Civil Misc
Petition No 4673 of 1987
In CA No 452 1 of 1986
From the Judgment and order dated 20121985 of the Patna High Court in CWJC No 1133 of 1984
LN Sinha and ML Verma for the Petitioner
SN Kacker SB Upadhyay MM Kashyap and Smt
Asha Upadhyay for the Respondents
The following order of the Court was delivered O R D E R This is an application made by the appellant for initiating proceedings for contempt against respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh
It is alleged that despite the fact that this Court had on 19th December 1986 after hearing learned counsel for the parties granted special leave and also passed an order directing maintenance of status quo as in the High Court in the presence of learned counsel for respondent No 4 three days after ie On 22nd December 1986 respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh filed a criminal miscellaneous petition No 484186 R 871 before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court alleging inter alia that respondent No 4 had the right to collect slurry deliberately and wilfully suppressed from the High Court the fact that this Court had directed maintenance of status quo and thereby obtained an order from the High Court dated 3rd January 1987 in the said proceedings by which respondent No 4 was allowed to transport briquettes from the area in question ie Iands covered by the notification issued under section 9 of the Coal bearing Areas Acquisition  Development Act 1957 including the disputed plot No 370 and bad thus wilfully and flagrantly disobeyed and violated the status quo order of this Court
After hearing learned counsel for the parties at quite some length we were satisfied that the High Court was not justified in passing the impugned order
We accordingly by order dated 23rd September 1987 vacated the aforesaid order of the High Court dated 3rd January 1987 and also allowed the application made by the apellant for grant of a prohibitory order and restrained respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh and their agents and servants from lifting sludgeslurry from the lands covered by the notification under section 9 of the Act in terms of the registered indenture of lease dated October 20 1984 executed by the State Government in favour of respondent No 4 and further directed that all operations carried on by them shall stop forthwith
There was a further direction made with regard to the withdrawal of the amounts deposited by respondent No 4 and his son towards the price of slurry collected by them in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court dated l5th January 1985 on furnishing bank guarantee
As the conclusion of the hearing we were inclined to the view that there was no contempt
The reasons therefor follow
The question whether respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh are guilty of contumacious and wilful disregard of this Court s order must depend on the precise meaning of the words status quo as in the High Court 
There is not much of a controversy as to the scope and effect of the status quo order passed by this Court
Shri LN Sinha learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the words status quo as in the High Court  mean status quo as prevailing between the parties when the matter was pending in the High Court and not after the High Court had passed the impugned judgment and disposed of the writ petition
The learned counsel contends that same meaning must be given to these words as otherwise the application for grant of prohibitory order would be infructuous and the order passed by this Court meaningless
He placed emphasis on the 872 word in  in the collocation of the words status quo as in the High Court  to define the scope and effect of the status quo order
According to him the word in  must mean status quo while the matter was in the High Court it was in seisin of the High Court till the moment before the delivery of the final judgment
Once the judgment had been delivered the matter came to an end in the High Court
In substance 13 the contention is that the status quo as prevailing between the parties when the matter was pending in the High Court had to be maintained
In reply Shri Kacker learned counsel for respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh submitted that the words status quo as in the High Court  must be interpreted to mean that the parties were relegated back to the position that obtained between them when the writ petition was still pending
Upon that basis he submitted that the contemnors were governed by the terms of the earlier order passed by the High Court dated 15th January 1985 permitting them to collect sludgeslurry from public land
It is urged that the disputed plot No 370 is such public land from which respondent No 4 in terms of the registered indenture of lease dated October 20 1984 executed by the State Government in his favour was entitled to remove sludgeslurry from the lands covered by the lease
The learned counsel points out that although respondent No 4 had been restrained by the High Court by its earlier order dated 19th October 1984 from removing sludgeslurry from the disputed plot of land it had by the subsequent order dated 15th January 1985 permitted him to collect sludgeslurry on certain conditions
One of the conditions was that respondent No 4 was required to deposit Rs 10000 in the High Court and that had been done
He also drew our attention to clB of that order which directed respondent No 4 to deposit the price of slurry in court along with monthly returns and it is said that several lakhs of rupees are in deposit in the High Court on that account
The expression status quo  is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty
According to the ordinary legal connotation the term status quo  implies the existing state of things at any given point of time
