Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696590357855.pdf (Zimbabwe)
About this series This new Country Economic Report series seeks to bring the best possible knowledge to bear on policy and institutional reforms in Africa.

It also seeks to develop and help implement the African Development Bank’s High Five strategies, while guiding the design of individual country assistance strategies.
And it seeks to enhance the quality and impact of the Bank’s analytical and advisory activities and development policy operations — and to foster a community of economists (across sectors) on the continent.

The series is produced by the Country Economics Department, in close collaboration with teams in other departments of the Bank’s Vice-Presidency for Economic Gov- ernance and Knowledge Management and Office of the Chief Economist.
Copyright © 2018 African Development Bank Group ISBN: 978–9938–882–85–8 The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the African Development Bank, its Boards of Directors, or the countries they represent.

This document, as well as any data and maps included, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city, or area.
Foreword I t took a long time for economic historians and development theorists to explain the mystery of modern economic growth.

Some researchers suggested that a combination of cheap energy costs at the time and high wages incentivized business people in the western world to devote more resources to technologi- cal innovation.

Others focused on the benefits of colonial resource extraction, or on the so- cial and political institutions that encouraged entrepreneurship.
These traditional arguments sounded con- vincing for a long while.

Today, they are insuf- ficient at best.

Material and political conditions alone could not have done it.

The Industrial Revolution was primarily the result of ideas.

People and business leaders found innova- tive ways of adopting technology and making it commercially viable so that it could boost productivity.

Some great inventions had been sitting on the shelves for many decades.
It took some wise and very practical people to design the institutions that would create the appropriate incentives and conditions for their broader use by firms and households, bring benefits and rewards to all stakeholders — and stimulate economic growth.
In a world where labor and capital are quite mobile, the main explanation of the economic differences between rich and poor countries is not just money: It is also and increasingly the difference in their ability to generate, or bor- row and use, the best ideas out there.

Zimbabwe has investment opportunities re- quiring minimal additional investments to realize medium-term growth targets.
Deep structural reforms can improve Zimbabwe’s business cli- mate and attract private investment and the return of the skilled labor force.

In particular, measures are needed to increase transparen- cy in the mining sector, strengthen property rights, reduce fears of expropriation, and con- trol widespread corruption.
The most likely possibility for longer term change is the regen- eration of civil society and a renewed engage- ment with political powers in a positive social contract, which plays a role both in tackling economic problems and bringing positive and peaceful political reform.
With the generous endowment of natural resources, existing stock of public infrastruc- ture, and comparatively skilled labor force, Zimbabwe has an unprecedented opportunity to join existing supply chains in Africa via the African Continental Free Trade Area.

To take advantage of such opportunities the govern- ment should adopt a three-pronged strategy in the near term with agriculture as the foun- dation, eco-tourism as the green job–genera- tor, and special economic zones as the growth pillar.
Ferdinand Bakoup Acting Director, Country Economics Department Vice-Presidency, Economic Governance and Knowledge Management/Office of the Chief Economist African Development Bank Group : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | d r o w e r o F iii Preface O ver the last decade or so, Zimba- bwe’s economy has faced a number of headwinds resulting in a collapse in growth.
Following the political transition in November 2017, the new government request- ed the African Development Bank to urgently prepare an economic report on the country to support renewal and transformation.

The gov- ernment also approached the Bank to assist and advice on re-engagement with the international community.
The Bank responded positively to this request, as Zimbabwe is an important re- gional member country, strategically located in Southern Africa, with enormous potential given its generous endowments of natural resources, its stock of public infrastructure, and its com- paratively skilled human resources.
Zimbabwe has cleared its arrears with the IMF in October 2016 and will now need to clear its arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank, in order to be relieved from sanctions and to access development finance from MDBs.

In this context, the Bank undertook eco- nomic and sector work in areas deemed critical for enhancing the country’s competitiveness and public sector effectiveness.
This report, entitled “Building a New Zimbabwe: Targeted Policies for Growth and Job Creation,” is part of this analytical work.

It provides the government with alternative growth scenarios to the year 2030.

It also identifies sectors for potential in- vestment to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

It is premised on the assumption that the arrears clearance will be expedited for eco- nomic restoration to commence.

The report is important for several reasons.


First, it provides the government, the donor community, and the private sector with a de- tailed assessment of investment opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Second, it proposes options to develop these opportunities and, in so doing, helps fill the gap created by the absence of sectoral investment priorities.

Third, it can be used to inform and support the government’s dialogue with donors and the business com- munity about further development of these sectors.
Increased coordination and partner- ship will improve the alignment of investments with the national objectives, as set out in Zim- babwe’s Transitional Stabilization Programme (2018–20) and subsequent medium-term plans.

I have no doubt that the report can contribute to the overall efficiency of the development process in Zimbabwe.
Kapil Kapoor Director General, Southern Africa Region African Development Bank Group : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e c a f e r P iv Contents Foreword Preface Acknowledgements Abbreviations Overview Part1 Zimbabwe’seconomy Chapter1 Countrycontext Economic and policy challenges Chapter2 Structuraltransformationiskeytoeconomicdevelopment Zimbabwe’s great potential Lack of growth and structural transformation Chapter3 InvestmentinZimbabwe:alternativegrowthscenariosto2030 Model and database Scenario analysis Rural and urban consumption, poverty, and employment Conclusion Part2 Targetedpoliciesforgrowthandjobcreation Chapter4 Zimbabwe’smedium-termoptions Chapter5 Choosingtherighttarget Zimbabwe’s existing comparative advantage What sectors could Zimbabwe enter?
Identifying sectors for quick wins in the short to medium term Chapter6 Assessingdomesticprivatefirms’capacityandproductioncosts iii iv x xi 1 7 9 15 16 18 23 23 24 34 35 37 39 43 44 45 46 53 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e t n o C v Chapter7 Attractingglobalinvestors Chapter8 Scalingupself-discoveries,recognizingthepowerofindustrialparks,andprovidinglimited incentivestotherightindustries Scaling up self-discoveries Recognizing the power of industrial parks Providing limited incentives to the right industries Chapter9 Twopromisingsectorstospurgrowth Agricultural development as the foundation Ecotourism as a path to prosperity Chapter10 Specialeconomiczones:keyinstitutionsforstructuralupgrading Rationale for special economic zones Special economic zones across regions Chinese foreign direct investment and its implications for developing special economic zones in Zimbabwe Chapter11 Newdevelopmentfinancingcomesindifferentforms Patient capital China’s South–South development cooperation for structural transformation Conclusion AppendixA.Supplementaltables AppendixB.StructureofSDGSIM AppendixC.DescriptionofSDGSIMmodeldatabase AppendixD.AdditionalSDGSIMsimulationresults Notes References Boxes 4.1 From a commodity exporter to a manufacturing powerhouse: China’s economic transformation 4.2 The Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework 5.1 Measuring revealed comparative advantage 7.1 9.1 China’s agricultural technological assistance and investment in Zimbabwe 9.2 Nature-based tourism Chinese investment in Zimbabwe and its decomposition 57 61 61 61 62 65 65 68 73 73 73 74 81 81 82 88 91 95 98 100 107 113 40 41 44 59 68 69 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e t n o C vi 9.3 Case studies on public–private partnerships: Namibia and South Africa
 10.1 The Chinese government’s commitment in setting policy and regulatory framework 10.2 Foreign direct investment and knowledge diffusion in Ethiopia 72 77 78 Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 Zimbabwe’s total merchandise exports and imports, 2008–17 Zimbabwe’s percentile ranking among Africa countries on selected Sustainable Development Goal indicators, 2000 and 2014 Zimbabwe’s percentile ranking among Africa countries on selected determinants of economic performance, 2000 and 2014 2.1 Composition of Zimbabwe’s natural resource rents, 1970–2015 2.2 Zimbabwe’s rapidly growing labor force, 1950–2100 2.3 Human capital per capita in Zimbabwe, neighbor countries, and select rapidly growing Asian countries, 2014 2.4 Produced capital per capita in Zimbabwe, neighbor countries, and select rapidly growing Asian countries, 2014 2.5 Total wealth per capita in Zimbabwe, neighbor countries, and select rapidly growing 9 12 13 16 17 18 18 Asian countries, 2014 Selected macro indicators for Zimbabwe under the base scenario, 2018–30 19 21 2.6 Zimbabwe’s GDP by industry at current prices, 2016 25 3.1 25 3.2 Zimbabwe’s domestic final demand under the base scenario, 2018–30 26 3.3 Annual growth of Zimbabwe’s macro indicators under the base scenario, 2019–30 26 3.4 Zimbabwe’s aggregated sectoral GDP under the base scenario, 2018–30 27 3.5 Annual growth of Zimbabwe’s sectoral GDP under the base scenario, 2019–30 3.6 Annual growth of Zimbabwe’s sectoral exports under the base scenario, 2019–30 27 3.7 Zimbabwe’s household consumption per capita under the base scenario, 2018 and 2030 28 28 3.8 Zimbabwe’s poverty rate under the base scenario, 2018 and 2030 3.9 Deviation of Zimbabwe’s absorption, GDP, and trade growth from the base scenario, by nonbase scenario 3.10 Deviation of Zimbabwe’s consumption and investment growth from the base scenario, by nonbase scenario 3.11 Deviation of Zimbabwe’s sectoral GDP growth from the base scenario, by nonbase scenario 3.12 Deviation of Zimbabwe’s sectoral exports growth
 from the base scenario, by nonbase scenario 3.13 Deviation of Zimbabwe’s private consumption per capita from the base scenario, by nonbase scenario, 2018–30 3.14 Rural and urban household consumption per capita in Zimbabwe 3.15 Average annual growth in Zimbabwe’s employment, by scenario, 2019–30 3.16 Zimbabwe’s national poverty rate, by scenario, 2018 and 2030 5.1 5.2 China’s revealed comparative advantage, by sector, 1990–2016 9.1 Tourism’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product, exports, and employment, 2004–2012 Zimbabwe’s revealed comparative advantage at the two-digit level, 1990–2016 30 30 32 32 33 34 35 35 44 47 70 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e t n o C vii 11.1 Developed and developing country shares of world investment, 1965–2030 11.2 Outward foreign direct investment from “BRICKS” countries, 2000–16 11.3 Costs of China-sponsored official development assistance–like projects completed in Zimbabwe, 2000–14 11.4 China-sponsored official development assistance projects completed in Zimbabwe in 2000–14, by sector 11.5 Value of other official flows from China to Zimbabwe, by sector, 2004–14 11.6 Distribution of other official flows from China to Zimbabwe, by sector, 2004–14 B1 B2 Aggregate payment flows in SDGSIM The labor market in SDGSIM Tables 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 2.1 Value added by sector, Zimbabwe, comparator countries in Africa, and comparator Structure of Zimbabwe’s GDP, 2016 Structure of Zimbabwe’s balance of payments, 2016 Sectoral structure of Zimbabwe’s economy, 2016 Structure of Zimbabwe’s government budget, 2016 2.1 countries in Asia, 1995–2016 (% of GDP) (continued)Value added by sector, Zimbabwe, comparator countries in Africa, and comparator countries in Asia, 1995–2016 (% of GDP) 2.2 Structure of Zimbabwe’s economy, 2009–16 3.1 Accounts used in disaggregation of the Zimbabwe SDGSIM model 3.2 Definitions of nonbase scenarios 5.1 5.2
 Zimbabwe’s revealed comparative advantage at the four-digit level, 2015 and 2016 5.3 Subsectors in which revealed comparative advantage is declining in at least two Zimbabwe and identified comparator and peer countries comparator countries and which Zimbabwe could potentially enter 5.4 Priority subsector identification using the four criteria for identifying subsectors 81 83 84 84 85 85 96 96 10 10 11 11 19 20 21 24 28 43 45 46 for quick wins in the short to medium term in Zimbabwe 48 53 6.1 Capacity constraints in Zimbabwe, 2017 54 6.2 Entry-level blue collar labor costs in Zimbabwe and selected countries 6.3 Minimum wage in Zimbabwe, by sector, 2012–18 54 6.4 Minimum wages in the construction sector in Zimbabwe and selected countries, 2017 54 55 6.5 Real average earnings index in Zimbabwe, by sector, 2009–14 56 6.6 Logistic Performance Index indicators, Zimbabwe and comparator countries, 2016 7.1 57 7.2 Zimbabwe’s inward foreign direct investment, 2000–16 Foreign investment (including joint ventures) approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority, by sector, 2010–17 Employment at firms with foreign investment (including joint ventures) enterprises approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority, by sector, 2009–16 Foreign investment (including joint ventures) from China approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority, by sector, 2010–17 8.1 Identified special economic zone projects in Zimbabwe 8.2 Types of special economic zone projects in Zimbabwe 58 58 59 61 62 7.4 7. : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e t n o C viii 8.3 Proposed fiscal and nonfiscal incentives for special economic zones in Zimbabwe 9.1 Growth of gross domestic product in current prices, by sector, 2010–16 9.2 Zimbabwe’s main exports and imports, 2014–16 9.3 Agricultural endowment: a cross-country comparison 9.4 Tourism’s contribution to gross domestic product, exports, and employment, by country, 2017 10.1
 Key factors underlying the success of special economic zones in China’s provinces: 63 65 65 66 70 Sustainable Development Goal indicators for Zimbabwe and Africa, 2000 and 2014 three case studies Zimbabwe’s sectoral factor intensity, 2016 79 91 A1 92 A2 Composition of Zimbabwe’s sectoral demand, 2016 93 A3 94 A4 Determinants of economic performance: Zimbabwe and Africa in 2000 and 2014 99 C1 D1 Average annual growth of real macro indicators in Zimbabwe, by simulation, 2019–30 100 101 D2 Macro indicators in Zimbabwe, 2018 and 2030, by simulation 102 D3 Government receipts and spending in Zimbabwe, 2018 and 2030, by simulation D4 Balance of payments in Zimbabwe, 2018 and 2030, by simulation 103 D5 Average annual growth of real GDP at factor cost in Zimbabwe, 2018 and 2030, by Value-added, trade, and consumption elasticities simulation D6 Sector structure in Zimbabwe, 2018 and 2030 D7 Back-of-the-envelope calculation of marginal product of infrastructure investment 104 105 106 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e t n o C ix Acknowledgements T his country economic report is a prod- uct of the Vice-Presidency for Econom- ic Governance and Knowledge Man- agement.
Ferdinand Bakoup, Acting Director, Country Economics Department, coordinated the report’s preparation.

AfDB staff on the team comprised Kararach Auma George, Lead Economist, Walter Owuor Odero, Principal Country Economist, in the Country Econom- ics Department, and Damoni Kitabire, Country Manager for the Zimbabwe AfDB Country Of- fice.

Vivianus Ngong, Amah Ezanin Marie-Aude Koffi, and Tricia Baidoo helped with coordinat- ing various aspects of the report’s production.
The AfDB Statistics Department and the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency deserve special acknowledgements for providing the statistics and other background information on Zimbabwe.
The preparation of this report also benefited from comments and insights of colleagues in the Macroeconomic Policy, Forecasting, and Research Department, in- cluding Abebe Shimeles (then Acting Direc- tor) and Jacob Oduor (then Principal Research Economist), and from Stefan Muller (then Lead Economist in the Country Economics Department).

The team was assisted by external con- sultants and researchers, namely Hans Lof- gren, Martin Cicowiez, Yan Wang, and Prosper Chitambara.
Sadiq Bentum Commey (Eighth Wonder Company Limited) designed the cover of the report.

Editing and layout were by a team from Communications Development Incorporated led by Bruce Ross Larson, and including Joe Caponio, Mike Crumplar, Peter Redvers-Lee, Christopher Trott, and Elaine Wilson.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t n e m e g d e w o n k c A l x Abbreviations AfDB FDI GDP GIF IMF MDG RCA SDG SEZ Zanu-PF African Development Bank Foreign direct investment Gross domestic product Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework International Monetary Fund Millennium Development Goal Revealed comparative advantage Sustainable Development Goals Special economic zone Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s n o i t a i v e r b b A xi Overview Z imbabwe has been undergoing political and economic transformation follow- ing the November 2017 resignation of President Robert Mugabe and the February 2018 passing of long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.
The current government re- mains committed to economic and structural reforms, notably to rebuild confidence by re- storing private property rights, ensuring macro- economic stability and growth, achieving fiscal consolidation, clearing external debt arrears, and improving governance and the business environment to generate broad-based growth and jobs.
The government has also committed to amicable settlement arrangements, includ- ing compensation of farmers whose land was expropriated during the land reform program.
Zimbabwe’s economy continues to grap- ple with fiscal and monetary misalignments, chronic cash shortages, high unemployment (especially among young people), low invest- ment and savings, industrial stagnation, re- duced agricultural output, and high domestic and foreign debt (which has reduced the coun- try’s potential to borrow from foreign financial institutions).
Zimbabwe is characterized by abundant land and natural resources, a relatively educat- ed and skilled human capital base, and existing but inadequate physical infrastructure.

The agricultural sector focuses on tobacco (for ex- port) and food crops (for domestic consump- tion).

Dependence on natural capital for de- velopment is high.
Mining is the main driver of the economy: the country has the world’s third largest platinum reserves and is the fifth largest producer of lithium, which is essential for re- chargeable batteries.

The manufacturing sector has seen a rapid decline, while natural resource extraction has been rising.

Alternative growth scenarios to 2030 With qualified assumptions, the SDGSIM-based analysis concludes that Zimbabwe has the po- tential to realize average growth above 4 per- cent a year between 2019 and 2030.
In the base case scenario, growth averages 4.2 percent a year, which corresponds to 2.2 percent growth per capita.

This scenario assumes an unchanged economic policy environment subject to long- term debt sustainability where most macro ag- gregates expand at the same pace as the econ- omy, which is achieved by keeping fixed tax rates and imposing exogenous and unchanged shares of GDP for other items with macro sig- nificance, including investment and transfers payments.
Balance between foreign exchange inflows and outflows is realized via a flexible real exchange rate, which influences both ex- port and import quantities.

A depreciation of the real exchange rate, at 0.6 percent a year, is needed to maintain external balance.

The nonbase scenarios explore the eco- nomic impact of scaled-up investment in in- frastructure, helping the country close its in- frastructure gap.
The scenarios differ in the expansion of infrastructure investment, the marginal product of new infrastructure cap- ital, the sectoral targeting of new infrastruc- ture capital (reflected in a higher total fac- tor productivity in one or more production activities), and the financing source of extra spending.
To realize 6 percent growth a year, the real additions infrastructure investment : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i w e v r e v O 1 amounts to 2 percent of base scenario GDP in 2019, 4 percent in 2020, and 6 percent in 2021– 30.

Investing half as much (1 percent of base scenario GDP in 2019, 2 percent in 2020, and 3 percent in 2021–30) yields half the return (3 percent).
The scenarios assume that the government finances the investment program, but in the real world, involving the private sector and considering other financing mechanisms may be beneficial.

While closing the infrastructure gap may be necessary for accelerated progress in Zimbabwe, it is not sufficient: to benefit and become competitive, firms need access to the right inputs (human and other) as well as an en- abling policy and institutional environment.
In this regard, lessons from policymaking in other parts of the world can offer ideas for adapta- tion to Zimbabwe’s realities.

Identifying opportunities for sustainable and inclusive growth Zimbabwe has investment opportunities re- quiring minimal additional investment to realize medium-term growth targets.

Deep structural reforms can improve Zimbabwe’s business climate and attract private invest- ment and the return of the skilled labor force.
In particular, measures are needed to increase transparency in the mining sector, strengthen property rights, reduce fears of expropriation, and control widespread cor- ruption.

The most likely possibility for longer term change is the regeneration of civil soci- ety and a renewed engagement with political powers in a positive social contract, which plays a role both in tackling economic prob- lems and bringing positive and peaceful po- litical reform.
With the generous endowment of natural resources, existing stock of public infrastruc- ture, and comparatively skilled labor force, Zimbabwe has an unprecedented opportunity to join existing supply chains in Africa through the African Continental Free Trade Area.

To take advantage of such opportunities the government should adopt a three-pronged strategy in the near term with agriculture as the foundation, eco-tourism as the green job generator, and special economic zones as the growth pillar.
The agricultural sector can be a foundation for inclusive growth, export diversification, and structural upgrading.

The focus should be on diversifying agricultural export earnings and developing supply chain trade (processing and market access to high-value products).

Eco-friendly tourism and associated light manufacturing such as handbags and handi- crafts are an engine for job creation and export growth and diversification.
With Zimbabwe’s enormous natural resources endowment for tourism, targeting tourism represents possibly the quickest way to deliver growth and job creation.

Developing special economic zones as an engine and pillar for growth and diversifica- tion could improve competitiveness in first- and later-stage processing of natural resourc- es (agriculture, precious metals, and minerals) as well as manufacturing capacity (electronic and medical equipment that use the country’s reserve of precious metals).
Given the right in- vestment climate and investor interest, several sectors could be developed, including assem- bly lines of farm machinery, nonmotor vehicles, home appliances, and technology-intensive services (such as supply value chains and logis- tics).

Special economic zones also provide the potential for scaling up to achieve economies of scale and generate links with the domestic economy.
New financing for development With some established donors constrained by heavy debt and slow growth since 2015 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i w e v r e v O 2 development finance will need to “go beyond aid” to combine trade aid and investment.
Fi- nancing will come less from official develop- ment assistance and more from other official flows, other official flow–like loans, and other official flow–like investments from develop- ment banks and sovereign wealth funds and new strategic investment funds in emerging economies.
Developing countries’ (including China) share of global investment overtook that of high-income countries in 2015, and most new finance comes in the form of patient capital, long-term investment with a maturity of 10 years or more.

Patient capital plays an important role in financing infrastructure.
Evidence of rising pa- tient capital is reflected in the growing num- ber of sovereign wealth funds and govern- ment-sponsored strategic investment funds established by countries such as Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philip- pines, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam.

Global leaders and the international devel- opment community (multilateral and bilateral donors) are looking east for new ideas, new momentum, and new financing.
In recent years, China has become the largest single trading partner for Africa and a key investor and pro- vider of aid, and a 1 percentage point increase in China’s real domestic fixed asset investment growth has tended to increase Sub- Saharan Af- rica’s export growth rate on average by 0.6 per- centage point.1 China and Zimbabwe have long had an “all-weather” friendly relationship, with mutual support, cooperation, and benefit.
In particu- lar, China has emerged as Zimbabwe’s largest aid, investment, and South–South cooperation partner in the last decade.

Zimbabwe is esti- mated to be one of the top recipients of Chi- na’s official development assistance, receiving $3.6 billion.
Zimbabwe could grasp the oppor- tunities provided by the large number of Chi- nese enterprises “going global” and join exist- ing global supply chains in food, cotton, wool, leather, footwear, garments, and assembly lines of farm machinery, motorcycles, or buses and become a light manufacturing and construc- tion logistic center for Southern and East Afri- ca and eventually the entire continent.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i w e v r e v O 3 PA R T 1 Zimbabwe’s economy CHAPTER 1 Countrycontext T his report on Zimbabwe’s economic growth opportunities and trajectory was prepared at the government’s re- quest following a political transition in No- vember 2017.
After recent political changes, Zimbabwe is searching to break away from its disappointing development record of re- cent decades and identify a path toward fast- er growth in gross domestic product (GDP), employment, and incomes accompanied by more rapid progress in poverty reduction and other parts of the global sustainable develop- ment agenda.
But this search for a new path is undertaken in a difficult economic context, including the need to address budget and bal- ance of payments deficits and major structural challenges such as large infrastructure gaps, an inefficient government, and inhospitable busi- ness climate.

The country has enormous potential given its natural resource endowment, public infra- structure stock, and skilled human resources.

But the country has long-standing debt arrears with several development partners and lend- ers.
While Zimbabwe cleared its arrears with the International Monetary Fund in October 2016, the country has yet to clear its arrears with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank, a requirement for relief from sanctions and for access to development fi- nance from multilateral development banks.
Recent political developments Zimbabwe has been undergoing political and economic transformation following the No- vember 2017 resignation of President Robert Mugabe and the February 2018 passing of long- time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai.
The current government remains committed to economic and structural reforms, notably to rebuild confidence by restoring private prop- erty rights, ensuring macroeconomic stabili- ty and growth, achieving fiscal consolidation, clearing external debt arrears, and improving governance and the business environment to generate broad-based growth and jobs.
The government has also committed to amicable settlement arrangements, including compen- sation of farmers whose land was expropriated during the land reform program.

Despite the positive messages from the gov- ernment, adherence to the rule of law and citi- zen voice remain poor compared with Africa as a whole and the Southern Africa subregion.
Al- though among the top performers in Africa on the 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Zimbabwe’s ranking remains low, and its overall governance score is 45.4 (out of 100), up from 40.4 in 2014.

In July 2018, the country successfully con- ducted a national and local election.
The ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), secured a two- thirds majority in the House of Assembly with 145 seats, followed by 63 seats for the main opposition party, the Movement for Demo- cratic Change Alliance and 1 seat each for the National Patriotic Front and an independent candidate.

The incumbent Emmerson Mnan- gagwa of ZANU-PF was re-elected president with 50.8 percent of the vote.
Economic and social developments Zimbabwe’s once vibrant economy collapsed following a prolonged period of policy mis- steps and international isolation.
The country : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 7 had achieved lower-middle-income status with GDP per capita of $1,205 and life expectancy of 61.3 years in 1982, just two years after inde- pendence, but dropped to low-income status with GDP per capita of $878.20 and life expec- tancy of 57 years in 2016.
Poor macroeconomic management and a reduced supply of goods because of widespread price controls result- ed in record hyperinflation, which peaked at 231,000,000 percent in 2008 before stabilizing after a multicurrency regime was adopted in 2009.2 Price stability and the removal of nu- merous economic controls improved business confidence, narrowed arbitrage opportunities, and reduced parallel market activities as goods became available on the formal market.
Real GDP growth decelerated from 4.5 per- cent in 2013 to 1.5 percent in 2015 to 0.7 percent in 2016 before recovering to 2.6 percent in 2017, driven largely by agriculture, mining, electricity and tourism activity.

Growth is projected to reach 3.5 percent in 2018 and rise to 4.2 per- cent in 2019 and 4.4 percent in 2020.

Growth in manufacturing and services is anticipated to re- main subdued because of liquidity constraints.
Significant economic challenges remain: a high fiscal deficit, rising inflation, cash shortages, high public debt, high informality, and an over- valued exchange rate which undermines the economy’s competitiveness.

Over 2013–17, fiscal pressures persisted on the back of declining revenues due to the slowdown in the economy and high recur- rent expenditures.

The budget deficit stood at 9.4 percent of GDP at the end of 2017, up from 2.4 percent at the end of 2015, financed mainly through domestic borrowing.
In 2018, the government proposed strong fiscal consol- idation measures such as freezing recruitment, retiring all staff above age 65, and introducing a voluntary retirement scheme to deal with the unsustainable budget deficit, which was driven largely by the wage bill (86 percent of revenue).

These measures aimed to halve the budget deficit to below 4 percent of GDP in 2018 and to less than 2 percent in 2019.
Despite these constraints, the government plans to increase spending on infrastructure from 11 percent in 2017 to 15 percent in 2018 to 25 percent in 2020.

Despite the cash shortages and liquidity constraints, the banking sector has remained stable on the back of adequate capitalization, improved earnings, and asset quality.

Nonper- forming loans declined from a peak of 20.5 per- cent in 2014 to 7.1 percent at the end of 2017, as a result of stronger management of credit risk.
The government has noted that the cash short- ages are a result of the increasing mismatch between electronic money balances created to finance the budget deficit and the physical stock of foreign currency available.

To mitigate this challenge, the authorities urge continued use of noncash (plastic and electronic) trans- action methods while other export-boosting measures and foreign exchange management (such as administrative arrangements for repa- triating foreign exchange and assets) are ad- dressed.
Meanwhile, inflation — driven mainly by money creation to finance the fiscal deficit — stood at 0.06 percent in February 2017 and closed the year at 3.46 percent before climbing to 3.52 percent in January 2018.

Inflation is pro- jected to average 3.6 percent in 2018.

Zimbabwe’s exports fell from $3.6 billion in 2011 to $2.8 billion in 2016 — an annualized rate of 5.7 percent.

