ivil Appeal No 1514 of 1979
From the Judgment and Order dated 1761977 of the Madras High Court in OSA 62 of 1973
TS Krishnamurthy lyer MJ Paul and Kailash Vasudev for the Appellant
K Parasaran PD Sharma TK Seshadri and K Swami for the Respondents
549 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN J
A very interesting question comes up for consideration in this appeal
The question to be ultimately decided falls within a very narrow compass but it is neces sary to set out the facts leading to the present appeal at some length
The property which is the subject matter of the present dispute originally formed part of an extent of land situat ed on Mount Road Madras bearing door Nos 2 and 3 and measuring 41 grounds and 2005 sq
It belonged to several co owners
These co owners had leased out the properties under two lease deeds in favour of Ms India Automobiles which was then the sole proprietary concern of one of them selves Ganshyamdas Girdhardas GG but was converted subsequently in 1961 into a partnership concern of GG and his four sons
The firm and its partners arc hereinafter compendiously referred to as the tenants 
The first lease Ext
P 1 was dated 229
1947 and related to Door No 2 Item No1 in Schedule A to the plaint
This was a property comprising of an area of 4 grounds and 151 square feet with certain buildings thereon
The rent for the premises was Rs 150 per month
The second lease deed Ext
P 2 dated 310
1947 relating to Door No 3 Item 2 in Schedule A to the plaint covered an area of 8700 sq
and some building thereon
The rent as per lease deed was Rs200 per month
On 3071953 all the co owners of the property includ ing GG sold the property to the United India Life Assur ance Company and the New Guardian of India Life Insurance Company Ltd In 1956 the Life Insurance Corporation of India LIC stepped into the shoes of these two insurance companies and became the owner of the property
On 20765 the LIC moved two applications being HRC Nos 3310 and 3311 of 1965 in the court of the Rent Con troller Sri A Varadarajan who later became a Judge of the this Court for fixation of a fair rent for each of the premises
The fair rent claimed was computed at Rs239903 per month in respect of item No 1 as against the rent of Rs 150 pm fixed under the lease deed
In respect of item 2 the fair rent claimed was Rs326650 as against Rs200 pm payable under the lease deed
The defendants GG and his sons filed their objections to the above applications
They claimed that under both the lease deeds what had been leased out to them was only a vacant land and that the superstructure had been built by them
They claimed there fore that they were entitled to relief under the Madras 550 City Tenants  Protection Act and that the Rent Controller Court had no jurisdiction to fix a fair rent
The Rent Controller accepted the above argument so far as item was concerned
So far as item 2 was concerned it appears that at the time of the hearing it was conceded before the Rent Controller that the respondents were tenants of the entire properties covered by the lease deed and that they had not constructed any of the premises thereupon
In view of this the Rent Controller dismissed HRC 3310 65 relating to item No 1 and in HRC 331165 fixed the fair rent in respect of item No 2 at Rs 1451 pm
The order of the Rent Controller was dated 93
There were appeals to the Court of Small Causes
In respect of item No 1 in HRA 53466 the Court on a perusal of the sale deed dated 30753 filed by the LIC before it came to the conclusion that the buildings on the land leased under exhibit P 1 had also been conveyed to the LIC and that the LIC was entitled to seek fixation of fair rent in respect of this premises also
The fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller at Rs994 pm was upheld
The order of the Rent Controller in respect of item 2 was also upheld
It may be mentioned here that even in certain earlier proceedings for fixation of fair rent and eviction HRC 86773 and HRC 255764 it had been held by the Rent Controller that item No 1 door No 2 belonged to the LIC but his order of eviction had been set aside by the appellate court on some other ground
In the circumstances the Court of Small Causes in the appeals now being referred to HRA
53466 did not treat the earlier decision as res judicata but came independently to the same conclusion that item No 1 belonged to the LIC
This was on 19th April 1967
The tenants filed revision petitions against the order of the Court of Small Causes but these were dismissed on 20111968
After the Civil Revision Petitions by the tenant were dismissed the LIC filed CS 641969 on the original side of the Madras High Court against the tenants for recovery of arrears of rent on the basis of the fair rents fixed which were computed at Rs9825097 in respect of the two items of property
Further interest at the rate of 12 thereon from date of plaint to the date of decree and at 6 thereafter till the date of realisation was also claimed
It may be mentioned here that the tenant filed CS 87 of 1972 claiming protection under the Madras City Tenants  Protection Act but this suit and further appeals therefrom have been dismissed
Turn 551 ing now to CS No 54 of 1969 which was disposed of along with CS No 87 of 72 by a common judgment dated 23101972 the contention urged on behalf of the tenants was that since the subject matter of the lease under exhibit P 1 was only a vacant site the Rent Controller had no juris diction to fix the fair rent in respect thereof and that therefore the claim in the suit for arrears of rent based on the Rent Controller s order in respect of the premises covered by exhibit P 1 had to fail
The Court addressed itself to this question
It came to the conclusion that exhibit P 1 did not in law create a valid lease between the co owners and the tenants
After referring to the terms of the sale deed exhibit P 3 the superstructure constructed on the land was held to have been conveyed to the vendee under the sale deed dated 30 7 1953 and to have thus vested in the LIC
The Rent Controller was therefore held to have had juris diction to fix the fair rent in respect of the premises
It was therefore held that the plantiff s claim in the suit should succeed
The suit was decreed accordingly
The tenants filed an appeal being OSA No 62 of 1973
The Appellate Bench confirmed the decree in respect of item No 2 subject to certain modifications which are not here relevant
However so far as item No 1 was concerned the Appellate Bench vacated the decree passed by the trial court
It held that there was a valid tease between the quondam owners and the tenants under Exts
P 1  P 2
Having regard to the express recitals in exhibit P 3 the Appellate Bench held that it was impossible to hold that the build ings which admittedly belonged to the defendants and had been constructed by them on the vacant land taken on lease under exhibit P 1 ever were or could be the subject matter of the sale under exhibit p 3
In view of this finding it was held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for fixation of fair rent in respect of the property which was only a vacant piece of land
In conse quence it was held the LIC could not maintain the suit for recovery of rent based on the order made by the statutory tribunal under the Rent Control Act and claim the difference between the so called fair rent and the contract rent
The claim of the LIC for recovery of Rs3922471 as arrears of rent in respect of item 1 was thus held to be not maintain able
OSA 62 of 1973 was therefore allowed to that extent
The present appeal by Special Leave granted on 37
1979 is from the order of the Division Bench rejecting the appellant s claim for arrears of rent in respect of item No 1 of the property set out in Schedule A to the plaint based on the difference between the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller and the rent payable therefore under exhibit P 1
