159 of 1956
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights
N C Chatterjee and D N Mukherjee for the petitioners
Mahabir Prasad Advocate General for the State of Bihar Bajrang Sahai and R C Prasad for the respondents
December 15
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J
This petition under article 32 of the Constitution is filed by the Mineral Development Limited against the State of Bihar and another for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government of Bihar dated September 7 1955 cancelling the petitioner s licence and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing them to forbear from giving effect to the said order of cancellation
One Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh hereinafter called the proprietor was the proprietor of Ramgarh and Serampur estates in the district of 612 Hazaribagh in the State of Bihar
On December 291947 the said proprietor executed a mining lease in favour of the Mineral Development Limited herein after called the Company for all minerals in respect of 3026 villages for a period of 999 years
On or about January 3 1951 the Deputy Commissioner Hazaribagh granted the Company a licence bearing No HL 261 H in form  B  under section 6 of the Bihar Mica Act 1947 hereinafter called the Act for mining mica
The licence was renewed from year to year by the relevant authority and the last of the renewals expired on December 31 1954
The Secretary to the Government of Bihar in the Revenue Department issued a notice dated March 7 1953 to the Company charging it with violations of sections 10 12 and 14 of the Act and calling upon it to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice why action should not be taken to cancel the licence issued in favour of the Company
By letter dated March 20 1953 the Company requested the Secretary to the Government Revenue Department Bihar to furnish the Company with particulars of the alleged violations of the provisions of the Act
After a reminder was sent the Company was furnished by the Government with the particulars by its letter dated May 1 1953
On or about May 17 1953 the Company sent a written representation to the Government denying the allegations made against it and explaining how the Company complied with the provisions of the Act
After this letter no further correspondence passed between the Government and the Company
But on September 7 1955 ie two years after the said representation the Government issued a notification cancelling the Company s licence No 261 H of 1951
The result of this notification was that the Company was prevented from carrying on the mining operations in large tracts of land it had taken on lease from the said proprietor  The Company in its petition has stated that it had invested a large sum of about Rs 16 lakhs to obtain the mining lease and spent a considerable sum in prospecting and developing the mines that by the arbitrary act of the Government it could not work the 613 mines that a large number of labourers had been thrown out of employment and that in the result it was being put to heavy loss
It has filed the present petition for the reliefs mentioned already for the reasons among others that the Government acted illegally and with mala fldes and infringed the fundamental rights of the petitioner under article 191 sub cls
f and g of the Constitution
The first respondent to the petition is the State of Bihar and the second respondent is the Additional Secretary to the Government of Bihar in the Revenue Department
They filed a counter denying the allegations made against the Government and particularly stated that they had acted within their rights and cancelled the licence in strict compliance with the provisions of the Act
The arguments of Mr Chatterjee learned Counsel for the petitioner may be broadly formulated under the following four heads i The Bihar Mica Act 1947 as amended by the Bihar Mica Amendment Act 1949 is ultra vires for want of constitutional competence ii the provisions of the Act are repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act 53 of 1948 and therefore to the extent of such repugnancy the former Act should yield to the latter Act with the result that the licensing provisions under the Act ceased to have any legal effect iii the petitioner has the fundamental rights under article 191f and g of the Constitution to acquire hold and dispose of his property and to carry on any occupation trade or business in respect thereof and that the provisions of section 251c of the Act operate as an unreasonable restriction on the said rights and are therefore void and iv even if the said section did not infringe his fundamental rights the order of the Government in cancelling the lease without affording him reasonable opportunity to show cause within the meaning of the second proviso to that section infringed his fundamental right
The first two contentions need not detain us for the petition may be disposed of on the basis of the last two contentions
614 The first question therefore is whether the provisions of section 25 of the Act infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner under sub cls
f and g of article 191 of the Constitution
The said provisions of the Constitution read Article 19 1 All citizens shall have the right f to acquire hold and dispose of property and g to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business
 Under sub cls
f and g of article 191 every citizen has the right to acquire hold and dispose of property and to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation trade or business
But cls
5 and 6 of article 19 authorize the State to make a law imposing restrictions in the interest of the general public but the restrictions so imposed must be reasonable