Imports totaled $5.2 billion in 2016, resulting in a trade deficit of $2.4 billion (figure 1.1).
The current account deficit declined from 4.2 percent of GDP in 2016 to 4 percent in 2017 as export incentive schemes introduced in May 2016 stimulated exports and is projected to decline to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2018 as the government envisages new limits and controls on imports (Statutory Instrument 64).
Never- theless, merchandise imports (mainly finished goods, fuel, and electricity) continue to ex- ceed exports, putting pressure on the supply of urgently needed foreign exchange: about : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 8 85 percent of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange comes from five products (tobacco, gold, plat- inum, chrome, and diamonds), making it critical to diversify exports.
Zimbabwe remains in debt distress,3 con- straining the country’s ability to attract invest- ment and access fresh capital.

The AfDB Group has been a leader in Zimbabwe’s re-engage- ment with international financial institutions and other creditors since the first Friends of Zimbabwe High Level Debt Forum in 2012.
The country is following an arrears clearance strat- egy, a staggered process that cleared arrears to the International Monetary Fund in October 2016 and that projects clearing arrears to the AfDB Group and the World Bank by the end of 2019.

Consultations with Paris Club credi- tors are also ongoing, critical to addressing the more than $3 billion in outstanding arrears.
in state-owned enterprises, Zimbabwe’s rank on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index remains low because of lack of policy consistency and coordination and because of high corruption in the public and private sectors.

The level of corruption, particularly in- creased the country’s risk premium, resulting in resource mobilization constraints and further capital flight.
Zimbabwe ranked 159 out of 190 countries in 2018, down from 161 in 2017 but still a retreat from the jump of 16 places to 155 out of 189 countries in 2016.

Small changes in deal- ing with construction permits, registering prop- erty, and resolving insolvency continue to be outweighed by losses in all the other measures except enforcing contracts, which remained unchanged.

The Special Economic Zones Act was en- acted in October 2016 to provide incentives to investors to boost private sector growth.
The country’s industrial development poli- cy focuses on five key sectors — agriculture and agro-processing, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and services — because of their quick turnaround and impact.

The government has FIGURE1.1 Zimbabwe’stotalmerchandiseexportsandimports,2008–17 $ billion Total merchandise exports Total merchandise imports 10 8 6 4 2 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: ZIMSTAT.
also passed a joint venture law to boost pri- vate sector participation infrastructure development.

in Zimbabwe’s poverty rate dropped from 75.6 percent in 1995 to 70.9 percent in 2001 then rose to 72.3 percent in 2011.

The pov- erty rate was higher in Matabeleland North (85.7 percent) and lower in Harare (36.4 per- cent) and Bulawayo (37.2 percent).4 Real GDP per capita declined 1.6 percent from 2016 to 2017 as rising inflation and low productivity reduced real earnings.
The country’s most re- cent Gini index was 43.2 in 2011.

Despite the economic slowdown, Zimbabwe’s Human De- velopment Index value improved from 0.452 in 2010 to 0.516 in 2015, owing to progress in life expectancy, from 49.6 years in 2010 to 57 years in 2016.

The country also made progress in universal primary education (Millennium De- velopment Goal [MDG] 2), gender equality and women’s empowerment (MDG 3) and combat- ing HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (MDG 6).
The government is committed to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which have been integrated into the Zimbabwe : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 9 TABLE1.1 StructureofZimbabwe’sGDP,2016 Item Absorption Private consumption Government consumption Fixed investment Private fixed investment Government fixed investment Change in inventories Exports Imports GDP at market prices Net indirect taxes GDP at factor cost $million %ofGDP 18,949 12,791 4,131 2,015 1,525 491 12 4,098 –6,427 16,620 –2,073 14,547 114.0 77.0 24.9 12.1 9.2 3.0 0.1 24.7 –38.7 100.0 –12.5 87.5 Source: Calculated based on 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
TABLE1.2 StructureofZimbabwe’sbalanceofpayments,2016 Item $million %ofGDP Current account, inflows of foreign exchange Exports Transfers to nongovernment Factor income Foreign savings Current account, outflows of foreign exchange Imports Transfers from nongovernment Transfers from government Factor income Capital account Net foreign financing to nongovernment Net foreign financing to government Foreign direct investment 6,842 4,098 1,942 211 591 6,842 6,427 16 0 399 591 90 76 426 41.2 24.7 11.7 1.3 3.6 41.2 38.7 0.1 0.0 2.4 3.6 0.5 0.5 2.6 Source: Calculated based on 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Trans- formation to ensure synergies.

Economic and policy challenges This section reviews key aspects of Zimbabwe’s economic and policy challenges to provide context for the scenario analysis.

The informa- tion is an important input and starting point for analyzing the SDGSIM results, which depend on changes in prices, quantities, and tax rates.
Much of the data are from the 2016 Zimbabwe macro and meso social accounting matrixes, which are part of the model database.5 Data from World Bank (2018b) were used to analyze Zimbabwe’s economy and its performance since 2000 from a regional African perspective.

Economic structure in 2016 Absorption (domestic final demand) exceeds total GDP by 14 percent thanks to a trade deficit of the same magnitude (table 1.1).
The private sector accounts for 86.1 percent of domestic final demand, and the government accounts for 27.8 percent.

Government final demand is more investment-focused than pri- vate final demand is: the ratio of investment to consumption is 0.24 for the government and 0.11 for the private sector.
In the current account, foreign savings (a current account deficit) of 3.6 percent of GDP and a surplus of nontrade items in the current account of 10.5 percent of GDP (with nongov- ernment transfers or worker remittances as the main inflow) made the trade deficit and ab- sorption in excess of GDP possible (table 1.2).

In the capital account, foreign direct investment of 2.6 percent of GDP and government and nongovernment financing cover the current ac- count deficit.
At 20.1 percent of GDP, taxes are the main receipt in the government budget, and nontax revenue amounts to 1.8 percent (table 1.3).

Gov- ernment savings are thus negative (–3.0 per- cent of GDP), while government investment is 3.0 percent.

The resulting government deficit (6.0 percent) is covered by domestic and for- eign financing.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 10 While agriculture’s share in value added is just 11.1 percent, the sector accounts for 33.1 percent of export revenue and is strong- ly export-oriented, with an export–output ratio of 39.4 percent (table 1.4).
Likewise, man- ufacturing, which includes semi-manufactured forms of gold (Zimbabwe’s main export prod- uct), makes an important contribution to ex- ports and is highly export-oriented (though less so than agriculture).

However, compared with agriculture, manufacturing accounts for a smaller share of value added (9.9 percent ver- sus 11.1 percent) and a much larger share of im- ports (73.8 percent versus 6.8 percent) and has a higher import–demand ratio (46.8 percent versus 20.3 percent).
By contrast, service sec- tors (except trade, hotels, and restaurants and transport and communications) have no direct links to the international economy.
Agriculture is intensive in unskilled labor and land, while public administration, education, and health are intensive in skilled labor (see TABLE1.4 SectoralstructureofZimbabwe’seconomy,2016 TABLE1.3 StructureofZimbabwe’sgovernmentbudget,2016 Item Recurrent receipts Direct taxes Activity taxes Commodity taxes Tariffs Domestic transfers Recurrent spending Consumption Foreign transfers Savingsa Investment Surplusb Financing Net domestic financing Net foreign financing $million %ofGDP 3,629 1,261 195 1,605 273 295 4,131 4,131 0 –502 491 –992 992 917 76 21.8 7.6 1.2 9.7 1.6 1.8 24.9 24.9 0.0 –3.0 3.0 –6.0 6.0 5.5 0.5 a.
Difference between recurrent receipts and recurrent spending.

b.

Difference between savings and investment.

Source: Calculated based on 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
Percent Sector Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels, and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Total Value added Production Exports Export–output ratio Imports Import– demandratio Source: Calculated based on the 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 11 FIGURE1.2 Zimbabwe’spercentilerankingamongAfricacountriesonselected SustainableDevelopmentGoalindicators,2000and2014 2000 2014 Change, 2000–14 Gross preprimary school enrollment (%) Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) Gross primary school enrollment (%) Net primary school enrollment (%) Net intake rate in grade 1 (% of official school-age population) Lower secondary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) Gross secondary school enrollment (%) Net secondary school enrollment (%) Gross tertiary school enrollment (%) Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5) Prevalence of wasting, weight for height (% of children under 5) People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population) People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) Access to electricity (% of population) Carbon dioxide emissions (kg per 2010 $ of GDP) –60 –40 –20 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percentile (value or change) Note: Indicators are shown only if data are available for at least 18 countries (that is, a third of the countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe).
Indicators shown for both 2000 and 2014 have identical country coverage for the two years.

The maximum number of countries is 54.

Data for 2000 refer to the average over 1998–2002, and data for 2014 refer to the average over 2012–16.

Source: Calculated based on data from World Bank (2018b).

table A1 in appendix A).

And more than 60 per- cent of mining output is used as intermediate input by the manufacturing sector (see table A2 in appendix A).
Performance and structural change in Zimbabwe and Africa since 2000 Zimbabwe’s percentile ranking among African countries declined between 2000 (reflecting the average or 1998–2002) and 2014 (reflecting the average for 2012–16) for all education SDG outcome indicators with data (figure 1.2).
Ex- cept for prevalence of wasting, which showed strong improvement, the picture is similar for health SDG outcome indicators (for which a low ranking is better for indicators measuring undesirable outcomes such as mortality).

Zim- babwe has been falling behind other African countries on infrastructure-related indicators (access to water, sanitation, and electricity).

The ranking for carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP remained roughly unchanged be- tween 2000 and 2014.
Zimbabwe’s declining rankings in education indicators are underpinned by unchanged or declining enrollment, intake, and completion in the country while the median for Africa in- creased noticeably (see table A3 in appendix A).

Among health indicators (except prevalence of wasting), the situation in Zimbabwe has im- proved, but not as much as in the region as a whole.

In infrastructure, access rates changed little in Zimbabwe while improving in the re- gion as a whole.
Finally, despite reducing car- bon dioxide emissions more than other African countries did, Zimbabwe is still at more than twice the regional median.
Zimbabwe’s un- weighted average ranking across all indicators declined from the 73rd percentile to the 56th (which translates to a drop from 15 to 23 out of 54 countries).6 Higher real GDP per capita may have con- tributed to and been reinforced by better SDG outcomes across the board through multiple : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 12 channels (including links related to household income and government revenue).
Zimbabwe’s real GDP per capita declined between 2000 and 2014 while the median for Africa increased significantly, causing Zimbabwe’s percentile ranking to fall by 20 points (figure 1.3; see also table A4 in appendix A).

Zimbabwe’s final demand composition switched toward consumption and away from investment, which may have caused growth to suffer given that consumption tends to be di- rected more toward satisfying current needs.
Among government final demand, Zimbabwe ranks very high for consumption (and increas- ingly so) but very low for investment, while total government final demand is high.

The data are consistent with Zimbabwe’s se- vere external imbalances, manifested as lower exports and higher imports than in other coun- tries, which eventually contributed to foreign debt default.

Among other things, Zimbabwe’s export percentile ranking fell by more than 36 points.
While the increased trade deficit made it possible to maintain higher domestic ab- sorption for a given level of GDP, the resulting macro imbalance may have contributed to low growth.

These developments took place in the context of sanctions imposed by the Europe- an Union, the United States, and others to en- courage more democratic rule.

Zimbabwe led Africa in education spending relative to GDP in 2014.
Its spending per stu- dent (relative to GDP per capita) was also high, in the 80th–90th percentile for primary, sec- ondary, and tertiary education.

Similarly, the country’s current spending on health (which represents most of health spending) is among the highest in the region (in the 94th percen- tile).

The country is in the 77th percentile for tax revenue, suggesting that the scope for rais- ing tax revenue may be limited.
Apart from the level and composition of pri- vate and government spending, institutions and infrastructure may be important determinants FIGURE1.3 Zimbabwe’spercentilerankingamongAfricacountriesonselected determinantsofeconomicperformance,2000and2014 2000 2014 Change, 2000–14 GDP per capita (constant 2010 $) Household final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation, public sector (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) Gross savings (% of GDP) Current account balance (% of GDP) Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) Government expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita) Government expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per capita) Government expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) Current health expenditure (% of GDP) Tax revenue (% of GDP) IDA resource allocation index (1 = low to 6 = high) Logistics Performance Index: Overall Logistics Performance Index: Quality of trade and transport infrastructure –40 –20 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percentile (value or change) Note: Indicators are shown only if data are available for at least 18 countries (that is, a third of the countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe).
Indicators shown for both 2000 and 2014 have identical country coverage for the two years.

The maximum number of countries is 52.

Data for 2000 refer to the average over 1998–2002, and data for 2014 refer to the average over 2012–16.

Source: Calculated based on data from World Bank (2018b).

 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 13 of economic performance.
In this regard, the World Bank International Development Associ- ation resource allocation index for Zimbabwe is low (in the 12th percentile), suggesting that the country’s policies and institutional arrange- ments do not support growth and poverty re- duction.
And the country is positioned in the bottom half of African countries for the overall Logistics Performance Index — which reflects how well infrastructure and institutions facili- tate trade, an essential component of success- ful development throughout the world — and for its trade- and transport-related infrastruc- ture subindex.
Zimbabwe meets just 25–30 percent of its infrastructure needs in transport, electricity, information and communications technology, and water and sanitation but still ranks in the 67th percentile (18 out of 53 countries).
Closing infrastructure gaps remains necessary to ac- celerate development in Zimbabwe and most other countries of the region, but progress in infrastructure must be accompanied by ad- vances in other areas, including human devel- opment and the broader policy environment.7 To meet its needs, the country may have to raise spending on infrastructure from $0.2 bil- lion a year to $2.0 billion for the next decade.8 In sum, the comparison of Zimbabwe and the rest of the Africa shows that Zimbabwe has performed worse than Africa as a whole on almost all SDG outcome indicators and that this result is consistent with the evolu- tion of development drivers, including the prioritization of consumption over investment and weak policies and institutions.
Weak poli- cies and institutions prevent high spending on education and health from yielding stronger performance in these areas.

To generate the growth needed to improve well-being and re- duce poverty, Zimbabwe must close its infra- structure gap.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t x e t n o c y r t n u o C 14 CHAPTER 2 Structuraltransformationiskey toeconomicdevelopment I n the early stages of development, structural transformation is one of the main engines of economic growth.

Manufacturing, in partic- ular, offers new and boundless possibilities for production of tradable goods, including tech- nology.
Manufacturing plays a crucial role in generating employment, accounting for almost 500 million jobs worldwide in 2013 — about a fifth of the global workforce — and allowing for greater inclusiveness and gender equality.9 Transforming from resource extraction and agriculture to manufacturing activities to serv- ices is crucial for increasing productivity, creat- ing jobs, and reducing poverty.
But mainstream economics has paid little heed to structural transformation and industrialization, with too few resources invested in the economic and in- dustrial infrastructure, causing deindustrializa- tion in many countries.

Africa has seen its share of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP) decline for 40 years.
In the globalized world, structural trans- formation is even more critical and harder to achieve because goods and services are relative- ly freely traded across borders, but other fac- tor endowments — human, natural, and physi- cal capital (land) — face barriers to movement across borders or are completely immobile.

Many developing countries have attempted to catch up with industrial countries but failed, some seemingly trapped as exporters of natu- ral resources and primary products.
In the last half-century, only 28 countries have closed the income gap with industrial countries by 10 per- cent or more — only 12 of them were non-Euro- pean and non-resource-based countries.10 Many African countries are net export- ers of primary products.

Intra-African trade accounted for only 15 percent of total African trade in 2017, while intra-Asian trade accounts for 58 percent of total Asian trade and in- tra-European trade accounts for 67 percent of total European trade.
Having realized the chal- lenges associated with inadequate regional in- tegration, African leaders agreed in March 2018 to create the African Continental Free Trade Area, a single continentwide market for goods and services with free movement of business persons and investment.
If all African countries join, by 2030, the market will include 1.7 billion people and $6.7 trillion in cumulative consum- er and business spending.11 Zimbabwe and many other African countries now face an unprecedented opportunity to be more integrated with the continent’s region- al supply chains and with global value chains through supply chain trade.12 Lower transport costs, thanks to recent public and private in- vestment in cross-regional infrastructure, allow African countries to target the larger markets in the European Union, which account for 35 percent of world trade, and in Asia, which account for 33 percent of world trade, by using the importing to export model to join existing supply chains in the region, an option previous- ly unavailable because of high transport costs.
Major emerging market economies such as China, India, and South Africa can serve as con- duit countries.13 Deep structural reforms are needed to im- prove Zimbabwe’s business climate and at- tract private investment and the return of the skilled labor force.
In particular, measures are needed to increase transparency in the min- ing sector, strengthen property rights, reduce fears of expropriation, and control widespread : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 15 FIGURE2.1 CompositionofZimbabwe’snaturalresourcerents,1970–2015 Percent of GDP Coal rents Forest rents Mineral rents 20 15 10 5 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database.
corruption.14 The most likely possibility for lon- ger term change is the regeneration of civil so- ciety and a renewed engagement with political powers in a positive social contract, which plays a role both in tackling economic problems and bringing positive and peaceful political reform.15 While structural reforms are fundamental to sustain the recovery and growth trajecto- ry, carefully sequencing reform programs is crucial to the success of economic recovery — particularly in a fragile policy environment such as Zimbabwe’s.
As the country embarks on new initiatives to revive its economy,16 the key issue is to identify opportunities that cata- lyze growth and structural change in the short to medium term without needing large-scale policy reforms.17 Zimbabwe’s great potential Zimbabwe is characterized by abundant land and natural resources, a relatively educated and skilled human capital base, and existing but inadequate physical infrastructure.
The agricul- tural sector focuses on tobacco (for export) and food crops (for domestic consumption).

Dependence on natural capital for develop- ment is high (figure 2.1).

Mining is the main driv- er of Zimbabwe’s economy: the country has the world’s third largest platinum reserves and is the fifth largest producer of lithium, which is essential for rechargeable batteries.

The manufacturing sector has seen a rapid decline, while natural resource extraction has been ris- ing.
Mining — extraction of precious and other metals such as gold, coal, iron ore, chromium ore, vanadium, asbestos, nickel, copper, lithium, tin, and platinum group metals — brings in half the country’s export earnings.

Extraction ex- ports grew from 24 percent of total exports in 2005 to 62 percent in 2016.18 The manufacturing sector is small and de- clining, accounting for 9.7 percent of GDP.
The tertiary sector depends largely on primary in- dustrial activities (such as farming and mining) as well as manufacturing.

The tertiary sector is the largest in the country and accounts for 57 percent of GDP.

Zimbabwe is ranked 33rd in the world in overall natural resources endowment for tour- ism by the World Travel and Tourism Council, and at its peak, the tourism sector employed 10 percent of the labor force and accounted for a fifth of exports.
Population and employment Zimbabwe’s population is roughly 16 million, 41 percent of which is ages 0–14, 59 percent of which is age 15 or older, and 3 percent of which is age 65 or older (figure 2.2).

The population growth rate is 2.3 percent.

The population of Harare, the capital and most populous city, is about 1.6 million, with 2.8 million in its metro- politan area.
Some 32 percent of the popula- tion lives in urban areas, and urban population growth is 2 percent a year.19 The share of informal employment in total employment in 2004 to 94.5 percent in 2014.
There has been increased from 80 percent : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 16 FIGURE2.2 Zimbabwe’srapidlygrowinglaborforce,1950–2100 Byvariant Population (million) Byagegroup Population (million) 75 50 25 0 1950 High variant Medium variant Low variant 30 20 10 0 Ages 15–64 Ages 0–14 Age 65 and older 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 1950 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 Source: UN Population Division projections.
a gradual shift in resources from high- to low-productivity sectors and a deepening in- formalization of the economy, which has also resulted in lower wages and a higher poverty rate.

The rise in informality has also weakened the tax base.

Human capital and total wealth per capita Zimbabwe has considerable human capital and a wealth of natural resources.
It continues to spend more on education as a percentage of GDP than any other country in Sub- Saharan Africa.20 Literacy is high: 84 percent among adults age 15 and older and 91 percent among young people ages 15–24 in 2011.21 Education accounts for a substantial share of overall public spending, 30 percent in 2017, indi- cating the high priority given to the sector.
Gov- ernment spending on education accounted for 9 percent of the wealth created by the econo- my in 2014, high compared with other countries.

Infant and junior education accounted for 50 percent of the education budget in 2014, secondary education 27 percent, and high- er education 17 percent.

Infant education has the lowest average expenditure per student ($159), followed by junior education ($216) and secondary education ($328).
Universities had the highest average expenditure per student ($3,309), followed by teacher education ($3,101).

Technical education averaged $319 per student.

The government spends 15 times as much per student at the higher education level than at lower levels, leading to excessive concentra- tion of public resources in the hands of the few students who have access to higher edu- cation.
The most educated 10 percent of stu- dents benefit from 53 percent of total public spending on education, making Zimbabwe one of the least equitable countries in Sub- Saharan Africa.22 Human capital per capita in Zimbabwe is lower than in South Africa and Zambia but higher than in Cambodia, Malawi, and Mozam- bique (figure 2.3).

Produced capital per capita is also higher in Zimbabwe than in Cambodia, Malawi, and Mozambique (figure 2.4).
And : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 17 FIGURE2.3 HumancapitalpercapitainZimbabwe,neighborcountries,and selectrapidlygrowingAsiancountries,2014 2014 $ (at market exchange rates) 80 60 40 20 0 Botswana Ca m bodia China Lao PDR M oza m bique M alawi South Africa Vietna m Za m bia Zim bab w e Source: Lange, Wodon, and Carey 2018.
FIGURE2.4 ProducedcapitalpercapitainZimbabwe,neighborcountries,and selectrapidlygrowingAsiancountries,2014 2014 $ (at market exchange rates) 30 20 10 0 Botswana Ca m bodia China Lao PDR M oza m bique M alawi South Africa Vietna m Za m bia Zim bab w e Source: Lange, Wodon, and Carey 2018.
Zimbabwe’s total wealth per capita (which takes into account produced capital, natural capital, human capital, and net foreign assets) was $18,958 in 2014, also higher than in Cambo- dia, Malawi, and Mozambique (figure 2.5).23 This allows for some optimism: what was achieved in Cambodia and other Asian nations could be achieved in Zimbabwe.
Lack of growth and structural transformation Like other landlocked developing countries, Zimbabwe incurs substantially higher transport and other trade costs than coastal countries do.

Being far from the world’s large markets in the Americas and Europe leaves the coun- try cut off from ports, and difficulty moving goods from country to country limits its intra- continental trade potential.
Trading costs are driven up by tariffs, border delays, and dete- rioration in the physical infrastructure of the major trade transit routes.

The targeted sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union against Zimbabwe beginning in 2000 led to devastating economic challenges for the country.

In partic- ular, agriculture value added fell from 18.7 per- cent of GDP in the mid-1990s to 11.0 percent in 2016 (table 2.1).
Agriculture accounts for 65.8 percent of total employment, industry for 9.1 percent.

Industry’s share of value added fell from 26.8 percent in the mid-1990s to 22.8 per- cent in 2016.

Manufacturing’s share fell from 19.5 percent in 1995 to 9.6 percent in 2016.

The shrinking of the formal economy through deindustrialization has resulted in the informalization of the economy.
Informali- ty discourages investment and weakens the economy’s overall competitiveness because numerous informal enterprises are stuck in a low-productivity trap.24 Being outside the regulatory framework implies that informal enterprises are less productive than formal : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 18 enterprises because informal enterprises are locked out of markets for finance, technology, and other resources that would enable them to close the gap.
Informal firms do not always “grow up” and join the formal sector.

In many cases, especially in developing countries, they remain stuck in an informality trap.

Data from ZIMSTAT show a similar structure of the economy, with only slightly different sectoral percentages (table 2.2 and figure 2.6).

The economy was stagnant during 2009–16, with manufacturing declining markedly from 12.7 percent of GDP in 2009 to 8.3 percent in 2016.
The share of agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry declined from 12.4 percent in 2009 to 9.4 percent in 2016.

The services and public administration sectors expanded, as did the mining sector, which increased from 6.7 per- cent of GDP in 2009 to 8.6 percent in 2016.
FIGURE2.5 TotalwealthpercapitainZimbabwe,neighborcountries,andselect rapidlygrowingAsiancountries,2014 2014 $ (at market exchange rates) 125 100 75 50 25 0 Botswana Ca m bodia China Lao PDR M oza m bique M alawi South Africa Vietna m Za m bia Zim bab w e Source: Lange, Wodon, and Carey 2018.
TABLE2.1 Valueaddedbysector,Zimbabwe,comparatorcountriesinAfrica,andcomparatorcountriesinAsia,1995–2016(%of GDP) 1995–97 1998–2000 2001–03 2004–06 2007–09 2010–12 2013–15 2016 Percent Sector Zimbabwe Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 18.65 26.84 19.53 54.51 ComparatorcountriesinAfrica Botswana Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Mozambique Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services South Africa Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 4.22 48.07 5.92 47.71 34.30 16.11 12.39 49.59 4.03 33.78 20.60 62.19 19.74 — 16.20 — 3.24 48.79 1.97 47.97 26.81 22.22 16.58 50.96 3.54 31.87 19.17 64.59 15.98 — 13.82 — : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 19 TABLE2.1(continued) Valueaddedbysector,Zimbabwe,comparatorcountriesinAfrica,andcomparatorcountriesinAsia,1995–2016(%of GDP) 1995–97 1998–2000 2001–03 2004–06 2007–09 2010–12 2013–15 2016 Sector Zambia Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 15.67 37.85 11.70 46.48 ComparatorcountriesinAsia Cambodia Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services China Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Lao PDR Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Myanmar Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services — is not available.
47.98 16.03 10.85 35.99 18.94 46.99 33.15 34.08 53.94 20.48 15.36 25.58 — — — — 18.95 27.70 11.49 53.35 42.96 20.06 14.84 36.98 15.97 15.66 31.53 38.47 50.73 20.58 13.45 28.69 — — — — — 51.63 19.48 32.51 8.78 48.01 25.46 35.02 22.79 39.52 Source: Calculated based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators database.
Total public debt stock was $13.8 billion in 2017 (80 percent of GDP), with $6.3 billion in public domestic debt and $7.5 billion in foreign debt.

The attendant burden of the debt and debt service payments are compounded by the serious structural weaknesses of the local economy, such as lack of diversified export base, which makes it difficult for the country to adjust to changing world demand for trad- able goods and changing production patterns.
Public borrowing in itself is not bad — it be- comes bad when it is unsustainable (when the government cannot service its debt or the debt crowds out key development expenditures) or when it is not used for development purposes.

However, higher borrowing is often a symptom of a wider and deeper systemic crisis reflecting political and economic instability, especially if the debt was contracted to finance recurrent expenditure, as is the case in Zimbabwe.
Rationalizing of foreign currency by the Re- serve Bank of Zimbabwe is affecting a lot of manufacturers that import materials for pro- duction.
The lack of foreign currency coupled : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 20 TABLE2.2 StructureofZimbabwe’seconomy,2009–16 Percent of GDP Industry Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water Construction Finance and insurance Real estate Distribution, hotels, and restaurants Transport and communication Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Source: ZIMSTAT national accounts data.
with high production costs has choked capacity utilization.

The Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company, the country’s largest manufacturer and supplier of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, cannot meet domestic demand because of the lack of foreign currency to import raw materials.

Most raw materials used in fertilizer manufacturing come from as far as the Middle East through Durban and Beira.
Electricity is another major challenge because the national grid fails to sup- ply enough electricity to sustain industry.

Unemployment in Zimbabwe is estimated at 7 percent, and 64 percent of the unemployed are male.25 The share of informal employment in total employment increased from 80 percent in 2004 to 84.2 percent in 2011 to 94.5 percent in 2014.26 Young people are the most affected because they have little labour market experi- ence.
In 2014 as much as 98 percent of young people ages 15–24 and 96 percent of young people ages 15–34 who were employed were in informal employment.
The country has been unable to generate enough jobs for young, new FIGURE2.6 Zimbabwe’sGDPbyindustryatcurrentprices,2016 Real estate 3% Construction 3% Health 3% Electricity and water 2% Distribution, hotels, and restaurants 14% Other services 4% Finance and insurance 8% Manufacturing 9% Mining and quarrying 10% Education 11% Public administration 11% Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry 11% Transport and communication 11% Source: ZIMSTAT national accounts data.
entrants into the labor force.

In addition, con- tracting agricultural output has disproportion- ately affected poor households, particularly : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 21 in rural areas.
The number of Zimbabweans in extreme poverty rose from 2.3 million in 2014 to 2.6 million in 2015 to 2.8 million in 2016 and is projected to continue rising.27 Many college graduates are unemployed, suggesting both limited job creation for these young entrants and a mismatch between skills and labor market demand.

