ivil Appeal No 3586 of 1988
From the Judgments and Orders dated 1881987  9111987 of the Goa High Court in WP No 921986  Misc
Civil Application No 334 of 1987
Dr RS Kulkarni SK Mehta Aman Vachher and Atul Nanda for the Appellant
KN Bhat and Mukul Mudgal for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH CJ
The appellant was appointed as a Headmaster of a school which was being run by the Calangute Don Bosco Educational  Welfare Foundation in 1974 in the State of Goa which was at the relevant time a Union Terri tory
Disciplinary proceedings were started against him in accordance with the Grant in aid Code which was in force at that time since the school was a recipient of the grant as per the Code
The findings of the Dispute Settlement Committee were approved by the director of Education of the Government of Goa by his Order dated July 12 1984 who permitted the termination of the services of the appellant The Principal of the Don Bosco High School therefore terminated the services of the appellant 254 as Headmaster by his letter dated July 26 1984 and the said order of termination was challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Bombay Panaji Bench Goa in Writ Petition No 92 of 1986
The petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Manage ment of the school which was a private body
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave
The school in question was a private school and was a recipient of the grant in aid under the Grant in aid Code issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power
The relevant rule of the Grantin aid Code ie rule 742 on which the Management relied read thus 7421
The services of an employee appoint ed to a permanent post shall not be terminated except in accordance with the procedure pre scribed hereinunder
No order of termination dismissal or imposition of any other penalty shall be passed against such employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which action is proposed to be taken and has been given an adequate opportunity to defend himself
The grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken shall be re duced to a form of a specific chargecharges which shall be communicated to the employee together with statement of allegation on which each charge is based
iii Management shall refer the case to the Director of Education in writing stating the date of the effect of the intended termination with a copy endorsed to the em ployee concerned for his acknowledgement
The letter endorsed to the employee shall enclose a copy of allegation with complete substanti ating evidence and other documents relevant to the case
The letter be issued to the employee at least one calendar month prior to the date of effect of intended termination
The issue of the letter shall be subject to rule 7413
v The Director shall refer the case to the Disputes Settlement Committee within seven days of the receipt of the letter in the Directorate of Education
The Disputes Settlement Committee shall give a hearing to both the 255 parties and also consider the written state ments if any submitted by either or both the parties and give its decision within fifteen days from the date of reference
In case any party fails to present the case the Disputes Settlement Committee shall take an ex parte decision
vi The decision of the Dispute settlement Commit  tee shall be final and binding on both the parties provided that it shall be open to either party to prefer an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal estab lished under the Goa Daman and Diu Adminis trative Tribunal Act 1965 within thirty days of the date of receipt of the decision of the Disputes Settlement Committee
 Rule 742 provides that the service of an employee appointed to a permanent post shall not be terminated except in accordance with the procedure prescribed thereunder and no order of termination dismissal or imposition of any other penalty shall be passed against such employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which action is proposed to be taken and has been given an ade quate opportunity to defend himself
The grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken shall be reduced to a form of a specific chargecharges which shall be communicat ed to the employee together with statement of allegation on which each charge is based
Then the Management is required to refer the case to the Director of Education in writing stating the date of the effect of the intended termination with a copy endorsed to the employee concerned for his acknowledgement
The letter endorsed to the employee shall enclose a copy of allegation with complete substantiating evidence and other documents relevant to the case
The letter shall be issued to the employee at least one calendar month prior to the date of effect of intended termination
The issue of the letter shall be subject to rule 7413
The Director is then required to refer the case to the Disputes Settlement Committee within seven days of the receipt of the letter in the Directorate of Education
The Dispute Settlement Committee shall give a heating to both the parties and also consider the written statements if any submitted by either or both the parties and give its decision within fifteen days from the date of reference
In case any party fails to present the case the Disputes Settlement Committee shall take an ex parte decision
The decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee shall be final and binding on the parties
The Dispute Settlement Committee acquires the jurisdiction to hear the case only on a refer ence made to it by the Director of Education
The order passed in this case by the 256 Director of Education on July 12 1984 reads thus No DEAcad
IBEZ
Bo40DBHSTerm
HMVol
III82 Government of Goa Daman and Diu Directorate of Education Panaji Goa
Dated 1271984
Read 1
This office order No DEAcad IBEZ Bo40 DBHSPC15Term
HMVol
III82 3610 dt
391982
Letter No 17 1 5 82 AE1115 dt
2631983 from the Convenor of the Dispute Settlement Committee and Asstt
Director of Education
ORDER Whereas a Dispute Settlement Commit tee was constituted to enquire into the pro posed case for Termination of Services of Shri Francis John the Headmaster of Don Bosco High School Calangute Bardez Goa vide order referred to above And whereas the accused Shri F John participated in the deliberations of the Dispute Settlement Committee along with his nominee for some time and thereafter remained absent from the deliberation of the Committee inspite of all reasonable opportunities given to him by the Convenor And whereas the said Committee in majority has decided that the termination of services of the said Shri F John Headmaster of Don Bosco High School Calangute is justi fiable
The undersigned is inclined to agree with the findings of the Dispute Settle ment Committee and it is hereby ordered that the finding of the majority report of the Committee is accepted and the Principal of the School is permit 257 ted to terminate the service of Shri F John as per Rule 74 amended of the Grant in aid Code and the vacancy so caused be filled up as per Rules
