Appeal No 716 of 1957
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated July 29 1955 of the former Bombay High Court in Appeal No 50 of 1953 under the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree dated September 3 1953 of the said High Court in First Appeal No 547 of 1952
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India T V R Tatachari and M section K Sastri for the appellants
Purshottam Trikamdas H R Gokhale and R Gopalakrishnan for the respondent
October 28
The Judgment of Jafer Imam and Raghubar Dayal JJ was delivered by Jafer Imam J A K Sarkar J delivered a separate judgment
IMAM J This is an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No 50 of 1953 reversing the decision of Shah J and restoring the order passed by the executing court which had been set aside by him
Two Questions arise for decision in this appeal 1 whether the Wada house ordered to be attached by the executing court is Watan property and if so can 165 it be attached in execution of a decree  2 If the Wada is not Watan property is it exempted from attachment by virtue of the provisions of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure  It is necessary now to state a few facts
One Rao Ba
Vithalrao Laxmanrao Thube hereinafter referred to as Laxmanrao brought Civil Suit No 313 of 1943 against Tuljaramarao Narainrao Desai hereinafter referred to as Tuljaramarao to recover Rs 80000 which had been borrowed by him from the plaintiff
Laxmanrao s suit was decreed on December 20 1943
Tuljaramarao having died his legal representatives the present appellants were brought on the record on September 21 1944
In April 1949 Laxmanrao filed an application for the execution of the decree
He sought the attachment with a view to their subsequent sale of certain properties including the Wada which is the subject matter of this appeal
The appellants objected to the proposed attachment on various grounds
The executing court on December 17 1951 issued a warrant of attachment only against the Wada in question
The appellants appealed to the Bombay High Court
Their appeal was heard by Shah J who by his order dated September 23 1953 set aside the order of attachment relying on the decision of Chagla J in second Appeal No 760 of 1942
He however gave no decision on the question whether section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure gave protection to the Wada from attachment
Against the decision of Shah J there was an appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court which was heard by a Division Bench
The Division Bench as already stated reversed the decision of Shah J and restored the order made by the executing court
Subsequently the High Court gave a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court
It is undisputed that the whole of village Nandi had been granted as inam to the ancestor of Tuljaramarao and his descendants as per Sanad Ext
54 and the Inam Patrak Ext
In that Sanad there is no mention of any Wada existing on the Inam land
According to the executing court the Wada 166 appears to have been built after the grant
It appears that the opinion of the Division Bench of the High Court was also to the same effect
There is no finding of Shah J to the contrary
We must therefore proceed on the basis that the Wada in question was not the subject of the original grant
This Wada came to be constructed on the land in the inam village of Nandi sometime subsequent to the grant
What has to be decided is do the attributes of Watan Property  accrue to the Wada which was constructed after the grant on land which was admittedly  Watan Property  as defined by the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act 1874 Bombay Act No III of 1874 hereinafter referred to as the Act
In appeal No 760 of 1942 Chagla J took the view that the house in that case was an accession to the site on which it stood
Accordingly it must partake of the character of the land on which it stood
The learned Judge stated that the question which he had to determine was whether the house was immovable property held for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office within the meaning of section 4 of the Act
Having regard to the definition of  immoveable property  in the Bombay General Clauses Act he was of the opinion that the house certainly formed part of the immoveable property which was held for the performance of the duty appertaining to the hereditary office of the Watan and that the only answer to the question  what is the immoveable property which is held for the performance of the duty under section 4 can be both the land and the house
If the house forms part of the immoveable property it is not possible to sever the two and to say that it is only the land which is Watan property and not the house which is permanently fastened to it
Shah J relied upon the decision of Chagla J and held that the land on which the Wada in the present case stood being Watan property the Wada must also be deemed to have acquired that character
The Division Bench which heard the appeal against the decision of Shah J was of the opinion that although a house 167 built on land must be regarded as immoveable property it did not follow that like the land on which it was built the house became Watan property
The fact that a house subsequently built became immoveable property would have no material bearing on the question whether it was Watan property or not
In order that the house may be regarded as Watan property it must satisfy the test laid down by the definition of the word  Watan Property  in section 4 of the Act and that if the word  held  was construed in the way in which the learned Judges of the Division Bench thought it should be it would be difficult to accept the view that a house subsequently built by a watandar on a part of the Watan land could be said to be held by him for the performance of his duties of a hereditary office
The learned Judges of the Division Bench accordingly were of the opinion that Shah J erred in so holding
 Watan Property  has been defined in the Act to mean  The moveable or immoveable property held acquired or assigned for providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office
It includes a right to levy customary fees or perquisites in money or in kind whether at fixed times or otherwise
It includes cash payments in addition to the original watan property made voluntarily by the State Government and subject periodically to modification or withdrawal
 The inam lands of Nandi were undoubtedly held as remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to an hereditary office and therefore were Watan properties
