Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1697640172531.pdf (Australia)
CHAPTER 4 Legislative, technological, methodological, resource and cultural challenges 4.1 Commonwealth, state and territory criminal intelligence stakeholders who gave evidence to this inquiry recognised the need for criminal intelligence to fight serious and organised crime and to support mechanisms to improve timely intelligence sharing.

Recent amendments to the ACC Act widened the range of entities that the ACC can share intelligence with.
However, evidence to the committee supported the view that the intention behind these new arrangements, which is to provide for a more comprehensive response to organised crime, cannot be fully realised until existing the current criminal limitations, challenges, perceptions and hurdles within intelligence framework are addressed.

This chapter considers those challenges.


4.2 Many submitters argued that the various arrangements in place for gathering, storing and sharing criminal intelligence are out-dated, impractical and not fit for purpose.

Legislative, structural and resource impediments to the flow of intelligence were highlighted as well as a range of unintended consequences including unequal intelligence holdings, an incomplete picture of criminal threats and declining stakeholder confidence.
Some stakeholders held reservations about sharing their own information and did not recognise the value added to that information when converted into intelligence and returned to them.
Mr Mark Burgess, CEO of the Police Federation of Australia (PFA), stated that intelligence was, for many years, considered a 'big black hole where information went in but no-one received anything out of'.1 Such concerns are exacerbated by the absence of a common approach to collecting, collating, analysing and disseminating criminal intelligence.
Efforts to establish an interoperable criminal intelligence system capable of producing a comprehensive national picture of organised crime are hindered for these reasons.

This chapter considers the current challenges towards a national criminal intelligence system.
4.3 One of the primary aims of the National Organised Crime Response Plan (NOCRP) is to remove capability gaps in and impediments to inter-jurisdictional collaboration and sharing of information and intelligence.2 However, the ACC submitted that producing a national picture of serious and organised crime was complicated by various factors relating to the collection, use and sharing of criminal intelligence including:  limited availability and accessibility of current and complete criminal intelligence and other information used in the production of criminal intelligence; and  the absence of agreement on a consistent way in which Australian agencies collect, collate, analyse, produce, store and disseminate criminal intelligence, 1 Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 2.
2 Australian Federal Police, Submission 12, p. 12.
30 which has led to inconsistent intelligence collection plans and priorities as well as duplication of effort by such agencies.3 4.4 The ACC asserted that these challenges cause 'much duplication of effort and inefficiency' amongst the law enforcement agencies, policing, national security and other government and private sector bodies in 'understanding the most effective response to the threat and impact of serious and organised crime'.4 Another area of potential duplication of effort is in relation to the crossover between volume crime and serious and organised crime.
This was explained by Commander Alf Fordham of the Western Australia Police: The problems are that quite often you find that people that operate in one zone simultaneously operate in the other zone.

What I am talking about here is the fact that there are a number of case studies where a national target might actually be arrested for domestic violence or for assaulting somebody at their local pub on a Friday night, because they actually engage in volume crime.
But a lot of the people that operate within the serious and organised crime sphere have graduated to that sphere from the nursery of crime, which is volume crime, and the business model does not necessarily accommodate the fact that these people quite easily move from within one zone to another zone on a regular basis.5 4.5 Other submitters raised a number of concerns regarding legislative, resource, methodological, technological and cultural obstacles and challenges which limited the effective flow of information and interoperability.
Interoperability concerns systems and tools, methodologies, content and data.

It is a key capability within the Organised Crime Strategic Framework and the ultimate objective for criminal intelligence stakeholders.
The NOCRP also places emphasis on the importance of interoperability: Essential elements of an integrated national approach are enhancing interoperability, the sharing of information and intelligence in an effective and timely manner and coordinating responses to organised crime across jurisdictions.6 4.6 The following section considers the various challenges identified in evidence before the committee while drawing on key initiatives and operations to highlight concerns.
Legislative impediments and challenges to sharing intelligence 4.7 Submitters argued that privacy and security legislation inhibit greater flows of timely intelligence and limit the ACC's access to information and intelligence.

Security and privacy legislation dictate who intelligence can be shared with and for 3 4 5 6 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, pp 3 & 14.

Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 3.


Commander Alf Fordham, Western Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 42.

Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010–13, Commonwealth of Australia, p. 9.
31 what purpose.7 Telecommunications intercept material collected by the ACC, for example, may only be shared with a small number of agencies with many of the ACC's partners excluded from current sharing provisions.8 The Northern Territory 4.8 including (NT) Police complexity of the 'various ACC legislation which restricts some of the dissemination rules' and the limited technological capability of the ACID and ALEIN database.9 Queensland Police's Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan also noted that legislation impacts 'what information can be shared, how it can be shared and how it can then be disseminated'.10 identified challenges 4.9 The ACC's CEO, John Lawler recognised that: …whilst there has been some very good work done by the department over a number of years in looking at these legislative impediments and working to eliminate them where it was possible to do so, the reality is that some still remain, and it does inhibit the sharing of information.11 4.10 Intelligence sharing currently takes place through a range of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), sharing agreements or requests for information between agencies.
As these are primarily individual arrangements, they can create silos of information.
The PFA commented that such arrangements create an 'ad hoc system of information sharing that lacks consistency' and can hamper the speed of intelligence sharing.12 CrimTrac also noted that while different rules will always apply in different jurisdictions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have also taken different approaches in relation to data collection.13 Multi-agency task forces 4.11 Multi-agency task forces serve as an example of interoperability of law enforcement agencies and operate under MOUs.
They are increasingly utilised as a means of combining resources and providing for the flow of intelligence between taskforce members.

The AFP listed a number of taskforces currently in operation including the Polaris Taskforce, Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce, Joint Organised Crime Taskforce (Victoria), Joint Organised Crime Group (Sydney office), Taskforce Galilee, Yelverton Taskforce (Perth), and the new waterfront taskforces.14 7 8 9 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 22.


Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 22.

10 Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 35.

11 Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 48.

12 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

13 Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 27.
14 Australian Federal Police, Submission 12, pp 10-11.

32 4.12 The ACC Board has the power to establish multi-agency task forces in response to concerns about a particular serious and organised crime matter.

Evidence to the committee suggested that prescribed task forces have become the primary means of circumventing legislative and other impediments to the sharing of information and intelligence.
Mr Greg Williams, Deputy Commissioner of the ATO explained that during the course of an operation, when a matter arises, agencies might not be able to respond because appropriate mechanisms are not in place.

Whereas: The creation of the prescribed task force model has been an attempt to circumvent that or actually provide the opportunity for interoperability around the sharing of information.
But sitting behind that [task force model] are still the business-as-usual requirements…Where it is prescribed, those problems then go away.15 4.13 Drawing on the example of Project Wickenby, Mr Williams explained how information can be shared more freely between task force agencies under the prescribed arrangements: In the context of Project Wickenby, the information-sharing exception has underpinned the broader outcomes achieved by the Wickenby agencies.
However, the same broad ability does not currently exist for other exceptions to secrecy laws in relation to the risk area of serious and organised crime.

Under the serious offences exception, information cannot be shared as freely between law enforcement agencies as occurs with the task force disclosure provisions.16 4.14 The prescribed task force provision has, according to Mr Williams and others, been a significant initiative in cross-agency cooperation.
The ATO alone is involved in 29 separate task forces relating to serious and organised crime.
According to Mr Williams, that number is expected to grow.17 Assistant Commissioner Morris of the AFP identified joint task forces as the 'order of the day in terms of delivering the business'.18 He emphasised the importance of joint task forces and the AFP's contribution to them: Some of the joint task forces we see working today—whether they are on the waterfront or the joint organised crime task force in Victoria or the standing joint task force with the New South Wales police and ACC— involve very significant intelligence inputs.
Those inputs come from a wide variety of sources.

They will be from our own intelligence holdings and investigations right through to our international interface with either law enforcement agencies in the region or more traditional…partners like New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

15 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 18.

16 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 16.
17 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 16.

18 Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 34.

33 The AFP draws in that information internationally as well as our own holdings.
We use our covert services to proactively fill information gaps that will assist task forces and combine that with the intelligence from our partner agencies, whether they be at the federal level such as Customs and the ACC or at the state level with the various law enforcement organisations.19 4.15 The AFP's Assistant Commissioner Morris explained that task forces must start with a solid intelligence foundation before commencing operations and highlighted the fundamental importance of intelligence to a task force: It is commonly known that when you are creating a task force to address a crime issue the analysts are usually the first people you pick in order to get the continuity of the intelligence picture before you started and also to take the continuity of the new information right through the whole task force information.
What we have found is that when those task forces begin they generate their own intelligence that perpetuates new investigations and new outcomes.

We are also able to deliver that into proposals for legislative reform, policy reform and so on.

