Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1697642789480.pdf (Australia)
39 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS MARLOW, D. The rehabilitation of mined and drilled land in Australia is a state responsibility.

Consequently, each state and territory has its own legislative, tenure allocation, oversight and management regime.
This structure of disparate regimes poses problems for companies operating across jurisdictions, but it does have the advantage that if a state is serious about improving its site rehabilitation regime, it has the op- portunity to ‘cherry-pick’ from the best of that of the other states, as well as from overseas.

Operators would coincidentally beneﬁ t from a greater commonality of legislation.
The Queensland government could signiﬁ cantly improve its approach to site rehabilitation by the following: analyse past relevant government reports to see if unadopted recommendations should regain current attention, mandate progressive rehabilitation as standard practice, mandate a requirement for a mine closure plan prior to approval of a resource lease, establish a single team to regulate rehabilitation on all sites, treat all abandoned sites in the same way, close legal loopholes for evading site rehabilitation and implement legislative changes to increase funding for site rehabilitation.
The word “mine” in this paper includes oil, natural gas and CSG (coal seam gas) wells.

INTRODUCTION faces Queensland presently large and greatly increasing environmental problems, resulting from past and present mining activities.

Some abandoned mines cause severe acid drainage contamination, while modern open-cut mining operations create massive landform alterations.
At the Peak Downs open-cut coal mine alone, about 31 million bank cubic metres of overburden are moved annually, while at the neighbouring Saraji mine, about 42 million bank cubic metres are excavated annually (Foster, 2013).

FIG.

1 illustrates the scale of operations.

The Queensland public probably expects that all sites (abandoned, surrendered, or operational) will eventually be rehabilitated.
However, the public’s understanding of what this means in reality is not necessarily that of governments, public servants, or mine operators.

The public probably expects that all sites will be restored to a state approximating what existed prior to operations, or at least to a landform that is safe and stable for cattle to graze and where pollutants will not contaminate groundwater or surrounding lands and waterways.

However, the cost of achieving this standard is staggering.
The cost to taxpayers just to rehabilitate all abandoned sites to this standard may be anywhere between a billion dollars and ten or even twenty billion dollars.

The cost of doing so for operational sites is far higher.

Queensland currently holds 5.38 billion dollars in rehabilitation securities, but the true rehabilitation cost may be anywhere between ﬁ fteen and ﬁ fty billion dollars (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2015a).
This paper describes the magnitude of the present rehabilitation problem - the onerous costs and the inadequate funds.

It then oﬀ ers several proposals on how we might improve our management of the problem and so be more eﬃ cient and eﬀ ective in our rehabilitation eﬀ orts.

Finally, it oﬀ ers several proposals on how additional funding might be obtained to increase the size of the rehabilitation eﬀ ort.
The objective of the paper is to generate discussion on an integrated suite of management, regulatory and legislative reforms that will dramatically improve the future natural environment of Queensland, compared with the worrying future resulting from incomplete rehabilitation of mine sites.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION ABANDONED SITES The principal environmental problem on abandoned sites is that of acid mine (or rock) drainage, which can be deﬁ ned as all processes where the inadvertent oxidation of sulphide-bearing rock following mining leads to the release of pollutants.

FIG.

2 displays the distinctive blue colour of copper sulphate leachate in an acid mine drainage spill.
The oxidation of Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 40 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND sulphidic mine wastes and the consequent release of acid drainage is one of the main strategic environmental issues facing the mining industry (Harries, 1997).
Large quantities of excavated rock containing sulphide minerals interact with water and oxygen to create sulphuric acid and the interaction can occur in tailings dams, spoil heaps, pit walls and underground workings.

This can leach or ﬂ ow into streams and aquifers.

The increased water acidity caused by these leachates is often fatal to wildlife, including stygofauna in aquifers and aquatic life in streams – especially following major breaches of any containment system.
However, the deleterious environmental eﬀ ects of major one-oﬀ acid-water incidents are often temporary.

A greater and more persistent problem is that of associated heavy metal contamination.

The excavated sulphidic rock often contains heavy metals, such as arsenic, cadmium, cobalt, copper, lead, silver and zinc.

The acidiﬁ ed water mobilises these elements and carries them downstream.

These toxic metals accumulate in the food chain and can prove lethal.
The metals are transported as either dissolved species in water (the more dangerous form) or as an integral part of suspended sediments.

They may then be stored in river bed sediments or seep into the underground water, thereby contaminating water from underground sources, particularly wells (Duruibe, Ogwuegbu and Egwurugwu, 2007).

Heavy metal contamination is persistent.

For example, the Rio Tinto orebodies in Spain have been mined since the third millennium BC.
Leblanc et al (2000) believe that ‘long-term release of metals from ancient mining operations that have not received the beneﬁ t of modern remediation may be a more serious problem than the impact of much larger, modern-day operations’.

OPERATIONAL SITES Open-cut mines can create massive unnatural landforms.
A modern open-cut coal mine may be 40 km long and may cut to a depth of 300 m. The extraction process creates massive spoil heaps with steep erosion-prone slopes and leaves massive voids that accumulate contaminated water.

Major flood events can flush the contamination into nearby waterways.

FIG.

1.

Peak Downs and Saraji coal mine, Queensland, 2012 (Image source: Lock the Gate Alliance).
Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 41 In 2010, the National Water Commission (2012) warned that the CSG industry needed to be adequately managed and regulated to avoid the risk of signiﬁ cant long-term impacts on adjacent surface and groundwater systems.
The Commission was concerned that ‘CSG development represents a substantial risk to sustainable water management, given the combination of material uncertainty about water impacts, the signiﬁ cance of potential impacts, and the long time period over which they may emerge and continue to have eﬀ ect’.

The potential risks included permanent damage to aquifers, resulting from excessive water extraction, depressurisation, cross- contamination and the re-injection of treated waste water.
exists and there are no legal avenues requiring the company or individuals that created the disturbance to carry out remediation (QG, 2015a).

A legacy site is deﬁ ned as a site that has been closed, but continues to negatively impact the environment or nearby communities – the associated mining tenure may or may not still exist.

