ivil Appeal No 3237 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 10101990 of the Delhi High Court in CW No 3204 of 1990
Soli J Sorabjee SV Deshpande and CL Sahu Advs
for the Appellant
Dr YS Chitale and SK Sinha for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA J
Leave is granted
Respondent No 6 Jupiter Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited was formed in 1979 for providing houses to its 130 members including the appellant Prem Jeer Kumar
The appellant was earlier the Secretary and then the President of the Society till 1985 by which time substantial con struction had been completed
The members were allotted three room flat for a sum of Rs 1 10000
In August 1985 Respondent No 3 Registrar Delhi Cooperative Societies appointed 784 an Administrator to look into the affairs of the Society since the appel
lant and other office bearers had held the office for more than two terms
The controversy giving rise to this proceeding relates to the alleged discrepancy re garding purchase of some building material in January 1984 for the construction of flats for members of the Society in Vikas Puri at New Delhi
The New Managing Committee of the Society formed in September 1986 complained to the Regis trar COoperative Societies alleging irregularities by the previous Managing Committee of which the appellant was the President
This matter was referred to arbitration by order dated 12101989 passed by the Joint Registrar Arbitration Cooperative Societies Delhi Administration
Respondent No 1 Surender Gandotra was appointed the Arbitrator who gave his AWard on 15 1990
The relevant portion of the Award is as under It is also interesting to discuss the conduct of these two respondents of this case Shri Poonam Dhand and Shri PJ Kumar as they have been moving applications after applications in this court raising vicious and frivolous grounds just to delay the delivery of justice in this case
The miscellaneous applications relating to the dispute of juris diction of this court and then that since criminal proceedings are pending with the Delhi Police proceedings in this Court should be kept pending till final decision in the criminal proceedings
All these applications were properly attended scrutinized and dis posed of legally
It is also interesting that despite number of chancesopportunities having been given to the respondent to file reply to the main points of the claimant society the defendants SShri Poonam Dhand and Shri PJ Kumar did not file any reply and followed delaying and dilatory tactics and to defeat the ends of justice
Even today 30th April 1990 fixed for hearing none came from the side of SShir Poonam Dhand PJ Kumar either presonally or through Advocate
The advocate of the claimant society Shri Tomar argued that ex parte proceedings may be initiated against the respondents who have absented from these proceedings
In view of these cricumstances and the conduct of respondents in this case 0right from the very inception of this case there is no other alternative left for me but to proceed ex parte against the respondents SShri Poonam Dhand and PJ Kumar
Ex parte award is announced with the following details 
785 Principal amount to be paid by the respon dents to the Jupiter Cooperative Societies Limited Vikas Puri New Delhi
Rs 1462 1020 Interest at the rate of 18 from 1741985 till all the dues are cleared by the respond ents
Cost allowed Rs500000 With the above observations ex parte award is given against the respondents SShri Poonam Dhand P3 Kumar who are jointly and severally responsible to pay the Jupiter Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited Vikas Puri New Delhi principal amount of Rs 14621000 NPS plus 18 interest from 1741985 till all the dues are cleared and costs of Rs5000
  The appellant then filed an appeal under section 76 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Delhi Act  in the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal Respondent No 2 challenging the Award dated 151990
The Tribunal held that the Arbitrator s act of proceeding ex parte against the appellant is justified and taking the view that the appeal had no merit dismissed the same
The appellant then filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the Award and dismissal of his appeal by the Tribunal on 371990
The said writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court on 10101990
It is in these circumstances that the appellant assails the Award dismiss al of the appeal and then the writ petition
The argument of Shri Sorabjee learned counsel for the appellant is that it is section 59 and not section 60 of the Delhi Act which applies to the present case
In reply Dr Chitale on behalf of the contesting respondents contended that section 60 relating to arbitration and not section 59 pertaining to surcharge applies to the present case
Sections59 and 60 of the Delhi Act insofar as relevant are quoted hereinbelow 59
Surcharge 1 If in the course of an audit inquiry inspection or the wind ing up of a cooperative society it is found that any person who is or was entrusted with the organisation or management of such society or who is or has at any time been an officer or an employee of the society has made any payment contrary to this Act the rules or the bye laWs or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust or wilful negligence or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money 786 or other property belonging to such society the Registrar may of his own motion or on the application of the committee liquidator or any creditor inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him by an order in writing in this behalf to inquire into the conduct of such person Provided that no such inquiry shall be held after the expiry of six years from the date of any act or omission referred to in this sub section
2 Where an inquiry is made under sub section 1 the Registrar may after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such rate or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent as the Registrar may consider just and equitable 60
