ivil Appeal No 1213 of 1979
583 From the Judgment and Order dated 244
1978 of the Gujarat High Court in LPA No 97 of 1978
Appellant in person
HS Parihar for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
The appellant DM Bharati challenges the validity of an order dated 309
1976 passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad
By the said order the Deputy Municipal Commissioner consequent on the staff of the Municipal Corporation working in the Town Planning Estab lishment having to be absorbed in the Municipal Corporation reverted the appellant from the post of junior draftsman in the Establishment and appointed him to act in the post of a tracer in the Town Development Department of the Corpora tion
The High Court rejected his writ petition and hence the present appeal
It is necessary to state the relevant facts
The appel lant had been appointed as a tracer in the Estate Department of the Municipal Corporation on 266
1955 and worked there till 18th February 1957
It appears that the Government appointed a Town Planning Officer under the provisions of section 31 of the Bombay Town Planning Act
The Town Planning Officer had to be supplied with an establishment
The establishment of the Town Planning Officer was admitted ly temporary
An arrangement was entered into between the two authorities that the arbitrator in the planning office could select such persons from the Corporation for his establishment as he thought fit
The Town Planning Officer demanded the services of the appellant and he was appointed as a tracer in the Town Planning Establishment on 222 1957
It is not clear whether the appellant went therein by way of transfer or by way of deputation as the original order dated 222
1957 is not available with us
However the High Court and the appellant have proceeded on the footing that the appellant was deputed from the Municipal Corporation to the Town Planning Establishment
Sometime later the post of a junior draftsman fell vacant in the Town Planning Establishment
The appellant tells us that he was asked to take charge of that post on 412
It appears that Mr Yevla Respondent No 6 in the WP was posted to fill in that vacancy but 584 on 214
1960 his appointment was cancelled and the appel lant was appointed as junior draftsman in the Town Planning Establishment wef
The appellant tells us that he had also been subsequently recommended for appointment to the post of Surveyor cum Draftsman which was a higher post and which had fallen vacant on 282
But before this proposal could materialise the appellant was suspended on 5th December 1962 by the Corporation and was removed from service on 13564
The Industrial Court granted approval to the removal of the appellant from service but made certain observations suggesting that he may be re appointed to the said post
The appellant filed a writ petition against the order of the industrial court
The High Court eventually set aside the order of the industrial court on 12
1969 and remanded the matter for fresh disposal to the industrial court
The Municipal Corporation preferred SLP 4871 in this Court which was dismissed on 27171
The industrial court re heard the matter pursuant to the order of the High Court and declined approval to the order of removal of the appellant from service with the result that the order of removal dated 13564 stood vacated and an order was passed on 3371 by the Municipal Commissioner that the appellant was reappointed as a junior draftsman in the Town Planning Establishment
In the meantime on 168
1965 consequent on the recom mendations of the industrial court the appellant was ap pointed as junior draftsman in the Estates Department of the Municipal Corporation where he had been previously working
This purported to be a fresh appointment and so the appel lant made a representation that he should be appointed in this post according to his seniority
No orders were passed on this representation except a direction that the appellant should join service within a week of receipt of the memo and then represent his case for seniority if he so desired
Thereupon the appellant accepted the order re appointing him as junior draftsman in the Estates Department and took charge of his office
The order of the High Court has found that the appellant was relieved from service on 1101967 because of retrenchment
When the above proceedings in the case of the appellant were taking place respondents 6 to 11 were directly selected as junior draftsmen by the Staff Selection Committee and promoted to the said post
The appellant did not appear before the Staff Selection Committee perhaps because of the various proceedings above referred to as a result of which he was under suspension from 512 1962 to 135
1964 when he was removed and then again till 16865 when he was re 585 appointed as a draftsman
Once the proceedings against the appellant came to a close the Municipal Commissioner passed order on 33 1971 cancelling the order dated 135
1964 removing the appellant from service
He was re appointed as a junior draftsman in the Town Planning establishment
Subsequently however the Town Planning Establishment was abolished and the appellant was served with the order dated 309
1976 by which he was reverted to the services of the Municipal Corporation
On such reverter however as we have seen he was posted as a tracer and not as a junior drafts man
The appellant filed an appeal against the said order before the Standing Committee but his appeal was rejected on 153
1977 on the ground that in the Corporation direct recruits were already working as junior draftsmen and that there was no post of junior draftsman vacant in the Corpora tion to which the appellant could be appointed
The appel lant thereupon filed a writ petition and as already stated he was unsuccessful therein and hence this present appeal
The appellant s contention before the High Court was two fold
The first contention was that since he had been ap pointed as junior draftsman in the Town Planning establish ment by the order dated 214
1960 he could not be repatri ated as a tracer in the Municipal Corporation that is to a lower post
It was also contended that the order dated 309
1976 has been passed by the Deputy Municipal Commissioner who is a person lower in rank than the person who appointed him namely the Municipal Commissioner and that therefore the order dated 30976 was passed by an officer without jurisdiction
These two arguments have been reiterated before us also
So far as the second contention is concerned it may at once be pointed out that if the order dated 30976 is an order of reversion by way punishment the appellant s contention may be correct in view of the provi sions contained in sections 53 and 56 of the Bombay Provin cial Municipal Corporation Act
However if the order dated 30976 has merely given effect to the abolition of the Town Planning establishment and restored the appellant to the post he can properly hold in the Municipal Corporation then no element of reversion would be involved and the Deputy Commissioner would be quite competent to pass the order in question
The only question therefore that survives for consideration is regarding the validity of an order dated 30976 in so far as it purported to appoint the appellant as a tracer in the Municipal Corporation instead of as a junior draftsman
We may mention here that a point was also made that the appellant should not have been appointed as an acting tracer but it has been explained by the Corporation that it was a verbal inaccuracy and that the appointment 586 of the appellant in the Municipal Corporation is not an acting but a substantive one
This point therefore does not survive
We shall proceed on the assumption that the appellant went to the Town Planning establishment which was a tempo rary one by way of deputation from the Municipal Corpora tion
There is some controversy as to whether the appellant was properly promoted as junior draftsman in the Town Plan ning establishment
There is a suggestion that both the demand by the Town Planning establishment for the services of the appellant as well as his promotion therein were not acceptable to the Corporation and that they were the conse quence of undue favour shown to the appellant by the Arbi trator who was the appointing authority
We do not think it is necessary to go into this controversy here because it is quite clear that the appellant s promotion as junior drafts man and proposed promotion as Surveyor cum Draftsman in the Town Planning Establishment cannot confer any rights on him in his parent department
When he left the Municipal Corpo ration and joined the Town Planning establishment he was a tracer and he can go back to the Estate Department or any other Department of the Municipal Corporation only to his original post ie as tracer subject to the modification that if in the meantime he had qualified for promotion to a higher post that benefit cannot be denied to him
In the present case unfortunately what happened was that when junior draftsmen were recruited by the Municipal Corporation in 1959 60 and in 1963 64 persons were selected and ap pointed to the said posts through the machinery of a Staff Selection Committee
The appellant submits that he had been wrongly overlooked and that the respondents had been wrongly promoted as junior draftsmen
He points out that under the regulations junior draftsmen had to be appointed by promo tion on the basis of seniority cure fitness and that the question of Staff Selection Committee did not at all arise
According to him the procedure for selecting by Staff Selection Committee would not come into force when the recruitment was restricted to persons in the municipal service
In the present case however all the persons who were appointed as junior draftsmen during the appellant s absence were from the municipal service
The appointment should therefore have been made directly by promotion without the intervening machinery of the Staff Selection Committee and the appellant being the seniormost tracer should have been appointed as junior draftsman in preference to respondents 6 to 11
There are considerable difficulties in accepting this case of the appellant
In the first place what he is really attempting is to challenge 587 the appointments of respondents 6 to 11 which had been made in 1963 64 by a writ petition filed in 1978 more than a decade after the above selections and appointments had been made It is true that at that time the appellant was under a cloud because he had been suspended and subsequently removed from service
But all the same if he had desired to challenge those appointments he should have taken immediate steps
Anyhow these obstacles had disappeared when the tribunal on remand by High Court had disapproved the appellant s removal from service by the order dated 135
At least in 1971
when the order was passed restoring him to the position of junior draftsman in the Town Planning establishment he could and should have taken steps to obtain his pro forma promotion in the parent department
The appellant says he was making some representations but this was not enough
The fact is that he took no effective steps to challenge the appointment of respondents 6 to 11 from 1963 64 right upto 1521978 when he filed the writ petition or atleast upto 1101976 when he made a represen tation against the order of reversion
Quite apart from the above consideration there is no material before us to show that the appointments of respond ents 6 to 11 were made irregularly and that the constitution of a Staff Selection Committee for selecting junior drafts men did not conform to the regulations and the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act
The Corpo ration has stated that they have been directly recruited
