ivil Appeal No 297 of 1956
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 30 1955 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Calcutta in Appeal No Cal
220 of 1954
C B Aggarwala and K P Gupta for the appellants
Purshottam Tricumdas for N C Chatterjee P K Goswami section N Mukheree and B N Ghosh for the respondent
February 4
The Judgment of Das C J and section K Das J was delivered by section K Das J Sarkar J delivered a separate Judgment
section K DAS J
This appeal by special leave raises a question of some nicety and of considerable importance in the matter of industrial relations in this country
The question is the true scope and effect of the definition clause in section 2 k of the hereinafter referred to as the Act
The question has arisen in the following circumstances
1158 The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dimakuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha Dibrugarh
The respondent is the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate district Darrang in Assam
One Dr K P Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1 1950
He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months
It was stated in his letter of appointment  While you are on probation or trial your suitability for permanent employment will be considered
If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment you ill receive seven days  notice in writing terminating your appointment
If you are guilty of misconduct you are liable to instant dismissal
At the end of the period of probation if you are considered suitable you will be confirmed in the garden s service In February 1951 Dr Banerjee was given an increment of Rs 5 per mensem but on April 21 Dr Banerjee received a letter from one Mr Booth manager of the tea estate in which it was stated   It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant
You will of  course receive one month s salary in lieu of notice As no reasons were given in the notice of termination Dr Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated
To this Dr Banerjee received a reply to this effect The reasons for your discharge are on the medical side which are outside my jurisdiction best known to Dr Cox but a main reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the requirements of the last medical indent after it had been signed by Dr Cox evidence of which is in my hands
 The cause of Dr Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha wrote to the manager of the Dimakuchi tea estate enquiring about the reasons for Dr Banerjee s discharge
The manager wrote back to say that Dr K P Banerjee was discharged on the ground 1159 of incompetence in his medical duties and the chief medical officer Dr Cox had found that Dr Banerjee was incompetent and did not have sufficient  knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medical officer in tea garden practice
 It was further stated that Dr Banerjee gave a faulty inexpert and clumsy quinine injection to one Mr Peacock and assistant in the Dimakuchi tea estate which produced an extremely acute and severe illness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patient s leg
The reasons given by the manager for the termination of the services of Dr K P Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein and certain conciliation proceedings details whereof are not necessary for our purpose were unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the service of Dr Banerjee
The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner Assam and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha respectively
This Board recommended that Dr Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his discharge
After the recommendation of the Board the respondent herein appears to have offered a sum equal to 28 month s salary and allowances in lieu of re instatement to this however the appellants did not agree
In the meantime Dr K P Banerjee received a sum of Rs 306 1 0 on May 22 1951 and left the tea garden in question
Then on December 23 1953 the Government of Assam published a notification in which it was stated that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under section 7 of the Act the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U K Gohain Additional District and Sessions Judge under cl
c of sub section
1 of section 10 of the Act
The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms 1160  i Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr K P Banerjee A M O ii If not is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof  Both parties filed written statements before Mr ohain and the respondent took the plea that Dr K P Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act therefore there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that expression was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits
Mr Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr Banerjee was a  workman  within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words Dr Banerjee being not a  workman  his case is not one of an  industrial dispute  under the and his case is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him
 There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India Calcutta
That Tribunal affirmed the finding of Mr Gohain to the effect that Dr Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act
The Appellate Tribunal then said  A dispute between the employers and employees to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 k of the  must be between the employers and the workmen
There cannot be any industrial dispute between the employers and the employees who are not workmen
 The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal
The appellants herein then moved this Court for special leave and by an order dated March 14 1956 special leave was granted but was  limited to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman falls within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contained in section 2 k of the 
 It is clear from what has been stated above that the 1161 question whether Dr K P Banerjee is or is not a workman within the meaning of the Act is no longer open to the parties and we must proceed on the footing that Dr K P Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act and then decide the question if the dispute in relation to the termination of his service still fell within the scope of the definition of the expression  industrial dispute  in the Act
We proceed now to read the definition clause the interpretation of which is the only question before us
That definition clause is in these terms  section 2 k   Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person It must be stated here that the expression  workman is also defined in the Act and the definition which is relevant for our purpose is the one previous to the amendments of 1956 therefore in reading the various sections of the Act we shall read them as they stood prior to the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing on the question before us
The definition of workman  as it stood at the relevant time stated   section 2 s  Workman  means any person employed including an apprentice in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute a workman discharged during that dispute but does not include any person employed in the naval military or air service of the Government  Now the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in section 2 k
If we analyse the definition clause it falls easily and naturally into three parts first there must be a dispute or difference second the dispute or difference must be between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or 1162 between workmen and workmen third the dispute or difference must be connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person
The first part obviously refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute the second part to the parties to the dispute and the third to the subject matter of that dispute
That subject matter may relate to any of two matters i employment or non employment and ii terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person
On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr K P Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the employer namely the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate on one side and its workmen on the other even taking the expression  workmen  in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act
The real difficulty arises when we come to the third part of the definition clause
Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the expression  of any person  occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an expression of very wide import and there are no reasons why the words any person should be equated with  any workman  as the Tribunals below have done
The argument is that inasmuch as the dispute or difference between the employer and the workmen is connected with the non employment of a person called Dr K P Banerjee even though he was not a workman the dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the definition clause
At first sight it does appear that there is considerable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants
It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression  any person  occurring in the third part and if any limita tions as to its scope are to be imposed they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act
1163 A little careful consideration will show however that the expression  any person  occuring in the third part of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world
First of all the subject matter of dispute must relate to i employment or non employment or ii terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen
Secondly the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act and consistently with the objects and other provision s of the Act
It is well settled that  the words of a statute when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view
Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language nor even in its popular use as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used and the object to be attained Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes 9th Edition p 55
It is necessary therefore to take the Act as a whole and examine its salient provisions
The long title shows that the object of the Act is  to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes
 The preamble states the same object and section 2 of the Act which contains definitions states that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context certain expressions will have certain meanings
Chapter 11 refers to the authorities set up under the Act such as Works Committees Conciliation officers Boards of Conciliation Courts of Enquiry and Industrial Tribunals
The primary duty of a Works Committee is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and his workmen and to that end to comment upon matters of their common 148 1164 interest or concern and endeavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters
Conciliation Officers are charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes
A Board of Conciliation may also be constituted for the same purpose namely for promoting the settlement of an industrial dispute
A Court of Enquiry may be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute
Section 7 of the Act empowers the appropiate Government to constitute one or more Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act
Chapter III contains provisions relating to the reference of industrial disputes to Boards of Conciliation Courts of Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals and the reference in the present case was made under section 10 of that Chapter
Under section 10c of the Act where an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial disputes exist or are apprehended it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication
Chapter IV of the Act deals with procedure powers and duties of the authorities set up under the Act
Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication section 15 requires that the Tribunal shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government
Section 17 lays down inter alia that the award of a Tribunal shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks fit
Section 17 A lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17 it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appropriate Government to modify or reject the award
Section 18 is important for our purpose and in so far as it relates to awards it states that an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on 1165 a all parties to the industrial dispute b all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause c where a party referred to under clause a or clause b is an employer his heirs successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates and d where a party referred to in clause a or clause b is composed of workmen all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part
Section 19 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards and states inter alia that an award shall subject to the provisions of the section remain in operation for a period of one year
Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes and lock outs Chapter V A with lay off and retrenchment Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter VII with miscellaneous matters
It is important to note that though in the definition of lock out section 2 1 of the Act and strike section 2 q of the Act the expression any person  has been used in sections 22 2 and 23 of the Act which deal with lock out and strike only the word workmen  has been used
Section 33 provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or any proceedings before a tribunal of any industrial dispute no employer shall a alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned the conditions of their service etc