552 The questions to be decided in this appeal on the above facts boil down to these 1 Was the LIC the vendee only of a vacant piece of land with no title to the buildings standing on the site in item 17 2 It is open for the tenants to contend that the order of the Court of Small Causes in the earlier rent control proceedings deciding to the contrary and fixing the fair rent of item 1 at Rs994 pm should be completely ignored as an order passed totally without jurisdiction although it has become final as be tween the parties Two interesting aspects may be pointed out in regard to these two questions
The first is that if either question is answered in the negative the other will not arise for consideration and the appeal will have to be allowed
But an affirmative answer to either question will necessitate an answer to the other
The second is that though the claim in issue before us is only a money claim for arrears of rent any decision given by us based as it will have to be on the issue whether the LIC owns the superstructure or not and whether the tenants are the les sees only of vacant land or of both land and buildings will have repercussions not only on the claim in this suit which by now has accummulated to more than Rs3 lakhs but also on any other proceedings by way of ejectment or otherwise which the LIC may have in contemplation against the tenants
The decision in this appeal will therefore be of great moment for the LI C
So far as the first question is concerned we have no doubt that the Division Bench of the High Court has come to the correct conclusion
In our view the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the lease exhibit P 1 executed by the co owners of the property in favour of one of them was invalid was erroneous
S5 of the  clearly envisages transfers of property by a person to one or more living persons or to himself or to himself and one or more other living persons
Whatever may be the position in spite of this provision in respect of a pur ported transfer by a person to himself alone which is very often the position in the case of trusts which was consid ered by the House of Lords in Rye vs Rye  there is no reason to hold that a contract between a person with himself and other is invalid The Division Bench we think has tightly distinguished the decisions in Girish Chandra vs Srinath 3 CLJ 141 and Rye vs Rye The observations of Lord Denning extracted by the learned Judges are quite apposite to the situation in the present case
Once this objection is out of the way the question is whether the construction put upon the leased land by the lessees formed part of the 553 property conveyed to the LIC Sri Parasaran pointed out that they did not and drew our attention to subsequent correspondence between the parties to show that even the LIC had not claimed at any stage any rent in respect of the superstructures apart from the contractual rent which was in respect of the land and that both parties have all along been proceeding on the footing that the superstructure on item 1 belonged to the lessees
This appears to be cor rect but it cannot be conclusive of the rights of the par ties
We have therefore gone carefully into the terms of exhibit P 1 and exhibit P 3
They clearly make out that the superstruc tures put up by the lessee under exhibit P 1 were not included in the property conveyed under the terms of exhibit P 3 and that whatever may be the rights of the LIC to evict the tenant with liberty to demolish the superstructure on the termination of the lease it had no property in the super structure so long as the lease subsisted
We therefore answer the first question posed by us in the affirmative
This brings us then to the second the really crucial question posed earlier viz whether despite the above conclusion we are precluded by principles of or analogous to res judicata from going behind the findings to the contrary given in the earlier rent control proceedings by the Court of Small Causes which have become final on the dismissal of the CRP filed thereagainst Sri TS Krishnamurthy lyer learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Courts now are precluded from going behind the findings of the Court of Small Causes in the earlier proceedings
He conceded that no legal conse quenes can flow from a totally void order see Kiran Singh vs Chaman Paswan   121
He also conceded that there may be a difference in principle between a civil court and a court of limited jurisdiction
While the former has an inherent jurisdiction to decide a question raised about its own jurisdiction and such a decision cannot be challenged in another court after it has become final See Bhatia Cooperative Society Ltd vs Patel  and Nageswara vs Canesa AIR 1942 Mad
675 the latter is strictly confined to the terms of the statute creating it
But he submitted even the decision of a Tribunal or a Court of limited jurisdiction cannot be called in question so long as it acts within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on it by the relevant statutes
He therefore invited us to peruse the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Build ings Lease and Rent Control Act 1960 hereinafter re ferred to as the Rent Control Act
Under the said Act he pointed out a petition for fixation of fair rent under section 4 could be filed by either a landlord or a tenant Raval  Co vs Rarnachandran  This is 554 what the LIC purported to do when it filed HRC Nos 3310 and 33 1164
When a petition under section 4 is filed the Rent Controller on the language of section 4 has to decide 1 whether the applicant is a tenant in or landlord of the building and 2 what the fair rent of the premises should be in accordance with the provisions of the Act
In the present case both the points had been put in issue
The respondents denied that the LIC was the landlord or they the tenants in respect of the property
They claimed to be the owner of the superstructure and admitted tenancy only in respect of the site
The Rent Controller and on appeal the Court of Small Causes were therefore called upon to give their decision on this question which was completely within their statutory jurisdiction and this decision certainly constitutes res judicata between the parties see also Explanation VIII to section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
At any rate it is not open to one of the parties to contend that the decision given by the Court of Small Causes which has become final between the parties is a total nullity which can be completely ignored
It was therefore not open to the High Court to entertain a collateral attack on the validity of binding nature or correctness of the order of the Court of Small Causes and to consider and determine afresh the issue as to whether the LIC is the owner of the premises as claimed or not
In support of his contention counsel referred to Krish namurthy vs Parthasarathy AIR 1949 Madras 780 reversing the decision in the same case reported in AIR 1949 Madras 387
The appellant landlord had filed an eviction petition under the Rent Control Act without giving notice under section 111h of the which in those days was considered to be a condition precedent even to the filing of an eviction petition under the Rent Control Act and ob tained an order of eviction
In these proceedings no conten tion had been raised by the tenant on the non issue of the notice under the 
An appeal by the tenant also failed but here again the above point was not taken
Thereafter the tenant filed a suit for a declaration that the order of the Rent Controller was ultra vires in that no notice to quit had been given as required by law
This plea was upheld by the learned Single Judge but was rejected in appeal
The Division Bench observed   
We agree with the learned Judge that this Court can entertain a suit to set aside an order of the Rent Controller if the Rent Controller exceeded the powers con ferred on him