It is not just about a law enforcement outcome; it is about trying, in the case of organised crime, to target-harden the environment to prevent future offences.20 4.16 Agencies have also used task forces in innovative ways to better meet their needs.
The ATO's Mr Williams informed the committee that his agency had developed a secure information exchange system to support the transfer of electronic data between agencies involved in Project Wickenby.
He noted that the system will allow agencies to transfer and share information in a timely and secure manner and ultimately to collaborate on documents.21 4.17 While also recognising the importance of task forces, Mr Mark Geddes, Agency Intelligence Coordinator of ASIC drew attention to a lack of continuity from one task force to the next.
Reflecting on ASIC's involvement in task forces Galilee and Attero, Mr Geddes explained that: There is no doubt that these special-purpose groups—the task forces that are set up—achieve a common language and an ability to rapidly share information.

But that is not necessarily transferable to new task forces, depending on the membership.

So there is a gap in that capability: once we get together for a specific purpose, can we transfer that to the next reason that we get together?
Often it is a reinvention of the wheel each time that happens.22 4.18 Mr Burgess of the PFA noted that while joint task forces had conducted these effective successful operations such as Operation Wickenby, 'even 19 Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 34.

20 Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, pp 34–35.

21 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 16.
22 Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 31.

34 collaborations are hampered by burdensome sharing procedures'.23 The ATO also noted that even in the context of a task force, it may not be at liberty to disclose information to participating law enforcement partners.
It supported greater freedom of exchange in relation to information within the task force context in order that it can be used to pursue criminal conduct.24 Limitations on intelligence gathering and sharing 4.19 Where specific intelligence sharing arrangements such as task forces are not in place, agencies raised concerns that they are unable to fully access ACC intelligence holdings.

Witnesses also pointed to other legislative challenges and impacts.
For example, the ATO explained that there was an inconsistency in its ability to obtain information from Commonwealth agencies relating to the application or administration of the indirect tax law.

This may limit the ATO's 'ability to use information disseminated from the ACC for a civil function even where it is essential in addressing the indirect tax crime risk'.
The ATO identified four areas for legislative reform to improve its own access to ACC's criminal intelligence and in turn, its own capacity to address the tax crime risk.25 These include:     enabling the ATO to use its compulsory information gathering powers in relation to indirect tax to obtain information from Commonwealth agencies such as the ACC; amending the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to allow the ATO to use information gained through telecommunications interception in the course of joint investigations by taskforces;26 enabling the ATO to make derivative use of information that the ACC has obtained under the Surveillance Devises Act 2002 where the ACC determines it appropriate to do so; and enabling to access Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.27 the ATO time content pursuant real to the 4.20 Restrictions on information such as telephone interception material was raised as a specific concern by the ATO and ASIC as explained by Mr Geddes: We can access telecommunications metadata et cetera, or stored communications, but we cannot actually intercept telecommunications or use the interception material that has been gained.
We have to be careful 23 Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 1.

24 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 21.

25 Australian Taxation Office, Submission 15, p. 4.
26 This recommendation was made by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement as recommendation 7 in its Inquiry into Commonwealth unexplained wealth legislation and arrangements, March 2012, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=le_ctte/c ompleted_inquiries/2010-13/unexplained_wealth/report/index.htm (accessed 8 April 2013).

27 Australian Taxation Office, Submission 15, pp 4–5.
35 when we are engaging with the organised crime environment, a lot of which uses telephone intercept material, that we do not allow that to be used in our operational environment.28 4.21 Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham of the South Australia Police identified interaction of Commonwealth legislation with state legislation as the key issue that needs to be addressed in order to establish a national criminal intelligence model.
He provided the following example about telecommunications companies (telcos) to highlight the point: Telcos and most of the law enforcement agencies around the country do many telephone checks.

We know that our serious crime cartels or groups use mobile telephones quite frequently.

In fact, it is not unusual for criminals to use one phone per day and then discard it.

So, as law enforcement agencies, we do a lot of telephone subscriber checks.

We get statements from the telcos.


In South Australia, for example, we may be doing the same intelligence checks as the ACC is doing, but, because of certain dissemination requirements through the legislation, we would not know.

So we could be doubling up on that.

… In these days of budget restraints and so forth, if we are going to have a true global exchange of intelligence then there needs to be some examination of the cost of telco checks and how we exchange that information.
Law enforcement as a whole could well be spending millions on this.

