Civil Appeal No 8 of 1957
Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 30th August 1955 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No 8 of 1955 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 10th December 1954 of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc
Writ No 1245 of 1954
R section Narula for the appellant
B B Tawakley and K P Gupta for the respondent
September 17
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K DAS J
This appeal has been preferred to this Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad on February 3 1956 to the effect that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 1331c of the Constitution
The question that falls for decision is the true scope meaning and effect of cl g of section 13 D of the U P Municipalities Act 1916 U P II of 1916 hereinafter referred to as the Act
The relevant facts which are not now in dispute are these
There was a general election to the Municipal 54 420 Board of Bareilly in October 1953
The appellant Mangoo Singh and respondent No 3 Imdad Husain along with sever al others were candidates at the said election from Ward No 15
The date fixed for filing nominations was October 5 1953 and the date for scrutiny of the nominations filed was October 7 1953
The appellant and respondent No 3 both filed their nominations on the due date and at the time of scrutiny lmdad Husain raised an objection to the nomination of the appellant on the ground that the latter was disqualified under cl
g of section 13 D of the Act for being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board because he was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one year s demand
This objection was dismissed and the nomination of the appellant was accepted by the Assistant Returning Officer
The poll took place on October 26 1953 and the counting of votes was done on October 29 1953
Four persons were to be elected from the said Ward and the appellant was the third in the list by reason of the number of votes which he had obtained
Imdad Husain was fifth in the list
Accordingly the appellant was declared as one of the returned candidates and lmdad Husain was at the top of the unsuccessful candidates
lmdad Husain then filed an election petition to set aside the election of the present appellant on various grounds
The only ground with which we are now concerned is the disqualification under cl
g of section 13 D of the Act
This election petition was heard by the Election Tribunal and by its judgment dated October 20 1954 the Election Tribunal held that the appellant was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one year s demand to which section 166 of the Act applied and there fore came under the disqualification in cl
g of section 13 D of the Act It further held that the payment of a sum of Rs 115 3 0 on October 10 1953 five days after the date fixed for the filing of nominations did not wipe off that dis qualification and the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to section 13 D of the Act
It may be here stated that the Election Tribunal also held that no bill for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant 421 as required by section 166 nor was any demand notice served on him as required by section 168 of the Act
On the above find ings the Tribunal allowed the election petition set aside the election of the appellant and declared a casual vacancy under cl
a of sub section
2 of section 25 of the Act which vacancy was subsequently filled up by the election of the third respondent on April 5 1955
The next general elec tion in the Municipality is due in October 1957
Against the decision of the Election Tribunal the appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for the issue of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution
The main point urged by the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in its interpretation of cl
g of section 13 D of the Act
Cha turvedi J who dealt with the application of the appellant agreed with the view of the law as expressed by the Election Tribunal and dismissed the application
The appellant then preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court
This appeal was also dismissed by Agarwala and Sahai JJ
by their judgment dated August 30 1955
The appellant then moved and obtained a certificate of fitness under article 1331c of the Constitution from the said High Court
Learned counsel for the appellant has not contested any of the findings of fact arrived at by the Election Tribunal and has confined his submissions to the question of the true construction of cl
g of section 13 D of the Act
Therefore it is necessary to read that section in so far as it is relevant for our purpose  13 D Disqualifications for membership
A person not withstanding that he is otherwise qualified shall be dis qualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a board if he a           b          c          d          e           f          422 g is in arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year s demand to which section 166 applies Provided further that in the case of g the disqualifica tion shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid
 The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant relates to and arises out of the expression  for being chosen as  occurring in the section
The argument is this
It is submitted that a person is chosen as a member of a board  when the poll takes place and a majority of voters vote for him as their chosen candidate  therefore the relevant date for the operation of the disqualification is the date of the poll and inasmuch as on October 10 1953 which was several days before the date of the poll the appellant was no longer in arrears of municipal tax in excess of one year s demand by reason of the payment made on that date the disqualification did not attach to him on the date of the poll
We are unable to accept this argument
It is worthy of note that an identical expression shall be disqualified for being chosen as  occurs in article 102 of the Constitution and section 7 of the Representation of the People Act 1951
This expression occurring in section 7 of the Repre sentation of the People Act 1951 was considered by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani vs Moreshwar Parashram and Others 1
In that case the question was when the disqualification mentioned in cl
d of section 7 of the Repre sentation of the People Act 1951 arose and it was held that the date for putting in the nominations was one of the crucial dates
On this point the following observations made in that case are apposite  Now the words of the section are shall be disqualified for being chosen
