ivil Appeal No 2468 of 1982
From the Judgment and Order dated 831982 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in CRP Nos 3726 3727 3910 and 4883 of 1979
PG NO 202 Dr YS Chitale and G Narasimhulu for the Appellant
TS Krishnamurti Iyer Krishan Kumar and Rajeshwar Rao for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN J
This appeal by special leave by a tenant arises out of a common judgment rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in four Civil Writ Petitions
Two of the Revision Petitions were filed by the appellant herein and the other two were filed by one Narsimha Murthy the second respondent herein
By a common judgment the High Court d_missed all the four revision Petitions
While Narsimha Murthy has not preferred any appeal the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave to question the legality and propriety of the decree for eviction passed against him on the ground he had unauthorisedly sublet the leased premises to the second respondent for running a hotel
Originally the building bearing door nos
7 2 606 607 617 and 618 old door No 2540 Rashtrapati Road Secunderabad belonged to one Bhima Rao
The appellant took the ground floor of the premises on lease in the year 1953 from the said Bhima Rao on a monthly rent of Rs250 for running a hotel in the name and style of Sharada Bhavan
In or about September 1967 Bhima Rao conveyed the premises by means of a Deed of Gift to his daughter Manga Devi the first respondent herein and the appellant duly attorned his tenancy and was paying her the rent
After August l969 the hotel came to be run by the second respondent instead of the appellant
As the first respondent had reasons to believe that the appellant had either transferred his rights under the lease or sublet the leased premises to the second respondent she terminated the tenancy by means of notice with effect from 31st January l97 l and called upon the appellant to surrender possession thereafter
The appellant refused to vacate and sent a reply refuting the allegations contained in the notice issued to him
This led to the first respondent filing a petition under Section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease
Rent and Eviction Control Act
1960 for short the Act  hereafter to seek the eviction of the appellant and the second respondent on three grounds viz 1 wilful default in payment of rent 2 unauthorised subletting and 3 causing waste to the property
The Rent Controller ordered eviction on the second and third grounds
The appellant and the second respondent preferred seperate appeals to the Appellate Authority and both the appeals were dismissed
Thereafter the two affected parties filed two PG NO 203 revisions each against the dismissal of the appeals and the High Court clubbed all the four revisions and rendered a common judgment dismissing all the revision petitions
The High Court however affirmed the finding of the courts below only on the ground of sub letting and consequently the sole question for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Court has erred in law in upholding the order for eviction passed by the first two Courts on the ground of sub letting
Dr Chitale learned counsel for the appellant took us through the terms of the agreement Exhibit R 14 entered into between the appellant and the second respondent as well as the relevant portions of the judgments of the Courts below and the High Court and argued that this was a case where the appellant had only transferred the managing rights of the hotel to the second respondent and hence there was no basis or material for the Rent Controller or the Appellate Court to hold that the appellant had sublet the leased premises to the second respondent and therefore the High Court too was in error in confirming the order of eviction passed against the appellant and the second respondent
The learned counsel further contended that neither the agreement nor the conduct of the parties afforded any ground for taking the view that the appellant had transferred his rights under the lease or had sublet the premises to the second respondent and on the other hand there was adequate material to show that the appellant had retained his rights in the leased premises notwithstanding his placing the hotel business in the hands of the second respondent
To substantiate these contentions Dr Chitale laid stress on certain clauses in the agreement which seek to emphasise that the transfer of rights pertained to the business alone and not the leasehold rights of the appellant in the leased premises
The clauses referred to are as follows
Clause 2 sets out that the first party the appellant has agreed to allow the second party the second respondent to manage the said Sharada Bhawan with all the furniture etc
Clause 7 interdicts the second party from permitting the use of the premises for any purpose other than that for which it is being used viz as a vegetarian restaurant without the consent in writing of the first party
Clause 8 enjoins the second party to maintain the standard and reputation which the said business has earned and acquired
Clause 9 prohibits the second party from assigning or underletting or otherwise parting with the business without the permission in writing of the first party
Clause 11 stipulates that the second party shall observe all the rules and regulations governing the licences granted to the first party by the Municipality Police etc