The Principal is further directed to revoke the order of suspension forthwith under intimation to the undersigned
Sd L Khisngte Director of Education
 It was on the basis of the approval given by the Direc tor of
Education as stated above the services of the appellant were terminated
From a reading of the relevant rule of the Grant in aid Code which is a part of the Public Law of the land it be comes obvious that the reference of the dispute between the Management of the school and the appellant to the Dispute Settlement Committee was made by the Director of Education in exercise of the powers confened on him by the Grant in aid Code which is issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power even though it may not have been done under a statute
The Director of Education who is a public functionary has given his approval to the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee before it was communicated to the School
While granting his aproval to the decision the Director of Education is discharging a governmental function as an authority constituted for the said purpose by the Government
It is obvious that the Management in the cir cumstances could not have terminated the services of the appellant without the communication received by it from the Director of Education
In such circumstances it cannot be said that the decision is that of a just private management governed by private law
It is the part of the process of the public law which affects public exchequer
When the matter came up before the High Court a prelimi nary objection was taken by the Management regarding the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
The appellant contended in the Writ Petition that the proceedings of the disciplinary Committee are in contraven tion of the principle of natural justice and fair play and the approval given by the Director of Education was unsus tainable
The appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Tika Ram vs Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal  Ors 1985 1 SCR 339 and contended that he was not asking for any relief against the private body but he was challeng ing 258 the order of the Director of Education who had granted approval to his removal on the basis of a report submitted to him by the Dispute Settlement Committee and hence the Director of Education who was a public authority and whose orders had been questioned before the Court was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
The High Court distinguished the above case by observing in Para 11 of its judgment thus 
Mr Kakodkar had placed reliance on Tika Ram vs Mundikota Shiksha Prasarak Mandal AIR 1984 SC 1621 in support of his proposition that a writ petition would be maintanable in the case of a Headmaster of a private school who is dismissed by the management of a pri vate school
In Tika Ram s case the petition er was not seeking any relief against the management on the basis of the clauses in the Schools Code
But the Court has observed In the instant case the appellant is seeking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court  Obviously no decision of an Officer of the Government is being challenged in the present case and hence Tika Ram s case is easily distinguishable
 With great respect to the High Court we should say that we do not find any substantial difference at all between the facts of this case and the facts involved in the Tika Ram s case supra
In Tika Ram s case supra the facts were these
The appellant in that case was also working as a Head master in a private school
On account of certain earlier events the Management instituted a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and on July 7 1975 the appellant was informed by the Management that it had imposed on him the punishment of reversion to the post of Assistant Teacher which according to the Management was the substantive post held by him
Aggrieved by that order of reversion the appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education Nagpur Division contending that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice and that he had never held the post of an Assistant Teacher to which he had been reverted
After hearing both the parties the Deputy Director of Education passed an order 259 dated October 3 1975 setting aside the decision of the Management and remanding the case to the Management for fresh decision on the ground that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice
Instead of filing an appeal against that order the Management filed a review petition before the Deputy Direc tor himself on October 17 1975
That was rejected by the Deputy Director by his order dated November 11 1975 on the ground that no such review could be filed before him
Against that order the Management filed an appeal before the Director of Education and that was dismissed on May 12 1976 affirming the order of remand passed by the Deputy Director of Education to reconsider the case
The Management again filed a petition before the Director of Education to recon sider the case
This petition for review was allowed by the Director of Education on November 26 1976 and the order passed by the Deputy Director on October 3 1975 remanding the case to the Management for a fresh decision was set aside
Aggrieved by the said order dated November 26 1976 the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay on the principal ground that the Director had no jurisdiction to review his earlier order May 12 1976 by which he had dismissed the appeal against the order of the Deputy Director
The High Court dismissed that writ petition holding that the appellant could not file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order passed by the Director on the ground that the teachers working in private schools could not enforce their right under clause 77 and connected clauses of the School Code which were not statutory rules
It was against that order the appellant in that case had filed the appeal before the SUpreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
Allow ing the said appeal this Court observed thus In the writ petition the appellant was not seeking any relief directly against the man agement on the basis of the clauses in the School Code
If the management does not obey the order passed by the Deputy Director or the Director it is open to the State Government to take such action under the School Code as may be permissible
In such an event the recognition accorded to the school may be withdrawn or the grant in aid may be stopped
In the instant case the appellant is seking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amena ble to the jurisdiction of the Court
The appellant has merely sought the quashing of the impugned order dated November 26 1976 passed by the Director on review setting aside the order of the Deputy Director
What 
260 consequences follow from the quashing of the above said order in so far as the management is concerned is an entirely different issue
In the circumstances the High Court was wrong in holding that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution did not lie against the impugned order passed by the director
