Appeals Nos 25 and 26 of 1958
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated August 7 1956 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos 151 and 152 of 1955
C B Agarwala A N Goyal and Mohan Lal Agarwala for the appellant
Gopi Nath Dikshit and C P Lal for the respondents
March 30
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J
These two appeals arise out Gajen of two writ petitions filed by the appellant Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh against the respondents the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another in the Allahabad High Court and they were based on the same facts and asked for the same relief
Both of them raise a short common question of limitation the decision of which would depend upon the determination of the scope and effect of the provisions of the proviso to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 hereafter called the Act
Since the facts in both the appeals are substantially the same we would refer to the facts in Civil Appeal No 25 of 1958
The decision in this appeal would govern the decision of the other appeal Civil Appeal No 26 of 1958
The appellant Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh was the proprietor of a village Beljuri in the District of Nainital
It appears that proceedings for compulsory acquisition of land including the said village for a public purpose were commenced by respondent 2 the State of Uttar Pradesh notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued in that behalf and the 678 provisions of section 17 were also made applicable
Accordingly after the notice under section 91 of the Act was published possession of land was taken by the Collector on March 19 1960
Thereupon the appellant filed his claim to compensation for the land acquired in accordance with section 92 and proceedings were held by the Deputy Land Acquisition Officer respondent 1 for determining the amount of compensation
It appears that in these proceedings an award was made signed and filed in his office by respondent I on March 25 1951
No notice of this award was however given to the appellant as required by section 122 and it was only on or about January 13 1953 that he received information about the making of the said award
The appellant then filed an application on February 24 1953 under a 18 requiring that the matter be referred for the determination of the Court as according to the appellant the compensation amount determined by respondent I was quite inadequate
Respondent I took the view that the application thus made by the appellant was beyond time under the proviso to section 18 and so he rejected it
The appellant then filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court on December 211953 in which he claimed appropriate reliefs in respect of the order passed by respondent I on his application made under a 18
This petition was heard by Mehrotra J and was allowed
The learned Judge directed respondent 1 to consider the application made by the appellant on the merits and deal with it in accordance with law
He held that in dealing with the said application respondent 1 should treat the application as filed in time
Against this decision the respondents preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court
Mootham C J and Chaturvedi J who heard this appeal took the view that the application filed by the appellant under section 18 of the Act was barred by time and so they allowed the appeal set aside the order passed by Mehrotra J and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant
The appellant then moved for and obtained a certificate from the said High Court and it is with this certificate that he has come to this 670 Court in the present appeal and so the short question which the appellant raises for our decision is whether the application filed by him under section 18 of the Act was in time or not
Before proceeding to construe the material provisions of section 18 it is necessary to refer very briefly to some other sections of the Act which are relevant in order to appreciate the background of the scheme in relation to land acquisition proceedings
Section 4 deals with the publication of the preliminary notification and prescribes the powers of the appropriate officers
Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette and a public notice of its substance shall be given at convenient places in the said locality that is the effect of section 41
Sec tion 42 deals with the powers of the appropriate authorities
Section 5 A provides for the hearing of objections filed by persons interested in any land which has been notified under section 41
After the objections are thus considered a declaration that land is required for a public purpose follows under section 61
Section 62 provides for the publication of the said declaration and section 63 makes the declaration conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose
Section 9 requires the Collector to give public notice in the manner specified stating that the Government intend to take possession of the land and calling for claim to compensation in respect of all interests in such land
Section 92 prescribes the particulars of such notice and section 93 an 4 provide for the manner of serving such notice
Section II deals with the enquiry and provides for the making of the award by the Collector
Section 12l then lays down that the award when made by the Collector shall be filed in his office and shall except as otherwise provided be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation 680 among the persons interested
Section 122 is important
It makes it obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made
It is common ground that no such notice was given by respondent 1 to the appellant
That briefly is the scheme of the relevant provisions of Part II of the Act which deals with acquisition
Part III which deals with reference to Court and procedure thereon opens with section 18
Section 181 provides that any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court inter alia whether the amount of compensation is adequate or not
It is under this provision that the appellant made an application from which the present appeal arises
Section 182 requires that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken
These grounds have been stated by the appellant in his application
The proviso to section 18 deals with the question of limitation
It prescribes that every such application shall be made a if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collector s award b in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 122 or within six months from the date of the Collector s award whichever shall first expire
The appellant s case falls under the latter part of el
b of the proviso
It has been held by the Allahabad High Court that since the application made by the appellant before respondent I was made beyond six months from the date of the award in question it was beyond time