High youth unem- ployment is a potential source of instabili- ty and conflict.

So generating employment, through the proposed Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework, is critical.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 22 CHAPTER 3 InvestmentinZimbabwe: alternativegrowthscenariosto2030 W ith the aim of informing policy- making, this chapter explores the consequences of alternative sce- narios for Zimbabwe’s economy on standard economic indicators as well as some Sustain- able Development Goal (SDG) indicators.
The scenarios, which cover 2016–30, address the consequences of alternative levels of and pri- orities for government spending and resource mobilization (domestic and foreign).

The chapter first describes the model and database used to create the scenarios and brief- ly discusses Zimbabwe’s economic and policy challenges as they relate to the model.

It then presents the scenarios and summarizes the main findings.

See appendixes B–D for details on the model structure, data, and additional results.
Model and database SDGSIM is a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model designed for coun- try-level analysis of medium- and long-run de- velopment policies with a focus on the SDG agenda.28 The model comprises a set of simul- taneous linear and nonlinear equations and is economywide, providing a comprehensive and consistent view of the economy, including the links among production and the income it generates, households, the government (its budget and fiscal policies), and the balance of payments.
In each period, the different agents (producers, households, government, and the country in its dealings with the outside world) are subject to budget constraints: receipts and spending are fully accounted for — and by con- struction equal (as they are in the real world).

The decisions of each agent — producers’ ob- jective is to maximize profits, and households’ objective is to maximize utility — are made sub- ject to these budget constraints.
For example, households set aside part of their income to di- rect taxes and savings and allocate the remain- der to utility-maximizing consumption.

The real exchange rate and foreign financing adjust to ensure that the country’s external accounts are in balance.

Wages, rents, and prices play a crucial role by clearing markets for factors and commodities (goods and services).
Domestic prices for internationally traded (exported or imported) commodities are influenced by in- ternational price developments.

Because Zim- babwe is a small country, international markets are assumed to demand and supply exports and imports at world prices.

Over time, production growth is deter- mined by growth in factor employment and growth in total factor productivity.

Growth in capital is endogenous, depending on invest- ment and depreciation.
Growth in labor (dis- aggregated by skill) and natural resources (with sector-specific factors for agriculture and min- ing) is exogenous, reflecting projections based on available data.

For labor, the projections re- flect the evolution of the labor force age distri- bution, labor force participation rates, and the impact of expanded education.

The unemploy- ment rate for labor is endogenous.


Growth in total factor productivity has two components: one that responds positively to growth in gov- ernment infrastructure capital stock and one that, unless otherwise noted, is exogenous.
SDGSIM was adapted to the Zimbabwean context and calibrated to a newly constructed database for 2016, the most recent year with : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 23 sufficient data, and ensuring that the scenarios start with an economic structure that is close to today’s.29 It was calibrated through several iterations to obtain baseline growth trajecto- ry, in this case to 2030, and additional controls were applied to establish alternative growth scenarios that consider alternative policies and shocks starting from 2019.
The basic accounting structure and much of the data required for SDGSIM are derived from a social accounting matrix.

Most features are similar to those of social accounting ma- trixes for other models, but a social account- ing matrix for SDGSIM has some nonstandard features that provide data for the explicit treatment of financial flows and different in- vestment types (table 3.1).
The required social accounting matrix disaggregation is often fine in areas related to the SDGs (such as labor and education).

Scenario analysis The scenarios include a base scenario and seven counterfactual scenarios.

The analysis treats 2018 as the base year and considers al- ternative scenarios for 2019–30.30 The assump- tions for the initial years ensure that the struc- tural changes from 2016 to 2018 are limited.
Base scenario The base scenario provides a business-as-usual picture of the evolution of Zimbabwe’s econo- my to 2030 without major changes in econom- ic policy.

It serves as a benchmark of compar- ison for the results of the nonbase scenarios.
TABLE3.1 AccountsusedindisaggregationoftheZimbabweSDGSIMmodel Category Item Category Item Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Distribution margins (3) Margin, domestic Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Taxes (4) Sectors (activities and commodities) (14) Factors (6) Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels, and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Labor, unskilled Labor, skilled Capital, private Capital, government Land Extractive resource Source: SDGSIM Zimbabwe database.
Margin, imports Margin, exports Tax, activities Tax, commodities Tariffs Tax, institutions incomes Household, rural Household, urban Government Rest of the world Capital account, rural household Capital account, urban household Capital account, government Capital account, rest of the world Institutions, current account (4) Institutions, capital account (4) Investment (3) Investment, nongovernment Investment, government Change in stocks : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 24 The overall expansion of the economy is driv- en by growth in GDP at factor cost, which is exogenous for the base scenario (but not for the other scenarios).
GDP growth estimates and projections for 2017–19 are based on AfDB (2018); over 2019–23 the growth rate increases until reaching the International Monetary Fund projection of 5.0 percent, which is maintained to 2030.
For 2019–30, the average growth rate is thus 4.2 percent, or about 2.2 percent per capita.31 The macroeconomic assumptions for the base scenario mimic an unchanged economic policy environment subject to long-term debt sustainability, domestically for the government and externally for the government and the pri- vate sector.

Most macro aggregates expand at the same pace as the economy.
This is achieved by keeping rates fixed for taxes and by impos- ing exogenous and for the most part unchanged shares of GDP or absorption (total consumption and investment spending) for other items with macro significance, including investment (gov- ernment and private, including foreign direct investment) and transfers payments involving the government or the rest of the world.
For domestically financed private investment, the absorption share increases over time, bringing Zimbabwe close to the median for Africa.

Given that domestic financing of the government relative to GDP declines at the same time, the household savings rate remains close to its ini- tial level.

(Foreign investment is self-financed from abroad while government investment is fi- nanced as part of the budget.)
Balance between foreign exchange inflows and outflows is realized via a flexible real exchange rate, which influenc- es both export and import quantities.

The rate adjusts via changes in the domestic price level rather than the nominal exchange rate (reflect- ing the fact that Zimbabwe’s economy is largely dollarized).32 Depreciation of the real exchange rate at 0.6 percent a year is needed to maintain the external balance.

During 2019–30, the economy grows along a smooth path.
Thanks to a persistent substantial trade deficit, absorption is well above GDP at factor cost (and to a lesser extent above GDP at market prices; figure 3.1)33 Private (house- hold) consumption is the largest component of domestic final demand (absorption) by a FIGURE3.1 SelectedmacroindicatorsforZimbabweunderthebasescenario, 2018–30 2016 $ trillion 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 GDP at factor cost Absorption Imports Exports 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
FIGURE3.2 Zimbabwe’sdomesticfinaldemandunderthebasescenario,2018–30 Private consumption 2016 $ trillion 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2016 $ billion 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 Public consumption Private investment Public investment 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 25 FIGURE3.3 AnnualgrowthofZimbabwe’smacroindicatorsunderthebase scenario,2019–30 Percent 8 6 4 2 0 Absorption Private consumption Public consumption Private investment Public investment Exports Imports GDP at factor cost Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
FIGURE3.4 Zimbabwe’saggregatedsectoralGDPunderthebasescenario, 2018–30 2016 $ billion Private services 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 Agriculture 2016 $ billion 350 300 Manufacturing Public services 250 Mining Other industry 200 150 100 50 0 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
exports than for imports reflects real exchange rate depreciation, needed for Zimbabwe to live within its balance of payments constraint in the context of a projected decline in mining export prices (3 percent a year for gold, Zimba- bwe’s main export, over 2018–30).34 Private services (which includes education and health) have the largest GDP by a wide margin (figure 3.4), followed by agriculture and manufacturing (see table C5 for detailed sector data).
Annual growth is even (4–5 percent) for all sectors except mining, which grows slower, partly because of the downward trend in ex- port prices (figure 3.5).

Similarly, among exports, mining has the lowest growth (a slight decline) while growth in other sectors is in the range of 4–6 percent (figure 3.6).

(Exports account for a large share of output for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; see table 1.4 in chapter 1).
Given population growth of 2 percent a year, aggregate household consumption growth of 3.4 percent translates to growth per capita of around 1.3 percent — or a 17 percent increase per capita between 2018 and 2030 (fig- ure 3.7).35 Growth in consumption per capita is 1.9 percent a year for rural households and 1.0 percent for urban households — or a 25 per- cent increase between 2018 and 2030 for rural households and a 13 percent increase for urban households.
The main reason that income per capita grows more rapidly for rural households is a large share of their income is agricultural land rents, which grow faster than other factor incomes.

The change in the national poverty rate is driven by the change in national private consumption per capita: between 2018 and 2030, the poverty rate declines by 6.7 percent- age points (figure 3.8).36 wide margin, with public consumption a dis- tant second (figure 3.2).
Average annual growth is 3–5 percent for all macro aggregates except private investment for which it is close to 8 percent (figure 3.3).

Slightly faster growth for Nonbase scenarios The nonbase scenarios explore the economic impact of scaled-up investment in infrastruc- ture that helps the country close its infrastruc- ture gap.
The scenarios differ in the level of : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 26 infrastructure investment expansion, the mar- ginal product of new infrastructure capital, its sectoral targeting (reflected in a higher total factor productivity in one or more produc- tion activities), and how the extra spending is financed (table 3.2).
Assumptions in nonbase scenario 1 are referred to as the central case, and other assumptions are referred to as alter- native cases.

All nonbase scenarios deviate from the base scenario starting in 2019 — in the absence of any new shocks, the results for 2017 and 2018 are al- ways identical to the base (figures 3.9–3.13).
All nonbase scenarios assume that GDP is endog- enous and that private savings (more specially the part that is domestically financed) drive private investment (instead of letting private investment drive savings, as in the base scenar- io, with private investment defined as a share of absorption).

This means that, other things being equal, an increase in household income translates to increases in private savings, private investment spending, private real investment, private capital stocks, and GDP.
But the precise link among changes in investment spending, real investment (the investment quantity), and change in the capital stock depends on how prices change.

Public investment is a policy tool that is covered in the government budget.

Across the nonbase scenarios, real government consumption and real government investment in noninfrastructure both follow the base tra- jectory (in real quantities).

Real government investment in infrastructure is changed as part of the scenarios.
Except for factor income out- flows (primarily profits due to past foreign di- rect investment), nontrade payments to and from the rest of the world (financing and trans- fers) are the same as under the base scenario (measured in foreign currency).

As a result, ex- cept for the scenarios in which infrastructure is financed from abroad, the changes in Zim- babwe’s net foreign assets are uniform and the same as under the base scenario.
FIGURE3.5 AnnualgrowthofZimbabwe’ssectoralGDPunderthebasescenario, 2019–30 Percent 5 4 3 2 1 0 Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Other industry Private services Public services Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
FIGURE3.6 AnnualgrowthofZimbabwe’ssectoralexportsunderthebase scenario,2019–30 Percent 8 6 4 2 0 –2 Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Other industry Private services Total Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
It implement is possible to investment packages that have a relatively uniform impact across all sectors, including areas such as roads, mobile phone networks, and electricity ac- cess, all of which benefit the economy broadly : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 27 FIGURE3.7 Zimbabwe’shouseholdconsumptionpercapitaunderthebase scenario,2018and2030 FIGURE3.8 Zimbabwe’spovertyrateunderthebase scenario,2018and2030 2030 index value (2018 = 100) 2016 $ billion 2016 $ 2,000 2018 2030 1,500 1,000 500 0 Index value 140 130 120 110 100 80 60 40 20 0 –20 2018 2030 Change, 2018–30 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simula- Rural Urban Nation Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
tions with SDGSIM.
TABLE3.2 Definitionsofnonbasescenarios Name Central case (all-30-tx+3) Foreign financing (all-30-ff+3) Low marginal product of new investment (all-00-tx+3) High marginal product of new investment (all-60-tx+3) Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment (trd-30-tx+3) Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment (trd-60-tx+3) Stronger infrastructure investment expansion (all-30-tx+6) Marginal product ofnew infrastructure capital 0.30 0.30 Marginal government revenue source Domestic taxes Foreign financing 0.00 Domestic taxes 0.60 Domestic taxes Sector targeting All All All All Tradedb 0.30 Domestic taxes Tradedb 0.60 Domestic taxes All 0.30 Domestic taxes Investment expansion (%ofGDPa) 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 a.
Refers to the value of the real investment expansion under base scenario GDP and prices.

b.

Refers to agriculture, manufacturing, and trade, hotels, and restaurants (including tourism), all of which are highly traded and employment generating.

Note: Italics indicate assumptions that differ from those in nonbase scenario 1.

Source: Estimated from SDGSIM simulation files.
Source: Estimated from SDGSIM simulation files : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 28 (albeit still with different impacts across sec- tors for a specific investment).

By contrast, sector targeting may be narrower, as with in- vestment in irrigation or in industrial zones that facilitate export-oriented manufacturing.
In the central case, the impact is uniform across all sectors, and in the alternative case, the country’s major labor-absorbing export sectors — agriculture, manufacturing, and the trade, hotels, and restaurants sector — are targeted.

Assessments of the marginal product of public capital vary widely, as they do in the real world, because of differences in government investment management record and infrastruc- ture capital stock scarcity.
The central case uses a marginal product of 0.30, which trans- lates, other things being equal, into a direct GDP increase (because of the gain in total fac- tor productivity) of $0.30 for every $1 of new capital stock.
However, the total impact differs because of the effects of the GDP changes in selected sectors on prices, incomes, produc- tion, and trade throughout the economy and because of the repercussions of creating the fiscal space needed for the investment.37 In the absence of sufficient continued investment, the gain declines over time because of depre- ciation.
In relative terms, the gain from one unit of capital becomes less significant as time passes if total factor productivity increases for other reasons (including the trend imposed under the base simulation).

Alternative simula- tions consider marginal products of 0.60 and 0.
With a marginal product of 0, the investment has a negative impact on economic indicators because it absorbs resources without produc- ing benefits.38 While targeted investment may yield higher returns when they are at a smaller scale, it may be difficult to scale them up with- out facing diminishing returns — that is, for a large scale-up of investment spending, the mar- ginal product of new infrastructure capital may be higher if the targeting is broad.
Technically, the marginal product of new infrastructure capital (0.30 for the central case) is allocated across targeted sectors on the basis of their 2016 GDP shares — that is, for any given mar- ginal product, the broader the sectoral focus, the smaller the relative total factor productivi- ty and GDP gains in any individual sector.

If the marginal product is zero, targeting is irrelevant.
The models consider two sources for meet- ing marginal government revenue needs from investment expansion: domestic taxes (by scal- ing of all direct and indirect tax rates, not in- cluding trade taxes) and foreign financing (gov- ernment borrowing net of interest payments).
The more positive the growth impact of the investment expansion, the smaller the need for additional government revenue — if strong enough, the investment expansion could pay for itself and generate a decline in taxes or for- eign financing.

Finally, real investment expansion is mea- sured relative to GDP using base scenario pric- es and introduced gradually.

Two expansions are considered: 3 percent and 6 percent of GDP.
For 3 percent expansion, the additional public investment value amounts to 1 percent of the base scenario GDP in 2019, 2 percent in 2020, and 3 percent in 2021–30, which may be compared to simulated infrastructure invest- ment of 1.5 percent of GDP in 2018 — so infra- structure investment grows very rapidly during 2019–21 and at a speed similar to or somewhat slower than the rest of the economy.
The case of 6 percent expansion is constructed the same way, but the real additions to infrastruc- ture investment amount to 2 percent of base scenario GDP in 2019, 4 percent in 2020, and 6 percent in 2021–30.
The central case: infrastructure investment expansion Under the central case scenario (all-30-tx+3), the government undertakes a tax-financed expansion of infrastructure investment that amounts to 3 percent of GDP and for which : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 29 FIGURE3.9 DeviationofZimbabwe’sabsorption,GDP,andtradegrowthfromthebasescenario,bynonbasescenario Percentage points Absorption Exports Imports GDP at factor cost 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 –0.5 Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
the resulting new capital stock has a marginal product of 0.30.

The growth rates for absorption and GDP at factor cost increase by roughly 0.3 percentage point (see figure 3.9).39 Given the trade deficit and the absence of accelerated growth for the foreign exchange inflows that finance it, export growth has to increase relative to im- port growth, a trend that is encouraged by a slight increase in depreciation compared with the base scenario (see table D1 in appendix D).
Aggregate public investment growth increases by more than 6 percentage points compared with the base scenario, while private consump- tion growth gains only 0.1 percentage point and private investment gain is even more marginal (see figure 3.10).

By assumption, growth in real government consumption is the same as in the base scenario.
The increased government tax revenue need- ed to finance the investment expansion peaks in 2021, when the total tax burden as a share of GDP increases by 2.7 percentage points com- pared with the base scenario, to 23.1 percent.

However, over time, the increased GDP growth translates into an increased government rev- enue, which gradually reduces the need to tax (relative to GDP).

By 2030, the burden declines to 22.4 percent of GDP, 1.6 percentage points above the 20.8 percent in the base scenario.
From a different angle, if in 2030 the govern- ment reduces its infrastructure investment to the GDP share in 2030 under the base scenario (2.9 percent) and cut taxes, private consumption increases by close to 4 percentage points (from 72.0 percent of GDP to 75.9 percent), raising annual growth by nearly 0.5 percentage point compared with the base scenario.
GDP growth accelerates by 0.5–0.7 percent- age point compared with the base scenario for all sectors except private services, which are relatively nontraded (compare sector export– output and import–demand ratios in table 1.4.

As a result, private services suffer from real de- preciation and grow only about 0.2 percentage point compared with the base scenario (see figure 3.11).
The gain in export growth is uniform across sectors, though the importance of the growth varies according to each sector’s ex- port–output ratio (see figure 3.12).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 30 FIGURE3.10 DeviationofZimbabwe’sconsumptionandinvestmentgrowthfromthebasescenario,bynonbasescenario Percentage points Private consumption Private investment Public investment 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 –2 Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
The 0.1 percentage point gain in private consumption growth means that in 2030, con- sumption per capita is just 1.5 percent above the level in the base scenario (see figure 3.13).

Consumption per capita declines from 2019 to 2021 and does not exceed the level in the base scenario until 2027.

This trajectory is in- fluenced strongly by the increase in taxation, which peaks in 2021 and declines gradually thereafter.
Foreign financing The foreign financing scenario (all-30-ff+3) de- viates from the central case in one respect: marginal revenue adjustments come through foreign financing instead of domestic taxes.
The change in net foreign financing (govern- ment borrowing net of government interest payments) compared with the base scenario and the central case (which has the same for- eign financing as the base scenario) follows the pattern of the tax change, peaking in 2021 at 2.3 percent of GDP and declining to 1.1 percent by 2030.
Foreign government debt is 58 percent of GDP in 2030 (assuming that the government borrows at a real interest rate of 2 percent) for the foreign financing scenario (but is no longer increasing by 2030), compared with 48 percent in 2018 for all scenarios and 45 percent in 2030 for the base scenario (see table D2 in appendix D).

While debt increases, growth is higher be- cause domestic resources are not diverted from private investment.
Growth in absorp- tion, GDP, private consumption, and private investment is 0.4–0.5 percentage point high- er compared with the base scenario and 0.1– 0.2 percentage point higher compared with the central case (see figures 3.9 and 3.10).

The gains are facilitated by more rapid import growth.
In sectors other than government services, GDP growth rates are also 0.1–0.2 percentage point above those for the central case, whereas in exports, growth rates are very close to those in the central case (see figures 3.11 and 3.12).
In addition to a 4.5 percent gain in private consumption in 2030 compared with the base scenario, the switch from taxes to foreign : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 31 FIGURE3.11 DeviationofZimbabwe’ssectoralGDPgrowthfromthebasescenario,bynonbasescenario Percentage points Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Other industry Private services Total 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 –0.5 Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
FIGURE3.12 DeviationofZimbabwe’ssectoralexportsgrowthfromthebasescenario,bynonbasescenario Percentage points Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Other industry Private services Total 3 2 1 0 –1 Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
financing also has a noticeable impact on the path to 2030 (see figure 3.13): private consump- tion is above the level in the base scenario throughout period 2019–30 thanks to higher GDP and real exchange rate appreciation.
Low and high marginal products of new investment The next two scenarios explore the role of the marginal product of new infrastructure investment, considering the cases of marginal : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 32 product at zero (all-00-tx+3) and at 0.60 (all-3- tx+3).

Otherwise they are identical to the cen- tral case scenario.
(For the case of a zero mar- ginal product, sector targeting is irrelevant.)

A zero marginal product reduces the ab- sorption, GDP, and trade growth rates by 0.1– 0.2 percentage point compared with the base scenario (see figure 3.9).

In absorption, the in- crease is public investment is the same as for the central case, which in the context of lower GDP growth requires a 0.4–0.6 percentage point decline in private consumption and in- vestment growth (see figure 3.10).
The decline in private demand is brought about by a grad- ual increase in the tax burden, which in 2030 reaches close to 24 percent of GDP (compared with 22 percent for the central case).

Private consumption (total and per capita) in 2030 is 5 percent lower than in the base scenario and 6.5 percent lower than in the central case sce- nario (see figure 3.13).
Growth in other indus- try (which includes the construction sector) is 0.2 percentage point higher compared with the base scenario but 0.1–0.2 percentage point lower in other sectors, with the largest loss in private services that depend on growth in do- mestic demand.

The picture is very different a marginal product of new infrastructure investment of 0.60.
GDP, absorption, and trade growth rates, private consumption, and private investment are 0.4–0.7 percentage point higher com- pared with the central case (see figures 3.9 and 3.10).

GDP and export growth are in the same range across sectors, with the strongest gains for tradable sectors (agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) (see figures 3.11 and 3.12).
The initial increase in the tax burden is similar to that in the central case but declines more rapidly: by 2030, it is only 0.2 percent above the level in the base scenario.
Thanks to more rapid growth, private consumption reaches the level in the base scenario by 2023 and exceeds it by more than 8 percent by 2030 (compared FIGURE3.13 DeviationofZimbabwe’sprivateconsumptionpercapitafromthe basescenario,bynonbasescenario,2018–30 Percent Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Foreign financing Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Central case Low marginal product of new investment 15 10 5 0 –5 –10 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
with only 1.5 percent in the central case; see figure 3.13).

Focusing on tradables Instead of the broad sector focus of the pre- ceding simulations, infrastructure investment may be designed to meet the needs of sectors that seem more attractive due to export po- tential (making them less constrained by do- mestic demand growth), import substitution, employment creation, and diversification.
A narrower focus might make it possible to main- tain a higher marginal product for limited scale- up of investment but might be more difficult for a larger increase.

The focusing on tradables with low marginal product of new investment scenario (trd-30-tx+3) is identical to the central case except that productivity gains are limited to agriculture, manufacturing, and trade, hotel, and restaurant services (which include tourism).
These three sectors account for the bulk of employment, exports, and imports (in 2018, the simulated shares are 84 percent, 80 percent, and 82 percent, respectively) but a much small- er share of value added (38 percent).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 33 FIGURE3.14 RuralandurbanhouseholdconsumptionpercapitainZimbabwe Index (2018 = 100) Rural Urban 150 100 50 0 Base Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 34 Growth in GDP, absorption, and private consumption is 0.2 percentage point high- er and investment growth is as much as 0.4 percentage point higher in the focusing on tradables with low marginal product for new investment scenario (trd-30-tx+3) than in the focusing on tradables with high marginal prod- uct for new investment scenario (all-30-tx+3).
Moreover, compared to the latter scenario, boosting productivity for tradables reduces real depreciation (see table D1 in appendix D), raising domestic purchasing power and lower- ing the price of new capital (because manufac- tured goods are the main component in new capital; see figures 3.9 and 3.10).

GDP growth gains are particularly strong for agriculture and manufacturing and for the trade, hotels, and restaurant sector; the same patterns apply to exports (see figures 3.11 and 3.12).
The strong growth gain means that the economy can bet- ter benefit from the total factor productivity gain.

It is related to the fact that these sectors are less constrained than others by a limited domestic market, which reduces prices and profitability in the face of total factor pro- ductivity–driven supply expansions.

In 2030, private consumption is the same as in the foreign financing scenario and almost 3 per- centage points higher than in the central case.
However, because of the effect of taxation, private consumption is below the level in the base scenario during 2019–23 (see figure 3.13).

In 2030, the tax burden is 22.3 percent of GDP, marginally above the central case.
To explore the impact of greater success in identifying high-productivity trade-focused in- vestment projects, the scenario with a higher marginal product of new infrastructure capital, 0.60 (trd-60-tx+3) was implemented; it is oth- erwise identical to the preceding scenario (trd- 30-tx+3) It may also be compared to the high marginal product of new investment scenario, which does not have a specific sector focus.
Compared with the preceding scenario, the gains are all roughly twice as large for absorp- tion, GDP, and trade growth (see figures 3.9, 3.11, and 3.12) and close to three times as large for the private final demands—private consump- tion and private investment — that respond to changes in prices and incomes (see figure 3.10).

Private consumption reaches the level in the base scenario by 2023 and exceeds it by more than 13 percent in 2030 (see figure 3.13).
The tax burden in 2030 is only 0.3 percent of GDP above the level in the base scenario (see table D3 and appendix D).

Stronger infrastructure investment expansion The stronger infrastructure investment expan- sion scenario (all-30-tx+6) is the same as the central case except infrastructure investment expansion is 6 percent of base GDP.

The stron- ger expansion adds to the challenge of identi- fying and managing a larger investment project portfolio without sacrificing productivity gains.
Gains in absorption, GDP, and trade growth (including at the sectoral level) are almost dou- ble those in the central case (see figures 3.9, 3.11, and 3.12).

The gains for GDP and absorption growth increase from 0.3–0.4 percentage point to 0.6–0.7.

But among domestic final demand, only public investment registers a substantial growth boost.
The gains in private final con- sumption remain small, including larger initial losses (6 percent in 2021), but reach the base by 2027 and exceed it by 3 percent in 2030 (see fig- ures 3.10 and 3.13).
Rural and urban consumption, poverty, and employment As indicated in the discussion of the base sce- nario, rural households gain relative to urban households because of the importance of land rents in their income flows: the exogenous annual growth rate for agricultural land use is 1 percent, below the rate of labor and capital stock growth.

In terms of consumer price index income growth, land rental income grows at 6 percent a year while other factors grow 3–4 percent.
The stronger rural gains reduce average urban–rural consumption inequality: rural consumption increases from 28 percent of urban consumption in 2018 to 31–32 percent in 2030 (figure 3.14).

Job creation and unemployment reduc- tion are major items on the policy agenda of most countries, and labor is the main income source for many poor people.
In the scenari- os, the unemployment rate invariably declines (see table D1 in appendix D), reflecting the fact that the labor force (and the population in the labor force age group) grows 2.8 percent a year while employment grows 3.3 percent a year or more (figure 3.15).
Employment growth and un- employment reduction are strongly correlated with GDP growth: the correlation coefficient between GDP growth and employment growth is 0.94.40 The only deviation from a perfect FIGURE3.15 AverageannualgrowthinZimbabwe’semployment,byscenario, 2019–30 Percent 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 Base Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
FIGURE3.16 Zimbabwe’snationalpovertyrate,byscenario,2018and2030 Poverty rate (percent) Reduction 2018–2030 (percentage points) 75 70 65 60 55 50 2018 Base Central case Foreign financing Low marginal product of new investment High marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with low marginal product of new investment Focus on tradables with high marginal product of new investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
15 12 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 35 correlation is that for the focusing on trad- ables with low marginal product of new invest- ment scenario, employment growth is higher than for the foreign financing scenario despite slightly lower GDP growth.

(The deviation is the same for poverty reduction.)


This suggests that a focus on tradables has a strong payoff in job creation and poverty reduction relative to GDP growth.

By definition, the ranking of scenarios by poverty reduction matches the ranking by growth in household consumption per capita.

All scenarios with a positive marginal product for infrastructure capital reduce poverty com- pared with the base scenario (figure 3.16).
Conclusion This analysis offers a macro and economywide perspective of scaled-up infrastructure invest- ment in Zimbabwe, highlighting the broader repercussions of micro and sector-level ac- tions by producers, households, and the gov- ernment.
The results give a numerical sense of the consequences of different investment programs in terms of productivity gains (high or low), revenue sources (taxes or foreign bor- rowing), sector focus (spreading benefits across all sectors or focusing on tradables), and scale (expansions of 3 percent or 6 percent of GDP).
The differences across the scenarios in GDP growth, household consumption, and poverty point to the importance of strong public in- vestment management and, other things being equal, of targeting total factor productivity gains to tradable sectors.

