nch of two members in their reasoned order pointed out what they perceived to be an error of law in the earlier decision and stated the points for the President to make a reference to a larger Bench
Accordingly the Bench of two members acted within their power is stating the points of law which required clarification and the President acted equally within the bounds of his power in constituting a larger Bench to hear and decide those points
795E 796C  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 3955 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 7121989 of the Delhi High Court in CW No 1060 of 1987
Dr V Gauri Shanker CV Subba Rao section Rajappa and M Chandershekharan NP for the Appellants
GL Sanghi
Raju Ramachandran Dhruv Mehta and RK Sanghi for the Respondent
792 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN J
Special Leave is granted
This appeal by the Union of India arises from the Judg ment dated 7121989 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No 1060 of 1987 setting aside Orders dated 22101986 and 431987
The former order was made by a Bench of two mem bers of the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal hereinafter called the Tribunal  and the latter order was made by the President of the Tribunal
By their Order dated 22101986 the Bench of two members of the Tribunal stated that they doubted the correctness of an earlier decision of a Bench of three members of the Tribunal in Bakelite Hylam Ltd Bombay  Anr
vs Collector of Cus toms Bombay  Anr and directed that the case of the present respondent Paras Laminates P Ltd be placed before the President of the Tribunal for referring it to a larger Bench of the Tribunal
The President by his Order dated 43
1987 referred the case to a larger Bench of five members
These two orders were struck down by the High Court stating that the Bench of two members ought to have followed the earlier decision of the larger Bench of 3 Judges and a reference of the case to a still larger Bench was contrary to judicial precedent and judicial discipline
In Bakelite Hylam supra a Bench of three members had held that the goods in question fell under Tariff Item 8460 as claimed by the importer in the Bills of Entry
In the present case the importer claimed in its Bills of Entry that the goods imported by it fell under Tariff Item 8460
But the customs authorities rejected the contention of the importer and classified the goods under Tariff Item 73152
The importer appealed to the Collector of Customs but without success
In its second appeal before the Bench of two members the importer relied upon the earlier deci sion in Bakelite Hylam supra and contended that an identi cal classification ought to have been adopted by the Customs Authorities for identical goods
The Bench of two members however referred the case to the President of the Tribunal for referring the same to a larger Bench
The order of the Bench of two members and that of the President have been struck down by the High Court by the impugned judgment for the reasons stated above
Mr V Gauri Shanker appearing for the appellant Union of India submits that section 129 C of the contains 793 express provisions enabling the President of the Tribunal to constitute larger Benches to resolve conflicts in opinion arising between members of a Bench or between Benches of the Tribunal
The Tribunal has ample powers to regulate its own procedure apart from the express provisions of the statute in that behalf
Counsel contends that the Tribunal has inherent or incidental or ancillary powers to effectuate the statutory powers expressly granted to it
Counsel submits that the statute must be so construed as to make the confer ment of power efficacious and meaningful
To deny the power of a Bench of two members to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision and to refer the case to the President for being heard by a larger Bench is to fetter the jurisdiction expressly vested in the Tribunal and thus stifle the growth of law evolving from the decisions of the Tribunal exercis ing judicial powers like a Court albeit within the statuto ry limits of its jurisdiction
Mr GL Sanghi appearing for the respondent the importer submits that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute
Its jurisdiction is limited to the specific powers conferred by the statute
It has no inherent jurisdiction and its powers are not plenary and are limited to the ex press provisions contained in the statute
While the powers of a civil court are plenary and unlimited unless expressly curtailed by statute the powers of a tribunal are the result of express grant and cannot exceed the bounds limited by the constituting statute
In the present case the powers of the Tribunal are expressly specified in the and those powers counsel says do not contain any provision enabling the President to refer a case to a larger Bench whenever a doubt about an earlier decision is ex pressed by another Bench of the same Tribunal
According to Mr Sanghi the Bench should have followed the earlier decision even if the members doubted its correctness and should have left it to this Court to correct the error if any
The Tribunal is constituted by the Central Government under section 129 of the Act
One of the members of the Tribunal is appointed by the Central Government as its President
Section 129 C says that the powers and functions of the Tribunal may be exercised and discharged by Benches constituted by the President from amongst its members
Subject to certain exceptions a Bench shall consist of one judicial member and one technical member section 129c2
Sub section 5 of section 129 C provides for a reference of a case by the President in the event of differences in opinion arising amongst members on any point
This sub section reads 794 5 If the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority if there is a majority but if the members are equally divided they shall state the point or points on which they differ and the case shall be referred by the President for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members of the Appellate Tribunal who have heard the case including those who first heard it Provided that where the members of a Special Bench are equally divided the point or points on which they differ shall be decided by the President
 Sub section 6 Section 129C says that the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate its own procedure
It reads 6 Subject to the provisions of this Act the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of the Benches thereof in all matters arising out of the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its functions including the places at which the Benches shall hold their sitting
 Sub sections 7 and 8 of this Section provide that the Tribunal shall for certain specific purposes be deemed to be a civil court
