Crl No 292 of 1986
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Ram Jethmalani Ms Rani Jethmalani and AK Sharma for the Petitioner
Anil Dev Singh Mrs Indra Sawhney and Ms section Relan for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN J
By this petition under Article 32 of the Consti tution the petitioner Smt
Poonam Lata has asked for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of her husband Shital Kumar who has been 1127 detained by an order passed by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue
dated February 28 1986
made under section 31 of hereinafter referred to as the Act  on being satisfied that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from dealing in smuggled goods
Put very briefly the essential facts are these
The Directorate of Enforcement New Delhi gathered intelligence over a period of time before making of the impugned order of detention which revealed that the detenu was engaged in receiving smuggled gold from across the Indo Nepal Border and was making payments in foreign currency and remitting the sale proceeds of such smuggled gold out of the country in the shape of US dollars with the help of carriers
On February 26
1986 the Directorate received information that the three carriers namely Ram Deo Thakur Shyam Thakur and Bhushan Thakur would be leaving under the assumed names of Dalip Mukesh and Rajesh respectively by 154 Dn
Jayanti Janata Express leaving New Delhi Railway Station at 645 pm
Accordingly the officers of the Delhi Zone of the Directorate mounted surveillance at Platform No 5 of the Railway Station from which the train was to steam off
The said carriers were detrained and upon search of their bag gage the officers recovered  29750 and Rs1500 from Ram Deo Thakur  Dalip  28900 and Rs650 from Shyam Thakur  Mukesh and  20000 and Rs1000 from Bhushan Thakur  Rajesh
The same ware seized under section 1101 of the 
The total value of the seized foreign currency was equivalent to Rs1025000 in round figure
During interrogation by the officers under section 108 of the  these persons stated that the seized for eign currency totaling  78650 had been paid by the detenu towards the price of 48 gold biscuits of foreign origin brought by them from Darbhanga to New Delhi and made over to him and accordingly the detenu was taken into custody on February 27 1986
He too made a statement under section 108 of the Act confessing that he was dealing in smuggled gold brought across the Indo Nepal Border and has been remitting the price of such gold in US dollars through different carriers
On February 28 1986 the detenu was served with the impugned order of detention along with the grounds thereof and copies of the relevant documents relied upon in the grounds
On March 25 1986
the detenu submitted a represen tation under section 8b of the Act and the detaining authority by its order of April 4 1986 rejected the 1128 same
On April 12 1986 the detenu made a representation to the Advisory Board through the Superintendent of the Central Jail Tihar
The representation together with comments of the detaining authority and the relevant documents were forwarded by the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue to the Advisory Board
On the same day the detenu appears to have made a representation to the Central Government and it was received in the Ministry of Finance on April 24 1986
The Minister of State for Finance rejected the said repre sentation on April 28 1986 and the detenu was informed about it the following day
The Advisory Board had its sittings on April 28 and 29 1986
and came to the conclu sion that there was sufficient cause for the detention and sent its report on May 8 1986
The Minister considered the report of the Advisory Board and confirmed the order of detention on May 14 1986 and the Central Government s order of confirmation was duly communicated on May 26 1986
The representation of the detenu was still before the Advisory Board when the petitioner moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution on April 23 1986
On April 29 1986 notice was ordered by the Court returnable on May 3 1986 and it directed that the matter may be placed before the Vacation Judge on May 15 1986
On that date the learned Vacation Judge made an order for the release of the detenu on parole in the following terms The detenu is released on parole until fur ther orders on the condition that he will report to the Directorate of Revenue Intelli gence New Delhi every day and the Directorate will be at liberty to ask him to explain his conduct during this time
Reply affidavit may be filed within two weeks
The matter will be listed two weeks after reopening of the Court after summer vacation
In the meantime the respondents will be at liberty to make an application for the revocation of the parole if any misconduct or any other activity comes to their notice which requires the revocation of the parole
 Notwithstanding the order of the learned Vacation Judge that the matter should be listed within two weeks after the re opening of the Court after the long vacation it should have been some time in early August of 1986 the case was not listed till January 14 1987
The 1129 respondents also took no steps to apply for early listing of the matter
On January 14 1987 a prayer was made by the learned counsel appearing for the Union of India seeking two weeks  time to file an additional affidavit and the case was ordered to be listed on March 3 1987
During all these months the detenu has been out of jail
Indisputably the detention was for one year