or b discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in the dispute
Section 33 A however uses the word employee  but read with section 33 the word employee must mean there a workman
Section 36 which deals with representation of parties has some bearing on the question before us
It layns down that a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by 1166 a an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member b an officer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause a is affiliated and c where the worker is not a member of any trade union by an officer of any trade union connected with or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed
An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Act by a an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member b an officer of a federation of associations of employers to which the association referred to in clause a is affiliated and c where the employer is not a member of any association of employers by an officer of any association of employers connected with or by any other employer engaged in the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed
Sub section 3 of section 36 states that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a court
Sub section 4 states that in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal
The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers employers and workmen or workmen and workmen
Thus an examination of the salient provisions of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are 1167 1 the promotion of measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen 2 an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes between employers and employers employers and workmen or workmen and workmen with a right of representation by a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or association of employers or a federation of associations of employers 3 prevention of illegal strikes and lock outs 4 relief to workmen in the matter of lay off and retrenchment and 5 collective bargaining
The Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations of employers and workmen past present and future
It draws a distinction between workmen  as such and the managerial or supervisory staff and confers benefit on the former only
It is in the context of all these provisions of the Act that the definition clause in section 2k has to be interpreted
It seems fairly obvious to us that if the expression any person is given its ordinary meaning then the definition clause will be so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions of the Act but also with the other parts of that very clause
Let us see how the definition clause works if the expression  any person  occurring therein is given its ordinary meaning
The workmen may then raise a dispute about a person with whom they have no possible community of interest they may raise a dispute about the employment of a person in another industry or a different establishments dispute in which their own employer is not in a position to give any relief in the matter of employment or non employment or the terms of employment or conditions of labour of such a person
In order to make our meaning clear we may take a more obvious example
Let us assume that for some reason or other the workmen of a particular industry raise a dispute with their employer about the employment or terms of employment of the District Magistrate or District 1168 Judge of the district in which the industry is situate
It seems clear to us that though the District Magistrate or District Judge undoubtedly comes within the expression  any person  occurring in the definition clause a dispute about his employment or terms of employment is not an industrial dispute firstly because such a dispute does not come within the scope of the Act having regard to the definition of the words  employer industry  and  workman and also to other provisions of the Act secondly there is no possible community of interest between the District Magistrate or District Judge on the one hand and the disputants employer and workmen on the other
The absurd results that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C J in his decision in Narendra Kumar Sen vs All India Industrial Disputes Labour Appellate Tribunal 1  If any person  were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever then we must not put even any territorial restriction on that expression
In other words it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves not only to raise a dispute with regard to the terms of employment in corresponding or similar industries not only a dispute with regard to the terms of employment of people employed in our country but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world The proposition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is
Take for example another case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without claiming any benefit for themselves and let us assume that a dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side and the employer on the other over such an objection
If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is referred to an industrial tribunal for adjudication the parties to the 1 129 130
1169 dispute will be the employer on one side and his workmen on the other
The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer cannot obviously be a party to the dispute because he is riot a workman within the meaning of the Act and there is no dispute between him and his employer
That being the position the award if any 7 given by the Tribunal will be binding under cl
a of section 18 on the parties to the dispute and not on the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer
It is extremely doubtful if in the circumstances stated the Tribunal can summon the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer as a party to the dispute because there is no dispute between the Manager or Chief Medical Officer on one side and his employer oil the other
Furthermore section 36 of the Act does not provide for representation of a person who is not a party to the dispute
If therefore an award is made by the Tribunal in the case which we have taken by way of illustration that award though binding on the employer will not be binding on the Manager or Chief Medical Officer
It should be obvious that the Act could not have contem plated an eventuality of this kind which does not promote any of the objects of the Act but rather goes against them
When these difficulties were pointed out to learned counsel for the appellants he conceded that some limitations must be put on the width of the expression  any person  occurring in the definition clause
He formulated four such limitations 1 The dispute must be a real and substantial one in respect of which one of the parties to the dispute can give relief to the other e g when the dispute is between workmen and employer the employer must be in a position to give relief to the workmen
This according to learned counsel for the appellants will exclude those cases in which the workmen ask for something which their employer is not in a position to give
It would also exclude mere ideological differences or controversies
2 The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must relate to the particular establishment or part of establishment in which the workmen are employed so 1170 that the definition clause may be consistent with section 18 of the Act
3 The dispute must relate to the employment non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person but such person must be an employee discharged or in service or a candidate for employment
According to learned counsel for the appellants the person about whom the dispute has arisen need not be a workman within the meaning of the Act but he must answer to the description of an employee discharged or in service or a candidate for employment
4 The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus with the dispute either because they are personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another person in the general interest of labour welfare
The further argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that even imposing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the expression  any person  occurring in the definition clause the dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 k of the Act because 1 the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination of service of Dr K P Banerjee 2 Dr K P Banerjee belonged to the same establishment namely the same tea garden 3 the dispute related to a discharged employee though not a workman and 4 the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr Banerjee it is stated belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an employee without the formulation of a charge and without giving him an opportunity to meet any charge was a matter of general interest to all workmen in the same establishment
We now propose to examine the question whether the limitations formulated by learned counsel for the appellants are the only true limitations to be imposed with regard to the definition clause
In doing so we shall also consider what is the true scope and effect of the definition clause and what are the correct tests to be applied with regard to it
We think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first two limitations
1171 They are we think implicit in the definition clause itself
It is obvious that a dispute between employers and employers employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen must be a real dispute capable of settlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the dispute to give  necessary relief to the other
It is also obvious that the parties to the dispute must be directly or substan tially interested therein so that if workmen raise a dispute it must relate to the establishment or part of establishment in which they are employed
With regard to limitation 3 while we agree that the expression I any person  cannot be completely equated with any workman  as defined in the Act we think that the limitation formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not quite correct
We recognise that if the expression  any person  means any workman  within the meaning of the Act then it is difficult to understand why the Legislature instead of using the expression any workman  used the much wider expression any person  in the third part of the definition clause
The very circumstance that in the second part of the definition clause the expression used is  between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen  while in the third part the expression used is any person indicates that the expression any person cannot be completely equated with any workman 
The reason for the use of the expression  any person in the definition clause is however not far to seek
The word workman  as defined in the Act before the amendments of 1956 included for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute a workman discharged during the dispute
This definition corresponded to section 2j of the old Trade Disputes Act 1929 except that the words including an apprentice  were inserted and the words  industrial dispute  were substituted for the words  trade dispute 
It is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act 1929 the word workman  meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do I49 1172 any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward
It is clear enough that prior to 1956 when the definition of  workman  in the Act was further widened to include a person dismissed discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal discharge or retrenchment led to the dispute a workman who had been discharged earlier and not during the dispute was not a workman within the meaning of the Act
If the expression  any person  in the third part of the definition clause were to be strictly equated with any workman  then there could be no industrial dispute prior to 1956 with regard to a workman who had been discharged earlier than the dispute even though the discharge itself had led to the dispute
That seems to be the reason why the Legislature used the expression any person  in the third part of the definition clause so as to put it beyond any doubt that the non employment of such a dismissed workman was also within the ambit of an industrial dispute
There was a wide gap between a workman  and an employee  under the definition of the word workman  in section 2 s as it stood prior to 1956 all existing workmen were no doubt employees but all employees were not workmen
The supervisory staff did not come within the definition
The gap has been reduced to some extent by the amendments of 1956 part of the supervisory staff who draw wages not exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem and those who were otherwise workmen but were discharged or dismissed earlier have also come within the definition
If and when the gap is completely bridged I workmen will be synonymous with employees  whether engaged in any skilled or unskilled manual supervisory technical or clerical work etc
But till the gap is completely obliterated there is a distinction between workmen and non workmen and that distinction has an important bearing on the question before us
Limitation No 3 as formulated by learned counsel for the appellants ignores the distinction altogether and equates any person  with any employee  past 1173 present or future this we do not think is quite correct or consistent with the other provisions of the Act
The Act avowedly gives a restricted meaning to the word I workman  and almost all the provisions of the Act are intended to confer benefits on that class of persons who generally answer to the description of workmen
The expression any person  in the definition clause means in our opinion a person in whose employment or non employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest with whom they have under the scheme of the Act a community of interest
Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between workmen and non workmen but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest
Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantially interested in the employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of lab our of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are under the provisions of the Act non workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision  We venture to think that the answer must be in the negative
Limitation 4 formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated
We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of tabour welfare may furnish in some cases the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen but the principle of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the principle of community of interest the workmen can raise a dispute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or the conditions or labour of whom they have a direct or substantial interest
We think that Chagla C J correctly put the crucial test when he said in Narendra Kumar Sen vs All India Industrial Disputes Labour Appellate Tribunal 1
1 129 130
1174  Therefore when section 2 k speaks of the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person it can only mean the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of only those persons in the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of whom the workmen themselves are directly and substantially interested
If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the employment or non employment of a person or in his terms of employment or his conditions of labour then an industrial dispute cannot arise with regard to such person
 We reach the same conclusion by approaching the question from a somewhat different standpoint
Ordinarily it is only the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute but an industrial dispute  is put on a collective basis because it is now settled that an individual dispute not espoused by others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of a 2 k
As Isaacs J observed in the Australian case of George Hudson Ltd vs Australian Timber Workers  Union1 The very nature of an I industrial dispute  as distinguished from an individual dispute is to obtain new industrial conditions not merely for the specific individuals then working from the specific individuals then employing them and not for the moment only but for the class of employees from the class of em ployers   
It is a battle by the claimants not for themselves alone
 Section 18 of the Act supports the aforesaid observations in so far as it makes the award binding not merely on the parties to the dispute but where the party is an employer on his heirs successors or assigns and where the party is composed of workmen on all persons employed in the establishment and all persons who subsequently become employed therein
If therefore the dispute is a collective dispute the party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in the subject matter of dispute or a substantial interest therein in the sense that the class to which the I 441
1175 aggrieved party belongs is substantially affected there
It is the community of interest of the class as a whole class of employers or class of workmen which furnishes the real nexus between the dispute and the parties to the dispute
We see no insuperable difficulty in the practical application of this test
In a case where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workmen themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to them or any of them they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute
Where however the party to the dispute also composed of workmen espouse the cause of another person whose employment or non employment etc may prejudicially affect their interest the workmen have a substantial interest in the subject matter of dispute
In both such bases the dispute is an industrial dispute
Learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to the definition of a  trade dispute  in the Indian 
That definition is also in the same terms but with this vital difference that the word  workmen  means there all persons employed in trade or industry whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises
 It is obvious that the very wide definition of the word workmen  determines the ambit of the definition of a trade dispute  in the 
The provisions of that Act have different objects in view one of which is the expenditure of the funds of a registered Trade Union I on the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the Trade Union or any member thereof
We do not think that that definition for the purposes of an Act like the is of any assistance in construing the definition in the Act with which we are now concerned even though the words employed are the same for one thing the meaning of the word workman  completely changes the ambit of the definition clause and for another the objects scheme and purpose of the two Acts are not the same
For the same reasons we do not think that with regard to the precise problem before us much assistance can be obtained by a detailed examination of English 1176 American or Australian decisions given with regard to the terms of the statutes in force in those countries
Each Act must be interpreted on its own terms particularly when the definition of a workman  varies from statute to statute and with changing conditions from time to time and country to country
The interpretation of section 2 k of the Act has been the subject of consideration in various Indian decisions from different points of view
Two recent decisions of this Court considered the question if an individual dispute of a workman was within the definition of an industrial dispute
The decision in C P Transport Services Ltd vs Raghunath 1 related to the C P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No XXIII of 1947 and the decision in Newspapers Ltd vs State Industrial Tribunal U P2 to the U P Industrial Disputes Act No XXVIII of 1947
Both these decisions considered section 2 k of the Act but with reference to a different problem
The definition clause in section 2 k was considered at some length by the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association vs The Industrial Tribunal Bombay 3 and learned counsel for the appellants has placed great reliance on some of the obervations made therein
The question which fell for decision in that case was whether  industrial dispute included within its ambit a dispute with regard to reinstatement of certain dismissed workmen
It was held that reinstatement was connected with non employment and therefore fell within the words of the definition
It appears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was preferred to the Federal Court was that the workmen whose reinstatement was in question were discharged during the dispute and were therefore workmen within the meaning of the Act Therefore the problem of interpretation with which we are faced in this case was not the problem before their Lordships of the Federal Court
The observations on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these  The question for determination is whether the 1  2 A 1
R 1957 section C 532
3 1949 F C R 321 329 330 346 347
1177 definition of the expression industrial dispute given in the Act includes within its ambit a dispute in regard to reinstatement of dismissed employees 
The words of the definition may be paraphrased thus  any dispute which has connection with the workmen being in or out of service or employment 
 Non employment  is the negative of  employment and would mean that disputes of workmen out of service with their employers are within the ambit of the definition
It is the positive or the negative act of an employer that leads to employment or to non employment
It may relate to an existing employment or to a contemplated employment or it may relate to an existing fact of non employment or a contemplated non employment
The following four illustrations elucidate this point 1 An employer has already employed a person and a trade union says  Please do not employ him 
Such a dispute is a dispute as to employment or in connection with employment
2 An employer gives notice to a union saying that he wishes to employ two particular persons
The union says  no 
This is a dispute as to employment
It arises out of the desire of the employer to employ certain persons
3 An employer may dismiss a man or decline to employ him
This matter raises a dispute as to non employment
4 An employer contemplates turning out a number of people who are already in his employment
It is a dispute as to contemplated non employment
 Employment or non employment  constitutes the subject matter of one class of industrial disputes the other two classes of disputes being those connected with the terms of employment and the conditions of labour
The failure to employ or the refusal to employ are actions on the part of the employer which would be covered by the terms  employment or non employment 
Re instatement is connected with non employment and is therefore within the words of the definition  It was contended that the re instatment of the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute 1178 because if the union represented the discharged employees they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the 
This argument is unsound
We see no difficulty in the respondents union taking up the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen
The non employment  of any person  can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen falling under the definition of that word in the 
It was argued that if  the respondents represented the undischarged employees there was no dispute between them and the employer
That again is fallacious because under the definition of industrial dispute it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only
The last words in the definition of industrial dispute viz  any person  are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants
 It is true that two of the illustrations Nos
2 and 3 given in the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not strictly speaking workmen but whether those persons would answer to such description or what community of interest the workmen had with them is not stated and in any view we do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a different problem can be taken as determinative of a problem which was not before the court in that case
A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in D N Banerji vs P R Mukherjee 1
The question there was whether the expression  industrial dispute  included disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business
More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a number of appeals reported in 1952 Labour Appeal Cases p 198 where the question now before us arose directly for decision
The same question arose for decision before the All India
Industrial Tribunal Bank Disputes and the majority of members Messrs K C Sen and 1  1179 J N Majumdar expressed the view that a dispute between employers and workmen might relate to employment or non employment or the terms of employment or conditions of labour of persons who were not workmen and the words any person  used in the definition clause were elastic enough to include an officer that is a member of the supervisory staff
The majority view will be found in Chap
X of the Report
The minority view was expressed by Mr N Chandra sekhara Aiyar who said  It is fairly clear to my mind that any person  in the Act means any one whe belongs to the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom can be said to be adequately presented by the group or category of persons to which he belongs
As stated already it should be remembered that the cases relied upon for the view that any person  may mean others also besides the workmen were all cases relating to workmen
They were discharged or dismissed workmen and when their cases were taken up by the Tribunal the point was raised that they had ceased to be workmen and were therefore outside the scope of the Act
This argument was repelled
In my opinion there is no justification for treating such cases as authorities for the wider proposition that a valid industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about the employment or non employment of someone else who does not belong and never belonged to their class or category
My view therefore is that the Act does not apply to cases of non workmen or officers if they may be so called
 Both these views as also other decisions of High Courts and awards of Industrial Tribunals were considered by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chairman of the Tribunal Mr J N Majamdar acknowledged that his earlier view was not correct and expressed his opinion concurred in by all the other members of the Tribunal at p 210 150 1180  I am therefore of opinion that the expression any person  has to be interpreted in terms of workmen  The words any person  cannot have in my opinion their widest amplitude as that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the Act
They are to be interpreted in a manner that persons who would come within that expression can at some stage or other answer the description of workman as defined in the Act
 It is necessary to state here that earlier a contrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Birla Brothers Ltd vs Modak 1 by Banerjee J in The Dalhousie Jute Co Ltd vs section N Modak 2 and by the Industrial Tribunal Madras in East India Industries Madras Ltd vs Their Workmen 3
It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some of the learned Judges in support of the view expressed by them these two Considerations are that 1 normally workmen will not raise a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially interested and 2 Government will not make a reference unless the dispute is a real or substantial one
