ivil Appeal No 10747 of 1983
From the Judgment and order dated 2681983 of the Rajasthan High Court in SB Civil Second A No 153 of 1983
Shiv Dayal Srivastava SK Bagga and Mrs SK Bagga for the Appellants
Dr YS Chitale and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA J
This is an appeal filed by the tenant after obtaining leave from this Court against a decree for eviction granted by the trial court and ultimately affirmed in second appeal by the High Court of Rajasthan by its judgment dated 26883
It appears that the appellants became tenants in 1947 but in 1958 the predecessors in 127 title of the respondents one Shri Bhonri Lal Surender Kumar and Rajinder Kumar purchased the property and thereafter in 1959 they became the tenants of Bhonri Lal and others
It is alleged that originally the rent was Rs135 but later on was raised to Rs145
The premises in question is a showroom and apparently is a business premises
In the year 1974 Bhonri Lal Surendra Kumar and Rajinder Kumar filed a suit for eviction against the present appellant in respect of this show room which is situated at MI Road Jaipur on the ground of bona fide need material alterations in the premises and default in payment of rent
During the pendency of this suit the present respondent purchased the property from Bhonri Lal and others in 1979
In substance the present respondent Harsh Wardhan Himanshu and Smt
Ritu Kasliwal purchased this property during the pendency of the suit and continued with the suit but the only ground on which eviction was granted and which was pressed before us and also before the High Court was the ground that the tenant present appellant without the permission of the landlord has made material alterations in the premises
The learned Judge of the High Court has maintained the finding of the construction of a balcony Dochatti and maintained the order of eviction on the ground that it is material alterations in the premises
The decree has been passed under Section 131c of the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1950 which reads as under 131c that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion of the court has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof
 It is only on this ground that the decree has been passed which has been challenged by the appellant before us
It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that in the plaint what was alleged by the plaintiff was as stated in Para 5 Para 5 That the defendants had constructed one Dochatti as balcony which is covering good area and is utilizing this Dochhati for his business
This work done by defendant is material alteration in the rented premises and this being without permission of plaintiffs is against the 128 law and on this Court the plaintiffs are entitled to get eviction decree for tenanted property
 In the written statement this Para 5 after amendment reads thus Firm oriental Engineering Co constructed a storey like balcony over the disputed show room in 1958 with the permission of the plaintiff
 It was contended by learned counsel that what the courts below have tried to infer on the basis of some inspection note and some affidavit filed at the back of the appellant and on the basis of no other evidence that it is a structure permanent in nature and that it has been affixed in the wall and that it has also been affixed on the floor this according to learned counsel is all based on no evidence at all
It was contended by the learned counsel that the only pleading was that this wooden balcony Dochhatti has been raised by the tenant
It is significant that even this is not alleged in the plaint when this was done whereas in the written statement it was clearly stated that this Dochhatti was made in 1958
It was further contended that in fact there is no material or evidence to come to the conclusion that this was constructed at what time
It is significant according to the learned counsel for the appellant that the two notices which were given before filing of the suit by the predecessors in title of the respondent this was not alleged as one of the grounds of eviction and in his own statement in cross examination what was stated has significantly been omitted from consideration by the three courts the trial court the appellate court and the High Court of Rajasthan
Learned counsel referred to this part of the statement and contended that it is clear that in the notice this was not made as a ground
In his cross examination he stated that when the tenant assured that it will be removed when he will vacate he gave up and that was not taken as a ground for eviction in the notice
Apart from it it was contended that in fact in 1964 a window was opened just to give sufficient light and air to this Dochhatti or balcony which is alleged to have been constructed by the tenant and for this purpose the expenses were borne by the landlord which is admitted by the predecessors in title of the respondent in their own statement and which is not disputed in these proceedings
On the basis of this it was contended that in fact the finding reached by the three courts is not based on evidence
It is also contended that the material evidence has not been looked into at all and that the material which could not be said to be evidence in the case has been looked into to reach this conclusion
129 It was further contended that apart from this the inference that this is a material alteration is contrary to the principles laid down by this court in number of decisions
According to the learned counsel it could not be said to be a construction which materially altered the premises in question
On the basis of the statement of the respondents predecessor in title Bhonri Lal in cross examination the absence of this being a ground of eviction in the two notices issued by the respondent Bhonri Lal before filing of the suit and the payment of the expenditure incurred for opening a window to provide light to this balcony by the landlord himself are circumstances according to the learned counsel which clearly go to show that this Dochhatti or balcony was constructed with the permission of Bhonri Lal and others who were the predecessors in title
It is also clear that for all these years this was present in the show room as is clear from the evidence that it is visible from outside