On the findings of the courts below the Wada in question was not the subject of the grant
In our opinion therefore at no time was it held for providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to a hereditary office
Nor could it be said to have been acquired for performance of any such duty
It had been constructed some time subsequent to the grant either by the grantee or his descendants and there is no indication on the record 168 that it was constructed for the purpose of providing remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to a hereditary office
To that extent at least it appears to be clear that the Wada in question does not come within the definition of Watan property as defined in the Act
The only question is whether having been constructed on land which is Watan property and being immovable property within the meaning of the Bombay General Clauses Act does it partake of the character of the land on which it stood  On behalf of the appellants it was argued that the Wada is an accession to the Watan property namely the land of village Nandi
It seems to us however that construction of a Wada on land which is Watan property is not an accession to it as accession to the land would suggest that over a course of years imperceptible accretion to the land has taken place and it was impossible to distinguish the original land from the accreted land
In such a case the accreted land may possibly partake of the character of the original land
Adjacent lands to the original land which have been acquired and can be distinguished cannot partake of the character of the original land
On behalf of the appellants it was argued that the right title and interest of the grantor had to be looked at first in construing a grant and if it appeared from the terms thereof that it did not contain any reservation or exception then all the rights title and interest of the grantor which he was capable of granting would pass to the grantee
The grantor in this case was the Government which could have built a construction on the land granted or dug tube wells on it
The grantee therefore could also build a house or any other structure on the land
On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the position of a watandar was not that of an absolute owner of the land
He held the land on certain conditions
The land was liable to forfeiture if he was guilty of certain acts mentioned in section 60 and Schedule 11 of the Act
We will assume there being nothing to the contrary in the Sanad that the grantee was not restricted from constructing a building on the land
From that 169 however it does not necessarily follow that the building so constructed became Watan property within the meaning of the Act
If the Government could have built a construction on the land it could also have dismantled it and removed the material with which it was made
Similarly the grantee could do so there being no restriction in that regard in the terms of the Sanad
It seems to us that on a proper construction of the Sanad there was no impediment in the way of the grantee from dismantling the house which he had built and removing the materials with which it had been constructed and selling the same
Indeed unless it is held that a house constructed on the land partakes of the character of the land it is difficult to see how the grantee is prevented from selling or mortgaging it but not the land on which it stood
It seems to us therefore that the Wada in the present case although immovable property did not partake of the character of the land on which it was constructed because it was severable from the land and was capable of being dismantled and the materials of which could be removed and sold without violating any of the provisions of the Act
In our opinion the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court that the Wada was not Watan property appears to be correct
The next question for consideration is whether the Wada is one belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him within the meaning of cl
c of the proviso to section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure
If it is then it is exempted from attachment by the provisions of the proviso
It was urged that as the word  agriculturist  has not been defined in the Code the word must be construed according to its ordinary meaning
According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary this word can also mean a farmer
Neither the extent of the land farmed by him nor the amount of income derived by him from cultivating the land was a relevant consideration in construing the word agriculturist Nor would it be right to restrict the meaning of the word  agriculturist  to mean that an agriculturist must be a person who himself or by the aid 170 of the members of his family tills the land and not with the aid of employed labour
On behalf of the respondent however it was contended that the word agriculturist  in el
c of the proviso must bear the same meaning as the word  agriculturist  in cl
b of the proviso
It was necessary therefore to construe the provisions of cl
b as well in order to under
stand what the Code intended the word  agriculturist  to mean in cl
On a proper construction of el
b not only an agriculturist must be the tiller of the land but he must also be a small agriculturist
Clause b was not intended to refer to a person who cultivated a large area of land and derived from it a large income
It was pointed out that in the present case the appellant Appasaheb was cultivating a very large area of land with the aid of employed labour and derived an income somewhere between Rs 30000 to 35000 a year
Section 601 of the Code states in detail what property of a judgment debtor is liable to attachment and sale in the execution of a decree
It was urged that but for the proviso all the properties of Tuljaramarao other than Watan property were liable to attachment and sale in execution of Laxmanrao s decree
The proviso no doubt exempted from attachment and sale certain properties mentioned therein but cl
b of the proviso clearly indicated that the object of the Code was to save in the case of a judgment debtor his tools as an artisan and where he was an agriculturist his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed grains as may in the opinion of the court be necessary to earn his livelihood
It did not even exempt his agricultural produce unless there was a notification under section 61 of the Code specifying by a general or special order how much of the agricultural produce was in the opinion of the State Government necessary for the purpose of providing until the next harvest for due cultivation and the support of the judgment debtor and his family
