Aarushhh/wikipedia-simple-splitted huggingface dataset:
All three men are allowed to appeal, to ask the State of Georgia to change or stop their punishments at the Georgia Supreme Court.  All three men are also to go on trial at the federal level.

Federal hate crime trial

On January 31, 2022, Travis McMichael offered to plead guilty to federal hate crimes.  In exchange, lawyers for the government said he could spend the first 30 years of his sentence in a federal prison, then go to a Georgia state prison.  However, Judge Lisa Godbey Wood of the U.S. District Court said no.  It is very unusual for a judge to refuse a plea deal that prosecutors have made with a defendant.  This means McMichael would go on trial for hate crimes.

On February 22, 2022, a jury said all three men were guilty of federal hate crimes.

References

2020 murders in the United States
2020 in Georgia (U.S. state)
Black Lives Matter

February 2020 events
Deaths by person in the United States
Racially-motivated violence in the United States
Micropigmentation is how tattoos can look like makeup such as eyelining and adding colors to the skin of the face, lips, and eyelids. Micropigmentation is can also make artificial eyebrows for people who lost them because of old age or disease. Micropigmentation can also hide scars and white spots in the skin such as in vitiligo.

References

Cosmetics
Dermatology
Fraisse-Cabardès is a commune of 104 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Fraissé-des-Corbières is a commune of 220 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

References 

Communes in Aude
Gaja-la-Selve is a commune of 143 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Sara Fabel is model, actress, and tattoo artist from Finland.

Biography
She initially started posting her artworks and modeling photos through her social media platforms like Facebook, Tumblr and Instagram. In late 2010, she had developed a fan base around her art and modelling. Then she started traveling to create contacts with international photographers and artists to get herself involved in collaborations and campaigns. After coming to United States in 2013, Sara Fabel retired from modeling and started her career in art.

She also collaborated with Kevin Llewellyn which was featured in Kat Von D's Wonderland gallery.

References

Finnish people
Finnish artists
Living people
1986 births
Ayron is a commune in the Vienne department in the Nouvelle-Aquitaine region in western France.

Communes in Vienne
Cahuzac is the name of several communes in France:
 Cahuzac, Aude, in the Aude department
 Cahuzac, Lot-et-Garonne, in the Lot-et-Garonne department
 Cahuzac, Tarn, in the Tarn department
 Cahuzac-sur-Adour, in the Gers department
 Cahuzac-sur-Vère, in the Tarn department
Khichdi (), is a dish from the Indian subcontinent made from rice and lentils (dal), but other variations include bajra and mung dal kichri. In Indian culture, it is considered one of the first solid foods that babies eat. Kichri is a salty porridge. The Anglo-Indian dish Kedgeree is thought to derive from khichri. India has designated it as the "National dish", as it is being globally promoted by the Government of India as "Queen of all Foods".

References

Indian food
National symbols of India
Pakistani food
Richard Jantz is an American Anthropologist. He focused on fields such as forensic anthropology, genetics, and also organized existing information in databases. He has written over 100 published articles, and his research has led the fields of physical and forensic anthropology. Jantz is currently a professor for the Department of Anthropology at the University of Tennessee.

Background 
Richard Jantz grew up in central Kansas, and went to Kansas University. At school, he found that his strengths lay in statistical analysis.
Research 
Jantz's recent research involves measuring the differences in bone size and shape between different Native American tribes. In this research, he challenged work done by Franz Boas, a founder of modern anthropology. The original study, done by Boas in the early 1900s, showed that children born in America had bones closer to other American adults, and children born in Europe had bones closer to those of other Europeans. In 2002, Jantz did his own study to test Boas' findings. He writes that he found no significant difference between the bones of American and European children, but his study receives criticism from many other anthropologists. 

A well-respected anthropologist, Jonathan Marks, said that Jantz's new research "has the ring of desperation to it (if not obfuscation), and has been quickly rebutted by more mainstream biological anthropology." Later, other anthropologists also looked back over Boas' study and found that he was actually correct.
Richard Jantz has also worked to advance scientific methods of determining sex based on bone shape. He has worked with many Native American remains to organize data in large computer databases. 

Jantz played a large role in the discovery and legal battle over a prehistoric skeleton called the Kennewick Man, suing the government to get more access to it for research. He argued that since the skeleton was radiocarbon dated to about 9,000 years old, no modern-day Native American tribes could really claim the skeletons as their own under the NAGPRA law. 

He worked to identify the crew of a confederate shipwreck found near South Carolina, and was part of a reexamination of the Nikumaroro bones to determine if they could have belonged to Amelia Earhart.