If we could examine at your level or at a higher level how the Commonwealth legislation interacts with the state legislation in terms of that exchange of information, that would be very valuable to us.29 4.22 The ATO expressed frustration with the secrecy provisions which limited their ability to share information.
Mr Williams noted that the ATO could only provide generic information when it might be holding valuable detailed information which law enforcement agencies are unable to access.
This, in turn, creates difficulties in the relationship with criminal intelligence stakeholders as: …people are desperately trying to deal with something, they know that there is information that would be of value to them to do it, but we are required by our secrecy provisions not to provide that at the present point in time.30 4.23 As a whole, the current system creates 'unequal data holdings, which risks some agencies being unaware of certain intelligence, misinformation about certain situations, or duplication of intelligence gathering operations'.31 The PFA argued that the recent establishment of a Firearms Intelligence and Targeting Team and in- principle agreement to establish a national firearms identification database had the 28 Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 32.
29 Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham, SA Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 38.

30 Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 19.

31 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

36 potential to provide an extensive national intelligence picture on firearms.
In contrast, the current arrangements under an MOU between the AFP and ACBPS are such that the ACBPS is required to notify the AFP of all dangerous weapon detections 'as soon as practicable'.32 Drawing from this experience, the PFA noted that a uniform information scheme would provide for greater accountability given that: With the current method of information requests or MOUs between the myriad of individual agencies, it is very difficult to keep track of what is being shared, between whom, and under what circumstances.33 4.24 Another matter of concern raised by witnesses was that of managing Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation.
Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope of the Victoria Police identified FOI legislation around the country as one of the legislative challenges to a national criminal intelligence mechanism.

He noted that: We may get an FOI request in Victoria for our intelligence, for instance, and we may well refuse that request.

But if it is sitting in a national system, then that same FOI request may well be made to another agency that has access to the data or who hosts the system.
So the idea is trying to get some consistency around that, and I understand that CrimTrac and the government are currently working their way through some draft legislation, and these sorts of issues are coming to the surface.34 4.25 However, the AGD warned that legal impediments are 'often raised but when you explore them they are not necessarily impediments' and that sometimes, the impediments are in fact, cultural.
Furthermore, Mr Anderson of the AGD also noted that there are always going to be tensions between the need to disclose which itself carries risks and the need to withhold intelligence.35 Balancing a need to share with a need to protect 4.26 The PFA argued that the free flow of intelligence would assist police officers in the performance of their daily duties and that they should be provided 'with direct real time access to intelligence holdings on operational grounds' for this reason.
The PFA commented that police officers, and those they interact with, are 'most at risk when an officer is forced to operate in a situation without proper intelligence regarding the circumstances of the situation'.
He explained that: Examples of such situations include; interacting with a person whose criminal history or mental illnesses are unknown to the officer, pulling over a car without knowing that it may have been involved in the commission of a criminal offence, or entering premises unaware of the possible presence of drug-manufacturing chemicals.

These dangerous situations that police officers could face have endless permutations.
The free flow of information 32 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 7.

33 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

34 Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 3.

35 Mr Iain Anderson, AGD, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 18.
37 between agencies ensures that police officers have ease of access to real time intelligence, and can access any known intelligence on any situation.36 In contrast to current arrangements, the PFA further argued that a uniform 4.27 sharing process would provide a 'platform for regulating how information is used, and also to monitor and prevent the misuse of information'.
Privacy and integrity concerns emanating from police accessing real time intelligence holdings for operational purposes could, according to the PFA, be addressed by way of 'electronic data tracking' capabilities which could be provided under a uniform electronic system.37 4.28 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) acknowledged that the ACC, the AFP and to a lesser extent, the ACBPS, had established 'electronic auditing of staff access to information databases' which is a key feature in ensuring the integrity and security of sensitive information.38 ACLEI stated that integrity testing pursuant to legislation introduced in March 2012 was an 'effective deterrence measure concerning unauthorised access and disclosure of official information'.
ACLEI commented that this will serve as a significant information.39 enhancement Nevertheless, ACLEI also raised concerns in relation to the 'need to share' intelligence by highlighting the importance of appropriate arrangements to protect intelligence from unauthorised disclosure.
In this regard, ACLEI noted that allegations relating to breaches of operational security through inappropriate disclosure of information were amongst Integrity Commissioner.40 that protects sensitive the corruption raised with frequently' integrity regime issues 'most the the to Technological challenges 4.29 As previously noted, criminal intelligence is currently stored in more than 30 systems operated by Australian law enforcement, policing, national security and other government agencies, with limited interoperability across them.41 With the widening of the range of agencies and stakeholders involved in gathering, using, providing and analysing criminal intelligence, there are greater technological challenges to achieving an interoperable system.
4.30 CrimTrac seeks to enhance policing and law enforcement through the provision of high quality information services to law enforcement agencies.