The High Court has pointed out that the relevant regulation gave a discretion to the Commissioner to make the appoint ments by promotion or by direct recruitment
section 542 of the Municipal Act on which the petitioner relies no doubt dispenses with the Staff Selection Committee when it is proposed to fill the appointment from among persons already in municipal service
But the nature of the recruitment that took place is not known
That apart the constitution of a Staff Selection Committee to decide upon the selections cannot be said to be illegal even though not mandatory in the situation
The High Court has found as a fact at more than one place in the judgment that the respondents 6 to 11 had been directly selected as junior draftsmen after proper scrutiny by the Staff Selection Committee
Even the appel lant stated before us that there was a circular among the municipal employees in regard to these appointments and selections
The appellant should have made an application for selection at that time or if he thought it more appro priate should have challenged the constitution of Staff Selection Committee and the direct recruitment and not forward his claim for promotion as junior draftsman by virtue of his 588 seniority
That he failed to do at the crucial time
It may be that this was because he had certain difficulties facing him by way of suspension and subsequent expulsion from service
But even in 1971 after his original order of suspension and removal had been set aside he took no imme diate steps to claim his rights in the parent department
He was apparently satisfied with his restoration as junior draftsmen in the Town Planning establishment
We are in agreement with the High Court that having regard to the circumstances of the appointment of respondents 6 to 11 he was not entitled to any promotion in preference to them and that he cannot claim appointment as junior draftsman when there was no such post in 1976 to which he could be appoint ed
It is not his case that any posts of junior draftsmen became vacant after his reversion to the parent department to which he could have been promoted
The appellant contends that the fact that his eligibili ty for appointment as a junior draftsman in the parent department had been accepted by the order dated 1681965 referred to earlier
It is also pointed out that subsequent ly a question arose of the seniority as between the appel lant and one Kavadia
This was gone into and the Municipal Corporation accepted the position that the appellant pos sessed qualifications required for the post of junior draftsman and that he was senior to Mr Kavadia
This was sometime in 1966
We however find that this aspect of the matter does not help the appellant because the order dated 168
1965 was passed in pursuance of the recommendation of the industrial court while approving the appellant s remov al that he may be reconsidered for appointment
In view of this order of the industrial court the appellant had to be given a posting and since he had been discharged from serv ice when he was a junior draftsman orders were passed appointing him as junior draftsman
This again was made as an order of fresh appointment and the appellant s represen tation that he should be given seniority was not accepted rightly for the reason mentioned above
There is also the further fact that the appellant was relieved from this post with effect from October 1 1967
There has been apparent ly no challenge to this order
Moreover these orders lost their basis once the petitioner was restored to his post in the Town Planning Establishment
In these circumstances the order dated 16865 or the determination of seniority be tween appellant and Kavadia in 1966 do not help the appel lant s case
Learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation submitted to us that the appellant had not joined his post as a tracer in compliance 589 with the order dated 30976 and that by now he has also reached the age of superannuation
We are not here concerned in this appeal with the consequences of non acceptance of the order dated 30976 by the appellant
We are only con cerned with the question whether the appellant was rightly appointed as tracer on his reverter to the Municipal Corpo ration and that question we have answered in the affirma tive
We do not express any opinion on the questions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent
In the circumstances we are of the opinion that there are no grounds to interfere with the order of the High Court
We therefore dismiss this appeal but in the cir cumstances we make no order as to costs
GN Appeal dis missed


Summary:
Respondents No 2 to 4 regular employees of the appel lant Delhi Transport Corporation were served with termina tion notices under Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Trans port Authority Conditions of Appointment  Service Regula tions 1952 by the appellant Corporation on the ground that they became inefficient in their work and started inciting other members not to perform their duties
The three respondents and their Union respondent No 1 filed writ petition in High Court challenging the constitu tional validity of Regulation 9b which gave the manage ment right to terminate the services of an employee by giving one month s notice or pay in lieu thereof
The Divi sion Bench of the High Court struck down the Regulation holding that the Regulation gave absolute unbridled and arbitrary powers to the management to terminate the services of any permanent or temporary employee and such power was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
Hence the Corporation filed the appeal before this Court by special leave
The validity of similar provisions in Para 522 of the Shastri Award rule 1i of the District Board Rules 1926 Part V Regulation 13 of Indian Airlines Employees  Service Regulations Regulation 48 of Air India Employees  Service Regulations and also the clause in the contract of appoint ment in respect of employees of Zilla Parishad and the New India Assurance Company also came up for consideration in the connected appeals and applications filed before this Court
It was contended on behalf of the Delhi Transport Corpo ration that there was sufficient guideline in Regulation 9b and the power of termination properly read would not be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution that the Court would be entitled to obtain guidance from the preamble the policy and the purpose of the Act and the power conferred under it and to see that the power was exercised only for that purpose that even a term like public interest  could be sufficient guidance in the matter of retirement of a government employee and such a provision could be read into a statute even when it was not otherwise expressly there that it was well settled that the Court would sustain the presumption of constitutionality by con sidering matters of common knowledge and to assume every state of facts which could be conceived and could even read down the section if it became necessary to uphold the validity of the provision that the underlying 144 rationale of this rule of interpretation or the doctrine of reading down of a statute being that when a legislature whose powers were not unlimited enacted a statute it was aware of its limitations and in the absence of express intention or clear language to the contrary it must be presumed to have implied into the statute the requisite limitations and conditions to immunise it from the virus of unconstitutionality that since every legislature intended to act within its powers in a limited Government the legislature would attempt to function within its limited powers and it would not be expected to have intended to transgress its limits that the guidelines for the exercise of the power of termination simpliciter under Regulation 9b could be found in the statutory provisions of the 1950 Act under which the regulations had been framed the pream ble Sections 19 20 and 53 the context of Regulation 9b read with Regulations 9a and 15 that even for the exer cise of this power reasons could be recorded although they need not be communicated which would ensure a check on the arbitrary exercise of power and effective judicial review in a given case ensuring efficient running of services and in public interest and the regulations in question were paral lel to but not identical with the exceptions carved out under proviso to Article 3112 that even the power of termination simipliciter under Regulation 9b could only be exercised in circumstances other than those in Regulation 9a ie not where the foundation of the order was mis conduct  the exercise of such power could only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute that the principles of natural justice or holding of an enquiry is neither a universal principle of justice nor inflexible dogma and the principles of natural justice were not incapa ble of exclusion in a given situation if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the adminis trative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands natural justice could be avoided that the words where it is not reasonably prac ticable to hold an enquiry may be imported into the regula tion that where termination took place by the exclusion of audi alteram partem rule in circumstances which were circum scribed and coupled with the safeguard of recording of reasons which were germane and relevant then the termina tion would not render the regulation unreasonable or arbi trary and if the regulation was read in this manner it could not be said that the power was uncanalised or unguid ed that under ordinary law of master and servant the Corporation was empowered by the Contract of Service to terminate the services of its employees in terms thereof the Declaration in Brojo Nath s case that such a contract was void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act or opposed to public policy offending the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles was not sound in law as a master the Corporation had unbridled right 145 to terminate the contract in the interests of efficient functioning of the Corporation or to maintain discipline among its employees and if the termination was found to be wrongful the only remedy available to the employees was to claim damages for wrongful termination but not a declaration as was granted in Brojo Nath s case
On behalf of the workmenintervenors it was submitted that provision of any rule that service would be liable to termination on notice for the period prescribed therein contravened Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary and uncontrolled power was left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action would be taken that Articles 14 19 and 21 were inter related and Article 21 did not exclude Article 19 and even if there was a law providing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty and there was consequently no infringement of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 such law in so far as it abridged or took away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that Article that violation of principle of natural justice by State action was viola tion of Article 14 which could be excluded only in excep tional circumstances and therefore a clause which autho rised the employer to terminate the services of an employee whose contract of service was for indefinite period or till the age of retirement by serving notice and which did not contain any guidance for the exercise of the power and without recording reasons for such termination violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 191g and 21 and principles of natural justice and was void under Section 2g of the  and unforce able under Section 2hi that since audi alteram partem was a requirement of Article 14