We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression  any person  occurring in the definition clause should lead on the contrary to an interpretation which to use the words of Maxwell is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on which the words are used and the object to be attained by the statute
We are aware that anybody may be a potential workman and the concept of a potential workman introduces an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty
We also agree that the expression  any person  is not co extensive with any workman potential or otherwise
We think however that the crucial test is one of community of interest and the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of labour as the case may be the parties 1 ILR 2 3 1181 to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest
Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances
Two other later decisions have also been brought to our notice  Prahlad Rai Oil Mills vs State of Uttar Pradesh 1 in which Bhargava J expressed the view that the expression any person  in the definition clause did not mean a workman and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen vs All India Industrial Disputes Labour Appellate Tribunal 2 being the decision of Chagla C J and Shah J from which we have already quoted some extracts
An examination of the decisions referred to above undoubtedly discloses a divergence of opinion  two views have been expressed one based on the ordinary meaning of the expression any person  and the other based on the context with reference to the subject of the enactment and the objects which the legislature has in view
For the reasons which we have already given we think that the latter view is correct
To summarise
Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act and its other provisions the expression any person  in section 2 k of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context the two crucial limitations are 1 the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute as indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other and 2 the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be One in whose employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of labour as the case may be the parties to the dipute have a direct or substantial interest
In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties
Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer the person regarding whose employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be strictly 1 AIR 1955 NUC Allahabad 2664
2 1953 55 Bo 
LR 125
1182 speaking a workman  within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest
In the case before us Dr KP Banerjee was not a workman 
He belonged to the medical or technical staff a different category altogether from workmen
The appellants had no direct nor substantial interest in his employment or non employment and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union it cannot be said on the tests laid down by us that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2k of the Act
The result therefore is that the appeal fails and is dismissed
In the circumstances of this case there will be no order for costs
SARKAR J
On November 1 1950 Dr K P Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakuchi Tea Estate whose management is the respondent in this appeal
On April 21 1951 the respondent terminated Dr Banerjee s service with effect from the next day and he was offered one month s salary in lieu of notice
He accepted this salary and later left the Tea Estate
The workmen of the Tea Estate raised a dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr Banerjee
On December 23 1953 the Government of Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of that dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of section 10 of the 
The order of reference was in the following terms Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen in the matters specified in the schedule below between 1 The workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate P O Dimakuchi District Darrang Assam represented by the Secretary Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha INTUC Office PO Dibrugarh Assam and 2 The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate PO Dimakuchi District Darrang Assam whose agents are Messrs Williamson Magor and Company Limited Calcutta
1183 And whereas it is considered expedient by the Govt
of Assam to refer the said dispute for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under section 7 of the Act XIV of 1947
Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by clause e of sub section 1 of section 10 as amended of the XIV of 1947 the Governor of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Sri Uma Kanta Gohain Additional District and Sessions Judge retired who has been appointed to constitute a Tribunal under the provisions of the said Act
SCHEDULE
i Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr K P Banerjee A M 0  iiIf not is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof  The Tribunal held that Dr Banerjee was not a workman as defined in the Act and therefore the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute and consequently it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a dispute
The workmen preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal
That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr Banerjee was not a workman within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non employment it was not an industrial dispute and was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal
From that decision the present appeal by the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this Court under article 136 of the Constitution
In granting the leave this Court limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman falls within the scope of the definition of  Industrial Dispute  contained in section 2k of the Act
That therefore is the only question before us
Section 2k is in these terms  Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or 1184 between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person
 The dispute that was raised was between an employer the respondent in this appeal and its workmen the appellants before us and concerned the employment or non employment of Dr Banerjee a person employed by the same employer but who was not a workman
The question that we have to decide has arisen because of the use of the words  any person  in the definition
These words are quite general and very wide and according to their ordinary meaning include a person who is not a workman
If this meaning is given to these words then the dispute that arose concerning Dr Banerjee s dismissal would be an industrial dispute because the dispute would then be clearly within section 2k
This indeed is not disputed
Unless there are reasons to the contrary these words have to be given their ordinary meaning
In Birla Brothers Ltd vs Modak 1 and in Western India Automobile Association vs Industrial Tribunal of Bombay 2 it was held that the words  any person  were not meant to refer only to workmen as defined in the Act but were wide and general and would include others who were not such workmen
In The Dalhousie Jute Co Ltd vs section N Modak 3 Banerjee J said  Any person means whatever individual is chosen
I see no reason to restrict the meaning of the word Person 
The same view was expressed in East India Industries Madras Ltd vs Their Workmen 4 which was the decision of an Industrial Tribunal
There is then some support for the view that the words I any person  should have no restriction put upon them
It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that it is not its contention that the words any person  should be understood as referring only to a  workman  as defined in the Act but that those words should include all persons of the workman class and 1 ILR 2 3 4 1185 so they would include discharged workmen
It is then stated that the first two of the cases mentioned above were concerned with a dispute regarding discharged workmen and did not therefore decide that the words I any person  included all
It is no doubt true that these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharged workmen but I do not understand the decision to have proceeded on that basis
Sen J said in Birla Brothers case 1 p 213 that  It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior to the Act are not persons 
And in the Western India Automobile Association case 2 it was said p 346 7  It was contended that the reinstatement of the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the union represented the discharged employees they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the 
This argument is unsound
We see no difficulty in the respondents union taking up the cause of the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen
The non employment  of any person  can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen falling under the definition of that word in the 
It was argued that if the respondents represented the undischarged employees there was no dispute between them and the employer
That again is fallacious because under the definition of industrial dispute it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only
The last words in the definition of industrial dispute viz  any person  are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants
 The last two of the cases mentioned earlier were not however concerned with any dispute regarding discharged workmen
In The Dalhousie Jute Co case 3 the dispute was with regard to the employment of persons who sought employment as workmen and in the East India Industries Madras Ltd case 4 the 1 ILR 2 3 1951 1 LLJ I45
41952 1186 dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of the supervisory staff that is another employee of the same employer who was not a workman
It is however said that in none of these cases the arguments that are now advanced appear to have been advanced and they were not considered in the judgments
This comment is justified
I shall therefore lay these cases aside in deciding the question that has arisen
Are there then good reasons for not giving to the words  any persons  their plain meaning  Several have been advanced and I shall examine them a little later
I wish now to discuss how it is proposed to restrict the meaning of these words
I have already stated that the contention is that the words are not confined to a workman but refer only to a person of the workman class
This I confess I do not follow
The word  workman  is a term defined in the Act
Outside the definition it is impossible to say who is a workman and who is not
That being so the words  workman class  would be meaningless unless they meant all persons who were workmen as defined in the Act
So read the words  any person  would mean only a workman
But it is conceded that this is not so
And of course it cannot be so for if that was intended there was no reason for the legislature not to have used the words  any workman  instead of the words it any person 
Again if this was the intention then a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute for a dismissed workman was not a workman within the definition of that word in the Act as it stood in 1953 that being the Act with which we are concerned
Such a result is against all conceptions of industrial disputes laws
It is indeed not contended that a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute
It therefore seems to me that the words  any personal cannot be said to refer only to persons of the workman class
If they cannot be restricted as being understood to refer only to a person of the workman class it is not suggested that they can be restricted in any other manner
It is then said that the words refer to workmen 1187 dismissed as well as in employment as also those who in future become workmen
Again I am in difficulty
So understood the words would not include a person who seeks employment as a workman because he has not become a workman till he is employed
That being so it would have to be said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when new workmen are to be appointed that only those of the candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be would not be an industrial dispute
That again seems to me to be against all con ceptions of industrial dispute laws
Furthermore I am wholly unable to appreciate what is meant by a dispute concerning a person who is not at the time the dispute arises a workman but in future becomes one
When is such a person to become a workman  I find no answer
Again is it to be said that whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not may have to depend on future circumstances for there is no knowing whether the person concerning whom the dispute arises will later become a workman or not  If he becomes one there can be no dispute concerning him referable to a point of time before he became one and if he does not he cannot be one who in future becomes a workman
It is said that the words any person  were used instead of the word workman because it was intended to include within them persons who had been dismissed before the dispute arose and who were not within the definition of workmen in the Act as it stood in 1953
If that was the reason why could not the legislature use the words  workmen and dismissed workmen  There was nothing to prevent that being done
In fact the definition of workman has been amended in 1956 to include workmen discharged in consequence of an industrial dispute or whose discharge has led to that dispute
So as the definition now stands it includes persons dismissed before the dispute arose
Yet the words  any person  have been left untouch ed in section 2 k and not been replaced by the word workman
This to my mind shows that it was not the 1151 1188 intention to confine the words  any person to workmen in employment or discharged
