110 of 1959
Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights
BR L Iyengar and Shankar Anand for the petitioners
M C Setalvad Attorney General for India B SenR Gopalakrishnan R H Dhebar and T M Sen for the respondents
March 7
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
The petitioner is a co operative society duly registered and it carries on the business of plying motor buses as stage carriages on the public highways in the State of Bombay
Its case in this petition is that it has been deprived of its right to carry on this business and has also been subjected to discriminatory treatment in the matter of the grant of permits to run its buses
It complains of the infringement of its fundamental rights under articles 191g and 14 of the Constitution
The questions raised in this matter turn on some of the provisions of the  as amended by Act 100 of 1956
These provisions have to be examined before proceeding to discuss the questions that arise
We are concerned only with Chapters IV and IVA of the Act
Chapter IV comprises sections 42 to 68 and Chapter IVA which was in its entirety introduced by the amending Act consists of sections 68A to 681
Taking Chapter IV first we find that section 421 provides that no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted under the Act
A  transport vehicle  is defined in section 233 as a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle
Clause a of sub sec
3 of section 42 as it originally stood 180 provided that sub sec
1 of that section would not apply to any transport vehicle owned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government other than a vehicle used in connection with the business of a railway
So under it the Government could ply stage carriages on
the public highways without having to obtain permits in respect of them
The amending Act of 1956 substituted a new clause a in section 423 for the old clause
The new cl
a provides that sub sec
1 shall not apply to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise
Since the amendment therefore the Government cannot run stage carriages on the public highways without a permit just as a private owner of stage carriages cannot do because such use of the vehicles will not be for a purpose unconnected with a commercial enterprise
Section 44 authorises a State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Trans port Authorities for different areas in that State to carry out the duties specified
Section 45 provides that every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle
Section 47 specifies the matters to which a Regional Transport Authority shall have regard in considering an application for the grant of a permit
We now come to Chapter IVA
Section 68Ab defines a  State transport undertaking  for the purpose of the Chapter to mean an undertaking providing road transport service carried on among others by a State Government
Section 68B provides that the provisions of Chapter IVA shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV
Section 68C is in these terms 68C Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient adequate economical and properly coordinated road transport service it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof 181 should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking whether to the exclusion complete or partial of other persons or otherwise the State  transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government May direct
Section 68D provides for the preferring of objections to the scheme published under section 68C consideration of such objections and final approval of the scheme by the State Government
The terms of section 68F1 are as follows  S68F 1 Where in pursuance of an approved scheme any State transport undertaking applies in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier s permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route the Regional Transport Authority shall issue such permit to the State transport under
taking notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV
The respondents to this petition are 1 The Regional Transport Authority Aurangabad 2 The State Transport Authority Bombay 3 The Divisional Controller of State Transport Marathwada and 4 The State of Bombay
Aurangabad and Maratliwada are both in the State of Bombay
The first and second respondents are the authorities set up under section 44 of the Act by the Government of Bombay
It is the duty of the first respondent to consider applications for and to grant permits for stage carriages to be plied in Aurangabad region and the second respondent hears appeals from the decisions of the first respondent
The third respondent is the head of a department of the Government of the State of Bombay and is in charge of public transport work in Marathwada
It appears that the petitioner had permits to run buses on four routes in Aurangabad and that these 182 permits were due to expire on October 1 1958
The third respondent who really represents the Government of the State of Bombay and who may be conveniently referred to as the State of Bombay had permits for two of these routes
On May 19 1958 the State of Bombay applied for permits for all these four routes under Chapter IV of the Act
On May 27 1958 the petitioner applied for renewal of its existing permits
The first respondent rejected the application of the petitioner and granted those of the State of Bombay
The petitioner appealed to the second respondent but its appeal was rejected
In the meantime on some date which does not appear on the record the petitioner had been granted temporary permits up to December 31 1958
On the expire of its temporary permits on December 31 1958 the petitioner would have been unable to run any of its buses and it therefore moved the High Court at Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court quashed the orders of respondents Nos 1 and 2 and directed the applications of the petitioner and the State of Bombay for the permits to be reconsidered