Therefore it could not be said that the landlord did not notice it and still no objection was raised
Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the making of the balcony which is the wooden structure supported on wooden pillars and supported on wooden beams could not in any manner be said to be a material alteration of the building itself and in support of this contention the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Om Prakash vs Amar Singh and another AIR 1987 SC 617
It was also contended that the landlord having seen the balcony constructed and not having raised any objection in so much so that even in the notice he did not raise an objection nor it is made a ground for eviction clearly goes to show that it was with the implied consent of the landlord that this Dochhatti or balcony was constructed
It is also clear from the circumstances that in order to provide light and air to this balcony in the upper portion a window was made in the show room and the cost of the construction of this window was paid by the landlord as is admitted by him
This also goes to show that this balcony or this wooden cabin was constructed or made with the implied consent of the landlord
The statement made by Bhonri Lal in cross examination clearly shows according to the learned counsel that even if any right accrued to him on the ground of this alteration he waived it and for this purpose learned counsel placed reliance on Dawsons Bank Ltd vs Nippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish AIR 1935 Privy Council P 79 Japan Cotton Trading Co Ltd
On the question of waiver learned counsel for the appellant also referred to certain observations in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes and also to certain observations from the American Jurisprudence
130 Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand referred to the plaint paragraph 5 quoted above and also the written statement para 5 after amendment and contended that on these allegations the courts below came to a finding of fact
However it was not disputed that what construction has been made is a finding of fact but whether it amounts to material alteration or not is undoubtedly a question of law
It was further contended by the learned counsel that as all the three courts have concurrently came to the conclusion on question on fact it is not open to this Court to reopen that question
It was also contended by learned counsel that the inspection note by the learned trial Judge no doubt has been relied upon but it is contended that as observed by the teamed Judge of the High Court it is relied upon only for purposes of appreciating evidence but unfortunately the learned counsel for the respondents himself could not refer to any other evidence except the statement of the tenant the appellant himself and apart from it even the allegations contained in para S of the plaint do not clearly make out that how this construction is such which was affixed on the wall and on the basis of which an attempt was made to contend that in fact it could not be removed unless the walls are demolished
This argument and the inferences drawn by the courts below apparently are not based on any evidence at all
The learned counsel contended that the balcony is strongly annexed lo the walls with the beams and the structure is 10x25  to the entire breadth of the showroom and also contended that it could not be removed without damaging the walls and thereby damaging the property itself but unfortunately learned counsel could not refer to any evidence in the case which could suggest these facts which were alleged by the learned counsel during the course of his arguments
Counsel in support of his contentions placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Om Prakash s case supra and also on Babu Manmohan Das Shah  Ors
vs Bishun Das  and it was also contended that question of waiver does not arise according to the learned counsel as if the landlord wants not to raise any objection he could grant a permission to the tenant but in absence of that the question of waiver could not be raised
Learned counsel attempted to contend that Bhonri Lal who filed this suit in 1974 filed the suit on that ground and therefore it could not be said that he waived the right to file a suit on this ground
Learned counsel did not refer to the statement of Bhonri Lal himself in cross examination
It was contended that it was in 1972 that the landlord for the first time came to know about the construction of this balcony and in 1974 suit was filed
It was therefore contended that the appeal deserves to be rejected
131 The first notice given on behalf of Bhonri Lal is through an advocate and in this notice it is clear that this objection about any construction or material alteration is not at all mentioned
Another notice which is given just a little before the filing of the suit is a notice dated 13874 and in this notice also there is no mention of any material alteration or construction of the Dochhatti or balcony
Although in this there is a reference to some damage to the floor of show room which was also made as one of the grounds which later on was not pressed and given up
It is therefore plain that if this Dochhatti or balcony which is a wooden construction put on was a matter which was without the permission of the landlord and about which the landlord had not consented he would have made it as a ground for termination of the lease or a ground of eviction in any one of these two notices if not in both
It is very clear that this fact has not at all been alleged in these notices given to the tenant appellant
In the cross examination of Bhonri Lal it is clearly stated when he was asked as to why in the notices which he gave before the filing of the suit this was not made a ground for termination of the lease he plainly stated no notice was given for the reason that the defendant had said that when they would vacate the show room they would remove the balcony
On their saying so I did not have any objection about the balcony
On the eastern side there is a window
I do not know its length and breadth
This is correct that this window was constructed in the year 1964
The cost of construction of the window amounting to Rs19985 p has been paid by me to the defendant
The balcony gets light and air through this widow
