Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1697634695203.pdf (Australia)
UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au 30 October 2021 Committee Secretary Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Dear Committee Secretary, UNSW LAW SOCIETY SUBMISSION REGARDING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA The University of New South Wales Law Society Inc. welcomes the opportunity to provide a submission to the Senate’s Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media.
The UNSW Law Society Inc. is the representative body for all students in the UNSW Faculty of Law.

Nationally, we are one of the most respected student-run law organisations, attracting sponsorship from prominent national and international firms.

Our primary objective is to develop UNSW Law students academically, professionally and personally.

The enclosed submission reflects the opinions of the contributors, with the UNSW Law Society proud to facilitate these submissions.
UNSW Law Society Inc. is not affiliated with any political entity.

We thank you for considering our submission.

Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any further assistance.
Yours sincerely, JANANI BALASUBRAMANIAN Policy Submissions Director SHARANYA MURTHY Policy Submissions Director KARTHIK PANDE Policy Submissions Director Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Authors POLICY SUBMISSION DIRECTORS Janani Balasubramanian, Sharanya Murthy and Karthik Pande STUDENT CONTRIBUTORS Alex Krikorian Danielle Pedersen Emily Chang Ines Celic Jessica Wang Lina Zaioor Matthew O’Rourke Melody Seymour Nieshanka Nanthakrishnakumar Shira Benson Verity Welch Acknowledgements We acknowledge the support of the following individuals who made this submission possible.
UNSW LAW SOCIETY CO-PRESIDENTS Sanjay Alapakkam and Alexandra Zoras UNSW LAW SOCIETY VICE-PRESIDENT (SOCIAL JUSTICE) Joshua Sykes Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
This submission argues the Australian government should introduce a public education campaign to improve digital media literacy amongst Australians and increase the number of resources available to prevent the risk of foreign interference reaching Australian people.
Educational campaigns should also be tailored to different demographics, including instilling mandatory courses for primary-school, high-school and university students, as well as campaigns for elderly people, people from low-income backgrounds, and people in regional areas.1 a.
Educational campaigns may also be rolled out through in-app features including enhancing access to official Government websites outlining the most recent public health advice and commonly asked questions in relation to the vaccine rollout.

2.
2.

Measures in universities should include publicly speaking out when incidents of foreign interference threatening academic freedom occurs; creating rules around ‘reporting’ and ‘doxing’ fellow classmates and grounds for disciplinary action;2 encouraging reporting against other students through internal university mechanisms.

a. Alternatively, if universities do not serve to be an adequate avenue of redress, reference to the Australian Human Rights Commission would also be appropriate.

3.
3.

This submission notes the importance of allowing third-party fact-checkers including Australian experts to assess content circulated on social media.

4.

This submission encourages the continued monitoring of the operation of Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation, including future reporting on its role in deterring foreign interference and regulating social media platforms.

5.
5.

If legislative sanctions are to be implemented to prevent foreign interference through social media, the legislation should not be so broad in application that it may infringe upon express or implied rights.

1 Tanya Notley et al, ‘Adult Media Literacy in Australia: Attitudes, Experiences and Needs’ (Report, Western Sydney University, Queensland University of Technology and University of Canberra, 14 April 2021) 12.
2 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 99–100.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au 6.

If a media oversight body is created to counteract rumours and misinformation, it is essential that such bodies are independent from the government and political interference.

7.
7.

Australia should fund a national education initiative (or alternatively, partner with a non-government organisation such as IREX to adopt their Learn to Discern program) to improve digital literacy to enable Australians to better discern between accurate and fake information disseminated within social media and news media.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au I BACKGROUND In an increasingly globalised world, social media and online platforms play a crucial role, at an unprecedented scale in the spreading and shaping values, ideologies, and agendas.

This includes the dissemination of news and information from mainstream news outlets, journalists, activists and activist groups, and ordinary people.
One estimate has suggested that nearly 80% of the Australian population have a social media account.

Social media is an 3 increasingly dominant channel for consumers of news and information to both find sources of and share news information.

This already encompasses just over half of all Australians, with 4 younger generations being the most likely age demographic to be accessing news and information through social media.5 However, this also makes social media a conduit for the spread of misinformation.
The ability of online content to transcend geographical boundaries poses complex jurisdictional issues when examining the issue of foreign interference.

Revolutionised interference tactics include cyber interference (e.g.

hacking, phishing, deepfakes), as well as expanding the range of potential sources and targets of attacks to include both state and non-state actors.
Foreign 6 interference has become easier, more efficient, less expensive, and ultimately, more pervasive in threatening the integrity of a nation’s democracy.7 Prior to examining how social media can undermine Australia’s democracy and values, this submission foregrounds the importance of defining Australian values.
For the purposes of this submission, Australian values have been defined to include the following:8 ● Respect for individual freedom and dignity; ● Freedom of speech and association; and 3 Simon Kemp, ‘Digital 2021: Australia’, Datareportal (Web page, 9 February 2021) <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-australia>.

4 Sora Park et al, Digital News Report: Australia 2020 (Report, 16 June 2020) 11.

5 Sora Park et al, Digital News Report: Australia 2020 (Report, 16 June 2020) 50.
6 Melissa-Ellen Dowling, ‘Democracy Under Siege: Foreign Interference in a Digital Era’ (2021) 75(4) Australian Journal of International Affairs 383, 383–385.

7 Melissa-Ellen Dowling, ‘Democracy Under Siege: Foreign Interference in a Digital Era’ (2021) 75(4) Australian Journal of International Affairs 383; Sarah O’Connor et al, Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2020) 8.
8 These values have been slightly modified from ‘Australian Values’, Department of Home Affairs (Web Page) <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/social-cohesion/australian-values>.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au ● Mutual respect, tolerance, and compassion for all.

A.
A.

USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA FOR PURPOSES THAT UNDERMINE AUSTRALIA’S DEMOCRACY AND VALUES, INCLUDING THE SPREAD OF MISINFORMATION A The Role of Social Media in Australian Democracy The widespread usage of social media in modern Australian democracy has empowered its high degree of influence.

Social media has become a key form of communication used by both individuals and organisations, particularly for marketing, outreach, and the shareability of content.
Even anecdotally, its reach in Australian politics and democratic action has rapidly grown, with private and public institutions alike making social media usage a key part of their strategy for engagement.9 Nefarious actors, including hackers situated anywhere across the globe, would be able to influence the conduct of Australian democracy quite easily through social media by taking advantage of both its broad usage and the algorithms and systems used for content curation to effectively spread disinformation and ultimately diminish the Australian value of democracy.
The Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters has already generally recognised the threat that manipulation from online sources (of which social media is a part) requires response.10 This part of the submission will focus primarily on examining how misinformation takes hold on social media, and explaining how this may impact the Australian democratic process.
B The Role of Social Media Algorithms A key function of social media, both generally within Australia, is connecting individuals with similar interests and views together on a global scale.