With the reasons of this order of the High Court we are not concerned
Respondent No 1 however without reconsidering the applications as directed by the High Court granted temporary permits to the State of Bombay
The petitioner again moved the High Court which thereupon quashed the order of respondent No 1 granting temporary permits to the State of Bombay
Thereafter on March 20 1959 the respondent No 1 granted temporary permits to the petitioner which were later extended to July 20 1959
On June 1 1959 the State of Bombay publish ed a scheme under section 68C in Chapter IVA of the Act
Various objections were filed against the scheme and nothing further appears to have been done to make the scheme final
On July 18 1959 respondent No 1 purporting to carry out the directions of the High Court reconsidered the petitioner s applications for renewal and the applications of the State of Bombay for permits and rejected the petitioner s applications while allowing those of the State of Bombay
On July 20 1959 the petitioner s temporary permits 183 having expired it ceased to operate its buses
On August 27 1959 the petitioner filed the present petition in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution for  appropriate writs quashing the order of respondent No 1 dated July 18 1959 restraining the State of Bombay from applying for permits save under the provisions of Chapter IVA and respondent No 1 from entertaining any application by the State of Bombay under Chapter IV and directing respondent No 1 to hear the petitioner s applications for permits according to law
Various grounds have been advanced in support of the petition and these will now be discussed
The petitioner first contends that in view of chapter IV A the State of Bombay bad no right to apply for permits under Chapter IV of the Act as it had done
It says that the order of the first respondent granting permits to the State of Bombay Under chapter IV was therefore illegal and affected its fundamental rights under article 191 g
The first question then is whether the State of Bombay was entitled to apply for permits under Chapter IV
The petitioner says that special provisions having been made in Chapter IVA to enable the Government to run its buses the Government s right to run buses was restricted to those provisions and the Government was not entitled to resort to the other provisions of the Act
In support of this con tention reference was made to the case of Nazir Ahmad vs King Emperor1 where it was observed that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all But this principle can apply only where one power is given and has no application where more powers than one are conferred
If a statute contains provisions giving more than one power then the rule cannot be applied so as to take away the powers conferred by anyone of these provisions
As pointed out in Taylor vs Taylor2  referred to by the judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad s case 1 When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a Court and the mode of exercising it is pointed out it means that no other mode is to be adopted
 1 1936 LR 63 IA 372
2 1876  431
184 Now the position here is different
The Government has of course the power to do any business it likes and therefore the business of running stage carriages
We have earlier drawn attention to the change made in cl a of section 423 by the amendment of 1956
Previously it was not necessary for the Government to obtain permits under section 421 for buses that it intended to run as stage carriages
Since the amendment the Government can no longer run transport vehicles for commercial purposes without obtaining permits unders421
Now the plying of buses as stage carriages is a commercial enterprise and for such buses therefore under the sections as they stand the Government would require permits as any one else
That being so the sections clearly contemplate that the Government may apply for and obtain permits for its buses run as stage carriages
The rule applied in Nazir Ahmad s case 1 does not permit the ordinary meaning of section 42 sub section
1 and sub section
3 cl
 a to be cut down because of the provisions of Chapter IVA
The Act lays down two independent sets of provisions in regard to the running of buses by the Government one under Chapter IV and the other under Chapter IVA
Chapter IVA was intended to give the Government a special advantage
When the Government chooses to proceed under that chapter it becomes entitled as a matter of right under section 68F 1 to the necessary permits
Under Chapter IV the Government does not have any such advantage it has to compete with other applicants to secure permits to be able to run its buses
The powers under the two Chapters are therefore difference To such a case the principle of Nazir Ahmad s case 1 cannot be applied
The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the maxim expression units est exclusio alterius and contended that since the Act by Chapter IVA provided that the Government would be entitled to run buses under a scheme it impliedly prohibited the running of buses by the Government otherwise
It does not seem to us that this maxim carries the matter further
It is a maxim for ascertaining the 1 1936 LR 63 IA 372 381 185 intention of the legislature
Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear there is no scope for applying the rule
Section 423 a appears to us to be perfectly plain in its terms
It contemplates that the Government has to apply for permits under section 421 to run buses as a commercial enterprise
That being so the maxim cannot be resorted to for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and implying a prohibition against the Government applying for permits under Chapter IV
