Civil Appeal No 793 of 1988 etc
From the Judgment and order dated 2561987 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No 8019 of 1987 FS Nariman GL Sanghi AK Sen Dr LM Singhvi Anil B Diwan K Srinivasamurthy Kailash Vasdev KK Jain KS Murthy UK Khaitan Ajay K Jain Vipin Sanghi Parveen Kumar AM Singhvi RS Yadav HM Singh N Waziri Vinoo Bhagat Shree 162 Narain and Sandeep Narain for the Appellants
Shanti Bhushan VB Reddy and K Rajendra Chaudhary for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA J
Leave granted
These special leave petitions have been filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court delivered on 25687 wherein the learned Judges set aside the orders passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal
The petitioners had filed writ petitions before the High Court which were heard by a learned Single Judge and who by his orders quashed the notification issued by the respondent Board dated 21781 unilaterally altering the conditions of supply
The learned Single Judge held that the Board had no authority unilaterally to alter the conditions of supply of electricity but on appeal the learned Judges of the Division Bench set aside the judgment passed by the Single Judge and held that the Board respondent had the statutory authority under Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act 1948  Act  for short to lay down the conditions of supply and if any doubt exists Section 18 clause c of the Act confers powers on the Board
It is against this judgment of the Division Bench in all these petitions which were disposed of by a common judgment that these special leave petitions have been filed and therefore these matters are before us
On 21781 the respondent AP State Electricity Board issued a notification exercising powers under Sec 49 of the Act
By this notification the Board unilaterally altered the conditions of supply for the high tension consumers of electricity
Admittedly these consumers are the industries which consume high tension power
This notification stated that the industries will be supplied the power for the contracted demands between 1501 KVA to 5000 KVA at 33 KV whereas industries whose contracted demand is above 5000 KVA shall avail supply at 132 KV or 220 KV
To comply with this requirement high tension consumers ie the present appellants before this Court will either have to replace the existing transformers and high tension control gears or to instal transformers with control gears to step down supply from the now proposed voltage to the existing voltage and these modifications have to be made by the industries concerned within a period of 6 months from the date of this notification
It was further 163 provided that after the lapse of six months if the consumers ie appellants have not made arrangements for receiving the supply at the proposed voltage and continue to receive supply at the voltage at which they were receiving on the date of the notification they will have to pay additional surcharge ranging between 25 to 13 on their power bills
It is alleged that after this notification the appellants and other similarly situated consumers made a representation to the Board and they were told that as the transmission and transformation losses in respect of supply to these high tension consumers is very much it has been decided by the Board to minimise these transmission losses and it is for that purpose that it has been decided to supply at high voltage as transmission of high voltage current results in lesser losses of transmission and by this process energy which is lost in the transmission will be saved and it was for this purpose that this policy has been adopted by the Board
According to the appellants consumers their grievance was that for the purpose of receiving power at a high voltage they will have to instal their own transformers which would involve heavy capital investments and for supply of power at high voltage even the Board will have to lay new lines of supply and all this would not be economical as compared to the contemplated loss of power on account of transmission but as Board did not accept the representation the petitioners filed their petitions before the High Court and the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by his judgment dated 24982 allowed the writ petitions against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in appeal before the Division Bench the judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside and the Division Bench took the view that Sec
49 of the Act coupled with Sec
18c of the same Act empowered the electricity board to unilaterally alter the terms and conditions of supply and it is against this judgment of the Division Bench that these appeals are before us
Before this notification the electricity was being supplied to high tension consumers at 11000 Voltes or 33000 Voltes
By this notification they were expected to receive supply at higher voltage specified in the notification
The main contention advanced before the High Court in the writ petitions was that it was not open to the Board to direct the existing consumers to take the supply at a higher voltage then the voltage at which they were receiving supplies or to impose an additional charge on the supply
It was contended before us that in view of Sec
26 read with 164 clause 6 of the schedule to the it is not open to the Board to unilaterally impose supply at a higher voltage
