Civil Appeal No 6626 of 1983
From the Judgment and order dated 1851983 of the Allahabad High Court in CMWP No 13741 of 1982
H 620 SN Kacker and RB Mehrotra for the Appellant
BD Agarwala and Miss Asha Rani for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J
This is an appeal by the tenant against an order upholding the order of eviction
The ground of eviction was on the landlord s bona fide need and requirement
The appeal arises out of the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 18th of May 1983 and also against the order dated 23rd of May 1983 dismissing a review application by the said High Court
Shri PK Mukerjee respondent No 1 herein had filed an application under section 3 of the UP Act No 3 of 1947 Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act hereinafter referred to as the old Act seeking permission to file the suit for eviction of the tenant the father of the appellant herein on the ground that accommodation in dispute was bona fide required by the landlord for his personal need
In September 1971 the Rent Control and Eviction officer rejected the application of the landlord and held that his requirement was not bona fide
On 12th of November 1971 the Commissioner allowed the revision filed by respondent No 1 against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction officer dated 5th of September 1971
It may be mentioned that on 15th of July 1972 the UP Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act 1972 hereinafter referred to as the new Act came into effect
On 2nd of August 1972 the State Government rejected the representation of the tenant namely the father of the appellant filed under section 7 of the old Act against the order of the Commissioner dated 2nd of November 1971
On or about 7th of February 1975 the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad allowed the writ petition of the tenant and set aside the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government hereinbefore mentioned
On 3rd of August 1978 a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad allowed the appeal of respondent No 1 and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 7th of February 1975 and upheld the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government allowing the eviction of the tenant
In September 1978 respondent No 1 moved an application under section 21 read with section 432rr of the new Act
Thereafter it is alleged that respondent No 1 had executed an agreement to sell the disputed premises in favour of the appellant s wife namely Smt
Madhu Soni
It is material to refer to the said agreement in brief
The agreement is dated as mentioned hereinbefore 7th of November 1978 621 and was entered into between Shri PK Mukerjee the landlord and Smt
Madhu Soni wife of Shri DK Soni son of Shri Harbans Lal Soni the then tenant
It was stated that the landlord had filed an application against Shri HL Soni the father in law of vendee for permission to file a suit for eviction against him on account of his personal need for the aforesaid premises and permission had been granted
It also recited that a portion of the said land which was demarcated in the site plan measuring about 121  x 1015  of the vendor which would be for the construction of a house would be in exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of the property at 8 Panna Lal Road Allahabad being the disputed premises would be sold to Smt
It also recited that the vendee or his family members would have no right of whatsoever nature and the vendee that is to say the appellant had given up his tenancy right in respect of the same that is to say the portion to be kept with the vendor and the premises will be built on the vacant land with the money that would be obtained by selling the property to Smt
Madhu Soni
The property was sold for Rs 100000 out of which Rs5000 was paid as earnest money and it was stipulated that the rest of the money would be paid at the time of the registration
It was further agreed that the parties would move the proper authorities as early as possible for permission to transfer and the sale deed would be executed within one month of the grant of the permission and notice to the vendee
It was further stated that if the vendee failed to get the sale deed executed after one month from the date of permission and notice to the vendee by the vendor the earnest money of Rs5000 would be forfeited and the right of the vendor would be as it subsisted prior to the agreement
It was further provided that in the event of non execution of the sale deed on account of any act or failure on the part of the vendee in pursuance of the agreement to sell the property would stand released in favour of the vendor and the earnest money of Rs5000 would be forfeited
It was clearly stipulated that the need of the vendor for the premises still subsisted and this agreement was being entered into since it would be possible for the vendor to construct a house for himself on the land not agreed to be transferred measuring 121  x 1015  
On that basis the parties had signed agreement on 7th November 1978
On 12th of December 1978 the father of the present appellant Shri HL Soni who was the original tenant died leaving behind his widow and two sons including the appellant and one daughter
It was alleged that on 18th of December 1978 respondent No l sent a letter of condolence to the appellant on the death of appellant s father
On 622 22nd of December 1978 appellant informed the Prescribed Authority before whom the application under section 2 11a of the new Act red with section 432rr was pending about the death of Shri HL Soni
On 23rd of March 1979 respondent No 1 moved an application for substitution in Case No 53 of 1978 for bringing on record the heirs of deceased Shri HL Soni along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act
On 10th of November 1979 the Prescribed Authority rejected the petitioners application for substitution and held that respondent No 1 had full knowledge of the death of Shri HL Soni and he did not move the application within time
On 11th of December 1979 respondent No 1 moved a second application under section 2 11a read with section 432rr of the new Act on the same ground on which the first application was moved
