ivil Appeal No 698 of 1980
From the Judgment dated the 251979 of the Kerala High Court in MFA 346 of 1978
MM Abdul Khader Darshan Singh and Praveen Kumar for the Appellant
PS Poti PK Pillai NP TT Kunnhikannan and Ms Malini Poduval for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAGANNATHA SHETTY J
This appeal by leave from a Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a short question of construction of the plain words of a term private forest  as defined in a statutory enactment called The Kerala Private Forest Vesting and Assignment Act 197 1 called shortly The Vesting Act
The High Court has decided the question in favour of the State and against the appellant
The judgment of the High Court has since been reported in AIR 1980 Kerala 137
The view expressed by the High Court has been subsequently affirmed by another Full Bench in State of Kerala vs Malayalam Plantation Ltd AIR 1981 Kerala 1 and reiterated by a larger Bench of five Judges in State of Kerala vs
KC Moosa Haji  Ors  Losing the construction argument the appellant has appealed to this Court
The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of this judgment save to state in the barest outline that the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh
One of its industrial under takings is located in Bilakootam Mavoor in Kozhikode Dis trict Kerala State
This establishment pro 405 duces Rayon Grade Pulp using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other species of wood as basic raw material
It has a large euca lyptus plantation coveting thousands of acres maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory
The State says that as a consequence of the Vesting Act the eucalyptus 8plantation being a private forest and not excluded there from is vested in the State with no fight title and inter est subsisting with the company
The claim of the company however is that the term private forest  as defined under the Vesting Act excludes the eucalyptus plantation Private forest  has been defined in the Vesting Act as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 The KLR Act
Since counsel for the appellant largely depends upon the judicial construction of the definition of private forest  in the KLR Act it is necessary that we should set out hereunder both the definitions placed alongside with each other THE KERALA PRIVATE FORESTS THE KERALA LAND REFORMS VESTING AND ASSIGNMENT ACT ACT 1 OF 1964 AS ACT 1971 AMENDED BY THE KERALA LAND REFORMS AMENDME NT ACT 351969 Act 26 of 1971 AS AMENDED BY ACT 5 OF 2
Definitions
In this 1978 Act unless the context otherwise requires 2
Definitions In this Act 47 private forest  unless the context otherwise means a forest which is requires not owned by the Govern ment but does not inclu de f private forest  means 1 in relation to the Mala i areas which are waste bar district referred to in and are not enclaves sub section 2 of Section within wooded areas 5 of the ii areas which are gardens or nilams Central Act 37 of 1956 i any land to which the iii areas which are Madras Preservation of Pri planted with tea coffee vate Forests Act 1949 Madras cocoa rubber cardomom Act XXVIII of 1949 applied or cinnamon and immediately iv other areas which are culti 406 before the appointed day excluding vated with A Lands which are gardens or pepper arecanut coco nilams as defined in the Kerala nut cashew or other Land Reforms Act 1963 1 of fruit bearing trees or 1964 are cultivated with any other agricultural crop
B Lands which are used princi pally for the cultivation of tea coffee cocoa rubber cardomom or cinnamom and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultiva tion of such crops or for the pre paration of the smae for the market
Explanation Lands used for the construction of office buildings godowns factories quarters for workmen hospitals schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops C lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit bearing trees or are princi pally cultivated with any other agricultural crop D sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of such buildings ii any forest not owned by the Government to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act 1949 did not apply inclu ding waste lands which are encla ves within wooded areas
407 2 in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala any forest not owned by the Government including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas
Explanation For the purposes of this clause a lane shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs We may first examine the scope of the definition of private forest  under Section 247 of the KLR Act
It means a forest which is not owned by the Government excluding thereby four kinds of areas specified under sub clauses i to iv
The latter part of sub clause iv contains the words  
Other areas cultivated with any other agricultural crop
The terms agriculture  and agricultural crop  have wider as well as narrower connotation
The wider concept covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent operations
It takes within its fold among other things the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce including forest products such as timber sal and piyasal trees casuarina plantations tendu leaves horranuts etc
See Commis sioner of Income Tax West Bengal Calcutta vs Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy  at 156
Of course there must be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultiva tion of land in the sense of tilling of the lands sowing of the seeds planting and similar work done in the land
The forest growth or spontaneous growth of any product plants or trees however would be outside the characteristic of agricultural products or operations
In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co vs State of Kerala  Ors   this Court while examining the scheme of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter III therein observed that lands under eucalyptus or teak which are the result of agricultural operations normally would be agricultural lands but not lands which are covered by eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a forest  This is the wider concept of agricultural crop perhaps attributed to the latter part of sub clause iv of the definition under Section 247 of the KLR Act
The latter part of sub clause iv of Section 247 of the KLR 408 Act counsel for the appellant contended is practically the same as the second limb of sub clause C of Section 2f1i of the Vesting Act
It was claimed that since eucalyptus plantation is covered by the expression any other agricultural crop  in Section 247 sub clause iv of the KLR Act Section 2f1i sub clause C of the Vest ing Act with similar words must also carry the same meaning