An abandoned site may be a legacy site.


In New South Wales, a derelict mine is deﬁ ned as a former mining site requiring remediation, where no individual or company can be held responsible for its management or rehabilitation (Department of Industry Resources and Energy, n.d.).
ONEROUS COSTS - INADEQUATE FUNDS ABANDONED SITES, LEGACY SITES AND DERELICT SITES In Queensland, an abandoned mine is deﬁ ned as a former mining site where a mining tenure no longer Remediation of abandoned sites involves addressing site safety and health risks, as well as containing potential contaminant spills and discharges into streams (QG, 2015b).

There are more than 15,000 identiﬁ ed abandoned mine sites in Queensland.

FIG.

2.
FIG.

2.

Acid Mine Drainage impacted waters of the Dee River in the vicinity of the Mount Morgan mine site (Image source: Unger et al.

2003) Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 42 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND About 3,500 of them are on state-owned land (QG, 2015a).

The Queensland government is responsible for those on state-owned land.
However, it claims that private landholders are responsible for managing abandoned mines on their land, including the hazards that accompany them (QG, 2015b).

A similar legal position is held by the New South Wales Government (Department of Industry Resources and Energy, n.d.).

The Queensland government will take action on any of the approximately 12,000 abandoned mines on private land only if there is an identiﬁ ed associated public hazard (QFCE, 2012).
The QAO estimated that it will cost up to a billion dollars to rehabilitate all abandoned mines in Queensland (QAO, 2014).

This may be a serious under-estimate.

Dr. Erskine of the CMLR estimates that the cost of fully rehabilitating the Mount Morgan site alone would run ‘probably in the hundreds of millions to [a] billion, in the billions probably’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015b).

See FIG.

2.
See FIG.

2.

Tim Buckley, Director of Energy Finance Studies (Australasia) of the pro-renewable energy group Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, believes that the true ﬁ gure of the cost of rehabilitating all abandoned mines in Queensland is more likely to be ten or twenty billion dollars (Seccombe, 2014).

The Queensland government allocated $8.3 million in the 2016-17 budget for the task (Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Directory, 2016).
OPERATIONAL SITES Operational sites are sites where the site operator still has legal responsibilities.

Such sites include ‘care-and- maintenance’ sites (where active resource extraction has been suspended and may later resume), sites in their closure stage, even post-closure sites (where long-term site monitoring or continuing treatment may be required).

QAO (2013-14) came to the following conclusions.


There is a signiﬁ cant gap between the total ﬁ nancial assurance (bonds) held and the estimated cost of remediation and it is not possible to quantify the size of the gap.

Successful environmental rehabilitation is not occurring and the state remains exposed to unnecessary ﬁ nancial risks.

Financial assurance is usually forfeited to the state only when environmental authority holders go into liquidation.
Even then, rehabilitation commonly does not occur, because the assurance is insuﬃ cient for this purpose.

IMPROVE MANAGEMENT MAKE THE MOST OF PAST MAJOR REPORTS Many legislative, management and enforcement deﬁ ciencies in site rehabilitation have been highlighted in important government reports, such as: 1.

2.

3.
2.

3.

‘Environmental regulation of the resources and waste industries’ (QAO (2013-14)); ‘Final Report of the Queensland Floods Commission of Enquiry’ (QFCE, 2012); and ‘Review of the Roles and Responsibilities of The Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Water Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries’ (SDPC, 2007).

All three reports made cogent recommendations.

Some have been implemented.

Work may be underway on others.

Some have not been adopted.


The unadopted recommendations should be looked at, anew.

It is far better to make as much use as possible of existing extensive reports by experienced authors, before embarking on expensive new lengthy enquiries.

This paper will later address some of these unadopted recommendations.
The review task requires a ﬁ xed end date, progressive release of results and a relatively small project team, with the expertise to competently analyse most of the recommendations and the ability to call on outside experts for advice, where needed.

This determination should be carried out by a government committee (just as departments now are required to tabulate progressive implementation of election promises) and the results published on the Queensland government website.
If the government is reluctant, the task should be carried out at a public governance centre at a Queensland university, or by the Queensland branch of a reputable relevant professional organisation (such as the Royal Society of Queensland, or Engineers Australia, or the Australian Academy of Technology and Engineering).

SITE PROGRESSIVE MANDATE REHABILITATION Rehabilitation work is carried out on mine sites, with mixed results, and valuable lessons are being learned: 1.
The rehabilitation work at the Kidston gold mine in North Queensland was highlighted in a mine rehabilitation handbook that was developed by a working group of experts, industry, and government and non- government (Australian representatives Government 2006, p. 36).
At Kidston, store/ Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 43 release covers were constructed over all waste rock dumps to minimise erosion and facilitate revegetation by storing wet season rainfall and releasing it during the long dry season via evapo-transpiration.

2.
2.

The rehabilitation work at coal mine sites in central Queensland’s Bowen Basin have been extensively studied, and the ﬁ ndings have largely been disappointing - ‘The steeply sloped landforms, poor soil characteristics, depauperate native species pool, and uniform presence of exotic pasture grasses in the rehabilitation indicate that most of these newly created ecosystems should not be used for cattle grazing and also have few natural values’ (Erskine and Fletcher, 2013).

3.
3.

The rehabilitation work at the Mount Leyshon open-pit gold mine in North Queensland was combination of a progressive and post-closure rehabilitation and was recognised with a Premier’s award for environmental excellence.
However, Dowd (2005) detailed deficiencies in the post-closure rehabilitation – some progressive rehabilitation was delayed until closure and contributed to exhausting the contingency budget allocated for the closure, the active site management required until the site was shown to be self-sustaining was not done and the monitoring needed to determine if the landscape had reached a self sustaining state was also not done.
It cost several million dollars to go back and fix the work that had already been done.

The lesson learned was that post-closure management needs to be given the same degree of attention as operational site management.

A progressive (staged) rehabilitation model is far superior to that of a rehabilitation-after-closure model.
Progressive rehabilitation is carried out as part of daily operations in the early years, when cash ﬂ ow is at its healthiest, the management structure is in place and on-site personnel and equipment are available to carry it out.

