vil Appeal No 1204 NT of 1979
From the Judgment and Order dated 321978 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case Petition No 271 of 1977
WITH Civil Appeal No 4371 NIT of 1991
Ms A Subhashini for the Appellant
Ms Janaki Ramchandran and ATM Sampath for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
Both these matters raise the same ques tion viz whether the act of a member of a joint family by which he impresses his individual property with the charac ter of joint family property or throws it into the hotch potch of the joint family or blends it with the joint family property is a disposition within the meaning of the  the  for short
Civil Appeal No 120479 is an appeal from an order of the High Court declining to call upon the Income tax Appel late Tribunal to refer the above question for the decision of the High Court in view of certain earlier decisions of the Court
The Madras High Court also declined to direct a reference on the above issue in TCP No 478 of 1977 and that is the subject matter of SLP C No 335 of 1979
In view of the pendency of Civil Appeal No 120479 we grant special leave in SLP C No 33579 also
Before discussing the correctness of the above conclu sion it may be convenient to set out the background of facts in Civil Appeal No 120479
170 That appeal arises out of the estate duty assessment conse quent on the death of one Natesan Chetty who died on 1372
He was the Karta of a Hindu Undivided Family HUF consisting of himself and his four sons
He was also the owner in his individual capacity of five house properties in Madras
On 1861970 and 1691970 he made declarations by which he impressed the above mentioned properties with the character of joint family properties and declared that they would thereafter belong to HUF of which he was the karta
Subsequently a partition was effected in the family in March 1971 in which two of the above mentioned properties came to the share of the deceased
Sri Natesan Chetty had also borrowed a sum of Rs 46800 from the HUF out of the rental income from the above mentioned properties for being invested in the business earned on by him
These borrowings were made between March 1970 and April 1971 and they were repaid in April 1971
In completing the assessment to estate duty of the estate passing on the death of Natesan Chetty the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty held that the declarations made by the deceased on 1861970 and 1691970 were dispositions within the meaning of the said expression as defined in the second explanation to section 215 of the 
These dispo sitions having been made for no consideration within the meaning of section 27 1 amounted according to him to gifts and since the gift had been made within two years of the date of death the subject matter of the gift was liable to be assessed as pan of the estate passing on death under section 9 of the 
As already mentioned two of the properties had been allotted to the share of the deceased in the partition of 1971 and it is common ground that they passed on the death of the deceased as they belonged to him on the date of his death
The question however was whether the other three properties which went to the other members of the family as a result of the declarations and partition were also liable to be included as pan of the estate deemed to pass on the death of the deceased by the application of section 9 read with S27 1 and section 215 of the 
The Assistant Controller answered this question in the affirmative and included their value taken at Rs 122500 in the princi pal value of the estate
As a consequence of his conclusion that the properties were liable to be included in the es tate the officer I so took the view that the sum of Rs 46800 being the loan taken by the deceased from the HUF and discharged within two years prior to the death should be added hack in computing the principal value of the estate by reason of the provisions of section 46 2 of the 
It is not in dispute before us that though two points were thus involved in the assessment one regarding the inclusion of the value of 171 three items of property as part of the estate of the de ceased passing on his death and the other regarding the addition or disallowance of the debt of Rs 46800 they are inter connected and that if the first question is answered in favour of the assessees the second question will also stand answered likewise
Dissatisfied with the conclusion of the Assistant Con troller the accountable person preferred an appeal to the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty which was successful
Thereupon the Department preferred an appeal to the Tribunal which following a decision of the Madras High Court in Rajamani Ammal vs Controller of Estate Duty
held that the sum of Rs 122500 could not be included in the value of the estate passing on the death and consequentially that the add back of Rs 46800 was also not justified
Thereupon the Controller of Estate Duty applied under section 64 1 of the  for a reference to the Madras High Court for its decision of the following two questions 1 Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the trans action by which a Hindu impressed his separate properties as with joint family character could not be considered as a disposition under the second explanation to section 215 and section 27 of the  2
