ivil Appeal Nos1426 to 1428 NT of 1975
From the judgment and Orders dated 2421972  2341974 of the Allahabad High Court in Income Tax Reference Nos45668  47 of 1973
WITH Civil Appeal No1653 NT of 1991
Raja Ram Aggarwal and ECAggarwal for the Appellant
VGauri Shankar BBAhuja SRajappa and Ms
ASubhashini for the Respondents
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHANJ
These four matters arise out of income tax assessments of the same assessee and involve the same questions
We grant leave in the Special Leave Petition after condoning the delay of 141 days in the circumstances set out in the application for condonation 240 of delay and proceed to dispose of all the four appeals by this common judgment
The assessee appellant in all these cases is a Hindu Undivided Family HUF known as Ms Moti Lal Chhadami Lal Jain carrying on business at Ferozabad
The HUF consisted of the karta Chhadamilal Jain and his son Bimal Kumar Jain
Appeal No1426 of 1975 relates to the assessment year 1962 63 Civil Appeal Nos1427 and 1428 relate to assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70 and the other remaining Civil Appeal relates to the assessment year 1973 74
The facts relevant for the assessment year 1962 63 may now be set out For the assessment year in question the previous year for which ended on 1271961 the assessee HUF derived income from property as well as hire rent and commission from Jain Glass WorksP Ltd hereinafter referred to as the company 
On 351960 the assessee family had granted a perpetual lease of certain buildings furnaces and lands owned by it to the company
It appears that a firm known as Jain Glass Works PLtd
had taken on lease the above assets of the HUF at an annual rent of Rs62000 for running its business in the manufacture of glassware
The lease deed recited that the company which had taken over the running business of the firm was to continue to have its factory for manufacture of glassware on the land belonging to the joint family and continue to use and enjoy all the facilities for the manufacture of glassware on the bhatties belonging to the family
In consideration of the use of all the above premises the company was to pay the HUF an annual rent of Rs21000 for the period during which the company continued to have its factory in the premises of the lessor and also to pay the HUF a commission at one per cent of the total turnover of the company for financial year
Under clause 3 of the lease deed the company was to pay the annual rent of Rs21000 in the following manner a Rs10000 to Shri Chhadami Lal Jain Trust Degree College Ferozabad
b Rs11000 direct to the lessor Ms
Moti Lal Chhadami Lal HUF
On 551962 another agreement was entered into between four parties the two male members of the assessee HUF the company the 241 Chhadami Lal Jain Trust hereinafter referred to as the Trust  and the Chhadami Lal Jain Degree College hereinafter referred to as the College which is an educational institution run by the Trust
This document referred to the earlier lease agreement between the family and the company and its terms
The agreement recorded inter alia that out of the total rent of Rs21000 payable by the company a sum of Rs10000 would be paid to the college and the balance to the HUF in four equal quarterly installments
Clause 7 of the deed reads as follows That in the event of the second party  failing to pay the rent every quarter in accordance with the above mentioned conditions or violates the terms of this agreement then in the first place the fourth party  shall have full rights to recover Rs10000 ten thousand rupees per year as rent by recourse to the Court in whatsoever manner it deems fit and shall have first charge on the full property mentioned below
Subsequently the first party  shall recover the balance of Rs11000 per year rent alongwith the interest costs and expenses from the second party  and such recovery will not be objected to by the second party  or its successors
 For the assessment year 1962 63 the assessee family returned Rs11000 as lease rent received from the company
It was claimed that the balance of Rs10000 was the income of the trust and hence not part of the income of the assessee
It was explained that the University while granting affiliation to the college had imposed a condition that security should be given for the running expenses of the college and as such a security was given by creating a charge of Rs10000 in favour of the college on the immovable property of the joint family
The contention was that the sum of Rs10000 out of the rent payable by the lessee for the property got diverted by overriding title to the college and ceased to be the income of the assessee
This contention was negatived by the Income Tax Officer ITO the Appellate Assistant Commissioner AAC and the Income tax Appellate Tribunal the Tribunal
The Tribunal however directed the ITO to give appropriate relief us 88 in respect of this amount
Another bone of contention between the parties related to the income from certain properties claimed to have been transferred by the assessee family to the Trust on 14111947
On that date the assessee executed a Trust Deed which was also registered at Ferozabad
By this deed Chhadami Lal the karta of the assessee family 242 expressed his desire to create a charitable trust which would fulfill the needs of education religion and medical facilities in the town of Ferozabad
He therefore proceeded to create a trust which would run a boarding house a dharamshala with a temple a commercial and industrial Institute a Jain Dharam School a Jain Aushadhalya a students  scholarship fund and a public library and reading room
Clause 3 of the deed provided
That the expenditure of the trust and expenses for the above mentioned objects will be made from the income of the following properties which income will be of the trust
