Criminal Appeal No 15259
 xi Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and Order dated May 12 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No 1182 of 1957
Nur ud din Ahmed JB Dadachanji O C Mathur and Ravindar Narain for the Appellants
852 G C Mathur and CA Lal for the Respondent
May 3
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J
The appellants are father and son carring on business in vegetable ghee at Aligarh
They along with Romesh the second son of appellant Jagannath Prasad were prosecuted under section 14 d of the U P Sales Tax Act 1948 UP 15 of 1948 hereinafter called the Act  and under section 471 read with section 468 and section 417 of the Indian Penal Code
They were all acquitted of the charge under section 468
Jagannath Prasad was convicted under section 471 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code and a 14 d of the Act and was sentenced to two years  rigorous imprisonment under a 471 to one years  rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000 under section 417 and to a fine of Rs 1000 under section 14 d of the Act
Bhagwan Das was convicted under section 14 d of the Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs 1 000 
Romesh was acquitted
The sentences passed on Jagannath Prasad were
concurrent
Their appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed and in revision to the High Court Jagannath Prasad was acquitted of the offence under a 417 of the Indian Penal Code but the other convictions and sentences were upheld
Against this judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad the appellants have come to this court by special leave
The facts leading to the appeal are these In 1950 51 the firm of the appellants purchased vegetable ghee valued at about Rs 3 lacs from places outside the State of U P in the name of four fictitious firm
The firm made its return for that year to the Sales Tax Officer Aligarh and did not include the sale proceeds of these transactions on the ground that they had purchased them from these four firms who were supposed to be carrying 853 on business in Hathras Aligarh and other places in U P By thus not including the proceeds of the sales of these transactions the firm evaded payment of sales tax for that year on those transactions
The return of sales tax made by the firm was accepted by the Sales Tax Officer with the consequence that the sale of goods covered by those transactions was not taxed
A complaint was made against the Sales Tax Officer in regard to these transactions an enquiry was held with the result that the appellants and Romesh were prosecuted and convicted as above stated
In the High Court there was no controversy about the facts i e the finding of the courts below that the appellants  firm purchased vegetable ghee from outside U P and did not show the sale proceeds of the sale of those goods on the ground that they had been purchased from inside the State of  J P when in reality they had been purchased from outside the State that the statements made by the appellant Jagannath Prasad before the Sales Tax Officer were false and that the bills produced by him before the Sales Tax officer were forged
The conviction was challenged on grounds of law alone
Before us five points were raised 1 that no sales tax was exigible on these transactions under a 3A of the Act in 1950 51 and liability arose by the amendment of the Act in 1952 which gave retroactive operation to the section and became applicable to sales in dispute and therefore there could be no prosecution under an ex post facto amendment 2 the trial of the appellants was illegal because of  want of complaint by the Sales Tax Officer under a 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code 3 there was no offence under section 14 d of the Act 4 forged invoices were produced by appellant Jagannath Prasad because they were called for by the Sales Tax Officer and therefore it cannot be said
that they were used by the appellant and 5 the Sales Tax Officer having accepted 854 he invoices as genuine no prosecution could be Entertained in regard to those invoices
Now the appellants cannot be prosecuted on the basis of any amendment subsequent to the date of the alleged offence committed by them
Both parties are agreed on that and therefore we have to see the Act as it stood on the date when the offence is alleged to have been committed
According to the charge the offence was committed on or about July 16 1951 when forged invoices produced by the appellants before the Sales Tax Officer
So what we have to see is the law as it stood on that day
Section 3 of the Act deals with liability to tax under the Act and section 3A with single point taxation
Under section 3 every dealer was required to pay on his turnover of each assessment year a tax at the rate of three pies a rupee
Thus the tax was payable in regard to all sales but under section 3A 1 the tax was leviable only at a single point
That section provided
section 3A 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare that the turnover in respect of any goods or class of goods shall not be liable to tax except at such single point in the series of sales by successive dealers as may be prescribed
The Government could declare the tax to be payable at a single point but there were two requirements there had to be a notification in the Official Gazette declaring the point at which the tax was payable and in the series of sales by successive dealers it had to be as may be prescribed i e as may be prescribed by rules
Section 3A was amended in 1952 with retrospective effect but retroactive provision is not applicable to the present proceedings
Under section 3A a notification No 1 3 was issued on 855 June 8 1948 declaring that the proceeds of sales of vegetable ghee imported from outside shall not be included in the turnover of the dealer other than the importer himself
