ivil Appeal Nos 4711 and 4702 of 1985
From the Judgment and Order dated 1212
1983 of the Karnataka High Court in CRP No 3765 of 1981
Dr YS Chitale Rameshwar Nath Ravinder Nath and Sukumar Ghosh for the Appellants in CA Nos 4701 and 4702 of 1985
253 P chidambram SS Javali HR Anantha Krishna Murthy and Ranjit Kumar for the Respondents in CA Nos 4701 and 4702 of 1985
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA J
These appeals by special leave are by the tenant and the sub tenant against a decree for eviction passed on the grounds of sub letting and the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the respondent landlord specified in clauses f  h of the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 herein after called the Act 
The Trial Court had rejected the landlord s application
for an order of eviction on these grounds but the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act has set aside the Trial Court s order and passed the decree for eviction on these grounds
Hence these ap peals
The material facts are undisputed at this stage
The premises comprises of two shops and a house adjoining the shops and belonged earlier to one TA Jotindranath Mudali ar
The premises were let out by the original lessor to Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram Appellant in Civil Appeal No 470 1 of 1985 on 4101943 on terms contained in the letter dated 410
1943 from the original lessor to Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram which reads as under TA Jotindranath 933 Laxmipur Mudaliar
Mysore 4th October 43 To Messrs Boolchand Chandiram Silk Merchant Co Messrs Bhagwandas Shyam sunder  Co 112 Commercial Street Bangalore Cantt
Dear Sirs With reference to your letter dated 30th Sept 43 and your personal conversation about renting out my shops in 254 the Commercial Street Bangalore Cantonment it is agreed and confirmed that you are prepared to take the two shops at monthly rent of Rs430 Rs Four hundred and thirty only with two years agreement and three month s advance and execute the necessary rental Deed with the option of sub letting one of the shops
As for the House adjoining the shops at monthly rent of Rs50 Rs Fifty only with one month s advance and Eleven Month s rental Deed
You have the option of sub letting the house also
Yours sincerely sd TA Jotindernath Mudaliar Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram continued as a tenant in the premises and sometime in the year 1946 sublet one of the two shops to one Arts Palace 
Later wef
141948 the appellant Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram inducted another sub tenant Ms Super Dry Cleaners Appellant in Civil Appeal No 4702 of 1985 in place of Arts Palace in the same shop
In 1960 a partition took place in the Hindu Undivided Family of Mudaliar brothers the original lessor and the suit premises fell to the share of Narendranath Mudaliar
Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram continued in the premises as the tenant with Super Dry Cleaners as the sub tenant in one shop from 14
The original lessor including Narendranath Mudaliar after partition in the HUF of Mudaliar brothers continued to take rent from the tenant Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram of the entire premises ie two shops and the house adjoining the shops till May 1974
On 2861974 the said Narendranath Mudaliar executed a registered sale deed in favour of respondent No 1 Ms Kay Pee Cee Investments a registered partnership firm comprising of three ladies of one family as partners for the sale consideration of Rs 140000
It may be mentioned that in a proceeding for fixation of standard rent between the original lessor and the tenant monthly rent of Rs325 was fixed for the entire premises ie two shops and the house and the rent due upto May 1974 was paid by the tenant to the original lessor
After execution of the said sale deed in favour of respond ent No 1 the tenant attorned in favour of respondent No 1 and paid rent for the entire premises  Rs325 per month to respondent No 1
The suit premises comprises of Shop
Nos 44 and 45 New Nos 1  2 in commercial Street Bangalore Cantt
and House No 250 New No 22 Narain Pillai Street Cross
Admittedly the premises are 255 in a prestigious commercial locality of the city of Banga lore
Respondent No 1 landlord claims that the entire suit premises is reasonably and bona fide required by the land lord for its own business as agents of various textile mills for the purpose of opening a showroom for which it was purchased
It is also alleged that one of the shops was unlawfully sublet wef
141948 giving rise to the other ground of sub letting also for eviction
The respondent No 1 gave a notice on 3171975 terminating the appellant tenant s tenancy
Thereafter on 591975 a petition was filed by respondent No 1 for eviction of the appellant on the grounds of sub letting and bona fide need of the land lord under clauses f  h of the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961
As earlier stated the Trial Court dismissed the application but the High Court has set aside that order and passed a decree for eviction on both the grounds
The ground of sub letting is to be decided on the above undisputed facts on the basis of legality of the act of sub letting on 141948 in these circumstances
The ground of bona fide need of the landlord is to be decided on the basis of the evidence led which is entirely oral from both the sides with reference to the infirmity if any in the High Court s finding permitting interference therewith in these appeals
Dr YS Chitale learned counsel appearing for the appellant tenant assailed the High Court s findings on both these questions