The second application was registered as Case No 68 of 1979
It is alleged further that on 12th of March 1981 respondent No 1 executed two separate agreements to sell the property in dispute in favour of RP Kanodia and PK Kanodia respectively
The Prescribed Authority on 7th of July 198 1 held that the second application under section 2 11a read with section 432rr of the new Act being Case No 68 of 1979 was within time and directed the tenant to be evicted from the premises in dispute
The Additional District Judge Allahabad on 25th of October 1982 dismissed the appeal of the tenant filed against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 7th of July 1981
On 11th of March 1983 the appellant s wife Smt
Madhu Soni filed a suit for injunction restraining Respondent No 1 from dispossessing her from the premises in dispute on the strength of registered agreement and she asserted that she resided in the accommodation as a result of part performance under section 53A of the 
Initially injunction was granted ex parte by the Trial Court and thereafter it was vacated after hearing respondent No 1
Aggrieved thereby an appeal  was filed by Smt
Madhu Soni in which the High Court had stayed dispossession
The High Court thereafter dismissed the writ petition of the tenant against the orders of the Prescribed Authority for eviction and the order of the Additional District Judge
A review petition was filed by the appellant and the same was dismissed
This appeal by special leave is against that decision of the High Court dated 18th of May 1983 Behind this long tale of dates the questions involved in this appeal are short namely firstly in view of the provisions of section 432rr was the High Court right in the facts and circumstances of the case specially the death of original tenant being alleged and in view of the fact that the execution of the order passed for eviction had 623 become final before coming into operation of the new Act the order was proper and secondly how far the subsequent events namely the A agreement with the wife of one of the sons of the original tenant to purchase property as well as the agreement with the Kanodias mentioned hereinbefore demolish or destroy the case of a bona fide need of the landlord
In other words are these not sufficient subsequent events which destroy the landlord s bona fide need and as such should be taken note of by the appropriate courts in ordering eviction
In this appeal therefore we have to keep in mind two aspects of law namely the finality of the decisions and secondly how far and to what extent subsequent events should be taken note of in order to do justice between the parties
Before we refer to the judgment of the High Court and the submissions made before us it is necessary for us to bear in mind certain decisions of this Court on these aspects on which reliance was placed
This Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs The Motor  General Traders  dealing with the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease Rent and Eviction Control Act 1960 dealt with the question as to how far the subsequent events can be taken note of
This Court held that for making the right or remedy claimed by a party justly and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accordance with the current realities the court can and in many cases must take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed
In the facts of that case this Court said that the High Court was right in taking into consideration the facts which came into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings
Therefore the fact that in determining what justice required the Court was bound to consider any change either in fact or in law which had supervened since the judgment was given
F This general principle and proposition of law was of ancient vintage
See the observations of the US Supreme Court in Pattersion vs State of Alabama  at page 607
The actual facts however of this case were entirely different and so it was not necessary to refer to those facts
In Ramji Dayawala  Sons P Ltd vs Invest Import   this principle was again reiterated entirely under different context
This Court also reiterated the same principle in Hasmat Rai and another vs Raghunath Prasad  where referring to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs The Motor and General Traders supra this Court held that when an action was brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the H 624 ground of personal requirement his need must not only be shown to A exist at the date of the suit but must exist on the date of appellate decree or the date when a higher court dealt with the matter
It was emphasised by this Court that if during the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court subsequent events had occurred which if noticed would non suit the plaintiff the court had to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly
The tenant was entitled to show that the need or requirement no more existed by pointing out such subsequent events to the court including the appellate court
Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage and it would be against the spirit or intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re entry
In such a situation it was reiterated that it would be incorrect to say that as the decree or order for eviction was passed against the tenant he could not invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events
But the tenant could be precluded from so contending when decree or order for eviction had become final
Emphasis supplied see the observations of Desai J at page 617GH of the report
In Syed Asadullah Kazmi vs The Addl
District Judge Allahabad and others   this Court was concerned with a residence at Allahabad
It was held by this Court that the order dated 25th March 1977 of the appellate authority releasing a portion of the premises in favour of the third respondent therein and leaving the remaining portion in the tenancy of the appellant therein acquired finality when the proceedings taken against it by the appellant had failed
