ivil Appeal No 2072 of 1990
From the Judgment and Order dated 135
1986 of the Calcutta High Court in Suit No 2479 of 1967
MK Banerjee Subrat Rai Choudhary Gopal Subramanium NP Aggarwala Anil Aggarwala PC Sharma LP Aggarwala Ms Indira Banerjee RN Jhunjhunwala Praveen Kumar CS Vaidyanathan PR Seetharaman DN Mukherjee Raj Kumr Gupta and PC Kapur for the appearing parties
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K JAYACHANDRA REDDY J
Leave granted
This appeal is directed against the order of the Divi sion Bench of the High Court of Calcutta
The appellant was transposed as the plaintiff in the Original Side suit No 247967 in the High Court of Calcutta
The suit was filed for a declaration that the various properties set out in the Schedule belonged and still belong to the joint family consisting of the members mentioned in the plaint
Pending the suit an application was filed for appointment of a receiver for the various properties mentioned in Schedule A  annexed to the petition for injunction and for other reliefs
One Mr SC Sen was appointed as Receiver
A declaration was also sought in the suit that the trust dated October 20th 1948 created by late Gopi Krishna Khemka father of the plaintiff is void and for cancellation of the same
Premises No 38 New Road Alipore building with open space was one of the properties belonging to the trust
Grindlays Bank Limited  Grindlays  for short respondent No 1 herein was the original tenant and they were occupying four flats and they surrendered a portion of the tenancy namely two flats ie Flats Nos 1 and 2 which came into effect from 1st 965 April 1978
The receiver let out these two flats to Ms Tata Finlay Ltd  Tatas  for short with Effect from Febru ary 7 1979 pursuant to a letter written by Tatas
Question ing the action of the receiver an application was filed in the High Court contending that the receiver had no authority to create any tenancy and that the receiver has virtually created two new tenancies terminating the original tenancy of Grindlays and it was contended before the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court that neither Grindlays nor Tatas were entitled to occupy the premises and they are liable to be evicted summarily
The learned Single Judge was not inclined to order summary eviction as prayed for but however observed that the respective contentions of the parties as to the validity of the tenancy created in favour of Tatas have not been finally decided by the High Court and that the parties are at liberty to agitate the same grounds in any action that they may be advised to proceed for evic tion of Tatas and Grindlays
As against the order of the learned Single Judge an appeal was filed before a Division Bench
It was contended before the Division Bench that upon surrender of Flats Nos 1 and 2 by the Grindlays a fresh tenancy was created by the receiver from 1st April 1978 and the other tenancy in favour of Tatas is beyond the powers of the receiver and that the receiver had no authority to create any tenancy either in favour of Grindlays or Tatas
Various contentions were raised before the Division Bench and ultimately the Division Bench having considered the several submissions passed an order the operative portion of which reads as follows Therefore the petitioner is entitled to get a decree for possession on any ground mentioned in Section 131 of the said Act and such relief can be obtained in a suit which cannot be filed in this court inasmuch as the premises in question is situated outside the original side jurisdiction of this Court
 More or less the same contentions are advanced before us
Firstly it is submitted that the receiver had no right or authority to create any lease or tenancy in respect of the said flats for a term exceeding three years at a time and such creation of a tenancy should be deemed to be only for a period of three years  terminable on the expiry of the said period
In this context a further submission is that upon surrender of Flat Nos 1 and 2 by Grindlays a fresh tenancy was created by the receiver from 1st April 1978 for which he had no authority
Therefore the High Court ought to have ordered summary eviction of Tatas and Grindlays
966 It is not in dispute that the tenancy in respect of Flat Nos 1 and 2 was surrendered by the Grindlays and from 1st April 1978 Tatas was inducted as tenant in respect of the said two flats at a monthly rent of Rs 1200 and service charge at the rate of Rs600 per month and since then Tatas is a monthly tenant in respect of the said two flats
It is the case of the Tatas that the terms of the tenancy were reduced into writing as recorded in the letter dated 7th February 1979 and the receiver adopted the same and did not raise any objection thereto and it claimed to be still a monthly tenant and therefore they are entitled to protec tion under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act  Act  for short and the appellant has no right to demand vacant possession of the said flats from the Tatas
