270 of 1955
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus
Hemendra Shah J B Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain for the petitioner
M C Setalvad Attorney General of India C K Daphtary Solicitor General of India B Sen and R H Dhebar with them for the respondent No 1 890 1955 October 14
DAS ACTG
This rule was issued on a petition filed under article 32 of the Constitution by one Purshottam Govindji Halai a citizen of India calling upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued by this Court directing the Superintendent House of Correction Byculla being the second respondent herein to produce before this Court one Govindji Deoji Halai the father of the petitioner who is also a citizen of India for the purpose of being released forthwith
The facts which are not in dispute may be shortly stated as follows
The said Govindji Deoji Halai hereinafter referred to as the assessee is the sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of Indestro Sales and Service Co at No 50 52 Lohar Chawl Street in the City of Bombay
Two private limited companies namely Indestro India Ltd and Indestro Eastern Ltd also carry on business and have their respective offices in the same premises
The assessee is said to have some connection with the two companies the nature of which however is not quite clear on the record before us
In respect of his own business of Indestro Sales and Service Co the assessee was assessed to income tax for the years 1943 44 to 1947 1948 and 1951 1952 by the Third Income tax Officer C 1 Ward Bombay at and for Rs 40178 4 0
The assessee not having paid up the assessed amount of tax the Income tax Officer on the 10th April 1951 issued to the  Additional Collector of Bombay the first respondent herein a recovery certificate under section 462 of the Income tax Act
It may here be mentioned that the Indestro Eastern Ltd was also assessed to income tax at and for Rs 192000 and a recovery certificate was also issued by the Income tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay
On the 1st February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand on the assessee for payment of the assessed amount of tax
No payment 891 having been made the Additional Collector attached the goodwill and tenancy rights in the said premises by a warrant of attachment issued on the 24th March 1954
The sale proclamation was issued on the 15th January 1955
The sale was held on the 25th February 1955 fetching a price of Rs 33000 and it was confirmed on the 30th March 1955
The sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the Additional Collector on the 7th June 1955 issued a notice under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 requiring the assessee to appear before him in person on the 16th June 1955 and show cause why he the assessee should not be apprehended and confined to civil jail in satisfaction of the said certified demand
The assessee did not appear in person on the appointed day but on the next day the 17th June 1955 an Advocate acting on behalf of the assessee wrote a letter to the Additional Collector purporting to show cause why the assessee should not be arrested and sent to the civil jail
The contentions put forward on behalf of the assessee not being considered satisfactory the Additional Collector on the 30th June 1955 issued a warrant for the arrest of the assessee under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876
The assessee was actually arrested on the 1st July 1955
On the 8th July 1955 an application was made by the present petitioner to the Bombay High Court under article 226 complaining of the arrest of his father the assessee and praying for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus for the production and release of the assessee
A rule was issued by the High Court but eventually on the 24th August 1955 the High Court Chagla CJ and Desai J discharged the rule
No application was made to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court from the decision of that High Court but on the 2nd September 1955 the present petition was filed in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution for the relief hereinbefore mentioned
On the 7th September 1955 a rule was issued by this Court on that petition subject to the question of its maintainability in view of the dismissal by the 113 892 High Court of the petition under article 226 from which no leave to appeal to this Court had been sought or obtained
The rule has now come up before us for hearing
In the view we have taken about the merits of the petition it is not necessary for us to consider the question of its maintainability after the dismissal of the petition under article 226 or to make any pronouncement on this occasion on the scope and ambit of article 32 of the Constitution in that situation
The principal contentions urged by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner are as follows namely a that section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act under which the Income tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay is void under article 131 of the Constitution in that the same offends article 221 and 2 article 21 and article 14 of the Constitution b that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13 1 of the Constitution as the same is repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution
We proceed to deal with the objections seriatim
a Section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act which is impugned before us runs as follows 46
1        2 The Income tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an assessee and the Collector on receipt of such certificate shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue Provided that without prejudice to any other powers of the Collector in this behalf he shall for the purpose of recovering the said amount have the powers which under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Act V of 1908 a Civil Court has for the purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree
The first objection to the above sub section is that it 893 contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses 1 and 2 of article 22
In view of the decision of this Court in the State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh  Another1 this objection has not been pressed before us and we need say no more about it
The second objection to section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act is that it is violative of article 21
Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law
In this case the assessee has been arrested and is being detained in jail in execution of a warrant of arrest issued under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 for the recovery of the demand certified under section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act