The Prescribed Authority was bound to give effect to that final order and was not acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law where he ordered eviction
This Court reiterated that it was true that subsequent events had to be taken into account by a statutory authority or court when considering proceeding arising out of a landlord s petition for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord s personal need
But in that case the order for release of a portion of the accommodation had acquired finality before the death of the landlord and the controversy concluded by it could not be reopened thereafter
This Court further reiterated that inasmuch as the question which arose before the Prescribed Authority on the application of the appellant after the proceedings for release had acquired finality it was not open even for this Court to reopen the proceeding for release
Not quite relevant to the present controversy there is however just an observation in Sher Singh  Ors
vs The State of Punjab  It was a decision dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution
There is an observation that traditionally subsequent events had to be taken into account in the area of civil law
It is necessary however to refer to a 625 decision of the special bench of the Allahabad high Court in Bansilal Sahu vs The Prescribed Authority and another  19801 ALL
LJ 331 which arose under the new Act
It was held therein that the question whether the eviction of the tenant had to be ordered from any specified part of the building under tenancy was not within the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority while acting under clause rr of section 432 irrespective of the occurrence of subsequent events which might make it improper to order the eviction from the entire building or which might tend to establish that the need set up by the landlord could be satisfied by ordering eviction of the tenant from a specified part of the building under tenancy
It was held that subsequent events or facts could not be considered so as to defeat the final order and the Prescribed Authority was bound to order eviction
The Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court overruled another Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt
Sarju Devi vs Prescribed Authority Kanpur 19771 All
LJ 251 and accepted the proposition laid down in Tara Chand Khandelwal vs Prescribed Authority Agra 1976 All LJ 708
Satish Chandra CJ speaking for the Allahabad High Court observed that the opening clause of this provision entitled the Prescribed Authority to find out whether permission under section 3 of the old Act had been obtained on any ground specified in subsection 1 or sub section 2 of section 21 of the present Act and that the same had become final
It was therefore according to the Chief Justice the beginning as well as the end of his jurisdiction to record findings
If the conclusion was in the affirmative the Prescribed Authority had no discretion but to order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy
It was further held that the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority was to order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy
It had not expressly been conferred any power to order eviction from a portion or part of the building under tenancy
It was further held that the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority while deciding an application under section 2 1 of the present Act could not be equated with the jurisdiction which had been conferred for giving effect to the permission granted under section 3 of the old Act
The two situations were different
Clause rr of section 432 of the present Act specifically prohibited the Prescribed Authority from satisfying itself afresh that the grounds existed
We are of the opinion that this is the correct state of law and if that is the position the so called subsequent events are not germane to the question to be decided by the High Court
In the aforesaid light in our opinion in the facts of this case the High Court was right
626 It may be mentioned that clause rr of section 432 of the new Act provides as follows where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub section 1 or sub section 2 of section 21 and has become final either before the commencement of this Act or in accordance with the provisions of this sub section after the commencement of this Act whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under section 21 and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy and it shall not be necessary for prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under section 22 Provided that no application under this clause shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted under section 3 of the old Act where such permission became final more than three years before the commencement of this Act Provided further that in computing the period of three years the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded All these aspects were considered by the High Court
We recognise that unless the statute expressly prohibits as it did in the instant case by the aforesaid clause cautious recognition of subsequent events to mould the relief should be taken note of
In the instant case in substance the need was there of the landlord for his occupation of his own premises
The landlord was a Government servant and wanted to reside in Allahabad and for this purpose he sought eviction and had obtained an order of eviction prior to coming into operation of the new Act
The hope of the landlord to come back to his origin was not defeated by the provisions of the new Act
In vain he moved from court to court and in the meantime there has been escalation of prices and restrictions on alienation of land and in order to save himself from this situation the landlord tried to sell part of the premises in question 627 subsequent to the decree to the wife of one of the sons of the tenant
This is not material
The agreement in question further stipulated that the present need of the landlord subsisted and out of this agreement only Rs5000 was advanced in 1978 and nothing was paid thereafter
The agreement for sale to Smt