A Court or tribunal can however be said to have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit or application only if it has 555 no jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter of the suit or application  
But even these rules are subject to the qualification that if the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the ascertainment of facts and the Court upon the facts found holds that it has jurisdiction then the decree of that Court cannot be ignored or set aside in collateral proceedings
 After reference to certain other decisions of the Court it was observed If a lessor brings a suit for eviction he is to prove the existence of a lease the relationship of lessor and lessee between himself and the defendant and the determination of the lease
If he fails to prove this the plaint is not returned because the suit is one which the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain but the suit is dismissed as revealing no cause of action  
In a suit by a landlord against his tenant for eviction the determination of the tenancy is merely one of the constituents of the cause of action that the landlord has to prove against his tenant in order to succeed in the suit
We are of opinion that a tenant can waive notice to quit but even if he cannot notice has not to be proved as a condition precedent to the institution of the suit  
Mr Srinivasa Ayyangar concedes that if a landlord filed a suit in ejectment and failed to say that the tenancy had been determined the Court would dismiss the suit and not return the plaint
In the same way the Rent Controller would have to dismiss the application if it were not alleged in the affidavit that notice had been given or if it found upon hearing the parties and considering the evidence that notice had not been given
It would follow from this therefore that if notice to quit was necessary it would be merely one of the issues to be decided by the Rent Controller and would not in any way affect his jurisdiction to entertain the applica tion
That being so if the Rent Controller did not decide that question properly the matter would have to be raised in appeal to the Court of Small Causes and would give this Court no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the defeated party for such a suit would be barred by section 124 of the Act
Again in Manibhai Hathibhai vs Arbuthnot AIR 1947 Bom
413 556 a writ petition was filed to challenge the validity of an order passed by the Rent Controller on the ground that the circumstances for the invocation of section 13b of the Bombay Rent Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1944 had not been fulfilled
It is sufficient for our present purposes to extract the observations in paragraph 16 of the judgment 16
It was sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the premises were at one time let out as a whole and then let out in parts as was sought to be contended by the applicants  
The jurisdiction of the Rent Controller xxx is a statutory jurisdiction which is vested in the Rent Controller by the terms of the Act it self
A regular tribunal is established by the Act which functions in those cases where
the standard rent of the premises as laid down in section 3 of the Act exceeds Rs80 per month
The tribunal owes its existence to the Act and not to any act of the parties and it has therefore jurisdiction to determine what are the cases which fail within its juris diction
If there is any dispute which arises between the parties as to whether the particular application falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal it is the tribunal which is competent to decide that dispute and determine whether the particular matter falls within its jurisdiction
If the tribunal decided it wrongly there is an appeal provided against its decision
It cannot therefore be contended as the petitioners have done that the respondent has no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the premises were at one time let out as a whole and then let out in parts as contended by the applicants
 Shri Iyer submits that the appellants  case here is on a stronger footing than in the two decisions cited above because here in the earlier proceedings before the Rent controller and the Court of Small Causes a specific point had been taken that the tenant was only a tenant of the land and not of the premises which belonged to him and that this contention had been specifically over ruled by the appellate court after a consideration of the relevant mate rial
Sri Krishnamoorthy Iyer also contended that even if it may be an arguable question as to whether the decision in the earlier petitions constitutes res judicata or not and it may plausibly be argued that it does not constitute res judicata the question for our consideration really is whether the order passed in the 557 earlier eviction petition can be treated as a nullity being passed by a court totally without jurisdiction
He submitted that if the tenants had filed a suit for declaration that the order passed in the earlier proceedings as a nullity that would have been bound to fail
Shri Iyer also relied on certain observations of this Court in the decisions reported as Rai Brij Raj vs Shaw   147 150 Official Trustee vs Sachindranath   pp 99 100 Antulay vs Nayak  at pp 649 677 and 700 Trideshwar Dayal vs Maheshwar Dayal  at p 1437 and Shiv Chander Kapoor vs Amar Bose   paras 22 and 23
Shri K Parasaran appearing for the respondents sought to support the High Court s judgment on various grounds
He contended that even if the arguments on behalf of the appellant were to be accepted the appellants were not entitled to succeed for the following reason
He drew our attention to the reference in the 1967 order of the Court of Small Causes to HRC 86763 an earlier petition filed by the LIC
The Court had said 7
The Corporation had formerly filed a petition HRC 8671963 in respect of these two buildings for fixation of fair rent
In that petition the tenant disputed the title of the Corporation in respect of the buildings
So the Corpo ration immediately filed an application HRC 255764 for eviction on the ground of wilful denial of title
The peti tion for fixation of fair rent was dismissed by the learned First Additional Rent Controller on the ground that the lease has been taken under two separate deeds and that a single petition was not maintainable
In the other petition he ordered eviction on the ground that the denial was not bona fide
He gave an express finding that the building No 2
Mount Road belongs to the Corporation
In the appeal the appellate court set aside the order of eviction on the ground that there was no denial of title prior to the insti tution of the petition
Of course the finding in that case that the building belongs to the Corporation cannot operate as res judicata because the tenant had no opportunity to file an appeal against that finding since the application for eviction had ultimately been dismissed
On this point I find that the building belongs to the petitioner Emphasis added He submitted that the Court erred in thinking that no fur ther proceed 558 ings had been taken in the earlier matter The fact was that a Civil Revision Petition CRP 183966 had been filed against the order of the appellate court HRA 116264
The CRP had been allowed and the matter remitted back for fresh disposal
When the matter came back to the Court of Small Causes the learned Judge in his order dated 9469 went into the issue at length and came to the conclusion that the superstructure belonged to Indian Automobiles and had not been conveyed to the LIC He held therefore that the claim by India Automobiles in the eviction petition of title to the superstructure would amount to a denial of title but that the denial was bona fide
He therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction passed against the tenants
Sri Parasaran therefore sub mitted that the question of title had already been decided in these earlier proceedings which we shall briefly refer to as the first set of proceedings 
