08 June 2023 
 
 
 
The Green Bond 
Your insight into sustainable finance

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
2
 
In this issue 
The Carbon removal issue 
Letter to the reader ................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 
A word from the editor .......................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Transition update: Waiting for the next surge .................................................................................................................................. 5 
The transition is still gaining pace, and China leads, but a surge in Western clean energy investment is underway. 
Meanwhile, several energy-using sectors are close to tipping points when it comes to electrification. Renewable energy 
investment now clearly exceeds fossil fuel investment, while the electrification of energy users is spreading. We still expect 
world fossil fuel consumption to peak in 2023. With both the supply of clean energy and the electrification taking off, the 
policy focus will turn to controlling supply chains and securing access to key materials. 
Sustainable Debt Market Update: Weakness extends into 2023 ................................................................................................ 9 
Sustainability-labelled debt issuance continues to drift lower. The first four months of 2023 saw sustainable debt issuance 
decline to USD 450bn, down from 543bn the same period last year. Similarly, flows into SRI/ESG-labelled funds for both 
bonds and equities have thus levelled off over the past 18 months. Both weaknesses are mostly due to a sudden drop in the 
US sustainable loan market and the country’s political conflict about ESG investing. Green bonds continue to increase 
globally and in Europe, where ESG is less politically embattled, fund flows continue to support the demand side. 
Development of the Nordic BECCS Market ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
The Nordic region is uniquely placed to be a major source of high-quality carbon removals for the burgeoning voluntary 
carbon market. Aker Carbon Capture is working with biogenic CO2 emitters across the region on large scale carbon 
removals projects. However, lack of clarity around interpretations of Paris Agreement Article 6 is leading to uncertainty on 
the buy and supply side. A unified understanding on the principles of carbon removal accounting towards national NDCs 
and corporate Net-Zero strategies is paramount.   
Carbon removal in aviation ................................................................................................................................................................. 15 
Airbus is fully committed to contributing to reaching the net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 target set by the aviation 
industry. To reach this target, carbon removal technologies, together with hydrogen, are promising complementary 
solutions to biomass-based sustainable aviation fuel. As carbon removal becomes increasingly commoditized, it is essential 
that a robust, liquid, and transparent market is established to ensure its effectiveness.   
EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: An overview of the EU’s “carbon border tax”.................................................. 18 
The EU’s new Carbon Boarder Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to reduce the competitive disadvantage faced by EU 
industries subject to stringent emissions regulations. From 2026, importers of cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, 
electricity, and hydrogen into the EU will have to pay the equivalent price of the EU ETS system. The new tariff is likely to 
increase the costs for carbon-intensive goods imported into the EU and carry the risk of trade disputes. EU industries in the 
scope of CBAM may benefit from the new measure but require additional incentives to adopt zero-emission solutions.  
The Green Bond Editorial Team ......................................................................................................................................................... 20 
Contacts at SEB ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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Letter to the reader 
 
Dear reader, 
 
Let me start by thanking Thomas Thygesen, Elizabeth 
Mathiesen and Tine Vist for their help in ensuring that The 
Green Bond publication has been mainstreamed and 
integrated into SEB’s frames through their persistent and 
solid leadership over the past 4 years!  
The financial market is an interesting place to be in. The 
parallel discussions on ESG, Sustainability and Sustainable 
Finance are creating massive headlines and confusion. We 
see headlines on litigation (two way), onboarding and 
offboarding of net zero commitments, as well as a 
significant decline in fossil-based capex.  
However, unless we find ways of dealing with pollution 
(whether in the air, the soil, or the water) and biological 
imbalances (i.e., biodiversity loss) – our accelerating 
appreciation of stability risk, un-manageable climate 
consequences, as well as discounted cost of ignorance 
(both living and financial) – will continue to drive finance to 
identify and price risk of products and industries which will 
be phased out. Hence, with increasing data accessibility 
discounting factors will also change.  
But there is a risk that when finance turns political (and 
vice versa), the headline risk increases alongside entering a 
non-familiar turf and create “translation” confusions.  
Reflecting on our client discussions, we see an increasing 
conviction to be in the front of the transition, to reduce risk 
but also be prepared for the repricing of cash-flows which 
happens in a transition. A large part of the transition talk 
has been on de-carbonization and consequently we have 
decided to dedicate a large part of this edition of “The 
Green Bond” to carbon removals. 
Alongside our regular market and transition updates, we 
will have contribution from Aker Carbon Capture, who 
represent a core part of the Nordic CCSU infrastructure, 
AIRBUS, who will share the aviation industry perspective of 
moving towards Paris through their strong transition 
initiatives and expected pathway – and lastly – a reflection 
by my colleagues Lina and Gregor on the New EU Carbon 
Border Tax. 
 
Enjoy your reading, 
Christopher Flensborg 
Head of Climate and Sustainable Finance 
christopher.flensborg@seb.se

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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A word from the editor 
Handing over the reins after 24 issues 
In 2019, I took over as lead editor of the Green Bond. Today, 24 issues 
later, I pass that responsibility on. It has been an amazing period where 
sustainable finance went from the fringe to the mainstream and net zero in 
2050 went from dream to possibility.   
 