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in holding that the addition of Rs 122500 made under section 9 and Rs 46800 made under section 462 could not be sus tained in the case of the deceased  The Madras High Court was of the opinion that the basic question at issue was covered by the earlier decisions of the Court in Rajamani Ammal vs Controller of Estate Duty as well as a subsequent decision in Con troller of Estate Duty vs Smt
Mookammal The Court found no substance in the attempt on behalf of the Revenue to distinguish the above decisions on the strength of a decision of the Court in Ranganayaki Ammal vs CED which had been confirmed by the Supreme Court in CED vs Kantilal Trikamlal In this view of the matter the High Court de clined to call for a reference on the two questions above mentioned and dismissed the application for reference
Hence the present Civil Appeal
It is not necessary to set out the facts in SLP No 335 of 1979 where the question involved is the same except that there was no subsequent partition after the blending and that no question regarding the deductibili ty of debts also arose in this case
172 It will be seen that both these appeals are directed against the orders of the High Court declining to call for a reference
It is fairly clear that the questions whether Rajamani Ammal was rightly decided and whether if so it needed reconsideration in the light of Kantilal Trikamlal are questions of law
But in view of the long lapse of time we have considered the issues on merits and since we are satisfied that the High Court s conclusion was correct we dispose of the appeals straightaway without going through the formality of asking the Tribunal to make a reference to the High Court and then awaiting the High Court s decision on the question of law referred
The has ceased to be enforceable since 1631985
In the circumstances we need not elaborate ly set out the provisions of the and the principles behind them
An outline of the provisions necessary for the determination of the issue before us will suffice
The levies a duty on the aggregate market value of the proper ties passing on the death of any person statutorily termed the principle value of the estate 
It is manifest that the statute could be easily circumvented if duty were re stricted only to properties which actually pass on a death for various of devices could be thought of by which the property of such person could ostensibly be transferred to others sometime before the death although it continues to be really under the domain and control of the deceased till the time of his death
The statute therefore contains elabo rate provisions deeming certain properties to pass on death even though their beneficial enjoyment may not actually change hands at the time of his death
One such item of properties which are deemed to pass on the death of a person are those which formed the subject matter of a gift made by him within a specified period preceding his death
S9 of the  which contains this deeming provision reads thus 9Gifts within a certain period before death 1 Property taken under a disposition made by the deceased purporting to operate as an immediate gift inter vivos whether by way of transfer delivery declaration of trust settlement upon persons in succession or otherwise which shall not have been bona fide made two years or more before the death of the deceased shall be deemed to pass on the death
In short the provision enabled the Revenue to ignore any gift of property made by the deceased within two years of his death by creating a statutory fiction that properties so gifted passed on the death of the deceased 173 although in fact and in law they ceased to be his a short time before his death
This is the first fiction
The legislature next proceeded to enact a second fic tion
This was in order to bring into the net of taxation transactions which may not be comprehended within the legal concept of a gift because they are ostensibly made for some consideration
It provided in section 27 that 27
1 Dispositions in favour of relatives Any disposition made by the de ceased in favour of a relative of his shall be treated for the purposes of this as a gift unless a the disposition was made on the part of the deceased for full consideration in money or money s worth paid to him for his own use or benefit or b    and references to a gift in this shall be construed accordingly    Resort to this provision in the present case is needed for a purpose
Admittedly the deceased received no consideration for impressing the property with the character of joint family property
If this amounted to a transfer then S9 alone would be sufficient to bring the properties within the net of taxation
But it could be argued that a gift involves a transfer  without consideration but the act of blending does not constitute a transfer  vide Stremann vs CIT and a host of other cases under the Income tax 
Section 27 helps the Department in the present case only in that it uses a much wider word dispo sition  and treats dispositions in favour of relatives as gifts
The statute had to make provision for a third fiction as well as it could still be contended that the word disposi tion  would not be sufficient to comprehend certain types of transactions
To be on the safe side therefore the statute proceeded to enact a special definition of the word dispo sition  in section 215 of the wide enough to rope in various kinds of acts in respect of property
