Civil Appeals Nos
374 375  457 462 of 1976
From the Judgment and order dated 12 3 76 of the Guja rat High Court in SCA Nos
178473 and 65074 1125 1118 1123 1124 1835 183674 respectively AK Sen SJ Sorabjee MV Chinubhai and BR Agarwa la for the appellants in CAs 374 37576
SJ Sorabjee Mrs Chinubhai SH Sanjanwala P H Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the appellants in CAs 457 46276
JM Thakere Adv
General J P Nanavati and MN Shroff for respondent No 1 in all the appeals
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG J
The eight Civil Appeals before us by certifi cates of fitness of the cases for appeals to this Court raise common questions involving the interpretation of Articles 31A and 3lB of the Constitution of Indian relation to the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act XXVII of 1961 herein after referred to as the Act 
The preamble of the Act says that it was enacted because xxx it is expedient in the public interest to make a uniform provision for the whole of the State of Gujarat in respect of restrictions upon holding agricultural land in excess of certain limits and it is also expedient for so securing the 105 distribution of agricultural land as best to sub serve the common good to provide for the acquisi tion of surplus agricultural land for the allotment thereof to persons who are in need of lands for agriculture including cooperative farming socie ties landless persons agricultural labourers and small holders or for the allotment of such surplus agricultural lands the integrity of which is main tained in compact blocks to a department of Govern ment or to cooperative farming societies or corpo rations owned or controlled by the State for ensuring the full and efficient use thereof and to provide for other consequential and incidental matters hereinafter appearing The part of section 6 of the Act with which we are especially concerned provides 61 Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement usage or decree or order of a Court with effect from the appointed day no person shall subject to the provisions of sub sections 2 3 3A and 3B be entitled to hold wheth er as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area
2 Where an individual who holds land is a member of a family not being a joint family which consists of the individual and his spouse or more than one spouse and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters irrespective of whether the family also includes any major son and land is also separately held by such individual s spouse or minor children then the land held by the individu al and the said members of the individual s family excluding major sons if any shall be grouped together for the purposes of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person
3 xxx xxx xxx 3A xxx xxx xxx 3B Where a family or a joint family con sist of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any of the following categories namely  i Minor son ii widow of a pre deceased son iii minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre deceased son where his or her mother is dead Such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of one fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five so however that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area and 9 1003 SCI 176 106 in such a case in relation to the holding of such family such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area Provided that if any land is held separately also by any member of such family the land so held separately by such member shall be grouped together with the land to such family for the purpose of determining the total holding of such family Provided further that where
in consequence of any member of such family holding any land in any other part of India outside the State the ceiling area in relation to the family is reduced as pro vided in sub section 3A the one fifth of the ceiling area as aforesaid shall be calculated with reference to the ceiling area as would have been applicable had no such land been held by such member in any other part of India
3C Where a family or a joint family irre spective of the number of members includes a major son then each major son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub section  1  
In accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act classes of land nature of irrigation facilities provided there and the ceiling area for each particular class of land in each locality were specified in Schedule I
This is found classified in nine local areas
The range of ceiling limit varies from 10 acres to 54 acres according to the irrigation facilities and quality of land the ceiling for less productive and less advantageously situated land being higher
The question which has been raised before us is whether apart from variations in the ceiling area imposed by stat ute there can be a depriviation of rights of individuals holding property separately in exercise of their separate individual rights by grouping them as members of one family so as to compel them to take only one unit of land  in such a way that their total holding does not exceed the ceiling limit which is the same for both individuals as well as families as defined by the Act with some allowances for large families
This raises a further question What is the unit for which this ceiling is prescribed It is evident that Section 6 conceives of each person holding land as a single unit whose holding must not exceed the ceiling limit
Section 2 sub section
21 says  person  includes a joint family
Thus the term person is not strictly speaking defined in the Act
Section 2 sub section
21 only clarifies that the term person will include a joint family also
It certainly does not exclude an indi vidual from being a person in the eyes of law
This has been done apparently to make it clear that in addition to individuals as natural persons families as conceived of by other provisions can also be and are per sons
This elucidation of the term person is in keeping with Section 3 42 of the  which lays down  person  shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incor porated or not