 It is significant as referred to above that in the two notices this was not made as a ground
It is also significant that when this was brought to the notice of Bhonri Lal the landlord who filed this suit originally he gave the above explanation
The present respondent in fact purchased during the pendency of the suit this property and indirectly purchased this litigation
Statement which has been quoted above goes to show that he gave up his objection to the balcony it is also clear from his evidence that a window which was opened to give light and air to this balcony the cost of it was also borne by the landlord himself
In the context of this evidence it is significant that even in the plaint it was not clearly stated that this balcony was made in the year 1972 as is now alleged
It is also significant that what is now alleged that this balcony is supported on beams which have been fixed in the walls and pillars which have been fixed in the floor is also not alleged in the plaint at all
It is also not alleged in the plaint as to how this structure which is 132 a wooden structure easily removeable according to the defendant appellant could be said to be a material alteration or as to how it has impaired or damaged or lowered the value of the property of the appellant
It is no doubt true that the Section as it stands does not require that in addition to material alteration it should be to lower or reduce the value of the property as was clearly observed by the learned Judge of the High Court and on that count there appears to be not much controversy
It is significant that all the three courts neither considered the omission of this allegation in the notices nor the statement made by Bhonri Lal quoted above and descripancies in pleadings referred to above and have come to conclusions which could not be reached
The only possible conclusion from these facts could be that either this balcony was constructed with the implied consent of the landlord or that after seeing it and understanding and on assurance given by the tenant the landlord decide to waive his objection to it and therefore did not make it as a ground for termination of the lease in his notice before the suit and even in the earlier notice which was given by him if at all there is any doubt it is clear that the landlord waived his right to file a suit on this ground
Unfortunately all the three courts failed to look into these conclusions appearing in evidence and failed to appreciate the matter in this light
On the question of waiver in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes it is observed as under In Stylo Shoes Ltd vs Prices Tailors Ltd 75 a notice to determine an existing tenancy under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 had not it was argued
been served by leaving it for the tenants at their last known place of abode in England as required by section 231 of the Act
The tenants had in fact received the notice had intimated to the landlords that they would not be willing to give up possession of the premises and had issued an originating summons for a new tenancy
On the facts Wynn Parry J held that the notice had been properly served but he added that even if it had not been duly served the tenants must in the circumstances be taken to have waived any invalidity in the service 75  It clearly goes to show that if a party gives up the advantage he could take of a position of law it is not open to him to change and say that he can avail of that ground
In Dawsons Bank Ltd s case supra the Lordships were considering the question of waiver as a little 133 different from estoppel and they observed as under on the other hand waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action it is an agreement to release or not to assert a right
If an agent with authority to make such an agreement on behalf of his principal agrees to waive his principal s rights then subject to any other question such as consideration the principal will be bound but he will be bound by contract But in the context of the conclusion that we have reached on the basis of circumstances indicated above that it could not be held that the tenant had constructed this Dochhatti or balcony a wooden piece without the consent express or implied of the landlord in our opinion it is not necessary for us to dialate on the question of waiver any further and in this view of the matter we are not referring to the other decisions on the question of waiver
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the finding about the construction without the consent of the landlord is a finding of fact and therefore could not be gone into in this appeal on leave under article 136 of the Constitution but it is clear that if the Courts below while coming to a conclusion of fact has omitted to consider material pieces of evidence and have drawn inferences without looking into the material pieces of evidence which prove circumstances on the basis of which a contrary inference could be drawn such findings are not binding on this Court and in this view of the matter therefore in our opinion the conclusions reached by the courts below could not be accepted
The next question which was debated at length by learned counel for parties is as to whether the said construction of the wooden Dochhatti or a balcony is a material alteration within the meaning of Sec 131c of the Act quoted above and in this regard it is undisputed that what has been constructed is a wooden structure which makes in the showroom a cabin and on the roof of the cabin a kind of balcony with a wooden staircase from inside the cabin to go to this balcony
Admittedly this all is a wooden structure built on beams and planks inside the showroom itself and in order to come to the conclusion whether such a wooden cabin made up inside the showroom could be said to be a material alteration or not we can draw much from Om Prakash s case supra where it was observed 134 The Act does not define either the word materially  or the word altered 
In the absence of any legislative definition of the aforesaid words it would be useful to refer to the meaning given to these words in dictionaries
Concise oxford Dictionary defines the word alter  as change in character position  materially as an adverb means important essentially concerned with matter not with form