and conferment of arbitrary power itself was contrary to Article 14 the rule in ques tion could not be sustained as valid that the Constitution al guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 were for all persons and there could be no basis for making a distinction between workmen  to whom the Industrial Disputes Act and other industrial laws applied and those who were outside their purview and the law applicable to the former could only add to and not detract from the rights guaranteed by Part 111 of the Constitution that the power to terminate the services of a person employed to serve indefinitely or till the age of retirement could be exercised only in cases of proved misconduct or exceptional circumstances having regard to the Constitutional guarantee available under Article 14 191g and 21 and unless the exceptional circumstances were spelt out the power to terminate the services would cover both permissible and impermissible grounds rendering it wholly invalid particularly because the requirement of audi alteram partem which was a part of the guarantee of 146 Article 14 was sought to be excluded and there could be no guidance available in the body of the law itself since the purpose for which an undertaking was established and the provisions dealing with the same in the law could provide no guidance regarding exceptional circumstances under which alone the power could be exercised that the question in volved in the instant cases was not the exercise of power which an employer possessed to terminate the services of his employee but the extent of that power that provisions of Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations 1952 could not be rendered constitutional by reading the require ment of recording reasons and confining it to cases where it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry and read ing it down further as being applicable to only exceptional cases would not be permissible construction and proper that the Regulation conferred arbitrary power of leaving it to the DTC Management to pick and choose either to hold an enquiry or terminate the services for the same misconduct and there was nothing in the provisions of the Act or the regulations from which the Management could find any guid ance and therefore in order to conform to the constitu tional guarantees contained in Articles 14 191g and 21 the regulation would have to make a distinction between cases where services were sought to be terminated for mis conduct and cases of termination on grounds other than what would constitute misconduct that regulation 9b deliber ately conferred wide power of termination of service without giving reasonable opportunity to an employee even if he was regular or permanent employee in addition to regulation 15 which provided for dismissal or removal after a disciplinary enquiry thus the intention of the regulation making au thority was clear and unambiguous the provision was not capable of two interpretations and consequently the ques tion of reading down did not arise and reading down in the instant cases involved not interpretation of any single word in regulation 9b but adding a whole clause to it which amounted to rewriting the provisions which courts had refused to make up for the omission of the legislature and would inevitably drain out Article 14 of its vitality and the right to equality which was regarded as a basic feature of the Constitution and subject permanent employees of the DTC to a tremendous sense of insecurity which is against the philosophy and scheme of the Constitution that unless the provision of the Constitution itself excluded the principles of natural justice they continued to be applicable as an integral part of the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution that as the employees of the DTC were not Government employees Article 3112 was not applicable and Article 14 fully applied to them including the principles of natural justice
147 On behalf of the Indian Airlines Corporation and the Air India which filed intervention applications it was submit ted that there had been distinction between the discharge simpliciter and dismissal from service by way of punishment that the effect of the judgments of this Court in the Cen tral Inland Water s case and West Bengal s case was to take away the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee by way of discharge simpliciter that this Court had recognised the existence of the inherent right of an employer to terminate the services of an employee in terms of the contract of employment and also under the various labour enactments that a plain reading of the amended Regulation 13 of the Indian Airlines Employees  Regulations and a cumulative reading of the amended regulations 48 and 44 of the Air India Employees Service Regulations clearly established that the vice if any of arbitrariness had been completely removed and that the power to terminate had been vested with the Board of Directors and not with any indi vidual and sufficient guidelines made available to the Board to exercise the restricted and limited power available to the employer under these regulations
On behalf of another intervenor New India Assurance Co it was submitted that the Central Inland Water s case was erroneous insofar as it made complete negation of power of the employer to terminate and rendered the termination illegal even where the employer had made all the necessary investigation and had given hearing to the employee con cerned before making the order and took in even private employment therefore the judgment of this Court should be read down and made applicable prospectively
In Civil Appeal No 4073 of 1986 it was contended on behalf of the Bank employee whose services were terminated under para 522 of the Shastri Award that mere failure of the employee to mention the loan taken by him from another branch of the Bank which was repaid subsequently had deprived him of his livelihood and his services were termi nated without charge of misconduct  and without an enquiry and paragraph 522 of the Shastri Award gave no indication as to on what conditions this arbitrary uncontrolled power could be used to get rid of one or more permanent employees for efficient management of Banks on subjective opinions or suspicion not tested in enquiry into facts and that this provision provided for insecurity of tenure for lakhs of permanent employees Articles 14 191g and 21 and the integrated protection of these Fundamental Rights excluded the doctrine of pleasure and insisted on security of tenure during good behaviour and the right to livelihood could not be rendered precari 148 ous or reduced to a glorious uncertainty that no princi ple of interpretation permitted reading down a provision so as to make it into a different provision altogether differ ent from what was intended by the legislature or its dele gate and there could not be any reading down which was contrary to the principles of interpretation that if two provisions existed firstly to remove from service after holding an enquiry on a charge of misconduct  and secondly without serving a charge sheet or holding an enquiry all provisions for holding enquiry would be rendered otiose and would be reduced to a mere redundancy that the Court had a duty to correct wrongs even if orders had been made which were later found to be violative of any fundamental right and to recall its orders to avoid injustice that substan tive provision of para 522 could not be controlled or cur tailed effectively so as to confine its operation within narrow constitutional limits that it was not the duty of the court to condone the constitutional delinquencies of those limited by the Constitution if they arrogated uncon trolled unconstitutional powers which were neither neces sary nor germane for supposed efficiency of services in the Banks as a business enterprise and that in a system gov erned by rule of law discretion when conferred upon execu tive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits
In Civil Appeal No I 115 of 1976 the appellant employ ee of the Zila Parishad contended that his services were terminated on account of the vindictiveness of some of the employees of the respondent and without enquiry
The em ployer submitted that the termination order was passed on the basis of the condition in the mutually agreed terms of contract of appointment and resolution passed by the Board and that Rule 1i of District Board Rules 1926 Part V gave right to both the parties to terminate the employment on one month s notice
On the questions i whether Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations 1952 was arbitrary illegal discriminatory and violative of audi alteram partem and so constitutionally invalid and void and ii whether the Regulation could be interpreted and read down in such a manner as to hold that it was not discriminatory or arbi trary and did not confer unbriddled and uncanalised power on the authority to terminate the service of an employee including a permanent employee without any reason whatsoev er
Dismissing Civil Appeal No 2876 of 1986 appeal by the Delhi Transport Corporation allowing Civil Appeal No 1115 of 1976 and directing other matters to be placed before a Division Bench in ac 149 cordance with the majority decision per Ray Sharma Sawant and K Ramaswamy JJ this Court HELD Per Ray J 1
I Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Transport Author ity Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations 1952 which confers powers on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent and confirmed employee by issuing a notice terminating the services or by making payment in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons in the order and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing the orders is wholly arbitrary uncanalised and unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well as Article 14 of the Constitution
There is no guide line in the Regulations or in the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act 1950 as to when or in which cases and circum stances this power of termination by giving notice or pay in lieu thereof can be exercised
264G 285C 12 Government Companies or Public Corporations which carry on trade and business activity of State being State instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such they are subject to the observance of fundamental rights embodied in Part 111 as well as to conform to the directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution
In other words the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them are to be tested by the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution
Furthermore the procedure prescribed by their Rules or Regulations must be reasonable fair and just and not arbitrary fanciful and unjust
264H 265A B 13 The audi alteram partem  rule which in essence enforces the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitu tion is applicable not only to quasi judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party in question unless the application of the rule has been ex pressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here
Rules of natural justice do no supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations
Moreover the Rule of Law which permeates the Constitution of India demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurally
Rule of law posits that the power to be exercised in a manner which is just fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for discrimination
265D E Regulation 9b does not expressly exclude the application of the 150 audi alteram parterm  rule and as such the order of termi nation of service of a permanent employee cannot be passed by simply issuing a month s notice or pay in lieu thereof without recording any reason in the order and without giving any hearing to the employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which the purported order is made