This provi sion insofar as it is material for our present purposes reads as follows 215 Property  includes any interest in property movable or immovable the proceeds of sale thereof and any money or investment for the time being representing the proceeds of sale and also includes any property con verted from one species into another by any method Explanation I The creation by a person or with his consent 174 of a debt or other right enforceable against him personally or against property which he was or might become competent to dispose of or to charge burden for his own benefit shall be deemed to have been a disposition made by that person and in rela tion to such a disposition expression proper ty  shall include the debt or right created
Explanation 2 The extinguishment at the expense of the deceased of a debt or other right shall be deemed to have been a disposi tion made by the deceased in favour of the person for whose benefit the debt or right was extinguished and in relation to such a dispo sition the expression property  shall include the benefit conferred by the extinguishment of the debt or right The short case of the department now is this the de ceased in these cases was the full and exclusive owner of the immovable properties in question
By the act of blending he has convened them into HUF propertieS
The properties no longer belong to him as an individual they belong to the family thereafter with certain rights qua them in the other members of the HUF
In other words there has been an extinguishment at the expense of the deceased of a part at least of his rights in the properties with a correspond ing benefit to the others
There has also been the creation by the deceased of a right in the others enforceable against the deceased and the properties eg the right to demand a partition
The deceased therefore has made a disposition in favour of his relatives for no consideration within two years of his death
The value of the properties in respect of which he made the disposition in favour of the family are therefore liable to be included in the principal value of the estate passing on his death under section 9 read with section 27 read with the Explanations to section 215
This is quite apart from the fact that the value of the two properties which subse quently fell to the share of the deceased at the partition in March 1971 are liable to be included as his own property actually passing on his death
The question that we have to consider is therefore whether the legal incidence of the act of blending an be brought within the four corners of the two Explanations to section 15 of the 
It was precisely this question which had been considered by the Madras High Court earlier in Rajamani Ammal vs Controller of Estate Duty in deciding the issue The High Court had the benefit of two earlier decisions of this Court in Goli Eswariah vs C GT and CGT vs Getti Chettiar  175 where this Court had held in the context of the Gift Tax  that the act of blending and the act of a coparcener receiving on partition of a HUF less than the share he was entitled to receive would not constitute gifts
The details of this decision need to be set out at some length
Three contentions had been urged in Rajamani a The first was that the act of blending constituted a disposi tion  within the general meaning of that word
Repelling this contention the Court observed The learned counsel for the revenue placed strong reliance on the word disposition in section 27 1 of the and contended that even an act of throwing of the self acquired property into the common stock of a joint Hindu family is included in that expression
In a case arising under the Gift tax  the word disposition came up for consideration in the decision in Goli Eswariah vs Commis sioner of Gift tax The Supreme Court held that the word disposition refers to a bilateral or a multilateral act and it does not refer to a unilateral act
This decision of the Supreme Court approves the decision of this court in Commissioner of Gift tax vs
P RangasamiNaidu FB
It is true that these decisions are under the Gift tax 
It is also true that the word disposi tion was considered in these decisions with particular reference to the definition of transfer of property under that 
We are of the view that the word disposition in section 271 of the also refers to a bilateral or multilateral act
The section refers to a disposition by the de ceased in favour of a relative and also speaks of partial failure of consideration
Section 9 also refers to property taken under a dispo sition
Therefore in our opinion the word disposition in section 271 however wide its ambit may be would not include the uni lateral act of a person by which he throws his self acquired property into the common stock of the joint family
 b It had been next contended on behalf of the Revenue that by throwing the self acquired properties into the common stock of the joint family the deceased had created a right enforceable against him in favour of the sons or the other coparceners viz the right to demand partition of the properties in question which they could not have exercised earlier
This contention was rejected by the learned judges by applying the principle enunciated in an earlier Full Bench decision of the Court in CIT vs Rangasami Naidu  where a similar contention had been repelled in the context of the Gift Tax 
The Court had there observed 176 With the father having absolute power of disposition inter vivos or testamentary in respect of his self acquisition and with no power in the son to interdict any alienation or disposition or call for partition the son s interest is next to nothing
But the right is real
It lies dormant
It is this dormant right which the undivided sons have in their father s property that entitles them to take the self acquired property of the father as coparceners to the exclusion of a divided son
