Writ Petition Crimi nal No 184 of 1989
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Kapil Sibbal KK Lahiri KR Nagaraja and RS Hegde for the Petitioner
VC Mahanjan TVSN Chari and Ms A Subhashini for the Respondents
344 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT J
In this writ petition the petitioner has chal lenged the validity of the detention order dated January 19 1989 passed under the  hereinaf ter referred to as the Act  by virtue of which the peti tioner has been under detention since the said date
The allegations made in the grounds of detention need not be stated for only legal submissions have been made on behalf of the petitioner in challenging the order of detention
The order of detention dated January 19 1989 reads as follows WHEREAS I Vijay Karan Commissioner of Police Delhi am satisfied that with a view to prevent Sh
Jitender Tyagi so Sh
Ram Nath Tyagi Ro VIII
Khajuri Police Station
Kila Distt
Meerut Uttar Pradesh aged at about 2526 from acting in a manner prejudi cial to the maintenance of public order it is necessary to make an order directing that the said Sh
Jitender Tyagi may be detained
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred vide sub section 2 of section 3 of the as delegated to me vide Delhi Administration Delhi s order No F2188 HP II dated 11189
I hereby direct that the said Sh
Jitender Tyagi be detained and kept in Central Jail Tihar Delhi
 It thus appears from the order of detention that it was passed by the Commissioner of Police Delhi in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section 2 of section 3 of the Act as delegated to him by the Delhi Administration
The order of detention was approved by the Administrator of Delhi by his order dated January 31 1989
Paragraph 3 of the said order is in the following terms 3
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub section 4 of section 3 of the  the Administrator hereby approves the order of the Police Commissioner dated 1911989 de taining Sh
Jitender Tyagi and further directs that Sh
Jitender Tyagi be kept in custody in Central Jail Tihar New Delhi
The first point that has been strenuously urged by Mr Kapil Sibal learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of detention not having been approved within a period of 345 twelve days as provided in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act it had spent its force on the expiry of the said period and accordingly the detention of the petitioner is illegal
Section 3 of the Act provides for the power to make orders of detention under certain circumstances
Sub section 4 of section 3 reads as follows 4
When any order is made under this sec tion by an officer mentioned in sub section 3 he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention this sub section shall apply sub ject to the modification that for the words twelve days the words fifteen days shall be substituted
 Under sub section 4 of section 3 no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government
The question that arises for our consid eration relates to the computation of the period of twelve days
To be more explicit the question is whether in com puting the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included or not
It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the day on which the order of detention was passed should be included and the order approving the detention having been passed on January 31 1989 that is on the thirteenth day after the expiry of twelve days it had ceased to be in force
On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the day on which the detention order was passed should be excluded and accordingly the detention of the petitioner having been approved on January 31 1989 it was quite within the period of twelve days
Further it is the case of the respondents that the order of detention was as a matter of fact approved on January 26 1989 and by the order dated January 31 1989 the order of approval was communicated to the authorities concerned
346 We may first consider the contention of the respondents that the order of detention was duly approved on January 26 1989
A statement in that regard has been made in the coun ter affidavit of the respondents
We are however unable to accept the same
We have already extracted above paragraph 3 of the order of detention dated January 31 1989 in which it has been categorically stated the Administrator hereby approves the order of the Police Commissioner dated 1911989 detaining Sh
Jitender Tyagi
 After the said categorical statement in paragraph 3 it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondents that the said order dated January 31 1989 was made for the purpose of communi cating the approval of the order of detention
In our view there can be no doubt whatsoever that the order of deten tion was approved by the said order dated January 31 1989
Now we may consider the question as to the computation of twelve days as referred to in sub section 4 of section 3
Sub section 4 inter alia provides that when an order is made by an officer mentioned in sub section 3 he shall forthwith report the facts to the State Government
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under sub section 4 the officer has to act forthwith after the making of the order in reporting the fact to the State Government and this is sufficient indication that the day on which the order of detention is made should be included in computing the period of twelve days
In our opinion sub section 4 has given a clear indi cation as to the computation of twelve days
The period of twelve days has to be calculated after  the making of the order of detention
Thus it is apparent that the period of twelve days comes after the making of the order of deten tion
It is true that in sub section 4 the officer making the order of detention shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government but the word forthwith  will not be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the period of twelve days inasmuch as there is a clear indica tion that the said period shall be computed after the order is made
In other words sub section 4 itself excludes the day on which the order is made
Computation of twelve days including the day on which the detention order is made will be ignoring the direction of the legislature as given in sub section 4 itself that the said period of twelve days will commence after the making of the detention order
It is however submitted that when two interpretations are possible that which enures to the benefit of the detenu should be accepted
In our opinion sub section 4 admits of only one interpretation regarding the computation of twelve days and accord 347 ingly the question as to the adoption of the interpretation which enures to the benefit of the detenu does not arise
The view which we take is in accordance with the well established canons of interpretations
It has been stated in Stroud s Judicial Dictionary Third Edition Volume I page 86 as follows Where an act has to be done within so many days after a given event the day of such event is not to be reckoned In Smt
Manjuli vs Civil Judge AIR 1970 Bom
1 the provision of section 151 of the Village Panchayats Act 1958 came up for interpretation before the Nagput Bench of the Bombay High Court
