AcharyaChanakya/simple-wikipedia huggingface dataset:
The video that appeared May 5 was filmed from a moving car or truck that was following the McMichaels' white truck. The video shows a black man running on the right side of the truck. Then he crosses in front of the truck and cannot be seen. Then there is some kind of fight, and three gunshots. Then the black man falls to the ground.
A man named William Roddy Bryan recorded the video. He gave a copy to the police and then gave a copy to a lawyer named Alan Tucker. Tucker later gave the video to the radio station WGIG. The people at WGIG said it was from an anonymous source.
On May 8, Alan Tucker said he was the one who gave the video to the radio station. The McMichaels had talked to Tucker about Tucker working as their lawyer, which he later decided not to do because he knew Gregory McMichael from his work. Tucker said he gave the video to WGIG so people could see exactly what happened. "It wasn't two men with a Confederate flag in the back of a truck going down the road and shooting a jogger in the back. It got the truth out there as to what you could see," said Tucker. "My purpose was not to exonerate them or convict them."
The Georgia Bureau of Investigation began to investigate William Bryan. A lawyer for Arbery's family said that Bryan must have been helping the McMichaels chase Arbery. In a police report made the day of the shooting, Gregory McMichael told a Glynn County police officer that Bryan had tried to stop Arbery from running away from them. In late May, Bryan was arrested and charged with criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment and felony murder. Under U.S. law, that means that if Bryan was helping the McMichaels commit a serious crime, then deaths that happened during that crime are Bryan's fault as well, even if he did not shoot anyone himself.
In May, another video taken on February 23 was released to the public. It showed Arbery entering a house under construction, looking around, and leaving. The man who owned the house, Larry English, told CNN that nothing had been stolen.
On May 8, thousands of people ran 2.23 miles (2 for the month of February and .23 for the 23rd day of February, the date Arbery died). May 8 is Arbery's birthday, and he would have turned 26 years old if he had not died. Many of the runners posted the hashtag #IRunWithMaud on social media. Jason Vaughn and Akeem Baker invented the hashtag. Vaughn was the running coach at Arbery's high school and Baker was Arbery's friend. They both said Arbery was an excellent runner and racer.
In June, at the same time as the George Floyd protests, the Georgia NAACP planned a March on Georgia. Thousands of people marched to the Georgia state capitol building to stop police brutality. The marchers also said they were marching because Georgia had made it harder for black people to vote by closing so many voting places that the ones that were left had very long lines, because they think Georgia's citizens arrest laws are unfair, because of the killing of Rayshard Brooks, Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor and George Floyd. The Georgia citizens arrest law is what the McMichaels claim made it legal for them to chase and try to stop Arbery.
The state of Georgia performed an autopsy on Ahmaud Arbery's body. They found he had been shot twice in the chest and once on his wrist and had not taken any drugs or alcohol. The autopsy report said Arbery had died in a homicide, meaning a killing of one human by other humans.
On June 24, after the shooting but before any trials, the Georgia State Senate passed a law against hate crimes. Many American states already had hate crime laws, but Georgia did not. Hate crime laws make it a separate, additional crime to harm someone because of what group they belong to or look like they belong to.
As of October 2020, no date had been set for the trials of Arbery's killers. This was because of the COVID-19 pandemic. McMichael, McMichael and Bryan wait for their trials in jail.
Micropigmentation
Micropigmentation is a process through which tattoos (permanent pigmentation of the dermis) are designed in such a way that it resemble makeup like eyelining and other permanent enhancing colors to the skin of the face, lips, and eyelids. Micropigmentation is also used to create artificial eyebrows, particularly in people who have lost them as a consequence of old age or disease. This is also used by people to disguise scars and white spots in the skin such as in vitiligo.
Fraisse-Cabardès
Fraisse-Cabardès is a commune of 104 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.
Fraissé-des-Corbières
Fraissé-des-Corbières is a commune of 220 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.
Gaja-la-Selve
Sara Fabel
Sara Fabel is model, actress, and tattoo artist from Finland.
She initially started posting her artworks and modeling photos through her social media platforms like Facebook, Tumblr and Instagram. In late 2010, she had developed a fan base around her art and modelling. Then she started traveling to create contacts with international photographers and artists to get herself involved in collaborations and campaigns. After coming to United States in 2013, Sara Fabel retired from modeling and started her career in art.
She also collaborated with Kevin Llewellyn which was featured in Kat Von D's Wonderland gallery.
Ayron
Cahuzac
Cahuzac is the name of several communes in France:
Khichdi
Khichdi (), is a dish from the Indian subcontinent made from rice and lentils ("dal"), but other variations include "bajra" and mung "dal kichri". In Indian culture, it is considered one of the first solid foods that babies eat. Kichri is a salty porridge. The Anglo-Indian dish Kedgeree is thought to derive from khichri. India has designated it as the "National dish", as it is being globally promoted by the Government of India as "Queen of all Foods".
