Appeal No 121 of 1955
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 22 195324th February 1954 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench in F C Appeal No 50 of 1947 arising out of the judgment and decree dated April 15 1947 of the Court of the Civil Judge Bahraich in Regular Suit No 25 of 1946
section K Dar Ch
Akhtar Hussain and C P Lal for the appellants
Niyamatullah Onkar Nath Srivastava J B Dadachanji section N Andley and Rameshwar Nath for respondent No 1 1958
September 16
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1289 GAJENDRAGADKAR J
The suit from which this appeal arises relates to a shrine and tomb known as Darga Hazarat Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi situated in the village of Singha Parasi and properties appurtenant to it
The plaintiffs who have preferred this appeal are members of  the Waqf Committee Darga Sharif Bharaich and in their suit they have claimed a declaration that the properties in suit were not covered by the provisions of the United Provinces Muslims Waqfs Act U P XIII of 1936 hereinafter described as the Act
The declaration the consequential injunction and the two other subsidiary reliefs are claimed primarily against respondent 1 the Sunni Central Board of Waqf United Provinces of Agra and Oudh
Two trustees who did not join the appellants in filing the suit are impleaded as pro forma defendants 2 and 3 and they are respondents 2 and 3 before us
It appears that respondent 1 purported to exer cise its authority over the properties in suit under the provisions of the Act and that led to the present suit which was filed on October 18 1946 No 25 of 1946
The appellants  case is that the properties in suit are outside the operative provisions of the Act and not subject to the jurisdiction of respondent 1 arid so according to the appellants respondent 1 has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in assuming authority over the management of the said properties
That is the basis of the reliefs claimed by the appellants in their plaint
The appellants  claim was resisted by respondent I on several grounds
It was alleged that the properties in suit did form a waqf as defined by the Act and were covered by its operative provisions
It was urged that respondent I was a duly constituted Sunni Central Board and it was authorised to exercise supervision over the management of the said waqf
The case for respondent I also was that the appellants  suit was barred by limitation and was incompetent inasmuch as before the filing of the suit the appellants had not given the statutory notice as required by section 53 of the Act
On these pleadings several issues were framed by the 1290 learned trial judge but the principal points in dispute were three  1 Are the properties in suit governed by the Act  2 Is the suit in time  and 3 Is the suit maintainable without notice as required by section 53 of the Act  The learned trial judge held that the properties in suit cannot be held to be waqf as defined by the Act
In his opinion it was not the village Singha Parasi but its profits free from land revenue that had been granted in trust for the shrine and its khadims and since the usufruct of the profits was subject to the condition of resumption and since the profits had not been vested in the Almighty the grant cannot be construed to be a waqf as contemplated by Muhamniadan Law
On the question of limitation the learned judge held that section 52 of the Act applied to the suit  but according to him though the suit was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by the said section it was within time having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act
The plea raised by respondent 1 under section 53 of the Act was partly upheld by the learned trial judge he took the view that the first three relief  claimed by the appellants were barred but the fourth was not
In the result the learned judge granted a declaration in favour of the appellants to the effect that  the shrine in question together with its attached buildings and the Chharawa were not waqf properties within the meaning of the Act
 As a consequence an injunction was issued restraining respondent 1 from removing or dissolving the committee of management of the appellants and respondents 2 and 3  not otherwise than provided for under section 18 of the Act in so far as the management and supervision of those properties are concerned in respect of which the appellants were not being granted a decree for a declaration sought for by them in view of the absence of the notice under section 53 of the Act 
The rest of the appellants  claim was dismissed
This decree was passed on April 15 1947
1291 Against this decree respondent I preferred an appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Lucknow Bench and the appellants filed cross objections
The High Court has reversed the finding of the trial court on the question as to the character of the properties in suit
According to the High Court the said properties constituted waqf as defined by the Act
The High Court has also held that the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation and was also in  competent in view of the fact that the statutory notice required by section 53 of the Act had not been given by the appellants prior to its institution
As a result of these findings the appeal preferred by respondent I was allowed the appellants  cross objections were dismissed the decree passed by the trial court was set aside and the appellants  suit dismissed April 22 1953
The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court to prefer an appeal to this Court under article 133 of the Constitution
That is how this appeal has come to this Court
