ivil Appeal Nos
3085 of 1981 and 3628 3649 of 1982
From the judgment and Order dated the 6th July 1981 and 5th August 1982 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal Nos
72481 and 132480 1470 1788 189481 55 94 36882 47581 113382 2131080 22158 2182280 10531 1061282 1086 177880 12332 1289078 1955079 1108982 11228  1941082
N K Sharma Ms Depika Saxena and Vineet Kumar for the appellants
R K Garg D K Garg P R Ramasesh and Ms R Bagai for the respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA J
The employer Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation created under a State Act entitled the Transport Corporation Act of 1950  Corporation Act  for short is in appeal by special leave and the common decision of a Division Bench of the High Court which held that termination of employees while on probation on ground of unsuitability amounted to retrenchment and for non compliance with the provisions of section 25F of the  Disputes Act  for short the termination is bad is challenged
As per Rule 7 made under section 45 of the Corporation Act direct recruits are to be on probation for two years and such probation can be extended
The employer terminated the employment 785 of some of the employees during the initial period of probation and of some others during the extended period on the ground of unsatisfactory service
Thereupon an industrial dispute was raised questioning the legality of their termination and the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication under section 10 of the 
The Labour Court held overruling the stand of the employer that section 25F of the had no application to the effect that the discharge was invalid
The employer Corporation came before the High Court challenging the Award
A learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that the order of discharge amounted to retrenchment as defined in section 2oo of the and those orders were bad for noncompliance of section 25F The employer Corporation challenged the decision of the single Judge before a Division Bench and the Division Bench by the impugned judgment upheld the decision of the learned single Judge
Admittedly the employees were probationers at the time of discharge from service
There is no dispute that as a condition precedent to discharge the requirements of section 25F of the had not been complied with
If the discharge of the employees would amount to retrenchment appellant s counsel does not dispute that the order of discharge would be bad for non compliance of section 25F of the 
The only question for consideration in these appeals therefore is whether the discharge of the employees from service amounted to retrenchment
It is the stand of the employer Corporation that the employees were probationers and the order of discharge in every case was on account of unsatisfactory service
Since the order of discharge has been grounded upon unsatisfactory service during the period of probation it has been argued that such termination of service is not retrenchment
Section 2oo of the defines retrenchment to mean  retrenchment  means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include a voluntary retirement of the workman or b retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation 786 if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf or c termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health
 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla vs AD Divikar examined the true meaning of the expression retrenchment  and posed the following question The question however before us is does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the termination of services of all workmen in an industry when the industry itself ceases to exist on a bona fide closure or discontinuance of his business by the employer
 It went on to say There is no doubt that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation for the words used in the statue
We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute
Therefore we propose first to examine the language of the definition and see if the ordinary accepted notion of retrenchment fits in squarely and fairly with the language used
What is the ordinary accepted notion of retrenchment in an industry
Let us now see how far that meaning fits in with the language used
We have referred earlier to the four essential requirements of the definition and the question is does the ordinary meaning of retrenchment fulfil those requirements  In our opinion it does
When a portion of the staff or labour force is discharged as surplusage in a continuing business there are a termination of the service of a workman b by the employer c for 787 any reason whatsoever and d otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action The Constitution Bench further said The legislature is using the expression for any reason whatsoever  says in effect  It does not matter why you are discharging the surplus if the other requirements of the definition are fulfilled then it is retrenchment
 In the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the intention was even to include a bona fide closure of the whole business it would we think be divorcing the expression altogether from its context to give it such a wide meaning as is contended for by learned counsel for the respondents
What is being defined is retrenchment and that is the context of the definition It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended
Where within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined
 After referring to certain decisions the Constitution Bench concluded by saying For the reasons given above we hold contrary to the view expressed by the Bombay High Court that retrenchment as defined in section 2oo and as used in section 25F has no wider meaning than the ordinary accepted connotation of the word it means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action The ratio of this decision has been pressed into service by the appellant Corporation for its stand that in the instant case the services have been terminated on the ground of unsuitability and it was not a case of disbanding surplus labour force and therefore did 788 not amount to retrenchment
On the other hand counsel for the employees have contended that the consensus of judicial opinion in later decisions of this Court is against the appellant s stand
The first decision is the case of State Bank of India vs N Sundara Money
A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court referred to the definition in section 2oo of the and observed  To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated
Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact of termination howsoever produced
 Then came the decision in Hindustan Steel Ltd vs The Presiding Officer Labour Court Orissa  Ors when a three Judge Bench of this Court again examined the true meaning of the definition of the expression retrenchment 
On this occasion reference was made to the Constitution Bench decision and as would appear from page 589 of the Report counsel had submitted that the three Judge decision of this Court in Sundara Money s case supra was in apparent conflict with the Constitution Bench decision and required reconsideration
