Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1697706179602.pdf (Canada)
Report of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation respecting its participation at the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association Seoul, Republic of Korea September 11-14, 2017 REPORT INTRODUCTION The Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) has the honour to present its report on the participation of a Canadian delegation to the NATO PA Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC), held in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK) on 11 – 14 September 2017.
The Parliament of Canada was represented by the Honourable Senator Joseph A.

Day.

The delegation of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) consisted of 16 parliamentarians from 12 different NATO member countries.

The committee attended meetings at the French Embassy and the Asan Institute.

The committee also met with individuals from: 1.

Republic of Korea’s Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs; 2.

Republic of Korea’s National Assembly Committees; 3.
Officials from the United States Forces-Korea (USFK); and 4.

Executive members from The Hanwha Group.

Topics of Discussion The purpose of the visit to Seoul was to discuss the evolving security dynamic in East Asia and the Republic of Korea’s perspective of near and long-term threats.

Such threats consist of continued missile proliferation on the Korean Penninsula as well as vulnerability to cyberattacks.
Prospects for renewed negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang, as well as the evolving nature of bilateral relations of the ROK with Japan, China and Russia were discussed in detail.

Additionally, new avenues for security cooperation between the Republic of Korea and NATO allies were also examined, along with the evolution of the Republic of Korea’s security cooperation with the U.S. and the transformation of its armed forces to meet the 21st century East Asian security environment.

Observations 1.
Observations 1.

At the time of escalating international tensions over the missile programme of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the delegation visited Seoul and the Korean Demilitarized Zone from 11-14 September 2017.

The parliamentary delegation noted strong solidarity between NATO member state parliamentarians and their counterparts in the Republic of Korea.

2.
2.

The head of the Delegation, Xavier Pintat (France) stated that in order to resolve growing concerns over Pyongyang’s recent actions in relation to missile and nuclear proliferation, the need for focused and earnest diplomatic efforts were necessary.
A similar sentiment was expressed by NATO PA President Paolo Alli (Italy), who stated that a peaceful resolution of the current standoff regarding the DPRK’s missile programme was essential and that the international community should remain united and firm in this regard.

3.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military is the fourth largest force in the world in terms of numbers, with over a million personnel1.

However, much of their military equipment dates from the Soviet era.
But, their Special Forces are the largest Special Forces team in the world and are the best-equipped of the entire DPRK’s military.

4.

In terms of progress, while Pyongyang has conducted a total of 17 missile tests and one nuclear test between 1994 and 2008, within the past 8 years, it has conducted over 70 missile tests and four nuclear tests.

2017 was the first year the DPRK had successfully demonstrated the capacity of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.

5.
5.

The current rate of missile and nuclear testing in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has spurred diplomatic activity and defensive measures across the region.

The DPRK continues to develop nuclear-capable medium and long-range ballistic missile systems.

According to defence experts, the DPRK’s ballistic missile capabilities serve as a strategic deterrent, an indicator of international prestige, and a tool for coercive diplomacy2.

6.
6.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has threatened to fire missiles at Guam, a small island in the Pacific, which is the closest territory belonging to the U.S., hosting two U.S. military installations3.

Attacking Guam has the possibility of triggering Article Five, which would commit Canada to military action against the DPRK.

7.
7.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s cyber capabilities are becoming yet another great concern for regional and global stability as they provide another means for exerting pressure to achieve the country’s strategic goals.

For several years, the DPRK has conducted cyber-attacks targeting financial institutions in the Republic of Korea, military organizations, government officials, and media outlets4.
In 2017, Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. attributed the WannaCry ransomware attack to the DPRK, which affected more than 300,000 computers in 150 countries, damaging the U.K. National Health Service as well as the Russian postal service5.

8.

Neither the Republic of Korea nor Japan currently has nuclear weapons or strategic missile capabilities.
Both countries rely on the United States of America 1 Gerald E. Connolly, “North Korea’s Challenge to International Security: Implications for NATO”, April 2018, p. 2.

2 Jung H. Pak, “Regime Insecurity or Regime Resilience?”, Brookings Institution, 2018, p. 7 3 Brad Lendon and Joshua Berlinger, “Next target Guam, North Korea says,” CNN, Aug 2017.

4 Jung H. Pak, “Regime Insecurity or Regime Resilience?”, Brookings Institution, 2018, p. 13-14.
5 BBC News, “Cyber-attack: US and UK blame North Korea for WannaCry,” Dec 2017. to provide these assurances, which are provided via bilateral defence treaties.

Both countries do, however, have Aegis-equipped destroyers that operate regionally.

Additionally, there are Memorandums of Understanding in place that facilitate data-sharing and overall bilateral cooperation for the purpose of ensuring strong ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities from the United States of America.