A rehabilitation plan must therefore be in place at the start of operations and its implementation at the forefront of daily management decision-making.

knowledge is gained of each ore body’s spatial and grade distribution.
The worth of the ore body might increase signiﬁ cantly over time, requiring rehabilitated areas to be dug up to regain access to the ore body – historically, this has occurred with gold mines.

However, in the early mining days, resource companies simply walked away when the proﬁ ts dried up.
Dr. Erskine of the CMLR asserts that, to avoid repeating its past, Australia must ensure that operating mines are properly and progressively rehabilitated while they are turning a proﬁ t (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015a).

A site rehabilitation plan may not even be prepared until after closure, at a time of negative cash ﬂ ow.
The magnitude of site rehabilitation obligations may not even have been considered in the good times and now there may be neither the resources nor the will to fulﬁ l those obligations.

If rehabilitation is delayed until after closure, there is the incentive never to formally close the site at all, but instead consign it (and its unfulﬁ lled rehabilitation obligations) to the indeﬁ nite limbo of ‘care and maintenance’.
A site is in ‘care and maintenance’ if the environmental authority holder is no longer operating the site to produce resources, but is maintaining the site, infrastructure and equipment.

A site may go into ‘care and maintenance’, because of a temporary downturn in world commodity prices.
However, in some cases, particularly sites in care and maintenance for long periods, the operator may believe that full rehabilitation is unachievable or ﬁ nancially prohibitive and that indeﬁ nite ‘care and maintenance’ status can be used to indeﬁ nitely avoid rehabilitation (QAO, 2013-14).
With continuing delay in even starting the rehabilitation process, there is also the continuing risk of bankruptcy and the transfer of rehabilitation obligations to government – or of operators convincing a government-of-the-day that it is now ‘unreasonable’ to have onerous rehabilitation obligations fulﬁ lled.

Dr. Erskine of the CMLR asserts that ‘The Government doesn’t want to take on the risk of a closed mine and the industry is reluctant to spend the money required to safely close the mine.
Instead, what we see are mines placed into care and maintenance, where the mining companies can avoid paying out rehabilitation bonds, because the mine isn’t oﬃ cially closed’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2015a).

Unfortunately, the usual practice is rehabilitation- after-closure.

Justiﬁ cations are given for this practice.

The mining plan may change over time as more Little progressive rehabilitation occurs in Queensland.
The concept of progressive rehabilitation was Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 44 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND introduced into the Environmental Protection Act 1994 in 2006 and can reduce ﬁ nancial assurance by certifying areas as rehabilitated during the life of the environmental authority.

DEHP has identiﬁ ed one case since 2006 where progressive rehabilitation had started (QAO, 2013-14).
is thus time It from progressive to move rehabilitation being ‘encouraged’ by government (with little visible sign of success) to progressive rehabilitation being mandated as standard practice for any mining operation – future and present.

The regulating authority and site operator should jointly create a workable enforceable progressive rehabilitation plan for every site.
MAKE MINE CLOSURE PLANS A CONDITION OF DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL Planning for mine closure is a critical component of environmental management in the mining industry.

World’s best practice requires that planning for mine closure start before mining commences and continue until ﬁ nal closure and relinquishment.

This creates better environmental outcomes and should avoid the need for costly remedial earthworks late in the project life cycle (DMPEPA, 2015).
In Queensland, any proposed mining operation requires an Environmental Authority (EA), which becomes a condition of the mining tenure.

As a matter of policy, DNRM needs to insert conditions in the associated lease that require: 1.

Every application for an EA includes a Mine Closure Plan that conforms to the DEHP guidelines.

2.

No application can be approved if its Mine Closure Plan is not formally approved by DEHP.

3.
3.

The approved Mine Closure Plan for an approved mining operation must be periodically reviewed and submitted to DEHP for consideration and re-approval.

If this approach is not practicable, a legislative approach will be required.

DEHP needs to create a set of ‘Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans’.
The guidelines created by the Western Australian Department of Mines and Petroleum and Environmental Protection Authority appear the best Australian guidelines currently available and (along with to be the best international closure guidelines) should be used as prime sources for development of Queensland guidelines.

The Western Australian model includes a three-yearly review (DMPEPA, 2015) and this appears reasonable.
Every review should require genuine DEHP involvement prior to submission to avoid a procedural ‘tick-and- flick’ mentality by DEHP.

There are many advantages to this reform: 1.

2.

3.

4.

It is a desirable whole-of-government approach, bringing together the views of DEHP, DNRM, State Development and Treasury.

It makes the future (and the obligations to fund and manage that future) real.
It provides, up front, for all parties, details of the procedures that must be followed, the fully-costed rehabilitation works that must be completed, the funding that must be in place to carry out the closure plan.

If the works are fully and accurately costed with matching ﬁ nancial assurances, there is an incentive for careful cost management, good design and planning and eﬀ ective rehabilitation.

5.
5.

These procedures, rehabilitation works and costing/funding calculations must be signed oﬀ by DEHP for approval to be granted, because DEHP will be held accountable for the quality and completeness of rehabilitation – and the consequences of rehabilitation failures and inadequacies.

7.

6.

The three-yearly review system means that the government mine management and oversight authority (DEHP) are always aware of the details of their responsibilities.
It places the closure process as part of the continuum of mine planning and design.

Final rehabilitation works at closure are seen as just the last stage of an integrated progressive rehabilitation process.

for Because the mine closure plan is a condition of tenure, in the pre-approval stage, it provides the opportunity true community consultation, regarding the closure process – future land uses, community involvement in the rehabilitation works (staged and ﬁ nal), etc.
This is critical to good closure planning, but is present now, only with the goodwill of the development applicant.

Indeed, true community consultation on all stages of the life of the mine needs to be mandatory.
Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 45 DEHP REGULATE THE HAVE ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF ALL SITES Currently, DEHP the environmental regulates performance of active (operator-controlled) mines and oversees any rehabilitation of these sites and DNRM monitors and physically remediates abandoned mines.
This is an improvement over the previous system, where the mining-oriented departments that regulated the environmental performance of mining operations were notoriously subject to regulatory capture (Hutton, 2013).