The stand taken by the Grindlays is that the premises in question comprised of four flats and they took all the four flats for 10 years on lease from 1st June 1958
After the expiry of the period of the said lease relationship between Grindlays and the Trust continued to be that of landlord and tenant governed by the Act and that in 1977 they agreed to surrender Flat Nos 1 and 2 by the letters dated 10th March 1978 and 29th March 1978 addressed to the receiver in favour of Tatas
However at all material times they retained the tenancy in respect of Flat Nos 3 and 4 and continued to be tenant in respect of those flats and they are also governed by the act
In the letters written it is also stated by the Grind lays that their continuation as tenant of flat Nos 3 and 4 was acknowledged by the receiver by his letter dated 15th May 1978
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that after the expiry of the lease the receiver had no power to grant a lease for a period exceeding three years without the leave of this Court as envisaged in Chapter 21 Rule 5a of the Original side Rules and that in the instant case without obtaining any such leave receiver s granting monthly tenan cies is illegal
Reliance was also placed on the injunction order passed by Justice AN Sen sitting on original Side while appointing the receiver
The learned Judge passed an order restraining the tenants from selling or transferring any of the properties mentioned in Schedule A 
According to the appellants the transfer includes lease and therefore the Receiver by creating a new lease ie tenancy has vio lated the injunction order and on that ground also the action of the receiver should be held to be illegal
First we shall dispose of this contention and then advert to the rest
Order 40 CPC which provides for the appointment of Receivers empowers the court to confer upon the Receivers all such powers as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization management protection preservation and improvement of the property
In Satyanarayan Banerji and Ors
vs Kalyani Prosad Singh Deo Bahadur and Ors AIR 1945 calcutta 387 a Division Bench held that the object of appointment of 967 Receiver is not to divest the rightful owner of the title but only to protect the property and an appointment might operate to change possession but cannot affect the title to the property which remains in those in whom it was vested when the appointment was made
In Ratnasami Pillai vs Sabap athy Pillai and Ors AIR 1925 Madras 318 it is held that the Receiver has only such powers as expressly granted by the Court
Relying on these two decisions the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in the instant case the Re ceiver has acted in such a manner affecting the title to the property and to the detriment of the interest of the right ful owner
Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines the meaning of transfer of property  and it is in the following terms In the following sections transfer of property means an act by which a living person conveys property in present or in future to one or more other living persons or to him self or to himself and one or more other living persons and to transfer property is to perform such act
In this Section living person includes a company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies associations or bodies of individuals
 In Mulla Transfer of Property Act 7th Edition page 48 there is a passage in this respect which reads thus The word transfer is defined with reference to the word convey
This word in English Law in its narrower and more usual sense refers to the transfer of an estate in hand but it is sometimes used in a much wider sense to include any form of an assurance inter vivos
The definition in Sec
2051ii of the Law of Property is conveyance includes a mortgage charge lease assent vesting declaration vest 
ing instrument disclaimer release of every other assurance of property or of any interest therein by any instrument except a will
 This is a special definition adopted for the purposes of the Law of Property Act 1925
The word con veys in Sec
5 of the Indian act is obviously used in the wider sense referred to above
Transferor must have an 968 interest in the property
He cannot serve himself from it and yet convey it
 The word transfer  is defined with reference to word convey 
In Hari Mohan alias Hari Charan Pal vs Atal Krishna Bose and Ors XXIII Vol
Indian Cases 925 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the term transfer  as used in Section 11 or Section 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act includes a lease as a lease is a transfer of an interest in immovable property
It is therefore clear that a lease comes within the meaning of the word transfer  but in this case the matter does not stop there
According to the learned counsel for the respondents the receiver has not created any new tenancy and the continuation of Grindlays as tenants in respect of Flats Nos 3 and 4 does not amount to a new lease and therefore there is no transfer
