Criminal Appeal No 133 of 1975
Appeal from the Judgment and order dated 3 2 1978 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl
A No 62873
R Nagarathnam for the Appellant
P Parmeswara Rao and G N Rao for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY J
This appeal has been filed under Section 2a of the 
The appellant was acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions judge Chittoor of an offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code
The acquittal was reversed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the appellant was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life
365 The deceased Subhadramma was the wife of the appellant
They were married about one and a half years before the occurrence
About three months before the occurrence the deceased gave birth to a female child in the house of the accused at Cherlopalle
After the ninth day the mother and child according to customary practice were taken by the mother of the deceased to her house at Krishna Kalva
Cherlopalle is about 25 miles from Krishna Kalva
The accused used to visit his wife and often used to stay in the house of the deceased s mother
After about one and a half months the accused asked his mother in law and brother in law to send his wife to his place
They replied that she had only delivered a child recently and that she would be sent to her husband s house in the fifth month
On 18th December 1972 according to the case of the prosecution the accused once again requested his mother in law to send his wife to his house
This time he also brought with him PW 8 an elderly gentleman from his village
His mother in law PW 2 told him that she would send the girl in the fifth month as she had not yet regained her health after delivery
The accused and P W 8 went away
That evening the accused again came to the house of his mother in law
After dinner all of them went to sleep
The house consisted of only one room
The accused the deceased her brother PW 1 her mother PW 2 and her grand mother PW 3 were all sleeping in the room
In the middle of the night PWs 1 2 and 3 were awakened by the cry Amma raised by Subhadramma
On waking up they saw the accused sitting by the side of the deceased with a knife in his hand
They found the deceased bleeding profusely from the left side of her chest
PW 1 put his foot on the hand in which the accused was holding the knife
The accused dropped the knife which was then picked up by the grand mother PW 3
Attracted by the cries raised by the PWs 1 to 3 the neighbourers P Ws 4 5 6 and others came there
They caught hold of the accused and tied him to a pole in front of the house by means of a rope
Some of the villagers who had gathered there also gave a beating to the accused PW proceeded to the house of PW 9 the Village Munsif and reported the occurrence to him
P W 1 affixed his thumb impression on the report exhibit P 1 prepared by P W 9
P W 9 then proceeded to the house of PW 1 where the blood stained knife MO 1 was handed over to him
Thereafter P W 9 prepared his own report exhibit P 4 and sent it alongwith exhibit P 1 and MO 1 to the Police Station at Renigunta
P W 14 the Sub Inspector of Police registered the First Information Report at 5 A M on 19th December 1972 and went ahead with the further investigation which was later taken over by the Inspector of Police PW 15
When the Police officers went to the village they 366 found the accused tied to a pole
They arrested him and found that he had injuries on his person
They got him examined by a Doctor
After holding the inquest the dead body was sent for postmortem examination
The Medical Officer P W 12 who conducted the autopsy found on the dead body a stab wound over the left axila 6 cms
below the arm pit 175 cms x 05 cm
nearly horizontal
The stab injury had gone through the third intercostal space and through the upper lobe of the left lung in an upward and medial direction
The upper lobe of the left lung had been cut through and through and had collapsed
P W 13 the Medical officer who examined the accused found several abrasions and contusions on the person of the accused
There was no fracture
After completing the investigation the Police laid a chargesheet against the accused and he was duly tried
The plea of the accused was one of denial
In the Committing Court the accused was content with a bare denial but in the Court of Sessions he stated that he went to the house of his mother in law at about 10 pm
On 18th December 1972
P Ws 1 and 2 taunted him saying we are maintaining you and your wife yet you come at any time you like 
They insulted him
There was an altercation
PW 3 hit him with a stone near his left eye
P W 1 beat him with a stick two or three times
He felt giddy and was about to lose consciousness
P W 1 came upon him with a knife to stab him
The deceased intervened and interposed herself between PW 1 and the accused
She received a stab injury
Seeing his wife injured he fell down unconscious
He regained consciousness next morning
The Learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution had failed to establish any motive and that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was discrepant conflicting and improbable  He thought that the prosecution had made an attempt to improve its case which was originally based on circumstantial evidence to made it appear as if PW 3 had also seen the stabbing
He commented on the failure of the Police to seize the mat or bedding on which the deceased was sleeping
He referred to the evidence of me Doctor who stated that the injury found on the deceased could have been caused even if she was standing
The learned Sessions Judge thought that when there were two divergent versions given by the prosecution and the defence and when two views were possible the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused
He therefore acquitted the accused
The High Court reversed the finding of acquittal
The learned Judges pointed out that there was no reason to doubt the testimony of P Ws 1 to 3 and that the discrepancies noticed by the learned Sessions 367 Judge were of a minor character
The High Court observed that the learned Sessions Judge had magnified the importance to be attached to minor discrepancies
The High Court also concluded from the medical evidence that it was more probable that the deceased was stabbed when she was lying down
Accepting the evidence of P Ws 1 to 3 which was corroborated by the evidence of P Ws 4 and 5 who came to the scene soon afterwards the High Court convicted the accused under Section 302 and sentenced him as aforesaid
In this appeal the learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the accused had no motive to kill his wife and that his version was more probable than the version of the prosecution
He submitted that the version of the accused that the occurrence took place at about 10 pm was substantiated by what was mentioned in exhibit P 15 the wound certificate given by PW 13 the Medical officer in respect of the injuries which he found on the person of the accused
He urged that the knife was not seized by the Police under any seizure Memo nor was the knife sent to any finger print expert
He urged that at the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge had not been met by the High Court
He also contended that two views were possible on the evidence and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt
We have perused the relevant evidence as well as the judgments of the Sessions Judge and the High Court
We are unable to find any substance in the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant
The High Court was well justified in commenting that the discrepancies on the basis of which the Trial Court rejected the evidence of P Ws 1 2 and 3 were of a minor character and that they have been unduly magnified by the learned Sessions Judge
The discrepancies were in regard to which of them woke up first where was the lantern and which of the neighbours came first to the scene on hearing their cries
The High Court was also right in holding that the medical evidence supported the prosecution version and not the defence version
Merely because the Medical Officer stated that the victim could have received the injury if she was standing it did not follow that the injury could have been received in the circumstances mentioned by the accused
The injury was inflicted with great force and its direction was upward
The location of the injury was 6 cms
below the arm pit on the left side
According to the accused the deceased received the injury when she placed herself between P W 1 and himself
We do not think that an injury of the nature received by the deceased could have been caused in the manner suggested by the accused
