Appeal No 3111 16 of 1991
From the Judgment and Order dated 2490 of the Allahabad High Court in WP No 5627 616388 1193 8415 1036089 and 1076 of 1990
WITH Civil Appeal Nos 580 to 606 of 1993  4416 of 1991 EC Agrawala Anant V Palli Atual Sharma Mrs Purnima B at Kak Mrs Rekha Palli and Pradeep Misra for the Appellants
1039 CS Vaidyanathan RK Jain Ms Bharti Sharma Mrs Rani Chhabra KB Rohtagi and Ms Aparna Rohtagi for the Respondents
The Judgment of he Court was delivered by KASLIWAL J Computer Code No 12964 of 1991
In SLP C No of 1991 Delinked
See separate Order in the concerned file
Special Leave granted in all the other petitions
In all the above appeals the short controversy raised is whether gur lauta and raskat and rab galawat and rab salawat are liable to the levy of market fee under the UP Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam of 1964 hereinafter referred to as the Act 
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court referred the question for being considered by a Full Bench
The Full Bench of the High Court by decision dated 241990 held that gur lauta and raskat and rab galawat and salawat were not an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act
Subsequently other Benches followed the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench
All the above appeals by grant of Special Leave are directed against the Judgment of the Full Bench dated 241990 as well as the subsequent decisions following the Full Bench case
Section 2a of the Act defines agricultural produce  and reads as under 2a agricultural produce  means such items of produce of agriculture horticulture viticulature apiculture sericulture pisciculture animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule and includes admixture of two or more of such items and also includes any such item in processed form and further includes gur rub shakkar khandsari and jaggery
It may be mentioned that the words gur rab shakkar khandsari and jaggery were added in the above definition of agricultural produce by UP Act No10 of 1970
To decide the controversy raised in these cases the definition of agricultural produce has to be taken into consideration after the words added by the aforesaid UP Act No10 of 1970
Sugarcane is an agricultural produce out of which juice is extracted
The said juice gets 1040 thickened by dehydration and when it reaches a particular pigment it takes the form of rab which is a semi solid form of the sugarcane juice
After the process of boiling this rab is put in a crystaliser where it is allowed to get cooled and crystals are formed when the same is rotated in the crystaliser
The crystalised rab is then put into centrifugal machines in which through the process of infusion of sulphur the sugarcane juice is cleaned and whitened
The rab which is not put into the centrifugal machine but is dehydrated and is
allowed to be hardened by the open pan process takes the shape of gur which is normally used for home consumption
The rab which is not allowed to be hardened is also sold in semi solid form but those persons who desire to make further profits put the rab into centrifugal machines and by the process of infusion of sulphur they obtain khandsari in the dry powdercrystalised form and the waste of rab which is obtained in the liquid form is known as molasses
The residue which is known as molasses is further utilised by many people by boiling in the open pans and the same is again re processed by cleaning and dehydrating and later by sulphitation is taken in powder form
This first process out of molasses of rab in the semi solid form is also sold in the market because this inferior quality contains less content of sucrose and is called rab galawat
Rab salawat is also prepared by the same process out of the molasses and is further inferior quality of rab
It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that rab galawat and rab salawat are thus nothing but different forms of rab although a little andor more inferior in quality
It has been contended that the main ingredient being sugarcane out of which juice is extracted and when gur rab khandsari and shakkar have been added in the definition of agricultural produce the rab galawat or rab salawat being the inferior forms of rab are necessarily an agricultural produce within the above definition of agricultural produce
It has also been submitted that so far as gur lauta or other forms of gur like kala gur gur budha etc are also prepared from the molasses by re boiling the molasses in the open pans which is allowed to thicken after dehydration in the boiling pans
Thus it has been submitted that gur lauta or gur raskat is nothing else except inferior form of gur
On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respon 1041 dents that the Full Bench of the High Court was right in taking the view that molasses are a different product which looses its original character and being a residual article after solidification of the natural article ie sugarcane juice it cannot be said to be an agricultural produce
It has been contended that molasses itself being not an agricultural produce gur lauta and raskat prepared from molasses cannot be held to be an agricultural produce
We have considered the arguments advanced on behalf
of the parties and have perused the record
A perusal of the definition of agricultural produce under Section 2a of the Act shows that apart from items of produce of agriculture horticulture viticulture apiculture sericulture pisciculture animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule the definition further includes admixture of two or more such items and thereafter it further includes taking any such item in processed form and again for the third time the words used are and further includes gur rab shakkar khandsari and jaggery 
It is a well settled rule of interpretation that where the legislature uses the words means  and includes  such definition is to be given a wider meaning and is not exhaustive or restricted to the items contained or included in such definition
Thus the meaning of  agricultural produce  in the above definition is not restricted to any products of agriculture as specified in the Schedule but also includes such items which come into being in processed form and further includes such items which are called as gur rab shakkar khandsari and jaggery If we look the matter from another angle UP Krishi Utpadan Adhiniyam is a beneficial legislation both for the agriculturists as well as the traders
It provides for collecting market fee by the mandi samities from the agricultural produce brought for sale and purchase in the market areas