When the matter came up for hearing on the 3rd of March 1987 Shri Jethmalani learned counsel for the petitioner confined his submissions to only one aspect namely that the period of parole ie from May 15 1986 till February 28 1987 could not be added to the period of detention specified in the impugned order under sub section
1 of section 3 of the Act and the period of one year from the date of detention having expired on February 26 1987 the impugned order had lapsed and the detenu became entitled to be freed from the shackles of the order of detention
Ac cording to the learned counsel section 10 of the Act prescribes the maximum period of detention to be one year or two years as the case may be from the date of detention or the specified period whichever expires earlier
Admittedly in respect of the detenu no decla ration under section 9 of the Act has been made and therefore the maximum period of detention so far as he is concerned is one year and it has to be reckoned as prescribed under section 10 of the Act
That section indicates not only the starting point but also the outer limit
In other words the argument is that once the detenu is taken into custody under the Act pursuant to an order of deten tion the running of time would not be arrest ed merely because the Court directs release of the detenu on parole
Shri Jethmalani drew a distinction between bail  and parole  he contended that preven tive detention was not a sentence by way of punishment and therefore the concept of serving out which pertains to punitive juris prudence cannot be imported into the realm of preventive detention
According to him the grant of parole to a detenu amounts to a provisional release from confinement yet the detenu continues to be under judicial deten tion release from jail custody subject to restrictions imposed on free and unfettered movement transfers the detenu to judicial custody
Since there is no provision to autho rise interruption of running of the period of detention release on parole does not bring about any change in the situation
It has further been argued that when the Court enter tains a writ petition for grant of habeas corpus and issues a rule nisi the detenu is deemed to have come into judicial custody and the effect of grant of parole does not termi nate such custody but merely allows greater freedom of move 1130 ment to the detenu
Conditions imposed on the detenu during parole impinge upon his freedom and liberty therefore the period during which a detenu is released on parole cannot be taken as a period during which the detention is not operative
Shri Jethmalani placed reliance on the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Lala Jairam Das  Ors
vs Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94 to contend that but for the special provision contained in sub section 3 of section 426 of the old Code of Criminal Proce dure 1898 corresponding to section 3894 of the Code of 1973 the power of the Court to grant bail to a convicted person or accused would not include a power to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence
The same principle ought to apply in the case of re lease of a detenu on bail or parole and the Court therefore cannot on general principles add the period of bail or parole to the period of detention
In the absence of any provision regarding the grant of parole and the computa tion of the period thereof and in view of the special provisions contained regarding com mencement and the computation of the period of detention of one year the period of parole cannot be deducted while computing the period of one year of detention
The learned counsel also relied upon the direction made by a Bench of three Judges in the case of Amritlal Chan numal Jain etc
vs State of Gujarat  Ors
Writ Petitions Nos
1342 43 1345 48 and 1362 of 1982 and No 162 of 1983 dated July 10 1985 where this Court directed that the period during which a detenu was on parole should be taken into account while calculating the total period of detention
According to learned counsel the direction in Amritlal Channumal Jain s case was given after a Bench of two Judges in Harish Makhija vs State of UP Crl
MP No 620 of 1984 in UP Crl No 301 of 1983 held on February 11 1985 that the period of parole cannot be counted towards the period of detention
Shri Jethmal ani has submitted that in view of the direc tion of the larger Bench of this Court the ratio laid down in Amritlal Channumal Jain s case supra has to prevail and must be taken as binding on us
There is no denying the fact that preven tive detention is not punishment and the concept of serving out a sentence would not legitimately be within the purview of preven tive detention
The grant of parole is essen tially an executive function and instances of release of detenus on parole were literally unknown until this Court and some of the High Courts in India in recent years made orders of release on parole on humanitarian considera tions
Historically parole  is a concept known to military law and denotes release of a prisoner of war on promise to return
Parole has become an integral part of the English and American systems of criminal justice inter twined with the evolution of changing atti tudes of the society towards crime and crimi nals
1131 As a consequence of the introduction of parole into the penal system all fixed term sen tences of imprisonment of above 18 months are subject to release on licence that is parole after a third of the period of sentence has been served