Individuals can easily initiate 9 For instance, the Australian Labor Party, the Australian Greens and Liberal Party of Australia all possess social media accounts as part of their communications with the public.
Government institutions, such as NSW Health and the Commonwealth Department of Health have been heavily reliant on social media to disseminate information in response to COVID-19.

10 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Report on the Conduct of the 2019 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto (Final Report, December 2020) 123.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au discussions with others who share their interests through a number of methods, including forums, groups, pages, and hashtags.

Social media platforms actively facilitate these methods through the nature of their algorithms that use a user’s data and engagement with the platform to determine how to display their content.
Both social media and search engines employ algorithms that are designed to select the most relevant and engaging content for the individual user.

For example, Facebook promotes groups a user should join, and TikTok’s ‘For You’ page tailors videos specifically for the user.

Consequently, an individual’s content diet can easily become an online echo chamber and can subsequently isolate users from users with certain viewpoints.
As these algorithms are simply intended to deliver content the user is likely to engage with, it follows that such algorithms are also likely to present content that, for the most part, accords with an individual’s own existing bias.

In doing so, the social media platform will spread information pertaining to a certain view while insulating that person from other perspectives.
Even if the information the individual is exposed as false and unreliable, users are more willing to trust that content or use it to confirm pre-existing beliefs.

By only showing individuals certain information, these platforms fail to provide information that reflects the existing gamut of opinions surrounding the national political debate.

These echo chambers, which lead to an increase in confirmation bias have been used to undermine Australia’s democratic values.
This has the important consequence of actually making it harder to break free from disinformation.

As mentioned in the Digital Platforms Inquiry, since these platforms pride themselves on providing individualised content based on one’s past behaviours and preferences, there is no space for this information to be challenged.
Therefore, these 11 algorithms are used to reinforce and escalate users' existing views, strengthening confirmation bias and undermining democratic values.12 11 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry (Final Report, 26 July 2019) 347.

12 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry (Final Report, 26 July 2019) 348.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Another way social media is used to undermine democratic values is through ‘micro-targeting’.

13 Social media platforms allow political advertisers to engage in ‘micro-targeting’, which utilises individuals’ personal data to personalise advertising messages to those who are predisposed to agree with them.
An example of micro-targeting was seen in the 2017 mail-in survey on Same-Sex Marriage, where ads appeared on Facebook trying to sway specific groups of Australian voters.

Micro-targeting has increased 14 disputes about ‘fake news’ and created divisiveness, as the public’s common knowledge is increasingly divided.

As a partial consequence, society is more misinformed and polarised 15 along partisan lines.
The large quantity of personal data available on social media platforms can be ‘harvested’ and used to target specific individuals and spread misinformation in a targeted fashion through social media.

This is something that is unique to social media — especially given 16 how microtargeting occurs as a consequence of the algorithms that are utilised by social media platforms.

Such microtargeting was done in the Cambridge Analytica data breach and was used to support the Trump presidential campaign.
This tool is also used in the Australian political 17 scene and is shown to have damaged political discourse.

Studies have shown that during the 18 2019 election social media was used to undermine democratic values and skew public 13 See generally, Jordan Guiano, ‘Distorting the Public Square: Political Campaigning on Social Media Requires Greater Regulation’ (Discussion Paper, Centre for Responsible Technology, The Australia Institute, 24 November 2019).
14 Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, ‘Outlets in Eight Countries Are Using Our Tool to Monitor Political Ads on Facebook’, ProPublica (online, 8 February 2018) <https://www.propublica.org/article/outlets-in-eight-countries-are-using-our-tool-to-monitor-political-ads-on-fac ebook?token=EnKCO7S5tur0EVV_U9AOlNE-b5icIEOw>.
15 Seth Copen Goldstein, ‘Solving the Political Ad Problem with Transparency’, The Conversation (online, 18 October 2017) <http://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366>.

16 Seth Copen Goldstein, ‘Solving the Political Ad Problem with Transparency’, The Conversation (online, 18 October 2017) <http://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366>.
17 Seth Copen Goldstein, ‘Solving the Political Ad Problem with Transparency’, The Conversation (online, 18 October 2017) <http://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366>.

18 Seth Copen Goldstein, ‘Solving the Political Ad Problem with Transparency’, The Conversation online, (18 October 2017) <http://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au perceptions against various parties by amplifying individuals' biases and prejudices.
19 In this way, microtargeting on social media enables the more effective spread of disinformation as it can be targeted towards particular groups of people who may be more susceptible to that misinformation, or who may share misleading information, in light of the problem of echo chambers as outlined above.

C Why Does Misinformation Work?

It is also important to understand why social media disinformation has been able to succeed within Australia.
Research conducted by the News Media Research Centre suggests that ‘[c]oncern about fake news is high across all demographics’, 20 and that social media in particular attracts high levels of concern about fake and misleading news.

21 So this submission therefore asks, how does disinformation get through?
One probable cause this submission wishes to explore is growing dissatisfaction with democratic values, which has greatly exacerbated the spread of misinformation, particularly via social media, leaving segments of the Australian community vulnerable to foreign interference and propaganda.
As public trust in institutions such as the government continues to erode, with Australians’ satisfaction with democracy at its lowest since the 1970s constitutional crisis (that culminated in Prime Minister Whitlam’s dismissal), 22 disillusioned individuals will look to alternate sources of perceived authority.
It is in this era of increased distrust that people may be especially susceptible to misinformation on social media that either purports to confirm their 19 Seth Copen Goldstein, ‘Solving the Political Ad Problem with Transparency’, The Conversation (online, 18 October 2017) <http://theconversation.com/solving-the-political-ad-problem-with-transparency-85366>.

