Kargil and Beyond

Speech by Sh. Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs at
India International Centre on July 20, 1999

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and
Gentlemen,

It is now time to look ahead; to
look beyond Kargil. But even in
charting our course for the fu-
ture we have to assess what
Kargil 1999 was all about? What
were the challenges — military
and diplomatic? What new fac-
ets of our total national com-
mitment and endeavour
emerged? What lessons for the
years that lie ahead? ‘Operation
Vijay’ — as the Prime Minister
said some days back — has
resulted in ‘Vijay’ for India. As
we re-examine the military and
diplomatic challenges that then
confronted us, and which were
successfully managed, we need
to have a preliminary analysis,
draw some first conclusions and
above all, looking beyond Kargil,
draw a route chart for the to-
morrows to come.

First, the military dimension.
Kargil was a military aggression
by Pakistan, with Pak army regu-
lars, across a stretch of the LoC,
in four pockets, from the
Mushkoh Valley in the west to
Tartuk in the Yaldor-Batalik
sector in the East. Initially, with
the aggressor — as with all
aggressors lay the element of
surprise. This was soon coun-
tered locally. Initially, the ter-
rain, too, conferred some ad-
vantage to the aggressor. They
had intruded along ridgelines to
occupy some key heights and
features that dominated a vital
road link, between Dras and
Kargil. The depth of the ridge-

2 INDIANEWS « August 15, 1999

Go gle

lines north of the LoC and their
gradients, along with nullah ap-
proaches enabled the Pakistan
army to provide crucial logisti-
cal and administrative support
to their troops.

The Indian army’s response to
the military challenge was mea-
sured yet swift, it was focussed,
thus effective. The first task was
to contain the intrusion. For this
an accurate assessment was
necessary about the degree and
extent of it. This involved,
amongst other activities the
drawing of fire. Simultaneously,
a redeployment of troops took
place. Through a successful
containment of the aggressor’s
intrusion was ensured the inevi-
table defeat of this misadven-
ture by Pakistan. The element
of surprise was countered by the
Indian army through the speed
and lethality of its response. On
26th May, the Air Force swung
into action in support of the
ground operations.

Our military objective had been
clearly spelt out to the intruders
retreat or the Indian army shall
evict you. In any event once the
intruder’s aim of interfering with
the Dras-Kargil Highway had
been thwarted the whole ratio-
nale of this aggression had got
defeated. A mere holding of
heights was militarily a counter
productive venture. They were
bound to be evicted — in detail
— one by one; for their occupa-
tion served scant military pur-
pose. For India, occupation of
territory, south of the LoC, was

simply not acceptable both
physically and as a violation of
a principle. Tactical surprise
having been lost early by the
aggressor, the military principles
of superior force, concentration
and firepower were bound to tell.
And they did, decisively. This
phase of eviction did not, in-
deed could not be a phase of
battles of maneuver. The nature
of the terrain, the adversary’s
dispositions plus most impor-
tantly our self-imposed restraints
about the LoC, precluded those
options. The battles for the
heights thus became classic
infantry actions in high altitude,
combining mountaineering and
fighting, against fixed enemy
positions at a higher elevation.
They were actions that de-
manded grit, stamina and daunt-
less courage. Our troops dis-
played all these qualities in full
measure.

Let us be clear about one other
vital aspect. This aggression in
Kargil sector was by the Pak
regular army, it had the logistic
and administrative support of
not the Pakistani Army alone
but of their total state machin-
ery. Secondly, this misadven-
ture was not aimed at infiltrat-
ing into the Srinagar Valley, it
was to occupy territory in Kargil
and in holding that. This pur-
pose, too, was defeated.

The Kargil aggression is not an

extension of the problem of ex-
ternally aided and abetted cross
border terrorism that we have
combated uptill now. It is an