According to the learned counsel as a particular customer has requisitioned supply of power at a particular voltage and Board had agreed to do it was not permissible now to alter the conditions
On the contrary on behalf of the Board it was contended that Sec 26 of Electricity Supply Act no doubt puts an obligation on the Board to supply power as were the obligations of the licensee under the 1910 Act and also the provisions of Clause 6 of the Schedule will apply to the Board but it was contended that it has not been provided anywhere in Clause 6 that it is the choice of the consumer to require supply at a particular voltage
It was also contended that clause 6 sub clause 5 provides the requisition to be in the form and the prescribed form does not indicate that it is open to the consumer to require the supply at any particular voltage
It was also contended that in fact Sec
26 itself talks of subject to the provisions of this Act and Sec
49 of the Act confers power on the Board to lay down the conditions of supply
It was also contended on behalf of the respondent Board that the Board chose to switch over to supply of high voltage in order to minimise the transmission losses as according to them if the electricity is transmitted at 33000 volts instead of 11000 volts the transmission loss will be reduced to 119th and if the supply is further increased to 132 KV the transmission loss will be further reduced to 144th with the result that the transmission losses could be reduced to 993
It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that in case of some industries the question of transmission losses is not substantial as some of them are situated just near the supply station and even if there is some loss it is negligible as compared to the heavy cost of installation which will have to be put up
An attempt was also made to suggest that when the distance is very short the transmission loss will be very low but one fact to be kept in consideration which was lost sight of at some stage that transmission loss is not only related to the distance that the power travels but also the quantum of power that travels
Admittedly all these petitioners are consumers who are consuming huge quantities of power which is clearly indicated from the bills charts of which were filed by the petitioners themselves before this Court indicating that their yearly power bills which run into crores and it is in this context that the question of transmission loss will have to be considered
The main controversy which was before the High Court was as to whether the Board has power unilaterally to alter the conditions of supply
On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that Sec
49 only confers powers on the Board to revise the tariffs periodically and it was 165 contended that a little before the present disputed notification was issued the tariffs were revised and that revision of tariffs was done keeping in view all the relevant consideration including all losses in transmission and transformation and therefore immediately after the revision of the tariffs there was no occasion for exercise of power under Sec 49 by issuing the impugned notification
It was contended that Sec
26 read with clause 6 of the Schedule is an obligation on the Board to supply the power as requested by the consumer
26 reads 26
Board to have powers and obligations of licensee under Act 9 of 1910
Subject to the provisions of this Act the Board shall in respect of the whole State have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the 9 of 1910 and this Act shall be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purposes of that Act Provided that nothing in Sections 3 to 11 sub sections 2 and 3 of Section 21 and Section 22 sub section 2 of Section 22 A and Sections 23 and 27 of that Act or in Clause I to V Clause VII and Clauses IX to XII of the Schedule to that Act relating to the duties and obligations of a licensee shall apply to the Board Provided further that the provisions of Clause VI of the Schedule to that Act shall apply to the Board in respect of that area only where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them has commenced  It is clear from a perusal of this provision that the obligation under Sec 26 is subject to the provisions of this Act
Clause 6 pertaining to requisition for supply to owner and occupiers of the electricity provides for conditions under which a licensee will be bound to supply and sub clause 5 of clause 6 of the Schedule under 1910 Act requires the requisition to be in a form prescribed and the form prescribed does not indicate that the consumer is free to ask for the supply at a particular voltage only
On behalf of the petitioners it was vehemently contended that Sec
49 confers powers on the Board only to revise the tariffs and it has not conferred any power on the Board to alter unilaterally the supply 166 at a particular voltage
The main contention on behalf of the petitioner was that Sec
49 only empowered the Board to fix uniform tariffs and in support of the contention reliance was placed on the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs Kalyan Borough Municipality  Anr  and Bisra Stone Lime Company Ltd  Anr
vs Orissa State Electricity Board  Anr  In these cases no doubt Sec
49 has been considered but the only question in these cases was pertaining to tariff and there was no occasion to consider the scope of Sec
49 Clause I which empowers the Board to lay down conditions of supply
49 reads 49
