In the petition for special leave to appeal though there is reference to the ground of inconvenience being vague yet there is no suggestion of mala fides
The question about mala fides appears to have been raised for the first time in paragraph 4 f and g of the statement of the case
We hold that the plea of mala fides has not It was also urged that the resolution is invalid as the District Collector who presided over the meeting of the Transport Authority which passed this resolution had opened the new Municipal bus stand on April I 1950
The suggestion is that be did not bring to bear upon the question an impartial and unbiased mind
The District Collector was not acting in the exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions so that his action can be subjected to the scrutiny which is permissible in the case of a judicial officer
He was acting purely in his executive capacity and his conduct in presiding over the meeting of the Transport Authority in the exercise of his normal functions and also opening the Municipal stand which he was entitled to do as the head of the District does not affect the validity or fairness of the order complained against
We do not think there is any merit in this contention
Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 as it originally stood did not empower the Transport Authority to alter from time to time the starting places and termini for motor vehicles
The rule was amended in 1950 so as to empower the Transport Authority to do so and after giving notice to the appellant who was the owner of a bus stand in a municipality which was being used for several years as the starting place and terminus for motor buses plying to and from the municipality the Transport Authority passed a resolution changing the starting place and terminus for the convenience of the public
The appellant applied for a writ of certiorari contending that r 268 as amended was ultra vires as it went beyond the rule making powers conferred by section 68 2 r of the and was also repugnant to article 19 1 g of the Constitution Held i that the fixing and alteration of bus stands was not a purpose foreign to the  control of transport vehicles  the purpose for which rules could be made under section 68 1 and the power to make rules prohibiting the picking up or setting down of passengers at specified places mentioned in section 68 2 r necessarily included the power to alter the situation of bus stands and r 268 as amended did not therefore go beyond section 68 2 r  ii the restriction placed upon the use of the bus stand for the purpose of picking up or getting down passengers to or from outward journeys cannot be considered to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on any profession trade or business of the appellant and r 268 was not in any way repugnant to article 19 1 g of the Constitution
The expression  duly notified stand  in the Madras means a stand duly notified by the Transport Authority
There is no warrant for the view that it means a stand 291 notified by the municipality
The provisions of section 270 b c and e do not affect the power of the Transport Authority to regulate traffic control or impose restrictions upon the licence of cart stands