In June 2019, I assumed the role as lead editor of The 
Green Bond together with colleagues from SEB’s 
investment banking and sustainable banking divisions. Our 
ambition was to prepare the publication for sustainable 
finance to move from pioneer market to mainstream 
segment, building on SEB’s reputation for thought 
leadership in this area.  
In the four years since then, we have updated and 
strengthened the GB publication. By June, we will have 
released 24 issues of The Green Bond together. During this 
time, we have created a new fundamental framework for 
analysing and understanding the clean energy transition, 
based on studies of long and deep historical technology 
cycles in the Transition Update section and strengthened 
the analysis of market trends in the Market Update section. 
At the same time, the world has changed, and the transition 
has gone from vision to reality. Four years ago, it was still to 
a large degree about changing mindsets, with a large share 
of the investor community remaining doubtful about the 
very existence of a climate crisis. There is no real debate 
about this issue anymore, and the policy stasis that had 
held the transition back in the 2010s has been replaced by 
very activist policies designed to accelerate it instead.  
The acceleration of the transition during those four years 
has been almost unbelievable. Global investment in 
renewable energy, electrification and other transition areas 
doubled from 2019 to 2022 and now stands at more than 
USD 1000bn per annum. During the same period, the 
sustainable finance market almost tripled, with more than 
USD 1500bn raised last year. For the first time since I 
started analysing the transition, it now looks like there is a 
realistic chance of completing the journey to net zero by 
2050.  
It will not be easy, but human ingenuity is a powerful force. 
If we can raise and allocate the capital that is required, then 
the technological revolutions driving the transition will 
allow us to both avert an irreversible climate disaster and 
lift the welfare of everyone on the planet at the same time. 
It is now time to take the next step in that journey. I hope 
you will agree that The Green Bond has been rejuvenated 
and continues to be the standard-bearer for SEB’s ambition 
to play a role in in shaping and driving the transition. From a 
research perspective, the exponential increase in 
transition-related investment means now is the time to 
focus on the role of capital markets in maintaining the 
accelerated pace – at the same time as getting a deeper 
understanding of where and how investors are likely to be 
rewarded with higher returns for participating, also in the 
stock market.  
After 24 issues, I therefore hand over the baton to Lead 
Scientist Gregor Vulturius from SEB’s Sustainable Finance 
Team, who will continue to combine expertise from the 
colleagues working with sustainability at SEB with insights 
from top external contributors.  
My colleagues in the SEB Equity Strategy & Sustainable 
Investment team and I will continue to work with Gregor 
and the rest of the Green Bond editors and contribute to the 
transition and market update sections of the publication, so 
we are still going to be very much involved. However, I 
wanted to take this opportunity to thank you for taking an 
interest in our joint work so far and invite you to continue 
expecting something exciting when a new issue of The 
Green Bond lands in your inbox. It has been a privilege to 
share the journey with you all.  
 
 
Thomas Thygesen 
Head of Research, Climate and Sustainable Finance 
thomas.thygesen@seb.dk

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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Transition update 
Waiting for the next surge 
The transition is still gaining pace. China leads, but a surge in Western clean 
energy investment is underway and several energy-using sectors are close 
to tipping points. We still expect fossil fuel consumption to peak in 2023. 
The policy focus will turn to supply chains and access to key materials. 
 
Western clean energy capex to play catch-up 
Over the past few years, the conditions for an accelerated 
transition to a zero-emission energy system have finally 
fallen into place. Global renewable energy investment 
doubled from 2019 to 2022 driven by China, where major 
policy initiatives were launched already in 2021.  
The Q1 BNEF data for global renewable investment show 
the China’s investment levelled off after two years of 
strong growth, but also revealed early evidence of a surge 
in investments in the wake of major policy initiatives that 
are starting to take effect in other parts of the world. 
The positive momentum behind clean energy investment is 
not evenly distributed globally. China still has a firm grip on 
the lead, with quarterly investment in renewable energy 
maintaining the level of USD 80-90bn reached in 2021. 
This could still rise further as the government continues to 
intraduce reforms to accelerate the transition. As an 
example of China’s level of ambition, BNEF reported that 
China’s Guangdong province recently tendered bids to 
construct 23 gigawatts of offshore wind power.   
That is more wind power than the world has ever built in a 
year – and that’s just coming from one region in China.  
Outside China, the policy initiatives launched by the US and 
Europe over the past year have yet to affect investment in 
a major way. This is normal given the lead time for major 
energy investment projects. However, there are now early 
signs that investment is picking up outside China as well.  
Q1 thus saw a 50% jump in renewable energy investment 
in the EMEA region compared with the level in Q4, taking it 
to the highest level in three years. According to the IEA, 
European countries have introduced more policy and 
regulatory changes to ease permitting for new projects in 
the last 18 months than over the entire previous decade, 
but this is only expected to have limited impact in 2023.  
For now, the increase in investment in Europe thus appears 
to be driven by installations of small-scale residential and 
commercial solar PV. Within the next couple of years, we 
expect to see utility-scale investment follow.
 
Figure 1 Investment in clean energy investment
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance  
 
Thomas Thygesen 
thomas.thygesen@seb.dk 
Elizabeth Mathiesen 
elizabeth.mathiesen@seb.dk