The scenarios assume that the government finances the investment program, but in the real world, involving the private sector and considering other financing mechanisms may be beneficial.
However, the bulk of the macro- economic issues raised in this analysis would remain relevant.

Finally, while closing the in- frastructure gap may be necessary for accel- erated progress in Zimbabwe, it is not suffi- cient: to benefit and become competitive, firms need access to the right inputs (human and other) as well as an enabling policy and in- stitutional environment.

In this regard, lessons from policymaking in other parts of the world can offer ideas for adaptation to Zimbabwe’s realities.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | e w b a b m Z n i i t n e m t s e v n I 36 PA R T 2 Targeted policies for growth and job creation CHAPTER 4 Zimbabwe’smedium-term options For developing countries whose economies depend heavily on natural resources, it is critical to apply the rents generated from natural resources to facilitate diversification to other non-resource-based industries.
Many de- veloping countries have abundant land and re- sources, so they are primary product exporters in the first stage of their development.

To upgrade their industrial structure, they must first close the endowment gap with advanced industrial countries by investing in human and institutional (intangible) capital and physical infrastructure.

The strategy to get there is to follow a country’s comparative advantage at each stage of development.
When firms enter industries and adopt technologies that are consistent with the country’s comparative advantage, the economy is most competitive.

These firms will claim the largest possible market shares and create the greatest possible economic surplus.

Because the industries are so competitive, re- invested surpluses earn the highest return, which allows the economy to accumulate even more physical and human capital over time.
This dynamic can lead to a virtuous circle: it can upgrade the country’s factor endowment structure as well as the industrial structure and make domestic firms more competitive in more capital- and skill-intensive products over time.

China, the Republic of Korea, and many other countries have been following their com- parative advantages (box 4.1).

Priority sectors should be compatible with a country’s endowment structure and com- parative advantages.
But identifying growth pillars or sectors is challenging, as econom- ic theories provide few clues for determin- ing which industries are “right” and which are “wrong.” As one analyst cautions, “[t]he first problem for the government in carrying out an industrial policy is that we actually know pre- cious little about identifying … a ‘winning’ in- dustrial structure.
There does not exist a set of economic criteria that determine what gives different countries preeminence in particular lines of business.”41 A pragmatic process for identifying growth pillars is to analyze latent comparative advan- tage, defined as the “comparative advantage of an economy that is embedded in the fac- tor costs of production to be determined by the economy’s endowment structure.”42 La- tent comparative advantage could lie in a new industry that is not yet successful in today’s economy, most likely because of high trans- action costs, logistics, or other poor business conditions.
If these conditions are improved, the economy could be competitive in the world market in this industry.

The Growth Identification and Facilita- tion Framework provides a practical guide for identifying a country’s latent comparative advantage — or what it could potentially do well (box 4.2).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s n o i t p o m r e t - i m u d e m s ’ e w b a b m Z i 39 BOX4.1 Fromacommodityexportertoamanufacturingpowerhouse:China’seconomic transformation China was a primary product exporter in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when its income per capita was less than a third of the average of Sub- Saharan Afri- can countries.

China had abundant land and labor, but capital was scarce.
Exports were concentrated in re- source-intensive raw materials and primary products, such as crude oil, crude coal, minerals, and food and vegetables.

Until 1984, crude oil and agricultural prod- ucts accounted for more than half of China’s exports (see figure 1).

After 40 years of gradually opening up and reform- ing, China has transformed its natural capital into produced and human capital as well as intangibles.
China followed its comparative advantages by initial- ly engaging in labor-intensive light manufacturing and then upgrading, allowing rural people access to jobs in urban areas (see figure 2).

Opening to foreign di- rect investment through special economic zones al- lowed the transfer of technology and tacit knowledge through learning by doing and learning by exporting.
Manufactures now account for 98 percent of exports, and China is integrated with the world’s most impor- tant supply chains.1 China’s transformation is attributable in part to continuing domestic investment and opening to for- eign direct investment in its endowment structure.

With annual savings of around 40 percent of GDP and dramatic improvement in education, China’s en- dowment of human, physical, and financial capital has grown significantly.
Indeed, the composition of as- sets in national wealth has changed dramatically.

The share of natural capital fell from 34 percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2014,2 while the share of produced capital and intangible and human capital increased.
Most important, China’s technolog- ical capabilities have benefited from learning by im- porting, learning by exporting, and adopting foreign technologies of production and mastering their use, reflecting the importance of learning by doing3 and of tacit knowledge transmission in economic growth.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s n o i t p o m r e t - i m u d e m s ’ e w b a b m Z i 40 FIGURE 1 China’s rapid transformation in export structure: following the comparative advantage Food and live animals Crude oil and other crude materials Other commodities and transactions 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 Miscellaneous manufactured articles Machinery and transport equipment Manufactured goods 1984 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 Source: Lin and Wang (2008), updated based on UN Comtrade data.
FIGURE 2 The employment structure transformed more slowly 100 80 60 40 20 0 Tertiary sector Secondary sector Primary sector 1952 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2009 Source: Lin and Wang (2008), updated based on UN Comtrade data.

Notes 1.

Lin and Wang 2008.

2.

Lange, Wodon, and Carey 2018.

3.

Greenwald and Stiglitz 2013.


BOX4.2 TheGrowthIdentificationandFacilitationFramework The six-step Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework can help policy makers in developing countries identify industries with latent comparative advantage and facilitate competitive private sector development: • Choosing the right target.
Policy makers should select as comparator countries dynamically growing coun- tries with a similar endowment structure to their own and with about 100 percent higher incomes per capita measured in purchasing power parity or those with similar incomes per capita 20 years ago.

They should then identify tradable goods and services that have grown well in those countries for the past 15–20 years.
These are likely to be new industries in their own countries that are consistent with their country’s la- tent comparative advantage, as countries with similar endowments are likely to have similar comparative advantage.

A fast-growing country that has produced certain goods and services for about 20 years will begin to lose its comparative advantage as wages rise, leaving space for countries with lower wages to enter.

• Assessing domestic private firms’ capacity and pro- duction costs.
Private domestic firms that are pres- ent in those industries will need tacit knowledge to lower costs and be competitive.1 Policy makers should identify the obstacles that prevent these firms from upgrading their products and the barriers that limit entry by other firms and then implement policies to remove the constraints and facilitate entry.

• Attracting global investors.


For industries in which no or only a few domestic firms are present, pol- icy makers should try to attract foreign direct in- vestment from the countries identified in step 1 or from other higher income countries producing those goods.

Foreign investors could bring in the general and tacit knowledge about a product’s de- sign, production technology, supply chain, and dis- tribution channels.
The government should also set up incubation programs to encourage startups in these industries.

• Scaling up self-discoveries.

In addition to the indus- tries identified in step 1, the government should pay attention to spontaneous self-discovery by private enterprises and support the scaling up of successful private innovation in new industries.
Rapid techno- logical change may give rise to new opportunities that would not have existed a decade or two earlier in the rapidly growing comparator countries.

Exam- ples include mobile phones and related e-services, social media, and green technologies.

• Recognizing the power of industrial parks.

In coun- tries with poor infrastructure and an unfriendly business environment, the government can set up special economic zones or industrial parks to re- duce barriers to firm entry and foreign investment.
These zones can create preferential business envi- ronments that most governments, constrained by low budgets and capacity, are unable to implement quickly economywide.

Establishing industrial parks or zones can also facilitate sustainable and green industrial clusters and reduce production and transaction costs.

• Providing limited incentives to the right industries.
Policy makers can compensate pioneer firms in the industries in which the country has a latent com- parative advantage with time-limited tax incen- tives, co-financing for investments, and access to foreign exchange to compensate for the external- ities created by first movers and to encourage firms to form clusters.

Because the identified industries are consistent with the country’s latent compara- tive advantage, the incentives should be limited in both time and cost.
To prevent rent-seeking and political capture, governments should avoid incen- tives that create monopoly rents, high tariffs, or other distortions.

Moreover, incentives should be linked to performance and be continuously evalu- ated against stated objectives.2 Notes 1.

Hausmann 2013.

2.

Lin 2012b.
Source: Lin and Monga 2010, 2011 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s n o i t p o m r e t - i m u d e m s ’ e w b a b m Z i 41 CHAPTER 5 Choosingtherighttarget T he first step in the Growth Identification and Facilitation Framework process is to choose the right target by identifying comparator countries — dynamically growing countries with a similar endowment structure to their own and an income per capita that is not too far ahead of the home country — and the tradable goods and services that they have been producing for about 20 years and that are declining, thereby providing opportunities for the home country.
For Zimbabwe, comparator countries were selected based on three criteria: an income per capita not exceeding 300 percent of Zim- babwe’s, consistent growth over the past 21 years (1995–2016), and good performance in manufacturing development as measured by manufacturing value added in GDP.

The most relevant comparator countries are Cambo- dia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (table 5.1).
Zimbabwe’s average income in 2011 interna- tional dollars in purchasing power parity terms declined from $2,488 in 1995 to $1,880 in 2016, in part because of macroeconomic misman- agement, poor governance, and trade sanc- tions.

Its structure of production remains that of a primary product exporter, similar to many countries in Africa.

Manufacturing value added in GDP was 9.6 percent in 2016.
The comparator countries include dynam- ically growing countries such as China (with manufacturing value added of 31 percent of GDP), Cambodia (17.2 percent), Lao PDR TABLE5.1 Zimbabweandidentifiedcomparatorandpeercountries Country Zimbabwe 1995 ($) 2,488 Comparator countries Cambodia China Lao PDR Myanmar Vietnam Peer countries Botswana Mozambique South Africa Zambia 1,103 2,564 2,023 927 2,042 8,904 373 9,177 2,029 GDPpercapita (2011internationaldollarsinpurchasingpowerparityterms) Shareof Zimbabwe(%) 100 44 103 81 37 82 358 15 369 82 2010 ($) 1,475 2,523 9,526 4,219 3,721 4,486 13,334 918 12,029 3,279 Shareof Zimbabwe(%) 100 171 646 286 252 304 904 62 816 222 2016 ($) 1,880 3,465 14,399 6,073 5,305 5,955 15,723 1,128 12,260 3,647 Average GDPgrowth percapita 1990–2016 (%) –1.0 5.5 8.6 5.5 8.6 5.5 2.9 5.2 1.5 2.7 Shareof Zimbabwe(%) 100 184 766 323 282 317 836 60 652 194 Manufacturing valueadded, 2016(%ofGDP) 9.6 17.2 30.1 8.8 22.8 15.6 5.7 9.5 13.3 8.1 Source: Calculated based on data from World Bank World Development Indicators database.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 43 (8.8 percent), Myanmar (22 percent), and Viet- nam (15.9 percent).
Although China’s income per capita is higher than that of Zimbabwe, it was selected because its development experience 20 years ago is highly relevant to Zimbabwe and FIGURE5.1 Zimbabwe’srevealedcomparativeadvantageatthetwo-digitlevel, 1990–2016 RCA 150 100 50 0 7 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, manufactures 68 Nonferrous metals 24 Cork and wood 21 Hides, skins, and furskins, raw 12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 97 Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and concentrates) 29 Crude fertilizers and crude materials 26 Textile fibers (except wool tops) 6 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Note: Revealed comparative advantage is the industry’s share in the country’s exports divided by its share in world exports, multiplied by 100.
Data are at the two-digit classifi- cation code level (Standard International Trade Classification revision 3).

Source: Calculated based on data from UN Comtrade.

because it is one of Zimbabwe’s top trade, aid, and foreign direct investment partners.

South Africa does not meet the criteria on economic growth but was selected as a peer country because of its geographic proximity.

Mozambique is growing rapidly but does not meet the criteria on income per capita but was selected as a peer country.
Zimbabwe’s existing comparative advantage What is the best way to measure the compar- ative advantage of a country like Zimbabwe?

A widely used measure for comparing one country’s export structure with that of other countries is revealed comparative advantage (RCA).
If Zimbabwe’s exports of commodity A account for a larger share in Zimbabwe’s total exports than commodity A’s share in world ex- ports, Zimbabwe has a revealed comparative advantage in commodity A (RCA > 1).43 This method is described in box 5.1.

At the two-digit classification code level (Standard International Trade Classification re- vision 3), Zimbabwe has a revealed comparative advantage in primary sectors such as agricul- ture and mining-related subsectors (figure 5.1).
BOX5.1 Measuringrevealedcomparativeadvantage Identifying existing comparative advan- tages is straightforward,1 as several estab- lished indicators can be used.

One es- tablished indicator is revea le d co m - advantage parative (RCA), which is calcu- lated as follows: RCAij = Xwt xwj Xit xij where xij is country i’s exports of product j, xwj is world exports of product j, Xit is the country’s total exports, and Xwt is world total exports.
Thus, if RCA < 1, the country has a re- vealed comparative disadvantage in the prod- uct, and if RCA > 1, the country has a revealed comparative advantage in the product.

Note 1.
Note 1.

Balassa 1965 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 44 Not surprisingly, Zimbabwe has a very strong comparative advantage in tobacco, nickel ores, ferro- alloys, diamonds, and gold — its top ex- ports in 2016.
At the four-digit code level, Zim- babwe has a revealed comparative advantage in 52 products, most notably cotton, cotton linters, and leather, which could be used as raw materials for labor-intensive industries such as textiles, garments, and footwear (table 5.2).

What sectors could Zimbabwe enter?


As labor and other costs rise in China (partic- ularly the eastern regions) and other emerging market countries, large and medium-size firms in those countries are “going global,” seeking new investment frontiers to relocate to other lower cost countries.

In doing so, they bring much-needed capital, technology, technical knowhow, tacit knowledge, experience, and market channels.
If Zimbabwe has latent (po- tential) comparative advantage in the sectors in which those firms operate, with lower transac- tion and logistic costs, and can provide a stable and reliable investment climate with low land and quality infrastructure in several special economic zones, it can attract multination- al corporations from advanced economies as TABLE5.2 Zimbabwe’srevealedcomparativeadvantageatthefour-digitlevel,2015and2016 Productcode Productdescription Revealedcomparativeadvantage 2015 2016 9710 8965 6715 6117 5322 2842 2841 2789 2771 2731 2632 2631 2473 1223 1213 1212 1211 741 611 593 14 Gold, nonmonetary (excluding gold) Collections and collectors’ pieces Other ferro-alloys (excluding radioactive ferro-alloys) Leather of other animals, without hair on Tanning extracts of vegetable origin Nickel mattes and nickel oxide sinters Nickel ores and concentrates Minerals, crude, not elsewhere specified Industrial diamonds, sorted Building or monumental (dimension) Cotton linters Cotton (other than linters) Wood rough, painted, preserved Other manufactured tobacco Tobacco refuse Tobacco, wholly/partly stemmed/stripped Tobacco, not stemmed/stripped Tea, whether or not flavored Sugars, beet or cane, raw, in solid Juice of any other single citrus fruit Poultry, live (fowls) Note: Revealed comparative advantage is the industry’s share in the country’s exports divided by its share in world exports, mul- tiplied by 100.
Data are at the four-digit classification code level (Standard International Trade Classification revision 3).

Source: Calculated based on data from UN Comtrade : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 45 well as from dynamic emerging market econo- mies such as China, India, Malaysia, Turkey, and South Africa.
The second part of step 1 is to identify the sectors in comparator countries in which re- vealed comparative advantages are declining by running a regression and identifying co- efficients that are negative and significant.

The changes in revealed comparative advantage in comparator countries are then examined over time.

Only subsectors in which revealed com- parative advantage is declining in at least two (out of four) comparator countries are con- sidered suitable for Zimbabwe to enter (table 5.3).
Though international opportunities exist in those sectors, investors may look to different countries based on investment climate and lo- cation, so the results here must be juxtaposed with those from step 2, assessing domestic pri- vate firms.
China has many sectors with a declining re- vealed comparative advantage, especially in labor-intensive and resource-intensive sectors such as agricultural products, footwear, textiles, garments, other vehicles, other manufacturing products, and travel goods, handbags and similar products (figure 5.2).

This is due in part to scarcity of land, water, and other resources and to rising labor costs.
In other words, China is losing com- parative advantage in producing those goods at home, and many companies are going abroad to find low-cost locations for their production base.

Zimbabwe and other African countries are well positioned to improve their investment cli- mate and attract these companies, to become the next global manufacturing base.
TABLE5.3 Subsectorsinwhichrevealedcomparativeadvantageisdeclininginatleasttwocomparator countriesandwhichZimbabwecouldpotentiallyenter Sector Animals, live, zoo animals, dogs, cats Cereals and cereal preparations Coal, coke, and briquettes Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, manufacture Crude animal and vegetable material Feeding stuff for animal Fixed vegetable oils and fats Footwear Inorganic chemicals Miscellaneous edible products and preparation Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit Travel goods, handbags and similar IsRCAforthesectordeclining?
Cambodia China South Africa LaoPDR Vietnam Numberofcountries whereRCAforthe sectorisdeclining No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 RCA is revealed comparative advantage.
Note: The calculation involved three steps: calculating the revealed comparative advantage over time for each sector at the three-digit level; regressing the revealed comparative advantage for each sector on time and determining whether it was de- clining (that is, if the coefficient was negative and statistically significant); and determining which sectors Zimbabwe could enter (those in which two or more countries have a declining revealed comparative advantage).
Source: Calculated based on data from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 46 Identifying sectors for quick wins in the short to medium term The analyses presented so far provide the basis for identifying Zimbabwe’s international mar- ket opportunities and its latent comparative advantage.
These analyses must be comple- mented by an examination of major constraints to and opportunities for the development of existing products and sectors.

Four criteria are used to winnow down the list of identified sectors: • Production requires low capital, and there is a significant domestic or regional market.
• Domestic production does not require sig- nificant power (electricity) or does not have high transport costs (no short-term need for substantial improvements in road and rail networks to move raw materials and output).

• Production in comparator countries is by small and medium-sized enterprises, which shows the potential for job creation in Zimbabwe.
• Zimbabwe’s factor endowment is well suited for production — some elements of the sup- ply chain are in place, revealed comparative advantage indexes or export specialization indexes indicate potential, and labor skill re- quirements are low or easily transferable.

Several sectors emerge as priorities in the short to medium term (1–5 years) by satisfy- ing all four criteria (table 5.4).
Some industries with potential for profitability (such as iron and steel, where a China-sponsored project was completed in 1999 and a new memorandum of understanding was signed in June 2018) are not listed as priority sectors because of their large capital requirements, sophisticated technolo- gy, and constraints in power (electricity), capi- tal, and labor skills in Zimbabwe.

There is scope for promoting links across priority sectors through value chains and clus- ters.
The Confederation of Zimbabwe Indus- tries and Ministry of Industry and Trade have FIGURE5.2 China’srevealedcomparativeadvantage,bysector,1990–2016 RCA 10 8 6 4 2 0 83 Travel goods, handbags, and similar 85 Footwear 84 Articles of apparel and clothing 81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating, and lighting 89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 82 Furniture and parts thereof 87 Professional, scientific & control 88 Photographic apparatus, optical goods 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Note: Revealed comparative advantage is the industry’s share in the country’s exports divided by its share in world exports, multiplied by 100.
Data are at the two-digit classifi- cation code level (Standard International Trade Classification revision 3).

Source: Calculated based on data from UN Comtrade.

identified 18 value chains that will link the re- source sectors (agriculture and mining) with manufacturing.

Backward, forward, and hori- zontal links with the mining industry can also be promoted.

• Agriculture, animal husbandry, and agri-business.
Because there are thousands of products in this sector, the specific prod- ucts to be encouraged will depend on de- cisions made by firms in a self-discovery process (see chapter 8).

This is Zimbabwe’s current export sector and existing compara- tive advantage.
The government should pro- vide more support by establishing agri-eco- logical zones (see chapter 10) and focus on rebuilding and strengthening the eight agriculture commodity industry clusters (horticulture, livestock and meat, legumes and oilseeds, tree crops, grains, cotton, to- bacco, and forestry and timber).
Useful les- sons for building capacity across selected value chains and program governance can : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 47 TABLE5.4 Prioritysubsectoridentificationusingthefourcriteriaforidentifyingsubsectorsforquickwinsin theshorttomediumterminZimbabwe Subsectors Sectora Agriculture and agri-business: animal husbandry, meat preparation, dairy production, cereals and cereal preparation (0–4), sugar, tea, coffee, animal feed (5–9), tobacco and similar (12), and cotton and similar (26) Criterion1 Criterion2 Criterion3 Criterion4 Decision Production requires low capital, and there is a significant domestic or regional market Domestic production does not require significant electricity and does not entail high transport costs Production in comparator countries is by small and medium-size enterprises Zimbabwe’s factor endowment is well suited for production Selected as priority sector or not Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (existing revealed competitive advantage) Textile fibers, crude fertilizer, mineral, metal ores, and metal scrap (25–29) No (capital intensive) No (needs stable power) No (large companies) Raw hide, skin, and fur (11–24); leather manufactures, rubber, and paper board (61–64) Yes Yes Declining Textile yarn, fabric, and art; iron and steel; nonferrous metals (65–69) No (capital intensive) No (needs stable power) No.
Rising No Yes No No Yes No Assembly opertions of bicycles, other road vehicles, and other (farm) machinery (71–79) Yes (assembly only) Yes (assembly only) Yes (assembly only) Yes (assembly only) Yes (assembly only) Travel goods and handbags and related handicrafts (81–83) Building fixtures (81–84) Footwear and accessories (code 85) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes a.

Drawn from 99 sectors from the standard World Integrade Trade Solution data.
Numbers in parentheses are Standard Inter- national Trade Classification codes.

Source: Based on authors’ analysis.

be drawn from the interventions to support and strengthen agri-business value chains by bilateral and multilateral partners since 2009.
Several such programs are being im- plemented on the ground, while others have recently ended, including the U.S. Agency for International Development–support- ed Zimbabwe Agricultural Competitiveness Program and Zimbabwe Agricultural Income and Employment Development Program, the CreateFund supported by the U.K. De- partment for International Development and the Danish International Development Agency, the EU Programme, and others.

• Tobacco.
• Tobacco.

Zimbabwe is one of the largest tobacco producers and exporters in the world and could move from the low end of the value chain (raw tobacco) to high value added products (manufactured ciga- rettes).

Tobacco makes a vital contribution to GDP, export revenues, and employment and is an important source of government revenue.

The number of registered growers increased from 81,801 in 2016 to 98,927 in 2017 — or 21 percent.
Tobacco exports were 182.3 million kilograms in 2017, up 11 percent from 2016, though export earnings were $904.4 million in 2017, down from $933.6 mil- lion in 2016.
China is the leading importer of Zimbabwean tobacco exports — consuming 60.8 million kilograms (at an average of $7.88 per kilogram) in 2017, which accounted for : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 48 33 percent of total tobacco exports, down from 42 percent in 2016 — followed by South Africa, Belgium, and Indonesia.44 Tobacco is sold at auction and then un- dergoes further processing by merchant companies to remove stems and tips from the leaf before being shipped abroad.
This adds 30–50 percent to the crop’s final ex- port value.

About 99 percent of the to- bacco that is produced is for export, which leaves only 1 percent for local processing and consumption.

Tobacco Processors Zim- babwe, founded in 1987, is one of the big- gest leaf processing companies in Africa.

It processes over 42 percent of Zimbabwe’s annual tobacco crop and exports the pro- cessed tobacco to cigarette manufacturers around the globe.

• Cotton.
• Cotton.

Exports are expanding in this sec- tor, which has the potential to create a large number of jobs.

In just 10 years, Cambo- dia’s garment sector created 335,400 jobs.

In Vietnam, the textile and garment sector employs 1 million workers.

If Zimbabwe can boost the sector’s growth rate to compara- ble levels, tens of thousands of jobs could be created in the medium term.
The Zimbabwean cotton value chain comprises five levels: seed cotton produc- tion, ginning, yarn spinning, textiles and dyeing, and clothing.

Zimbabwe has a com- parative advantage in seed cotton produc- tion, and cotton remains the mainstay of smallholder farmers in the drier regions of Midlands, Lowveld, and the Zambezi Valley of Zimbabwe.

It contributes to income, em- ployment, and export earnings.
More than 200,000 farmers directly depend on seed cotton production for their livelihood.45 Over 90 percent of cotton grown in Zim- babwe is contract growing through input funding arrangements by various ginners and merchants who are members of the Cotton Ginners Association.

Cotton is sold as lint or seed.

Lint is used to make clothes, blankets, and furniture fabrics in the textile industry, while seed is used to manufacture vegetable oil and livestock protein cake.
The lint and the seed is also exported for foreign currency.

In August 2014, Zimbabwe launched the Cotton to Clothing strategy with the tech- nical assistance of the International Trade Centre.

The strategy is to maximize value addition throughout the entire value chain of cotton to clothing.

It targets objectives that can be implemented in the short term with resources that are realistically available in the short term.
The strategy aims to cre- ate a foundation for even greater develop- ment of cotton to clothing in the long run.

• Assembly operations of farm tractors/ma- chinery and motorcycles.

Few companies in Zimbabwe assemble farm tractors, buses, and other vehicles.46 The country’s auto- motive sector includes four motor vehicle assemblers — Willowvale, Quest Motors, Deven Engineering, and AVM Africa Limited.
But the country’s only assembly plant, Wil- lowvale Mazda Motor Industries, stopped assembling vehicles in 2012 when annual production declined to below 4,000, from a peak of 18,000 in 1997.
There is also a cluster of companies that have developed interna- tional franchise arrangements with global brands such as Audi, Chevrolet, Ford, Isuzu, Mercedes Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo.47 In February 2018, the Government launched the Zimbabwe Motor Industry Development Policy 2018–30 to promote the growth of the local motor industry and increase capacity utilization by over 90 per- centage points by 2030.
More firms can be attracted to assemble similar equipment and machinery such as well-drillers, solar water heaters, and solar equipment using complete knock-down kits : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 49 • Building materials/fixtures and storage/ logistic facilities.
This sector has declined in comparator countries, and there is a huge demand for these materials in Zimbabwe and neighboring countries.

It is a labor- intensive sector that does not need high- skilled workers.

Constructing a storage and logistic center near Harare would not be difficult.

Several companies operate in this sector, including Bak Logistics, a subsidiary of Tobacco Sales Limited.
Several cement factories also operate, including Lafarge Cement Zimbabwe, PPC Zimbabwe, and Si- no-Zimbabwe Cement Company.

Lafarge Zimbabwe has a cement grinding capacity of 0.4 million ton per year, compared with 3.2 million tons for South Africa and 1.4 mil- lion tons for Zambia.

Lafarge Zimbabwe has a market capitalization of $112 million.48 • Tourism and light manufacturing related to tourism.

Zimbabwe saw 2,422,930 tourist ar- rivals in 2017, up 12 percent from 2,167,686 in 2016.
Growth in arrivals came from all source regions and most major markets, particular- ly Europe, North America, and Asia.

Tourism receipts were $917 million in 2017, up 12 per- cent from $819 million in 2016, in line with the increase in tourist arrivals.49 Examples of light manufacturing related to tourism include handicrafts and hand- bags made of cotton and wool.

• Leather.
• Leather.

The leather sector peaked in 2000, at more than 17 million pairs of leather shoes a year, but production has fallen because of the economic crisis and stiff competition from cheap imports, especially from China.

In 2011, Zimbabwe produced around 1 million shoes a year.

Some 63 percent of the hide that is exported from Zimbabwe is in its raw form, with no value added to it.
This has led to a serious shortage of raw material and forced half the country’s tanneries to shut down or incur debt to pay premium prices for hides.50 Out of nine tanneries, only four were reported to be operating in 2013.

This shows the need for companies that process and manufacture leather products.

Oppor- tunities exists across the whole leather value chain, from cattle ranching (given that the national heard is depleted) to processing and manufacturing.
Bata Shoe Company is one of the big- gest players in the footwear industry.

It has helped some of its former employees by leasing them machinery to produce leather uppers for shoes.

This has led to the forma- tion of several small and medium-size enter- prises that employ up to 40 workers with re- liable equipment and a steady buyer (Bata).

But because of the economic challenges and high operating costs, Bata finds it dif- ficult to compete with imports from other countries.

• Clothing.
• Clothing.

The clothing industry was heavily affected by the economic meltdown and in- flux of cheap imports.

Textile manufacturing was once an important industry but became uncompetitive in the face of cheap imports, which flooded the country.

The econom- ic meltdown resulted in the vast majority of Zimbabweans relying on secondhand clothes that came in bales from Mozam- bique.

These cheap imports coupled with economic turmoil resulted in the collapse of the clothing industry.
Carousel (Private) Limited is the manu- facturing division of Edgars Stores Limited and has been one of the main producers of clothing in Zimbabwe since 1974.

