Appeal No 298 of 1955
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 28 1953 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Order No 90 of 1949 arising out of the judgment and order dated January 25 1949 of the Sub Judge Purnea in Misc
Case No 54 of 1947
Sir lqbal Ahmad section N Andley J B Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath for the appellant
366 MC Setalvad Attorney General for India and R C Prasad for the respondent
March 16
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J
This appeal arises out of a proceeding in execution of an adjudication made under the provisions of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act 1934 U P XXV of 1934 an Act passed by the legislature of the United Provinces now called the Uttar Pradesh
The questions that arise in this appeal largely turn on the provisions of that Act and they have therefore to be referred to
The Act was intended to give relief to the proprietors of certain landed properties in the United Provinces
Section 4 of the Act enabled a proprietor of such landed properties to make an application in writing to the Collector of the District in which any of his lands is situate stating the amount of his debts and asking for the application of the Act to him
Upon such an application being made the Collector is to make an order under section 6 forwarding it to a Special Judge appointed under the Act who under section 3 is any civil judicial officer appointed for a local area to exercise the powers conferred and to perform the duties imposed by the Act
Section 7 of the Act provides that upon the making of an order by the Collector under section 6 subject to certain exceptions which it is not necessary to enumerate all proceedings pending in the courts in the United Provinces in respect of a debt due by the applicant shall be stayed and all execution processes issued against him by such courts shall become null and void and no fresh process in execution shall be issued against him nor any fresh suit or other proceeding instituted
The Special Judge after he has received the application sent to him by the Collector is required by section 8 to call upon the applicant to submit a written statement verified in the manner of a plaint setting out full particulars of his debts the names and addresses of his creditors and the nature and extent of his proprietary rights in land as also of all his properties which are liable to attachment under section 60 of 367 the Code of Civil Procedure
Under section 9 the Special Judge has then to publish a notice calling upon persons having claims against the applicant to submit the same within a time specified
Section 10 states that the claimant shall give full particulars of his claim and of the applicant s properties
Section 11 provides that the Special Judge will publish a further notice specifying the properties mentioned by the applicant as belonging to him and any person wishing to make a claim to any such property has to do so within a certain period
The same section gives power to the Special Judge to decide the claims made to the properties and provides that the decision made by him is to be deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction
Section 14 lays down that the Special Judge will inquire into the claims submitted by the creditors against the applicant and decide the questions in issue on the same principles as those on which a court of law would have decided them but he has the power to reduce the interest due and to give relief to the applicant in respect of such claims under certain specified United Provinces Acts
Sub section 7 of section 14 provides that if upon enquiry the Special Judge finds that any amount is due to any claimant he shall pass a simple money decree for such amount together with costs and interest and  such decree shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction  but it shall not be executable within the United Provinces except under the provisions of the Act
The next section to be referred to is section 19 which requires the Special Judge to send the decrees granted under section 147 to the Collector for execution in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the Act and to inform him of the nature and extent of the property which he has found to be liable to satisfy the debts of the applicant
Then come the provisions as to execution contained in Chapter V
The sections in this Chapter provide that the Collector will himself and without being required to be moved for the purpose by any person proceed to execute the decree against the properties of the applicant within the United Provinces by the various methods indicated and for 368 realising the value of the applicant s properties the Col lector shall have all the powers of a civil court for the execution of a decree
With regard to the properties of the applicant outside the United Provinces the Act could not provide for execution
To cover such cases it was enacted by section 243 that for the purpose of execution against property outside the United Provinces the decrees passed by the Special Judge would be deemed to be decrees in favour of the Collector
These are all the provisions of the Act that need be referred to for the purposes of this case
The facts may now be stated
The respondent was the proprietor of landed properties in the United Provinces and was entitled to claim relief under the Act
He became heavily encumbered in debts
It is not necessary to go into his financial embarrassment in great detail and it will be enough to say that in 1926 and 1927 he had created several mortgages on his properties in favour of the Allahabad Bank the Banaras Bank and a person called Kalia for very large sums
In 1929 the Banaras Bank filed a suit against the respondent in the Court of the Additional Sub Judge Banaras in the United Provinces for enforcement of its mortgage making the other creditors of the respondent named above parties to the suit
A decree was passed in that suit giving the creditors priority in a certain order
The Allahabad Bank not being satisfied with that order of priority filed an appeal in the High Court at Allahabad which was decided in its favour
While the appeal was pending the respondent applied to the Collector of Banares for relief under the Act