References 

American anthropologists
Living people
Generville is a commune of 60 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Gourvieille is a commune of 76 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

References

Other websites

Communes in Aude
Gruissan is a commune of 5,000 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Homps is a commune of 591 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

References

Other websites

Communes in Aude
Issel is a commune of 488 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Roquetaillade-et-Conilhac is a commune of 277 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France. The municipality was created on 1 January 2019 and consists of the former communes of Roquetaillade (the seat) and Conilhac-de-la-Montagne.

References 

2019 establishments in France
Communes in Aude
A speech disorder or speech impairment is a long-lasting communication problem, caused by problems with speaking. People with speech impairments have problems making certain sounds, forming words, or combining these words into sentences. Common speech impairments are stuttering, lisps and rhotacism (inability or difficulty pronouncing the R sound). Someone who cannot speak at all is called mute.

References
Clatsop County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon. As of the 2020 census, the county has a population of 41,072 people. The county seat is Astoria.

References

Oregon counties
Clay Center is a city in Nebraska in the United States. It is the county seat of Clay County.

Cities in Nebraska
County seats in Nebraska
Broken Bow is a city in Nebraska in the United States. It is the county seat of Custer County.

Cities in Nebraska
County seats in Nebraska
Minden is a city in Nebraska in the United States. It is the county seat of Kearney County.

Cities in Nebraska
County seats in Nebraska
Gering is a city in Nebraska in the United States. It is the county seat of Scotts Bluff County.

Cities in Nebraska
County seats in Nebraska
Hyannis is a village in Nebraska in the United States. It is the county seat of Grant County.

Villages in Nebraska
County seats in Nebraska
Jonquières is a commune of 59 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Labastide-d'Anjou is a commune of 1,326 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Laprade is a commune of 95 people (2017). It is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.

Communes in Aude
Marc Alfos (January 1, 1956 – August 3, 2012) was a French voice actor.

Filmography

Animated roles
 Godzilla: The Series - Major Anthony Hicks
 Superman: The Animated Series - Kalibak

Live-action roles
 24 - Jonathan Wallace

Film roles
 A Bug's Life - Dim
 Asterix and the Vikings - Timandahaf
 Hercules - Nessus
 Muppet Treasure Island - Billy Bones
 Over the Hedge - Dwayne LaFontant
 Renaissance - Nusrat Farfella
 Robots - Jack Hammer
 Sinbad: Legend of the Seven Seas - Kale
 The Incredibles - Mr. Incredible/Bob Parr
 Toy Story - Sarge
 Toy Story 2 - Sarge
 Toy Story 3 - Sarge

Video game roles
 Dark Messiah of Might and Magic - Human Leader

References

Other websites 
 IMDb Profile

French voice actors
1956 births
2012 deaths
A Condorcet method (; ) is one of many election methods that elects the candidate that is preferred by more voters than their opponent in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. This candidate, known as the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner.
A Condorcet winner might not always exist in a particular election because the preference of a group of voters selecting from more than two options can possibly be cyclic — that is, it is possible (but very rare) that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. (This is similar to the game rock paper scissors, where each hand shape wins against only one opponent and loses to another). The possibility of such cyclic preferences in a group of voters is known as the Condorcet paradox. However, there always exists a smallest group of candidates that beats all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, which is guaranteed to only have the Condorcet winner in it when one exists; many Condorcet methods always elect a candidate who is in the Smith set when there is no Condorcet winner, and are thus said to be "Smith-efficient".  The Condorcet winner is also usually but not necessarily the utilitarian winner (the one which maximizes social welfare).
Condorcet voting methods are named for the 18th-century French mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, who championed such voting systems.  However, Ramon Llull devised the earliest known Condorcet method in 1299. It always elects the same candidate as Copeland's method in cases with no pairwise ties.

Condorcet methods usually use preferential (ranked) voting, though they can be done with separate rounds of runoff elections.
Most Condorcet methods have a single round of preferential voting, in which each voter ranks the candidates from most preferred (marked as number 1) to least preferred (marked with a higher number). A voter's ranking is often called their order of preference. The votes can be tallied in many ways to find a winner. Some - the Condorcet methods - will elect the Condorcet winner if there is one. They can also elect a winner when there is no Condorcet winner, and different Condorcet-compliant methods may elect different winners in the case of a cycle.
The procedure given in Robert's Rules of Order for voting on motions and amendments is also a Condorcet method, even though the voters do not vote by ranking the candidates. There are multiple rounds of voting, and in each round the vote is between two of the alternatives. The loser (by majority rule) of a pairing is eliminated, and the winner of a pairing is paired in a later round against another alternative. Eventually only one alternative remains, and it is the winner. This is similar to a single-winner or round-robin tournament; the total number of pairings is one less than the number of alternatives. Since a Condorcet winner will win by majority rule in each of its pairings, it will never be eliminated by Robert's Rules. But this method cannot reveal a voting paradox in which there is no Condorcet winner and a majority prefer an early loser over the eventual winner (though it will always elect someone in the Smith set)
. A lot of the literature on social choice theory is about this method since it is widely used and is used by important organizations (legislatures, councils, committees, etc.). It is not practical for use in public elections, however, since its multiple rounds of voting would be very expensive for voters, for candidates, and for governments.
Summary 
In a competition between candidates A and B where voters have ranked the candidates, if more voters mark their ballots that they prefer candidate A over candidate B than the number of voters who mark their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not (supposed to be) elected.