The concept of reasonableness has been clearly explained by Patanjali Sastri CJ in State of Madras vs V G Row1 as under
 It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases
The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby the disproportion of the imposition the prevailing conditions at the time should all enter into the judicial verdict
 These observations if we may say so with great respect lay down the correct principle
It follows that it is the duty of this Court to decide having regard to the aforesaid considerations and such others whether a particular statute satisfies the objective test of  reasonableness 
While not disputing the general principle the learned Counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the decision of this Court in Thakur Raghubir Singh vs Court of Wards Ajmer 2 in support of his contentions
The facts in that case 1  607
2   1055
615 weres 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act XLII of 1950 provided that  if a landlord habitually infringes the rights of a tenant under this Act he shall notwithstanding anything in section 7 of the Ajmer Government Wards Regulation 1888 1 of 1888 be deemed to be a landlord who is disqualified to manage his own property  within the meaning of section 6 of the said Regulation and his property shall be liable to be taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards The determination of the question whether a landlord bad habit ually infringed the rights of his tenants was left to the Court of Wards
The petitioner whose estate was taken over by the Court of Wards questioned the validity of the power conferred on the Court of Wards
This Court held that the said section was void as being an unreasonable restriction on the rights in property as the restriction made the enjoyment of that right depend upon the mere discretion of the executive
Mahajan J as he then was observed   When a law deprives a person of possession of his property for an indefinite period of time merely on the subjective determination of an executive officer such a law can on no construction of the word reasonable be described as coming within that expression because it completely negatives the fundamental right by making its enjoyment depend on the mere pleasure and discretion of the executive the citizen affected having no right to have recourse for establishing the contrary in a civil court In that case the combined operation of section 112 of Act XLII of 1950 and the provision s of Regulation 1of 1888 was that the Court of Wards could in its own discretion and on its own subjective determination assume superintendence of the property of a landlord who habitually infringed the rights of his tenants
The Act also did not provide any machinery for determining the question whether a certain landlord was a person who habitually infringed the rights of his tenants
Even the condition precedent for the assumption of superintendence by the Court 616 of Wards viz the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner was also a matter entirely resting on his discretion
It will be seen that under that Act the entire question was left to the unbridled discretion of the executive without providing for any machinery to ascertain the grounds for its action
That decision cannot apply to the facts of the present case as they differ in material respects from those considered by this court in that decision
The short question therefore is whether section 25 of the Act places unreasonable restrictions on the petioner s fundamental rights under article 191f and g of the Constitution
It is conceded that the State can make a law imposing restrictions in the interest of the public on citizens in respect of their enjoyment of mineral rights but the complaint is that the law which enables the State in its uncontrolled discretion to prevent the owner or the lessee of such a field from enjoying his land or leasehold interest or to carry on his mining operations permanently or for an indefinite period is unreasonable
So stated there is plausibility in the argument
But let us look at the law more closely to ascertain whether it suffers from such a vice
The Act was passed in the year 1947 and was amended from time to time
The declared object of the Act is  to regulate the possession and transport of and trading in mica in the Province of Bihar 
It was necessitated presumably because of the scarcity of mica and its importance in the industrial field and for that reason for regulating home consumption and foreign export
The learned Counsel for the petitioner did not controvert the position and indeed conceded that reasonable restrictions can legitimately be imposed on the mining operations of the petitioner
Section 4 of the Act imposes a prohibition on the possession of and trading in mica without licence proprietor s certificate or digger s permit
Sections 5 and 6 prescribe a machinery for granting proprietor s certificate miner s or dealer s licence
Sections 10 to 12 define the duties of licensees and registered proprietors in the matter of keeping accounts and producing them for inspection
Section 14 prohibits 617 the removal of mica from one place to another without a pass
Sections 17 19 and 21A impose penalties for the infringement of the provisions of the Act an the rules made thereunder
Section 22 to 24 deal with miscellaneous matters such as the power Of a police officer to arrest without warrant persons guilty of an offence under this Act to search seize and detain mica removed without a pass etc
Then comes section 25