6
 
The US has yet to show any signs of a pick-up, but 
according to American Clean Power (ACP), during the first 
eight months after the IRA was passed, over USD 150bn in 
domestic utility-scale clean energy investments have been 
announced. This is equivalent to five years’ worth of clean 
energy investments, surpassing total investment into US 
clean power projects commissioned between 2017-21. 
Europe’s surge in Q1 led to a new record for quarterly 
global investment at an annualized level of around USD 
540bn. With policy support for the Western economies to 
play catch-up remaining strong, we still expect clean 
energy investment to double by 2025 and again by 2030. 
Renewable energy supply ramping up 
The recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic and the global 
energy crisis led to a significant increase in all kinds of 
energy investment. According to estimates from the IEA 
(which uses a broader definition of clean energy than the 
BNEF figures we normally use for reference), annual clean 
energy investment has grown much faster from 2021-
2023 (24%) than investment in fossil fuels (15%), but 
both have increased. 
Figure 2 Clean energy and fossil fuels capex 
Source: International Energy Agency 
This can mainly be attributed to the volatility in fossil fuel 
markets caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which both 
accelerated the adoption of various clean energy 
technologies but also caused a short-term scramble for oil 
and gas supply. However, the underlying trends are still 
strongly in favour of renewable energy and show no 
evidence of a lasting interest in fossil fuels. 
The global oil and gas industry had profits of more than 
USD 4tn in 2022, but the oil and gas resources approved 
for development in 2023 still falls well below the average 
level of the past decade. The cashflow was instead used 
for dividends, share buybacks and debt repayments. 
According to the IEA, approximately USD 2.8tn will be 
invested in the global energy sector in 2023, with more 
than USD 1.7tn going to clean energy, which in the IEA 
definition includes renewable power, nuclear energy, grids, 
storage, low-emission fuels, efficiency improvements, and 
end-use renewables and electrification. Only USD 1tn will 
be invested in fossil fuel supply and power. 
Solar energy investment alone is estimated to exceed fossil 
energy investment, a strong indication that 2023 still looks 
likely to mark the peak for fossil energy consumption. This 
would be an important achievement, even if it is only the 
first step towards decarbonization. 
Developed economies and China have accounted for over 
90% of the increase in clean energy investment since 
2021. Barriers including higher interest rates, unclear 
policy frameworks, financial constraints, and high capital 
costs are holding back investment. The slow introduction of 
clean energy in the poorest countries of the world remains 
a challenge. SSAs are likely to play a key role in facilitating 
the raising of capital for these investments, given the 
limited local supply of saving. 
Transition for energy users: EV boom continues 
While the supply of renewable energy is picking up, there 
has also been an increase in consumer spending on electric 
cars, heat pumps and other appliances. China is the first 
major economy to reach a 20% market share for BEVs, but 
the Eurozone is not far behind. When it comes to adoption, 
the US remains a distant third despite Tesla’s success on 
the production side, while a look at the Nordics show the 
likely development for all the major regions. Norway leads 
the way globally with a BEV market share of more than 
80%, aided by strong policy incentives for early adopters. 
Figure 3 Market share for battery EVs 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance  
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Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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Without such measures, it will take a bit longer in other 
countries, but the exponential trajectory is likely to persist, 
leading to a complete transition for cars in the early 2030s. 
The auto sector remains the only major energy-using sector 
to have passed the tipping point and entered the 
exponential part of the S-curve. However, other sectors are 
not far behind, starting with light commercial vehicles. In 
Europe, the BEV share of commercial vehicle sales has 
tripled since 2020 to around 7%; in China, it is almost 10%. 
Heavy vehicles are not quite there yet, though, with a 
market share for BEVs going sideways around 3-4%. 
Figure 4 EV share of commercial vehicle sales 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance  
Shipping is also slowly moving towards the tipping points 
where things suddenly move fast. Danish shipping 
company Mærsk has just announced that the world’s first 
container ship to sail on green methanol will be delivered in 
September, with EU Commission President Ursula von der 
Leyen as godmother (perhaps acknowledging financial 
support from the EU). Zero-emission shipping remains in 
the experimental incubation phase, but there is little doubt 
that the experiences from first attempts like this will shape 
the shipping industry’s future over the next 10-20 years. 
Transition supply chain: new contested area 
With both the supply of clean energy and the electrification 
of energy users taking off, the manufacturing supply chains 
gain in significance. The concentration of manufacturing 
capacity for solar PV, wind, batteries, electrolysis, and heat 
pumps is primarily found in China. This concentration 
extends beyond manufacturing and permeates various 
steps along the supply chain. China's prominent role in 
technology manufacturing is a result of its long-term 
industrial strategy, which involved significant investment in 
clean energy supply chains.  
Figure 5 Clean tech manufacturing concentration 
Source: International Energy Agency  
As a result, China has not only reduced the costs of clean 
energy technologies within its own borders but has also 
become the leading exporter of several clean energy 
technologies worldwide. The competition is not standing 
still, though. Tesla is breaking new grounds in the 
manufacturing of EVs. Our colleagues from SEB’s Equity 
Research’s capital goods team recently visited Tesla’s 
Model Y factory in Berlin, which is the stepping-stone for 
Tesla’s next gen vehicles (yet to be presented). And for the 
next gen cars the theme is “a step-change in cost”. 
Figure 6 Battery manufacturing capacity 
 
Source: International Energy Agency 
Tesla is pitching a massive cost reduction in the making 
targeting an overall cost reduction of 50% which would put 
it in the USD 25K range. The plan is a 40% reduction in 
manufacturing footprint and in specific areas, e.g., the 
drivetrain, the ambition is a 75% reduction in factory size 
and 65% reduction in factory cost.  
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To achieve that its breaking engineering ground moving to 
a combo of parallel and serial assembly as opposed to the 
+100-year-old recipe of serial assembly line production. 
However, even if Tesla does excel at manufacturing EVs, 
China will still control the EV supply chain. IEA data shows 
that China is the main player at every stage of global 
battery manufacturing, except for the mining of critical 
minerals. In 2022, over 75% of the battery manufacturing 
capacity in the world was in China. Even with increased 
capex in the west, it’s still likely to be 65% in 2030. 
Both the US and the EU have launched major policy 
initiatives to reduce their dependency on Chinese suppliers. 
The IRA has catapulted the US to the fore of the race to 
localize clean tech, notably by extending generous 
subsidies to energy technology producers. The ACP also 
noted that 46 new utility-scale clean energy manufacturing 
facilities were announced since the act was passed. 
This puts the EU under pressure. Europe would need to 
invest an estimated USD 149bn in manufacturing plants to 
meet 100% of its clean energy demand locally by 2030, 
according to BNEF. The Green New Deal for industrials 
does open for subsidies, but they are delegated to the 
individual member states and lack scale today. 
Commodities remain a key bottleneck 
Expanding the supply of materials for the transition 
remains a major challenge. The capital cost and the cost of 
clean energy technologies have increased in recent years 
due to higher prices for critical materials, semiconductors 
and bulk materials like steel and cement. This could 
become a big problem for an accelerated transition, 
particularly as the investment in new mining capacity has 
only recently started to pick up. 
Figure 7 Investment in mining  
 
Source: International Energy Agency  
According to the IEA, investment in critical mineral mining 
rose by 30% in 2022. Exploration spending also grew, 
notably for lithium, copper, and nickel. However, with a 
time-lag of 10 years from exploration to production and at 
least five years from the start of investment in a new mine 
until it is operational, current investment levels are unlikely 
to deliver the needed supply expansion in time. 
According to BNEF estimates there was already a 4-million-
ton deficit in primary copper supply, which excludes 
recycling, in 2022. This gap is set to grow eightfold to 32 
million tons by 2050 unless current reserves can be 
supplemented with new geological discoveries and 
projects. This will not be easy. As an illustration, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo produces 70% of the 
world's cobalt, and just three countries account for over 
90% of global lithium production. 
Figure 8 Copper demand and supply capacity 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance  
Recycling can ease some of the burden but has limits 
(defined by historical metal production), so an expansion of 
primary supply will most likely be needed. Companies 
engaged in the transition may provide an unexpected 
source of capital here. BNEF recently reported that General 
Motors will invest USD 650mn in Lithium Americas and help 
develop the Thacker Pass mine in Nevada. In Germany, 
Volkswagen also plans to invest in mines ‘to bring down the 
cost of battery cells, meet half of its own demand and sell 
to third-party customers’. 
This kind of vertical integration was also part of the first 
great automobile revolution. Ford’s first auto factory 
complexes had their own steel works, harbor, electricity 
production and rubber plantations as this was the only way 
to ensure that the necessary production inputs were 
available when needed. If companies secure their own 
supply, it can help avoid serious shortages. 
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Sustainable Debt Market Update 
Weakness extends into 2023 
Sustainability-labelled debt issuance continues to drift lower. The main 
reason is that issuance of bank loans is down, especially in Asia and North 
America. Labelled bond issuance, on the other hand, is still rising. In Europe, 
where ESG is less politically embattled than in the US, fund flows continue 
to support the demand side.  
 