Though the dispute between the parties raises only three principal issues the facts leading to the litigation are somewhat complicated  and it is necessary to mention them in order to get a clear picture of the background of the present dispute
It is believed that Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi was a nephew of Muhammad Ghazni and he met his death at the hands of a local chieftain when he paid a visit to Bahraich
On his death his remains were buried in village Singha Parasi by his followers and subsequently a tomb was constructed
In course of time this tomb became an object of pilgrimage and veneration
Urs began to be held at the shrine every year and it was attended by a large number of devotees who made offerings before the shrine
It is partly from the income of these offerings that the tomb is maintained
Certain properties were endowed by the Emperors of Delhi in favour of this tomb and accretions were made to the said properties by the savings from the income of the endowed properties and the offerings brought by the devotees
164 1292 The tomb was managed by a body of persons known as Khuddams of the Darga
This body had been looking after the Darga and the performance of ceremonies and other services at the shrine
Whilst the management of the Darga was being thus carried on Oudh came to be annexed in 1856 and the proclamation issued by Lord Canning confiscated all private properties and inams in the said State
The properties attached to the Darga were no exception
Fresh settlements were however subsequently made by the Government as a result of which previously existing rights were revived usually on the same terms as before
This happened in regard to the properties appertaining to the Darga
It would appear that in 1859 or 1860 a Sanad had been granted to Fakirulla who was the head of the khadims in respect of rent free tenure of the village Singha Parasi
The grantee was given the right to collect the usufruct of the village which was to be appropriated towards the maintenance of the Darga
The grantee s son Inayatulla was apparently not satisfied with the limited rights granted under the Sanad and so he brought an action Suit No 1 of 1865 claiming proprietary rights in the said properties
Inayatulla s suit was substantially dismissed on November 11 1870 by the Settlement Officer
It was held that the proprietary rights of the Government in respect of the properties had been alienated for ever in favour of the charity and so the properties were declared to vest in the endowment
Inayatulla s right to manage the said properties under the terms of the grant was however recognized
Soon after this decision it was brought to the notice of the Chief Commissioner in 1872 that the khadims at the Darga were mismanaging the properties of the Darga and were not properly maintaining the Darga itself
On receiving this complaint a committee of mussalmans was appointed to examine the affairs of the Darga and to make a report
The committee submitted its report on February 20 1877 and made recommendations for the improvement of the management of the Darga and its properties
According to the committee it was necessary to appoint a jury of five persons including two khadims to manage the Darga and its properties
Meanwhile some of the lands appurtenant to the Darga had been sold and offerings made by the devotees as well as other properties had become the subject matter of attachment
In the interest of the Darga Government then decided to take possession of the properties under the provisions of Pensions Act XXIII of 1873 This decision was reached after the Government had considered the report made by the Deputy Commissioner on August 31 1878
The result of declaring that the properties were governed by the provisions of the Pensions Act was to free the properties from the mortgages created by the khadims
The management of the Darga and its properties by the Government continued until 1902
During this period Inayatulla attempted to assert his rights once more by instituting a suit in the civil court in 1892
In this suit Inayatullah and two others who had joined him claimed possession of the Darga together with the buildings appurtenant thereto and village Singha Parasi
Their claim was decreed by the trial court but on appeal the said decree was set aside on July 20 1897
The appellate court of the Judicial Commissioner held that Inayatulla s allega tion that the proprietary interest in the properties vested in him was not justified
Even so the appellate court observed that it was not proper or competent for the Government to interfere in the management of the waqf and its properties the Darga was a religious establishment within the meaning or Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863 and the assumption of the management of the Darga and its properties was unauthorised and improper
As a result of these observations the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh filed a suit No 9 of 1902 under section 539 present section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
This suit ended in a decree on December 3 1902
By the decree the properties in suit were declared  to vest in the trustees when appointed 
The decree further provided for a scheme for the management of 1294 the Darga and its properties
The scheme thus framed came into operation and the trustees appointed under it began to manage the Darga and its properties
The scheme appears to have worked smoothly until 1934
In 1934 Ashraf Ali and others clamed Suit No 1 of 1934 that an injunction should be issued restraining the defendants from taking part in the management of the affairs of the Darga
The plaintiffs also prayed that the defendants should be prohibited from spending monies belonging to the waqf on frivolous litigations due to party feelings