Section 151 inter alia provides that any person who is qualified to vote is entitled to challenge the validity of the election within 15 days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election
The High Court in interpreting the provision rightly laid stress on the word after and held that the day of which the result was declared must be excluded
This Court had also occasion to construe rule 119 of the Election Rules framed under the Representation of the People Act in TC Basappa vs T Nagappa  Rule 119 provides inter alia that an election petition against a returned candidate is to be presented at any time after the publica tion of the name of such candidate under section 67 of the Act but not later than 14 days from the date of publication of the notice in the official gazette under rule 113
Mukh erjea J as he than was speaking for the Bench observed as follows The High court seems to think that in comput ing period of 14 days the date of publication is to be included
This seems to us to be an unwarranted view to take which is opposed to the ordinary canons of construction
Dr Tek Chand appearing for the respondent No 1 plainly confessed his inability to support this view and we must hold therefore that there is no question of the Tribunal s enter taining election petition after the prescribed period in the present case
 In re VS Mehta AIR 1970 AP 234 which is a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relating to the computa tion of the period of three months in section 106 of the Factories Act Section 106 provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable 348 under the Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector
The question before the High Court was whether in computing the said period of three months the day on which the offence was alleged to be committed should be excluded or not
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the term within three months of the date in section 106 of the Factories Act means within three calendar months after the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an In spector  and consequently the date of the knowledge that is the date of inspection should be excluded in computing the period of three months
That interpretation resulting in the exclusion of the date of knowledge should be made as the High Court considered the expression within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector as within three months after the date on which etc   
Thus what is significant to be noticed is the word after which the High Court has substituted for the word of  in the expression of the date in section 106
In Haru Das Gupta vs State of West Bengal   the question was whether under section 12 of the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act 1970 the order or decision of the State Government confirming the detention order was made within three months from the date of detention
In holding that in computing the said period of three months the date of detention shall be excluded this Court has laid down that the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day
This Court has agreed to the view expressed by Wills J in Ratcliff vs Bartholomew that a complaint under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act filed on June 30 in respect of an act alleged to have been committed on May 30 was within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise
The principle on the basis of which that view was expressed by Wills J is that the day on which the cause for the complaint arose had to be excluded while computing the period within which under the Act the complaint had to be filed
Thus it is apparent from the above decision that the day on which the cause of action arises has to be excluded in computing a particular period of time and in the instant case such an exclusion has to be made in view of the word after in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act
349 The petitioner has however placed reliance on a few decisions which will be stated presently
In Prabhu Narain Singh vs Superintendent Central Jail Varanasi ILR 1961 1 All
427 the Allahabad High Court has on an interpreta tion of sub section 3 of section 3 of the  which is verbatim the same as subsec tion 4 of section 3 of the Act with which we are con cerned held that in computing the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included
One of the reasons for the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court which is strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the detenu is that if the day on which the order is passed is to be excluded 
from twelve days prescribed for the approval of the said order then the consequence of the acceptance of this interpretation would be that it would not be possible for the State Government to approve of the order until after the day on which it was passed had expired
It has been observed that such an unrea sonable consequence was not contemplated by the legislature
When the language of a statute is plain and simple the question of ascertaining the intention of the legislature does not arise
In our opinion the word after  in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act is very significant and clearly excludes any contention that in computing the period of twelve days the day on which the order of detention is passed should be included
The Allahabad High Court has omitted to consider the word after in the section
We are unable to subscribe to the view of the High Court that if the day on which the order of detention was made is excluded from the calculation of the period of twelve days in that case the position would be that it would not be possible for the State Government to approve of the order of deten tion until after the day on which it was passed had expired
The expression in the meantime in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act clearly indicates that the State Gov ernment can approve of the order of detention even on the day it is passed
The language of sub section 4 of section 3 is plain and simple and the question whether the order of detention can be approved on the day it is passed or not does not at all arise
In our opinion Prabhu Narain Singh s case supra has not correctly interpreted the provision of section 33 of the in regard to the computation of the period of twelve days
The learned Counsel for the detenu has placed reliance upon two other decisions namely Nillapareddi Chandrasekhra Reddy vs The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another and C Krishna Reddy and Another vs Commissioner of Police Hyderabad 350 and Others  both are of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
These two decisions relate to the commu nication to the detenu of the grounds of detention not later than five days from the date of detention as provided in section 81 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1951
We do not think that we should be justified in ex pressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the computation of the said period of five days as made in these two decisions for the language that is used in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act with which we are concerned is different from that used in section 81 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1951
Similarly the decision of the Patna High Court in Gulam Sarwar vs State of Bihar and Others relied on by the respondents also related to the computation of the period of five days as contained in section 81 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1951