Locat- ed in Bulawayo, it produces a wide range of denim, ladies wear, and men’s casual wear for Edgars’ retail divisions and other retail- ers.

Carousel is the second biggest employer in the industry after Paramount Garments (also known as Archer Clothing).
Established in 1953, Paramount has built a strong reputa- tion and supplies various retailers and brand houses such as Dayton Hudson Corporation : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 50 Eddie Bauer, Edgars, Gap, Haggar, Nicole Miller, Pringle, Sanetta, and Woolworths.

It employs more than 1,000 workers and is currently the biggest employer in the sector.
These companies have been able to survive because of economies of scale and because of the niche market of people in the formal sector who can afford to buy clothes that are considered expensive by an average Zimbabwean.

• Cooking oil.

Surface Wilmar is a fast growing company at the forefront of oil processing and expressing technology.

Founded in 2006 and situated in Chitungwiza, Surface Wil- mar is the largest cooking oil manufacturer in Southern Africa.
Its business activities in- clude oil seed crushing, edible oils refining, manufacturing of consumer products and soya meal, and cotton hulls production.

Its consumer products include Puredrop cook- ing oil, Excella rice, and Golden Glow.
United Refineries manufactures cooking oil under the brands Roil (one of the leading cooking oil brands in the country and certified by the Standard Association of Zimbabwe) and Sunshine (a 100 percent soya bean–based brand that is not as common as Roil), wash- ing soap under the brands Impala and Olive, and bath soap under the brands Imperial Leather and Vogue.

• Cereal.

Cereal production has been rising, and in 2017, Zimbabwe recorded a surplus in maize production.
The forecast for cereal production 2018 is just under 2 million tons, down 24 percent from 2017 but still above the previous five-year average.

Maize pro- duction is expected to decrease by 21 per- cent in 2018, while sorghum and millet pro- duction are expected to be half their 2017 levels.

Factors weighing down production include low productivity, environmental challenges and climate change, pricing re- gime, high cost of inputs and utilities, and funding challenges.
Price floors are a se- rious challenge to the competitiveness across the value chain because the gov- ernment sets price floors that are above regional prices to encourage local millers to support its agriculture schemes or com- mand agriculture.

Nestlé Zimbabwe is one of the biggest cereal production companies in Zimbabwe, with offices in all major cities (Bulawayo, Gweru, Harare, Mutare, and Masvingo).

Nestlé Zimbabwe supplies its products to the local market and exports to Malawi and Zambia.
National Foods is a diversified con- glomerate and one of the largest manufac- turers and marketers of food products in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa.

It has been milling for more than 90 years in Zimbabwe.

When the company was established in 1920, its main focus was small-scale milling, but it now has the resources, technology, and workforce to feed millions of people.

The company’s flagship brands include Gloria, Red Seal, NF Stockfeeds, Pearlenta, Mahat- ma, Rosetta, Snow White, and Better Buy.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | t e g r a t t h g i r e h t g n i s o o h C 51 CHAPTER 6 Assessingdomesticprivatefirms’ capacityandproductioncosts A fter identifying the target countries and sectors that Zimbabwe could enter, it is necessary to assess whether domestic private firms already operate in those sectors and identify any constraints and how to overcome them.
Private domestic firms that are present in those industries will need tacit knowledge to lower costs and be competitive.51 Policy makers should identify the obstacles that prevent these firms from upgrading their products and the barriers that limit entry by other private firms and then implement pol- icies to remove the constraints and facilitate entry.
In Zimbabwe, private sector develop- ment is hampered by macroeconomic instabil- ity; lack of financing, land tenure, and condu- cive investment regulations; high input costs; outdated machinery; inefficient government bureaucracy; and infrastructure (particularly in energy).

These factors have led to Zimbabwe’s low ranking on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index.
Small improve- ments in dealing with construction permits, registering property, and resolving insolven- cy were outweighed by losses in all the other measures except enforcing contracts, which remained unchanged.

Private investments were severely depressed because of high credit risk and lack of credit.

Zimbabwe ranked 159 out of 190 countries in 2018, down from 161 in 2017. inadequate Weighted capacity utilization in manufac- turing fell from 47.4 percent in 2016 to 45.1 per- cent in 2017.
Table 6.1 outlines the constraints identified from the 2017 manufacturing sector survey.
According to The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, the 10 most problemat- ic factors for doing business in Zimbabwe are instability (8.8 percent), policy instability (19.3 percent), foreign curren- cy regulations (15.9 percent), inefficient gov- ernment bureaucracy (13.6 percent), access to finance (10.5 percent), corruption (9.2 percent), government inade- quate supply of infrastructure (8.3 percent), tax rates (4.6 percent), restrictive labor regulations (4.4 percent), and tax regulations (4.1 percent).52 This step also assesses the labor and logis- tics costs that private firms in the targeted sectors face as major impediments.
Zimbabwe has higher labor costs than neighboring coun- tries do (tables 6.2 and 6.3).

It had the highest minimum wage in the construction sector in 2010 ($311), followed by South Africa ($243) and Namibia at ($215; table 6.4).
And the average real earnings index (which includes all non- wage costs related to employing workers) for TABLE6.1 CapacityconstraintsinZimbabwe,2017 Constraint Cost or shortage of raw materials Low local demand Forex shortage Competition from imports Antiquated machinery and machine breakdowns Capital constraints High cost of doing business Liquidity crisis Drawbacks from current economic environment Access to finance Competition from local producers Power and water shortages Other Shareoftotal(%) 19.6 17.8 13.8 8.6 8.6 6.9 6.5 6.2 4.5 4.5 1.4 1.0 0.7 Source: 2017 Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries Manufacturing Sector Survey.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t s o c n o i t c u d o r p d n a y t i c a p a c ’ s m r fi e t a v i r p c i t s e m o d g n i s s e s s A 53 TABLE6.2 Entry-levelbluecollarlaborcostsinZimbabweandselected countries TABLE6.4 Minimumwagesintheconstructionsectorin Zimbabweandselectedcountries,2017 Country Zimbabwe South Africa Namibia Zambia Botswana Mozambique Malawi Minimumwage($) 310.76 242.88 214.72 108.00 102.08 89.34 30.00 Countryandyear Bangladesh, 2013 Entry-levelmonthlywageorminimumwagea($) 68 in garment industry; 19 in other sectors China (Southern coastal areas), 2017 659 India (varies by region and sector), 2014 48–116 Kenya, 2013 57 in rural areas 139 in urban areas Lesotho (varies by sector), 2014 102–112 Nigeria, 2011 115 Vietnam (varies by region), 2015 101–145 Ethiopia, 2014 Zimbabwe 35–40 in the garment and shoemaking industries 267 for low-skilled labor; 275 living wage per individualb a.
Except for Ethiopia, the official minimum monthly wage is used as a proxy for en- try-level labor costs.

b. https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/unemployment-rate.

Source: Calculated based on data from http://www.wikipedia.org and staff estimates.
TABLE6.3 MinimumwageinZimbabwe,bysector,2012–18 $ Sector Agriculture Banking Cement and lime Clothing Construction Commercial Detergents, edible oils, and fats Engineering Food processing Hotel and catering Soft drinks Baking Poverty line — is not available.
2012 59.00 633.49 298.10 155.09 258.72 — 192.24 240.00 242.35 175.00 211.00 — 539.80 2013 65.00 633.49 314.50 166.57 276.32 — — Source: Data derived from National Employment Councils.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t s o c n o i t c u d o r p d n a y t i c a p a c ’ s m r fi e t a v i r p c i t s e m o d g n i s s e s s A 54 TABLE6.5 RealaverageearningsindexinZimbabwe,bysector,2009–14 Sector Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Electricity and water Construction Financial services and real estate Distribution Transport and communication Public administration Education Health Private domestic services Other Total Source: ZIMSTAT.
Zimbabwe’s whole economy declined mark- edly from 159 in 2010 to 95.7 in 2014, which re- flects a weakening economy (table 6.5).
Logistics costs stem from poor infrastructure and logistics services.

The ease of moving goods and services across borders is an indicator of the quality of trade and facilitation in a coun- try.
The World Bank ranked Zimbabwe 172 out of 183 countries — not good given that the coun- try is landlocked and that connectivity to the regional transport system is needed to promote economic activity and cross-border trade.53 The World Bank Logistic Performance Index ranked Zimbabwe 151 out of 160 countries in 2016.
In 2016, the lead time for sea port or air- port supply chain was 5 days for Zimbabwe, compared with 2–3 days for comparator coun- tries, the lead time for land export was 9 days for Zimbabwe, compared with 3–6 days for comparator countries, and the lead time for sea and airport import was 10 days for Zim- babwe, compared with 3–5 days for compara- tor countries (table 6.6).54 In 2014, the cost as- sociated with the land export supply chain was $1,500 for Zimbabwe, compared with $2,236 for Ethiopia, $1,846 for South Africa, $707 for Cam- bodia, $683 for China, and $274 for Vietnam.
The cost associated with the land import sup- ply chain was $1,732 for Zimbabwe, compared with $2,739 for Ethiopia, $2,141 for South Afri- ca, $2,000 for Lao PDR, $514 for China, $465 for Cambodia, and $354 for Vietnam.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t s o c n o i t c u d o r p d n a y t i c a p a c ’ s m r fi e t a v i r p c i t s e m o d g n i s s e s s A 55 TABLE6.6 LogisticPerformanceIndexindicators,Zimbabweandcomparatorcountries,2016 Indicator Zimbabwe Cambodia China Ethiopia LaoPDR SouthAfrica Vietnam Logistics Performance Index rank 151 Export time and cost (sea port or airport supply chain) Distance (kilometers) Lead time (days) Cost ($)a Export time and cost (land supply chain) Distance (kilometers) Lead time (days) Cost ($)a 760 5 1,732 2,381 9 1,500 Import time and cost (sea port or airport supply chain) 73 87 3 469 178 5 707 87 4 397 407 6 465 27 130 3 494 402 6 683 187 5 683 649 9 514 126 — — 152 750 2 1,500 2,000 750 6 2,236 — — 1,500 750 3 2,739 — — — — — — Distance (kilometers) Lead time (days) Cost ($)a Import time and cost (land supply chain) Distance (kilometers) Lead time (days) Cost ($)a Other indicators Shipments meeting quality criteria (%) Clearance time without physical inspection (days) Clearance time with physical inspection (days) Physical inspection (%) Multiple inspection (%) — is not available.
a.

Data are for 2014.

Source: World Bank 2016a.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s t s o c n o i t c u d o r p d n a y t i c a p a c ’ s m r fi e t a v i r p c i t s e m o d g n i s s e s s A 56 CHAPTER 7 Attractingglobalinvestors F or industries in which no or only a few domestic firms are present, policy mak- ers should try to attract foreign direct in- vestment (FDI) from the countries identified in step 1 or from other higher income countries producing those goods.
Foreign investors could bring in the general and tacit knowledge about a product’s design, production technology, supply chain, and distribution channels.

The government should also set up incubation pro- grams to encourage startups in these industries.

Since 2009, the government has attempt- ed to attract FDI through several measures.

But barriers such as the indigenization law and economic empowerment laws and limited pro- tection of property rights are significant.
BMI ranks Zimbabwe 45 out of 48 countries in Sub- Saharan Africa for investment attractiveness because of deteriorating economic growth, political instability, and doubts over credit- worthiness of the government (which does not have a sovereign credit rating).55 In the first half of 2018, Zimbabwe received FDI commitments of $11 billion, up from $330 million in 2016.

No information is avail- able on the decomposition by sectors.
In- ward FDI flows rose from $23 million in 2000 to $545 million in 2014 before declining to $319 million in 2016 (table 7.1).

Inward FDI flows as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.31 per- cent in 2000 to 3.84 percent in 2014 before declining to 2.35 percent in 2016.

Inward FDI flows have been affected by the high cost of doing business, which adversely affects the return on investment.
The current govern- ment reforms to the business environment are expected to have a positive impact on in- ward FDI flows.

By contrast, inward FDI stock rose from $1.2 billion in 2000 to $4.3 billion in 2016.

The country accounts for a very small share of total world FDI flows: 0.018 percent in 2016.

Manufacturing, mining, and services led in foreign investment projects approved over 2010–17 (table 7.2).
Total investments approved increased from $521 million in 2010 to $6.6 bil- lion in 2011 before declining to about $1.5 billion in 2017.
TABLE7.1 Zimbabwe’sinwardforeigndirectinvestment,2000–16 Indicator Inward flows ($ million) Inward stock ($ million) Inward flows (% of GDP) Inward flows (% of gross fixed capital formation) — Inward flows (% of world total) 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.024 0.025 0.028 0.041 0.024 0.018 — is not available.
Source: UNCTADstat.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s r o t s e v n i l a b o g l g n i t c a r t t A 57 TABLE7.2 Foreigninvestment(includingjointventures)approvedbytheZimbabweInvestmentAuthority,by sector,2010–17 $ million Sector Agriculture Construction Manufacturing Mining Services Tourism Transport Energy Total 2010 2.1 258.8 53.1 186.1 18.1 510.0 1.7 — 2011 444.8 120.9 670.0 3,687.3 128,099.3 1,583.1 — — 2012 20.8 119.8 58.1 688.1 41.7 1.1 0.2 — 2013 2.5 129.5 158.0 214.9 172.4 3.4 5.3 — 2014 10.5 33.5 646.8 159.7 286.3 3.3 2.4 — — is not available.
Source: Zimbabwe Investment Authority database.
TABLE7.3 Employmentatfirmswithforeigninvestment(includingjointventures)enterprisesapprovedbythe ZimbabweInvestmentAuthority,bysector,2009–16 $ million Sector Agriculture Construction Manufacturing Mining Services Tourism Transport Energy Total 2009 548 319 3,201 6,483 665 163 82 — 2010 7 689 2,912 2,694 742 38 89 — 2011 518 2,120 6,049 8,256 5,749 3,160 0 — 2012 370 427 1,655 4,554 2,422 22 19 — 2013 24 428 2,805 3,361 1,787 227 91 — 2014 240 1,017 3,685 3,241 1,175 103 126 — 2015 637 1,892 6,284 1,974 2,320 36 65 240 2016 856 171 2,003 2,966 2,129 148 246 750 11,461 7,171 25,852 9,469 8,723 9,587 13,449 9,270 — is not available.
Source: Zimbabwe Investment Authority database.

Total employment in Zimbabwe Investment Authority–approved investments peaked at 25,852 in 2011 before declining to 9,270 in 2016 (table 7.3).

China has emerged as Zimbabwe’s largest trade and investment partner.

Mining, man- ufacturing, and services are again the leading sectors in approved foreign investment from China (table 7.4).
Chinese investment also fo- cuses on infrastructure development, manu- facturing, agricultural development, and mining (platinum, gold, diamonds, iron ore, and coal; box 7.1).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s r o t s e v n i l a b o g l g n i t c a r t t A 58 TABLE7.4 Foreigninvestment(includingjointventures)fromChinaapprovedbytheZimbabweInvestment Authority,bysector,2010–17 $ million Sector Agriculture Construction Manufacturing Mining Services Tourism Transport Energy Total 2010 — 1.2 27.2 39.9 4.2 — — — 2011 444.8 30.5 114.4 494.5 13.6 0.5 — — 2012 18.6 7.4 35.6 583.1 23.0 0.3 — — 2013 2.5 123.3 99.4 105.9 58.1 0.4 — — 2014 2015 2016 2017 9.5 25.0 149.4 35.1 18.9 — 1.0 — 3.1 4.2 74.5 57.6 9.2 — 1.6 — 1.0 22.7 107.3 65.2 21.3 0.6 2.5 — 0.8 1.3 32.8 163.9 28.4 — 0.3 65.0 292.5 72.5 1,098.2 668.0 389.5 238.9 188.6 220.5 — is not available.
Source: Zimbabwe Investment Authority database.

BOX7.1 ChineseinvestmentinZimbabweanditsdecomposition In the last two decades, China has emerged as Zimba- bwe’s largest aid, investment, and South–South coop- eration partner.

Chinese investment focuses on four areas: • Infrastructure development.

Building roads, power stations, schools, and hospitals has been the most visible part of Chinese investment.
In 2015, the state-owned Power Construction Corpora- tion of China signed a $1.2 billion deal to expand the Hwange Thermal Power Station, Zimbabwe’s largest thermal power plant.

The project will add 600 megawatts to the plant’s total capacity.

And China’s Sinohydro Group is expanding the Kariba South Power Station in a $355 million project to be completed in 2018.1 • Manufacturing.
With the support of buyer’s credit from the Export Import Bank of China, the China Capital Iron and Steel Corporation took part in the reconstruction of the number 4 blast furnace of the Zimbabwean Iron and Steel Corporation.

The project was completed in June 1999.

• Agricultural development.

China has made signifi- cant investments in Zimbabwe’s farm mechaniza- tion program and in the tobacco industry.
Chinese investors also till land under contract farming,2 meaning that they manage the land but do not have freehold ownership of it (interview with the Embassy of Zimbabwe in Beijing, 2012).

• Mining.

Chinese investments are found mainly in the mining of platinum, gold, diamonds, iron ore, and coal.

In 2009 China paid $3 billion for exclusive access to Zimbabwe’s extensive platinum rights, a contract estimated to be worth $40 billion.3 Notes 1.

Zhou 2018.

2.
Zhou 2018.

2.

On Chinese investment in Zimbabwe’s agricultural develop- ment, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3UcdfaOD50.

3.

Smith 2011.
Source: Mapaure 2014 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s r o t s e v n i l a b o g l g n i t c a r t t A 59 CHAPTER 8 Scalingupself-discoveries,recognizingthe powerofindustrialparks,andproviding limitedincentivestotherightindustries Scaling up self-discoveries I n addition to the industries identified in step 1, the government should pay attention to spontaneous self-discovery by private enter- prises and support the scaling up of success- ful private innovation in new industries.
Rapid technological change may give rise to new op- portunities that would not have existed a de- cade or two earlier in the rapidly growing com- parator countries.

Examples include mobile phones and related e-services, social media, and green technologies.
The government has taken some actions to improve investment climate by: • Approving the SME Infrastructure Develop- ment Policy, which compels local authorities to provide adequate infrastructure for small and medium-size enterprises in both urban and rural areas.

• Setting up a one-stop-shop to reduce the time needed to register a new business.

• Ring fencing at least 30 percent of revenue collection from small and medium-size en- terprises by local authorities.
• Recapitalizing the Small and Medium Enter- prises Development Corporation by $2 mil- lion in the 2018 budget.

• Launching a $90 million funding package in 2017 aimed at capacitating various up-and- coming businesses.56 • Licensing of the Zimbabwe Women Microfi- nance Bank Limited in May 2018, which pro- vides deposit and lending services to female entrepreneurs to enhance their financial in- clusion through access credit at concession- ary rates.
The bank, which is wholly owned by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, will part- ner with the government-owned People’s Own Savings Bank, which has 34 branches countrywide, largely in rural areas.

These were steps in the right direction.

Going forward, the government and private stakeholders must pay attention to the relevant policies needed to encourage self-discoveries.
Recognizing the power of industrial parks Many African countries, including Zimbabwe, have identified special economic zones (SEZs) as a key pillar to attract foreign direct invest- ment and increase competitiveness in the pro- duction of goods and services.

The Zimbabwe government passed the Special Economic Zones Act (Chapter 14:34) in 2016.

The SEZs model is aligned to Africa’s Agenda 2063 with a focus on value addition.

Zimbabwe plans to set up SEZs in new areas to attract foreign direct investment.
Bulawayo and Harare are focusing on reindustrialization, while agriculture-based provinces are focusing on agro-processing, TABLE8.1 IdentifiedspecialeconomiczoneprojectsinZimbabwe Project Tourism-focused Location Victoria Falls Integrated industrial park (technology hub) Sunway City, Harare Leather and textile manufacturing Diamond cutting and polishing Bulawayo Harare and Mutare Chemical manufacture (exploiting coal bed methane) Lupane Source: Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment Promotion 2017 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e i r e v o c s i d - f l e s p u g n i l a c S 61 TABLE8.2 TypesofspecialeconomiczoneprojectsinZimbabwe Typeofproject Description Single factory Factories and companies operating at very low capacity or idle infrastructure Product specific Priority products to qualify for special incentives Multisectoral Designating specific sectors and geographic areas Industrial park For industrial development Knowledge based Using human capital Source: Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment Promotion 2017. with tourism centers being turned into tourist zones (tables 8.1 and 8.2).
While the Special Economic Zone Act was finalized in 2016, its implementation has been slow.

One of the main issues is inadequate pol- icy research and guidance on which sectors should be targeted, how to target promotion of foreign direct investment, and what policy measures have been announced but not im- plemented (see chapter 10).

Implementation of SEZs is also being hampered by the delays in the gazetting of the nonfiscal regulations and incentives by the government.
No investment projects have yet been processed under an SEZ.

Providing limited incentives to the right industries Policy makers can compensate pioneer firms in the industries in which the country has a la- tent comparative advantage with time-limited tax incentives, co-financing for investments, or access to foreign exchange to compensate for the externalities created by first movers and to encourage firms to form clusters.
Be- cause the identified industries are consistent with the country’s latent comparative ad- vantage, the incentives should be limited in both time and cost.

To prevent rent-seeking and political capture, governments should avoid incentives that create monopoly rents, high tariffs, or other distortions.
Moreover, incentives should be linked to performance and be continuously evaluated against stated objectives.57 According to Zimbabwe government regula- tions, SEZs will offer foreign investors tax and administrative benefits and incentives, though it is unclear how many of these policies have been implemented (table 8.3).

In addition, for- eign investors will not have to comply with the indigenization laws in the SEZs.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e i r e v o c s i d - f l e s p u g n i l a c S 62 TABLE8.3 ProposedfiscalandnonfiscalincentivesforspecialeconomiczonesinZimbabwe Incentive Fiscal incentives Corporate tax Description Exemption from corporate income tax for the first five years of operation.

Thereafter, a corporate tax rate of 15 percent applies.
Special initial allowance Special initial allowance on capital equipment to be allowed at the rate of 50 percent of cost from year one and 25 percent in the subsequent two years.

Employees’ tax Specialized expatriate staff will be taxed at a flat rate of 15 percent Nonresident withholding tax on fees Exemption from nonresident tax on fees on services that are not locally available.

Nonresident withholding tax on royalties Exemption from nonresident tax on royalties.
Nonresident withholding tax on dividends Exemption from nonresident tax on dividends.

Customs duty on capital equipment Capital equipment for special economic zones will be imported duty free.

Customs duty on raw materials Inputs that include raw materials and intermediate products imported for use by companies set up in special economic zones will be imported duty free.

However, the duty exemption will not apply where such raw materials are produced locally.
Nonfiscal incentives Land tenure Investors shall enjoy a 50-year lease, and where they purchase urban land, they shall duly receive their title deeds.

One-stop-shop investment services Single-window facility for investment registration, clearances through the one-stop-shop investment center in each enclave/zone.
New clean technologies All importation of clean technologies, those that pretreat effluent, solid waste, and emissions to the blue and green bands shall be duty free to promote the use of environmentally friendly technology.

Ownership Ownership of companies in special economic zones should be 100 percent, as per international best practice.

Capital and profit repatriation Investors are entitled to repatriate 100 percent of capital and profits.
Medium of exchange The use of the multicurrency regime shall persist.

Work and residence permits Automatic work and residence permits for expatriates and investors.

Water and energy supply Dedicated water and energy supply in special economic zones.

Offshore borrowing Investors will be allowed to borrow offshore without Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe approval.

Local government taxes and levies on land Exemption from local government taxes and levies on underdeveloped land.
Source: Ministry of Macro-Economic Planning and Investment Promotion 2017 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e i r e v o c s i d - f l e s p u g n i l a c S 63 CHAPTER 9 Twopromisingsectorsto spurgrowth T his chapter discusses the opportuni- (table 9.1).

Exports depend heavily on primary commodities, with agricultural exports concen- trated on a single commodity: tobacco (table 9.2).
The key questions are how to overcome these challenges to start structural upgrading and which African countries with a similar ag- ricultural endowment can set an example for ties in two sectors for spurring growth.
First is agricultural development, which can be a foundation for inclusive growth, ex- port diversification, and structural upgrading in Africa through diversification of agricultural export earnings and development of supply chain trade (processing and market access to high-value products).58 Second is eco-tourism, which given Zimbabwe’s enormous natural resources endowment and tourism’s success elsewhere as an engine for job creation and export growth and diversification presents one of the quickest paths to prosperity.
Agricultural development as the foundation The optimism in agriculture as a driver for growth and transformation has been widely shared in Zimbabwe since the peaceful transi- tion of power in 2017.

As Theo de Jager, pres- ident of the World Farmers’ Organisation in Africa, said, “Zimbabwe was once a very pro- ductive agricultural country and in the lead in many agricultural industries.

It has a strong educational system, a highly competitive spirit and definitely a lot of potential.
The country’s infrastructure is still in relatively good condi- tion and a turnaround in its agricultural sector is a definite possibility if certain factors are put in place.” But transforming the strategy of agricul- ture-led growth and structural upgrading into reality faces major challenges.
Agricultural growth since 2010 has been remarkably uneven, with a major contraction in 2015 and 2016, while manufacturing has been steadily declining TABLE9.1 Growthofgrossdomesticproductincurrentprices,bysector,2010–16 Percent Industry 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Agriculture, hunting, and fishing 11.44 Mining and quarrying 43.08 Manufacturing Electricity and water Construction Finance and insurance 4.00 28.81 33.26 5.61 25.41 16.66 21.62 12.66 –0.93 5.70 9.77 2.73 11.55 2.62 9.77 5.96 25.00 –2.49 –3.00 –5.84 –0.48 –3.31 –2.16 11.89 0.41 11.05 6.88 –2.43 –46.20 0.07 3.62 58.35 30.37 8.26 13.70 33.98 13.78 7.62 –1.31 10.05 Source: Zimbabwe National budget statement 2017.
TABLE9.2 Zimbabwe’smainexportsandimports,2014–16 Commodity Exports (% of total) Precious metals Tobacco Mineral ores Iron and steel Imports (% of total) Fuels Cereals Machinery Vehicles 2014 2015 2016 30 27 12 9 25 5 9 9 31 33 8 6 26 7 9 8 36 33 11 4 29 10 9 7 Source: International Trade Centre Trade Map database.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 65 Zimbabwe in pursuing agriculture- led growth and structural change.
Of three African countries that have com- parable agricultural endowment and close proximity to Zimbabwe, Ethiopia is the most suitable comparator, and its recent growth successful particular experience — in its agriculture- led strategy — industrialization presents a good case study for Zimbabwe (table 9.3).59 Ethiopia’s experience in agricultural development Ethiopia has seen rapid and stable growth since the early 2000s.
Real GDP growth averaged 10.9 percent during 2004–14, the highest in Sub- Saharan Africa.

It jumped from being the 2nd poorest country in the world in 2000 to being the 11th poorest in 2014 and is on course to reach middle-income status by 2025.60 Ag- riculture has played a key role in sustaining growth, creating jobs, and diversifying exports.

Of the 10.9 percent average growth in 2004–14, services accounted for 5.4 percentage points, agriculture 3.6 percentage points, and industry 1.7 percentage points.
Ethiopia’s agricultural output more than doubled over the last decade, with annual growth averaging 7.6 percent, mainly because of a significant improvement in productivi- ty.
Total factor productivity grew 2.3 percent a year, thanks to increased use of modern in- puts (such as chemical fertilizers and improved seeds), significant land expansion, an improved road network, higher rural education levels, and favorable international and local price in- centives.61 The agricultural sector accounted for more than 72 percent of the 11.6 million jobs created over the past 15 years.

Export growth in agriculture was also ac- companied by diversification.
The expansion of horticulture and the cut flower industry, to- gether with other high-value cash crops, marks a spectacular export success, contributing to rapid export growth and diversification.

Ethio- pia ranks among the top eight exporters world- wide in three products: sesame seeds (second), cut flowers (fourth), and coffee beans (eighth).