However, because of the possibility of the Condorcet paradox, it is possible, but unlikely, that this can't be done. This is sometimes called a Condorcet cycle or just cycle and can be thought of as Candidate Rock beating Candidate Scissors, Candidate Scissors beating Candidate Paper, and Candidate Paper beating Candidate Rock. If there is no cycle (and no ties), all Condorcet methods elect the same candidate.
Each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference (top-to-bottom, or best-to-worst, or 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.). The voter may be allowed to rank candidates as equals, to express indifference (no preference) between them. To save time, candidates omitted by a voter may be treated as if the voter ranked them at the bottom.
 For each pairing of candidates (as in a round-robin tournament) count how many votes rank each candidate over the other candidate. Thus each pairing will have two totals: the size of its majority and the size of its minority (or there will be a tie).

For most Condorcet methods, the pairwise counts are all that is necessary to figure out who won, who came in 2nd place, etc. and can be used to figure out if there is a Condorcet winner, and who it is.
Definition 
A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner (if there is one); this is the candidate whom more voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time. This candidate can be found by checking if there is a candidate who beats all other candidates; this can be done by using Copeland's method and then checking if the Copeland winner has the highest possible Copeland score.

Note that there are ½N(N−1) pairwise comparisons for N candidates. For 10 candidates, this means there are 0.5*10*9=45 comparisons, which can make elections with many candidates hard to count the votes for.
In some situations, an election has no Condorcet winner. This occurs as a result of a kind of tie known as a majority rule cycle, described by Condorcet's paradox. Different Condorcet methods pick different winners in these situations. Some Condorcet methods involve the basic procedure described below, coupled with a Condorcet completion method, which is used to find a winner when there is no Condorcet winner. Other Condorcet methods involve an entirely different system of counting, but are classified as Condorcet methods because they will still elect the Condorcet winner if there is one.

It is important to note that not all single winner, ranked voting systems are Condorcet methods. For example, instant-runoff voting and the Borda count are not Condorcet methods.

Basic procedure
Basic procedure

Finding the winner 
In any Condorcet method that passes Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, it can sometimes help to identify the Smith set from the head-to-head matchups, and eliminate all candidates not in the set before doing the procedure for that Condorcet method.

Condorcet methods use pairwise counting. For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference. The counts for all possible pairs of candidates show all the pairwise preferences of all the voters.
Pairwise counts are often displayed in a pairwise comparison matrix or outranking matrix such as those below. In these matrices, each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'. The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison. Cells comparing a candidate to themselves are left blank.

Imagine there is an election between four candidates: A, B, C and D. The first matrix below records the preferences expressed on a single ballot paper, in which the voter's preferences are (B, C, A, D); that is, the voter ranked B first, C second, A third, and D fourth. In the matrix a '1' indicates that the runner is preferred on this voter's ballot over the 'opponent', while a '0' indicates that the runner is defeated. For example, in the following matrix, A beats D:
Using a matrix like the one above, one can find the overall results of an election. Each ballot can be transformed into this style of matrix, and then added to all other ballot matrices using matrix addition. The sum of all ballots in an election is called the sum matrix.

Suppose that in the imaginary election there are two other voters. Their preferences are (D, A, C, B) and (A, C, B, D). Added to the first voter, these ballots would give the following sum matrix:

When the sum matrix is found, the contest between each pair of candidates is considered. The number of votes for runner over opponent (runner,opponent) is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner (opponent,runner) to find the Condorcet winner. In the sum matrix above, A is the Condorcet winner because A beats every other candidate. When there is no Condorcet winner, many Condorcet completion methods, such as Ranked Pairs and the Schulze method, use the information contained in the sum matrix to choose a winner.
Cells marked '—' in the matrices above have a numerical value of '0', but a dash is used since candidates are never preferred to themselves. The first matrix, that represents a single ballot, is inversely symmetric: (runner,opponent) is ¬(opponent,runner). Or (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = 1. The sum matrix has this property: (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = N for N voters, if all runners were fully ranked by each voter.

Example: Voting on the location of Tennessee's capital 

Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible.

