Appeals Nos
1816  1817 of 1968
Appeal from the Judgment  Order dated the 30th March 1967 of Orissa High Court in FAs
Nos 44  45 of 1963 Writ Petition No 372 of 1974 140 Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Civil Appeal No 336 of 1970 Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 28th March 1969 of the Mysore High Court in WP No 226 of 1967
Lal Narain Sinha Sol
Gen of India A K Basu and D N Gupta for the Appellant In CA
No 181668 and Petitioner in WP No 37274 A K Basu  D N Gupta for the Appellant In CAS
1817 68 V M Tarkunde Santosh Chatterjee and R N Sachthey for the Respondents In CAs
1816 181768  WP No 37274 Soli J Sorabjee Obed Shenio P C Bhartari Ravinder Narain  K J John for Intervener No 1 section P Nayar for Intervener No 2 section T Desai B P Maheshwari and Suresh Seth for Intervener No section T Desai B P Maheshwari  Suresh Seth for the Appellant In CA No 33670
M Veerappa for the respondent In CA No 33670
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY J
These appeals raise a common question as to whether Dumpers Rockers and Tractors are motor vehicles within the meaning of the relevant State Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts and are accordingly taxable thereunder
Apart from these appeals Bolani Ores Ltd Appellant in Civil Appeal No 1816 of 1968 has filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1930
The question raised in the writ petition will only arise for determination if the judgment of the High Court of Orissa is held to be valid otherwise the question of the constitutional validity of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act hereinafter referred to as the Taxation Act  does not fall for determination as that would be purely academic
The two Civil Appeals Nos
1816 of 1968 and 1817 of 1968 arise out of two suits One filed by Bolani Ores Ltd and the other by Orissa Minerals Development Company Ltd respectively for a declaration that the machineries in their possession which were described in the respective Schedules to the plaints were not liable for registration under section 22 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act hereinafter referred to as the Act  and cannot therefore be taxed under section 6 of the Taxation Act
In the suit filed by Bolani Ores Ltd 8 types of machinery were involved  1 Shovels 2 Drill Master 3 Caterpillar Bulldozers 4 Rockers 5 Dumpers 6 Motor Grader 7 Tractors and 8 Fargo Truck fitted with serving tank for diesel oil etc
The Trial Court held that all the items of machinery as above mentioned except item 6 ie Motor Grader came within the definition of a 141 motor vehicle  given in section 2 18 of the Act and were therefore liable for registration under section 22 of the Act as well as payment of taxes under the Taxation Act
Against this decision First Appeal No 44 of 1963 was filed in the Orissa High Court
The State did not file any cross appeal against the declaration that item 6 was not taxable
The High Court was of the view that unless it is shown that the vehicle is of a special type adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of roads or public roads the vehicles were motor vehicles
It was conceded during the hearing on behalf of the appellant that type 8 Fargo Truck clearly comes within the definition of motor vehicle and likewise the Advocate General conceded that type 2 Ingersoll Hand Drill Master cannot be held to be a Motor Vehicle
The High Court accordingly modified the order of the Trial Court in respect of the types in items 1 2 and 3
It held that these three types as well as the Motor Grader in item 6 already held by the Trial Court not to be a motor vehicle were not liable for registration under section 22 of the Act nor would they be subject to payment of tax under the Taxation Act
In the suit filed by Orissa Mineral Development Company Ltd out of which First Appeal No 45 of 1963 arose the plaintiff sought a declaration that nine types of machinery which it owns were not liable for registration under the Act  Item 1  2 being Dumpers 3 3A Tractors 4 Caterpillar Trax Cavetror 5  6 Caterpillar Bull dozers 7  8 Scrapers and 9 Shovel
The Trial Court found on evidence that items 4 to 9 had a sort of crawler mechanism and were not adapted for regular use on the roads
This fact was also admitted by the opposite party
Accordingly it held that the vehicles in these Items did not come within the ambit of the definition of motor vehicle  under section 218 and were not liable for registration under section 22 of the Act
The case of Dumpers and Tractors items 1 to 3 and 3A however was held to stand on a different footing as these vehicles were adapted for being used on roads for transporting the goods of the plaintiffs though it may be within its own field of operation
The reasons for bringing such vehicles and the tractors within the purview of section 218 of the Act were discussed at some length and accordingly it was held in both the suits that the vehicle indicated in the respective suit were liable for registration under section 22 of the Act and for payment of the requisite tax under the Taxation Act
In these appeals intervention of Ms Chougle  Co Ms NCDC Ltd and Ms Dalmia Cement Ltd who allege that proceedings taken by them are pending in Courts was permitted and they are represented by the learned Advocates Soli J Sorabji section P Nayar and section T Desai respectively
Civil Appeal No 336 of 1970 is in respect of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act hereinafter called the Mysore Act 
The appellants in this appeal filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore challenging the demand by the Regional Transport Officer to get the Dumpers registered under the Act failing which they would be committing an offence entailing penal 142 consequences
The High Court of Mysore while dismissing the petition held that the Dumpers can be used for carrying loads even outside the mining area or any other enclosed premises like any other goods vehicle  which is required to be registered under the Act
According to it what would take the vehicle out of the category of motor vehicles  under the Mysore Act is that they must be such as are capable of use in any other place for the purpose of transport of goods or passengers which in its view was not the same thing as saying that if the vehicle is not put to use elsewhere or used for a special purpose it must be exempted from registration under section 22 of the Act
 It further observed  The test of purpose as argued by the learned counsel does not also in our view fall clearly within the purview of the statutory exemption in section 218 of the Act
On the other hand what is enjoined is that its very design and manufacture must be such as would confine its capability for use only in a factory or enclosed premises Referring to the case of Ms Bolani Ores Ltd vs State of Orissa 1 the interpretation placed by the Orissa High Court on the judgment of the Supreme Court in The State of Mysore vs Syed lbrahim2 was not accepted
On this aspect of the Mysore High Court observed  But it may also be noted that in the decision of the Supreme Court above referred to what was in question was whether the owner of a Motor Car which was used for transporting passengers for hire was liable for prosecution under section 421 of the Act
The exemption under section 218 did not fall for consideration in the said decision
It was in this context that the Supreme Court laid down that if a Motor Vehicle is used as a transport vehicle the owner who so uses it or permits it to be so used is required to obtain the necessary permit
It is the use of the vehicle for carrying passengers for hire or reward which determines the application of section 421 of the Act
 The_High Court however agreed with the test laid down by the Orissa High Court for determining what under the is a motor vehicle 
The decision in these appeals hinges on the view we take of what a motor vehicle  is for the purpose of section 2c of the Taxation Act under which the motor vehicle has the same meaning as in the  and whether the subsequent amendment of the definition in section 218 of the Act by the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act will govern the definition of motor vehicle  for the purposes of the Taxation Act
Section 6 of the Taxation Act imposes on every motor vehicle a tax at the rate specified in the Second Schedule to the Act
The question therefore arises as to what is a motor vehicle  for the purposes of the Taxation Act