20 Sora Park et al, Digital News Report: Australia 2020 (Report, 16 June 2020) 78.
21 Sora Park et al, Digital News Report: Australia 2020 (Report, 16 June 2020) 78.
22 Australian National University, Trust in Government Hits All Time Low ( 9 December 2019) <https://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/trust-in-government-hits-all-time-low>; Peri K. Blind, ‘BUILDING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: Review of Literature and Emerging Issues’ (Working Paper, 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, November 2006) 10-11.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au suspicions, or at least, raises new doubts that serve to further undermine the confidence and trust that people have in the system.23 One pertinent example is the foreign interference identified on popular microblogging website Tumblr in which Russian social media agitators were revealed to have been using fake accounts to spread propaganda and sow political discord ahead of the 2016 United States Presidential and General elections.
24 In particular, black Americans were targeted by the Trump Campaign and Russian social media accounts where genuine racial tensions were 26 25 exploited to encourage political apathy and low voter turnout, or alternately to promote 27 certain presidential candidates over others.
Such propaganda included Russian accounts posing as black users to organise real world political events addressed to black Americans,28 as well as using voter data to manipulate social media feeds showing compromising adverts of the opposition.29 In the more recent experience of the United States, foreign actors used social media in 2020 to denigrate President Joe Biden, ‘undermine the voting process’, and ‘exacerbate 23 Terry Flew et al, ‘Trust and Mistrust in Australian News Media’ (Report, Centre for Behavioural Economics, Society & Technology (BEST), Queensland University of Technology, March 2020).
24 Natasha Lomas, ‘Tumblr Confirms 84 Accounts Linked to Kremlin Trolls’, TechCrunch (online, 24 March 2018) <https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/23/tumblr-confirms-84-accounts-linked-to-kremlin-trolls/>.

25 Dan Sabagh, “Trump 2016 campaign 'targeted 3.5m black Americans to deter them from voting'”, The Guardian (online 29 September 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/28/trump-2016-campaign-targeted-35m-black-americans-to-d eter-them-from-voting>.
26 Philip Ewing, ‘Tumblr’s Ban of Russian Accounts Adds Detail to Targeting of Black Americans’, National Public Radio (online, 27 March 2018) <https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597021235/tumblrs-ban-of-russian-accounts-adds-detail-to-targeting-of-black- americans>.
27 Philip Ewing, ‘Tumblr’s Ban of Russian Accounts Adds Detail to Targeting of Black Americans’, National Public Radio (online, 27 March 2018) <https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597021235/tumblrs-ban-of-russian-accounts-adds-detail-to-targeting-of-black- americans>.
28 Philip Ewing, ‘Tumblr’s Ban of Russian Accounts Adds Detail to Targeting of Black Americans’, National Public Radio (online, 27 March 2018) <https://www.npr.org/2018/03/27/597021235/tumblrs-ban-of-russian-accounts-adds-detail-to-targeting-of-black- americans>.
29 Dan Sabagh, “Trump 2016 campaign 'targeted 3.5m black Americans to deter them from voting'”, The Guardian (online 29 September 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/28/trump-2016-campaign-targeted-35m-black-americans-to-d eter-them-from-voting>.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au socioeconomic tensions’.
30 In the United Kingdom, investigation by the British Broadcasting Corporation found misinformation likely from foreign sources shared within pro-Brexit Facebook groups during the 2019 European elections.

This included websites that promoted fringe conspiracies and were known sources of false information.

These examples all help 31 to demonstrate that it is often distrust of the government that leads to disinformation campaigns from foreign actors succeeding.
This submission posits that similar tensions between a disenfranchised public and governmental institutions exist in Australia, leaving the general population vulnerable to propaganda from foreign actors.

This has been particularly blatant in recent times, with the government’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis attracting widespread debate on fundamental issues including the relationship between State and citizen, balancing personal freedoms with safety, and government deference to health experts.
The 2019 election was the first time that the Internet became the most popular media source for following election coverage, 32 and it seems only inevitable that social media is only to become more prominent in Australian political coverage.
It is therefore no surprise that social media is a major channel through which foreign interference can occur, as foreign organisations take advantage of breakdowns of government support.33 It is also the existence of this distrust that makes it more likely for social media echo chambers to form and succeed — which only amplifies the extent to which disinformation and foreign influence succeeds in Australia.
Echo chambers are not simply created with the absence of opposing views in the social media algorithm and the ease at which news and 30 National Intelligence Council, Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections (Intelligence Community Assessment No ICA-2020-00078D, 10 March 2021) 2.

31 Mariana Spring and Lucy Webster, ‘European Elections: How Disinformation Spread in Facebook Groups’, BBC Newsnight (online, 30 May 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-48356351>.
32 Australian National University, Trust in Government Hits All Time Low (Article, 9 December 2019) <https://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/trust-in-government-hits-all-time-low>.

33 Fergus Hanson and Elise Thomas, ‘Cyber-Enabled Election Interference Occurs in One-Fifth of Democracies’, The Strategist (Blog Post, 17 May 2019).

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/cyber-enabled-election-interference-occurs-in-one-fifth-of-democracies/>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au information can be shared.

Rather, 34 their formation relies on individual’s distrust of mainstream media and institutions, including the government and scientific bodies.

With sufficient distrust of the standard sources of information, individuals use social media platforms to seek others who share their similar distrust.
The intended use of social media in connecting like-minded individuals facilitates multiple successful connections, and, accordingly, facilitates the establishment of echo chambers.

United by a shared distrust of mainstream sources, echo chambers ultimately reinforce a false and commonly dangerous perception of truth in their members, especially in a ‘fake news’ era.

Individuals can now curate their own virtual realities that can shield them from having their views challenged by opposing opinions.
Such echo chambers can also increase political tribalism within Australia - where one only sees as correct that which suits their narrative, and collaborative approaches to find right solutions are no longer preferred.

Given the potentially destabilising impact such tribalism could have on the stability of Australian democracy, foreign interference seeking to take advantage of the echo chambers of social media would seem especially dangerous.
There have been attempts to combat the rampant flow of misinformation, both through government initiatives such as the government-run mythbusting webpage and through social 35 media efforts such as Facebook 36 and Twitter 37 implementing mandatory warnings on COVID-19 related content.

However, the anti-vaccination movement in Australia continues to grow in record numbers fuelled by scientific scepticism and the echo chambers freely available on social media .
The resultant vaccine hesitancy and anti-science mindsets from 38 bringing ideas previously dismissed as fringe conspiracy theories into mainstream discourse 34 C Thi Nguyen, ‘The Problem of Living Inside Echo Chambers’, The Conversation (online, 11 September 2019) <https://theconversation.com/the-problem-of-living-inside-echo-chambers-110486>.

35 ‘COVID-19 Mythbusting’, Australian Government (Web Page) <https://www.australia.gov.au/covid-19-mythbusting>.
36 Nick Statt, ‘Facebook Will Now Show You a Warning Before You Share Articles About Covid-19’ , The Verge (online, 12 August 2020) <https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/12/21365305/facebook-covid-19-warning-notification-post-misinformation >.