On May 7 1934 the learned District Judge expressed his regret that animosity and party feelings should find their way in the management of a trust and issued an order directing the defendant committee that no money out of the Darga funds should be spent either in the litigation pending before him or in any other litigation without the sanction of the court
For nearly six years after the date of this order the Darga and its properties appear to have been free from any litigation
This peace was however again disturbed in 1940 when a suit was filed No 1 of 1940 with the sanction of the Advocate General by five plaintiffs against the managing committee and its trustees for their removal and for the framing of a fresh scheme
On October 16 1941 the suit was decreed
The managing committee and the trustees however challenged the said decree by preferring an appeal to the Chief Court
Their appeal succeeded and on March 7 1946 the decree under appeal was set aside though a few minor amendments were made in the original scheme of management
Whilst this litigation was pending between the parties the United Provinces Muslim Waqfs Act UP XIII of 1936 was passed in 1936 for better governance administration and supervision of the specified muslim waqfs in U P
In pursuance of the provisions of the Act respondent I was constituted and under section 51 it issued the notification on February 26 1944 declaring the properties in suit to be a Sunni Waqf under the Act
After this notification was issued respondent 1 called upon the committee of management of 1295 the waqf to submit its annual budget for approval and to get its accounts audited by its auditors
Respondent I also purported to levy the usual contributions against the waqf under section 54 of the Act
The members of the committee of management and the trustees with the exception of two persons held that the properties in suit did not constitute a waqf within the meaning of the Act and that respondent 1 had no authority or jurisdiction to supervise the management of the said properties
That is how the appellants came to institute the present suit on October 18 1946 against respondent 1
That in brief is the back ground of the present dispute
For the appellants Mr Dar has raised three points before us
He contends that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the properties in suit constituted a waqf over which respondent I can exercise its authority or jurisdiction and he argues that it was erroneous to have held that the appellants  suit was barred by section 52 and was incompetent under section 53 of the Act
Mr Dar has fairly con ceded that if the finding of the High Court on the question of limitation or on the question of the bar pleaded under section 53 was upheld it would be unnecessary to consider the merits of his argument about the character of the properties in suit
Since we have reached the conclusion that the High Court was right in holding that the suit was barred under section 52 and was also incompetent under section 53 of the Act we do not propose to decide the question as to whether the properties in dispute are waqf within the meaning of the Act
The plea of limitation under section 52 as well as the plea of the bar under section 53 are in substance preliminary objections to the maintanability or competence of the suit and we propose to deal with these objections on the basis that the properties in dispute are outside the purview of the Act as alleged by the appellants
Before dealing with the question of limitation it would be useful to refer to the relevant part of the scheme of the Act
Section 4 of the Act provides for the survey of waqfs to be made by the Commissioner of Waqfs appointed under sub section
1 of section 4
Subsection 3 requires the Commissioner to ascertain and determine inter alia the number of Shia and Sunni Waqfs in the district their nature the gross income of the properties comprised in them as well as the expenses incurred in the realisation of the income and the pay of the mutawalli
The Commissioner has also to ascertain and determine whether the waqf in question is one of those exempted from the provisions of the Act under section 2
The result of this enquiry has to be indicated by the Commissioner in his report to the State Government under subs
Section 6 deals with the establishment of two separate Boards to be called the Shia Central Board and the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs
Section 18 defines the functions of the Central Boards and confers oil them general powers of superintendence over the management of the waqfs under their jurisdiction
After the Boards are constituted a copy of the Commissioner s report received by the State Government is forwarded to them and under section 5 sub section
1 each Central Board is required as soon as possible to notify in the official gazette the waqfs relating to the particular sect to which according to the said report the provisions of the Act apply
It is after the prescribed notification is issued by the Board that it can proceed to exercise its powers under section 18 in respect of the waqfs thus notified
It is the notification issued by respondent under section 5 1 and the subsequent steps taken by it in exercise of its authority that have led to the present suit
Mr Dar contends that the provisions of section 5 2 do not apply to the present suit and so the argument that the suit is barred by limitation under the said section cannot succeed
It is clear that the notification was issued on February 26 1944 and the suit has been filed on October 18 1946
