ivil Appeal No 593 of 1963
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 19 1962 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No 157 of 1961
MC Setalvad and R Gopalakrishnan for the appellant
GS Pathak OC Mathur JB Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain for respondent No 1
Ranganadham Chetty and AV Rangant respondents Nos 2 and 3
The Judgment of PB Gajendragadkar KN Wanchoo JC Shah Ragubar Dayal JJ
was delivered by Gajendragadkar J Subba Rao J delivered a dissenting opinion
GAJENDRAGADKAR J
The short question which this appeal raises for our decision relates to the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari while dealing with
orders passed by the appropriate authorities granting or refusing to grant permits under the provisions of the hereinafter called the Act 
67 The State Transport Authority Madras hereinafter referred to as Authorityissued a notification on the 4th July 1956 under section 572 of the Act calling for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits to run as an express service on the route Madras to Chidambaram
107 applications were received in response to the said notification some of these were rejected as time barred or otherwise defective and the others which were in order were examined by the Authority
On the 8th May 1957 the Authority found that Provincial Transport Private Ltd Madras was the most suitable amongst the applicants and granted one permit to it
As regards the second permit the Authority held that none of the other applicants was suitable and so it refused to grant the said permit to anyone of themit decided to call for applications afresh under section 572 of the Act
Against this order appeals were preferred by 18 claimants for permits before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal hereinafter called the Appellate Tribunal amongst them was the appellant Syed Yakoob and respondent No 1 KS Radhakrishnan
The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the grant of the first permit to the Provincial Transport Pvt Ltd and so Car as the second permit was concerned it allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant and directed that the said second permit should be issued to him respondent No 1 s claim for the said permit was accordingly rejected
This order was passed on the 7th July 1958
The validity of this order was challenged by respondent No 1 by his writ petition No 44 of 1959 11led in the High Court of Madras
Srinivasan J who heard the writ petition held that th e Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in deciding the question of the grant of the second permit and allowed considerations not germane to the question to vitiate its order
That is why the rule issued on the writ petition filed by respondent No 1 was made absolute
68 This order was challenged by the appellant before a Division Bench of the said High Court by an appeal preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent
The Division Bench has held that the order passed by Srinivasan J could be sustained on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in favour of respondent No 1 and so it has affirmed the decision of the learned single Judge on that ground alone
In regard to the finding of the learned single Judge that an
irrelevant consideration had vitiated the finding of the Appellate Tribunal the Division Bench held that the consideration in question was not irrelevant and so it differed from the view taken by Srinivasan J
In the result the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Division Bench was dismissed
It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave and to his appeal he has impleaded respondent No 1 and has added the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents 2 and 3 Mr Setalvad for the appellant contends that in issuing a writ of certiorari in respect of the impugned order passed by the Appellate
Tribunal the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution
In our opinion
this contention is well founded and must be accepted
The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt
A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction or in excess of it or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions
A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly as for instance it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the 69 dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice
There is however no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court
This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of tact however grave it may appear to be
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the
Tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding
Similarly if a finding of fact is based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari
In dealing with this category of cases however we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was  insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding
The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court
It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised vide Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed Ishaque1 Nagendra Nath Bora vs The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam2 and Kaushalya Devi vs Bachittar Singh3
It is of course not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of 1  2  3 AIR 1960 SC 1168
70 the record means
What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record
Where it is manliest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis interpretation of the relevant statutory provision or sometimes in ignorance of it or may be even in disregard of it or is expressly rounded on reasons which are wrong in law the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari
In all these cases the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record
It may also be that in some cases
the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must on the whole be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record
If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari
In our opinion it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record
Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened
In the present case the question raised by the appellant presents no difficulty whatever
The point which was raised before the High Court by respondent 71 No 1 lies within a very narrow compass it is a very short and simple question of fact
It appears that in dealing with the rival claims of the appellant and respondent No 1 for the second permit on the route in question the Appellate Tribunal was ultimately influenced by the fact that the appellant had a workshop at Madras which is one terminus of the route in question whereas respondent No 1 had a workshop and a place of business only at Cuddalore which is an intermediate station on the route and did not possess a workshop at either of the terminii of the route the other terminus being Chidambaram
In fact that appears to be the effect of the finding made by the Authority also
Respondent No 1 urged before the High Court that in coming to the conclusion that he had no workshop at Chidambaram the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider material evidence adduced by him
It is on this narrow ground that a writ has been issued in favour of respondent No 1
Mr Setalvad contends that the question as to whether respondent No 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram is a pure question of fact and the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and seek to correct it by issuing a writ of certiorari
In this connection he relies on the fact that both the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal have in substance found that respondent No 1 had no workshop at either of the two terminii on the route and the fact that no reasons have been given in support of the said finding would not justify the interference of the High Court in its jurisdiction under article 226
It may be conceded that it would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal had indicated why it rejected the case of respondent No 1 in regard to his alleged workshop at Chadambaram but we do not think that the failure of the Appellate Tribunal to give a reason in that behalf or to refer specifically to the evidence adduced by respondent No1 would by itself constitute such an error in its decision as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under article 226
In this connection we ought to add that it has not been suggested by 72 respondent No 1 that in dealing with his claim for a permit admissible evidence which he wanted to adduce had been excluded by the Tribunal from the recordthe argument that some evidence was not duly considered by the Tribunal would normally pertain to the realm of the appreciation of evidence and would as such be outside the purview of an enquiry in proceedings for a writ of certiorari under article 226
It appears that when respondent No 1 applied for the permit he sent a letter dated 11th July 1956 in which he had stated that he had a workshop at Chidambaram and that he was running it in order to maintain the service efficiently and without any breakdown whatsoever
The argument is that this letter has not been challenged by any party to the proceedings and has been completely ignored by the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal when they reached the conclusion that respondent No 1 did not possess a workshop at Chidambaram
As we have already pointed out neither the Authority nor the Appellate Tribunal has given reasons in support of the findings of fact recorded by it but the said fact alone does not in our opinion justify the conclusion of the High Court that the letter in question had not been considered by the said Authorities and so the High Court was not right in issuing a writ of certiorari on that basis alone
But apart from this aspect of the matter the record shows that the assertion of respondent No 1 that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was contradicted by one of the claimants for a permit and is entirely inconsistent with the reports submitted to the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal by the department
D Kanniah Pillai one of the applicants for the permit had specifically averred in his application that the other applicants amongst whom respondent No 1 was included were all for away from the Headquarters having no workshop at Chidambaram
Thus it would not be right to assume that the claim made by respondent No 1 that he had a workshop at Chidambaram was not disputed by any other competitor
73 What is more significant however is the evidence supplied by the report made by the Regional Transport Officer South Arcot
This report is made under different columns
Column 4 speaks about the possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location
The report is made in respect of each one of the applicants
In regard to respondent No 1 under column 4 the report shows that he was maintaining a workshop as per Government Order at Cuddalore and column 5 speaks about the location of his residence or place of business as Cuddalore
A similar report has been submitted about the appellant and that shows that the appellant had workshop facilities at Madras and that he had a residence and place of business at the terminus
When the present dispute went before the Appellate Tribunal a fresh report appears to have been called for and this report which has been made by the Secretary State Transport Authority also shows that respondent No 1 had a workshop at Cuddalore on the route whereas the appellant had a workshop at Madras
It would thus be clear that on the question as to whether respondent No 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram there was his own assertion stating that he had such a workshop
and there were the two reports made by the Transport Officers which contradicted the said assertion the said assertion was also challenged by one of the applicants
 On this state of the record it was we think not permissible to the High Court to consider these questions of fact and to hold that the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal was a finding without any evidence