DEHP thus has a regulatory environmental role on operator-controlled sites (but not on abandoned sites), while DNRM manages all issues confronting abandoned sites.
It was wise to remove a mining-oriented department from regulating the environmental performance of mine operators, but the solution is ﬂ awed.

The rehabilitation problems of operator-controlled sites and those of abandoned sites are much the same.

Yet they are treated as if they are completely separate issues to be managed by two diﬀ erent agencies.

The two departments have very diﬀ erent mind-sets and expertise.
DEHP, responsible for environmental protection, has a prime focus on environmental restoration.

DNRM, facilitating mining and regulating mine safety, has a prime focus on public safety issues (such as ground subsidence and uncapped shafts).

responsible for This artiﬁ cial division of responsibility inevitably creates compartmentalised thinking.
For DEHP, there is the risk that regulators of operator-controlled sites may fail to properly appreciate the cause-and-eﬀ ect links between current practices and future liabilities and legacy risks.

Regulators would beneﬁ t from being exposed to the problems of abandoned sites to learn about legacy risks.

They would then have ﬁ rst- hand experience of what can go wrong, because at legacy sites there is failure on multiple fronts - safety, environmental, economic and social.
For DNRM, there is the problem of being required to perform the physical environmental rehabilitation of abandoned sites without advice or assistance from the department that holds the most scientiﬁ c knowledge in this ﬁ eld.
The rehabilitation of both operator-controlled sites and abandoned sites would thus be improved if a team within DEHP regulated the environmental performance on all sites (active, ‘care and maintenance’, closed and abandoned) and used any relevant regulatory powers that it had to maximise the eﬀ ectiveness of all site rehabilitation.
This may help to resolve a diﬃ culty revealed in the 2013-14 QAO report – that a lack of protocols between DEHP and DNRM about the management of ‘care and maintenance’ sites had resulted in sites remaining in care and maintenance while the departments disputed over the administrative and regulatory responsibility (QAO, 2013-14).

If we assume that DNRM retains responsibility for abandoned sites, this proposed change needs to be managed with sensitivity.
There must be no perception of one department being ordered about by the other in some destructive master-servant relationship.

It is incumbent on DEHP regulatory staﬀ and DNRM implementation staﬀ to cooperate on the prioritisation and management of abandoned sites.

The environmental expertise of DEHP will complement the mine safety expertise of DNRM to improve the management of abandoned sites.
This scenario does not imply that DEHP is to be involved in the physical rehabilitation of abandoned sites – just that it perform a (tactful) oversight role and provide valuable environmental advice and consultation, where appropriate.

HAVE A MULTIDISCIPLINARY BODY REHABILITATE ABANDONED SITES It is much preferable to have one body to regulate the environmental performance of all sites (operator-controlled and abandoned) and a second body to perform the physical rehabilitation of abandoned sites.
However, it would benefit both bodies, if each temporarily seconded staff to the other, for those staff to gain a wider perspective and broader work experience.

The management of abandoned sites is presently carried out by DNRM under the Abandoned Mine Lands Program (AMLP).

This work could continue under DEHP regulatory oversight, as previously discussed.
Indeed, one can argue that the laxities of DNRM’s predecessors (such as Mines Department and DME) were largely responsible for the problems of abandoned sites and so DNRM has a continuing duty to rectify past failures.

However, there is the potential for destructive inter-departmental friction.

A second option would be to move the management responsibility to DEHP to avoid potential friction.
Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 46 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND However, this does not solve the problem of compartmentalised thinking.

Presently, DEHP environmental expertise and thinking are excluded from the management of abandoned sites – now DNRM geological and mining expertise and thinking would be excluded.
DNRM staﬀ could be transferred to DEHP to supply this expertise, but this runs the risk of the ex-mining staﬀ being regarded with suspicion in an environmental department and consequently being sidelined and having their career paths blighted.
A third option would be to adopt a variation of Recommendation 13 of the 2007 SDPC report, which recommended, in part, that the Directors-General of DME (now DNRM) and EPA (now DEHP) and Treasury immediately establish a senior executive level inter- departmental management committee to manage the inclusion of new sites in the abandoned mines program, and ensure that the technical advice and expertise of EPA and DME be applied to managing complex abandoned mine sites.

(SDPC, 2007).
(SDPC, 2007).

Admittedly, this recommendation is misleading.

The EPA (DEHP) participation on the committee was apparently only to ensure that the regulator pursued all legal avenues to force the miner to rehabilitate.

However, such a committee might be able to promote a coordinated approach to the management of abandoned sites.
However, the best solution would be to transfer the management of abandoned sites to an independent corporate body whose only function was the eﬀ ective (and cost-eﬀ ective) rehabilitation of mine sites under a charter of responsibilities that included the maximum cost-eﬀ ective involvement of local communities in the work.

This would add social and economic beneﬁ ts to the environmental beneﬁ ts of the rehabilitation work.
Staﬀ from both DEHP and DNRM would be temporarily seconded to this body to add the richness of their expertise and world-view to the diversity of talent.

Whatever path is followed, there needs to be a more open attitude, regarding rehabilitation operations, with public reporting of the situation, the policy being followed, and the progress made in dealing with individual sites.
GOVERNMENT MAKE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REHABILITATION OF ALL ABANDONED SITES Recommendation 12 of the 2007 SDPC report recommended that DME (now DNRM) be made immediately rehabilitation of all abandoned mines (SDPC, 2007).

It argued responsible the for that because the State authorised access to the resources, the State was responsible for any ongoing liability due to inadequate rehabilitation of the site (SDPC, 2007).
While this argument made for state responsibility for all abandoned mines does indeed apply to all abandoned mines, the recommendation itself is misleading.

A close reading indicates that ‘all’ refers to mines abandoned both before and after 1 January 2001, when the environmental regulation of the mining industry was transferred to the EPA.
The report never deﬁ ned what it meant by the term ‘abandoned mine’, but it appears as if it meant an abandoned mine that should be in the AMLP, which was and is limited to abandoned mines on state land.

