iminal Appeal No 19 of 1957
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 7 1956 of the former PEPSU High Court in Criminal Revision No 45 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated February 22 1956 of the Additional Sessions Judge Patiala in Criminal Appeal No 17536 of 1955 56
Pritam Singh Safe for the appellant
N section Bindra and T M Sen for the respondent
April 21
The Judgment of the Court was deliveredby KAPUR J
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of PEPSU passed in revision 
The appellant was a sub Inspector of Police who at the relevant time was the Station House Officer in charge Shehna police station in the erstwhile PEPSU State
He was convicted under section 193 Indian Penal Code by a First Class Magistrate and his appeal to the Sessions Judge Patiala was dismissed except as to sentence
He took a revision to the PEPSU High Court but that was also dismissed
This appeal has arisen in the following circumstances One Surjit Singh so Risaldar Waryam Singh was arrested on September 25 1953 at Barnala in PEPSU State by the Police Inspector Jaswant Singh
He was kept in the lock up at Barnala and on the following day his custody was handed over to the appellant and he was taken to Shehna and was kept in custody it 729 is not clear under what section in the police station lock up at Shehna
Surjit Singh was there kept in custody from September 26 1953 till October 10 1953 when at about 10 pm he was surreptitiously removed to Police Station Dialpur and then to Police Post Hamirgarh and from there was taken to Police Station Baga Purana in Ferozepur District of the then Punjab
An application under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under article 226 of the Constitution was made for a writ of Habeas Corpus and Mandamus in the High Court of PEPSU
In that petition it was alleged that Surjit Singh was being kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made and without obtaining a remand by a Magistrate
In reply to this an affidavit dated October 13 1953 was filed by the appel
lant in which he stated that Surjit Singh had association with notorious dacoits that he the appellant had never taken him into custody at any time that the said Surjit Singh was absconding and had not been arrested in spite of the best efforts of the police that at the time of the making of the affidavit he was not in the appellant s custody and that it was incorrect that Inspector Jaswant Singh had ever entrusted Surjit Singh to his appellant s custody
He also stated that no petition had been brought to him nor had he received any telegram in connection with the custody of Surjit Singh
This affidavit was affirmed as follows  I solemnly affirm that the facts stated from paras Nos
I to 7 are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and nothing which is relevant to this case has been kept back from this Hon ble Court 
As both the parties admitted before the High Court that Surjit Singh was not in the custody of the appellant the petition was dismissed
On November 9 1953 the brother of Surjit Singh made an application under section 476 Criminal Procedure Code for the prosecution of Inspector Jaswant Singh and the appellant for perjury under section 193 Indian Penal Code in that they had filed false affidavits
This matter was heard by another learned Judge of that Court who ordered the 92 730 prosecution of the appellant and directed the Registrar of the High Court to file a complaint which was filed
The complaint was taken cognizance of by the First Class Magistrate at Patiala who convicted the appellant and sentenced him to nine months  imprisonment and a fine of Rs 300 and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months
The appellant took an appeal to the Sessions Judge Patiala who confirmed the order of conviction but reduced the sentence to one of three months  simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs 50 and in default one month s simple imprisonment a revision against this order was dismissed in limine by the Chief Justice although he gave reasons for dismissing it
The appellant then obtained special leave from this Court
On behalf of the appellant the first contention raised was that the appellant was not bound to file an affidavit and therefore he could not be convicted under section 193 Indian Penal Code because his case did not fall under section 191 Indian Penal Code
In support of his contention he relied upon the Rules of the PEPSU High Court framed for the purpose of proceedings under article 226 and section 4912 Criminal Procedure Code for the issuing of writs of Habeas Corpus
He also referred to the Rules made by that Court for the issuing of writs of Mandamus Prohibition Quo Warranto and Certiorari under article 226 and submitted that there was no Rule in the former ie for writ of Habeas Corpus requiring a return to be made on behalf of the res pondent to be sup ported by an affidavit whereas in the latter ie issuing of writs of Mandamus etc
an affidavit was necessary and therefore it was submitted that section 191 was inapplicable
Rule 2 of the Rules of the Court required that when a Judge was of the opinion that prima facie case had been made out for granting the application a rule nisi was to issue calling upon the person or persons against whom the order was sought to appear before the Court and to show cause why such an order should not be made
As has been pointed out in Greene vs Home Secretary 1 which was a case under Reg
18 B of the Defence of the 1  302 731 Realm Act the whole object of proceedings for a writ of Habeas Corpus is to make them expeditious to keep them as free from technicality as possible and to keep them as simple as possible
