Appeal No 276 of 1956
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated October 15 1954 of the Allahabad High Court in Execution First Appeal No 224 of 1951
section P Sinha and Tiryugi Narain for the appellants
G C Mathur for respondent No 1 1961
February 20
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J
This appeal raises a question of limitation in execution proceedings
The decree sought to be executed was made by the Civil Judge Kanpur on September 2 1938 in a suit for partition brought by two brothers Jumna Prasad and Devi Prasad and two minor sons of Jumna Prasad against Gajju Lal his son Jawala Prasad the four minor sons of Jawala Prasad Sharda Prasad Dharam Pal Ram Pal and Krishna Pal and one Smt
Sundari
By the decree one of the properties a house formerly bearing No 3622 and now 3658 Etawa Bazar Kanpur was awarded along with other properties to the defendants in the suit
The present application for execution was made by the four brothers Sharda Prasad Dharam Pal Ram Pal and Krishna Pal on Novem ber 23 1949
The prayer was that these applicants may be delivered possession over this Etawa Bazar house along with Gajju Lal Jawala Prasad and Smt
Sundari on dispossession of Jumna Prasad and Devi Prasad
It is stated in the application that all these applicants had  up till now been minors and one of them is still a minor and so no question in respect of time arises
 This  it is important to note was the first application for execution of the  partition decree
A number of objections were raised but the principal objection and the only one with which we are concerned in this appeal was that the application was barred by time
The decision of this question depended on the answer to the question raised on behalf of the opposite parties that Jawala Prasad one of the persons entitled jointly with these applicants to make an application for the execution of the decree could have 877 given a discharge of the liability under the decree without the concurrence of his minor sons and so time ran under section 7 of the Limitation Act against them also from the date of the decree
The Trial Court did not feel satisfied that Jawala Prasad could give a valid discharge and held accordingly that the application was within time
on appeal the High Court held that Jawala Prasad as the Karta of the Hindu joint family could act on behalf of the entire joint family in taking possession of the house allotted to the defendants and delivery of such possession could discharge the liability qua the entire joint family and held accordingly that the application was barred by limitation
The High Court however granted a certificate under article 1331c of the Constitution and on that certificate this appeal has been filed by the applicants for execution
Two contentions were raised on behalf of the appellants in support of the plea that the High Court erred in holding that the application for execution was barred by limitation
First it is urged that section 7 of the Limitation Act does not apply at all to a partition decree
The second contention is that in any case Jawala Prasad could not give a valid discharge of the liability under the decree in view of the provisions of O 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure
On the first contention the argument is that the word  discharge  is appropriate only in respect of a monetary claim and is wholly inappropriate in respect of any decree for possession whether on partition or otherwise
There is in our opinion no substance in this argument
The mere fact that the two illustrations to section 7 are in respect of debts is no ground for thinking that the provisions of section 7 are limited to suits or decrees on monetary claims only
Nor can we see any reason to think that the word  discharge  can refer only to debts
Discharge means to free from liability
The liability may be in respect of monetary claims like the debts it may be in respect of possession of property it may be in respect of taking some order as regards property it may be in respect of many other matters
Except in the case of declaratory decrees or 878 decrees of a similar nature the decree in favour of one person against another requires the person against whom the decree is made liable to do something or to refrain from doing something
This liability is in a sense a debt which the party is in law bound to discharge
The ordinary use of the word  judgment debtor  to denote a person against whom a decree has been made makes a clear recognition of this
It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Code of Civil Procedure itself defines  judgment debtor  to mean  any person against whom a decree is passed or an order capable of execution has been made
 It is helpful to notice in this connection the provisions of section 8 of the Limitation Act that  nothing in section 6 or section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of preemption
 If section 7 had been applicable merely to litigation for monetary claims it would have been unnecessary and indeed meaningless to take the special step of exempting suits to enforce rights of pre emption from the operation of section 7
This is a further reason in support of the conclusion that the word  discharge in section 7 is not limited to discharge of monetary claims only but also to discharge or satisfaction of all other liabilities as well
We therefore hold that the first argument raised on behalf of the appellants has no substance
Equally untenable is the second argument that the provisions of 0 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure debar the manager of a Hindu joint family from giving discharge in respect of a liability to deliver properties
Under the Hindu Law the Karta of a Hindu joint family represents all the members of the family and has the power and duty to take action which binds the family in connection with all matters of management of the family property
Clearly therefore when in respect of a transaction of property possession has to be received by the several members of the family it is the Karta s duty and power to take possession on behalf of the entire family including himself the members of the family who are sui juris as well as those who are not
879 When any minor member of a joint family is a party to a proceeding in a court he has however to be represented by a next friend appointed by the court and where somebody other than the managing member of the family has been appointed a guardian ad litem there might be difficulty in the way of the managing member giving a discharge on behalf of the minor
Where however the managing member himself is the guardian ad litem the only difficulty in the way of action being taken by him on behalf of a minor is to the extent as mentioned in 0
32 rr 6 and 7
In Ganesha Row vs Tuljaram Row 1 the Judicial Committee pointed out that  No doubt a father or managing member of a joint Hindu family may under certain circum stances and subject to certain conditions enter into agreements which may be binding on the minor members of the family
But where a minor is party to a suit and a next friend or guardian has been appointed to look after the rights and interests of the infant in and concerning the suit the acts of such next friend or guardian are subject to the control of the Court