Shri section Ghosh learned counsel appearing for the sub tenant adopted the arguments of Dr Chitale
Shri Chidambaram learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No 1 landlord has urged that there is no infirmity in the High Court s decision on both the questions to permit any interference in these appeals
We shall first take up the question relating to the landlord s reasonable and bona fide requirement which is a ground for eviction under clause h of the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Act
It may be recalled that the Trial Court had negatived the existence of this ground while the High Court reversing that conclusion has held it to be proved
The question before us is whether there is any infirmity in the High Court s reversal of this finding justifying interference in these appeals
Against the deci sion of the Trial Court the provision made in Section 50 of the Act is of a revision and not an appeal to the High Court
However the power of revision is not narrow as in section 115 CPC but wider requiring the High Court to examine the impugned order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding  which enables the High Court to pass such order in refer ence thereto as it thinks fit 
256 It is clear that the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to satisfy itself not only as to the legality of the impugned order or proceeding but also of its correctness
The power of the High Court therefore extends to correcting not merely errors of law but also errors of fact
In other words the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act is required to examine the correctness of not only findings on questions of law but also on questions of fact
It is significant that the revi sion provided is directly against the Trial Court s order and not after a provision of appeal on facts
All the same the power in revision under Section 50 of the Act cannot be equated with the power of the Appellate Court under Section 1072 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is the same as that of the original court and the revisional power under Section 50 of the Act even though wide as indicated must fall short of the Appellate Court s power of interference with a finding of fact where the finding of fact depends on the credibility of witnesses there being a conflict of oral evidence of the parties
It has therefore to be seen whether the High Court in the present case while reversing the Trial Court s finding on the question of landlord s reasonable and bone fide requirement of the suit premises exceeded its jurisdiction
Admittedly the only evidence led by the landlord for this purpose is oral comprising of the testimony of PW
I Dinesh the Power of Attorney holder of the landlord and son of one of the three ladies who were partners of that firm
The evidence in rebuttal is also oral comprising essentially of denial of the plaintiffs requirement
The credibility of the oral evidence adduced by the parties has to be assessed in the background of certain undisputed facts and circumstances
It is undisputed that the respondent No firm comprising of three partners all women belonging to a family of businessmen having textile business also was constituted in 1958 and the firm was registered in 1961 the power of attorney was given to PW 1 Dinesh son of one of the partners on 491970 the suit premises was purchased by the respondent No 1 firm in 1974 respondent No 1 firm has its business in one room on the third floor in a rented premises in Bangalore and it does not have any other premises for this purpose and PW 1 Dinesh is looking after the entire business of the respond ent No 1 firm as a duly constituted attorney
1 Thakur das Bhoolchand proprietor of Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram also admitted that the children of the ladies who were partners of the respondent No 1 firm are carrying on the business and that business is being carried on 257 in a premise at Sakalji Market Avenue Raod Bangalore which according to respondent No 1 is a rented accommodation
RW 1 has merely denied knowledge of the premises being taken on rent by respondent No 1
The question therefore is wheth er on these undisputed facts and circumstances the land lord s reasonable and bona fide need has been proved
The Trial Court in deciding against the landlord was influenced considerably by the fact that in support of the landlord s case no piece of documentary evidence is pro duced 
The Trial Court accepted that the family of the respondent No 1 carries on textile business but held it not proved that partition in the family has taken place to give rise to the requirement of respondent No 1 firm for the suit premises when the joint family owns other premises in Bangalore
According to the Trial Court the respondent No 1 firm is not a separate entity detached from the family
The Trial Court was obviously in error in being influenced by the absence of any documentary evidence to support the need set up by respondent No 1
There is no finding record ed by the Trial Court of the existence of any document which was material for deciding the question and it being in possession of the respondent No 1 had not been produced at the trial
In the absence of any such finding the effect of non production of any documentary evidence being put in scales against the landlord resulted in an infirmity permit ting the High Court to examine the correctness of the find ing even when it was based on the credibility of the oral evidence adduced by the parties