The candidates for the capital are:
Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities
 Nashville, with 26% of the voters, near the center of the state
 Knoxville, with 17% of the voters
 Chattanooga, with 15% of the voters

The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:

To find the Condorcet winner every candidate must be matched against every other candidate in a series of one-on-one contests. In each pairing the winner is the candidate preferred by a majority of voters. The results for every possible pairing are as follows:

The results can also be shown in the form of a matrix:

As can be seen from both of the tables above, Nashville beats every other candidate. This means that Nashville is the Condorcet winner. So Nashville would win an election held under any Condorcet method.
While any Condorcet method will elect Nashville as the winner, first-past-the-post and instant-runoff voting would select Memphis and Knoxville respectively, using the same ballots. This would occur despite the fact that most people would have preferred Nashville to either of those options. Condorcet methods make these preferences obvious rather than ignoring or discarding them.

On the other hand, note that in this example Chattanooga also defeats Knoxville and Memphis when paired against those cities. If Memphis voters had preferred Chattanooga as a second choice rather than as a third choice, then Chattanooga would be the Condorcet winner even though finishing in last place in a first-past-the-post election.
Two-method systems 
Some Condorcet methods first do a series of pairwise comparisons and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, use an entirely different, non-Condorcet method to determine a winner. The simplest such fall-back methods completely ignore the results of the pairwise comparisons. For example, the Black method chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists, but uses the Borda count instead if there is a cycle (the method is named for Duncan Black).

A more complex two-stage process is, when there is a cycle, to first eliminate all candidates not in some group which is found by looking at the pairwise comparisons, and then use a separate voting system to find the winner. Sets used for this purpose are defined so that they will always contain only the Condorcet winner if there is one, and will always, in any case, contain at least one candidate. Such sets include the
Smith set: The smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such that every candidate in the set can beat all candidates outside the set. It is easily shown that there is only one possible Smith set for each election.
 Schwartz set: This is the innermost unbeaten set, and is usually the same as the Smith set. It is defined as the union of all possible sets of candidates such that for every set:
 Every candidate inside the set is pairwise unbeatable by any other candidate outside the set (i.e., ties are allowed).
 No proper (smaller) subset of the set fulfills the first property.
 Landau set (or uncovered set or Fishburn set): the set of candidates, such that each member, for every other candidate (including those inside the set), either beats this candidate or beats a third candidate that itself beats the candidate that is unbeaten by the member.
Single-method systems 
Some Condorcet methods use a single procedure that meets the Condorcet criteria and, without any extra procedure, also pick winners when there are cycles. In other words, these methods do not involve separate procedures for different situations. Typically these methods base their calculations on pairwise counts. These methods include:
Copeland's method: This simple method involves electing the candidate who wins the most pairwise matchings. However, it often produces a tie.
 Kemeny–Young method: This method ranks all the choices from most popular and second-most popular down to least popular.
 Minimax: Also called Simpson, Simpson–Kramer, and Simple Condorcet, this method chooses the candidate whose worst pairwise defeat is better than that of all other candidates. A possible improved modification to this method involves only allowing it to choose a winner from the Smith set; this has been called Smith/Minimax.
 Nanson's method and Baldwin's method combine the Borda Count with an instant runoff procedure.
 Dodgson's method extends the Condorcet method by swapping candidates until a Condorcet winner is found. The winner is the candidate which requires the minimum number of swaps.
Ranked pairs breaks each cycle in the pairwise preference graph by dropping the weakest majority in the cycle, thereby yielding a complete ranking of the candidates. This method is also known as Tideman, after its inventor Nicolaus Tideman.
 Schulze method repeatedly drops the weakest majority in the pairwise preference graph until there is a Condorcet winner (unless there are ties). This method is also known as Schwartz sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting and path winner.
Related terms 

 Other terms related to the Condorcet method are:
 Condorcet loser
 the candidate who is less preferred than every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by fewer voters than any other candidate).
 Weak Condorcet winner
 a candidate who beats or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by at least as many voters as any other candidate). There can be more than one weak Condorcet winner.
 Weak Condorcet loser
 a candidate who is defeated by or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup. Similarly, there can be more than one weak Condorcet loser.