It also appeared to regard the management of abandoned mines to be primarily non-environmental, speciﬁ cally referring to mine capping.
However, the 2012 QFCE report interpreted the 2007 SDPC report as indeed meaning all abandoned sites, accepted that the reasoning does apply to all abandoned sites and reasoned that the government had not adopted Recommendation 12 of the 2007 report because it considered abandoned mines on private land to be the responsibility of the landholder.
It then concluded that one agency having responsibility for all abandoned mines might assist both in identifying which mines might cause harm and in responding to that possibility.

It further concluded that imposing responsibility for abandoned mines on private landholders might deter them from reporting environmental harm that might be occurring.
It regarded abandoned mines as a primarily environmental problem and went on to recommend in Recommendation 13.17 that the Queensland government should determine which of its agencies should be made responsible for all abandoned mines (QFCE, 2012).

This recommendation implied that the government was (or should be) responsible for all abandoned mines – the question was merely which agency should administer the responsibility.

Recommendation 13.17 was not adopted.


rejection continuing government’s of The responsibility for the rehabilitation of legacy sites on private land has not been challenged and local authorities seem unaware of the consequences – that the government has, in eﬀ ect, transferred responsibility for ameliorating the consequences to landholders and local authorities.
Any future legal disputes regarding responsibility or liability would serve no societal beneﬁ t. It is time for the government to accept responsibility for these sites.
A landowner may have Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 47 received some form of payment from the mining operator for damage caused to the landowner’s land, if the operation was relatively recent.
However, such payments are not for the satisfactory rehabilitation of the site – that is a governmental and operator responsibility.

Landowners also lack the sophisticated engineering capacity to deal with such problems.

Funding for this long-overdue reform is addressed later in this paper.
IMPROVE FUNDING THE FOR FUNDS RAISE MORE REHABILITATION OF ABANDONED SITES The Queensland government presently funds the rehabilitation of abandoned sites from an annual budget allocation – there is no direct contribution from the resources industry (such as a levy).

Present funding is already manifestly inadequate.

If the government accepts its responsibility for the eventual rehabilitation of all abandoned mines, signiﬁ cant additional funding will become even more critical.
The state could discipline itself by allocating a ﬁ xed percentage of royalties received from the resources sector to the task of rehabilitating legacy sites.

This is logical – if the state is gaining ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts from present resource operations, then it should be allocating some of those funds to rectify the deleterious environmental consequences of past failures in regulating the sector.
Mining, petroleum and LNG royalties amount to over two billion dollars per year (State of Queensland Treasury, 2015).

A 1% allocation would translate to only $20 million per year to tackle a billion-dollar-plus problem, but it would still be more than double the 2016-17 budget allocation.

The state could impose an annual levy (say 1%) for legacy site rehabilitation on Financial Assurances lodged for new resource operations.
The Northern Territory and Western Australia already impose a 1% annual levy on new mines.

However, the Western Australian scheme loses more in refunded bonds than it gains in annual levy income (Pepper, Roche and Mudd, 2014).

The Northern Territory scheme compensates resource operators by applying a 10% discount to the rehabilitation security bond.
However, this bond includes a 15% security component on top of the 100% security and the eﬀ ective security percentage is still a minimum of 100% (Department of Mines and Energy - Northern Territory, 2015).

Any Queensland annual rehabilitation levy without any compensation to the resources sector would be ﬁ ercely resisted by the sector.
ELIMINATE THE DISCOUNTS ON FINANCIAL ASSURANCE PAYMENTS In Queensland, an operator that holds an EA for a mining or petroleum lease must pay a ﬁ nancial assurance to the administering authority to cover the operator’s estimated cost for site rehabilitation works.

However, operators can apply for three discounts (totalling 30% of payments).

The total rehabilitation liability is calculated by subtracting the proposed discount amount from the 100% rehabilitation liability amount.
Therefore, even assuming that an operator’s calculated cost was not an under-estimate, the taxpayer could still be saddled with up to 30% of the ﬁ nal rehabilitation cost.

The Financial Discount is available is available for every EA holder that submits certiﬁ ed documentation to demonstrate sound ﬁ nancial health and a declaration that the costs of rehabilitation have been adequately budgeted for.
The Progressive Rehabilitation and Certiﬁ cation Discount is available for every EA holder which avoids impacting areas of remnant vegetation or where areas of signiﬁ cant disturbance are being proactively rehabilitated.
The Waste Management Discount is available for every EA holder that can demonstrate it is not undertaking signiﬁ cant high risk storage activities (waste rock dumps, tailings storage facilities, landﬁ ll regulated dams, brine and waste), or has implemented measures that reduce the amount of waste that would otherwise be stored in on-site high risk storage activities (QG, 2015c).

The Financial Discount makes no sense and needs to be ended.
Every company seeking an EA should be required to demonstrate sound ﬁ nancial health and provide detailed evidence (not a mere declaration) that the costs of rehabilitation have been adequately budgeted for, to gain approval for any proposed development, in the ﬁ rst place.

The Progressive Rehabilitation and Certification Discount makes more sense as it rewards better environmental behaviour, but should still be eliminated.
Companies should be required to provide details of how they will minimise impacts on areas of remnant vegetation and they should be required to provide a progressive (legally Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 48 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND to to conform enforceable) rehabilitation plan, to gain approval for any proposed development.

If companies refuse these societal norms, approval must be denied.
It is important that site operators progressively rehabilitate the site during operations.

The discounted cash flow method (NPV) encourages the deferral of expenditure and so works against progressive rehabilitation, but this should not be allowed.

Deferred rehabilitation work may never be performed - the operator may just walk away, when the rehabilitation costs greatly exceed the financial assurance.

For example, one site has been in ‘care and maintenance’ since 1998.
The financial assurance held for this site is $3.8 million while the rehabilitation costs are estimated as $14.2 million (QAO, 2013-14).

1.

While prices and grades are high (and consequently cash ﬂ ows are highly positive), no site rehabilitation is carried out and no site rehabilitation plan is prepared.

2.

