ivil Appeal No 1201 of 1976
From the Judgment and Order dated 3876 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No 12204 of 1975
Appellant in person
Dileep Tandon and RB Mehrotra for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN J
This appeal by special leave by a tenant is directed against the dismissal of Civil Miscellaneous Writ No 12204 of 1975 by the High Court of Allahabad
The second respondent became the owner of a house bearing Municipal No 140 old No 94 A in Hewett Road Allahabad under a gift deed executed in his favour by his mother in 1945
However even in 1944 his father had leased the house to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs30 which after some years was raised to Rs35 The house is a three storeyed building and the appellant was residing in the first and second floors and running a drug store belonging to his wife in the ground floor
Some years later the second respondent s father leased out an adjacent building also to the appellant for being used for the drug store business
In 1967 it became necessary for the second respondent to seek recovery of possession of the house because his elder brother with whom he was living asked him to find accommodation elsewhere
Therefore the second respondent applied for permission under Section 3 of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Rent Act to the Prescribed Authority to file a suit for eviction against the PG NO 725 appellant on the ground of urgent and reasonable requirement of the house for his own occupation
The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on November 10 1967
After the 1947 Rent Act came to be replaced by the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 hereinafter the 1972 Rent Act the second respondent again sought the permission of the Prescribed Authority to file a suit against the appellant but this time he sought for recovery of possession of the leased premises either fully or partially
He averred in the application that since his brother had asked him to vacate his house he had taken up residence in a single room in the house of one Srivastava and was living there in great hardship and as such he wanted to recover possession of his house in its entirety failing which at least a portion of it
The Prescribed Authority refused to grant permission on the ground the application had been made within a period of six months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act and hence it was barred by Rule 181 of the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Rules 1972 hereinafter the Rules
The Appellate Authority however differed from the Prescribed Authority and granted permission to the second respondent to recover possession of the ground floor portion of the house alone
Thereupon the appellant moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ to quash the order of the Appellate Authority but did not meet with Success and hence this appeal by special leave
A few facts may first be noticed before the appellant s contentions are set out and examined
Admittedly the second respondent became the owner of the leased premises in the year 15145 under a gift settlement made by his mother and except the leased building he has no other house
It is also an admitted fact that when the first Application for permission to sue was made the second respondent was living with his brother but subsequently he had to move out of that house and take up residence in a single room in a building belonging to one Srivastava
A Commissioner appointed by the Court had inspected the room occupied by the second respondent and found that the second respondent was faced with acute shortage of space and that the bath room and latrine were situated in the ground floor which was in the landlord s occupation
While the prayer in the first application was for the release Of the entire house the prayer in the second application was for release of the whole house or in the alternative for the release of at least a portion of the house
PG NO 726 Coming now to the contention of the appellant who is a member of the bar and who appeared in person and argued the case for himself
they were as follows 1
The application made under the 1972 Rent Act was a second application for release of the house on the same ground of requirement and hence it was barred under Rule 181 of the Rules since it had been made within six months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act
The High Court s view that the second application was not barred under Rule 181 because it is the circumstances of requirement and not the nature of the requirement that would constitute the ground of eviction is erroneous and unsustainable
The Act and the Rules do not permit the creation of two dwelling units in a building covered by a single tenancy and hence the grant of permission for partial eviction is bad in law
The Appellate Authority has erred in rendering a finding against the appellant in the matter of comparative hardship merely because the appellant had another building adjacent to the leased premises for running the drug store
In any event the Appellate Authority and the High Court have failed to notice that without the ground floor the first and second floors cannot be used as residence because the bath and toilet rooms are situated only in the ground floor The learned counsel for the second respondent
besides refuting the above contentions of the appellant argued that the appeal itself has become unsustainable because the appellant has vacated the building in the year 1976 itself and taken up residence in another house belonging to his wife and consequently by reason of Explanation 1 to Section 21 of the 1972 Rent Act he is disentitled to dispute the second respondent s right to recover possession of the house
We will now consider the contentions of the appellant in seriatum In so far as the first contention is concerned it suffers from a fallacy in that it is founded upon a misconstruction of Rule 18 1 The Rule in question is worded as under 18
Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings Section 384 and 41 l Where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for PG NO 727 eviction under Section 3 of the old Act on any ground mentioned in Section 211 has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under clause i or clause m of Section 432 by the District Judge and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application under Section 21 on the same ground within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act whichever is later the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings conclusive  emphasis supplied Provided that the period during which the operation of any permission as aforesaid is stayed by order ot  any court or authority shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months 2   omitted
On a reading of Rule 181 it may be seen that the Rule does not prohibit or bar the filing of an application for release of any building on any ground mentioned in Section 21 1 within a period of six months from the date on which a final order was passed in the previous application made under Section 3 of the 1947 Rent Act or within a period of six months from the commencement of the Act
All that the Rule says is that it a second application is made for release of the house on which permission to sue was sought in the previous application on the same ground within a period of six months from the date of the final order in that application or within six months from the commencement of the Act whichever is later the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive
 The Rule only sets out a rule of presumption to be followed by the Prescribed Authority for dealing with an application for release on the same ground without a sufficient interval of time between the filing of the two petitions The Rule does not mandate that a second application preferred on the same ground within a period of six months from the date of the order in the previous application or from the commencement of the Act must necessarily be dismissed as barred under the Rules
The first contention of the appellant is therefore obviously misconceived and cannot therefore be sustained PG NO 728 In so far as the second contention is concerned the appellant is right when he says that the earlier application under Section 3 of the 1947 Rent Act and the later application under Section 211 of the 1972 Rent Act should be construed as having been made on one and the same ground viz bona fide requirement of the premises by the second respondent for his own occupation
The High Court has however taken the view that the ground of eviction in the two applications is not the same because different sets of circumstances would constitute different grounds and such a test is satisfied in this case
We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the High Court s view is correct or not because even if we treat the two applications as having been made on the same ground the second application would not attract the operation of Rule 181
Since the Rule contains only a formula of presumption based on facts it goes without saying that the prescription is only of a directory nature and not of a mandatory nature
In this context we may appositely refer to the following passage in Phipson on Evidence Thirteenth Edition at pages 4 and 5 Presumptions are either of law or fact
Presumptions of law are arbitrary consequence expressly annexed by law to particular facts and may be either conclusive as that a child under a certain age is incapable of committing any crime or rebuttable as that a person not heard of for seven years is dead or that a bill of exchange has been given for value
Presumptions of fact are inferences which the mind naturally and logically draws from given facts irrespective of their legal effect
Not only are they always rebuttable but the trier of fact may refuse to mke the usual or natural inference notwithstanding that there is no rebutting evidence
 Besides it is a well known principle that in the interpretation of statutes that where the situation and the context warrants it the word shall used in a Scction or Rule of a statute has to be construed as may
The present context is one such where the words the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive have to be read as the Prescribed Authority may accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive because the findings are based upon existence of facts
We may now set out the reason as to why the prescription in Rule 181 should be construed as only PG NO 729 directory and not mandatory In the first place the Rule envisages two kinds of situations one of them where the second application is made within an interval of six months from the date on which final orders were passed in the previous application and the other where the second application is made beyond an interval of six months which may even go up to several years as in this case where the interval was over five years but within six months of the Act coming into force
Surely the legislature would not have intended that the interval factor in the two sets of situations should be visited with the same consequences by adopting a rigid and inflexible application of the prescriptive guideline given in Rule 181 
The second factor is that even if the interval factor is the sole criterion for the application of the formula contained in Rule 181 the legislature could not have intended that even where drastic changes had taken place subsequent to the disposal of the earlier application the prescribed authority should shut his eyes to the realities of the situation and blindly and mechanically apply the formula in Rule 181 and reject the second application