Disputes which may be referred to arbitration1 Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force if any dispute touching the constitu tion management or the business of a coopera tive society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society arises a among members past members and persons claiming through members past members and deceased members or b between a member past member or person claiming through a member past member or deceased member and the society its com mittee or any officer agent or employee of the society or liquidator past or present or c between the society or its commit tee and any past committee any officer agent or employee or any past officer past agent or past employee or the nominee heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer deceased agent or deceased employee of the society or d between the society and any other cooperative society between a society and liquidator of another society 787 or between the liquidator of another society
such disputes shall be referred to the Regis trar for decisior and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit other proceedings in re spect of such dispute 2 For the purposes of sub section 1 the following shall be deemed to be disputed touching the constitution management or the business of a cooperative society namely a a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee heirs or legal rep resentatives of a deceased member whether such debt of demand is admitted or not b a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recov ered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the princi pal debtor as a result Of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not c any dispute arising in connection with the elec tion of any officer of a society other than a society mentioned in sub section 1 of section 31
3 If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is or is not a dispute touching the consitution management or the business of cooperative society the decision thereon of the Registra shall be final and shall not be called in question in an court
i 4     In substance the contention of the learned counsel for the appeal lant is that the proper action to take in such a case is to resort to section 59 dealing with surcharge and not to settlement of dispute by arbitration since it is not one of the disputes which may be referred to arbitration in terms of section 60 of the Delhi Act
It was argued that sub section 2 of section 60 is exhaustive and not merely illustrative which shows that the present dispute does not fall within the ambit 0 section 60
Dr Chitale on the other hand asserted that it is sub 788 section 1 of section 60 which indicates the true scope of section 60 while sub section 2 is merely illustrative and no exhaustive
It was urged that clause c of sub section 1 of section 60 expressly provides that if any dispute touching the constitution  management or the business of the cooperative society arises between the society or its committee and any past committee any officer agent or employee or any past officer of the society the dispute shall be refered to arbitration
Reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on Chander Nagar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd and Anr
vs Ashok Ohri A 1
R 1976 63 Delhi 299 wherein the learned Single Judge took the view that sub section 2 of section 60 of the Delhi Act is exhaustive and not merely illustra tive
That decision overlooks the decision of this Court in Srirakulu referred hereafter and conflicts with it
Further consideration of the same is therefore not necessary
Dr Chitale placed reliance in Pentakota Srirakulu vs The Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd  to contend that this point was concluded against the appellant
In our opinion the contention of Dr Chitale has to be accepted
The decision of this Court in Srirakulu was ren dered with reference to the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1932 hereinafter referred to as the Madras Act  wherein section 51 relating to settlement of disputes by arbitration was the provision corresponding to section 60 of the Delhi Act Clause c of sub section L of section 51 of the Madras Act was substantially the same as clause c of sub section 1of section 60 of the Delhi Act
The explana tion in sub section 1 of section 51 of the Madras Act was substantially similar to clause aof sub section 2 of section 60 of the Delhi Act
The material part of section 51 of the Madras Act on the basis of which the decision was endered in Srirakulu quoted therein is as under  section 51 Arbitration Disputes 51
1 If any dispute touching the business of a registered society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid servant of the society arises a        b       789 c between the society or its com mittee and any past committee any officer agent or servant or any past officer past agent or past servant or the nominee heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer deceased agent or deceased servant of the society or d      
Explanation A claim by a registered society for any debt or demand due to it from a member past member or the nominee heir or legal representative of a deceased member whether such debt or demand be admitted or not is a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of this sub sec tion
 In the Madras Act section 49 was the provision correspond ing to section 59 of the Delhi Act
It was therefore on the basis of similar corresponding provisions that the question arose for decision of this Court in Srirakulu
In Srirakulu also the facts disclosed in the inquiry that certain loss was caused to the society by the acts of past Managing Committee and therefore a special officer ap pointed to look into the affairs of the society made a claim under section 51 of the Madras Act before the Registrar against the past President of the Society It was held that the Registrar s order under section 51 of the Madras Act could not be challenged