It may be pointed out that section 2c of the Taxation Act prior to its amendment in 1940 defined a motor vehicle  as meaning any vehicle propelled or which may be propelled on a road by electrical or mechanical power either entirely 1 A
IR1958 Orissa 1
2 3
143 or partially
In 1939 the of 1914 was repealed and a new Act substituted in its place
The 1914 Act defined motor vehicle  as including a vehicle carriage or other means of conveyance propelled or which may be propelled on a road by electrical or mechanical power either entirely or partially The Orissa Act therefore initially adopted the definition in the Taxation Act which was in consonance with the  as it then stood
The definition of motor vehicle  under section 218 of the Act having been redefined the Taxation Act by the Orissa Amendment Act 2 of 1940 adopted that definition for the purposes of taxation
The preamble to this amendment stated that the amendment was made for the purpose of avoiding repugnancy in the 
The Orissa Amendment Act of 1943 reenacted provisions of sections 2 to 8 of the said Act as the Amendment Act 2 of 1940 was due to expire on November 23 1943
Section 218 of the Act was however amended by Act 100 of 1956 but there was no corresponding amendment in the definition of section 2c of the Taxation Act
It is therefore contended that the amended definition is inapplicable Lo the Taxation Act but it is only the definition of a motor vehicle  as it existed under the Act prior to the amendment that has to be read in section 2c of the Taxation Act inasmuch as the purpose and intendment of the Legislature was only to incorporate the definition as it existed at the time when the Taxation Act was amended in 1943
If it was otherwise following the legislative practice adopted earlier by the Orissa Legis lature the definition of a motor vehicle  would have been suitably amended in order to avoid any repugnancy with the amendment
Apart from this contention it is also submitted that under the definition as it existed prior to the amendment or subsequent thereto dumpers rockers and tractors are not motor vehicles  because they are not adapted for use on the road
Before we deal with this question it is necessary to note the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate for the State of Orissa that the appellants should not be permitted to raise this question as it was not pleaded or urged either before the Trial Court or before the High Court nor is there any evidence to determine the question whether the vehicles on which the levy of the impugned tax is held to be valid are used solely upon the premises of the owners
It is submitted that the contention is contrary to what is stated in the plaint and that it is also not covered by any of the issues under which the question as to whether the premises in which the plaintiffs operate are the exclusive premises of the plaintiffs nor is there any evidence as to whether the area where the vehicles operate is the exclusive area of the plaintiffs
In our view the preliminary objection has no validity because firstly in para 2 of the plaint it is definitely pleaded  That for the specific purpose of mining operations within their leasehold areas they possess Caterpillar Bulldozers Model DS Letourneau Westinghouse Dumpers and Euclid Dumpers Motor Grader Tractors
Fargo Truck etc
These machines are mechanically propelled but are neither intended nor adapted for use on public roads nor are ever used by the plaintiffs on public roads or public places Secondly 144 the relief asked for is that the machines in possession of the plaintiffs as described above for the purpose of working in the mines and removing over burdens are not liable for registration and consequent payment of taxes under the Taxation Act
Thirdly the written statement clearly comprehends what the plaintiffs  case is
It is categori cally stated in para 4 that the various types of machines enumerated in para 2 of the plaint being mechanically propelled vehicles come within the definition of motor vehicles as contained in section 218 of the Act since they do not come under the exceptions provided therein
It is incorrect to say that these vehicles are neither intended nor adapted for use on public roads nor are ever so used by the plaintiffs on public roads or public places
On the contrary the places where the aforesaid machines are operating are public places within the meaning of section 224 of the since the public are granted the right of access to the same for transacting day to day business
 Fourthly issues Nos 4 and 5 viz Are the suit vehicles not motor vehicles  within the provisions of  and Are the suit vehicles liable for registration and taxation respectively give scope for the question now raised
Lastly the evidence also which has been led by the plaintiffs and to which we shall have occa sion to refer later entitles the appellants to raise this question
For these reasons we reject the preliminary objection
It is now necessary to compare the two definitions of motor vehicle  under section 218 of the Act both before and after the amendment by Act 100 of 1956
We therefore give below both these definitions Section 2 18 before amendment
motor vehicle means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or used solely upon the premises of the owner
Section 2 18 after amendment by Act 100 of 1956 motor vehicle means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises
it will be observed from a comparison of the two definitions that the vehicles which have been taken out of the category of a motor vehicle  are different in these two definitions
Before the amendment a motor vehicle though a motor vehicle within the meaning of the first part of the definition is nonetheless not so because of its specified user ie if it is used solely upon the premises of the owner
These vehicles under section 6 of the Taxation Act read with section 2c thereof would not attract liability to tax
But after the amendment though a motor vehicle may be adapted for use upon roads nonetheless in order to be taken out of the category of the definition it had to be further adapted namely it should be a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises
In other 145 words a motor vehicle of a special type adapted as stated in the post amendment definition would be such as would not be considered to be adapted for use upon roads
The position is the same with respect to the Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts of other States also
We have seen the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1957 which though does not define motor vehicle  as such nonetheless under section 2j states that words and expressions used but not defined in the Act shall have the meanings assigned to them in the 
It also says that the Mysore General Clauses Act 1899 Mysore Act III of 1899 shall apply for the interpretation of the Act as it applies for the interpretation of a Mysore Act Section 3 is the taxing provision which provides that a tax at the rates specified in Part A of the Schedule shall be levied on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads kept in the State of Mysore
In the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1931 section 2i states that the expressions mentioned in clauses a to f of which clause d refers to motor vehicle  shall have the meanings assigned to them in the 
It is also pertinent to mention that the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area Motor Vehicles Taxation Act by section 2v defines a public road  and by section 4 which is the taxing provision it is provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time direct that a tax shall be levied on every motor vehicle using any public road in the Andhra area of the State of Andhra Pradesh
The Madras Act uses the same language as that of the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area Act
It appears that using any public road in the Presidency of Madras was first substituted for the words kept or used in the Presidency of Madras by section 3 1 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Taxation Amendment Act 1932 Madras Act V of 1932
The Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act 1958 follows the same pattern as the Mysore Act and though it does not define a motor vehicle  yet by section 210 it provides that other words and expressions used but not defined in the Act shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the 
The Bengal Motor Vehicles Tax Act 1932 also is similar as that of the Bombay Act inasmuch as s25 thereof states that words and expressions used but not defined in the Act shall have the same meaning as in the 