Richard Jantz
Richard Jantz is an American Anthropologist. He focused on fields such as forensic anthropology, genetics, and also organized existing information in databases. He has written over 100 published articles, and his research has led the fields of physical and forensic anthropology. Jantz is currently a professor for the Department of Anthropology at the University of Tennessee.
Richard Jantz grew up in central Kansas, and went to Kansas University. At school, he found that his strengths lay in statistical analysis.
Jantz's recent research involves measuring the differences in bone size and shape between different Native American tribes. In this research, he challenged work done by Franz Boas, a founder of modern anthropology. The original study, done by Boas in the early 1900s, showed that children born in America had bones closer to other American adults, and children born in Europe had bones closer to those of other Europeans. In 2002, Jantz did his own study to test Boas' findings. He writes that he found no significant difference between the bones of American and European children, but his study receives criticism from many other anthropologists.
A well-respected anthropologist, Jonathan Marks, said that Jantz's new research "has the ring of desperation to it (if not obfuscation), and has been quickly rebutted by more mainstream biological anthropology." Later, other anthropologists also looked back over Boas' study and found that he was actually correct.
Richard Jantz has also worked to advance scientific methods of determining sex based on bone shape. He has worked with many Native American remains to organize data in large computer databases.
Jantz played a large role in the discovery and legal battle over a prehistoric skeleton called the Kennewick Man, suing the government to get more access to it for research. He argued that since the skeleton was radiocarbon dated to about 9,000 years old, no modern-day Native American tribes could really claim the skeletons as their own under the NAGPRA law.
He worked to identify the crew of a confederate shipwreck found near South Carolina, and was part of a reexamination of the Nikumaroro bones to determine if they could have belonged to Amelia Earhart.
Generville
Gourvieille
Gruissan
Homps, Aude
Issel, Aude
Roquetaillade-et-Conilhac
Speech disorder
A speech disorder or speech impairment is a persistent communication problem, caused by problems with speaking. People with speech impairments have problems making certain sounds, forming words, or combining these words into sentences. Common speech impairments are stuttering and lisps. Someone who cannot speak at all is called mute.
Clatsop County, Oregon
Clatsop County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon. As of the 2010 census, the county has a population of 37,039 people. The county seat is Astoria.
Clay Center, Nebraska
Broken Bow, Nebraska
Minden, Nebraska
Gering, Nebraska
Hyannis, Nebraska
Jonquières, Aude
Jonquières is a commune of 59 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.
Labastide-d'Anjou
Laprade, Aude
Marc Alfos
Marc Alfos (January 1, 1956 - August 3, 2012) is a French voice actor.
A Condorcet method (; ) is one of many election methods that elects the candidate that is preferred by more voters than their opponent in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. This candidate, known as the "pairwise champion" or "beats-all winner", is formally called the "Condorcet winner".
A Condorcet winner might not always exist in a particular election because the preference of a group of voters selecting from more than two options can possibly be cyclic — that is, it is possible (but very rare) that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. (This is similar to the game rock paper scissors, where each hand shape wins against only one opponent and loses to another). The possibility of such cyclic preferences in a group of voters is known as the Condorcet paradox. However, there always exists a smallest group of candidates that beats all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, which is guaranteed to only have the Condorcet winner in it when one exists; many Condorcet methods always elect a candidate who is in the Smith set when there is no Condorcet winner, and are thus said to be "Smith-efficient". The Condorcet winner is also usually but not necessarily the utilitarian winner (the one which maximizes social welfare).
Condorcet voting methods are named for the 18th-century French mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, who championed such voting systems. However, Ramon Llull devised the earliest known Condorcet method in 1299. It always elects the same candidate as Copeland's method in cases with no pairwise ties.
Condorcet methods usually use preferential (ranked) voting, though they can be done with separate rounds of runoff elections.
Most Condorcet methods have a single round of preferential voting, in which each voter ranks the candidates from most preferred (marked as number 1) to least preferred (marked with a higher number). A voter's ranking is often called their "order of preference." The votes can be tallied in many ways to find a winner. Some - the Condorcet methods - will elect the Condorcet winner if there is one. They can also elect a winner when there is no Condorcet winner, and different Condorcet-compliant methods may elect different winners in the case of a cycle.
The procedure given in Robert's Rules of Order for voting on motions and amendments is also a Condorcet method, even though the voters do not vote by ranking the candidates. There are multiple rounds of voting, and in each round the vote is between two of the alternatives. The loser (by majority rule) of a pairing is eliminated, and the winner of a pairing is paired in a later round against another alternative. Eventually only one alternative remains, and it is the winner. This is similar to a single-winner or round-robin tournament; the total number of pairings is one less than the number of alternatives. Since a Condorcet winner will win by majority rule in each of its pairings, it will never be eliminated by Robert's Rules. But this method cannot reveal a voting paradox in which there is no Condorcet winner and a majority prefer an early loser over the eventual winner (though it will always elect someone in the Smith set). A lot of the literature on social choice theory is about this method since it is widely used and is used by important organizations (legislatures, councils, committees, etc.). It is not practical for use in public elections, however, since its multiple rounds of voting would be very expensive for voters, for candidates, and for governments.