The view taken by the High Court proceeds on the literal construction of the relevant clause
As we have already seen the award was signed and delivered in his office by respondent 1 on March 25 1951 and the application by the appellant was made under section 18 on February 24 1953
It has been held that the effect of the relevant 681 clause is that the application made by the appellant is plainly beyond the six months permitted by the said clause and so respondent I was right in rejecting it as barred by time
The question which arises for our decision is whether this literal and mechanical way of construing the relevant clause is justified in A law
It is obvious that the effect of this construction is that if a person does not know about the making of the award and is himself not to blame for not knowing about the award his right to make an application under section 18 may in many cases be rendered ineffective
If the effect of the relevant provision unambiguously is as held by the High Court the unfortunate consequence which may flow from it may not have a material or a decisive bearing
If on the other hand it is possible reasonably to construe the said provision so as to avoid such a consequence it would be legitimate for the Court to do so
We must therefore enquire whether the relevant provision is capable of the construction for which the appellant contends and that naturally raises the question as to what is the meaning of the expression the day of the Collector s award
In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under section 12
In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act
It is a decision inter alia in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition
If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded
If however the owner does not accept the offer section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court and  it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and 86 682 the Collector
In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded
It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance
In Ezra vs The Secretary of State 1
It has been held that the meaning to be attached to the word award under section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances but from the examination of the provisions of the law relating to the Collector s proceedings culminating in the award
The considerations to which we have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer and that consequently although the Government is bound by his proceedings the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded
 Then the High Court has added that such tender once made is binding on the Government and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the Civil Court
The said case was taken before the Privy Council in Ezra vs Secretary of State for India 2  and their Lordships have expressly approved of the observations made by the High Court to which we have just referred
Therefore if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned
That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded
Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office it must 1 Cal
36 86
2 Cal
683 involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively
If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words the date of the award occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate
There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion
If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the  rights of the owner of the property and in that sense like all decisions which affect persons it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party
The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision either actual or constructive is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force
Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or constructively
If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it can be said to be made when pronounced
If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement
Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later
The knowledge of the party affected by the award either actual or constructive being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression the date of the award used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively
In our opinion therefore it would be unreasonable to 684 construe the words from the date of the Collector s award used in the proviso to section 18 in a literal or mechanical way
In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under section 122 it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested a are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made
This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned
The Legislature recognised that the making of the award under section 11 followed by its filing under section 121 would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force
It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also necessary and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned
It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it
This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression from the date of the Collector s award in the proviso to section 18
It is because communication of the order is regarded by the Legislature as necessary that section 122 has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate
It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under section 122 should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under section 18 and this result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature
It may now be convenient to refer to some judicial decisions bearing on this point
In Magdonald vs The Secretary of State for India in Council 1 Rattigan and Shah Din JJ
held that under the proviso to section 18 until an award is announced or communicated to the parties concerned it cannot be said to be legally made
1 1005 4 Ind C 914
685 An award under the Act it was observed in the judgment is in the nature of a tender and obviously no tender can be made unless it is brought to the  knowledge of the person to whom it is made
The learned Judges observed that this proposition seemed to them to be self evident
The same view has been expressed by the Oudh Judicial Commissioner in Hari Das Pal vs The Municipal Board Lucknow 1
On the other hand in Jehangir Bomanji vs G D Gaikwad 2 the Bombay High Court has taken the view that the element of notice is only an essential ingredient of the first part of cl
b of the proviso to s18 which prescribes the period of limitation as six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice from the Collector not of the second part which prescribes the maximum period of six months from the date of the Collector s award in absolute terms