To say that material considerations were ignored by the Appellate Tribunal in holding that respondent No 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram would be plainly unreasonable when it is remembered that the evidence disclosed a sharp conflict between the versions of the parties and the version of respondent No 1 was inconsistent with the reports made by the Transport Officers which must have been treated as more reliable by the Appellate Tribunal
There 74 can be little doubt that if respondent No 1 had owned a workshop at Chidambaram it would have been mentioned in col 4 because the said column is obviously intended to indicate all places where the claimant owns a workshop and possesses repair facilities
It appears that before Srinivasan J the appellant s learned counsel conceded that the allegation made by respondent No 1 that he owned a workshop at Chidambaram had not been challenged before the Transport Authorities and naturally Srinivasan J was considerably impressed by the said concession but as the Division Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal has pointed out the said concession was not correctly made in fact the record distinctly shows that the claim made by respondent No 1 was challenged by one of the applicants for permit and was plainly inconsistent with the reports to which we have just referred
Therefore the concession on which Srinivasan J relied has been properly left out of account by the Division Bench in dealing with the appeal
The Division Bench thought that apart from the said concession it did appear that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked the claim made by respondent No 1 in his letter of the 11 th July 1956
As we have already indicated we find it difficult to sustain this finding
In our opinion apart from the fact that the plea raised by respondent No 1 could not be validly raised under article 226 even on the merits the said plea is not well founded
The question on which respondent No 1 sought for the intervention of the High Court under article 226 was a simple question of fact and we are satisfied that on that question of fact the Appellate Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the claim made by respondent No 1 about the existence of a workshop at Chidambaram was not well founded but even if the said finding did not appear to the High Court to be satisfactory that would be no reason for issuing a writ under article 226
There was evidence in support of the finding of the Appellate Tribunal and it is not a 75 case where the finding is based on no evidence at all
We ought also to add that though the Division Bench was satisfied that the concession on which Srinivasan J substantially acted had been wrongly made before him its attention does not appear to have been drawn to the reports made by the Transport Officers to which we have just referred
We have no doubt that if the Division Bench had taken into account those reports it would have hesitated to confirm the finding made by Srinivasan J
It appears that Srinivasan J was inclined to take the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it took into account certain irrelevant considerations
The Division Bench has held that the said considerations cannot be said to be irrelevant
These considerations centre round the question as to whether preference should be given to an applicant for permit who has his headquarters at the terminus as against another who has only a branch office at the said terminus
The practice usually followed by the Tribunals under the Act appears to be to give one mark under col 3 to the applicant who has his headquarters at the terminus and give only 12 mark to an applicant who has only a branch office at the terminus
Having held that the consideration on which marks are thus allotted cannot be said to be irrelevant the Division Bench has indicated that the policy underlying the said practice may be open to doubt
In our opinion it would have been better if the Division Bench had not expressed any opinion on this aspect of the matter particularly when it came to the conclusion that the said matter was primarily for the decision of the Appellate Tribunal
Mr Pathak for respondent No 1 has relied on a recent decision of this Court in KM Shanmugam vs The SRVS P Ltd1 in support of his contention that the error committed by the Appellate Tribunal really amounted to a contravention of section 47 of the Act
He argues that the Appellate Tribunal was 1  76 under an obligation in considering the question about the grant of a permit to take into account the interests of public generally under section 47a and inasmuch as the Appellate Tribunal has ignored the fact that respondent No 1 owns a workshop at Chidambaram and thereby has refused his application for a permit the interests of thepublic generally have been sacrificed
This argument prima facie appears to be far fetched and fanciful but Mr Pathak urges that the observations made by this Court in the case of KM Shanmugum are in his favour
In our opinion the said decision does not lend any assistance to Mr Pathak s contention
In that case this Court was satisfied that the Tribunal made a clear error of law inasmuch as it held that in the case of the first respondent as it had a branch at Kumbakonam its other branch at Manmargudi should be ignored
 The judgment shows that this Court took the view that it was obviously an untenable proposition to hold that even if a company has a well equipped office on a route in respect of which a permit is applied for it shall be ignored if the company has some other branch somewhere unconnected with that route and it was observed that was precisely what the Appellate Tribunal had held and that according to the Court clearly was an error apparent on the face of the record
It is in that connection that this Court referred to the mandatory provisions of section 47
We do not think that this decision can be legitimately pressed into service by Mr Pathak in the present case
It is only after it is proved that respondent No 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram that any subsequent question about the interests of the public generally can possibly arise
If as in the present case the Appellate Tribunal has held that respondent No 1 did not own a workshop at Chidambaram no consideration of public interests can arise at all and it is with this question that the present writ proceedings are concerned