Madhu Soni reads as follows That it is made clear that the need of the vendor for the premises still subsists and this agreement is being entered into since it will be possible for the vendor to construct a house for himself on the land not agreed to be transferred measuring 121  x 1015 
The parties therefore have signed this Deed on the 7th day of November 1978 In view of the subsequent events namely non permission of the Urban Ceiling Authorities failure to register and execute the document delay for permission on the part of the vendee and the escalation of prices that is to say if in 1979 perhaps it was possible to build some kind of accommodation with the amount of sale price to be obtained from the execution of the document which it is not possible in 1987 and further there is no readiness or willingness on the part of the vendee to execute the document after the existence of the basic need of the landlord for which originally the proceedings were taken and finalised we do not find it possible to hold that subsequent events have so materially altered as to defeat the original order for possession passed in favour of the respondents
We do not find perusing the records that there was any failure for substitution on the part of the landlord to take steps
The other son of the deceased was not residing with the deceased in the premises in question therefore there was no need to substitute him
The other agreements to which reference had been made was the alleged agreement with RP Kanodia and PK Kanodia respectively
Nothing was proved before us that agreement is valid today or given effect to in view of the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act
It may be mentioned that the Competent Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling  Regulation Act 1976 by the order dated 20th of April 1979 refused permission to sell in favour of Smt
Madhu Soni
On 7th November 1978 the wife of the appellant and the landlord had entered into an agreement to sell a portion of the land as well as the house in dispute to the appellant s wife and for that purpose a sum of 628 Rs5000 had been paid as earnest money as mentioned hereinbefore A and in the agreement it was clearly stated that the parties would move the proper authorities as early as possible for permission to transfer the property and the sale deed would be executed within one month of the grant of such permission and notice to the vendee
Clause 6 of the agreement further stipulated that if the vendee failed to get the agreement executed after one month from the date of permission and notice to the vendee the earnest money of Rs5000 would be forfeited and the right of the vendor will be as it subsisted prior to the agreement
The requisite permission in terms of the agreement was obtained by the landlord in the year 1979 and a registered notice consequently was also sent to the appellant s wife requiring her to get the sale deed executed in accordance with the agreement
Thereafter a reply dated 2 1st September 1979 was also received by the landlord
However the appellant s wife failed to get the sale deed executed and consequently the agreement itself became infructuous and the earnest money stood forefeited
The need as it has been reiterated in the agreement of the landlord for his own purpose still subsisted
There was no delay in bringing the heirs of the deceased tenant on record
In the aforesaid view of the matter there was no substance in the objection filed against the execution of the order of eviction in terms of clause rr of section 432 of the new Act
In any event such events were frivolous after the order had become final
The subsequent events which we have examined do not in any way effect the decision of need for possession of the premises in question of the respondent landlord
It may be mentioned that there was an application by the respondent for the review
This was heard and no order was made on that application
It was reiterated in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that since 1st of December 1978 till todate the appellant had not paid any money to the landlord nor deposited the damages in the court
At the time of his death late HL Soni was residing in the house in dispute with his eldest son Shri DK Soni the appellant his wife Smt
Madhu Soni and Mrs Kailash Soni the widow
Other son Shri AK Soni and daughter Mrs Kangan Khanna were not residing with Late Shri HL Soni at the time of his death and as such they were not heirs as contemplated by section 3g of the new Act
The landlord was a Government servant and was posted at Lucknow and as such during his tenure he had to reside at Lucknow but after his retirement he wanted to settle down at his ancestral house at Allahabad and it was for this reason that the proceedings for eviction were taken
629 It was not proved to the satisfaction of the authorities below that any agreement to sell the premises to Kanodias has been given effect to and had been acted upon or can be acted upon
It that view of the matter the need indubitably succeeds and even if the allegations made are taken into consideration do not merit any revision of the order which had become final
Finality of the judicial decisions is one of the essential ingredients upon which the administration of justice must rest
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion even if the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents are taken into consideration and a new look is taken because of the subsequent events which in our opinion cannot be done in view of the specific prohibition in clause rr of section 432 of the new Act the appellant hac no case
In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in not interfering with the order of the Prescribed Authority
After all finality of the decisions of the authorities under the Act has to be given due reverence and place in the judicial administration
Taking cautious note of the relevant subsequent events we find no merit in the appellant s contentions inasmuch as there is nothing on record to show that the landlord s bona fide need for his residence in Allahabad has been met or can be met in the state of affairs except by the order which is impugned in this appeal
In the premises the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs
Since however the appellant has been staying in the disputed premises for quite some time we grant time till 30th of April 1988 to deliver vacant possession of the premises subject to filing usual undertaking within four weeks from today
In default in filing undertaking the order would become executable forthwith
SL Appeal dismissed


Summary:
 The State Government by a notification dated November 6 1961 issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notified for acquisition lands belonging to the respondent
This was followed by a declaration dated November 18 1965 under section 6 of the Act and the notices calling upon the respondent to put its claims for compensation in respect of the lands sought to be acquired
Thereafter no further action was taken in this behalf
In the meantime the lands in question were encroached upon by a large number of trespassers who put up slums thereon
The respondent repeatedly asked the State Government to take steps to remove the encroachments and expedite the making of the award and payment of the compensation but no action was taken by the Government
The respondent thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to make the award under section 11 of the Act and take possession of the lands after payment of the compensation to the respondent
On March 25 1981 the State Government passed an order under section 48 of the Act withdrawing the lands of the respondent from acquisition and the respondent was accordingly informed of that decision
The respondent thereupon amended its writ petition to challenge the withdrawal order above said as mala fide and to pray for the quashing of the same
The writ petition was allowed by a Single Judge of the High Court and his decision was affirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court
Aggrieved the State Government appealed to this Court against the decision of the High Court
Allowing the appeal the Court  HELD The High Court erred in striking down the order under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and compelling the State 591 Government to acquire the lands of the respondent
Under the scheme of the Act neither the notification under section 4 nor the declaration under section 6 nor the notice under section 9 is sufficient to divest the original owner of or other person interested in the land of his rights therein
Section 16 makes it clear beyond doubt that the title to the land vests in the Government only when possession is taken by the Government and till that point of time the land continues to be with the original owner and he is also free except where there is specific legislation to the contrary to deal with the land just as he likes
So long as the possession is not taken over the mere fact of a notification issued under section 4 or a declaration made under section 6 does not divest the owner of his rights in the land to take care of it and confer on the State Government any right whatsoever to interfere with the ownership of the land or safeguard the interests of the owner
Section 48 gives liberty to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition at any stage before the possession of the land is taken by it
By such withdrawal no irreparable prejudice is caused to the owner of the land and if at all the owner has suffered any damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in relation thereto he will be compensated therefor under section 482
As held in Trustees of Bai Smarth Jain Shvetamber Murtipujak Ganodhaya Trust and Ors
vs State of Gujarat and another AIR 1981 Gujarat 107 the State can be permitted to exercise its power of withdrawal unilaterally
Having regard to the scheme of the Act it is difficult to see why the State Government should at all be compelled to give any cogent reasons for its decision not to go ahead with the acquisition of any land as was the view of the High Court
It is well settled in the field of specific performance of contracts that no person will be compelled to acquire any land as a breach of a contract can always be compensated for by damages
That is also the principle of section 482 of the Act
594D H 595A D Even assuming that a withdrawal order under section 48 should be backed by reasons and should be bonafide in the present case the order is not vitiated in any manner
The Government had intended to acquire vacant land for the construction of houses but his land had been over run by slum dwellers to such an extent that it was not possible for the Government to effectuate the intended purpose of acquisition
The Government cannot be compelled to go ahead with the acquisition
Where slum dwellers on a large scale occupy pieces of land social and human problems of such a magnitude arise that it is virtually impossible for municipalities and no mean task for the Government to get the lands vacated and in view of these genuine difficulties if the Government is reluctant to go ahead with the acquisition it can hardly 592 be blamed
The Court sees no justification to direct the Government to embark upon such a venture to acquire the land
Section 24 of the acts lays down the rule that the State will generally speaking pay for the land only in the condition in which it was on the date of issue f the notification under sec 4 and that subsequent changes on the land will not be taken into account in the determination of the compensation
The fact that the Government exercised the power of withdrawal after the writ petition was filed does not spell mala fides once the existence of circumstances which justified the decision of the Government to withdraw is acknowledged
Far from a decision to withdraw in such a case being considered mala fide the Government would have been acting mala fide if despite the clear knowledge that the land could not be used for its purpose it had decided to go ahead with the acquisition
The State Government has definitely acted in the best interests of the public and public revenues and its decision could not be faulted
595D F H 596B F H Appeal allowed
Orders impugned of the High Court set aside
n Rules issued by the High Court discharged
597G Ms Majas Land Development Corpn
and another vs State of Maharashtra and others AIR 1983 Bombay 188 referred to