Juridically it must be this dormant birth right that enables the father at his pleasure without formalities to deny to himself his independent power or predominant interest and look upon the property as the property of the family
In our view it is this birth right imperfect and subordinate to the special power and predominant interest of the father that comes into play and makes the interest of the son real and an interest in praesenti when the father chooses to waive his rights
At his pleasure and without reference to his son if the father abandons or determines once for all not to exercise his independent power over the property the son s interest therein becomes a real and full fledged coparcenary right
There is no vesting of rights here by the father on the son but what is dormant springs to life but irrevocably at the pleasue of the father
 c A third contention raised on behalf of the Revenue was that throwing the self acquired property into the common stock of the joint family would amount to extinguishment at the expense of the deceased of a debt or other right within the meaning of Explanation 2 to section 2 15
This conten tion was also repelled by the learned Judges
They observe We are also of the opinion that throwing the self acquired property into the common stock of the joint family will not amount to extin guishment at the expense of the deceased of a debt or other right within the meaning of Explanation 2 to section 2 15
As seen from the judgments cited above after the act of throwing into the common stock it is the joint family or the coparcenary that owns the property
The person who converted his indi vidual property into joint family property is a member of the Hindu joint family or the coparcenary and contines to be a member of the joint family
His interest in 177 the erstwhile separate property would extend to the whole of the property even as of the other coparceners for the interest of every coparceners extends over the whole of the joint family property
There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the coparceners
On the death of any one of the coparceners the others take the proper ty by survivorship
It may be the ultimate survivor is the person who threw the self acquired property into the common stock
It therefore follows that there was no extinguishment of the right of the deceased and creation of a right in favour of another in these of throw ing the self acquired properties into the common stock
The decision in Valliammal Achi vs Controller of Estate Duty relied on by the learned counsel for the revenue and the decision in Kantilal Trikamlalv
Controller of Estate Duty  relied on by the learned counsel for the accountable personrelated to what we may term as unequal partitions
They do not deal with cases of throwing the self acquired properties into the common stock
We are not concerned with the case as to whether an unequal partition would amount to an extinguishment of a right and creation of a benefit within the meaning of Explanation 2 to section 215 which was the point that was considered in those cases
 The above decision is clearly against the Revenue
The Revenue however strongly relies upon a later decision of the same High Court in Ranganayaki Ammal  Ors
vs Controller of Estate Duty It is sub mitted that Ranganayaki Ammal has been af firmed by this Court in CED vs Kantilal Tri kamlal a common judgment reversing Kantilal Trikamlal vs CED and affirming Ranganayaki Ammal Mad and therefore Rajmani is no longer good law
It is therefore necessary to refer to these cases though the question involved there was somewhat different
In Ranganayaki Ammal the deceased Bheema Naidu and his widow and children constituted a Hindu undivided family
A little within the period of two years prior to the death of the deceased a partition was effected of the joint family properties and in that partition he took a smaller share instead of his legal half benefiting the other to the extent of the difference
The same thing had happened in the case of Kantilal Trikamlal also
Trikamlal Vadilal and his son Kantilal constituted a Hindu undivided family
On 16th November 1953 and instrument styled a release deed was executed between the two persons
Under this instrument a sum of rupees one lakh out of the joint family properties was taken by 178 the deceased m lieu of his share in the joint family properties and he relinquished his interest in the remaining properties of the joint family which were declared to belong to Kantilal as his sole and absolute properties and Kantilal also relinquished his interest in the amount of rupees one lakh given to the deceased and declared that the deceased was the sole and absolute owner of the said amount
Trikamlal Vadilal died on 3rd June 1955 that is within two years of the release deed
The Assistant Controller found that as on November 16 1953 the deceased was enti tled to a one half share in the joint family properties the value of which was Rs 344058 but had relinquished his interest in the joint family properties by receiving only a sum of rupees one lakh
The officer there fore held that the difference between Rs344058 and Rs 106724 being the amount received by the deceased together with inter est was includible in the principal value of the estate of the deceased being the value of a disposition by the deceased in favour of a relative for partial consideration
This assessment was upheld eventually by the Su preme Court