In those countries parole is taken as an act of grace and not as a matter of right and the convict prisoner may be released on condition that he abides by the promise
It is a provisional release from confinement but is deemed to be a part of the imprisonment
Release on parole is a wing of the reformative process and is expected to provide opportunity to the prisoner to trans form himself into a useful citizen
Parole is thus a grant of partial liberty or lessening of restrictions to a convict prisoner but release on parole does not change the status of the prisoner
Rules are flamed providing supervision by parole authorities of the convicts released on parole and in case of failure to perform the promise the convict released on parole is directed to surrender to custody
See The Oxford Companion to Law edited by Walker 1980 edn p 931 Black s Law Dictionary 5th edn p 1006 Jowitt s Dictionary of English Law 2nd edn Vol 2 p 1320 Kenny s Outlines of Criminal Law 17th edn p 574 76 The English Sentencing System by Sir Rupert Cross at pp
31 34 87 et seq
 American Jurisprudence 2nd edn Vol
59 pp
53 61 Corpus Juris Secundum vol
67 Probation and Parole Legal and Social Dimen sions by Louis P Carney
It follows from these authorities that parole is the release of a very long term prisoner from a penal or correctional institution after he has served a part of his sentence under the continuous custody of the State and under conditions that permit his incarceration in the event of misbehavior
There is abundance of authority that High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution do not release a detenu on bail or parole
There is no reason why a different view should be taken in regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution particularly when the power to grant relief to a detenu in such proceedings is exercisable on very narrow and limited grounds
In State of Bihar vs Rambalak Singh  Ors a Constitution Bench laid down that the release of a detenu placed under detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules 1962
on bail pending the hearing of a petition for grant of a writ of habeas corpus was an improper exercise of jurisdiction It was observed in that case that if the High Court was of the view that prima facie the impugned order of detention was patently illegal in that there was a serious defect in the order of detention which would justify the release of the detenu the proper and more sensible and reasonable course would invariably be to expedite the hearing of the writ petition and 1132 deal with the merits without any delay rather than direct release of the detenu on bail
Again in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Jairam  Ors 1982 1 SCC 176 a three Judge Bench speaking through Chandrachud CJ referred to Rambalak Singh s case and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court admitting the detenu to bail on the ground that it was an improper exercise of jurisdiction
As to grant of parole it is worthy of note that in none of the cases this Court made a direction under Article 32 of the Constitution for grant of parole to the detenu but left it to the executive to consider whether it should make an order in terms of the relevant provision for temporary release of the person detained as under section 12 of the COFEPOSA in the facts and circumstances of a particular case
In Samir Chatterjee vs State of West Bengal   the Court set aside the order of the Calcutta High Court releasing on parole a person detained under section 31 of the and unequivocally viewed with disfavor the observations made by Krishna Iyer J in Babulal Das vs State of West Bengal  to the effect While discharging the rule issued and dis missing the petition we wish to emphasize that section 15 is often lost sight of by the Government in such situations as long term preventive detention can be self defeating or criminally counter productive
Section 15 reads 15
Temporary release of persons detained We consider that it is fair that persons kept incarcerated and embittered without trial should be given some chance to reform them selves by reasonable recourse to the parole power under section 15
Calculated risks by re lease for short periods may perhaps be a social gain the beneficent jurisdiction being wisely exercised
 Alagiriswamy J speaking for the Court observed in no uncertain terms 1133 We fail to see that these observations lay down any principle of law
Section 15 merely confers a power on the Government
The power and duty of this Court is to decide cases coming before it according to law
In so doing it may take various considerations into ac count
But to advise the Government as to how they should exercise their functions or powers conferred on them by statute is not one of this Court s functions
Where the Court is able to give effect to its view in the form of a valid and binding order that is a different matter
Furthermore section 15 deals with release on parole and there is nothing to show that the petitioner applied for to be released on parole for any specific purpose
As far as we are able to see release on parole is made only on the request of the party and for a specific purpose
 The innovative view expressed by Krishna lyer J in Anil Dey vs State of West Bengal 14 which he tried to reiterate in Golam Hussain vs The Commissioner of Police Calcutta  Ors  and in Babulal Das  case supra therefore no longer holds the field and rightly so because the Court cannot usurp the functions of the Government
Section 10 of the Act provides that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of an order of detention to which provisions of section 9 do not apply shall be for a period of one year from the date of detention or the specified period whichever expires earli er