Ethiopia’s success in developing its horticul- ture industry is attributable largely to target- ed public investment in air services exports.
Indeed, a decisive factor in the exponential growth of the flower industry is the expansion of Ethiopian Airlines’ cargo capacity and pas- senger flights, with new routes to the Republic of Korea and Singapore.
Investment in key in- frastructure is critical to an agriculture- led in- dustrialization strategy.62 Ethiopia’s sustained and inclusive growth was achieved through an agriculture- led indus- trialization strategy that was compatible with local comparative advantage combined with TABLE9.3 Agriculturalendowment:across-countrycomparison Ruralpopulation (%oftotal population) 2016 Landarea (thousandsq. km) 2016 Landuse(%oftotal) Forestarea 2015 Permanent cropland 2015 Arableland 2015 Arableland (hectaresper person) 2015 80 74 35 68 1,000.0 569.1 1,213.1 386.9 12.5 7.8 7.6 36.4 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.3 15.1 10.2 10.3 10.3 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.25 Country Ethiopia Kenya South Africa Zimbabwe Source: World Bank data.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 66 strong government support of infrastructure investment and adoption of a wide range of financing policies.63 First, the government fol- lowed a path that was compatible with local comparative advantage.
For example, agricul- ture features much more prominently in the Ethiopian development strategy than in the strategies of East Asian countries, where the economic transformation has been driven mainly by private small-scale manufacturing firms.

Second, the government demonstrated a strong commitment to agricultural devel- opment and made a large investment in in- frastructure and extension services early on, laying the foundation for the agriculture- led structural upgrading.
The country’s budget prioritizes sectors with large growth and pov- erty reduction impact, including agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, roads, health, and education.

In 2012/13, public invest- ment in those areas accounted for over 70 per- cent of general government spending.

These policies laid the foundation for the 10.9 per- cent annual growth in 2004–14.
Third, infrastructure development was fi- nanced through a variety of arrangements, including prioritizing investment in public in- frastructure (by restraining government con- sumption) and mobilizing external concessional and nonconcessional financing.

Is Ethiopia’s growth model replicable in Zimbabwe?


Ethiopia’s agriculture- led industrialization strat- egy is highly applicable in Zimbabwe given the countries’ similar agriculture endowments, and it can succeed there with strong government commitment and investment in essential infra- structure.

Despite the many serious challenges facing Zimbabwe’s economy, this optimistic outlook rests on three factors.

First, the new government’s economic recovery plan names revitalizing agriculture as a priority.
Second, in addition to the traditional EU market, now accessible since the lifting of trade sanctions, South East Asia — in particular China — has emerged as a giant new market for Zimbabwe’s agricultural and horticultural ex- ports.

Zimbabwe’s exports of horticultural pro- duce to the European Union rose to $54 million in 2015 from $21.3 million in 2014.

Demand for peas and macadamia nuts has been booming in China; Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; and Viet- nam.
In 2016, Zimbabwe exported $9.2 million worth of macadamia nuts to China; Hong Kong, China; and South Africa.

Third, China has emerged as both the major export market for and the biggest source of foreign direct investment in Zimbabwe’s agri- cultural sector.

The Chinese tobacco company Tianze has helped revive Zimbabwe’s tobacco output by investing $40 million a year in inter- est-free loans and subsidized inputs and pro- viding technical support, training, and other services to contracted farmers.
Zimbabwe’s tobacco output has rebounded to 217 million kilograms in 2014, just short the peak of 231 mil- lion kilograms in 2001.64 The Chinese invest- ment and collaboration can be game changers in modernizing Zimbabwe’s agriculture (box 9.1).

To replicate Ethiopia’s successful agriculture- led industrialization strategy in Zimbabwe, the first step is to diversify exports and develop the agricultural processing sector.
In contrast to Ethiopia, one of the major constraints fac- ing Zimbabwe’s government is a shortage of financing.

So the government’s strong commit- ment to financing extension services and infra- structure investment is likely constrained in the short term.

But relying on the large inflow of foreign direct investment in agriculture from China and other countries presents both op- portunities and challenges.
For example, tobac- co’s contribution to total exports increased by 6 percentage points from 2014 to 2016, possibly as a result of the massive Chinese investment (see table 9.2).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 67 BOX9.1 China’sagriculturaltechnologicalassistanceandinvestmentinZimbabwe Since the 2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Summit in Beijing, the Chinese government has pro- vided major technical assistance programs, in partic- ular deploying Chinese agricultural experts to African countries to introduce and transfer new agricultural technology developed in China, develop agricultural demonstration centers, train local staff, and provide a variety of technical advice to local farmers.
After a decade of implementation of this program, the Chinese government has proposed further invest- ment to enhance the program’s impact.

These include helping Zimbabwe’s government develop a database to promote research and corporation, improving proj- ect management oversight, and encouraging close co- ordination with local institutes to scale up successful projects.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, Anhui province started to implement 20 projects in Zim- babwe on agricultural cultivation and processing.

The most prominent ones are being implemented by a company called Anhui Agriculture Develop- ment.
During the first state of development cooper- ation, from December 2010 to 2012, Anhui Agriculture Development rented 5,000 hectares of land and had an average yield of 6 tons per hectare of wheat, 6.75 tons per hectare of corn, 2.25 tons per hectare of soybean, and 2.25 tons per hectare of tobacco.

These yields far exceeded local averages.

In 2012, the second stage began to expand the project to 50,000 hectares.
Anhui Agriculture Development and Anhui WaiJingJian, another major Chinese investor in Zim- babwe, have also invested in manufacturing, mining, infrastructure, tourism, and real estate projects.
The Inspur Group, an information technology com- pany, has been providing training to Zimbabweans, aiming to help transform its agricultural sector into a “smart agriculture business.” “Inspur Group hopes to help Zimbabwe develop a knowledge-based ag busi- ness utilizing information technology — we call it a “smart granary” project,” said Huang Gang, Inspur vice president of overseas investment.1 Note 1.

CRI Online, 3 April 2018.

Source: Li 2018; http://en.inspur.com/en/2402170/2400037/index.html.
So one policy priority needs to be manag- ing private investment in agriculture.

This raises the question of what policy instruments and incentive mechanisms effectively channel pri- vate investment to activities that support ex- port diversification and scale up job-creating activities such as processing and local supply chain development.

One policy options is spe- cial economic zones (see chapter 10).
Ecotourism as a path to prosperity As one of the world’s largest economic sectors, tourism has been an engine for job creation and export growth and diversification over the past two decades.

Its growth has spread prosperity across the world.
In 2017, the sector accounted for 10.4 percent of global GDP and 313 million jobs, or 9.9 percent of total employment.65 Evidence from a diverse group of developing countries, such as Cabo Verde, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, In- donesia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, South Afri- ca, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey, consis- tently shows that proactive government support can make tourism a powerful instrument for gen- erating jobs and inclusive growth.66 There are several reasons why tourism can be a path to prosperity.
First, tourism : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 68 development creates numerous links with the local economy (agriculture, transportation, and services), generating employment, particular- ly for women, young people, migrant workers, rural communities, and indigenous peoples.
Second, with the digital revolution in the last few decades, tourism plays a leading role in the adoption and diffusion of new technologies and skill upgrading of the workforce in devel- oping countries.

From the perspective of sustainable devel- opment, tourism also plays a role in protect- ing environmental and cultural assets — when a sound management system put in place.
Many developing countries have rich natural or cultural heritage assets (such as national parks, coral reefs, rare species, ancient cit- ies, or monuments) that are under threat due to poverty, resource constraints, and weak regulatory and enforcement capacity.
Pro- moting sustainable and socially responsible tourism, such as nature-based tourism (box 9.2), can empower local communities to be- come key stakeholders in tourism to safe- guard local natural resources because of their local knowledge and the economic incentives when their livelihoods depend on natural resources.67 Zimbabwe’s natural heritage is a key asset for tourism development.
The country’s tour- ism product has three main aspects: people, culture, and history; natural resources (such as Victoria Falls); and existing infrastructure (such as hotels and lodges).

Before the major political and econom- ic disruption of the early 2000s, the tourism sector played an important role in exports, employment, and GDP (figure 9.1).
Tourism as a source of export earnings has shown remark- able resilience to economic shocks: despite the country’s serious economic meltdown in 2000–08, tourism’s contribution to exports BOX9.2 Nature-basedtourism Nature-based tourism — tourism whose main pur- pose is the viewing or enjoyment of the natural en- vironment, including hiking, birdwatching, or safaris — has been increasingly recognized as an important path to achieving both conservation and sustainable development.
While empirical evidence is difficulty to collect, the development benefits of nature-based tourism rests on the premise that local communi- ties receiving economic benefits from nature-based tourism will have an incentive to conserve natu- ral habitats.
Several case studies show that in these communities, wages in nature-based tourism can be substantially higher than those in other activities, in- dicating nature-based tourism can create demand for specialized skills or local knowledge such as guides or rangers.
In Zambia, nature-based tourism accounts for nearly 16 percent of exports, 6.5 percent of GDP, more than 6 percent of wages and net income of unincorporated business, 7 percent of government revenue, and nearly 10 percent of formal employment.1 More important, in recent years the internet and digital trade such as Airb- nb have become engines of growth for nature-based tourism across the globe.
In Scotland, communities, local businesses, and cultural venues across the country have seen an increase in sustainable tourism and eco- nomic development from internet access and Airbnb, with the income from Airbnb averaging £3,600 in 2016, or about 16 percent of the average household income.

Note 1.
Note 1.

NRCF 2007 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 69 FIGURE9.1 Tourism’scontributiontoZimbabwe’sgrossdomesticproduct, exports,andemployment,2004–2012 Percent 20 15 10 5 0 Contribution to exports Contribution to GDP Contribution to employment 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: Zimbabwe Tourism Authority.
increased from 13 percent in 2005 to about 20 percent in 2011, before declining to 7.8 per- cent in 2012.

Although restoring tourism was a pillar in the 2011–15 National Development Plan to revive the economy, transforming policy plan- ning into a reality remains a major challenge.
The most urgent investment needed is the re- habilitation and upgrading of tourist resorts, airports, safety and security, the national road network, internet access, and water and elec- tricity supply.68 The lack of infrastructure in- vestment is the root cause of the high costs associated with access to tourism destinations.

Continuing difficulties in accessing land to scale up tourism to achieve the economies of scale that improve price competitiveness are also a factor.
How Zimbabwe’s recent tourism performance compares with that of other African countries Despite ranking 33 in tourism resource en- dowment in 2017, Zimbabwe has largely failed to unleash its natural resource potential.

The country ranks poorly in tourism’s contribu- tion to GDP, to exports, and to employment, far behind comparable countries in Africa such as Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania (table 9.4).
TABLE9.4 Tourism’scontributiontogrossdomesticproduct,exports,andemployment,bycountry,2017 Rank Country Shareof GDP (%) Rank Country Shareof exports (%) Rank Country Shareof employment (%) 32 51 63 74 92 99 117 130 135 147 Gambia Namibia Tanzania Senegal Kenya South Africa Zimbabwe Malawi Zambia Swaziland Sub- Saharan Africa World Source: WTTC 2017.
21.9 14.9 13.3 11.0 9.8 9.3 8.1 7.2 7.0 6.1 7.1 10.2 24 53 65 74 81 91 108 109 173 180 Gambia Tanzania Kenya Senegal Zambia South Africa Zimbabwe Namibia Malawi Swaziland Sub- Saharan Africa World 46.5 21.4 16.5 13.3 11.4 9.9 7.3 7.0 1.6 0.4 8.6 6.6 38 51 72 85 89 97 135 152 156 159 Gambia Namibia Tanzania South Africa Senegal Kenya Malawi Zimbabwe Swaziland Zambia Sub- Saharan Africa World 18.8 14.9 11.6 9.8 9.6 9.2 6.2 5.2 5.0 5.0 6.0 9. : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 70 A roadmap for reviving the tourism sector in Zimbabwe Promoting tourism as a driver for sustainable and inclusive growth depends on meeting three conditions.
First, tourism needs to gener- ate strong links with local economies, in partic- ular with the agricultural and services sectors.

Second, it needs to stimulate the provision of financial services (such as micro-financing) to help households set up hosting businesses such as accommodations and restaurants) and for investment in basic infrastructure (through the construction of roads, ports, and airport facilities).

Third, tourism must minimize the ad- verse impact on the environment and cultural heritage.
Meeting these conditions requires a national strategy with policy, regulatory, and institutional frameworks that offer sufficient incentives to promote private participation and limit financial leakage from the domestic economy (the latter of which is a perennial problem in the tourism sector in many Sub- Saharan African countries69).

Guidelines developed to help Zambia’s gov- ernment expand the tourism sector are highly relevant for Zimbabwe.
Those guidelines fo- cused on building links with the local econo- my and leveraging private participation and on mobilizing resources to finance investment for tourism development.

Building links with the local economy and leveraging private participation Like Zambia, Zimbabwe needs a long-term (5–10 years) national plan focused on remov- ing impediments to tourism growth.
The plan should incorporate achievable tourism targets, improved data collection and management systems, balanced development of the coun- try’s tourism circuits, financing for infrastruc- ture projects (road, air, telecommunications, water, and electricity), the “soft” but critically important supporting framework of policy and licensing, (establishing standards, legislation and training capacity; improving marketing; and managing and regulating the sector), which is crucial to encourage private investment.
Achieving the necessary economies of scale (that is, the critical mass) in tourism is crucial for building local links and promoting private par- ticipation.

High-volume tourism entities (hotels and large lodges) are vital to linking tourists and destinations, building a robust supply chain, and attracting private investors.
For example, a certain quantity of accommodation is essential to create the critical mass needed to convince airlines to establish routes and tour operators to promote the destination.

In expanding new areas of tourism, attracting “first-mover” inves- tors is critical.

Effective policy instruments are similar to those proposed for development of special economic zones (see chapter 10).
They should focus on the “soft” supporting frame- work of policy and legislation to improve the investment and business climate (such as fewer licenses and value added tax and visa exemp- tions), financial incentives (such as special con- cessions) to compensate the higher investment risk faced by first-mover investors, and target- ed investment to leverage private participation.
For example, $1 million in financing for the Zam- bia Wildlife Authority led to a sharp increase in international nature-based tourists visiting national parks, which generated $5–$8 million in 2015, demonstrating the scale of financial re- turns from targeted public investment.
Mobilizing financing resource to support tourism In Zimbabwe, where acute shortage of gov- ernment financial resources has posed the big- gest impediment to economic growth, a vari- ety of public–private partnership approaches should be examined.

Policy instruments that ensure that government agencies in the tour- ism sector are held accountable for improved performance and cost efficiency are critical to boost the private sector’s confidence.
These : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 71 instruments includes public–private partner- ships, improved revenue collection, and in- creased management efficiency.

In particular, this involves passing on to the private sector the day-to-day cost of managing nature-based tourism while the government focuses on oversight and enforcement.
The policy instruments should also focus on leveraging private participation from Chinese investors and targeting investment in locations with high returns in the tourism sector.

Success- ful public–private partnership models include community- based joint venture partnerships in South Africa and Zambia and broader partner- ships among the government, the private sec- tor (both local and foreign investors), and the World Bank in Mozambique (box 9.3).
Given the huge potential from scaling up nature-based tourism in Zimbabwe, the broader partnership approach, involving development organiza- tions such as the African Development Bank or the World Bank and private Chinese investors could be crucial to building local capacity to use tourism as a path to prosperity.
BOX9.3 Casestudiesonpublic–privatepartnerships:NamibiaandSouthAfrica Community-based joint venture partnerships in na- ture-based tourism typically involves the communities to provide the land and the private sector to provide the capital for investment.

Wilderness Safaris was the first operator to invest in joint venture agreements with local communities in Namibia and South Africa.
A land claim settlement allowed the local community to take ownership in Namibia, and Wilderness Safaris became the lessee.

At the national level, the conser- vancy program in Namibia, enacted in 1996, uses land tenure and responsibility for wildlife as mechanisms for financial and economic growth.

This has led to the sustainable use of wildlife resources, stable land tenure by rural Namibians, and improved livelihoods.
It has also provided the basis for communities to devel- op tourism enterprises, either through joint ventures or as community-based operations.

Following regis- tration of the first four conservancies, annual income grew from $87,000 in 1998 to $5.7 million in 2008.

The private sector has invested more than $19 million in communal conservancies since 1998.

There are now 31 formal joint venture lodges, most owned by the pri- vate sector, and another 15 in negotiation.1 Note 1.
NRCF 2007; Spenceley 2010 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | 72 CHAPTER 10 Specialeconomiczones:key institutionsforstructuralupgrading S pecial economic zones (SEZs) have grown to major economic and institutional reforms.
In many respects, Zimbabwe presents a case in point, and SEZs are a rational policy choice to catalyze growth and structural changes with- out large-scale policy reforms.

rapidly across the globe over the past few decades as a policy instrument to speed up structural upgrading.

Although it is difficult to quantify the success of SEZs and single out key factors underpinning their per- formance, numerous comparative studies pro- vide some evidence indicating that successful SEZs share a few common factors.
This chapter discusses these factors then covers how SEZs could serve as engines and pillars for growth and diversification and improve competitive- ness in first- and later-stage processing of natu- ral resources in Zimbabwe.

Rationale for special economic zones In many developing countries, SEZs70 have been established as part of an overall devel- opment strategy to catalyze growth and struc- tural transformation, including industrialization and upgrading.
Their wide implementation across many low-income countries has been driven by the belief that SEZs can remove im- pediments to structural transformation such as market failure, weak institutions and the con- sequent poor policy coordination, and lack of financial resources for investment in essential infrastructure.
In countries with a fragile po- litical system and weak governance, where the economy is often distorted by patronage-driv- en rent cycling, SEZs can be an economic in- strument and a special governance zone.71 The prevalence of rent seeking and elite capture of public investment are why these countries have been trapped in stagnation, and the po- litical economy factors are the key obstacles Special economic zones across regions SEZs are established with one or more of four policy objectives: to attract foreign direct in- vestment and promote technology transfer, to support industrial upgrading and structural change, to pilot new policies and approach- es (for example, transition from a centrally planned system to a market economy or re- forms in customs, legal, labor market, and pub- lic–private partnership aspects), or to mobilize resources and coordinate investment in related industries and achieve the required infrastruc- ture improvements.
In the 1970s and 1980s, SEZs were critical in facilitating the industrial development and upgrading of East Asia’s “tiger economies.” Similarly, since the early 1980s, China has used SEZs — initially as a policy experiment to test economic reform programs and a platform for attracting foreign direct investment to develop the export-oriented manufacturing sector.
Chinese SEZs, which now account for 44 percent of GDP, have indeed played a key role in China’s structural transformation and industrial upgrading.72 In Latin America, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Hon- duras used free zones to take advantage of preferential access to U.S. markets and have developed large-scale manufacturing sec- tors, transforming economies that previously : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 73 depended heavily on agricultural commod- ities.
In the Middle East and North Africa, SEZs have promoted export diversification in Egypt, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates.73 Except in Kenya and Mauritius, SEZs in Afri- ca established before 2010 have generally un- derperformed compared with those in other regions and have prematurely shifted to a slow- growth path.74 They have generally performed poorly in static economic outcomes measured with short-term indicators (including foreign direct investment, employment, and exports); in dynamic outcomes measured by technology transfer, integration with the domestic econ- omy, and structural change (including diversi- fication, upgrading, and increased openness); and in socioeconomic outcomes, including the quality of employment created and impact on poverty reduction.
Chinese foreign direct investment and its implications for developing special economic zones in Zimbabwe The launch of the China–Africa Cooperation Action Plan (2016–2018) at the 2015 Johannes- burg Summit reignited the expectations of SEZs as a catalyst to revive Africa’s growth and structural change.
The Chinese government pledged $60 billion to 54 African countries at the summit, and the China–Africa Production Capacity Cooperation Fund, with an initial pledge of $10 billion, has propagated a new wave of SEZs in Africa.
Called Chinese Econom- ic and Trade Cooperation Zones, they have generated broad interest from international investors in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zambia.75 In addition to the SEZs established under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation frame- work, private Chinese enterprises have created smaller SEZs, such as industrial parks and free trade zones, in Botswana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda.76 Given the scale of Chinese FDI in Africa and the strong commit- ment from both the Chinese and African gov- ernments, SEZs present a real opportunity for Africa to start structural transformation, learn- ing from the Chinese experience in SEZ design and implementation.
(including China has become Zimbabwe’s biggest eco- nomic partner in Zimbabwe.
Approved foreign investment joint ventures) from China totaled $292.5 million in 2017, with the mining sector receiving 56 percent, the en- ergy sector 22.2 percent, the manufacturing sector 11.2 percent, and the services sector 9.6 percent.77 In April 2018, Zimbabwean Presi- dent Emmerson Mnangagwa visited China, and Chinese President Xi Jinping said that he was willing to work with Mnangagwa to jointly map out future cooperation and write a new chap- ter in China–Zimbabwe relations for the ben- efit of both countries.78 Evidently, the China effect is significant and has important implica- tions in the identification of opportunities in Zimbabwe to catalyze growth and structural change.79 China granted Zimbabwe over $1 billion in low-interest loans between 2010 and 2015 and accounted for over half the foreign di- rect investment approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority in 2015.
In 2016, China announced an additional $4 billion in foreign direct investment for Zimbabwe for 2016–18, equivalent to about 7 percent of 2016 GDP.

With China’s financial support, the govern- ment of Zimbabwe has started a new SEZ initiative to attract foreign direct investment to revive the economy, in particular the man- ufacturing sector.
Three locations have been designated as pilots before the SEZ initiative is expanded to the rest of the country: Sun- way City Integrated Industrial Park in Harare as a financial hub, the Victoria Falls, and the Bulawayo industrial hub (targeted for agricul- ture business, tourism, mining, services and : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 74 manufacturing).80 Transforming these emerg- ing opportunities into a reality that benefits the local economy requires addressing three key questions.
Which special economic zone model is most suitable in the Zimbabwe context?

Experience over the past few decades across the globe shows that no orthodox model ex- ists for developing SEZs and that policy mak- ers must adopt a strategy that is responsive to the rapidly changing domestic and inter- national environment.
Countries like China, with a large domestic market and an abundant source of labor, have adopted the model of ex- panding labor-intensive manufacturing sectors to achieve export-led growth and structur- al change in the initial stage of development.

SEZs have also played a key role in facilitating the transfer of foreign technology to develop domestic industrial capacity, which gradually increases trade in the manufacturing supply chain.
African countries, including Zimbabwe, face different challenges to replicate the labor- intensive export-driven model.

First, they have relatively small domestic markets, and the re- gional market is fragmented because of poor infrastructure and lack of regionwide econom- ic coordination.
Second, their SEZs started al- most two decades later than those in the rest of world, so they face bigger obstacles in de- veloping a manufacturing sector, in particular in the presence of “factory Asia,” which domi- nates the global market in a wide range of man- ufacturing products.
Many have argued that instead of replicat- ing the low-skilled labor-intensive manufac- turing models, African countries could explore their comparative advantages in natural re- source–based sectors such as agriculture, min- erals, oil and gas, and tourism in the medium term and develop manufacturing and services opportunities (including trading and logistics) in the long term.
Indeed, SEZs can improve com- petitiveness in first- and later-stage processing of resources and provide the potential for scal- ing up SEZ programs to achieve economies of scale and generate spillovers to the rest of the economy.

The experiences of Ghana and Nigeria pro- vide supporting for the natural resource– and agriculture-based SEZ model.
Ghana had at- tempted to attract investment in the labor- intensive garment sector (through its Textiles Village project) and in the human capital–inten- sive information and communication technolo- gy sector (through an information technology park initiative), but these sectors never took off.
Instead, about 80 percent of exports from Ghana’s SEZs in 2008 came from the cocoa and wood processing sectors, which align much more closely with the country’s comparative advantage in natural resource–intensive sec- tors.

Nigeria had a similar story.

SEZs originally established to expand labor-intensive manu- facturing have largely failed, but the country quickly attracted large-scale investment in its oil and gas free zones.
For example, the Onne zone at Port Harcourt has attracted at least 80 international investors and created more than 20,000 jobs.81 SEZs in natural resource–based sectors holds promise for Zimbabwe, which has the world’s third largest reserves of platinum (used in electronic and medical equipment) and is the fifth-largest producer of lithium (an es- sential input in rechargeable batteries).
With skyrocketing global demand for smartphones and electric cars, Zimbabwe is already attract- ing increasing interest from mining companies.

Other industries with the potential foreign di- rect investment through SEZs are machinery, fertilizer, seeds, and agricultural equipment.

The pharmaceutical and construction sectors — with their large domestic market — could also be good targets.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 75 What lessons can Zimbabwe learn from past special economic zone development?

Four key factors are critical to the successful operation of SEZs:82 • Strong policy commitment from the gov- ernment.

SEZs development should be part of the broader national development strategy.
High-level and active involvement of government agencies (minister-level pol- icy makers) for a long period (5–10 years) is essential to ensure policy consistency and stability.
In developing China’s first four SEZs in the 1980s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping specifically referenced the SEZs as an in- strument in China’s outward-looking trans- formation strategy, describing them as “a window of technology, a window of man- agement, a window of knowledge as well as a window of international policy.” In Ethio- pia, the Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15 called for the establishment of the two biggest SEZs (the Eastern Indus- trial Zone and the Bole Lemi Industrial Zone).
As part of the plan, the two SEZs were de- signed to develop medium- and large-scale manufacturing industries in textiles and gar- ments, leather and leather products, sugar, cement, metal and engineering, chemicals, pharmaceutics, and agro-processing prod- ucts.
The Ministry of Industry has actively promoted SEZs and entered into SEZ devel- opment agreements with private investors from China, Turkey, and international devel- opment agencies such as the World Bank.83 • Comprehensive legal and regulatory frame- work.

While reducing uncertainties and business risks are key to attracting FDI, promoting environmentally and socially re- sponsible SEZs is fundamental to sustainable development.
Successful SEZs are regulated by a transparent legal and regulatory frame- work that outlines the program strategy and establishes the rules of operation for all stakeholders.

The framework provides the guidelines for addressing difficult land issues, facilitating infrastructure provision, and ensuring compliance with labor and en- vironmental standards.
While its presence is no guarantee of success, the absence of an effective legal and regulatory framework and poor enforcement are key reasons why SEZ programs have not taken off or suc- ceeded in many African countries.84 China’s early SEZ development provides important lessons in environmental and labor stan- dards.

The legal and regulatory framework developed for the Shenzhen SEZ does not cover any environmental and labor regu- lations (box 10.1).
After two decades of the SEZ’s rapid expansion, water pollution had reached an alarming level.

And the wide- spread of violations of workers’ rights and poor working conditions resulted in many waves of protests from workers.85 • SEZ management and governance capacity.

While developing a sound legal and regula- tory framework is straightforward on paper, effective enforcement of it underpins the fate of SEZs.
In many successful zone pro- grams, the regulatory agency is anchored to a central ministry (the president, prime min- ister, or ministry of finance) and supported by a sustainable budget to ensure effective management and governance.

In contrast, in many African countries, the agency re- sponsible for developing, promoting, and regulating SEZs lacks resources and capacity to carry out the mandate and a systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanism rarely exists.
• Prioritization of infrastructure develop- ment.

Access to basic services is a prereq- uisite for SEZs.
China has made infrastruc- ture development a priority in the new SEZ development in Xinjiang and elsewhere by implementing the so-called “five accesses plus one leveling” policy for all SEZs and : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 76 BOX10.1 TheChinesegovernment’scommitmentinsettingpolicyandregulatory framework China’s government has played a dominant role in developing the legal framework and regulations and in planning infrastructure for SEZs.
In 1980, it established the first legal framework and regulations for Guang- dong SEZ, which were modified for SEZs in other provinces based on the local business environment.

The first SEZ legal framework covered three areas critical to attracting foreign direct investment: • Protection of private property rights.
The SEZ encouraged foreign citizens, Chinese expatriates, compatriots from Hong Kong, China, and Macau, China, and their companies and enterprises (re- ferred to here as investors) to open fac- tories and set up enterprises and other establishments with their own invest- ment or in joint ventures with Chinese firms.

The SEZ guaranteed to protect their assets, including profits, and other rights in accordance with the law.

• Tax incentives.
• Tax incentives.

Foreign investors enjoyed a reduced corporate income tax rate (15–24 percent, compared with 33 per- cent for domestic firms), paid zero cus- tom duties, and had duty-free allowanc- es for imported production materials.

There were also income tax exemptions for foreigners working in SEZs.

• Land use policy.

Foreign investors were given the rights for land development, use, and business.
They were also al- lowed to transfer and lease land rights or mortgage them (in accordance with the law, within the stipulated purposes and terms of use).

When foreign firms invest- ed in projects encouraged by the state (such as technologically advanced proj- ects or projects with large links to the local economy), the land use right was guaranteed and the construction land was exempt from land use fees.

Source: Zeng 2011, 2015. industrial parks.