Condorcet ranking methods 
Some Condorcet methods produce not just a single winner, but a ranking of all candidates from first to last place. A Condorcet ranking is a list of candidates with the property that the Condorcet winner (if one exists) comes first and the Condorcet loser (if one exists) comes last, and the same holds for the candidates ranked between them.
Methods that satisfy this property include:

 Copeland's method, Kemeny–Young method, Ranked pairs, Schulze method

Though there won't always be a Condorcet winner or Condorcet loser, there is always a Smith set and "Smith loser set" (smallest group of candidates who lose to all candidates not in the set in head-to-head elections). Some voting methods produce rankings that sort all candidates in the Smith set above all others, and all candidates in the Smith loser set below all others, with this also applying to all candidates ranked between them. Because the Smith set and Smith loser set are equivalent to the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser when they exist, methods that always produce Smith set rankings also always produce Condorcet rankings.
Comparison with instant runoff and first-past-the-post (plurality) 
Many proponents of instant-runoff voting (IRV) are attracted by the belief that if their first choice does not win, their vote will be given to their second choice; if their second choice does not win, their vote will be given to their third choice, etc. This sounds perfect, but it is not true for every voter with IRV. If someone voted for a strong candidate, and their 2nd and 3rd choices are eliminated before their first choice is eliminated, IRV gives their vote to their 4th choice candidate, not their 2nd choice. Condorcet voting takes all rankings into account simultaneously, but this makes it fail the later-no-harm criterion and the later-no-help criterion. With IRV, indicating a second choice will never hurt your first choice. With Condorcet voting, it is possible that indicating a second choice will cause your first choice to lose.
There are circumstances, as in the examples above, when both instant-runoff voting and the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system wouldn't elect the Condorcet winner. (In fact, FPTP can elect the Condorcet loser and IRV can elect the second-worst candidate, who would lose to every candidate except the Condorcet loser.) When there is a Condorcet winner that IRV doesn't elect, a majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner. Supporters of the Condorcet criterion see it as an important criterion when choosing a voting method. They see the Condorcet criterion as a natural extension of majority rule. Condorcet methods tend to encourage the selection of broadly supported candidates who appeal to the median voter. Here is an example that is designed to support IRV while making Condorcet look bad:

499 A>B>C

3 B>C>A

498 C>B>A
3 B>C>A

498 C>B>A

B is preferred by a 501–499 majority to A, and by a 502–498 majority to C. So, according to the Condorcet criterion, B should win, despite the fact that very few voters rank B in first place. By contrast, IRV elects C and plurality elects A. The goal of a ranked voting system is for voters to be able to vote sincerely and trust the system to protect their intent.

The importance of this scenario, of two parties with strong support, and the one with weak support being the Condorcet winner, may be less than one would expect, though, as it is common in plurality voting systems (see Duverger's law), but much less likely to occur in Condorcet or IRV elections, which unlike Plurality voting, punish candidates who are opposed by a significant block of voters.

Here is an example that is designed to support Condorcet while making IRV look bad:

33 A>B>C

16 B>A>C

16 B>C>A

35 C>B>A
16 B>C>A

35 C>B>A

B would win against either A or C by more than a 65–35 margin in a one-on-one election, but IRV eliminates B first, leaving a contest between the more "polar" candidates, A and C. Proponents of plurality voting state that their system is simpler than any other and more easily understood.

All three systems are susceptible to tactical voting, but the types of strategy used and how often there is value in voting strategically differ in each method.

Potential for tactical voting 
Like all voting methods, Condorcet methods are vulnerable to compromising. That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely (strategically) raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot. However, Condorcet methods are only vulnerable to compromising when there is a majority rule cycle, or when one can be created.
All Condorcet methods are at least somewhat vulnerable to burying. That is, voters can sometimes help a more-preferred candidate by strategically lowering the ranking of a less-preferred candidate on their ballot.

Evaluation by criteria 
Scholars of electoral systems often compare them using mathematically defined voting system criteria. The criteria which Condorcet methods satisfy vary from one Condorcet method to another. However, the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion, and thus is incompatible with independence of irrelevant alternatives (though it implies a weaker analagous form of the criterion: when there is a Condorcet winner, losing candidates can drop out of the election without changing the result), later-no-harm, the participation criterion, and the consistency criterion.

Use of Condorcet voting
The Wikimedia Foundation used the Schulze method to elect its Board of Trustees until 2013, when it switched to a ratings ballot with Support/Neutral/Oppose ballots.
 The Pirate Party of Sweden uses the Schulze method for its primaries
 The Debian project uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its leader
 The Software in the Public Interest corporation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Directors
 The Gentoo Foundation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Trustees and its Council
 The Free State Project used Minimax for choosing its target state
 The uk.* hierarchy of Usenet
 The Student Society of the University of British Columbia uses ranked pairs for its executive elections.
 Kingman Hall and Hillegass Parker House, two loosely affiliated student housing cooperatives, each use the Schulze method to elect their management teams.