The learned counsel then referred to the case of Viscounts Rhondda s claim 1 where it was observed at p 365 that The words of the statute are to be construed so as to ascertain the mind of the Legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used and in so construing them the existing state of the law the mischiefs to be remedied and the defects to be amended may legitimately be looked at together with the general scheme of the Act
 His point is that Chapter IVA was introduced by the amendment of 1956 to meet the observations made in Moti Lal vs Government of Uttar Pradesh 2  and some other cases that section 423a was discriminatory in that it exempted the Government from the requirement of a permit and was hence void as offending article 14 of the Constitution
It is said that Chapter IVA must therefore be construed as containing the only provisions enabling the Government to run a stage carriage
It is difficult to appreciate this contention
The observations in the cases referred to had been made in regard to cl
a of section 423 as it stood before its amendment in 1956
That section has been amended and as it now stands it is not discriminatory
The evil pointed out no more exists and no question of reading the Act keeping in view that evil of discrimination arises
We find nothing in Moti Lal s case 2 or any other case which points to an evil nor has the learned counsel drawn our attention to any which the Act can be said to have intended to remedy
We therefore find no justification for reading Chapter IVA as containing 1 2 1951 1 ILR AU
24 186 the only provisions under which the Government can ply stage carriages
It is next said section 42 contemplates the owner of a transport vehicle obtaining a permit and a State transport undertaking cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV as it cannot be suchowner
But here we are not concerned with a State transport undertaking for that comes into existence for the purposes of Chapter IVA and that Chapter has not been resorted to by the Government yet
Here the Government applied for the permits under Chapter IV
The Government can of course be the owner of transport vehicles
We have earlier said that in view of cl
a of section 423 the Government has to apply for permits under section 421 as any other owner
Therefore the Act contemplates the Government as owner of transport vehicles
Further under section 68A a State transport undertaking  has been defined as an under taking providing road transport service carried on by a state Government
Such an undertaking is really a department of a Government and in order to be able to provide transport service it must be able to own transport vehicles
In fact section 68F1 requires the State transport undertaking to apply for permits under Chapter IV and therefore contemplates it as an owner of a transport vehicle for the purposes of section 42 which is contained in that Chapter
The learned counsel then referred to the concluding portion of section 471 which makes it incumbent on the authority considering applications for permits to take into consideration the representations made by the persons therein mentioned
He said that the persons there mentioned did not include the Government and therefore the intention is clear that applications for permits by the Government were not intended to be considered under section 47 and if Government could not come under s 47 it could not come under Chapter IV at all
But assume that representations by the Government are not contemplated by section 47
That does not show that applications for permits by the Government are also not contemplated by that section
It is also said that the matters to which the authority granting the permits is required to have regard in 187 considering applications for permits under section 47 are such that if the State enters into competition with citizens for the grant of permits the State must necessarily get them
Therefore it is said that it could not have been intended that the State would compete with the citizens in the matter of obtaining permits under Chapter IV
We are unable to assent to this contention
There is nothing in section 47 which leads to the conclusion that whenever the Government applies along with private citizens for permits the Government must get them
Indeed if that were so then it would not have been necessary to provide by section 68F 1 that when the Government that is its State transport undertaking applied in pursuance of an approved scheme for a permit the authority concerned would be bound to grant such permit
Section 68F 1 clearly contemplates that without the provision made therein it may so happen that the authority acting under section 47 may think it fit to grant the permit to a private operator in preference to the Government
It also seems to us that there is nothing in our law to prevent the Government from entering a business in competition with private citizens
Indeed article 196 by providing that nothing in article 191g shall affect the application of any existing law in so far as it relates to or prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade business industry or service whether to the exclusion complete or partial of citizens or otherwise would seem to indicate that the State may carry on any business either as a monopoly complete or partial or in competition with any citizen and that would not have the effect of infringing any fundamental rights of such citizen
Our attention was then drawn to the proviso to section 471 under which other thing being equal a cooperative society is entitled to preference over individual owners in the matter of grants of permits
It is said that the Government is not an individual owner and therefore it is not contemplated as an applicant for a permit under section 47