We ought to add that the decision in the case of KM Shanmugam cannot justify a party whose application for permit has been rejected by the authorities under the Act to move the High 77 Court under article 226 and invite it to consider all questions of fact on the plea that the decision on the said questions of fact may assist him to invoke the provisions of section 47
That clearly is not the effect of the said decision
Mr Pathak has also urged that even if we come to the conclusion that the High Court was not competent to issue a writ in the present proceedings having regard to the nature of the questions raised before it by respondent No 1 we should not reverse the decision of the High Court under article 136 of the Constitution
The jurisdiction of this Court under article 136 though very wide is exercised by the Court in its discretion says Mr Pathak and he contends that where the order under appeal furthers the ends of justice we should not reverse the said order on technical grounds
We are not impressed by this plea
It may be conceded that in a proper case this Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under article 136 where the interests of justice patently indicate the desirability of adopting such a course but we do not see how a plea of such a kind can be entertained where it is clearly shown that the impugned orders passed by the High
Court are without jurisdiction
If Mr Pathak s argument were to be accepted in a majority of cases if the High Court interfered with questions of fact in issuing writs of certiorari against the decisions of special Tribunals it may always be urged that what the High Courts have done is in the interests of justice and this Court should not interfere with the decisions of the High Courts
In the circumstances of the present case we do not see how considerations of justice can really arise
The Tribunals of fact have found that respondent No 1 does not own a workshop at Chidambaram and having regard to the other relevant circumstances which the Tribunals have considered the fact that he does not own a workshop at Chidambaram has ultimately proved decisive against respondent No 1 and in favour of the appellant
If that be so a decision based on facts found by the 78 Tribunal cannot be reopened on the plausible plea that a further enquiry should be made because that would be just
If findings of fact were allowed to be disturbed by High Courts in such writ proceedings that may lead to an interminable search for correct findings and would virtually convert the High Courts into Appellate Courts competent to deal with questions of fact
That is why we think in entertaining petitions for writs of certiorari it is necessary to remember that findings of fact recorded by special Tribunals which have been clothed with jurisdiction to deal with them should be treated as final between the parties unless of course it is shown that the impugned finding is based on no evidence
Therefore we do not think the plea made by Mr Pathak that in the interests of justice we should refrain from setting aside the order under appeal can be upheld
There is one more point to which reference must be made
It appears that in the writ petition filed by respondent No 1 he claimed that the orders passed by the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal should be set aside and a rule was issued in terms of the prayer made in the said petition
Ultimately the said rule has been made absolute
It is obvious that in the writ petition respondent No 1 did not challenge the grant of the permit to the  Provincial Transport Pvt Ltd but unfortunately having regard to the prayer made by respondent No 1 in his writ petition the orders ultimately passed in the said proceedings may if technically construed mean that the orders of the Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal have been set aside and that clearly was not and could not have been the intention of the High Court in issuing the writ
It would we think be better if in issuing a writ on a writ petition and in making it absolute in case the writ petition succeeds care is taken to draw the order more accurately
The result is the appeal is allowed the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ 79 petition filed by respondent No 1 is dismissed Respondent 1 to pay the cost of the appellant in this Court
Mr Ranganathan Cherry who appears for respondents 2 and 3 has asked for his costs
We do not think this request can be accepted
It may be that in such proceedings the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal are proper and necessary parties but unless allegations are made against them which need a reply from them it is not usual for the authorities to be represented by lawyers in Court
In ordinary cases their position is like that of courts or other Tribunals against whose decisions writ proceedings are filed they are not interested in the merits of the dispute in any sense and so their representation by lawyers in such proceedings is wholly unnecessary and even inappropriate
That is why we direct that respondents 2 and 3 should bear their own costs
SUBBA RAO J I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my learned brother Gajendragadkar J
I cannot agree
The facts lie in a small compass and they are as followsThe State Transport Authority Madras called for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits on the route Madras to Chidambaram
107 applications were received by the said Authority
The appellant and the first respondent are two of the said applicants
The State Transport Authority gave one of the permits to the Provincial Transport Private Limited Madras we are not concerned with this permit
As regards the second permit the said Authority found none of the applicants suitable and therefore refused to grant the same to any one of them and directed fresh applications to be called for
Against the said order the appellant first respondent and others preferred appeals to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
The appellant herein was respondent 16 and respondent herein was appellant 7 before the said Appellate Tribunal
The first respondent secured the highest total marks viz 712  under columns 1 to 5 under the scheme of marking sanctioned by the State Government