and further sets out that if any breach is committed by the PG NO 204 second party he should indemnify the first party
Under Clause 13 the first party has reserved a right to inspect the business at all reasonable times to satisfy himself that The second party was fulfilling the conditions set out in the agreement
Clause 15 provides that on the expiry of the agreement the second party should peacefully and quietly surrender and hand over possession of the business to the first party together with all the furniture fixtures utensils etc
 Clauses 16 and 17 are of significance for both parties and therefore they are extracted in full Clause 16 The lease of the premises wherein the said business is being run shall continue to be enjoyed exclusively by the first party at all times and first party shall be liable to pay the monthly rent of Rs250 or any other enhanced rent that may be Agreed upon between the first party and the landlord and in such event the second party shall pay to the first party the difference between the present rent of Rs250 and the enhanced rent along with the monthly amounts payable vide clause 2 hereof and shall observe faithfully all terms and conditions of the agreement of tenancy between the first party and the owner of the premises
It is clearly understood and agreed this agreement is only with respect to the running of the said business on a MUNAFA basis to the second party and not subletting or underletting of the premises housing the said business
Clause 17 The essence of this agreement is that the second party shall run the said business on his own account making use of the existing property such as furniture fixture etc
which continue to belong to the first party with out any proprietory rights or interest to the second party on any of the said property
It is distinctly understood and agreed between the parties here to that the second party shall not be entitled to obtain any credit or accommodation from any third party on the security of the said business
The parties hereto agree that the second party shall carry on the said business on his own account and responsibility and the first party shall not be liable in any manner or to any extent in respect of the second party s liabilities arising out of his running the said business or otherwise
 Placing reliance on these clauses it was seriously canvassed on behalf of the appellant that the agreement was PG NO 205 explicit in its terms and there was no ambiguity and as per the terms the transfer effected was only the business of running the hotel and not the appellant s interest in the leased property and no sub tenancy was created in favour of the second respondent
The appellant s counsel urged that in almost identical circumstances this Court has held in Md Salim vs Md Ali  that the transfer effected was only the right to manage the business run by the lessee and there was no transfer of any interest of the lessee in the business premises
It was the further contention of Dr Chitale that in all such cases the Courts must look to the dominant intention of the parties while effecting the transfer to find out whether the transfer amounted to a sub letting of the leased premises
A reference was made to the decision in Dwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf  19761 1 SCR 277 in this behalf
Disputing the contentions of Dr
Chitale Mr Krishnamurthy Iyer learned counsel appearing for the first respondent stated that the intention of the parties and the true nature of the transaction between them was the handing over of the hotel on a permanent basis to the second respondent together with the tenancy rights of the appellant
Mr Iyer said that for obvious reasons the parties had to camouflage the real nature of the transaction by making it appear that the managing rights of the business alone were transferred but the truth could not be suppressed and hence the lower courts had rightly held that the transfer had all the trappings of sub letting and the appellant was therefore liable for eviction
It was urged that in view of the concurrent findings rendered against the appellant by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority the High Court could have very well declined to go into the merits of the findings without reappraisal of the evidence but even so the High Court had given the appellant the indulgence of a detailed examination of the evidence for itself and has after such exercise confirmed the findings of the Courts below and as such there is no need or justification for any further examination the contentions of the appellant
The learned counsel submitted that if nevertheless the case of the appellant has to be considered once ever again then the agreement
though subtly worded provided adequate material to show that the transfer of the business had brought about a subletting of the premises also
The manner in which the hotel had been run by the second respondent it was added afforded additional material to prove the factum of sub letting of the premises
Krishnamurthy Iyer drew our attention to several terms in the agreement to which we PG NO 206 shall advert to in due course to substantiate his contentions