It was emphasised that the KLR Act and the Vesting Act constitute a Code of agrarian reform and they are cognate legislations with the Vesting Act as supplementary to the KLR Act
The expression any other agricultural crop  used in both the enactments while defining private forest  must therefore receive the same meaning as otherwise it would lead to anomalies
This is the line of argument for the appellant
This whole line of arguments with respect is hard to accept
As Felix Frankfurter J said Legislation is a form of literary composition
But construction is not an abstract process equally valid for every composition not even for every composition whose meaning must be judicially ascertained
The nature of the composition demands awareness of certain presuppositions 
And so the significance of an enactment its antecedents as well as its later history its relation to other enactments all may be rele vant to the construction of words for one purpose and in one setting but not for another
Some words are confined to their history some are starting points for history Words are intellectual and moral currency
They come from the legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning
Sometimes it remains unchanged
Like currency words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value
The learned Judge further stated Legislation has an aim it seeks to obviate some mischief to supply an inadequacy to effect a change of policy to formulate a plan of government
That aim that policy is not drawn like nitrogen out of the air it is evinced in the language of the statute as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose
That is what the Judge must seek and effectuate
 See Courts Judges and Politics by Walter F Murphy Some Reflections of the Reading of Statutes  by Felix Frankfurter
Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute unless the Statutes are pari materia legislations
In the present case the aim and object of the two legislations are not similar in the first place
Secondly the definition of private forest  in the KLR Act is not just the same as the definition of private forest  in the Vesting Act
Indeed there is a vast differ ence in between the two
The object of the Vesting Act was to provide for the Vesting in the Government 409 of private forest in the State of Kerala for the assignment thereof to the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation
The preamble of the Act provides that such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the agricultural production in the State and to promote the welfare of the agricultural population in the State
Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act 1949  The MPPF Act  applied immediately before the appointed day the second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala
The definition of private forest  as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under sub clauses A to D
This significant reference to MPPF Act in the definition of priVate forest  in the Vesting Act makes all the difference in the case
The MPPF Act was a special enactment
It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras State to preserve the private forests in the district of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District
The Scheme of that Act has been explained by several decisions of the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the MPPF Actcame into force it would continue to be a forest even if there was subsequent replantation
See State of Kerala vs Anglo American DTT Co and State of Kerala vs KC Moosa Haji supra FB AIR at 154 155 It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act 1949 and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971
In Malankara case supra this Court was not con cerned with the lands covered by the MPPF Act and denuded thereafter of forest growth and cultivated with fresh re plantation
Therefore it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning accorded to private forest  from the KLR Act to the Vesting Act
That wide concept cannot fit into the new legal source
In State of Kerala vs Gwalior Rayon Sm
Wvg Co Ltd  1 this Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that the Forest Lands in the State of Kerala has attained a peculiar character owing to the geography and climate and the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural plantations
That much is clear from the following observa tions at 683 It is therefore manifest that when the legislature stated in 410 the preamble that the private forests are agricultural lands they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by and large could be prudently and profitably ex ploited for agricultural purposes
 There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district
This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant
Look at the definition
Sub clause A refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act Garden  means lands used principally for growing coconut trees arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same Nilam  means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy
Sub clause B deals with what may be called plantation crops cultiva tion of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops
Such agricultural crops are by name specified
Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder
Next follows sub clause C
It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit bearing trees
It thus refers to only the fruit beating trees
It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop
If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultur al crop  in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit beating or otherwise it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit beating trees
It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub clause A to C has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees
The words used in every sub clause too have associa tions echoes and overtones
While construing such words judges must as Felix Frankfurter J said retain the associations hear the echoes and capture the overtones supra p 414
When so examined and construed we do not discover any indication that the words in sub clause C any other agricultural crop are quite wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus planta tions
It is said indeed rightly that in seeking legislative intention judges not only listen to the voice of the legis lature but also listen attentatively to what the legislature does not say
Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub clause C
Under Section 3 sub section 1 private forests vest in Government
Sub clause 2 however excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits 411 applicable to an owner if they are under his personal culti vation