This submission of counsel was considered and facts of the Constitution Bench case were analysed and Gupta J who spoke for the Court stated On the facts of the case before us giving full effect to the words for any reason whatsoever would be consistent with the scope and purpose of section 25F of the  and not contrary to the scheme of the Act
We do not find anything in Hariprasad s case which is inconsistent with what has been held in State Bank of India vs N Sundara Money supra
 The same question came up for consideration before a two Judge Bench of this Court in Santosh Gupta vs State Bank of Patiala
The facts of the case were more or less the same as in the present dispute
Employment there had been terminated upon failure of the workman to pass the test which would have enabled her to be confirmed in service and it was contended on behalf of the 789 management that termination of service was not due to discharge of surplus labour force and therefore it did not amount to retrenchment
The Division Bench referred to the Constitution Bench decision and observed If the definition of retrenchment  is looked at unaided and unhampered by precedent one is at once struck by the remarkably wide language employed and particularly by the use of the words termination for any reason whatsoever
The definition expressly excludes termination of service as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action 
The definition does not include so it expressly says voluntary retrenchment of the workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the service of the workman on the ground of continuous ill health
Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation can hardly be described as termination by the employer of the service of a workman
Yet the Legislature took special care to mention that they were not included within the meaning of termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever 
This in our opinion emphasizes the broad interpretation to be given to the expression retrenchment 
In our view if due weight is given to the words the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever  are understood to mean what they plainly say it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the expression retrenchment  must include every termination of the service of a workman by an act of the employer
The underlying assumption of course is that the undertaking is running as an undertaking and the employer continues as an employer but where either on account of transfer of the undertaking or on account of the closure of the undertaking the basic assumption disappears there can be no question of retrenchment within the meaning of the definition contained in section 2oo
This came to be realised as a result of the decision of this Court in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla vs A D Divikar supra
The Parliament then stepped in and introduced 25F and 25FFF by providing that compensation shall be payable to workmen in case of transfer of 790 undertaking or closure of undertaking as if the workmen had been retrenched
We may rightly say that the termination of the service of a workman on the transfer or closure of an undertaking was treated by Parliament as deemed retrenchment 
The effect was that every case of termination of service by act of employer even if such termination involved was a consequence of transfer or closure of the undertaking was to be treated as retrenchment  for the purposes of notice compensation etc
Whatever doubts might have existed before Parliament enacted 25FF and 25FFF about the width of 25F there cannot now be any doubt that the expression termination  of service for any reason whatsoever now covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in section 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as sections 25FF and 25FFF The learned Judges drew support from what had been observed in Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd vs The Workmen The object of retrenchment compensation is to give protection to the retrenched employee and his family to enable them to tide over the hard period of unemployment and observed Once the object of 25F 25FF and 25FFF is understood and the true nature of the compensation which those provisions provide is realised it is difficult to make any distinction between termination of service for one reason and termination of service for another Chinnappa Reddy J thereafter referred to the Constitution Bench decision and said It is true that there are some observations which if not properly understood with reference to the question at issue seemingly support the submission of Dr Anand Prakash that termination of service for any reason whatsoever means no more and no less than discharge of a labour force which is a surplusage
The misunderstanding of the observations and the resulting confusion stem from not appreciating 1 the lead question which 791 was posed and answered by the learned judges and 2 that the reference to discharge on account of surplusage  was illustrative and not exhaustive and by way of contrast with discharge on account of transfer or closure of business  It was further observed The ratio of Shukla s case in fact has already been explained in Hindustan Steel Ltd vs The Presiding Officer Labour Court Orissa  Ors
The decisions in Hindustan Steel Ltd vs The Presiding Officer Labour Court Orissa  Ors
and State Bank of India vs N Sundara Money have in our view properly explained Shukla s case and have laid down the correct law
 The same question arose for consideration before another two Judge Bench in Mohan Lal vs Management of Ms Bharat Electronics Ltd Desai J spoke for the Court thus Niceties and semantics apart termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself
The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action voluntary retirement of the workman retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf and termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health
It is not the case of the respondent that termination in the instant case was a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action
If such a position were adopted the termination would be ab initio void for violation of principle of natural justice or for not following the procedure prescribed for imposing punishment
It is not even suggested that this was a case of voluntary retirement or retirement on reaching the age of superannuation or absence on account of continued ill health
The case does not fall under any of the excepted categories
792 There is thus termination of service for a reason other than the excepted category
It would  indisputably be retrenchment within the meaning of the word as defined in the Act
It is not necessary to dilate on the point nor to refer to the earlier decisions of this Court in view of the later two pronouncements of this Court to both of which one of us was a party
A passing reference to the earliest judgment which was the sheet anchor till the later pronouncements may not be out of place
In Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla vs A D Divikar after referring to Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd vs Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union a Constitution Bench of this Court quoted with approval the following passage from the aforementioned case But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment  This observation was made in the context of the closure of an undertaking and being conscious of this position the question of the correct interpretation of the definition of the expression retrenchment  in section 2oo of the Act was left open
Reverting to that question the view was re affirmed but let it be remembered that the two appeals which were heard together in Shukla s case were cases of closure   In the majority judgment in Surendra Kumar Verma etc
vs The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court New Delhi  Anr the ratio of the latter case has been followed
A Bench of two learned Judges in the case of L Robert D Souza vs The Executive Engineer Southern Railway  Anr re examined the entire position
Desai J who again spoke for the Court indicated 793 At the outset it must at once be pointed out that the construction put by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on the expression retrenchment  in section 2oo of the Act that it means only the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason whatsoever is no more good law and in fact the decision of the full Bench of Kerala High Court in L Robert D Souza vs Executive Engineer Southern Railway  Anr 1970 has been specifically overruled by this Court in Santosh Gupta vs State Bank of Patiala
This Court has consistently held in State Bank of India vs N Sundara Money Hindustan Steel Ltd vs Presiding Officer Labour Court and Delhi Cloth  General Mills Ltd vs Shambhu Nath Mukherjee 1971 1 SCR 591 that the expression termination of service for any reason whatsoever  now covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in section 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as sections 25FF and 25FFF
It was attempted to urge that in view of the decision of this Court in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd vs Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union the ratio of which was re affirmed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla vs A D Divikar all the later decisions run counter to the Constitution Bench and must be treated per in curium
This contention need not detain us because first in Hindustan Steel Ltd case  than in Santosh Gupta s case supra and lastly in Mohan Lal vs Bharat Electronics Ltd it was in terms held that the decision in Sundara Money s case was not at all inconsistent with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hariprasad Shukla s case and not only required no reconsideration but the decision in Sundara Money s case was approved in the aforementioned three cases This position is further buttressed by the decision in Delhi Cloth  General Mills Ltd case wherein striking off the name of a workman from the roll was held to be retrenchment
 In the series of cases that have come later the Constitution Bench decision has been examined and the ratio indicated therein has been confined to its own facts
The view indicated by this Court in that case obviously did not meet with the approval of Parliament and 794 therefore the law has been subsequently amended as already indicated
Lord Devlin once observed I am not one of those who believe that the only function of law is to preserve the status quo
Rather I should say that law is the gate keeper of the status quo
There is always a host of new ideas galloping around the outskirts of society s thought
All of them seek admission but each must first win its spurs the law at first resists but will submit to a conqueror and become his servant
In a changing society the law acts a valve
New policies must gather strength before they can force an entry when they are admitted and absorbed into the consensus the legal system should expand to hold them as also it should contract to squeeze out old policies which have lost the consensus they once obtained
 We are inclined to hold that the stage has come when the view indicated in Money s case supra has been absorbed into the consensus and there is no scope for putting the clock back or for an anti clockwise operation
Once the conclusion is reached that retrenchment as defined in s2oo of the covers every case of termination of service except those which have been embodied in the definition discharge from employment or termination of service of a probationer would also amount to retrenchment
Admittedly the requirements of section 25F of the had not been complied with in these cases
Counsel for the appellant did not very appropriately dispute before us that the necessary consequence of non compliance of section 25F of the in a case where it applied made the order of termination void
The High Court in our opinion has therefore rightly come to the conclusion that in these cases the order of retrenchment was bad and consequently it upheld the Award of the Labour Court which set aside those orders and gave appropriate relief
These appeals are dismissed
There would be one set of costs
Consolidated hearing fee is assessed at Rs 5000
NVK Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant Corporation terminated the employment of some of its employee respondents who were probationers on the ground of unsatisfactory service some during the period of their probation and others during the extended period of probation
The Labour Court to which the dispute was referred held that section 25F of the had no application and that for this reason the discharge was invalid
Dismissing the employer s writ petition a Single Judge held that the orders of discharge amounted to retrenchment as defined in S2 oo of the Act and were bad for non compliance of s25F A Division Bench of the High Court upheld this decision
In the appeal to this court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the services of the respondents had been terminated on the ground of their unsuitability and it was not a case of disbanding surplus labour force and therefore such termination did not amount to retrenchment
Dismissing the appeal  HELD 1
Once the conclusion is reached that retrenchment as defined in section 2 oo of the covers every case of termination of service except those which have been embodied in the definition discharge from employment or termination of service of a probationer would also amount to retrenchment
794 E In the instant case the requirements of section 25F had not been complied with794 F 784 2
The stage has come when the views indicated in State Bank of India vs N Sundara Money  has been absorbed into the consensus and there is no scope for putting the clock back or for an anti clockwise operation
794 D Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla vs AD Divikar 1957 SCR 121 Hindustan Steel Ltd vs The Presiding Officer Labour Court Orissa  Ors
  Santosh Gupta vs State Bank of Patiala   Indian Hume Pipe co Ltd vs The Workmen  Mohan Lal vs Management of Ms Bharat Electronics Ltd   Surendra Kumar Verma etc
vs The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court New Delhi and Anr1981 1 SCR 789 L Robert D  Souza vs The Executive Engineer Southern Railway  Anr
1982 3 SCR 251 referred to