Other considerations
If every seat in a legislature is elected (in separate elections, by the same pool of voters – use of districts will avoid this) by the Condorcet method, the legislators would all be centrists and might all agree with each on what laws to pass. Some voters prefer to have opposites in the legislature so they can't pass laws easily. These voters might prefer the Condorcet method for electing executive offices.
 If 10 candidates run for governor in a Condorcet race, ballot counters may need to count 9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1 = 45 head to head runoffs to find the winner. While this is doable, it might be more practical to still use ballot access laws or primaries, defeating some of the original intent of the Condorcet method. Possible solutions:
 Computers can be used to speed up the counts, though some voters fear computers can be hacked and used for ballot counting fraud.
Another option would be to allow several independent scanner owners count the ballots and compare results. Volunteer hand counters could then spot check various candidates and ranks to make sure they match the subtotals reported by the scanners.
 It is also possible to limit the number of ranks voters can use; for example, if every voter is only allowed to rank each candidate either 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, with equal rankings allowed, then only the runoffs between candidates ranked 1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, 1st and last, 2nd and 3rd, 2nd and last, and 3rd and last need be counted, as the runoffs between two candidates at the same rank will result in ties.
The negative vote-counting approach to pairwise counting may reduce the amount of work the vote-counters have to do. For example, with 10 candidates, a voter who ranks candidate A as their 1st choice and doesn't rank any other candidate prefers A over 9 other candidates. In the regular approach, this means recording those 9 preferences; but with negative counting, it can simply be recorded that A is marked on 1 voter's ballot, with this itself indicating that A is preferred in every match-up. When a voter ranks a candidate 2nd, then a negative vote can be placed in the matchup between the 2nd choice and 1st choice to indicate that the 2nd choice is not preferred to the 1st choice, such that it will cancel out with the support the 2nd choice would receive against the 1st choice from being marked on the voter's ballot. Negative votes can likewise be applied to matchups where both candidates are ranked equally.
If there are no more than 5 candidates ( or a larger number of candidates is short-listed to 5) then the amount of effort counting ballots could be reduced to normal acceptable levels by asking voters to select an order of preference from a predetermined list of the possibilities. This would mean that the ballots would just require to be counted once to determine the number of votes cast for each order of preference. The results would then be entered into a simple spreadsheet which would determine the Condorcet winner. For example where there are candidates A, B and C, there are six orders of preference, so voters could be asked to choose which of the six they wish to vote for. Counting would then be simply a matter of counting how votes were cast for each order of preference. The results could then be applied to a simple spreadsheet which revealed the Condorcet winner
. If there were four candidates (options) then there would be 24 orders of preference; if there were five candidates then there would be 120 orders of preference and so on.
Voters make an economic trade-off in the amount of time invested in researching and ranking candidates.  If voters rank too few candidates or rank such as to inaccurately represent their preferences, the Condorcet candidate cannot be correctly discovered. Nominating primaries reduce the number of candidates to avoid this, and the style of nominating primary can impact whether the Condorcet candidate—or at least a similar candidate—remains or if all such candidates are eliminated in favor of polarized options.
Related pages
 

 Condorcet loser criterion
 Ramon Llull (1232–1315) who, with the 2001 discovery of his lost manuscripts Ars notandi, Ars eleccionis, and Alia ars eleccionis, was given credit for discovering the Borda count and Condorcet criterion (Llull winner) in the 13th century

Notes and references

Further reading

Other websites

 .
 .
 . The Basic Motions page lists Rules of Order for discussions and the motions organized on ranked choice ballots used in Condorcet voting.
 . Multipage description of Condorcet method and Ranked Pairs from a Canadian perspective.
 . Demonstration and commentary on Condorcet method.
 .
 .
 .

Software 

 .
 .
 .
 .
 .
 
 
 
 

Voting systems
In voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, but also known as the top cycle, or as Generalized Top-Choice Assumption (GETCHA), is the smallest non-empty set of candidates in an election such that more voters prefer any candidate in the set over any candidate not in the set in head-to-head matchups. The Smith set is one way to determine who the best candidates in an election are.  Voting systems that always elect a candidate from the Smith set pass the Smith criterion and are said to be "Smith-efficient".

A set of candidates where every candidate in the set pairwise beats every candidate not in the set is known as a dominating set.

Properties
Properties 

 The Smith set always exists.  There is only one smallest dominating set since dominating sets are nested and non-empty and there is a limited number of candidates.
 The Smith set can have more than one candidate, either because of pairwise ties or because of cycles, such as in Condorcet's paradox.
 The Condorcet winner, if one exists, is the only member of the Smith set. If weak Condorcet winners exist then they are in the Smith set.
 The Smith set only contains candidates who are also in the mutual majority-preferred set of candidates, if one exists.

Algorithms 
The Smith set can be calculated with the Floyd–Warshall algorithm in time Θ.  It can also be calculated using a version of Kosaraju's algorithm or Tarjan's algorithm in time Θ.
It can also be found by ordering the candidates by their number of pairwise victories minus pairwise defeats (a Copeland method ranking), and then looking for the smallest group of candidates, starting from the top, who pairwise beat all candidates not already in the group.