 The incalculable value of Habeas Corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right to the appellant s freedom  Lord Wright
When there is no question of fact to be examined or determined no affidavit is needed
As soon as there emerges a fact into which the Court feels it should enquire the necessity for an affidavit arises
Ordinarily an affidavit may not be necessary in making the return if the detention is under orders of the detaining authority in exercise of its plenary discretion as in Liversidge vs Anderson 1 and in Greene s case 2 or a person is detained under the orders of a Court
But where the detention is as it was in the present case it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to justify its action by disclosing facts which would show to the satisfaction of the Court that the custody is not impro per
Where the prisoner says  I do not know why I have been detained I have done no wrong  it is for the detaining authority to justify the custody
When issues of fact are raised and the actions of the police officers as in the present case are expressly challenged and facts are set out which if unrebutted and unexplained would be sufficient for the writ to issue an affidavit becomes necessary
It cannot be said therefore that in the present case the appellant was not legally bound to place facts and circumstances before the Court to justify the detention of Surjit Singh and this could be done by an affidavit
Section 4 of the Oaths Act lays down the authority to administer oaths and affirmations and it prescribes the courts and persons authorised to administer by themselves or by their officers empowered in that behalf oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed upon them and they are all courts and persons having by law the authority to receive evidence
Section 5 prescribes the persons by whom oaths or affirmations must be 1  2  302 732 made and they include all witnesses i e all persons who  may lawfully be required to give evidence by or before any court
These two sections show that the High Court or its officers were authorised to administer the oath and as the appellant was stating facts as evidence before the High Court he had to make the oath or affirmation and was bound to state the truth
Section 14 of that Act is in the following words section 14
Every person giving evidence on any subject before any Court or person hereby authorised to administer oaths and affirmations shall be bound to state the truth on such subject 
As the appellant was giving evidence on his own behalf in that he was denying the allegation made in the affidavit of the brother of Surjit Singh he was bound to state the truth on the subject on which he was making the statement
The contention therefore that under section 191 of the Indian Penal Code the relevant portion of which is section 191
 Whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth   makes any statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true is said to give false evidence  the appellant was not legally bound by oath to state the truth cannot be supported
On the other hand at the stage of the proceedings in the High Court where it was being alleged that Surjit Singh was being detained by the appellant illegally it was necessary for the appellant to make an affidavit in making a return and therefore if the statement is false as it has been found to be then he has committed an offence under section 193
The opening words of section 191 whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth  do not support the submission that a man who is not bound under the law to make an affidavit can if he does make one deliberately refrain from stating truthfully the facts which are within his knowledge
The meaning of these words is that whenever in a court of law a person binds himself on oath to state the truth he is bound to state the 733 truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should not have gone into the witness box or should not have made an affidavit and therefore the submission that any false statement which he had made after taking the oath is not covered by the words of section 191 India Penal Code is not supportable
Whenever a man makes a statement in court on oath he is bound to state the truth and if he does not he makes himself liable under the provisions of section 193
It is no defence to say that he was not bound to enter the witness box
A defendant or even a plaintiff is not bound to go into the witness box but if either of them chooses to do so he cannot after he has taken the oath to make a truthful statement state anything which is false
Indeed the very sanctity of the oath re quires that a person put on oath must state the truth
In our opinion this contention is wholly devoid of force and must be repelled
It was then contended that the officer before whom the appellant swore the affidavit i e the Deputy Registrar of the High Court of PEPSU was not authorised to administer oaths
That officer as a witness for the prosecution has stated that he could administer an oath and therefore this contention of the appellant is also without any force and must be repelled
It was also argued that the affidavit filed by the appellant was affirmed as being true to the best of knowledge and belief and therefore it could not be said as to which part was true to the appellant s knowledge and which to his belief
We have read the affidavit which consists of 7 paragraphs and each paragraph relates to affirmation of a fact which if true could only be so to the appellant s knowledge
