peaINo 4235 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 561987 of the Cal cutta High Court in original order No 129 of 1985 and915 of 1983
AK Ganguly AK Chakraborty AD Sikri and Ms Mridula Ray for the Appellants
DN Mukherjee and Rathin Das for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PUNCHHI J
We are required in this matter to interplay some of the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regu lation Act 1976 to determine whether the appellant herein had any excess vacant land
Probhavati Poddar Proforma respondent herein was the owner of two properties in the city of Calcutta being i premises No P 290 CIT Road comprising 41456 sq
of land of which 321 sq
was covered by a build ing constructed thereon long before the coming into force of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act 1976 hereafter referred to as the Act  with a dwelling unit therein and ii property No P 210 CIT Scheme VIIM Calcutta comprising 33965 sq
of vacant land
Hereaf ter these would be referred to as the built up property  and vacant property  respectively
The exact dateperiod of the construction of the built up property is not available on the present record but the litigation has proceeded on the footing that it was constructed long before February 17 1976 the day when the Act came into force in the State of West Bengal
The State 1egislatures of 11 States including the State of West Bengal considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parlia 506 ment for the imposition of ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole and in compliance with clause 1 of Article 252 of the Constitution passed a Resolution to that effect
Accordingly the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Bill 1976 was introduced in the Lock Sabha on January 28 1976 covering all the Union Territories and the 11 resolving States
After the passing of the Bill by the Parliament the Act came into force on February 17 1976 at once
Later from time to time the Act was adopted by some other States after passing Resolutions under Article 2521 of the Constitu tion
The Act now apparently is in force in 17 States and all the Union Territories in the country
The primary object and purpose of the Act was to provide for the imposition of the ceiling on vacant land in urban ag glomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to sub serve the common good and in furtherance of the directive princi ples of Articles 39B  C of the Constitution
These features were spelled out by this Court in Union of India etc
VB Chaudhary etc
19793 SCR 802
That it is valid piece of legislation save and except Section 271 and had received the protective umbrella of Article 31 C as it stood prior to its amendment by 42nd Amendment Act was held by this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji etc
vs Union of India  Others
19811 SCC 166 Appointed day has been defined in Section 2 A of the Act
It means i in relation to any State to which the Act applies in the first instance the date of introduction of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Bill 1976 in Par liament and ii in relation to any State which adopts the Act under Clause 1 of Article 252 of the Constitution the date of such adoption
In relation to the State of West Bengal in which the town of Calcutta is situated the appointed day is January 28 1976
It is thus evident that between the appointed day and the date of enforcement of the Act there is a 20 day s gap
The Act ordains a ceiling limit of 500 sq mtrs
for the urban agglomeration of Calcutta as per item 15 of Category A in Schedule
I of the Act
Both the properties of Smt
Poddar
the proforma respondent herein thus became liable to be screened by the Authorities under the Act
Before hand on July 8 1978 Smt
Poddar entered into an agreement with Smt
Meera Gupta the appellant herein to sell the vacant property on 507 terms entered
On November 23 1978 the proposed vendor and the proposed vendee gave notice under Section 26 of the Act to the Competent Authority appointed for the purpose of the proposed sale
On August 7 1980 the competent authority in exercise of powers under Section 62 of the said Act issued a notice under Section 61 thereof to Smt
Poddar directing her to file a statement in Form No 1 on the basis that she held vacant land in the Calcutta Urban Area in excess of the ceiling limit of 500 sq mtrs
Having got no response a reminder was sent to her but in vain
The Competent Authority thereafter initiated suomo to proceed ings against Smt
Poddar and sent her a draft statement on September 18 1979 exercising powers under Section 81 of the Act intimating that she could submit her objection if any to the draft statement
It was specified in the said statement that she was tentatively required to surrender 25421 sq
of land figure arrived by totalling 41456 sq mtrs
of the built up property and 33965 sq mtrs
of the vacant property to 75421 sq mtrs are substracting therefrom 500 sq
resulting in 25421 sq mtrs
The objections of Smt
Poddar filed to the draft statement were rejected by the Competent Authority who published the final statement under section 9 of the Act vesting the said 25421 sq
of excess land in the State and the same was communicated to Smt
Poddar on June 22 1981
She preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the Act before the Special Secretary Land and Land Reforms Department Government of West Bengal the Appellate Author ity under the Act but the same was dismissed in default on January 18 1983
Before hand the appellant herein filed suit No 121 of 1981 against Smt
Poddar in the Calcutta High Court claiming specific performance of the agreement dated July 8 1978
On August 21 1981 a decree for specific performance was passed in favour of the appellant in the usual terms
