Suo Motu Statement by

Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs in Parliament on
the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

The sixth Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) Review Confer-
ence is currently taking place in
New York. Consistent with our
policy India is not attending the
Conference.

Since independence India has been
a strong proponent of global
nuclear disarmament and has
taken numerous initiatives towards
this objective. We remain commit-
ted to nuclear non-proliferation.
India holds that genuine and last-
ing non-proliferation can only be
achieved through agreements that
are based upon equality and non-
discrimination, for only these can
contribute to global peace and sta-
bility.

In 1995, the NPT was extended
indefinitely and unconditionally.
Hon'ble Members would be aware
that 187 countries are today par-
ties to the NPT. The proponents of
NPT cite these developments as
evidence of NPT’s success; yet, it
is also clear that there exist strong
differences even among the NPT
States Parties. Three of the five
Review Conferences held so far
failed to reach any agreement ona
‘final document’. The non-nuclear
weapon States Parties to the NPT
have increasingly felt let down by
the lack of progress on disarma-
ment, as well as non-compliance
with the basic provisions of the
Treaty.

The nuclear weapon States Parties
to the NPT and their allies have
not diminished the role of nuclear
weapons in their respective or col-
lective security calculus; on the
contrary, new doctrines and justi-
fications have been developed.

2. INDIA NEWS ¢ May-June 2000

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May 9, 2000

NATO's new strategic concept,
announced last year, ten years after
the end of the Cold War, goes to
re-emphasising a need for the con-
tinued retention of nuclear weap-
ons. The nuclear weapons sharing
arrangements within NATO also
pose serious questions about com-
pliance. Such developments are
clear and continuing violations of
the provisions of the NPT. This the
NPT community has been unable
to discuss, let alone deal with.

One of the basic obligations of the
nuclear-weapon-states under the
NPT was to prevent further prolif-
eration. The record on this has
also not been satisfactory. The
nuclear-weapon-states have either
been active collaborators in or
silent spectators to continuing pro-
liferation, including exports of
nuclear weapon related compo-
nents and technologies.

After more than three decades, the
nuclear weapon States Parties to
the NPT remain to be persuaded
to begin any kind of collective,
meaningful negotiations aimed at
global nuclear disarmament. These
countries were expected to display
a special responsibility to imple-
ment Article VI; instead, this spe-
cial responsibility today appears
to be arrogated as a permanent
special right to possess nuclear
weapons and only for their exclu-
sive security.

India is a nuclear weapon state.
Though not a party to the NPT,
India’s policies have been consis-
tent with the key provisions of NPT
that apply to nuclear weapon
states. These provisions are con-
tained in Articles |, Ill and VI. Article

| obliges a nuclear weapon state
not to transfer nuclear weapons to
any other country or assist any
other country to acquire them and
India’s record on non-proliferation
has been impeccable. Article III re-
quires a party to the Treaty to pro-
vide nuclear materials and related
equipment to any other country
only under safeguards; India’s
exports of such materials have
always been under safeguards.
Article VI commits the parties to
pursue negotiations to bring about
eventual global nuclear disarma-
ment. It needs to be emphasised
that India today is the only nuclear
weapon state that remains com-
mitted to commencing negotiations
for a Nuclear Weapons Conven-
tion, in order to bring about a
nuclear-weapon-free-world, the
very objective envisaged in Article
VI of the NPT.

After the tests undertaken by India
in May, 1998, we have declared
that India shall only maintain a
minimum credible deterrent and
not engage in any arms race. The
role of India’s nuclear weapons is
defensive; accordingly, India has
announced a policy of no-first-use
and a policy of non-use against
non-nuclear weapon states. In fact,
this meets the demand of unquali-
fied negative security assurances,
raised by the large majority of non-
nuclear weapon states to ensure
their security. India has also indi-
cated readiness to provide requi-
site assurances to the nuclear-
weapon-free-zones in existence or
those being negotiated. We have
also taken new initiatives calling
for de-alerting of nuclear weapons
as a means of reducing the risk of

See STATEMENT, Page 3