The effect of the notification thus was that if a dealer imported vegetable ghee from outside U P and sold it he was required to include the sale proceeds in his turnover but the other dealers who bought vegetable ghee from the importer in U P and sold it were not so required
The appellants having thus imported the vegetable ghee from outside U P were required by the notification to include the proceeds in their turnover and it was to avoid this that they falsely produced forged invoices that they had purchased the vegetable ghee from those fictitious dealers within the State of U P and thus if the notification was an effective notification the appellants successfully evaded the payment of sales tax which under the law they were required to pay
But it was agreed that the notification was ineffective in view of the words as may be prescribed because that could only be done by rules and no rules bad been made under section 3A which made every dealer liable to sales tax if he was an importer from outside U P
To this extent the contention of the appellants is well founded and therefore under a 3A merely by notification the Government could not prescribe a single point taxation as was done by the notification but that does not help the appellants very much
Under section 3 every dealer was liable to pay sales tax on every transaction and section 3A only gave relief in regard to sales at every point and thus prevented multi point taxation
If the notification under section 3A was ineffective as indeed it was the appellants were required to pay tax on all their sales and in order to escape multi point taxation they took advantage of an ineffective notification and tried the false plea of the goods having been imported by fictitious persons and their having purchased those goods from those 856 fictitious dealers and in this manner the appellants escapes payment of sales tax under section 3
In other words they tried to take advantage of section 3A by producing false documents and thereby evaded payment of tax under section 3 which every dealer was required to pay on his turnover
In trying to get the benefit under the ineffective notification issued under section 3A the appellants evaded payment of tax under section 3 which they were in any case liable to pay
It cannot be said therefore that no offence was committed under section 14 d of the Act which provides Section 14 Offences and penalties
Any person who a   b   c   d fraudulently evades the payment of any tax due under this Act shall without prejudice to this liability under any other law for the time being in force on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class be liable to a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and where the breach is a continuing breach to a further fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day after the first during which the breach continues
It is no defence to say that the appellants were asked by the Sale Tax Officer to produce invoices
The appellants were trying to get exclusion from their turnover of the sale of goods worth about 3 lacs and had made statements before the Sales Tax Officer in regard to it on July 9 1951 and in order to prove that the goods 857 were not required to be included in the turnover the invoices were produced by appellant Jagannath Prasad
When a fact has to be proved before a court or a tribunal and the court or the tribunal calls upon the person who is relying upon a fact to prove it by best evidence it can not be a defence as to the offence of forgery if that best evidence which in this case was the invoices turn out to be forged documents
A person who produced those documents cannot be heard to say that he was required to prove his case by the best evidence and because be was so required be produced forged documents
It was then submitted that the Sales Tax Officer was a court within a 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in the absence of a complaint in writing by such an officer no cognizance could be taken of any offence punishable under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code
This in our opinion is an equally erroneous submission
The Sales Tax Officers are the instrumentalities of the State for collection of certain taxes
Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder certain officers are appointed as Sales Tax Officers who have certain duties assigned to them for the imposition and collection of taxes land ID the process they have to perform many duties which are of a quasijudicial nature and certain other duties which are administrative duties
Merely because certain instrumentalities of state employed for the purpose of taxation have in the discharge of their duties to perform certain quasi judicial functions they are not converted into courts thereby
In a recent judgment of this Court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai vs The State of UP 1 all the opinions were unanimous on this point that taxing authorities are not courts even though they perform quasi judicial functions
The following observation of Lord 1 1963 1 SCR 778 858 Sankey L C in Shell Co of Australia Ltd vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1was quoted with approval  The authorities are clear to show that there The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a court which nevertheless are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power
Lord Sankey also enumerated some negative propositions as to when a tribunal is not a court
At p 297 his lordship said  In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject  1
A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision
Nor because it hears witnesses on oath
Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide
Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects
Nor because there is an appeal to a Court
Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body
See Rex vs Electricity Commissioners Hidayatullah J in Shrimati Ujjam Bhai2 case described Sales tax authorities thus  The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State
They are not a part of the legislature nor are they a part of the judiciary
Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes and in the process of assessing taxes they follow a pattern of action which is considered Judicial
They are not thereby converted into Courts of Civil judicature
They still 1  283
2 1963 1 SC R 778 859 remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within the definition of State in article 12
No doubt the Sales Tax officers have certain powers which are similar to the powers exercised by courts but still they are not courts as understood in section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code
In sub section 2 of B 195 it is provided section 1952 In clauses b and e of sub section
1 the term Court includes a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub Registrar under the Indian Registration Act 1877
It cannot be mid that a Sales Tax Officer is a I Revenue Court
Under section 2a of the Act an assessing authority is defined to mean any person authorised by the State Government to make assessment under the Act and under R 2h a Sales Tax Officer means  Sales Tax Officer means a Sales Tax Officer of a circle appointed by the State Government to perform the duties and exercise the powers of an assessing authority in such circle
Thus under the Act a Sales Tax Officer is only an amassing authority
Under section 7 of the Act if the Sale Tax Officer after making such enquiriesas he thinks necessary is satisfied that a return made is correct and complete he shall assess the tax on the basis thereof  and it no return is submitted he can make such enquiries as he considers necessary and then determine the turnover of a dealer Thus his determination depends upon enquiries he may make and which he may consider necessary
Sections 9 10 and 11 of the Act deal with Appeals Revisions and Statement of the Case to the High court
Under a 13 power
is given 860 to a Sales Tax Officer to require the production of all accounts documents and other information relating to business and accounts and registers shall be open to inspection of the Sales Tax Officer at all reasonable times
He has the power to enter any office shop godown vehicle or any other place in which business is done which is a power destructive of the Sales Tax Officer being a Court which is a place where justice is administered as between the parties whether the parties are private persons or one of the parties is the State
Under section 23 certain secrecy is attached to documents filed before the Sales Tax officer and information received by him
Similarly under R 43 certain power is given to the Sales Tax Officer to calculate turnover when goods are sold for consideration other than money and this is after such enquiry as he considers necessary
All these provisions show that the Sales Tax Officer cannot be equated with a Court
In our opinion therefore the Sales Tax Officer is not a Court
In Krishna vs Goverdhansiah1 it was held that the Income Tax Officer is not law court within the meaning of section 195 of the Criminal s Procedure Code and this view was accepted by this court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai s2 case
In Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain3 a Commissioner appointed under the Public Enquiries Act 1950 was held not to be a court
Shell Co of Australia vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation 4 was referred to in that case
At p 967 the following passage from Halsbury s Laws of England Hailisham Edition Vol 8 p 526 was approved Many bodies are not courts although they have to decide questions and in so doing have to act judicially in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness 1 AIR 1954 Mad
2 1963 1 SCR 778
3  4 1931 AC 2752B3 861 and impartiality such as assessment committees guardian committees the Court of referee constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the Insurance funds the benchers of the Inns of Courts when considering the conduct of one of their members the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man That passage is now contained in Vol 9 of the 3rd Edition at p 343
But it was submitted that the Sales Tax officer while acting as an assessing authority is a court within the meaning of section 195 2 of the Procedure Code because by the amendment of 1923 the definition of the word court was enlarged substituting the word includes in place of the word means and the section now reads as has been set out above
Undoubtedly by this change the legislature did mean to make the definition of the word court wider but that does not enlarge the definition of the words Revenue Court
The track of decision which was pressed on our attention is based primarily on a full bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in In re Punemchand Maneklal1
In that case an Income tax Collector was held to be a Revenue Court within the meaning of the word as used in section 195
The learned Chief Justice who gave the judgment of the court proceeded on the basis that inquiries conducted according to the Forms of judicial procedure under Chapter IV of the Incometax Act were proceedings in a Revenue Court
This was on the ground that under the law as it then stood revenue questions were generally removed from the cognizance of civil courts and the officers charged with the duty of deciding disputed question relating to revenue between an individual and the 1  Bom
862 Government would be invested with the functions of Revenue Court
This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in State vs Nemchand Pashvir Patel After referring to the various powers which were given to the Sales Tax Officers under the B  bay Sales Tax Act that Court proceeded to say that the Sales Tax Officers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act were Revenue Courts because  they had jurisdiction to decide Questions relating to revenue are exclusively empowered with the powers which are normally attributes of a court or a tribunal land are authorised to adjudicate upon a disputed question of law or fact relating to the rights of the citizens