Thus there can be no doubt that if the one year s limitation prescribed by section 5 2 applies to the present suit it would be barred by time unless the appellants are able to invoke the assistance of section 15 of the Limitation Act
But according to Mr Dar the present suit is outside section 5 2 1297 altogether and so there is no question of invoking the shorter period of limitation prescribed by it
Let us then proceed to consider whether the present suit falls within the mischief of section 5 2 or not
Section 5 2 provides that  The mutawalli of a waqf or any person interested in a waqf or a Central Board may bring a suit in a civil court of competent jurisdiction for a declaration that any transaction held by the Commissioner of waqfs to be a waqf is not a waqf or any transaction held or assumed by him not to be a waqf is a waqf or that a waqf held by him to pertain to a particular sect does not belong to that sect or that any waqf reported by such Commissioner as being subject to the provisions of this Act is exempted under section 2 or that any waqf held by him to be so exempted is subject to this Act
 The proviso to this section prescribes the period of one year s limitation to a suit by a mutawalli or a person interested in the waqif
Sub section 4 of section 5 lays down that the Commissioner of the waqf s shall not be made a defendant to any suit under sub section
2 and no suit shall be instituted against him for anything done by him in good faith under colour of this Act
The appellants  argument is that before section 5 2 can be applied to their suit it must be shown that the suit is filed either by a mutawalli of a waqf or any person interested in the waqf
The appellants are neither the mutawallis of the waqf nor are they persons interested in the waqf
Their case is that the properties in suit do not constitute a waqf under the Act but are held by them as proprietors and that the notification issued by respondent I and the authority purported to be exercised by it in respect of the said properties are wholly void
How can the appellants who claim a declaration and injunction against respondent I on these allegations be said to be persons interested in the waqf asks Mr Dar
The word  waqf  as used in this subsection must be given the meaning attached to it by the definition in section 3 1 of the Act and since the appellants totally deny the existence of such a waqf they cannot be said to be interested in the  waqf 
The 1298 argument thus presented appears prima facie to be attractive and plausible but on a close examination of section 5 2 it would appear clear that the words  any person interested in a waqf  cannot be construed in their strict literal meaning
If the said words are given their strict literal meaning suits for a declaration that any transaction held by the Commissioner to be a waqf is not a waqf can never be filed by a mutawalli of a waqf or a person interested in a waqf
The scheme of this sub section is clear
When the Central Board assumes jurisdiction over any waqf tinder the Act it proceeds to do so on the decision of three points by the Commissioner of Waqfs
It assumes that the property is a waqf that it is either a Sunni or a Shia waqf and that it is not a waqf which falls within the exceptions mentioned in section 2
It is in respect of each one of these decisions that a suit is contemplated by section 5 sub section
If the decision is that the property is not a waqf or that it is a waqf falling within the exceptions mentioned by section 2 the Central Board may have occasion to bring a suit
Similarly if the decision is that the waqf is Shia and not Sunni a Sunni Central Board may have occasion to bring a suit and vice versa
Likewise the decision that the property is a waqf may be challenged by a person who disputes the correctness of the said decision
The decision that a property does not fall within the exceptions mentioned by section 2 may also be challenged by a person who claims that the waqf attracts the provisions of section 2
If that be the nature of the scheme of suits contemplated by section 5 2 it would be difficult to imagine how the mutawalli of a waqf or any person interested in a waqf can ever sue for a declaration that the transaction held by the Commissioner of the waqfs to be a waqf is not a waqf
That is why we think that the literal construction of the expression  any person interested in a waqf  would render a part of the sub section wholly meaningless and ineffective
The legislature has definitely contemplated that the decision of the Commissioner of the Waqfs that a particular transaction is a waqf can be challenged by persons who do not accept the correctness of the said decision and it is this class of persons who are 1299 obviously intended to be covered by the words any person interested in a waqf 
It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute
In our opinion on a reading of the provisions of the relevant sub section as a whole there can be no doubt that the expression any person interested in a waqf  must mean any person inter ested in what is held to be a waqf 
It is only persons who are interested in a transaction which is held to be a waqf who would sue for a declaration that the decision of the Commissioner of the Waqfs in that behalf is wrong and that the transaction in fact is not a waqf under the Act
We must accordingly hold that the relevant clause on which Mr Dar has placed his argument in repelling the application of section 5 2 to the present suit must not be strictly or literally construed and that it should be taken to mean any person interested in a transaction which is held to be a waqf
On this construction the appellants are obviously interested in the suit properties which are notified to be waqf by the notification issued by respondent 1 and so the suit instituted by them would be governed by section 5 sub section