265F 14 Considering from all these aspects Regulation 9b is illegal and void as it is arbitrary discriminatory and without any guidelines for exercise of the power
It confers unbridled uncanalised and arbitrary power on the authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording any reasons and without conforming to the princi ples of natural justice
It is also void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy and also ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution
265E 265B C 266G Moti Ram Deka Etc
vs General Manager NEF Railways Maligaon
Pandu Etc   Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union of India   Shyam Lal vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr   Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice SR Tendolkar  Ors   Jyoti Pershad vs The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi   State of Orissa vs Dr Miss Binapani Devi  Ors   AK Kraipak of India vs Col JN Sinha and Anr 1971 1 SCR 791 Air India Corporation vs VA Rebello  Ant AIR 1972 SC 1343 The Workmen of Sudder Office Cinnamara vs The Manage ment  Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd vs Work men  Anr   Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India 1978 2 SCR 621 EP Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu and Anr   Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs Malvenkar  Ors   Manohar P Kharkher and Anr
vs Raghuraj  Anr  1
Michael  Anr
vs Johnaton Pumps India Ltd   Sukhdev Singh  Ors
vs Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghu vanshi  Anr   SS Muley vs JRD Tata  Ors  West Bengal State Electricity Board  Ors
vs Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Ors 1985 3 SCC 116 Workmen Of Hindustan Steel Ltd and Anr
vs Hindustan Steel Ltd and Ors   OP Bhandari vs Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd  Ors
   Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd  Anr
vs Brojo Nath Ganguly  Anr and Delhi Transport Undertaking vs Balbir Saran Goel   referred to
21 An Act can be declared to be valid wherein any term has been 151 used which per se seems to be without jurisdiction but can be read  down in order to make it constitutionally valid by separating and excluding the part which is invalid or by interpreting the word in such a fashion as to make it con stitutionally valid and within jurisdiction of the legisla ture which passed the said enactment by reading down the provisions of the Act
This however does not under any circumstances mean that where the plain and literal meaning that follows from a bare reading of the provisions of the Act Rule or Regulations that it confers arbitrary uncana lised unbridled unrestricted power to terminate the serv ices of a permanent employee without recording any reasons for the same and without adhering to the principles of natural justice and equality before the law as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution it can be read down to save the said provision from constitutional invalidity by bring ing or adding words in the said legislation such as saying that it implies that reasons for the order of termination have to be recorded
271C F 22 In interpreting the provisions of an Act it is not permissible where the plain language of the provision gives a clear and unambiguous meaning that it can be interpreted by reading down and presuming certain expressions in order to save it from constitutional invalidity
Therefore it is impossible to hold by reading down the provisions of Regula tion 9b framed under section 53 of the Delhi Road Trans port Act 1950 read with Delhi Road Transport Amendment Act 1971 that the said provision does not confer arbitrary unguided unrestricted and uncanalised power without any guidelines on the authority to terminate the services of an employee without conforming to the principles of natural justice and equality as envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution of India
271F H 272A Union of India  Anr
vs Tulsiram Patel  Ors 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131 Roshan Lal Tandon vs Union of India   Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh Indore  Ors
vs Radhakrishan  Ors
   In Re The Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act 1937 and the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Amendment Act 1938 and in Re a Special Reference under Section 213 of the Government of India Act 1935  RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India   RL Arora vs State of Uttar Pradesh  Ors
  and The Mysore State Electricity Board vs Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Ltd  Ors 1963 Supp
2 SCR 127 Jagaish Pandey vs The Chancellor of Bihar  Anr
   referred to
HN Seervai Constitutional Law of India Third Edi tion p 119 referred to
152 Per Sharma J 11 The rights of the parties in the present cases cannot be governed by the general principle of master and servant and the management cannot have unrestricted and unqualified power of terminating the services of the employ ees
In the interest of efficiency of the public bodies however they should have the authority to terminate the employment of undesirable inefficient corrupt indolent and disobedient employees but it must be exercised fairly objectively and independently and the occasion for the exercise must be delimited with precision and clarity
Further there should be adequate reason for the use of such a power and a decision in this regard has to be taken in a manner which should show fairness avoid arbitrariness and evoke credibility
And this is possible only when the law lays down detailed guidelines in unambiguous and precise terms so as to avoid the danger of misinterpretation of the situation
An element of uncertainty is likely to lead to grave and undesirable consequences
Clarity and precision are
therefore essential for the guidelines
272D F 12 Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Transport Authori ty Condition of Appointment and Service Regulation 1952 cannot therefore
be upheld for lack of adequate and appro priate guidelines
272G Per Sawant J 11
There is need to minimise the scope of the arbi trary use of power in all walks of life
It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals
however high placed they may be
It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life
liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies
It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power and good sense circumspection and fairness do not go with the posts however high they may be
There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility
The presumption is neither legal nor rational
History does not support it and reality does not warrant it
In particular in a society pledged to uphold the rule of law it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law
276E F 12 Beyond the self deluding and self asserting right eous presumption there is nothing to support the high authority  theory
This 153 theory undoubtedly weighed with some authorities for some time in the past
But its unrealistic pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried without even so much as an ode to it
278A B 13 The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property
It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working
Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency
To ensure both the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging certain and secured and not vague and whimiscal
With capricious service conditions both discipline and devotion are endangered and efficiency is impaired
276G H 277A 14 The right to life includes right to livelihood
The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fan cies of individuals in authority
The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy
Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income the right to work becomes as much fundamental
Fundamental rights can ill afford to be consigned to the limb of undefined premises and uncertain applications
That will be a mockery of them
277B 15 Both the society and the individual employed there fore have an anxious interest in service conditions being well defined and explicit to the extent possible
The arbi trary rules which are also sometimes described as Henry VIII Rules can have no place in any service conditions
277C Sukhdev Singh  Ors
vs Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghu vanshi  Anr
   Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India  The Manager Government Branch Press  Ant
vs DR Belliappa   The Manag ing Director Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation  Anr
vs Vinay Narayan Vajpayee   AL Kalra vs The Project  Equipment Corporation of India Ltd   Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd  Anr
vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  Ors
   West Bengal State Electricity Board  Ors
vs Desh Bandhu Ghosh  Ors 1985 2 SCR 1014 Olga Tellis  Ors
vs Bombay Municipal Corpora tion  Ors
 1985 Supp 2 SCR 51 Union of India  Anr
vs Tulsiram Patel Ors 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131 Cen tral Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd  Anr
vs Brojo Nath Ganguly  Anr
  OP Bhandari vs Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd  Ors   NC Dalwadi vs State of Gujarat 1987 3 154 SCC 611 MK Agarwal vs Gurgaon Gramin Bank  Ors 1987 Supp
SCC 643 and Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P  T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch etc
vs Union of India  Ors  referred to
21 The doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations
It is essen tially used firstly for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality
It is an exten sion of the principle that when two interpretations are possible one rendering it constitutional and the other making it constitutional the former should be preferred
The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from its viola tion of any of the provisions of the Constitution
The second situation which summons its aid is where the provi sions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intention of the legislature from the object of the statute the context in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it is made
However when the provision is cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is clear it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience
In such circumstances it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute
Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires to amend it
If the remaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided
The doctrine can never be called into play where the statute requires extensive additions and deletions
Not only it is no part of the court s duty to undertake such exercise but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so
288F H 289A B Re Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act 1937 and the Hindu Women s Rights to Property Amendment Act 1938 etc  Nalinakhya Bysack vs Shyam Sunder Halder  Ors
   RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs The Union of India   Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar 1962 Supp
2 SCR 769 RL Arora vs State of Uttar Pradesh  Ors   Jagdish Pandey vs The Chancellor University of Bihar  Anr 1968 I SCR 231 Shri Umed vs Raj Singh  Ors 1975 I SCR 918 Mohd Yunus Salim s case   Sunil Batra etc
vs Delhi Adminis tration  Ors   Excel Wear etc
vs Union of India  Ors
   Minerva Mills Ltd  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors
   Union of India  Anr etc
vs Tulsiram Patel etc
  and Elliott Ashton Welsh 11 vs United States   308 referred to
155 22 Therefore the doctrine of reading down cannot be availed of for saving the regulation in the instant case