The procedure laid down in the Act as earlier summarised was duly followed and on March 21 1940 the Special fudge of Banares to whom the application had been forwarded by the Collector passed three money decrees in favour of the three creditors of the respondent mentioned above in a certain order of priority with which we shall not be concerned in this case
The total amount of such decrees came nearly to rupees nine lacs
He then sent the decrees to the Collector of Banaras for execution as required by the Act
The execution of the decrees 369 was thereafter commenced by the Additional Collector Banaras under the provisions of the Act against the properties in the United Provinces
The respondent owns an estate in the district of Purnea in Bihar called the Semapur estate
Under section 243 of the Act earlier mentioned the decrees passed by the Special Judge are to be deemed to be decrees in favour of the Collector for the purpose of execution against the Semapur estate
The Additional Collector Banaras applied to the Additional Civil Judge Banaras for transmission of the said decrees to the Court of the Subordinate Judge Purnea for execution and an order for transmission of the decrees to the Court at Purnea was accordingly made by that Judge on January 4 1947
Thereafter on March 17 1947 the Additional Collector Banaras applied to the Subordinate Judge Purnea as the transferee Court to execute the decrees by attachment and sale of the Semapur estate
The Subordinate Judge thereupon made an order directing execution to issue as sought
The respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court at Patna from this order of the Subordinate Judge Purnea and his appeal was allowed with the result that the execution of the decrees against the Semapur estate failed
The present appeal is by the Additional Collector Banaras against the order of the High Court
The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the Subordinate Judge Purnea bad jurisdiction to order execution of the decree transferred to him
The High Court held that he did not have that jurisdiction
The matter was put in this way
The decree was not a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure
It was only to be deemed as such because of section 147 of the Act
The Act was an Act of the United Provinces legislature which could not pass a legislation having effect outside the United Provinces
The operation of section 147 of the Act had therefore to be confined within the borders of the United Provinces
The Subordinate Judge Purnea could not apply that section in Bihar and treat the decree as a decree 47 370 under the Code
If he could not do so he could not order execution of the decree
If he were permitted so to apply the Act then an Act of the legislature of the United Provinces would be indirectly affecting property outside the United Provinces which it could not directly do
The Act could be applied in Bihar only by giving it an extra territorial operation
This the law did not allow
So the decree could not be executed in Purnea
We think that this argument is fallacious
No question of any extra territorial application of the United Provinces Act either directly or indirectly arises in this case
It is clear that by virtue of section 147 of the Act a decree of the Special Judge under the Act is within the United Provinces a decree for all purposes of the Code
It could therefore be transferred decree under section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a court outside the United Provinces for execution
Now when a decree is transferred it is the duty of the transferee court to execute it by all methods provided by the Code of Civil Procedure
But it is said that the transferee court must be satisfied that it is a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure before it can order execution under that Code
How then is the transferee court to decide that  It has before it a decree passed not by itself but by another court
It has therefore to satisfy itself that the decree was one which for that court was a decree passed under the Code
In order to do that it is asked to apply the United Provinces Act to the decree passed within the United Provinces
How can it be said that if it so applies the United Provinces Act it is giving it an extra territorial operation  It is doing nothing of the kind
It is applying an Act of the United Provinces to something which happened within the territories of those Provinces it is applying an United Provinces Act to a matter within the competence of the legislature of the United Provinces to legislate upon
No doubt a court outside the United Provinces is applying a statute of those Provinces but that does not amount to giving extra territorial operation to that statute
If the statute is being so applied 371 to one of its legitimate objects it is not being given any extra territorial operation at all
We further find it difficult to appreciate how the application by the Subordinate Judge of Purnea of the United Provinces Act to the decree of the Special Judge Banaras sent to him for execution results in the United Provinces Act affecting property outside the United Provinces
The only result of such application is to remove the objection that that decree is not a decree of a court in the United Provinces passed under the Code the Act is not thereby made to affect property outside the United Provinces
Of course if that decree is a decree under the Code it can be executed against any property outside the United Provinces
That however is not the result of the United Provinces Act but of the Code of Civil Procedure which is a central legislation and applies to Bihar also
The High Court was therefore wrong in thinking that the Subordinate Judge Purnea had no jurisdiction to execute the decree passed under the Act within the United Provinces and sent to him for execution
It was then contended that the order of transfer of the decree was invalid because under section 39 of the Code such an order could be made only on the application of the decree holder and in the present case it had not been made on his application
His point was this
Under section 243 of the Act a decree of the Special Judge is to be deemed to be a decree in favour of the Collector for the purpose of execution against property outside the United Provinces
Therefore in the present case it was the Collector Banaras who was the decree holder and he alone could apply for the transfer of the decree