37 Kari Paul, ‘Twitter Targets Covid Vaccine Misinformation With Labels And “Strike System”’, The Guardian (online, 2 March 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/01/twitter-coronavirus-vaccine-misinformation-labels>.
38 Anastasia Tsirtsakis, ‘Online Australian Anti-Vaxx Groups Grow by Nearly 300%: Report’, RACGP (News Report, 18 May 2021) <https://www1.racgp.org.au/newsgp/clinical/online-australian-anti-vaxx-groups-grow-by-nearly>.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au has real and dangerous consequences for the public health of Australians.
The effects of this have been seen in other nations, including in the United States whereby members of school boards have faced threats of violence and intimidation after attempting to implement mask mandates in schools.39 D Interference in the Tertiary Sector Foreign interference has pervaded Australia’s higher education system, undermining democratic values such as academic freedom and freedom of speech.
Academic freedom is broadly defined as ‘the freedom of individuals to study, teach, research and publish without being subject to, or causing undue interference’.

Freedom of speech is an element of 40 academic freedom and is a common law right in Australia.
These democratic values are 41 supposedly protected through the institutional autonomy of Australian universities.42 However, they are increasingly undermined by the rise of managerialism, bureaucratic involvement in educational policy, and reliance on private funding to Australian universities, which has led to the commercialisation of universities.43 This is demonstrated by the growing concern over China’s interference in Australian universities to control the global image and promote the views of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP).
Students and academics practice self-censorship while discussing China, avoiding comments which may be perceived as critical of the CCP.
This is to avoid being 44 39 Alison Durkee, ‘Schools Association Asks Biden For Protection Against Violent Anti-Maskers’, Forbes (online, 30 September 2021) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2021/09/30/schools-association-asks-biden-for-protection-against-v iolent-anti-maskers/?sh=48de11527fd6>; Timothy Bella and Devlin Barrett, ‘Garland asks FBI to address recent ‘disturbing spike’ in threats against educators’, The Washington Post (online, 5 October 2021) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2021/10/05/garland-educators-threats-masks-fbi/>.
40 Malcolm Tight, ‘So What Is Academic Freedom?’ in Malcolm Tight (ed), Academic Freedom and Responsibility (Philadelphia, Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press, 1988) 132.

41 Department of Education and Training, Report of the Independent Review of Freedom of Speech in Australian Higher Education Providers (March 2019) 18, 100.
42 Department of Education and Training, Report of the Independent Review of Freedom of Speech in Australian Higher Education Providers (March 2019) 18, 20.
43 Carole Kayrooz, Pamela Kinnear and Paul Preston, ‘Academic Freedom and Commercialisation of Australian Universities: Perceptions and Experiences of Social Scientists’ (Discussion Paper No 37, Australia Institute, March 2001) 2; Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Universities in Crisis (Final Report, 27 September 2001) 6–7.
44 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 1–3,15–16, 35, 75–8; see also Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au threatened by their peers through social media abuse 45 and reported to Chinese authorities, which can often pose a serious threat to the physical and emotional wellbeing for those who have family living in China.
This has been facilitated by social media platforms, most 46 popularly WeChat, which has been used by Chinese international students to criticise, harass, and dox their pro-democratic classmates and academics.

WeChat is known to heavily censor 47 and surveil their users on behalf of the Chinese government, creating an information vacuum which breeds insular thinking and indoctrinates its users with CCP ideology.
48 This CCP-controlled digital ecosystem ultimately undermines democratic values of academic freedom and freedom of speech, and universities have failed to respond appropriately as Chinese international students are a critical revenue stream.

While not able to be extensively 49 explored within the context of this submission, one must also query the longer term implications of this foreign interference on the roles of universities within policy making.
Given that universities are an institution vital to starting and informing debate about policy matters within Australian democracy, foreign interference in these sectors forcing students and academics to unduly self-censor would seemingly negatively impact the ability of universities to fulfil these roles as the contributions to political debate become constrained.

B.
B.

RESPONSES TO MITIGATE THE RISK POSED TO AUSTRALIA’S DEMOCRACY AND VALUES, INCLUDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS Matthew Condon, ‘What Drew Pavlou did Next’, The Australian, (online, 14 August 2021) <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/the-underdog-bites-back-what-drew-pavlou-di d-next/news-story/a6a0c1a00a5cdb5656c52c7529d374f7>.
45 Matthew Condon, ‘What Drew Pavlou did Next’, The Australian, (online, 14 August 2021) <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/the-underdog-bites-back-what-drew-pavlou-di d-next/news-story/a6a0c1a00a5cdb5656c52c7529d374f7>.

46 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 1–3.
47 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 75–8.

48 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of RepressionUndermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 75–8.
49 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 11–13.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au This submission notes there have been a surfeit of ad hoc, dissociated measures created by the Australian government in response to foreign interference through social media, however, a single, powerful agency or principal piece of legislation to manage and control the issue is absent — measures this submission recommends.
This submission will outline the legislative, institutional, and educational measures from the Australian Government and social media platforms to combat foreign interference through social media.

A Legislative In 2018, the offences of intentional and reckless foreign interference and preparing for a foreign interference offence were inserted into the Criminal Code.
The offences require a 50 person to engage in conduct that will influence a political or governmental process, the exercise of Australian rights, support intelligence of a foreign principal or prejudice Australia’s national security.

‘Conduct’ is defined to include ‘an act, an omission to perform an act, or a state of affairs’.

This is quite broad and would capture any type of interference 51 which occurs regardless of the mechanism by which it is carried out.
Therefore, the law in its current form appears to capture the conduct of foreign interference through social media in a very broad sense.

More specific reference to social media platforms is needed to be more effective.

For example, utilising the definition of ‘communications activity’ in the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth) section 13, would clarify that the foreign interference offence in the Criminal Code encompasses social media activity.
Counter Foreign Intelligence Legislation The introduction of the Counter Foreign Interference Strategy and Taskforce in 2019 to track, investigate and prevent foreign interference, 52 is another initiative by the Australian government to mitigate the risks posed to Australian democracy.
The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth) (‘the Scheme’) aims to provide greater visibility of the extent of foreign influence and activities undertaken on behalf of foreign principals that may 50 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 div 92.

This division was inserted by the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Cth).

51 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 4.1(2).


52 Prime Minister, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Defence, ‘Stepping Up Australia’s Response Against Foreign Interference’ (Media Release, Prime Minister of Australia, 2 December 2019) <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/stepping-australias-response-against-foreign-interference>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au exist in Australia’s democracy and political process.