According to that decision as far as the limitation under the latter part is concerned it runs from the date of the award and the date of the award has nothing whatever to lo with the notice which the Collector has to give under section 122
In our opinion this decision is based on a misconstruction of the relevant clause in the proviso to section 18
The same comment falls to be made in regard to the decision of the Kerala High Court in State of Travancore Cochin vs Narayani Amma Ponnamma 3
It may however be pertinent to point out that the Bombay High Court has taken a somewhat different view in dealing with the effect of the provision as to limitation prescribed by section 33A2 of the Indian Income tax Act
This provision prescribes limitation for an application by an assessee for the revision of the specified class of orders and it says that such an application should be made within one year from the date of the order
It is significant that while provid ing for a similar period of limitation section 331 specifically lays down that the limitation of sixty days therein prescribed is to be calculated from the date on which the order in question is communicated to the 1 1914 22 Ind C 652
2 AIR 1954 Bom
419 3 AIR 1958 Kerala 272
686 assessee
In other words in prescribing limitation section 331 expressly provides for the commencement of the period from the date of the communication of the order whereas section 33A2 does not refer to any such communication and naturally the argument was that communication was irrelevant under section 33A2 and limitation would commence as from the making of the order without reference to its communication
This argument was rejected by the Bombay High Court and it was hold that it would be a reasonable interpretation to hold that the making of the order implies notice of the said order either actual or constructive to the party affected by it
It would not be easy to reconcile this decision and particularly the reasons given in its support with the decision of the same High Court in the case of Jehangir Bomanji 1
The relevant clause under section 33A2 of the Indian Income tax Act has also been similarly construed by the Madras High Court in OAOAM Muthia Chettiar vs The Commissioner of Income tax Madras 2
If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time observed Rajamannar CJ limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order
In other words the Madras High Court has taken the view that the omission to use the words from the date of communication in section 33A2 does not mean that limitation can start to run against a party even before the party either knew or should have known about the said order
In our opinion this conclusion is obviously right
A similar question arose before the Madras High Court in Annamalai Chetti vs Col J G Cloete3
Section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act XXVIII of 1860 limited the time within which a suit may be brought to set side the decision of the settlement officer to two months from the date of the award and 1 AIR 1954 Bom
2 ILR 3 Mad
687 so the question arose as to when the time would begin to run
The High Court held that the time can begin to run only from the date on which the decision is communicated to the parties
If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act says the judgment it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties otherwise they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the decision having been passed
Adopting the same principle a similar construction has been placed by the Madras High Court in K V E Swaminathan alias Chidambaram Pillai vs Letchmanan Chettiar 1
On the limitation provisions contained in sections 731 and 77l of the Indian Registration Act XVI of 1908
It was held that in a case where an order was not passed in the presence of the parties or after notice to them of the date when the order would be passed the expression within thirty days after the making of the order used in the said sections means within thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it
These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned
Therefore we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to section 18 of the Act
In the result we allow the appeal set aside the orders passed by Mootham C J and Chaturvedi J and restore those of Mehrotra J
In the circumstances of this case there would be no order as to costs
Appeal allowed
1 Mad 491


Summary:
Certain lands belonging to the appellant were compulsorily acquired
The Collector made an award with respect to the amount of compensation signed and filed it in his office as required by section 121 Land Acquisition Act on March 19 1950
But no notice of the award as required by section 122 was given to the appellant
The appellant came to know of the award on or about January 13 1953 and on February 24 1953 he filed an application under section 18 requiring that the matter be referred for the determination of the Court
The proviso to section 18 prescribes that in cases where a person was not present or represented at the time of the making of the award the application under section 18 shall be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 122 or within six months from the date of the award whichever shall expire first
The appellant s application was dismissed as time barred on the ground that it was made beyond six months of the date of the award
Held that the application made by the appellant under section 18 of the Act was not beyond time
The award of the Collector was not a decision but an offer of compensation on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property and it was not effective until it was communicated to the owner
The making of the award did not consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or filing it in the office of the Collector it also involved the communication of the award to the owner either actually or constructively
Consequently the expression the date of the award in the proviso to section 18 meant the date when the award was communicated to the owner or is known by him either actually or constructively
The application in the present case was made within six months of the date when the appellants came to know of the award and was within the period prescribed
Ezra vs The Secretary of State Cal
36 and Ezra vs Secretary of State for India Cal 605 applied
Magdonald vs The Secretary of State for India in Council 1905 4 Ind
C 914 and Hari Das Pal vs The Municipal Board Lucknow 1914 22 Ind C 652 approved
677 Jahangir Bemanji vs G D Gaikwad AIR 1954 Bom
419 and State of Travancore Cochin vs Narayani Amma Ponnamma AIR 1958 Kerala 272 disapproved
O A O A M Muthia Chettiar vs The Commissioner of Income tax Madras ILR  Annamalai Chetti vs Col
T G The Cloeta Mad 189
and E V E Swaminathan
The Alias Chidambaram Pillai vs Letchmanan Chettiar 1930 ILRAcqu  referred to