But even belief would fall under Explanation 2 to section 191 which is as under Explanation 2 to section 191
 A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know 734 The appellant relied upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor vs Lachmi Narain 1
But unless there was something peculiar in the facts of that case it cannot be considered to be good law
It does not even take into consideration Explanation 2 of section 191
Lastly it was urged that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was erroneous in that he did not hold an enquiry as required under sections 200 and 202 Criminal Procedure Code the former of which is expressly mentioned in sub section 2 of section 476 Criminal Procedure Code
That contention is equally untenable because under section 200 proviso aa it is not necessary for a Magistrate when a complaint is made by a court to examine the complainant and neither section 200 nor section 202 requires a preliminary enquiry before the Magistrate can assume jurisdiction to issue process against the person complained against
In our opinion the appellant has been rightly convicted and we would therefore dismiss this appeal
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
In 1925 the Sikh Gurdwaras Act 1925 was passed inter alia for the better administration of certain Sikh Gurdwaras and after the merger of the erstwhile State of Patiala and the East Punjab States Union called Pepsu with the State of Punjab the Act was amended by the Sikh Gurdwaras Amendment Act 1959 in order to extend the Act to the area which was formerly within Pepsu
Under section 43 of the Act before it was amended in 959 a Board had been constituted called the Sikh 1 Lah
500 Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee to act as the committee of management in respect of some of the principal Sikh Gurd waras and in addition to exercise control direction and general superintendence over all committees appointed under the provisions of the Act  the Board consisted of three categories of members namely 1 elected members 2 certain designated members and 3 co opted members which included persons residing in Pepsu and other parts of India
By the Amending Act of 1959 S 148B was added to the main Act which provided  1 As from the commencement of the Amending Act in addition to the members of the Board constituted under section 43 a every person in the extended territories who immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act is a member of the Interim Gurdwara Board Patiala constituted by Punjab Government shall be deemed to be a member of the Board constituted under section 43  and b thirty five Sikhs including six Sikhs belonging to the Scheduled Castes residents in the extended territories who shall be elected by the persons specified in sub section
2 in accordance with the rules made in this behalf by the State Government shall become the members of the Board 
The petitioners who profess and practice the Sikh faith filed a petition under article 32 Of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of section 148B on the ground that the section violated the fundamental right granted under article 26b of the Constitution to every religious denomination or any section thereof including the Sikh denomination  to manage its own affairs in matters of religion
They contended inter alia 1 that the amending Act of 1959 was passed with a view that a particular group of Sikhs might not regain the majority it had lost on November 16 1958 when the annual election of the Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee was held 2 that the members of the Interim Board Patiala who under section 148B1a are deemed to be members of the Board constituted under section 43 were appointed under a Punjab Government notification and being merely nominees of Government did not represent the Sikh Community that under section 148B thirty five Sikhs from the extended area were introduced into the Board by means of an indirect method that is by a limited Sikh electorate the members of which electorate were in their turn elected by Sikhs as well as non Sikhs  that the right guaranteed under article 26b was given to all members of the Sikh denomination to manage Sikh Gurdwaras that the right must be exercised by all Sikhs who alone must elect their representatives and that the introduction of new members into the Board in respect of the extended territories in the manner envisaged by section 148B violated by itself the right of the Sikhs in a matter of religion and constituted an infringement of their fundamental right under article 26b
Held  1 that in considering the question as to whether a 501 provision of law is constitutionally valid the court cannot be called upon to embark on an enquiry into public policy or investigate into questions of political wisdom or even to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a law which it is otherwise competent to make  2 that a direct election by the entire Sikh Community in the management of Gurdwaras is not part of the Sikh religion and 3 that the method of representation for the extended areas under section 148B of the Act was an arrangement dictated merely by considerations of convenience and expediency and did not involve any principle of religion
Accordingly section I48B of the Act  lid not affect  matters of religion  within the meaning of article 26b of the Constitution and consequently did not contravene the fundamental right under that Article
The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madyas v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt  and Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs The State of Mysore   referred to