The Scheme requires those carrying 53 out activities on behalf of foreign principals, even potentially through social media, to register their arrangements depending on who the foreign principal is and the purpose of their activities.
As expressed by then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull when introducing the National Security Legislation Amendment, 54 the Scheme operates on the basis of a clear distinction between foreign interference and foreign influence.
The Department of Home 55 Affairs stipulates that foreign influence is inevitable and permissible when transparent whereas foreign interference is coercive, corruptive, deceptive, and contrary to Australia’s sovereignty and its values.56 Although this conceptualisation seeks to balance freedom of communication and serious threats posed to our nation, this submission argues that the Scheme is nonetheless problematic for multiple reasons.
It is argued that in light of the ‘unprecedented’ 57 scale of the risk of foreign interference, this formulation is ineffective in capturing all conduct that is dangerous.

In other words, this rigid distinction creates a ‘grey area’ of conduct between acceptable influence and unlawful interference 58 that has become particularly challenging when considering the role of social media.
Foreign interference through this medium has been particularly rife, including Russian interference in the United States 2016 Presidential elections, and currently in Australia with interference by Chinese media owned companies which influence and exclude information to Chinese-Australian audiences that do not align with the CCP’s values.
Russia and China have exploited this ‘grey zone’ to strive to remain under key escalatory thresholds, meeting their objectives to influence international political 53 Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth); ‘Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme’, Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government (Web Page) <https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/foreign-influence-transparency-scheme>.

54 National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Cth).
55 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 December 2017, 13145 (Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister).

56 Department of Home Affairs, ‘Security’, Countering Foreign Interference (Web Page, 27 February 2020) <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference>.

57 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 7 December 2017, 13145 (Malcolm Turnbull, Prime Minister).
58 Katherine Mansted, ‘The Domestic Security Grey Zone: Navigating the Space Between Foreign Influence and Foreign Interference’ (Occasional Paper No February 2021, Australian National University, 1 February 2021) 4.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au processes gradually rather than an ‘all-out grab’.
59 In practice, this has occurred through ‘blended operations’ which may combine lawful and unlawful tactics, seen for example through Chinese officials using diplomatic accounts to spread messages of propagandistic nature, or Russian promotion of certain political ads on social media platforms through fake accounts.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has described this as the challenge of 60 ‘connecting the deceptive dots’ where security officials may be alert to criminal activity while underestimating the significance of lawful activities that facilitate it.

Current 61 legislation is ineffective in dealing with such acts in the ‘grey zone’.

Thus, this submission puts forward that a new approach is required to be more effective in early detection of foreign interference.
B Education Higher education in Australia is a source of foreign influence from international students, research and funding.

However, foreign interference may also transpire.

Patrick Hallinan noted there were ‘a number of countries’ seeking to interfere in Australian research, going so far as to control people from ‘ethnically and linguistically diverse’ backgrounds.
Given the 62 high use of social media amongst university students and potential for foreign interference through this medium, the University Foreign Interference Taskforce (‘UFIT’) was introduced in 2019 in response to this and developed a set of guidelines which aim to safeguard both academic freedom and national security.
The UFIT proposed that universities have an 59 Michael J Mazzar, ‘Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Order,’ War on the Rocks- Texas National Security Review (online, 22 December 2015) <https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-order>; Peter Layton, ‘Responding to China’s Unending Grey-Zone Prodding’, Royal United Services Institute (online, 11 August 2021) <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/responding-chinas-unending-grey-zone-pr odding>.
60 Chris Zappone, ‘“Grey Area”: China’s Trolling Drives Home Reality of Social Media War,’ Sydney Morning Herald (online, 6 December 2020) <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/grey-area-china-s-trolling-drives-home-reality-of-social-media-war-20201 203-p56kcx.html>; ; Morris, Mazaar and Hornung et al.

Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray (Research Report, 2019) 19.
61 Alex Joske, ‘The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front System’, The Strategist- Australian Institute Policy Institute (online, 9 June 2020) <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-party-speaks-for-you-foreign-interference-and-the-chinese-communist-pa rtys-united-front-system/>.
62 Jenny Sinclair, ‘Universities Told to Take Threat of Foreign Interference Seriously’, Research Professional News (online, 9 June 2020) <https://researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-australia-universities-2021-6-universities-told-to-take-threat-of-f oreign-interference-seriously/>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au accountable authority responsible for countering foreign interference, and a robust reporting framework.

This was in addition to education programs which raise awareness and train 63 students to identify foreign interference threats on campus and in the classroom.
The 64 guidelines also required academics to disclose their membership of foreign political parties over the past decade, however this has been criticised as a ‘blanket-approach’ which has the 65 potential to breach anti-discrimination and privacy laws.66 The response from Australian universities has been mixed.

Most Australian universities have demonstrated a commitment to the UFIT’s guidelines, in addition to Robert French’s Model Code on Freedom of Speech in Higher Education Providers.
For example, the University of 67 Technology Sydney updated its orientation program to include guidance on how to report intimidation and surveillance by other students, thereby encouraging students to report internally as opposed to bodies like the embassy.

However, other universities are heavily 68 reliant on their existing conventional policies on student and staff conduct, which is an inadequate approach.
This traditional approach can be attributed to universities' desire to 69 appeal to international countries and students rather than drawing the ire of foreign regimes through more radical and overt strategies to curb foreign interference.

This submission 70 63 Department of Education and Training (Cth), Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the University Sector (November 2019) 10–12.
64 Department of Education and Training (Cth), Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the University Sector (November 2019) 20–1.

65 Department of Education and Training (Cth), Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the University Sector (November 2019) 13.
66 Lisa Visentin,“‘Sledgehammer’: Plan to Force University Staff to Reveal Foreign Political History,” Sydney Morning Herald (online, 28 August 2021) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/sledgehammer-plan-to-force-university-staff-to-reveal-foreign-politic al-history-20210827-p58mfb.html>.
67 Human Rights Watch, University Responses to Human Rights Watch (July 2021) <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/07/University%20Responses%20to%20HRW_1_0.pdf >; Department of Education, Skills and Employment (Cth), Review of Adoption of the Model Code on Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom in Higher Education (June 2021) 5.
68 Lisa Visentin, ‘University Students will be Trained to Spot Foreign Interference,’ Sydney Morning Herald (online, 31 August 2021) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/university-students-will-be-trained-to-spot-foreign-interference-2021 0830-p58n3s.html>.

69 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 6.
70 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 11–13.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au therefore argues for a stronger, more enforceable approach to be taken by existing mechanisms such as UFIT, to limit foreign interference in the higher education sector.
C Institutional Previous efforts to combat misinformation have yielded inconclusive results, with the Australian Electoral Commission (‘AEC’) reporting that they had only found 11 instances of illegal practice after an extensive investigation of electoral communication on social media.71 This figure arguably shows that governmental organisations do not understand the difficulty of practical enforcement of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, given the longstanding psychological consequences of misinformation once it has already been viewed and understood.
Considering it was identified that a large majority of COVID-19 misinformation currently in circulation came from a group of 12 online personalities with followings in the millions, 72 the unfettered power of social media to impact upon public psyches and the ability of misinformation to evade detection cannot be underestimated.
A response to this, during the 2019 Federal election, was the AEC’s Stop and Consider social media campaign to encourage Australian voters to fact-check sources of information, including sources found through social media, during the election period.

