ecial Leave Petition C No 8566 of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 9101987 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in WP No 306 of 1983
R Mohan for the Petitioner
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
This petition is for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 9th October 1987
The question that was urged before the High Court and the question which is sought to be raised in this petition is whether the respondent Pradesh Rayons Ltd which is manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp a base material for manufacturing of synthetics or manmade fabrics is an industry as mentioned in Schedule I of the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution cess Act 1977 for the purposes of levy of Water Cess under the Act
The water Prevention and Control Of Pollution Act 1974 was passed by the Parliament to provide for the prevention and control of water pollution and the maintaining or restoring of wholesomeness of water for the establishment with a view to carrying out the purposes aforesaid of Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution for conferring on and assigning to such Boards powers and functions relating thereto and for matters connected therewith
For the aforesaid purposes the Act contemplated creation of State Boards at State level and the Central Board at the national level
Thereafter the being Act 36 of 1977 was passed hereinafter called the Act 
The preamble to the said Act states that the said Act was to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on water consumed by persons carrying on certain industries and by local authorities with a view to augment the resources of the Central Board and the State PG NO 383 Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution constituted under the 
Therefore the said Act was passed only for the purpose of providing for levy and collection of cess on water consumed by persons carrying on certain industries with a view to augment the resources of the Central Board and the State Boards
Section 2c stipulates A specified industry  means any industry specified in Schedule T Section 3 provides as follows 3
Levy and collection of cess 1 There shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the and utilisation thereunder
2 The cess under sub section  I shall be payable by a every person carrying on any specified industry and b every local authority and shall be calculated on the basis of the water consumed by such person or local authority as the case may be for any of the purposes specified in column 1 of Schedule II at such rate not exceeding the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 thereof as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time specify
 Therefore this section provides for levy and collection of cess from the specified industries
Specified industry is one which is mentioned in Schedule I which is as follows 1
Ferrous metallurgical industry
Non ferrous metallurgical industry
Mining industry
Ore processing industry
Petroleum industry
Petro chemical industry
Chemical industry
Ceramic industry
PG NO 384 9
Cement industry
Textile industry 11
Paper industry
Fertilizer industry
Coal including coke industry
Power thermal and diesel generating industry
Processing of animal or vegetable products industry
 Therefore the short question is whether the industry run by the respondent herein for manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp a base material for manufacture of synthetics or man made fabrics is one of the industries mentioned in Schedule I hereinbefore
In this case the respondent company was registered as company in 1975
The supply of energy to the company commenced on August 22 1981 and the production began from September 1 1981
The company manufactures rayon grade pulp of 26250 tonnes per annum
The Company was served with a notice on 12th August 1981 to furnish the quantum of water consumed for assessment under the Act
Based on the returns filed by the respondent as required under section S of the Act assessment of water cess was made by an order dated 31st December 1981
Aggrieved by the said order the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Committee constituted under the Act
The Appellate committee by its order dated 30th November 1982 conformed the orders of the assessment passed by the petitioner
Before the Appellate Committee various contentions were urged and only one of such contention survives now and is agitated before us namely that the Rayon Industry is nOt included in Schedule I of the said Act
The Appellate Committee by its order said as follows We are unable to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel
The appellant industry is manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp which comes under the category of textile industry as it involves the production of Rayon Grade Pulp
a base material for manufacture of synthetic of man made fibres   PG NO 385 From the aforesaid it appears that the Appellate Committee was of the view that the respondent herein was manufacturing Rayon Grade Pulp which comes under the category of Textile mentioned in Schedule I of the Act
Textile industry is item No 10 in the aforesaid Schedule
Aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Committee the respondent herein filed writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the levy of cess on water on the ground that it was not one of the industries mentioned in the Schedule
The High Court by its order dated 9th October 1987 rejected the contention relating to the constitutional validity but upheld the contention that the respondent s industry was not an industry which is mentioned in Schedule I and as such was not liable to pay cess
It is the propriety or the correctness of that decision which is sought to be canvassed before us by this petition
It must therefore be made clear that we are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the High Court about the constitutional validity of the Act in question
That is not at issue before us since the petitioner Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution has not challenged that finding
The only question is whether the respondent is an industry as mentioned in the aforesaid schedule
The High Court in the impugned judgment has held that Rayon Grade Pulp is not covered by any of the items specified in the said Schedule
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right
Before us it was sought to be canvassed that Rayon Grade Pulp is covered either by Item No 7 which is chemical industry or 13y item No 10 which is textile industry or item No I1 which is paper industry
We are unable to accept the contention