Pursu ant to the said decree the deed of conveyance in respect of the vacant property was executed in favour of the appellant on November 19 1981 for a consideration of Rs126000 paid over to Smt
Poddar
Possession of the vacant property was delivered to the appellant and necessary entries were made in the municipal and revenue registers
The appellant then got scent of the dismissal of the appeal of Smt
Poddar in default on July 2 1983
The appel lant then filed a Review Petition before the Appellate Authority stating inter alia that she had become the owner of the vacant property and prayed for retrieval of the same from being treated as excess land in the hands of Smt
Podar
The Review Petition was rejected on August 10 1983 which occasioned a petition under Article 226 of the Consti tution being filed by the appellant in the Calcutta 508 High Court on a variety of grounds
The Writ Petition was opposed on each and every ground
The learned Single Judge before whom the writ petition was placed taking aid from some observations in two decisions of this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji s case supra and State of UP  Others vs L J Johnson  Others allowed the writ petition on November 27 1984
On appeal by the State of West Bengal and its responding officers a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment and order of the Single Judge on June 5 1987 in Appeal No 129 of 1985 leading to this appeal by special leave at the instance of the appellant
The matter having come before a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member on 2871988 it was felt that lohnson s case supra may have to be tested and thus the matter was ordered to be heard by a larger Bench at least of three Judges
This is how the matter stands placed before us
As said at the outset we have to interplay some of the provisions occurring in Chapter 3 titled as Ceiling on Vacant Lands in the Act
We shall presently set out those provisions which have a bearing in the case
But before we do that we do not wish to leave the impression that we have not viewed the statute as a whole
The endeavour on our behalf to construe the provisions has not left any part thereof altogether
So we proceed thenceforth to the interpretative process
Section 3 of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided in this Act on and from the commencement of this Act no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub section 2 of Section 1
Ceiling limit of vacant land in case of every person like the prece dessor in interest of the appellant is 500 sq
as set up under Section 4
Clauses g and q defining vacant land and land appurtenant and sub sections 9 and 11 of Section 4 which have precedence in engaging our attention are set out below but without the Explanation to sub sec tion 11 for it is not relevant for our purpose 2g Land appurtenant in rela tion to any building means i in an area where there are building regulations the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building which is no case shall exceed five hundred square meters or ii in an area where there are no building regulations an extent of five hundred square metres contiguous to the land oc 509 cupied by such building and includes in the case of any building constructed before the appointed day and with a dwelling unit therein an additional extent not exceeding five hundred square metres of land if any contiguous to the minimum extent referred to in subclause i or the extent referred to in sub clause ii as the case may be 2q Vacant Land means land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agricul ture in an urban agglomeration but does not include i land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regula tions in force in the area in which such land is situated ii in an area where there are building regulations the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building and iii in an area where there are no building regulations the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before or is being constructed on the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such building
49 where a person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculat ing the extent of vacant land held by such person
411 For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in sub sections 5 6 7 9 and 10 shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in sub clause ii or sub clause iii of clause q of section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter
 To begin with vacant land as per the definition given in clause q of Section 2 means land as such not being land mainly used for the put 510 pose of agriculture but situated in an urban agglomeration Vacant Land however does not include as per the defini tion land of three categories
The first category is land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated
But this is a category with which we are not concerned in the instant case
Johnson s case supra is of this category
The second category is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are building regula tions which has been constructed upon or is under con struction on the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building
This means that if the building stood constructed on the land prior to January 28 1976 the land occupied under the building is not vacant land
It also covers the land on which any building was in the process of construc tion on January 28 1976 with the approval of the appropri ate authority
That too is not vacant land
Additionally the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings is also not vacant land
The third category likewise conditioned is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are no building regulations which has been constructed before January 28 1976 or is in the process of construction on such date and the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings
The aforesaid three categories of lands would otherwise be vacant land but for the definitional exclusion
The specific non inclusion of these three categories of land is by itself an integral part of the definitional and function al sphere
The question that arises what happens to lands over which buildings are commenced after the appointed day and the building progresses to complete thereafter
On the appointed day these lands were vacant lands but not so thereafter because of the surface change
Here the skill of the draftsman and the wisdom of the legislature comes to the fore in cognizing and filling up the gap period and covering it up in the scheme of sub section 9 of Section 4
The visible contrast between vacant land and any other land held by a person on which there is a building with a dwell ing unit therein becomes prominent
The said any other land is reckoned and brought at par with the vacant land for the purpose of calculating the final extent of vacant land
It seems to us that the expression vacant land in the first portion of the provision connotes land minus land under buildings constructed or in the process of construc tion before and on the appointed day and the expression vacant land in the latter portion of the provision con notes the sum total of vacant land of the first order and distinctly the other land on which is a building with a dwelling unit therein of which construction commenced after the appointed day and the land appurtenant thereto
Such an interpretation is required by the conext 511 as otherwise the concept of the appointed day and the gap period would be rendered otiose
The legislature cannot be accused to have indulged in trickery or futility in giving something with one hand and taking it away with the other
Any other landin the sequence would thus mean any other built upon land except the one excluded from the expression vacant land on account of it being occupied by a building which stood constructed or was in the process of construc tion on the appointed day
Such interpretation of ours finds support from Section 5 of the Act which pursues and does not leave alone transfer of vacant land in the gap period
It provides as follows 5
TRANSFER OF VACANT LAND 1 In any State to which this Act applies in the first in stance where any person who had held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of this Act has transferred such land or part thereof by way of sale mortgage gift lease or otherwise the extent of the land so trans ferred shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person and the excess vacant land in relation to such person shall for the pur poses of this Chapter be selected out of the vacant land held by him after such transfer and in case the entire excess vacant land cannot be so selected the balance or where no vacant land is held by him after the trans fer the entire excess vacant land shall be selected out of the vacant land held by the transferee Provided that where such person has trans ferred his vacant land to more than one per son the balance or as the case may be the entire excess vacant land aforesaid shall be selected out of the vacant land held by each of the transferees in the same proportion as the area of the vacant land transferred to him bears to the total area of the land trans ferred to all the transferees
2 Where any excess vacant land is selected out of the vacant land transferred under sub section 1 the transfer of the excess vacant land so selected shah be deemed to be null and void
3 In any State to which this Act applies in the first instance and in any State which adopts this Act under clause 1 of Article 252 of the Constitution no person holding vacant land 512 in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale mortgage gift lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under Section 6 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been pub lished under sub section 1 of Section 10 and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void Underlining ours
The underlining is reflective of the scheme of the Act in as much as transfers of vacant land within the gap period are ignorable and likewise in our view vacant land brought under construction of building by a person within the gap period is also ignorable for the purposes of calcu lating the extent of vacant land so that the provisions of law are not defeated by human ingenuity
At this juncture sub section 11 of Section 4 may be noticed
It provides removal of doubts declaring
inter alia that nothing in sub section 9 shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in sub clause ii or sub clause iii of clause q of Section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter
Though this provision is not happily worded yet when mean ingfully construed in the context it means that a building which gets excluded by virtue of the definition of vacant land gets clothed with the protective cloak for not being reckoned again as any other land over which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein
Sub section 11 of Section 4 means to convey that what is not vacant land under sub clauses ii and iii of clause q of Section 2 cannot go to add up as vacant land under sub section 9 of Section 4 by descriptive overlapping
If we wipe out the distinction of vacant land and any other land as demon strated in sub section 9 of section 4 we strangulate and destroy the spirit and life blood of the appointed day and the gap period
We would loathe giving such a construction and would rather opt for a construction which carries out the objectives of the Act primary of which is to fix a ceiling limit on the holding of vacant lands conditioned as they are on the appointed day and as held on the date of the commencement of the Act
It would be worthwhile at this stage to take note of the expression land appurtenant as defined in Section 2g