The appellant got only 412 marks
Ignoring the highest total of 80 marks secured by the first respondent the Appellate Tribunal rejected his claim on the ground that he had his workshop and place of business en route at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the route
Excluding the first respondent the Appellate Tribunal for the reasons mentioned in the order preferred the appellant in a competition between him and appellant 14 before the Tribunal
The main ground of preference was that the appellant had got his workshop in the headquarters at Madras
In file result the Appellate Tribunal rejected the application of the first respondent and gave the permit to the appellant
The first respondent filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court Judicature at Madras for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the said Tribunal
The said petition was heard by Srinivasan J and he quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal mainly on the ground that the Tribunal did not take into consideration a material and relevant circumstance to the enquiry before it namely that the petitioner had the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at Chidambaram one of the terminii of the route in question
In that view the learned Judge quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal
On Letters Patent Appeal a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Ramachandra Iyer CJ and Venkataraman J held that the learned Judge should not have given a finding on the question whether the first respondent had the above said facilities at Chidambaram but agreed with him that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked the claim made by the first respondent to the effect that he had such facilities at Chidambaram
Hence the appeal
Mr Setalvad learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Appellate Tribunal had held on the material placed before it that the first respondent had no such facilities at the terminal and that therefore the High Court had n0 jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal
81 Mr Pathak learned counsel for the first respondent argued that though the first respondent clearly stated in his letter dated July 11 1956 to the Transport Authority that he had such facilities the State Transport Authority as well as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had ignored that material circumstance which was germane to the question of public interest under section 47 of the  and therefore the High Court had rightly quashed that order under article 226 of the Constitution and directed the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal on merits
Alternatively he contended that though there might be some material for the Appellate Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the first respondent had no such facilities three learned Judges of the High Court on the admissions made and the material placed before them have held that the Tribunal did not decide that question and that they only gave a further opportunity to the Appellate Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits and that in the circumstances it is not a fit case for this Court to interfere under article 136 of the Constitution
The first respondent has a fundamental right to carry on business in transport
The is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interests on such right
Under section 47 of the said Act the Regional Transport Authority shall in considering an application for a stage carriage permit have regard inter alia to the interests of the public generally
The fact that the first respondent has a separate workshop or at any rate has the necessary repair and maintenance facilities at one of the terminii of the route viz at Chidambaram is certainly a consideration germane to the question of public interest
Indeed the scheme of marking system suggested by the Government also recognizes the importance of such facilities at either of the terminii of the route
If the first respondent had placed before the authorities concerned the said circumstance in support of his claim for a permit and if that was ignored or not investigated into by the said authorities the High Court would certainly 1 SCI64 5 82 have jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the authorities and direct them to ascertain whether the claim of the first respondent was true and if it was true to take that into consideration before issuing the permit to one or other of the claimants before them
In such an event the High Court would not be interfering with the finding fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal based on the material placed before it but would only be quashing the order on the ground that an important and material circumstance was ignored or not investigated into by the Tribunal
If a Tribunal ignores or fails to investigate a material circumstance put forward by a claimant and gives a finding against him the said finding can certainly be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record
In the present case the State Transport Authority was considering the competing claims of 107
persons for two permits
The said Authority gave its decision on May 8 1957
The first respondent filed his application for a permit on July 11 1956
On the same day he addressed a letter to the said Authority to the following effect Chidambaram is one of the terminii of this proposed route
A separate office and workshop are located at Chidambaram in order to maintain the service efficiently and without any breakdown or whatsoever
 None of the innumerable applicants in his application denied specifically the caim of the first respondent that he had a separate office and workshop at Chidambaram
This fact was conceded before Srinivasan J though the learned judge put the concession somewhat higher than was actually made
Nor did the learned counsel for the appellant go back on the limited concession before the Division Bench
But one Kanniah Pillai who was applicant No 43 D stated in his application thus The applicant Nos 43 57 69 78 and 81 are residents of Chidambaram but No 57 is a fleet 83 owner
69 and 78 have no workshop
No 81 is a new entrant
The rest all are far away from the headquarters having no workshop at Chidambaram