Provision for the sale or electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees
1 Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations if any made in this behalf the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs
2 In fixing the uniform tariffs the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors namely a the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required b the co ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee c the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies d the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas
3 Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee having 167 regard to the geographical position of any area the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors
4 In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity the Board shall not show undue preference to any person
 Sub clause 1 of this Section clearly provides that the Board could lay down conditions of supply and for purposes of such supply it may also frame uniform tariffs
Sub section 1 therefore clearly authorises the Board to lay down the conditions of supply and have to fix uniform tariffs is provided for in sub clause 2
If there is any doubt sub clause 4 makes it clear that in exercise of powers under this Section Board could fix the conditions of supply and also fix the tariffs and it was therefore contended on behalf of the respondent Board that although the Division Bench referred to Sec
18c still the Board has enough power under Sec
49 itself to lay down the conditions of supply
This question about the conditions of supply specifically came up before this Court in the case of Jagadamba Paper Industries Pvt Ltd Etc
vs Haryana State Electricity Board  Ors
Etc  and it was observed at page 172 We are of the view that the Board has been conferred statutory power under section 491 of the Act to determine the conditions on the basis of which supply is to be made
This Court in Bisra Stone Lime Company Ltd  Anr
vs Orissa State Electricity Board  Anr  took the view that enhancement of rates by way of surcharge was well within the power of the Board to fix or revise the rates of tariff under the provisions of the Act
What applied to the tariff would equally apply to the security that being a condition in the contract of supply
Each of the petitioning consumers had agreed to furnish security in cash for payment of energy bills at the time of entering into their respective supply agreements
There was no challenge in these writ petitions that the demand of security at the time of entering into supply agreements has to be struck down as being without jurisdiction
Section 491 of the Act clearly indicates that the Board may supply electricity to any person upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit
In exercise of this power the Board had initially introduced the condition regarding security and 168 each of the petitioners had accepted the term
 It is not disputed that although under the original agreement the electricity Board was bound to supply power at a particular voltage but after the lapse of that agreement by lapse of time subsequent agreement provided the clause where the right has been reserved by the Board to alter the conditions of supply and that is why the only contention advanced by the petitioners was that under Sec
49 the respondent Board had no authority unilaterally to alter conditions of supply and as discussed above this contention cannot be accepted
The Division Bench relied on provisions contained in Sec
18 sub clause c which reads to exercise such control in relation to the generation distribution and utilisation of electricity within the State as is provided for by or under this Act
 It is no doubt true that under these provisions the Board exercises control in relation to generation distribution and utilisation of electricity and the learned Judges of the Division Bench felt that although specific power is not there under Sec
18c but it is wide enough to authorise the Board to alter the conditions of supply
It is no doubt true that Sec
18c confers power of control on the Board but as indicated above in our opinion the specific power under Sec
49 clause I is clear enough wherein Board has been authorised to lay down the conditions of supply
On the merits of the contention various controversies were raised in respect of the calculations and mathematics of calculating the transmission loss
An attempt was also made on behalf of petitioners to suggest that the way of calculations suggested by the respondent Board does not appear to be correct but it is not disputed and it can not be disputed that where power travels through the transmission lines there is always some loss of power
It is also a fact which could not be disputed that loss of power will be related to the quantum of power which travels through the transmission line and the distance through which power has to travel
It is also a fact which could not be disputed that if power is transmitted at high voltage the loss during transmission is less as compared to the loss when the power is transmitted at a low voltage and in view of these accepted scientific facts it is not necessary for us to go into the calculations and mathematical part of it to find out 169 as to whether the calculations submitted by the Board is correct or those suggested on behalf of the petitioners are correct