As the main argument of the learned Counsel turns upon the provisions of section 25 it is necessary to read the entire section which is as follows  Section 25  1 The State Government may cancel the licence or proprietor s certificate of any licensee or registered proprietor who a allows his licence or proprietors certificate as the case may be to be used on behalf of any other person as authority to buy or have in his possession or sell mica extracted from a mica mine or from a mica dump or b being a person to whom a miner s licence has been granted extracts mica from a mine the particulars of which are not endorsed on his licence or c is guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the other provisions of this Act or rules made thereunder or d is convicted of an offence under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code committed in respect of mica Provided that a licence or a proprietor s certificate shall not be cancelled solely by reason of conviction from which the licensee or the registered proprietor has no right of appeal or revision Provided further that a licence or a proprietor s certificate shall not be cancelled unless the licensee or the proprietor has been furnished with the grounds for such cancellation and has been afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause why his licence shall not be cancelled
2 A fresh licence or proprietor s certificate shall not without the previous sanction of the State Government be granted to any licensee or registered 79 618 proprietor whose licence or proprietor s certificate has been cancelled under this section
 This section embodies the severest punishment that can be imposed under the Act on a licensee or a proprietor
It enables the State Government to cancel the licence
The power is entrusted to the highest executive in the State which ordinarily can be relied upon to discharge its duties honestly impartially and in the interest of the public without any extraneous considerations
The section provides clearly ascertainable standards for the State Government to apply to the facts of each case
Clauses a b c and d of section 251 describe with sufficient particularity the nature of the defaults to be committed and the abuses to be guilty of by the licensee in order to attract the penal provisions
Clause c with which we are directly concerned embodies the last step that can be resorted to by the State Government to eliminate the recalcitrant operator from the field of mining industry if only he is guilty of repeated failures to comply with any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder other than those mentioned in the other clauses of the section
The discretion of the State Government under cl
c of section 251 is hedged in by two important restrictions viz i the failure to comply with the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder should be a repeated failure and not a mere sporadic one ie the defaulter must be a recalcitrant one ii before cancelling the licence the State Government should afford reasonable opportunity to the licensee to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled
That apart the cancellation of the licence has not the effect of barring the licensee or the proprietor from applying for a fresh licence
The only condition imposed is that a fresh licence shall not be granted to him without the previous sanction of the State Government
In the foregoing circumstances can it be said that the section imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner s fundamental rights  The statutory conditions subject to which the licence is given are obviously reasonable 619 and necessary for regulating the mining industry
The provisions of the Act as we have already pointed out were only designed to compel a licensee to keep accounts produce them before the authorities when required to prevent him from removing mica from the fields without passes and to impose penalties for contravening the rules
The only vice is said to lie in the power to cancel a licence conferred on the State Government under section 25 of the Act
The power given to the State Government is only to achieve the object of the Act ie to enforce the said provisions which have been enacted in the interest of the public and that power as we have indicated is exercisable on the basis of objective tests and in accordance with the principles of natural justice
We cannot therefore hold that section 251c of the Act imposes an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner s fundamental rights under article 191f and g of the Constitution
Before leaving this part of the case we must make it clear that we do not intend to lay down as a proposition that whenever discretionary power is conferred on a State Government or the Union Government by law the said law must necessarily operate as a reasonable restriction on a fundamental right
Such a general proposition negatives the concept of fundamental rights for the simple reason that fundamental rights are guaranteed against State action
Therefore the conferment of such a power on the State Government and not upon a subordinate officer is only one of the considerations that may enter into the judicial verdict on the reasonableness of a particular law and the reasonableness of that law falls to be decided only on the cumulative effect of the circumstances under which such power is conferred
The next question is did the State Government comply with the provision of section 251c read with the second proviso thereto of the Act  Under the said proviso the State Government can cancel a licence after affording reasonable opportunity to the licensee to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled
This proviso confers a quasi judicial power on the 620 State Government
The concept of  reasonable opportunity  is an elastic one and is not susceptible of easy and precise definition
The decisions on cases under article 311 of the Constitution afford illustrations of the applications of the said doctrine to varying situations