I will have no personal concern with this income nor will be used for my personal benefit but will be spent on the aims of the trust
 Chhadami Lal constituted himself the trustee to look after the trust as long as he lived and manage its affairs
The deed then proceeded to set out the details of the property the income from which will be used for the purpose of the trust
The properties were said to be of the value of Rs612000 and to yield an income of about Rs18000 per annum
On the strength of the above document the assessee HUF was not assessed on the income from the properties for the assessment year 1949 50
However while scrutinizing the accounts for the assessment years 1951 52 to 1959 60 the ITO assessed the income from the properties in the hands of the family as he was of opinion that the Trust Deed only purported to transfer the income from the properties to the Trust but not the corpus thereof and that therefore the income was not eligible for exemption under s43i of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922
Appeals by the assessee to the AAC and the Tribunal were unsuccessful
It was be mentioned here that on 9th August 1960 Shri Chhadami Lal and his son had executed another registered document
This document referred to the creation of the Trust in 1947 which it was stated had been running several educational and charitable institutions regularly and successfully
The document proceeded to say Thus there has been a great progress in the working of the above mentioned institutions and the property above mentioned was felt to be insufficient in the year 1957 therefore both of us thought it proper that in order to run 243 the trust successfully the properties mentioned below should also be invested in the trust and to be under the same so that Shri Chhadami Lal Jain Trust should always run properly and the public good that has been done upto now as stated above should continue to be so done in the same rather better way
Public good should continue to be done
Therefore we executants had given to the trust on the Ist July 1957 the following property the value of which was Rs25000 by canceling mutation thereof in respect thereof in our name and giving up possession of the below mentioned property at the same time had transferred it to the Trust
Since the Ist of July 1957 we have had no connection with the property mentioned below nor shall we have any concern with it is the future
 The deed then proceeded to mention the details of the property which has been in the use of the trust above mentioned since 1957 and will continue likewise to be in the use of the trust always
It then proceeded to appoint eleven persons who were to be trustees to continue to run the Trust and the institutions
Chhadami Lal Bimal Kumar and his wife were three of the trustees the others being outsiders
Then followed several clauses
Clause 3 referred to the properties which has been given to the trust before and now and empowered the trustees to sell or lease out the land to construct a building for the trust if it was found necessary
Clause 5 however prohibited the trustees from putting the property of the trust to personal use wasting it or from mortgaging and selling it except in accordance with clause 3 Despite this document the ITO assessed the family on the income from the above properties
Appeals to the AAC failed but the Tribunal allowed the appeals of the assessee
For the assessment year 1962 63 the Tribunal following its earlier orders in the case of the Trust viz ITA No17157 of 1963 64 and ITA No11774 of 1964 65 allowed the assessee s appeal
The assessee aggrieved by the Tribunal s decision on the first contention and the department aggrieved by the decision on the second contention sought references to the High Court
Thus two questions were referred to the High Court in relation to the assessment year 1962 63 ITRef4561968
These questions were 1 Whether on a proper construction of the lease deeds dated 244 351960 and 551962 and the accompanying facts and circumstances of the case the sum of Rs10000 is the income of the assessee and not that of Chhadami Lal Jain Degree College 2 Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the income of Rs14000 from properties purported to have been transferred to Seth Chhadami Lal Jain Trust was not assessable in the hands of the assessee family ITR47 of 1973 related to assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70 for which the relevant previous years ended on 1967 and 1968
For these assessment years also the inclusion of the income of Rs13920 from the properties claimed to have been transferred to the Trust in the assessments of the HUF having been deleted by the Tribunal following its orders in the appeals relating to 1964 65 to 1967 68 the following question was referred to the High Court in RANos88 and 89 of 1972 73 dated 81272 Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case income of Rs13920 from properties purported to have been transferred to the trust was not assessable in the hands of assessee family It may be mentioned that though a reference was also made by the Tribunal on the other question regarding income from the property in RANo90 and 91 of 1972 73 dated 7372 that was not the subject matter of ITR 4773 and hence we are not concerned with that here
In ITR16879 which relates to the assessment year 1973 74 three questions were referred to the High Court of which we are concerned with only two here