In the first instance the regulation is a part of the service regulations of the employees made by the Delhi Road Trans port Authority in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section 1 read with clause c of sub section 2 of Section 53 of the Delhi Road Transport Act 1950 whose object is to provide for the establishment and the regula tion of Road Transport Authority for the promotion of a co ordinated system of road transport in the State of Delhi
There is nothing either in the object of the service regula tions or in the object of the Act which has a bearing on Regulation 9b
If anything the object of the Act would require framing of such service regulations as would ensure dedicated and diligent employees to run the undertaking
The dedication of the employees would pre suppose security of employment and not a constant hanging of the Democle s sword over their head and hence would in any case not bear the existence of such regulation
Secondly the language of regulation is so crystal clear that no two interpretations are possible to be placed on it and hence it is not permis sible to read in it any meaning other than what is clearly sought to be conveyed by it
Thirdly the context of the regulation makes it abundantly clear that it is meant to be a naked hire and fire rule and the authority has been vested with unguided and arbitrary power to dispense with the services of any category of the employees
Sub clause a of the Regulation mentions elaborately the circumstances in which the services of an employee can be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu of such notice
Sub clause b follows closely on its heel and states in clear language that when the termination is made due to reduction of estab lishment or in circumstances other than those mentioned in sub clause a one month s notice or pay in lieu thereof is all that is necessary to be given for terminating an employ ee s services
The intention of the rule making authority therefore is more than clear
It was to give an absolute free hand without any limitations whatsoever to terminate the services of any employee
Both the language of the regulation as well as the context in which it is cast leave no scope for reading into it any further provision
289C H 290A 23 Moreover reading in the rule circumstances under which alone the rule can be used and reading it down to read in it words or expressions or provisions in order to save the legislation would not only distort the intention of the rule making authority but would also require extensive amendment of a very vague nature to it
The reading in the regulation of a provision that the concerned employees should be given a hearing with regard to his mis conduct will require that be should first be intimated of the mis conduct of which he is guilty
But 156 that kind of a situation is taken care of by sub clause a of the said regulation
There is
therefore
no need of a separate prevision for the same
on the other hand
the services of an employee are to be terminated on grounds other than those mentioned in sub clause a then those grounds being unknown to the employee cannot be met by him even if he is given a hearing
The Court cannot read in the rule all circumstances where it is not possible or necessary to hold an enquiry
Such situations are capable of being formulated easily and conveniently at least in general terms as is done by the Constitution makers in the second proviso to Article 311 2
The reading of such circumstances in the existing regulation would require its extensive recasting which is impermissible for the Court to do
There is no authority which supports such wide reading down of any provision of the statute or ruleregulation
Therefore the doctrine of reading down is singularly inapplicable to the present case
281B 290B 291A F 3
Clause b of Regulation 9 contains the much hated and abused rule of hire and fire reminiscent of the days of laissez faire and unrestrained freedom of contract
274E Per Ramaswamy
J 1 11 The question of security of work is of most impor tance
If a person does not have the feeling that he belongs to an organisation engaged in promotion
he will not put forward his best effort to produce more
That sense of belonging arises only when he feels that he will not be turned out of employment the next day at the whim of the management
Therefore as far as possible security of work should be assured the employees so that they may contribute to the maximisation of production
300D E Daily Rated Casual Labour vs Union of India at 130 131 referred to
12 A permanent employee of a statutory authority corporation or instrumentality under Article 12 has a lien on the post till he attained superannuation or compulsorily retired or service is duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law
Security of tenure enures the benefit of pension on retirement
Dismissal removal or termination of hisher service for inefficiency corruption or other misconduct is by way of penalty
HeShe has a right to security of tenure which is essential to inculcate a sense of belonging to the service or organisation and in volvement for maximum production or efficient 157 service
It is also a valuable right which is to be duly put an end to only as per valid law
300A G Roshan Lal Tandon vs Union of India  at 195 196 Calcutta Dock Labour Board vs Jarfar Imam and Sirsi Municipality vs Cecelia Kom Francis Tal lis   referred to
13 The right to life a basic human right assured by Article 21 of the Constitution comprehends some thing more than mere animal existence it does not only mean physical existence but includes basic human dignity
The right to public employment and its concomitant right to livelihood receive their succour and nourishment under the canopy of the protective umbrella of Articles 14 161 191g and 21
296A 297B Munn vs Illinois  and 154 referred to
Kharak Singh vs State of UP 1964 1 SCR 332 Olga Tellis vs Bombay Municipal Corporation 1985 2 Suppl
SCR page 51 at 79 Menaka Gandhi vs Union of India 1978 2 SCR 621 State of Maharashtra vs Chander Bhan and Board of Trustees Port of Bombay vs Dilip Kumar   referred to
14 The arbitrary unbridled and naked power of wide discretion to dismiss a permanent employee without any guidelines or procedure would tend to defeat the constitu tional purpose of equality and allied purposes
Therefore when the Constitution assures dignity of the individual and the right to livelihood the exercise of power by the execu tive should be combined with adequate safeguards for the rights of the employees against any arbitrary and capricious use of those powers
Workmen of Hindustan Steels Ltd vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  Ors  and Francis Corallie vs
UT of Delhi     referred to
15 It is well settled constitutional law that different Articles the Chapter on Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Constitution must be read as an integral and incorporeal whole with possible overlapping with the subject matter of what is to be protected by its various provisions particularly the Fundamental Rights
The fundamental rights protected by Part III of the constitu tion out of which Articles 14
19 and 21 are the most frequently 158 invoked to test the validity of executive as well as legis lative actions when these actions are subjected to judicial scrutiny are necessary means to develop one s own person ality and to carve out one s own life in the manner one likes best subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in the paramount interest of the society and to a just
fair and reasonable procedure
The effect of restriction or deprivation and not of the form adopted to deprive the right is the conclusive test
Thus the right to a public employ ment is a constitutional right under Article 161
All matters relating to employment include the right to continue in service till the employee reaches superannuation or his service is duly terminated in accordance with just fair and reasonable procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Constitution or the Rules made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or the statutory provision or the Rules
regulations or instructions having statutory flavour made thereunder
But the relevant provisions must be conformable to the rights guaranteed in Parts III  IV of the Constitu tion
Article 21 guarantees the right to live which includes right to livelihood
to many
assured tenure of service is the source
311G 312G H 313A B RC Cooper vs Union of India   Minerva Mills Ltd vs Union of India and Union of India  Ant
vs Tulsiram Patel  0rs 1985 Suppl
2 SCR 131 at 233 referred to
16 Article 14 is the general principle while article 3112 is a special provision applicable to all civil serv ices under the State
Article 3112 embodies the principles of natural justice but proviso to clause 2 of article 311 excludes the operation of principles of natural justice engrafted in article 3112 as an exception in the given cir cumstances enumerated in these clauses of the proviso to article 3112 of the Constitution
Article 14 read with Arti cles 161 and 311 are to be harmoniously interpreted that the proviso to article 3112 excludes the application of the principles of natural justice as an exception and the applicability of Article 3112 must therefore be circum scribed to the civil services and to be construed according ly
In respect of all other employees covered by Article 12 of the Constitution the dynamic role of Article 14 and other relevant Articles like 21 must be allowed to have full play without any inhibition
unless the statutory rules them selves consistent with the mandate of Articles 141619 and 21 provide expressly such an exception
317F H 315A Union of India  Ant
vs Tulsiram Patel  Ors 1985 Suppl
2 SCR 131 at 233 AK Kraipak  Ors etc
vs Union of India  Ors and Union of India vs Col JN Sinha  Ors 1971 1 SCR 791 referred to
159 17 Article 191g empowers every citizen right to avocation or profession etc which includes right to be continued in employment under the State unless the tenure is validly terminated and consistent with the scheme enshrined in the fundamental rights of the Constitution
Whenever there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the Legislature or of the Executive or of an authority under Article 12
Articles 14 and 21 spring into action and strike down such an action
The concept of reasonableness and non arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional spectrum and is a golden thread which runs through the whole fabric of the Constitution
315B D 18 Thus Article 14 read with 161 accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with principles of natural justice
Any law made or action taken by the employ er corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article 12 must act fairly and reasonably
Right
to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice
Exercise of unbri dled and uncanalised discretionary power impinges upon the right of the citizen vesting of discretion is no wrong provided it is exercised purposively judiciously and with out prejudice
Wider the discretion the greater the chances of abuse
Absolute discretion is destructive of freedom than of man s inventions
Absolute discretion marks the beginning of the end of the liberty
The conferment of absolute power to dismiss a permanent employee is antithesis to justness or fair treatment
The exercise of discretionary power wide of mark would bread arbitrary unreasonable or unfair actions and would not be consistent with reason and justice
320B D 19 The right to public employment which includes right to continued public employment till the employee is superan nuated as per rules or compulsorily retired or duly termi nated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which in turn is an integral part of right to life assured by article 21 of the Constitution