It was suggested therefore that the Code intended to exempt from attachment and sale in the case of an agriculturist only that much which was necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such
171 interpreted by various High Courts in India
Reference to only some of these cases need be made
In the case of Hanmantrao Annarao vs Dhruvaraj Pandurangrao 1 it was held by the Bombay High Court that the word  agriculturist  in cls
b and c of the proviso to section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure denotes persons who are personally engaged in tilling and cultivating the land and whose livelihood depends upon the proceeds of such tillage and cultivation of the soil
It does not include large landed proprietors even though they may be tilling the land and cultivating it through their servants
In the case of Parvataneni Lakshmayya vs The Official Receiver of Kistna 2 a Full Bench of the Madras High Court arrived at the following conclusion after considering various decisions of some of the High Courts in India  We think that having regard to the scheme of the section exempting from attachment as it does tools of artisans and where the judgment debtor is an  agriculturist  his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed grain as may in the opinion of the Court be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood and his houses and other buildings occupied by him protection is intended to be given to those who are real tillers of the land and that an  agricul turist  in the section is a person who is really dependent for his living on tilling the soil and unable to maintain himself otherwise
Main chief or principal sources of income are not in our view the proper tests
A man s main source of income may be from tilling the soil but his other source or sources of income may be more than sufficient to maintain him
The fact that a man s income from tilling the soil may be larger than his income from his ownership of land or other sources does not seem to us to make him an  agriculturist within the meaning of the section
At the same time we see no reason for depriving an  agriculturist  of the exemption under the section because he may have invested money in a business or businesses as alleged in the present case and may 1 1946 49 BLR867
2 ILR 172 derive some income therefrom or do coolie work and add to his earnings in bad times
The test of sole source of income if applied would deprive him of the benefit of the section and we prefer the tests which we have already laid down viz that he must be a tiller of the Boil really dependent for his living on tilling the soil and unable to maintain himself otherwise
 in the case of Tirloki Prasad vs Kunj Behari Lal 1 the Allahabad High Court held that the test to be applied in deciding whether a person is an agriculturist is whether his main source of income is derived from cultivation or not
In the case of Dwarka Prasad vs Municipal Board Meerut 2 the same High Court held that there was no reason for holding that cl
b of the proviso to section 601 applied only to the case of very small farmers and not to the case of large farmers
Clause b aimed at protecting the implements of every farmer so as to enable him to continue to earn his livelihood in the same way as he had been doing previously
There was nothing to indicate that the clause was limited to small farmers
In the case of Gowardhandas vs Mohanlal 3 the conclusions of the Nagpur High Court were i Whether a person is an agriculturist or not is not a question turning on source of income but on nature of occupation
ii A person may have many occupations
If one of them is agriculture and for that purpose a house or building is occupied protection can be claimed
iii A person who owns land and lets it reserving either money or produce is not an agriculturist but a landlord
iv A person who cultivates the land as a labourer though neither a landowner nor a tenant is an agriculturist
v If a man cultivates the land with his own hands or by means of labourers whose activities he directs he is an agriculturist whether he operates on a large or a small scale
If he has no connection with 1 AIR 1935 All 448
2 AIR 1958 All
3 ILR 173 the land except that he owns it and people work for him he may or may not be an agriculturist according to circumstances
 In the case of Nihal Singh vs Siri Ram 1 the Lahore High Court held that the word agriculturist  means a person who personally engages in the occupation of tilling the soil and derives his livelihood from that occupation and cannot or does not maintain himself from other sources
On the facts of the case that Court held that a man who merely received rent from tenants or the income of the produce derived by the employment of servants or partners could not be said to depend for his livelihood upon the proceeds derived from so engaging himself in the tillage of the soil
In the case of Anantalal vs Bibhuti 2 the Patna High Court held that an agriculturist was one who tilled the soil and thereby earned his livelihood and was expected to have implements of husbandry cattle and seed grain
This however did not mean that he must till the land with his own hands or that he must necessarily have his own implements of husbandry
In any event cultivation must be his main source of income though this would not be the sole test
The question whether a person was an agriculturist or not would have to be decided with reference to the facts of each particular case
In the present case the evidence of the appellant s own witness Balaji shows that Tuljaramarao had reserved some lands for a home farm about 8 years before his death
The area reserved was about 35 acres and that he maintained about 12 bullocks and 8 servants
He was getting an income of Rs 20000 to Rs 25000 a year from these lands
He used to keep his cattle in the Wada where his servants also stayed and his agricultural implements were kept
The pro duce of the lands was also stored in the Wada
Tuljaramarao used to supervise the agricultural operations and his servants
After his death his son appellant Appasaheb became the owner
Appasaheb increased the acreage of the cultivation of the home farm to about 60 acres
He has 14 bullocks and 10 1 Lah23
2 Pat
348 174 or 12 servants and the income is Rs 30000 to Rs 35000 a year
The cattle and the produce are kept in the Wada where he also resides
This witness also stated that the appellant Appasaheb had inams in 4 villages
Furthermore in 10 or 12 villages he owns lands and he gets about Rs 35000 to Rs 40000 from his lands
The said Appasabeb and his brother sometimes worked personally in the fields