It has to be borne in mind that this Act with which we are concerned is an Act imposing liability for cess
The Act is fiscal in nature
The Act must therefore be strictly construed in order to find out whether a liability is fastened on a particular industry
The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to its natural construction of words
See the observations in Re Micklethwait   456
Also see the observations in Tenant vs Smith  and Lord Halsbury s observations at page 154
See also the observations of Lord Simonds in St Aubyn vs AG  at 485
Justice Rowlatt of England said a long time ago that in a taxing ACt one has to look merely at what is clearly said
There is no room for any intendment
There is no equity about a tax
There is no presumption at to tax
Nothing is to be read in nothing is to be implied
One has to look fairly at the language used
See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndicate vs IRC 1921J 1 KB PG NO 386 64 at 71
This Court has also reiterated the same view in Gursahai Saigal vs CIT Punjab   SL T Madras vs V MR
P Firm Muar 1965 I SCR 815
and Controller of Estate Duty Gujarat vs Kantilal Trikamlal  The question as to what is covered must be found out from the language according to its natural meaning fairly and squarely read
See the observations in IRC vs Duke of Westminster 1936 AC I at 24 and of this Court in A V Fernandez vs The State of Kerala  Justice Krishna Iyer of this Court in Martand Dairy  Farm vs Union of India has observed that taxing consideration may stem from administrative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualisation or neat logic and so the literal though pedestrian interpretation must prevail
In this case where the question is whether a particular industry is an industry as covered in Schedule I of the Act it has to be judged normally by what that industry produces mainly
Every industry carries out multifarious activities to reach its goal through various multifarious methods
Whether a particular industry falls within the realm of taxation must be judged by the predominant purpose and process and not by any ancillary or incidental process carried on by a particular industry in running its business
Chemical process would be involved to a certain extent more or less in all industries but an industry would be known as a chemical industry if it carries out predominantly chemical activities and is involved in chemical endeavours
We fail to see that Rayon Grade Pulp could be considered even remotely connected as such with chemical industry or textile industry or paper industry
In all preparations there is certain chemical process but that does not make all industries chemical industries
The expression chemical means according to Collins English Dictionary
any substance used in or resulting from a reaction involving changes to atoms or molecules or used in chemistry
The Concise Oxford Dictionary 8th Edition page 170 defines chemical   as made by or relating to chemistry
Broadly and literally in our opinion it can be said that the Rayon Grade Pulp is neither chemical industry nor textile industry nor paper industry
We find it difficult on a broad and literal construction to bring the industry of the respondent into any of these categories
In other words to find out the intention of the legislation if possible it should be PG NO 387 found out from the language used in case of doubt
The purpose of legislation should be sought for to clarify the ambiguity only if any
The fairest and most rational method says Blackstone to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most natural and probable
And these signs are either the words the context the subject matter the effects and consequence or the spirit and reason of the law
See Commentaries on the Laws of England by Blackstone facsimile of 1st edition of 1765 University of Chicago Press 1979 Vol 1 p 59
The words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification  although terms of art must be taken according to the acceptation of the learning in each art trade and science
If words happen still to be dubious we may establish their meaning from the context which includes the preamble to the statute and laws made by the same legislator on the same subject
Words are always to be understood as having regard to the subject matter of the legislation
See Cross Statutory Interpretation 2nd Edition page 21
This Court in Lt Col Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc
vs Union of India  Ors 1983 I SCR 393 at page 404 of the report reiterated that the dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament
One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity
Therefore the first question to be posed is whether there is any ambiguity in the language used
If there is none it would mean the language used speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning
If the literal construction leads to an absurdity external aids to construction can be resorted to
To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed
Bearing the aforesaid principle in mind we find that there is no absurdity in the literal meaning
The purpose of the Act is to realise money from those whose activities lead to pollution and who must bear the expenses of the maintenance and running of the State Board
It is a fiscal provision and must therefore not only be literally construed but also be strictly construed
Having regard to the literal expression used and bearing in mind the purpose for the legislation we arrive at a result that certain PG NO 388 industries have to pay the expenses of the maintenance and functioning of the State Boards
Considering the principle broadly and from commonsense point of view we find nothing to warrant the conclusion that Rayon Grade Pulp is included in either of the industries as canvassed on behalf of the petitioner here and as held by the High Court in the judgment under appeal
In this case we must also note that neither the water Pollution Board nor any authorities under the Act nor the High Court proceeded on any evidence how these expressions are used in the particular industry or understood in the trade generally
In other words no principle of understanding in common parlance is involved in the instance case
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the contention sought for by the petitioner is of no substance
Our attention however was drawn to the decision of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in Ms Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg
Wvg Co Ltd Mavoor vs The Appellate Committee for Water Cess Trivandrum and others AIR 1983 Kerala 110
There the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court held that industry manufacturing rayon grade pulp is chemical industry