The key to the interpretation of section 10 of the Act is in the words may be detained 
The subsequent words from the date of detention  which follow the words maximum period of one year  merely define the starting point from which the maximum period of detention of one year is to be reckoned in a case not falling
under section 9
There is no justifiable reason why the word detain  should not receive its plain and natural meaning
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1 p 531 the word detain  means to keep in confinement or custody
Webster s Campre hensive Dictionary International Edition at p 349 gives the meaning as to hold in custody
The purpose and object of section 10 is to prescribe a maximum period for which a person against whom a detention order under the Act is made may be held in actual custody pursuant to the said order
It would not be violated if a person against whom an order of deten tion is passed is held in actual custody in jail for the period prescribed by the section
The period during which the detenu is on parole cannot be 1134 said to be a period during which he has been held in custody pursuant to the order of his detention for in such a case he was not in actual custody
The order of detention pre scribes the place where the detenu is to be detained
Parole brings him out of confinement from that place
Whatever may be the terms and conditions imposed for grant of parole detention as contemplated by the Act is interrupted when release on parole is obtained
The position would be well met by the appropriate answer to the question how long has the detenu been in actual custody pursuant to the order According to its plain construction the purpose and object of section 10 is to prescribe not only for the maximum period but also the method by which the period is to be computed
The computation has to commence from the date on which the detenu is taken into actual custody but if it is interrupted by an order of parole the detention would not continue when parole operates and until the detenu is put back into custo dy
The running of the period recommences then and a total period of one year has to be counted by putting the differ ent periods of actual detention together
We see no force in Shri Jethmalani s submission that the period during which the detenu was on parole has to be taken into consideration in computing the maximum period of detention authorised by section 10 of the Act
It is pertinent to observe that the Court has no power to substitute the period of detention either by abridging or enlarging it
The only power that is available to the Court is to quash the order in case it is found to be illegal
That being so it would not be open to the Court to reduce the period of detention by admitting the detenu on parole
What in a given situation should be the sufficient period for a person to be detained for the purpose of the Act is one for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining author ity
Preventive detention jurisprudence in this regard is very different from regular conviction followed by sentence that an accused is to suffer
Whether it be under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution the Court would therefore have no jurisdiction either under the Act or under the general principles of law or in exercise of ex traordinary jurisdiction to deal with the duration of the period of detention
Parliament has authorised the detention of persons under the COFEPOSA to serve two purposes 1 To prevent the person concerned from engaging himself in an activity prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange and also preventing him from smuggling activities 1135 and thereby to render him immobile for the period considered necessary by the detaining authority so that during that period the society is protected from such prejudicial activities on the part of the detenu
And 2 In order to break the links between the person so engaged and the source of such activity and from his associates engaged in that activity or to break the continuity of such prejudicial activities so that it would become difficult if not impossible for him to resume the activities
 Release of a detenu on parole after an order of detention has been made and the detenu lodged in custody for achieving one or the other of the aforesaid legislative objects is thus contrary to the purpose of the statute
There is a statutory prohibition against release of a detenu during the period of detention in sub section 6 of section 12 of the Act
That sub section which was inserted by Amending Act 39 of 1975 with effect from 171975 reads Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law and save as otherwise provided in this section no person against whom a deten tion order made under this Act is in force shall be released whether on bail or bail bond or otherwise
 Sub section 6 puts a statutory bar to the release of the detenu during the period of detention in a manner otherwise than the one provided in section 12
Section 12 authorises either the Central Government or the State Government to temporarily release the detenu on such terms and conditions as the appropriate Government considers necessary to impose
The scheme of section 12 unless release by the appropriate Government is taken to be one of parole keeps away parole from the subject of preventive detention
At any rate it is the appropriate Government and not the Court which deals with a case of temporary release of the detenu