Example using the Copeland ranking:

A pairwise loses to C, so it is certain that all candidates from A through C (A, B, and C) are in the Smith set. However, there is one matchup where a candidate who is known to be in the Smith set loses or ties someone who may or may not be in the Smith set: C loses to D; so D is confirmed to be in the Smith set. Another such matchup can now be seen: D ties with E. So E is added into the Smith set. Because all of A through E beat all candidates other than each other, the Smith set is A through E.

Related pages 

 Condorcet criterion
 Condorcet method
 Landau set
 Preorder
 Partial order

References
References 

   In an analysis of serial decision making based on majority rule, describes the Smith set and the Schwartz set.
   Introduces a version of a generalized Condorcet Criterion that is satisfied when pairwise elections are based on simple majority choice, and for any dominating set, any candidate in the set is collectively preferred to any candidate not in the set.  But Smith does not discuss the idea of a smallest dominating set.
   Narrows Smith's generalized Condorcet Criterion to the smallest dominating set and calls it Smith's Condorcet Principle.
   Discusses the Smith set (named GETCHA) and the Schwartz set (named GOTCHA) as possible standards for optimal collective choice.

Other websites 

 Example algorithms to calculate the Smith set 

Voting systems
Tomás Felipe Carlovich (20 April 1949 – 8 May 2020) was an Argentine professional football player and coach. He was born in Rosario, Argentina. As a coach, he managed Central Córdoba. As a player, he played for Rosario Central, Central Córdoba and Independiente Rivadavia.

On 6 May 2020, Carlovich was beaten with a shovel by a robber in Rosario while riding his bike. He died two days later in a coma at a hospital from his injuries, aged 71.

References

1949 births
2020 deaths
Deaths by beating
Deaths from cerebral hemorrhage
Murdered sportspeople
Argentine footballers
People from Rosario, Argentina
Cécile Rol-Tanguy (10 April 1919 – 8 May 2020) was a French communist. She was a Resistance fighter during World War II. She was active in the liberation of Paris. She was secretariat and a liaison officer, in charge of operations and confidential communications. She was born in Royan, Saintonge.

In 2008, Rol-Tanguy became the Grand Officer of the Legion d’Honneur.

Rol-Tanguy died at her home in Monteaux, Loir-et-Cher on 8 May 2020, aged 101.

References

French World War II resistance members
French centenarians
1919 births
2020 deaths
French communists
People from Loir-et-Cher
Pairwise comparison is any process of comparing things in pairs to judge which of two things is preferred, or has a greater amount of some something, or whether or not the two things are identical. The method of pairwise comparison is used in the scientific study of preferences, attitudes, voting systems, social choice, public choice, requirements engineering and multiagent AI systems.  In psychology literature, it is often referred to as paired comparison.

Overview 
If someone shows what they like more between two options, this preference can be expressed as a pairwise comparison.  If the two alternatives are x and y, these three pairwise comparisons are possible:

The person prefers x over y: "x > y" or "xPy"

The person prefers y over x: "y > x" or "yPx"

The person has no preference between both alternatives: "x = y" or "xIy"
Transitivity 
It is generally assumed that pairwise comparisons are transitive.  Most agree on what transitivity is, though there is debate about the transitivity of indifference. The rules of transitivity are as follows.

 If xPy and yPz, then xPz
 If xPy and yIz, then xPz
 If xIy and yPz, then xPz
 If xIy and yIz, then xIz

This is linked to (xPy or xIy) being a total preorder, P being the related strict weak order, and I being the related equivalence relation.
Argument for intransitivity of indifference 
Some believe that indifference (lack of preference) is not transitive.  Consider the following example.  Suppose you like apples and you prefer apples that are larger.  Now suppose there exists an apple A, an apple B, and an apple C that are the same except for the following. Suppose B is larger than A, but it is not possible to see this without an extremely sensitive measuring device.  Also suppose C is larger than B, but this also can't be seen without a sensitive measuring device.  However, the difference in sizes between apples A and C is large enough that you can see it. In psychophysical terms, the size difference between A and C is above the just noticeable difference ('jnd') while the size differences between A and B and B and C are below the jnd.
You are confronted with the three apples in pairs without a sensitive measuring device.  Because of this, when shown only A and B, you have no preference between apple A and apple B; and you are indifferent between apple B and apple C when shown only B and C.  However, when the pair A and C are shown, you prefer C over A.

Preference orders 
If pairwise comparisons are transitive by the four rules shown above, then pairwise comparisons for a list of alternatives (A1, A2, A3, ..., An−1, and An) can take the form:

 A1(>XOR=)A2(>XOR=)A3(>XOR=) ... (>XOR=)An−1(>XOR=)An

For example, if there are three alternatives a, b, and c, then the 13 possible preference orders are:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

If the number of alternatives is n, and indifference is not allowed, then the number of possible preference orders for any given n-value is n!.  If indifference is allowed, then the number of possible preference orders is the number of total preorders. It can be expressed as a function of n:
where S2(n, k) is the Stirling number of the second kind.