In all these cases the common question would be whether the definition of a motor vehicle  as it existed before the Amendment Act of 1956 is the same as in section 2c of the Taxation Act or does the definition in section 2c of the Taxation Act mean that the motor vehicle as defined in the Act from time to time is to be adopted for the purpose of section 2c of the Taxation Act
In so far as the larger question is L251 Sup
CI75 146 concerned asto Whether dumpers rockers and tractors are motor vehicles at all within the meaning of the first part of the definition of motor vehicle  in section 2 18 of the Act which is the same before and after the amendment it is contended that these vehicles are not suitably adapted for use upon roads which according to the learned Advocates mean the public roads or roads to which the public has a right of access
The Motor Vehicles Taxation Acts are enacted in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Legislatures under entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution while the is enacted by the Parliament in exercise of the concurrent legislative power in entry 35 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
Entry 57 of List II empowers legislation in respect of taxes on vehicles whether mechanically propelled or notsuitable for use on roads including tramcars subject to the provisions of entry 35 of List III
The power exercisable under entry 57 is the power to impost taxes which are in nature of regulatory and compensatory measures
The regulatory and compensatory nature of the tax is that the taxing power should be exercised to impose taxes on motor vehicles which use the roads in the State or are kept for use thereon either throughout the whole area or parts thereof and are sufficient to make and maintain such roads  See The Automobile Transport Rajasthan Ltd vs The State of Rajasthan and others1 In this case the earlier decision in Atiabari Tea Company Ltd vs The State of Assam and others 2 was considered
Since the taxing statute is a regulatory or compensatory statute it is contended that the provisions of sections 6B 7 9A of the Taxation Act relate only to the actual use of the public road
It is pointed out that section 6 of the Taxation Act does not place the burden of taxation on the registered owners of the motor vehicles but only on the persons who keep the motor vehicles for use which would mean use their on the public roads
If no such use of public roads is made or the vehicles are not such as can be used on the public roads then no tax could be levied under the Taxation Act
Reference in the Taxation Act to the registered owners is it is submitted meant only for the purpose of enabling refund of tax paid but not payable in terms of the Act or section 7 of the Taxation Act
Under Entry 35 of the Concurrent List the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures can legislate in respect of only mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied
It has no power to deal with vehicles which are not mechanically propelled though under the Taxation Act these non mechanically propelled vehicles which are suitable for use on roads can also be taxed even without their being registered under the Act
It will thus be seen that while entry 57 of List II is solely concerned with taxes on vehicles whether mechanically propelled or not entry 35 deals with also the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied
Taxes on vehicles cannot the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied
On the other hand the expression principles of taxation  denote rules of guidance in the matter of taxation
The ambit and amplitude of these two legislative entries in the respective Lists was dealt with in State of Assam  Others 1 1963 1 section C R 491
2  147 vs Labanya Probha Debi1 where Suba Rao CJ speaking for the
Constitution Bench of this Court observed at p 614 The two entries deal with two different matters though allied ones one deals with taxes on vehicles and the other with the principles on which such taxes are to be levied
when two entries in the Constitution whether in the same List or different Lists deal with two subjects if possible an attempt shall be made to harmonize them rather than to bring them into conflict
Taxes on vehicles in their ordinary meaning connote the liability to pay taxes at the rates at which the taxes are to be levied
On the other hand the expression  principles of taxation denotes rules of guidance in the matter of taxation
We therefore hold that the Amending Acts do not come into conflict with the existing law in respect of any principles of taxation but only deal with a subject matter which is exclusively within the legislative competence of the State Legislature
 It is contended that having regard to the nature of the vehicles question they are particularly suitable for the functions they are performing and unsuitable for the roads on which they would be only a source of damage inconvenience danger and uneconomical compared with the other vehicles usually utilised for transport of goods
Accordingly it is submitted that  1 the present case should be determined with reference to the definition of motor vehicle  read without the amendment in the Act as such vehicles operating solely within the appellants  premises should not be liable to tax 2 the vehicles not being suitable for public roads would not be either registered or taxed whether before or after 1956
Both for the purposes of registration and taxation the common question arises viz whether the vehicles in question are adapted for use upon roads which it is submitted are public roads or roads to which public have a right of access
If they are not then they are not motor vehicles  within the meaning of either the Act or the Taxation Act 3 the concept adapted for use on roads  must lie within the ambit of the expression used by the Constitution otherwise it would be unconstitutional
It must therefore follow that the definition can only refer to vehicles which are reasonably suitable for the road in the sense that an average man could think that plying of the vehicles on the road would be one of the normal uses of the vehicles
That alone would be a test of suitability and 4 for the interpretation of section 22 of the Act it would be permissible and even obligatory to examine the section not in isolation but in the light of the object and scheme of the Act and the regulatory provisions regarding the licensing of drivers issuing of permits provisions for compulsory registration and other regulatory provision are confined to the vehicles on the public roads
The provisions of section 22 are definitely to advance the objects of the Act and to effectuate the regulatory provisions
By the very language the principal purpose is to insist upon registration in respect of vehicles plying in public places
Further the 1  148 expression must be interpreted to advance the object of the Act exactly as the other para of section 22 does
In this view the expression purpose of carrying passengers or goods cannot mean the personal use of the owner
A person himself cannot be the passenger and goods and as such it must not be interpreted disjunctively
It is a single expression passenger or goods
It is conceivable that this alternative part of the section is only to ensure that in connection with the journey on a public road even if a motor vehicle goes into a place which will not be strictly a public place like hotel or inside a railway such as in a Railway Station or even inside the premises of a bus depot hospitals etc
provisions for compulsory registration should be applicable
The judgment of the High Court is assailed on the ground that while formulating the test to determine whether a vehicle is adapted for use on the roads it has evidently equated compatibility with suitability because at certain places it has laid down the test in terms of compatibility and at other places in terms of suitability
This is clearly illustrative by its decision regarding tractor 
A tractor without a tailor can neither carry passengers nor goods
In the instant case it is said that the tractor cannot ply in a public place nor does it ply in any other place for carrying passengers or goods
It could not evidently fall within section 22 of the Act
Though this is so the High Court says that because it can be adapted by attaching a tailor it comes within section 218 forgetting that what we are concerned with is a tractair without a tailor which is actually used to supply compressed air to certain plants or machines which clearly shows that the High Court did not have a correct concept of adapted for use on road
