Appeal No 38 of 1989
From the Judgment and order dated 153
1988 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Ahmedabad in MA No 49 of 1988
PH Parekh and Shishir Sharma for the Appellant
B Dutta Additional Solicitor General Ms Indu Malho tra and CV Subba Rao for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH J
The appellant was working as an Upper Division Clerk in the year 1975
He was placed under suspen sion by an order dated 2571975 as a result of the institu tion of a criminal prosecution against him and he continues to remain under suspension till today
By an order dated 49
1975 he was sanctioned subsistence allowance at the rate of 50 per cent of his salary last drawn
By a further order made on 661982 the subsistence allowance was reduced to 25 per cent of the salary he was drawing on the date of suspension
The increments he would have earned from time to time and the periodical revisions of pay scales were not taken into consideration in determining the subsistence allowance
The charge sheet was filed in the criminal case against the appellant in 1976 and the case was committed to the sessions but the committal proceedings were quashed by the High Court in 1978
Then the proceedings again began before the Metropolitan Magistrate in 1979
The case however has not yet come to an end
Aggrieved by the denial of the salary and allowances due to him for a long time on account of the order of suspension and in particular the order fixing the subsistence allowance at 25 per cent of the salary which he was drawing at the time of suspension by the Order dated 65
1982 the appel lant approached in the year 1988 the Central Administrative Tribunal Ahmedabad Bench for a direction to be 227 issued to the Government to restore the original Order dated 48
1975 by which the subsistence allowance was fixed at 50 per cent of his salary
That petition was dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated 1531988 on the ground that the appellant had approached the Tribunal more than five years after the date on which the Order dated 65
1982 had been passed apparently on the ground of limitation set out in sub section 2 of section 21 of the Administrative Tribu nals Act 1985 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal the appellant filed this appeal
The question for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether in a case of this nature the Tribunal was right in holding that the application before it was barred by time
Sub section 1 of section 21 of the Act no doubt says that a Tribunal shall not admit an application in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause a of sub section 2 of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made within one year from the date on which such final order has been made and in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause b of subsection 2 of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months
Sub section 2 of section 21 however provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub section 1 of section 21 where the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction powers and authority of the Tribunal become exercisable under the Act in respect of the matter to which such order related and no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause a or as the case may be clause b of sub section 1 or within a period of six months from the said date whichever period expires later
Sub section 3 of section 21 further confers power on the Tribunal to condone the delay in certain cir cumstances if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period
In the present case the main grievance of the appellant was not that the Order dated 651982 by which the subsist ence allowance payable to him was reduced to 25 per cent was bad at the commencement although there were some allegations to that effect but it was one relating to the failure of the authority or the Government to review the Order dated 651982 even though a long period of 5 years had elapsed 228 after the reduction of the subsistence allowance
His con tention was that the delay in the conclusion of the criminal proceedings as a consequence of which he had been kept under suspension was not due to him and in the circumstances it was not just and proper that he should be paid a subsistence allowance at a reduced rate for an unreasonably long period
In support of his case the appellant relied upon a decision dated 2361987 of the very bench of the Tribunal in Shri Bhupendra Mahashuklal Mehtap vs The Union of India  Ors in TA No 223 of 1986 SCA No 3509 of 1922 in which Fundamental Rule 53 which authorised the Government to review an order regarding subsistence allowance arose for consideration
In the said case the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal quashed the Order dated 651982 passed against the applicant in that case by which the subsistence allowance payable to the said applicant had been reduced
An order of suspension is not an order imposing punish ment on a person found to be guilty
It is an order made against him before he is found guilty to ensure smooth disposal of the proceedings initiated against him
Such proceedings should be completed expeditiously in the public interest and also in the interest of the Government servant concerned
The subsistence allowance is paid by the Govern ment so that the Government servant against whom an order of suspension is passed on account of the pendency of any disciplinary proceeding or a criminal case instituted against him could maintain himself and his dependants until the departmental proceeding or the criminal case as the case may be comes to an end and appropriate orders are passed against the Government servant by the Government regarding his right to continue in service etc
depending upon the final outcome of the proceedings instituted against him