It is clear from this evidence that Appasaheb is by no means entirely dependent for his livelihood upon the income from the home farm
Apart from the income of the home farm he has a substantial income from other lands and there is nothing to show that this income derived from his other lands is the result of cultivation by him
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the Bombay High Court had taken an extreme view in the case of Hanmantrao Annarao vs Dhruvaraj Pandurangrao 1
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dwarka Prasad vs Meerut Municipality 2 where it was held that a tractor was an implement of husbandry and it was not subject to attachment although it was used for cultivating an area of about 1200 bighas of a farm
The decisions of the Madras High Court in the case of Parvataneni Lakshmayya vs The Official Receiver of Kistna 3 of the Lahore High Court in the case of Nihar Singh vs Siri Ram and Others 4 and of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Gowardhandas vs Mohanlal 5 were also relied upon on behalf of the appellants in order to show that to be an agriculturist a person did not have to personally cultivate the land and that it was immaterial whether the area cultivated or the income derived therefrom was large or small
The real test was was the cultivation his main source of livelihood  It was submitted on the facts of the present case that the appellant Appasaheb depended for his livelihood on the income derived from the land cultivated by him and that the Wada 1 2 AIR 1958 All
561 3 ILR 4 Lah
5 ILR 175 on the land was occupied by him as an agriculturist for the purpose of his cultivation
Such being the position the Wada was occupied by him as an agriculturist and was therefore exempted from attachment under cl
c of the proviso to section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Sub section 1 of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes all saleable property movable and immovable belonging to the judgment debtor and over which he has a disposing power liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree against him
In this subjection unless the terms of the proviso came to the rescue of the judgment debtor all lands and houses or other buildings goods and money amongst other things belonging to him would be liable to be attached
The Legislature however recognized that it would not be expedient to leave the matter at that
Hence the proviso
The relevant clauses in order to determine what the word  agriculturist  means are clauses b and c of the proviso
Under cl
b the tools of an artisan are exempted from attachment
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word  artisan  means a mechanic handicraftsman or an artificer
The object of the Legislature in exempting from attachment tools of an artisan was obviously to leave him his tools in order to enable him to make a living
Without his tools the artisan would be destitute a situation which the Legislature intended to avoid
In the case of a judgment debtor who was an agriculturist the Legislature intended that his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed grain as in the opinion of the court were necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as an agriculturist should be exempted from attachment
Here again the intention of the Legislature was to leave in the hands of an agriculturist sufficient means whereby he could earn his livelihood as an agriculturist
According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the meanings of the word  husbandry  is the business of husbandry that is to say a person who tills and cultivates the soil or a farmer
The same dictionary states that one of the meanings of the word 176  livelihood  is means of living maintenance
It can also mean income revenue stipend
In the case of an agriculturist his implements of husbandry must therefore mean implements with which he tills the soil
These are saved from attachment
So far as his cattle and seed grain are concerned only that much is exempted which in the opinion of the court would be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood and by which he could earn his maintenance
It is to be noticed that under cl
b the land which an agriculturist tills is not exempted from attachment
The agricultural produce of the land is exempted to the extent as notified in the Official Gazette issued under section 61 of the Code
On a fair reading of the provisions of cl
b that which is saved to an agriculturist are his implements with which he tills the soil and such cattle and seed grain which in the opinion of the court are necessary for him to use in order to enable him to maintain himself
The provisions of cl
b in the case of an agriculturist therefore suggest a person who tills the soil in order to maintain himself
Under cl
c houses and other buildings with the materials and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him are exempted from attachment
The word  agriculturist  in this clause must carry the same meaning as the word  agriculturist  in cl
b and the house must be occupied by him as such
The object of the exemption in el
c apparently is that an agriculturist should not be left without a roof over his head
In other words the Legislature intended by cls
b and c to prevent an agriculturist becoming destitute and homeless
It was however argued on behalf of the appellants that there are no restrictive words in cl
So long as it was a house belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him it was exempted from attachment no matter what other income than agriculture was earned by him
The Wada in question was clearly occupied by the appellants for the purpose of tilling the land of the home farm and for storing the produce thereof the implements of 177 husbandry and tethering of cattle employed in cultivating the land
It seems to us on the evidence of the appellants  own witness that they do not themselves till the land of the home farm which is done by a large number of labourers employed by them  Tuljaramarao did not himself cultivate the land
He merely supervised the work of cultivation by the labourers
The witness however did state that sometimes Appasaheb and his brother worked personally in the fields
This is a vague statement which does not necessarily mean that they did any act of cultiva tion themselves
The Wada in question is a big structure where the appellants reside but if they are not agriculturists within the meaning of that word in section 60 the Wada cannot be exempted from attachment