Shri Soli Sorabji on behalf of the interveners has more or less adopted a similar line of argument and has referred us to the several dictionary meanings of the word adapted 
He has also referred to the English cases on this question and submitted that no vehicle cam be taxed unless it possesses the attribute of being suitable for use on roads
The expression adapted for use on roads must be construed as suitable for use on roads in the light of entry 57 otherwise the legislation would be ultra vires the said entry and consequently such a construction should be avoided by courts
He further submitted that the Orissa High Court has misconstrued the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore vs Syed Ibrahim1 where the observations were made with reference to the definition of a public service vehicle as defined in section 225 of the Act under which user by itself was sufficient to bring the vehicle within its purview
He has referred us to sections 47f 55f 712 74 751 and 3 and 77 of the Act in support of his proposition that having regard to the general object purpose and the policy underlying the Act the expression roads must mean public roads and not private roads
If so the dumpers rockers and tractors etc
which do not ply or are not suitable for plying on public roads cannot be either registered under the Act or taxed under the Taxation Act
Mr Tarkunde for the State of Orissa submits that every motor vehicle registered under the Act is liable to pay tax under the Taxation Act and since dumpers rockers and tractors are by their nature 1  149 adapted for use on the roads they are registerable and they have to be registered and are liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act
There has been a good deal of argument on both sides on the meaning of the expression adapted for use upon roads
We have been referred to certain English decisions which deal with the meaning of the word adapted  in the English Road Traffic Act 1960
While the definition of motor vehicle  in the Act describes it as a mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads the English Road Traffic Act describes it as a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads
Even the earlier English Road Traffic Act 1930 had used the words intended or adapted for use on roads while making Part I applicable to motor vehicles
In Daley and others vs Hargreaves1 the Queen s Bench Division took the view that as there was no evidence sufficient to show that the dumpers were intended or adapted for use on roads within the meaning of section 36 of the Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933 and section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1930 and the case being indistinguishable in substance from the Scottish decision in MacDonald vs Carmichael2 which the Court would follow for conformity it had not been established that dumpers were motor vehicles to which the regulations applied
In MacDonald s case2 it was held that the dumpers were solely used in connection with road construction and were not constructed to carry goods on an ordinary highway
They were so constructed as to be capable of and were in fact occasionally used for carrying road making material along short stretches of the public highway in the vicinity of the work of reconstruction
The ratio of that decision was applied to the Daley s case1 where Salmon J observed at p 555  In my judgment the true effect of the Court of Justiciary s decision was that the very limited use of the dumpers on the road in that case did not establish that they were intended or adapted for use on the road within the meaning of those words in the Road traffic Act 1930 section 1 Lord Parker CJ though agreeing reserved his opinion by emphasising that it must not be taken as the result of this decision that dumpers of the type used in this case were not motor vehicles intended or adapted for use on the road
He indicated that he had agreed with Salmon J merely because there was no proof in that case that the dumpers used were motor vehicles
While dealing with the English cases it must not be forgotten that the definition of motor vehicle in the Road Traffic Act imports the element of intention into the definition for ascertaining whether a vehicle is a motor vehicle
In Maddox V Storer3 Lord Parker CJ was construing the word adapted when used disjunctively with constructed
He observed at p 456  One can get illustration after illustration on looking at the Act itself where adapted when used disjunctively with 1 2 3 150 constructed must mean a physical alteration and as it seems to me other cases where the word adapted alone is used and where it must be given the adjectival meaning of be  fit and apt for the purpose But where the word adapted alone has been used such as in subparagraph 2 of paragraph 1 of the First Schedule to the Road Traffic Act 1960 he was of the view that it was wholly inapt to mean altered so as to make fit
He asked How do you alter a motor car so as to make it fit to carry not more than seven passengers  It is clearly there standing on its own susceptible only of meaning fit and apt for the purpose In Burns vs Currell1 also Lord Parker delivered the judgment
He referred to the decision in Daley MacDonald Maddox supra observed at p 440 thus  But to define exactly the meaning of the words intended or adapted is by no means easy
I think that the expression intended to take that word first does not mean intended by the user of the vehicle either at the moment of the alleged offence or for the future
I do not think it means the intention of the manufacturer or the wholesaler or the retailer After referring to Salmon J s observations in Daley s case supra and the suggestion that the word intended might be paraphrased as suitable or apt Lord
Parker pointed out that it may be merely a difference of wording but he preferred to make the test whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its users would be a road user and then he dealt with the meaning of the word adapted and observed at p 441  So far as the other word adapted is concerned as was pointed out in Maddox vs Storer 19631 QB 451the word adapted is used throughout the Road Traffic Act 1960 in a number of different contexts
Sometimes It is used as an alternative to constructed constructed or adapted and it seems clear and indeed it has been so held for a very long time that adapted there means altered
On the other hand as it was pointed out in Maddox vs Storer it is used in other contexts in this Act in particular when it stands alone as clearly meaning apt or fit in other words in an adjectival sense
Here in this context of intended or adapted my own view is though I think it is perhaps unnecessary to decide it in this case that adapted used disjunctively with intended and not with the word constructed is used in its adjectival sense
 The decisions rendered on the definition of motor vehicle  under the English Road Traffic Act are of little help because that definition 1 151 has reference to the words intended or adapted while the element of intention has no relevance under the Act where the word adapted alone is used
It has been urged before us that since the learned thief Justice Lord Parker had referred to the meaning of the words intended and adapted separately in the context of the English Road Traffic Act we should take assistance from his observations
It appears to us that where two words of different import are used which in the context of the scheme of the Act and its purpose play an important part to ask us to take the meaning given of one of the words and import it as the meaning for the purposes of the Act even when the same word is used is perhaps to place us in a similar predicament as that of the gentleman who when asked to expound on Chinese metaphysics not knowing how to begin looked up the article on China in the Encyclopedia Britannica and also on metaphysics and combined the two into Chinese metaphysics
As usual references have been made to the Dictionaries but quite often it is not possible to hold a dictionary in one hand and the statute to be interpreted in the other for ascertaining the import and intent of the word or expression used by the Legislature
The shade of meaning of a word its different connotations and collocations which one finds in a dictionary does not relieve us of the responsibility of having to make the ultimate choice of selecting the right meaning We choose that meaning which is most apt in the context colour and diction in which the word is used