Related pages 

 Analytic Hierarchy Process
 Law of comparative judgment
 Potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives (PAPRIKA) method
 PROMETHEE pairwise comparison method
 Preference (economics)
 Stochastic Transitivity
 Condorcet method

References 

 
 
 Y. Chevaleyre, P.E. Dunne, U. Endriss, J. Lang, M. Lemaître, N. Maudet, J. Padget, S. Phelps, J.A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, and P. Sousa. Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. Informatica, 30:3–31, 2006.

Further reading
Further reading 

 Bradley, R.A. and Terry, M.E. (1952). Rank analysis of incomplete block designs, I. the method of paired comparisons. Biometrika, 39, 324–345.
 David, H.A. (1988). The Method of Paired Comparisons. New York: Oxford University Press.
 Luce, R.D. (1959). Individual Choice Behaviours: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: J. Wiley.
 Thurstone, L.L. (1927).  A law of comparative judgement. Psychological Review, 34, 278–286.
 Thurstone, L.L. (1929).  The Measurement of Psychological Value.  In T.V. Smith and W.K. Wright (Eds.), Essays in Philosophy by Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy of the 	University of Chicago.  Chicago: Open Court.
 Thurstone, L.L. (1959).  The Measurement of Values.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
 Zermelo, E. (1928). Die Berechnung der Turnier-Ergebnisse als ein Maximumproblem der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Mathematische Zeitschrift 29, 1929, S. 436–460

Psychology
Madeleine Riffaud (born 23 August 1924) is a French poet, journalist, war correspondent and a member of the French Resistance. She was born in Arvillers, France. Riffaud was awarded the National Order of Merit.

She began operating for the French Forces of the Interior at the age of 18 under the codename "Rainer". On July 23, 1944, at age 19, she became known for the killing of a German officer, whom she shot dead. Shortly afterwards, she was captured by the Gestapo and was nearly executed.

After the war ended in 1945, she became a journalist for Ce Soir, a French newspaper.

References

1924 births
Living people
French journalists
French poets
French World War II resistance members
War correspondents
Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe (née Wilborts; born 31 May 1923) is a French sociologist, activist and World War II resistance fighter. She was born in Paris. In 2008, she was honored with the Legion of Honour. 

During World War II, she was arrested by the Gestapo to La Santé Prison. She was nearly executed. 

In 1954, she began working for the National Centre for Scientific Research. In 1996, she became Chair of the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation.

References

Other websites
 Portrait  de Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe

1923 births
Living people
French World War II resistance members
French sociologists
Scientists from Paris
Writers from Paris
Irish Home Rule was a proposed system of government in Ireland, in which Ireland would have its own government inside the United Kingdom. Until 1920, Ireland was ruled directly by the British government. British members of parliament tried to pass bills for Home Rule in 1886, 1893, and 1912, but they never got enough votes to pass. Irish Nationalists supported Home Rule, and Irish Unionists opposed it.

The 1886 bill was supported by the Liberal Party, but did not get enough votes in the House of Commons. The 1893 bill got enough votes to pass in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords.  William Gladstone was an important supporter of both. The 1912 bill also passed in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords. In 1912, Unionists in Ulster signed a document called the Ulster Covenant, and made an army called the Ulster Volunteers, to fight against Home Rule.
Although many Nationalists wanted Home Rule, some thought it was not good enough. Most members of the party Sinn Féin wanted Ireland to be completely separate from Great Britain. Sinn Féin became the most powerful party in 1916 and made their own government in Dublin, the Dáil Éireann. Irish Nationalists fought in the Irish War of Independence against the British government from 1919-1921. In 1920, Britain passed a law that said there would be two parliaments, one for Northern Ireland, and one for Southern Ireland. This was a form of Home Rule. However, the Southern Ireland parliament never met. The war did not end until the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which created the Irish Free State. The Irish Free State still had the same king as Britain, but had a separate government.

Related pages

 History of Ireland

References 

History of Ireland
"Frinkcoin" is the 13th episode of the 31st season of The Simpsons. It was first shown on television in the United States on the Fox network on February 23, 2020. In the episode, Professor Frink makes a new cryptocurrency. The episode was watched by 1.84 million people when it was first shown on television.

Plot 

The Simpson family are eating at a vegan restaurant, wanting Lisa to pick them for a project at school. She chooses Professor Frink because he wants to help the world with science. At Springfield University, Lisa interviews Professor Frink. Frink says he is making a new cryptocurrency called Frinkcoin.