If at all he says it was this decision that constituted res judicata and the Court of Small Causes in HRA 53466 arising out of HRA 331064 which we shall refer to as the second set of proceedings  could not have considered the issue again or taken a different view
Sri Parasaran also sought to explain the reasons why the respondents did not prefer any appeal or revision from the order of the Court of Small Causes in HRA 53466 He submitted that the law then prevalent in Tamil Nadu as laid down in the decisions of the Madras High Court in Palaniappa Chettiar and Others vs Vairavan Chettiar 1963 76 LW 21 and Palaniappa Chettiar vs Babu Sahib alias Sheik Mytheen Sahib and Others 1964 77 LW 551 was that the Rent Control Act would apply even in cases where the landlord had leased out only a vacant site and the tenant had put up his own construction thereon
It was only in Salay Mohamed Sait etc
vs Jaffer Mohamed sait s Memorial Dispensary Charity and Others 1969 1 Andhra Weekely Reporter SC 16 that this view was disapproved
At that stage therefore the respondents could not have hoped to succeed even if their stand that they were the owners of the superstructure had been accepted
We do not think mat these contentions have any force
So far as the first contention is concerned it may be pointed out firstly that an answer to it is furnished by the terms of section 19 of the Act set out a little later which does not contain a reference to section 4
The application under section 4 could not therefore have been summarily rejected even assuming that the question of title could be said to have been substantially in issue and decided in the previous proceedings
Secondly the order now relied upon was passed in April 1969 and was not in exist 559 ence when the Court of Small Causes passed its order in the second set of proceedings
Thirdiv even assuming the argument of learned counsel to be correct all that can be said is that in the second set of proceedings the tenants could have contended that it was not open to the Court of Small Causes to go into the question of title in view of the decision in the first set of proceedings
But no such plea was taken before it with the result that the court discussed the matter and arrived at a decision
In deciding whether the decision constitutes res judicata or not we are not entitled to go into the correctness of that decision
Right or wrong the second decision has become final and the same issue says the appellant cannot be gone into again
Last ly the 1969 decision of the Court of Small Causes was only concerned with the question whether there was denial of the LIC s title by the tenants and if so whether it was bona fide
It was only this limited aspect eviction on the ground of non bona fide denial of title that was under consideration of the Court under section 102vii of the Act read with the proviso to section 101 and the Court s observa tions on the question of title were one on a collateral issue
We do not therefore think that the 1969 decision can be an effective answer to the appellant s contention based on the 1967 decision
The second argument explaining why the respondents did not challenge the 1967 order in further appeal or revision is also of no avail in consider ing the issue raised by the counsel for the appellant
But we think Sri Parasaran is right in the third con tention urged by him before us which goes to the root of the matter
His argument is that a Rent Controller and on appeal from him the Court of Small Causes is not competent to go into a question of title to immovable property and that a civil court cannot be barred from examining a claim of title merely because the question may have had to be considered by the Rent tribunals as a collateral issue in deciding certain applications before them
He contended that it is a basic proposition well settled by authority that a tribunal of limited jurisdiction like the Rent Controller this expression will hereinafter also include a Court of Small Causes disposing of an appeal from him cannot be clothed with jurisdiction to decide far reaching questions of title to immovable property
This he said is a proposi tion that is borne out on general principles as well as on the provisions of the Rent Control Act
Taking up the provi sions of the Act he referred us to the provisions of Ss 10 and 19 which read thus section 101 Eviction of tenants
A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in 560 accordance with the provisions of this section or sections 14 to 16 Provided that nothing contained in the said sec tions shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the Govern ment Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for evic tion on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded
section 19 Decisions which have become final not to be reo pened Any application under section 3 A or section 12 and any application under sub section 2 or subsection 3 or sub section 3 A of section 10 or under sections 14 15 or 16 shall be summarily rejected by the authorized officer or the Controller
as the case may be
if such application raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim
substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided in a former proceeding i under this Act or ii under any other law from time to time in force before the date of the commencement of this Act and relating to matters dealt with in this Act
counsel contended that section 10 makes it clear beyond doubt that the Rent Controller is precluded from deciding any issue regarding title to the property and that if any such question arises he should leave it to be decided by ordi nary civil courts in appropriate proceedings
The procedure to be adopted by him in disposing of the applications before him is a summary one hardly conducive to a satisfactory disposal of such complicated questions
Under Rule 122 he is required to decide applications by recording a brief note of the evidence of parties and 561 witnesses and decide matters after giving the parties an opportunity to state their case more or less in the manner in which a Court of Small Causes decides cases before it
Indeed in the Presidency Town he is subordinate to the Court of Small Causes which has been notified as the author ity to hear appeals from his orders and it is a well settled proposition that the Court of Small Causes is not competent to adjudicate on questions of title
For these reasons learned counsel submits the decision of the Court of Small Causes in the earlier proceedings cannot fetter a civil court from adjudicating upon all the issues arising before it in a civil suit
We think that this contention is well founded
There are clear indications in the Act and rules that the Rent Con troller does not have the jurisdiction to decide questions of title
In a proceedings under the Act whether it be for fixation of fair rent or eviction the tenant may raise several objections
He may inter alia take up the point that the opposite party is not the landlord
The defini tion of landlord under the Act is very wide and encompass es not only an owner but also persons receiving or entitled to receive the rent of the building which has been let out or would be entitled to receive the rent of the building if it were let out to a tenant in one of several capacities
Denial of title of the landlord is itself one of the grounds on which eviction can be sought section 102vii 
Sri Krish namurthy Iyer is therefore certainly right in contending that the Act requires the Rent Controller to consider this issue among others while disposing the applications before him
But we think Sri Parasaran is right in saying that since the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain an application except by a landlord or a tenant the ques tion of title to the property is one on which his very jurisdiction depends