It seems to us that even if it is not necessary that a person must till the land with his own hands to come within the meaning of the word  agriculturist  he must at least show that he was really dependent for his living on tilling the soil and was unable to maintain himself otherwise
In the present case it is quite obvious that even if the appellants can be described as agriculturists in the widest sense of that term they are not agriculturists who are really dependent for their maintenance on tilling the soil and that they are unable to maintain themselves otherwise
The evidence shows that Tuljaramarao was getting an income of nearly 20000 to 25000 rupees from lands cultivated in the home farm and that the appellant Appasaheb by extending the acreage of that farm was receiving an income of Rs 30000 to Rs 35000
In addition he had lands in 10 or 12 other villages and his income from the lands was Rs 35000 to Rs 40000
Assuming that these figures include the income from the lands of the home farm they would show that in addition to that income he had an additional income of at least Rs 5000 from lands in villages other than Nandi
Furthermore the appellant Appasaheb is receiving a cash allowance of Rs 700 to Rs 800 per annum and Rs 4000 to Rs 5000 from the village officers of the four inam villages
In these circumstances it can hardly be said that the appellant 23 178 Appasaheb is really dependent for his maintenance by tilling the soil and unable to maintain himself other
From this point of view it seems to us that he cannot be regarded as an agriculturist within the meaning of that word in section 60 of the Code
In our opinion the decision of the High Court that the Wada in question was not Watan property and that it was not exempted from attachment by virtue of the provisions of section 601 of the Code is correct
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs
SARKAP
The appellants are the legal representatives of one Tuljaram Desai
Tuljaram was the owner of certain watan properties
On his death his son the appellant Appasaheb became entitled to them
The other appellants are the widow and younger son of Tuljaram
Sometime in 1943 one Vithalrao Thube obtained a decree for Rs 80000 against Tuljaram
By 1949 both Tuljaram and Vithalrao had died
The respondent is the successor in interest of Vithalrao
The present appeal arises out of the proceedings for the execution of the decree started by the respondent against the appellants
In this appeal we are concerned only with a wada building belonging to the appellant Appasaheb standing on watan land which the respondent seeks to have attached and sold in execution
It is not now in dispute that watan properties are not saleable properties and cannot therefore be attached and sold in execution
The wada stands on watan land and the respondent seeks to proceed against the structure apart from the land
The appellant Appasaheb contends that he is an agriculturist and that wada belonging to and occupied by him is protected from attachment and sale by cl
c of the proviso to sub section
1 of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure
He also contends that the wada itself is watan property and is not in view of sub section
1 of section 60 liable to attachment and sale as it is not a saleable property
Now sub section
1 of section 60 makes all saleable property liable to attachment and sale in execution
The proviso to it so far as material runs thus  Provided that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale namely b tools of artisans and where the judgmentdebtor is an agriculturist his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed grain as may in the opinion of the court be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such c houses and other buildings with materials and the sites thereof and land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him
 I propose now to consider the question whether the wada is saved from execution under el
c of the proviso to sub section
1 of section 60
In order that the clause may apply two conditions have to be fulfilled
First the person claiming benefit under it must be an agriculturist and secondly the wada must belong to and be occupied by him
First then was the appellant Appasaheb an agriculturist within the meaning of the clause  Now the plain meaning of the word  agriculturist  in the present context is a person who occupies himself with agriculture that is cultivation of land for raising crops
Anybody who is engaged in cultivating land for raising crops would be an agriculturist
So far there is no difficulty
It appears however from the reported decisions that the High Courts have expressed sharply divergent opinions on the question as to who is an agriculturist within the meaning of the clause
The difference however is not on the point that an agriculturist must be one who cultivates but as to whether the agriculturist contemplated in cls
b and c is one who cultivates with his own hands and whether all persons who carry on agricultural operations are agriculturists within the clauses
These differences have arisen not because any difficulty was felt as to the meaning of the word  agriculturist  but from the intention of the legislature to be gathered from the other words used in the clauses
In this appeal these authorities have been relied on by the 180 parties as it suited the contention of each
It is necessary therefore to consider the views expressed in these cases and decide whether the word  agriculturist  is to be given its plain meaning or has to be qualified in some way
It is of some significance to state that by and large the view of one High Court has been discarded by another
One view is that an agriculturist is a person whose main source of livelihood is agriculture see Tirloki Prasad vs Kunj Behari Lal 1
It is said that this is the right view for an agriculturist must be one who is so by profession
Now the main source of livelihood of a person may vary from time to time therefore at one period of time a person might be ail agriculturist but not at another
It is not reasonable to hold that such a result was intended
Again it would often be difficult to decide which is the main source of livelihood of a person
Indeed it is not quite clear as to what is meant by main source of livelihood unless it means the livelihood producing the largest income
I find nothing in the clauses to warrant this view they do not say anything about agriculture being a person s main source of livelihood in any sense of the word  main 
Furthermore if this view is accepted a rich farmer who has income from other sources which income is smaller than his income from agriculture would be protected by these clauses while a poor peasant who makes a slightly bigger income say as a day labourer than he does from agriculture would be deprived of the protection