To cite a few examples it may be that after the disposal of the first application the landlord had been rendered houseless due to the house occupied by him falling down due to decay or heavy rains or being destroyed by fire Could any one say that irrespective of the changes that have taken place the findings rendered in the previous application would have the force of relevancy till the period of six months fixed under the Rule has expired It is therefore manifest that the rule of presumption enunciated in Rule 181 is only to serve as a guideline to be followed by the prescribed authority if he finds the circumstances to remain unchanged and the finding rendered in the earlier application to have relevancy even with reference to the facts set out in the second application the Rule intended to avoid multiplicity of proceeding as the very heading given to the Rule would make it clear It will therefore be inequitable and unrealistic to construe Rule 18 1 as containing an inexorable legal prescription for rejecting a second application filed within the prescribed time limit solely on the basis of the findings rendered in the earlier application
In this case we have already referred to the fact that after the first application was rejected the living conditions ot  the second respodent had changed materially He had been turned out of his brother s house and forced to take up residence in a single room belonging to a third party and live there in great discomfort and hardship In the plight in which he was placed he was even prepared to accept partial release of the house it  he could not get release of the entire premises
The long interval of time PG NO 730 between the rejection of the first application and the date of making the second application viz about five years and the significant changes that had taken place during the interval in the living conditions of the second respondent undoubtedly rendered irrelevant the earlier findings and such being the case the rule of presumption given in Rule 181 can have no application or relevance to the second application
Viewed in this manner we do not think the Appellate Authority or the High court has committed any error in granting the relief of partial release of the house to the respondent Hence the second contention of the Appellant has also to fail
So far as the third contention is concerned viz the impermissibility of creating two dwelling units in a single tenanted premises the argument fails to note that Section 211 provides for an order of eviction being passed against a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof Emphasis supplied
We do not therefore find any error in the second respondent being granted the relief of partial eviction
As regards the fourth contention it is admitted that the appellant had been given an additional building by the second respondent s father for being used for the drug store business Since the appellant was using the ground floor in the suit premises only for running his wife s drug store and was not living there in the Appellate Authority cannot be said to have committed any error in taking the view that in the matter of comparative hardship the second respondent would be the more affected person if eviction was not ordered than the appellant by an order of partial eviction being passed because he had another building and could conveniently shift his business to that building
Coming to the last contention of the appellant viz the unsuitability of the first and second floors for residential purpose without the use of the bath and toilet rooms in the ground floor it is open to the appellant to move the Prescribed Authority for directions being given to the second respondent to make suitable provision in the ground floor for the appellant and his family members to have access to and make use of the bath and toilet rooms in the ground floor
As regards the contention of the respondent that the appellant and his wife are now living in a house belonging to the appellant s wife and as such the appellant is precluded under Explanation i to Section 211 of the 1972 Rent Act from resisting the second respondent s suit for eviction we are unable to make any pronouncement on it because of lack of evidence in support of that plea and PG NO 731 besides the appellant would say that the house now occupied by him and his wife is the subject matter of a litigation between his wife and her uncle
In the light of our conclusions the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed
There will however be no order as to costs
RSS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In this group of cases a common question of law that falls for Determination by the Court is whether the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act Act No 13 of 1972 are applicable to cantonments situated in the State of UP
The High Court has answered this question in the affirmative
Hence these appeals by tenants
The main judgment under appeal is in the case of Brij Sunder Kapoor vs Additional District Judge  Ors 1980 All India Rent cases 3I9
Brief facts of that case are therefore stated below showing how the said question arose
It may be mentioned that the Allahabad High Court reiterated the same view later in the case of Lekh Raj vs 4th Addl
Distt
Judge Meerut AIR 1982 All 265
Jhansi is a cantonment in Uttar Pradesh
Brij Sunder Kapoor the appellant is a tenant of Premises No 103 Sadar Bazar Jhansi of which Respondent No 3 Bhagwan Das Gupta is the landlord
In 1975 the landlord filed an application before the prescribed authority under Section 21 of the Act praying that he required the premises for his personal occupation and that the same be released to him
The appellant tenant contested the application
The application was dismissed by the prescribed authority but on appeal by the landlord it was allowed by the Additional District Judge
The tenant thereupon filed a writ petition which was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad
The appellant tenant has therefore filed this appeal
In order to judge the legality of the point urged regarding applicability of the Act to cantonment area in PG NO 559 UP the Court first referred to the history of tenancy legislation in the State of UP where the Rent and Eviction Control Legislation was initiated by the United Provinces Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance promulgated on 1101946 followed by UP Act III of 1947 which was made retrospective wef 1101946
Both the Act and the Ordinance applied to cantonment area
By a later Act UP Amendment Act 44 of 1948 cantonment areas were excluded from the purview of Act III of 1947 perhaps in view of Cantonments House Accommodation Act 1923