These are 2 Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case income of Rs6329 from properties purported to have been transferred to the Trust was not assessable in the hands of the assessee family 3 Whether on a proper construction of the lease deeds dated 351960 and 551962 and accompanying facts and circumstances of the case the sum of Rs10000 is the income of the assessee and not that of Chhadami Lal Jain Degree College 245 The questions referred were answered by the High Court against the assessee and in favour of the Department
The judgment of the High Court in ITR45668 is reported in 1977 106 ITR909 All
This judgment contains the reasons for the conclusion on the question relating to the rental income is concerned
But so far as the other question is concerned the High Court answered it following its earlier decision in ITR72 of 1969 arising out of the Tribunal s orders in the case of the trust in ITANos17157 of 1963 64 and ITANo11774 of 1964 65 referred to earlier and reported in The judgment in ITR 4773 follows the decision in ITR 45668
In ITR 16879 again the ruling in has been followed and the decision given against the assessee
These are the three judgments in appeal before us
Before considering the questions arising in these appeals we would like to point out that there is no information before us as to what has happened a in the assessment years 1950 51 to 1959 60 b in the intervening assessment years 1963 64 to 1967 68 and again from 1970 71 to 1972 73 c in the assessment years subsequent thereto and d for assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70 so far as the issue regarding the rental income is concerned
We are indeed surprised that even the assessee who in all probability must have been affected by the assessments for those years should not have cared to place the relevant information before us
It is regrettable that neither party has cared to verify whether any appeals before the authorities or references in the High Court or appeals or special leave petitions are pending for those years
It would have been helpful to both sides if an attempt had been made to find out all the information so that all the connected matters could have been consolidated and heard together
So far as the question of rental income is concerned we agree with the view taken by the High Court
The assessee is the owner of the properties in question and has leased out the properties in question to the company for an annual rent of Rs21000
This is the income of the family
The assessee s agreement with the company is only that Rs10000 out of the rent due to it should be paid directly to the College
This is only a mode of application of the income by the family which will make no difference in its liability to tax on the entire rent of Rs21000
Nor does the fact that the College has been given a right by the four party agreement to sue for and recover the sum of Rs10000 directly from the company in case of default alter this position
That is only a mode of recourse provided to the College for the enforcement of the promise made to it by the assessee
The payment to or recovery 246 of Rs10000 by the College will only discharge in part the liability of the company to pay a rent of Rs21000 to the assessee under the lease deed
It is contended on behalf of the assessee that it would not be correct to treat this a case of a mere application by the assessee of a part of the rental income due to and receivable by it
The right given to the College to sue the company directly coupled with the creation of a charge in its favour on the property yielding the rent for such payment has the result of diverting that part of the rental income at the very source or inception
Under the second agreement it is urged not merely an amount of Rs10000 per annum but the very right to receive and enforce the payment of that part of the rent is assigned to the College by the assessee
Its effect is that the income from the property thereafter accrues partly to the assessee and partly to the College with the result that the assessee is left only with the right to receive Rs11000 from the company every year
Reliance is placed in this context on the decisions in CIT vs Sitaldas Tirathdas  SC and Murlidhar Himmatsingka vs ITO  SC We are of opinion that this contention cannot be accepted
As we have pointed out earlier the right given to the College to sue the company is only the right to recover part of amount which has already accrued to the assessee
The creation of a charge in favour of the College does not make any difference
It only obliges the company to pay a part of the rent to the College on behalf of the assessee but the existence of a mere obligation is not sufficient to constitute diversion of income
The classic statement of the true principle is set out in CIT vs Sitaldas Tirathdas supra Obligation no doubt there are in every case but it is the nature of the obligation which is the decisive factor
There is a difference between an amount which a person is obliged to apply out of his income and an amount which by the nature of the obligation cannot be said to be a part of the income of the assessee
Where by the obligation income is diverted before it reaches the assessee it is deductible
But where the income is required to be applied to discharge an obligation self imposed and gratuitous after such income reaches the assessee the same consequence in law does not follow
It is the first kind of payment which can truly be excused and not the second
The second payment is merely 247 an obligation to pay another a portion of one s own income which has been received and is since applied
The first is a case in which the income never reaches the assessee who even if he was to collect it does so not as part of his income but for and on behalf of the persons to whom it is payable
 In the above passage it is clear the expressions reaches the assessee and has been received have been used not in the sense of the income being received in cash by one person or another