Similarly the suit prem ises belonging admittedly to the three ladies who were partners of the respondent No 1 firm and to no other member of the family to which those ladies belonged the premises if any belonging to other members of the family could not be taken into account for assessing the reasonable and bona fide need of the business of respondent No 1 firm
Since the three ladies constituting the respondent No 1 firm come from a family having textile business and for the purpose of the suit premises they being distinct from other members of the family with their separate business in a rented accommo dation in the same city the Trial Court s finding was vitiated by another infirmity when it failed to examine the need set up by respondent No 1 firm in the correct perspec tive
The High Court was therefore justified in re examin ing the correctness of the finding on this question correct ing both these errors which had vitiated the Trial Court s finding
These infirmities in the Trial Court s finding clearly show that the weight of the Trial Court s finding of fact in the present case was considerably reduced and the High Court in a revision under Section 50 of the Act was empowered to examine the cor 258 rectness of this finding after eliminating both the infirmi ties
It is obvious that the partners of the respondent No 1 firm belonging to a family already having large textile business would not purchase the suit premises in a presti gious commercial locality at Bangalore merely for earning the monthly rent of Rs325 after investing the amount of Rs 140000 in 1974 to acquire the business premises
This factor indicating the greater probability also has to be put in scales while assessing the landlord s bona fide require ment set up in the present case
Viewed in this manner the High Court s finding on this question based on the oral evidence adduced by the parties in the background of undis puted facts and circumstances of the case reaching the conclusion that the landlord s reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises for its own occupation is proved does not suffer from any infirmity which can justify interference therewith in these appeals
This alone is sufficient to affirm the decree for eviction passed against the appellants in these appeals
We shall now consider the other question relating to sub letting which is a ground for eviction specified in clause f of the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Act
The basic point for decision is whether the sub letting made by Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram to Ms Super Dry Cleaners of one shop which is a part of the suit premises wef 14 1948 was unlawful being contrary to any provi sion of law then in force
Considerable argument was ad vanced from both sides relating to the law then in force
We may here indicate that existence of the ground of sub let ting loses much of its significance on our above conclusion that the landlord s reasonable and bona fide need was right ly held proved by the High Court with the consequence that the decree for eviction can be sustained on that ground alone
The ground of sub letting however remains of prac tical significance only for the purpose of applicability of sub section 4 of Section 21 of the Act since that would be attracted only if the ground of sub letting also found proved by the High Court is not upheld herein
If however this ground also is upheld then the decree being passed even on this ground the further question of greater hard ship to the landlord or the tenant under Section 214 of the Act would not arise
It is for this reason that we consider it necessary to examine the question of subletting
The main controversy between the two sides on the ground of sub letting is whether a written consent of the landlord for sub letting was necessary on 141948 when the sub letting was made and if so 259 was there such a written consent given by the landlord The written consent of the landlord on which reliance is placed by the tenant as well as the sub tenant the appellants in these appeals is that contained in the above quoted letter dated 4101943 of the original lessor
Unless the written consent of the landlord contained in the above letter dated 4101943 can be held to be subsisting on 141948 when the sub letting was made in favour of Ms Super Dry Cleaners there  would admittedly be no written consent of the landlord to this subletting
There is no controversy in this respect
The first point for consideration therefore is whether the written consent of the landlord contained in the above quoted letter dated 4101943 can be treated as subsisting and available on 14
1948 when the subletting in question was in fact made
There is no case set up by the tenant and sub tenant of any implied consent of the original lessor or waiver of the ground of sub letting and therefore that question does not arise for consideration
The written consent of the landlord for sub letting on 141948 according to learned counsel for the appellants is to be found in the letter dated 4101943 of the original lessor
The consent of the landlord for sub letting is a question of fact
Such consent is an act of volition of the landlord and is not to be inferred from any statutory provi sion
The effect of the statute comes in if at all only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the landlord s consent can be treated as subsisting after lapse of the period for which it was expressly given
There being no compulsion on the landlord to give such consent it cannot ordinarily extend beyond the period for which alone it was expressly given
Admittedly the consent which was given by the original lessor in the present case is to be found only in the said letter dated 4101943