Sustainable finance: still sinking 
The first months of 2023 have seen a further decline in 
global sustainable debt transactions, extending the decline 
in the last months of 2022. The first four months of 2023 
saw sustainable debt issuance decline to USD 450bn, down 
from 543bn the same period last year. The general 
impression is thus still the same as through the last months 
of 2022: Sustainable debt is still rising almost twice as fast 
as in any year before 2021, but issuance is at the same 
time drifting further away from that 2021 peak at the 
same time as transition capex finally is picking up. 
Figure 9 Cumulative sustainable debt transactions 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 30 April 2023 
Green bonds still holding the line 
Taking a closer look at the distribution of issuance across 
the main product types within sustainable finance, the 
distribution is also the same as we saw in 2022.  
Green bonds are the only segment with substantial issuance 
growth, while sustainability bonds, typically focused on EM 
investment, just managed to eke out a marginal gain. These 
are both segments with a high degree of transparency and a 
direct link from lending money to seeing action/physical 
capital on the ground.  
Social and sustainability-linked bonds have both seen 
issuance decline modestly, but in general sustainability-
labelled bonds have held up relatively well and even posted 
a small gain in the first four months of 2023.  
 
 
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Gregor Vulturius, PhD 
gregor.vulturius@seb.se 
Thomas Thygesen 
thomas.thygesen@seb.dk 
Filip Carlsson 
filip.carlsson@seb.se

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
10
 
Instead, it’s the sustainability-labelled bank loans that have 
seen the biggest decline. Green loan issuance has dropped 
by around USD 20bn, but it’s sustainability-linked loans that 
are the main culprit with issuance down more than USD 
100bn compared with the first four months of 2022.  
Figure 10 Y/Y sustainable debt by product type, Jan-Apr  
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 30 April 2023 
The regional distribution also shows a clear segmentation. 
SSAs are still issuing more sustainable debt than a year ago, 
and the Middle East has also been raising a higher amount. 
The Nordics and Oceania have seen modest declines, 
Europe a bit more than that, but the big moves have come 
from Asia and North America. These two regions alone 
explain most of the aggregate decline.  
Figure 11 Y/Y sustainable debt market by region, Jan-Apr 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 30 April 2023 
There are thus two key explanations for the decline in 
sustainable debt issuance. First, it is exclusively due to a 
decline in the creation of sustainable bank loans, while 
sustainability-labelled bond issuance has increased from 
397.7bn to 411.3 bn. Second, it is exclusively due to falling 
activity in Asia and especially North America, while the rest 
of the world has seen close to unchanged issuance.  
Figure 12 Sustainable bond issuances Jan-May 
 
Source: Bloomberg 5 June 2023 
Within the overall growing segment of sustainability-
labelled bonds, the weakness is especially marked in the 
real estate sector and for high-yield bonds, both segments 
where activity generally has come down sharply over the 
past quarters. From a regional perspective it is again the US 
that stands out with a modest decline.  
Demand has also levelled off 
Is this weakness mostly about supply or demand for 
sustainability-labelled debt? We can get a clue from looking 
at fund flows, and there does seem to be an element of 
softer demand at play. Developed market flows into 
SRI/ESG-labelled funds for both bonds and equities have 
thus levelled off over the past 18 months after posting 
exponential growth in the preceding years.  
This has coincided with a slowdown in general fund inflows, 
so it is not necessarily a sign that investors are moving away 
from the segment. However, over the past couple of 
quarters, it also looks like the share of total fund flows going 
into SRI/ESG- labelled funds has started to decline.  
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Figure 13  ESG fund flows bond and Equity 
Source: EPFR  
The most likely explanation for this weakness is the political 
conflict surrounding ESG as an investment concept over 
there. 15 US states have now introduced laws trying to 
make ESG as an investment strategy illegal. This is forcing 
asset managers and institutional investors to weigh up the 
benefits of ESG risk assessment against the threat of 
lawsuits and loss of investment mandates.  
Figure 14 ESG bond fund flows EU vs US  
Source: EPFR 
This is not the situation in Europe, and the divergence does 
appear to be reflect in fund flows. Both for SRI/ESG-labelled 
equity and bond funds, a gap has opened with European 
fund inflows continuing while they have levelled off in the 
US.  
For bond funds, Europe has seen inflows of around USD 
20bn over the past year, while they have been close to zero 
in the US. For equities, US has been flat for six months, while 
Europe has seen inflows of 6-7bn. In both cases, though, the 
numbers are much smaller than the inflows we became 
accustomed to in the preceding years.  
Figure 15 ESG Equity fund flows EU vs US  
Source: EPFR  
The US debate about ESG appears to be unnecessarily tied 
into a broader conflict about cultural values. Some political 
segments have filed ESG under the broader heading of 
‘woke’ and thus see this as part of a broader political 
conflict. There is nothing woke about ESG, though, it is a 
well-established market practice designed to identify risks 
for companies and check if they have been reflected in 
asset prices.  
At the same time, ESG was never intended to be an 
investment strategy controlling the composition of a 
portfolio. To the extent that pension funds without further 
justification (like a claim that high ESG rating leads to higher 
return) make portfolio composition subordinated to ESG 
concerns, they could face a problem with their fiduciary 
duties towards pension-savers.   
We suspect that we are missing some more ‘neutral’ 
instruments focused on e.g., transition investment to take 
sustainable finance to the next level and disarm the 
combatants in the US ESG debate at the same time.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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Development of the Nordic BECCS Market 
Joel Flitton 
Director Carbon Removals 
Joel.Flitton@akercarboncapture.com 
 
