217 of 1955
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights
N C Chatterjee Vir Sen Sawhney and Ganpat Rai with him for the petitioners
Lal Narain Sinha Bajrang Sahai and section P Verma with him for respondent No 2 1955
October 28
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J
The petitioners have filed this application under article 32 of the Constitution claiming that the buildings and lands as set out in the Schedule annexed to the petition and marked A hereinafter referred to as the disputed properties did not vest in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the 990 Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Act
Petitioner No I in his individual capacity was at one time the owner of the disputed properties which lie within Touzi No 28 of the Collectorate of Hazaribagh
On the 29th of December 1947 petitioner No I as owner leased out the disputed properties to a Company known as Mineral Development Ltd hereinafter referred to as the Company
The Company took possession of the disputed properties and has been paying rent
On the 7th of April 1949 petitioner No I in his individual capacity executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the disputed properties to three trustees namely himself and petitioners 2 and 3
The Company has been paying rent to the trustees since then
The Act came into force on the 25th of September 1950
On the 3rd of November 1951 the State Government issued a notification under section 31 of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No I in his individual capacity specified therein had passed to and become vested in the State
On the 26th of October 1953 a notice under section 4h of the Act was issued by the Collector to the Company and on the 4th of March 1954 the State Government issued a notification under section 31 of the Act purporting to vest in the State the properties covered by the above mentioned deed of settlement and another deed of settlement with which we are  not concerned
The Company instituted a title suit No 33 of 1951 against the State of Bihar in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Hazaribagh basing its claim on a mining lease executed by petitioner No I in his individual capacity the genuineness of which was challenged by the State
Petitioner No I in his individual capacity was made a party to this suit
The Company also instituted a title suit No 9 of 1954 against the State of Bihar to which petitioner No I in his individual capacity was made a party challenging the legality of the issue of notice dated 26 10 1953 under section 4h of the Act
On the 11th of November 1954 the State of Bihar filed title suit No 53 of 1954 to which the Company 991 petitioner No I in his individual capacity the three trustees and others were made parties
By this suit the State of Bihar challenged the genuineness of the lease in favour of the Company and the deed of settlement in favour of the trustees
The real question for determination is what vested in the State on the publication of the notification under section 3 and by virtue of the provisions of section 4a of the Act According to Mr Chatterjee the disputed properties did not vest in the State whatever else may have
Having regard to the definition of estate in the Act if anything vested in the State on the publication of a notification it was the land comprised in the notified estate
Although the disputed properties stood on the land in the notified estate they did not vest in the State because the definition of estate speaks of land only and not of any building on it
The notification under section 3 was a mere declaration and actual vesting took place under section 4a
On the date of vesting the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No 1 who had parted with his right title and interest therein long before the Act was enacted and the publication of the notification under section 3
Mr Sinha on behalf of the State of Bihar on the other hand contended that on a perusal of the provi sions of sections 4 5 and 7 of the Act it would appear that the Act contemplated something more than the  land in an estate vesting in the State and the disputed  properties could and did vest in the State on the publication of the notification under section 3
In our opinion it is of little consequence in the present case whether the notified estate vested in the State by reason of the publication of the notification under section 3 or by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Act because in either case a vesting did take place
Although the word land is used in the definition of estate the provisions of sections 4 5 and 7 show the necessary intention to include something more than the land when an estate vests in the State
Under section 4a it is not only the 992 estate but also buildings of a certain description and other things which vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a notification under section 3
Under sections 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned therein also vest in the State because the buildings in question are deemed to be settled by the State with the intermediary in possession
This could only be on the supposition that these buildings vested in the State and the person in possession held the same as settlee under the State
In the present case on the date of the publication of the notification under section 3 the disputed properties were said to be in the possession of the Company as lessee and the petitioner No I had no right title or interest therein as he had transferred his lessor s reversion to trustees by a deed of settlement
We may assume therefore that on the date of publication of the notification the disputed properties were not used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No 1 It
becomes therefore necessary to interpret the word used occurring in section 4a
It is to be noticed that this clause of section 4 does not expressly state that a building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent must be so used at the date of the publication of the notification
In this clause the words used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate must be read in the light
of the provisions of section 4h where similar words are employed
Under section 4h the Collector has the power to make inquiries in respect of any transfer of any kind of interest in any building used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate if the transfer had been made at any time after the first day of January 1946
If on due inquiry the Collector is satisfied that such transfer was made with the object of defeating he provisions of the Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher compensation then the Collector may after giving notice to the parties concerned and hearing them and with the previous sanction of she State Government annul the transfer and dis 993 possess the person claiming under it
These provisions clearly indicate that if any building was used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent and such building had been transferred after the first day of January 1946 the transfer could be annulled if the circumstances mentioned in section 4h had been established