The learned counsel also placed for our consideration a decision of Alagiriswamy J as he then was in M Rodgers vs Prakash Rao Naidu and of this court in Bhagwan Das vs Rajeev Singh Since both the parties lay emphasis upon the terms of the agreement to support their respective contentions it is necessary that we look into the terms of the agreement for ourselves
The preamble sets out that the terms first party and second party cannoting the appellant and the second respondent will wherever the context permits include their heirs successors administrators and assigns
The agreement would say that the first party as the owner of the vegetarian restaurant Sharada Bhawan has agreed to allow the second party to manage the said hotel with all the furniture etc
The agreement is for a period of eleven months from the 1st day of September 1969 and thereafter the same could be renewed or extended for any further period by mutual consent except in the event of the first party being evicted in which event the second party would not be entitled to any compensation for any loss or damage caused to him by reason of the eviction
Clause 2 provides that in consideration of obtaining on hire on munafa basis of the business together with all the furniture etc
the second party should pay to the first party a sum of Rs750 per month during the period of first eleven months and thereafter at the rate of Rs900 per month during the subsequent renewed or extended period
 As per Clause 3 the second party should pay all taxes tees rates and other statutory outgoings in respect of the business and ii any loss is caused to the first party by non payment the latter was entitled to recover all such charges from the second party and would also be entitled to cancel or terminate the agreement forthwith
According to Clause 4 the second party was responsible for not only payment of all expenses and charges relating to the running of the business but also for carrying out repairs to business premises painting colour wash
and the like
The same Clause empowers the second party to appoint dismiss promote or otherwise deal with all members of the staff and employees of all categories   and makes him liable for all claims and demands relating to the period covered by the agreement  Clause 7 prohibits the second party from using the premises for any purpose other than for running a vegetarian restaurant without the consent of the first party
Clause 9 interdicts the second party from assigning or under letting or otherwise parting with the business without the written permission of the first party
Clause 13 stipulates that the second party should allow the first party to inspect the business at all reasonable times to satisfy himself that the PG NO 207 second party was fulfilling the conditions governing the agreement
Clause 15 sets out that the second party shall on the expiry of the agreement peacefully and quietly surrender and hand over possession of the said business to the first party with all the furniture and fixtures utensils etc
 Clause 16 which has already been extracted states that the lease of the premises shall continue to be enjoyed exclusively by the first party at all times and the first party shall be liable to pay the monthly rent of Rs250 or any other enhanced rate that may be agreed upon between the first party and the landlord and in such an event the second party shall pay to the first party the difference between the present rent of Rs250 and the enhance rent along with the monthly amounts payable by him
There is an explanatory clause stating that the agreement is only with respect to the running of the business and not to any subletting or underletting of the premises
Clause 17 stipulates that the business was to be run by the second party on his own account making use of the existing property such as furniture fixture etc
belonging to the first party without any proprietory rights or interest and that the second party was not entitled to obtain any credit or accommodation from any third party on the security of the business and that he was to run the business on his own account and responsibility
Clause 18 makes the second respondent solely responsible for any consequences arising out of non compliance with the orders passed by the competent authorities or for contravention of any of the provisions of the laws in force Clauses 19 and 20 provide for the second respondent furnishing a cash security of Rs5000 and the first respondent being entitled to reimburse himself from out of the deposit amount any loss or damages suffered by him on account of any default committed by the second party On a reading of the various provisions of the agreement unable to accept the contentions of the appellant that what was transferred was only the hotel business and not the appellant s interest in the leased premises as a lessee
Though the agreement is initially for a period of 11 months the renewal clause would enable the parties to go on extending the lease for any length of time and as per the preamble such extensions of lease would be binding upon the heirs successors administrators and assigns of both parties
The appellant had handed over the furniture utensils etc
to the second respondent and received a sum of Rs5000 as security and he was entitled to reimburse himself for any loss or damage caused to the furniture and the utensils
Though the agreement states that the appellant will continue to be the lessee of the property it is obvious that the rent of Rs250 per month was really to be paid by PG NO 208 the second respondent through the appellant