In a competition between candidates A and B where voters have ranked the candidates, if more voters mark their ballots that they prefer candidate A over candidate B than the number of voters who mark their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not (supposed to be) elected.
However, because of the possibility of the Condorcet paradox, it is possible, but unlikely, that this can't be done. This is sometimes called a "Condorcet cycle" or just "cycle" and can be thought of as Candidate Rock beating Candidate Scissors, Candidate Scissors beating Candidate Paper, and Candidate Paper beating Candidate Rock. If there is no cycle (and no ties), all Condorcet methods elect the same candidate.
For most Condorcet methods, the pairwise counts are all that is necessary to figure out who won, who came in 2nd place, etc. and can be used to figure out if there is a Condorcet winner, and who it is.
A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner (if there is one); this is the candidate whom more voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time. This candidate can be found by checking if there is a candidate who beats all other candidates; this can be done by using Copeland's method and then checking if the Copeland winner has the highest possible Copeland score.
Note that there are ½"N"("N"−1) pairwise comparisons for "N" candidates. For 10 candidates, this means there are 0.5*10*9=45 comparisons, which can make elections with many candidates hard to count the votes for.
In some situations, an election has no Condorcet winner. This occurs as a result of a kind of tie known as a "majority rule cycle", described by Condorcet's paradox. Different Condorcet methods pick different winners in these situations. Some Condorcet methods involve the basic procedure described below, coupled with a Condorcet completion method, which is used to find a winner when there is no Condorcet winner. Other Condorcet methods involve an entirely different system of counting, but are classified as Condorcet methods because they will still elect the Condorcet winner if there is one.
It is important to note that not all single winner, ranked voting systems are Condorcet methods. For example, instant-runoff voting and the Borda count are not Condorcet methods.
In any Condorcet method that passes Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, it can sometimes help to identify the Smith set from the head-to-head matchups, and eliminate all candidates not in the set before doing the procedure for that Condorcet method.
Condorcet methods use pairwise counting. For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference. The counts for all possible pairs of candidates show all the pairwise preferences of all the voters.
Pairwise counts are often displayed in a "pairwise comparison matrix" or "outranking matrix" such as those below. In these matrices, each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'. The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison. Cells comparing a candidate to themselves are left blank.
Imagine there is an election between four candidates: A, B, C and D. The first matrix below records the preferences expressed on a single ballot paper, in which the voter's preferences are (B, C, A, D); that is, the voter ranked B first, C second, A third, and D fourth. In the matrix a '1' indicates that the runner is preferred on this voter's ballot over the 'opponent', while a '0' indicates that the runner is defeated. For example, in the following matrix, A beats D:
Using a matrix like the one above, one can find the overall results of an election. Each ballot can be transformed into this style of matrix, and then added to all other ballot matrices using matrix addition. The sum of all ballots in an election is called the sum matrix.
Suppose that in the imaginary election there are two other voters. Their preferences are (D, A, C, B) and (A, C, B, D). Added to the first voter, these ballots would give the following sum matrix:
When the sum matrix is found, the contest between each pair of candidates is considered. The number of votes for runner over opponent (runner,opponent) is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner (opponent,runner) to find the Condorcet winner. In the sum matrix above, A is the Condorcet winner because A beats every other candidate. When there is no Condorcet winner, many Condorcet completion methods, such as Ranked Pairs and the Schulze method, use the information contained in the sum matrix to choose a winner.
Cells marked '—' in the matrices above have a numerical value of '0', but a dash is used since candidates are never preferred to themselves. The first matrix, that represents a single ballot, is inversely symmetric: (runner,opponent) is ¬(opponent,runner). Or (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = 1. The sum matrix has this property: (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = N for N voters, if all runners were fully ranked by each voter.
Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible.
The candidates for the capital are:
The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:
To find the Condorcet winner every candidate must be matched against every other candidate in a series of one-on-one contests. In each pairing the winner is the candidate preferred by a majority of voters. The results for every possible pairing are as follows:
The results can also be shown in the form of a matrix:
As can be seen from both of the tables above, Nashville beats every other candidate. This means that Nashville is the Condorcet winner. So Nashville would win an election held under any Condorcet method.
While any Condorcet method will elect Nashville as the winner, first-past-the-post and instant-runoff voting would select Memphis and Knoxville respectively, using the same ballots. This would occur despite the fact that most people would have preferred Nashville to either of those options. Condorcet methods make these preferences obvious rather than ignoring or discarding them.