Both these decisions thus raised the question whether there was gift within the meaning of S9 read with S27 read with the Explanations to S215 of the where a coparcener in a HUF at the family parti tion voluntarily agrees to accept properties of a value less than what he is entitled to claim as a matter of right at such partition
This Court as did the Madras High Court in Ranganayaki Ammal the Andhra Pradesh decision in Cherukuru Eswaramma vs CED and the Punjab  Haryana High Court judgment in CEDv
Jai Gopal Mehra answered the question in the affirmative
This Court distinguished Goi Eswariah  SC and Getti Chettiar  SC on the ground that the defi nition of disposition  in Explanation 2 Sec tion 215 of the is much wider than the scope of that expression used in the Gift Tax Act
We do not consider it necessary to set out here the full and de tailed reasoning of this Court in Kantilal Trikamlal s case
Before proceeding further we may refer to a few later decisions of High Court relevant to the issue before ns
The Allahabad High Court in CEDv
Laxmi Bai  a decision rendered after Kantilal Trikamlal thought that the act of blending would not be a disposition  within fie mean ing ofthe 
In CED vs Babub hai T Panchal 1982 133 ITR455 the Gujarat High Court had occasion to consider the question whether a transaction of release by a member of a Hindu Undivided family within a period of two years of his death of his interest in the family properties would amount to a disposition  within the  meaning of Explanation 2 to Section 215 of the 
The 179 question was answered in the negative
In CED vs Satyanarayan Babulal Chaurasia  the Bombay High Court without touching the issue in detail merely held applying Goli Eswarian vs C GT 197076 ITR 675 SC that the act of blending does not involve a transfer
The question that falls for our considera tion now is whether despite the extended definition in S215 of the  as explained in Kantilal Trikamlal the act of blending unlike the voluntary acceptance of an unequal partition fails outside the purview of the deeming part of the definition contained in the explanations
We think the answer to this question has to be in the affirmative Revert ing once again to the contentions of the Revenue in Rajamani which are also the con tentions reiterated before us for the Revenue it will be remembered that Rajamani specifically dealt with the language of the two explanations 10 S215 and that its decision rested on three grounds i a disposition  as held on Goli Eswariah SC has to be a bilateral  or multilateral  act or trans action not a unilateral act ii the act of blending does not create any right enforceable against the blender or his property but only brings to the surface rights already latent and inherent in the others and iii the act of blending does not result in the extinguishment of any right of the blender with a correlative conferral of benefit on others
our view
Kantilal Trikamlal does not affect the validity of any of the three grounds set out above
So far as the first ground is concerned it does not touch upon the reasoning of Goli Eswariah not to say doubt or dissent from it
It refers to CED vs Kancherla Kesava Rao  SC hinting at possible distinction and to Getti Chettiar but without any hint of dis sent and points out that the conventional construction of disposition  has to submit to the larger sweep of hypothetical extension by definition and that unlike under the Gift Tax  there is no limitation environmen tal or by the society of words warranting the whittling down of the unusually wide range of Explanation 2 to S2 15
In other words the cumulative effect of Goli Eswariah Getti Chettiar and Kantilal Trikamlal is that blending  or partition  will not be a disposition  within the ordinary connotation of the expression but will be one if either of the Explanations to S215 are attracted
This takes us to the other two contentions dealt with in Rajamani as to the scope of the two explanations
On this aspect Rajamani has held that unlike an 180 equal partition the act of blending will not amount to a disposition  attracting Ss9 and 27 of the 
It distinguishes cases of unequal partition dealt with in Valliammal Achi vs
CED and the High Court s decision in Kantilal Trikam lal cited before it which have now received the imprimatur of this Court in Kantilal Trikamlal
We are inclined to think that the distinction has been made on sound lines
We do not consider it necessary to repeat or elaborate the rea soning in Rajamani on these two points as it succinctly epitomises well settled principles of Hindu Law
Suffice it to say that we en dorse this reasoning and think that the High Court was right in holding in the present cases that the acts of blending did not result in the gift  of immovable properties within the meaning of the statute and that Rajamani required no reconsideration because of Ranganayaki AmmalTrikamlal
This disposes of the question sought to be referred in these cases
We should however like to advert to another aspect which may arise for consideration at some future date
It may perhaps be possible to contend that though a declaration of blending does not amount to a gift  where the act of blending is followed up by a subsequent partition the two transactions taken together do result in the extinguishment at the expense of the deceased of his rights in the properties which go to the share of other coparceners at the subsequent partition and that if the two can be treated as parts of the same transac tion Explanation 2 to S215 may be attract ed