I am unable to accept a view which produces such a result
I find no reason why a person who has a profession besides agriculture should be protected if agriculture is his main profession and not otherwise particularly when what is protected is agricultural implements cattle seed grain and house used for agricultural purposes
Another view taken is that the agriculturist must be one whose sole means of livelihood is cultivation of land but excluding persons carrying on farming in a large way Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar vs The Official 181 Receiver of South Arcot 1
This view has been discarded in a later full bench decision of the same High Court in Parvataneni Lakshmayya vs The Official Receiver of Kistna 2 to which reference will be made later
For myself I find nothing in the clauses to justify this view
Take the case of a small cultivator who in order to maintain himself takes up the other work and so supplements his income
There is nothing in the clauses to indicate that such a cultivator should be deprived of the protection
It is well known that agricultural operations do not occupy a person for the whole year and as the income from agriculture is for quite a large number not enough to meet their needs many small cultivators have to supplement their in
come by other work when they are not engaged in the fields
There is nothing in the clauses to lead to the view that these persons were not intended to get the protection
It seems to me manifest that there is no reason to deprive these persons of the benefit of the protection
Neither do I find any words in the clauses to support the view that big farmers are not intended to get the protection
This aspect of the matter will be discussed further later
The view taken in Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar s case 1 does not therefore appear to me to be well founded
In Nihal Singh vs Siri Ram 3  a full bench of the Lahore High Court held that an agriculturist must be one who personally tills and not through servants and does not maintain himself from other sources of income
The reason given to support this view appears to be as follows The word agriculturist must mean the same thing in cls
b and c
In cl
b it is in juxtaposition with the word artisan
An artisan is one who himself practices a handicraft and furthermore he must practice the handicraft not as a hobby but as a living
So in cl
b an agriculturist must be one who personally tills and not through servants and maintains himself by agriculture alone
I am not convinced by this reasoning
If the word agriculturist means one who must till with his own 1 Mad
2 ILR 3 Lah
182 hands then it is wholly unnecessary to rely on the juxtaposition of the words artisan and agriculturist in cl
b for reaching the conclusion that the Lahore High Court did
It is only if the word  agriculturist  as ordinarily understood includes one who carries on agricultural operations through persons employed by him that it becomes necessary to rely on the reasoning based on the juxtaposition of the two words in the clause
But I am wholly unable to appreciate the logic of this reasoning
Assume that an artisan must be one who works with his own hands
It does not follow that an agriculturist if it does not mean exclusively one who tills with his own hands must be one who tills only with his own hands when that word is used in juxtaposition with the word artisan
Such juxtaposition would afford no reason for departing from the normal meaning of the word agriculturist
In Hanmantrao vs Dhruvraj 1 also it was said that an agriculturist within the meaning of the clauses is one who tills with his own hands
The reason there put is that since in el
b reference is made to implements of husbandry cattle and seed grain necessary for earning a livelihood as a cultivator therefore primafacie only an agriculturist who cultivates with his own hands is meant
Again I am unable to follow the reasoning for a person who lives on cultivation carried on by hired labour would also require implements of husbandry cattle and seed grain
An agriculturist as I have said is one who carries on cultivation
Now one may carry on cultivation himself or through hired labour
In the latter case also he would be an agriculturist within the plain meaning of that word
Then it seems to me that if we exclude from the clause an agriculturist who does not till with his own hands a most unreasonable situation would ensue
Old and incapacitated small farmers and most women would have to be denied the protection of the clauses
Again it may so happen that a person carrying on agricultural operations himself becomes unable to do so through ill health for two or three years when he gets the cultivation done 1 ILR 183 by employing labour and resumes cultivation when he regains his health
If the view now under discussion is correct then such a person would cease to be an agriculturist during the period of ill health though before and after that period he would be an agriculturist
It does not seem to me that such results could have been intended
I come now to the view taken in Parvataneni Lakshmayya vs The Official Receiver of Kistna 1 earlier referred to
It was there said We think that having regard to the scheme of the section exempting from attachment as it does tools of artisans and where the judgment debtor is an  agriculturist  his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seedgrain as may in the opinion of the court be neces sary to enable him to earn his livelihood and his houses and other buildings occupied by him protection is intended to be given to those who are real tillers of the land and that an  agriculturist  in the section is a person who is really dependent for his living on tilling the soil and unable to maintain him otherwise
 I am unable to agree with this view
It leads to obvious anomalies
Take the case of a person whose sole means of living is agriculture
Suppose he carries on agriculture on a large scale and makes a big income out of it
He would still be dependent on agriculture for his living and unable to maintain himself otherwise
He would be an agriculturist for the purpose of the clauses within the meaning of Parvataneni s case 1 for that case does not say that a large scale farmer is not an agriculturist
Such a person would be entitled to protection under the clauses even though his income from agriculture is say Rs 25000 a year
Now take the case of a small farmer whose income from agriculture is Rs 1000 a year but who also makes Rs 1500 from other sources and is able to maintain himself from the latter income