The use of a dictionary ad lib without an analysis of the entire Act its purpose and its intent for ascertaining the meaning in which the Legislature could have used the word or expression may not lead us to the right conclusion
With this caution before us for avoiding any of the aforesaid methods which might lead to a possible incongruity we will examine the different facets to which our attention has been drawn
The meaning of the word adapted in section 218 of the Act is itself indicated in entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which confers a power on the State to tax vehicles whether propelled mechanically or not and uses the word suitable in relation to its use on the roads
The words adapted for use must therefore be construed as suitable for use
At any rate words adapted for use cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles Which are not  suitable for use  on roads
In this sense the words is adapted for use have the same connotation as is suitable  or is fit for use on the roads
The question would then arise are dumpers rockers and tractairs suitable or fit for use on roads  It is not denied that these vehicles are on pneumatic wheels and can be moved about from place to place with mechanical power The word vehicle itself connotes that it is a contrivance which moves
A vehicle which merely moves from one place to another need not necessarily be a motor vehicle within the of a218 of the Act
It may move on iron flats made into a chain such as a caterpillar vehicle or a military tank
Both move from one place to another but are not suitable for use on roads
It is not that they cannot move on the roads but they are not adapted made fit or suitable for we on roads
They would if used dig and 152 damage the roads
It is contended that the dumpers or rockers are very heavy and though they can move on roads they would damage the roads and therefore they are not suitable for use on roads
To substantiate this proposition the appellants have produced before us certain notifications issued by the State of Orissa under which vehicles beyond a certain laden
weight are prohibited from plying on the roads
It was rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate for the State of Orissa that there are only some of the roads on which vehicles heavier than what is indicated in the notification cannot be permitted
But that is not to say that all vehicles which exceed a particular weight are not adapted for use upon roads and are therefore not motor vehicles
A dumper in the Mysore case according to the manufacturer s own specifications is suitable for roads and is described thus   The dumper will carry bulk goods building materials mining products agricultural and forestry products earth stones bricks concrete mortar etc
The structure is of simple design and easy to handle
Tripping is performed by releasing the locking device retaining the tipping body
The dumper requires no more than a few seconds for the emptying of its tipping body and gives no trouble to the driver when being operated on uphill or downhill roads With its load unbalanced or when the load refuses to slide out easily
Quickness and ease characterise the operation of the dumper and the clumsy manoeuvring can be dispensed with
In narrow lanes or rough roads where turning would be impossible or undesirable the seat is turned and will face driving direction
 It is also averred in the plaint in the suit filed by the appellant Bolani Ores Ltd that Euclid Dumpers are used for transporting ore from the mining faces to the crushing and screening plant or from head mine stockpile to near railway siding
Rockers also seem to be similar to dumpers
But in this case rockers are heavier than dumpers
In so far as the tractairs are concerned attachments are fitted for the purpose of supplying compressed air to Jack Hammer Drills which are used to drill holes in the ore body so that explosive charges may be inserted in them to break the ore into manageable sizes
In respect of all these three types of vehicles it cannot be said that they are not adapted for use upon roads
That they are not so used or are confined for use to only places other than roads or public places is a different matter because whether they have to be registered under the Act or are liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act will depend upon the provisions of the respective Acts
In so far as the Act is concerned we must bear in mind that it is essentially an Act to regulate transport  The statement of objects and 153 reasons given for the 1939 Act in so far as it is relevant for our purpose states thus It has been recognised now for some years past that the Indian Motor Vehicles Act 1914 which was framed to suit conditions at an early stage of development of motor transport is no longer adequate to deal with conditions brought about by the rapid growth of motor transport in the past two decades
In the interest alike of the safety and convenience of the public and of the development of a so called system of transport much closer control is required than the present Act permits and it is necessary to take powers to regulate transport
 A perusal of the provisions of the Act in the light of the objects and reasons would justify the conclusion that it is not necessary for every vehicle registered under the Act to be also liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act
It may be that a vehicle is registerable under the Act but not liable for tax under the Taxation Act
For instance section 22 of the Act provides  No person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is registered  Similarly under section 3 of the Act No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to himself authorizing him to drive the vehicle and no person shall be drive a motor vehicle as a paid employee or shall so drive a transport vehicle unless his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do A motor vehicle  under section 218 has been defined as any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads
Having regard to the context of the definition of public place in section 224 of the Act the regulatory character of the Act and the use of the word road  used in a public Act road would mean a public road which word as already noticed has been used will the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area Motor Vehicles Taxation Act
The word public place has been defined in section 224 as meaning a road street way or other place whether a thoroughfare or not to which the public have a right of access
If the public have no right of access to any place which is not a road street way or thoroughfare it will not be a public place
A motor vehicle which is not adapted for use upon roads to which the public have no right of access is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 218 of the Act
But where a vehicle is adapted for use on a road which is neither more nor less than that it is made suitable or fit for use upon road ie public roads it is a motor vehicle and if such a motor vehicle is a goods vehicle under section 28 which means a vehicle which is not only suitable or fit for use upon roads but is constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods or where it is not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods solely or in addition to passengers car is a public service vehicle within the meaning of section 225 of the Act namely  an motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the 154 carriage of passengers for hire or reward it has to be registered under section 22 and can only be driven by a person who holds a licence under section 3 of the Act
Where a vehicle is adapted for use upon roads and though it is not driven on the Public roads or in a public place even then if it carries goods car passengers which may not be for hire or reward or the passengers may be friends or relatives of the owner or the goods may belong to the owner and plying in a place to which the public has as a matter of right no access it nonetheless cannot be driven without its being registered or without the driver holding a licence to drive such a vehicle
In so far as the Act is concerned having regard to the fact that the dumpers and rockers are motor vehicles which are not taken out of that category as was the case before the amendment they have to be registered after the amendment and can only be driven by persons holding a valid licence