We must therefore see the consent given therein
The aforesaid letter dated 4101943 of the original lessor confirming the creation of the tenancy with effect from 4101943 stated that two shops were let out on a monthly rent of Rs430 for two years with the option of sub letting one of the shops and the house adjoining the shops was let out on a monthly rent of Rs50 for eleven months with the option of sub letting the house also
There is no dispute that subsequently in a proceeding for fixation of the standard rent the entire premises comprising of the two shops and the houses was treated as one premises and the monthly rent of Rs325 was fixed for the entire premises and this is how the tenancy was treated by both sides as one tenancy instead of two separate tenancies appearing in the 260 letter dated 4101943
The letter dated 4101943 created contractual tenancy for a period of two years in respect of the two shops and for a period of eleven months for the adjoining houses
Obviously the consent of the landlord for sub letting mentioned therein by giving the tenant the option of sub letting cannot therefore be construed as consent for a period beyond the period of the contractual tenancy which was only two years in respect of two shops
It would neither be reasonable nor appropriate to construe that the consent was given for any period after expiry of the period of contractual tenancy specified therein
There is nothing in the said letter dated 410
1943 10 suggest the continuance of the tenancy after the expiry of the specified period of contractual tenancy and therefore there could be no occasion to contemplate any consent for sub letting after expiry of the period of contractual tenancy of two years in respect of the two shops
This is the factual position emerging from the aforesaid letter dated 4101943 which alone is the basis of appellant s assertion that sub letting wef
141948 was with the written consent of the original lessor
Admittedly creation of the sub tenancy wef
141948 in respect of one of these shops was long after the expiry of the period of contractual tenancy of two years specifically mentioned in that letter
The question there fore is whether the landlord s consent given in the said letter dated 4101943 could be treated as subsisting for creation of a valid sub tenancy wef 14
1948 after the expiry of the period of contractual tenancy The argument of Dr Chitale learned counsel for the appellanttenant which has also been adopted by Shri Ghosh learned counsel for the appellant sub tenant is that on expiry of the contractual tenancy the tenant became a statutory tenant by virtue of the restriction on his evic tion except on one of the grounds for eviction provided in the statute and therefore all the terms and conditions of the contractual tenancy became the terms and conditions of the statutory tenancy
On this basis it was argued that the written consent of the landlord for sub letting during the period of the contractual tenancy continued to subsist as one of the terms and conditions of the statutory tenancy also
It was argued that for this reason even though the subletting was made wef
141948 after the period of the contractual tenancy yet it too must be deemed to be with the written consent of the landlord which was available during the period of the contractual tenancy
Dr Chitale also referred to the fact that the first sub letting in 1946 to Arts Palace of the same shop which was later sublet wef 14
1948 to Ms Super Dry Cleaners was also after expiry of the period of two years of the contractual tenan cy
This fact however is not 261 material in the present case since the first sub letting ended before commencement of the second sub letting on 14
1948 and it is only the validity of the subsisting sub letting wef 14
1948 which is in question in the present proceedings
Dr Chitale relied on a number of decisions of this court in support of his contention  that the written consent of the landlord for sub letting during the period of contractual tenancy continued as one of the terms and condi tions of the statutory tenancy when the sub letting was made wef 141948
In reply Shri Chidambram contended that the written consent of the landlord for sub letting is not one of the terms which ensures to the benefit of the tenant during subsistence of the statutory tenancy after expiry of the contractual tenancy
The decisions cited at the Bar on this point are Damadilal and Others vs Parashram and Others 1976 Supp
SCR 645 Y Dhanapal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal   Smt
Gian Devi Anand vs Jeevan Kumar and Others 1985 Supp 1 SCR 1 Mahabir Prasad Verma vs Dr Surinder Kaur   Ms Shalimar Tar Products Ltd vs HC sharma and Others   Shantilal Rampuria and Others vs Ms Vega Trading Corporation and Others   Ms Bajaj Auto Limited vs Behari Lal Kohli   Duli Chand Dead by Lrs
vs Jagmender Dass  and Tara Chand and Another vs Ram Prasad The decision in Damadilal s case supra and others in the same line related primarily to the question of heritable interest in the premises of the legal representatives of the deceased tenant who was in occupation as statutory tenant
Pointing out that the concept of statutory tenancy under the English Rent Acts and under Indian Statutes like the one with which we are concerned rests on different foundations it was held that the statutory tenant had a heritable inter est in the premises which was not merely a personal interest but an interest in the estate like that of a contractual tenant
On this conclusion the right of legal representa tives of the statutory tenant to protect the possession and prosecute the appeal against eviction order was upheld