According to Parvataneni s case 1 such a person would not be an agriculturist for the purpose of the clauses and would not be entitled to any protection under them
I find 1 ILR 184 it impossible that the legislature could have intended such a result
Then again I find nothing in the language of the clauses clearly leading to the view accepted in Parvataneni s case 1 however
The only reference to a living is in cl
b and it is to be found in the words  such cattle and seed grain as may be necessary to enable him to earn his living as such  that is as an agriculturist
I do not think that these words lead to the conclusion that the agriculturist contemplated must depend for his living on agriculture
They are intended to define the limit of the protection which an agriculturist is entitled to for his cattle and seed grain
These words must therefore mean such cattle and seed grain as are necessary for the agriculturist to earn his livelihood from agriculture if that was his sole means of livelihood
If that were not so we would have to hold that this part of the clause contemplated an agriculturist whose livelihood depended on agriculture alone and who had no other source of income
Obviously where a person earned his livelihood from agriculture and another source it could not be decided what cattle and seed grain he would require to earn his living as an agriculturist for the simple reason that he did not earn his living as an agriculturist only
Parvataneni s case 1 however accepts the view that a person may be an agriculturist within the meaning of the clauses though he may have besides agriculture another source of income
And with that view for the reasons earlier stated I entirely agree
There seems to me to be other reasons also why the view taken in Parvataneni s case 1 is not the correct one
So far as the tools of an artisan are concerned cl
b does not limit the protection to such of them as are necessary to enable him to earn his living as an artisan
Therefore there is no reason to think that an artisan is one who must be dependent for his living on the handicraft practised by him
Likewise all implements of husbandry of an agriculturist are exempt from attachment and sale
The word  such  occurring before the words I cattle and seed grain in cl
b 1 ILR 185 shows that these are protected only to the extent indicated and that there is no limit to the protection afforded to the implements of husbandry of an agriculturist
If this is the correct reading of the clause as I think it is then it seems to me impossible to say that an agriculturist whose implements of husbandry are intended to be protected must be one who could not maintain himself apart from agriculture
Likewise there is nothing in cl
c to indicate that the agriculturist there mentioned must be one who depends for his living on agriculture There remains one other view to consider
It has been said that the agriculturist must be a very small farmer Muthuvenkatarama Reddiar vs The Official Receiver of South Arcot 1
For this qualification for an agriculturist again I find no warrant in the clauses or indeed anywhere else in section 60
The various clauses in the proviso to section 60 sub sec
1 exempting diverse things from attachment and sale are no doubt based on public policy but the consideration of public policy in each case appears to me to be different
I find it impossible to say that the central idea was to protect the poor or to prevent a person being left destitute
Thus el
a protects the necessary wearing apparel cooking vessels beds and bedding of the judgment
debtor
Even a very rich judgment debtor is entitled to protection under this clause
Clause d protects books of account
Here again it is not a poor man alone that is contemplated nor would deprivation of books of account leave one destitute in all cases
Clause g protects political pensions which may be and often are of substantial amounts
Clause h protects wages of labourers and domestic servants
This clause of course deals with a poor man and is intended to relieve against poverty
Since however there is no one specific central idea running through all the clauses each clause has to be construed by itself
Coming then to cls
b and c I find no justification for the view that they deal only with poor people or are intended to protect against destitution
Thus there 1 Mad 227
24 186 is nothing in el
b to indicate that the tools of only poor artisans are to be protected
The same thing can be said of an agriculturist
The fact that his cattle and seed grain are protected to the extent necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood does not lead to the view that he must be a poor agriculturist
On the contrary the clause contemplates an agriculturist who has more cattle and seed grain than he needs for his livelihood
It clearly contemplates a rich and large scale agriculturist
Therefore it seems to me that there is no warrant for imposing any qualification on the plain meaning of the word I agriculturist  in cls
b and c
In my view an agriculturist contemplated by the clauses is any person who occupies himself with agriculture
This is the view taken in Gowardhandas vs Mohan Lal 1 and with it I agree
A person occupying himself with agriculture would be an agriculturist though he does not cultivate with his own hands and carries on agriculture in a very large scale
He would still be an agriculturist though he has other means of livelihood besides agriculture
I come now to the facts of this case
The question is is Appasaheb such an agriculturist as I have indicated  The evidence clearly shows that he is
It can be said to have been established beyond doubt and not questioned in the Courts below that Appasaheb was carrying on agricultural operations under his supervision through labour employed by him and with his own cattle and agricultural implements on fifty to sixty acres of land
The evidence also establishes that Appasaheb s income from agriculture came to Rs 30000 to Rs 35000 per year
It appears that he was in receipt of cash allowances of Rs 700 to Rs 800 per year in respect of the watan and Rs 4000 to Rs 5000 per year from village officers of the watan villages neither of which was income from agriculture
These facts in my view make Appasaheb an agriculturist for the purpose of cls
b and c though it may be that he was not dependent for his living upon agriculture and was a large scale farmer who did not 187 till with his own hands
I wish however to state that there is uncontradicted testimony that Appasaheb personally took part in the agricultural operations
Now cl
c protects from attachment and sale houses and other buildings with the sites thereof and land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him