Actually however the order for the transfer had been made in this case on the application of the Additional Collector Banaras
So it was said the order was invalid
Now this argument depends upon the Collector and the Additional Collector being different persons
It is clear however that they are not
That appears from sections 14 and 14A of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act 1901 to which our attention was drawn
Section 14 gives power to the Government to appoint a Collector for discharging the 372 duties mentioned in the Act or any other law for the time being in force
Section 14A1 gives power to the Government to appoint an Additional Collector
Sub section 3 of section 14A provides that the  Additional Collector shall exercise such powers and perform such duties of a Collector as the Government may direct
The Additional Collector therefore exercises such of the powers and discharges such of the functions of the Collector as the Government directs him to do
We have before us a document containing such an order by which the work of sale and execution which under the Encumbered Estates Act had to be done by a Collector had been entrusted to the Additional Collector
It follows that for the purposes of execution and sale under the Act the Additional Collector is to be deemed to be the Collector as he exercises the latter s powers in this regard
The Additional Collection was hence quite competent to apply for the transfer of the decree
The third point against the validity of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was that under section 39 of the Code the decree could be transferred only by the Court which passed it
It was said that in the present case it is only by virtue of section 14 of the Act that the decision of the Special Judge is deemed to be a decree  that since it was his decision he must be deemed to have passed it
It was then pointed out that the order for the transfer of the decree had in fact been made by the Additional Civil Judge Banaras and not by the Special Judge Banaras and hence that order was of no effect
This is an argument with which we are not much impressed
It has been pointed out to us that the powers of a special Judge under the Act were conferred on the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge Banaras by the United Provinces Government s Revenue Department notification No 767 Rev
published in the United Provinces Gazette of the 12th October 1935
The Additional Subordinate Judge later came to be called the Additional Civil Judge
It is therefore the same court which exercises the powers of an Additional Civil Judge as also those of a Special Judge under the Act
We find 373 no difficulty in treating the order of transfer as having been made by the Special Judge
The fact that the order purported to be made by the Additional Civil Judge was a matter of mere irregularity and cannot make it invalid
Nor do we find any lack of power in the Special Judge to order a transfer of the I decrees
The Act provides that his adjudication would be treated as a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction
The execution of such a decree outside the United Provinces is also clearly contemplated by section 243
We have earlier held that such execution is permissible in law
That being so in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act it has to be held that the Special Judge must be deemed to be a court which passed the decree within the meaning of section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Nor does there seem to be any objection to think that the Special Judge is a civil court
From the provisions of the Act earlier set out there is no doubt that he adjudicates upon rights of the parties and acts in the same way as any other civil court would do
Indeed apart from the fact that the proceedings before him do not commence by the filing of a plaint we find no distinction between him and a court as ordinarily understood
The order of transfer of the decree is hence in our view clearly a good order
Lastly it was said that the decree was barred by limitation long before the order for its transfer was made
It was contended that article 182 of the Limitation Act governed the case and the application for its execution had been made beyond the time limited
The question is does the article apply  The High Court held that that article had no application to the present case and that no question of limitation arose  for the execution proceeding in Purnea Court is merely a continuation of the execution proceeding pending before the Collector of Banares 
In our opinion the High Court was right in the view that it took
It is quite clear that if the application for execution with which we are concerned was made in a pending execution proceeding notion of the application of article 182 arises
It  long been 374 recognised by the courts in our country that a right to continue a proceeding which is pending is a right which arises from day to day and no question of any bar of limitation with regard to the enforcement of such a right arises See Kedar Nath Dutt vs Harra Chand Dutt 1 Subba Chariar vs Muthuveeran Pillai 2
The question then is was the application for execution which has resulted in the order under appeal one for continuing a pending execution proceeding  It is not disputed that all along since the decree was sent by the Special Judge to the Collector for execution and before that date the decree was not executable it has continuously been in execution under the provisions of the Act by the Additional Collector Banaras and that such execution proceeding was pending on the date of the present application for execution
The question thus is whether the execution proceeding started in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Purnea was a continuation of the execution proceeding by the Additional Collector Banaras
We think it was
We have to remember that section 147 of the Act which said that an adjudication of the special Judge was to be deemed to be a decree also provided that that decree would not be executable within the United Provinces except under the provisions of the Act
We have also to remember that the Act provided that as against the properties within the United Provinces the decree could only be executed by the Collector on his own by the various methods provided