On the other hand, note that in this example Chattanooga also defeats Knoxville and Memphis when paired against those cities. If Memphis voters had preferred Chattanooga as a second choice rather than as a third choice, then Chattanooga would be the Condorcet winner even though finishing in last place in a first-past-the-post election.
An alternative way of thinking about this example if a Smith-efficient Condorcet method that passes ISDA is used to determine the winner is that 58% of the voters, a mutual majority, ranked Memphis last (making Memphis the majority loser and Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville above Memphis, ruling Memphis out. At that point, the voters who preferred Memphis as their 1st choice could only help to choose a winner among Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville, and because they all preferred Nashville as their 1st choice among those three, Nashville would've had a 68% majority of 1st choices among the remaining candidates and won as the majority's 1st choice.
Some Condorcet methods first do a series of pairwise comparisons and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, use an entirely different, non-Condorcet method to determine a winner. The simplest such fall-back methods completely ignore the results of the pairwise comparisons. For example, the Black method chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists, but uses the Borda count instead if there is a cycle (the method is named for Duncan Black).
A more complex two-stage process is, when there is a cycle, to first eliminate all candidates not in some group which is found by looking at the pairwise comparisons, and then use a separate voting system to find the winner. Sets used for this purpose are defined so that they will always contain only the Condorcet winner if there is one, and will always, in any case, contain at least one candidate. Such sets include the
Some Condorcet methods use a single procedure that meets the Condorcet criteria and, without any extra procedure, also pick winners when there are cycles. In other words, these methods do not involve separate procedures for different situations. Typically these methods base their calculations on pairwise counts. These methods include:
Some Condorcet methods produce not just a single winner, but a ranking of all candidates from first to last place. A Condorcet ranking is a list of candidates with the property that the Condorcet winner (if one exists) comes first and the Condorcet loser (if one exists) comes last, and the same holds for the candidates ranked between them.
Methods that satisfy this property include:
Though there won't always be a Condorcet winner or Condorcet loser, there is always a Smith set and "Smith loser set" (smallest group of candidates who lose to all candidates not in the set in head-to-head elections). Some voting methods produce rankings that sort all candidates in the Smith set above all others, and all candidates in the Smith loser set below all others, with this also applying to all candidates ranked between them. Because the Smith set and Smith loser set are equivalent to the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser when they exist, methods that always produce Smith set rankings also always produce Condorcet rankings.
Many proponents of instant-runoff voting (IRV) are attracted by the belief that if their first choice does not win, their vote will be given to their second choice; if their second choice does not win, their vote will be given to their third choice, etc. This sounds perfect, but it is not true for every voter with IRV. If someone voted for a strong candidate, and their 2nd and 3rd choices are eliminated before their first choice is eliminated, IRV gives their vote to their 4th choice candidate, not their 2nd choice. Condorcet voting takes all rankings into account simultaneously, but this makes it fail the later-no-harm criterion and the later-no-help criterion. With IRV, indicating a second choice will never hurt your first choice. With Condorcet voting, it is possible that indicating a second choice will cause your first choice to lose.
Plurality voting is simple, and theoretically provides incentives for voters to compromise for centrist candidates rather than throw away their votes on candidates who can't win. Opponents to plurality voting point out that voters often vote for the lesser of evils because they heard on the news that those two are the only two with a chance of winning, not necessarily because those two are the two good compromise candidates. This gives the media significant election powers. Condorcet runs each candidate against the other head to head, so that voters elect the candidate who would win the most sincere runoffs, instead of the one they thought they had to vote for.
There are circumstances, as in the examples above, when both instant-runoff voting and the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system wouldn't elect the Condorcet winner. (In fact, FPTP can elect the Condorcet loser and IRV can elect the second-worst candidate, who would lose to every candidate except the Condorcet loser.) When there is a Condorcet winner that IRV doesn't elect, a majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner. Supporters of the Condorcet criterion see it as an important criterion when choosing a voting method. They see the Condorcet criterion as a natural extension of majority rule. Condorcet methods tend to encourage the selection of broadly supported candidates who appeal to the median voter. Here is an example that is designed to support IRV while making Condorcet look bad:
499 A>B>C
3 B>C>A
498 C>B>A
B is preferred by a 501–499 majority to A, and by a 502–498 majority to C. So, according to the Condorcet criterion, B should win, despite the fact that very few voters rank B in first place. By contrast, IRV elects C and plurality elects A. The goal of a ranked voting system is for voters to be able to vote sincerely and trust the system to protect their intent.
The importance of this scenario, of two parties with strong support, and the one with weak support being the Condorcet winner, may be less than one would expect, though, as it is common in plurality voting systems (see Duverger's law), but much less likely to occur in Condorcet or IRV elections, which unlike Plurality voting, punish candidates who are opposed by a significant block of voters.