The main question for decision in Damadilal s case supra was the heritable nature of the statutory tenancy and it was in this context that the terms and conditions of a statutory tenancy were held to be the same as those of the contractual tenancy preceding it
No question arose in Damadilal s case supra of the right of a statutory tenant to create a sub tenancy after replacement of the contractual tenancy with the statutory tenancy
The observations made and the deci sion rendered in Damadilal s case supra cannot therefore be construed as holding that a statutory tenant has a right to create a sub tenancy 262 during subsistence of statutory tenancy after expiry of the contractual tenancy when the Rent Acts give the same protec tion against eviction tO the tenant except on one or more of the specified grounds
Obviously the protection to the statutory tenant and the heritable nature of the statutory tenancy providing the same protection against eviction to the tenant s heirs does not further require conferral of the right of inducting a sub tenant which is not necessary for enjoyment of the tenancy and the protection against eviction given by the Rent Acts
There is no rationale for inferring or extending the landlord s written consent for sub letting beyond the period of contractual tenancy for which alone it is given
No separate discussion of the later decisions in the same line is necessary because of the same distinction in all of them
One decision which
requires specific mention and is obviously nearest on facts to the present case is Mahabir Prasad Verma vs Dr Surinder Kaur  In that case the contractual tenancy was for a period of one month from 14
1974 to 3041974 with the landlord s consent for sub letting
The tenant continued to occupy the premises even after expiry of the contractual tenancy on 3041974 and inducted therein a sub tenant
The landlord sued for eviction of the tenant on the ground of unlawful sub letting of the premises which was a ground for eviction under the relevant Rent Act
There was some dispute about the time of induction of the sub tenant it being claimed by the tenant that the induction of the sub tenant was in the month of April 1974 during subsistence of the contractual tenancy while the landlord contended that the sub letting was after the month of April 1974
It was found as a fact that the tenant had sublet in the month of April 1974 when the written consent of the landlord subsisted and not subsequent to it in May as claimed by the landlord
The crux of the question for decision therein was stated thus The crux of the question therefore is whether the sublet ting by the tenant with the written consent of landlord during the currency of the tenancy becomes unlawful and illegal on the determination of the tenancy and furnishes a ground for eviction within the meaning of section 132iie of the Act
 On the finding that the sub tenant had been inducted during the period of contractual tenancy on the basis of the writ ten consent for subletting given by the landlord the sub letting did not become unlawful merely because the contrac tual tenancy of the tenant came to an end and the protection against eviction to the tenant as a statutory tenant also 263 enured to the benefit of the lawful sub tenant recognised by the statute
It was held as under Subletting lawfully done with the written consent of the landlord does not become unlawful merely on the ground that the contractual tenancy has come to an end
Subletting to constitute a valid ground for eviction must be without the consent in writing of the landlord at the time when the tenant sub lets any portion to the sub tenant
A subletting by the tenant with the consent in writing of the landlord does not become unlawful on the expiry of the contractual tenancy of the tenant unless there is any fresh sub letting by the tenant without the written consent of the landlord Mere continuance in posses sion of a sub tenant lawfully inducted does not amount to any fresh or further sub letting
We are therefore satis fied that in the instant case the tenant has not sub let any portion without the written consent of the landlady after the commencement of the Act  
Mere continuance of possession by the subtenants lawfully inducted by the tenant with the written consent of the landlady contained in rent note does not afford any ground to the landlady for eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub letting as the tenant has not sub let after the commencement of the Act any por tion without the consent in writing of the landlady emphasis supplied Of all the decisions cited at the Bar this decision is admittedly nearest on facts to the present case with the only difference that the sub letting in the present case was after expiry of the contractual tenancy and after the com mencement of the Act prohibiting subletting without the written consent of the landlord when it was made on 141948 while the sub letting in Mahabir Prasad s case supra was during the period of contractual tenancy when the express written consent of the landlord for sub letting was available
The principle for application however is the same with the only difference in the result since in Mahabir Prasad s case supra the sub letting was made during subsistence of the contractual tenancy with the written consent of the landlord
It is significant that the judgment in Mahabir Prasad s case supra was by AN Sen J who also wrote the opinion in Gian Devi s case supra relied on by Dr Chitale as one of the decisions in line with Damadilal s case supra