As the grades and prices and cash ﬂ ows decline, the operator announces plans to close the site and the government-of-the- day expresses its conﬁ dence in the site’s rehabilitation.
it the recognises 3.
The operator releases a reassuring statement importance of that rehabilitation at the site and will work with the government to ﬁ nalise the rehabilitation plan, while the government-of-the-day assures the public that it is working closely with the operator to ensure that rehabilitation of the site is satisfactorily completed; The Waste Management Discount should be eliminated – the way that this discount is phrased, every EA holder would automatically receive it, because all that the EA holder needs to do is to demonstrate that measures will be implemented to ‘reduce the amount of waste that would otherwise be stored in on-site high risk storage activities’.
A calculated reduction of 0.01% would qualify.

These discounts are contrary to Recommendation 8 of the 2013-14 QAO report, which recommends that DEHP ensure that the ﬁ nancial assurance that it calculates and collects reﬂ ects the estimated cost of environmental rehabilitation.

The Financial Assurance collected (before discounts) is supposed to cover the operator’s estimated cost for site is already ample rehabilitation works.
There evidence, quoted in the QAO report, that past estimates were often grossly inadequate.

There is no contingency fee, as in the Northern Territory system.

Yet, in Queensland, operators can obtain up to a 30% discount.

Ending these unnecessary discounts cannot be made retrospective, but they must not apply to future applications – they are nothing but a state subsidy of the depletion of non-renewable state resources.
END THE OFFLOADING OF LARGE REHABILITATION LIABILITIES TO MINNOW COMPANIES The following sequence of events is now coming to public attention (particularly for large coal mines with large rehabilitation liabilities and a product in perceived structural decline): 4.

Prior to any of the promised rehabilitation taking place, the operator sells the operation and its unfulﬁ lled rehabilitation obligations for $1 to a small corporation with negligible assets.

5.
5.

The original operator releases a reassuring statement that it will make a contribution (unquantiﬁ ed) towards the so-far unfulﬁ lled site rehabilitation obligations.

6.

The new owner on-sells the operation to another corporation, even more obscure with even less ﬁ nancial credibility.

7.

There is no more talk of the original operator contributing to the task of site rehabilitation.

For the long-term good of the mining industry, this has to stop – now.
The media has been publishing this sequence of events – Steps 1 and 2 (Latimer, 2012), Step 3 (Schwarten, 2012), Steps 4 and 5 (Tasker, 2013), Steps 6 and 7 (Shift Miner, 2015).

Whatever the true motives of the large operator, the public perception can only be that another large corporation is seeking to evade its rehabilitation obligations.
Public condemnation and distrust of the entire mining industry will surely follow when the ﬁ nal step is ﬁ rst taken – that of the last owner’s disappearance into pre-planned bankruptcy, with no recoverable ﬁ nancial assets and government left with a ﬁ nancially-ruinous rehabilitation burden.
There appear to be only two legislative ways to end this practice – either the practice has to be legally treated as grand fraud and the perpetrators liable for personal criminal prosecution, or any corporation involved in the practice must face truly brutal ﬁ nancial penalties.
Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 49 A non-confrontational approach would be for the resources sector to publicly recognise that this practice is a gross violation of its own ‘social licence to operate’ and to have their peak bodies publicly repudiate any corporation indulging in this practice.
Should this fail to eventuate, government could create a Public Register of ‘Corporations Acting against the Public Good’, with links to the reasons why these corporations are on this register.

The corporations on the register would be denied approval for any future development application until they take such action as would warrant their removal from the register.

If a corporation on the register were to be acquired by another corporation, that corporation would go on the register.
END THE PRACTICE OF TRANSFER PRICING MANIPULATION Transfer pricing occurs when two companies that are part of the same multinational group trade with each other and the parties establish a price for the transaction.

This is entirely lawful, but a group with an overseas stock market listing may artiﬁ cially distort this price to minimise their payments to Australian governments by recording as much of its proﬁ t as possible in a tax haven with low or zero taxes.
This is known as transfer pricing manipulation and is illegal – if it is proven.

Even in the 1970s, this practice was used by multinational groups to minimise, even eliminate, the tax owed to the Australian Government.
The practice continues today for the same purpose and the Australian Government is currently in legal dispute with major multinational groups, regarding the channelling billions of dollars in proﬁ ts from iron ore sales through subsidiary overseas companies that pay little tax (Chenoweth, 2015a).

In the mining sector, the practice currently is known as the Singapore Sling, because of the marketing hubs set up by mining multi-nationals in Singapore to facilitate transfer pricing transactions.
The same transfer pricing manipulation is also used to minimise royalty payments, where royalties are based on the price received for the ﬁ rst sale.

If the ﬁ rst sale is to another company in the group, rather than a buyer truly independent of the seller, the price can be manipulated to minimise royalty payments to state and territory governments.

The Queensland government is currently involved in major royalty disputes with multinationals over transfer pricing practices (Chenoweth, 2015b; Ludlow, 2016).
Multiple legal disputes in multiple jurisdictions are evidence that state and territory governments and the Australian government need to work together to tighten legislation to make transfer pricing manipulation more easily legally proven and the perpetrators more easily prosecuted and ultimately to make it ﬁ nancially pointless (i.e.

transfer pricing manipulation does not result in reduced payments to government).
A ﬁ rst step would be for the Queensland Oﬃ ce of State Revenues (which collects mining and petroleum royalties) to liaise with its counterparts in the other states to optimise the legal eﬀ ectiveness of their royalty-gathering legislation.

For example, is the Western Australian legislation indeed much tighter in levying royalties on the price to the end seller than the Queensland legislation, as has been claimed (Chenoweth, 2015b)?
Should there be a universal return to a royalty system of imposing ﬂ at rates per unit of resource extracted?

END THE PAYMENT OF ROYALTIES TO NON- STATE ENTITIES On some blocks of land titled before 1910, the ownership of the coal beneath the land surface was granted to the landholder and not retained by the government.

A resource company can acquire this land and eﬀ ectively pay the royalties to itself.
The future loss of royalties over the working life of a single large open-cut mine may total hundreds of millions of dollars – and there is more than one such mine.

It has been estimated that in the ten years up to the end of 2009, the state missed out on $554 million in royalties paid to private owners.