It cannot be described as a matter that is squarely and directly in issue in these proceedings to which any finality can be attached as the Rent Control ler by deciding the issue wrongly cannot clothe himself with jurisdiction where none exists
All that the Rent Controller has to do is to satisfy himself that the person seeking eviction or fixation of fair rent is a landlord who has prima facie  the right to receive the rents of the property in question
That the Rent Controller s jurisdic tion on this issue is limited is clear from the proviso to section 101 of the Act
In order to decide whether the denial of the landlord s title by the tenant is bona fide the Rent Controller may have to go into the tenant s contentions on the issue but he is not to decide the question finally
He has only to see whether the tenant s denial of the land lord s title is bona fide in the circumstances of the case
He may reach a conclusion on the merits that the landlord has title yet he cannot order eviction if the tenant s action in 562 denying the title was bona fide
Per contra he may reach the conclusion on the materials before him that the landlord has no title yet it seems if he finds that the applicant is otherwise a landlord and that the grounds on which the tenant s denial was based were not bona fide he will have to order eviction
So also in an application under section 4 the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is to determine a fair or standard rent for the premises
He has no doubt to ensure that the person applying for the fair rent is the tenant or the landlord
He has also no doubt to satisfy himself as to the extent of the premises qua which the relationship of landlord and tenant exists and in respect of which rent is receivable or payable
For deciding these issues he may have no doubt also to consider the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties
Yet having regard to the manner in which he is required to come to this conclusion and having regard to the fact that at least in the Presidency Town an appeal from his order goes to the Court of Small Causes it is difficult to escape the conclu sion that the jurisdiction to be exercised by him is a limited and a prima facie one
It will be anomalous to hold that where an owner of property seeks to evict his tenant under section 102vii but the Rent Controller refuses to pass the order of eviction though satisfied about his title because the tenant had acted bona fide it would be open to the owner to seek eviction by having his title adjudicated upon in a civil court but that the owner cannot have a similar right in the matter of recovery of rent which is basically a relief for which he has to approach a civil court
A question of title may be a complex one involving difficult issues
For instance the owner may claim title under an adoption or a will or a trust deed or a gift deed and there may be contentious claims among several persons which it will not be possible for the Rent Controller to decide
It is important to remember that when an owner files a suit for arrears of rent it is open to the tenant under the general law to plead that no rent is payable in respect of the premises as indeed it belongs to him
The right to raise this issue cannot be taken away without a specific statutory provision
The terms of section 11 CPC including Explanation VIII are not comprehensive enough to cover the case
The limited nature of the jurisdiction of a Tribunal like the Rent Controller and the Court of Small Causes has been considered in a number of cases by this Court as well as other courts 1 We may start with an early Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court Venkatarama Rao  Ors
vs Musunuru Venkayya and Ors
 It arose under the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908
In that case the Revenue Divisional Officer in 563 certain earlier proceedings had held that a particular village was not an estate and this had been confirmed by the District Collector and the High Court
Later on the plaintiffs filed suits against the tenants in possession of holdings in the village for an injunction restraining them from removing the paddy heaps standing on the suit lands until a due division was made of the crop and until the rent in kind payable to the plaintiffs was paid by the tenants
The tenants wanted to contend in reply that the village in question was an estate within the meaning of the Act and they had occupancy rights therein
The plaintiffs however objected that this plea was not open to the tenant in view of the earlier decision of Revenue Divisional Officer
Negativing the plea of the plaintiffs the Court pointed out 8 xxx xxx xxx If a particular matter is one which does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court then a decision of a revenue court on such a matter which might be incidentally given by the revenue court cannot be bind ing on the parties in a civil court
One practical test would be to determine if that particular matter would not be a matter in respect of which the civil court would have jurisdiction
To give an obvious instance suppose in a suit under section 55 for the grant of a patta instituted by a person claiming to be the adopted son of the ryot who was a patta dar the landlord raises a plea that he is not entitled to the patta because his adoption is not valid it may be that the revenue court would have to summarily go into the ques tion whether the person suing is or is not the validly adopted son of the previous ryot
Can it possibly be said that the finding of the revenue court on the issue of adop tion is binding on the parties in a subsequent suit in a civil court in which the validity of the adoption might fall to be decided There can be no doubt about the answer
That is because the dispute as to the validity of the adoption is not a dispute in respect of which a revenue court has exclusive jurisdiction
Such a dispute is a matter well within the jurisdiction of a civil court
Thereafter it cannot be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Reve nue court and the decision of such a dispute by a revenue court cannot be binding in a civil court
564 Incidentally it may be pointed out this decision has been cited with approval by this Court in Bhagwan Dayal vs Reoti Devi  2 Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1964 SC 807 was a decision under the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948
In that case it was held on a construction of section 91 of the Act that the property in question being an inam village is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competence of the Settlement Officer to determine the mat ters within his jurisdiction rests and that as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction
Any determination by him of this question therefore is subject to the result of an appeal to the tribunal binding on the parties only for the purpose of the proceedings under the Act but no further
The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision
However if the property is an inam village whether the inam village is an inam estate is within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdic tion of the Civil Courts is clearly barred
3 Dhulabhai vs State  was concerned with the interpretation of the provision in the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act barring the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters entrusted to the jurisdiction of the special tribunals created under the Act
It is unnecessary to refer in detail to this case except to set out a passage from pages 682 3 where Hidayatullah CJ speaking for the Constitution Bench reviewed all earlier cases on the sub ject and enunciated the principles emerging therefrom of which the following are relevant here The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows 1 Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts  jurisdic tion must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit
Such provision however does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity 565 with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure
2 Where there is an express bar of the jurisdic tion of the court an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive
In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right 0r a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not
XXX XXX XXX 4 in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal  Ors
vs Dossibai NB Jeejeebhoy   the appellant had ob tained lease of an open land for construction of buildings
After putting up the buildings he applied for determination of standard rent under the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947
The application was rejected holding that the provisions of the Act did not apply to open land let for construction
This view was confirmed by the High Court
Sometime thereafter in another case the High Court held that the question whether the provisions of the Act applied to any particular lease must be determined on its terms and a building lease in respect of an open plot was not excluded from the provisions of the Act solely because open land may be used for residence or educational purposes only after a structure is built thereon
Relying upon this judgment the appellant filed a fresh application for determining the standard rent
The trial Judge rejected the application holding that question of the applicability of the Act was res judicata since it had been finally decid ed by the High Court between the same parties in respect of the same land in the earlier proceeding for fixation of standard rent
The order was confirmed by the first appel late court and on furher appeal by the High Court
The Supreme Court however reversed the judgment of the High Court
The Court observed 566 A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court
If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction the decision will not operate as res judicata
Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute the decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise 5 Gangabai vs Chhabubai   related to the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes
In that case the respondent being in need of money entered into an agreement with the appellant for a loan of Rs2000 and it was simultaneously decided that she should execute a nominal document of sale and rent note of her house
These documents were executed on January 7 1953 but the respondent contin ued in the possession of the house property throughout
The appellant was attempting to enforce the document as a sale deed by filing suit in the Court of Small Causes for recov ery of rent and the said suits had resulted in decrees
The respondent thereupon filed a suit for a declaration that she was and continued to be owner of the house property alleg ing that the documents executed on 7th January 1953 were never intended to be acted upon
The appellant in defence maintained that the sale deed represented a genuine transac tion and ownership of the house property had passed to her
It was pleaded that the decrees passed by the Court of Small Causes operated as res judicata barring the respondent from pleading that the sale deed was merely a nominal transac tion
Reliance was also placed on section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act
The High Court held that the sale deed and rent note were sham documents that the decrees of the Court of Small Causes did not operate as res judicata and that section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act did not preclude the respondent from establishing the true nature of the transac tion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
In regard to this contention it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the High Court erred in applying the statutory provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that it should have invoked the general principles of res judicata
It was submitted that it was necessary to find out whether the Court of Small Causes was competent to try the two earlier suits and decide the issues arising therein
After refer ring to various decisions cited on behalf of the parties the Court observed 567 It seems to us that when a finding as to title to immovable property is rendered by a Court of Small Causes res judicata cannot be pleaded as a bar in a subsequent regular civil suit for the determination or enforcement of any right or interest in immovable property
In order to operate as res judicata the finding must be one disposing of a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and the issue should have been heard and finally decided by the court trying such suit
A matter collaterally or incidental ly in issue for the purposes of deciding the matter which is directly in issue in the case cannot be made the basis of a plea of res judicata
It has long been held that a question of title in a Small Cause suit can be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the suit and cannot operate 8as res judicata in a subsequent suit in which the question of title is directly raised  
Our attention has been drawn to Expla nation VIII to section 11 in the Code of Civil Procedure recently inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act 1976
Section 973 of the Amendment Act declares that the new provi sion applies to pending suits proceeding appeals and applica tions
In our opinion the Explanation can be of no assistance because it operates only where an issue has been heard and final ly decided in the earlier suit 6 We may next refer to Jeeth Kaur and Ors
vs Smt
P Kondalamma and another AIR 1983 AP 2 19
In that case the tenant filed a petition under the relevant Rent Control Act for permission to deposit rents in court
The landlady denied any relationship of tenant and landlord between the applicant and herself
This contention was upheld by the appellate court and the High Court
In a subsequent suit filed by the tenants in the civil court as tenants of the suit building the landlady contended that the earlier decision operated as res judicata but this contention was negatived
The Court observed The main relief sought for bythe tenants was for deposit ing the rents on the ground that the landlord refused to receive the same
In order to give that relief the Rent Control Court must first have jurisdiction as it can adjudi cate disputes only between a landlord and a tenant
Since the relationship is denied by the landlord the Rent Con troller had decided that question incidentally
This is not the main relief for which the application is filed
In fact it is not a dispute which is exclusively triable by the Tribunals 568 under the Act
The dispute has to be decided as incidental to the granting of the main reliefs
The necessary condition for exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller is the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant
The rent authorities have no power to decide a dispute which is not between a landlord and tenant
Therefore the decision on the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists is a decision regarding jurisdictional facts and such a decision is neither conclusive nor final
In such circum stances the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit in which the question of jural relationship of the landlord and tenant arises is not ousted
Since the said decision is not final it can never operate as res judicata between the parties
In fact if we examine the provisions of the Act there are only five reliefs that can be granted under the Rent Control Act
One is fixation of fair rent and increase thereof under sections 4 5 and 6 the second is permission to deposit rents in the court under section 8 5 the third is to order eviction under section 10 the fourth is to direct recovery of possession by the landlord for repairs under section 12 and the fifth is to order restoration of amenities when they are unjustly withheld under section 14 of the Act
