Appeal No 632 of 1962
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 5 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No 325 of 1957
GN Kunzru BC Misra PK Chakravarti and Om Prakash for the appellants
J P Goyal and SP Singh for the respondents
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court Dhavan J allowing the revision under section 115 CPC and dismissing the suit brought by the appellants hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs
The relevant facts for the purpose of appreciating the points raised before us are as follows The four plaintiffs out of which three are appellants before us the fourth having died brought a suit for damages against the six defendants one defendant had in the meantime died and four are respondents before us
The allegations in the plaint in brief were that the plaintiffs and the defendants were members of an association called Parsi Zoroastrian Anjuman that the defendants alongwith some other members of the association formed a group and each of them conspired among themselves to injure and harass the plaintiffs and a few others in various ways that at a meeting held on May 5 1954 in connection with the election of Trustees when defendant NA Guzder occupied the chair he gave a ruling that the plaintiffs Kershasp section Gandhi and BTJ Shapoorji since deceased were unfit candidates for the office of Trustees and thus prevented them from seeking election and contrary to the rules of the Anjuman and without taking votes declared the defendant FJ Gandhi and one AF Cama duly elected
It was further alleged that on 961 July 3 1954 another meeting of the Anjuman was held when the plaintiffs Khushro section Gandhi and Framroze section Gandhi were candidates for election to the office of the trustees and defendant FJ Gandhi gave a perverse ruling rejecting the nominations of the above plaintiffs and after taking votes declared GT Shappoorjee as duly elected trustee that by the aforesaid rejections the plaintiffs had suffered an injury for which defendants Nos
1 to 6 were jointly and severally liable and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages from the defendants
The plaint was filed on January 21 1955
Before any written statement was submitted on February 13 1955 the sixth defendant section Rabadi entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs
The terms of the compromise were 1
I Shavak Dorabjee Rabadi defendant No 6 have considered the subject matter of the suit and am sincerely sorry and apologise to the plaintiffs unconditionally for whatever I have done
I realise that I was m error and was misguided
The plaintiffs above named accept the apology tendered by Shri Shavak Dorabjee Rabadi defendant No 6 and the suit against him may be disposed of treating the aforesaid apology and its acceptance by the plaintiffs as a settlement of the dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant No 6 3
The plaintiffs do not claim any costs against the defendant No 6 and defendant No 6 will bear his own costs
It is therefore prayed that the claim against defendant No 6 may be disposed of in terms of the above settlement
 A decree was passed in terms of this compromise against defendant No 6
On May 14 1955 the other defendants filed a written statement and inter alia alleged That the release of defendant No 6 Sri section Rabadi an alleged joint tort feasor and the compromise entered into behind the back of the answering defendants with him in full settlement of their suit for damages appears to be collusive and dishonest and the release by the plaintiffs of defendant No 6 from his joint liability as a tort feasor has in law extinguished the plaintiffs  rights to sue the others remaining defendants and claim damage from them 962 It was further alleged that the four plaintiffs could not be legally allowed to totalise the sum of their individual damage alleged to have been suffered and thereby procure the trial of the suit in the court of higher jurisdiction and that the suit had been purposely over valued
In a statement dated March 17 1956 the plaintiffs clarified that the damages are being claimed by the plaintiffs in respect of all the facts mentioned in the plaint and particularly as a result of the facts that have been mentioned in paragraphs 17 and 19 the plaint and further that on account of all the facts complained of each plaintiff is entitled to claim Rs 10100 as damages but the plaintiffs have claimed only Rs 10100 and have given up rest of the claim
 Two of the issues framed by the Civil Judge may be set out Issue No 5
What is effect of the compromise between plaintiffs and defendant No 6 as against rights of the other defendants  Is the suit not maintainable against other defendants  Issue No 11
Is the court fee paid by the plaintiffs insufficient  By order dated September 18 1956 the Civil Judge held that the court fee paid by the plaintiffs was insufficient and that there was a deficiency of Rs 90512 in the court fee which the plaintiffs had to make good
The plaintiffs were given 15 days time to make good the deficiency
Instead of paying the money the plaintiffs applied under OVI r 17 CPC for amendment of the plaint
The plaintiffs stated in this application that they would in consideration of the order of the Court split the amount of Rs 10100 into two portions claiming Rs 5050 each in respect of the two separate incidents dated July 3 1955 and May 5 1955 respectively