When related to any building in an area where there are building regulations as well as in an area where there are no building regulations the additional extent as permitted is based on the principle of contiguity
The expression applies to buildings constructed before the appointed day as well as to buildings construction of which commenced before the appointed day and was in progress on that day
It no doubt applies to buildings constructed thereafter too
513 When we import this understanding to sub section 9 of Section 4 two different results discernably follow based on the commencement of the construction
If the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein had begun after the appointed day then it is all the same any other land to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person
And if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein on land had been completed or was in progress by and on the appointee day then is not any  other land to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person
This is the interpretation which commends to us of sub section 9 of Section 4 as also of sub section 11 of Section 4 and the definitive expres sions used therein as explained and highlighted earlier
Applying that interpretation on the facts found by the High Court we hold that the built up property which in any event had been built up prior to the commencement of the Act and it is nobody s case that construction thereof had begun after the appointed day is outside the purview of vacant land
If that is excluded from being reckoned towards calculating the extent of vacant land held by the predeces sor in interest of the appellant the vacant land in the vacant property cannot be declared excess for that is within the permissible limits
Even if no land is left as land appurtenant to the built up area then 9356 sq mtrs the remainder plus 33965 sq mtrs of the unbuilt property would total up to the figure less than 500 sq
 again within the permissible limit
Therefore interpretation to the contrary of the dealt with provisions by the Division Bench of the High Court bereft as it is of the concept of the appointed day and the gap period would have to give way meriting the acceptance of this appeal and setting aside of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court by issuing the necessary writ direction and order so as to quash the entire proceedings towards declaring excess land in the hands of the appellant and her predecessor in title
We order accordingly
The interpretation we have put to the provisions pertinently relate to sub clause ii and iii of clause q of Section 2
This interpretation in express terms cannot apply to sub clause i of clause q of Section 2
Johnson s case supra as said before is a case under sub clause i of clause q of Section 2
In the instant case there appears to be no occasion to test its correctness or even to dilate upon the judgments of the High Courts reported in AIR 1981 Madhya Pradesh 17 AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and AIR 1987 Allahabad 272 cited at the bar
As a result this appeal is allowed
The appellant shall have her costs throughout
TNA Appeal allowed


Summary:
Vacation  Sufficient Cause Meaning of
Section 143 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act 1987 enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own occu pation and he has no other building in the area concerned
This right however stands deferred under second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a build ing in use without sufficient cause
The appellant an owner of a house was in occupation of first floor of the house while the second floor was let out to a Judge
His entire house is requisitioned for occupation of a Judge
The appellant did not file any objection under section 32 of the Requisition Act
However after vacating the building he applied for eviction of respondent
The Courts in view rejected his application by applying the second proviso to section 143 of the Himachal Rent Control Act
468 Allowing the Landlord s appeal and setting aside the order of Courts below this Court HELD 1 Sufficient cause  is an expression which is found in various statutes
It has been construed liberally in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as adequate or enough
That is any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be understood as sufficient cause
For instance economic difficulty or financial stringency or family reasons may compel a landlord to let out a building in his occupation
So long it is found to be genuine and bona fide it would amount to vacating a building for suffi cient cause
And the bar of second proviso stands lifted In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pre tence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of landlord to approach the controller for necessary direc tion to tenant to hand over possession to him
470 B C 11 Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance of an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as not without sufficient cause 
A land lord has no option
He is required to vacate under con straint of law
Therefore the statutory restriction created by second proviso would not apply in such a case
470 D 2
Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could not adversely reflect on sufficiency of cause under Rent Control Act
Reason for either arises in differ ent circumstances
Vacating a building even under an incor rect order passed by a competent authority under Requisition Act would be for sufficient reason
The Rent Control author ities could not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act Therefore it could not be a valid consideration for holding that the building was vacated without sufficient cause
The courts below thus committed an error of law in applying second proviso to reject the application filed on behalf of the appellant
470 H 471 A B