But it is said that the words  any person were left in the Act because it was intended to include not only workmen in employment and dismissed workmen bat also persons who in future become workmen
It is said that that this is so appears from section 18 of the Act
I shall presently consider this section but I desire to observe now that this argument much weakens the argument noticed in the preceding paragraph for if the words  any person  were used so that persons who in future become workmen might be included in them they could not have been used to avoid such dismissed workmen as were not workmen as defined in the Act being excluded from them
It seems to me that if it is argued that the words  any person  were used so that persons who in future become workmen may be included in them it cannot be argued that those words were used instead of the word workman because it was intended to include within them certain dismissed workmen who were not workmen within the definition of that term in the Act as it stood in 1953
Coming now to section 18 it is in these terms A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on a all parties to the industrial dispute b all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Board or Tribunal as the case may be records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause c where a party referred to in clause a or clause bis an employer his heirs successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates d where a party referred to in clause a or clause bis composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment as the case may be to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part
1189 1 entirely fail to see how that section assists at all in finding out who were meant to be included in the words any person 
Is it to be said that section 18d by making the award binding on those who become in future employed in the establishment as workmen indicates that such persons are treated in the same way as workmen in actual employment and therefore it must have been intended to include them within the words  any person  along with present and dismissed workmen
I am wholly unable to agree
The object of section 18d is quite clear
The Act is intended to compose a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a settlement or an award brought about by the machinery provided in it and the period during which an award or a settlement is to remain in force is also provided
The idea behind section 18 is that whoever takes up appointment as a workman in the establishment to which the dispute relates during the time when the award or settlement is in force would be bound by it
If it were not so the award or settlement would have little effect in settling a dispute for any newly recruited workmen could again raise the dispute
Any one having any experience of industries knows that workmen are largely a shifting population and that the need for replacement of the workmen leaving and for addition to the strength of the workmen employed is not infrequent
To meet the exigency arising from this need and to make the award or settlement effective it was necessary to enact section 18d
Its object was not to place workmen in employment and workmen recruited in future in the same position for all purposes of the Act
On the same reasoning in view of section 18a it has to be said that it was the intention of the Act to give the heirs successors or assignees of an employer the same position for all purposes of the Act as that of the employer
But that would be absurd
Section 18d deals with a person who in future becomes employed
The section does not say employed as a workman but I will assume that that is what is meant
I do not understand what is meant by saying that such a person is within the words  any person  in section 2k
What is the point of time that has to be considered  1190 If it is after he has become employed then he is a workman and admittedly within the words any person 
Is it to be said that before such employment also he is within the meaning of those words
But it is difficult to follow this
It is conceivable that any person whatsoever may in future be employed as a workman for there is nothing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a workman
In this way the words  any person  would include all
That however is not meant for it will defeat the very argument based on section 18d
Is it to be said then only such future workmen are meant as apply for jobs as such  But the section makes no reference to such people at all and cannot therefore be of any assistance in showing that it was intended that such applicants would be included within the words  any person 
I am therefore wholly unable to accept the argument that section 18dshows that future workmen were intended to be included within the words any person
I wish also to say this
Assume that section 18d shows that it was intended to include within the words any person  one who in future becomes a workman
But where is the reason for saying that the words do not also include others  Section 18 provides none
I proceed now to discuss the reasons advanced for restricting the generality of the words  any person They were put as follows 1
In certain sections of the Act the words  any person  have been used but there the reference is to workmen and therefore in section 2k the words  any person  should mean persons of the workman class 2
The scheme and the purpose of the Act generally and the object of the Act specially being to benefit workmen the words any person  should be confined to people of the workman class
The word dispute in section 2k itself indicates that the person raising the dispute must be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment non employment terms of employment or the conditions of labour of a person that person must be of the workman class
1191 The first reason then is that in certain sections the Act uses the words  any person
I will assume that by the use of these words only workmen are intended to be referred to in these sections
But the question arises why is such intention to be inferred Clearly because the context requires it
I will refer to some of these sections to make my point clear
Section 21 defines a lock out as  the closing of a place of employment or the suspension of work or the refusal by the employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him Section 2q defines a strike as  a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment
 Lock outs and strikes are dealt with in sections 22 23 and 24 of the Act
Section 222 says that no employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock out any of his workmen except on certain conditions mentioned in the section
Section 23 says that no employer of any workman employed in any industrial establishment shall declare a lock out during the periods mentioned in the section
Section 24 states that a strike or a lock out shall be illegal if commenced or declared in contravention of section 22 or section 23
The definitions of lock outs and strikes are for the purposes of sections 22 23 and 24
There are other sections in which lock outs and strikes are mentioned but they make no difference for our present purpose
The lock outs and strikes dealt with in sections 222 23 and 24 are lock outs of and strikes by workmen
It may hence be said that in section 21 and q by the word person a workman is meant
Therefore it is these sections viz 222 23 and 24 which show what the meaning of the word person  in the definitions is
I would like to point out in passing that section 221 says that no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing in the Act to show that the word person in section 221 means only a workman
Proceeding however with the point we are 1192 concerned with the question is is there any provision in the Act which would show that the words  any person in section 2k were meant only to refer to persons of the workman class
I have not been able to find any and none has been pointed out
Therefore the fact that in section 2 sub sections
1 and q the word  persons  means workmen is no reason for concluding that the same word must be given the same restricted meaning in section 2k
The position with regard to section 33A in which the word employee has to be read as meaning a workman because of section 33 is the same and does not require to be dealt with specially
I may add that if it has to be said that because in certain other sections the word person has to be understood as referring to a workman only in section 2k also the same word must have the same meaning then we have to read the words  any person in section 2k as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act
This however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent
I may further say that it was not contended that the word  person in section 2 sub sections 1 and q and the word employee in section 33A has to be read as including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman and a person who in future becomes a workman and it seems to me that such a contention would not have been possible
I proceed now to deal with the second group of reasons based on the object and scheme of the Act
It is said that the Act makes a distinction between employees who are workmen and all other employees and that the focus of the Act is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them
This was the view taken in United Commercial Bank Ltd vs Kedar Nath Gupta 1
I will assume all this
It may also be true that the Act is not much concerned with employees other than workmen
But I am unable to see that all this is any reason for holding that the words  any person  must mean a person of the workman class
The definition in section 2k would be fully concerned with workmen however the words  any person  in it may 1 1193 be understood because the dispute will be one to which a workman is a partyl Is it to be said that the Act would cease to be intended for workmen or the focus of it displaced from workmen or that the distinction between workmen and other employees would vanish if a dispute relating to the dismissal of one who is not a workman is held to be an industrial dispute even though the dispute is one to which workmen are parties  I am unable to subscribe to such an argument
But it is said that in such a case the workmen would not be interested in the dispute the dispute would not really be with them and they would not be in any real sense of the word parties to it
So put the argument comes under the last of the three reasons earlier stated namely that in order that there may be an industrial dispute the workmen must be interested in that dispute
This contention I will consider later
It is also said in the United Commercial Bank Case 1 that the main purpose of the Act is to adjust the relations between employers and workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by the Act
It is really another way of saying that the workmen must be interested in the dispute for if they are not interested no benefit can accrue to them from an adjustment of it
This as I have said I will discuss later
It is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen and therefore if a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman is an industrial dispute capable of being resolved by adjudication under the Act then if the award goes in favour of the workmen raising it a benefit would result to a person whom the Act did not intend to benefit
So it is said an industrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is not a workman
But the benefit resulting to the person in such a case would only be incidental
The workmen themselves would also be benefited by it at the same time
To adopt this argument would be to deprive the workmen of this benefit and there is no justification for doing so
How the workmen would be benefited would appear later when I discuss the question of the workmen s interest in the dispute
I will show later 1 1952 1 L L J 
1194 that if the workmen were not interested in the dispute so that they could get no benefit under it there would be no reference by the Government and there would be no benefit to a person who was not a workman
Further I am unable to agree that the Act is intended to confer benefit on workmen
Its object is admitted by all to preserve industrial peace
It may confer some benefit on workmen but at the same time it takes away their power and right to strike and puts them under a disadvantage
We were referred to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of the All India Industrial Tribunal Bank Disputes dated July 31 1950
This note was by Mr Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court
In that note he expressed the view that  any person  in section 2k means any one who belongs to the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom can be said to be adequately represented by the group or category of persons to which he belongs
I have already stated my difficulties in agreeing that the words any person  mean only persons of the work
man class
I will presently deal with the reasoning on which Mr Aiyer bases his view but I wish to say now that it seems to me that the words any person cannot refer to anyone belonging to the employer class because the dispute must be in connection with the employment non employment or terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person and it is not possible to conceive of any such thing in connection with a person in his capacity as an employer
Mr Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to be put on the words  any person  is that the person should have something to do with the particular establishment where the dispute has cropped up
He said that it could not be that the workmen in Bank A could raise a valid and legitimate industrial dispute with their employer because some one in Bank B had not been treated well by his employer
Assume this is so