What is reasonable opportunity under one set of circumstances need not be reasonable under different circumstances
It is the duty of the Court to ascertain in each case having regard to the overall picture before it to come to a conclusion whether reasonable opportunity is given to a person  to show cause within the meaning of the second proviso to section 251 of the Act
Tribunals or authorities who are entrusted with quasi judicial functions are as much bound by the relevant principles governing the  doctrine of bias  as any other judicial tribunal
This Court in a recent decision in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao vs The State of Andhra Pradesh 1 observed The principles governing the doctrine of bias vis a vis judicial tribunals are well settled and they are i no man shall be a judge in his own cause ii justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done
The two maxims yield the result that if a member of a judicial body is  subject to a bias whether financial or other in favour of or against any party to a dispute or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist he ought not take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal and that any direct pecuniary interest however small in the subject matter of inquiry will disqualify a judge and any interest though not pecuniary will have the same effect if it is sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias
The said principles are equally applicable to authorities though they are not courts of justice or judicial tribunals who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others ie authorities who are empowered to discharge quasijudicial functions
 In view of the foregoing principles the first question to be considered is whether in the present case the 1 1959 SCR Supp
1 319
621 authority functioning for the State Government it is admitted that the then Revenue Minister of the State made the impugned order had personal bias against the petitioner
Secondly we will have to scrutinize the record to ascertain whether reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause or whether it was denied that right
Thirdly we will have to ascertain whether the State Government found that the petitioner was guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the other provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder and cancelled the licence on the basis of that finding
It may be mentioned that the learned Advocate General who appeared before us on behalf of the State submitted that the State Government exercised its power under section 251c of the Act
The notice to show cause was issued by the State Government to the petitioner on March 7 1953
The licence granted in favour of the petitioner was cancelled by the State Government by its notification dated September 1 1955
Admittedly during this period Sri Krishna Ballav Sahay was the Revenue Minister of the Government of Bihar and he was in charge of the department dealing with mines
There was political rivalry between the said Minister and Sri Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh the ex landlord of Ramgarh and Serampur estates in the district of Hazaribagh who leased the lands in question to the petitioner
The case of the State is that the said lease was benami only for the said proprietor and the case of the petitioner is that the wife of the proprietor Rani Lalita Rajya Luxmi Devi is the registered share holder of the Company
The question whether the lease is only benami for the proprietor or not is now in dispute in title suit No 53 of 1954 pending on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge Hazaribagh
We shall therefore assume for the purpose of this case that there is a dispute on the question of title the State Government asserting that the lease is only benami for the proprietor and the petitioner claiming to be the real lessee and the wife of the proprietor only a registered share holder of the 622 Company
Whichever version is true the proprietor directly or because of his wife is very much interested in the Companyat any rate the Government s case is that he is the owner
It is alleged in the petition that the said proprietor opposed the Revenue Minister in the general election held in 1952 to the Bihar Legislative Assembly in the constituency of Giridih and Barkagaon and defeated him
It is also stated that before the said election the Revenue Minister filed a criminal case against the proprietor in the District Court of Hazaribagh charging him under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code
The High Court in a judgment dated April 15 1952 delivered in the petition to transfer the said case to some other Court recorded the admitted fact that there was political rivalry between the Minister and the proprietor
Ultimately this Court transferred the said criminal case from the State of Bihar to the file of a Magistrate s Court in Delhi on the ground that there was political rivalry between the two persons
These facts are not denied in the counter affidavit filed by the State
In the said counter affidavit the following cryptic statement occurs  That the allegations in para
14b of the petition about the alleged political rivalry between Sri Kamakshya Narain Singh and Sri Krishna Ballav Sahay the then Minister Revenue has no bearing on the facts of this case so far as the orders of the Government are concerned and to that extent the allegations are denied
 It may therefore be taken that the allegations of  personal bias of the Revenue Minister against the proprietor is not denied
It is also not disputed that the proceedings against the petitioner were started during the tenure of the said Revenue Minister and that the actual order of cancellation was made by him