The qualifying words as in the High Court  clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo order
In the present case the High Court determined only one question namely that slurry was not coal or mineral
It refrained from entering into the question of right or title of the parties on the ground that it involved investigation into disputed questions of facts
Therefore apart from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or mineral the impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the 873 parties
Viewed from that angle it is obvious that status quo as in the High Court cannot mean anything else except status quo as existing when the matter was pending in the High Court before the judgment was delivered
Both the parties understood the scope and effect of the status quo order as meaning the state of things existing while the writ petition was still pending ie till the delivery of the judgment by the High Court
Respondent No 4 moved the High Court in Crl
MP No 484186 R without impleading the appellant herein and obtained the impugned order from the High Court dated 3rd January 1987 which we have vacated
The proper course for respondent No 4 to have adopted was to have approached this Court to seek clarification if he had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo order
We highly deprecate the conduct of respondent No 4 for having approached the High Court and obtained the impugned order by suppressing the fact that this Court had passed the status quo order
Even so strictly speaking no case for contempt is made out on the plain terms of the status quo order
The parties were relegated back to the position that obtained while the writ petition was pending
They were therefore subject to the order passed by the High Court dated 15th January 1985
No other conclusion is possible looking to the terms of the status quo order
We must add that there is no merit in the contention that the disputed plot No 370 was public land and the State Government was entitled to grant a lease for removal and collection of sludgeslurry despite the notification issued under section 9 of the Act
It is quite clear upon the terms of the notification issued that the Central Government has made the requisite declaration under section 91 of the Act for acquisition of the lands measuring 77845 acres as specified in Schedule A  and it specifically includes the disputed plot No 370 in Village Sudamdih
The appellant in paragraph 11 of the application for contempt has averred that on the publication in the official gazette of such declaration by the Central Government under section 91 of the Act the aforesaid lands vast absolutely in it free from all encumbrances
The aforesaid declaration by the Central Government under section 91 further specifies as enjoined by clb of sub s2 thereof that the acquisition of the right in or over lands measuring 77845 acres describe in Schedule A  also carries with it the right to mine quarry bore dig and search for win work and carry away minerals in the lands
It is pertinent to observe that respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have not in the counter affidavit denied the aforesaid averment made in paragraph 11 except to say that they are a matter of record
It is plain upon the terms that the area in question ie plot 874 No 370 has been acquired under section 91 of the Act together with the right to mine quarry bore dig and search for win work and carry away the minerals thereon
lt is idle to contend that the disputed plot No 370 was open land
It is nothing but an afterthought and is illconceived
It is unfortunate that the appellant rested itself content by obtaining the status quo order in terms in which it was passed
It should instead have for safeguarding its interests insisted upon a prohibitory order
In the meanwhile we are informed that respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have been taking advantage of the qualified status quo order by removing sludgeslurry or briguettes worth about Rs50000 per day
The appellant is at liberty to take recourse to such legal remedy as is available for the protection of its rights
We have tried to secure its interests to some extent by permitting withdrawal of the moneys deposited by respondent No 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh in the High Court on furnishing bank guarantee
CMP is disposed of accordingly
NPV Petition disposed of


Summary:
 The State of Bihar had a Directorate of Indigenous Systems of Medicines which was a part of its Health Department and one Dr Nagesh Dwivedi was its Director
On 651978 the State Government created a separate Directorate of Indigenous Medicines the Director being from one of the systems of medicines consisting of Ayurvedic Unani and Homeopathic
At the time of creation of the separate Directorate the Government sanctioned the posts of two Deputy Directors for each of the two remaining systems
The State Government had in the meanwhile prescribed a 50 point roster to implement the policy of reservation to posts and appointments for members of the backward classes under article 164
It was laid down that if in any grade there is only one vacancy for the first time then it will be deemed to be unreserved and for the second time also if there be only one vacancy then it will be deemed to be reserved 
Acting upon this roster the Government reserved the post of Deputy Director Homeopathic for a scheduled caste candidate
The Public Service Commission on being moved by the Government issued an advertisement inviting applications from members of the scheduled caste and the appellant was selected for appointment to the post
Respondent No 4 challenged the selection of the appellant in the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
In October 1982 an additional post of Deputy Director Ayurvedic was created and filled
