ns Nos 188 and 189 of 1968
Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental rights
V Krishnamurti section K Dholakia and J B Dadachanji for the petitioners in both the petitions
Niren De Attorney General section section Shukla and section P Nayar for the respondents in both the petitions
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami J
In these writ Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution a common question of law arises for determination viz whether the Mysore Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act 1954 Mysore Act 1 of 1955is constitutionally valid
The villages of Debur and Kappasoge in Mysore District were Inam grants made to Bakshi Bhima Rao the ancestor of the petitioners
The inam grants were made by the Ruler of 3 Mysore State in recognition of the military services of Bakshi Bhima Rao
The inam included not only the income from the lands but from every kind of revenue including excise and the right to treat all lands newly brought into cultivation as the personal property of the Inamdars
The Mysore Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act 1954 Mysore Act 1 of 1955 hereinafter called the impugned Act was passed by the  Mysore Legislature and received the assent of the President on the 18th March 1955 and published in the Mysore Gazette on 19th March 1955
The Act was subsequently amended by Mysore Act 7 of 1956 which received the assent of the President on 28th June 1956 and which was published in the Mysore Gazette on 5th July 1956
By virtue of a notification dated 2nd October 1956 under section 1 clause iv of the impugned Act the two inam villages vested in the State of Mysore under section 3 of the impugned Act
Compensation of the various items was
the subject matter of dispute between the petitioners and the Special Deputy Commissioner who was appointed to assess
compensation under the machinery of the Act
Awards of compensation were made under sections 17 and 20 of the impugned Act by the Special Deputy Commissioner
The peti tioners preferred Miscellaneous Appeals Nos 89 and 130 in the High Court of Mysore under section 31 of the impugned Act
These appeals were heard and decided by the Mysore High Court by a consolidated order of the 27th October 1960
Against that decision two appeals were brought to this Court in Civil Appeals 196 and 197 of 1965
These appeals were heard on 25th October 1967
It was then pointed out by the Court that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act cannot be challenged in the statutory appeals in view of the decision of this Court in K section Venkataraman  Co vs State of Madras1 The petitioners thereafter filed these writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Act
The main contention raised by the petitioners is that the impugned Act does not provide for adequate compensation for the property acquired that the compensation provided for was not a just equivalent in other wordsthe market value of the property at the time of acquisition and there was hence a violation of the guarantee under article 312 of the Constitution
The impugned Act is entitled as an Act to provide for the abolition of personal inams and certain miscellaneous inams in the State of Mysore except Bellary District
The preamble states that it is expedient in the public interest to provide for the abolition of  personal inams and certain miscellaneous inams in the State of Mysore except Bellary District and for other matters connected therewith
 Section 14 enacts that this section and 1  4 sections 2 27 38 and 40 shall come into force in respect of any inam village or minor inam in an unalienated village on such date as the Government may by notification appoint
Section 3 provides for the consequences of  the vesting of an inam in the State and states as follows  1 When the notification under sub section 4 of section 1 in respect of any inam has been published in the Mysore Gazette then notwithstanding anything contained in any contract grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force with effect on and from the date of vesting and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act the following consequences shall ensue namely  a the provisions of the Land Revenue Code relating to alienated holdings shall except as respects minor inams to which this Act is not applicable be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the inam and the provisions of the Land Revenue Code and all other enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply to the said inam b all rights title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands cultivated lands uncultivated lands whether assessed or not waste lands pasture lands forests mines and minerals quarries rivers and streams tanks and irrigation works fisheries and ferries shall case and be vested absolutely in the State of Mysore free from all encumbrances Section 9 enacts Lands and buildings to vest in the inamdar 1 Every inamdar shall with effect on and from the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than i communal lands waste lands gomal lands forest landstank beds mines quarries rivers streams tanks and irrigation works ii lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under sections 4 5 6 7 or 8 and iii lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar
2 Every building situated within the limits of the inam which was owned immediately before the 2 date of vesting by the inamdar shall with effect on and from such date vest in the inamdar
Explanation  In this section inamdar  means an inamdar other than a holder of a minor inam referred to in section 7