But this apart from being a totally new question of law not raised at any stage and not debated before us would also require not only a closer look from the legal angle but also investigation into facts particularly as to whether the act of blending and the subse quent partition can be treated in law and on facts as parts of a single transaction
We therefore express no opinion on this issue
For the reasons discussed above these appeals fail and are dismissed
But we make no order regarding costs
YL Appeals dismissed


Summary:
The tenure holder of the land in dispute father of the appellants died on 2081974 leaving behind besides the four appellants three other sons three daughters and a widow as his legal heirs and representatives
After his death a notice under section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960 proposing to declare certain lands as surplus addressed to him was served on his son appellant No 1 who filed objections
The Prescribed Authority partly upheld the objections and by its judgment dated 2941975 determined some land as surplus
The appel lants filed an appeal before the Civil Judge
Meanwhile the Ceiling Act was amended by the Uttar Pradesh Act 20 of 1976 section 31 3 whereof provided for redetermination of surplus lands within two years from 10101975 in cases where orders declaring lands as surplus had been made prior to that date notwithstanding any appeal against the original order of determination of surplus land
A fresh notice under section 10 2 of the Act issued to appellant No 1 proposing to declare certain lands as surplus
After considering the appellant s objection the Prescribed Authority by its order dated 22121976 deter mined some land as surplus holding that the said lands were surplus which were owned by the deceased as tenure holder on the appointed day
The appeal against the said order was dismissed by the District Judge
In the writ petition preferred by the appellants the High Court held that previous determination of surplus lands by the Prescribed Authority did not operate as res judicata and that the appellate 160 authority was justified in ignoring the sale deed dated 27101971
It however held that the determination about some plots of lands had not been properly made and remanded the case to the appellate authority with the direction to it to issue notice to the other brothers of the appellants
Aggrieved the appellants filed the appeal by special leave to this Court
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the proceeding for re determination of ceiling land could not have been initiated by the Prescribed Authority until notice under section 9 2 of the Act was issued to all the heirs of the deceased tenure holder that since the redetermination proceedings were initiated after Act 20 of 1976 was en forced the redetermination could only be made under the provisions of the Act as amended by Act 20 of 1976 and in view of the changes in the Ceiling Act there was no surplus land liable to be vested in the State that as two years had elapsed from the enforcement of Act 20 of 1976 no redeter mination was permissible thereafter
Disposing of the appeal and remanding the case to the Prescribed Authority this Court HELD 1
Section 313 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Amendment Act 1976 Act 20 of 1976 authorised the Prescribed Authority to redetermine the surplus land in relation to the tenure holder if initiated within two years from October 10 1975
p 164 D E In the instant case the previous determination of ceiling was made before 10101975
Accordingly under section 313 of UP Act 20 of 1976 the Prescribed Authority had jurisdiction to initiate the said proceedings and such jurisdiction did not depend on issuance of notice under section 9 2 of the Act to the tenure holder andor his successors in interest
p 164 EF Shantnu Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh  Ors 1977 Allahabad Law Reports p 564 referred to
Although the Prescribed Authority had jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding for re determination of surplus land and he had in fact initiated such proceeding within two years as referred to in 313 of UP Act 20 of 1976 yet such determination could not have been made without affording to the heirs and legal representatives of the tenure holder an opportunity of being heard and showing cause before the Prescribed Authori ty
p 164 FG The tenure holder had died in 1974 and the said fact was made known to the Prescribed Authority when the initial determination of surplus lands was made
It was unfortunate that in spite of the said fact the Prescribed Authority failed and neglected to ascertain the names of all the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased tenure holder and did not issue notice to them for redetermination of surplus land
pp 164 GH 165 A 3
While the High Court directed to issue notice to other brothers and remanded the case to the appellate au thority it did not direct to issue notices to other heirs and legal representatives
Morever without giving other heirs and legal representatives an opportunity of being heard adjudication of the case on merits by the concerned authorities or by the High Court was not warranted
p 165 AB 4
The Prescribed Authority will decide the question of plus land in accordance with the existing provisions of the Ceiling Act applicable on the relevant date after issuing notices to the heirs and legal representatives of the tenure holder and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard
P 165 DE