What the passage emphasises is the nature of the obligation by reason of which the income becomes payable to a person other than the one entitled to it
Where the obligation flows out of an antecedent and independent title in the former such as for example the rights of dependents to maintenance or of coparceners on partition or rights under a statutory provision or an obligation imposed by a third party and the like it effectively slices away a part of the corpus of the right of the latter to receive the entire income and so it would be a case of diversion
On the other hand where the obligation is self imposed or gratuitous as here it is only a case of an application of income
The case of a sub partnership referred to on behalf of the assessee is really a case on the borderline
It is possible to take a view that it is nothing more than a case of one partner agreeing to divide his share of profits from a firm with others and indeed this was the view taken earlier see Mahaliram Santhalia vs CIT But apparently in view of the commercial necessities which compel the formation of sub partnerships a series of judicial decisions approved in Murlidhar Himmatsingka vs ITO supra have held that they represent cases of diversion
That analogy cannot be extended to cases such as the present
We would also like in this context to refer to S241iv of the Income tax Act 1961
It provides for a deduction in the computation of income from house property in respect of the amount of an annual charge on the property
The statutory provision was initially wide enough to rope in cases of such charges irrespective of the purpose for which they were created and even where they were voluntarily created by an assessee
But the provision has been amended wef141969 to exclude deduction of an annual charge voluntarily by the assessee
The case before us is not one of income from house property computed under Ss22 24 and we are referring to this only as a matter of interest
This amendment also indicates that a charge voluntarily created would 248 stand on an different footing from super imposed charges
For these reasons we agree with the view taken by the High Court and hold that the assessee is liable to tax on the entire rental income of Rs21000
Turning now to the second question before us it talks of the income from the properties purported to have been transferred to the Trust and in the words in quotation lies the crucial issue in the case
There is no dispute that the income from the property is applied wholly for religious and charitable purposes
S43i of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 and its successor section 111a of the Income tax Act 1961 insofar as they were applicable to the assessment years before us exempt the income derived by an assessee from property held in trust or other legal obligation for such purposes
This exemption has been denied to the assessee on the short ground that the properties with the income from which we are concerned continue to vest in the assessee and have not been effectively transferred to the Trust
This is said to be so far two reasons
The first is that the trust has been created in respect of immovable properties of the value of more then Rs100 and this is possible only if the properties had been duly conveyed to the trustees by a deed duly stamped and registered
The second is that the deeds of trust themselves do not speak of the corpus of the properties being held in trust
Clause 3 of the 1947 deed only stipulates that the income from the properties will be the income of the trust
A little later also the deed proceeds to set out the properties the income from which will be used for the purposes of the trust
In other words the deed only records the assessee s desire to utilise the income for the objects mentioned in the deed and not for his personal benefit
The document of 1960 does not improve matters any further
So it is said no valid trust has been created by the assessee to merit the claim for exemption
We are of the opinion that the view of the High Court proceeds on an unduly narrow construction of the deeds of 1947 and 1960
We have pointed out that under the deed of 1947 the karta of the assessee family is the sole trustee to execute the objects of the trust
It appears to have been overlooked that while a registered conveyance to the trustees by the owner of immovable property is necessary where the trustees are persons other than the author this requirement does not arise where the author of the trust is to be the sole trustee
While a trust is not complete until the trust property is vested in trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust this can be done by the settlor where he is 249 himself the trustee by a declaration of trust using language which taken in connection with his acts shows a clear intention on his part to divest himself of all beneficial interest in it and to exercise dominion and control over it exclusively in the character of a trustee
Sec6 of the Indian Trusts Act makes this clear beyond all doubt
In the present case there is a deed which makes clear the unequivocal intention to utilise the income from the properties in the manner set out in the deed of trust
It is in the context of the above legal position that one has to understand the references in the trust deed to the income of the properties belonging to the trust
Indeed this is made clear by the conduct of the party all through and the language of the second deed
The assessee s full ownership of and unqualified right to enjoy the properties gets restricted and qualified on the execution of such a trust deed by the various conditions set out and imposed by the trust deed