As long as those sec tions stand no complaint can be made of infringement of article 21 for those two sections constitute a procedure established by law
It is only if those sections are void that the question of violation of the fundamental right under article 21 can arise at all
We have therefore to pass on to the third objection to section 462 founded on article 14 of the Constitution which alone has been strenuously insisted on before us by learned counsel for the petitioner
Article 14 is invoked in two ways
It is pointed out that the first part of section 462 provides that the Collector on receipt of a certificate from the Income tax Officer shall proceed to recover from the defaulting assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue
It is next said that the proviso to the sub section invests the Collector with all the powers a Civil Court has under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of the recovery of the amount due under a decree
It is submitted that section 462 provides for two different and alternative methods of recovery of the dues and clothes the Collector with the power to apply either of the two methods that is to say he may issue a warrant of arrest under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 against one defaulter and keep him in detention for a period which may 1  894 work out to be much longer than six months and he may proceed against another defaulter under the Code of Civil Procedure and arrest and detain him for the maximum period of six months
The powers that are thus conferred on the Collector by section 462 are unfettered and unguided and enable the Collector at his will to discriminate between two defaulters who are similarly situated and thereby violate the behests of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
This argument appears to us to be founded on a misapprehension about the true meaning of section 462
On a proper reading that subsection does not prescribe two alternative modes of procedure at all
All that the sub section directs the Collector to do is to proceed to recover the certified amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue that is to say he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by the appropriate law of his State for the recovery of land revenue and that in thus proceeding he is under the proviso to have all the powers a Civil Court has under the Code
The sub section does not prescribe two separate procedures
The statement to the contrary in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Shaik Ali Ahmed vs Collector of Bombay1 does not appear to us to be correct
In our opinion the proviso does not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only mode of recovery authorised by the body of sub section 2 of section 46
Viewed in this light there is no question of the possibility of any discrimination at all
This part of the argument cannot therefore be accepted
The other way in which the protection of article 14 is invoked is founded on a comparison of the provisions of the different laws adopted by the different States for the recovery of land revenue
Section462 of the Indian Income tax Act requires the Collector on receipt of the requisite certificate from the Incometax Officer to proceed to recover from the assessee the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an 1 ILR  155 895 arrear of land revenue
This means that the Collector must take such proceedings as he would have done if he were engaged in recovering land revenue
Thus a Collector in the City of Bombay in recovering the certified amount of income tax must proceed under Ejection 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 Bombay Act II of 1876 and arrest and detain him far the period therein mentioned which prior to the 8th October 1954 might have worked out to a period much longer than six months
On the other hand the defaulting assessee in all other parts of the State of Bombay has to be proceeded against under section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 Bombay Act V of 1879 under which he cannot be detained for more than the period limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment debtor in execution of a decree for an equal amount of money
So even in one State there were two procedures to which defaulting assessees could be subjected according as they were in or outside the City of Bombay
A Collector in the State of Madras in recovering the certified amount of income tax has to proceed under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act 1864 Madras Act II of 1864
When the Collector finds that the certified amount cannot be liquidated by the sale of the property of the defaulting assessee and the Collector has reason to believe that the defaulter is wilfully withholding payment or has been guilty of fraudulent conduct in order to evade payment the Collector may under section 48 of that Act cause the arrest and imprisonment of the defaulter not being a female
But that section goes on to say that no person shall be imprisoned for a longer period than two years or for a longer period than six months if the arrear does not exceed Rs 500 or for a longer period than three months if the arrear does not exceed Rs 50
A Collector in West Bengal proceeding to recover the certified amount under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act 1913 Bengal Act III of 1913 cannot under section 31 of that Act direct the detention of the defaulting assessee in prison for more than six months if the amount is more 896 than Rs 50 or in other cases for more than six weeks
The defaulter in the Punjab cannot under section 69 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act 1887 Punjab Act XXVII of 1887 be kept in civil jail for more than one month
Section 148 of the U P Land Revenue Act 1901 UP Act III of 1901 limits the period of detention to 15 days and also exempts many persons eg Talukdars and women from any imprisonment
The Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 Reg
I of 1886 does not insist on imprisonment at all
A cursory perusal of the provisions of the different Acts referred to above will at once show that in the matter of recovery of arrears of land revenue the different States have prescribed different machinery some obviously harsher than others
The argument is that income tax being a subject with respect to which the Union alone may make law and the recovery of it being the Union responsibility the machinery for the recovery of income tax should be framed on a uniform all India basis for to the Union all defaulters who may not pay up the Union demand are similarly situated but the Indian Income tax Act by section 462 authorises the Collectors in different States to adopt machinery which differs from State to State so that defaulters are treated differently in different States