Section 17 provides as follows Amount of compensation payable  1 Save as otherwise provided in section 26 the total compensation payable in respect of any inam shall be the aggregate of the sums specified below i a sum equal to twenty times the amount of land revenue payable in respect of land held by kadim tenants and permanent tenants entitled to be registered under section 4 and section 5 respectively
Explanation  where the land revenue is paid in kind the amount of land revenue for purposes of this
clause shall be determined on the basis of the market value prevailing on the 1st day of January 1954 of the crop or crops paid as land revenue ii a sum equal to seventy five per centum of the amount payable by the quasi permanent tenants of the inamdar under subsection 2 of section 6 in respect of lands of which they are entitled to be registered as occupants under sub section 1 of the said section 6 iii a sum calculated at the rates specified below in respect of lands referred to in clause iii of subsection 1 of section 7 or section 9 a seventy five rupees per acre within the municipal limits of the Cities of Bangalore Mysore and Davangere and within an area of one mile from such limits and b forty rupees per acre within the municipal limits of the towns of Kolar Tumkur Chitaldrug Shimoga Bhadravati Chickmagalur Hassan and Mandya and the limits of the Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board Area and within an area of one mile from such limits and c twenty rupees per acre in all other areas iv a sum equal to twenty times the jodi quitrent or other amount if any of like nature derived by the inamdar concerned from persons holding minor inams under such inamdar and 6 v a sum equal to ten times the average net annual income derived by the inamdar during a period of five years immediately preceding the date of vesting from lands other than lands referred to in clause iii and lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under sections 4 5 6 7 8 and 9 Provided that a the income from sandalwood or any other forest produce shall not be included in the annual income from forests unless the right thereto was expressly conferred on the inamdar by a competent authority b the income from royalty on minerals or from mining lease shall not be included in the annual in come unless the right to such minerals or mines was expressly conferred on the inamdar by a competent authority and such right was recognised under section 38 of the Land Revenue Code c the income from ferries shall not be included unless the right to such ferries was expressly granted to the inamdar by a competent authority
On behalf of the petitioners learned counsel stressed the argument that the inamdar of the estate was completely deprived of any sort of compensation in regard to the category of lands mentioned in section 9  1  1
It was said that in regard to the permanent tenants the compensation was fixed at 20 times of the land revenue but in the case of quasi permanent tenants the compensation is 75 per cent of the value payable by the quasi permanent tenants under section 62
That is to say the Government recovers a premium under section 62 at 40 times the land revenue and hands over 75 per cent as compensation to the holder of the inam estate
It was contended that compen sation was not fixed on the basis of the market value on the date of acquisition and that the guarantee embodied in Article 31 2 of the Constitution has been violated
In support of this argument reference was made to the decision of this Court in The State of West Bengal vs Mrs Bela Banerjee  Ors 1 in which this Court observed that while under Entry 42 List III the Legislature was given discretionary 1 1954 SCR558
7 power to lay down the principles which should govern determination of the amount to be given to the owner of the property appropriated Article 312 of the Constitution required that such principles must ensure what is determined as payable must be compensation  ie a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived
Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the Court
The Court therefore held in that case that the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 which was enacted primarily for the settlement of immigrants who had migrated into West Bengal due to communal disturbances in East Bengal and which by section 8 provided that the compensation to be awarded for compulsory acquisition to the owner of the land was not to exceed the market value of the land on 31st December 1946 was ultra vires of the Constitution and void under Article 312 of the Constitution
At page 564 of the report the Court observed as follows  Turning now to the provisions relating to compensation under the impugned Act it will be seen that the latter part of the proviso to section 8 limits the amount of compensation so as not to exceed the market value of the land on December 31 1946 no matter when the land is acquired
Considering that the impugned Act is a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came into force the fixing of the market value on December 31 1946 as the ceiling on the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of 
Article 312
In our opinion this principle cannot apply in testing the validity of the impugned Act in the present case
Article 312 before its amendment by the Constitution 4th Amendment Act reads as follows  2 No property movable or immovable including any interest in or in any company owning any commercial or industrial undertaking shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given
8 But Article 31A was added in the Constitution with retros pective effect by section 4 of the Constitution 1st Amendment Act 1951 which provides as follows  4
After Article 31 of the Constitution the following article shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been inserted namely  31A Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates
etc 1 Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part no law  providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of this Part Provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent
2 In this article a the expression estate  shall in relation to any local area have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area and shall also include any jagir inam or maufi or other similar grant b the expression rights  in relation to an estate shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor sub proprietor under proprietor tenure holder or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect ofland revenue
Article 31A was amended again by section 3 of the Constitution 4th Amendment Act 1955 with retrospective effect
Section 3 of the Constitution 4th Amendment Act reads as follows a for clause 1 the following clause shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted namely  1 Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13 no law providing for a the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or 9 b the taking over of the management of any property by the State for a limited period either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property or c the amalgamation of two or more corpora tions either in the public interest or in order to secure the proper management of any of the corporations or d the extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing agents secretaries and treasurers managing directors directors or managers or corporations or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof or e the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement lease or licence for the purpose of searching for or winning any mineral or mineral oil or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement lease or licence shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 article 19 or article 3 1 Provided at where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent and b in clause 2 i in sub clause a after the word grant  the words and in the States of Madras and Travancore Cochin any janmam right  shall be and shall be deemed always to have been inserted
ii in sub clause b after the word tenure holder  the words raiyat under raiyat  shall be and shall be deemed always to have been inserted
In the present case it is plain that under Article 31A as introduced by the 1st Amendment to the Constitution or as altered by the 4th Amendment the impugned Act is protected from attack in any Court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Article 312 of the Constitution
The reason is that the impugned Act is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of such rights as contemplated by Article 31A of the Constitution
The impugned Act provides L7 Sup
C1169 2 10 for acquisition of the rights of inamdars in inam estates in Mysore State and it is intended to abolish all intermediate holders who were termed as Superior holders and to establish direct relationship between the Government and occupants of land in the Inam Villages in respect of which notifications had been issued
The legislation was undertaken as a part of agrarian reform which the Mysore State Legislature proposed to bring about in the former State of Mysore
The impugned statute therefore falls under the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that Article 31 has been violated that no principle of compensation has been provided or that the compensation provided for is illusory or inadequate
On behalf of the petitioners Mr Krishnamurthi in support of his argument referred to the decision of this Court in State of Madras vs D Namasivaya Mudaliar and Ors
1 in which Madras Lignite Acquisition of Land Act Madras Act XI of 1953 was held invalid on the ground that the provisions of the Act relating to compensation violated Article 312 of the Constitution as it stood before the Constitution 4th Amendment Act 1955 and that the principle laid down in The State of West Bengal vs Mrs Bela Banerjee  Or s2 was applicable
Reference was also made to another decision of this Court in P Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Special Deputy Collector Madras  Anr
3 in which the question was raised with regard to the validity of Land Acquisition Madras Amendment Act 1961 Madras Act 23 of 1961
In that case the petitioners  lands were notified for acquisition for the purpose of housing schemes and the object of the acquisition was slum clearance
In that case also it was held by this Court that the principle of Bela Banerjee s2 case should be applied and by virtue of Article 312 the Legislature in making the law of acquisition must provide for a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of or specify the principles for the purpose of ascertaining such just equivalent It was pointed out that the comparative study of the principal Act and the Amending Act showed that if land was acquired for a housing scheme under the Amending Act the claimant would get a lesser value than what he would get for the same or similar land acquired for some public purpose under the Principal Act
The discrimination between persons whose lands were acquired for housing schemes and those whose lands were acquired for other public purposes could not be sustained on the principle of reasonable classification and the Amending Act clearly violated Article 14 of the Constitution and was void
In our opinion the ratio of the two decisions in State Of Madras vs 1 1964 6SCR936
2 1954 SCR558
3   11 DNamasivaya Mudaliar  Ors
1 and P Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Special Deputy Collector Madras and Anr
2 has no application to the present case because those cases related to legislation not dealing with agrarian reform and the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution was not available to either of the statutes challenged in those cases