The Queensland government has no plans to review the relevant legislation.

One economist called for the removal of the anomaly, because (it was argued) the state still legally owned the resources.
However, a property lawyer who has represented landholders with these title deeds said it would be very complex as it would require changing the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 and working out new methodology for compensation (McBryde, 2015).
The government may feel that any unquantiﬁ able ﬁ nancial beneﬁ t resulting from removing this anomaly (of limited applicability) in the present situation of declining coal prices and consequent falling coal royalties is not worth the political cost of alienating the entire mining sector.
Alternatively, it can be argued that the need for governments Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND to maximise what royalties it can receive is now more important than ever.

The question is one for government to resolve, but government should address the question and publicly justify whatever position it decides to take.
RECOMMENDATIONS If implemented, the following recommendations will signiﬁ cantly improve the eﬀ ectiveness of site rehabilitation in Queensland: 1.

Determine the fates of all rehabilitation recommendations made in past major government reports, analyse those not fully implemented, recommend which of these deserve renewed scrutiny and publicly release the resulting report.

2.

Mandate staged rehabilitation for all sites still the responsibility of their operators.

3.
3.

Require the granting of any EA be conditional upon the inclusion of a site closure plan that conforms to associated closure guidelines and is acceptable to DEHP.

4.

Have DEHP regulate the environmental performance on all sites (active, ‘care and maintenance’, recently closed and abandoned) and use any relevant regulatory powers that it has to maximise the magnitude and quality of any rehabilitation.

5.
5.

Create a single multi-disciplinary body to undertake the physical rehabilitation of all abandoned sites.

6.

Have the state government take responsibility for the rehabilitation of abandoned sites on private land.

7.

Eliminate the three discounts on the ﬁ nancial assurance payments made by operators to government.

8.
8.

End the practice of companies selling large coal assets (and the attendant large unfunded rehabilitation for eﬀ ectively nothing to minnow companies which have no prospect of ever funding the required site rehabilitation.

liabilities) 9.

Have the Queensland Oﬃ ce of State Revenues liaise with its counterparts in the other states and the Northern Territory to optimise the legal eﬀ ectiveness of royalty- gathering legislation.

10.
10.

If practicable, remove the anomaly where some mine operators pay royalties to private landholders (often one of their own subsidiaries) instead of to the state.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AMLP Abandoned Mines (Queensland) Land Program CMLR Centre for Mined Land Rehabilitation (University of Queensland) CSG Coal Seam Gas DEHP Department of Environment and Heritage (Queensland) DME Department (Queensland) of Mines and Energy DNRM Department of Natural Resources and Mines (Queensland) Environmental Authority EA EPA Environmental Protection Agency (Queensland) QAO Queensland Audit Oﬃ ce QFCE Queensland Floods Commission of Enquiry SDPC Service Delivery Performance and Commission (Queensland) DMPEPA Department of Mines and Petroleum & Environmental Protection Authority (Western Australia) – used only in citations QG Queensland Government - used only in citations ‘Industry insider warns LITERATURE CITED AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2015a, taxpayers may foot bill for mine rehabilitation unless government, step up’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Landline), updated 19 September 2015, viewed 19 September 2015, h t t p : / / w w w. a b c .
n e t .
a u / n e w s / 2 0 1 5 - 0 9 - 1 9 / t a x p a y e r s - m a y - f o o t - b i l l - f o r - m i n e - rehabilitation/6787954 industry AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2015b, ‘Digging out’, Australian Broadcasting 20 Corporation September 2015, viewed 20 August 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/landline/content/2015/ s4315994.htm (Landline), broadcast AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 2006, ‘Leading Practice Sustainable Development in Mining: Mine Rehabilitation’, published September 2006, http://www.industry.gov.au/resource/Documents/ LPSDP/LPSDP-MineRehabilitationHandbook.pdf CHENOWETH, N., 2015a, ‘Tax oﬃ ce pursues BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto over Singapore tax shelter’, Australian Financial Review, written 6 April 2015, viewed 23 June 2016, http://www.afr.com/news/policy/tax/tax- office-pursues-bhp-billiton-and-rio-tinto-over- Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 REHABILITATION OF LAND DISTURBED BY MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN QUEENSLAND: SOME NEEDED LEGISLATIVE AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS 51 singapore-tax-shelter-20150405-1mezhv fneﬂ 294-1226617749523 CHENOWETH, N., 2015b, ‘Qld hits BHP with $288m royalty bill on Singapore sales’, Australian Financial Review, written 12 November 2015, viewed 15 June 2016, h t t p : / / w w w. a f r. c o m / b u s i n e s s / m i n i n g / c o a l / q l d - h i t s - b h p - w i t h - 2 8 8 m - r o y a l t y - b i l l - o n - s i n g a p o r e - s a l e s - 2 0 1 5 1 1 1 2 - gkx9sw#ixzz4Bc4cg1uT DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY RESOURCES AND ENERGY, n.d., ‘Derelict Mines Program’, NSW Government, viewed 29 June 2016, http://www.resourcesandenergy.nsw.gov.au/miners- and-explorers/programs-and-initiatives/derelict DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND ENERGY - NORTHERN TERRITORY, 2015, ‘Addressing Legacy Mining Issues in the Northern Territory’, Northern Territory Government, last updated 11 September 2015, viewed 17 June 2016, h t t p : / / w w w .
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rehab will closure’, Australian Mining, written 17 August 2012, https://australianmining.com.au/news/blair-athol- rehab-will-take-six-years-following-closure/ LEBLANC, M., MORALES, J.A., BORREGO, J.

& ELBAZ-POULICHET F., 2000, ‘4,500-year-old mining pollution in southwestern Spain: long- term implications for modern mining pollution’, Economic Geology, 93, 655-662.
DMPEPA & (DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND PETROLEUM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AUTHORITY – WESTERN AUSTRALIA), 2015, ‘Guidelines for Preparing Mine Closure Plans: May 2015’, Government of Western Australia, viewed 21 July 2015, h t t p : / / w w w. d m p .