But it does not follow that an industrial dispute must be one concerning a person of the workman class alone for a person having something to do with an 1195 establishment need not necessarily belong to the workman class
An officer in an establishment where the dispute crops up would be as much a person having something to do with that establishment as a workman there and therefore even assuming that the limitation suggested by Mr Aiyar applies there would be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning him arising
The question is not whether the person concerning whom an industrial dispute may arise has to be employed in the establishment where the dispute arises but whether he must belong to what has been called the workman class
The decision of the former question which has not arisen in this case is of no help in deciding the question that has arisen and I do not therefore feel called upon to express any opinion with regard to it
Mr Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a Bank raise a dispute with that Bank about an employee of the Bank who was not a workman for example an officer who had been dismissed
He assumed that the Bank and the officer had no dispute as between themselves
In his view if in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute and could be made the subject matter of an award by an Industrial Tribunal the award would not be binding on the officer because he had no concern with the dispute
According to him it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was under an obligation to give effect to the award
Therefore in his view such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute
Now whether the award would be binding on the officer or not would depend on whether he could be made a party to the dispute under section 18b
It is not necessary to discuss that question now
But assume that the award was not binding on the officer
Why should not the bank be under an obligation to give effect to the award in so far as it lay in its power to do so  If the dispute was an industrial dispute the award would be binding on the Bank and it must give effect to it
Then the argument comes to this that the dispute is not an industrial dispute because the award would not as 152 1196 assumed be binding on the officer concerning whom the dispute arose
I cannot accept this view
Take this case
An employer dismisses five of his workmen
The workmen dismissed make no grievance
Three months later the employer dismisses twenty five more and again neither the dismissed workmen nor the workmen in employment raise any dispute
Two months after the second dismissal the employer dismisses fifty workmen
These workmen make no complaint and leave
The workmen in employment now begin to take notice of the dismissals and think that the employer is acting on a set policy and raise a dispute about all the dismissals
The dispute is then referred for adjudication and an award is made in favour of the workmen
Assume that all the dismissed workmen could be made parties to the adjudication proceedings but for one reason or another were not made parties
This award would not be binding on the dismissed workmen and certainly not on those who had been dismissed on the two earlier occasions
They would not be covered by any of the provisions of section 18
Is it to be said that for that reason the dispute is not an industrial dispute I am wholly unable to agree
Such a dispute would be entirely within the definition even on the assumption that the words any person mean only persons of the workman class
It follows therefore that in order to decide whether a dispute is or is not an industrial dispute the question whether the award would be binding on the person concerning whose employment the dispute was raised is no test
I therefore find nothing in the minute of dissent of Mr Aiyar to justify the putting of any restriction on the plain meaning of the words any person in section 2k
As I shall show later if certain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and who I will assume would not be bound by the award are not to be industrial disputes the object of the Act would clearly be defeated
I cannot therefore agree that the fact that an award is not binding on one affords a reason for holding that there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him
The matter was put from another point of view
It 1197 is said that if workmen could raise an industrial dispute with their employer concerning the salary of a manager who was not a workman and an award was made directing the employer to pay a smaller salary to the manager the employer would be bound by the award but not the manager
Then it is said suppose the employer had made a contract with the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number of years
It is pointed out that in such a case the award being binding on the employer he would be compelled to commit a breach of his contract and be liable to the manager in damages
It is said that it could not have been the intention of the Act to produce a result whereby an employer would become liable in damages and therefore such a dispute cannot be an industrial dispute
But I do not agree that the employer would be liable in damages
The award being binding on him under the Act the performance of his contract with the manager would become unlawful after the award and therefore void under section 56 of the Contract Act
The employer would not by carrying out the award be committing any breach of contract nor would he be liable in damages
To hold that the dispute contemplated is an industrial dispute would not produce the absurd result suggested
The reason suggested for not holding that dispute to be an industrial dispute therefore fails
Take another case
Suppose there was a dispute between two employers A and B concerning the wage to be paid by B to his workmen A complaining that B was paying too high wages and the dispute was referred for adjudication by a Tribunal and an award was made that B should reduce the wages of his workmen
Assume the workmen were not parties to the dispute and were not made parties even if it was possible to do so
The award would not be binding on the workmen concerned under section 18
None the less it cannot be said that the dispute was not an industrial dispute
It completely satisfies the definition of an industrial dispute even on the basis that the words SC any person  mean only workmen
So again it would appear that the words may include one on 1198 whom the award would not be binding
I may add here though I do not propose to decide the question it being wholly unnecessary for the case before us that it seems to me that when a dispute concerns a person whether a workman or not who is riot a party to the dispute he can under section 18b be properly made a party to appear in the proceedings arising out of that dispute
I find nothing in that section to prevent such a course being adopted
If he is made a party there is no doubt that the decision whichever way it went would be most satisfactory to all concerned
If this is the right view then all argu ments based on the fact that the words  any person  can only include one on whom the award would be binding would disappear for on being made a party the award would be binding on that person
It would on the contrary show that it was intended that the words  any person  should include one who is not a party to the dispute and therefore not in the workman class
An argument based on section 33 was also advanced
That is this
The section provides that during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute the conditions of service of workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the employer nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise punished by him except with the permission of the Board or Tribunal
It is said that this section shows that it was intended to protect only workmen and therefore the words  any person  in section 2k should be understood as meaning workmen only
I do not follow this argument at all
Section 33 gives protection to workmen concerned in the dispute which can only mean workmen who are parties to the dispute
A workman concerning whom a dispute arises may or may not be a party to the dispute
The object of the section is clear
If workmen could be punished during the pendency of the proceedings then no workman would raise a dispute or want to take part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its adjudication
Further such punishment would surely give rise to 1199 another dispute
All this would defeat the entire object of the Act which is to compose disputes by settlement or adjudication
Section 33 gives protection to workmen who are parties to the dispute and does not purport to concern itself with the person concerning whom the dispute arises
Such being the position the section can throw no light on the meaning of the words any person  in section 2k
Suppose a workman was dismissed and thereupon a dispute arose between the employer and the other workmen in employment concerning such dismissal
Such a dispute would be undoubtedly an industrial dispute
And it is none the less so though no protection can be given to the dismissed workman under section 33 for he is already dismissed
Reference was also made to section 36 which provides for the representation of the parties to a dispute in a proceeding arising under the Act out of such dispute
Sub section 1 of section 36 provides how a workman who is a party shall be represented and sub section 2 provides how an employer who is likewise a party shall be represented
The section does not provide for representation of any other person
It is said that this shows that the words  any person  must mean only a workman because they must mean an employee past present or future and only such employees as are workmen can be parties to the dispute under the definition
I am unable to agree
Section 36 provides for the representation of workmen besides employers and of no one else because no one but a party need be represented in the proceedings and under the definition a party to an industrial dispute must either be an employer or a workman
This section has nothing to do with the person concerning whom the dispute arises
If however he is also a party to the dispute then the section makes a provision for his representation in the proceedings arising out of that dispute as such a party and not as one concerning whom the dispute has arisen
I have earlier said that there may be a case in which though the person concerning whom the dispute arises is a workman still he may not be a party to it
The fact that besides an em 1200 ployer the Act makes provision for the representation in the proceedings arising out of an industrial dispute of workmen alone does not show that an industrial dispute can only arise concerning a workman
In my view therefore section 36 is of no assistance in finding out the meaning of the words  any person 
I come now to the last of the reasons advanced for restricting the natural meaning of the words  any person 
It is said that the word dispute in the definition shows that the person raising it must have an interest in it and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment non employment terms of employment or conditions of labour of a person that person must be a workman
I confess I do not follow the reasoning
It is said that this is the view expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C J and Shah J in Narendra Kumar Sen vs The All India Industrial Disputes Labour Appellate Tribunal 1
I have some difficulty in seeing that this is the view expressed in that case
What happened there was that certain workmen raised a dispute against their employer which included a demand for fixing scales of pay and for bonus not only for themselves but also for the foremen and divisional heads under the same employers who were not work men and this dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal
The Tribunal refused to adjudicate the dispute in so far as it concerned the pay and bonus of persons who were not workmen as according to it to this extent it was not an industrial dispute
The workmen then applied to the High Court for a writ directing the Tribunal to decide the dispute relating to the claims made for the pay and bonus of the persons who were not workmen
The High Court held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute and refused the writ
Chagla C J expressed himself in these words p 130 A controversy which is connected with the employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour is an industrial controversy
But it is not enough that it 1 1201 should be an industrial controversy it must be a dispute and in my opinion it is not every controversy or every difference of opinion between workmen and employers which is constituted a dispute or difference within the meaning of section 2k
A workman may have ideological differences with his employer a workman may feel sympathetic consideration for an employee in his own industry or in other industry a workman may feel seriously agitated about the conditions of labour outside our own country but it is absurd to suggest that any of these factors would entitle a workman to raise an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2k
The dispute contemplated by section 2k is a controversy in which the workman is directly and substantially interested
It must also be a grievance felt by the workman which the employer is in a position to remedy
Both the conditions must be present it must be a grievance of the workman himself it must be a grievance which the employer as an employer is in a position to remedy or set right
 Then he said p 131  It is only primarily in their own employment in their own terms of employment in their own conditions of labour that workmen are interested and it is with regard these that they are entitled to agitate by means of raising an industrial dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal by the Government under section 10