Cultivation for this purpose includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species
The explanation to sub section 2 makes this aspect beyond doubt
The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree fruit bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub section 2
The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub section 2 the trees of every variety
But while providing for exclusion under sub clause C the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds
It seems to have considered only fruit bearing trees and not of other species
If the inten tion was otherwise the sub clauseC would have been in a different language
In our view as a matter of pure construction untram melled by authority the words used in the latter part of sub clause C could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit bearing trees
This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subse quent two decisions Malayalam Plantation Limited and KC Maosa Haji cases supra
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed
In the circumstances of the case however we make no order as to costs
TNA Appeal dis missed


Summary:
These appeals arose as a sequel to certain directions of this Court in the famous Sanchaita Investment Company case which by dint of tremendous advertisement campaign collected deposits amounting to several crores of rupees from thou sands of depositors spread all over India
The firm pros pered and thereafter tied up and siphoned away a sizeable portion of its funds from its coffers for the benefit of the management personnel by acquiring movable and immovable properties in the names of the firm relatives and benami dars
Then they started making defaults in its obligations to the depositors
The depositors approached the High Court and eventually the matter came up to this Court in 1983
With a view to safeguard the interests of the depositors and ensure that the properties of the firm be duly identified and full and due benefit of the funds be diverted to its coffers this Court by its order appointed a Commissioner to take charge of all the assets documents papers of the firm agents sub agents transferees and benamidars
Further to enable the Commissioner to gather all the assets of the firm he was given powers to attach all assets and properties which in his prima facie opinion are of the ownership of the firm or any of its partners
Such assets were to be put to sale if no objections are received there to within one month from the date of attachment
All objections thus received in respect of such properties were to be forwarded to the Prothonotary of Calcutta High Court and a Division Bench of the High Court was to dispose of the objections on merits
By a further order dated 23rd September 1985 this Court empowered the Commissioner to remove all unauthorised 283 persons or trespassers from possession of the property proposed to be sold and the Commissioner to hand over vacant possession to the rightful purchasers
One of the properties thus attached by the Commissioner by a public notice was house N 5211B Surendra Nath Baner jee Road Calcutta
It was subsequently brought to sale on as is and where is basis
Asit Kumar Mandal and two others purchased this property and requested the Commissioner to give them vacant possession
Since the sale was on as is and where is basis the Mandais moved an application before the High Court Division Bench praying for the vacant posses sion of the said property and the same was granted
Hence the appellants ie Paul Bros and Others moved two Special Leave Petitions in this Court and claimed that they were bona fide tenants in the property even under the predecessors in interest of Mahamaya Devi in whose name the property was purchased by Sanchaita firm and therefore could be evicted only in accordance with due process of law after full contest and could not be thrown out in summary pro ceedings just as if they were persons in unauthorised pos session of the property or as if they were mere trespass ers
On the other hand the Mandais contended that in terms of the orders of this Court and of the Calcutta Division Bench they purchased the property only on the basis that they would get a perfect title and speedy possession
Allowing the Special Leave Petitions this Court HELl That the contention of the Mandais is not main tainable either in principle or on the terms of the direc tions of this Court
The attachment and sale in pursuance of this Court s order of the present property in question did not have the legal effect of invalidating any interests created or subsisting in the property by sale transfer encumbrance or alienation prior to the attachment
Even the sale was on as is and where is basis
The Courts order of 27th September 1983 only empowered the Commissioner to remove all unauthorised persons and trespassers but persons who are in lawful possession of the 284 property could not be evicted forcibly or summarily
The said order could not be interpreted to mean that the pur chasers would be entitled to vacant possession through the commissioner even by evicting bona fide tenants or other encumbrancer or independent out siders who had acquired interest for consideration in the property
The object of the directions was to cut short the proliferation of litiga tion and to gather in expeditiously the assets of Sanchaita
292D E 295H 296B Having regard to the large scale dealings the special circumstances and the desperate situation the Court made an exception and made it possible for the Commissioner to get false and frivolous claimants out of the way by a quick procedure because even normally the trespassers and unautho rised persons cannot be thrown out except by recourse to legal proceedings
So this order could not be availed of to ride rough shod over the rights and interests of others in the properties which had been created bona fide
Even third parties who have acquired real interests in the property either independent of or even through Sanchaita could not be called upon to give up their rights which would mean to do more than merely realise what rightfully belongs to Sanchaita that is by conferring a better title than it had in fact acquired while purchasing those properties 297B G So in the instant case considering the materials and evidence and the records placed before the Court by the claimantsobjectors to prove that they are not stooges or false claimants but have bona fide right to possession it was held that the auction purchaser could not evict Paul Brothers and Phani Bhushan Ghose except eviction proceedings in the normal course and in accordance with law as may be available to them against the claimantsobjectors
The claim s of the other appellant was rejected
297C D