The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the said advertisement and the consequent order of appointment of the appel 131 lant
The High Court was of the view that the post of Director and three Deputy Directors could not be clubbed together for reservation of posts and appointments
Nor could the posts of Deputy Directors Homeopathic Ayurvedic and Unani which form distinct and separate systems of medicines be grouped for purposes of reservation
The appellant contended that there were four posts in the Directorate of Indigenous Medicines and all the posts were Class I posts and therefore according to the 50 point roster the post of Director having been treated as unreserved by the Rotational system the post of Deputy Director Homeopathic was rightly reserved for a scheduled caste candidate
Dismissing the appeal this Court  HELD The posts of the Director and those of the Deputy Directors constitute different cadres of the service
It is manifest that the post of the Director of Indigenous Medicines which is the highest post in the Directorate carried on a higher grade or scale could not possibly be equated with those of the Deputy Directors on a lower grade or scale
In view of this according to the 50 point roster if in a particular cadre a single post falls vacant it should in the case of first vacancy be considered as general
That being so the State Government could not have directed reservation of the post of Deputy Director Homeopathic which was the first vacancy in a particular cadre ie that of the Deputy Directors for candidates belonging to the schedule castes
Such reservation was not in conformity with the principles laid down in the 50 point roster and was impermissible under article 164 of the Constitution and clearly violative of the guarantee enshrined in article 161 of equal opportunity to all citizens relating to public employment
Clause 4 of article 16 is by way of an exception of the proviso to article 16 i
The High Court rightly held that the reservation of the post of Deputy Director Homeopathic amounted to 100 reservation which was impermissible under article 164 as otherwise it would render the guarantee of equal opportunity in the matter of public employment under article 161 wholly elusive and meaningless
137F H 138A C If there is only one post in the cadre there can be no reservation under article 164 of the Constitution
The whole concept of reservation for application of the 50 point roster is that there are more than one posts and the reservation as laid down by this Court in MR Balaji s case can be upto 50
The Government cannot for instance declare that the post of the Director of Indigenous Medicines shall be reserved 132 for candidates belonging to scheduled castes
The Directorate is a paramedical service with Director as its head and the three Deputy Directors belonging to three distinct and separate disciplines viz
Homeopathic Unani and Ayurvedic under him
In the para medical system the three posts of Deputy Directors pertain to three distinct systems and therefore each of them is an isolated post by itself
The same principles should we think as in the case of Director apply
We refrain from expressing any opinion on the aspect whether the isolated posts like those of the Deputy Directors can be subjected to the 50 point roster by the rotational system as it does not arise in the present case
Assuming that the 50 point roster applied admittedly the first vacancy in the cadre of Deputy Directors was that of the Deputy Director Homeopathic and it had to be treated as unreserved the second reserved and the third unreserved
The first vacancy of the Deputy Director Homeopathic in the cadre being treated as unreserved according to the roster had to be thrown open to all
A candidate belonging to the Scheduled caste had therefore to compete with others
138C G The three posts of Deputy Directors of Homeopathic Unani and Ayurvedic are distinct and separate as they pertain to different disciplines and each one is isolated post by itself carried in the same cadre
There can be no grouping of isolated posts even if they are carried on the same scale
The Government of India instructions relating to reservations of posts and appointments for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes contained in the Brochure on Reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Services and which have been issued to carry out the mandate of article 164 consistent with the equality clause under article 161 and 162 and the requirements of article 335 namely the maintenance of efficiency of administration clearly show that there can be no grouping of one or more isolated posts for purposes of reservation
To illustrate Professors in medical colleges are carried on the same grade and scale of pay but the posts of Professor of Cardiology Professor of Surgery Professor of Gynecology pertain to particular disciplines and therefore each is an isolated post
138H 139A F Article 164 is an exception to article 161 and article 162 and therefore the power to make a special provision for reservation of posts and appointments in favour of the backward classes must not be so excessive which would in effect efface the guarantee of equal opportunity in the matter of public employment or at best make it illusory
We are not aware of any decision of this Court where excessive reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens to the extent of 100 has been upheld except in the application of the carry forward rule
139G H 133 MR Balaji  Ors
vs State of Mysore 1963 Suppl
1 SCR 439 T Devadasan vs Union of India  Anr   State of Kerala  Anr
vs NM Thomas  Ors   Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh Railway vs Union of India  Ors   State of Karnataka vs Shivaji Y Garge CA No 4117 of 1984 decided on 19th October 1984 KC Vasanth Kumar  Anr
vs State of Karnataka 1985 Suppl
SCC 714 and Arati Ray Choudhury vs Union of India  Ors   referred to