There is a specific provision in Clause 16 that in the event of the landlord enhancing the rent the second respondent should pay the difference between the present rent of Rs250 and the enhanced rent along with the monthly amounts payable as per clause 2
 It is therefore patent that the burden of paying the rent has been passed on to the second respondent and this can occur only if the premises had been sublet to him
The agreement confers proprietory rights on the second respondent over the hotel business inasmuch as he is made the sole authority to appoint the staff as well as terminate their services and also take disciplinary action against them
He is empowered to run the business on his own account and responsibility so long as he pays the appellant a sum of Rs750 per month or the first eleven months and thereafter a sum of Rs900 per month All the taxes fees rates and other statutory outgoings are to be paid by the second respondent himself
Even the cost of effecting repairs to the business premises and painting and colour washing etc
are to be borne by him alone
Clauses 7 and although appearing to interdict the second respondent from changing the user of the premises or from assigning or subletting the business really permit him to do so if he obtains the consent or permission in writing of the appellant
If what was transferred to the second respondent was only the right to manage the hotel business it is incomprehensible that he would be called upon to effect repairs to the leased premises or to undertake painting colour washing etc
at his own expense
Similarly the question of the second respondent changing the user of the premises or assigning or subletting or parting with the business with the written consent or the appellant will not arise if his rights under the agreement were restricted to the management of the business alone
Clause 15 is curiously worded because it speaks about the second respondent peacefully and quietly surrendering and handing over possession of the business to the first party with all the furniture fixtures utensils etc   The clause would show that what was really meant was surrendering the possession of the building but in order to conceal matters the word business has been used in the place of building 
On a conspectus of all the terms of the agreement we feel that the High Court was fully justified in taking the view that the appellant and the second respondent had used all the ingenuity at their command to camaflouge the real nature of the transaction and make it appear that there was only a transfer of the managing rights of the business and not a transfer of the business in toto together with the right to occupy the leased premises The clauses on which the appellant s counsel placed reliance to project the PG NO 209 appellant s case are only make believe clauses which have been introduced with a design and purpose viz to conceal the real nature of the contract so that the landlord may not seek the eviction of the appellant on the ground of subletting the premises
In spite of the introduction of a few cleverly worded clauses the other clauses are self revealing and go to show that the parties were fully aware of the vulnerability of their action and the risk of eviction ensuing therefrom
It is on account of such awareness the appellant has carefully provided in the agreement that in the event of his being evicted from the premises he will not be liable to pay any compensation for any loss or damage resulting to the second respondent
Besides the agreement the manner in which the second respondent had been conducting the business would also show that he was not a transferee of the managing rights alone but he was a transferee of the business together with the appellant s interest in the leased premises also
The business turnover increased from Rs200 to 250 per day to Rs700 to 800 per day
The second respondent was assessed to income tax and sales tax in his own name as the proprietor of Sharada Bhawan and not as the manager of the hotel
He was recognised as the proprietor of the hotel and admitted to membership of the Hotel Owner s Association
He exercised absolute control over the business and over the members of the staff and was the sole authority to appoint them or terminate their services or take disciplinary action against them
He was not bound to render accounts to the appellant or share with him the profits or losses of the business
He became solely responsible to bear all the expenses and to pay all the taxes public charges etc
Thus even the conduct of the parties afford material to conclude that what was transferred to the second respondent was much more than the right to run the hotel business for a limited period
It is therefore futile for the appellant to say he had not parted with his interests in the leased premises to the second respondent
As regards the decisions cited by Dr Chitale we do not think that either of them can advance the appellant s case m any manner
In Md Salim vs Md Ali supra the facts were perceptibly different
That was also a case where the right of management of a shop run by a tenant was conferred on one Md Salim and it was agreed between the parties that from out of the amount paid by Md Salim the lessee was to pay the rent to the landlord