The defendants filed an application contending that as the plaintiffs had failed to make good the deficiency in the court fee within the time given the plaint should be rejected in view of the provisions of the O VII r 11 CPC and section 6 UP Court Fees Act
By order dated November 28 1956 the Civil Judge allowed the plaintiffs  application for amendment on payment of Rs 30 as costs and also rejected the defendants  application
Against this order the defendants filed a revision
Dhavan J first dealt with the point whether the plaintiffs could renounce a part of the claim instead of making good the deficiency in court fee
He came to the conclusion that the suit contained four causes of action and that the plaintiffs had to pay court fee on four separate causes of action of the value of Rs 2525 each
As the learned counsel for the plaintiffs had 963 given an undertaking to make good any deficiency in court fee Dhavan J directed the plaintiffs to pay court fee on the four separate causes of action valued at Rs 2525 each
He also directed an amendment to be made in the plaint
The learned Judge felt that it would be in the interest of justice that the question covered by issue No 5 being one of law should be decided by him in the revision
It appears that the counsel for both parties conceded that the Court had power to decide the issue as the entire record was there although the learned for the plaintiffs felt that the decision should be left to the Trial Court
The learned counsel for the appellants contends before us that the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide issue No 5 in a revision
He says that the subject matter of the revision was the order of the Civil Judge dated November 28 1956 and the High Court could not decide any other point and convert itself into an original court
The learned counsel for the respondents tried to justify the decision regarding jurisdiction of the High Court under section 24 CPC
This section inter alia provides that the High Court may withdraw any suit appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it and try and dispose of the same
We are unable to appreciate how the order of the learned Judge can be justified under section 24
He has not purported to withdraw any suit and try the same
What he has done is to try an issue arising in a suit in a revision arising out of an interlocutory order
It seems to us that the High Court even if the parties conceded had no power to decide the issue
But if we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the case to the Civil Judge to try it according to law the Civil Judge would feel handicapped in deciding the case properly because he will feel bound to follow the opinion given by the learned Judge on issue No 5
Under the circumstances we heard arguments on the issue
Dhavan J following the English Common Law held that the decree against Rabadi was complete accord and satisfaction and the cause of action against all the defendants being one and indivisible the decree operated as a bar against further proceedings against the remaining joint wrong doers
Winfield on Tort 8th edn p 661 states the English Law thus The liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several each may be sued alone or jointly with some or all the others in one action each is liable for the whole damage and judgment obtained against all of them jointly may be executed in full against any one of them
At common law final judgment obtained against one 964 joint tort feasor released all the others even though it was wholly unsatisfied
This was established in Brinsmead vs Harrison1 and the reason put by Blackburn J was Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium
Kelly CB urged that if the rule were otherwise then in a second action the second jury might assess an amount different from that in the first action and the plaintiff would not know for which sum he should levy execution
The rule was abolished by the Law Reform Married Women and Tortfeasors Act 1935
It has long been settled that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all the others because the cause of action is one and indivisible
This rule has not been affected by the Act of 1935
It applies to a release under seal and to a release by way of accord and satisfaction and probably to nothing else
A mere covenant or agreement not to sue as distinguished from an actual release does not destroy the cause of action but merely prevents it from being enforced against the particular tortfeasor with whom it is made
 That was not the law in England in the beginning
The history of the law on this point is set out in William s Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence  p 35 footnote as follows In YB 1305 33 35 E 1 RS 7 it was apparently held that in trespass against four a verdict against two did not of itself prevent continuance against the other two
The verdict may not however have been embodied in a judgment
The former rule appears more clearly from YB 1342 16 E 3 1 RS 171 where judgment against one did not bar the action against the others
That the parties were joint tortfeasors appears plainly from the note from the record ibid 175 n 7
See also YBB E 3
7b pl 4 1412 13 H 14 H 422b 131
27 in the latter it is said that in trespass against two if one be condemned and the plaintiff has execution against him with satisfaction he shall be barred against the others thus implying that the mere judgment would not bar
Hickman vs Machin 1605 1 Ro
896 F 4 7 from which case however sub