The tractair though it may be a motor vehicle within the definition of that term is neither a goods vehicle nor a vehicle which carries passengers nor is it being driven in a place to which public have as a right access
As it does not perform any of the aforesaid functions or uses it is not a vehicle which has to be registered nor has it to be driven only by a person who holds a licence
The question then remains as to whether these vehicles though registrable under the Act are motor vehicles for the purpose of the Taxation Act
It has already been pointed out that before the amendment vehicles used solely upon the premises of the owner though they may be mechanically propelled vehicles adapted for use upon roads were excluded from the definition of motor vehicle 
If this definition which excludes them is the one which is incorporated by reference under section 2 c of the Taxation Act then no tax is leviable on these vehicles under the Taxation Act
Shri Tarkunde for the State of Orissa contends that the definition of motor vehicle  in section 2c of the Taxation Act is not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference and as such the meaning of motor vehicle for the purpose of section 2c of the Taxation Act would be the same as defined from time to time under section 218 of the Act
In ascertaining the intention of the Legislature in adopting the method of merely referring to the definition of motor vehicle  under the Act for the purpose of the Taxation Act we have to keep in mind its purpose and intendment as also that of the Motor Vehicles Act
We have already stated what these purposes are and having regard to them the registration of a motor vehicle does not automatically make it liable for taxation under the Taxation Act
The Taxation Act is a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the purpose of raising revenue to meet the expenditure for making roads maintaining them and for facilitating the movement and regulation of traffic
The validity of the taxing power under entry 57 List II of the Seventh Schedule read with article 301 of the Constitution depends upon the regulatory and compensatory nature of the taxes
It is not the purpose of the Taxation Act to levy taxes on vehicles which do not use the roads or in any way form part of the flow of traffic on the roads which is required to be regulated
The regulations under the Motor Vehicles Act for registration and prohibition of certain categories of vehicles being driven by persons 155 who have no driving licence even though those vehicles are not plying can the roads are designed to ensure the safety of passengers and goods etc
and for that purpose it is enacted to keep control and check on the vehicles
Legislative power under Entry 35 of List III Con V current List does not bar such a provision
But Entry 57 of List II is subject to the limitations referred to above namely that the power of taxation thereunder cannot exceed the compensatory nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using the roads viz public roads
If the vehicles do not use the roads notwithstanding that they are registered under the Act they cannot be taxed
This very concept is embodied in the provisions of section 7 of the Taxation Act as also the relevant sections in the Taxation Acts of other States namely that where a motor vehicle is not using the roads and it is declared that it will not use the roads for any quarter or quarters of a year or for any particular year or years no tax is leviable thereon and if any tax has been paid for any quarter during which it is not proposed to use the motor vehicle on the road the tax for that quarter is refundable
If this be the purpose and object of the Taxation Act when the motor vehicle is defined under section 2c of the Taxation Act as having the same meaning as in the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 then the inten tion of the Legislature could not have been anything but to incorporate only the definition in the Motor Vehicles Act as then existing namely in 1943
as if that definition was bodily written into section 2c of the Taxation Act
If the subsequent Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Amendment Act 1943 incorporating the definition of motor vehicle  referred to the definition of motor vehicle under the Act as then existing the effect of this legislative method would in our view amount to an incorporation by reference of the provisions of section 218 of the Act in section 2c of the Taxation Act
Any subsequent amendment in the Act or a total repeal of the Act under a fresh legislation on that topic would not affect the definition of motor vehicle  in section 2c of the Taxation Act
This is a well accepted interpretation both in this country as well as in England which has to a large extent influenced our law
This view is further reinforced by the use of the word has in the expression has the same meaning as in the  in section 2c of the Taxation Act which would perhaps further justify the assumption that the Legislature had intended to incorporate the definition under the Art as it then existed and not as it may exist from time to time
This method of drafting which adopts incorporation by reference to another Act whatever may have been its historical justification in England in this country does not exhibit an activities draftsmanship which would have adopted the method of providing its own definition
Where two Acts are complimentary or interconnected legislation by reference may be an easier method because a definition given in the one Act may be made to do as the definition in the other Act both of which being enacted by the same Legislature
At any rate Lord Esher MR dialing with legislation by incorporation in In re
Wood s Estate state1 said at p 615 If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of he clauses of a former Act the legal effect of that as has 1 156 often been held is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or printed in it and the moment you have those clauses in the later Act you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all
 The observations in Clarke vs Bradlaugh1 are also to the same effect
Brett LJ in that case had said at p 69    there is a rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute the repeal of the first statute by a third statute does not affect the second In Secretary of State for India in Council vs Hindusthan Co operative Insurance Society Ltd2 the Privy Council was considering a case where the incorporation effected in the statute viz the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act 1911 referred to by their Lordships as the Local Act was in express terms and in the form illustrated by 54 and 55 Vict Ch 19
The Local Act in dealing with the acquisition of land for the purposes designated by it made provision for the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were subjected to numerous modifications which were set out in the Schedule so that in effect the Local Act was held to be the enactment of a Special Law for the acquisition of land for the special purpose
It was in the context of these and several other provisions which pointed to the absorption of certain of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the Local Act with vital modifications that Privy Council observed at p 266 But their Lordships think that there are other and perhaps more cogent objections to this contention of the Secretary of State and their Lordships are not prepared to hold that the sub section in question which was not enacted till 1921 can be regarded as incorporated in the Local Act of 1911
It was not part of the Land Acquisition Act when the Local Act was passed nor in adopting the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is there anything to suggest that the Bengal Legislature intended to bind themselves to any future additions which might be made to that Act
It is at least conceivable that new provisions might have been added to the Land Acquisition Act which would be wholly unsuitable to the Local code
Nor again does Act XIX of 1921 contain any provision that the amendments enacted by it are to be treated as in any way retrospective or are to be regarded as affecting any other enactment than the Land Acquisition Act itself
Their Lordships regard the local Act as doing nothing more than incorporating certain provisions from an existing Act and for convenience of drafting doing so by reference to that Act instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it was desired to adopt 1 1881 8 Q D D 63
2 L R 58 I A 259