We find no ground or justification to take the view that the legislature though intended to levy market fee by mandi samities on gur and rab but may have had no intention of charging of market fee on inferior qualities of gur called as gur lauta or raskat and similarly of inferior qualities of rab called rab galawat and rab salawat
We do not find any good reason to take the view as contended on behalf of the respondents that the gur lauta or raskat being prepared from the molasses as such these items should not be considered as agricultural produce
It cannot be denied that molasses is a syrup drained from the sugarcane juice in the process of manufacturing sugar
Similarly rab is also a product prepared in the same process and 1042 rab salawat and galawat are inferior forms of rab
It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that gur lauta or raskat is not fit for human consumption and the same is utilised for animal consumption as such cannot fall within the definition of gur
Even if for arguments sake it may be admitted that the aforementioned inferior quality of gur is not fit for human consumption and is utilised for animal consumption we do not see any reason to hold that on account of such use or consumption the item cannot be held as an agricultural produce within the meaning of its definition in Section 2a of the Act
Thus in our view an kinds of rab and gur made from sugarcane or from molasses shall fall within the definition of rab and gur as contained in Section 2 a of the Act
In Rathi Khandsari Udyog etc
vs State of UP  Ors etc
  this court while considering the definition of khandsari under Section 2 a of the Act held as under  The Legislature has in terms encompassed Khandsari  within the definition of Section 2a of the Act
And the term Khandsari  is sufficiently wide to cover all varieties of khandsari including the article produced by the factories like those of the petitioners
Besides the basic premise assumed by the petitioners that the object of the Act is merely to protect the producers from exploitation is fallacious
of course one of the main objects of the Act is to protect the producers from being cheated by unscrupulous traders in the matter of price weight payment unlawful market charges etc
and to render them immune from exploitation as indicated by the prefatory note  and by the provisions contained in Section 16i ii iii iv viii etc
While this is one of the objects of the Act it is not the sole or only object of the Act
The Act has many more objects and a much wider perspective such as development of new market areas efficient collection of data and processing of arrivals in Mandis with a view to enable the World Bank to give substantial economic assistance to establish various markets in Uttar Pradesh as also protection of consumers and even traders from being exploited 1043 in the matter of quality weight and price
In Kishan Lal and Ors
vs Slate of Rajasthan  Ors
  it was held as under The definition of the word agricultural produce in the Act includes all produce whether agricultural horticultural animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule
The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially apart the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil
Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character
To say therefore that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States
In Bharat Trading vs State of UP  Ors Writ Petition Civil No 9982 of 1983 decided on 31st March 1992 it was held that raskat  is nothing more than an inferior quality of gur and the same was held as an agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2a of the Act
Thus we hold that gur lauta or raskat and rab galawat and rab salawat fall within the definition of agricultural produce  as contained in Section 2a of the Act and are exigible to market fee under the Act and the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct
In the result we allow all these appeals set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and as a result of which the writ petitions riled by tile respondents stand dismissed
No order as to costs
NVK Appeals allowed


Summary:
Dr H Borobabu Singh the first respondent in the Contempt Petition held the office of Speaker of Manipur Legislative Assembly
This Court having held that the Speaker while deciding the question of disqualification of a Member of the Legislative Assembly under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution acts as a statutory authority in which capacity the Speaker s decision is subject to judicial review by the High Court and this Court made certain orders quashing the disqualification of certain members of the Manipur Legislative Assembly
In spite of the clear decision of this Court it was submitted the contemner continued to resist the Implementation of such orders made by this court
petitioner In the contempt petition 1
Manilal Singh was then the of the Manipur Legislative Assembly and as the Secretary be took steps to implement this Court s orders
The allegation made by him was that the contemner Dr H Borobabu Singh got annoyed with him for his attempt to secure obedience and implementation of this Court s orders and therefore as an act of reprisal the contemner had made an 769 770 order of his compulsory retirement
The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order of his compulsory retirement alleging that it was mala fide being an act of reprisal by the contemner for the petitioner s obedience of this Court s orders
This Court stayed the operation of the order of compulsory retirement as well as the order of suspension passed by the contemner
The petitioner then complained that the contemner was not permitting him to function as the Secretary of the Manipur Legislative Assembly and was also not paying him his salary and other dues and that another person had been appointed by the contemner to function as the Secretary
On July 22 1992 this Court made an order reiterating that the petitioner shall be allowed to function as the Secretary of the Manipur Legislative Assembly without delay and that all concerned will enable him to so function
Further directions were also given
As a result of the grievance made by the petitioner that in spite of the orders of this Court he was neither allowed to function as the Secretary nor paid his salary etc
another order was made on August 4 1992 directing the Chief Secretary of the State to ensure that the direction given for payment of dues was promptly obeyed