The very nomenclature of the allowance makes it clear that the amount paid to such a Government servant should be suffi cient for bare subsistence in this world in which the prices of the necessaries of life are increasing every day on account of the conditions of inflation obtaining in the country
It is luther to be noted that a Government servant cannot engage himself in any other activity during the period of suspension
The amount of subsistence allowance payable to the Government servant concerned should there fore be reviewed from time to time where the proceedings drag on for a long time even though there may be no express rule insisting On such review
In doing so the authority concerned no doubt has to take into account whether the Government servant is in any way responsible for the undue delay in the disposal of the proceedings initiated against him
If the Government servant is not responsible for such delay or even if he is responsible for such delay to some extent but is not primarily responsible for it it is for the Government to recon 229 sider whether the order of suspension should be continued or whether the subsistence allowance should be varied to his advantage or not
The decision on the said question no doubt depends upon several factors relevant to the case
In the instant case the appellant was suspended in the year 1975
Now nearly 13 years have elapsed from the date of suspen sion
He was paid subsistence allowance at the rate of 50 per cent of the salary last drawn by him from 1975 and 1982 and from 1982 he is being paid 25 per cent of the salary last drawn by him
It is not clear from the record before us since the application made by the applicant was dis missed by the Tribunal at the preliminary stage whether the appellant was responsible for the inordinate delay in the disposal of the case instituted against him
In the circum stances of the case we are of the view that even though no relief could be given to the appellant in respect of the period which was beyond three years from the date on which the Tribunal commenced to exercise its powers under the Act it was quite open to the Tribunal to consider whether it was proper for the Government to continue to give effect to the Order dated 651982 from any subsequent date and if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Order dated 651982 was required to be revised it could pass an appro priate order notwithstanding the fact that a period of five years had elapsed from the date on which the order reducing the subsistence allowance was passed
While doing so it was open to the Tribunal to fix a date within the period of the said three years from which the appellant should be paid the subsistence allowance at the revised rate of course having due regard to the date of the application also
In the alternative the Tribunal could have asked the authority concerned to review the order
In the circumstances the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the application solely on the ground that the order reducing the subsistence allowance having been passed on 65
1982 the Tribunal could not entertain an application for directing the Government to revise the Order dated 65
1982 even in respect of any period within three years from the date on which the Tribunal commenced to exercise its powers having due regard to the date of the application also since we feel that the cause of action in respect of such prayer arises every month in which the subsistence allowance at the reduced rate is paid
We therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal and remand the case to it to dispose of the application made by the appellant on merits
We make an order accordingly
There is no order as to costs
PSS Appeal allowed


Summary:
Sub section 1 of section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act 1932 provides  Save as hereinafter provided in this Act any contract  which is entered into after the date on which this Act comes into operation and which is not in accordance with the by laws of any recognized cotton association shall be void 
In respect of the transactions in cotton entered into between the parties the appellants had to pay the respondents a sum of money for failure to give delivery of the cotton bales under the 347 contracts but the payment was made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties
Subsequently the appellants sued the respondents for recovery of the amount on the footing that the contracts were void under section 81 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act 1932 as being not in accordance with the by laws of the East India Cotton Association Ltd of which both the parties were members in as much as the contract notes did not company with the terms contained in the official contract form provided by the by laws of Association by reason of the omission to fill in the blanks relating to measurements and difference above or below the settlement rate
The respondents contended that the relevant provisions contained in the official contract form bad either become obsolete or were suspended at all material times
The evidence showed that according to the practice of the trade the parties to the contract were not tied down to a literal compliance with the terms contained in the official contract form but were required to act according to the position as it then obtained and that it was sufficient if they substantially complied with the requirements of the contract form  Held that in the circumstances of the case the official contract form had to be filled in so far as it was practicable and that the omission to fill in the blanks in the contract notes did not spell any departure from an essential or a characteristic part of the contract form consequently the legal effect of the contracts was not in any manner changed so as to render the contracts void as not being in accordance with the by laws of the Association within the meaning of section 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act 1932
Radhakisson Gopikisson vs Balmukund Ramchandra 1932 L R 60 I A 63 relied on