Conse quently there is no violation of the injunction order passed by Justice AN Sen Learned counsel for the respondents
referred to various documents mostly in the form of letters between the receiver and the Grindlays
We have perused these letters
They go to show that the Grindlays surren dered those two flats with the consent of the receiver but the stand taken by them is
that their continuation as tenants of Flat Nos 3 and 4 was acknowledged by the receiv er and the same cannot be treated as a new lease
One of the questions is whether mere surrender of Flats Nos 1 and 2 affects the Grindlays  tenancy of Flats Nos 3 and 4
It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that after the expiry of the stipulated period the tenancy in question turned to be a monthly tenancy and therefore the entire character of tenancy got changed
In Utility Articles Manufacturing Co vs Raja Bahadur Motilal Bombay Mills Ltd  a Division Bench consisting of Beaumont CJ and Kania J explaining the nature of the monthly tenancy observed in the following terms A characteristic of a periodical tenancy is that as each period commences it is not a new tenancy it is really an accretion to the old tenancy
A monthly tenancy that is a tenancy subject to a month s notice creates in the first instance a tenancy for two months certain
But as soon as the third month commences that is not a new tenancy it turns the original tenancy into a three months  tenancy and when the fourth month begins the tenancy becomes a four months  tenancy and so on so long as the tenancy 969 continues until that is to say notice to quit is given
 Relying on the above passage the learned counsel contended that the monthly tenancy therefore is new tenancy
Even otherwise according to the learned counsel the integrity of the tenancy is broken up and on that score also it is a new tenancy
Reliance is placed on Badri Narain Jha and Ors
vs Rarneshwar Dayal Singh and Ors
  it is ob served An interse partition of the mokarrari interest amongst the mokarraridars as alleged by the plaintiffs could not affect their liability qua the lessor for the payment of the whole rent as several tenants of a tenancy in law constitute but a single tenant and qua the landlord they constitute one person each constituent part of which possesses certain common rights in the whole and is liable to discharge common obligations in its entirety In White vs Tyndall 13 Appeal Cases 263 it is stated that the parties to whom a demise is made hold as tenants in common but what they covenant to pay is one rent not two rents and not each to pay is one rent not two rents and not each to pay half a rent but one rent
There is a privity of the estate between the tenant and the landlord in the whole of the leasehold and he is liable for all the covenants running with the land
According to the appellant in the instant case if this principle is followed the break up of the tenancy affected the integrity of the tenancy inasmuch as by virtue of this break up two new tenancies have come into existence paying separate rents and therefore in that view also it is a new tenancy
Yet another submission of the appellant is that the act of the receiver in leasing out in favour of Grindlays and Tatas for a period of more than three years was bad in view of Chapter 21 Rule 5a of the Original Side Rules
Though this point appears to have been abandoned before the Division Bench yet it is also canvassed before us
Chapter 21 of the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules deals with Receivers
Relevant part of the Rule 5 reads thus 5
In every order directing the appointment of a Receiver of immovable property there shall unless otherwise or dered be inserted the following directions a that the Receiver shall have all the powers provided for 970 in Order XL rule 1d of the Code except that he shall not without the leave of the Court 1 grant leases for a term exceeding three years
The submission is that the act of the Receiver in leasing out the flats in the above manner beyond three years is in violation of this Rule and in that view of the matter lease should be cancelled and the tenants should summarily be evicted
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that there was no new tenancy and surrender of flats Nos 1 and 2 by the Grindlays and retaining two more flats does not amount to a new tenancy atleast so far as Grindlays is concerned and a reduction of rent also does not create new tenancy inasmuch as the rent that they had to pay was only for two flats in respect of each their tenancy continue
In Woodfall s Law of Landlord and Tenant 25th Edn
Page 969 paragraph 2079 reads as under 2079
Implied surrender of part only
If a lessee for years accept a new lease by indenture of part of the lands it is a surrender for that part only and not for the whole k and though a contract for years cannot be so divided as to be avoided for part of the years and to subsist for the residue either by act of the party or act in law yet the land itself may be divided and the tenant may surrender one or two acres either expressly or by act of law and the lease for the residue will stand good and untouched