Any procedure prescribed to deprive such a right to livelihood or continued employment must be just fair and reasonable procedure and conformable to the mandate of Articles 14 and 21
In other words an employee in a public employment also must not be arbitrarily unjustly or unreasonably deprived of hisher livelihood which is ensured in continued employment till it is terminated in accordance with just fair and reasonable procedure
Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void
320E F AK Kraipak  Ors etc
vs Union of India  Ors
  Union of India vs Col JN Sinha and Anr 1971 1 SCR 791 160 Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union Regd Sindri  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors
  at 60 61 SS Muley vs JRD Tata  Superin tendent of Post Office vs K Vasayya 1984 3 Andhra Pra desh law Journal 9 West Bengal Electricity Board  Ors vs DB Ghosh  Orb  1985 2 SCR 1014 Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd  Anr
vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  Ors
   OP Bhandari vs Indian Tourism Development Corp Ltd  Ors
   APSRT Corp vs Labour Court AIR 1980 AP 132 RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs State of Punjab   Kanhialal vs District Judge  Ors  MK Agarwal vs Gurgaon Gramin Bank  Ors  All Saints High School vs Government of AP   938 e to f Frank Anthoney Public School vs Union of India   269 b to e Christian Medical College Hospital Employees  Union  Anr
vs Christian Medical College Veilore Association  Ors   562 Kameshwar Prasad vs State of Bihar 1962 Suppl
3 SCR 369 and OK Ghosh vs EZX Joseph 1963 Supp 1 SCR 789 referred to
United States vs Samuel D singleton   referred 110 Undoubtedly efficiency of the administration and the discipline among the employees is very vital to the successful functioning of an institution or maximum produc tion of goods or proper maintenance of the services
Disci pline in that regard amongst the employees is its essential facet and bas to be maintained
The society is vitally interested in the due discharge of the duties by the govern ment employees or employees of corporate bodies or statutory authorities or instrumentalities under article 12 of the Con stitution
The government or corporate employees are after all paid from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes either by way of direct or indirect taxes
The employees are charged with public duty and they should perform their public duties with deep sense of responsibili ty
The collective responsibility of all the officers from top most to the lowest maximises the efficient public admin istration
They must therefore be held to have individual as well as collective responsibility in discharge of their duties faithfully honestly with full dedication and utmost devotion to duty
Equally the employees must also have a feeling that they have security of tenure
They should also have an involvement on their part in the organisation or institution corporation etc
They need assurance of serv ice and protection
The public interest and the public good demands that those who discharge their duties honestly efficiently and 161 with a sense of devotion and dedication to duty should receive adequate protection and security of tenure
There fore before depriving an employee of the means of liveli hood to himself and his dependents ie job the procedure prescribed for such deprivation must be just fair and reasonable under articles 21 and 14 and when infringes article 191g must be subject to imposing reasonable restrictions under article 195
320G H 321A D 322D 111 Conferment of power on a high rank officer is not always an assurance in particular when the moral standards are generally degenerated that the power would be exercised objectively reasonably conscientiously fairly and justly without inbuilt protection to an employee
Even officers who do their duty honestly and conscientiously are subject to great pressures and pulls
Therefore the competing claims of the public interest as against individual interest of the employees are to be harmoniously blended so as to serve the societal need consistent with the constitutional scheme
322D E 112 Regulation 9b of the Delhi Road Transport Condi tions of Appointment and Service Regulations 1952 is arbitrary unjust unfair and unreasonable offending Arti cles 14 161 191g and 21 of the Constitution
It is also opposite to the public policy and thereby is void under Section 23 of the 
330G 113 Under ordinary law of master and servant whether the contract of service is for a fixed period or not if it contains a provision for termination of service by notice in terms thereof it can be so determined and if the con tract finds no provision to give notice and the contract of service is not for a fixed period law implies giving of a reasonable notice
Where no notice or a reasonable notice was issued
before terminating the contract
the termination of the contract of service is wrongful and the aggrieved employee is entitled at law to sue for damages
It is not disputed that the Delhi Road Transport Corporation is a statutory Corporation under the Delhi Road Transport Act and the Regulations are statutory and its employees are entitled to the fundamental rights enshrined in Part 111 of the Constitution
The Corporation or an instrumentality or other authority under Article 12 is not free like an ordinary master a private employer to terminate the services of its employees at its whim or caprices or vagary
It is bound by the Act and the Regulation and paramount law of the land the Constitution
292G H 293A B 114 Any law much less the provisions of Contract Act which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaran teed in Part III of 162 the Constitution are void by operation of Article 13 of the Constitution
The law of contract like the legal system itself involves a balance between competing sets of values
Freedom of contract emphasises the need for stability
certainty and predictability
But important as values are
they are not absolute and there comes a point when they face a serious challenge This Court as a court of consti tutional conscience enjoined and is jealously to project and uphold new values in establishing the egalitarian social order
As a court of constitutional functionary exercising equity jurisdiction this Court would relieve the weaker parties from unconstitutional contractual obligations unjust unfair oppressive and unconscionable rules or conditions when the citizen is really unable to meet on equal terms with the State
It is to find whether the citi zen when entered into contracts of service was in distress need or compelling circumstances to enter into contract on dotted lines or whether the citizen was in a position of either to take it or leave it and if it finds to be so this Court would not shirk to avoid the contract by appro priate declaration
302G 303B 304H 305A B Central Inland Water Transport Company Limited vs Brojo nath Ganguly 1986 SC 1571 affirmed
Ramdas Vithaldas Durbar vs section Amarchand  60 43 Indian Appeals
164 and V Raghunadha Rao vs State of Andhra Pra desh  referred to
Anson s Law of Contract p 6 and 7 and Professor Guido Calabresi of Yale University Law School Refractivity Paramount power and Contractual Changes 1961 62 71 Yale Law Journal P 1191 referred to
21 The golden rule of statutory construction is that the words and phrases or sentences should be interpreted according to the intent of the legislature that passed the Act
All the provisions should be read together
If the words of the statutes are in themselves precise and unambig uous the words or phrases or sentences themselves alone do then no more can be necessary than to expound those words or phrases or sentences in their natural and ordinary sense
But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature it is always safe means of collecting the intention to call in aid the ground and cause of making the statute and have recourse to the preamble which is a key to open the minds of the makers of the statute and the mischiefs which the Act intends to redress
In determining the meaning of statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that 163 word or phrase in its context
It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intent of the legislature then it is proper to look for some other possible meaning and the court cannot go further
323D G 22 The Doctrine of Reading Down is therefore an internal aid to construe the word or phrase in a statute to give reasonable meaning but not to detract disort or emasculate the language so as to give the supposed purpose to avoid unconstitutionality
Thus the object of reading down is to keep the operation of the statute within the purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid
324E 325B 23 It cannot be accepted that the Courts in the proc ess of interpretation of the Statute would not make law but leave it to the legislature for necessary amendments
In an appropriate case Judges would articulate the inarticulate major premise and would give life and force to a Statute by reading harmoniously all the provisions ironing out the creezes
The object is to elongate the purpose of the Act
323B 24 The Courts though have no power to amend the law by process of interpretation but do have power to mend it so as to be in conformity with the intendment of the legis lature
Doctrine of reading down is one of the principles of interpretation of statute in that process
But when the offending language used by the legislature is clear precise and unambiguous violating the relevant provisions in the constitution resort cannot be had to the doctrine of read ing down to blow life into the void law to save it from unconstitutionality or to confer jurisdiction on the legis lature
Similarly it cannot be taken aid of to emasculate the precise explicit clear and unambiguous language to confer arbitrary unbridled and uncanalised power on an employer which is a negation to just fair and reasonable procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21 of the Consti tution and to direct the authorities to record reasons unknown or unintended procedure
326H 327A B Elliott Ashton Walsh H vs United States   Nalinakhya Bysack vs Shyam Sunder Haldar  Ors  at 544 45 United States vs Wunderlick  SC Jaisinghani vs Union of India   In re Hindu Women s Right to Property Act  KN Singh vs State of Bihar 1962 Suppl 2 SCR 769 RL Arora vs State of UP   Jagdish Pandev vs Chan cellor of the Bihar  Amritsar Municipality vs State of Punjab  Sunil Batra vs Delhi Admn   NC Dalwadi vs State of Gujarat 1987 3 164 SCC 611 Charanlal Sahu vs Union of India 1989 Suppl
Scale 1 at p 61 Delhi Transport Undertaking vs Balbir Saran Goel  Air India Corporation vs Rebellow  and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs PS Malvankar   re ferred to
Federal Steam Navigation Co vs Department of Trade and Industry at p 100 and Saints High School Hyderabad vs Govt
of A P   re ferred to
Craies Statute Law 7th Ed
V P 64
25 The language of Regulation 9b is not capable of two interpretations
This power is in addition to the normal power in Regulation 15 to conduct an enquiry into misconduct after giving reasonable opportunity
Thereby the legislative intention is manifest that it intended to confer such draco nian power couched in language of width which hangs like Damocles sword on the neck of the employee keeping every employee on tenter hook under constant pressure of uncer tainty precarious tenure at all times right from the date of appointment till date of superannuation
It equally enables the employer to pick and choose an employee at whim or vagary to terminate the service arbitrarily and capri ciously
Regulation 9b thereby deliberately conferred wide power of termination of services of the employee with out following the principles of audi alteram partem or even modicum of procedure of representation before terminating the services of permanent employee