 Except this vague and implied denial by Kanniah Pillai there is nothing on the record to suggest that any other applicant denied the claim of the first respondent
The fact remains that the appellant did not at any stage of the proceedings refute the claim of the first respondent
With this background let me first look at the order of the State Transport Authority
The said Authority has ignored the said letter of the first respondent claiming to have a workshop at Chidambaram but it stated in an omnibus clause that the first respondent and some of the other applicants were residents either in the middle or off the route and they were not so well situated as an applicant who had facilities at one end of the route with all the necessary facilities
It may be stated that this is an implied finding against the first respondent but the complaint of the first respondent is that it is made in utter disregard of his claim
So too the Appellate Tribunal observed in its order disposing of the 18 appeals before it that the first respondent who had secured the highest number of marks including those column 1 of the mark list had his workshop and place of business en route at Cuddalore and not at either of the terminii of the route
This observation was also made in utter disregard of the claim made by the first respondent that he had a workshop Chidambaram one of the terminii of the route and though the other applicants except one had not denied the said fact
The High Court therefore found on the material placed before it that the said Authority as well as the Tribunal had failed to consider the specific claim made by the
first respondent in regard to his workshop at Chidambaram and therefore rightly set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal so that the Appellate Tribunal might consider the claim made by the first respondent
I 84 do not see any flaw in the reasoning of the High Court
Nor can I say that it has exceeded its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution
But Mr Setalvad contended that there was material before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal gave its finding on the basis of that material
He relied upon an extract from the report of the Regional Transport Authority South Arcot dated January 31 1957
That was a report sent by the said Authority to the State Transport Authority
Against the name of the first respondent in column 4 under the heading possession of workshop or repair or maintenance facilities and its location it is stated maintaining a workshop at per GO at Cuddalore
Again in the report sent by the State Transport Authority to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the name of the first respondent in column 8 under the heading Place of residence or principal place of business and the nearest distance the entry is Cuddalore on the route
This information given by the Transport Authority is presumably gathered from the earlier report of the
Regional Transport Authority
Reliance is placed upon a letter dated January 10 1957 written by the first respondent to the Secretary State Transport Authority in support of the contention that even the first respondent though on July 111 1956 he claimed to have had a workshop at Chidambaram did not mention it therein
But a perusal of that letter shows that he did mention that he had the sector and terminal qualifications
Basing the argument on the said documents it was contended that there was material on which the Appellate Tribunal could have come to the finding which it did viz that the first respondent had no workshop at either of the terminii of the route
Firstly these documents were not expressly relied upon by the Tribunal for holding that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram
Secondly these documents were not relied upon by the appellant either before Srinivasan J or before the Division Bench to the effect that the Appellate Tribunal gave a finding on the basis of the 85 said material
Thirdly one of the said documents viz the letter of the first respondent does not support the contention
The other two reports did not say that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram
The officers who made the report did not make any enquiry as regards the fact whether the first respondent had a workshop at Chidambaram on the basis of the claim made by him
There is therefore absolutely no evidence to controvert the first respondent s claim and that is the reason why the appellant did not place the said documents before the High Court in support of his contention that there was material before the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for holding that the first respondent had no workshop at Chidambaram
A perusal of the two orders shows that presumably in view of the innumerable applications the specific claim of the first respondent was completely missed by the Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal
This is therefore a clear case of a finding made by the Tribunal without any evidence to support it and by ignoring a specific claim made before it
I am therefore of opinion that the High Court rightly set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal
The next question is whether this is a fit case for interference under article 136 of the Constitution in exercise of this Court s extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder
Srinivasan J and on appeal the Division Bench on the basis of the material placed and the concession made before them came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had ignored the specific claim set up by the first respondent
The first respondent had secured the highest number of marks
His claim if substantiated would certainly tilt the balance in his favour
The material placed before us was not relied upon by the appellant before the High Court
The High Court gave a further opportunity to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the claim of the first respondent
Though the High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal the observation in the judgment clearly shows that the Tribunal 86 could reconsider the matter
Indeed learned counsel for the first respondent conceded that fact