In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition one of the meanings of the word alter  is to make change to modify to change change of a thing from one form and set to another
The expression alteration  with reference to building means substantial  change varying change the form or the nature of the building without destroying its identity
The meaning given to those two words show that the expression materially altered  means a substantial change in the character form and the structure of the building without destroying its identity
It means that the nature and character of change or alteration of the building must be of essential and important nature
In Babu Manmohan Dos Shah vs Bishun Dos  1967 SC 643 this Court considering the expression material alterations  occuring in section 31c UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 observed Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean as such the question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case the alterations in the present case must mean material alterations as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the front and structure of the premises
 It is no doubt true that in the last part of this passage quoted above it has been clearly stated that no definition could be drawn of the material alteration but it will have to be decided on the basis of facts and circumstances appearing in each case but the material consideration would be whether the construction carried out by the tenant alters the front show or the structure of the premises and considering this aspect of the law it was further observed In determining the question the Court must address itself to the nature character of the constructions and the extent 135 to which they make changes in the front and structure of the accommodation having regard to the purpose for which the accommodation may have been let out to the tenant
The Legislature intended that only those constructions which bring about substantial change in the front and structure of the building should provided a ground for tenants  eviction it took care to use the word materially altered the accommodation
The material alterations contemplate change of substantial nature affecting the form and character of the building
Many a time tenants make minor constructions and alterations for the convenient use of the tenanted accommodation
The Legislature does not provide for their eviction instead the construction so made would furnish ground for eviction only when they bring about substantial change in the front and structure of the building
Construction of a Chabutra Almirah opening a window or closing a verandah by temporary structure or replacing of a damaged roof which may be leaking or placing partition in a room or making similar minor alterations for the convenient use of the accommodation do not materially alter the building as in spite of such constructions the front and structure of the building may remain unaffected
The essential element which needs consideration is as to whether the constructions are substantial in nature and they alter the form front and structure of the accommodation
 Here it has been observed that the essential element which needs consideration as to whether the construction are substantial in nature and they alter the front elevation or the front and the structure of the building itself and it is in the light of this that ultimately in this decision what was constructed has been held not to be material alteration as it was observed The partition wall was made without digging any foundation of the floor of the room nor it touched the ceiling instead it converting a big hall into two portions for its convenient use it could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building
The partition wall did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of the accommodation
 The question as to whether the construction is of a permanent nature 136 or a temporary nature also was considered by this Court in the decision quoted above and it was observed The High Court observed that the fact that a construction is pennanent or temporary in nature does not affect the question as to whether the constructions materially alter the accommodation or not
We do not agree with this view
The nature of constructions whether they are permanent or temporary is a relevant consideration in determining the question of material alteration 
A permanent construction tends to make changes in the accommodation on a permanent basis while a temporary construction is on temporary basis which do not ordinarily affect the form or structure of the building as it can easily be removed without causing any damage to the building
 It is thus clear that what is alleged to have been constructed in the present case in the light of the test laid down by this Court in the decision referred to above could not be said to be material alteration in the premises in question
In Venkatlal G Pittie  Anr
vs Ms Bright Bros Pvt Ltd 3 SC 139 the question was not about material alteration but the question was whether the construction carried out by the tenant were permanent in nature and were such which has diminished the value of the property and further that the construction have been made after encroaching on the land which was not the part of the lease and in that context the question as to whether the structures raised were permanent or temporary have been considered and the nature of the things as appeared in that case apparently is of no avail so far as the case in hand is concerned as it was observed in that case Two questions arise for consideration in these appeals i whether the structure constructed by the tenant in the premises in question amounted to permanent structure leading to the forfeiture of the tenancy of the tenant ii what is the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution on questions of facts found by the appellate bench of Small Causes Court