There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction
It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute
Furthermore being a judicial body it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers
Certain powers are recog nised as incidental and ancillary not because they are inherent in the Tribunal nor because its jurisdiction is plenary but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised the powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited
Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined but within the bounds of its jurisdiction it has all the powers expressly and im pliedly granted
The implied grant is of course limited by the express grant and therefore it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all 795 such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective
As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes eleventh edition where an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution
 See also Income Tax Officer Camanore vs MK Mohammed Kunhi   819
It is true that a Bench of two members must not lightly disregard the decision of another Bench of the same Tribunal on an identical question
This is particularly true when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger Bench
The ration ale of this rule is the need for continuity certainty and predictability in the administration of justice
Persons affected by decisions of Tribunals or Courts have a right to expect that those exercising judicial functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases on identical matters
Classification of particular goods adopted in earlier decisions must not be lightly disregarded in subsequent decisions lest such judicial inconsistency should shake public confidence in the adminis tration of justice
It is however equally true that it is vital to the administration of justice that those exercising judicial power must have the necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings being to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous decision in the earlier case
In such circum stances it is but natural and reasonable and indeed effica cious that the case is referred to a larger Bench
This is what was done by the Bench of two members who in their reasoned order pointed out what they perceived to be an error of law in the earlier decision and stated the points for the President to make a reference to a larger Bench
That the President has ample power to refer a case to a larger Bench is not in doubt in view of sub section 5 of section 129 C which we have set out above
That provision clearly says that in the event of the members of a Bench differing in opinion on any point and the members are equally divided the case shall be referred to the President for hearing on any such point by one or more of the members of the Tribunal and such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members
It is true that sub section 5 refers to difference of opinion arising amongst members of a Bench in a particular case and not specifically where the members of a Bench doubt the correctness of an earlier decision
However section 129 C confers power of reference upon the 796 President
That power should be construed to be wide enough to enable the President to make a reference where members of a Bench find themselves unable to decide a case according to What they perceive to be the correct law and fact because of an impediment arising from an earlier decision with which they cannot honestly agree
In such cases it is necessary for the healthy functioning of the Tribunal that the Presi dent should have the requisite authority to refer the case to a larger Bench
That is a power which is implied in the express grant authorising the President to constitute Bench es of the Tribunal for effective and expeditious discharge of its functions
In our view the Bench of two members acted within their power in stating the points of law which required clarifica tion and the President acted equally within the bounds of his power in constituting larger Bench to hear and decide those points
In the circumstances we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the High Court
TNA Appeal allowed


Summary:
The appellant s father executed a Will just one day prior to his death bequeathing all his property in favour of the sons of appellant s only sister
The testator was ill and lived with the beneficiaries six months prior to his death
Though the testator could sign he put his thumb impression on the Will
The disinherited daughter challenged the genuineness of the Will on the ground that there were suspicious circum stances and the propounder took active part in the execution of the Will
The Courts below right up to High Court held that the execution of the Will was beyond doubt
Aggrieved she has preferred this appeal by special leave
Allowing the appeal this Court HELD 11 Although freedom to bequeath one s own proper ty amongst Hindus is absolute both in extent and person including rank stranger yet to have testamentary capacity or a disposable mind what is required of propounder to establish is that the testator at the time of disposition knew and understood the property he was disposing and per sons who were to be beneficiaries of his disposition
Pru dence however requires reason for denying benefit to those who too were entitled to bounty of testator as they had similar claims on him
Absence of it may not invalidate a Will but it shrouds the disposition with suspicion as 814 it does not give any inkling to the mind of testator to enable the Court to judge if the disposition was voluntary act
Taking active interest by propounder in execution of Will raises another strong suspicion
Mere execution of Will by producing scribe or attesting witnesses or proving genu ineness of testator s thumb impressions by themselves was not sufficient to establish validity of Will unless suspi cious circumstances usual or special are ruled out and the Court s conscience is satisfied not only on execution but its authenticity
815D G H Venkatachalliah vs
N Themmajamma  and Kalyan Singh vs Smt
Chhoti  Ors  relied on
12 Happy marriage or financially well settlement of appellant could not add to genuineness of Will
The High Court in recording this finding completely misdirected itself
More so when no finding of dire circumstances of respondent to help out of which testator dis inherited the other daughter was recorded by any courts
817A B 2
Although this Court does not normally interfere with findings of fact recorded by courts below but if the find ing is recorded by erroneous application of principle of law and is apt to result in miscarriage of justice then this Court will be justified in interfering under Article 136
817E F Malkani vs Jamadar AIR 1987 SC 767 distinguished