The choice is made by a series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announce ment of the election
It follows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of these stages he cannot be chosen 1   821 423 It was pointed out in N P Ponnuswami vs The Returning Officer Namakkal Constituency and Others 1 that  elec tion  is a continuous process consisting of several stages and embracing many steps of which nomination is one nomina tion is the foundation of a candidate s a right to go to the polls and must be treated as an integral part of the elec tion
If a person is disqualified on the date of nomina tion he cannot be chosen as a candidate because the dis qualification mentioned in section 13 D attaches to him on that date
This is also clear from para
222 of the U P Municipali ties Conduct of Election of Members Order 1953
That sub para
states  22 2 The Returning Officer shall then examine the nomi nation papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary inquiry if any as he thinks necessary refuse any nomination on any of the fol lowing grounds a that the candidate is not qualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act or b that the candidate is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under the Act or cthat there has been any failure to comply with any of the provisions of paras
16 and 17 or d that the signature of the candidate or any proposer or seconder is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud
 If the disqualification of cl
g of section 13 D of the Act is to come into operation only oil the day of the poll then it is quite unnecessary for the Returning Officer to consider that disqualification at the time of scrutiny  and indeed it will be improper for him to refuse nomination on the ground of such disqualification
Clause b of para
22 2 uses the same expression disqualified for
being chosen showing clearly enough that the starting point of the act of choosing is not on the date of the poll only
The process of choosing commences on the date of filing nominations
1  424 We now turn to the second proviso to section 13 D
The submis sion of learned counsel for the appellant is that as stated in the proviso the disqualification is transient and ceases to operate as soon as the arrears are paid Oil October 10 1953 the appellant was no longer disqualified and there fore he could be chosen on the date of the poll that is on October 26 1953
The argument is that in the case of such a transient disqualification the second proviso must be so read as to mean that a disqualification subsisting on the day of nomination can be wiped off completely by subse quent payment of arrears of tax otherwise a disqualifica tion at the time of nomination will disentitle a person to stand for election  even though it ceases to operate before the day of the poll
This argument also we cannot accept as correct it is really the first argument in a different form
The wiping off of the disqualification under the second proviso has no retrospective effect and the disqual ification which subsisted on the day of filing nominations did not cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subse quent payment of the arrears of municipal tax
On this point we accept as correct the view expressed in Ahmed Hossain vs Aswini Kumar1 where a similar question under the Bengal Municipal Act Ben
XV of 1932 fell for con sideration
The question was if a person disqualified on the date of nomination could shake off his pre existing disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date of nomination and the date of scrutiny
What happened in that case was this  on the material date that is the last date for submission of nominations a person was in arrears for more than three months in payment of the tax which he was liable to pay and he came within the mischief of el
g of amended a 221 of the Bengal Municipal Act
The contention was that the name of the Press of which the candidate was the proprietor and not his name was recorded in the books of the Municipality as the assessee and that the name of the candidate was in the electoral roll by reason of his educational qualifications
This contention was repelled and it was 1 Al
R 425 observed that if a person was disqualified on the date of the nomination he could not shake off his preexisting disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date of nomination and the date of scrutiny
There is also other judicial authority which  supports the same view
In Harford vs Linskey 1 a similar question arose for deci sion under the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 section 12 whereof enacted that  a person shall be disqualified for being elected and for being a councillor  if and while he is interested in contracts with the Corporation
The peti tioner in that case admitted that at the time of his nomina tion he was interested in contracts with the Corporation but contended that he could and would have got rid of his disqualification before the day fixed for the poll and was therefore not disqualified for nomination
The question was whether he was so disqualified
Wright J delivering the judgment of the Court observed  In the absence of any guide we think it safest to hold that in cases of elections under the Municipal Corporations Acts a person who at the time of nomination is disquali fied for election in the manner in which this petitioner was disqualified is disqualified also for nomination
The nomination is for this purpose an essential part of the election and if there are no competitors it of itself constitutes the election by virtue of the express words of section 56
A different construction might produce much confu sion
On the nomination day no one could know whether the persons nominated will at the poll be effective candidates or not
It is true that in the case put the disqualifica tion may be removed before the election is completed  but what is to be the effect if the disqualification continues until the poll begins or until the middle of the polling day or until the close of the poll  Will votes given before the removal of the disqualification be valid If not how is the number of them to be ascertained  it seems to us unreason able to hold that the Act means to leave the matter in such a state of uncertainty and for these reasons 1  858
426 we think that this petitioner was disqualified for nomina tion or election
 The same state of uncertainty and confusion to which a reference has been made in the aforesaid observations will arise if the construction which learned counsel for the appellant has pressed for our acceptance is adopted in the case before us
Lastly it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the expression to which section 166 applies  in cl