The Nordic region is uniquely placed to be a major source of 
high-quality carbon removals for the burgeoning voluntary 
carbon market, which by some estimates will be worth USD 
50bn globally by 2030 and approaching USD 1tn, by 2050. 
Aker Carbon Capture’s post combustion CO2 capture 
technology can be applied to capture CO2 emissions from 
the combustion of sustainably-sourced biomass feedstocks 
in a process known as BECCS (bio-energy with carbon 
capture and storage). Nordic BECCS projects offers 
favourable attributes for producing high quality carbon 
removals. 
Today Aker Carbon Capture is working with biogenic CO2 
emitters across the region to mature large scale carbon 
removals projects. Ørsted ordered in May of this year five 
modular and standardized Just Catch units from Aker 
Carbon Capture for their large-scale BECCS project in 
Denmark. In this landmark project, Microsoft will purchase 
2.76mn tonnes of high-quality, durable carbon removal 
over a period of 11 years. This represents one of the 
world’s largest carbon removal offtake agreements by 
volume to date. 
Many of the key elements for generating high quality 
carbon removals are already in place, but there remain 
challenges that need to be overcome before the Nordic 
carbon removals industry can be scaled in line with 
projected demand. 
The IPCC stated that, to have any chance of staying within 
1.5 -2.0 degrees of global warming, there is a need for 
greenhouse gas removals (GGR) of between 5-16 Gigatons 
of CO2 pa by 2050. The urgency is clear, but progress in 
deploying GGR technologies at the required industrial scale 
– specifically carbon dioxide removals – is still at an early 
stage. 
In the Nordic region, around 75mn tonnes of biogenic CO2 
emissions are generated each year from the Pulp and 
Paper, Power and Heat, and Waste to Energy (WtE) 
industries, Figure 16. The supply of biomass feedstocks 
used by these industries is mostly residues from the 
Scandinavian forestry industry and in the case of WtE, from 
municipal waste. 
Moreover, the development of large-scale sites for 
geological CO2 storage development is moving forward in 
Northwestern Europe, with a focus on regions with existing 
infrastructure, coupled with subsurface expertise from the 
oil and gas industry. There is the potential to generate 
significant volumes of carbon removals by applying post 
combustion carbon capture to existing industrial point 
sources of biogenic CO2 emissions, then transporting and 
permanently sequestering the captured CO2 in geological 
storage. 
For organizations operating in industries with large point 
source biogenic CO2 emissions, the nascent Voluntary 
Carbon Market (VCM) now presents an opportunity to 
realize significant value from a by-product of core business 
operations. 
Critical elements required to establish a scalable BECCS 
industry in the Nordics, may be divided into three 
categories: Policy/Regulation, Technology and Full CCS 
Value Chain development.  All three elements have 
numerous linkages and dependencies that need to be 
matured in alignment with one another.   
Shaping Policy and Regulation to support market growth 
Supportive policy is critical to provide clarity and credibility 
in carbon markets. This involves the need for a well-
designed, enabling, and transparent regulatory system 
which incorporates the triad of monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV).

13 
 
Figure 16 Biogenic emissions in the Nordic region 
 
Source: Endrava, CaptureMap  
Policy and funding remain crucial to further accelerate the 
development of the carbon removals market. From a 
BECCS perspective, state financial support for early 
projects is essential for the development of the 
infrastructure required to accelerate implementation and 
allow the industry to scale.  
Nordic countries are taking steps to incentivize the 
implementation of BECCS projects to produce negative 
emissions. As an example, Denmark targets 500,000 
tonnes of CO2 removals per year from 2025 through its 
CCUS strategy. This target is linked to a funding tender of 
DKK 2.5bn for negative emissions from technological 
processes, with an operational support period of eight 
years. 
In addition, the Swedish government has recognized the 
large potential for BECCS as a key mitigation measure and 
has committed SEK 36bn to support BECCS projects 
through a reverse auction system.  
However, lack of clarity around interpretations of Paris 
Agreement Article 6 is leading to uncertainty on both the 
supply and demand side of the VCM. A unified 
understanding on the principles of carbon removal 
accounting towards national NDCs and corporate Net-Zero 
strategies is paramount, especially when transferring 
across international borders.  
Maturing technology to capture CO2 at scale 
For BECCS in the Nordics, post combustion carbon capture 
is the most viable option for capturing CO2 from industrial 
point source emissions. Classed as a tailpipe technology, 
this can be retrofitted to existing processes with minimal 
impact on upstream operations. 
Amine-based post combustion CO2 capture has the highest 
technology readiness level (TRL) of any comparable 
technology and is today already being deployed at an 
industrial scale.  Aker Carbon Capture is currently 
delivering a modularized Just Catch plant to Twence’s 
waste-to-energy facility in The Netherlands with a capture 
capacity of 100,000 tonnes CO2 per year. At Brevik in 
Norway, Aker Carbon Capture is delivering a Big Catch 
capture plant to Heidelberg cement Norge with a capture 
capacity of 400,000 tonnes per year. These are both based 
on Aker Carbon Capture’s proprietary amine-based capture 
technology.   
Integrated solutions to strengthen the business case 
The energy penalty associated with CO2 capture and 
liquefaction has a significant impact on the levelized cost 
per tonne for carbon removal and hence for the overall 
business case for implementing a BECCS project. 
Industries with potential for BECCS in the Nordics, such as 
Biomass combined heat and power (CHP) generation, Pulp 
and Paper and Waste to Energy, are all typically connected 
to regional district heating networks, have highly efficient 
existing processes, but have minimal waste heat or steam 
that can be used within a carbon capture process. Through 
advanced heat integration, Aker Carbon Capture’s 
technology has demonstrated a reduction in the energy 
penalty for carbon capture by a factor of five versus 
typically quoted figures for standard monoethanolamine 
(MEA) based capture processes.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
14
 
Connecting the CCS Value Chain 
The first large-scale CO2 storage infrastructure is now 
under development in the North Sea. The governments in 
Norway, UK, Denmark and the Netherlands have all 
incentivized the development of CO2 storage, with annual 
injection capacity typically ranging from 3-5mn tonnes per 
year for the initial projects. This first wave of projects, 
consisting of the Norwegian Northern Lights, the British 
Northern Endurance Partnership and Hynet, the Danish 
Greensands and the Dutch Porthos are all planned to start 
operation in the period 2024-2027.
 