The fact remains that lower the voltage higher the transmission loss higher the voltage lower the transmission loss and it is also not in dispute that these appellants are high tension consumers consuming substantial power and therefore when power travels through transmission lines even for short distances it is not smaller quantities of power but heavy quantities of power is transmitted and in this view of the matter it could not be said that the policy decision taken by the Board to supply these high tension consumers power at high voltage so that transmission loss and transformation loss should be minimised could not be said to be any wrong decision or a decision not supported by scientific reasoning
It was also contended that 6 months  time granted was too short in view of the fact that these consumers were expected to instal transformers and equipments which ordinarily are not easily available in this country and which involved high capital investment
It was also suggested that even the respondent Board has not been able to lay lines for supply at high voltage as during the course of this litigation most of the appellants have accepted to receive the supply at the high voltage and therefore it was contended that the enhanced rate for supply at low voltage which was brought into force immediately after six months of the issue of this notification is not only justified as it was termed by learned counsel for the petitioners to be penal but it was contended that it is not reasonable as in spite of the fact that the petitioners accepted to receive supply at high voltage and some of them have even installed the transformers and other equipments but still Board was not in a position to lay supply lines for the high voltage supply of power and on this basis in substance it was vigorously contended that this enhanced rate should not be made chargeable from the date immediately after the expiry of six months after the issue of this notification
In one of the case ie AP Paper Mills which has been specifically alleged that inspite of the fact that the petitioner has installed a transformer but the respondent Board could not lay down the lines as there was some injunction issued against the Board when the work for laying the lines started still although the Board is not in a position to supply the power at high voltage still the appellant is compelled to pay the higher rate as he is not receiving power at the high voltage indicated in the notification
170 So far these aspects of the matter are concerned admittedly they were not before the High Court
Originally what was challenged in the High Court was the power of the Board to unilaterally alter the conditions of supply
This question about from what date the higher rates should be charged and as to whether grant of six months time to complete the preparation for receiving the supply at a higher voltage is reasonable or not were not before the High Court Single Judge nor before the Division Bench and in fact tacts in respect of each petitioner on the basis of which these questions could be considered are also not before us although an attempt has been made by some of the appellants by additional affidavits and documents to place it before us
But it is not sufficient nor it is proper to decide these questions
After all the respondent Board is an authority under a Statute and if the appellants are able to satisfy the authority that the time of six months in the context of the circumstances when this notification was issued was not reasonable it is open to the Board to consider from what date to enforce the enhanced rates for supply at lower voltage taking into consideration all the cases and also keeping in view the circumstances in connection with installation of transformers and laying the lines which have come during the course of these hearings
It is also open to the Board that in the special facts of any particular case to provide a separate date for enforcement of the higher rate
But all these questions can not be decided in the scope of the present appeals
It was also contended by the appellants that by altering this condition of supply the appellants will have to undergo huge capital investment burden
On the other hand on behalf of the Board it was contended that if the bills of supply of power of these appellants are looked at it will indicate that what they are supposed to spend on the installation in stepping down power is not so heavy and it was contended that ultimately if this is not done by the Board the loss incurred on account of transmission has to be borne not only by these consumers who are substantially responsible for the transmission loss but by those also who are not at all responsible for heavy transmission losses
An attempt was made to suggest that when power is supplied to the rural consumers mainly agriculturists and small consumers the power has to be supplied at long distance and that is also to be supplied at low voltage and therefore it was contended that in fact the long distance supply to smaller consumers is really responsible for the loss during transmission for which these high tension consumers ie the present appellants are being penalised as they are being called upon to pay at a higher rate but this argument suffers from a fallacy