It operates three systems—National Automated Fingerprint Identification System, National Criminal Investigation DNA Database and National Police Reference System.42 AUSTRAC, Australia's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing 36 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 3.

37 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.
38 Australian Commission on Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 9, p. 6.

39 Australian Commission on Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 9, p. 5.

40 Australian Commission on Law Enforcement Integrity, Submission 9, p. 5.

41 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 14.

42 CrimTrac, Submission 4, p. [2].
38 regulator and specialist financial intelligence unit, draws on the intelligence holdings of the ACC, AFP and the ACBPS to add value to AUSTRAC intelligence.43 4.31 While there are numerous agencies involved in criminal intelligence, there is no single and complete 'point-of-truth' for Australian criminal intelligence holdings nor an automated process for searching across all such systems simultaneously.44 The ACBPS noted that its analysts often do not have access, or have only limited access, to other law enforcement databases 'unless they are either part of a joint taskforce or out posted with the partner agency'.
Consequently: Siloed access to agency databases has resulted in duplication of analytical effort and operational activity.
A consolidated IT domain, where intelligence can be shared and accessed across agencies would be a significant step in improving the interoperability of Australian law enforcement agencies in relation to criminal intelligence holdings.45 4.32 Mr Lawler, CEO of ACC, emphasised the need for real time intelligence and that to fight organised crime, intelligence needs to be available within 48 hours of it occurring.46 However, according to the PFA, many police forces still rely on central and even manual processes for intelligence sharing.
They argue this not only slows down the intelligence flow to operational frontline police but is 'ineffective, time consuming, and potentially dangerous for operational police and those they interact with'.47 4.33 CrimTrac draws a parallel between greater interoperability and improving information for criminal intelligence purposes: The information provisioned to CrimTrac to deliver the 'reference data' is sourced from the separate and independent systems of policing of the eight federal, state and territory police agencies…There are impediments in gathering consistent data from disparate systems from a range of sources, and whilst the information is made available to agencies such as the ACC and AFP, the value of this interoperability may be enhanced if we could achieve efficiencies in 'making the connections'.48 4.34 Mr Geddes from ASIC argued that while the ability to share information rapidly was a commonly held aspiration, it was tempered by two factors, namely logistics and legislative impediments.
In relation to logistical challenges, he commented that each agency that is a board member of the ACC has its 'own information and communications technology, and they are always operating on different cycles'.

As a consequence, each state jurisdiction and Commonwealth agency 43 AUSTRAC, Submission 14, p. 4.

44 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 14.

45 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Submission 18, p. 5.
46 Mr John Lawler cited in Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

47 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

48 CrimTrac, Submission 4, p. [5].

39 is at a different phase in terms of developing their information and communications technology.

This makes it 'unlikely that two—let alone dozens—of those agencies will have full compatible and interoperable systems'.
Therefore, any new platform that might be considered that allows for real-time communication of information 'has to potentially be built from scratch, and there is likely a cost there'.49 Mr Geddes concluded: So I guess no individual agency has the current resourcing or the current budget to build a separate, stand-alone system, and I think that has to be factored into the considerations.50 4.35 Another challenge in relation to interoperability is the variability and differences in the technological capabilities across agencies.
Some agencies have undergone a process of modernisation.

AUSTRAC is midway through modernising and enhancing its analytical systems and recently updated its IT infrastructure.51 For others, such as the Victoria Police, overhaul of its intelligence processes, standards, practices and competencies are planned.52 4.36 NT Police information and communications technology are at their life's end.
Assistant Commissioner Kershaw recognised that their systems are 'not fast enough' at being able to capture real time information and feed it into systems such as the Fusion Taskforce.

He explained that: We are constantly looking at ways of how we can get the right information reports, for example, into those central repositories and then extract what we need out of them.
So a lot of it has come down to the different systems, and we are looking at some different systems up here at the moment because we are finding that we are at the end of the life of our systems.

In particular, when you have a large number of police on the street who are collecting intelligence for you every day, it is very critical that you have a central repository in-house.
It is important from a serious-and-organised- crime point of view, and I think it is important from a national point of view as well.53 4.37 The PFA highlighted the 'burdensome process of sharing and accessing intelligence' which has 'frustrated police for a long time'.
As a case in point, the Queensland Police Service has been calling for a centralised database of at-risk children given that without such a database, 'police are flying blind'.54 49 Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 31.