Figure 17 Carbon capture phase in the value chain 
 
Source: Aker Carbon Capture
Connecting emitters’ facilities to CO2 storage sites requires 
the development of a CO2 transport network. Export and 
storage projects typically require anchor volumes of 1-2mn 
tonnes of CO2 per annum to be commercially viable. Except 
for the pulp and paper industry, typical bio-emissions from 
industrial point sources in the Nordics are in the range of 
0.1 - 0.4mn tonnes per annum. Individual BECCS projects 
standalone volumes could therefore struggle to support the 
case for transport and storage infrastructure development 
alone. 
CO2 export hubs will be required so that CO2 volumes can 
be aggregated prior to transport to final storage locations. 
Across Sweden there are a number of ongoing 
collaborative initiatives between emitters and port 
operators to develop regional CO2 export hubs, including 
the CINFRACAP project in Gothenburg, CCNET project in 
Malmö and the NICE project in Stockholm. 
Aligning timelines across the CCS Value chain 
The business case for developing export hubs and CO2 
storage sites is dependent on committed volumes of CO2 
being available for injection once the storage projects come 
online. Emitters are reluctant to take large investment 
decisions to implement carbon capture without clear line of 
sight to available export and storage options. This “chicken 
and egg” paradox in the CCS value chain underlines the 
need to align project development timelines across the full 
value chain.  
Utilization demand for Bio- CO2 in synthetic fuel production 
will provide near term offtake options for bio-emitters. 
Large scale BECCS at Pulp and Paper mills with harbour 
access, could support standalone point-to-point transport 
solutions and present attractive opportunities for first 
mover BECCS project developers.  
Concluding remarks 
Establishing a viable BECCS project today is complex and to 
facilitate further projects, clarity around aspects of 
relevant policy is needed. Continued investment in CO2 
transport and storage infrastructure will be essential to 
unlocking the huge potential for BECCS in the Nordics. 
Nevertheless, through close cooperation between actors 
across the value chain, carbon removals from BECCS is 
becoming a reality for those who see the opportunity.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
15
 
Carbon removal in aviation 
Bruno James 
Head of New Energy Business Development 
bruno.james@airbus.com 
Valentin Vincent 
New Energy Strategist  
valentin.vincent@airbus.com 
 
Commercial Aviation Decarbonization Roadmap 
Commercial aviation, responsible for 2.5% of human 
generated GHG (GreenHouse Gases) emissions, has 
embarked on an ambitious journey towards 
decarbonisation. In October 2022, the ICAO (International 
Civil Aviation Organization) adopted a long-term 
aspirational goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 
2050. 
To reach this goal, the industry is exploring multiple 
solutions, including technological innovation in aircraft 
design and the use of new energies such as hydrogen and 
Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF). Efficiency improvements 
in airport operations and air traffic management are also 
being pursued. 
Airbus is fully committed to contributing to reaching the 
net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 target set by the aviation 
industry under ATAG (Air Transport Action Group), IATA 
(International Air Transport Association) and ICAO 
commitments. The company’ roadmap includes the ability 
to use 100% SAF on all aircraft from 2030 onwards. SAF is 
seen as a key first step in the decarbonisation of 
commercial aviation, with biomass-based SAF and 
synthetic SAF both playing complementary roles. 
In addition to its focus on SAF, Airbus has launched a 
project to develop a fully native hydrogen-powered aircraft 
for operations from 2035 onwards. Hydrogen has the 
potential of emitting no CO2 during flight with a low carbon 
footprint if produced from renewable or low-carbon 
electricity. 
Airbus’ most recent aircraft incorporate technologies that 
reduce emissions by up to 25% compared to our previous 
generations across the entire Airbus Family. The company 
also offers a series of recommendations for operation 
optimization and also delivers services through its Navblue 
subsidiary, which can save a few percent of emissions in 
operation. 
Figure 18 Airbus ZEROe hydrogen-powered aircraft  
 
Source: Airbus  
Despite these efforts, some hard-to-abate volumes of GHG 
emissions will remain. For example, even the most 
advanced SAF pathways will achieve 80% CO2 abatement. 
This means that even if 100% SAF is used, 20% of the CO2 
emissions will still need to be abated with Carbon Capture. 
Indeed, in the aviation industry, it is not feasible to capture 
residual emissions at the source with a carbon capture 
system at the exit of an aircraft’s engines during flight. 
The Role of Carbon Capture 
In such a context, Carbon Capture plays two important 
roles for commercial aviation. 
The first one is for offsetting the hard-to-abate residual CO2 
emissions. This is why Direct Air Carbon Capture (DACC) is 
critical to the decarbonization of commercial aviation. It is 
one of the main solutions to remove the remaining hard-to-
abate volumes of CO2 directly from the air.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
16
 
The second role of Carbon Capture is related to the 
production of synthetic SAF. Indeed, Sustainable Aviation 
Fuel is key for the decarbonization of commercial aviation 
but is primarily relying on biomass-based SAF to date. To 
accelerate the increase of the use of SAF the development 
of synthetic SAF is also required. This is why research and 
development into the production of synthetic SAF is very 
active worldwide. Although the technology and efficiency 
of this pathway still need to be improved, synthetic SAF 
offers the significant benefit of relying on widely available 
components: hydrogen molecule (that can be obtained 
from water electrolysis) and carbon molecule, which could 
come ideally from carbon capture technologies. 
Carbon removal technologies, together with hydrogen, are 
therefore emerging as promising complementary solutions 
to biomass-based SAF for aviation. One such technology, 
with the highest potential for aviation, is Direct Air Carbon 
Capture and Storage (DACCS), which removes human-
induced CO2 directly from the air. 
Airbus has partnered with1PointFive, Carbon Engineering’s 
licensed US partner, to bring Carbon Dioxide Removals 
(CDR) to the aviation industry. A direct air capture facility 
acts like a large-scale, highly efficient tree: it sucks air out 
of the atmosphere and extracts the CO2 present there.
Figure 19 Direct Air Capture & Storage 
 