 In Halsbury s Laws of England 4th Edn
Volume 27 paragraph 449 read as under 449
Surrender by change in nature of tenant s occupation
A surrender is implied when the tenant remains in occupation of the premises in a capacity inconsistent with his being tenant where for instance he becomes the landlord s employee or where the parties agree that the tenant is in future to occupy the premsises rent free for life as a licensee
An agreement by the tenant to purchase the rever sion does not of itself effect a surrender as the purchase is conditional on a good title being made by the Landlord
 971 In Foa s General Law of Landlord and Tenant 7th Edition by Judge Forbes paragraph 991 reads thus 991
Lease of part  c It has been held that acceptance of a new lease of part only of the demised premises operates as a surrender of that part and no more b but any ar rangement between landlord and tenant which operates as a fresh demise will work a surrender of the old tenancy and this may result from an agreement under which the tenant gives up part of the premises and pays a diminished rent for the remainder and it may result from the mere alteration in the amount of rent payable c
Where one only of two or more lessees accepts a new lease it is a surrender only of his share d
 In Hill and Redman s Law of Landlord and Tenant 16th Edn
on page 45 1 it is observed Any arrangement between the landlord and tenant which operates as a fresh demise will work a surrender of the old tenancy and this may result from an agreement under which the tenant gives up part of the premises and pays a dimin ished rent for the remainder provided a substantial differ ence is thereby made in the conditions of the tenancy
But a surrender does not follow from a mere agreement made during the tenancy for the reduction or increase of rent or other variation of its terms unless there is some special reason to infer a new tenancy where for instance the parties make the change in the rent in the belief that the old tenancy is at an end
 From the above passage it can be inferred that surrender of a part does not amount to implied surrender of the entire tenancy and the rest of the tenancy remains untouched
We shall now examine the cases cited
In Konijeti Venkayya and Another vs Thammana Peda Venkata Subbarao and Another 19 Viswanatha Sastri J referred to the above mentioned passage from Woodfall s Law of Landlord and Tenant and observed that the principle of law is stated correctly
It can therefore be seen that surrender of the part of the lease does not amount to surrender of the whole
In NM Ponniah Nadar vs 972 Smt
Kamalakshmi Ammal AIR 1989 SC 467 it is held A mere increase or reduction of rent will not necessarily import a surrender of an existing lease and the grant of a new tenancy
So also if on account of the variation in the quantum of rent any consequential change is made regarding the time and manner of the payment of the rent it cannot have the effect of graver consequences being imported into the change of rent than what the parties had intended and warrant a finding by the Court that the parties had intend ed to create a new tenancy in supersession of the earlier one or that by operation of law a new tenancy had come into existence
 From what has been considered above it emerges that surren der of part of the tenancy does not amount to implied sur render of the entire tenancy
Likewise the mere increase or reduction of rent also will not necessarily import a surren der of an existing lease and the creation of a new tenancy
We have noticed above that the transfer includes lease 
Therefore it becomes necessary at this stage to consider whether there has been violation of injunction granted by Justice AN Sen which formed part of the appointment order of the Receiver
So far as the Grindlays are concerned we are unable to accede to the contention that a new tenancy is created
It is true that Justice AN Sen issued an injunction restraining the defendants from selling or transferring any of the properties
There is some force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the lease in favour of Tatas amounts to transfer but the same cannot be said of Grindlays
Therefore the question of evicting them summarily on this ground does not arise
However the sub mission of the learned counsel is that even the lease in favour of the Grindlays expired and by creating a monthly tenancy it may even go beyond three years and therefore it is not only creating a new lease but also is in violation of Rule 5 of the Original Side Rules
We think we need not deal with this question elaborately in view of the main and important question regarding the applicability of the provi sions of the Act
However we have already considered and held that no new tenancy is created so far Grindlays are concerned
Regarding the contention of infraction of Rule 5 it must be noted that the tenancy continued as monthly tenancy and it cannot be said that the Receiver has created tenancy for a period exceeding three years and as observed in Utility s case it is an accretion to the old tenancy and not a new 973 tenancy