The agreement however expressly stated that the transferer will remain the proprietor of the business and that the licence for the business should stand in his name and that after a period of two years the transferee will restore the business along with the articles PG NO 210 in good condition to the transferor
The transfer agreement had been attested by the landlord himself
It was on these facts it was decided in that case that there was no transfer of interest in the business premises and what was transferred was only the right to manage the business
In the present case the agreement provides for the second respondent being allowed to run the business for any length of time as his own proprietory concern and to have all the benefits exclusively for himself
In the other case of Dwarka Prasad supra the court dealt with the application of the  dominant intention test with reference to the facts of that case
The question in there was whether a cinema theatre equipped with projectors and other fittings and ready to be launched as an entertainment house was accommodation as defined in Section 21d of the UP Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 and if so whether the Act barricades eviction by the landlord because the premises let constitutes an accommodation It was in that context the Court observed that where the lease is composite and has a plurality of purpose the decisive test is a dominant purpose of the demise
There is no occasion in this case for the test of dominant intention being applied because there was and there can be no lease of the managing rights of the hotel business as such and on the contrary what was transferred was an outright transfer of the hotel together with the furniture equipment etc
as well as the lease hold right of the erstwhile hotelier in the leased premises
The facts of this case bear a close similarity to the facts noticed in Bhagwan Das v S
Rajdev Singh supra That was a case where the premises let out to one Usha Sales was put under the occupation of one Bhagwan Das and when the landlord sought the eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub letting the plea raised was that Bhagwan Das had been appointed as an agent by Usha Sales for displaying and selling the protect o Usha Sales and Bhagwan Das was in the occupation of the premises on his own behalf for the purposes of his business as an agent
The Court after perusing the agreement entered into between Usha Sale and Bhagwan Das held that the appellant was given complete control and supervision of the premises and that the agreement was a curious mixture of inconsistencies and was plainly a clumsy attempt to camouflage the sub tenancy which was intended to be created thereby
The facts of the present nt case have a striking similarity to the facts noticed in that case and
therefore the same conclusion should be reached in this case also
Besides the above said decision Mr Iyer referred us to a decision of the Madras High Court in M Rodgers vs N Prakash Rao Naidu
supra where a tenant who was running a printing press in a leased building stopped the business and the manager began running the press as the lessee of the machinery without the tenant having any PG NO 211 share in the business
On the landlord sueing the tenant for eviction on the ground of subletting the High Court held that since the machinery cannot be run unless it is placed in the premises where it is situated the lessee of the machinery would get the advantage of the use of the business premises also and as such the lease amount stipulated for the lease of the machinery would also include the lease amount payable for the building and hence the transaction would clearly amount to the lessee subletting the building simultaneously with the leasing out of the machinery
The present case warrants the same view being taken especially in the light of the recitals in the agreement which stipulate that the amount payable by the second respondent would comprise in it the rent payable by the appellant landlord for the leased premises
At the end of the arguments it was represented at the bar that the second respondent has since vacated the premises and handed over the business to the appellant and that the appellant himself is now running the hotel through his son
We do not think the changed circumstances can affect the rights of the first respondent in any manner to have the appellant evicted on the ground of subletting
In the light of our conclusions the appeal fails and is dismissed
However having regard to the fact that the appellant would require some time to find an alternate place to shift his hotel he is granted six month s time from today to vacate the premises subject to his filing an undertaking within four weeks from today on the usual terms
There will be no order as to costs
RSS Appeal dismissed


Summary:
These three groups of special leave petitionsappealswrit petitions concern the policy and legality of the levy of Court fees under the Provisions of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits valuation Act 1958 the PG NO 155 PG NO 156 Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1961 and the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959
The petitioners from Rajasthan had challenged before the High Court the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 20 read with Article 1 Schedule 1 of the Rajasthan Act which prescribed and authorised the levy of court fees on an uniform ad valorem basis without the prescription of any upper limit
