Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1697634473924.pdf (Australia)
Steve Khouw Friday, 9 December 2016 Committee Secretary Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 By email: 18Cinquiry@aph.gov.au Dear Committee Secretary, As a concerned citizen, I submit by way of associating your Terms of Reference of this Inquiry as follows: 1.

Whether the operation of Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’) imposes unreasonable restrictions upon freedom of speech?

Yes.
Yes.

Freedom of speech is a fundamental right of all Australian citizens that underpins democracy and liberty as enshrined in our Constitution.

The grounds for prosecution under S18C as it stands now relies on ambiguous, subjective emotional laden words – to “offend, insult and humiliate.” Whereas one person might feel being offended or insulted or humiliated, yet to another individual s/he might not.
These words must be replaced with one that has legal precedence and a reasonable degree of objectivity that also, will protect against threats whether in physical violence or emotional abuse, that is concurrently able to replace the reference in existing S18C provision against “intimidation.” I like very much the proposal by Senator George Brandis with a slight modification.
My suggestion is that we indeed replace the words “offend, insult, humiliate and intimidate” with the phrase “racial vilification.” And we should not remove S18D, which I will discuss below.

The NSW Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 forms the basis of defining what racial vilification entails - the incitement of hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of race.
We can adopt this distinction for purposes of replacing S18C as above however, I would like to add when applied to amending S18C to enhance the definition to include that such act must be accompanied by either violence or verbal abuse which replaces the notion of intimidation.

To call another race names is simple not enough to invoke S18C.

I speak as an immigrant Australian of Chinese ancestry, that I have had my fair share of discrimination and name calling.
What makes Australians with vast diversity Australians, is the intrinsic “thick skin” that we cultivate to overcome adversity from the very genesis of our Great Southern Land and indeed dare I say from our colonial, pioneering era.

If we do not nurture a nation of thick skins, bowing down to political correctness p a g e 1 | 3 Freedom of speech in AustraliaSubmission 296 and softening the spirit of competing then I am afraid we will degenerate into a nation of wussies with dire socio-economic consequences.
Indeed, every day I welcome insults, for I can demonstrate how thick is my skin to the perpetrator and earn respect that hopefully morph into mateship.

Thus, it is important that the concept of racial vilification as the centrepiece of the amendment contain references to the pièce de résistance – accompanied by threat or intimidation.

Consequently and conversely, freedom of speech to me is the ability to name call another race without threats or intimidations and the tolerance of society as such.
Only if it escalates into hate speech that is when it had reached acceptable community standards.

All hate speech is accompanied by violence or verbal abuse.

Moreover, as the legislation stands, freedom of speech is adequately protected by S18D anyway, in my view both S18C and 18D are complementary and symbiotic therefore neither can function without the other and it is not advisable to remove S18D for this reason.
It must be mentioned in the legislation exactly what the exceptions are or we again descend into the abys of ambiguity.

2.

Whether the handling of complaints made to the Australian Human Rights Commission (“the Commission”) under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) should be reformed?

Yes.
Yes.

The current approach is inadequate per se, it is open to abuses such in the case of the QUT students that also exposes the failings of the Human Right Presidency to cull complaints at an early junction in the process.
It is essential therefore, a procedural system of triage is introduced when administrating applications to the Commission such that vexatious and trivial complaints are vetted via an objective test that assess whether the complaint has on the balance of probability a reasonable chance of succeeding and if not, to be immediately dismissed accordingly.

There should be a fee charge for raising such complaint.

This is to prevent trivial applications and discourages vindictive complainants.

3.
3.

Whether the practice of soliciting complaints to the Commission (whether by officers of the Commission or by third parties) has (i) had an adverse impact upon freedom of speech or (ii) constituted an abuse of the powers and functions of the Commission, and (iii) whether any such practice should be prohibited or limited?

Yes, the existing process has an obvious adverse impact upon freedom of speech, can be and often in previous complaints were deliberate abuses of powers and functions of the Commission.
The media in recent times has highlighted some of the more juicy ones with a public interests slant.

Yes, such practices should be curtailed to yield a more effective and efficient way to process the complaint such that trivial and vexatious cases are dismissed much earlier than is possible right now.

What is required is a process of triage, akin to self-administered checks and balances.

p a g e 2 | 3 Freedom of speech in AustraliaSubmission 296 4.
Whether the operation of the Commission (i) should be otherwise reformed in order better to protect freedom of speech (ii) and, if so, what those reforms should be?

Yes.

The Member for Berowra, Mr. Julian Lesser MP, had made a pragmatic suggestion, to empower the President of the Commission to terminate any complaints which on the balance of probability and from any evidence adduced by the complainant, have little prospect of success.
In order to enhance objectivity, the President shall make her determination only on point of law.

I am in absolute accord with this notion.

At the moment, the President of the Commission must first conciliate the complaint then only has discretionary power (not automatic) to terminate the application on the basis of being trivial, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance.

This process opens to dire inconsistencies and increases the workload and running cost of the President and her staff.
CONCLUSION That Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 specifically S18C together with S18D, be not repealed rather amended to include the following features: a.

Replace the reference to “offend, insult, humiliate and intimidate” with the phrase “racial vilification” and clearly define racial vilification by adopting the NSW Anti-Discrimination legislation as the template but include the notion of threats and abuses into the definition; and b.
Add a provision that empowers the President of the Commission to terminate at an earlier juncture of the process of assessing a complaint if the application is unlikely to be successful.

Essentially, a system of triage.

Thanking you in advance for considering my submission.

Yours sincerely, Steve Khouw p a g e 3 | 3 Freedom of speech in AustraliaSubmission 296