The injury must have been caused in the manner suggested by the prosecution that 368 is when the deceased was lying on her right side
It is true that the accused did not have any deep motive to kill the deceased
It is obvious that he must have been upset by the persistent refusal of the brother and mother of the deceased to send her with him to his house
He probably attributed the refusal to reluctance on the part of his wife to accompany him straightaway
We may also refer here to the comment of the learned Counsel for the appellant that realizing that the motive would assume considerable importance if the case was one based on circumstantial evidence the prosecution tried to make P W 3 depose as if she had witnessed occurrence
We do not think that the comment is justified
PW 3 an old woman of 69 years stated in her evidence that she saw the accused who was sitting by the side of the deceased on the cot make a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased and that the deceased cried out Amma  In cross examination she stated that she did not remember if she had told the Police that the accused made a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased
The Inspector of Police P W 15 however stated that P W 3 did not state before him that she saw the accused making a gesture as if he was stabbing the deceased
We do not think that we will be justified in rejecting the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses on the basis of this statement of P W 3
At the worst the so called improvement made by her may be rejected but no more
We are unable to discover any good reason to reject the evidence of P Ws 1 to 3 or the evidence of P Ws 4 and 5
We are afraid the learned Sessions Judge allowed himself to be assailed by airy and fanciful doubts
We are satisfied that the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal
The learned Counsel for the appellant advanced the usual argument submitted in all cases where an order of acquittal is reversed namely that where two views of the evidence are possible the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt arising from the two views and that where the Trial Court has taken a possible view and acquitted the accused the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal merely because another view is also possible
The principles are now well settled
At one time it was thou ht that an order of acquittal could be set aside for substantial and compelling reasons only and Courts used to launch on a search to discover those substantial and compelling reasons
However the formulae  of substantial and compelling reasons good and sufficiently cogent reasons and strong reasons and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this Court in Sanwat Singh  Ors
vs State of Rajasthan1
In Sanwat Singh s case this Court harked 1 Al
R 369 back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs Emperor1 and re affirmed those principles
After Sanwat Singh vs State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently recognised the right of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup s case
Occasionally phrases like manifestly illegal  grossly unjust  have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference
But such expressions have been used more as flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of the Appellate Court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the Appellate Court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion
In some cases Ramabhupala Reddy  Ors
v The State of AP2 Bhim Singh Rup Singh vs State of Maharashtra3 it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh s case may be added the further principle that if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of the Trial Court
This of course is not a new principle
It stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt
If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt
But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account
To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him
If the preponderance of probability is all one way a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt
It is therefore essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt the benefit of which an accused person may claim must be reasonable A reasonable doubt it has been remarked does not mean some light airy insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at some time or other it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict it means a real doubt a doubt founded upon reason4
As observed by Lord Denning in Miller vs Minister of pensions5 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt
1 61 IA 389
2 AIR 1971 SC 460
3 Al
R 4 Salmon J in his charge to the jury in R V Fantle reported in 5 370 The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice
If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not in the least probable  the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt but nothing short of that will suffice
In Khem Karan  Ors
vs State of UP  Anr1
 this Court observed Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can without danger to the administration of justice be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused person if there is otherwise fairly credible testimony
Where the Trial Court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule
That is what the High Court has done in this case
The appeal is dismissed
P B R Appeal dismissed


Summary:
The appellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of his wife
The trial court acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish any motive for the offence that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was discrepant conflicting and improbable and that when two views were possible on the basis of two divergent versions given by the prosecution and the defence the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused
The High Court reversed the order of acquittal and convicted and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life on the view that the trial court had magnified the importance to be attached to the discrepancies which were of a minor nature In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that in all cases where two views of the evidence were possible the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt arising from the two views and that on this principle the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal merely because another view was also possible
Dismissing the appeal  HELD  1 Where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule
370D 2 After the decision of this Court in Sanwat Singh vs State of Rajasthan  this Court has consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs Emperor 61 TA 389
Occasionally phrases like manifestly illegal grossly unjust have been used to describe the orders of acquittal which warrant interference
But such expressions have been used more as flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion
In two other cases it has been held that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh s case may added the further principle that if two 364 reasonable conclusions could be reached on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court
This principle stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt
If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt
But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account
To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of duality of views the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him
If the preponderance of probability is all one way a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt
It is therefore essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt the benefit of which an accused person may claim must be reasonable
A reasonable doubt does not mean some light airy insubstantial doubt that may flit through the mind of a Judge about almost anything at any time or other it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict it means a real doubt a doubt founded upon reason
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice
If the evidence is so strong against a man be to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible but not in the least probable the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt but nothing short of that will suffice
369A G Sanwat Singh vs State of Rajasthan  applied
Ramabhupala Reddy  Ors
vs The State of AP AIR 1971 SC 460 Bhim Singh Rup Singh vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1974 SC 286 Miller vs Minister of Pensions 1947 2 All
ER 372 Khem Karam  Ors
vs State of UP  Anr referred to