The execution of the trust deed creates an overriding title in the beneficiaries thereunder viz the various cross sections of the public covered by it to require that the income from the properties which are made the subject matter of the trust be utilised in the manner set out therein and no other
Indeed after the execution of the trust deed the properties are no longer held by the assessee as the absolute owner thereof they are held by the assessee under trust and legal obligation to apply the income exclusively for charitable purposes thus attracting the provisions for exemption contained in the Act
For the reasons discussed above we are inclined to take the view that the deed of 1947 should be construed as a valid trust which has the effect of diverting the income at the source and that the income thereafter has ceased to be the income of the assessee family
We therefore answer the question referred to the High Court on this issue in favour of the assessee
In the result of CA 1427 875 are allowed and the other two civil appeals are allowed in part
There will however be no order regarding costs
RNJ CA1427 2875 allowed
CA142675  165391
partly allowed


Summary:
The appellants the promotees  from Class II service were promoted as Executive Engineers by relaxing five years length of service as Class II Engineers in officiating capacity on various dates between January 6 1969 to May 29 1971
Only the appellant No 1 and two other were confirmed as Executive Engineers wef July 11 1973 December 11 1974 and December 9 1975 respectively
The respondent No1 was recruited and appointed directly as Asstt
Executive Engineer wef October 251971
he was also given relaxation of the length of service of five years as Asstt
Executive Engineer and was promoted as Executive Engineer on October 8 1973 and was confirmed wef December 22 1976
199 All the appellants except one MR Gupta were further promoted as Superintending Engineers on different dates between 1980 to 1984 whereas the respondent No 1 was promoted as Superintending Engineer on March 4 1987
The applicant No 1 was further promoted as Chief Engineer The validity of the promotion of respondent No 1 to the post of Chief Engineer was challenged
The respondent No 1 who was shown junior to the appellants field Writ Petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent State Government to consider his case for promotion as Superintending Engineer from the date on which the respondents were promoted assigning the seniority over the appellants and the consequential reliefs
On reference a Division Bench of the High Court held that respondent No 1 was a member of the service from the date of his initial appointment as Asstt
Executive Engineer and the appellants and the proforma respondents were not members of the service and directed the Single Judge to dispose of the matter on merit against which this appeal on leave was filed
The appellants contended that the appellants being promoted as Executive Engineers against regular vacancies which were neither a stop gap arrangement nor fortuitous and being continued in service without any break from the respective dates o their promotion they were members of the service in a substantive capacity as Executive Engineers from the respective dates of promotion that since the respondent No 1 was recruited as Asstt
Executive Engineer wef August 30 1971 long after the promotion of the appellants the appellants were seniors to the respondent No 1 as Executive Engineers as Proviso to Rule 52 entitles them to remain in a substantive capacity as Executive Engineer since requisite number of qualified Asst
Executive Engineers were not available for promotion that in view of their continous officiation as Executive Engineers in terms of Rule 212a of the rules they must be deemed to be the members of the service from the dates of promotion and therefore they were seniors to the respondent no1
The respondents contended that unless the appellants were appointed substantively to the cadre posts they could not be members of the service
The respondent No 1 became a member of the service 200 from the date of his initial appointment as Asstt
Executive Engineer therefore he was senior to the appellants and proforma respondents
As agreed by the parties this Court declare the law on the interpretation of the rules and leave the matter for the State Govt
to decide the inter seniority on merits
Disposing the appeal it is
HELD 1
Appointment to a post in accordance with the rules is a condition precedent and no one can claim appointment to a post or promotion as of right but has a right to be considered in accordance with the rules Appointment by promotion or direct recruitment therefore must be in accordance with the rules so as to become a member of the service in a substantive capacity
Seniority is to be fixed in accordance with the principle laid down in the rules
213G 214A 2
The promotee has right to confirmation in the cadre post as per Rule 114 if a post is available to him within his quota or at a later date under rule 52 read with rule 114 and gets appointment under rule 811
His seniority would be reckoned only from the date of the availability of the post and the year of allotment he shall be next below to his immediate senior promotee of that year or the junior most of the previous year of allotment whether officiating or permanent occupying the post within 50 quota
214G 215A 3
A direct recruit on promotion within his quota though later to the promotee is interposed in between the periods and interject the promotee s seniority snaps the links in the chain of continuity and steals a march over the approved promotee probationer215B 4
Mere officiating appointment by promotion to a cadre post outside the quota continuous efficiation therein and declaration of probation would not clothe the promotee with any right to claim seniority over the direct recruits