Consequent upon the receipt of various representations demanding the applicability of Act III of 1947 to cantonment area the State promulgated Ordinance 5 of 1949 which however was allowed to lapse
In the meantime the Allahabad High Court in Smt
Ahmedi Begum vs Distt
Magistrate ruled that the State Legislature was in competent to regulate accommodation lying in cantonments since that was a subject in which Parliament alone was competent to legislate
This view was later approved by this Court in Inder Bhushan Bose vs Rama Sundari Devi
 Thereupon Parliament enacted the UP Cantonments Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1952 Act 10 of 1952
In 1957 Parliament enacted the cantonments Extension of Rent Control Laws Act of 1972 gave it retrospective operation from 2611950 which provided for extension to contonments of State law relating to control of rent and regulation of house accommodation
As a consequence of this Act III of 1947 became applicable to the cantonment area even though Act 10 of 1952 was in force
In order to avoid any complication UP Cantonments Control of Rent and Eviction Repeal Act 1971 was enacted
A notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 extending Act III of 1947 to cantonments in UP was issued in 341972 but soon thereafter Act III of 1947 was repealed by UP Act 13 of 1972 which came into operation On 1571972 which necessitated the issuance of another notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 extending the provisions of Act 13 of 1972
Accordingly a notification dated 191973 was issued
It was in view of this notification that Respondent No 3 filed his application under Section 21 of the Act which has given rise to these proceedings
Counsel for the appellants raised three principal contentions viz 1 Whether Act 46 of 1957 applied at all to the State of UP in view of Act 10 of 1952 which contained special provisions applicable to cantonments in the State of UP ii Did not the power of the Central Government under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 get exhausted when the PG NO 560 notification dated 3rd April 1972 was issued by which provisions of Act III of 1947 were extended to cantonments in UP
If yes was not the second notification dated 191973 illegal and non est on that account iii Does not Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers and is it not consequently void and inoperative Dismissing the appeals this Court HELD Once it is the avowed policy of Parliament that cantonment areas in a State should be subjected to the same tenancy legislation as the other areas therein it follows that the decision involves also that future amendments in such State legislation should become effective in cantonment area as well
In some rare cases where Parliament feels that such subsequent amendments need not apply to cantonment areas or should apply with more than the limited restrictions and modifications permitted by section 3 it is open to Parliament to legislate independently for such cantonment areas
But the decision that in the main such State legislation should apply is unexceptionable and cannot be said to constitute an abdication of its legislative function by Parliament
585G H 586A Amended section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957 on a proper construction validly empowers the Central Government by notification to extend the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh not only in the form in which it stood on the date of the said notification but also along with its subsequent amendments
589D E Act 10 of 1952 was a detailed statute which was applicable to cantonments in the State of UP 566C Parliamentary legislation Act 68 of 1971 terminates the applicability of Act 10 of 1952 in Uttar Pradesh cantonments
567B It enacts that Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed in its application to the State of UP on and from the date on which Act III of 1947 was extended to the cantonment areas in the State by a notification under section 3 of Act XLVI of 1957
567E A notification was issued on 341972 under section 3 of Act XLVI Of 1957 extending the provisions of Act III of 1947 with certain modification set out therein to PG NO 561 cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
On and from 3rd April 1972 therefore Act 10 of 1952 ceased to apply to cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh
566E F In view of this there was at least on and after that date no obstacle in the way of Act III of 1947 being operative in the cantonments of the State of UP as well
566F The provisions of Act 68 of 1971 have rendered Act 10 of 1952 inoperative as and from 341972 leaving the provisions of Act I11 of 1947 in the field only until it was replaced by Act 13 of 1972
567C Notification dated 191973 extended to the cantonment areas only the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as they stood in that date
It was only 1721982 that a further notification was issued superseding the notifi cation dated 191973 by which the provisions of Act XIII of 1972 as in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh were also extended to the cantonment areas
The purpose of this notification obviously was that since there had been amendments to Act XIII of 1972 in 1974 and again in 1976 it was necessary and desirable that the amended provisions should also be extended to the cantonment areas
573D E Gurcharan Singh  Ors
vs V K Kaushal  The delegation of a power to extend even future laws of another State will not be bad so long as they are laws which are already in force in the said areas and so long as in the process and under the character of the law or a change of it in essential particulars is not permitted
582H583A Mahindra  Mahindra vs Union   Lachmi Narain vs Union   Delhi laws Act case   Raj Narain Singh s case 1955 I SCR 74 B Shama Rao vs Union Territory of Pondicherry   Gwalior Rayon s Case   Sita Ram Bishambher Dayal vs State of UP   Smt
Bajya vs Smt
Gopikabai  Another   Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi etc
vs Mamanchand Ratilal Aggarwal  Ors  and SP Jain vs Krishna Menon Gupta