107 We have referred to the Central 10 of 1897 and not to the State  which also contains a similar clarification because Article 367 of our Constitu tion provides that the definitions contained in the Central Act apply for the interpretation of the Constitution
The argument which has been ad vanced before us is that the concept of the term person having been fixed by the Central  this concept and no other must be used for interpreting the second proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution which lays down Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land building or structure provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof
As no argument based on Articles 14 and 19 is open to the appellant the Act under consideration having been included in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution the ground now taken is that Section 6 subsection 2 of the Act set out above contains a colourable device for getting round the limitations on legislative power imposed by the second proviso to Article 31A1 of the Constitution
It is urged that this is done by adopting an unnatural and legally untenable concept of a person which transpires from an analysis of Section 6 of the Act
It is true that but for the provisions of Section 6 subs2 of the Act the term person which includes individuals as natural persons as well as groups or bodies of individuals as artificial persons such as a family is the entitlement to the ceiling area would be possessed by every person whether artificial or natural
In other words if Section 62 of the Act was not there each indi vidual member of a family would have been entitled to hold land upto the ceiling limit if it was his or her legally separate property
This follows from the obivous meaning of the term person as well as the inclusive definitions given both in the Act under consideration and in the 
Spouses and minor children as natural persons have not been debarred from holding their separate rights to land by the provisions of the Act
It is not the object of the Act to do that
The object of the Act as set out above is two fold firstly to limit the ceiling area of each holder and secondly to acquire what falls beyond the ceiling limit so that the State may distribute it to more needy persons
It is not disputed that compensation is provided for acquisition of what exceeds the ceiling area in every case
As was held by this Court in HH Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru vs State of Kerala1 the amount of compen sation fixed can not be questioned
Therefore no 1973 Supp
SCR 1 108 provision of the Act could be or is challenged on the ground that the required compensation is not prescribed for an acquisition under it as required by Article 312 of the  Constitution or is inadequate
Article 3lB of the Constitu tion seems to us to provide a complete answer to any attack directed against the provisions of an Act based upon an alleged violation of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III of the Constitution
It reads 3lB
Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31B none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that such Act Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by and provisions of this part and notwithstanding any judgment decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary each of the said Acts and Regulation s shall subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal Or amend  it continue in Force
Learned Counsel for the petitioners concede that in view of the decision of this Court in HH Kesavananda
Bharti s case supra and other cases referred to there it is not possible to assail the provisions
of Section 6 of the Act on the ground that they take away or abridge any right
conferred by Part III of the Constitution on individuals But what they urge is that the second proviso to Article 31A1does not confer any right upon any person but only imposes a limit upon the Legislative compe tence to that the inclusion of the Act in the 9th Schedule will not validate a provision which a legislature was not competent it all to enact
Such a provision it was submit ted will not be protected by Article 3lB of the Constitu tion
The contention is that Article 3lB does not protect a provision from invalidity on the ground of legislative incompetence of the legislature enacting it
We do not think that the ease before us raises any question of legislative competence of the nature which could arise if a State Legislature had tried to trespass upon the exclusive domain of Union Legislation
What has been urged is simply that the second proviso to Article 31 1 disables the State Legislature from acquiring any land below the ceiling limit without providing for compensation for such acquisition at the full market value
The proviso certainly protects and indeed confers certain rights upon individuals to an amount of compensation
That is its direct effect
The argument on behalf of the appellant as we under stand it is that although an alteration of the ceiling limit for each person directly by prescribing its stauto ry limit is permissible yet if it is not done directly by changing the ceiling limit for each person but by introduc ing a concept of person contrary to the concept in the provisions of the second proviso to Article 31 A 1  it becomes a prohibited colourable device for getting round the second proviso to Article 31A1
It is urged that the effect of the amended Section 6 of the 109 Act is to change the ceiling limit for some persons only by altering the legal and constitutional concept of a person
We do not find any fixed concept of person anywhere
No doubt the concept is wide so that it could be contended that it should not be narrowed down or confined But does Section 6 2 do that Section 6 2 does not either disable a husband or wife from owning or holding their separate properties separately
It does not merge or de stroy their separate legal personailties
It requires their separate holdings to be grouped together as though they were held by one person only for the purpose of determining the ceiling limit for each member of a family