It is clear that AN Sen J who wrote the 264 opinion of the Bench in Mahabir Prasad s case supra as well as in Gian Devi s case supra did not construe the earlier decisions starting with Damadilal s case supra in the manner read by Dr Chitale
If Dr Chitale is correct in his submission on this point then the entire emphasis in Mahabir Prasad s case supra on the sub letting being made during the period of contractual tenancy in April 1974 and not thereafter being decisive of the validity of sub letting was misplaced and a futile exercise
In our opinion this was not so and the correct premise is that landlord s written consent for sub letting during the period of contractual tenancy cannot be construed as his consent subsisting after expiry of the contractual tenancy
The submission of learned counsel for the appellants runs counter to the clear deci sion in Mahabir Prasad s case supra which in our opinion is in no way contrary to the decisions starting with Damadi lal s case supra the observations wherein are in the context of heritability of the statutory tenancy
In fact
it is rightly not even contended by Dr Chitale that the decision in Mahabir Prasad s case supra runs counter to Damadilall s case Supra and other decisions following them
This is sufficient to indicate that the appellants  conten tion is untenable
There is some controversy between the parties about the legislative history of the Rent Acts in the Bangalore Civil Station wherein the suit premises is located but an in depth consideration of that controversy is not necessary
The only question is whether on 141948 when the sub letting was made in favour of Ms Super Dry Cleaners the contractual tenancy giving written consent for sub letting having expired was the written consent of the landlord for sub letting necessary under the statute then in force It is sufficient to state that the Bangalore House Rent and Accom modation Control Act 1946 was brought into force wef 1101946 for a period of two years expiring on 110 1948
Later enactments were Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act 1951 and then Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 wef
31121961
The suit for eviction was filed in Sep tember 1975 on the grounds contained in clauses f and h of the proviso to sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Karna taka Rent Control Act 1961
in the Bangalore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act 1946 which applied at the time of sub letting in the present case on 141948 the provision for eviction of tenants was made in Section 9 thereof
Sub section 2 specifies the grounds on which a landlord was entitled to seek eviction of his tenant
One such ground in Sub section 2 is of sub letting and the relevant portion reads as under iii that the tenant has after the commencement of this 265 Law without the written consent of this landlord 
a sub let the entire building or any portion thereof or  It is therefore clear that the written consent of the landlord for sub letting was necessary under the relevant statute applicable on 14
1948 when the sub letting was made in the present case
In fact
this requirement of written consent of the landlord was the basis on which both sides argued the case and the main thrust of Dr Chitale s argument was that such a written consent was to be found in the letter dated 4101943 of the original lessor
We have earlier indicated that the landlord s consent in the afore said letter dated 4101943 was not available on 141948 after expiry of the contractual tenancy
The rest is only a logical corollary to this conclusion leading to the inevita ble result that induction of the sub tenant Ms
Super Dry Cleaners wef 141948 by the tenant Ms Bhoolchand Chandiram was unlawful being made contrary to the provision of law then in force which constitutes the ground for evic tion contained in clause f of Sub section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961
There is thus no ground to differ with the conclusion reached by the High Court that the ground of sub letting has been made out even though our reasons are different
On the above conclusion that the ground of sub letting also was rightly held proved by the High Court in addition to the ground of landlord s reasonable and bona fide re quirement the question of applicability of Sub section 4 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act 1961 does not arise and therefore it is not necessary to examine the question of comparative hardship
In that view of the mat ter the appeals must fail
Consequently both the appeals are dismissed
In view of the fact that the appellants are carrying on their business in the suit premises for a long time and will therefore need some reasonable time to shift to some other place we grant to the appellants time till 3131991 for vacating the suit premises and delivering vacant possession thereof to the landlord respondent No 1 subject to undertaking in the usual terms being filed by the appellants within a period of four weeks
No costs
Y Lal Appeals dis missed


Summary:
A group of Block Level Extension Officers rendered surplus in their parent department were appointed as Sales Tax Inspectors Class III Executive posts in the respond ent State between 13th February 1967 and 28th September 1970
By an order dated 29th March 1967 they were exempted from the requirement of going through competitive examina tion for the purpose of absorption
By memorandum dated 22nd May 1967 it was provided that seniority of surplus Class III ministerial employees of the development blocks on their absorption in other departments shall be determined with regard to the completed years of service counted for fixa tion of initial pay
By a subsequent memorandum dated 8th November 1967 this facility was also extended to employees absorbed in Class III executive posts