327E G 26 No doubt the power to take appropriate and expedi tious action to meet the exigencies of weeding out ineffi cient corrupt indolent officers or employees from service should be provided and preserved to the competent authority but any action taken without any modicum of reasonable procedure and prior opportunity always generates an un quenchable feeling that unfair treatment was meted out to the aggrieved employee
To prevent miscarriage of justice or to arrest a nursing grievance that arbitrary whimsical or capricious action was taken behind the back of an employee without opportunity the law must provide a fair just and reasonable procedure as is exigible in a given circumstance as adumbrated in proviso to article 3112 of the Constitution
If an individual action is taken as per the procedure on its own facts its legality may be tested
But it would be no justification to confer power with wide discretion on any authority without any procedure which would not meet the test of justness fairness and reasonable 165 ness envisaged under articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
Therefore conferment of power with wide discretion without any guidelines without any just fair or reasonable proce dure is constitutionally anathema to articles 14 161 191g and 21 of the Constitution
Doctrine of reading down cannot be extended to such a situation
328A C 329B C 27 In view of the march of law made by Article 14 it is too late in the day to contend that the competent author ity would be vested with wide discretionary power without any proper guidelines or the procedure
When it is found that the legislative intention is unmistakably clear unam biguous and specific the preamble the other rules and the circumstances could not be taken aid of in reading down the provisions of the rules or the regulations of the constitu tional scheme
330F G 31 The phrases public policy opposed to public policy or contrary to public policy are incapable of precise definition
It is valued to meet the public good or the public interest
What is public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest vary from time to time with the change of the circumstances
Therefore in the absence of specific head of public policy which covers a case then the court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest invent new public policy and declare such practice or rules that are derogatory to the constitution to be opposed to public policy
The rules which stem from the public policy must of necessity be laid to further the progress of the society in particular when social change is to bring about an egalitar ian social order through rule of law
In deciding a case which may not be covered by authority courts have before them the beacon light of the trinity of the Constitution viz the preamble Part III and Part IV and the play of legal light and shade must lead on the path of justice social economic and political
Lacking precedent the court can always be guided by that light and the guidance thus shed by the trinity of our Constitution
308C D 309G H 310A 32 Since Constitutions are the superior law of the land and because one of their outstanding features is flexibility and capacity to meet changing conditions con stitutional policy provides a valuable aid in determining the legitimate boundaries of statutory meaning
Thus public policy having its inception in Constitutions may accomplish either a restricted or extended interpretation of the liter al expression of a statute
A statute is always presumed to be constitutional and where necessary a constitutional meaning will be inferred to preserve validity
Likewise where a statute tends to extend or preserve a constitutional 166 principle reference to analogous constitutional provisions may be of great value in shaping the statute to accord with the statutory aim or objective
Therefore when the provi sions of an Act or Regulations or Rules are assailed as arbitrary unjust unreasonable unconstitutional public law element makes it incumbent to consider the validity thereof on the anvil of inter play of articles 14 161 191g and 21 and of the inevitable effect of the provi sion challenged on the rights of a citizen and to find whether they are constitutionally valid
310C D 311E 4
The absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based
In a system governed by rule of law dis cretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within defined limits
The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and in general such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is
If a decision is taken without any princi ple or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law
328D E 5
No doubt it is open to the authorities to terminate the services of a temporary employee without holding an enquiry
But in view of the march of law made viz that it is not the form of the action but the substance of the order which is to be looked into it is open to the Court to lift the veil and pierce the action challenged to find whether the said action is the foundation to impose punishment or is only a motive
The play of fair play is to secure justice procedural as well as substantive
The substance of the order the effect thereof is to be looked into
330C D Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab  re ferred to
It is for concerned authorities to make appropriate rules or regulations and to take appropriate action even without resorting to elaborate enquiry needed consistent with the constitutional scheme
331A Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  Ors
   referred to
Ram Chander vs Union of India  referred to
The ratio in Brojonath s case was correctly laid down and requires no reconsideration
331D 167 Central Inland Water Transport Company Limited vs Brojo nath Ganguly  affirmed
Per Mukharji CJ Contra 1
The constitutionality of the conferment of power to terminate services of a permanent employee without holding an enquiry is sustained by reading that the power must be exercised on reasons relevant for the efficient running of the services or performing of the job by the societies or the bodies
It should be done objectively the reasons should be recorded and the basis that it is not feasible or possible reasonably to hold any enquiry without disclosing the evidence which in the circumstances of the case would be hampering the running of the institution
The reasons though recorded need not be communicated it is only for the purpose of running of the institution
There should be factors which hamper running of the institution without the termination of the employment of the employee concerned at the particular time either because he is a surplus or inefficient disobedient and dangerous
235C E 21 The philosophy of the Indian Constitution as it has evolved from precedent to precedent has broadened the horizons of the right of the employees and they have been assured security of tenures and ensured protection against arbitrariness and discrimination in discharge or termination of his employment
This is the basic concept of the evolu tion from the different angles of law of master and servant or in the evolution of employer and employee relationship
It is true that the law has traveled in different channels government servants or servants or employees having status have to be differentiated from those whose relationships are guided by contractual obligations
However the basic and fundamental question to be judged is in what manner and to what extent the employees of either of semi Government or statutory corporations or public undertakings who enjoy the rights privileges limitations and inhibitions of institu tions who come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Consti tution could be affected in their security of tenure by the employers consistent with the rights evolved over the years and rights emanating from the philosophy of the Constitution as at present understood and accepted
229D G 22 Efficiency of the administration of these undertak ings is very vital and relevant consideration
Production must continue services must be maintained and run
Efficacy of the services can be manned only by the disciplined em ployees or workers
Discipline decency and 168 order will have to be maintained
Employees should have sense of participation and involvement and necessarily sense of security in semipermanent or quasi permanent or permanent employment
There must be scope for encouragement for good work
In what manner and in what measure this should be planned and ensured within the framework of the Constitution and power mingled with obligations and duties enjoined with rights are matters of constitutional adjustment at any particular evolved stage of the philosophy of our Constitu tion
230A C 23 Arbitrary whimsical or discriminatory action can flow or follow in some cases by the preponderance of these powers to terminate
The tact that the power is entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound insurance against misuse
At least it does not always ensure against erosion of credibility in the exercise of the power in particular contingency
Yet discipline has to be maintained efficiency of the institution has to be ensured
It has to be recognised that quick actions are very often necessary in running of an institution or public service or public utility and public concern
It is not always possible to have enquiry because disclosure is diffi cult evidence is hesitant and difficult often impossible
In those circumstances the approach to the location of power possession and exercise of which is essential for efficient running of the industries or services has to be a matter both of balancing and adjustment on which one can wager the salivation of rights and liberties of the employ ees concerned and the future of the industries or the serv ices involved
330D F 24 The power to terminate the employment of permanent employment must be there
Efficiency and expediency and the necessity of running an industry or service make it impera tive to have these powers
Power must therefore be with authorities to take decision quickly objectively and inde pendently
Power must be assumed with certain conditions of duty
The preamble the policy purpose of the enacting provision delimit the occasions or the contingencies for the need for the exercise of the power and these should limit the occasions of exercise of such powers
The manner in which such exercise of power should be made should ensure fairness avoid arbitrariness and mala fide and create credibility in the decisions arrived at or by exercise of the power
All these are essential to ensure that power is fairly exercised and there is fair play in action
Reasons good and sound must control the exercise of power
230G H 231A Thus for the running of the industry or the service effi ciently 169 quickly and in a better manner or to avoid dead locks or inefficiency or friction the vesting of the power in cir cumstances must be such that it will evoke credibility and confidence
Notice of hearing and opportunity in the form of an enquiry may or may not be given yet arbitrariness and discrimination and acting whimsically must be avoided
These powers must therefore be so read that the powers can be exercised on reasons which should be recorded though need not always be communicated and must be by authorities who are high ranking or senior enough and competent and are expected to act fairly objectively and independently
The occasion for the use of power must be clearly circumscribed in the above limits
These must also circumscribe that the need for exercise of those powers without holding a detailed or prolonged enquiry is there
231E F G Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd  Anr