2 and as such it would be barred by time unless it is saved under section 15 of the Limitation Act
In this connection it may be relevant to refer to the provisions of section 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act X of 1940
This section provides that any party to an arbitration agreement desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement shall apply to the court and the court shall decide the question on affidavits
It would be noticed that the expression  any party to an arbitration agreement  used in the section poses a similar problem of construction
The party applying under section 33 may dispute the very existence of the agreement and yet the applicant is described by the section as a party to the 165 1300 agreement
If the expression  any party to an arbitration agreement  is literally construed it would be difficult to conceive of a case where the existence of an agreement can be impeached by a proceeding under section 33
The material clause must therefore be read liberally and not literally or strictly
It must be taken to mean a person who is alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement in other words the clause must be construed to cover cases of persons who are alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement but who do not admit the said allegation and want to challenge the existence of the alleged agreement itself
This liberal construction has been put upon the clause in several judicial decisions Chaturbhuj Mohanlal vs Bhicam Chand Chororia  Sons Mathu Kutty vs Varoe Kutty 2  Lal Chand V Messrs Basanta Mal Devi Dayal  Ors
We may also point out incidentally that in dealing with an application made under section 34 of the Arbitration Act it is incumbent upon the court to decide first of all whether there is a binding agreement for arbitration between the parties in other words the allegation by one party against another that there is a valid agreement of reference between them does not preclude the latter party from disputing the existence of the said agreement in proceedings taken under section 34
These decisions illustrate the principle that where the literal meaning of the words use in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative
Before we part with this part of the appellants  case it is necessary to point out that the argument urged by Mr Dar on the construction of section 52 is really inconsistent with the appellants  pleas in the trial court
The material allegations in the plaint clearly amount to an admission that the Darga and its appurtenant properties constitute a waqf Under the 1 2 AIR 1950 Mad
3 1301 Act but it is urged that they do not attract its provisions for the reason that the waqf in question falls within the class of exemptions enumerated in section 2 iia and c of the Act
 The Darga waqf  says the plaint in para
11 is of such a nature as makes it an exception from the purview of the Act as provided by section 2 of the Act 
Indeed consistently with this part of the appellants  case the plaint expressly admits that the cause of action for the suit accrued on February 26 1944 and purports to bring the suit within time by relying on sections 14 15 18 and 29 of the Limitation Act
In their replication filed by the plaintiffs an attempt was made to explain away the admissions contained in the plaint by alleging that  if ever in any paper or document the word I waqf had been used as a routine or hurriedly then it is vague and of no specific meaning and its meaning or connotation is only trust or amanat   and yet in the statement of the case by the appellants  counsel we find an express admission that the subject matter of the suit is covered by the exemptions of section 2 cls
ii a and ii c
Thus on the pleadings there can be no doubt that the appellants  case was that the Darga and its properties no doubt constituted a waqf under the Act but they did not fall within the purview of the Act because they belong to the category of waqfs which are excepted by section 2ii a and c
The argument based on the application of section 2 has not been raised before us and so on a consideration of the pleadings of the appellants it would be open to respondent 1 to contend that the appellants are admittedly interested in the waqf and their suit falls within the mischief of section 5 even if the words  any person interested in a waqf  are literally and strictly construed
The next question which calls for our decision is whether the appellants  suit is saved by virtue of the provisions of section 15 of the Limitation Act
That is the only provision on which reliance was placed before us by Mr Dar on behalf of the appellants
Section 15
provides for  the exclusion of time during which proceedings are suspended  and it lays down that  in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any 1302 suit or application for the execution of a decree the institution or execution of which has been staved by an injunction or order the time of the continuance of the injunction or order the day on which it was issued or made and the day on which it was withdrawn shall be excluded 
It is plain that for excluding the time under this section it must be shown that the institution of the suit in question had been stayed by an injunction or order in other words the section requires an order or an injunction which stays the institution of the suit
And so in cases falling under section 15 the party instituting the suit would by such institution be in contempt of court
If an express order or injunction is produced by a party that clearly meets the requirements of section 15