157 It was further observed at p 267  In this country it is accepted that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second  see the cases collected in Craies on Statute Law 3rd edn
pp 349 350
This doctrine finds expression in a common form section which regularly appears in the amending and repealing Acts which are passed from time to time in India
x x x x x The independent existence of the two Acts is therefore recognized despite the death of the parent Act its offspring survives in the incorporating Act
Though no such saving clause appears in the General Clauses Act their Lordships think that the principles involved is as applicable in India as it is in this country
It seems to be not less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act no addition to the former Act which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Art can be deemed to be incorporated in it at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition This Court in The Collector of Customs Madras vs Nathelle Sampethu Chetty and Another1 considered the Privy Council decision in the Hindusthan Co operative Insurance Society Ltd 2 and distinguished that case and held the principle inapplicable to the facts of that case
In State of Bihar vs section K Roy2 this Court was considering the definition of employer in section 2e of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act 1948 Where that expression was defined to
mean the owner of a coal mine as defined in clause g of section 3 of the Indian Mines Act 1923
The Indian Mines Act 1923 had been repealed and substituted by the Act 35 of 1952
In the latter Act the word owner had been defined in cl
1 of section 2
The question was whether by virtue of section 8 of the General Clauses Act the definition of the word employer in cl
e of section 2 of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act should be construed with reference to the definition of the word owner in cl
1 of section 2 of Act 35 of 1952 which repealed the earlier Act and reenacted it
It may be mentioned that according to section 21 of Act 35 of 1952 the word owner when used in relation to a mine means  any person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or of any part thereof and in the case of a mine the business whereof is being carried on by a liquidator or receiver such liquidators receiver  
The expression coal mine is separately defined in cl
b of section 2 of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonn 1   at pp
830 833
2 LR 58 IA 259
3 1966 Supp
SCR 259
158 Schemes Act 1948
Ramaswami J speaking for the Court observed at p 261  As a matter of construction it must be held that all works machinery tramways and sidings whether above or below ground in nor adjacent to a coal mine will come within the scope and ambit of the definition only when they belong to the coal mine
In other words the word or occurring before the expression belonging to a coal mine in the main definition has to be read to mean and
 This case as well as the decision in New Central Jute Mills Co Ltd V The Assistant Collector of Central Excise Allahabad  others1 are distinguishable on the facts and legislation which this Court was considering
In the New Central Jute Mills Co Ltds1 case the Privy Council decision in the Hindusthan Co operative Insurance Society Ltd s case supra was referred to and distinguished
It is however contended by the learned Solicitor General that both in Nathella Sampathu Chetty s case supra as well as the New Central Jute Mills Co Ltd s case1 this Court was considering the effects of the two Acts which were made by Parliament by central legislation and it is therefore not strictly a case of incorporation because the Central Legislature is deemed to have while making the latter enactment kept in view the provisions of the former Act
In our view this may not be conclusive
in Ram Sarup vs Munshi and Others2 a judgment of the Bench of five Judges of this Court held that the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 had no effect on the continued operation of the Punjab Preemption Act 1913 and that the expression agricultural land  in the later Act had to be read as if the definition of the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it
After referring to the observations of Brett LJ in Clarke s case supra Rajagopala Ayyangar J speaking for the court observed at pp 868869  Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has in general no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated
x x x x x x In the circumstances therefore the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 has no effect on the continued operation of the Preemption Act and the expression  agricultural land  in the later Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it
 The above decision of this Court is more in point and supports our conclusion
In our view the intention of Parliament for modifying the has no relevance in determining the intention of the Orissa Legislature in enacting the Taxation Act
Apart from 1 2  159 this aspect the power of taxation as we have said earlier is not in the Concurrent List III but in List II and construed as a taxation measure we cannot extend the ambit of it by mere implication
As we said it is possible for both the Acts to co exist even after the definition of motor vehicle  in the Act has been amended
It is therefore clear that the definition of motor vehicle as existing Prior to 1956 Amendment would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act
Mr Tarkunde has referred to section 6 of the in support of his contention that after the amendmentthe amended definition would apply to the Taxation Act
But we do not think that there is any justification for thissubmission
Section 6 of the  specifically refers to that Act or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the and states that if these Acts repeal any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect the matters specified in clauses a to e of that section
Since the Taxation Act is a State Act neither section 6 nor section 6A of the has any relevance
That Act has to be interpreted in the light of the Orissa and since there is no question of any amendment or any repeal of any of the Orissa Acts affecting the Taxation Act section 7 of the Orissa has also no relevance
If so the question is whether these vehicles were used solely upon the premises of the owner
On this aspect there can be no doubt because there is evidence to show that dumpers rockers and tractaires tractors with air compressed attachment are exclusively used on the premises of the owners
In Civil Appeal No 1816 of 1968 P W 1 Assistant Superintendent of Mines Bolani Ores Ltd stated that there is no public road within their leasehold premises
No member of public is allowed to enter into leasehold premises without due permission obtained before hand
They have check gates on the approach road to their leasehold
All the machines are within leasehold and never outside it
In cross examination no doubt he admitted that the leasehold has no fence
He however stated that there is an official approach road to the plant
He also stated in cross examination that there is a gate book gate register and a security guard
From this evidence it is clear that though there is no fence there are check gates and the public are not allowed to enter into the leasehold without prior permission and the machines are used within the leasehold premises
The mere fact that there is no fence does not mean that the leasehold premises are not enclosed premises
It is obvious that no one can get into the leasehold premises without having to go through the gate for which gate book gate register and security guard are provided
In Civil Appeal No 1817 of 1968 Orissa Mineral Development Company s case P W 1 stated in his evidence that the dumpers in the schedule were to carry ores from the place of excavation in the railway wagon within the mining area
The members of the public have no right to enter into it
There are check gates and guards
160 P W 2 stated in his evidence that the suit vehicles were used at the place of mining operations
The members of the public have no access to the mining area
There were ten to twelve guards around the mining area and there were also guards at the gates of the approaching road
The guards were to prevent the unauthorised persons to enter into the mining area and there was a duty chart of those guards
No doubt P W 4 stated in his evidence that the area within which the machines were used was neither fenced nor walled around