Since the Act authorises the appropriate Government to make an order of temporary release invariably the detenu seeking to have the benefit of temporary relief must go to the appropriate Government first
It may be that in a given case the Court may be required to consider the propriety of an adverse order by the Government in exercise of the jurisdiction under section 12 of the Act
On the principle that exercise  of administrative jurisdiction is open to judicial review by the superior court the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 may be called upon in a suitable case to 1136 examine the legality and propriety of the governmental action
There is no scope for entertaining an application for parole by the Court straightaway
The legislative scheme keeping the purpose of the statute and the manner of its fulfilment provided thereunder would not justify enter taining of an application for release of a detenu on parole
Since in our view release on parole is not a matter of judicial determination apparently no provision as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the computa tion of the period of bail was thought necessary in the Act
But we would like to point out to the Government the desira bility of inserting a provision like sub s4 of section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 that when an action is taken under section 12 of the Act and the appropriate Gov ernment makes a temporary release order the period of such temporary release whether on bail or parole has to be ex cluded in computing the period of detention
Either the statute or the rules made thereunder should provide for this eventuality
In the premises it must accordingly be held that the period of parole has to be excluded in reckoning the period of detention under sub section 1 of section 3 of the Act
We find it difficult from the observations made by the three Judge Bench in Amritlal Channumal Jain s case to infer a direction by this Court that the period of parole shall not be added to the period of detention
The words used shall be taken into account  are susceptible of an inter pretation to the contrary
We find that an order made by a bench of two Judges of this Court in Harish Makhija s case supra unequivocally laid down that the period of parole cannot be counted towards the period of detention
This accords with the view taken by this Court in a bench of two Judges in State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya  and State of Gujarat vs Ismail Juma  Ors  In view of these authorities which appear to be in consonance with the object and purpose of the Act and the statutory provisions and also having regard to the fact that the direction made in Amritlal Channumal Jain s case supra is capable of another construction as well we do not find Shri Jethmalani s contention on this score as acceptable
For these reasons the only contention advanced by Shri Jethmalani in course of the hearing namely that the period of parole from May 15 1986 to February 28 1987 could not be added to the maximum period of detention of the detenu Shital Kumar for one year as specified in the impugned order of detention passed under sub s1 of section 3 of the Conserva tion of Foreign Exchange  Prevention of Smuggling Activi ties Act 1974 must fail
The writ petition is accordingly 1137 dismissed
There shall be no order as to costs
We direct that the petitioner shall surrender to custody to undergo remaining period of detention
We give the detenu ten days  time to comply with this direction failing which a non bailable warrant for his arrest shall issue
PSS Petition dis missed


Summary:
Sub section 6 of section 12 of the prohibits release of a detenu on bail or bail bond or otherwise during the period a detention order is in force
Sub sections 1 and 1A of section 12 however permit tempo rary release by the Central or State Governments on certain terms and conditions
Section 10 provides for a maximum period of detention of one year in cases to which provi sions of section 9 do not apply
The husband of the petitioner was detained under section 31 of the Act by an order dated February 28 1986
His repre sentation under section 8b was rejected by the detaining au thority on April 4 1986
The Advisory Board in its sittings on April 28 and 29 1986 concluded that there was sufficient cause for detention
The order of detention was confirmed by the Minister on May 14 1986
The writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Consti tution on April 23 1986 was heard by the Vacation Judge on May 15 1986 who made an order for the release of the detenu on parole and directed the matter to be listed in early August of 1986
The case however could not be listed till January 14 1987 and was finally heard on March 3 1987
The detenu had been out of Jail during the entire period
The period of one year expired on February 28 1987
1124 It was contended for the petitioner that the period of parole from May 15
1986 till February 28
1987 could not be added to the period of detention specified in the order under sub section
1 of section 3 of the Act that the period of one year from the date of detention having expired on February 28
1987 the order of detention had lapsed entitling the detenu to be freed and that once the detenu is taken into custody under the Act pursuant to an order of detention the running of time would not be arrested merely because the court directs the release of the detenu on parole
Relying on the decision in Lala Jairam Das  Ors
vs Emperor