We pass on to consider the next question raised on behalf of the petitioners namely whether the impugned Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature under Entry 36 of List 11 to the 7th Schedule and Entry 42 of List III as those Entries stood before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution
The argument maybe summarised thus  Entry 36 of List 11 read with Article 2463 of the Constitution was obviously intended to authorise the State Legislature to exercise the right of eminent domain ie right of compulsory acquisition of private property
The exercise of such power has been recognised in Anglo Saxon jurisprudence as conditioned by public necessity and payment of compensation
All legislation in this country authorising such acquisition of property from Regulation 1 of 1824 to Land Acquisition Act 1894 proceeded on that footing
The existence of public purpose and the obligation to pay compensation are therefore necessary concomitants of compulsory acquisition of private property and so the term acquisition must be construed as importing by necessary implication the aforesaid two conditions
It is also a recognised rule for the construction of statutes that unless the words of the statute clearly so demand a statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of a subject without compensation  Attorney General V De Keyser s Royal Hotel3 The power to take compulsorily raises by implication a right to payment  Central Control Board vs Cannon Brewery4
The words subject to the provisions of entry 42 in List 111 in entry 36 reinforce the argument as these words must be taken to mean that the power to make a law with respect to acquisition of property should be exercised subject to the condition that such law should also provide for the matters referred to in entry 42 in other words a two fold restriction as to public purpose and payment of compensation both of which are referred to in entry 42 is imposed on the exercise of the law making power under entry 36
Entry 36 at the material time read as follows lm15  Acquisition or requisition of property except for the purposes of the Union subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III
Entry 42 was to the following effect 1  2  3   542
4 1919 AC 744
12 Principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given
By the Constitution 7th Amendment Act 1956 Entries 36 of List 11 33 of List I were omitted and Entry 42 of List III was altered and the altered entry reads as follows  Acquisition and requisitioning of Property it was however pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that the amendment was not retrospective and the validity of the impugned Act must be tested by the language of entries 36 of List II and 42 of List III as they stood at the material time
In our opinion there is no substance in the argument
It is true that under the common law of eminent domain as recognised in Anglo Saxon jurisprudence the State cannot take the property of its subject unless such property is required for a public purpose and without compensating the owner for its loss
But when these limitations are expressly provided for in Article 312 and it is further enacted that no law shall be made which takes away or abridges these safeguards and any such law if made shall be void there can be no room for implication and the words acquisition of property in entry 36 must be understood in their natural sense of the act of acquiring property without importing into the phrase an obligation to pay compensation or a condition as to the existence of a public purpose
In other words it is not correct to treat the obligation to pay compensation as implicit in the legislative entry 33 of List I or legislative entry 36 of List II for it is separately and expressly provided for in Article 312
The well known maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum is indeed a principle of logic and common sense and not merely a technical rule of construction
The express provision in Article 312 that a law of acquisition in order to be valid must provide for compensation will therefore necessarily exclude all suggestion of an implied obligation to provide for compensation sought to be imported into the meaning of the word acquisition in entry 36 of List II
In the face of the express provision of Article 312 there remains no room for reading any such implication in the legislative heads
The entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and State Legislatures
Such a context is hardly appropriate for the imposition of implied restrictions on the exercise of legislative powers which are ordinarily matters for positive enactment in the body of the Constitution
It was said that the words subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List 111 must be taken to mean that the law making power under entry 36 could be exercised subject to the two conditions as 13 to public purpose and payment of compensation both of which are referred to in entry 42
In our opinion the contention is unsound
The two entries are merely heads of legislation and are neither interdependent nor complementary to each other
These words in entry 36 mean no more than that any law made under entry 36 by a State Legislation can be displaced or overridden by the Union Legislation making a law under entry 42 of List II
It is important to notice that similar words do not occur in entry 33 of List I which confers on Parliament the power to make laws with respect to acquisition of property for the purpose of the Union
For if these restrictive conditions as to public purpose and payment of compensation are to be derived only from those words then it must follow that in the absence of those words Parliament can make law authorising acquisition of property without a public purpose and without a provision for compensation