It may indirect ly have the effect of disabling a member of a family from holding land upto the prescribed ceiling limit for a person holding as an individual
In other words the result is that such a member of a family will have to be content with a holding less than that of an unmarried individual
It has the effect of making it clear that what have to be grouped together are the separate properties of individuals belong ing to families other than what are joint families in law
It takes in and applies to members of families other than undivided Hindu families
It means that married per sons and their minor children will have to be viewed as though they hold one lot together even though they retain their separate legal personalities and remain competent owners of their separate holdings
It does not affect either their legal status or competence
It does reduce their individual holdings
But we do not find any prohibi tion enacted by the second proviso to Article 31A1 against different ceiling limits prescribed for various individuals or classes of individuals differently situated
Nor does the second proviso to Article 31A1 prescribe any particular or direct more of imposing different ceilings on individu als differently circumstanced
A glance at the provisions of Section 20 of the Act shows that separate rights to properties grouped together for purposes of computation only do not vanish
On the other hand each holder of such separate rights above the ceiling limit is permitted to select the property he or she wishes to continue to hold in such a way that the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same propor tion in which lands held by each spouse before furnishing the relevant statement were under sub section 1 of Section 10
The reduction in their holdings would therefore be proportionate to the areas of lands held separately but  brought together only for the purposes of determining the ceiling limit for the family
The whole object of the proc ess prescribed seems to be that families as contemplated by the Act should be units for merely determination of ceil ings for each member of a family
Appellants relied on Kunjukutty Sahib etc
vs State of Kerala  Anr1 where it was held by this Court at p 314 It was not disputed that the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unamended Act by itself debarred the legislature from further 1 1973 1 SCR326  341 110 reducing the ceiling limit so fixed
Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended Act the second Proviso to article 31A 1 must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act
The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act
The prohibition contained in the second proviso oper ates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law at the given time
It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit
But it was not contended that a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring the land in excess would offend any provision of the Consti tution
Pritam Singh vs State of Punjab  Ors1 was also cited on behalf of the appellants
Here the contention amongst others was repelled that by adding land transferred to certain relations to that held by a person under his person al cultivation for the purpose of determining his ceiling area and the surplus left under the provisions of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1955 as amended by a subsequent Act rights guaranteed by the second proviso to Article 31A1 were contravened
This case certainly does not lay down that the ceiling limit applicable to each individual must be uniform or that it must be contained in a single statutory provision directly dealing with ceiling limits
It follows that the ceiling limit may vary from individual to individual
These varying limits may result from the combined effect of several provisions
The pre scription of different ceiling limits for different individ uals differently circumstanced could be enacted directly by a single provision dealing with individual celling lim its or alternatively it could be the consequence of several provisions dealing with differing sets of circum stances
No law known to us has ever laid down that the intention of the law makers on a particular subject must necessarily transpire from a single statutory provision or statutory provisions dealing directly with a particular aspect
To read any such limit into the 2nd proviso to Article 31A1 of the Constitution would be to accept a novel restriction on legislative competence
We have no doubt that no such restriction could be found in the 2nd proviso to Article 31 A  1  of the Constitution
It was urged that Article 31A1 and 3lB of the Consti tution operate in different fields of legislation
Whereas Article 3 IA 1  cures certain possible invalidities in ordinary legislation arising from its
inconsistencies with Articles 14 or 19 or 31 of the Constitution Article 3lB cures a wider range of infirmities arising from conflict with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and necessitates a constitutional amendment so as to protect an impugned legislation by its inclusion in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution
Legislation protected 1 1967 2 SCRp
111 by Article 31A of the Constitution would fall under appro priate legislative entries in the 7th Schedule
But to secure the protection of Article 3lB of the Constitution resort to the provisions of Article 368 of the Constitution is imperative
These differences do not mean that legisla tion falling under any part of Article 31A1 of the Consti tution including the provisos cannot receive also the protection contemplated by Article 3lB of the Constitution
There is nothing in our Constitution to bar any statute from receiving a dual protection so to speak of both Article 31A1 and 3lB of the Constitution if the conditions of each are satisfied
It is clear to us that the proviso to Article 31A1 of the Constitution confers certain rights upon individuals and protects them from constitutionally illegal invasion