The rent authorities cannot grant the reliefs of declaration of occupancy rights
7 We may lastly refer to the decision of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs Ramalinga Samigal Madam and Ors 1985 4 SCC
In that case the plaintiff respondent claimed title to the suit land on the basis of its long and uninter rupted possession since prior to 1938 as also under an order of assignment of 1938 issued in its favour by the Zamindar whereby the right to cultivate in respect of that land was granted to it subject to the payment of certain amounts
In 1953 the plaintiff applied for a ryotwari patta in respect of this land after abolition of the Estate but the Addition al Settlement Officer by order dated 25th June 1954 took a decision that land was not a ryoti land but had been registered as a poramboke village communal land and therefore no one was entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of that land
The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for a declaration of as title and right to continue in possession and enjoyment of the suit land subject to payment of ryot wari or other cess to be imposed by Government without any interference from the Government
The State Tamil Nadu resisted the suit on merits by contending that the suit land was communal land and that the assignment or grant by the zamindar 569 in favour of plaintiff was invalid
It also took a technical plea that the decision of the Additional Settlement Officer that the suit land was poramboke and not ryoti  land was final and the Civil Court s jurisdiction to decide that question was barred under section 64 C of the Tamil Nadu Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act 1948 which ran as follows 64 C Finality of orders passed under this Act 1 Any order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall subject only to any appeal or revision provided by or under this Act be final
2 No such order shall be liable to be questioned in any court of law
The State Government s plea was rejected by the High Court
In appeal the State contended before this Court that every refusal of a ryotwari patta by a Settlement Officer in an inquiry under section 11 involves a decision on his part that either the applicant is not a ryot or the land is not ryoti land in the instant cases it was the latter and such decision on the nature or character of the land has been given a finality under section 64 C which cannot be ques tioned in a court of law
Therefore it was urged that the civil court s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the nature or character of the suit lands must be held to have been ex cluded or ousted
After discussing several decisions in regard to the exclusion of a civil court s jurisdiction as well as the provisions of the Act the Court pointed out that the terms of section 64 C a1one will not be decisive on the point of ouster of the civil court s jurisdiction
The observations made by the Court in paras 13 and 14 have relevance to the present case and need not be set out here in extenso
We are of opinion in the light of the decided cases referred to above that the contention on behalf of the respondents has to be accepted
We are concerned with the jurisdiction of a civil court
The extensive jurisdiction conferred on civil courts under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be curtailed without a specific statu tory warrant or except on some clear principle
There is nothing in the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act which in any way takes away or narrows down the civil court s juris diction as for example there is in the Delhi Rent Control Act section 50
As to principle whether we look at it on the analogy of res judicata or adopt the approach of Sri Iyer as to whether the order in the earlier proceedings is to be treated as an 570 order that is null and void or merely one that is valid until set aside the answer has to turn on the true nature and scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Rent Control ler under the Act
It is possible we have to ask ourselves having regard to the context scheme and terms of the legis lation that the statute could have envisaged the Rent Controller and the authorities to whom appeal or revision could be preferred from his orders to be final authorities to adjudicate on issues of title also The answer in our opinion has to be in the negative
Section 4 of the Rent Control Act as already pointed out provides only a machin ery for fixation of fair rent in respect of certain prem ises
It is the quantum of fair rent that arises for deter mination by the Rent Controller
There is no doubt that since an application for this purpose cannot lie except at the instance of a landlord or a tenant the Rent Controller has to deal with this incidentally but this is not one of the direct issues before the Rent Controller
If and only if this relationship exists between the parties the Rent Controller steps in for a limited purpose to determine what the fair rent is and then fades out of the picture
Where a fair rent is fixed by a Controller the Rent Control Act does not provide for a machinery for recovery of the amount
The amount has to be recovered by the landlord only by recourse to a civil court
This gives an indication that the determination of the relationship that gives rise to the application is also not conclusive
This is indeed made clear by the provisions relating to eviction
We have al ready referred to the effect of the provisions of section 10 2vii read with the proviso to section 101 and pointed out how jurisdiction to decide questions of title is denied to the Rent Controller
The position cannot be different under section 4
Having regard to the much narrower scope of section 4 it would be anomalous to read a wider jurisdiction to the Rent Controller thereunder than under section 10
In our opinion on a proper construction of the Rent Control Act the question on which the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded is only the determination as to the fair rent of the premises
If the civil court in this case had come to the conclusion that there is a relationship of a landlord and a tenant and that the LIC was entitled to recover the rent from the tenants it will have to pass a decree in favour of the LIC on the basis of the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller
It will not be open to the civil court to re determine the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord because that is a matter squarely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and therefore impliedly excluded from the purview of the civil court
But his decision is not final on the issue that opens up his jurisdiction and cannot preclude an owner from contending in a civil court that he should not be asked to pay rent for his own property to some one else
571 For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the High Court reached the correct conclusion and that this appeal has to fail
The appeal is therefore dismissed
In the circumstances however we make no order as to costs
Y Lal Appeal dismissed


Summary:
Two separate properties bearing Door Nos 2 and 3 ad measuring 41 grounds and 2005 sq ft which originally formed part of an extent of land situate at Mount Road Madras belonged to several co owners who leased out the same to the Respondent by two separate lease deeds exhibit P 1 and P 2 item 1 and 2 in the Schedule A to the plaint
The property contained in Door No 2 which comprised an area of 4 grounds and 151 sq ft with certain buildings was given on rent for Rs 150 pm whereas the property contained in Door No 3 which also had some buildings thereon was let out for Rs200 pm
The owners sold the properties to the United India Life Assurance Co and the New Guardian of India Life Insurance Co Ltd in July 1953