The Madras High Court in In re B Nataraja Iyer held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals under the Income tax Act was a court within the meaning of a 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code but a Tehsildar who was the original assessing authority was not because there was no lis before him
There is one passage in the judgment of Sundara Ayyar J which is of significance
It was said I may observe that I am prepared agree with Dr Swaminathan that more
authority to receive evidence would not make the officer recording it a Court
At page 84 it was said that the determination of the assessment in the first instance may not be of a court although the assessing officer may have the power to record statements
But an appeal against the assessment is dealt with by the Collector in the manner in which an appeal is  disposed of by  a Civil Court
In this connection reference may be made to the statement of the law contained in the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar J in Shri Virinder Kumar Satyawadi vs The State of Punjab 2
There 1 19567 SCR 404
2  1018
863 the distinction between a quasi judicial tribunal and a courtwas given as follows It may be stated broadly that what disti nguished a Court from a quasi judicial tribu nal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment
To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it
And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law
When a question therefore arisen as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi judicial tribunal what has to be decidedis whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court
Dealing with quasi judicial tribunals it was observed in Gullapelli Negeswara Rao vs The State of Andhra Pradesh1  The concept of a quasi judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority toconform to the norms
of judicial procedure in performing some act in the exercise of its executive power
It is not necessary to refer to other cases because they were decided on their own facts and related to different tribunals
In our opinion a Sales Tax Officer is not a Court within the meaning ofs
195 ofthe criminal Procedure Code and there
fore it was not necessary for a Sales Tax Officer to 1 1959 Supp
1 SCR 319 353 4 864 make a complaint and the proceedings without such a complaint are not without jurisdiction
In our opinion the appellants were rightly convicted and we therefore dismiss this appeal
The appellant Jagannath Prasad must surrender to his bail bonds
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellants who carry on the business in vegetable ghee purchased vegetable ghee from outside U P in the name of four fictitious firms
In their return of sales tax they did not include the sale proceeds of these transactions on the ground that they had purchased from the four firms and that under a notification made under section 3A of the U P Sales Tax Act tax was leviable only at a single point on the sale by the outside suppliers to these four firms
In support of this the appellant No 1 made a false statement before the Sales tax Officer and also filed forged bill
before him
The return was accepted by the Sales Tax Officer with the result that the sales covered by these transactions were not taxed
The appellants were tried and convicted for offence under section 471 Indian Penal Code for using forged documents and under section 14d of the Act for fraudulently evading payment of tax due under the Act
The appellants contended that the trial for the offence under section 471 was illegal as no complaint had been made by the Sales Fax Officer as required by section 14 d of the Act was not made out as no tax was payable under section 3A because the notification issued thereunder was invalid
Held that the Sales Tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure and it was not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of the Appellants under section 471 Indian Penal Code
A Sales Tax Officer was merely an instrumentality of the State for purposes of assessment and collection of tax and even if he was required to perform certain quasi judicial functions he was not a part of the judiciary
The nature of the functions of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner prescribed for their 851 performance showed that he could not be equated with a Court
Nor could he be said to be a Revenue Court
Though the definition of Court in section 195 of the Code Was enlarged by the substitution of the word include for the word means by the amendment of 1923 it did not change the definition of Revenue Court
 Smt
Ujjam Bai vs The State of U P 1963 1 SCR 778 Shell Co of Australia Ltd vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain    applied
Krishna vs Gocerdhanaiah A I R  approved
In re Punamchand Maneklal 1914 1 L R and State vs Nemchand Pashvir Patel 1956 7 section T C 404 not approved
In re  R Nataraja Iyer 1914 1 L R and Shri Virender Kumar Satyawadi vs The Sate of Punjab1955 2 section C R 1013 referred to
Held further that the appellants were rightly convicted under section 14 d of the Act
Sales tax was payable under s3 of the Act in respect of all sales
But under s3A it was leviable only at a single point if the Government issued a notification declaring the point at which tax was payable and it was so prescribed by the rules
Under the notification issued by the Government tax was payable only by the dealer who imported the goods and sold them
The appellants having imported the ghee were liable to pay the tax on the sales of this ghee which they fraudulently evaded
Though the notification was ineffective as no rules were made under the Act prescribing the single point it did not help the appellants as the only effect of this was that section 3A did not come into play
In trying to get the benefit of the ineffective notification under section 3 A the appellants evaded payment of tax under section 3 which they were liable to pay