Whether the requirements of section 15 would be satisfied by the production of an order or injunction which by necessary implication stays the institution of the suit is open to argument
We are however prepared to assume in the present case that section 15 would apply even to cases where the institution of a suit is stayed by necessary implication of the order passed or injunction issued in the previous litigation
But in our opinion there would be no justification for extending the application of section 15 on the ground that the institution of the subsequent suit would be inconsistent with the spirit or substance of the order passed in the previous litigation
It is true that rules of limitation are to some extent arbitrary and may frequently lead to hardship but there can be no doubt that in construing provisions of limitation equitable considerations are immaterial and irrelevant and in applying them effect must be given to the strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them Nagendra Nath Dey vs Suresh Chandra Dey 1
In considering the effect of the provisions contained in section 15 it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Narayan Jivangouda vs Puttabai 2
This case was an offshoot of the well known case of Bhimabai vs Gurunathgouda 3
It is apparent that the dispute between Narayan and Gurunathgouda 1 2 1944 47 Bom
L R I 3 PC 1303 ran through a long and protracted course and it reached the Privy Council twice
The decision of the Privy Council in Bhimabai s case 1 upholding the validity of Narayan s adoption no doubt led to a radical change in the accepted and current view about the Hindu widow s power to adopt in the State of Bombay but this decision was of poor consolation to Narayan because the judgment of the Privy Council in Narayan Jivangouda s case 2 shows that Narayan s subsequent suit to recover possession of the properties in his adoptive family was dismissed as barred by time
The dispute was between Narayan and his adoptive mother Bhimabai on the one hand and Gurunathgouda on the other
On November 25 1920 Gurunathgouda had sued Bhimabai and Narayan for a declaration that he was in possession of the lands and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession
On the same day when the suit was filed an interim injunction was issued against the defendants and it was confirmed when the suit was decreed in favour of Gurunathgouda
By this injunction the defendants were ordered  not to take the crops from the fields in suit not to interfere with the plaintiff s wahiwat to the said lands not to take rent notes from the tenants and not to obstruct the plaintiff from taking the crops raised by him or from taking monies from his tenants 
Two important issues which arose for decision in the suit were whether Narayan had been duly adopted by Bhimabai in fact and whether Bhimabai was competent to make the adoption
These issues were answered against Narayan by the trial court
Bhimabai and Narayan appealed to the Bombay High Court but their appeal failed and was dismissed Bhimabai vs Gurunathgouda 3
There was a further appeal by the said parties to the Privy Council
The Privy Council held that the adoption of Narayan was valid and so the appeal was allowed and Gurunathgouda s suit was dismissed with costs throughout
In the result the injunction granted by the courts below was dissolved on November 4 1932
Oil 1 1932 35 Bo  L R 200 P C 2 1944 47 Bom
L H I 3 1304 November 25 1932 Narayan and Bhimabai filed their suit to recover possession of the properties from Gurunathgouda
They sought to bring the suit within time inter alia on the ground that the time taken up in litigating the former suit or at least the period commencing from the grant of temporary injunction on February 25 1920 to November 4 1932 when the injunction was dissolved by the Privy Council should be excluded under section 15 of the Limitation Act
This plea was rejected by the trial court and on appeal the same view was taken by the Bombay High Court
Rangnekar J who delivered the principal judgment exhaustively considered the relevant judicial decisions bearing on the question about the construction of section 15 and held that the injunction issued against Narayan and Bhimabai in Gurunathgouda s suit did not help to attract section 15 to the suit filed by them in 1932 Narayan vs Gurunathgouda 1
The matter was then taken to the Privy Council by the plaintiffs but the Privy Council confirmed the view taken by the High Court of Bombay and dismissed the appeal Narayan vs Puttabai 2
In dealing with the appellants  argument that the injunction in the prior suit had been issued in wide terms and in substance it precluded the plaintiffs from filing their suit their Lordships observed that there was nothing in the injunction or in the decree to support their case that they were prevented from instituting a suit for possession in 1920 or at any time before the expiry of the period of limitation
It appears from the judgment that Sir Thomas Strangman strongly contended before the Privy Council that since the title of the contending parties was involved in the suit it would have been quite futile to institute a suit for possession
This argument was repelled by the Privy Council with the observation that  we are unable to appreciate this point for the institution of a suit can never be said to be futile if it would thereby prevent the running of limitation 
There can be little doubt that if on considerations of equity the application of section 15 could be extended this was pre 1 2 1944 47 Bom
L R I 1305 eminently a cast for such extended application of the said provision and yet the Privy Council construed the material words used in section 15 in their strict grammatical meaning and held that no order or injunction as required by section 15 had been issued in the earlier litigation