9.
9.

In early 2017, the United States installed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile battery system – a defense system capable of intercepting short- and medium-range missiles during their initial phase of flight.

This system was deemed operational before the current president of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae-In, came into power.
From a regional perspective, THAAD is currently the best line of defense available to protect dense population centres as it bolsters overall ballistic missile defense capabilities and complements existing systems in place to create a multilayered defensive shield against threats.

10.

The delegation was briefed by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies on potential courses of action for regional security.
First, mutual trust between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. is integral to the stability of the region.

Of critical importance for the stability of the region is the implementation and deployment of THAAD as well as defense burden-sharing.

11.

However, the election of a new government in the Republic of Korea appears to have changed the dynamics of the ROK-USA defence relationship.
Some officials share sentiments that THAAD might not be the best course of action for the country and there are concerns that the Republic of Korea may suspend the THAAD missile system.

Other concerns include the possibility of trade wars, territorial disputes and arms races, which would further increase tensions.

12.

China opposed the installment of THAAD missile battery systems in the region, citing their concern that such capabilities could compromise China’s own missile programmes.
Because of this issue, China imposed trade sanctions on the Republic of Korea, thereby putting additional stress on their economy.

From a security perspective, the presence of THAAD missile battery systems in the Republic of Korea are essential, given that they ensure stability in the region via the U.S.A. – a hegemon with the ability to deter the DPRK.

Both Russia and China have been against imposing trade sanctions on the DPRK in response to missile and nuclear testing.

13.
13.

The delegation was briefed by General Vincent K. Brooks, Commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea on the tri-command system on the Korean peninsula.

The common mission of all three commands is to defend the Republic of Korea.

The presence and participation of the international community on the Korean peninsula is crucial, given that it enables the continued prosperity of the Republic of Korea and adds greatly to the stability of Northeast Asia.
14.

The United Nations Command (UNC) ensures the continuance of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and conducts investigations, surveying military-to-military messaging to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The United States lead the UNC as the executive agent of the command and controls international forces sent from 17 other participating nations.

15.
15.

The Combined Forces Command (CFC) serves as a crucial line of defence for the Republic of Korea, maintaining wartime operational control over US-ROK forces.

If conflict were to break out on the peninsula, the CFC would be leading the charge in aiding the Republic of Korea.

16.

The mission of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) is to support the UNC and CFC and to train US forces in Korea.
The USFK serve to uphold the US-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty of 1953 and all other joint exercises in the region between the two allies.

17.

With respect to Canadian policy implications, Canada’s new defence policy (SSE) states that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s efforts to expand its nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons programs show disregard for many UNSC resolutions, demonstrating that the DPRK poses a threat to security from both a regional and international perspective6.

18.
18.

There exists the long-standing question of whether Canada should join the U.S.’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) system.

A Senate defence committee report released in 2014 unanimously recommended that the Government of Canada enter into a ballistic missile defence agreement with U.S.7 , especially in light of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea efforts to improve its weapons programmes, its willingness to defy UNSC resolutions, and its efforts to destabilize the region8.
A DND spokesperson has stated that although Canada’s new defence policy (SSE) does not alter our stance on BMD, the new defence policy does commit the current government, through NORAD modernization, to territorial defence against ballistic missiles9.

CONCLUSION The visit by the Canadian Delegation of the NATO PA sub-committee to Korea was valuable in affirming the need for peaceful and focused diplomatic action so as to ensure greater security stability in East Asia.
The Canadian Delegation recognizes a growing need for increased bilateral cooperation between the Republic of Korea, NATO member countries, Japan, China, Russia as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

6 Department of National Defence, “Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy” June 2017, p. 51.

7 Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: Responding to the evolving threat,” June 2014, p. v. 8 ibid., p. 7.

9 Evan Solomon.
9 Evan Solomon.

“Should Canada help in North Korean standoff?” Maclean’s, Sept 2017.

A report has been prepared by the Secretariat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly – Ethan Corbin.

NATO PA will continue to monitor the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Respectfully submitted, Ms. Leona Alleslev, M.P.


Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association Travel Costs ASSOCIATION Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association ACTIVITY Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) DESTINATION Seoul, Republic of Korea DATES September 11-14, 2017 DELEGATION SENATE Hon.

Joseph A.

Day HOUSE OF COMMONS STAFF TRANSPORTATION $ 6,894.41 ACCOMMODATION $ 1,875.40 HOSPITALITY $ 0 PER DIEMS $ 686.72 OFFICIAL GIFTS MISCELLANEOUS $ 0 $ 0 TOTAL $ 9,456.53