As indi 171 cated above transmission loss no doubt is on account of low voltage when it travels long distance as it is related to distance but the quantum of loss also is proportional to the quantum of power that travels through the transmission lines and it could not be disputed that the power that has to travel to meet the requirements of small agricultural consumers is negligible as compared to the quantum of power that is supplied to these high tension consumers the present appellants and therefore there is no substance in the contention that the loss incurred in supply to the smaller consumers is being recovered from the present appellants the high tension consumers
It was also contended that under Sec
18A1 read alongwith Sec
18A2 of the Act it is the duty of the Board to establish and maintain sub stations and main transmission lines and it is not open to the Board to transfer this responsibility to the consumers by requiring them to make their own arrangements to step down electricity after taking it at a high voltage
Section 2 sub clause 7 of the Act defines the main transmission lines but ll this in sub clause 7 of Section 2 refers to is about transmission of electricity from a generating station to another generating station or to a sub station
Apparently it refers to all the lines and equipments required to be installed from the generating station to the distributing sub station
Apparently both being that of the Board itself it has to maintain it and on this basis it could not be contended that if the consumer has to receive power at a high voltage and if he wants to utilise it at a low voltage it is not his responsibility to instal equipments for stepping down the power from high voltage to low voltage
It was also contended that Sections 28 and 29 read with Sections 18 and 18A of the Act indicate that where any scheme as contemplated under Sections 28 and 29 is to be formulated the procedure prescribed therein had to be followed and it was suggested that as the policy of the Board to change over of supply of power at a high voltage involves heavy expenditure it will fall within the scope of Sections 28 and 29 and therefore it could not be done without following the procedure indicated in these provisions
A perusal of these sections 28 and 29 of the Act indicates that it is altogether a different function rather than what is being done by the Board in exercise of the powers under Section 49 clause 1 and therefore this contention that the procedure indicated in Sections 28 and 29 has to be followed is of no substance
In the light of discussions above therefore in our opinion there 172 is no substance in these appeals
But as indicated earlier as regards the imposition of the higher tariff on failure to receive the supply at the voltage indicated in the notification from the date specified therein or not will be open to the Board for consideration and the parties may approach the Board and it will be open to the Board in the facts and circumstances of each case not to levy the surcharge indicated in the notification during a particular period and in so doing the Board will take into consideration the facts and circumstances of each particular case
The appeals are therefore dismissed
In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs
HSK Appeals dismissed


Summary:
 The prosecution alleged that the married life of the appellant who was said to be 1512 years of age was in a serious disarray that she and the non appealing accused were on terms of illicit intimacy that she also submitted herself to PW 2 in an extra marital relation that on 131173 she implored the non appealing accused and PW 2 to free her from a cruel husband by doing away with him that she agreed that she would thereafter live with the non appealing accused as his wife that the three designed and conspired to do away with the deceased in pursuance of which the appellant persuaded her husband to go to the bus stand at Chandigarh at 930 am
On 14th November 1973 where the non appealing accused and PW 2 were waiting for him as pre arranged and took him to Pinjore by bus where they consumed liquor together and the non appealing accused purchased Ghotna that while all the three were walking back to Chandigarh and climbed the way side hill the non appealing accused gave blows on the head of the unsuspecting deceased with the Ghotna while PW 2 pinned him down that they concealed the clothes and body of the deceased in the nearby bushes that both of them returned to Chandigarh by night fall and the nonappealing accused informed PW 2 that he in turn had informed the appellant of the death of her husband that the mother of the deceased PW 19 lodged a complaint on 131273 about her missing son in writing with the Senior Superintendent of Police Chandigarh alleging that she had learnt that a certain person of the village Lahor Khoda with his two sons and the Sarpanch with his two other relatives had killed her son the motive being that her son had developed illicit relations with the daughter of the person that after coming to know of her husband s death the appellant misled her mother in law PW 19
into making a H 746 report to the police containing false and misleading information in an attempt to draw a red herring across the trial
The non appealing accused was arrested on 3475
On his information exhibit P8 a pair of shoes purse 25 pieces of bones including an incomplete human skull were recovered
The appellant and PW 2 were arrested on 8575
After completing the investigation charges were brought against the appellants and the two accused for conspiracy and murder
PW 2 who was one of the co accused turned approver