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and McLean, RW Proceedings of the Fifth Australian Workshop on Acid Drainage.
and human biotoxic DURUIBE, J.O., OGWUEGBU, M.O.C.

& ‘Heavy metal EGWURUGWU J.N., 2007, pollution eﬀ ects’, International Journal of Physical Sciences (5), pp.

112-118, May, 2007, Vol.

2 http://www.academicjournals.org/article/ article1380209337_Duruibe%20et%20al.pdf ERSKINE, P.D.

& FLETCHER, A.T., 2013, ‘Novel ecosystems created by coal mines central Queensland’s Bowen Basin’, in (33): pp.

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2 1-12, 2013, http://ecologicalprocesses.springeropen.com/ articles/10.1186/2192-1709-2-33 20 December published FOSTER, S., 2013, The ‘HSE takes Leighton’s published work’, 11 April 2013, viewed 31 July 2015, h t t p : / / w w w .

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a u / business/hse-takes-leightons-work/story- Courier Mail, ‘transfer LUDLOW, M., 2016, ‘Origin LNG consortium used taxes’, pricing’ Australian written June 2016, 28 April 2016, viewed 23 http://www.afr.com/news/politics/origin-lng- consortium-used-transfer-pricing-to-cut-taxes- 20160426-gofb0q to Review, Financial cut MCBRYDE, E., 2015, ‘Loophole lets miners skip royalties on coal ‘, The Queensland Times, written 10 July 2015, viewed 30 July 2015, http://www.qt.com.au/news/loophole-lets-miners- skip-royalties-coal/2701888/ ‘Coal WATER COMMISSION NATIONAL Australian 2012, Government, 2012, http://www.nwc.gov.au/nwi/position-statements/ coal-seam-gas Seam Gas’, updated June PEPPER, M., ROCHE, C. & MUDD, G., 2014, ‘Australia’s Mining Legacy Challenge’, Life- of-Mine 2014 Conference, Brisbane, Australia, www.mpi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ Final-LofM-Mining-Legacies.docx QAO (Queensland Audit Oﬃ ce), 2013-14, the resources ‘Environmental regulation of and http://www.
industries’, parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/tableoffice/ tabledpapers/2014/5414t4785.pdf waste QUEENSLAND CABINET AND MINISTERIAL delivers 2016, resources Government, DIRECTORY, almost half-a-billion mines’, and ‘Budget for natural Queensland Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 52 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND released 14 June 2016, viewed 15 June 2016, http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2016/6/14/ budget-delivers-almost-halfabillion-for-natural- resources-and-mines QFCE (QUEENSLAND FLOODS COMMISSION ‘Final Report: 2012, OF ENQUIRY), Chapter 13 – Mining’, viewed 20 July 2015, http://www.ﬂ oodcommission.qld.gov.au/__data/ assets/pdf_ﬁ le/0017/11717/QFCI-Final-Report- Chapter-13-Mining.pdf QG (QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT), 2015a, ‘About abandoned mines’, Queensland Government, last updated 6 May 2015, viewed 30 July 2015, https://www.qld.gov.au/environment/land/ abandoned-mines/about/ (QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT), ‘Abandoned Mine Lands Program 2015b, (AMLP)’, Queensland Government, last updated 6 May 2015, viewed 29 July 2015, https://www.qld.gov.au/environment/land/ abandoned-mines/program/ QG QG for (QUEENSLAND assurance environmental last ‘Financial an Government, GOVERNMENT), security 2015c, authority’, deposit updated Queensland 1 April 2015, viewed 30 July 2015, https://www.business.qld.gov.au/business/ running/environment/licences-permits/ﬁ nancial- assurance-rehabilitation/financial-assurance- security-deposit SCHWARTEN, C., 2012, ‘Mine environment rehabilitation conditions slack says Pearce’, The Morning Bulletin, written 26 November 2012, http://www.themorningbulletin.com.au/news/ mine-rehab-conditions-slack/1635462/ SECCOMBE, M., billion-dollar black 2014, ‘Mining’s multi- Saturday hole’, The 24 published 2014, Paper, https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/ politics/2014/05/24/minings-multi-billion-dollar- black-hole/1400853601 May SDPC (SERVICE DELIVERY AND 2007, PERFORMANCE COMMISSION), the Roles and Responsibilities ‘Review of of the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Water Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Primary Industries July 2015, and Fisheries’, viewed 30 http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/ tableOﬃ ce/TabledPapers/2007/5207T1077.pdf 2015, viewed STATE OF QUEENSLAND ‘Annual 15 May (QUEENSLAND Report TREASURY), 2014-15’, 2016, https://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/publications- resources/annual-reports/2014-15/pdf/docs/ complete-treasury-annual-report-2014-15.pdf re- to Publishing open Pty 2015, http://www.shiftminer.com/news_item/blair- athol-to-reopen-in-weeks-1015 Ltd, written ‘Blair Athol SHIFT MINER, 2015, weeks?’ in February Fitzroy 18 TASKER, S., 2013, ‘Linc to reopen Blair Athol coal mine after buying project from Rio’, The Australian, written 3 October 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/ mining-energy/linc-to-reopen-blair-athol-coal- mine-after-buying-project-from-rio/story- e6frg9df-1226732312637 UNGER, C., LAURENCOURT, T., KELIHER, L., MCCOMBE, C. & BARTLEY, G., 2003, ‘Rehabilitation plan for the Mount Morgan minesite: November 2003’, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, The State of Queensland.
AUTHOR PROFILE The author began his career as a milling metallurgist with Mount Isa Mines at Mount Isa, before returning to the University of Queensland to complete his M.Sc.

He then worked on Hamersley Iron’s ﬁ nancial modelling system, before returning to Brisbane to work for MIM Holdings as a Technical Computer Analyst.

He later worked in the Queensland Public Service, holding the position of Principal Research Adviser at his retirement.
He has lately involved himself in investigating the beneﬁ ts to be derived from the involvement of communities and professional organisations in what he regards as the increasingly important issue of site rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 53 Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1 54 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF QUEENSLAND Rehabilitation of mining and resources projects as it relates to Commonwealth responsibilitiesSubmission 32 - Attachment 1