ivil Appeal No 217 of 1959
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 20 1958 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Writ Petition No 108 of 1958
H N Sanyal Additional Solicitor General of India N section Bindra R H Dhebar and T M Sen for the appellants
R K Garg and M K Ramamurthy section N Andley J B Dadachanji Rameshwar Nath and P L Vohra for the respondents
November 26
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J
This appeal by special leave raises the question of the scope of article 1322 of the Constitution
The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the second respondent Ms
Jammu Kashmir Mechanics And Transport Workers Co operative Society Limited Jammu hereinafter called the Society
The Society was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co operative Societies Act No 6 of 1993 Vikrimi
They put in a number of applications before the third appellant for the grant of stage carriage and public carrier permits to them for various routes in the State of Jammu  Kashmir but no permits were granted to them on the ground that under r 4 47 of the Jammu 348 and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules hereinafter called the Rules service licence could only be issued to a person or a company registered under the Partnership Act and that as the Society was neither a person nor a partner Ship it was not entitled to a licence under the Rules
The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu  Kashmir under section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu  Kashmir challenging the vires of r 4 47 of the Rules
To that petition the appellants herein viz the Government of Jammu  Kashmir State the Transport Minister the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent were made party respondents The High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires as offending article 14 of the Constitution and on that finding directed a writ of mandamus to issue against the appellants herein from enforcing the provisions of the said rule
The appellants filed an application in the High Court for a certificate under article 1321 of the Constitution but the High Court rejected it on the ground that no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case
Therefter the appellants applied for special leave under article 1322 of the Constitution and this Court granted the same
The order giving the special leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents herein to raise the question of the maintainability of the appeal at its final hearing
Learned Counsel for the respondents raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal
Shortly stated his objection is that under article 1322 of the Constitution special leave can be given only if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution that in the present case the interpretation article 14 of the Constitution has been well settled and put beyond dispute by a series of decisions of this court that therefore no question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution much less a substantial question of law in regard to that mattter arises for consideration and that therefore no special leave can be granted under the said Article
349 This argument is sought to be met by the learned Additional Solicitor General in the following manner Whenever a question of classification is raised it involves the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution with reference to the classification impugned
To state it differently the argument is that the question in each case is whether the classification offends the principle of equality enshrined in article 14
Therefore whether a registered firm a limited company and a person have equal attributes is a question of interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution
Before considering the validity of the rival contentions it would be convenient to ascertain precisely what was the question raised in the High Court and what was the decision given thereon by it
The argument advanced before the High Court on behalf of the Society was that under r 4 47 a licence can be issued only to a person or a firm registered under the Partnership Act and not to a corporation registered under the Co operative Societies Act or otherwise and therefore the said rule being discriminatory in nature offends article 14 of the Constitution
The learned AdvocateGeneral appearing for the appellants contended that under article 14 of the Constitution rational classification is permissible and the legislature has framed the impugned rule on such a basis the object of which is to safeguard the interest of the public
The High Court after considering the rival arguments expressed the opinion that the said rule did not proceed on any rational basis of classification and that as a corporation had been arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory treatment the impugned rule offended the equality clause of the Constitution
The appellants in their petition for special leave filed in this Court questioned the correctness of the conclusion of the High Court
They asserted that the said rule was based upon reasonable classification and therefore could not be struck down as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution
In other grounds they elaborated the same point in an attempt to bring out the different attributes of the two classes affording an intelligible differentia for 45 350 classification
They clearly posed the question proposed to be raised by them in the appeal as under Ground The Grouns iv  The aforesaid rule 4 47 of the Motor Vehicles Rules is based upon reasonable classification and is and was perfectly intra vires and valid and could not be struck down as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution of India
 Ground vi  There is a marked difference between a corporate body and partnership registered under the Provisions of the Partnership Act and these points of difference provide an intelligible differentia for classification
The Hon ble High Court has only referred to one point of difference and has overlooked other points of distinction and has erred in striking down the aforesaid rule 4 47 Ground viii   Rule 4 47 was framed in the light of local conditions prevailing
Co operative Societies and Corporations in the matter of transport were not considered to be proper objects for the grant of licence or permit
The classification is rational and reasonable
The exclusion of artificial persons from the ambit of the Rule is natural and not discriminatory
 The other grounds are only a further clarification of the said grounds
In part It of their statement of case the appellants stated as follows  It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation
 The respondents in their statement of case accepted the said legal position but contested the position that there was reasonable classification
It is therefore manifest that throughout there has never been a controversy between the parties in regard to the interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution but their dispute centered only on the question whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable classification
In the premises can special leave be granted to the appellants under Art 1322 of the Constitution  Article 1322 reads Where the High Court has refused to give such a certificate the Supreme Court may if it is 351 satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution grant special leave to appeal from such judgment decree or final order Under cl
2 of article 132 there is no scope for granting a special leave unless two conditions are satisfied i the case should involve a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and ii the said question should be a substantial question of law