Hickman vs Payns a different inference is drawn in Broome vs Wooton  1605 Yelv
67 The first discussion of the question in the Year Books is in YB 1441 M 20 H 6 11a pl 24 where X had first sued A B and C in trespass and 1 965 obtained judgment against A who alone appeared to the writ later X not having levied execution under this judgment sued B Paston and Fulthorpe expressed opinions that he was not barred by the first judgment but Newton CJ thought that he was
In YB 1495M 11 Ii 7
5b pl 23 Bro
Trespas 428 it was said that one can release one joint tortfeasor after judgment against another without affecting that other such a release would have been unnecessary if the judgment had discharged all other joint tortfeasors
Y BB
1474 T 14 E 4
6a pl 2 1475 T 15 E 4 26b pl 3
The rule was not settled in 1584 for it was then made a question whether even satisfaction following on judgment would discharge the others above 9 n2 and see Cocke vs Jennor nd Hob
66   where it was said that if joint tortfeasors be sued in several actions satisfaction by one would discharge the others it was not said that judgment against one would discharge The common law rule was first established by the case of Broome Brown vs Wootonx and the only reason given was that transit in rem judicatam
Goldrel Foucard  Sons vs Sinclair and Russian Chamber of Commerce in London2 Sargant L regarded the rule in Brinsmead vs Harrisona highly technical
The rule was changed in England by legislation vide The Law Reform Married Women and Tortfeasors Act Pt
II 25  26 Geo 5 c 30
Section 61a and b of that Act read as follows Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort whether a crime or not a judgment recovered against any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any other person who would if sued have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage b if more than one action is brought in respect of that damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered or for the benefit of the estate or of the wife husband parent or child of that person against tortfeasors liable in respect of the damage whether as joint tortfeasors or otherwise the sums recoverable under
the 1  2  192 3  966 judgments given in those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given and in any of those actions other than that in which judgment is first given the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action
 This provision has been adopted in other parts of the Commonwealth
Recently in Egger vs Viscount Chelmsford1 Lord Denning MR observed I cannot help thinking that the root of all the trouble is the tacit assumption that if one of the persons concerned in a joint publication is a tortfeasor then all are joint tortfeasors
They must therefore stand or fail together
So much so that the defence of one is the defence of all and the malice of one is the malice of all
I think this assumption rests on a fallacy
In point of law no tortfeasors can truly be described solely as joint tortfeasors
They are always several tortfeasors as well
In any joint tort the party injured has his choice of whom to sue
He can sue all of them together or any one or more of them separately
This has been the law for centuries
It is well stated in Serjeant Williams  celebrated notes to Saunders  Report 1845 ed of Cabell vs Vaughan  f g
I several persons jointly commit a tort the plaintiff has his election to sue all or any number of the parties because a tort is in its nature the separate act of each individual 
Therein lies the gist of the matter
Even in a joint tort the tort is the separate act of each individual
Each is severally answerable for it and being severally answerable each is severally entitled to his own defence
If he is himself innocent of malice he is entitled to the benefit of it
He is not to be dragged down with the guilty
No one is by our English law to be pronounced a wrongdoer or be made liable to be made to pay damages for a wrong unless he himself has done wrong or his agent or servant has done wrong and he is vicariously responsible for it
Save in the case where the principle respondent superior applies the law does not impute wrongdoing to a man who is in fact innocent 1  264
967 Gatley on Libel and Slander  Sixth Edition in a footnote at p 367 remarks regarding the approach of Lord Denning in Egger vs Chelmsford  1  His approach is also not easy to reconcile with the law on the release of joint tortfeasors
In the United States of America in an early decision Lovejoy vs Murray2 the United States Supreme Court refused to follow the English Common Law
Miller J speaking on behalf of the Court observed after referring to Broome Brown vs Wooten  3  and other cases The rule in that case has been defended on two grounds and on one or both of these it must be sustained if at all
The first of these is that the uncertain claim for damages before judgment has by the principle of transit in rem judicatam become merged into a judgment which is of a higher nature
This principle however can only be applicable to parties to the judgment for as to the other parties who may be liable it is not true that plaintiff has acquired a security of any higher nature than he had before
Nor has he as to them been in anywise benefited or advanced towards procuring satisfaction for his damages by such judgment
This is now generally admitted to be the true rule on this subject in cases of persons jointly and severally liable on contracts and no reason is perceived why joint trespassers should be placed in a better condition