The contention is that section 462 which sanctions such discrimination is clearly violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and has therefore become void under article 13 1
The learned Attorney General appearing for the respondents seeks to meet the aforesaid argument in two ways
In the first place he urges that the impugned sub section does not by itself make any discrimination
All that it says is that the certified amount of income tax is to be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue and there its operation ends
In recovering the certified demand the Collector has to have recourse to the machinery available to him for enforcing a demand for arrears of land revenue but the provisions of the State laws which prescribe that machinery are not incorporated in section 462
897 If the State laws are discriminatory that vice cannot be imputed to section 462
There is good deal to be said on either side
The State laws prescribe the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue only and they are not in terms and by themselves concerned at all with the recovery of income tax demand
That machinery is made available for the purpose of recovery of income tax by virtue only of section462 of the Indian Income tax Act
In the matter of recovery of income tax the Collectors adopt theprocedure laid down by the State laws not because the State laws enjoin them to do so but because section 462 directs them to do so
In other words it is section 462 which tells the Collectors of Madras to follow the procedure under section 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act 1864 as if those provisions are set out in the Indian Income tax Act in extenso and it tells the Collectors of all other States to adopt the procedure prescribed by their own State laws as if the provisions prescribing that procedure were set out in that section
In such a situation it is a plausible argument to say that all the provisions of all the State laws are mutatis mutandis to be read into section 46 2 and that therefore if there be any vice of discrimination in the State laws that vice cannot but be regarded as having crept into section 462
On the other hand to hold that all the provisions of all the State laws for recovery of arrears of land revenue have been referentially incorporated in section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act will lead us into difficulties
Will the subsequent amendments of the State laws be also incorporated in section 462 Section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act having incorporated the State laws as they then stood how can any State Legislature which has no power to make any law with respect to income tax alter or amend section 462 Are the State laws as incorporated in section 462 at the time it was enacted to be treated as crystallised and to be applied by the Collectors although the State laws for the recovery of arrears of land revenue may be materially altered by sub 898 sequent amendment These are some of the questions which will have to be answered before we can come to a decision on this point
In the view we take of the second part of the learned AttorneyGeneral s argument to which we shall presently refer it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this part of his argument
The learned Attorney General then argues that assuming that section 462 by incorporating the different State laws which are not uniform has become discriminatory such discrimination is permissible and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14
This argument appears to us to be well founded
The meaning scope and effect of the article in question have been explained by this Court in a series of decisions beginning with that in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs The Union of India1 and ending with that in Budhan Chowdhury and others vs The State of Bihar1
The following passage in the unanimous judgment of the Full Court in the last mentioned case at p 1049 briefly summarises the true intendment of the constitutional provision       
It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation
In order however to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled namely i that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and ii that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question
The classification may be founded on different bases namely geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration
It is also well established by the decisions of this Court 1 1950 SCR 869
2  899 that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure
The respective contentions now put forward as to the validity or otherwise of section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act have to be judged in the light of the principles so laid down by the Full Court
The Indian Income tax Act imposes a liability on persons who are amenable to it to pay the tax assessed against them
The assessed amount is a public demand of the Union and has to be recovered if not voluntarily paid up
The assessees are scattered all over the Union and machinery has to be devised for that purpose
On looking round the Union finds that there is machinery in every State for recovery of land revenues which are State demands
Each State in its wisdom has devised a machinery which it has considered appropriate and suitable for the recovery of its own public demand
As was said by the Supreme Court of America in Middleton vs Texas Power and Light Company1 There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds
It is conceded that each State is well within its rights to devise its own machinery for the recovery of its own public demand and that no person belonging to one State can complain that the law of his State is more rigorous than that of the neighbouring state
The reason is obvious for the people of one State are not similarly situated as people of another State
Their needs as understood by their own Legislature are different from those of the people of other States
If in the matter of recovery of arrears of land revenue defaulters of one State cannot complain of denial of equal protection of the laws on the ground of the difference in the modes of recovery prevailing in other States can it be said to be unreasonable for the Union to adopt for the recovery of its public demand from defaulters of each State the same mode of recovery 1   157
114 900 of public demand prevailing in that State Here the defaulters are classified on a territorial or geographical basis and this basis of classification has precisely the same correlation to the object of the Indian Income tax Act as it has to the object of the different Public Demands Recovery Acts