 I find some difficulty in accepting all that the learned Chief Justice said
But assume he is right
How does it follow that because an industrial dispute is one in which workmen must be interested it must be concerning themselves  I do not see that it does
Neither do I find Chagla C J saying so
In the case before him the dispute concerned persons who were not workmen and he found on the facts before him that the workmen were not interested in that dispute and thereupon held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute
But that is not saying that an industrial dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen
Even the observations that I have read from p 131 of the report would not support this view
It is not 1202 difficult to conceive of a dispute concerning the employment of a person who is not a workman which at the same time is one which affects the conditions of labour or terms of employment of the workmen themselves
I shall give examples of such disputes later
What I wish now to point out is that even if an industrial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested that would be no reason for saying that it can only be a dispute concerning workmen and that therefore the words  any person  in section 2k must mean only workmen
I also think it right to say now that this argument is not really open to the respondent for the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is as I have earlier stated that the words  any person do not mean a workman only but mean all persons of the workman class or past present and future workmen
Now I find nothing in the judgment of Chagla C J to show that workmen can be interested in the workman class or in past or future workmen
On the contrary be says that workmen are interested primarily and by the word  primarily  I think he means directly and substantially only in their own employment terms of employment or conditions of labour
Reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court will therefore land the respondent in contradiction
I find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it
The Act does not say so
But it is said that the word dispute in the definition implies it
No doubt one does not raise a dispute unless he is interested in it and as the Act must be taken to have in contemplation normal men it must have assumed that workmen will not raise a dispute unless they are interested in it
But that is not to my mind saying that it is a condition of an industrial dispute as contemplated by the Act that workmen must be interested in it
So to hold would in my opinion lead to grave difficulties and might even result in defeating the object of the Act
This I will endeavour to show presently
What I have to say will also show that even assuming that an industrial 1203 dispute is one in which workmen have to be interested the dispute that we have in this case concerning Dr Banerjee s dismissal is an industrial dispute for the appellant workmen are directly and substantially interested in it
The question that first strikes me is what is the 2 interest which workmen must have I find it impossible to define that interest
If it cannot be defined it cannot of course be made a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute for we would then never know what an industrial dispute is
Now  interest  as we understand that word in courts of law means the well known concepts of proprietary interest or interest in other recognised civil rights
Outside these the matter becomes completely at largeand well nigh impossible of definition
To say that the interest that the workmen must have is one of the well known kinds of interest mentioned above is to my mind to make the Act largely infructuous
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act is not dealing with interest as ordinarily understood
It cannot be kept in mind too well that the Act is dealing with a new concept namely that of the relation between employer and employed or to put it more significantly between capital and labour a concept which is undergoing a fast and elemental change from day to day
The numerous and radical amendments made in the Act since it came on the Statute book not so long ago testify to the fast changing nature of the concept
Bearing all these things in mind I find it almost impossible to define adequately or with any usefulness an interest which will serve the purposes of the Act
I feel that an attempt to do so will introduce a rigidity which will work harm and no good
Nor does it to my mind in any manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and substantial
I will illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an example or two
Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer and the other workmen raised a dispute about it
Such a dispute comes completely within the definition even assuming that the words 153 1204 any person  only refer to persons of the workman class as the respondent contends
There is therefore no doubt that such a dispute is an industrial dispute
The question then is what interest have the disputing workmen in the reinstatement of the dismissed work man if they must have an interest  The reinstatement would not in any way improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance any interest of theirs in any sense of the term in common use
The only interest that I can think of the workmen having for themselves in such a dispute is the solidarity of labour
It is only this that if the same thing happens to any one of them the others would rally round and by taking up his cause prevent the dismissal
Apart from the Act how would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking effect  They would have if they wanted to prevent the dismissal gone on strike and thereby tried to force the employer s hands not to give effect to the dismissal
That would have destroyed the industrial peace which the object of the Act is to preserve
It is in order to achieve this object that the Act recognises this dispute as an industrial dispute and provides for its settlement by the methods of conciliation or adjudication contained in it and preserves the industrial peace by preventing the parties being left to their own devices
If what I have described as solidarity of labour is to be considered as direct and substantial interest for the purposes of an industrial dispute as I conceive is not disputed by any one then it will appear that we have embarked on a new concept of interest
I will now take another case which in regard to interest is the same as the previous one
Suppose the employer engages some workmen at a low rate of wages and the other workmen raise a dispute demanding that the wages of these low paid workmen be increased
This case would be completely within the definition of an industrial dispute even according to the most restricted meaning that may be put upon the words any person  namely that they refer only to work
men as defined in the Act because the dispute concerns the terms of employment of such a workman
1205 So this has admittedly to be held to be an industrial dispute
What then is the interest of the workmen in this dispute  The increase in the wages claimed would not in any manner improve the financial condition of the disputing workmen nor serve any of their interests as ordinarily understood
It would however help the workmen in seeing that their own wages were not reduced by preventing the employer from being able to engage any low paid workman at all
Apart from this I can think of no other interest that the disputing workmen may have in the dispute
If therefore it is essential that the disputing workmen must have an interest in the dispute this must be that interest for as already stated the dispute is undoubtedly an industrial dispute
If this is sufficient interest to constitute an industrial dispute I fail to see why the workmen have no sufficient interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who is particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should be removed and they should have a more human foreman
This is surely a matter in which the workmen raising the dispute have a personal and immediate interest and not as in the last case an interest in the prevention of something happening in future which conceivably may never happen at all
Such an interest is plainly nearer to the ordinary kinds of interest than the interest in solidarity of labour or in the prevention of future harm which in the preceding paragraphs have been found to be sufficient to sustain an industrial dispute
The dispute last imagined would undoubtedly be an industrial dispute if the foreman was a workman for then it would be entirely within the definition of an industrial dispute
Now suppose the foreman was not a workman
Can it be said that then the dispute would not be an industrial dispute  Would the interest of the workmen in the dispute be any the less or in any way different because the foreman whose dismissal was demanded was not a workman  I conceive it impossible to say so
Therefore if interest is the test the dispute that I have imagined would have to be held to be an industrial dispute whether or not 1206 the foreman concerned was a workman
Now assume that the dispute did not arise out of a demand for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dismissal on the ground that he was a particularly kind and sympathetic man and the workmen were happy to work under him
In such a case the interest of the workmen in the dispute would be the same as their interest in the dispute demanding the foreman s dismissal
They would be demanding his reinstate ment in their own interest they would be demanding it to make sure that their work would be easy and smooth and that they would be happy in the discharge of it
Such a dispute therefore also has to be held to be an industrial dispute and as in the last case it would make no difference for this purpose that the foreman concerned was not a workman
If this is right as I think it is then similarly the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr Banerjee would be an industrial dispute for the workmen have sufficient personal and immediate interest in seeing that they have a doctor of their liking to look after them
It is indeed the case of the workmen that by his devotion to duty and good behaviour Dr Banerjee became very popular with the workmen
Whether the contention of the workmen is justified or not and whether it would be upheld by the Tribunal or not are wholly different matters and do not affect the question whether in an industrial dispute the work
men must be interested
It is enough to say that I find no reason to think that the appellant had no interest in the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr Banerjee
Therefore I would hold that even if it is necessary to constitute an industrial dispute that workmen must have an interest in it the dispute before us is one in which the appellants  have a direct and substantial interest and it is an industrial dispute
For myself however I would not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute
The Act does not do so
I repeat that it would be impossible to de no 1207 such interest
In my view such a condition would defeat the object of the Act
It is said that otherwise the workmen would be able to raise disputes in which they were not interested
Supposing they did the Government is not bound to refer such disputes for adjudication
Take a concrete case
Suppose the workmen raise a dispute that the manager of the concern should have a higher pay
It would be for the Government to decide whether the dispute should be referred for adjudication or not
The Government is not bound to refer
Now how is the Government to decide  That must depend on the Government s evaluation of the situation
That this is the intention is clear from the object that the Act has in view
I will here read from the judgment of the Federal Courtin Western India Automobile Association case1 what the object of the Act is
It was said at PP
331 332
 We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope
The Act is stated in the preamble to be one providing for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes
Any industrial dispute as defined by the Act may be reported to Government who may take such steps as seem to it expedient for promoting conciliation or settlement
It may refer it to an Industrial Court for advice or it may refer it to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication
The legislation substitutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding award by an impartial tribunal
Now in many cases an industrial dispute starts with the making of number of demands by workmen
If the demandsare not acceptable to the employer and that is what often happens it results in a dismissal of the leaders and eventually in a strike
No machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes can be considered effective unless it provides within its scope a solution for cases of employees who are dismissed in such conditions and who are usually the first victims in an industrial dispute
If reinstatement of such persons cannot be brought about by 1 1949 FCR 321
1208 conciliation or adjudication it is difficult if not im possible in many cases to restore industrial peace which is the object of the legislation 
This is the view of the object of the Act that is accepted by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen s case2 and United Commercial Bank case 2
In Narendra Kumar Sen s case 1 Chagla C J said at p 130 The was enacted as Mr Desai rightly says to bring about industrial peace in the country to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers to prevent strikes and lock outs to see that the production in our country does not suffer by reason of constant and continuous labour troubles 
Therefore in deciding whether to refer or not the Government is to be guided by the question whether the dispute is such as to disturb the industrial peace and hamper production