We may also point out that section 244 provides that for the purpose of such execution the Collector is to have all the powers of a civil court for the execution of a decree
It is therefore clear that the only mode of execution of the decree within the United Provinces contemplated by the Act is the execution by the Collector
Within the United Provinces the execution of the decree by the Collector would be deemed to be an execution under the Civil Procedure Code
The execution by the Collector is execution of what is a decree within the Code
When the decree is executed outside the United Provinces where as already stated it can be legally 1 Cal 420
2 Mad
375 executed the amount realised by the execution by the Collector has to be taken into account
When the Subordinate Judge Purnea has to decide the question  whether the application for execution made to him is in continuance of an existing execution proceeding he has to recognise the proceeding before the Additional Collector Banares as a proceeding in execution under the Code for it is so under the Act
In doing this for the reasons earlier mentioned he would not be giving any extra territorial operation to the Act
It seems to us therefore that the execution of the decree by the Collector must be deemed to be execution of a decree for all purposes and therefore an application made to the Subordinate Judge Purnea for execution of the same decree while an execution proceeding was pending before the Collector must be a continuation of the execution last mentioned
No question of limitation can arise in regard to such an application
We think therefore that this appeal must succeed
We set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of the Subordinate Judge Purnea
The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the High Court
Appeal allowed


Summary:
The Director General Ordnance Factories DG issued a Circular dated 6111962 to the effect that the Diploma holders who have been appointed as Supervisor Grade B  technical or in equivalent grades should on completion of one year s satisfactory service be promoted the post of Supervisor Grade A  Tech and the Diploma holders who worked satisfactorily as Supervisor A  Tech or in equivalent grades for 2 years should be promoted as Chargeman
Subsequently the DG issued another Circular dated 2011966 according to which promotions were to be in accordance with normal rulesie
on the basis of their listing by the relevant Departmental Promotion  Committee and not merely on satisfactory completition of 2 years continuous service as Supervisor A  Grade or equivalent grades
In effect the first Circular was withdrawn by the second Circular
In 1973 some Supervisors Grade Al riled a Writ Petition before the High Court claiming benefit of the first circular
Without going into the merits of the controvery a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground of delay
On appeal a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition on merits
On further appeal this Court directed that the cases of those appellants be considered for promo906 907 tion as Chargeman Gr
II and they promoted them unless they were found unfit from the dates on which they ought to have been promoted
Virendra Kumar  Ors
vs UOI CA No 4411981 decided on 2281
Thereafter the present appellants riled Writ Petitions before the High Court praying for the same relief as was granted by this Court in Virendra Kumar s case
The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions
The Special Leave Petitions filed by the Union of India against the Judgment came to be dismissed
Consequently
the DG issued an order giving antedated seniority to the appellants for the purposes of promotion
The appellants were also given deemed dates of promotion to post of chargeman Gr11 from the dates when they completed two years of service as Supervisor Gr A  and consequent seniority in the other higher grades
This resulted in some employees who were senior to the appellants in the cadre of Chargeman Gr
II and other higher grades becoming junior to the appellants
These employees who were adversely affected by the order of the DG giving ante dated seniority to the appellants and were not impleaded as parties at any stage of the litigation challenged the DG s order before the Central Administrative Tribunal
The Tribunal allowed the application and set aside the DG s order giving ante dated seniority to the appellants
Aggrieved by the Judgment of the Tribunal the appellants preferred the present appeal
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD 1
This Court has authoritatively laid down in Paluru s case that Civil Appeal No 44181 Virendra Kumar vs UOI was not correctly decided
The appellants have throughout been basing their claim on Virendra Kumar s case
Once the base is knocked out by the judgment of this Court in Paluru s case the appellants are left with no ground to sustain the order dated February 2025 1987 issued by the DG by which they were given ante dated seniority
917 B C 12
Even if it is assumed that the High Court judgment had become final with the dismissal of the SLP against it and could Rot have been reviewed by the High Court or the Tribunal it became final only between the parties inter se
The first circular was issued in the year 1962
The appellants riled writ petitions in the High Court twenty years thereafter seeking enforcement of the first circular
The petitioners wanted the clock to be put back by two decades through the process of the Court
All those 908 persons who were promoted in accordance with the rules during that long period and were not parties before the High Court could not be made to suffer for no fault of theirs
On the other hand some employees challenged the order dated February 2025 1987 which affected them adversely within the period of limitation before the Central Administrative Tribunal
In any case the judgment of this Court in Virendra Kumar having been over ruled in Paluru s case the appellants have neither the law nor the equity on their side
The judgment of the Tribunal being in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in Paluru s case there is no ground to interfere with the same
918 A D Paluru Ramkrishnaiah  Ors etc
vs Union of India  Anr   followed
Virendra Kumar  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors
 Civil Appeal No 44181 decided on 221981 referred to