50 Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 32.

51 Mr Johann Visser, AUSTRAC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 32.

52 Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 1.
53 Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 23.

54 Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 1.
40 ACID and ALEIN 4.38 Section 7 of the ACC Act provides the ACC with the legal authority to collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate criminal information and intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and intelligence.55 ALEIN is a secure extranet which provides a gateway to the ACID and two other databases managed by the ACC.56 ACID provides a 'secure, centralised, national repository for criminal intelligence'.57 It serves as the 'major system for sharing intelligence between Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies'.58 ACID enables ACC staff to share highly protected information with client law enforcement agencies through the ALEIN network.
It is accessible to more than 25 Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies and regulatory authorities.

However, evidence to the committee upheld the view that ACID and ALEIN were no longer capable of meeting the needs of its users.
Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police said that ACID and ALEIN were 'probably at their use-by date' and that a new system was required.59 4.39 The ACC acknowledged that ACID and ALEIN are 'based on outdated technology and [are] no longer fit for purpose'.60 CEO, Mr Lawler, recognised that frustration with the system as expressed by some state and territory jurisdictions emanated from the fact that it is 'not able to deliver the sort of performance that one expects now in a personal context from the sort of computer power that is more broadly available'.
Mr Lawler continued: It is quite clunky, and the sorts of tools that are available are not where they need to be.
That has had the effect of a drop in user numbers, which I would expect to continue until such time as that is remediated.61 4.40 Similarly, the PFA stated that while there had been successes in relation to multi-agency operations such as Project Wickenby and Project Hoffman,62 the technology that underpins much of the intelligence sharing capabilities is out-dated as: 55 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 13.
56 The other two are the National Clandestine Laboratory Database and the Violent and Sexual Crime Database.

57 Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2005–06, p. 28.

58 Attorney-General's Department cited in Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society, September 2007, p. 101.
59 Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 22.

60 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 22.

61 Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, pp 45–46.

41 …the ACC intelligence sharing systems, ACID and ALEIN, are based on technology from the 1980s.

Meanwhile, criminals utilise advanced technology developed in 2012, and are continually updating.
The technological capabilities that facilitate the sharing, collating and analysis of criminal intelligence needs to be updated to modern technology standards, and the necessary resources should be made available to do so.63 4.41 Mr Patrick Walsh described ACID as a 'poor' intelligence database and explained the ramifications for constructing a national picture of serious and organised crime: …this is not a user-friendly system and while the ACC regularly posts its intelligence products on it ACID is not used extensively by all law enforcement agencies.
This reduces national knowledge about certain criminal threats and degrades law enforcement's ability to do effective strategic intelligence which can provide warning to government about the potential development of future organised crime threats.64 4.42 Similarly, Detective Superintendent Pointing of the Queensland Police Service observed that closed-circuit television (CCTV) data, telephone intercept data and social media data were 'too complex for ACID'.65 However, the PFA highlighted the fact that ACID and the development of the National Firearms Identification Database had provided opportunities to 'build truly national intelligence holdings and to serve as models for more complete intelligence sharing capabilities'.
One of the lessons emanating from these experiences according to Mr Burgess of the PFA is that these repositories do not solve the problem of siloed intelligence holdings: The multitude of variables and factors faced by front-line police and the highly complex nature of organised crime mean that all intelligence is potentially valuable and potentially linked to other intelligence.
Therefore, separate holdings on issues such as firearms and drug intelligence is not providing a complete picture.66 4.43 The Queensland Police Service also made the point that there were new approaches that may be a better solution than ACID given the rapidly growing technology and advances made since the 1980s.
Acting Assistant Commissioner Hogan noted that the limitations of ACID had led many agencies to develop other ways to share information which has driven up the number of direct requests to 62 Project Wickenby, a joint taskforce of the AFP, ATO, ACC, ASIC, AUSTRAC and CDPP is noted as a successful example of such an initiative.

It recently seized over $40 million worth of assets.
The PFA also noted the successes of Project Hoffman, a joint operation between the NSW Police, AFP and ACC which resulted in the seizure of more than 28 kg of heroin with an estimated value of $32 million (Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 6).

63 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 6.

64 Mr Patrick Walsh, Submission 2, pp 5-6.

65 Detective Superintendent John Pointing, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 36.
66 Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 1.

42 specific jurisdictions.