No reason was suggested why Parliamentary Legislation with respect to such acquisition of property is to be free from such restrictive condition while State Legislation should be subject to them
The true inference is that the power to make law belonging to both Parliament and the State Legislatures can be exercised only subject to the aforesaid two restrictions not by reason of anything contained in the legislative entries themselves but by reason of positive provisions contained in Article 312
But as legislation falling within Article 31A cannot be called in question in a Court of law for noncompliance with those provisions such legislation cannot be struck down as unconstitutional and void
In our opinion counsel on behalf of the petitioners is unable to make good his argument that the impugned Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature at the time when it was enacted
For these reasons we hold that the petitioners have made out no case for grant of relief under article 32 of the Constitution
These writ petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs
There will be one set of hearing fee
VPS Petitions dismissed


Summary:
By virtue of a notification under section 14 of the Mysore Personal and Miscellaneous Inams Abolition Act 1954 the Inam villages of the petitioners vested in the State of Mysore
The petitioner challenged the validity of the Act on two grounds namely  1 that the compensation provided by the Act was not the market value of the property at the time of acquisition and since it did not provide for an adequate compensation as a just equivalent  there was a violation of article 312 and 2 that the impugned Act was beyond the legislative competence of the Mysore Legislature under Entry 36 of List 11 and Entry 42 of List III to the 7th Schedule as the Entries stood before the 7th Amendment of the Constitution because i the existence of public purpose and the obligation to pay compensation are necessary concomitants of compulsory acquisition of property and so the term acquisition  must be construed as importing by necessary implication the two conditions of public purpose and payment of adequate compensation and ii the words subject to the provisions of Entry 42 List III  in Entry 36 of List 11 reinforce the argument that a law with respect to acquisition of property made under Entry 36 should be exercised subject to the two fold restriction as to public purpose and payment of compensation both of which are referred to in Entry 42 List Ill HELD  1 a The impugned Act provides for the acquisition of rights of inamdars in inam estates and it is intended to abolish all intermediate holders and to establish direct relationship between the Government and occupants of land in Inam villages in respect of which notifications had been issued
The legislation was undertaken as a part of agrarian reform which the Mysore State Legislature proposed to bring about in the State
Therefore the impugned Act is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of such rights as contemplated by article 31A and hence the impugned Act is protected from attack in any court on the ground that it contravenes article 312
9 G H 10 A B b The ratio of the two decisions in State of Madras vs Namasivaya Mudaliar  and Vajravelu Mudaliar vs Spl
Collector   in which it was held that the principle of Beta Banerjee s case
  that the Legislature in making a law of acquisition must provide for a just equivalent  as compensation has no application to the present case because those two cases related to legislation not dealing with agrarian reform and the protection of article 31A was not available to either of the statutes challenged in those cases
A B 2 2 1 Under the common law of eminent domain the State cannot take the property of its subject unless such property is required for a public purpose and without compensating the owner for its loss
But when these limitations are expressly provided for in article 312 and it is further enacted that no law shall be made which takes away or abridges those safeguards and any such law if made shall be void there can be no room for implication and the words acquisition of property  in Entry 36 must be understood in their natural sense of the mere act of acquiring property without importing into the phrase an obligation to pay compensation or a condition as to the existence of a public purpose
The entries in the Lists of the VII Schedule are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and State Legislatures and the principle of the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum makes it inappropriate to treat the obligation to pay compensation as implicit in Entry 33 of List I or Entry 36 of List 11 when it is separately and expressly provided for in article 312
12 C F 3 The words subject to the provision of Entry 42 of List III  mean no more than that any law made under Entry 36 by a State Legislature can be displaced or overridden by the Union Legislature making a law under Entry 42 of List 11
If the restrictive conditions as to public purpose and payment of compensation are to be derived from these words their absence in Entry 33 of List I leads to the unreasonable inference that Parliament can make law authorising acquisition of property without a public purpose and without a provision for compensation
The true inference is that the power to make a law belonging both to Parliament and State Legislatures can be exercised subject to the two restrictions not by reason of anything contained in the legislative entries but by reason the positive provisions in article 312
But as legislation falling within article 31A cannot be called in question in a court for non compliance with those provisions in article 312 such legislation cannot be struck down as unconstitutional and void
13 B E