As remarked by Lord Ellenborough in Drake vs Mitchell  A judgment recovered in any form of action is still but a security for the original cause of action until it be made productive in satisfaction to the party and therefore till then it can not operate to change any other collateral concurrent remedy which the party may have  The second ground on which the rule is defended is that by the judgment against one joint trespasser the title of the property concerned is vested in the defendant in that action and therefore no suit can afterwards be maintained by the former owner for the value of that property or for any injury done to it
This principle can have no application to trespassers against the person nor to injuries to property real or personal unaccompanied by conversion or change of 11965 1QBD248 2 18L ed
129132 132 134
3  968 possession
Nor is the principle admitted in regard to conversions of personal property
Prior to Brown vs Wootton Cro
73 the English doctrine seems to have been the other way as shown by Kent in his Commentaries 2 Kent Com 388 referring to Shepherd s Touchstone Title Gift and to Jenkins p 109 ease 88
We have already stated the only two principles upon which it rests
We apprehend that no sound jurist would attempt at this day to defend it solely on the ground of transit in rem judicatam
For while this principle as that other rule that no man shall be twice vexed for the same cause of action may well be applied in the case of a second suit against the same trespasser we do not perceive its force when applied to a suit brought for the first time against another trespasser in the same matter
But in all such cases what has the defendant in such second suit done to discharge himself from the obligation which the law imposes upon him to make compensation  His liability must remain in morals and on principle until he does this
The judgment against his co trespasser does not affect him so as to release him on any equitable consideration
It may be said that neither does the satisfaction by his co trespasser or a release to his co trespasser do this and that is true
But when the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury done him from whatever source it may come he is so far affected in equity and good conscience that the law will not permit him to recover again for the same damages
But it is not easy to see how he is so affected until he has received full satisfaction or that which the law must consider as such
We are therefore of opinion that nothing short of satisfaction or its equivalent can make good a plea of former judgment in trespass offered as a bar in an action against another joint trespasser who was not party to the first judgment In India the English Law has been generally followed
The learned counsel for the appellant relies on Ram Kumar Singh vs Ali Husain1
The facts in that case in brief were as follows
The plaintiff sued several defendants jointly to recover damages Rs 325  in respect of an alleged assault committed on him by 1 All 173 175 969 and accepted Rs 25 representing his proportionate share of damages
The High Court held The fact that one of several tortfeasors in the progress of a suit admits his liability  as well as that of the other defendants and agrees to pay a sum of money in satisfaction of his liability does not exonerate the other defendants who may be rouged responsible for the acts complained of from liability
In the case of Brinsmead vs Harrison1 one of the tort leasors was sued for damages for trover of a piano and damages were recovered as against him
In that case it was held that a suit against the other tortfeasor could not be sustained for the same cause of action notwithstanding the fact that the judgment already recovered remained unsatisfied
That is a very different case from the case before us
In the case before us all the tortfeasors were sued in one and the same suit and judgment was not recovered only against the party who had admitted his liability in the progress of the suit and had agreed to pay a sum of money in satisfaction of his liability
 This case was followed in Hat Krishna Lal vs Haji Qurban Ali2
But in these cases the decree was not passed first against the tortfeasor admitting liability
The learned counsel for the respondent relies on Makhanlal Lolaram vs Panchamal Sheoprasad5
It was held in that case that an accord and satisfaction in favour of one joint tortfeasor operates in favour of them all
 Vivian Bose AJC observed An accord and satisfaction in favour of one joint tortfeasor operates in favour of them all  9 QB 819 and   Odgers on Libel and Slander Edn 6 p 521 Ratanlal on Torts Edn 10 p 71
The basis of these decisions is that where the injury is one and indivisible it can give rise to but one cause of action
Consequently if satisfaction is accepted as full and complete and against one person it operates with respect to the entire cause of action
 In Shiva Sagar Lal vs Mata Din4 the facts as stated in the head note in brief were Plaintiff filed a suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution against five defendants of whom defendant 1 was a minor
It was alleged that the other defendants had instigated defendant 1 to make a complaint against 1 1871 72 LR7 CP 547
2 Luck
3 AIR 1934 Nag 226 227
4 AIR 1949 All
970 the plaintiff
Subsequently the plaintiff filed an application that there had been a settlement between him and defendant 1 and he had consequently released him