On August 25 1992 the Court after recording that the action to retire the petitioner from service on August 31 1992 as Joint Secretary appeared to be prima facie in violation of the Court s order stayed the operation of the order expression its concern at the apathy exhibited towards obedience of the mandate under Article 144 of the Constitution and after hearing all the counsel made an order directing that the Chief Secretary Deputy Secretary of the legislative Assembly and the contemner should be per sonally present in Court at the next hearing in September 9 1992
On the aforesaid date the Chief Secretary and the Deputy Secretary were personally present but on behalf of the contemner his Counsel sought an adjournment till September 22 1992 on he ground that the Manipur Legislative Assembly was in session which was granted
On September 25 1992 the contemner did not appear in person but his Counsel filed an affidavit that he is immune from the directions of the Court in view of his constitutional position as Speaker
The Court heard 771 the Counsel and rejected the contention and adjourned the matter to 20 12 the contemner to give a written undertaking before be left the country as a member of the Indian parliamentary delegation that he would appear in the court
The contemner did not give the aforesaid undertaiking and when the matter was taken up on November 12 1M the contemner was not present and the only thing done by him was to Me an affidavit dated November 6 1992 indicating that he would not personally appear before the Court In the aforesaid circumstances and having regard to the attitude adopted by the contemner It became necessary for the Court to consider the making of necessary consequential orders to secure the presence of the contemner
It accordingly heard arguments on December 8 1992
The Attorney General of India submitted that the undisputed and the unequivocal stand taken by the contemner left no doubt about his wilful and contumacious disregard and disobedience of the Court s orders which is without any doubt by Itself sufficient to constitute criminal contempt of this Court
That apart from the power which this Court has under the and the Rules framed thereunder the powers of this Coon under several provisions of the Constitution of India is wide enough to indicate that the procedure available to It for ensuring compliance of it orders Includes the taking of all steps considered necessary to ensure compliance of this Court s orders which is a constitutional obligation of the Court to uphold the role of law  and that the Court also had the power to direct the Government of India to take the necessary steps to produce the contemner in the Court if the ordinary course of requiring a Magistrate to produce him In the Court Is considered inappropriate
The Solicitor General of India on behalf of the Government of India and the Counsel for the Chief Secretary and the petitioner supported the submissions of the Attorney General while the Counsel for the contemner reiterated the stand taken by the contemner that by virtue of the office of the Speaker which he holds he is immune from the Court s process even in a contempt matter which does not relate to his function as Speaker inside the House
Directing the production of the contemner Dr H Borobabu Singh before the Court on March 23 13
HELD  1
The undisputed facts expose the conduct of the contemner Dr H Borobabu Singh in refusing to obey the orders of this Court 772 directing him to appear in person in this Court to enable the hearing of the contempt proceedings against him after the tentative opinion formed by this Court that his wilful and contumacious violation of this Court s orders and deliberate obstruction of the persons acting in the aid of this Courts orders coupled with his act of reprisal against the Secretary of the legislative Assembly for obeying the orders made by this Court make out a prima facie case of  contempt as recorded in the orders made and known to him
780G H 781A 2The contemner s repeated and categorical refusal to appear in person in this Court in spite of this Court s orders and grant of considerable indulgence to him is clear from the statements made in his affidavits and through his counsel who has appeared for him throughout 782B 3
From the documents filed by the Union of India it is evident that even the Union Home Minister has strongly advised the contemner to desist from the course he has chosen to adopt and to obey the orders of this Court which is his constitutional obligation
783C 4
Articles 141 142 and 144 of the Constitution are well known and they are mentioned for the benefit of the contemner who has wilfully and deliberately refused to obey and ignored not merely the orders of this Court but has also chosen to ignore the provisions in the Constitution itself to which he must have sworn allegiance before taking his sent as a Member of the Manipur Legislative Assembly
782H 5
The immunity given by Article 361 of the Constitution is not to a Speaker and no other provision supports the submission made by the contemner
It is unfortunate that a person who holds the constitutional officer of Speaker of a Legislative Assembly has chosen to ignore the constitutional mandate that this country is governed by the rule of law and what the law is is for this Court to declare in discharge of Its constitutional obligation which bind all in accordance with Article 141 of Constitution of India and Article 144 then says that all authorities a are to act in aid of the orders made by this Court
The contemner has chosen to ignore also the obvious corollary of rule of law that no person is above law
782F G 773 7
Having doen its best to make the contemner see reason and be present by granting indulgence repeatedly to the extent that the Attorney General said that the indulgence and leniency was being construed as the weakness of the Court this Court is constrained to now take the only appropriate and logical course to which the Court is driven in these circumstances viz to require the production of the contemner Dr H  Borobabu Singh in person before this Court It is the constitutional duty  of this Court to uphold the majesty of law and justify the confidence of the people that no one in this country is above the law and governance is not of men but of the rule of law 
783B D 8The Government of India is directed to produce Dr H Borobabu  Singh in person in this Court on the next date of hearing taking such steps as are necessary for the purpose
The Government of India would be entitled to take all steps which are necessary including the use of minimum force which may be required for compliance
784H 795A 9
A copy of the order to be sent forthwith by the Registrar judicial to Home Secretary Government of India for prompt compliance
The next date of hearing fixed for March 23 1993
785B