Similarly in Civil Appeal No 336 of 1970 in the case of Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd it has been stated in the reply affidavit in paragraph 4 that a trench 4 X4 x2  is dug alround the mining area so as to prevent free ingress and egress to the mining area
Certain pit areas are fenced with barbed wire
In fact to avoid accidents particular area where dumpers are being used have necessarily to be fenced
This is required under the Mining Act and Rules framed thereunder
 In reply to paragraph 4 it has been stated by the respondent that the allegations of the deponent in paragraph 4 of his affidavit except the allegation that the mining area is a well defined and enclosed area are substantially correct
From the very nature of the area operated by these three companies it is obvious that the machines which are the subject matter of these appeals must be working in their respective mining areas
The mere fact that there is no fence or the barbed wire around the leasehold premises is not conclusive
There is evidence to show that the public arc not allowed to go inside without prior permission there are gates and a check on ingress and egress is kept by guards who also ensure that no unauthorised persons have access to the mining area all of which indicate that the respective mining areas are enclosed premises within the meaning of the exceptions under section 2c of the Taxation Act
In the result Civil Appeal 33670 is dismissed with cost and other appeal  are partly allowed and it is held that dumpers and rockers though registrable under the Act are not taxable under the Taxation Act as long as they are working solely within the premises of the respective owners
So far as the tractairs are concerned they are neither registerable under the Act nor taxable under the Taxation Act
The appellants will get proportionate costs
As we have held that these machines are not taxable the question about the constitutional validity of the Taxation Act challenged by Writ Petition No 372 of 1974 filed by Bolani Ores Ltd would become academic and need not be considered
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed but without costs
PBR CA33670 and WP 37274 dismissed C A 1816 181768 partly allowed


Summary:
The appellants who owned Dumpers Rockers and Tractors claimed that these machines were not liable for registration under section 22 of the Indian and as such were not taxable under section 6 of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1930
The trial court held that the machinery were motor vehicles within the meaning of section 218 of the and were therefore liable for registration under that Act and so to payment of tax under the Taxation Act
The High Court held that unless it was shown that the vehicles were of a special type adapted for use only in factories or enclosed premises and incapable of running on any other type of roads or public roads the vehicles were motor vehicles and that the three types not being motor vehicles were not liable for registration under section 22 of the Act nor were they subject to payment of tax under the Taxation Act
Section 2c of  the Taxation Act adopted the definition of motor vehicle contained in the Motor Vehicles Act 1914
The Motor Vehicles Act 1914 was repealed and replaced by the 
The definition of motor vehicle in section 218 of the having been redefined the Taxation Act by the Orissa Amendment Act 2 of 1940 adopted that definition for the purpose of taxation
The Orissa Amendment Act 1943 reenacted provisions of sections 2 to 8 of the Taxation Act as the Amendment Act 2 of 1940 was due to expire
Section 218 of the was amended by Act 100 of 1956
But there was no corresponding amendment in the definition of section 2c of the Taxation Act
It was contended in this Court that under the definition of motor vehicle as it existed prior to amendment or subsequent thereto dumpers rockers and tractors were not motor vehicles because they were not adapted to use on the road and 2 the definition of motor vehicle in section 2c of the Taxation Act is not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference and as such the meaning of motor vehicle for the purpose of section 2c of the Taxation Act would be the same as defined from time to time under sections 82 to 18 of the 
HELD  Dumpers and rockers though registrable under the are not taxable under the Taxation Act as long as they are working solely within the premises of the respective owners
So far as the tractairs are concerned they are neither registrable under the nor taxable under the Taxation Act
160 F A motor vehicle which is not adapted for use upon roads to which public have no right of access is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of section 218 of the Act
The words is adapted for use have the same connotation as is suitable or is fit for use on the roads
The meaning of the word adopted in section 218 of the Act is itself indicated in entry 57 of List If of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution which confers powers on the State to tax vehicles whether propelled mechanically or not and uses the words suitable in relation to its use on the roads
The words adapted for use must
therefore be constructed as suitable for use
The words adapted for use 139 cannot be larger in their import by including vehicles which are not suitable for use on roads
A perusal of the provisions of the Act would justify the conclusion that it is not necessary for other vehicles registered under the Act to be also liable for payment of tax under the Taxation Act
153 G A 151 F G Daley and others vs Hargreaves  MacDonald vs Carmichael  Maddox vs Storer and Burns vs Currell  referred to
2 The power of taxation under Entry 57 List II cannot exceed the compensatory nature which must have some nexus with the vehicles using the public roads
If the vehicles do not use roads notwithstanding that they are registered under the Act they cannot be taxed
If this be the Purpose and object of the Taxation Act when the motor vehicle is defined under section 2c of the Taxation Act as having the same meaning as in the then the intention of the legislature could not have been anything but to incorporate only the definition in the as it existed in 1943 as if that definition was bodily written into section 2c of the Taxation Act
If the subsequent Orissa Motor Vehicle Taxation Amendment Act 1943 incorpo rating the definition of motor vehicle referred to the definition of motor vehicle under the Act as then existing the effect of this regulative method would amount to an incorporation by reference to the provisions of section 218 of the Act in section 2c of the Taxation Act
Any subsequent amendment in the Act or a total repeal of the Act under a fresh legislation on that topic would not affect the definition of motor vehicle in section 2c of the Taxation Act
155 B D E The use of the word has  in the expression has the same meaning as in the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 in section 2c of the Act would justify the assumption that the legislature had intended to incorporate the definition under the Act as it then existed and not as it may exist from time to time 155 F In re
Woa s Estate 188631 Ch
D607 Clarke vs Bradlaugh 18888 QBD 63 Secretary of State for India in Council vs Hindusthan Co operative Insurances Society Ltd LR 58 IA 259 State of Bihar vs section K Ray 1966 Supp
SCR 259 and Ram Sarup vs Munshi and Others   referred to
The definition of motor vehicle as existing prior to the 1956 amendment of the would alone be applicable as being incorporated in the Taxation Act
The intention of Parliament for modifying the has no relevance in determining the intention of the Orissa Legislature in enacting the Taxation Act
The power of taxation is not in the concurrent List but in List It and construed as a taxation measure the ambit of it cannot be extended by mere implication
It is possible for both the Acts to Co exist even after the definition of motor vehicle in the Act has been amended
159 B 158 H In the instant case there is evidence to show that the dumpers rockers and tractairs are exclusively used on the premises of the owners
159 E The machines which are the subject matter of these appeals must be working in their respective mining areas
The mere fact that them is no fence or barbed wire around the leasehold premises is not conclusive
There is evidence to show that the public are not allowed to go inside without prior permission there are gates and a check on ingress and egress is kept by guards who also ensure that no unauthorised persons have access to the mining area
160 DE