the High Court upheld the constitutionality of the impugned provision
The appeal and the special leave petitions from Karnataka are directed against the common order of the Karnataka High Court upholding the validity of the corresponding provision of the Karnataka Act which similarly imposed an ad valorem court fee without prescribing any upper limit
The writ petitions have challenged the provision directly in this Court
So far as the Bombay Act is concerned the State of Maharashtra has come up in appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court affirming the order of the learned Single Judge striking down the provisions of section 291 read with entry 10 of Schedule I of the Act in so far as they purport to prescribe an ad valorem court fee without any upper limit on grants of probate letters of administrative etc while in respect of all other suits appeal and proceedings an upper limit of court fee of Rs15000 is prescribed
The High Court held this prescription of ad valorem court fee without any upper limit on this class of proceedings alone was constitutionally impermissible in that it sought to single out this class of litigants
It was contended on behalf of the petitionersappellants that i the imposition of court fees at nearly 10 of the value of the subject matter in each of the courts through which the case sojourns before it reaches a finally would seriously detract from fairness and justness of the system 11 the exaction of ad valorem fee uniformly at a certain percentage of the subject matter without an upper limit or without the tapering down after a certain stage onwards would negate the concept of e fee and part take of the character of a tax outside the boundaries of the State s power 111 the ad valorem yardstick which is relevant and appropriate to taxation is wholly inappropriate because the principle or basis of distribution in the case of a fee should be the proportionate cost of services inter se amongst the beneficiaries iv in the very nature of the Judicial process a stage is reached beyond which there could be no proportionate or progressive increase in the services rendered to a litigant either qualitatively or PG NO 157 quantitatively v in the process of adjudication of disputes before courts judicial time and the machinery of justice are not utilised in direct proportion to the value or the amount of the subject matter of the controversy vi a recognition of the outermost limit of the possible services and a prescription of a corresponding upper limit of court fee should be made lest the levy in excess of that conceptual limit becomes a tax and vii though India is a federal polity the judicial system however is an integrated one and that therefore different standards of court fee in different States would be unconstitutional 
The contentions of the State were that i as long as their power to raise the funds to meet the expenses of administration of civil justice was not disputed and as long as the funds raised show a correlation to such expenses the States should have sufficient play at the joints to work out the incidents of the levy in some reasonable and practical way ii it would quite obviously be impracticable to measure out the levy directly in proportion to the actual judicial time consumed in each individual case hence the need to tailor some rough and ready workable basis which though may not be an ideal or the most perfect one would at least be the least hostile iii if an upper limit is fixed and the collection fell short of what the Government intends and is entitled to collect this would eventually result in the enhancement of the general rates of court fee for all categories iv if the value of the subject matter is a relevant factor in proportioning the burden of the court fee
where the line should be drawn in applying the principle it is more a matter of legislative wisdom and preference than of the strict judicial evaluation and adjudication and v courts cannot compel the State to bring forth any legislation to implement and effectuate a Directive Principle
Dismissing the appeals writ petitions and the special leave petition this Court HELD  I All civilised Governments recognise the need for access to justice being free
Whether the whole of the expenses of administration of civil justice also in addition to those of criminal justice should be free and met entirely by public revenue or whether the litigants should contribute and if so to what extent are matters of policy
170G 2 A fee is a charge for the special service rendered to a class of citizens by Government or Government agencies and is generally based on the expenses incurred in rendering the services
174B PG NO 158 The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras vs Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1 1005 and Om Prakash Agarwal vs Guni Ray AIR 1986 SC 726 referred to
3 It is for the governmental agencies imposing the fee to justify its impost and its quantum as a return for some special services
4 Once a broad correlation between the totality of the expenses on the services conceived as a whole on the one hand and the totality of the funds raised by way of the fee on the other is established it would be no part of the legitimate exercise in the examination of the constitutionality of the concept of the impost to embark its effect in individual cases