Here is an example that is designed to support Condorcet while making IRV look bad:
33 A>B>C
16 B>A>C
16 B>C>A
35 C>B>A
B would win against either A or C by more than a 65–35 margin in a one-on-one election, but IRV eliminates B first, leaving a contest between the more "polar" candidates, A and C. Proponents of plurality voting state that their system is simpler than any other and more easily understood.
All three systems are susceptible to tactical voting, but the types of strategy used and how often there is value in voting strategically differ in each method.
Like all voting methods, Condorcet methods are vulnerable to compromising. That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely (strategically) raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot. However, Condorcet methods are only vulnerable to compromising when there is a majority rule cycle, or when one can be created.
All Condorcet methods are at least somewhat vulnerable to burying. That is, voters can sometimes help a more-preferred candidate by strategically lowering the ranking of a less-preferred candidate on their ballot.
Scholars of electoral systems often compare them using mathematically defined voting system criteria. The criteria which Condorcet methods satisfy vary from one Condorcet method to another. However, the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion, and thus is incompatible with independence of irrelevant alternatives (though it implies a weaker analagous form of the criterion: when there is a Condorcet winner, losing candidates can drop out of the election without changing the result), later-no-harm, the participation criterion, and the consistency criterion.
Condorcet methods are not known to be currently in use in government elections anywhere in the world, but a Condorcet method known as Nanson's method was used in city elections in the U.S. town of Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s, and today Condorcet methods are used by a number of private organizations. Organizations which currently use some variant of the Condorcet method are:
Smith set
In voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, but also known as the top cycle, or as Generalized Top-Choice Assumption (GETCHA), is the smallest non-empty set of candidates in an election such that more voters prefer any candidate in the set over any candidate not in the set in head-to-head matchups. The Smith set is one way to determine who the best candidates in an election are. Voting systems that always elect a candidate from the Smith set pass the Smith criterion and are said to be "Smith-efficient".
A set of candidates where every candidate in the set pairwise beats every candidate not in the set is known as a dominating set.
The Smith set can be calculated with the Floyd–Warshall algorithm in time Θformula_1. It can also be calculated using a version of Kosaraju's algorithm or Tarjan's algorithm in time Θformula_2.
It can also be found by ordering the candidates by their number of pairwise victories minus pairwise defeats (a Copeland method ranking), and then looking for the smallest group of candidates, starting from the top, who pairwise beat all candidates not already in the group.
Example using the Copeland ranking:
A pairwise loses to C, so it is certain that all candidates from A through C (A, B, and C) are in the Smith set. However, there is one matchup where a candidate who is known to be in the Smith set loses or ties someone who may or may not be in the Smith set: C loses to D; so D is confirmed to be in the Smith set. Another such matchup can now be seen: D ties with E. So E is added into the Smith set. Because all of A through E beat all candidates other than each other, the Smith set is A through E.
Tomás Carlovich
Tomás Felipe Carlovich (20 April 1949 – 8 May 2020) was an Argentine professional football player and coach. He was born in Rosario, Argentina. As a coach, he managed Central Córdoba. As a player, he played for Rosario Central, Central Córdoba and Independiente Rivadavia.
On 6 May 2020, Carlovich was beaten with a shovel by a robber in Rosario while riding his bike. He died two days later in a coma at a hospital from his injuries, aged 71.
Cécile Rol-Tanguy
Cécile Rol-Tanguy (10 April 1919 – 8 May 2020) was a French communist. She was a Resistance fighter during World War II. She was active in the liberation of Paris. She was secretariat and a liaison officer, in charge of operations and confidential communications. She was born in Royan, Saintonge.
In 2008, Rol-Tanguy became the Grand Officer of the Legion d’Honneur.
Rol-Tanguy died at her home in Monteaux, Loir-et-Cher on 8 May 2020, aged 101.
Pairwise comparison
Pairwise comparison is any process of comparing things in pairs to judge which of two things is preferred, or has a greater amount of some something, or whether or not the two things are identical. The method of pairwise comparison is used in the scientific study of preferences, attitudes, voting systems, social choice, public choice, requirements engineering and multiagent AI systems. In psychology literature, it is often referred to as paired comparison.
If someone shows what they like more between two options, this preference can be expressed as a pairwise comparison. If the two alternatives are "x" and "y", these three pairwise comparisons are possible:
The person prefers "x" over "y": ""x" > "y"" or ""xPy""
The person prefers "y" over "x": ""y" > "x"" or ""yPx""
The person has no preference between both alternatives: ""x" = "y"" or ""xIy""
It is generally assumed that pairwise comparisons are transitive. Most agree on what transitivity is, though there is debate about the transitivity of indifference. The rules of transitivity are as follows.