We would like to add that in dealing with this point their Lordships did not think it necessary to consider whether the prohibition required by section 15 must be express or can even be implied
There is another decision of the Privy Council to which reference may be made
In Beti Maharani vs The Collector of Etawah 1 their Lordships were dealing with a case where attachment before judgment under section 485 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been issued by the court at the instance of a third party prohibiting the creditor from recovering and the debtor from paying the debt in question
This order of attachment was held not to be an order staying the institution of a subsequent suit by the creditor under section 15 of Limitation Act of 1877
 There would be no violation of it  said order observed Lord Hobhouse  until the restrained creditor came to receive his debt from the restrained debtor
And the institution of a suit might for more than one reason be a very proper proceeding on the part of the restrained creditor as for example in this case to avoid the bar by time though it might also be prudent to let the court which had issued the order know what he was about 
In Sundaramma vs Abdul Khader 2 the Madras High Court while dealing with section 15 of the Limitation Act has held that no equitable grounds for the suspension of the cause of action can be added to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act
It is true that in Musammat Basso Kaur vs Lala Dhua Singh 3 their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that it would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not  but this observation must be read in the context of facts with which 1 All 198 210 211
2 1932 ILR56 Mad
490 3 1888 15 IA 211
1306 the Privy Council was dealing in this case
The respondent who was a debtor of the appellant had agreed to convey certain property to him setting off the debt against part of the price
No money was paid by the respondent and disputes arose as to the other terms of the agreement
The respondent sued to enforce the terms of the said agreement but did not succeed
Afterwards when he sued for the debt he was met with the plea of limitation
The Privy Council held that the decree dismissing the respondent s suit was the starting point of limitation
The said decree imposed on the respondent a fresh obligation to pay his debts under section 65 of the Indian Contract Act
It was also held alternatively that the said decree imported within the meaning of article 97 of Limitation Act of 1877 a failure of the consideration which entitled him to retain it
Thus it is clear that the Privy Council was dealing with the appellants  rights to sue which had accrued to him on the dismissal of his action to enforce the terms of the agreement
It is in reference to this right that the Privy Council made the observations to which we have already referred
These observations are clearly obiter and they cannot in our opinion be of any assistance in interpreting the words in section 15
It is in the light of this legal position that we must examine the appellants  case that the institution of the present suit had been stayed by an injunction or order issued against them in the earlier litigation of 1940
We have already noticed that Civil Suit No 1 of 1940 had been instituted against the appellants with the sanction of the Advocate General for their removal and for the settlement of a fresh scheme
The appellants were ordered to be removed by the learned trial judge on October 16 1941 but on appeal the decree of the trial court was set aside on March 7 1946
It is the period between October 16 1941 and March 7 1946 that is sought to be excluded by the appellants under section 15 of the Limitation Act
Mr Dar contends that the order passed by the trial judge on October 16 1941 made it impossible for the appellants to file the present suit until the final decision of the 1307 appeal
By this order the appellants were told that they should not in any way interfere with the affairs of the Darga Sharif as members of the committee and should comply with the decree of the court by which they were removed from the office
It is obvious that this order cannot be construed as an order or an injunction staying the institution of the present suit
In fact the present suit is the result of the notification issued by respondent I on February 26 1944 and the subsequent steps taken by it in the purported exercise of its authority under the Act
The cause of action for the suit has thus arisen subsequent to the making of the order on which Mr Dar relies and on the plain construction of the order it is impossible to hold that it is an order which can attract the application of section 15 of the Limitation Act
We have already held that the relevant words used in section 15 must be strictly construed without any consideration of equity and so construed we have no doubt that the order on which Mr Dar has placed reliance before us is wholly out side section 15 of the Limitation Act
We would however like to add that this order did not even in substance create any difficulty against the institution of the present suit
The claim made by the appellants in the present suit that the properties in suit do not constitute a waqf and the declaration and injunction for which they have prayed do not infringe the earlier order even indirectly or remotely
We must accord ingly hold that the High Court was right in taking the view that section 15 did not apply to the present suit and that it was therefore filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by section 52 of the Act
That takes us to the consideration of the next preliminary objection against the competence of the suit under section 53 of the Act