Source: Airbus  
Beating the challenges 
To make a significant impact on global CO2 levels, carbon 
capture technologies must be scaled up to an industrial 
level as quickly as possible. Currently, they are still in their 
infancy. While there have been some promising 
developments and pilot projects, much more needs to be 
done to bring these technologies to scale. This will require 
significant investments in R&D and the establishment of 
supportive policies and regulations to incentivize their 
developments. 
A range of natural and technological approaches to remove 
carbon emissions from the atmosphere is available today, 
including: 
• Reforestation and improved forest management 
• Improved crop management 
• Crops or forests to produce energy, with the carbon 
emissions from the energy production being captured 
and sequestered in geological formations (bioenergy 
carbon capture and storage - BECCS), and  
• Direct air capture of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere with the captured carbon being utilized or 
sequestered. 
Each of these approaches has limitations, from land 
constraints with related displacement of natural habitats. 
They might also face difficulties in relation to permanency 
for nature-based solutions or to permitting and access to 
low-cost renewable energy for techno-based solutions. 
Techno-based solutions such as Direct Air Capture are still 
far from being cost-competitive compared to the other

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
17
 
solutions due to high energy intensity requirements. As 
past low-carbon technology transitions suggest, this calls 
for policy and political strategies beyond carbon pricing. 
Standardization will also be required to facilitate Carbon 
Dioxide Removals (CDR) recognition and to ensure 
common criteria (e.g., permanency, additionality, 
monitoring, reporting and verification accuracy) will be met 
for CDR to be considered of high environmental integrity 
and supporting sustainable development. 
Way forward 
In conclusion, it is clear that carbon capture and removal is 
a crucial component in the efforts to combat climate 
change. The strategy must always prioritize avoiding and 
reducing emissions before turning to carbon offsetting or 
carbon removals. As carbon dioxide removal becomes 
increasingly commoditized, it is essential that a robust, 
liquid, and transparent market is established to ensure its 
effectiveness. This will require collaboration between 
governments, businesses, and individuals to create a 
system that incentivizes sustainable practices. The way 
forward is clear: we must develop and prioritize carbon 
capture and removal in our efforts to create a safe and 
sustainable future for all.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
18
 
EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: An overview of the 
EU’s “carbon border tax” 
 
Lina Apsheva 
Analyst Climate & Sustainable Finance 
lina.apsheva@seb.se 
Gregor Vulturius, PhD 
Lead scientist and advisor Climate & Sustainable Finance  
gregor.vulturius@seb.se 
 
Over three years ago, the EU announced its ambitious plan 
to become the first carbon neutral continent by 2050. The 
European Commission presented a plan titled “The 
European Green Deal”, which outlined a roadmap for 
reaching this goal.  
As the EU set out to significantly reduce its carbon 
emissions and “greenify” the economy, concerns were 
raised about the potential relocation of carbon-intensive 
industries to regions with less stringent climate policies. 
Such relocation, known as carbon leakage, could 
significantly undermine the EU's environmental efforts and 
lead to the shifting of emissions rather than their actual 
reduction.  
What is the CBAM 
The primary objective of the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM) is to prevent carbon leakage by 
ensuring that the price of imports reflects their carbon 
content, thereby reducing the competitive disadvantage 
faced by EU industries subject to stringent emissions 
regulations. The policy aims to incentivize both domestic 
and international industries to decarbonize, encouraging 
the adoption of cleaner production methods and 
technologies.  
Initially, CBAM will apply to the import of only certain 
carbon-intensive goods, or processed products from those 
goods, that are at most significant risk of carbon leakage. 
The sectors covered by the mechanism include cement, 
iron and steel, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity, and 
hydrogen. In 2022, the value of EU imports of products 
covered by the CBAM exceeded US 130bn. Exports to the 
EU in CBAM sectors are concentrated among just a few big 
trading partners with the UK, China, Türkiye, Russia and 
India making up more than half of total EU imports.  
Figure 20 EU imports from non-EU countries of origin, 
sectors covered by CBAM in 2022 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, ICT  
How will it work 
The CBAM will enter into force in its transitional phase on 1 
October 2023. During this phase, importers to the EU will 
have to start counting and disclosing CO2 emissions. Once 
the permanent CBAM system will then enter into force in 
the beginning of 2026, importers will be required to 
purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to the 
embedded carbon in their products. The price of these 
certificates will be based on the average price of emission 
allowances in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).  
Once fully phased in, CBAM will capture more than 50% of 
the emissions in ETS covered sectors. By 2030, the product 
scope of the mechanism will be reviewed to assess the 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Steel and iron
Aluminum
Fertilizer
Cement
Electricity
Hydrogen
China
Russia
India
Turkey
US
UK
Algeria
Ukraine
Rest of world