The objects of the two Acts in this behalf are in pari materia and the same considerations must apply to both
People of each State are familiar with and used to the coercive processes which each State finds it necessary to impose on its own people for the recovery of public demand and there can be no hardship and consequently no objection to their being put to the same processes for the recovery of the public demand of the Union
The grouping of the income tax defaulters into separate categories or classes Statewise is certainly a territorial classification which is based on an intelligible differentia and the subjection for the purposes of the recovery of the certified demand of each of such classes of defaulters to the same coercive process devised by their own State on a consideration of local needs for the recovery of their own public demands cannot be regarded as bereft of a reasonable nexus or correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Indian Income tax Act any more than it can be so regarded with respect to the respective State laws
The fact that the income tax demand is a Union public demand appears to us to make no difference in the legal position
The Indian Income tax Act classifies people into various groups for the purpose of imposing the tax and taxes them differently eg insurance companies which are taxed differently from an ordinary business concern and in some cases exempts them altogether eg agriculturists and persons with income below a certain level
There can on the same principle be no objection to people of a backward area who may be in need of aid in the shape of tax remission to be exempted from taxation either wholly or in part
If this is right when a question of imposition is concerned it cannot be wrong when the matter is one of recovery
The two together make up the full measure of the 901 burden and if it is permissible to vary the burden at one end it must be equally valid to vary it at the other for the same or similar reasons
It is said that the income tax demand being a Union demand there should be uniformity in the punishment to be meted out to defaulters and it can be done easily by suitably amending section 462 so as to provide for the detention of all defaulters for the same period in all cases in all States
In the first place it is a fallacy to regard arrest and detention
of a defaulter who fails to pay income tax as a punishment or penalty for an offence
It is a coercive process for recovery of public demand by putting pressure on the defaulter
The defaulter can get himself released by paying up the dues
In the next place the Court is only concerned to interpret the law and if it is valid to apply the law as it finds it and not to enter upon a discussion as to what the law should be
The whole problem before us is whether the apparent discrimination can be supported on the basis of a permissible classification
The case of Bowman vs Lewis1 is in point
We do not however find it necessary to express any opinion on the extreme contention urged by the learned Attorney General on the authority of that decision that a mere territorial classification by itself and without anything else is enough to place the law beyond the operation of the equal protection clause
Indeed in that very case it was recognised that it was not impossible that a distinct territorial establishment and jurisdiction might be intended as or might have the effect of discrimination against a particular race or class where such race or class should happen to be the principal occupants of the disfavoured area
For the purposes of this case it will suffice to say that the discrimination complained of is not unconstitutional for the simple reason that the impugned law is based on a territorial classification having a reasonable nexus or correlation between that basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Act
Our decision in The State of Rajasthan vs Rao Manohar Singhji2 which is relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is easily 1   2  902 distinguishable on facts for the law impugned in that case for the first time imposed certain disabilities on Jagirdars of a certain area of the State and there was no evidence that those Jagirdars were in any way different from the Jagirdars of the other areas of the State
In the present case the classification has been made Statewise and it is clear that in the matter of payment of public demands of the States the people of different States are not similarly situated and their own States have imposed on them such coercive processes as the circumstances and needs of each State require
The law impugned before us has only adopted for its own purpose the same coercive process which was devised by the States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose of the Union
The same or similar considerations apply to both cases
There is the same or similar correlation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Indian Incometax Act
To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas namely by a Section 30 Magistrate in some areas by the Sessions Judge with assessors in certain areas and by the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas
Adoption of an existing machinery devised for a particular purpose cannot if there be no vice of unconstitutionality in the machinery render it unconstitutional if it is made to subserve a purpose closely akin or similar to the purpose for which it bad been devised
The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner must therefore be rejected
As already stated under section 46 2 the Collector on receipt of the certificate from the Income tax Officer has to proceed to recover the certified demand as if it were an arrear of land revenue
This means that the Collector of a particular place has to take steps as indicated in the State law relating to the recovery of arrears of land revenue
As already stated in the State of Bombay there are two 903 statutes regulating the procedure for the recovery of arrears of land revenue according as the defaulter resides in the City of Bombay or in any other area within the State of Bombay
Section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 applies to the City of Bombay and section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 applies to the rest of the State
Prior to the 8th October 1954 the portion of section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 which is relevant for our present purpose was as follows If the sale of the defaulter s property shall not produce satisfaction of the demand it shall be lawful for the Collector to cause him to be apprehended and confined in the civil jail under the rules in force at the Presidency for the confinement of debtors for which purpose a certificate of demand under the Collector s signature sent with the defaulter shall be the sheriff s sufficient warrant equally with the usual legal process in ordinary cases of arrest in execution of judgment for debt Provided however that such imprisonment shall cease at any time upon payment of the sum due and that it shall in no case exceed one day for each rupee of the said sum