 In Babu Manmohan Das Shah s case supra the question which was be fore this Court was not as tn whether the construction made was such which could be said to be a material alteration but the real question which was raised before the Court was whether it is necessary further to hold 137 that this construction diminishes the value of the accommodation although in the Section it was material alteration or such construction which diminishes the value of the accommodation used but it was contended that it will amount to and considering this aspect of the matter in this judgment it was observed As already stated even if the alterations did not cause any damage to the premises or did not substantially diminish their value the alterations were material alterations and on that basis alone the appellants were entitled to evict the respondent
 It is thus clear that even this judgment is of no assistance so far as the present case is concerned
In the light of the discussions above and in the light of the test laid down by this Court in Om Prakash s case
supra it is clear that this construction of the balcony or Dochhatti which is a wooden structure does not amount to material alteration which could give a cause of action to the respondent landlord for filing a suit of eviction
No other question was pressed
In the light of the discussions above therefore the appeal has to be allowed
It is therefore allowed
The judgment and decree passed by the courts below are set aside and the suit filed by the respondent is dismissed
In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs so far as this Court is concerned
SL Appeal allowed


Summary:
The Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act Bom
XL of 1953 was enacted by the State Legislature with the object of constituting a fund for the financing of activities for the welfare of labour and section 31 of the Act provided as follows There shall be constituted a fund called the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the sums specified in subsection 2 shall be paid into the Fund
 Section 32 provided inter alia as follows The Fund shall consist of  a all fines realised from the employees b all unpaid accumulation Notices were served on the appellant s company as also on other companies similarly situated by the Welfare Commissioner appointed under the Act calling upon them to remit to him the fines and unpaid accumulations in their custody
The appellant in reply questioned the validity of the Act on the ground that it contravened article 312 Of the Constitution and thereafter filed a Writ petition out of which the present appeal arises which was treated by consent of parties as a test case
The Judges of the Division Bench who heard the matter field that the impugned Act was intra vires though on different grounds and dismissed the petition
The sole point for determination in the appeal was whether section 3I and sub cls
a and b Of section 32 Of the Act were void as being violative of article 312 Of the Constitution Held that the unpaid accumulation of wages remaining with the appellant company was its own property and section 31 of the impugned Act in so far as it directs the payment of it tinder 32b of the Act contravenes article 312 Of the Constitution and must be invalid
Article 312A of the Constitution has no retrospective effect and cannot apply and the matter must be decided on the law as it stood at the date of the Writ petition
1123 The State of West Bengal vs Subodh Gopal Bose  and Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay vs Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd   applied
Assuming that money was not property within the meaning of article 312 and article 191f applied that Article also would be of no help to the respondent as the Act could not be supported under article 195 Of the Constitution
Commonwealth of Australia vs Bank of New South Wales  held inapplicable
The State of Bihar vs Mahayajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga  considered
The impugned Act had not the effect of substituting the Board as the creditor in place of the employee nor could it be said to be a legislation in respect of abandoned property
Although by defining unpaid accumulation  in the way it did the Legislature obviously intended that only such wages of the employees as were time barred should be taken by the State it being well settled that the law of limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt sections 3I 52 and 17 of the Act must be held to have the effect of transferring to the Board the debts due by the appellant to its employees free from the bar of limitation
Such a transfer can be valid only if it gives a complete discharge to the employer from the debts
If it does not the Act must be held to infringe article 191f of the Constitution
The Act contains no provision granting a discharge to the debtor
The bar of limitation prescribed either by section 15 Of the Payment of Wages Act Act IV Of 1936 or article 102 of the Limitation Act or the provisions of section 56 of the Contract Act assuming they applied could not give such a discharge
Where the Statute deals with rights arising out of a contract and interferes with the rights of one of the parties to it it must affect those of the other parties to it as well
Consequently the impugned Act which takes over the rights of the employees in respect of wages due to them without compensation and is therefore unconstitutional as contravening article 191f or Art 312 of the Constitution would be unconstitutional as regards the appellant as well
The purpose of a legislation relating to abandoned property must be in the first instance to safeguard the property in the interest of the true owner and thereafter in absence of any claim the taking over of it by the State
The impugned Act which vests the property absolutely in the State without any regard for the claims of the true owner cannot be said to be a law relating to abandoned property
I43 1124 Connecticut Mutul Life Insurance Company vs Moore   Anderson National Bank vs Luckett  and Standard oil Company vs New Jersey   referred to
As regards the fines mentioned in section 32a of the Act the appellant must be held to be a bare trustee under section 8 of the Wages Act having no beneficial interest in fund created by that Act and consequently sections 3I and 32a of the Act cannot contravene article 312 Or article 191f of the Constitution
Nor could it be said that the Act by extending the circle of beneficiaries had encroached on the rights of the employees of the appellant
These sections must therefore be held to be constitutionally valid