I think it is a fair reading of this clause to say that the houses buildings and lands must be occupied by the agriculturist for the purpose of agriculture for the object of these clauses is to protect an agriculturist only so far as is necessary for his agricultural operations
If an agriculturist occupied a house say as a holiday resort there would be no reason to protect that house from attachment and sale
The question then arises whether Appasaheb occupied the wada for the purposes of his agricultural operations
I think the evidence makes it perfectly clear that he did so
It shows that the larger part of the wada was used for storing crops keeping agricultural implements residence of the farm servants and tethering cattle used for agriculture
Appasaheb and his family lived in a part of the wada but that also was clearly occupation for purposes of agriculture for it is from there that he supervised the agricultural operations
I have therefore come to the conclusion that the wada is saved from attachment and sale in execution by cl
c of the proviso to sub section
1 of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure
The other contention of the appellants does not seem to me to be sustainable
It is said that the maxim accession credit principali applies and the wada standing on watan land has acquired the character of watan as an accession to it
It is not in dispute now that the wada was not in existence when the watan was first created but had been built subsequently by one of the watandars
It is also said that the grant of the watan carried full right of ownership in the subject of the grant  that the grantee had the right to make such use of the land granted as any owner of it could have 188 done
So it was said that the wada had been put up rightfully by the watandar and became part of the watan as an accession to it
There is no doubt that the wada was rightfully constructed
It may be that it became on such construction a part of the land on which it stands and assumed the character of immovable property
But I am unable to agree that it thereupon assumed the inalienable character of watan property and was therefore hot liable to attachment and sale in execution
I do not think that the maxim accessio cedit principali applies in giving the wada put up on watan the character of a watan
Watan is a creation by government grant
It is inalienable under a special Act
The inalienable character attaches under the Act only to the property granted by the government
This peculiar character cannot be extended to other property by the application of the maxim
Therefore it seems to me that the wada is not inalienable though it stands on land which is inalienable as a government grant under a special Act
I would for this reason reject this contention of the appellant
As however in my view the wada is protected from attachment and sale in execution under cl
c to the proviso to sub section
1 of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure I would allow the appeal
BY COURT In view of the majority Judgment the appeal is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The respondent company was a manufacturer of edible and non edible oils and was registered as a  dealer  under the United Provinces Sales Tax Act 1948
Its year of account commenced on June 1 and ended on May 31 of the next year
Under section 71 of the Act read
with rule 39 of the rules framed thereunder the respondent exercised the option of being assessed on the turnover of the previous year and submitted its return for the assessment year 1948 49 on its taxable turnover of the previous year ending May 31 1947
The Sales Tax Officer assessed the turnover in respect of edible oil at 3 pies per rupee under section 3 but in respect of non edible oil he held that since a notification dated June 8 1948 issued under section 3A had come into force from June 9 of the assessment year providing for the levy of tax at 6 pies per rupee the assessee was liable to be assessed at 3 pies per rupee on the turnover during the first 69 days of the year and at 6 pies per rupee for the remaining days of the year
On appeal by the assessee the appellate authority modified the order and directed that the tax be levied at a flat rate of 3 Pies on both edible and non edible oils
This order was set aside by the revising authority and the order of the Sales Tax Officer was restored
On a direction made by the High Court the revising authority submitted a question for opinion
The High Court held that the assessee was liable to pay the tax at a flat rate of 3 pies per rupee
On appeal by the Commissioner of Sales Tax by special leave Held per Hidayatullah Das Gupta and Sliah jj affirming the view of the High Court that the assessee who elected to submit his return on the turnover of the previous year is liable to be assessed to sales tax at the rate in force on the first day of the year of assessment because the liability arises on that date and any subsequent enhancement of the rate by virtue of a notification under section 3A does not alter that liability
A taxing statute must be interpreted in the light of what 190 is clearly expressed therein and nothing can be implied nor can provisions be imported into them so as to supply an assumed deficiency
Per section K Das and Ayyangar JJ
The rate of tax as applied by the sales tax officer was in accordance with law
Having regard to the scheme underlying the option to elect for a previous year turnover conferred by section 71 of the Act the change in the law and in the rate of tax effected during the assessment year must apply to the turnover of the previous year which is deemed to be the turnover of the assessment year and sales effected during that period have to be assessed at the rate prevailing in that year
Although the notification was prospective and was made with the object of changing the rate of taxation during the assessment year the date mentioned therein did not prevent the application of the assessment year rate to the opted previous year turnover
It is not correct to say that there is absence of machinery for reassessment and refund of tax to justify the conclusion that the basis of the tax liablity for an assessment year is that which prevailed on the first day of that year since there are provisions in the Act such as for instance sections 10 and 22 which provide for reductions refunds and rectification of errors regarding taxation and even for enhancement of the tax already levied
There was no ambiguity in the notification and the principle of resolving ambiguities in favour of the assessee could not be applied in this case