We are aware of some of the decisions in which it is observed that no teacher could enforce
a fight under the School Code which is non statutory m character against the management
But since this petition is principally direct ed against the order passed in a quasijudicial proceeding by the Director though in a case arising under the School Code and since the Director had assumed a jurisdiction to review his own orders not conferred on him we hold that the appellant was entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Consti tution
 In the instant case also we are concerned with the Grant in aid Code
The decision which was challenged before the High Court was the order of the Director of Education dated July 12 1984 which is fully extracted above
It is further seen that a copy of the above order has been commu nicated by the Director of Education not merely to the Management of the School but also to the Zonal Officer North Education Zone Mapsa and the Grant in aid Section of the Directorate of Education
If the impugned orders of the director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Commit tee to which he had referred the case are set aside then the order of termination of service of the appellant which is pursuant to them would also have to fall
Any private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant inaid Code which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the School for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant in aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is partici pating in the decision making process
Under these circum stances we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the juris diction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu tion since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Tika Ram s case supra
261 We therefore set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the writ petition was not maintainable before it
Since the High Court has not gone into the merits of the case we remand the case to the High Court and direct it to hear the writ petition on merits in accordance with law
The appeal is accordingly allowed but there shall be no order as to costs
RNJ Appeal al lowed


Summary:
The plaintiff appellant had flied a suit against the defendentsrespondents for a declaration of its title and for possession of the suit property mentioned in the schedule to the plaint which consisted of two parts the first part related to a large extent of vacant land known as parade ground and the second part pertained to survey Nos 162 to 165 on which stood structures of old Lancer s Lines and certain evacuees were occupying the same at the time of institution of the suit
The second part is known both as Lancers Quarters and Rasala Lines
In the suit the plaintiff also claimed damages for wrongful occupation of a portion of the property and rent for another portion for the period from 1st January 1964 till delivery of possession
The Plaintiffs  case was that by virtue of Resolution No 37 dated 1911984 and Resolution No 77 dated 29248 pub lished in Bhavnagar Darbar Gazette the entire suit lands vested in and belonged to the plaintiff who entered into and remained in possession thereof
According to the plaintiff the Government of India claiming to be the owner of the Parade Ground in or about June 1961 fixed the boundary marks and thus the entry of the Government of India consti tuted wrongful encroachment
As regards the Lancers  Quar ters it was stated in the plaint that they did not belong to the plaintiff that the same were occupied by the State Lancers and subsequently by the refugees and that the plain tiff allowed the land and the structures thereon to be used free by the Government
However the plaintiff asserted that it was entitled to recover rent or compensation in respect thereof from 1154 till delivery of possession
The defendents denied the claim of the plaintiff and pleaded that consequent upon the Bhavnagar State acceding to the Indian Union and consequent on the Federal Financial Integration of State the accommodation lands and buildings in the use or occupation of the Ex State forces were trans ferred to the Government of India and became its property
The defendents respondents denied that the suit land vested in the plaintiff on the strength of the Resolution afore said
220 The Trial Court held that the plaintiff had proved its title to the suit land and that it was in possession of the suit property till 771952
It also held that the suit having been filed on 3rd March 1964 the same was not barred under section 65 of the Limitation Act
As regards Rasala Lines the trial Court did not uphold the claim of the plaintiff because of its admission that it did not own the buildings standing thereon
As such the Trial Court decreed the suit for possession in respect of Parade Ground alone and dismissed the same in respect of Rasala Lines
The first defendant Union of India preferred an appeal to the High Court against the decree of the trial Court and the plaintiff flied cross objections in so far as the suit was dismissed in respect of Rasala Lines
The High Court dismissed the cross objection filed by the appellant but allowed the appeal of the Union of India holding inter alia that there was nothing on record to show that the Municipal ity was formally handed over he land in question and that its right over the land was never recognised by the Union of India or the State Government
The High Court also held that the suit was liable to be dismissed as being time barred
Hence this appeal by the plaintiff Municipality by Special Leave
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD With the accession and completion of territorial and financial integration and part B  states forming part of Indian Union the lands and buildings in the use or occupation of the former Indian State Government as distin guished from the private properties of the Rulers were transferred and vested in the Government of India and became its property
226D The right to sell such lands of the State Government were with the Government concerned
It is that right that was given to the Municipalities after the formation of the Union of the United States of Saurashtra
It cannot be treated therefore as a transfer of title in respect of those lands to the municipality but the right to execute the sale deed in respect of those lands of the Government was transferred or vested in the municipalities concerned
This authorisation itself was later cancelled by the Government of Gujarat under Order dated 26363
229C D G Possession of the land was also not taken by the munici pality at any time
It is not open to the appellant to rely on the principle that possession follows title
232B 221 Not only there is evidence to show that physical posses sion was with the defendants but also there could not be any legal possession with the plaintiff as the title to the land is not vested in them
Since the suit itself is for posses sion based on title and the plaintiffs have not proved title it is not necessary for the defendent to plead or prove adverse possession
1232C