This policy ensures that all SEZs have access to five basic facilities (water, electricity, gas, telecommunication, and roads) and levels the site within SEZ for construction before any firms are permitted to register.

How can special economic zone initiatives generate economic and social benefits in the local economy?
As Zimbabwe embarks on new SEZ initiatives, the policy priority should be developing the local capacity to coordinate and manage the large flow of Chinese foreign direct investment by strengthening absorptive capacity at all lev- els.

At the national level, policy makers should heed lessons from other countries’ experiences and develop a policy framework for economic corporation that meets the development ob- jectives of both China and Zimbabwe.
In partic- ular, policies should enhance local capacity to promote links between SEZs and the domestic economy through local supply chain develop- ment, knowledge, and technology spillovers.

Doing so requires human capital, a skilled labor force, and entrepreneurship.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 77 BOX10.2 ForeigndirectinvestmentandknowledgediffusioninEthiopia Do foreign investors that are attracted by preferential policies in special economic zones promote knowledge dissemination and help reduce the productivity gaps be- tween rich and poor countries?
In Ethiopia, a causal link exists between greenfield foreign direct investment and knowledge spillover in the manufacturing sector.

Four years after a foreign plant opened, the total factor pro- ductivity of domestic plants was 8 percent higher.

Foreign plants also attracted new economic activity to recipient districts.

How is knowledge transferred from for- eign to domestic plants?
Domestic plants report adopting technology from foreign plants by learning by observation, hiring workers who previously worked at foreign plants, making direct contact through cus- tomer and supplier relationships, licens- ing technology from foreign plants, tak- ing advantage of competitive pressures.

Knowledge transfer through more informal channels is also important.
Knowledge of production processes is the most common type of benefit associated with foreign di- rect investment, but domestic plants also learn from foreign plants about managerial and organizational practices and logisti- cal aspects of the supply chain, including exporting.
Domestic plants do not pay higher labor costs to obtain these productivity spill- overs, a finding consistent with the idea of unlimited supplies of labor in underde- veloped countries.In addition, although domestic plants report some competition from foreign plants, total factor productiv- ity estimates reveal that on average foreign direct investment entry raised total factor productivity.
The findings underscore the importance of locating foreign plants in close proximi- ty to domestic plants (via special economic zones) and provide some support for the Ethiopian government’s industrial policy, though more research is needed to quan- tify the cost of the incentives provided to foreign plants and to compare the costs with the benefits of knowledge spillovers.

Note 1.

Lewis 1954.

Source: Abebe, McMillan and Serafinelli 2018.


Chinese investment in Zimbabwe has fo- cused primarily on activities related to agri- culture and natural resources, for which local supply relationships are fundamental and for which there is significant scope to improve competitiveness in first- and later-stage pro- cessing of resources.
Zimbabwe is thus in a better position to negotiate the rules and con- ditions of foreign direct investment to ensure transfer of knowledge and technology and generate jobs — but removing the binding con- straint of human resources is crucial.

Human capital development can be achieved by ac- tively collaborating with Chinese investors to target resources for training and skills devel- opment and knowledge sharing (see box 10.2 for how knowledge transfer and productivity growth are related in Ethiopia).
A long-term human development strategy should focus on forging links between exiting education : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 78 institutions and developing new institutions that are continually upgraded and adapted to evolving skill needs, providing up-to-date train- ing and education programs to ensure that the training meets the needs of structural change in the economy.
The best example of success is the Pen- ang Skills Development Centre in Malaysia, a public–private effort that is a key factor in Malaysia’s economic transformation over the past two decades.

It was the first industry-led training center established in Malaysia in 1989 in response to an acute shortage of skilled workforce.
State and federal governments provide financial support, and foreign private companies played a leading role in establish- ing the center, providing trainers, equipment, and training programs to meet their respective needs.
The center has become a key agen- cy, pooling resources among SEZs in Penang to provide up-to-date training and education programs and to stay abreast of technology to ensure that programs are continually upgraded and adapted to industry’s evolving skill needs.86 Chinese private investment in Zimbabwe’s SEZs presents both opportunities and chal- lenges.

A key challenge is ensuring that SEZs achieve growth targets without comprising social and environmental standards.
The envi- ronmental standards are particularly important given the poor environmental records of many SEZs in China, especially among early SEZs.

The mindset of “grow first and clear afterward” at all levels of government in China has proven costly.
The cost of environmental degradation from China’s rapid industrial growth, driven TABLE10.1 KeyfactorsunderlyingthesuccessofspecialeconomiczonesinChina’sprovinces:threecasestudies Governance Humancapitaldevelopment Logisticsandconnectiontovaluechains • Developed social security system, including pension, medical insurance, and housing subsidies to attract skilled workers from other regions.
• Designated financial resources to attract highly qualified personas, including generous research grants and awards for innovation.

• Developed modern logistics park (Futian tariff-free zone) with its bridge linking Shenzhen and Hong Kong, China.

• Used the marketing and retail network developed by firms in Hong Kong, China, to enter into a global market in Europe and North America.
Specialeconomic zone Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (located near Hong Kong, China, started in 1980) Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone (located near Shanghai, started in 1991) • • • • • In 1981, implemented major reforms in administrative management system in trade, traffic management, investment, and city management.
In 1993, introduced open bidding system in government-financed construction projects In 1998, launched an electronic monitoring system for licensing management, online access to public procurement, and monitoring and auditing system of public- financed projects.

Initiated a joint task force between Kunshan municipal government and the zone’s administrative commission.

Launched government service evaluation system, including effectiveness assessment, accountability systems, and internet-based monitoring.
• Adopted “people first” policies and set up national overseas scholar pioneer center to attract overseas and domestic postgraduates with generous benefits and preferential treatment for setting up business.

• • • • Focused on developing logistics capacity and marketing through targeted service- oriented foreign direct investment, which reached 38 percent of total foreign direct investment in 2008.
Targeted leading multinationals and tracked down their domestic and overseas production network to identify entry points in supply chains (for example, through Infovision Optoelectronics to target its supplier Dexing Electronics into the Kunshan Special Economic Zone).

Targeted finance to support brand products and develop regulatory systems to set up standards and quality control and protect intellectual property rights.
Targeted government financing to support logistics and marketing development and tax incentives for enterprises in the modern service sector.

Tianjin Industrial Park (located near Tianjin port, started in 2000) • Maintained prominent role of • environmental protection agency for planning econ-industrial park.

Established the service-oriented and independent government agency in the park to simplify business operation procedures and improve business administration efficiency.
• Attracted highly qualified labor force through housing subsidies, children’s education allowance, and research funding, Encouraged local universities (such as Nankai) to establish campuses in the park to provide vocational training and exchange programs with multinationals.
• : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 79 largely by SEZs across the country, was about 8 percent of GDP in 2010.

Because Chinese foreign direct investment has become the largest source of external fi- nancing for SEZs in Zimbabwe, the government should develop a strategic public–private part- nership while broadening financing sources to improve social and environmental outcomes.
The public– private partnership should aim to involve multilateral development banks, in- cluding the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, whose strength lies not in the scale of financing, but in their capacity to enforce environment and social safeguards in SEZs investment.
The public–private partner- ship also presents an important opportunity for building the management and governance capacity of government agencies for scaling up SEZ development, given the long tradition of rigorous oversight of multilateral development bank operations.

The partnership model adopted by the Ethi- opia government provides a good example.
In developing the Kilinto and Bole Lemi Industrial Zones, the Ministry of the Interior successfully engaged different partners, including Chinese investors and the World Bank.87 The Chinese partners provided a large share of infrastruc- ture financing, training, and technical support for development and management of the zones, and the World Bank support focused on capacity building in the development and enforcement of the overall institutional and regulatory framework.
While private investors in the two zones focused narrowly on attract- ing large investment and improving enterprise competitiveness, the World Bank project as- sessment identified several potential violations of environmental safeguards that had been largely excluded in the investment decisions of private investors.
Another example is the Resettlement Policy Framework for the Kilinto Industrial Zone in Ethiopia, developed under the public–private partnership program with the World Bank, which the Ministry of Interior intends to use as blueprint for addressing the social and environmental aspects of future SEZ development.

Table 10.1 summarizes the mechanisms ad- opted in three Chinese SEZ to enhance man- agement and governance.
For example, gov- ernment agencies in Shenzhen SEZ launched an electronic monitoring system for licensing management, online access to public procure- ment, and a monitoring and auditing system of public-financed projects in 1990.
The Kun- shan SEZ, established in the 1990s, was under the management of a joint task force between the Kunshan municipal government and the zone’s administrative commission, which in- troduced an open bidding system in govern- ment-financed construction projects and later launched a government-sponsored evalua- tion system (covering economic performance, accountability systems, and internet-based monitoring).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e n o z i c m o n o c e l a i c e p S 80 CHAPTER 11 Newdevelopmentfinancing comesindifferentforms W ith some established donors con- or more — and are willing and better able to take risks.
In addition, evidence suggests that net foreign assets are positively and significant- ly associated with long-term orientation.93 strained by heavy debt and slow growth since 2015, development fi- nance will need to “go beyond aid” to combine trade aid and investment.
Financing will come less from official development assistance88 and more from other official flows, other official flow–like loans, and other official flow–like investments from development banks and sovereign wealth funds and new strategic in- vestment funds in emerging economies.89 Nu- merous new financing platforms, facilities, and instruments have already been established.90 Global leaders are looking east for develop- ment financing, because emerging and devel- oping countries have much higher savings rates and thus will have higher investment rates in the next 15 years (2015–30).
Developing coun- tries’ (including China) share of global invest- ment overtook high-income countries’ share in 2015 (figure 11.1).
Most of the finance comes in the form of patient capital, long-term in- vestment with a maturity of 10 years or more.91 Based on a culture of Confucianism, China and many East Asian economies are ranked high in long-term orientation.92 Patient capital Patient capital can be seen as capital invested in a relationship in which the stakeholder or investor is willing to take a stake in the host country’s development, aiming for a win-win.
Thus it can finance the huge infrastructure gaps in Africa and elsewhere.

Owners of pa- tient capital are equity-like investors but willing to sink money in the real sector or unlisted in- frastructure projects for a long time — 10 years Patient capital thus has several important features: • It depends heavily on the domestic bank- ing sector and institutional investors that can turn the long-term savings of citizens into loanable funds.
The development of commercial and investment banks and insti- tutional investors such as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and strategic invest- ment funds should be encouraged in every country, including Zimbabwe.
International multilateral financial orga- nizations such as the World Bank, region- al development banks such as the African Development Bank, and bilateral donor– funded development banks such as the • FIGURE11.1 Developedanddevelopingcountrysharesofworldinvestment, 1965–2030 Percent 100 75 50 25 0 Developed countries Developing countries, including China Developing countries, excluding China 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Source: World Bank data.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 81 in Export- Import Bank of China and China De- velopment Bank play critical roles in turning domestic public savings into international long-term development funds (a part of patient capital).
Establishment of new insti- tutions such as the Asian Infrastructure In- vestment Bank and the New Development Bank, the Silk Road Funds, and other infra- structure funds should be supported.

These are among the providers of patient capital.

• Patient capital is highly correlated with en- trepreneurial capital and direct investment from the private sector.
Governments ev- erywhere should improve the investment climate so that the private sector can invest infrastructure via public–pri- directly vate partnerships such as special economic zones, eco-industrial parks, eco-cities, as well as in the manufacturing sectors.
Total external financing flows to develop- ing economies were $1.4 trillion in 2016, of which 45 percent was foreign direct invest- ment, 28 percent was remittances, 12 percent was official development assistance, 9 percent was foreign portfolio flows, and 6 percent was other investments (mainly bank lending).
For- eign direct investment was the most stable and resilient flow to developing counties; foreign portfolio flows fluctuate drastically over the years.94 The share of patient capital flows (for- eign direct investment, official development assistance, and half of bank lending) would thus be around 60 percent of total external financ- ing flows to developing economies.95 This im- plies that $840 billion could be invested in de- veloping countries.
Patient capital plays an important role in financing infrastructure.

Successful countries with future orientation96 have seen their infra- structure better financed.
Other evidence of rising patient capital is reflected in the rising number of sovereign wealth funds and govern- ment-sponsored strategic investment funds established by countries such as Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, the Phil- ippines, Senegal, South Africa, and Vietnam.97 The number of multilateral strategic invest- ment funds, including those for infrastructure, is also rising rapidly.
The World Bank recently established a new private sector window using International Development Association fund- ing, to be implemented by the International Finance Corporation, to invest in the private sector.

This is in effect using public money to finance private equity (an approach that is sim- ilar to what China has been doing) and an inno- vative approach worth supporting.
The International Financial Corporation has established a new equity fund in infrastructure called the InfraVenture Fund and has attracted private insurance companies to co-invest in it.

Large private insurance companies such as Alli- anz, Munich Re, Liberty Mutual, and Prudential have already joined.98 China’s state-led capitalism is an important form of patient capital, characterized by a longer term horizon.
“Chinese state-to-state lending reduces governments’ reliance on conditionality- linked Western financing, giving them more autonomy to use budget deficits to intervene in their economies.” “These re- sults suggest that Chinese financing could be a developmental opportunity, but only if gov- ernments invest wisely.
Otherwise, by lending without policy conditions, China may be en- couraging developing country governments to spend without bounds, sowing the seeds for future debt problems.”99 China’s South–South development cooperation for structural transformation Global leaders and the international develop- ment community (multilateral and bilateral donors) are looking east for new ideas, new momentum, and new financing.
Over the last 10 years, emerging economies, including : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 82 nontraditional donor organizations such as Arab organizations, have become major sourc- es of international development finance, in- frastructure investment, and outward foreign direct investment.
“In recent years, China has become the largest single trading partner for Africa and a key investor and provider of aid,” and “a 1 percentage point increase in China’s real domestic fixed asset investment growth has tended to increase Sub- Saharan Africa’s ex- port growth rate on average by 0.6 percentage point.”100 China’s approach in South–South develop- ment cooperation differs from that of estab- lished donors in that China combines trade, aid, and public and private investment to strive for mutual respect and mutual benefit, or win- win.
Africa–China trade has been growing at approximately 20 percent a year since 2000.
Foreign direct investment has grown 40 per- cent in the last 10 years.101 Official development assistance from China is small compared with that from other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries but is commensurate with its income per capita.102 Moreover, China has been using its compara- tive advantage in constructing infrastructure with the advantage of economies of scale to help others invest in large-scale development projects.
China is the largest source of con- struction financing, and it has supported many of Africa’s most ambitious infrastructure devel- opment in recent years, including hydropower, railways, and roads.103 Chinese official development assistance has been found to have a significant positive effect on economic growth in recipient countries.
One additional Chinese aid project increased economic growth by 0.7 percentage point two years after the aid project was committed, in a sample of recipient countries whose average growth rate was 2.8 percent.
This result held for official development assistance projects only; there was no effect for other official flows.104 As China’s gross national income and fiscal revenue have continued to grow, its develop- ment financing has risen dramatically, to close to $100 billion in 2015–16 (including grants, concessional loans, and export buyer credits, as well as contributions to the Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and other multilateral banks).105 China will gradually take more re- sponsibilities and explore its new roles in global affairs.
Official development assistance is likely to grow from the current 0.1 percent of gross national income to 0.3 percent.106 But the pace of the increase depends on the global gover- nance system.
China has tried to set up the “right” platforms for its contribution to glob- al development, including its contribution to setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other new groupings such as the New Development Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, and the African Capacity Development Fund.
In particular, China’s outward foreign direct investment soared to over $183 billion in 2016 FIGURE11.2 Outwardforeigndirectinvestmentfrom“BRICKS”countries, 2000–16 $ billion 200 150 100 50 0 –50 #1 China (world rank #2) #2 Korea, Rep. #2 Russian Federation #5 South Africa #4 India #6 Brazil 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Calculated based on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 83 FIGURE11.3 CostsofChina-sponsoredofficialdevelopmentassistance–like projectscompletedinZimbabwe,2000–14 2014 $ million 200 150 100 50 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: Calculated based on data from AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Data- set, 2000–2014, version 1.0.
(figure 11.2), ahead of all other emerging market economies and second only to the United States.

China and Zimbabwe: aid, trade, and investment China and Zimbabwe have long had an “all- weather” friendly relationship, with mutual support, cooperation, and benefit.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has reiterated his willing- ness to join President Emmerson Mnangag- wa to “write a new chapter” in China–Zimbab- we relations.107 In particular, China has emerged as Zimbabwe’s largest aid, investment, and South–South cooperation partner in the last decade.
Zimbabwe is estimated to be one of the top recipients of China’s official develop- ment assistance, receiving $3.6 billion.108 In De- cember 2017, Zimbabwe signed a $153 million loan agreement with China to expand and re- furbish its international airport in Harare, in a bid to attract investors and tourists.
This was FIGURE11.4 China-sponsoredofficialdevelopmentassistanceprojectscompletedinZimbabwein2000–14, bysector Energy generation and supply 3% Transport and storage 3% Other social infrastructure and services 5% Government and civil society 19% Developmental food aid/food security assistance 6% Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 8% Communications 9% Health 19% Others 11% Education 17% Note: Data refer to the share of 64 completed projects.
Source: Calculated based on AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 2000–2014, version 1.0 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 84 the first such large loan deal under the new government.109 In March 2018, China agreed to fund the expansion of the Kariba South hydro power station by 300 megawatts.
Zimbabwe requires 1,400 megawatts but can produce only 900 megawatts.
It imports 300 megawatts each from South Africa and 50 megawatts from Mo- zambique, so the expansion would help reduce Zimbabwe’s power import bill.110 Over 2000–14, China supported at least 64 completed developmental projects and pro- grams totaling $533 million (in 2014 prices) in grants, no-interest loans, and some official de- velopment assistance–like projects (figure 11.3).111 Health projects and government and civil soci- ety projects each accounted for 19 percent of the projects; education projects accounted for 17 percent; communications projects for 9 per- cent; agriculture, forestry, and fishing projects for 8 percent; developmental food aid projects for 6 percent; other social infrastructure and services projects for 5 percent; energy genera- tion and supply projects for 3 percent; transport and storage projects for 3 percent; and projects in other sectors for 11 percent (figure 11.4).
FIGURE11.5 ValueofotherofficialflowsfromChinatoZimbabwe,bysector, 2004–14 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Business and other services Communications Energy generation and supply Government and civil society Industry, mining, and construction Population programs/ reproductive health Water supply and sanitation 0 300 600 900 1,200 1,500 $ million Source: Calculated based on data on other official flows and vague official flows from AidData.com.
Other official flows and investment Over the last decade, China has provided sig- nificant concessional and nonconcessional loans, export credit, and other official flows FIGURE11.6 DistributionofotherofficialflowsfromChinatoZimbabwe,bysector,2004–14 Communications 3% Population programs and reproductive health 0.03% Business and other services 1% Water supply and sanitation 6% Government and civil society 7% Industry, mining, and construction 11% Energy generation and supply 15% Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 55 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l Source: Calculated based on data on other official flows and vague official flows from AidData.com.
85 CASESTUDY ChineseinvestmentinthetextileandapparelsectorinSub-SaharanAfrica Under the “flying geese” model, economists expect the textile and apparel sector to boost industrializa- tion in Africa.

Chinese companies’ engagements in this sector in Africa are thus particularly interesting, as they are the world’s major players and have the po- tential to shape the continent’s industrialization.
Chinese investors in the garment-making sector have focused their investment in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland.

Some were originally from Taiwan, China; their business in the region start- ed as early as the 1970s.

These companies recruited technicians from China; many of those technicians later opened their own factories.
As the Chinese economy grew, more and more investors from China came to Southern Africa, usually forming clusters to share information, build connections, and seek busi- ness.

The more established clusters machinery sales agents and expatriate technicians of Chinese origin.

Chinese producers in Southern Africa used to export garments to the European and U.S. markets when Afri- can governments offered generous financial incentives to encourage foreign investment in export businesses.
But as the tax holidays ended, most Chinese firms left the export business.

The main reason was that clients in those two markets have strict requirements on qual- ity and lead time, which African factories were unable to guarantee, and some manufacturers even had to pay huge penalties for infractions.
Other issues, such as increasing labor conflicts, deficient facilities, cum- bersome export processes, and lack of local industrial suppliers, greatly raised transaction costs and left the factories unable to compete with those based in China and other Asian countries.

Most Chinese garment producers left in Africa sell their products almost exclusively to the South African market.
Major retailers in South Africa have adopted a fast-fashion business model, requiring one-week responses to changes in fashion.

Local suppliers have the advantage of short lead times against Asian im- ports and are thus able to survive in this niche market.

Hundreds of private investors from China and Taiwan, China, are operating cut, make, trim or cut, make, pack factories.

They are all small, averaging 100–200 people, and require little capital (as low as $20,000) to start.
They can easily relocate to places with lower production costs.

Yet JD Group, a giant Chinese apparel maker, set up a long-term production base in Tanzania in 2011.

Its motives are different.

In 2005, feeling pressure from rising production costs, the company set up factories in Cambodia, where today it has 13 plants that employ more than 20,000 workers.

However, average monthly wages there have risen from $40 to $150.
So the com- pany, whose clients are mainly in the United States, began to search for a new production site.

It came to Tanzania through an old aid project, Urafiki Textile Co., in Dar es Salaam.

Tanzania’s stable political situation, good relations with China, and a new special economic zone helped the chief execu- tive officer make up his mind.

Within a year of his first visit in May 2011, the company had opened a facto- ry in Dar es Salaam.
By August 2014, the factory had hired more than 1,000 local workers.

A second factory was completed in October 2015 with 2,500 local work- ers.

All products are exported to the U.S. market.

The first factory served more as an experiment.

The experience was used to set up many more facto- ries, just as the company had done in Cambodia, get- ting a foothold before expanding.

“When we establish a factory with tens of thousands of employees, it can- not be a short-term investment.
We want to stay at least twenty to thirty years,” Wang Wenping said. : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 86 CASESTUDY(continued) ChineseinvestmentinthetextileandapparelsectorinSub-SaharanAfrica A main bottleneck that all Chinese apparel makers in Africa face is supply of fabrics and accessories, so most are imported from China, raising costs and op- erational difficulties and causing production delays.
Only a few textile mills in Sub- Saharan Africa still pro- duce fabric for apparel, and they do not achieve scale economies.

Chinese factories run the complete value chain of textile–apparel production, with a vast num- ber of mills and many accessory suppliers, and can supply amounts and varieties required by garment makers at good prices.

Seeing the gap, several companies from China and Taiwan, China, set up textile mills in Africa, including Urafiki in Tanzania and Taiyuan in South Africa.
Their performance has been unsatisfactory, due mainly to local workers’ low productivity and unstable power supplies.

“If we had done a better investigation, we would not have invested here,” the CEO of Taiyuan has said, expressing regret over the venture.2 JD Group has plans to extend to weaving and dyeing in Tanza- nia in a few years, as the firm’s operations in China cover textile processing.

However, Wang Wenping is cautious.

“A textile mill needs a lot of equipment.

The investment amount is big.


We are not in hurry to un- fold all the plans immediately.

We should do it step by step.” In 2013 and 2014, a small Chinese textile–apparel cluster emerged in Ethiopia, as three textile mills and one garment maker set up in a Chinese-run industrial park.

They did not coordinate with each other — but made the almost simultaneous investments coinci- dentally.
Rising wages and environmental standards in China pushed the textile manufacturers to seek cheaper manufacturing space overseas.

The Ethio- pian government’s support and incentives attracted them.

These companies target primarily the Ethiopian and East African markets.

All produce only polyester cloth and garments, which are technically less de- manding to make and more affordable to African con- sumers.
Since the start of operations, sales have been very promising, but the firms found many unexpected problems on the production side: delays in customs clearance, frequent leave of local workers, unprofes- sional service providers, and the like.

The owner of one of the mills summarized his experience in Ethio- pia: “As long as people can make the products, they can make money.”3 Scattered Chinese textile–apparel investments can be found elsewhere in Africa, often driven by China’s industrial upgrading.
Yet not all African countries will benefit from relocation.

Chinese investors will be at- tracted only to countries with government commit- ments to provide investors with a reasonable business environment.

Access to domestic and international markets, functioning infrastructure, political stability, financial incentives, and other elements will influence Chinese investors’ choice of destination.
Additionally, governments need to make more effort to strength- en foreign factories’ links with local supplies, for them to expand and stay longer in Africa.

Notes 1.

Interview with Wang Wenping, JD Group Tanzania Branch, Dar es Salaam, August 2013.

2.

Interview with CEO of Taiyuan Textile Mill, Ladysmith, South Africa, July 2013.

3.

Interview with owner of Kaipu Spinning, Dukem, Ethiopia, Jan- uary 2015.

Source: Based on Tang (2014), with updates drawing on authors’ visits and interviews.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 87 (figure 11.5).

The majority of other official flows has been invested in the agricultural sector (55.5 percent), which is where Zimbabwe has a comparative advantage, followed by energy generation and distribution (15 percent) and industry, mining, and construction (10 percent; figure 11.6).
Zimbabwe could grasp the opportunities pro- vided by the large number of Chinese enterpris- es “going global” and join existing global supply chains in food, cotton, wool, leather, footwear, garments, and assembly lines of farm machinery, motorcycles, or buses (see table 5.4 in chapter 5) and become a light manufacturing and con- struction logistic center for Southern and East Africa and eventually the entire continent.
Conclusion Zimbabwe holds lots of promise to regain growth and structural transformation, through a three-pronged strategy of agriculture- led industrialization, eco-tourism sector develop- ment, and special economic zones.
But in the short term, these growth strategies hinge on the country’s capacity to finance infrastructure investment — identified as the binding con- straint across all sectors.112 After clearing the arrears with the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank, there are opportu- nities for Zimbabwe to seek investment from these multilateral development banks and other investment funds.
A range of policy recommendations has infrastruc- been proposed to address the ture financing shortage, including the short- term measure of linking mining sector rents to infrastructure development financing, the medium-term measure of gaining access to international financial markets, and the long- term measure of adopting policies that sup- in- port macroeconomic stability, vestors’ confidence, encourage allocation of capital to long-term investment, and enhance the country’s absorptive capacity, in particular the large amount of foreign direct investment from China.
Although this report does not ad- dress the financing issue, further studies should focus on financial sustainability, including tax revenue, government spending, and instru- ments to leverage external financial resources, such as public–private partnerships.
increase : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s m r o f t n e r e f f i d n i s e m o c i g n c n a n fi t n e m p o e v e d w e N l 88 Appendixes APPENDIX A Supplementaltables TABLEA1 Zimbabwe’ssectoralfactorintensity,2016 Percent Activity Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels, and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Total Labor, unskilled Labor, skilled Capital Land 19.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 Extractive resource 0.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i A x d n e p p A 91 TABLEA2 CompositionofZimbabwe’ssectoraldemand,2016 Percent Sector Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels, and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Total Intermediate use Distribution margin Private consumption Government consumption Exports Grossfixed capital formation Stockchange Total –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2016 Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i A x d n e p p A 92 TABLEA3 SustainableDevelopmentGoalindicatorsforZimbabweandAfrica,2000and2014 Zimbabwe Africamediana Zimbabwepercentileranking Indicator Gross preprimary school enrollment (%) Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) Gross primary school enrollment (%) Net primary school enrollment (%) Net intake rate in grade 1 (% of official school-age population) Lower secondary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) Gross secondary school enrollment (%) Net secondary school enrollment (%) Gross tertiary school enrollment (%) Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5) Prevalence of wasting, weight for height (% of children under 5) People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population) People using at least basic sanitation services (% of population) Access to electricity (% of population) Carbon dioxide emissions (kg per 2010 $ of GDP) Change, 2000– –26.4 –7.4 –25.5 –15.1 –57.2 –29.4 –11.7 18.8 3.8 6.5 –25.8 –19.6 –11.5 –20.7 –2.0 Note: Indicators are shown only if data are available for at least 18 countries (that is, a third of the countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe).
Indicators shown for both 2000 and 2014 have identical country coverage for the two years.

The maximum number of countries is 54.

Data for 2000 refer to the average over 1998–2002, and data for 2014 refer to the average over 2012–16.

a.