This submission 73 argues that the Australian government should go further and implement similar campaigns outside of election periods.
A recent report into media literacy amongst Australian adults revealed that overall Australian adult media literacy is low, and that only 39% of respondents felt confident to take steps to identify misinformation.

Therefore, public education should 74 also be at the forefront of combating foreign interference through social media.
D Social Media Platforms’ Responses 71 Asha Barbaschow, Countering Foreign Interference and Social Media Misinformation in Australia (19 March 2020) ZDNet <https://www.zdnet.com/article/countering-foreign-interference-and-social-media-misinformation-in-australia/>.

72 Erum Salam, Majority of Covid Misinformation Came from 12 People, Report Finds (18 July 2021) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/17/covid-misinformation-conspiracy-theories-ccdh-report>.
73 Australian Electoral Commission, ‘AEC Encouraging Voters to “Stop and Consider” this Federal Election’ (Media Release, 15 April 2019) <https://www.aec.gov.au/media/media-releases/2019/04-15.htm>.

74 Tanya Notley et al, ‘Adult Media Literacy in Australia: Attitudes, Experiences and Needs’ (Report, Western Sydney University, Queensland University of Technology and University of Canberra, 14 April 2021) 12.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au As private organisations, social media companies have the right to control what type of content is allowed on their platform and how this content is disseminated.

This is evidenced with Facebook’s ‘Community Standards’, for example; a mechanism arguably of more symbolic nature rather than producing true meaningful change.
When considering these 75 rights alongside the large number of social media users, it is evident that social media companies have significant influence in determining what constitutes free speech.

Accordingly, social media companies must uphold facilitating the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, while fulfilling the increasingly important responsibility to curb misinformation.

Facilitating fact-checking mechanisms is a method to curb such misinformation and foreign interference.
This conflict has heightened during the COVID-19 pandemic with social media companies intervening to prevent the spread of misinformation, as recently shown with YouTube banning Sky News Australia for a week.

However, there is 76 a need to balance the interests of social media companies and the Australian government, given that social media companies are private organisations with a global outreach.
Currently, many social media platforms have developed internet ad libraries, including Facebook’s Ad Library and Twitter’s Ad Transparency Centre, which allow for political 77 advertisements to be recorded in a publicly accessible database during election times.

However, these are not without their faults.


This submission argues that the Government might consider how it can better regulate the availability, usage and information contained within internet ad libraries so that citizens can better understand how and why they are being targeted.

It should also consider how it can require that social media platforms confirm that the organisations advertising politically are registered locally.
75 Peter Suciu, ‘Delving Deeper Into Facebook's Murky Community Standards’, Forbes (online, 8 June 2020).

76 Amanda Meade, ‘Sky News Australia banned from YouTube for seven days over Covid misinformation’, The Guardian (online, 1 August 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/aug/01/sky-news-australia-banned-from-youtube-for-seven-days-ov er-covid-misinformation>.
77 The Australia Institute, Submission No 31 to Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media, Foreign Interference through Social Media (January 2021) 4.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Furthermore, social media enables the spread of misinformation, potentially coming from foreign entities, at a much higher rate than any other platform.
78 In response, major social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Google, Microsoft, Redbubble and TikTok are signatories of The Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation in 2021, designed to combat misleading information online.

Those that have signed must aim 79 to provide safeguards protecting Australians against harm from online misinformation and submit a report annually on the platform’s progress in achieving outcomes in accordance with the Code’s objectives.
As the Code is in the onset of its inception, it is too early to 80 determine its effectiveness.

However, as of now, this submission finds this initiative to be a key measure in ensuring compliance with preventing the spread of misinformation on social media platforms and protecting Australian values.

RECOMMENDATIONS 1.
RECOMMENDATIONS 1.

This submission argues the Australian government should introduce a public education campaign to improve digital media literacy amongst Australians and increase the number of resources available to prevent the risk of foreign interference reaching Australian people.
Educational campaigns should also be tailored to different demographics, including instilling mandatory courses for primary-school, high-school and university students, as well as campaigns for elderly people, people from low-income backgrounds, and people in regional areas.81 a.
Educational campaigns may also be rolled out through in-app features including enhancing access to official Government websites outlining the 78 Sophie Marineau, ‘Fact Check US: What is the Impact of Russian Interference in the US Presidential Election?’, The Conversation (online, 30 September 2020) <https://theconversation.com/fact-check-us-what-is-the-impact-of-russian-interference-in-the-us-presidential-ele ction-146711>.
79 Josh Taylor, ‘Australian Government Ready to Pursue Facebook and Twitter if Misinformation Code Doesn't Work’, The Guardian, (online, 22 February 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/feb/22/australian-government-ready-to-pursue-facebook-an d-twitter-if-misinformation-code-doesnt-work>.

80 Digital Industry Group Inc, Australia Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (Report, 22 February 2021).
81 Tanya Notley et al, ‘Adult Media Literacy in Australia: Attitudes, Experiences and Needs’ (Report, Western Sydney University, Queensland University of Technology and University of Canberra, 14 April 2021) 12.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au most recent public health advice and commonly asked questions in relation to the vaccine rollout.

2.
2.

Measures in universities should include empowering staff and students to publicly speak out when incidents of foreign interference threatening academic freedom occurs; creating rules around ‘reporting’ and ‘doxing’ fellow classmates and grounds for disciplinary action; 82 encouraging reporting against other students through internal university mechanisms particularly in instances of intimidation and threats.
a. Alternatively, if universities do not serve to be an adequate avenue of redress, reference to the Australian Human Rights Commission would also be appropriate.

3.

This submission notes the importance of allowing third-party fact-checkers including Australian experts to assess content circulated on social media.

4.
4.

This submission encourages the continued monitoring of the operation of the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation, including future reporting on its role in deterring foreign interference and regulating social media platforms.

C. INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES TO CYBER-ENABLED FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND MISINFORMATION Overseas jurisdictions have taken a variety of approaches to address the threat of cyber-enabled misinformation and disinformation.
83 In particular, policy makers have paid close attention to the destructive potential of disinformation after observing its effect in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Parliament’s electoral processes.84 82 Human Rights Watch, They Don’t Understand the Fear We Have: How China’s Long Reach of Repression Undermines Academic Freedoms at Australian Universities (Report, June 2021) 99–100.
83 Florian Saurwein and Charlotte Spencer-Smith, ‘Combating Disinformation on Social Media: Multilevel Governance and Distributed Accountability in Europe’ (2020) 8(6) Digital Journalism 820, 821.