g of section 13 D means that a bill of the sum due must be presented to the person liable for it as required by that section before he can come within the mischief of the clause fur thermore the use of the expression demand  makes it essen tial that a demand notice must also be served as required by section 168 of the Act
As on the finding of the Election Tribu nal neither a bill was presented to the appellant nor was he served with a demand notice learned counsel contends that the appellant does not come within the mischief of the clause
Sections 166 and 168 are in these terms section 166
Presentation of bill 1 As soon as a person becomes liable for the payment of a any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand or b any sum payable under clause c of section 196 or section 229 or section 230 in respect of the supply of water or payable in respect of any other municipal service or undertaking or c any other sum declared by this Act or or by rule or bye law to be recoverable in the manner provided by this chapter the board shall with all convenient speed cause a bill to be presented to the persons so liable
2 Unless otherwise provided by rule a person shall be deemed to become liable for the payment of every tax and licence fee upon the commencement of the period in respect of which such tax or fee is payable 427  section 168
Notice of demand
If the sum for which a bill has been presented as aforesaid is not paid in municipal office or to a person empowered by a regulation to receive such payments within fifteen days from the presentation thereof the board may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the form set forth in schedule IV or to the like effect
 We are clearly of the view that the expression to which section 166 applies  cannot bear the meaning sought to be given to it on behalf of the appellant
That expression merely describes the nature of the demand referred to in cl
Section 166 refers to three types of dues el
a of sub section
1 refers to any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand cl
b refers to sums payable under el
c of section 196 or section 229 or section 230 in respect of the supply of water etc and cl
c refers to any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or bye law to be recoverable in the manner provided by Chapter VI
The demand to which section 166 applies must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one or other of the aforesaid three clauses and the demand re ferred to in el
g of section 13 D must be of that nature or type this in our view is the true meaning and effect of the expression to which section 166 applies 
Nor do we think that the word demand  attracts the operation of section 168
It may be readily conceded that the word de mand  ordinarily means something more than what is due it means something which has been demanded called for or asked for
But the meaning of a word must take colour from the context in which it is used
In el
g the context in which the word demand  is used has a very obvious and clear reference to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends therefore the expression used is arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year s demand 
The word demand  in that context and in the collocation of words in which it has been used can only mean in excess of one year s municipal tax or other dues 
We have been referred to several meanings of the word 55 428 demand  in standard English dictionaries and law lexicons
When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of according to lexicographers
It is sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons it is well recognised that the word demand  may mean simply a claim or due  without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay the claim or due
For the reasons given above we hold that not one of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant is worthy of acceptance
The election petition was rightly decided as the appellant was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board in question on the day he filed his nomination under cl
g of section 13 D of the Act
According ly the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of respond ent 3 who alone contested the appeal before us
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was elected to the Municipal Board under the U P Municipalities Act 19i6
He was in arrears in the payment of Municipal tax in excess of one year s demand to which section 166 of the Act applied at the time of the filing of nominations but made the payment before the date of the poll
Under section 13D cl
g of the Act a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a board if he is in arrears in the pay ment of Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year s demand to which section 166 applies provided that the disquali fication shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid
 On an election petition filed by a defeated candidate the elec tion was set aside by the Election Tribunal on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to section I3 P cl
g of the Act
It was contended for the appellant that the relevant date for the operation of the disqualification was the date of the poll and that in any case he did not come within the mischief of the disqualification clause in that section as a bill for payment of the tax was not presented to him nor a notice of demand served on him under section 168
Held1 that if a person is disqualified on the date of nomination he cannot be chosen as a candidate within the meaning of section 13 D of the U P Municipalities Act 19i6 because the disqualification attaches to him on that date and the process of choosing consists of a series of steps starting with nomination and ending with the announcement of the election
The wiping off of the 419 disqualification has no retrospective effect and the dis qualification which subsisted on the date of the nomination cannot cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subse quent payment of the arrears of Municipal tax
Chatturbhuj Withaldas jasani vs Moreshway Parashram and Others   N P Ponnuswami vs The Returning Officer Namakkal Constituency and Others  and Harford vs Linskey  relied on
Ahmed Hossain vs Aswini Kumar AIR 1953 Cal
542 ap proved
2that the expression to which section 166 applies in section 13 D cl
g of the Act merely describes the nature or type of dues mentioned in that section and that the effect is that the demand referred to in section 13 D cl
g must be of that nature or type
3that the word demand in section 13 D cl
g of the Act means claim or due and only refers to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends and does not attract the operation of section 168