Values for indicators with data available in both periods refer to the same countries in both periods.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from World Bank (2018b).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i A x d n e p p A 93 TABLEA4 Determinantsofeconomicperformance:ZimbabweandAfricain2000and2014 Zimbabwe Africamediana Zimbabwepercentile Change, 2000–14 –20.5 57.2 7.1 –19.4 0.0 –11.9 –36.4 –2.3 2000 1,266.2 67.9 18.7 9.6 1.9 11.4 37.2 36.5 Indicator GDP per capita (2010 $) Household final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation, private sector (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation, public sector (% of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) Gross savings (% of GDP) Current account balance (% of GDP) Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP) Government expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita) Government expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per capita) Government expenditure per student, tertiary (% of GDP per capita) Current health expenditure (% of GDP) Tax revenue (% of GDP) IDA resource allocation index (1=low to 6=high) Logistics performance index: overall Logistics performance index: quality of trade and transport infrastructure 2014 929.3 84.2 23.8 9.9 2.5 12.4 26.2 46.1 –7.2 – – Note: Indicators are shown only if data are available for at least 18 countries (that is, a third of the countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe).
Indicators shown for both 2000 and 2014 have identical country coverage for the two years.

The maximum number of countries is 52.

Data for 2000 refer to the average over 1998–2002, and data for 2014 refer to the average over 2012–16.

a.

Values for indicators with data available in both periods include the same countries in both periods.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from World Bank (2018b).
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i A x d n e p p A 94 APPENDIX B StructureofSDGSIM T his appendix provides additional detail on SDGSIM as applied to Zimbabwe.113 Figure A1 summarizes the payment flows that the model captures in in any year; figure A2 describes the labor market.
Activities produce, selling their output at home or abroad and using their revenue to cover their costs (of intermediate inputs, fac- tor hiring, and taxes).

Activity decisions about factor hiring, which determine output level, are driven by profit maximization.

The shares ex- ported and sold domestically depend on the relative prices of their output in world and do- mestic markets.

SDGSIM includes three core institutions: households, government, and the rest of the world.
• Households (split into rural and urban in the Zimbabwe application) earn incomes from factors, transfers from the government, and transfers from the rest of the world.

Incomes are used for direct taxes, savings, and consumption.

The savings share is ex- ogenous or endogenous depending on the mechanism for balancing private investment and available financing.

Consumption chang- es in response to income and price chang- es.
By construction (and as required by the household budget constraints), consump- tion equals income net of direct taxes and savings.

• The government gets its receipts from taxes and transfers from abroad; it uses these for consumption, transfers to households, and investments (providing capital stocks used in the production of government services), drawing on domestic and foreign financing for supplementary funding.
To remain within its budget constraint, it either adjusts some part of its spending on the basis of available receipts or mobilizes additional receipts of one or more types to finance its spending.

• The rest of the world (which appears in the balance of payments) sends foreign curren- cy to Zimbabwe in the form of transfers to government and households, foreign direct investment, loans, and export payments.

Zimbabwe uses these inflows to finance its imports.
The balance of payments clears (inflows and outflows are equalized) via ad- justments in the real exchange rate (through changes in the domestic price level, chang- ing the ratio between the international and domestic price levels in domestic currency), which take place when the balance is in sur- plus or deficit.

Private investment financing is provided from domestic household savings (net of fi- nancing to the government) and foreign invest- ment.
It is assumed that household investment spending will adjust in response to changes in available funding or that household savings will adjust to finance a predetermined investment level.

In domestic commodity markets, flexible prices ensure balance between demands for domestic output from domestic demanders and supplies to the domestic market from domestic suppliers.
The part of domestic de- mands that is for imports faces exogenous world prices — Zimbabwe is viewed as a small country in world markets without any impact on the import and export prices that it faces.
Domestic demanders decide on import and domestic shares in their demands on the basis of the relative prices of commodities from : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i B x d n e p p A 95 FIGUREB1 AggregatepaymentflowsinSDGSIM Factor markets d n a m e d r o t c a F Domestic wages and rents Households Private savings n o i t p m u s n o c e t a v i r P + Indirect taxes Govcons and inv Government t s e r e t n i – r e f s n a r T i g n d n e L Rest of world Imports Exports t s e r e t n i – r e f s n a r T Private investment financing i g n d n e L I D F Interm input demand Activities Domestic commodity markets Domestic demand Foreign wages and rents Private investment Source: Authors’ construction.
these two sources.

Similarly, domestic suppli- ers (the activities) decide on the shares for ex- ports and domestic supplies on the basis of the relative prices received in these two markets.114 Factor markets reach balance between de- mands and supplies via wage (or rent) adjust- ments.

Across all factors, the factor demand curves are downward-sloping, reflecting the re- sponses of production activities to changes in factor wages.
On the supply side of the labor market, unemployment is endogenous — the model includes a wage curve (a supply curve) that is upward-sloping until full employment is reached, at which point it becomes vertical (see figure B2).

Over time, the labor force grows due to demography (working-age population and its labor force participation rates).
For non- labor factors, the supply curves are vertical in FIGUREB2 ThelabormarketinSDGSIM 5 4 3 2 1 0 Demand Supply 85 87 89 91 93 95 Source: Authors’ construction.

any single year (the supply is fixed) but switch over time as supplies change (see next point).

 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i B x d n e p p A 96 The above discussion refers to the function- ing of the model economy in a single year.
In SDGSIM, growth over time is endogenous.

The economy grows because of accumulation of capital (determined by investment and depre- ciation), labor (determined by demography), and other factors (following exogenous growth trends) and because of improvements in total factor productivity.

Apart from an exogenous component, total factor productivity depends on government capital stocks.
In a postcalculation module, information poverty rates and Gini coefficients for an initial year and the evolution of real consumption per capita from the simulations are used to gener- ate one or more synthetic household surveys, assuming a log-normal distribution within each household group for which poverty results are generated.

Poverty results are currently gener- ated only at the national level for an aggregate household.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i B x d n e p p A 97 APPENDIX C DescriptionofSDGSIMmodel database T he SDGSIM database for Zimbabwe de- estimates for different countries and regions.116 Population data are based on UNDESA (2017).

veloped for this analysis has 2016 as its base year.
The construction of the so- cial accounting matrix is explained in detail in Cicowiez and Lofgren (2018), and the related model and database disaggregation is shown in table 2.1 in chapter 2.

The other key data are elasticities (in trade, production, and consump- tion), factor stocks, and projections for gross domestic product (GDP) and other indicators.
For poverty and inequality, the most recent information was for 2011, covering national, rural, and urban headcount poverty rates as well as a national Gini coefficient.117 To conduct rudimentary poverty analysis, the national 2011 figures were considered valid for 2016, but the rural and urban ones were not.

Among the factors, base-year stocks are needed for private capital and labor.
The pri- vate capital stock was estimated based on cap- ital rents in the social accounting matrix and typical rates for depreciation (4.5 percent) and a modest rate of net profits (10 percent).

For government capital, estimates are not needed for base-year stocks because the simulation results depend only on deviations of the stock from base scenario levels.

Apart from simulat- ed investment levels, these deviations depend on government capital depreciation rates, which were set at 3.5 percent.
The fact that the model is solved over time generates additional data needs.

As noted in the main body of the text, the base scenario is calibrated to replicate a path of growth in GDP at factor cost — that is, based on data and projections from AfDB (2018) and IMF (2018).

Projections are also needed for growth in the labor and mining factors.
For labor, which is dis- aggregated into skilled and unskilled, these pro- jections are based on projected changes in the educational composition of the labor force.

For mining, growth in resource extraction is a major determinant of mining sector growth; the relevant factor growth rate was set to gen- erate growth in the mining sector that is close to overall GDP growth.

The elasticities used are displayed in table C1.


They were defined on the basis of the lit- erature and author assessments, drawing on a combination of econometric evidence and experience from similar country applica- tions.115 For the extractive industry activity, the value added elasticity and constant elas- ticity of transformation are at low levels to let production and export growth be driven by exogenous assumptions regarding use of the resource factor.
For household consumption, expenditure elasticities are based on Muham- mad et al.

(2011).

These were then recalibrated to reflect the consumption structure in the Zimbabwe social accounting matrix.

In the con- text of the linear expenditure system demand functions, which are used in SDGSIM, estimates are also needed for the so-called Frisch param- eter (technically the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income) for each household group.

Using a relationship in Lluch et al.


(1977), which expresses an inverse relationship between the Frisch parameter and real consumption per capita, the rural Frisch parameter was estimated at –7.3, and the urban Frisch parameter was estimated at –4.4.
These values were used, in particular since they were consistent with Global Trade Analysis Project : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i C x d n e p p A 98 TABLEC1 Value-added,trade,andconsumptionelasticities Sector Agriculture, forestry and fishing Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services VA 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.90 0.90 CET 2.20 1.10 2.20 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 Armington LES,rural LES,urban VA is the constant elasticity of substitution value added function.
Armington is the constant elasticity of substitution aggre- gation function for domestic demand (elasticities of substitution between imports and domestic output).

CET is the constant elasticity of transformation function for domestic output (elasticities of transformation between exports and domestic supply).

LES is the linear expenditure system (elasticities of household consumption with respect to total consumption spending) for rural and urban households.
Source: Annabi, Cockburn, and Decaluwé 2006 and authors’ assessments.

Though some of the data used are clearly rough estimates, for most simulations, most parameters play a qualitatively minor role as long as their values stay within accept- ed bounds because of the consistency fea- tures of an economywide model like SDG- SIM (in markets for factors and commodities, quantities demanded and supplied must be equal, and all agents live under budgetary constraints).
However, for any given simula- tion, specific parameters may be important, so it is important to design the simulations so that the role played by such parameters is carefully considered.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i C x d n e p p A 99 APPENDIX D AdditionalSDGSIMsimulation results TABLED1 AverageannualgrowthofrealmacroindicatorsinZimbabwe,bysimulation,2019–30 Percent, unless otherwise indicated 2030 Low marginal product ofnew investment High marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withlow marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withhigh marginal product ofnew investment Stronger infra- structure investment expansion 2018a Base Central case Foreign financing Indicator Absorption Consumption, private Consumption, government Fixed investment, private Fixed investment, government Exports Imports GDP at factor cost Total factor employment (index) Total factor productivity (index) Gross national income Gross national disposable income Gross national income per capita Gross national disposable income per capita Real exchange rate (index) Unemployment rate (%)b Headcount poverty rate (%)b a.
Unless otherwise noted, data are 2016 $ billion.

b.

The base-year column shows the base-year rate, and the simulation columns show simulation-specific final-year rates.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 100 TABLED2 MacroindicatorsinZimbabwe,2018and2030,bysimulation Percent of nominal GDP 2030 Low marginal product ofnew investment High marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withlow marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withhigh marginal product ofnew investment Stronger infra- structure investment expansion 2018a Base Central case Foreign financing Indicator Absorption Consumption, private Consumption, government Investment, private Investment, government Exports Imports Net indirect taxes GDP at factor cost Gross national income Gross national disposable income Foreign savings Foreign savings Foreign government debt Foreign private debt Domestic government debt GDP at market prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 101 TABLED3 GovernmentreceiptsandspendinginZimbabwe,2018and2030,bysimulation Percent of nominal GDP 2030 2018 Base Central case Foreign financing Lowmarginal product ofnew investment Highmarginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withlow marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withhigh marginal product ofnew investment Stronger infrastructure investment expansion Indicator Receipts Direct taxes Import tariffs Export taxes Other indirect taxes Private transfers Foreign transfers Factor income Domestic financing Foreign financing Total Spending Consumption Fixed investment Stock change Private transfers Foreign transfers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Commodity subsidies Total 24.6 24.5 26.0 25.8 27.5 24.6 25.9 24.6 27.4 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 102 TABLED4 BalanceofpaymentsinZimbabwe,2018and2030,bysimulation Percent of nominal GDP 2030 Low marginal product ofnew investment High marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withlow marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withhigh marginal product ofnew investment Stronger infra- structure investment expansion 2018 Base Central case Foreign financing Indicator Outflows Imports Private transfers to rest of world Official transfers to rest of world Factor income to rest of world Change in foreign reserves Total Inflows Exports Private transfers from rest of world Official transfers from rest of world Factor income from rest of world Private financing Government financing Foreign investment Total 43.1 46.0 46.6 46.9 45.7 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
33.2 10.9 1.2 0.5 0.4 1.2 47.4 31.5 10.6 1.1 0.5 0.4 1.1 32.3 9.6 1.0 0.5 0.4 1.0 32.9 10.9 1.2 0.5 0.4 1.2 45.2 44.8 47. : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 103 TABLED5 AverageannualgrowthofrealGDPatfactorcostinZimbabwe,2018and2030,bysimulation Percent Indicator Aggregate sectors Agriculture Industry Mining Manufacturing Other Services Private Government Disaggregated sectors Agriculture Mining and quarrying Manufacturing Electricity and water supply Construction Financial intermediation Real estate and business activities Trade, hotels and restaurants Transport and communications Public administration Education Health Domestic services Other services Total 2030 Low marginal product ofnew investment High marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withlow marginal product ofnew investment Focuson tradables withhigh marginal product ofnew investment Stronger infra- structure investment expansion 2018 Base Central case Foreign financing Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
: e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 104 TABLED6 SectorstructureinZimbabwe,2018and2030 Percent Valueadded Production Employment Exports Imports Export/ output Import/ demand 2018 Agriculture Industry Mining Manufacturing Other Services Private Government Total 2030 Agriculture Industry Mining Manufacturing Other Services Private Government Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Change, 2018–30 Agriculture Industry Mining Manufacturing Other Services Private Government Total 2.3 0.0 –1.0 0.6 0.3 –2.3 –2.3 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.0 –0.7 2.5 0.2 –3.3 –3.2 –0.1 0.0 3.0 –0.4 –0.3 –0.2 0.1 –2.5 –2.4 –0.1 0.0 1.6 –3.7 –9.5 5.8 0.0 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.0 1.7 –0.3 –1.7 –1.7 0.0 0.0 Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simulations with SDGSIM.
41.7 25.6 42.8 24.4 1.1 2.5 2.8 0.0 14.2 42.8 24.2 21.2 27.5 1.1 3.5 3.9 0.0 15.4 1.1 –1.3 –21.5 3.0 0.0 1.0 1.1 0.0 1.2 20.7 42.0 1.5 47.5 17.1 7.1 7.9 0.0 22.0 20.8 41.5 1.5 47.6 15.0 7.2 8.1 0.0 23.0 0.0 –0.5 –0.1 0.1 –2.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0. : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 105 TABLED7 Back-of-the-envelopecalculationofmarginal productofinfrastructureinvestment No.
Calculation Centralcase Focuson tradablewith lowmarginal productofnew investment Δ K Δ GDP–productivity Δ GDP–financing* Δ GDP–total MP — productivity = 2/1 MP — financing = 3/1 MP — total = (2+3)/1 436.1 139.3 –41.7 97.6 436.1 210.1 –41.7 168.4 0.319 0.482 –0.096 0.224 –0.096 0.386 Δ K = change in 2030 infrastructure stock compared to base.

Δ GDP productivity = change in 2030 GDP for scenario com- pared to all-00-tx+3.
Δ GDP financing = change in 2030 GDP for scenario all-00-tx+3 compared to base.

Note: The scenarios have identical investment financing costs since sector targeting appears only in the distribution of pro- ductivity gains.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on results from simula- tions with SDGSIM : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | i D x d n e p p A 106 Notes 1.

IMF 2013.

15.

Kanyenze, Chitambara, and Tyson 2017.


2.

Despite authorities’ commitment, the multicurrency 16.

Government of Zimbabwe 2013. regime made the country’s exports less competitive.

17.

Tyson 2017.

To provide credibility to the multicurrency system 18.

Calculated based on 2009–16 export data (2016 esti- and promote consumer and business confidence, the mates: $2.2 billion in mineral exports and $3.6 billion central bank undertook a demonetization process in total exports).
between June and September 2015, based on cash 19.

KPMG 2017. held by the public and nonloan bank accounts at the 20.

World Bank 2017. end of 2008, effectively removing the legal status of 21.

Maune 2016. the Zimbabwe dollar.

3.

IMF 2017.

22.

IIEP Pôle de Dakar 2016.

23.

Lange, Wodon, and Carey (2018) substantially im- 4.

ZIMSTAT 2015 Zimbabwe Poverty Atlas.

prove on estimates of natural capital and, for the first 5.
For more information on the data sources and the time, measure human capital by using household sur- construction of the social accounting matrix, see veys to estimate lifetime earnings.

Cicowiez and Lofgren (2018, pp.

17–23), which this sec- 24.

Palmade and Anayiotos 2005. tion draws on.

25.

Zimbabwe Inter-Censal Demographic Survey 2017.

6.

To calculate the average, the percentile ranking for 26.
See the Zimbabwe Labour Force Surveys of 2004, indicators measuring undesirable outcomes such as 2011, and 2014. mortality were reversed so that a high ranking corre- 27.

World Bank 2017. sponds to a low value.

Given that the countries that 28.


The starting point for SDGSIM was MAMS, a model are underrepresented in the database may do worse designed for analyzing strategies related to the Mil- than others (including little or no data for Somalia lennium Development Goal agenda (Lofgren, Cicow- and South Sudan), Zimbabwe’s ranking in a database iez, and Diaz-Bonilla 2013).

with full country coverage would probably be slightly 29.

Findings based on comparisons across results for dif- higher.

7.
7.

AfDB 2018. ferent scenarios (on which the analysis are based) are rarely sensitive to year-to-year changes in economic 8.

New Zimbabwe 2018. structure.

9.

UNIDO 2013.

10.

Lin 2012b.

11.

Signé 2018.

30.

The first simulation year is 2016, for which the solu- tion replicates the 2016 social accounting model.

31.

For the nonbase scenarios, GDP growth is endog- 12.

See, for example, Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013), enous starting in 2019.
For the base scenario, the who argue that lower transport costs allow import- variable GDP at factor cost is fixed at the projected ing to export and that joining global supply chains levels while an endogenous variable is added that (rather than building supply chains) is a good way for scales total factor productivity in all or selected pro- developing countries to catch up.

Many East Asian duction activities so that the exogenous GDP level is countries are examples.

13.

World Bank 2009.

14.


World Bank 2017. generated.

Given that one variable is added and one is removed, the model continues to have an equal number of equations and variables.
For the nonbase : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e t o N 107 scenarios, this is reversed: the GDP variable is flexi- GDP of the zero marginal product scenario to the ble whereas the total factor productivity adjustment 2030 GDP of the base scenario).

The change in cap- variable is fixed at the level generated under the base ital stock is the difference between the 2030 infra- scenario.
This means that the results for the non- structure capital stock for the scenario and for the base scenarios are no different if the only change is a base scenario.

Marginal products are computed by switch from exogenous to endogenous GDP.

Howev- dividing GDP change by the capital stock change.

As er, given that other shocks are introduced, the GDP indicated, the productivity marginal product is close level (and other results) will deviate from the base.
to 0.30 for the central case scenario but larger for the 32.

The real exchange rate can be defined as the ratio focusing on tradables with low marginal product of between the prices of goods and services that are new investment scenario, the latter of which indi- traded internationally and the prices of goods and cates positive repercussions from the focus on trad- services that are produced and used domestically.
able goods, among other things, by lowering the pric- In a computable general equilibrium model, the rate es of tradable goods, which boosts purchasing power can adjust via changes in the nominal exchange rate and reduces the cost of capital goods.

or the domestic price level.

38.

Gupta et al.

(2014) estimate the marginal product of 33.


See tables D1–D7 in appendix D for additional and public capital from cross-country regressions at 0.52 more detailed results, including for the nonbase (0.30 for middle-income countries and 0.65 for low- scenarios.

34.

World Bank 2018a.

income countries), Dessus and Herrera (2000) esti- mate it at and 0.142, and Easterly, Devarajan, and Pack 35.
The results for household income (as opposed to con- (2003), using a variety of approaches, find no evi- sumption) are similar because the changes in the share dence that public or private investment is productive of total income that is allocated to consumption (rath- in Sub- Saharan Africa.

The three marginal products er than to direct taxes, transfers, or savings) is small.

considered in this paper (0.60, 0.30, and 0.00) exem- 36.
The poverty calculation draws on simulated national plify high, medium, and low cases.

data on private consumption per capita and assumes 39.

Unless otherwise noted, growth rates are geometric unchanged inequality.

More specifically, the pover- average annual real growth rates for 2019–30 — that ty analysis assumes a log-normal distribution, a 2016 is, using 2018 simulation results as the starting point.

national poverty rate of 73.2 percent, and a nation- 40.
Calculated using data in figure 3.16 and table D6 in al Gini coefficient of 43.2.

Both are the most recent appendix D. At the sectoral level, the main change available estimates, based on 2011 data.

The 2018 pov- in employment shares for all scenarios is an increase erty rate, slightly lower, is based on the model simu- in agriculture at the expense of private services (see lation.

The rural and urban inequality data needed to table D6 in appendix D).
compute separate urban and rural poverty rates are 41.

Schultze 1983, p. 7. not available.

42.

Lin and Monga 2011.

37.

Table D7 in appendix D shows back-of-the-envelope 43.

This definition was developed by Balassa (1965).

calculations of the economywide marginal product 44.

TIMB 2017. of the infrastructure investment program for the 45. International Cotton Advisory Committee 2015. central case scenario (all-30-tx+3) and the focusing 46.
On automobile assembly in Zimbabwe, see https:// on tradables with low marginal product of new in- www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rz9giTzPa8.

vestment scenario (trd-30-tx+3).

The change in GDP 47.

Bhebhe 2015. is split into two parts: change due to the productiv- 48.

LafargeHolcim 2017. ity effect (by comparing 2030 GDP to the 2030 GDP 49.

Zimbabwe Tourism Authority 2018. for the relevant scenario with zero marginal product) 50.

ITC 2014. and change due to financing (by comparing the 2030 51.
Hausmann 2013 : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e t o N 108 52.

WEF 2017.

53.

WFP 2018.

54.

World Bank 2016.

55.

KPMG 2017.

79.

On China’s investment in Zimbabwe’s agricultural sec- tor, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3Ucd- faOD50.

In June 2018, China released funding for the expansion of the largest power plant in Zimbabwe, 56.
Government of Zimbabwe 2018. the Hwange Power Station, which will add 600 mega- 57.

Lin and Monga 2011.

58.

UNECA 2010.

59.

Moller 2016.

60.

World Bank 2014.

61.

Moller 2016.

62.

Dinh et al.

2013.

63.

Moller 2016.

64.

Xinhua News Agency 2017. watts to the country’s grid (Xinhua News Agency 2018a).

And on 11 June 2018, China and Zimbabwe signed a $1 billion memorandum of understanding to establish a steel plant in Zimbabwe with capacity to produce 2 million tons of steel a year.

80.
80.

Zimbabwe previously set up economic processing zones in 1996–2006.

They resulted in 205 companies being established, generating an estimated $172 mil- 65.

Based on data from the World Travel and Tourism lion in investment and creating 32,512 jobs and Council.

66.

UNCTAD 2013.

67.

Wunder 2000.

68.

Abel and Roux 2017.

69.

Christie et al.

2014.

$1.15 billion in export earnings.


Some of the compa- nies are still in operation despite the collapse of the program when the government merged the Export Processing Zone Authority and the Zimbabwe In- vestment Centre to form the Zimbabwe Investment 70.

The concept of SEZs has many variation and forms.

Authority and despite the overall failure of policy Farole (2011) provides a comprehensive and concise economic management at the national level.
definition: SEZs are designated areas within a coun- 81.

Farole 2011. try’s national boundaries where the rules of business 82.

Based on a review of cases studies on SEZ perfor- are different from those that prevail in the nation- mance across many countries: Farole (2011), which al territory.
These differential rules deal principally focused on Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal, with investment conditions, international trade and and Tanzania as well as established zone programs in customs, taxation, and the regulatory environment; Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and whereby the zone is given a business environment Vietnam; FIAS 2008; and Zeng 2015. that is intended to be more liberal from a policy per- 83.
IPRCC and UNDP 2015. spective and more effective from an administrative 84.

Farole 2011. perspective than that of the national territory.

85.

Zeng 2015.

71.

Ndulu et al.

2008.

Patronage-driven rent cycling in- 86.

Farole 2011. cludes rent from natural resources, foreign aid (a geo- 87.

IPRCC and UNDP 2015. political form of rent), or manipulation by govern- 88.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co- ments of relative prices (regulatory rent).
operation and Development definition, official devel- 72.

Tao, Yuan, and Li 2016. opment assistance includes grants or loans that are 73.

For a detailed review of SEZs across the globe, see undertaken by the official sector with promotion of Farole (2011), IPRCC and UNDP (2015), and Zeng (2010).

economic development and welfare as the main ob- 74.

Farole 2011.

75.

IPRCC and UNDP 2015.

76.


Brautigam and Tang 2013. jective and that are concessional in character and con- vey a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a discount rate of 10 percent).

See www.oecd.org/ 77.

Based on data from the Zimbabwe Investment dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinition Authority.

andcoverage.htm.

Lin and Wang (2014a, 2017a) have 78.

Reuters 2018.

See also Tiezzi (2018).

suggested expanding the definition.
suggested expanding the definition : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e t o N 109 89.

Lin and Wang 2017a.

Chinese ministries and embassies and economic and 90.

For example, Germany’s January 2017 Marshall Plan, commercial counselor offices; the aid and debt infor- the African Development Bank’s High 5s, and China’s mation management systems of finance and planning Belt and Road Initiative.
See also Felino and Pinto ministries in counterpart countries; and case study (2017), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the fol- and field research by scholars and nongovernmen- low-up to the United Nations Conference on Trade tal organizations.

The project-level data from 4,304 and Development meeting on financing for develop- officially committed projects and 630 pledges of ment, 8–10 November 2017.

91.

Lin and Wang 2017b.


support were standardized using the tracking under- reported financial flows method into three types: 92.

Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Gert, and Michael 2000. official development assistance, other official flows, 93.

Lin and Wang 2017b.

94.

UNCTAD 2017. and vague official finance (which represent official financial flows with insufficient open-source infor- 95.

This figure matches the findings of Lin and Wang mation to clearly determine whether the flows are (2017b).
It assumes that the majority of foreign port- more akin to official development assistance or folio investment is impatient (less than 10 years).

Re- other official flows).

(Some scholars have challenged mittances can be used to finance consumption or the data limitations and classifications.)

The study investment, but the exact breakdown is not available.
used an instrumental variable approach, with the an- Admittedly, these assumptions are strong and these nual production of Chinese steel interacted with the estimates are rough.

Future research is needed to recipient province’s probability of receiving aid used develop the exact measure of patient capital flows as an instrument variable to address the endogeneity based on micro data.

problem associated with Chinese aid.

96.

As in Commission on Growth and Development 105.

See Poon (2018).

(2008).

97.


Halland et al.

2016.

98.

Kynge and Ralph 2018.

106.

Official development assistance is around 0.3 per- cent of gross national income for Japan and the United States.

The Organisation for Economic Co- 99.

Kaplan (2018, p. 1).

The study used the China Global operation and Development–Development Assis- Financial Index, an originally constructed dataset, and tance Committee mandates 0.7 percent.
However, an econometric test across 15 Latin American coun- China is still a developing country, with GDP per cap- tries from 1990–2015.

100.

IMF 2013, p. 5.

101.

McKinsey and Company 2017.

102.

See Lin and Wang (2014a).

103.

McKinsey and Company 2017. ita of around $9,000 in 2017.

107.

Reuters 2018.

108. http://aiddata.org/china.

China does not publish country- or project-level official development assis- tance and cooperative data, so estimates are unof- 104.

Dreher et al.

2017.


Because official data on China’s ficial media-based data with triangular checks and aid and investment by country and by project are adjustments.

not available, the study used a media-based data- 109.

Reuters 2018. set that captured official development assistance 110.

Xinhua News Agency 2018b.

(more concessional) and other official flows (less or 111.

Many of the official development assistance–like not concessional) from China.
The dataset covers programs included technical assistance and medical 138 countries in five regions (Africa, the Middle East, teams that are not measurable in monetary terms.

Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbe- 112.

This report focuses on the short to medium term.

For an, and Central and Eastern Europe) in 2000–14.
The assessment of long-term investment in infrastructure, four primary open sources were English, Chinese, and such as in airports, railways, and roads, see the parallel local-language news reports; official statements from updating of the 2011 Zimbabwe Infrastructure Study : e w b a b m Z w e N a i g n d i l i u B | s e t o N 110 113.
See Lofgren and Cicowiez (2018) for a fuller not have a choice between imports and domes- documentation.

tic output for commodities if only one source is 114.

An individual production activity does not re- available.

spond to changes in relative prices for exports and 115.

For a survey, see Annabi, Cockburn, and Decaluwé domestic sales if its output has only one destina- (2006).

tion, either exported in full or sold domestically in 116.

Dimaranan, McDougall, and Hertel 1997. full.


By the same token, domestic demanders do 117.

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