The appellant would have every opportunity to establish that the first respondent has no workshop at Chidambaram
Instead of following the straight course he is trying to shut out further enquiry to arrive at the truth
In the circumstances I am of the view that this is not a case which calls for the exercise of this Court s extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High Court
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent
ORDER BY COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed and the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No 1 is dismissed
Respondent No 1 to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court
Respondents 2 and 3 to bear their own costs


Summary:
The State Transport Authority issued a notification under the  calling for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits for the route Madras to Chidambaram
A large number of applications were received
The authority granted the first permit to one of the applicants and for the second it decided to call for fresh applications
The appellant as also a number of other applicants appealed to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
The Tribunal confirmed the grant of the first permit and as regards the second it allowed the appeal of the appellant and directed that it should be granted to him
Respondent No 1 moved the High Court under Art226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari and the single Judge who heard the matter held that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked relevant considerations and allowed irrelevant considerations to prevail and so made the Rule absolute
A Letters Patent appeal was preferred by the appellant
The Division Bench affirmed the order of the single Judge on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in favour of the respondent No 1 and dismissed the appeal The appellant came to this Court by special leave and it was contended on his behalf that in issuing the writ of certiorari the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution
Held per Gajendragadkar Wanchoo Shah and Dayal JJ
The contention raised on behalf of the appellant was well founded and must prevail
A writ of certiorari is issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by courts or tribunals in cases where they exceed their jurisdiction or fail to exercise it or exercise it illegally or improperly ie where an order is passed without hearing the party sought to be affected by it or where the procedure adopted is opposed to principles of natural justice
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory one and in exercising it the court is not entitled to act as a court of appeal
That necessarily means that the findings of fact arrived at by the inferior court or tribunal arc binding
65 An error of law apparent on the face of the record can however be corrected by a writ of certiorari but not an error of fact however grave it may appear to be
A writ of certiorari can also be issued if it is shown that in recording a finding of fact admissible and material evidence has not been admitted or inadmissible evidence affecting the impugned finding has been admitted
A finding of fact based on no evidence would also be an error of law and as Such amenable to such a writ
But a finding of fact cannot be challenged in such a proceeding on the ground that the relevant and material evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding
Adequacy or sufficiency of evidence or an inference of fact to be drawn from the evidence or finding of fact are entirely within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed Ishaque   Nagendra Nath Bora vs The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam  and Kaushalya Devi vs Bachittar Singh AIR 1960 SC 1168 relied on
It is neither possible nor desirable to define or describe all cases of errors which can be said to be errors of law apparent on the face of the record
Whether or not an error is such an error would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature and scope of the law misconstrued or contravened
It was not open to a party on the authority of the decision of this Court in KM Shanmugam vs
SRVS P Ltd to come to the High Court under article 226 to have all questions of fact reconsidered so as to invoke the plea of public interest  under section 47 of the 
K M Shamnugam vs SRVS P Ltd 1 1964 1 SCR 809 held inapplicable
In the present case the controversy centered round the fact whether the respondent No 1 had a workshop at Chidambaram one of the two terminii of the route and that the tribunal had failed to duly consider some evidence in that connection
That argument was an argument related to appreciation of evidence and as such was outside the purview of a proceeding for a writ of certiorari
The High Court was therefore in error in issuing the writ of certiorari
In issuing a writ and in making it absolute care should be taken to draw the order accurately
Unless allegations are made against them the State Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal should not be represented through lawyers
Their position in ordinary cases is just the same as that of courts and other tribunals
Per Subba Rao J Where the tribunal ignores or fails to investigate a material circumstance germane to a question of public 1 SCI64 5 66 interest under section 47 of the Act put forward by a claimant for permit and gives a finding against him that finding is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record and is liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari
and the Appellate Tribunal failed to consider the specific claim of the respondent 1 as to the existence of his workshop at Chidambaram and was therefore right in setting aside their orders
The High Court could not be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution
This was a clear case where the Tribunal made a finding that was based on no evidence and was contrary to the specific claim made before it
Since the first respondent had secured the highest number of marks this claim if substantiated would tilt the balance in his favour
This Court would not interfere in such a matter in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution to set aside the High Court s order