Merely because there is change in a tenancy namely that it has become a monthly tenancy it does not amount to a new tenancy as contended by the appellant so far as Grind lays are concerned
It is also submitted on behalf of the Grindlays that no new lease has been created by the Receiver and they come within the meaning of tenants  and therefore they cannot be evicted except as provided under the provisions of the Act
Section 2h of the Act reads thus tenant means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is or but for a special contract would be payable and includes any person continu ing in possesion after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person s death such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction
 In Darnadilal and Others vs Parashram and Others Section 2i of the Madhya Pradesh Accommoda tion Control Act 1961 which is analogous to Section 2h of the Act has been considered and it is held Tenancy has its origin in contract
There is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy and heritability is an inci dent of the tenancy
It cannot be assumed however that with the determination of the tenancy the estate must neces sarily disappear and the statute can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation
 It is also further observed that The definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists In Biswabani P Ltd vs Santosh Kumar Dutta and Ors
  it is observed that 974 If thus the appellant was already in possession as a tenant of the premises an unsuccessful attempt to create a fresh lease would not change the nature of his possession as from a tenant to one in part performance under a void lease
The appellant continues to be in possession as tenant merely because the appellant and respondents 1 and 2 attempted to enter into a fresh lease which did not become effective
 Their Lordships referred to a passage in Woodfall on Land lord and Tenant  Vol 1 27th Edn
page 187 para 446 which reads thus Moreover if the tenant enters into possession under a void lease he thereupon becomes tenant from year to year upon the termsof the writing so far as they are applicable to and not inconsistent with a yearly tenancy
Such tenancy may be determined by the usual notice to quit at the end of the first or any subsequent year and it will determine without any notice to quit at the end of the term mentioned in the writing
But if the lessee does not enter he will not be liable to an action for not taking possession nor will an action lie against the lessor for not giving possession at the time appointed for the commencement of the term but before the lease is executed
 In an unreported judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Smt
Ashrafi Devi and Anr
vs Satyapal Gupta  Ors Suit No 96658 dated 9th Sept 1977 Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji as he then was dealt with the question of cancelling the tenancy of lease created in respect of a room and kitchen by the Official Receiver
In that case it was found that the Official Receiver violating the order of the injunction granted lease which the Court found it to be illegal
Then the learned Judge proceeded further to consider whether such an illegality can be rectified in the proceedings before the Court and it was held that Therefore by acting in viola tion of the order of the court no right in my opinion can be created in favour of a third party
Indeed the court has not acted
The action was in breach of the order of the court
 The learned counsel for the appellant relied on this judgment in support of his submission that the lease in the instant case created by the Official Receiver is also ille gal
From the facts of that case we find a clear injunction order was passed specially restraining the Receiver from creating any new tenancy and in gross violation of that order
But in the instant case the facts are different
The injunction granted 975 by A N
Sen J does not apply to the tenancy in favour of Grindlays in respect of flats Nos 3 and 4 inasmuch as it is an old tenancy though in a modified form
In Ashrafi Devi s case as a matter of fact the learned Judge observed There was no question of the lease being given without the power by the Receiver or in derogation or in violation of the order of the court
The lease within the competency of a Receiver cannot be impeached or affected in the summary manner as was contended
 We have already noted that the Grindlays were the tenants in respect of the four flats
They surrendered two flats
This partial surrender does not put an end to the tenancy and we are satisfied that in respect of the Grindlays no new tenan cy is created by the Receiver and they continued to be the tenant and they are entitled to the protection under the Act
Shri Vaidyanathan learned counsel appearing for one of the respondents relying on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Arumugha Gounder vs Ardhanari Mudaliar and Others AIR 1975 Madras 23 1 contended that the protec tion under the Act cannot be extended to the tenant of a Receiver