In this case a contrary view has been expressed
In our view all these decisions are of no help to us having regard to the differ ence in language of the provision with which we are con cerned
Be that as it may we have no hesitation in holding that in computing the period of twelve days referred to in sub section 4 of section 3 of the Act the day on which the order of detention was passed should be excluded and upon such computation it must be held that the approval of the order of detention was made within twelve days after the making of the order of detention
The next point that has been urged on behalf of the detenu is that the order dated January 11 1989 of the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi directing that during the period from 1911989 to 184
1989 the Commissioner of Police Delhi may also exercise the powers of detaining authority under sub section 2 of section 3 of the Act is ultra vires section 33 of the Act
Section33 provides that if having regard to the circumstances pre vailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do it may by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also if satisfied as provided in subsection 2 exer cise the powers conferred by the said sub section
It is contended that as no circumstances as mentioned in section 33 in respect of which satisfaction has to be made by the Administrator of Delhi have been stated in the order nor in the grounds of detention the said order dated January 11 1989 is illegal and invalid
This point has not been taken in the writ petition and accordingly the Delhi Administration did not get an opportunity to controvert the allega 351 tions made for the first time in the argument
The point is not one involving only a question of law but it also in volves question of fact
In the circumstances we do not think we shall be justified in allowing the petitioner to take the point for the first time in the argument
The next point that has been urged by the learned Coun sel for the petitioner is that the detaining authority that is the Commissioner of Police Delhi not having supplied to the detenu a copy of the said order dated January 11 1989 of the Administrator of Delhi directing him to exercise the powers of the detaining authority under subsection 2 of section 3 of the Act a serious prejudice has been caused to the detenu in that if the copy of the said order had been supplied the detenu might have contended that no such circumstances as contemplated by sub section 3 of section 3 of the Act were prevailing and that the delegation of the powers on the Commissioner of Police of Delhi was illegal and invalid and consequently the order of detention was inoperative and void
The Act does not provide for supplying a copy of an order under section 33 of the Act
The said order has not been relied upon by the Commissioner of Police in passing the impugned order of detention
It may be that by virtue of the said order dated January 11 1989 passed under section 33 of the Act the Commissioner of Police could exercise the powers of the detaining authority under section 32 of the Act
But that has nothing to do as to the subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police in making the impugned order of detention
We do not think there is any substance in the contention made on behalf of the detenu and it is accordingly rejected
In the grounds of detention it is inter alia stated as follows Though Sh
Jitender Tyagi is in judicial custody it is reported that applica tion for his bail has been filed in the court in case FIR No 6 dated 7189 us 255459 Arms Act PS Yamuna Vihar Delhi
It is likely that he may be released in these cases on bail and again indulge in nefarious activi ties of extortion and intimidation
Keeping in view his activities I have issued order for his detention under section 32 of the Na tional Security Act 1980 so that his crimi nal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order could be stopped
 It is urged on behalf of the detenu that only in one case the detenu has made an application for bail but in the said statement of 352 the Commissioner of Police in the grounds of detention he was proceeding on the assumption that in all the cases the detenu had made applications for bail
Accordingly it is submitted that this shows complete non application of mind by the detaining authority
We are unable to accept the contention
Mr Mahajan learned Counsel for the respond ents has produced before us the records of the detaining authority from which it appears that a copy of the applica tion for bail was with the detaining authority before he made the order of detention
So the contention that the detaining authority proceeded on the basis that the detenu had made applications for bail in all the cases pending against him is not correct
There is therefore no sub stance in this contention
Equally non meritorious is the contention that a copy of the application for bail has not been supplied to the de taining authority for his consideration
It is submitted that if such a copy had been supplied to the detaining authority he would have considered the statement of the detenu that he was falsely implicated in these cases
The contention is based on erroneous assumption that a copy of the bail application was not supplied to the detaining authority
Indeed as noticed already a copy of the bail application was with the detaining authority before he had passed the order of detention
This contention is also rejected
No other point has been urged in this writ petition
For the reasons aforesaid the writ petition is dismissed
TNA Petition dismissed


Summary:
The words  any object held sacred by any class of persons occurring in section 295 Of the Indian Penal Code are of general import and cannot be limited to idols in temples or idols carried on festival occasions
Not merely idols or sacred books but any other object which is regarded as sacred by any class of persons whether actually worshipped or not fall within the description
Queen Empress vs Imam Ali All 150 and Romesh Chunder Sannyal vs Hiru Mondal Cal
852 considered
Consequently in a case where the allegation in the petition of complaint was that one of the accused broke the idol of God Ganesa in public and the two others actually aided and abetted him with the intention of insulting the religious feeling of the complainant and his community who held the deity in veneration and the trial Magistrate on receipt of the Police report that the alleged occurrence was true dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure holding that the breaking of a mud image of Ganesa was not an offence under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the Sessions judge and the High Court in revision agreeing with the view of the trial Court refused to direct further enquiry  Held that the courts below were clearly in error in inter preting section 295 of the Indian Penal Code in the way they lid but since the complaint stood long dismissed no further enquiry need be directed into the matter
Held further that the Courts must be circumspect in such matters and pay due regard to the religious susceptibilities of different classes of persons with different beliefs whether they shared those beliefs or not or whether those beliefs in the opinion of the Court were rational or not