The necessary conclusion would therefore be that the direct recruit shall get his seniority with effect from the date of the year of the allotment as Asstt
Executive Engineer which is not alterable
Where the promotee would get his seniority wef
the date of the availability of the posts within 50 quota of the promotees
215D 5
The seniority of the promotee from Class II service Executive Engineer shall be determined with effect from the date on which the cadre post was available to him and the seniority shall be determined accordingly215F 201 6
Under the Rules determination of seniority would be made only after the promotee becomes a member of the service 
Therefore the year of allotment must be determined having regard to i availability of the cadre post within quota ii satisfactory completion of the probation and iii appointment to the post in the substantive capacity in term of Rules 126 and 7 read with Rule 114 and Rule 812
Any other construction would be contrary to the avowed object of the rules as a whole218B C 7
There is neither invidious discrimination nor arbitrariness in Rule 212a offending articles 14  16
The differentiation drawn between direct recruit and the promotee bears rational relation to the object of Rule 212
219H 8
The Government of Haryana to determine the cadre posts if not already done regularly from time to time including the post created due to exigencies of service in terms of Rule 32 read with appendix A  and allot the post in each year of allotment as contemplated under rule 12 read with Rule 52a and issue orders appointing substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the appellants promotees and the direct recruit in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineers etc
within four months from the date of receipt of this judgment
The inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits shall be determined accordingly
220D E MS Mighlani vs State of Haryana  Anr  JC Yadav vs State of Haryana  KK Khosla vs State of haryana 1990 2 SCC 199 VB Badami etc
vs Stat of Mysore 1976 1 SCR 815 KC Joshi  Ors
vs Union of India  Ors to
RP Khanna vs SAF Abbas  Ors at 557 C J Baleshwar Dass  Ors
vs State of UP  Ors
 1981 1 SCR 449 at 463 BS Yadav vs State of Haryana  The Direct Recruit Clall II Engineering Officers  Association vs State of Maharasthra  Ors  at 745 Distinguished 9
It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a stature only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision
It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other
The proper function of proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language o the main enactment 202 and its effect to confine to that case
Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms
211E F 10
The scope of the proviso is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule
It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set a naught the real object of the main enactment unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect 211G H 11
In interpreting the rule effect must be given to allow everyone drawn from the sources to have their due share in the service and chances of involvement to effectively discharge the duties of the posts honestly and efficiently with dedication
Any wanton or deliberate deviation in the implementation of the rules should be curbed and snubbed and the rules must be strictly implemented to achieve the above purpose
If wanton doviations are allowed to be repeated it would breed indiscipline among the services and amounts to undue favour to some and denial of equity for many for reasons known or unknown subverting the purpose of the rules213F 12
Rules 21 23 27 210 212a 52a 8 92 11 123 125 to 127 to be construed harmoniously
lest the legislative animation would be defeated and the rules would be rendered otiose and surpluses
It would also adversely effect the morale and efficiency of the service215C 13
With a view to have efficient and dedicated services accountable to proper implementation of Govt
policies it is open and is constitutionally permissible for the State to infuse into the services both talented fresh blood imbued with constitutional commitments enthusiasmdrive and initiative by direct recuritment blended with matured wealth of experience from the subordinate services212G 14
It is permissible to constitute an integrated service of persons recruited from two or more sources namely direct recruitment promotion from subordinate service or transfer from other services
Promotee from subordinate service generally would get few chances of 203 promotion to higher echolans of services
212H 15
Avenues and facilities for promotion to the higher services to the less privileged member of the subordinate service would inculcate in them dedication to excel their latent capabilities to man to cadre posts 213A 16
Talent is not the privilege of few but equal avenues made available would explore common man s capabilities overcoming environmental adversity and open up full opportunities to develop one s capabilities to shoulder higher responsibilities without succumbing to despondence
Equity talented young menwomen of great promise would enter into service by direct recruitment when chances of promotions are attractive
213B 17
The chance of promotion would also enable a promotee to imbue involvement in the performance of the duties obviate frustration and eliminate proclivity to corrupt practices lest one would tend to become corrupt sloven and mediocre and a dead wood
In other words equal opportunity would harness the human resources to augment the efficiency of the service and undue emphasis on either would upset the scale of equality germinating the seeds of degeneration 213D