The Queensland Police Service alone receives an average of 16 000 requests for information a year which places considerable strain on its resources.67 4.44 The ATO also noted that availability and access to criminal intelligence could be enhanced via technology solutions.
The ATO explained that the Criminal Intelligence Working Group which contributes to the National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis coordinated by the ACC, is working on enhanced technology.68 Addressing these technological challenges are key considerations before the agencies engaged in the development of the ACIM which is discussed in Chapter 5.
4.45 The ACC explained that the ACID is a tool predominantly used for the second phase of collecting and collating as well as the third phase of analysis and production of intelligence.

The ACID will not be incorporated into the ACIM because the former serves as a searchable database containing criminal intelligence data while the ACIM is a set of strategies, processes and guidelines for managing criminal intelligence nationally.
A Proceeds of Crime funded scoping study was initiated in 2010 to examine further options for the provision of ACID and ALEIN, however, neither is currently under redevelopment.69 Methodological challenges 4.46 Rather than the implementation of a single, consistent methodology in relation to criminal intelligence across jurisdictions, different agencies are applying different approaches and methods.
Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police observed that the various jurisdictions 'are not on the same page as far as what sort of model we are using in relation to criminal intelligence'.70 4.47 While the value of criminal intelligence is without question, agencies are at different stages of developing and strengthening intelligence capabilities: their criminal  Victoria Police overhauled is state intelligence division and reformed its intelligence processes in July 2012 to produce a Victoria Police Intelligence Doctrine after applying the UK National Criminal Intelligence Model for some years;71 67 Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 35.
68 Australian Taxation Office, Submission 16, p. 3.

69 Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No.

17, received 28 March 2013.

70 Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 23.

71 Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 1.
43    Queensland Police Service is currently undertaking a review of its structure including its intelligence to 'make sure we are looking at all of the best practice there is';72 South Australia Police have undertaken a major structural change in relation to intelligence-policing since 2000;73 and Northern Territory Police is currently restructuring its intelligence division and examining different domestic and international models and approaches in relation to its intelligence doctrine.74 4.48 Of concern to the committee is the extent to which these new models and approaches will be consistent with the proposed ACIM as it develops.
Having invested resources, time and energy into establishing these new models, the question remains as to what extent jurisdictions will be willing to adapt their systems to ensure interoperability and complementarity with the ACIM.

This problem was recognised by Mr Patrick Walsh who observed that policing agencies across the country have their own intelligence frameworks and doctrines.
He explained that as long as every agency has its own doctrine, connectivity between them at the national level would remain a challenge.

He recognised that solutions to this challenge include the establishment of common values around training: If an analyst is trained and they work in Victoria Police, that person should be able to go to the Federal Police and the Federal Police should be thinking, 'I do not need to retrain this person because I know their common standards of training'.
There certainly needs to be career progression for analysts so that they do not just get stuck in these support roles.

That is a funding issue.

There needs to be better governance across our law enforcement intelligence community.
I think the ACC has done some things in that area, some good things in the training space, and also in trying to develop greater coordination and sharing at the ACC board level.75 4.49 Differences in approach are further demonstrated by the extent to which jurisdictions share available information with the ACC.

Some share all information while others are more discerning.

Tasmania Police, contributed over 50 000 items of information and intelligence to ACID over eight months in 2012.
It had taken a decision years ago to 'push absolutely everything up' to the ACC.76 Similarly, the WA 72 Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 35.

73 Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham, South Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 40.

74 Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 25.
75 Mr Patrick Walsh, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2012, p. 5.

76 Deputy Commissioner Scott Tilyard, Tasmania Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 47.

44 Police committed to giving almost all of its data to the ACC.77 However, Commander Fordham noted that despite this approach, and extended offers to the ACC to place analysts on the floor within WA Police intelligence, concerns remained that intelligence given to the police was not provided in a timely manner.
He also noted that the ACC may be accused of 'borrowing our watch to tell us the time' as its own intelligence was often returned to it without any added analysis.78 Similarly, the NT Police submitted that jurisdictions were often provided information that they already had.79 4.50 The ACC underscored the importance of a consistent approach to the management of intelligence assets.
Noting the challenges of a limited understanding of the value and utility of criminal intelligence, the ACC argued for a nationally consistent approach to managing such assets through the establishment of common standards, protocols and processes.80 Standardisation of intelligence information 4.51 According to the ACC, in 2010–11, there were 2775 active users of ACID with nearly 560 000 searches for information and intelligence while a total of 451 039 information and intelligence documents were uploaded onto the system.81 The following year, the number of searchers fell to 331 664 reflecting a continued decline across all agencies for three years in a row.82 4.52 While it is widely accepted that ACID/ALEIN cannot meet the standards of sharing capabilities, law enforcement and other agencies are 'bombarding each other with requests for information'.83 Yet, the ACC highlighted that the quality, quantity and format of intelligence uploaded onto these systems are 'significantly varied'.84 The ACBPS alone uploads approximately 19 000 intelligence reports to ACID every year and made the point that agencies contributing to the criminal intelligence holdings 'apply different business rules to the process, which can result in marked differences in information quality, timeliness and consistency'.85 4.53 Furthermore, there is no consistent request for information (RFI) process.
This amplifies the challenges in relation to intelligence sharing and analysis.