AIR it was contended that the court cannot on gener al principles add the period of bail or parole to the period of detention and that the ratio laid down in Amritlal Channumal Jain etc
vs State of Gujarat  Ors WP Nos
1342 43 of 1982 decided on July 10 1985 that the period during which a detenu was on parole should be taken into account while calculating the period of detention has to prevail and must be taken as binding
Dismissing the writ petition
the Court
HELD 1
The period of parole of the detenu from May 15 1986 to February 28
1987 has to be excluded in reckoning the period of his detention for one year under sub section
1 of section 3 of the 
1136D G H 21 The purpose and object of section 10 of the Act is to prescribe not only a maximum period for which a person against whom a detention order under the Act is made may be held in actual custody pursuant to the said order but also the method by which the period is to be computed
The key to the interpretation of the section is in the words may be detained
 The subsequent words from the date of detention which follow the words maximum period of one year merely define the starting point from which the maximum period of detention of one year is to be reckoned in a case not fall ing under section 9
There is no justifiable reason why the word detain should not receive its plain and natural meaning to hold in custody 
1134B 1133G EP 22 The period during which the detenu is on parole cannot be said to be a period during which he has been held in custody pursuant to the order of his detention
In such a case he was not in actual custody
The order of detention prescribes the place where the detenu is to be detained
Parole brings him out of confinement from that place and detention as contemplated by the Act is interrupted until the detenu is put back into custody
The running of the period recommences then and 1125 a total period of one year has to be counted by putting the different periods of actual detention together
In the instant case it cannot therefore be said that the period during which the detenu was on
parole has to be taken into consideration in computing the maximum period of detention authorised by section 10 of the Act
1133H 1134A D Harish Makhija vs State of UP Crl
MP No 620 of 1984 in WP Crl No 301 of 1983 decided on February 11 1985 State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya  and State of Gujarat vs IsmaiI Juma  Ors  referred to
Amritlal Channumal Jain etc
vs State of Gujarat  Ors
 Writ Petitions Nos
1342 43 of 1982 decided on July 10 1985 distinguished
Parole is the release of a prisoner from a penal or correctional institution after he has served a part of his sentence under the continuous custody of the State and under conditions that permit his in carceration in the event of misbehavior
It is a grant of partial liberty or lessening of restrictions to a convict prisoner and does not change the status of the prisoner
1131E BC Preventive detention is not punishment
The scheme of section 12
unless temporary release by the appropriate Government is taken to be one of parole keeps away parole from the subject of preventive detention
1130F 1135F 41 What in a given situation should be the sufficient period for a person to be detained for the purpose of the COFEPOSA Act is one for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority
Preventive detention jurisprudence in this regard is very different from regular conviction fol lowed by sentence that an accused is to suffer
1134EF 42 Whether it be under article 226 or article 32 of the Constitution
the Court has no jurisdiction either under the Act or under the general principles of law or in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to deal with the duration of the period of detention either by abridging or enlarging it
The only power that is available to it is to quash the order in case it is found to be illegal
It would not therefore be open to the Court to reduce the period of detention by admitting the detenu on parole
1134FE 5
Sub section
6 of section 12 of the Act puts a statutory bar to the release of the detenu after an order of detention has been made and the detenu lodged in custody
It is the appro priate Government and not the Court 1126 which deal with a case of temporary release of the detenu under subss1 and 1A of section 12 of the Act
The detenu seeking to have the benefit of temporary relief must go to the appropriate Government first
The Court cannot entertain his application for parole straightaway
On the principle that exercise of administrative jurisdiction is open to Judicial review by the superior Court the High Court under article 226 or this Court under article 32 may in a given case examine the legality and propriety of the Government action
1135EC F G 1136A 1135H Samir Chatterjee vs State of West Bengal   State of Bihar vs Rambalak Singh  Ors and State of Uttar Pradesh vs Jairam  Ors 1982 1 SCC 176 referred to
Babulal Das vs State of West Bengal   Anil Dey vs State of West Bengal and Golam Hussain vs Commissioner of Police Calcutta  Ors   overruled
It is desirable to insert in the COFEPOSA Act or the Rules made thereunder a provision like sub s4 of section 389 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973 that when an action is taken under section 12 of the Act and the appropriate Govern ment makes a temporary release order the order of such temporary release whether on bail or parole has to be ex cluded in computing the period of detention
1136C Lala Jairam Das  Ors
y Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94 referred to