We do not find any significant difference between the provisions of the Madras Act which form the basis of this Court s decision in Srirakulu and sections 59 and 60 of the Delhi Act with which we are con cerned to justify taking a different view as suggested by learned
counsel for the appellant
Following the view taken in Srirakulu this appeal must fail
Consequently the appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs5000
NPV Appeal dis missed


Summary:
The petitioner who was convicted under section 302 IPC on 631979 and sentenced to life imprisonment was also tried for a second murder committed while he was on parole after his conviction and sentence for the first murder and was convicted under section 303 IPC
Altering the conviction to one under section 302 IPC for the second murder this Court sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of death sentence and by its judgment dated 3091983 directed that in case any remission and commutation in respect of his earlier sentence was granted the latter sentence should commence thereafter
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
praying for his release on the ground that both the life sentences had to run concurrently in accord ance with section 14272 Cr PC and as he had undergone 14 years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time of filing the writ petition on February 19 1990 he was entitled to be released It was contended that this Court s direc tion dated 30983 was contrary to section 4272 of the Code of Criminal 743 Procedure 1973 since it amounted to directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment were to run consecutively and not concurrently
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the direction of this Court properly construed was not contrary tos
4272 Cr
PC and therefore the question of issuing any writ or directions as claimed by the peti tioners did not arise
Disposing of the petition treating it as one for clari fication of the judgment dated 3091983 this Court HELD 11 A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as trans portation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person s natural life unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropri ate authority
This being so at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and therefore there can b no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub s 1 ors
427 Cr
PC 747G 749D E 12 The earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being under stood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropri ate authority and a person having only one life span the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life as envisaged by section 4272 of the Cr
PC can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might
749F G It cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment is to b treated asasentence of imprisonment for a fixed term
748B Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The Stateof Maharashtra  Ors  and MaruRam vs Union of India  Anr   followed
21 The operation of the superimposed subsequent sen tence of Iife imprisonment should not be wiped out merely because in respect of to correspondingI earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation was granted by the appropriateauthority
75lF G 744 22 In the instant case the last sentence in the direc tion meant that in case any remission or commutation was granted in
respect
of the earlier sentence of life impris onment alone then the benefit of that remission or commuta tion would not ipso facto be available in respect of the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would contin ue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the earlier sentence alone
The consequence would be that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence was also granted to the petitioner
It was in this manner that the direction was given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently
750E H 751A The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life had therefore to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner
750C D 3
The general rule enunciated in subsection 1 of section 427 Cr
PC is that without the Court s direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecu tively
749G The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence iS provided for in subsection 2 which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on subsection 1 if there being no express direction of the Court to that effect
749G H 750A Subsection 2 is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted under sub section 1 of section 427 0Cr
PC T50A 41 The mandatory minimum of 14 years  actual imprison ment prescribed by section 433A Cr
PC which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and short sentencing statutes made by the various States would not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th Decem ber 1978 when section 433A Cr
PC came into force but the section would apply to those sentenced by the trial court after 18121978 even though the offence was committed prior to that date
748D E Maru Ram vs Union of India  Anr   followed
745 42 In the instant case section 433A Cr
PC was applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprison ment since the conviction by the trial court even for the first murder was after 18121978 the second offence itself being committed after 18121978
The mandatory minimum of 14years  actual imprisonment as required by section 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment was not served out by the petitioner and therefore irrespective of the points raised in the instant petition on the basis of section 4272 Cr
PC the petitioner could not claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the Government
748E G 5
The petitioner s incarceration was the result of a valid judicial order and therefore there could be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which alone could be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution
747E F