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
19
 
feasibility of including other goods covered by the EU ETS1.  
To comply with WTO rules and level the carbon costs for 
importers and domestic corporates, the phasing-out of free 
allocation under the EU ETS will take place in parallel with 
the phasing-in of CBAM in the period 2026-2034.  
It is important to note that the CBAM for the most part 
limited to goods. This means that manufactured products 
that contain some of the goods covered by the mechanism, 
such as, for example, electric appliances and cars, will not 
be covered by the EU’s “carbon border tax”2.  
Potential benefits 
The introduction of the CBAM has significant implications 
for various stakeholders. EU industries will be relieved of 
the competitive disadvantage caused by different carbon 
pricing regimes, creating a more level playing field. It is 
expected to stimulate the adoption of cleaner technologies 
and practices within the EU.  
Moreover, the CBAM could potentially encourage non-EU 
countries to enhance their own climate policies to avoid 
paying additional costs associated with carbon-intensive 
exports. For instance, Türkiye’s Medium Term Program 
(2023–2025) explicitly connects its plans for introducing 
a national ETS in Türkiye to the CBAM3. It may also provide 
an incentive of companies without carbon pricing like India 
in establish emission trading or carbon tax schemes. 
Figure 21 Global emissions trading schemes, average 
price Jun 2022 – Mar 2023 
Jurisdiction 
Carbon price (USD) 
Scope 
EU ETS 
87.22 
Covers 40% of EU 
emissions 
UK ETS 
92.69 
Covers around a third of 
UK emissions 
California Cap and Trade 
Program 
27.22 
Covers around 85% of 
the state’s emissions 
China ETS  
8.80 
Power sector, covering 
around 4bn tons of CO2 
South Korea ETS 
15.03 
Covers around 66% of 
South Korea’s emissions 
Source: International Carbon Action Partnership 
Potential challenges and concerns 
Implementing the CBAM faces several challenges and 
concerns. Firstly, ensuring the accuracy and reliability of 
carbon footprint measurements for imported goods poses a 
significant technical challenge. Establishing a robust and 
transparent monitoring system will be crucial to the 
success of the CBAM. Additionally, the potential for trade 
disputes and tensions with non-EU countries, particularly 
those heavily reliant on carbon-intensive industries, 
remains a concern. The EU must navigate these challenges 
while ensuring compliance with WTO rules. 
Additionally, some analyses have pointed out that CBAM 
covering only raw materials and not produced goods might 
put European manufacturers at a disadvantage as opposed 
to their counterparts in developing countries4. 
Implications for corporates and financial institutions 
The private sector will be affected by the CBAM in various 
ways. Firstly, it is likely to influence the costs for imports 
into the EU, as companies in carbon-intensive sectors 
outside of the block will face increased costs due to the 
purchase of CBAM certificates. Increased import costs may 
also affect EU companies that use imported goods for 
domestic manufacturing.  
At the same time, the CBAM may help to improve the price 
competitiveness of carbon-intensive industries in the EU – 
as intended by the new regulation. However, EU industries 
will likely require additional support to adopt low or zero-
emission solutions to meet EU climate targets and manage 
the phase-out of free ETS allowances. 
Moreover, the mechanism may have implications for 
international trade and relations, potentially leading to 
trade disputes. Non-EU countries heavily reliant on carbon-
intensive industries might view the CBAM as a trade barrier 
or protectionist measure, potentially triggering retaliatory 
actions. These trade-related uncertainties and disputes 
could have broader impacts on financial markets, affecting 
investor confidence and market stability. 
On the other hand, the CBAM incentives importers to 
reduce their carbon footprint to avoid additional costs 
associated with the EU carbon border tax. This will likely 
result in an increased demand for clean technologies, 
renewable energy, and energy efficiency solutions from 
suppliers both outside and inside the EU.  
Financial institutions will need to consider the risks 
associated with the CBAM and carbon-intensive assets in 
their risk assessment and investment decision making. The 
potential impacts of the mechanism on the profitability and 
valuation of carbon-intensive industries, as well as the risk 
of carbon leakage, may require a reassessment of 
investment strategies and risk management frameworks.
 
1 Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (europa.eu) 
2 See Annex I of the regulation for a complete list of goods and processed goods included in the CBAM 
3 World Bank State and Trends of carbon pricing 2023  
4 The unintended consequences of CBAM on the EU Industrial Strategy – EURACTIV.com

20
 
The Green Bond Editorial Team 
Thomas Thygesen 
Head of Strategy, Head of Research 
Climate & Sustainable Finance 
thomas.thygesen@seb.dk 
 
Elizabeth Mathiesen 
Senior Strategist 
Equity Strategy Research 
elizabeth.mathiesen@seb.dk 
 
Gregor Vulturius, PhD 
Advisor 
Climate & Sustainable Finance 
gregor.vulturius@seb.se 
 
 
Tine Vist 
Senior Quantitative Strategist 
Equity Strategy Research 
tine.vist@seb.dk 
 
Mads Skak Bossen 
Quantitative Strategist 
Equity Strategy Research 
mads.bossen@seb.dk 
 
Filip Carlsson 
Junior Quantitative Strategist  
Macro & FICC Research 
filip.carlsson@seb.se 
 
Lina Apsheva 
Analyst 
Climate & Sustainable Finance 
lina.apsheva@seb.se

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
21
 
Contacts at SEB 
Hans Beyer 
Chief Sustainability Officer of SEB 
hans.beyer@seb.se 
Christopher Flensborg 
Head Climate & Sustainable Finance  
christopher.flensborg@seb.se 
The Climate & Sustainable Finance Team 
greenbonds@seb.se 
 
SEB Norway: 
Ben Powell 
Head Climate & Sustainable Finance in Norway 
benjamin.powell@seb.no 
SEB Finland: 
Anssi Kiviniemi  
Head of Sustainability in Finland  
anssi.kiviniemi@seb.fi 
SEB Germany: 
Alexandra Themistocli 
Head of Sustainable Banking in Germany 
alexandra.themistocli@seb.de 
SEB UK: 
Renato Beltran 
Client Executive, LC&FI 
renato.beltran@seb.co.uk 
SEB Hong Kong: 
Carol Au-Yeung 
Client Executive, Financial Institutions Coverage 
carol.au.yeung@seb.se 
SEB Singapore: 
Eng Kiat Ong 
Financial Institution Coverage Singapore 
eng-kiat.ong@seb.se 
SEB Denmark: 
Lars Eibeholm 
Head of Sustainable Banking in Denmark 
lars.eibeholm@seb.dk 
SEB USA: 
John Arne Wang 
General Manager 
john.wang@sebny.com 
SEB Baltics: 
Aušra Šamšonienė 
Sustainability Officer, Baltics 
ausra.samsoniene@seb.lt 
Viktors Toropovs 
Sustainability Officer in Latvia 
viktors.toropovs@seb.lv 
Audrius Rutkauskas 
Sustainability Officer in Lithuania 
audrius.rutkauskas@seb.lt 
Evelin Allas 
Sustainability Officer in Estonia 
evelin.allas@seb.ee

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
22
 
 
 
 
“The Green Bond” is SEB’s research publication that strives to bring you the 
latest insight into the world of sustainable finance – one theme at a time. 
Even though the publication covers all kinds of products and developments 
in the sustainable finance market, we decided to keep its historic name – 
“The Green Bond” – as tribute to our role as a pioneer in the Green Bond 
market. 
You may be wondering why a Scandinavian bank chose a picture of 
bamboo for the cover. There is a reason for that too! Bamboo is one of the 
fastest growing plants on the planet, which makes it an efficient 
mechanism of carbon sequestration. Moreover, once grown, bamboo can 
not only be used for food, but also used as an ecological alternative to 
many building materials and even fabrics. Its great environmental potential 
makes bamboo a perfect illustration of our work and aspirations.

Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
23
 
This report was published on 08 June 2023. 
Cut-off date for calculations was 30 April 2023, unless otherwise stated.  
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Climate & Sustainable Finance Research 
08 June 2023
 
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the extent of our regulation is available on request); Denmark by 
Finanstilsynet; Finland by Finanssivalvonta; Norway by Finanstilsynet 
and Germany by Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. In 
the US, SEBSI is a U.S. broker-dealer, registered with the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). SEBSI is a direct subsidiary of 
SEB.