The application was allowed and defendant 1 was discharged
 Following Duck vs Mayeu1 it was held that the discharge  of defendant 1 amounted merely to a covenant not to sue him and not to a release of all the joint tortfeasors
The English Courts adopted this line of reasoning in order to soften the rigour of the common law but in the present case it cannot be said that the compromise amounted to a covenant not to sue as a decree was passed
It seems to us however that the rule of common law prior to Brown vs Wooton2 and the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court is more in consonance with equity justice and good conscience
In other words the plaintiff must have received full satisfaction or which the law must consider as such from a tortfeasor before the other joint tortfeasors can rely on accord and satisfaction
This rule would recognise that the liability of tortleasors is joint and several
What is full satisfaction will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case
For example the acceptance of Rs 25 in the case of Ram Kumar Singh vs
Ali Hussain3 would not be a case of full satisfaction
In this case an apology was received from the defendant Rabadi and accepted and embodied in a decree
This cannot be treated to be a full satisfaction for the tort alleged to have been committed by the respondents defendants
But this must be treated as an election on the part of the plaintiffs to pursue their several remedy against the defendant Rabadi
The learned counsel for the respondents urges that if a decree is passed against them for damages the defendant Rabadi who compromised would be liable to contribute in accordance with the rule laid down in Dharni Dhar vs Chandra Shekhar4 in which it was held that the rule in Merry weather vs Nixon5 did not apply in India
It is not necessary to decide whether the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court lays down the law correctly because even if it is assumed that this is the law in India it would not affect the rights of the plaintiffs  In the result the appeal is allowed the judgment and decree of the High Court set aside and the case remitted to the Trial Court
He shall dispose of the suit in accordance with this judgment and law
No order as to costs
VPS Appeal allowed
1 2  3 All 173 4 ILR 1952 1 All
759 FB


Summary:
A suit for damages was filed on the allegations that the plaintiffs and defendants were all members of an association and that the defendants committed a tort against the plaintiffs by conspiring and preventing the plaintiffs from being elected to the office of trustees of the association
One of the defendants tendered an unconditional apology which was accepted by the plaintiffs and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise
The other defendants thereafter filed written statements contending that the release of one of the defendants from his joint liability as a tort lessor extinguished the plaintiff s rights against the remaining defendants and raised questions regarding valuation and court fees
The trial court took up the issue regarding court fees held there was a deficiency and granted time to the plaintiffs to make good the deficiency
The plaintiffs instead applied for amendment of the plaint and the trial court allowed the application
The High Court in revision filed by the defendants gave appropriate directions regarding payment of court fee
The High Court also decided with the consent of both sides that the decree against one of the defendants namely the compromise decree was complete accord and satisfaction and that the cause of action against all the defendants being one and indivisible the decree operated as a bar against further proceedings against the remaining defendants
In appeal to this Court it was contended that the subject matter of revision before the High Court being only the order of the trial court regarding court fee the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide any other point
HELD 1 The High Court had no power to decide any other issue even if the parties had consented
The order of the High Court could not be justified under section 24 Civil Procedure Code because it was not a case of the High Court withdrawing the case to itself and trying the same
9 63 D E 2 The High Court having decided the question of maintainability of the suit against the
other defendants the trial court would feel handicapped if the matter were to be remitted to it
The appropriate procedure is for this Court to decide the question
963 E F 3 The rule which is in consonance with equity justice and good conscience and which also recognises that the liability of tort feasors is joint and several is that before the other joint tort feasors can rely on accord and satisfaction a plaintiff must have received full satisfaction or L6Sup
CI69 10 960 what the law must consider as such from one of the tort feasors
What is full satisfaction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
970 C E In the present case the apology which was embodied in a decree could not be treated as full satisfaction for the tort alleged to have been committed by the defendants
But it must be treated as an election on the part of the plaintiffs to pursue their several remedy against the defendant tendering the apology
970 E F Ram Kumar Singh vs Ali Husain All 173 Makhanlal Lolaram vs Panchamal Sheoprasad AIR  Har Krishna Lal vs Haji Qurban Ali Luck
284 and Shiva Sagar Lal vs Mata Din AIR 1949 All 105 and English and American Law referred to