That is to say under  these provisions the use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the first day of January 1946 and not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its transfer after the first day of January 1946
To hold otherwise would be to make the provisions of section 4h meaningless
When a proprietor transfers any such building  it necessarily follows that the building thereafter was not used by him as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of his estate
If the transfer was made before the first day of January 1946 the provisions of section 4h would not apply and such a transfer would not be liable to be annulled and the building so transferred would not vest in the State on the date of the publication of the notification covering the estate on which such building stands
If on the other hand this transfer was made after the first day of January 1946 a building comprised in a notified estate which was used immediately previous to the date of the transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under section 4h and it would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of section 4a must be read accordingly
It would be unreasonable to construe the provisions of section 4a in the way suggested by Mr Chatterjee
The scheme of the Act has to be borne in mind and the provisions of sections 4a and 4h have to be read together
The petitioners had not asserted in their petition that the disputed properties were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate of petitioner No I before the first of January 1946 or before the lease in favour of the Company
On behalf 994 of the State on affidavit it has been stated that the disputed properties were all along used as cutchery before the creation of the lease and that they were not being used in connection with any mining operation
In our opinion if as a result of the inquiry under section 4h the transfer of the disputed properties by the petitioner No I is annulled the disputed properties must be regarded as having vested in the State because they were used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent previous to the transfers made by the petitioner No 1
It was next contended that section 4h is ultra vires the Constitution because it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to realize rent from the Company as the transfer in its favour was imperilled by the notice issued to it under section 4h
No appeal or review was provided in the Act against the order of the Collector issuing notice or an order of annulment made by him
The Collector was left with absolute power to annul a transfer and to dispossess a person in possession thereunder
Section 4b however does direct the Collector to give reasonable notice to the parties concerned and to bear them
Such annulment or dispossession which he may order must be with the previous sanction of the State Government and he is compelled to do so on terms which may appear to him fair and equitable
The power is therefore not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested
Assuming however that the Collector has very wide powers it is to be remembered that section 4h is a part of the law of acquisition of estates as enacted by the Act and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place
The Act is a valid law of acquisition and its whole purpose may be defeated unless there was some such provision as contained in section 4b
The Act being a law for acquisition of estates the question of it or section 4h of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioners does not arise
In any event the Act including sect ton 4h is protected by article 31 A of the Constitution
The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs


Summary:
On the 29th of December 1947 petitioner No 1 executed a lease to C a company of certain properties consisting of lands and buildings comprised in the estate belonging to him
Subsequently in 1949 he executed a deed of settlement whereby he transferred the properties to three trustees namely himself and petitioners 2 and 3
Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 Bihar Act XXX of 1950 came into force on the 25th of September 1950 and on the 3rd of November 1951 the State of Bihar issued a notification under section 31 of the Act declaring that the estate of petitioner No 1 had passed to and become vested in the State
A notice under section 4h of the Act was issued by the Collector to C and on the 4th of March 1954 the State Government issued a notification under s31 purporting to vest in the State the properties in question
It was contended for the petitioners that the buildings standing on the land comprised in the notified estate did not vest in the State on the ground 1 that the estate of the petitioner No 1 did not vest in the State under section 3 of the Act but by virtue of the provisions of section 4 2 that the definition of estate in the Act speaks of land only and not of any building on it 3 that on the date of vesting the buildings were not used as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of the notified estate within the meaning of section 4a and 4 that section 4h is ultra vires the Constitution as it imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to realise rent from the company
Held that 1 whether the estate of petitioner No I vested in the State by reason of the publication of the notification under section 3 or by virtue of the provisions of section 4 was of little consequence as in either case a vesting took place 2 although in the definition of estate the word land is used and there is no mention of the word building the provisions of sections 4 5 and 7 show the intention of the legislature to include some 989 thing more than merely the land of a notified estate as vesting in the State
Under section 4a buildings of a certain description and other things vest in the State absolutely on the publication of a notification under section 3
Under sections 5 and 7 the buildings mentioned therein are deemed to be settled by the State with the intermediary and this could only be an the supposition that the buildings vested in the State the intermediary being a settlee under the State 3 sections 4a and 4h must be read together
Under section 4h the use to which the building was put previous to its transfer after the first day of January 1946 and not thereafter was what the Collector was concerned with and not to what use it had been put after its transfer after the first day of January 1946
If a transfer was made after the first day of January 1946 of a building comprised in the notified estate which was used immediately previous to the date of transfer primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate the transfer would be liable to be annulled under section 4h and the building would vest absolutely in the State on the publication of the notification and the provisions of section 4a must be read accordingly and 4 the Collector s powers under section 4h wide as they are are not quite so absolute or arbitrary as suggested
section 4h is a part of a validly enacted law of acquisition of estates and is an integral part of the machinery by which acquisition of an estate takes place
The Act or section 4h of it imposing any unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners therefore does not rise
The Act including section 4h of it is protected by article 31 A of the Constitution