iminal Appeal No 79 of 1956
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 7 1955 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No 370 of 1954 arising out of the judgment and order dated July 26 1954 of the Court of the Special Judge at Bhagalpur in Special Case No 14 of 1954
B R L Iyengar for appellant No 1
section P Sinha and P C Agarwala for appellant No 2
R C Prasad for the respondent
August 18
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J
This appeal by special leave is directed against the concurrent judgments and orders of the courts below convicting the two appellants under section 120B read with section 165A Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months and to pay a fine of Rs 200 each and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 6 months
A separate conviction under section 165A has been recorded in respect of the first appellant Badri
Under this head he has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months the sentence to run concurrently with the sentence under the common charge
The facts as found by the courts below which could not be successfully challenged before us areas follows The second appellant Ramji Sonar is a goldsmith by profession and runs a shop on the main road in the village Naogachia
In that village there is a police station and the shop in question is situated in between the police station building and the residential quarters of the Inspector of police who was the First Informant in the case resulting in the conviction and 1143 sentences of the appellants as stated above
The first appellant Badri runs a school for small boys in the same village about 50 yards away from the shop a foresaid of the second appellant
On August 221953 the First Informant who holding the position of an Inspector of police was in charge of the police station made a seizure of certain ornaments and molten silver from a vacant building in front of the house of the second appellant Ramji
Those ornaments were being melted by six strangers coining from distant places with implements for melting said to have been supplied by Ramji
The seizure was made on the suspicion that the ornaments and the molten silver were stolen property which were to be sold to Ramji in a shape which could not be identified with any stolen property
After making the seizure list of  the properties thus seized the police officer arrested Ramji as also the other six strangers
Ramji was released on bail that very day
Police investigations into the case thus started followed
During that period on August 24 1953 at about 7 30 pm the Inspector was on his way from his residential quarters to the police station when both the appellants accosted him on the road and Ramji asked him to hush up the case for a valuable consideration
The Inspector told them that he could not talk to them on the road and that they should come to the police station
Thereafter the Inspector reported the matter to his superior officer the DSP PW 8 and to the sub inspector PW 9 attached to the same police station
On August 31 the same year the first appellant Badri came to the police station
saw the Inspector in the central room of the thana and offered to him a packet wrapped in a piece of old newspaper containing Rs 500 in currency notes
He told the Inspector P W 1 that the second appellant Ramji had sent the money through him in pursuance of the talk that they had with him in the evening of August 24 as a consideration for hushing up the case that was pending against Ramji
At the time the offer was made a number of police officers besides a local merchant PW 7 were present there
The Inspector at once 1144 drew up the first information report of the offer of the bribe on his own statement and prepared a seizure list of the money thus offered and at once arrested Badri and put him in the thana lock up
After the usual investigation the appellants were placed on their trial with the result indicated above
Both the courts below have found that the prosecution case a summary of which has been given above has been proved by good and reliable evidence and that the defence case that the prosecution was started by the inspector out of spite and in order to defend himself against the consequences of wrongfully arresting Ramji was unfounded
We are not impressed with the halting criticism of the evidence adduced in this case on behalf of the prosecution and accepted by the courts below
Ordinarily this Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact
The only serious question raised in this appeal is the point raised on behalf of the second appellant Ramji as to whether the statement made by the first appellant Badri on August 31 1953 that he had been sent by the second appellant with the money to be offered by way of bribe to the police officer was admissible against him
The learned counsel for the appellant was not able clearly to formulate his grounds of objection to the admissibility of that piece of evidence which is the basis of the charge against both the accused persons
Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act is a complete answer to this contention
The section is in these terms  10
Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong anything said done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it  The incident of August 24 when both the appellants 1145 approached the inspector with the proposal that he should hush up the case against the second appellant for which he would be amply rewarded is clear evidence of the two persons having conspired to commit the offence of bribing a public servant in connection with the discharge of his public duties
There cannot therefore be the least doubt that the court had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the offence
Therefore the charge under section 120B had been properly framed against both of them
That being so anything said or done by any one of the two appellants with reference to the common intention namely the conspiracy to offer bribe was equally admissible against both of them
The statement made by the first appellant on August 31 that he had been sent by the second appellant to make the offer of the bribe in order to hush up the case which was then under investigation is admissible not only against the maker of the statement the first appellant but also against the second appellant whose agent the former was in pursuance of the object of the conspiracy
That statement is admissible not only to prove that the second appellant had constituted the first appellant his agent in the perpetration of the crime as also to prove the existence of the conspiracy itself
The incident of August 24 is evidence that the intention to commit the crime had been entertained by both of them on or before that date
Anything said or done or written by any one of the two conspirators on and after that date until the object of the conspiracy had been accomplished is evidence against both of them
It was faintly suggested on behalf of the second appellant that the charge under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code had been deliberately added by the prosecution in order to make the first appellant s statement of August 31 admissible against the second appellant as otherwise it could not have been used as evidence against him
As already indicated the incident of August 24 is a clear indication of the existence of the conspiracy and the court was perfectly justified in drawing up the charge under section 120B also
It is no 1146 answer in law to say that unless the charge under that section had been framed the act or statement of one could not be admissible against the other
Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act has been deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co conspirator admissible against the whole body of conspirators because of the nature of the crime
A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness
Naturally therefore it is not feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts or statements of the others unless there is a common bond linking all of them together
Ordinarily specially in a criminal case one person cannot be made responsible for the acts or statements of another
It is only when there is evidence of a concerted action in furtherance of a common intention to commit a crime that the law has introduced this rule of common responsibility on the principle that every one concerned in a conspiracy is acting as the agent of the rest of them
As soon as the court has reasonable grounds to believe that there is identity of interest or community of purpose between a number of persons any act done or any statement or declaration made by any one of the co conspirators is naturally held to be the act or statement of the other conspirators if the act or the declaration has any relation to the object of the conspiracy
Otherwise stray acts done in darkness in prosecution of an object hatched in secrecy may not become intelligible without reference to the common purpose running through the chain of acts or illegal omissions attributable to individual members of the conspiracy
It was also suggested that the statement made by the first appellant on August 31 about the purpose of the payment having been made after the payment was not admissible in evidence because the object of the conspiracy had been accomplished before the statement in question was made
Reliance was placed in this connection upon the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mirza Akbar vs The King Emperor1
But that decision is itself an answer to the 1 1940 LR 67 IA 336
1147 contention raised
The payment was made and the statement that it was being made with a view to hushing up the case against the second appellant is a part of the same transaction that is to say the statement accompanied the act of payment of the bribe
Hence it cannot be said that the statement was made after the object of the conspiracy had already been accomplished
The object of the conspiracy was the hushing up of the criminal case against the second appellant by bribing the public servant who was in charge of the investigation of the case
The object of the conspiracy was yet far from being accomplished when the statement in question was made
The leading case on the subject is that of R vs Blake 1
That decision is an authority both for the positive and the negative aspects of the question
It lays down what is admissible and what is not admissible
It held that the documents actually used in effectuating the objects of the conspiracy were admissible and that those documents which had been created by one of the conspirators after the object of the conspiracy had been achieved were not admissible
section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act is on the same lines
It is manifest that the statement in question in the present case was made by the first appellant in the course of the conspiracy and accompanied the act of the payment of the money and is clearly covered by the provisions of section 10 quoted above
It must therefore be held that there is no substance in the only question of law raised in this appeal
It is accordingly dismissed
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
A the owner of the land in question conveyed posses sion of it to B under an oral agreement of sale
A deed was drawn up within about a week but before it could be regis tered A died and his sons executed a sale deed in respect of the land in favour of C Aggrieved B instituted a suit against C and A s sons for specific performance
B died during the pendency of the suit and his son D was impleaded as his legal representative
The suit was decreed in favour of D
Though the decree became final it was not executed
C filed a suit alleging that he was put in possession by D and that E and others trespassed into the property
E contested the suit on the ground that D had orally trans ferred his rights and conveyed possession to him for valu able consideration
The Trial Court decreed the suit
On appeal the first appellate court held that C was not enti tled to a decree
On appeal to the High Court the Learned Single Judge held that B s possession was adverse to A on the assumption that a sale had been effected orally leaving only execution of the sale deed to be done later and so C would not be entitled to add the period before the sale in his favour on 6649 for the purpose of calculating the period of posses sion for 12 years prior to the suit and that such posses sion could not enure to his benefit under the 
However the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court on the question of C s title had not been challenged
The Division Bench reversed the above judgment holding that the Learned Single Judge failed to apply the correct legal position on the assumption that the transaction of 10746 was only an oral sale
This appeal by special leave has been filed by E against the judgment of the Division Bench
194 Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
If a person is in actual possession and has a right to possession under a title involving a due recogni tion of the owner s title his possession will not be regard ed as adverse in law even though he claims under another title having regard to the well recognised policy of law that possession is never considered adverse if it is refera ble to a lawful title
The purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible charac ter cannot contend that his possession was adverse
Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is main tained against right
When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper referable to a contract it cannot be adverse
198F G 199A 21 In the case of an executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed and animus of the purchaser throughout is that he is in possession of the property belonging to the vendor and that the former s title has to be perfected by a duly executed registered deed of sale under which the vendor has to pass on and convey his title
The purchaser s possession in such cases is of a derivative character and in clear recognition of and in acknowledgement of the title of the vendor
The position is different in the case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a deed of transfer not registered the owner of a property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right of title to the property
In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether
The transferee after getting into possession retains the same with the clear animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negation of any right or title of the transferor his enjoyment is solely as owner in his right and not derivatively or in recognition of the title of any person
So far as the vendor is concerned both in mind and actual conduct there is a total divestiture of all his right title and interest in the property
This applies only in a case where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property
On the other hand in the case of an executory contract the possession of the transferee until the date of registration of the conveyance is permissible or derivative and in law is deemed to be on behalf of the owner himself
199B F 195 22 In the instant case the parties are concluded by the finding of the Division Bench that the transaction of 10746 was only an agreement for sale and not an oral sale of the property
199G Annamalai Chettiar and Another vs Muthiah Chettiar and Another ILR 19651 Madras 254 approved