Section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 which provides for the arrest and detention of the defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay Contains the following proviso Provided that no defaulter shall be detained in imprisonment for a longer period than the time limited by law in the case of the execution of a decree of a Civil Court for a debt equal in amount to the arrear of revenue due by such defaulter
A cursory perusal of the two sections will show at once that the procedure prescribed by section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 for the recovery of arrears of land revenue was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 in that a defaulter residing in the City of Bombay could be kept in detention for a day for every rupee of the arrears which might considerably exceed the maximum period of six months which is the period 904 limited by the Code of Civil Procedure for the detention of a judgment debtor in civil jail
The argument is that on the advent of the Constitution section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 became void under article 131 in that it denied to the Bombay defaulter equality before the law in comparison with the defaulter outside the City of Bombay for he could be detained for a longer period of time
In the view we have taken it is not necessary to express any opinion whether the discrimination brought about by the two sections was supportable on the ground of a reasonable classification based on territorial considerations so as not to offend the constitutional inhibition
Assuming then but not deciding that section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 became inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 and therefore became void to the extent of such inconsistency it was not as recently explained by this Court in Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras vs The State of Madhya Pradesh Nagpur and Another1 obliterated from the statute book for all times or for all purposes or for all people
The effect of article 131 is that the law could not stand in the way of the enjoyment of fundamental rights
The law was not dead
Further the law was amended on the 8th October 1954 when the proviso to section 13 quoted above was replaced by the following proviso Provided that such imprisonment shall cease at any time upon payment of the sum due and that it shall in no case exceed i A period of six months when the sum due is more than Rs 50 and iiA period of six weeks in any other case
 This amendment is nothing less than an enactment of a new provision
It lays down a new law which is similar to the law laid down by section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879
Therefore the disparity that prevailed between the original proviso to section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 and the proviso to section 157 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 is now removed The 1  905 disparity between the two provisions as they originally stood being thus eliminated the vice of unconstitutionality is also removed and section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 as it now stands cannot be assailed as repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution
It was faintly suggested that as the assessment proceedings had been started and the certificate had been issued by the Income tax Officer to the Additional Collector of Bombay and the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand and actually attached the properties prior to the amendment the assessee must be governed by section 13 as it originally stood and not by it as subsequently amended
We do not think there is any substance in this contention
It is true that the warrant of attachment of the property was issued on the 24th March 1954 but the sale proclamation was issued and the sale was actually held after the date of amendment
The defaulting assessee might have paid up the dues in which case there would have been no occasion for sale
It is therefore his default that occasioned the sale
Again the sale proceeds might have been sufficient to cover the certified demand in which case there would have been no occasion for the issue of warrant for his arrest
It is only after the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and the assessee failed to pay up the balance that the question of the arrest of the defaulter arose
By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June 1955 that is to say long after the amendment of the section
In our opinion the second ground urged by the learned counsel must also be negatived
We may mention that our attention was drawn to the decision of the Madras High Court in Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee vs The Collector of Malabar1 but learned counsel could not rely upon it as an authority as it was itself under appeal before this Court
The result therefore
 is that this application must be dismissed
1 906 CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J I agree rather reluctantly
The reluctance is not because there is anything in the reasoning of the judgment pronounced just now by my Lord which does not appear to be sound but because I am not happy about the result
We have to face and accept wholly different consequences for non payment of income tax according as the assessee belongs to one State or another
The nature of the tax is one and the same and it is levied under a single Central Act and yet the ultimate coercive processes for recovery differ in nature and extent between State and State
We have to attribute to the legislature a rational classification based on geographical areas the susceptibilities of people in those areas and their reactions to the adoption of methods of recovery
For arrest and detention wilful default or fraudulent conduct is required in Madras
In Assam there can be no imprisonment at all
The periods of detention vary between Bengal UP and the Punjab
Taluqdars in UP are completely exempt
Are we to assume that people in Madras are more amenable and generally ready and willing to pay as compared with those in Bombay who are a tenacious lot and must be subjected to a longer process of detentive coercion Are the Talaqdars in UP exempt from arrest because of possible political repercussions if such influential persons are subjected to such treatment What is the rationale in providing different periods of detention for Bengal and the Punjab We must be in a position to postulate some reasonable basis for the differentiation and we cannot get away from this necessity by vague references  to the wisdom of the legislature or by indulging in pure speculation as to what might have been at the back of its mind