In that case the tenant was let into possession of a land by Receiver appointed by the Court pending the suit
The question was whether the provisions of Tamil Nadu Culti vating Tenants Protection Act 1955 can be extended to such a tenant
It was observed in para 6 that So then the act of the Receiver in letting out the land in the suit is an act of the Court itself and it is done on behalf of the Court the whole purpose of the Court taking possession through the Receiver appointed by it is to pro tect the property for the benefit of the ultimate successful party
If that is the essence and purpose of appointment of a Receiver as we hold it is it will be difficult to agree that by a literal application of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act it could be put beyond the reach of the Court to give relief to the successful party entitled to possession Before arriving at this conclusion the Full Bench as a matter of fact also observed in para 3 976 If literal application of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Ten ants Protection Act is made it may prima facie appear that a tenant let into possession by a Receiver would be entitled to statutory protection under the Act
A cultivating tenant in relation to any land has been defined to mean a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied
A landlord in relation to a holding or part thereof is defined to mean a person entitled to evict a cultivating tenant from such holding or part
A tenant let into possession by a Receiver appointed by Court literally appears to satisfy the defini tion of cultivating tenant and the Receiver the defini tion of Landlord because the former carried on personal cultivating under a tenancy agreement
 The Full Bench however took the view that the Receiver appointed by the Court acts as an Officer of the Court and he cannot create a lease which takes the pending matter beyond the purview of the Court and anyone who gets posses sion through such an act could only do so subject to the directions and orders of the Court
In our view the princi ple laid down by the Full Bench does not apply to the facts in the instant case atleast to the case of Grindlays as in our view on new tenancy is created in their favour
Even by the time the Receiver was appointed the Grindlays were the tenants in respect of the four flats and they continued to be so
It is only later after due correspondence that they made a partial surrender and those two flats were let out to Tatas after due negotiations in respect of the rent
Grind lays  affidavit shows that they have also sent rent by way of Bank pay orders and they have been received by the Land lord
It is only for the first time on 26788 that the tenant was informed to stop the payment of rent
Further the receiver has not acted in any manner affecting the title
Now coming to the case of Tatas we agree with the High Court that it is a new tenancy
Such a lease comes within the meaning of transfer  and in view of the injunction order passed by AN Sen J creation of such a new tenancy is legally barred
In Kerr on Receivers 12th Edn
at p 154 it is observed The receiver does not collect the rents and profits by virtue of any estate vested in him but by virtue of his position as an officer of the Court appointed to collect property upon the title of the parties to the action
977 In appointing a receiver the Court deals with the possession only until the right is determined if the right be in dispute
 It is also useful to note a passage from Sir John Woodroffe book on Receivers The Receiver being the officer of the Court from which he derives his appointment his possession is exclusively the possession of the Court the property being regarded as in the custody of the law in gremio legis for the benefit of whoever may be ultimately determined to be entitled thereto In Kanhaiyalal vs Dr DR Banali  at p 729 it was observed A receiver appointed under 040 of the Code of Civil Proce dure unlike a receiver appointed under the insolvency Act does not own the property or hold any interest therein by virtue of a title
He is only the agent of the Court for the safe custody and management of the property during the time that the Court exercises jurisdiction over the litigation in respect of the property In such a situation the question is whether the Tatas can invoke the benefit of the provisions of the Act
In Smt
Ashrafi Devi s case this is precisely the question that is decided and we have already referred to some of the obser vations made therein
Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji held further On behalf of the transferee of the said property it was contended that the West Bengal Tenancy Premises Act 1956 protects such transferee
If however a valid lease or a tenancy had been created then of course such a lease or a tenant would be protected but that in my opinion begs the question