The trial court on the basis of the approver s testimony as corroborated by other evidence held the non appealing accused and the appellant guilty of the offences under sections 302 and 120 B of the IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life
The High Court dismissed their appeals and confirmed the convictions and sentence
In the appeal to this Court it was urged that the evidence of the approver insofar as the compicity of the appellant was concerned lacked corroboration on material particulars and that no conviction could be sustained on such uncorroborated accomplice s testimony
On the question as to 1 the nature and extent of corroboration of an accomplice s evidence and 2 the procedure for the trial of offences by a child  under the East Punjab Children s Act 1949  HELD 11 An accomplice by long legal tradition is a notoriously infamous witness one who being partipes criminis purchases his immunity by accepting to accuse others
Section 114 illustration b of the Evidence Act envisages the presumptive uncreditworthiness of an accomplice
But then section 133 provides that a conviction is not illegal merely because it rests upon an accomplice s uncorroborated testimony
753C D 12 In indictments particularly of serious crimes counsel of caution and the rule of prudence enjoin that it is unsafe to rest a conviction on the evidence of a guilty partner in a crime without independent corroboration on the material particulars
Judicial experience was thus elevated to a rule of law
lt is a practice which deserves all the reverence of law
753D E l3 The nature and extent of the corroboration must necessarily 747 vary with the nature and circumstances of each case
Enunciation of any general rule valid for all occasions is at once unwise and unpractical
753F 14 The corroboration has to be of two kinds first belonging to the area of reassurance of the credit of the approver himself as a trustworthy witness and the second which arises for conclusion after the court is satisfied about the creditibility of the approver as to the corroboration in material particulars not only of the commission of the crime but also of the complicity of other accused person in the crime
If on the first area the court is not satisfied the second does not arise
However the two areas of corroboration are not two separate watertight compartments
The evidence as a whole will have to be examined to reach conclusions on both aspects
757G H 752C Sharvana Bhavan vs State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1273 referred 15 The controversy in the present case in the ultimate analysis belongs to the second area whether the approver s testimony as to appellant s complicity in the conspiracy could safely be held to have been corroborated by independent evidence on the material particulars
758F G There was a considerable lapse of time between the death of decease and the arrest of the appellant and the non appealing accused
There is no evidence to show that in the interregnum there was any liasion between the two
The incriminating circumstances in the evidence of the approver appearing against the appellant that on 13111973 appellant wept and implored the non appealing accused and PW 2 to do away with the deceased and that appellant also agreed that she would thereafter live with the non appealing accused had had to be put to the appellant m the course of her examination under section 313 Cr
PC but this has not been done
Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to submit an explanation to it
That part of the evidence must for that reason be excluded from consideration
759C E Harijan Magha Jesha vs State of Gujarat  referred to
On a consideration of the entire matter the approver s evidence in regard to the complicity of the appellant in the conspiracy lacks corroboration on certain material particulars necessary to connect the 748 appellant
A little more reassurance than is afforded by the state of evidence in the case is perhaps necessary to convict appellant
The appellant in the circumstances would be entitled to the benefit of doubt
759F At the time of the commission of the offence the appellant even on the basis of the observations made by the sessions court was about 15 years of age and was a child  within the meaning of East Punjab Children s Act 1949
The sessions court invoked the proviso to section 27 of the Act and held that the appellant was so depraved a character that none of the other methods mentioned in the section in which the case could legally be dealt with was suitable in her case
759G 760C In view of the finding that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt any examination of the legality or propriety of the procedure adopted in the case in the matter of trial of a child  under the East Punjab Children s Act 1949 and the correctness of the view of the sessions court in appealing to the proviso to section 27 and sentencing appellant to imprisonment for life is not necessary 
760 C D Appeal allowed
Conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside and appellant directed to be set at liberty
However conviction and sentence of the other non appearing accused left undisturbed
760E Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Editition Vol
VII para 2054 Rex vs Bhaskerville  Rameshwar Kalyan Singh vs State of Rajasthan   Director of Public Persecutions vs Kill bourne 1973 Appeal AC 729All England law reports 19821 page 815g R vs Beck  R vs Spencer   R vs Donat  Attorney General of Hongkong vs Wong Muko Ping and Halsbury s Laws of England IV Ed
II p 268 para 454 referred to