The principle underlying the Article is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court
With that object the Article is freed from other limitations imposed under articles 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
What does interpretation of a provision mean  Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood
The question of interpretation can arise only if two or more possible constructions are sought to be placed on a provision one party suggesting one construction and the other a different one
But where the parties agree on the true interpretation of a provision or do not raise any question in respect thereof it is not possible to hold that the case involves any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
On an interpretation of article 14 a series of decisions of this Court evolved the doctrine of classification
As we have pointed out at no stage of the proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of article 14 or the principles governing the doctrine of classification have been questioned by either of the parties
Indeed accepting the said doctrine the appellants contended that there was a valid classification under the rule while the respondents argued contra
The learned Additional Solicitor General contended for the first time before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the doctrine of equality namely whether an artificial person and a natural person have equal attributes 352 within the meaning of the equality clause and therefore the case involves a question of interpretation of the Constitution
This argument if we may say so involves the same contention in a different garb
If analysed the argument only comes to this as an artificial person and a natural person have different attributes the classification made between them is valid
This argument does not suggest a new interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution but only attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine of classification
We therefore hold that the question raised in this case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
Assuming that the case raises a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution can it be said that the question raised is a substantial question of law within the meaning of cl
2 of Art 14
This aspect was considered by the Federal Court in T M KrishnaswamyPillai vs Governor General In Council 1
That decision turned upon the provisions of section 205 of the Government of India Act 1935
The material section 205  1 An appeal shall lie to the Federal Court from any judgment decree or final order of a High Court if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council made thereunder  The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the effect that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of section 2403 of the Government of India Act 1935
Under section 2403 of the said Act no person who was a member of civil service of the Crown in India or held any civil post under the Crown in India could be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him
The High Court on the facts found held that the appellant therein had been offered A reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meaning 1 1947 52 CWN FR 1
part of that section says  353 of the said section but gave a certificate under section 2051 of the Government of India Act 1935In dealing with the propriety of issuing the certificate in the circumstances of that case Zafrulla Khan J speaking on behalf the Court concisely and pointedly stated at p 2   It was urged before us that the case involved a question relating to the interpretation of sub section 3 of section 240 of the Act
To the extent to which any guidance might have been needed for the purposes of this case on the interpretation of that sub section that guidance was furnished so far as this Court is concerned in its judgment in Secretary of State for India vs IM Lal 1945 FCR 103 The rest was a simple question of fact
In our judgment no  substantial question of law  as to the interpretation of the Constitution Act was involved in this case which could have formed the basis of a certificate under section 2051 of the Act
 On the question of interpretation of article 14 of the Constitution this Court in Budhan Choudhry vs The State of Bihar 1 explained the true meaning and scope of that Article thus  It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reason
able classification for the purposes of legislation
In order however to pass the the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely i that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and ii that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statue in question
The classification may be founded on different bases namely geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like
What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration 1  1049
354 This in only a restatement of the law that has been enunciated by this Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India 1 and in other subsequent decisions
The said principles were reaffirmed in the recent decisions of this Court in Rama Krishna Dalmia vs Justice Tendolkar 2  and in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi vs State of Bihar 3
In view of the said decision there is no further scope for putting a new interpretation on the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution vis a vis the doctrine of classification
The interpretation of article 14 in the context of classifi cation has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land and under article 141 of the Constitution that interpretation is binding on all the Courts within the territory of India
What remained to be done by the High Court was only to apply that interpretation to the facts before it
A substantial question of law therefore cannot arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court
In the result we accept the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Three persons K M and S who were accused of murder made statements to the police which disclosed that the dead bodies after being dismembered were thrown into a stream and the police party thereafter went with the three accused to the stream where each of them pointed out a place where different 109 840 parts of the dead bodies were discovered
It was contended on behalf of the accused that it was only the information which was first given that was admissible under sec
27 of the Evidence Act that once a fact has been discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence it cannot be said to be re discovered in consequence of information received from another accused person and that in the absence of evidence to show which of the accused first gave the information the discoveries alleged cannot be proved against any of the accused persons Held that even assuming that this argument was correct as it appeared from the evidence that S led the police to a particular spot on the stream and it was at his instance that some blood stained earth was recovered from a place outside the village and he had also pointed out the trunk of one of the dead bodies and the High Court was satisfied that there was an initial pointing out by S the case was covered by the rule and the evidence as to the discoveries was admissible
With regard to the rule applicable to cases where there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in sec
27 of the Evidence Act having been made by several accused persons either simultaneously or otherwise some of the decided cases have gone further than is warranted by the language of sec
27 of the Evidence Act and may have to be reviewed on a future occasion