I find no difficulty in thinking that the Government would realise that there was no risk of the peace being disturbed or production being hampered by the dispute raised by the work men demanding a higher salary for the manager for being normal men the workmen were not likely to suffer the privations of a strike to enforce their demand for a cause of this nature
The Government must be left to decide this primary question for itself and therefore the Government must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen had sufficient interest in the dispute
If Government thought that the workmen had no such interest as would lead them to disturb industrial peace by strike or otherwise if the dispute was not ended the Government might not in its discretion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal
It must be left free to decide as it thinks best in the interest of the country
It is not for the Court to lay down rigid principles of interest which interfere with the Government s discretion for that might defeat the object of the Act
If the Government feels that the dispute is such that it might lead to the disruption of industrial peace it is the policy of the Act that it should exercise its powers under it 1 2 1209 to prevent that
Assume a case in which the workmen raised a dispute without having what the court considers sufficient interest to make it an industrial dispute and therefore on the matter coming to the court the dispute was held not to be an industrial dispute
Upon that the Government s hands would be tied and it would not be able to have that dispute resolved by the processes contemplated in the Act
Suppose now that the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is disturbed and production hamper
The object of the Act would then have been defeated
And why  Because it was said that it was not a dispute in which the workmen were interested and therefore not a dispute which was capable of being adjusted under the provisions of the Act
It would be no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike in such a case
If they would not neither would the Government refer the dispute for adjudication under the Act and it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether the workmen were interested in the dispute or not or whether the dispute was an industrial dispute or not
Therefore I think that it is not necessary to say that a dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act only when workmen are interested in it
Such a test of an industrial dispute would make it justiciable by courts and also introduce a rigidity in the application of the Act which is incompatible with the fast changing concepts it has in view and so defeat the object of the Act
It is enough to assume that as normal men workmen would not raise a dispute or threaten industrial peace on account of it unless they are interested in it
I wish however to make it clear should any doubt exist as to this that I do not intend to be understood as saying that the question whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not is never justiciable by courts of law and that a dispute is an industrial dispute only if the Government says so
Such a larger question does not arise in this case
All that I say is that it is not a condition of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it and no question of interest 1210 falls for decision by a court if it can be called upon to decide whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not
The question of interest can only be of practical value in that it helps the Government to decide whether a dispute should be referred for adjudication or not
Then it is said that if workmen were allowed to raise a dispute concerning a person who was not a workman then it would be possible for such a person to have his dispute with the employer adjudicated through the workmen
This case was put
Suppose the manager wanted his salary to be increased but could not make the employer agree to his demand he could then instigate the workmen and make them raise a dispute that his salary should be increased and if such a dispute is an industrial dispute and the award goes in favour of the workmen then the result would be that the Act could be used for settling disputes between the manager and his employer a dispute which the Act did not intend to concern itself with
So it is said that the words  any person in section 2 k cannot include an employee who is not a work
I am unable to agree
First in interpreting an Act the Court is not entitled to assume that persons would use its provisions dishonestly
The words in the Act cannot have a different meaning than their natural meaning because otherwise there would be a possibility of the Act being used for a purpose for which it was not meant
The remedy against this possibility is provided in the Act in that it has given complete freedom to the Government not to refer such a dispute
It is not necessary to meet a somewhat remote apprehension that the Act may be used for purposes other than those for which it was meant to construe its language in a manner different from that which it plainly bears
Lastly in doing this many cases like Chose earlier mentioned including the present which are clearly cases of industrial disputes would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent by interpretation a remote apprehension of a misuse of the Act
This would do more harm than good
1211 1 have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within section 2 k
As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so
I would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with law
ORDER OF THE COURT
In view of the opinion of the majority the appeal is dismissed
But there will be no order as to costs
Appeal dismissed


Summary:
HELD The order of detention was passed by the respondent No 2
District Magistrate on the basis of two Criminal Cases in respect of two incidents which had occurred on October 2 and 3 1986
So far as the case being GD No 38 was concerned the report of this incident was made by the picket employed at police station Kydganj
It appeared from this report that there were no particulars about the shopkeepers who had been terrorised and threatened for payment of money as alleged in the grounds of detention nor were mentioned at all the names of any of the witnesses in whose presence the threat or terror was used and money was demanded
The report was absolutely vague and it was not possible for the detenu to give an effective representation 127 against the ground which is one of the Constitutional requirements enjoined in Article 225 of the Constitution of India
The second ground which led to crime case No 24886 under section 307 IPC and crime case No 24986 under section 45 of the Explosives Act and which occurred on October 3 1986 registered on the complaint of SubInspector Yatendra Singh through special court Allahabad also did not disclose any particulars as to the shop keepers in whose presence the bombs alleged were thrown by the appellant and who were terrified and panic stricken etc nor were mentioned the names of any witnesses in respect of the said incident
133F 134A D The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the Society as held by this Court in Kanu Biswos vs State of West Bengal   while determining the meaning of public order 
Public order is what the French Call order Publique and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order
From the observations of this Court made in many cases it is evident that whether an act amounts to a breach of law and order or a breach of public order solely depends upon its extent and reach to the society
If the act is restricted to particular individuals or a group of individuals it breaches the law and order problem but if the effect and reach and potentiality of the act are so deep as to affect the community at large andor the even tempo of the community then it becomes a breach of the public order
An act which may not at all be objected to in certain situations is capable of totally disturbing the public tranquillity
When communal tension is high an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community
An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to
Thus whether an act relates to law and order or the public order depends upon the impact of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community it will be an act which will affect the public order 
134D E137A B 138B D In this case so far as the first incident which occurred on 2101986 was concerned the ground was vague inasmuch as the names of the witnesses in whose presence the threat was given and the incident occurred had not been mentioned
As regards the second incident which occurred on 3
101986 the Crime Case No 24886 under section 307 IPC and the Crime Case No 24986 under section 45 of the Explosive Act were pending trial
138E F 128 A case crime No 200 of 1985 under sections 323504506426 l
PC read with section 23 of the UP Gangsters and Anti Social Activities Act No 4 of 1986 was registered against the appellant by the police
That case was challenged by an application under section 482 Cr
PC in the High Court
The said application was admitted on 261986 and had been pending
The High Court had while admitting the case granted stay of arrest of the appellant
The appellant had been taken into custody and was in jail as an undertrial prisoner on October 10 1986 when the impugned order of detention was clamped upon him
The appellant stated in this Appeal that till date he had not applied for bail in case crime No 24886 and case crime No 24986 as well as the case registered in report No 38 dated October 2 1986 at the police station Kydganj
The question was whether there was a possibility of the detaining authority to be satisfied that the appellant was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as there was no likelihood of his being released from the jail custody immediately
There was nothing in the case to show that in consideration of his previous conduct and acts there was a likelihood of the appellant s indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order if he was set free andor released from custody
138F H 139A B 140B C The detaining authority District Magistrate respondent No 2 had not filed an affidavit stating whether he had taken into consideration the fact that the appellant had already been in the judicial custody and on considering his past activities he had been subjectively satisfied that if set free or released from jail custody on bail there was a likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities endangering public order
On the other hand the Station officer of Kydganj police station had filed a counter stating that the District Magistrate had passed the impugned detention order when the appellant was already in jail on the p apprehension that the appellant was likely to be released on bail in the near future and if he was bailed out the public order would become worse
This clearly showed that the police officer had arrogated to himself the knowledge about the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate on whom the power is conferred by the Act
The affidavit filed by the station officer of police implied that he had access to the file of the District Magistrate or he influenced the decision of the District Magistrate for making the detention order
There was nothing to show that there was awareness in the mind of the District Magistrate the detaining authority of the fact that the appellant was in jail at the time of the clamping of the order of detention and the detaining authority was satisfied in considering his antecedents that there was a likelihood of his indulging in criminal activities jeopardising public order if he 129 was released on bail and that there was every likelihood of his being A enlarged on bail within a short time
On this ground alone the detention order was invalid
It might be said in this connection that the respondents could very well oppose the bail application when it came up for hearing and if at all the appellant was released on bail the respondents were not without a remedy
They could file an application for cancellation of the bail
In the circumstances it could not but be held that the passing of the order of detention of the appellant who was already in custody was fully bad and invalid in law
The respondents could very well proceed with the criminal case under section 307 IPC and get the appellant punished if the case was proved beyond doubt against him
The police officers who witnessed the hurling of the bombs and the Sub Inspector of police who recorded the FIR could come forward to give evidence
In the circumstances the open statement in the affidavit of the Sub Inspector that the witnesses were afraid of disclosing their names and giving evidence was wholly incredulous and could not be accepted
141G H 142A G 143G 144A The clamping of the order of detention was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act
The history sheet did not at all link to the proximity of the two incidents on the basis of which the detention order had been passed
144C D The impugned order of detention was illegal and invalid
144G E Kanu Biswas vs State of West Bengal 1972 3 SCC 831 Haradhan Saha vs The State of West Bengal and Anr   Kanchanlal Maneklal Chokshi vs State of Gujarat  ors
   Dr Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar  ors   Arun Ghosh vs State of West Bengal  Nagendra Nath Mondal vs State of West Bengal 11972 1 SCC 498 Nand Lal Roy alias Nonda Dulal Roy vs State of West Bengal  SK Kedar vs State of West Bengal  Ashok Kumar vs Delhi Administration  State of UP vs Hari Shankar Tewari   Masood Alam vs Union of India AIR 1973 SC 897 Rameshwar Shaw vs District Magistrate Burdwan State of Andhra Pradesh  ors
   Ramesh Yadav vs District Magistrate Etah and others AIR 1986 SC 315 Abdul Gaffer vs State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 1496 and Sudhir Kumar Saha vs Commissioner of Police Calcutta