We have no hesitation in holding that the Revenue Minister had personal bias against the proprietor and that he was also acting on the belief that the lease was only benami for the said proprietor
We therefore hold that the said Revenue Minister had personal bias within the meaning of the decisions and he should 623 not have taken part in either initiating the enquiry or in cancelling the licence
On the basis that section 25 of the Act is constitutionally valid the question is whether the provisions of that section have been complied with in the present case
If they were not complied with the order of the State Government made in derogation of the said provisions would certainly infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner
The main objection to the validity of the impugned order is that the State Government did not afford the petitioner reasonable opportunity to show cause why his licence should not be cancelled
The subject matter of the mining leasehold interest is in respect of 3026 villages for a period of 999 years
It is alleged in the petition that a large amount of about Rs 16 lakhs were spent by the petitioner to obtain the mining lease and in addition a considerable sum was spent in prospecting and developing the mines
On March 7 1953 the Government of Bihar through its Secretary in the Revenue Department issued a notice to the petitioner asking it to show cause within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice why action to cancel the miner s licence No 261 H under section 251c of the Act should not be taken by the Government
It is stated in the notice that the petitioner committed  violations of sections 10 12 and 14 in respect of their mica godowns at Marhand and Sultana sections 10 and 12 in respect of the godowns at Simaria and section 10 in respect of Kowabar godowns and have thus been guilty of repeated failures to comply with those provisions of the Bihar Mica Act 1947
 On receipt of this notice the peti tioner by its letter dated March 20 1953 asked the Government to furnish it with particulars of the allegations contained in the said notice and on March 27 1953 renewed its request for the said particulars
On May 1 1953 the Government sent a Memorandum No AM1 802253R to the petitioner Company giving the particulars of the violations of the provisions of the Act
The subject of the memorandum is described as  Repeated failure to comply with the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act 1947
 The particulars show that between December 3 1952 and December 11 1952 624 the Inspector of Mica Accounts inspected different godowns of the petitioner and found contravention of the provisions of sections 10 12 and 14 of the Act
What is important to notice is that the inspection though spread over a few days was really one inspection of different godowns and the particulars disclosed were comparatively trivial defaults in carrying out the provisions of the Act
It may also be noticed that one of the particulars related to an inspection alleged to have been made on March 6 1952 and in respect of that inspection the petitioner was prosecuted and convicted but the licence was renewed for the next two years in spite of the said conviction
The result of that inspection is therefore not germane to the enquiry initiated by the notice dated March 7 1953
After giving the particulars the memorandum concludes  it is clear that the Company has been guilty of repeated failure to comply with the provisions of the Bihar Mica Act 1947  and on these allegations the Company was directed to show cause why the licence should not be cancelled under section 251b of the Act
Section 251b says that the State Government may cancel the licence of any licensee who  being a person to whom a miners s licence has been granted extracts mica from a mine the particulars of which are not endorsed on his licence
 It is admitted by the learned Advocate General that the Government did not take action under cl
b of section 251 and that the mention of that clause in the memorandum was only a mistake for cl
c of section 251 of the Act
On May 17 1953 the petitioner submitted to the Government a detailed explanation in regard to the charges levelled against it
It premised its explanation with the statement that all the relevant books of accounts and stock books had been seized by the Inspector of Mica Accounts and had not been returned in spite of repeated requests and that therefore it reserved its right to make further submissions when the books were returned
It also pointed out that at the time of inspection it was not asked to explain the alleged irregularity in accordance with the usual procedure in regard to such matters
In then proceeded to answer every one of 625 the allegations made against it
The explanation given by the Company appears to be plausible and the contraventions alleged even if true appear to be too trivial for the drastic action taken by the State
In 1954 the Government filed a suit against the said proprietor for a declaration that the various companies brought into existence by him were bogus ones and the various transactions entered into by him were all benami for him
After the explanation given by the petitioner there was a lull for more than two years
The State Government neither returned the account books nor invited the petitioner to make further submissions by allowing it to look into the accounts seized by the authorities concerned
Suddenly on September 7 1955 a notification was issued to the effect that the Governor of Bihar was pleased to cancel the petitioner s licence
It was also directed to stop operating the mica mines forthwith and to produce the books of account relating to the above mines in respect of their godowns on September 12 1955