Section 53 provides that  no suit shall be instituted against a Central Board in respect of any act purporting to be done by such Central Board under colour of this Act or for any relief in respect of any waqf until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to the Secretary or left at the office of such 166 1308 Central Board stating the cause of action the name description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left 
This section is similar to section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code
It is conceded by Mr Dar that if section 53 applies to the present suit the decision of the High Court cannot be successfully challenged because the notice required by section 53 has not been given by the appellants before the institution of the present suit
His argument however is that the notification issued by respondent I on February 26 1944 did not refer to the Darga and offerings made by the devotees before the Darga and he contends that the present suit in respect of these properties is outside the provisions Of section 53 and cannot be held to be barred on the ground that the requisite notice had not been given by the appellants
We are not impressed by this argument
Column 1 of the notification in question sets out the name of the creator of the waqf as Shahan e Mughalia and the name of the waqf as Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi
In col 2 the name of the mutawalli is mentioned while col 3 describes the properties attached to the waqf
The tomb of Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi which is the object of charity in the present case is expressly mentioned in col 1 and so it is futile to suggest that the tomb or Darga had not been notified as a waqf by respondent 1 under section 51
In regard to the offerings we do not see bow offerings could have been mentioned in the notification
They are made from time to time by the devo tees who visit the Darga and by their very nature they constitute the income of the Darga
It is unreasonable to assume that offerings which would be made from year to year by the devotees should be specified in the notification issued under section 51
We must therefore reject the argument that any of the suit properties have riot been duly notified by respondent I under section 51 of the Act
If that be so it was incumbent upon the appellants to have given the requisite notice under section 53 before instituting the present suit
The requirement as to notice applies to 1309 suits against a Central Board in respect of their acts as well as to suits for any relief in respect of any waqf
It is not denied that the present suit would attract the provisions of section 53 if the argument that the Darga and the offerings are not notified is rejected
The result is that the suit is not maintainable as a result of the appellant s failure to comply with the requirements of section 53
We would accordingly confirm the finding of the High Court that the appellants  suit is barred by time under section 52 and is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the appellants have not given the requisite notice under section 53 of the Act
The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Elections to the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha were held in the months of FebruaryMarch 1985
The appellant and Respondent No 1 were the contesting candidates from Niwadi Legislative Assembly constituency No 34
Respondent No 1 having secured majority of votes was declared elected on 631985 to the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha
The appellant challenged the election of the respondent No 1 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Jabalpur alleging that the first respondent was guilty of adopting corrupt practices within the meaning of sub sections 2 3 and 3A of Section 123 of the Representation of Peoples Act 1951
Respondent No 1 denied the allegations made in the election petition
The High Court dismissed the Election Petition holding that the appellant had not substantiated all the charges levered by him against respondent No 1
Hence this appeal by the appellant
Before this Court the appellant pressed only issues 3 4 and 5 and gave up the rest
Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD An election petition where corrupt practices are imputed must be regarding as proceedings of a quasi criminal nature wherein strict proof is necessary
Since a charge of corrupt practice the consequence of which is not only to render the election of the returned candidate void but in some cases to impose on him a disqualification it must be proved on appraisal of the evidence adduced by both the parties particularly by the election petitioner who assails the election of a returned candidate
591B C The element of bargaining is completely absent in the present case
Needless to say that it is necessary for the purpose of proving the corrupt practice of bribery to estab lish that there was an element of bargaining
592C 582 Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal vs Rajiv Gandhi 1987 Supp
SCC 93 Kona Prabhakara Rao vs M Seshagiri Rao  Anr  Manphul Singh vs Surinder Singh 1974 1 SCR 52 Jamuna Prasad Mukheriya  Ors
vs Lachi Ram  Ors   Rahim Khan vs Khurshid Ahmed  Ors   Ram Sharan Yadav vs Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh  Ors   Rahim Khan vs Khurshid Ahmed  Ors   Lakshmi Raman Acharya vs Chandan Singh  Ors 1977 2 SCR 412 and Ramji Prasad Singh vs Ram Bilas Jha  Ors   Mohan Singh vs Bhanwar Lal  Ors   Harjit Singh Mann vs section Umraon Singh  Ors   lqbal Singh vs section Gurdas Singh  Ors   Lalroukung vs Haokholal Thangam  Anr ELR Vol  referred to