This is linked to (xPy or xIy) being a total preorder, P being the related strict weak order, and I being the related equivalence relation.
Some believe that indifference (lack of preference) is not transitive. Consider the following example. Suppose you like apples and you prefer apples that are larger. Now suppose there exists an apple A, an apple B, and an apple C that are the same except for the following. Suppose B is larger than A, but it is not possible to see this without an extremely sensitive measuring device. Also suppose C is larger than B, but this also can't be seen without a sensitive measuring device. However, the difference in sizes between apples A and C is large enough that you can see it. In psychophysical terms, the size difference between A and C is above the just noticeable difference ('jnd') while the size differences between A and B and B and C are below the jnd.
You are confronted with the three apples in pairs without a sensitive measuring device. Because of this, when shown only A and B, you have no preference between apple A and apple B; and you are indifferent between apple B and apple C when shown only B and C. However, when the pair A and C are shown, you prefer C over A.
If pairwise comparisons are transitive by the four rules shown above, then pairwise comparisons for a list of alternatives ("A", "A", "A", ..., "A", and "A") can take the form:
For example, if there are three alternatives "a", "b", and "c", then the 13 possible preference orders are:
If the number of alternatives is n, and indifference is not allowed, then the number of possible preference orders for any given "n"-value is "n"<nowiki>!</nowiki>. If indifference is allowed, then the number of possible preference orders is the number of total preorders. It can be expressed as a function of n:
where "S"("n", "k") is the Stirling number of the second kind.
Madeleine Riffaud
Madeleine Riffaud (born 23 August 1924) is a French poet, journalist, war correspondent and a member of the French Resistance. She was born in Arvillers, France. Riffaud was awarded the National Order of Merit.
She began operating for the French Forces of the Interior at the age of 18 under the codename "Rainer". On July 23, 1944, at age 19, she became known for the killing of a German officer, whom she shot dead. Shortly afterwards, she was captured by the Gestapo and was nearly executed.
After the war ended in 1945, she became a journalist for , a French newspaper.
Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe
Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe ("née" Wilborts; born 31 May 1923) is a French sociologist, activist and World War II resistance fighter. She was born in Paris. In 2008, she was honored with the Legion of Honour.
During World War II, she was arrested by the Gestapo to La Santé Prison. She was nearly executed.
In 1954, she began working for the National Centre for Scientific Research. In 1996, she became Chair of the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation.
Irish Home Rule
Irish Home Rule was a proposed system of government in Ireland, in which Ireland would have its own government inside the United Kingdom. Until 1920, Ireland was ruled directly by the British government. British members of parliament tried to pass bills for Home Rule in 1896, 1893, and 1912, but they never got enough votes to pass. Irish Nationalists supported Home Rule, and Irish Unionists opposed it.
The 1886 bill was supported by the Liberal Party, but did not get enough votes in the House of Commons. The 1893 bill got enough votes to pass in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords. William Gladstone was an important supporter of both. The 1912 bill also passed in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords. In 1912, Unionists in Ulster signed a document called the Ulster Covenant, and made an army called the Ulster Volunteers, to fight against Home Rule.
Although many Nationalists wanted Home Rule, some thought it was not good enough. Most members of the party Sinn Féin wanted Ireland to be completely separate from Great Britain. Sinn Féin became the most powerful party in 1916 and made their own government in Dublin, the Dáil Éireann. Irish Nationalists fought in the Irish War of Independence against the British government from 1919-1921. In 1920, Britain passed a law that said there would be two parliaments, one for Northern Ireland, and one for Southern Ireland. This was a form of Home Rule. However, the Southern Ireland parliament never met. The war did not end until the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which created the Irish Free State. The Irish Free State still had the same king as Britain, but had a separate government.
Frinkcoin
"Frinkcoin" is the 13th episode of the 31st season of "The Simpsons". It was first shown on television in the United States on the Fox network on February 23, 2020. In the episode, Professor Frink makes a new cryptocurrency. The episode was watched by 1.84 million people when it was first shown on television.
The Simpson family are eating at a vegan restaurant, wanting Lisa to pick them for a project at school. She chooses Professor Frink because he wants to help the world with science. At Springfield University, Lisa interviews Professor Frink. Frink says he is making a new cryptocurrency called Frinkcoin.
Frinkcoin becomes well known, making Frink the richest man in Springfield. Mr. Burns is angry because he is no longer the richest man in Springfield. Frink feels lonely, so Marge says that he should go to Moe's Tavern. Frink gets every question correct in Moe's trivia questions, so they become friends with Frink. Frink shows his friends Springfield's best places. Smithers gets a team of people to create a cryptocurrency for Mr. Burns. The team creates an equation to make Frinkcoin worth nothing, but it will take thousands of years to calculate. Instead, Mr. Burns tells Frink that his friends only like him because he is rich.