We are therefore unable to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the protective umbrella of Article 3lB does not shield the impugned provisions against an attack based upon the limits imposed by the second provi so to Article 31A1 on legislative power
The argument overlooks certain obvious answers firstly that limits on legislative powers imposed by Part III of the Constitution do have the direct result of protecting individual rights and secondly that no part of the second proviso to Article 31 1 of the Constitution was as already pointed out above infringed by the impugned provisions and thirdly even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that rights conferred on individuals by the 2nd proviso to Article 31 1 were infringed in any way pro
visions of Article 3lB of the Constitution are enough to repel an attack based upon such an alleged infringement
Both Arti cle 31A1 and 3lB are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution
Consequently we have to and do dismiss these appeals
But in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs
PHP Appeals dis missed


Summary:
The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act 1961 by filing writ petitions in the High Court of Gujarat
The Preamble of the Act state that the Act was enacted for Securing the distribution of agricultural land as best to sub serve the common good
Section 61 of the Act provides that no person shall hold either as owner or tenant land in excess of the ceiling area
Section 62 provides that where an individu al who holds land as a member of a family not being a joint family then the spouse
and the children excluding major sons shall be grouped together for the purposes of the Act and the provisions of the Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person
The ceiling area is fixed depending on the classes of land nature of irrigation facilities and productivity
The said statute has been put in the 9th Schedule by the Parliament
The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants but granted certificate of fitness under article 1331 of the Constitution to the appel lant
The appellants contended that 1Second proviso to article 31A of the Constitution provides that where any law makes provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate which is held by a person under his personal cultivation it shall not be lawful for the State to
acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force unless the law provides for payment of compensation at a rate which is not less than the market value
Apart from variations in the ceiling area imposed by a statute there cannot be a depri vation of rights of individuals holding property separately in exercise of their separate individual rights by grouping them as members of one family
2 The concept 017 person adopted by the statute is unnatural and legally untenable
The concept of the term person  having been fixed by the Central General Clause Act this concept and no other must be used for interpreting second proviso to article 31A of the Constitution
3 The second proviso to article 31A1 does not confer any right upon any person but only imposes a limit upon legislative competence so that the inclusion of the Act in the  9th Schedule will not validate a provision which the Legislature was  not competent at all to enact
HELD The term person  is not defined in the
Section 221  merely states that person includes a joint family Under s 342 of the  a person is defined as
including any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not
In the absence of section 62 each individual member of a family would have been entitled to hold land upto the ceiling limit if it was his or her legally separate property
The Act does not debar spouses and minor children from holding their sepa rate
rights to land
There is no fixed concept of person  any where
Section 62 does not either disable a husband or a wife from holding their separate properties separately
It does not merge or destroy their separate legal personali ties
It 104 merely requires their separate holdings to be grouped to gether as through they were held by one person only for the purpose of determining the ceiling limit Each holder of such separate rights above the ceiling limit is permitted to select the property he or she wishes to continue to hold in such a way that the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same proportion in which lands were held by each spouse
The reduction in their holding will there fore be proportionate to the areas  of lands held separate ly
But they are grouped together only for the purpose of determining the ceiling limit for the fan and as a result of a specific provision to that effect
It is not denied by the appellants that the ceiling limit could have been low ered by the statute
Article 31A does not prohibit the legislature from fixing ceiling limits for various individu als or the classes of individuals differently situated nor does the second proviso to article 31A1 prescribe any partic ular or direct mode of imposing different ceilings for individuals differently circumstanced
106 G H 109 A E Pritam Singh vs State of Punjab  Ors  distinguished
2 Article 3lB provides a complete answer to any attack directed against the provisions of the Act based upon viola tion of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III of  the Constitution
To read any limit into the second proviso to article 31A1 that there can be only single ceiling limit for all persons would be to accept a novel restriction on legislative competence
There is nothing in the Constitution to bar any statute from receiving a dual protection
In the
present case the statute in question is fully protected by article 3lB
Since the second proviso to Article 31A confers certain rights upon individuals the protective umbrella of article 3lB shields the impugned provi sion against any attack based upon the alleged violation of such rights as well
110 G H 111 A C 3 There is no question of legislative competence
in the present case
The proviso protects and confers certain rights upon individuals to an amount of compensation
That is the direct effect
111 B C