Secondly it was contended that no party should be made to suffer because of an Act of the Court I have not been able to appreciate this contention
The court specifi cally prevented the transfer or creation of the tenancy
The tenancy which is created was in derogation and in violation of the order of the court
Therefore by acting in violation of the order of the court no right in my 978 opinion can be created in favour of a third party
Indeed the court has not acted
The action was in breach of the order of the court
 Similarly as observed in Arumugha Gounder s case any such act of the Receiver done on behalf of the Court pen dente lite and anyone who gets possession through such an act could only do so subject to the directions and orders of the Court
If we apply the above principles to the case of Tatas the tenancy created in their favour by the Receiver is in violation and contrary to the injunction order and such an act is subject to the directions and orders of the Court appointing the Receiver
Therefore the tenancy created in favour of the Tatas was in breach of the order of the court and consequently the Tatas cannot claim any protection under the provisions of the Act and they are liable to be evicted
In the counter affidavit filed on their behalf it is no doubt stated that they were inducted into possession and even sending the cheques
The case of the appellant is that cheques were never encashed
In any event as observed above the new tenancy created in their favour contrary to the orders of the Court does not create a fight and is liable to be cancelled
Consequently the provisions of the Act cannot be invoked by them
The appeal is therefore dismissed as against respondent No 1 Grindlays and allowed as against respondent No 2 Tatas
In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs
RSS Appeal dis missed


Summary:
The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by way of public interest litigation seeking directions for i inquiry against police officials under whose jurisdiction the malady of forced prostitution Devdasi system and Jogin traditions were flourishing and ii for rehabilitiation of the victims of this malady
Disposing the writ petition this Court
HELD 1
The malady of prostitution is not only a social but also a socio economic problem and therefore the meas ures to be taken in that regard should be more preventive rather than punitive
This cannot be 862 eradicated either by banishing branding scourging or inflicting severe punishment on the helpless and hapless victims most of whom are unwilling participants and invol untary victims of compelled circumstances and who finding no way to escape are weeping or wailing throughout
This devastating malady can be suppressed and eradicated only if the law enforcing authorities in that regard take very severe and speedy action against all the erring persons such as pimps brokers and brothel keepers
867D E G 2
In spite of the stringent and rehabilitative provi sions of law contained in Constitution of India 1950 the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act 1956 Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 it cannot be said that the desired result has been achieved
It cannot be gainsaid that a remarkable degree of ignorance or callous ness or culpable indifference is manifested in uprooting this cancerous growth despite the fact that the day has arrived imperiously demanding an objective multi dimensional study and a searching investigation into the matter relating to the causes and effects of this evil and requiring the most rational measures to weed out the vices of illicit trafficking
867C D 3
The Courts also in such cases have to always take a serious view of this matter and inflict consign punishment on proof of such offences
However it is neither practica ble and possible nor desirable to make a roving enquiry through the CBI throughout the length and breadth of the country
and no useful purpose will be served by issuing any such direction
867G 867E 4
Apart from legal action both the Central and the State Governments have got an obligation to safeguard the interest and welfare of the children and girls of this country
867H Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India and Guarav Jain vs Union of India  Ors
   referred to
All the State Governments and the Governments of Union Territories should direct their concerned law enforc ing authorities to take appropriate and speedy action under the existing laws in eradicating child prostitution without giving room for any complaint of remissness or culpable indifference
They should also set up separate Advisory Committees for making suggestions for eradication of prosti tution implementation of the social welfare programmes for the care protection treatment development and rehabilita tion of the victims and for 863 amendments of the existing law or for enactment of any new law for prevention of sexual exploitation of the children
These Governments should also devise a machinery for ensur ing proper implementation of the suggestions of their re spective committees
868D H 869A E