84 Digital Democracy Project, Lessons in Resilience: Canada’s Digital Media Ecosystem and the 2019 Election (Report, 2020) 6.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Policy responses in general can be classified under three broad categories: Education, minimisation, and regulation.

A Canada Canadians are subject to a similar level of misinformation to the United States and generally fail to check the accuracy of information before sharing it on social media networks.
A 63% 85 increase in the screen-time of the average Canadian, along with an increasing reliance on the internet and social media as the main source of news, has led to officials instigating several 86 proactive reforms to combat the problem.87 The most significant of these reforms was to the Canada Elections Act in 2018, 88 targeting general misinformation.
By extension, this submission believes the amending provisions would be applicable to foreign interference through social media which is often founded upon the spread of misinformation.

The Act was amended to revise the existing wording of the offence of knowingly publishing false information about political figures with the intention of influencing the results of an election.
The amendment allowed for accidental misstatements 89 of fact, statements mistakenly thought to be true, and statements of opinion to be captured by the provision.

90 It was challenged by the Canadian Constitution Foundation on the ground that it infringed on the freedom of expression granted by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Canadian Supreme Court held the amendment had no force or effect on that 91 ground that it was not a justifiable limit on freedom of expression.92 Other Canadian measures to combat misinformation include the Digital Citizen Initiative, a multi-component strategy that aims to promote citizen resilience against online 85 Karine Garneau and Clémence Zossou, Misinformation During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Report, February 2021); Shelley Boulianne, ‘Is Canada resilient to misinformation?’ (Lecture, MacEwan University, April 15 2021) <https://academic.macewan.ca/bouliannes/files/2021/06/Is-Canada-Resilient-v4REVISED.pdf>.
86 Canadian Internet Registration Authority, Canada’s Internet Factbook 2021 (Web Page, 2021) <https://www.cira.ca/resources/factbook/canadas-internet-factbook-2021#screentime>.

87 ‘Online Disinformation’, Government of Canada (Web Page, 30 June 2021) <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-disinformation.html#a1b>.

88 Canada Elections Act, SC 2000, c 9, s 91(1).

89 Elections Modernization Act, SC 2018, c 31, s 61.
90 Canadian Constitution Foundation v Canada (Attorney General) (2021) ONSC 1224, [5] (‘Canada Constitution Foundation’).

91 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’).

92 Canadian Constitution Foundation v Canada (Attorney General) (2021) ONSC 1224, [5].

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au disinformation.
93 In conjunction with its public education role, the organisation also facilitates grants to fund research which can assist the government in implementing evidence-based policies to promote a healthy information ecosystem.94 B China With its totalitarian political system and stricter information control, China has taken a heavy-handed approach to addressing social media misinformation 95 compared to other nations, particularly in response to COVID-19.
The net effect of this is that freedom of expression is substituted with social responsibility, and social order.96 Control of misinformation is primarily achieved through criminal sanctions for defamation related offences, facilitated both by nation’s first cybersecurity law, 97 and the Security Administration Punishment Law.
Notably, China’s arguably most effective means of 98 combating misinformation is through its national rumour refuting platform, which was established in 2018 and uses artificial intelligence to identify suspect online material and remove it.99 In addition, special COVID-19 misinformation rectification campaigns have been implemented by WeChat and Douyin, while state media frequently counteracts specific rumours that are disseminated to the public.100 93 ‘Online Disinformation’, Government of Canada (Web Page, 30 June 2021) <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-disinformation.html#a1b>.
94 ‘Digital Citizen Contribution Program’, Government of Canada (Web Page, 3 May 2021) <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-disinformation/digital-citizen-contribution-progra m.html>.
95 Scott W. Harold et al, ‘Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media’ (Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2021); Dexter Roberts, ‘China’s Disinformation Strategy: Its Dimensions and Future’ (Research Report, Atlantic Council, December 2020); Sarah Cook, ‘Beijing Is Getting Better at Disinformation on Global Social Media’, The Diplomat (online, 30 March 2021) < https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/beijing-is-getting-better-at-disinformation-on-global-social-media/>.
96 Usha M Rodrigues and Jian Xu, ‘Regulation of COVID-19 Fake News Infodemic in China and India’ (2020) 177(1) Media International Australia 125, 128–9.

97 Cybersecurity Law (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 June 2017.

98 Public Security Administration Punishments Law (People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, Order No 38, 1 March 2006.
99 Stella Qiu and Ryan Woo, ‘China Launches Platform to Stamp Out ‘Online Rumors’’, Reuters (online, 30 August 2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet/china-launches-platform-to-stamp-out-online-rumors-idUSK CN1LF0HL>.

100 Usha M Rodrigues and Jian Xu, ‘Regulation of COVID-19 Fake News Infodemic in China and India’ (2020) 177(1) Media International Australia 125, 128–9.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au C Nordic Countries The 2021 World Press Freedom Index assesses the press freedom situation in 180 countries, particularly the quality of journalism against misinformation.
The policy responses of Finland and Sweden are ranked 2nd and 3rd respectively.101 Finland Ranking 1st in the Media Literacy Index 2021, 102 Finland excels in combating foreign misinformation by promoting media literacy within their education system.

The Finnish Government’s understanding of the need for stronger literacy amidst social media usage is encapsulated in their 2019 document ‘Media Literacy in Finland’.
This was developed alongside actors and organisations within the Finnish media industry, highlighting themes of active citizenship and critical thinking.

103 From 2016, Finnish secondary schools introduced multi-platform information literacy and critical thinking as a core component of the curriculum.

104 For example, students are taught about the manipulation of statistics, the digital alteration of images, analysis of propaganda campaigns, and evaluations of vaccine disinformation.
According to the World Economic Forum, the Finnish Government has 105 utilised Finnish fact-checking organisation, Faktabaari, to teach professional fact-checking methods in schools, 106 serving as a means to block foreign misinformation.
Additionally, 101 ‘2021 World Press Freedom Index: Journalism, the Vaccine Against Disinformation, Blocked in More than 130 Countries’, Reporters Without Borders (Web Page) <https://rsf.org/en/2021-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-vaccine-against-disinformation-blocked-more-1 30-countries>.

102 ‘Finland, Denmark and Estonia Top the Media Literacy Index 2021’, Education Estonia (Blog post, 15 March 2021) <https://www.educationestonia.org/finland-denmark-and-estonia-top-the-media-literacy-index-2021/>.
103 Mikael Wigell, Harri Mikkola and Tapio Juntunen, ‘Best Practices in the Whole-Of-Society Approach in Countering Hybrid Threats’ (2021) European Parliament <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653632/EXPO_STU(2021)653632_EN.pdf> 1, 30.