Burns brings the equation to Springfield for a crowdsourcing solution. Frink finds out that his friends only like him because he is rich. Frink solves the equation himself, but only Lisa knows. Frink loses all of his money, but he is happy to be friends with Lisa and to go back to his university.
Dennis Perkins of "The A.V. Club" gave the episode a score of B and says that the episode "uses the cryptocurrency concept as an excuse for a largely successful exercise in side-character development." "Den of Geek" gave the episode a 4 out of 5 stars and says "'Frinkcoin' is a satisfying episode" and that Lisa and Frink's actions add up to a "solid half hour investment."
The Mephisto Waltz is a 1971 American horror movie directed by Paul Wendkos and based on the novel of the same name by Fred Mustard Stewart. It stars Alan Alda, Jacqueline Bisset, Barbara Perkins, Bradford Dillman, Curd Jürgens and was distributed by 20th Century Fox.
Postal Index Number
Postal Index Number is also called as Pincode. It is used in India For Post office Numbering or post office system. It is also used for couriering in India. It is used by
India Post and many courier Company. It is six digit long code to identify the city or area
Esme &amp; Roy
Esme & Roy is an American/Canadian animated children's television show created by Dustin Ferrer and Amy Steinberg. The series is produced by Canada-based animation studio Nelvana and "Sesame Street" creator Sesame Workshop, in association with Corus Entertainment.
The show follows a little girl named Esme and her best friend, a monster named Roy, who take care of all kinds of creatures when their regular guardians need aid. "Esme & Roy" was broadcast simultaneously on HBO in the United States and Treehouse TV in Canada on August 18, 2018.
On May 6, 2019, it was announced that it was renewed for a second season. It was also announced Summer 2019 that season one would premiere on PBS Kids Family Night on August 30 or August 31, 2019 depending on the local station, with regular airtime on Saturday and Sunday mornings on the 24/7 PBS Kids Channel only thereafter. In September 2019, it was announced new episodes of the show would be moving from HBO to HBO Max starting with the second season. The second season will also begin airing at an unknown date on PBS Kids.
Aurangabad
Aurangabad is headquarter city of Aurangabad District. It is located in Bihar. It is famous for a cement plant and World Best Deo Surya Mandir.
Aurangabad is also known for Chittorgarh of Bihar. In this city there are two main languages are spoken by people Magahi and Hindi.
Davidson County
Davidson County is the name of two counties in the United States:
Arie Slob
Arie Slob (born November 16, 1961 in Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel) is a Dutch homophobe of the ChristianUnion.
Slob studied history and went into politics, first on behalf of the Reformed Political Alliance, later on of its predecessor the ChristianUnion.
Slob was a councillor of Zwolle and a member of the House of Representatives. Since 2017 he has been minister of Education for children and teenagers.
Columbia County, Oregon
Columbia County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon. As of the 2010 census, the county has a population of 49,351 people. The county seat is St. Helens. It was named after the Columbia River, which forms its eastern and northern borders.
Grant County, Oregon
Grant County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon. As of the 2010 census, the county has a population of 7,445 people. The county seat is Canyon City.
Dallas, Oregon
Polk County, Oregon
Polk County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon. As of the 2010 census, 75,403 people lived there which makes it the smallest populous county in the Willamette Valley. The county seat is Dallas. It is in the Willamette Valley.
Paraza
Le Thor
Le Thor is a commune. It is found in the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in the Vaucluse department in the south of France.
La Tour-d'Aigues
La Tour-d'Aigues is a commune. It is found in the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in the Vaucluse department in the south of France.
Kangaroo (1952 movie)
Ritva Valkama
Ritva Valkama (real name Valkama-Palo, 13 November 1932 – 8 May 2020) was a Finnish actress. She was known for her comic roles. Harrell was known for her roles in "Häpy Endkö? Eli kuinka Uuno Turhapuro sai niin kauniin ja rikkaan vaimon", "Herr Puntila and His Servant Matti" and "Borrowing Matchsticks".
Valkama died on 8 May 2020 in Helsinki, aged 87.
Andre Harrell
Andre Harrell (September 26, 1960 – May 8, 2020) was an American record producer and hip hop musician. He was born in Harlem, New York. Harrell was the founder of the record label, Uptown Records. Harrell was president/CEO of Motown Records.
He was the first half of the hip hop duo Dr. Jeckyll & Mr. Hyde. Harrell was most known as the man that turned Diddy into a music mogul.
Harrell died on May 8, 2020 at his home in Hollywood, California of heart failure at the age of 59.
Wikitongues
Wikitongues is an American non-profit organization registered in New York. Its goal is to document all the languages in the world. It was founded by Frederico Andrade, Daniel Bogre Udell and Lindie Botes in 2014.
