Appeals Nos 35  36 of 1954
1505 Appeals from the judgments and order dated August 28 1952 of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos 34 and 35 of 1952 arising out of the orders dated January 24 1952 of the said High Court exercising its Civil Original Jurisdiction in Misc
Applications Nos 302 of 1951 and 303 304 and 305 of 1951 respectively
R J Kolah B Narayanaswami J B Dadachanji section N Andley and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant
H N Sanyal Addl
Solicitor General of India N P Nathwani and R H Dhebar for respondent No 3 in C A 35  No 5 in C A 36
D H Buch and Naunit Lal for respondent No 2 in C A 35  Nos 2 4 in C A 36 1958
March 19
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J
These appeals arise out of petitions made to the Bombay High Court under article 226 for writs of certiorari
The appellant is the manager of the Tata Mills Limited which carries on business in the manufacture and sale of textile goods in Bombay and as such is responsible for the payment of wages under the 
The first respondent was the Authority under the at the times material to these appeals
The sixth respondent is the present Authority
The Authority is entrusted with the duty of deciding cases falling within the purview of the Act
The second third fourth and fifth respondents are employees in the Mills
A dispute arose about a claim made by the operatives of the Mills for a bonus for the year 1948
This was referred to the Industrial Court at Bombay which made an award on April 23 1949 and awarded a bonus equivalent to four and a half months  wages subject to certain conditions of which only the sixth is material here
It runs as follows  Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are 1506 not in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November 1949
In such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mill concerned Those operatives who made a claim before the date fixed above were duly paid but payment was refused to the third respondent who applied much later on the ground that the condition subject to which the award was made was not fulfilled
The third respondent thereupon made an application before the first respondent the Authority under the 
Similar claims were made by the second fourth and fifth respondents for a bonus for the year 1949
The Industrial Court awarded a bonus equal to two months  wages and in the sixth condition put the date as December 31 1950
By this time Labour Appellate Tribunals came into existence so both sides filed appeals against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of Bombay
The appeals failed and the award was upheld
After that the matter followed the same pattern
Respondents 2 4 and 5 applied for their bonus after December 31 1950
The Mills refused to pay and these respondents applied to the first respondent the Authority under the 
The two sets of claims that is to say the claim of the third respondent for a bonus for the year 1948 and the claims of the second fourth and fifth respondents for bonuses for the year 1949 were heard together
The appellant contested these applications on two grounds
He questioned the jurisdiction of the Authority to entertain the petitions made to it
He also contended that in any event as the condition subject to which the award was made namely an application on or before November 30 1949 was not fulfilled the claim for a bonus did not lie
The first respondent held that it had jurisdiction and after hearing the parties on the merits decreed the various claims
1507 The appellant thereupon filed writ petitions in the High Court
They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J
An appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard by the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J
They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in another case dated March 11 1952 and following that decision dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision
The appellant then applied for a certificate for leave to appeal here
This was granted by Chagla C J and Dixit J on February 2 1953
The first question that we have to decide is whether the first respondent had jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to him as the Authority under the 
This depends on whether these bonuses are  wages  within the meaning of the definition in section 2vi of the Act
The scope of the Authority s jurisdiction is set out in section 15 of the Act
It is to bear and decide 1all claims arising out of deduction from wages and 2 all claims regarding delay in the payment of wages
Therefore unless these bonuses are  wages  within the meaning of the Act the Authority will have no jurisdiction
The definition of  wages  in section 2vi of the Act is long and complicated but leaving aside the clauses in it that are not material for our present purpose it runs  Wages  means all remuneration   which would if the terms of the contract of employment express or implied were fulfilled be payable whether conditionally upon regular attendance good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration 191 191 1508 of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment but does not include   and then five matters that are not included are set out
Now consider this clause by clause   Wages  means all remuneration
 Is bonus a remuneration  We think it is Remuneration is only a more formal version of  payment  and payment is a recompense for service rendered
Now it is true that bonus in the abstract need not be for services rendered and in that sense need not be a remuneration for example there is a shareholder s bonus in certain companies and there is a life insurance bonus and so forth
But that is not the kind of bonus contemplated here because the kind of remuneration that the definition contemplates is one that is payable  in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment
 Therefore the kind of bonus that this definition con templates is one that is remuneration for services rendered or work done