vs Hindustan Steel Ltd  Ors
   West Bengal State Electricity Board and Others vs Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Oth ers 1985 3 SCC 116 Moti Ram Deka vs North East Frontier Railway  SS Muley vs JRD Tata  Manohar P Kharkhar vs Raghuraj  Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr
vs Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr  Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi   Union of India  Anr
vs Tulsi Ram PateI 1985 Suppl
2 SCR 131 at p 166 Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd vs Workmen  Anr  at 130 L Michael  Anr
vs Ms Johnston Pumps India Ltd  at 498 Delhi Transport Corporation Undertaking vs Balbir Saran Goel  at 764 Air India Corporation Bombay vs VA Rebellow  Anr   Municipal Corpo ration of Greater Bombay vs PS Malvenkar  Ors  at page 1006 Roshan Lal Tandon vs Union of India  at 195 D E Champak Lal Chiman Lal Shah vs The Union of India at 204 Ram Gopal Chaturvedi vs State of MP  at 475 Gheru Lal Parekh vs Mahadeodas Maiva  Others 1959 Supp 2 SCR 406 at 440 OP Bhandari vs ITDC  Ors   The Hindu Women s Rights to Property Act  Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union Regd Sindri and Others vs Union of India and Others 1981 2 SCR at 60 61 Ajay Hasia etc
vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi  Ors etc  at 100 102 AV Nachane  Anr
vs Union of India  Anr
   India Tobacco Co Ltd vs The Commercial Tax Officer Bhavanipore  Ors at 657 AL Kalra vs The Project and Equipment Corpora tion of India Ltd  at 664 Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India  Ors 1984 2 170 SCR 79 at 101 Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd vs The Workmen  Ors
  at 669 The Collector of Customs Madras vs Nathella Sampathu Chetty  at 825 Commissioner of Sales Tax Madhya Pradesh vs Radhakrishan  Ors supra Gurdev Singh Sidhu vs State of Punjab  Anr  at 592 593 UP State Electricity Board vs Hari Shankar Jain  AR Antulay vs RS Nayak and Anr   SG Jaisinghani vs Union of India and Ors  at p 718 19 and Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala 1973 Supp 1 SCR 1 referred to
A Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd vs Macaulay formerly Instone  referred to
Chitty on Contract 46th Edition Vol
II p 808 or 25th Edition Vol
II p 712 paragraph and Halsbury s Law of England 4th Edition Vol
No 16 paras 607 and 608 referred to
31 Courts have been tempted to read down in the path of judicial law making on the plea that legislature could not have intended to give powers to the authorities or employers which would be violative of fundamental rights of the per sons involved in the exercise of those powers and there fore should be attributed those powers on conditions which will only make these legal or valid
Our law making bodies are not law unto themselves and cannot create or make all laws
They can only confer powers or make laws for the conferment of powers on authorities which are legal and valid
Such powers conferred must conform to the constitu tional inhibitions
232C D 32 Legislation both statutory and constitutional is enacted from experience of evils
But its general language should not necessarily be confined to the form that the evil had taken place
Time works changes brings into existence new conditions and purposes and new awareness of limita tions
Therefore a principle to be valid must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth
This is particularly true of the constitutional construc tions
Constitutions are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions but designed to approach immor tality as nearly as human institutions can approach it
In the application of a Constitutional limitation or inhibi tion the interpretation cannot be only of what has been  but of what may be 
Therefore
in the interpretation of the provisions of an Act where two constructions are possi ble the one which leads towards constitutionality of the legislation would be preferred to that which has the effect of 171 destroying it
If the Courts do not read the conferment of power in the aforesaid manner the power is liable to be struck down as bad
233B D 33 The Court must proceed on the premise that the law making authority intended to make a valid law to confer power validly or which will be valid
The freedom therefore to search the spirit of the enactment or what is intended to obtain or to find the intention of parliament gives the Court the power to supplant and supplement the expressions used to say what was left unsaid
This is an important branch of judicial power the concession of which if taken to the extreme is dangerous but denial of that power would be ruinous and this is not contrary to the expressed inten tion of the legislature or the implied purpose of the legis lation
234G H 235A 34 It has been said that if the legislature has mani fested a clear intention to exercise an unlimited power it is impermissible to read down the amplitude of that power so as to make it limited
This cannot be agreed to
Our legis latures are limited by the constitutional inhibitions and it is made that the Court should read their Acts and enact ments with the attribute that they know their limits and could not have intended to violate the Constitution
It is true that the Court should be loath to read down where there are clear unambiguous and positive terms in a legislation and should proceed with a straight forward method of strik ing down such legislations
But where the statute is silent or not expressive or inarticulate the Court must read down in the silence of the statute and in the inarticulation of its provisions the Constitutional inhibitions and transmute the major inarticulate premise into a reality and read down the statute accordingly
236H 237A B 35 The plain thrust of legislative enactment has to be found out in the inarticulate expressions and in the silence of the legislation
In doing so to say what the legislature did not specifically say is not distortion to avert any constitutional collision
237E In the language of the relevant provisions of the instant cases there is no intention of the legislature to flout the constitutional limitations
237E Elliot Ashto Welsh 11 vs United States   26 Ed
308 referred to
36 It is not that the reading down is used for a purpose which is just the opposite which the legislature had intended
Legislature had not 172 intended arbitrary or uncontrolled or whimsical power
Indeed it considered
This is not the proper way to read that power in the Regulation 9b
Para 522 of the Shastri Award read properly must be circumscribed with the condi tions indicated above as a necessary corollary or conse quence of that power
It is also not reading to the legisla ture conditions which were not there in the second proviso to Article 3112 of the Constitution
237H 238A B Union of India  Anr
vs Tulsiram Patel 1985 Supp
2 SCR 131 relied on
No doubt absolute powers cannot be regulated without essential legislative policy but in the instant cases properly read absolute power was not there
Power that was only constitutionally valid that power can be presumed to have been given and if that presumption is made conditions indicated above inevitably attach
But these conditions are necessary corollary flowing from the conferment of the power of termination in a constitutional manner for the smooth proper and efficient running of the industry
238C E 37 In the circumstances power must be there the power must be read down in the manner and to the extent indicated above of terminating the services of permanent employees without holding any enquiry in the stated contingencies and this would be either by virtue of the silence of the provi sion indicating the contingencies of termination or by virtue of constitutional inhibitions
That reading would not violate the theory that judges should not make laws
238F G Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Justice Tandolkar  at 299 Jyoti Prasad vs The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi  at 139 Union of India vs Col JN Sinha  Anr  at 461 NC Dalwadi vs State of Gujarat paragraphs 9 and 10 at page 619 Commissioner of Sales Tax MP Indore  Ors
vs Radhakrishan  Ors
  at 257 Olga Tellis  Ors etc
vs Bombay Municipal Corporation  Ors 1985 Suppl
2 SCR 51 at 89 RMD Chamarbaugwalla vs Union of India  at p 935 and 938 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar 1962 Supp 2 SCR 769 RL Arora vs State of Uttar Pradesh   Jagdish Pandev vs The Chancellor University of Bihar  Anr   at pages 236 237 Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration  Ors   Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co Ltd vs State of Assam  Ors   Charan Lal Sahu  Ors
vs Union of India  at 173 pages 53 and 54 paras 101 as well as p 61 para 114 Shah  Co vs State of Maharashtra  at 477 78 M Pentiah and Ors
vs Veera Mallappa and Ors   Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board etc
vs A Rajappa  Ors   Minerva Mills Ltd Ors vs Union of India  Ors
   at p 239 and 259 Elliott Ashton Welsh 11 vs United States 26 Lawyers  Edition 2nd 308 at 327 Malinakhva Bysack vs Shyam Sunder Haldar  Ors   at p 544 545 and Municipal Committee Amritsar  Anr
vs State of Punjab  ors
   referred to
United States of America vs Edward A
Rumely 97 Law yers Edition 770 at 775 Reg
vs Sadiers Co   460 and 463 Framamus vs Film Artists Association at 542 and Seaford Court Estates  referred to
HM Seervaid Constitutional Law of India  3rd Edn
1 pages 119 120 and Lord Denning The discipline of Law at p 12 referred to
38 Termination simpliciter under Regulation 9b of the Regulation 1952 Delhi Road Transport Authority Conditions of Appointment and Services or similar powers can be exer cised only in circumstances other than those in Regulation 9a
The exercise of such powers can only be for purposes germane and relevant to the statute viz the employee is incompetent or unsuitable so as to make his continuance in the employment detrimental to the interest of the institu tion or where the continuance of the employee is a grave security risk making his continuance detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and where because of the conduct of the employee or there is lack of confidence in the employee which makes it necessary in the interest of the Corporation to immediately terminate the services of the employee etc etc
Therefore each case of conferment of power involved should be judged on the aforesaid basis
236E G 39 Having regard to the finality of the position of law and having regard to the theory that parties have ad justed their rights on the understanding of the law as it was justice of the situation would be met if pending liti gations are examined and disposed of in the light of afore said principles
Where issues of damages or consequences of termination by virtue of exercise of the power are still pending adjudication in any forum and have been finally adjudicated these should be re examined by the appropriate authorities before whom these issues 174 are pending but previous terminations where no lis is pending will not be reopened
To that extent the law will be prospective
239D F 4
This Court
under Article 141 of the Constitution is enjoined to declare law
The expression declared  is wider than the words found or made 
To declare is to announce opinion
Indeed the latter involves the process
while the former expresses result
Interpretation ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process while that interpreted ascertained or evolved is declared as a law
The law de clared by this Court is the law of the land
To deny this power to this Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country
Therefore
there should be a more active and creative role for the courts in declaring what the law is
240E G 1
C Golaknath  Ors
vs State of Punjab  Anr
   81181384 referred to