From the foregoing narration of facts it is obvious that the licence affecting rights of great magnitude was cancelled to say the least for trivial reasons
The enquiry was held by the department headed by the Minister who was obviously biased against the petitioner
Some technical non compliances of the rules alleged to have been discovered during the inspection of certain godowns were given as an excuse to withdraw the licence no opportunity was given to the petitioner to inspect its accounts and to explain the alleged defaults with reference to the accounts
After the petitioner gave its reply a sense of false security was created in the petitioner and after a period of two years the Government issued the notification cancelling the licence
Meanwhile as a second string to the bow the state filed a suit against the proprietor for a declaration that the lease was benami and for other reliefs
The hidden hand of the Revenue Minister can be seen in this enquiry
The proceedings were started because of political rivalry between the proprietor and the Revenue Minister
Though heavy stakes were involved the enquiry was conducted in a manner which 80 626 did not give any real opportunity to the petitioner to explain its conduct and to disprove the allegations made against it and the order of cancellation of the licence was made admittedly by the same Revenue Minister who was behind the enquiry
In the circumstances we must hold that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner within the meaning of the second proviso to section 251 of the Act
That apart the State Government did not find on the material that the petitioner was guilty of repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Act
The particulars furnished by the Government did not disclose any such repeated failure
Under section 251c of the Act repeated failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Act is a necessary condition for the cancellation of a licence
Unless there is repeated failure within the meaning of that clause the State Government has no power to cancel the licence under the said clause
That apart neither in the notice initiating the proceedings nor in the notification cancelling the licence issued by the Government it was stated that the petitioner was guilty of  repeated failure  within the meaning of the said clause
But in the particulars furnished the State Government alleged that the petitioner had been guilty of repeated failure to comply with the provisions of the Act but the particulars did not support that statement for apart from the default of March 1952 the alleged contravention of rules were discovered by the Inspector of Mica Accounts only during the inspection of some of the godowns between December 3 1953 and December 11 1953
The result of that one continuous inspection cannot be the basis for holding that the petitioner was guilty of  repeated failure  within the meaning of section 251c of the Act
There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was found to be guilty of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act on any other occasion after March 1952
Apart from the only prosecution which we have already noticed the petitioner was not prosecuted for any other contravention of the provisions of sections 10 12 or 14 of the Act
That prosecution cannot be pressed into 627 service as the State Government renewed the licence for 1953 54
In this state of record we must hold that the respondents failed to prove that the petitioner was guilty of repeated failure to comply with the provisions of the Act
On the basis of the said finding the respondents would have no power to take action under section 251c of the Act
The foregoing discussion establishes that neither the necessary condition to enable the Government to take action under section 251c of the Act has been established nor the State Government had afforded reasonable opportunity to the petitioner within the meaning of the second proviso to section 251
In the result we accept the petition and issue a writ of certiorari against the respondents quashing the order of the Government of Bihar dated September 1 1955 cancelling miner s licence No 261 H of 1951 granted in favour of the petitioner
The respondents will pay the costs to the petitioner
Petition allowed


Summary:
The three respondents who were the General Manager the Assistant Manager and the Secretary of the Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd were charged under sections 12 13 and 26 of the United Provinces Shop and Commercial Establishment Act 1947 for contravening the provisions of the Act relating to holidays leave and maintenance of certain registers regarding a class of field workers employed by the company to guide supervise and control growth and supply of sugar cane for use in the factory
It was contended on their behalf that those employees were workers within the meaning of the and the United Provinces Shop and Establishment Act did not apply to them
The Judicial Magistrate rejected that contention and convicted the respondents under section 26 of the Act and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs 30 each
On a reference by the Sessions judge recommending that the said convictions and sentences may be set aside the High Court acquitted the respondents
The State Government appealed to this Court by Special Leave
Held that the order of acquittal passed by the High Court was erroneous
The provisions of the were intended to benefit only workers employed in a factory and since field workers guiding supervising and controlling growth and supply of sugar cane for use in the factory were not employed in the factory the did not apply to them and they fell within the definition of  Commercial Establishment  under the United Provinces Shop and Commercial Establishment Act 1947