Such a grievance would be one of disproportionate nature of the distribution of the fees amongst those liable to contribute and not one touching the conceptual nature of the fee
184A B 5 The test is one of the comprehensive level of the value of the totality of the services set off against the totality of the receipts
If the character of the fee  is thus established the vagaries in its Distribution amongst the Class do not detract from the concept of a fee  as such though a wholly arbitrary distribution of the burden might violate other constitutional limitations
185G Municipal Corporation of Delhi  Ors
vs Mohd 
Yasin
  HH Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar vs Commissioner for Hindu Religious  Charitahle Endowments 1963 Supp 2 SCR 302 Sreenivasa General Traders  Ors
vs Andhra Pradesh  Ors  State of  Maharashtra  Ors
vs The Salvation Army Western India Territorv  Kewal Krishan Puri  Anr
vs State of Punjab  Ors  Secretary
Government of  Madras Home Department  Anr
vs Zenith Lamp  Anr
vs State of Kanataka AI 1979 SC 119 The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments Madras vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swantiar of Sri Shirur Mutt   Om Prakash Agarwal vs Giri Raj Kishori 730 NM Desai vs The Teesteels Ltd  Anr AIR 1980 2 SC 2125 Lady Tanumuti Girijaprasad  Anr
vs Special Rent Acquisition Officer Western Railway Special Civil Application No 979 of 1970 with Special Civil Application 287 of 1967 The City Corporation of Calicut vs Thachambalath Sadasvian  Ors  referred to
Indian Organic Chemicals vs Chemtax Fibres Secretary Government of Madras Home Department vs Zenith Lamp  Electrial Ltd ILR 1968 Madras 247 overruled
PG NO 159 6 Though legislative measures dealing with economic regulation are not outside article 14 it is well recognised that the State enjoys the widest latitude where measures of economic regulation areconcerned
These measures for fiscal and economic regulation involve an evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting economic criteria and adjustment and balancing of various conflicting social and economic values and interests
It is for the State to decide what economic and social policy it should pursue and what discriminations advance those social and economic policies
In view of the inherent complexity of these fiscal adjustments courts give a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic and social policies and effectuate the chosen system in all possible and reasonable ways
187G H 188A B East India Tobacoo Co vs State of Andhra Pradesh  The State of Gujarat  Anr
vs Shri Ambica Mills Ltd Ahmedabad referred to
7 The lack of perfection in a legislative measure does not necessarily imply its unconstitutionality
It is rightly said that no economic measure has yet been devised which is free from all discriminatory impact and that is such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist the court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of criticism
under the equal protection clause
reviewing fiscal services
189F G  GK Krishnan etc
vs The Slate of Tamil Nadu 1975 2 SCR 715 730 San Antonic Independent School Districf vs Bodriguer
411 USI at p 41
Income Tax Officer Shillong  Anr
vs N Takim Roy Rymbai etc
  referred to
It is trite that for purposes of testing a law enacted by one State in exercise of its own independent legishtive powers for its alleged violation of Article 14 it cannot be contrasted with laws enacted by other States
192C The State of Madhya Pradesh vs GC Mandawar   referred to
9 Having regard to the nature and complexity of this matter It is perhaps difficult to say that the ad valorem principle which may not be an ideal basis for distribution of a fee can at the same time be said to be so irrational PG NO 160 as to incur any unconstitutional infirmity
The presumption of constitutionality of laws requires that any doubt as to the constitutionality of a law has to be resolved in favour of constitutionality
Though the scheme cannot be upheld at the same time it cannot be struck down either
192E F 10 The State is in theory entitled to raise the totality of the expenses by way of fee
Any interference with the present yardstick for sharing the burden might in turn produce a yardstick less advantageous to litigants at lower levels
192G 11 The High Court has struck down the provisions of section 291 read with entry 10 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fees Act 1959 on the ground that the levy of court fee on proceedings for grant of probate and letters of administration ad valorem without the upper limit prescribed for all other litigants is discriminatory
If in respect of all other suits of whatever nature and complexity an upper limit of Rs15000 on the court fee is fixed there is no logical justification for singling out this proceeding for an ad valorem impost without the benefit of some upper limit prescribed by the same statute respecting all other litigants
193A B F 12 The Directive Principles of State Policy though not strictly enforceable in courts of law are yet fundamental in the governance in the country
They constitute fons juris in a Welfare State
194E UBSE Board vs Hari Shanker AIR 1979 SC 69 referred to
13 The power to raise funds through the fiscal tool of a fee  is not to be confused with a compulsion to do so