Accordingly it is a  remuneration  and as the definition includes all remuneration of a specified kind we are of opinion that bonus of the kind contemplated here falls within the clause that says it must be  remuneration 
Next comes a clause that limits the kind of remuneration for though the opening words are  all remuneration  the words that follow limit it to all remuneration of the kind specified in the next clause that is to remuneration  which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment express or implied were fulfilled
 Now the question is whether the kind of bonus contemplated by this definition must be a bonus that is payable as a clause of the contract of employment
We think it is and for this reason
If we equate  bonus  with  remuneration  the 1509 definition says clearly enough that the bonus must be such that it is payable if the terms of the contract are fulfilled that is to say it will not be payable if the terms are not fulfilled
Now we can understand a position where a statute declares that whenever the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled the bonus shall be payable equally we can envisage a situation in which an employer engages to pay a bonus should the terms of the contract of employment be fulfilled by a separate and independent agreement that is riot part of the contract of employment
In either case the matter could be said to fall within this part of the definition
But we can see no way in which a bonus can be said to be payable if and when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled outside these two cases namely legislation or a separate contract that is not part of the contract of employment except when it is payable by reason of a term express or implied in the contract of employment itself
In any event if there are such cases the present is not one of them for the bonus here is payable under an award of an Industrial Court and has nothing to do with the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment except indirectly
It was argued that as an Industrial Court can direct payment of bonus should an industrial dispute arise in that behalf the matter falls within the definition
But does it  One of the matters that an Industrial Court might take into consideration before awarding a bonus is whether all the terms of the contract of employment have been duly fulfilled and it is possible that such a Court might refuse to award a bonus in cases where the terms were not fulfilled but it would not be bound by such a consideration and its right to make an award of bonus is not conditional on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment whereas under the definition that is an essential ingredient
Therefore even if due fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment was to be one of the reasons for the award the bonus so awarded would not be payable because the terms of the contract 1510 had been fulfilled but because of an industrial dispute and because in order to settle it the Court awarded the bonus
It is not necessary to analyse the definition any further except for one clause because even if all the other ingredients are present the clause we have just considered would exclude a bonus of the kind we have here that is to say a bonus awarded by an Industrial Court
The clause we have yet to examine is this  and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable
 It was contended that the words  and includes any bonus  stand by themselves and that the words that follow must be disregarded when bonus is under consideration because they relate only to additional remuneration  and riot to  bonus 
Now it may be possible to say that the words  of the nature aforesaid  only govern the words  additional remuneration  and that they do not apply to bonus with the result that the inclusion clause  and includes any bonus etc would refer to two separate things namely 1 bonus and 2other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid
In our opinion the clause means 1 bonus   which would be so payable  and 2 other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable
 If that is correct then the words  which would be so payable  throw us back to the earlier part of the definition and we reach the position that the kind of bonus that is included by the inclusion clause is the kind that would be payable  if the terms of the contract of employment express or implied are fulfilled
 There is another reason for reaching this conclusion
The opening words of the definition make it clear that  wages  means remuneration that is payable when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled
Therefore that is something certain
1511 One knows ahead of time that if the terms of the contract are fulfilled then the bonus is payable
It may be that the exact amount has yet to be determined but the fact that bonus is payable and can be claimed as soon as the terms of the contract are fulfilled is a matter that can be predicated beforehand that is to say even before the terms of the contract are fulfilled or indeed even before the work has started if the contract is made that far ahead
But that is not the case when bonus is awarded by an Industrial Court for there it is impossible to say ahead of time whether bonus will be awarded or not indeed at the time the contract is entered into it would be impossible to say whether such a claim could be laid at a II because a difference of opinion between one worker and his employer about the right to bonus would Dot necessarily lead to an industrial dispute
When an Industrial Court awards a bonus independent of any contract it does so only if there is an available surplus for a distribution of bonus and the amount of the award would depend on the extent of the surplus available for that purpose
Therefore the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment is not an essential ingredient of an award of an Industrial Court
In F W Heilgers  Co vs N C Chakravarthi the learned Judges of the Federal Court held that a bonus not payable under a contract of employment does not fall within the definition of wages in section 2vi of the  as it stood before the amendment in 1957