104 Jon Henley, ‘How Finland Starts its Fight Against Fake News in Primary Schools’, The Guardian (online, 29 January 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/fact-from-fiction-finlands-new-lessons-in-combating-fake-ne ws>.
105 Harriet Barber, ‘Finland’s Secret Weapon in the Fight Against Fake News: Its Kindergarten Children’, The Telegraph (online, 16 February 2021) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/climate-and-people/finlands-secret-weapon-fight-against-fake-news -kindergarten/>.

106 Emma Charlton, ‘How Finland is Fighting Fake News - In the Classroom’, World Economic Forum (online, 21 May 2019) <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/how-finland-is-fighting-fake-news-in-the-classroom/>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Finland’s self-regulating body for ethical professional practice, Council for Mass Media, launched a project in 2018, called “Responsible Journalism”.
This taught classroom students and the general population, via educational videos, the substantive differences between journalism and ‘fake news’.107 Further to Finland’s main tool of media literacy, a 2020 Press Release by the Finnish Government noted a project by the Prime Minister’s Office alongside the Finnish Media Pool to support social media influencers in sharing accurate information concerning COVID-19 vaccines.108 Sweden The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (‘MSB’) plays a significant role in combating misinformation and foreign interference through their 2018 handbook, ‘Countering Information Influence Activities’.
The handbook warns against disinformation and automated bots that exploit social vulnerabilities, emphasising how these agents can undermine the democratic process.

109 Additionally, the MSB increased general awareness against disinformation campaigns in 2013 and produced brochures in 2018 entitled “If Crisis or War Comes”, encouraging more caution towards false information.

According to Brookings, a 110 comprehensive strategy was devised to counter foreign interference prior to the Swedish 2018 Election.
111 These measures included Sweden’s largest media outlets collaborating to scrutinize facts and a pop-up newsroom consisting of students, journalists, and fact-checkers to track sources of disinformation.112 107 Maarit Jaakkola, ‘Journalists as Media Educators: Journalistic Media Education as Inclusive Boundary Work’ (2020) Journalism Practice 1, 10.

108 Government Communications Department, ‘Combating Coronavirus Together by Sharing Reliable Information’ (Press Release 160/2020, 22 March 2020).
109 ‘Countering Information Influence Activities’, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Handbook) <https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/28698.pdf>.

110 Mikael Wigell, Harri Mikkola and Tapio Juntunen, ‘Best Practices in the Whole-Of-Society Approach in Countering Hybrid Threats’ (2021) European Parliament 1, 35 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653632/EXPO_STU(2021)653632_EN.pdf>.
111 Margaret L Taylor, ‘Combating Disinformation and Foreign Interference in Democracies: Lessons from Europe’, Brookings (online, 31 July 2019) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31/combating-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-in-d emocracies-lessons-from-europe/>.
112 Margaret L Taylor, ‘Combating Disinformation and Foreign Interference in Democracies: Lessons from Europe’, Brookings (online, 31 July 2019) Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Additionally, an elections handbook and training to government/election officials was provided to increase preparations against disinformation.
An interesting measure adopted 113 by the Swedish Government, via the MSB, was tasking the Swedish Defence Research Agency (‘FOI’) with monitoring digital media, particularly bots on Twitter prior to the election.
Although there was uncertainty with the origin of the bots’ activity, it spread significant awareness of bot-related content.114 Finally, the Swedish Government has dedicated efforts to media literacy through the Swedish Media Council’s learning tool, ‘MIL for me’, providing online training resources on media and information literacy, and warning against anti-democratic messages on social media.115 D Ukraine IREX’s ‘Learn to Discern’ curriculum and methodology has been adapted and implemented in Ukraine with high levels of success and is an illustrative example of the positive effects such a program could have in Australia.
In 2015, the Ukrainian Government integrated critical information consumption skills into existing secondary school curricula and teacher training programs.

An IREX study of Year 8 and 9 Ukrainian students who participated in 116 the program found that they were twice as likely to detect hate speech and 18% better at identifying misinformation than students that did not participate in the program.
117 The success of IREX’s program in Ukraine is an interesting case study in demonstrating how public-private partnerships (with media literacy focused organisations) may be useful in fighting foreign interference through educational measures.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31/combating-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-in-d emocracies-lessons-from-europe/>.
113 Erik Brattberg, ‘European Lessons for Tackling Election Interference’, Carnegie Endowment for International peace (online, 18 August 2020) <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/18/european-lessons-for-tackling-election-interference-pub-82561>.

114 Ralph Schroeder, ‘Even in Sweden?

: Misinformation and Elections in the New Media Landscape’ (2020) Nordic Journal of Media Studies 97, 101–4.
115 “Media Literacy and Safe Use of New Media” European Commission (Web Page) <https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/sweden/68-media-literacy-and-safe-use-of-new -media>.

116 IREX, ‘Strengthening Media Literacy in the Ukrainian Education System’, IREX (2021) <https://www.irex.org/project/strengthening-media-literacy-ukrainian-education-system>.
117 IREX, ‘Learn to Discern (L2D) - Media Literacy Training’, IREX (2021) <https://www.irex.org/project/learn- discern-l2d-media-literacy-training>.
Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37 UNSW Law Society Inc. ABN: 84 087 397 820 E: policy.submissions@lawsoc.org.au Recommendations In sum, international policy responses to cyber-enabled foreign interference and misinformation place recurring emphasis on the importance of investing in education as a means for citizens to improve their digital literacy.
In contrast, while Australia has a framework for media literacy education, 118 there is no uniformly funded national policy for media literacy, leading to low confidence in fact-checking and the increasing prevalence of misinformation.

As such, this submission recommends: 5.

If legislative sanctions are to be implemented to prevent foreign interference through social media, the legislation should not be so broad in application that it may infringe upon express or implied rights.

6.
6.

If a media oversight body is created to counteract rumours and misinformation, it is essential that such bodies are independent from the government and political interference.

7.

Australia should fund a national education initiative (or alternatively, partner with a non-government organisation such as IREX to adopt their Learn to Discern program) to improve digital literacy to enable Australians to better discern between accurate and fake information disseminated within social media and news media.
118 Jocelyn Nettlefold and Kathleen Williams, ‘Insight Five: A snapshot of Media Literacy in Australian Schools’ (Research Report, Institute for the Study of Social Change, University of Tasmania) 3.

Foreign Interference through Social MediaSubmission 37