Civil Appeal No 3946 of 1987
349 From the Judgment and Order dated 2271983 of the High Court of Delhi in LPA No 141 of 1982 M
PN Misra for the Appellant
Krishan Kumar and Vimal Dave for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA J
Leave granted
This appeal arises out of SLPCivil No 1414983 filed by the petitioner husband against the judgment of High Court of Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No 14182 decided on 22783
The present appellant husband filed a petition in the trial court for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion
The trial court granted the decree of divorce but on appeal by the respondent wife learned Single Judge of High Court of Delhi reversed the decision and dismissed the petition filed by the appellant husband
It is against this that a Letters Patent Appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was filed before the High Court wherein it was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed
It is against this that the present special leave petition was filed
Considering the circumstances of the case and the age of the parties we issued notice and also directed the parties to appear before us in chambers and in spite of our best efforts it is unfortunate that no reconciliation was possible
It is one of those unfortunate cases where the husband and wife are of mature age not only that but they have a grown up son who is maturing into a lawyer as he is studying in law and unfortunately even these circumstances were not able to bring about an amicable settlement in the matter
The parties to these proceedings were married at Delhi in accordance with the Hindu customs on February 7 1961
It seems that there was disagreement and disharmony from the very beginning
A male child however was born out of this wedlock on August 30 1964
The parties by and large lived together till February 1971
They have lived separately ever since except for a short duration in the middle of 1975 when they were together
The main allegation of the appellant was that from the very beginning the respondent wife did not like to 350 live in the joint family and she used to behave in a peculiar manner A always created ugly scenes indulged in quarrels and taunting and ultimately forced the appellant to shift to a government allotted quarter and live separately away from other members of the family but according to him even then her behaviour continued to be the same and it was also alleged that because of her behaviour ultimately the appellant suffered a nervous break down and had to be admitted in the Willingdon Hospital New Delhi for about 45 days
The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that from perusal of all the facts alleged it appears that there may have been a few incidents prior to the birth of the child on August 30 1964 but after that there was no such incident pleaded or proved till 1966 except for the allegation that the wife got the pregnancy terminated sometime in 1966 against the wishes of the appellant and on this basis the learned Judges of the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the early part before August 1964 probably was a period of inexperience and lack of adjustment between the husband and wife but ultimately after the birth of the son in 1964 there appears to be nothing serious and in this view of the matter the learned Judges came to the conclusion that between 1963 and 1968 there appears to be no incident or problem which really deserves consideration
A small matter about her describing herself Mrs Veena Vohra instead of Mrs Veena Nanda the learned Judges have considered and have accepted the explanation of the wife as plausible
The learned Judges of the Division Bench have considered all the circumstances and have also referred to the correspondence and the letters wherein regrets have been expressed in some matters by the respondent
Considering all these facts the Division Bench came to the conclusion that although it is unfortunate that they have not been keeping good relations but it could not be said to be a case of cruelty entitling the appellant to a decree for divorce
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and also having heard the parties themselves we come to the same conclusion as was reached by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court while disposing of the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Single Judge
It is no doubt an unfortunate state of affairs but it could not be held that the respondent was behaving with the appellant in a manner which could be termed as cruelty which would entitle the appellant to a decree for divorce
Sometimes the temperament of the parties may not be conducive to each other which may result in petty quarrels and troubles although it was contended by the appellant that he had to suffer various ailments on account of this kind 351 of behaviour meted out to him by the wife but it could not be held on A the basis of any material that ailment of the appellant was the direct result of her respondent s conduct
The Division Bench therefore was right in coming to the conclusion that there is no material to come to the conclusion that the respondent treated the appellant with such cruelty as would entitle him to a decree for divorce
In view of the facts and circumstances therefore the appeal is devoid of merit
It is therefore dismissed
The judgment of the High Court of Delhi is maintained
In the circumstances of the case respondent shall be entitled to costs of this appeal
The counsel s fee is quantified at Rs3000
SL Appeal dismissed


Summary:
This writ petition challenged the constitutional validity of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act 1986