Speaking broadly for the enforcement of the levy of a central tax like the Income tax there should be uniformity of procedure and identity of consequences from non payment
The machinery for recovery might be different between the several States but the defaulting assessees must be put on the same footing as regards the penalties
But the law as it now stands can be supported on the grounds mentioned by my Lord and I do not propose to differ


Summary:
The assesses carrying on business in the City of Bombay was assessed to income tax for the years 1943 44 to 1947 48 and 1951 52 by the Income tax Officer C 1 Ward Bombay
As the assessee did not pay the income tax due the Income tax Officer issued in April 1951 to the Additional Collector of Bombay a recovery certificate under section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act 1922
In February 1954 the Additional Collector issued a notice of demand and as no payment was made he attached the good will and tenancy rights of the assessee s premises by a warrant of attachment dated 24th March 1954 888 A sale was held in February 1955
The sale proceeds not being sufficient to satisfy the assessed tax the Additional Collector issued a notice under section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act 1876 requiring the assessee to appear before him and show cause why he should not be apprehended and confined to civil prison in satisfaction of the said certified demand
In default of assessee s appearance and showing cause a warrant for his arrest was issued under section 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 and he was actually arrested on 1st July 1955
An application to the Bombay High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus having proved unsuccessful an application under article 32 was filed in the Supreme Court for the same relief
Two main points urged on behalf of the assessee were a that section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act under which the Income tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay was void under article 13 1 of the Constitution in that it offended article 21 and article 14 of the Constitution bthat section 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act 1876 Bombay Act II of 1876 under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector was void under article 131 of the Constitution as the same was repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution
Held as regards a 1 that there was no violation of fundamental rights under article 21 of the Constitution inasmuch as section 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 under which warrant of arrest was issued for the recovery of the demand certified under section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act constituted a procedure established by law
Both section 13 of Bombay Act II of 1876 and section 46 of the Indian Income tax Act under which action had been taken against the assessee were not void and therefore no question of violation of funda mental rights under article 21 could arise at all iithe contention that section 462 of the Indian Income tax Act provides for two different and alternative methods of recovery of the dues and clothes the Collector with the unfettered and unguided power to apply either of the two methods inasmuch as it enables the Collector at his will to discriminate between two defaulters who are similarly situated and thus violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution was without force because sub section 2 of section 46 does not prescribe two different procedures
The proviso enacted therein does not indicate a different and alternative mode of recovery of the certified amount of tax but only confers additional powers on the Collector for the better and more effective application of the only mode of recovery authorised by the body of sub section 2 of section 46 and therefore there was no question of possibility of dis crimination at all iiithe further contention that section 462 of the Indian Incometax Act violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and has thus become void under article 14 of the Constitution as section 462 required the Collectoron receipt of the requisite certificate from 889 the Income tax Officer to recover the amount specified in the certificate as if it were an arrear of the land revenue and there are different laws adopted by different States for the recovery of land revenues and thus there is discrimination on the ground that defaulters are treated differently in different States is also without force be cause discrimination complained of is a permissible classification and does not offend the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 as the grouping of the income tax defaulters in separate categories on classes State wise is a territorial classification which is based on an intelligible differentia and there is a reasonable nexus or co relation between the basis of classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Income tax Act
The fact that the income tax demand is a Union public demand makes no difference in the legal position
Held as regards b that the contention that section 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 became unconstitutional under article 131 of the Constitution in that the procedure prescribed by section 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 in respect of a defaulter residing in the City of Bombay was harsher and more drastic than the procedure laid down in section 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 in respect of a defaulter residing outside the City of Bombay was without force because section 13 of the Bombay Act II of 1876 was amended on 8th October 1954 and a new law laid down a law similar to the law laid down by section 157 of the Bombay Act V of 1879 and thus the vice of unconstitutionality if any  was removed
State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh  Another 1953 SCR 254 Shaik Ali Ahmed vs Collector of Bombay ILR  Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs The Union of India 1950 SCR 869 Budhan Choudhry and others vs The State of Bihar 1955 1 SCR 1045 Middleton vs Texas Power and Light Company   Bowman vs Lewis 101 US 22  The State of Rajasthan vs Rao Manohar Singhji 1954 SCR 996 Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras vs The State of Madhya Pradesh Nagpur and Another 1965 2 SCR 589 and Erimmal Ebrahim Hajee vs The Collector of Malabar 1954  referred to