The High Court has observed that the product of the Pulp Division of a rayon silk manufacturing company is rayon grade pulp extracted from bamboo or wood
The High Court noted that the pulp produced in the Pulp Division of the company is the raw material for the Staple Fibre Division
The High Court further observed that the pulp in question is a chemical used as chemical raw material in the form known as chemical cellulose for preparation of fibres
The High Court noted that for the scientist cellulose is a carbohydrate an organic compound a saccharide and for the layman also it is a chemical like salt and sugar
Manufacture of pulp from wood or bamboo involves consumption of large quantities of water which get polluted in the process and chemical industry   in the context in which it is used in Schedule I of the Act can therefore include an industry manufacturing rayon grade pulp
We are unable with respect to accept the circuitous process of reasoning of the Kerala High Court
As mentioned hereinbefore looked at from this circuitous method every industry would be chemical industry
It could not have been the intention to include all industries because every industry has to go to certain chemical process more or less and therefore it could not be so construed
Such expression should therefore be construed reasonably strictly and from a commonsense point of view
The High PG NO 389 Court of Kerala has set out in the said judgment the company s case in that case which also produced Rayon Grade Pulp and the manufacturing process consisted only of isolating cellulose present in bamboo and wood by removal of lignin and other contents and that the resultant product is not chemical cellulose
It explained the process as under The actual process of manufacture of Rayon grade pulp is by feeding the raw materials on the conveyors leading to the chippers where they are chipped into small pieces in uniform sizes
The raw materials are washed by a continuous stream of water before they are fed into chippers for removal of their adhering mud and dirt
The chips are then conveyed into Digesters where they are subjected to acid pre hydrolysis using dilute sulphuric acid solution
The spent liquor is then drained out and the chips washed to remove the acid
The chips are again cooked using a solution containing cooking chemicals at high temperature of above 160C After the chips are thus cooked the pressure is released and the material is collected in a blow tank from where the chipped pulp is sent to Knotter Screen for removal of uncooked particles
The pulp is washed in a series of washers in a counter current manner
The washed pulp is bleached in a multi staged Bleaching Plant and converted into sheets in a continuous machine
The pulp sheets so obtained are sent to other factories for their conversion into Staple Fibre
 The said High Court also relied on a passage from the Book of Popular Science Grolier 1969 Vol 7 p 55 which reads as follows Just what is a chemical after all Presumably it is a pure chemical substance an element or compound and not a mixture
Thus sulphuric acid is a chemical 
But common salt and sugar with which all of us are familiar are also pure chemical substances 
The truly chemical industries which manufacture chemicals are seldom well known to the public
This is because we as consumers do not ordinarily make use of chemicals in their pure form
Instead they are converted into products that reach the consumer only after a number of operations   Emphasis supplied PG NO 390 As mentioned hereinbefore the expression should be understood not in technical sense but from broad commonsense point of view to find out what it truly means by those who deal with them
Bearing the aforesaid perspective in mind we are unable to agree with the view of the Kerala High Court expressed in the aforesaid judgment
In that conspectus of the Kerala High Court everything would be included in the process of chemical
In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the impugned judgment was right and the High Court of Kerala in the judgment referred to hereinbefore was not right
In the aforesaid view of the matter this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed


Summary:
During the pendency of the suit for eviction of the defendant appellant from the shop room under section 11 of the Bihar Building Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act 1982 the Trial Court passed an order directing the appellant to deposit rent month by month
The appellant having defaulted in the payment of rent for two months the respondent landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the Act for a direction to strike out the defence of the appellant
The appellant s defence was that it was a case of genuine mistake
The Trial Court held that the excuse for non payment was not bona fide and that there was unexplained delay to deposit the rent
The Trial Court therefore struck off the appellant s defence
The High Court dismissed the revision application of the appellant it limine
Disposing of the appeal it was HELD 1 The Act as the preamble states is inter alia to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants 
Therefore though it is for protection of tenants the Act is enjoined to regulate the rights and the duties of the landlords and the tenants
413C 2 The Court must from a proper perspective judge the question whether the delay or failure to deposit the rent in terms of order under section 13 of the Act has been properly explained and if that delay has been properly explained then the court has a discretion to excuse the delay but if the delay has not been properly explained then the court has no discretion
Such a construction would be a harmonious rendering of the language of section l 3 to the claim for justice in each particular case
414B C PG NO 409 3 In construing the question whether the delay has been reasonably explained or not the court in the scheme of the administration of justice must take a constructive and purpose oriented approach
If it does then the element of discretion comes into play though not in the form of directory or mandatory provision but in considering whether the delay was properly explained or not
414C D 4 In the facts of this case there is good deal of justification for the delay and the delay has been properly explained
The Trial Court therefore committed an error resulting in miscarriage of justice
The High Court in not interfering with this miscarriage too committed an error of jurisdiction
4l4D E Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari vs Lakshmi Narayan Gupta 1985 3SCR 825 Mrs Manju Choudhary vs Dulai Kumar Chandra and Ms BP Khemka Pvt Ltd vs Birendra Kumar Bhowmick   referred to