 In that case their Lordships held that in view of the provisions of section 462 of the then Code of Civil Procedure which corresponds to 0
32 r 7 of the present Civil Procedure Code the managing member who had been appointed a guardian in the suit had no authority to enter into any compromise or agreement purporting to bind the minor
This principle has been applied also to cases where the provisions of 0 32 r 6 would apply and so it has been held in numerous cases in India that the Karta of a Hindu joint family though guardian in the suit cannot give a valid discharge in respect of a claim or a decree for is money or other movable property Parmeshwari Singh vs Banjit Singh 2 and Letchmana Chetty vs Subbiah Chetty 3 In the present case however there is no scope for the application of either the provisions of 0 32 r 6 or O32 r 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Neither is 1 1913 LR 40 IA 132138 2 AIR 1939 Pat
3 Mad
920 880 this a case of a receipt of any money or movable properties nor is there any question of entering into an agreement or compromise on behalf of the minor
For clearly acceptance of delivery of possession of property in terms of the decree in a partition suit can by no stretch of imagination be considered entering into any  agreement or compromise We are therefore of the opinion that Jawala Prasad the managing member of the family could have given a discharge of the liability under the partition decree by accepting delivery of possession on behalf of his minor sons without their consent and so time ran against them also under section 7 of the Limitation Act from the date of the decree
The High Court was therefore right in its conclusion that the application for execution was barred by limitation
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The Government of India entered into an agreement with the President of Argentine Institute for Promotion of Trade to supply Hessian in return for licences for
shipment to India of food stuff purchased there and with a view to implement that agreement issued orders under r 75Ai of the Defence of India Rules 1939 on the managing agents of certain jute mills on September 30 1946 requisitioning hessian and directing them and any other person in possession of the said goods to deliver them to the Director of Supplies Calcutta
Although in the heading of the notices after the names of the managing agents it was not stated that they were being addressed as managing agents of such and such mills the schedules attached to them made it clear that they were addressed as managing agents of such and such mills
On the same day notices of acquisition under r 75A2 were served on the said managing agents and they were further informed that under r 75A3 the goods would vest in the Government at the beginning of the same day free from any mortgage pledge lien and other similar encumbrance
The notices of acquisition were also accompanied by schedules similar to those accompanying the requisition orders
The 821 Government of India tried to take possession of the hessian but was resisted by the mills and the holders of pucca delivery orders and brought the suit out of which the present appeals arose for enforcing the said orders of requisition and acquisition
The Defence of India Act 1939 and the Rules made thereunder had in the meantime come to an end and the question before the courts below was whether the orders of requisition and acquisition as served were effective in law
The trial judge held that as there were no valid orders of requisition as the mills had not been properly served and since the goods were subject to pucca delivery orders the mills as well as the Government were estopped from challenging the ownership of the holders of the said delivery orders
The appeal court held that the orders of requisition were valid and binding that the mills and not the holders of the delivery orders were the owners of the goods but that the notices of acquisition had not been served as required by r 75A2 Of the Rules and therefore there was no valid acquisition under r 75A3 Of the Rules
Held that the requisition of the goods could be effected either by taking possession of them or by requiring them to be placed at the disposal of the requisitioning authority
Since in the present case the mills and not the holders of the delivery orders were admittedly in possession of the goods on the date of the requisition the proper persons to be served with the orders were the mills
Since the Rules did not expressly provide as to the manner in which orders of requisition in writing under r 75A had to be served r 119i must apply and as the orders in the present case concerned an individual corporation they had to be served in the manner prescribed by 0
XXIX r 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
The word officer as defined by section 2ii Of the Indian Companies Act 1913 includes a managing agent and such definition can be utilised for the purpose of the Code and regard being ha to the nature of his duties there can be no doubt that a managing agent would be within the expression  other principal officer in O XXIX r 21 of the Code
There was no basis for the contention that service under r2 must be on some human being or that there could be no effective service on a corporation by serving another corporation which might be its principal officer
The service of the orders of requisition on the managing agents obviously meant for the mills in the instant case was therefore good service under 0
XXIX r 3 Of the Code
Since r 75A2 itself did not provide for any mode of service of notice under it either the one or the other of the modes specified in section I48 of the Indian Companies Act 1913 or 0
XXIX r 2 Of the Code would be a reasonable mode of effecting service thereunder
In the instant case the notices of 822 acquisition having been served under 0
XXIX r 2a as the orders of requisition had also been such service was good service and the acquisition was effective in law
It was not correct to say that the property in the goods represented by the pucca delivery orders had passed to their holders
The contract involved in such delivery orders is a contract of sale of unascertained goods and in view of section 18 of the Indian  title cannot pass to the buyer till the goods are ascertained by appropriation
Anglo India jute Mills Co vs Omademull Cal
127 explained
It was not correct to say that the Government of India in acquiring the requisitioned goods was claiming title through the mills and would be like them estopped qua the holders of pucca delivery orders
The power to acquire the property flowed from the Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder and covered not merely the rights of the owners but the entire goods
Rule 75A3 of the said Rules made it quite clear the acquisition thereunder was of a title paramount and of the whole of the property freed from all kinds of encumbrances
No question of serving any notice on the holders of pucca delivery orders therefore arose in the present case as the property in the goods had not in law passed to them