The Central Government had passed an order for taking over the management of six undertakings of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills in respect whereof there were proceedings in the High Court and this Court by its judgment dated the 12th February 1988 in Ms Doyarpack Systems Pvt Ltd vs Union of India  Ors
SLPs Civil Nos 4826  7405 of 1987 had disposed of the matter
The petitioners claiming to be shareholders of the respondent No 4 Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co Ltd and to have interest in its business affairs and properties filed this writ petition contending that the effect of the decision of this Court above said was to take away valuable assets of the respondent No 4 without paying any compensation therefor and to impose on respondent No 4 liabilities without any corresponding assets available to discharge the liabilities and further that the acquisition virtually amounted to confiscation of the shares of respondent No 5 and respondent No 6 held by respondent No 4 and that the rights of the shareholders of the respondent No 4 were substantially damaged
The petitioners challenged the vires and constitutional validity of sections 3 and 4 of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Ltd Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings Act 1986  The Act  in so far as those sought to divest respondent No 4 of the shares in respondent No 5 and respondent No 6 and certain excluded assets contending that the Act was violative of Articles 14 and 191g of the Constitution
Dismissing the petition the Court  HELD The petitioners  contentions were not tenable because all the contentions had been directly or indirectly dealt with in the judgment of this Court afore said
It was not correct that no public 739 purpose was served by acquisition
It was held that section 8 provides for payment of compensation in lumpsum and the transfer and vesting of whatever is comprised in section 3
It was incorrect to state that there was no compensation for taking over of the shares
It was found by the said judgment that the net wealth of the company was negative and therefore sections 3 and 4 could be meaningfully read if all the assets including the shares were considered to be taken over by the acquisition
That was the only irresistible conclusion that followed from the construction of the documents and the history of the Act
The Act in question was passed to ensure the principles enunciated in clauses b and c of Article 39 of the Constitution
In that context it was held that to leave a company the net wealth of which was negative at the time of take over of the management with the shares held by it as investment in other company was not only to defeat the principles of Article 39b and c of the Constitution but it would permit the company to reap the fruits of its mismanagement
That would be as absurd situation
In this context the contentions now sought to be urged were no longer open to the petitioners
It was held by the judgment of this Court aforementioned that there was a public purpose which was analysed and spelled out from the different provisions of the Act
There was compensation for the acquisition of the property
The contentions of the petitioners had been dealt with and repelled by the said judgment of this Court
The Court reiterated the reasoning of that judgment
744B746B747F H The acceptance of the petitioner s case would mean that the State would pump in Rs15 crores of public money to release the shares from its liabilities and then hand over the shares free from such liability back to the company when the net worth of the company at the time of take over of management was negative and in the teeth of the present financial liabilities built up by the company the shares would inevitably have been sold in discharge of its liabilities and in any event the shares stood charged with the very liabilities which related to the undertakings of the company which were taken over by the Government
Therefore it was incorrect to say that there was no public purpose for taking over these shares
It would be absurd to say that there was no compensation paid for the acquisition
The law as declared by this Court in Doypack Systems Pvt
Ltd supra is binding on the petitioners and the question was no longer res integra in view of Article 141 of the Constitution
See the observations of this Court in Ms Shenoy and Co represented by its partner Bele Srinivasa Rao Street Bangalore and others vs The Commercial Tax Officer Circle II Bangalore and Ors  752C E753B C 740 In view of the preamble of the Act which states and proclaims that the Act was passed to carry out the object of Article 39b and c of the Constitution and in view of the scheme of the Act as analysed before the Court and as apparent from the judgment of this Court aforesaid it is clearly manifest that the Act was passed for a public purpose and for the acquisition of shares there was a public purpose
The acquisition subserved the object of the Act
Compensation for such acquisition has been provided for
No separate compensation need be provided for in the circumstances of the case for these shares
The factual basis for the legal challenge made in this writ petition was incorrect in the facts of this case
It was too late to contend that there was no compensation for the shares or that the acquisition of the shares amounted to confiscation or there was no public purpose in the Act
The petition was wholly devoid of any merit
754G H 755A B Ms
Doypack Systems Pvt Ltd vs Union of India  Ors
 SLPs Civil Nos 4826 and 7045 of 1987 decided by Supreme Court on 12288 The State of Bihar vs Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga and Ors   State of West Bengal vs Union of India 1964 1 SCR 371 Smt
Somvanti  Ors
vs The State of Punjab and Ors  Ms Shenoy and Co represented by its partner Bele Srinivasa Rao Street Bangalore and Ors
vs The Commercial Tax Officer Circle II Bangalore and Ors  and T Govindraja Mudalier etc etc
vs The State of Tamil Nadu and Ors   referred to