It seems to us that if the Government is not an individual owner as to which we are not called upon to say anything it does not 188 follow that section does not contemplate the Government as an applicant for permit
If Government is not an individual owner then all that will happen in view of the proviso to section 471 will be that a co operative society will not be able to claim any preference over the Government
All that the proviso does is to give a co operative society a preference over individual owners
It is not concerned with stating who can apply for permits
It seems to us therefore that the petitioner s contention that the Government cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV of the Act is unsustainable
The petitioner cannot complain of the Government having applied under that Chapter
We are not called upon therefore to discuss the further question whether any fundamental right of the petitioner under article 191g would have been affected by the Government having applied for and obtained permits under Chapter IV without having the right to do so
This disposes of the contentions concerning the infringement of the peti tioner s fundamental rights under article 191g of the Constitution
We will now consider the question of the violation of article 14 of the Constitution
The first contention in this regard was based on the proviso to section 471
It is said that in the circumstances of this case as a cooperative society the petitioner was entitled to preference over the Government considered as an individual owner and had not been given that preference
It is contended that respondent No 1 relying on various promises made by the State of Bombay to repair roads and to give other facilities to the traveling public had held that the other conditions were not equal while under the proviso it was entitled to rely only on the existing conditions
It is contended that thereby the provisions of article 14 had been infringed
This contention is in our view clearly untenable
The decision of respondent No 1 may have been right or wrong and as to that we say nothing but we are unable to see that decision offends article 14 or any other fundamental right of the petitioner
The respondent No 1 was acting as a quasi judicial body and if it has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate 189 remedies available to the petitioner for obtaining relief
It cannot complain of a breach of Art 14
The other contention of the petitioner is that if Chapter IV permits the State to compete with a private citizen it offends article 14 because in view of the vast resources of the State a private citizen is bound to lose in such competition
This point is clearly unfounded
Article 196 as it now stands contemplates such a competition as we have earlier pointed out
The petitioner can base no grievance on such competition
For these reasons we think that this petition must fail and hence it is dismissed with costs
Petition dismissed


Summary:
These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of jagirs and Land Reforms Act I952 XI Of 1952
Applications were made before the judicial Commissioner under article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that various provisions of the Act placed unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
The judicial Commissioner held that the Act excepting section 221 section 37 and cl
4e of the Schedule to the Act was constitutionally valid
The State appealed against that part of the order which declared the three provisions unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional
Held that the appeal of the State must be allowed and that of the petitioner dismissed
It was not correct to say that section 22 of the Act which lays down the scheme for giving effect to section 7a of the Act which permits the jagirdars to remain in possession of certain lands even after the abolition of their jagirs is a piece of colourable legislation and therefore ultra vires the Legislature
That section cannot be said to discriminate as between jagirdars on the one hand and other occupants of land to whom section 281 applies on the other since they belong to distinct and different classes
107 Even assuming that they belong to the same class and section 22 is discriminatory that section is protected by article 31A of the Constitution
The question as to colourable legislation  is really one relating to legislative competency and there can be no doubt that the Vindhya Pradesh Legislature was perfectly competent to enact the impugned provisions under Entry 18 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
K C Gajapati Narayan Deo vs The State of Orissa
1954 SCR i and Raghubir Singh vs The State of Ajmer Now Rajasthan
1959 SuPP1
1 SCR 478 relied on
There was no substance in the contention that section 37 of the Act is repugnant to section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently ultra vires the State Legislature
The Vindaya Pradesh Legislature had undoubtedly the power under Entry 3 List II of the Seventh Schedule to make a provision like section 37 Of the Act and once it did so the last part of section 9 of the Code would apply and the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be barred by section 9 of the Code read with section 37 of the Act
Nor was it correct to say that cl
4e of the Schedule deprives the jagirdar of his proprietory interest without compensation
Although he may have to pay rent for the land remaining with him no revenue for such land was any longer payable by him and the revenue is taken into account in assessing compensation
The entire Act therefore falls within the protection of article 31A of the Constitution and in view of the decisions of this Court its constitutional validity is beyond question
Case law referred to