In 1956 the Life Insurance Corpora tion of India the appellant stepped into the shoes of the said companies The appellant moved two applications before the Rent Controller for fixation of a fair rent  for each of the premises In respect of the property in Door No 2 the rent claimed was Rs239903 while in respect of the other the rent claimed was Rs326650p
The tenants claimed that under both the lease deeds what had been leased out to them was only a vacant land and since the superstructure had been built by them they were entitled to relief under the Madras City Tenants  Protection Act
It was further contended that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to fix a fair rent
The Rent Controller accepted the contention of the tenant so far as item No 1 property at Door No 2 was concerned but with regard to the second property Door No 3 he fixed the fair rent at Rs 1451 pm
There were then two appeals to the Court of Small Causes
The Small Causes Court came to the conclusion that the buildings on the land leased vide P 1 had also been conveyed to the appellant and that the LIC was entitled to seek fixation of fair rent in respect of this premises also
However the order of the Rent Controller in regard to the 546 other property in Door No 3 was upheld
However in certain earlier proceedings for fixation of fair rent etc it had been held by the Rent Controller that item No Door No 2 belonged to the LIC but his order of eviction had been set aside by the appellate court on some other ground
The Court of Small Causes did not treat that decision as res judicata
The tenants being aggrieved by the order of the Court of Small Causes filed revision petitions but they were dis missed on 20111968
The appellant thereupon filed Civil Suit against the tenants respondents for recovery of arrears of rent together with interests etc
on the basis of the fair rent fixed
The respondents tenants also filed a civil suit claiming protec tion under the Madras City Tenants  Protection Act but this suit and further appeals therefrom were dismissed
In the suit for recovery of rent filed by the appellant the ten ants contended that since the subject matter of the lease under exhibit P 1 was only a vacant site the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to fix the fair rent in respect thereof and that therefore the claim in the suit for arrears of rent based on the Rent Controller s order in respect of the premises covered by exhibit P 1 had to fail
The trial Judge in the High Court came to the conclusion that exhibit P 1 did not in law create a valid lease between the co owners and the tenants
He further held that the superstructure constructed on the land had been conveyed to the vendee under the sale deed dated 3071953 and thus vested in LIC
On this reason ing the High Court held that the Rent Controller had juris diction to fix the fair rent in respect of the premises
The tenants filed an appeal
The appellate Bench confirmed the decree in respect of Item 2 but as regards Item No 1 the Appellate Bench vacated the decree passed by the trial Court
It held that there was a valid lease between the owners and the tenants under Exts
P 1 and P 2
The appel lant Bench held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for fixation of fair rent in respect of the property which was only a vacant piece of land
Thus the Court held that the LIC could not maintain the suit for recovery of rent based on the order made by the statutory tribunal under the Rent Control Act
The tenants  appeal was accordingly partly allowed
LIC came up in appeal to this Court against the said order after obtaining special leave
Two questions arose for determination by this Court viz 1 Was the LIC the vendee only of a vacant land with no title to the buildings standing on the site in Item 1 and 2 it open for the tenants to contend that the order of the Court of Small Causes in the earlier rent 547 control proceedings deciding to the contrary and fixing the fair rent of item 1 could be completely ignored as an order passed totally without jurisdiction though it had become final between the parties Dismissing the appeal this Court HELD There are clear indications in the Act and rules that the Rent Controller does not have the jurisdiction to decide questions of title
In a proceeding under the Act whether it be for fixation of fair rent or eviction the tenant may raise several objections
He may inter alia take the point that the opposite party is not the landlord
561C D All that the Rent Controller has to do is to satisfy himself that the person seeking eviction or fixation of fair rent is a landlord  who has prima facie the right to receive the rent of the property in question
That the Rent Controller s jurisdiction on this issue is limited is clear from the proviso to Section 101 of the Act
561 F G The extensive jurisdiction conferred on civil courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be curtailed without a specific statutory warrant or except on some clear principle
There is nothing in the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act which in any way takes away or narrows down the civil court s jurisdiction as for example there is in the Delhi Rent Control Act Section 50
569G H Section 4 of the Rent Control Act provides only a ma chinery for fixation of fair rent in respect of certain premises
It is the quantum of fair rent that arises for determination by the Rent Controller
There is no doubt that since an application for this purpose cannot lie except at the instance of a landlord or a tenant the Rent Controller has to deal with this incidentally but this is not one of the direct issues before the Rent Controller
If and only if this relationship exists between the parties the Rent Controller steps in for a limited purpose to determine what the fair rent is and then fades out of the picture
Where a fair rent is fixed by a Controller the Rent Control Act does not provide for a machinery for recov ery of the amount
The amount has to be recovered by the landlord only by recourse to a civil court
This gives an indication that the determination of the relationship that gives rise to the application is also not conclusive
This is indeed made clear by the provisions relating to eviction
570B E If the civil court in the instant case had come to the conclusion that there is a relationship of a landlord and a tenant and that the LIC 548 was entitled to recover the rent from the tenants it will have to pass a decree in favour of the LIC on the basis of the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller
It will not be open to the civil court to re determine the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord because that is a matter squarely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Rent Control ler and therefore impliedly excluded from the purview of the civil court
But his decision is not final on the issue that opens up his jurisdiction and cannot preclude an owner from contending in a civil court that he should not be asked to pay rent for his own property to some one else
570F H There is no reason to hold that contract between a person with himself and others is invalid
571A Krishnamurthy vs Parthasarathy AIR 1949 Mad 780 Manibhai Hathibhai vs Arbuthnot AIR 1947 Bom
413 Rai Brij Raj vs Shaw  at 147 150 Official Trustee vs Sachindranath   99 pp
Antulay vs Nayak  at 649 677 and 700 Trideshwar Dayal vs Maheshwar Dayal  at 1437 Shiv Chander Kapoor vs Amar Bose  paras 22 and 23 Palaniappa Chettiar and Ors
vs Vairavan Chettiar 19631 76 LW 21 Palaniappa Chettiar vs Babu Sahib alias Sheik Mytheen Sahib and Ors 1964 77 LW 551 Salay Mohamed Sail etc
vs Jaffer Mohamed Sait s Memorial Dispensary Charity and Ors 1969 1 Andhra Weekly Reporter SC 16 Bhagwan Dayal vs Reoti Devi   Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ant AIR 1964 SC 807 Dhulabhai vs State   Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors
vs Dossibai NB Jee jeebhoy 1070 3 SCR 830 Jeeth Kaur and Ors
vs Smt
P Rondalamma and Ant AIR 1983 AP 219 and State of Tamil Nadu vs Ramalinga Samigal Madam and Ors