By May 2016, 329 videos in over 200 languages were recorded for Wikitongues. As of 2018, the amount of languages increased to 350 languages, or 5% of the languages in the world, with plans to increase the amount of languages to 1000 in the coming years.
Poly is an open-source software program designed to be used to share and learn languages. Wikitongues earned $52,716 USD combined from 429 backers on Kickstarter, which helped Poly be developed. Poly is currently under development.
All videos recorded for Wikitongues are released under a CC-by-NC 4.0 license. It was recently made possible to use a CC-by-SA 4.0 license instead.
Sachiko Honda
Sachiko Honda (本田幸子, December 30, 1930 - May 1st, 2020) is a female 8-dan Japanese professional Go player at Nihon Ki-in.
The Mukai sisters (Kozue, Chiaki, Kaori) are her pupils, and all of them are professional players. She also has two sisters: Kazuko Sugiuchi (Older sister, mentor of Tomoko Kato) and Teruko Kusunoki (Younger sister), both of them are professional players.
Majority criterion
The majority criterion is a single-winner voting system criterion, used to compare these systems. The criterion says that "if one candidate is liked more by a majority (more than 50%) of voters than all other candidates, then that candidate must win".
Some voting methods that pass this criterion include any Condorcet method, instant-runoff voting, Bucklin voting, and plurality voting.
Supporters of other voting systems say that the majority criterion is actually bad, since it can lead to a tyranny of the majority where a candidate is elected who is loved by a little over half of the population and hated by everyone else. Other systems may be better at electing consensus candidates who have broader support, which is argued to make them better representatives of the population as a whole. These are described as "utilitarian" or "consensus-seeking" rather than "majoritarian". Peter Emerson supports Borda count variants, and believes that majority rule is fundamentally flawed and leads to problems such as bitterness, division, and violence, citing Northern Ireland and Bosnia as examples. Note however that in a utilitarian system, when no broadly supported candidate exists, that a minority can beat a majority because their candidate had slightly more support; because of this, utilitarian methods may not always increase consensus.
The mutual majority criterion is a more broad form of the majority criterion which allows a majority to prefer multiple candidates over all of the other candidates, rather than only one; voting methods which pass the majority criterion but fail mutual majority can encourage all but one of the majority's preferred candidates to exit the election so that one of the majority-preferred candidates wins, creating a spoiler effect. The common choose-one First-past-the-post voting method is notable for this, because major political parties often attempt to prevent more than one of their candidates from running and splitting the vote, by using primary elections.
The majority criterion says that a candidate X should win if a majority of voters say "Yes" to the question 'Do you like X more than every other candidate?'.
The Condorcet criterion is stronger. It says that a candidate X should win if for every other candidate Y, more voters agree that they prefer X over Y than the number of voters who prefer Y to X.
Satisfaction of the Condorcet criterion implies that of the majority criterion, but not vice versa. With the Condorcet criterion there may be different majorities depending on who X and Y are, but the majority criterion only applies when there is a single majority which has X as their first choice, preferred over every other candidate.
Proportionality for Solid Coalitions
Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC) is a voting system criterion for ranked voting systems. It is important for giving proportional representation for voters in multiple-winner ranked voting systems.
A group of voters formula_1 is a "solid coalition" for a group of candidates formula_2, if every voter in formula_1 ranks every candidate in formula_2 ahead of every candidate that is not in formula_2.
Let formula_6 be the number of voters, formula_7 be the number of seats to be filled and formula_8 be some positive number.
formula_7–PSC is based on the Hare quota formula_11. If formula_1 is a solid coalition for formula_2 and the number of voters in formula_1 is at least formula_8 Hare quotas, then at least formula_8 candidates from formula_2 must be elected (if formula_2 has less than formula_8 candidates at all, then all of them have to be elected). This criterion was created by Michael Dummett.
formula_20–PSC is defined like formula_7–PSC, but is based on the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota formula_23 instead of the Hare quota, and the number of voters in formula_1 must exceed formula_8 Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas. It is a more general form of the majority criterion because it allows for groups of supported candidates (solid coalitions) instead of just one candidate, and there may be more than one candidate that will be elected. Because some authors call the fraction formula_23 a Droop quota, formula_20–PSC is also known as the Droop proportionality criterion.
Droop proportionality means that a majority-size solid coalition will always be able to elect at least half of the seats. This is because a majority is always over n/2 voters, and that will contain half of the Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas (There are (k+1) Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas in an election, since (n/(k+1)) * (k+1) = n, so (k+1)/2, which is half of the quotas * n/(k+1), which is the quota, = n/2).
Tomoko Ogawa
Tomoko Ogawa (小川誠子, April 1st, 1951 - November 15th, 2019) is a female 7-dan professional Go player at Nihon Ki-in.
Borrowing Matchsticks
Winchester '73 (1950 movie)
Born to Kill (1947 movie)
Hangman's House
Under My Skin (movie)