Another order issued on 19th July 1973 on the subject maintained the provision with regard to seniority as contained in the memorandum dated 22nd May 1967
Subsequently these Sales Tax Inspec tors were made permanent to that post retrospectively with effect from 31st March 1967 by an order dated 15th Febru ary 1980
In the combined seniority list prepared accord ingly some of the directly recruited Sales Tax Inspectors were shown junior to the absorbed Sales Tax Inspectors
On cross petitions being filed by the existing Sales Tax Inspectors and the absorbed Sales Tax Inspectors assailing the seniority list the High Court quashed the order dated 15th February 1980 and seniority was directed to be fixed in accordance with the Recruitment Rules and general condi tions of Service Rules
In these appeals by special leave it was contended for the existing Inspectors that the absorbed Inspectors could not be confirmed on 15th February 1980 retrospectively with effect from a presumed date namely 31st March 1967 that the determination of seniority taking 155 confirmation as the basis was erroneous as they were enti tled to have the entire period between their actual appoint ment and confirmation taken into consideration and that the appointment of the absorbed Inspectors was illegal having been made not in conformity with the relevant rules and without the recommendations of the Public Service Commis sion
For the absorbed Inspectors it was contended that since they had been working in another department of the State Government from various dates between 13th November 1956 and the actual date of their absorption they were entitled to have the entire period of their service in that department taken into consideration and the fixation of their seniority on the basis of their having been confirmed from the presumed date of 31st March 1967 was erroneous that none of the rules relied on by the existing Inspectors was applicable to them and that it was the executive in structions issued in this behalf particularly dated 29th March 1967 22nd May 1967 8th November 1967 which ap plied to their absorption
Allowing the appeals the Court HELD 1
The order of the State Government dated 15th February 1980 giving retrospective confirmation to the absorbed Sales tax Inspectors from a presumed date and determination of inter se seniority on the basis of the dates of confirmation was valid
159H 21 Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule his seniority shall be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirma tion
His transfer to the same or an equivalent post in another Government department cannot wipe out his pre exist ing length of service in the parent department
162D 164G Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers  Associa tion vs State of Maharashtra  Ors   Wing Commander J Kurnar vs Union of India  Ors  and K Madhavan  Anr
vs Union of India  Ors
  referred to
22 It is however perfectly within the power of the Government to have a rationalisation of the entire situation and determine with objectivity and fairness what rules should govern the inter se seniority and ranking of the personnel working in the concerned department
The Courts will only insist that the rules so formulated should be reasonable just and equitable
165E 166E RS Makashi vs IM Menon   KC Vasudeva 156 SG Jai Singhghani vs Union of India   referred to 23 In the instant case if the period between the dates of appointment and confirmation of the existing Inspectors was counted for fixing their seniority but the period during which absorbed Inspectors worked in their parent department was ignored the former would have obviously been placed on a more advantageous position but only to the prejudice of the latter as it would have amounted to sacrificing their interest
If on the other hand the periods of continuous service of both the sets of Inspectors was taken into ac count it would have resulted in granting benefit to the absorbed Inspectors at the cost of existing ones and presum ably including those who had already been promoted as As sistant Sales Tax Officers even prior to 22nd May 1967 inasmuch as the period during which they had served in their parent department was much longer than the period of offici ation of existing Inspectors
This was the situation with which the State Government was faced and it was its duty to evolve some policy or equitable formula which did justice as far as possible to the competing claims of both the sets of officers
The decision taken by the Government in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case could not be said to be either arbitrary or discriminatory
No statutory rule has been brought to Court s notice which could run counter to it
165H 166A D 3
The services of the absorbed Inspectors have not been shown to have ever been factually terminated in their parent department
Again though the nature of appointment of these officers in the Sales Tax Department was temporary they were allowed to uninterruptedly continue to hold the said post and were subsequently not only confirmed on that post but were also given ad hoc promotion as Assistant Sales Tax Officers
Furthermore no relief for the quashing of their appointment was sought for by the direct recruits before the High Court nor was any such relief pressed there
In fact even the fixation of their pay as Inspectors consequent upon their absorption which was done in accordance with the executive instructions does not seem to have been ever challenged
The validity of their appointment in the Sales Tax Department therefore could not be assailed
160G