We are concerned with the old definition here and not the amended one so the present case is in our opinion covered by that authority
It is true that no bonus had been awarded in Heilgers  case 1 and that therefore there was no ascertained sum whereas there is one in the present case or rather a sum that is ascertainable but that was only one of the grounds on which the learned Judges proceeded
They held that in order to bring a particular 1  360 1512 payment under the definition of wages two things are necessary  1 a definite sum and 2 a contract indicating when the sum becomes payable  and they said  It is obvious that unless there is an express provision for paying a stipulated sum the definition will not cover such a payment
 The bonus in the present case is not payable because of a contract but because of the award of an Industrial Court
Therefore according to the Federal Court it is not  wages  within the meaning of the 
In 1957 the definition was amended and the following was added  wages  means and includes c any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment whether called a bonus or by any other name but does not include 1 any bonus whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise which does not form part of remuneration payable under the terms of employment The change would have been unnecessary had the law been otherwise under the old definition nor is it possible to say that the clause was added by way of abundant caution because the Federal Court decided otherwise in 1949
In view of this amendment and in view of the Federal Court s decision we do not feel justified in taking a different view especially as we think the decision was right
The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court tried to distinguish the Federal Court s judgment on the ground that no bonus had been declared there and so there was no ascertained sum but as we have pointed out the ratio of the decision covers the present case and in any case that is our view quite apart from their conclusion
1513 On this view it is not necessary to consider the other points that were argued because if the definition of wages  as it stood before the amendment is not wide enough to include a bonus of the kind we have here namely one payable under an award of an Industrial Court then the Authority under the had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to it under section 15 of the Act
The appeals are allowed with costs
The decisions of the learned High Court Judges are set aside and also the decrees of the Authority under the 
There will be only one set of costs
Appeals allowed


Summary:
In a suit for ejectment filed by the landlord respondent a decree for eviction from a shop was passed against the tenant appellant on 19th August 1971
The Trial Court however directed the parties to bear their own costs
During the pendency of the tenant s appeal the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 was enforced with effect from 15th July 1972
The appellant made the deposit contemplated by section 39 read with section 40 of the Act within one month in the lower appellate court and asserted that in view of the deposit so made he was entitled to be absolved from his liability for eviction
The deposit however did not include the costs of the suit
The landlord contested the tenant s claim on the ground that since the costs of the suit had not been deposited within time the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of section 39 read with section 40
In defence the tenant urged that since the trial Court had directed the parties to bear their own costs the benefit of the aforesaid sections could not be denied to him
In the alternative it was asserted that the delay in the deposit of costs was liable to be condoned
These contentions did not find favour with the lower appellate court and it dismissed the appeal with costs
The tenant s second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court
The High Court held that the costs of the suit had to be deposited notwithstanding the fact that the trial court had directed the parties to bear their own costs
According to the High Court the words landlord s full costs of the suit  were not the same thing as the costs awarded to the plaintiff in a suit but really meant all those taxable costs which were capable of being ascertained on the date of the deposit
In this Court the appellant reiterated the pleas raised in the courts below
Allowing the appeal it was 821  HELD 1 Irrespective of the actual amount of costs that may have been incurred by the landlord in prosecuting a suit he is entitled to recover from the tenant only such costs which in law are known as taxable costs and are made payable to the landlord
824E 2 Non deposit of such costs which either on account of the relevant rules or some specific order of the court are not payable by the tenant to the landlord on the date of deposit contemplated by section 39 or 40 cannot deprive the tenant of the benefit of these two sections
The fact that in appeal there was a possibility of costs of the suit also being awarded to the landlord by reversing the decree of the trial court in this behalf will not be material
824H825A 3 In cases falling under this category the appellate or revisional court in order to safeguard the interests of the landlord and to give effect to the intention of the legislature expressed in section 39 read with section 40 of the Act will require the tenant to deposit such costs also in supersession of the decree or order of the subordinate court in this behalf before passing an order giving him the benefit of these sections
825E 4 The appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act and to be absolved from his liability to be evicted from the shop in question
826G H Krishna Kumar Gupta vs Additional District Judge IV RD Ram Nath  Co vs Girdhari Lal and Smt
Phoolwati vs Gyan Chand Verma 1985 All LJ 1 referred to