While 77 Commander Alf Fordham, Western Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 43.

78 Commander Alf Fordham, Western Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 45.

79 Northern Territory Police, Submission 16, p. [1].

80 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 18.

81 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 21.

82 Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 105.
83 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 6.

84 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 22.

85 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Submission 18, pp 3–4.
acknowledging the requirement to balance a 'need to know' with a 'responsibility to share', the ACC held that a single and complete point-of-truth for Australian criminal intelligence and a consistent approach to RFIs would resolve these challenges.86 4.54 CrimTrac pointed out that without applying due diligence when entering the information and having robust checks for user data entry errors (including the resolution of subject identity issues), the value of the information can be limited.
In this regard, CrimTrac argued for a system that would provide for accurate data: 45 Accurate information has flow on benefits to the user as they do not have to check and potentially amend the material down the track.
The greater the accuracy and validity of the identifying and reference information, the higher user confidence will be that the information can be trusted and effectively used for multiple purposes.87 4.55 The PFA also held that a uniform standard of information sharing would ensure that 'all law enforcement and other relevant agencies contribute to the same extent, and have the same intelligence, solving these inefficiency risks'.88 The PFA argued that either all such agencies move towards a single database or establish a link between their respective intelligence holdings in order that any intelligence held by one agency is accessible by another.
However: Whatever form it takes, only this free flow of criminal intelligence will provide law enforcement agencies with the complete intelligence picture.

Without it, Australia's police and other agencies are forced to combat crime with one eye closed.89 4.56 The PFA maintained that there was scope to extend the standardised national approach for recording drugs intelligence collected at seizures.

Currently, the ACID and ALEIN include a centralised clandestine laboratory information repository.
A mandatory requirement to provide drugs intelligence combined with widening the variety of data types could assist law enforcement agencies to track the movement and distribution of illicit drugs, identify crime groups involved in manufacturing and distribution, and analyse trends and common methodologies of drug importing, manufacturing and distribution.
The PFA noted that: With the beginnings of a national drug database already present, this component of ACID and ALEIN provides an opportunity to implement the extensive intelligence sharing processes Australian law enforcement needs.90 4.57 The PFA noted in support of the free flow of all criminal intelligence between law enforcement and other relevant agencies that in an 'ideal world', all such agencies 86 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 14.

87 CrimTrac, Submission 4, p. [5].


88 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

89 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 3.

90 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 7.

46 would be connected to a single criminal intelligence database.
While the ACC has a legislative mandate to maintain such a database under section 7A of the ACC Act, the PFA recognised two obstacles which hinder the establishment of a truly national criminal intelligence holding underpinned by the free flow of intelligence: technology which hampers …outdated to facilitate intelligence sharing, and a lack of mandatory intelligence sharing requirements.91 the capability 4.58 However, the PFA also recognised other challenges including the need for coverage of a large variety of data types in the sharing arrangements.
Without this being addressed by agencies, particularly the ACC, a comprehensive picture of organised crime would not be able to be formed.92 To address these obstacles, the PFA recommended the development of the 'technical capacity to facilitate the free flow of criminal intelligence between law enforcement and relevant agencies, and for legislative obligations for agencies to share all their criminal intelligence'.93 National Criminal Target Report 4.59 The National Criminal Target Report: Serious and Organised Crime Targets (NCTR) and accompanying target list is one of the ACC's leading strategic intelligence products.
While the OCTA provides a picture of the 'what' of organised crime, the NCTR provides a picture of the 'who', including entities who represent the highest levels of risk to Australia.
Covering both Australian and off-shore entities, the NCTR is produced through analysis of data provided by law enforcement, state and territory police and crime commissions.94 Three concerns were raised in relation to the target list:    that there is not a free flow of information in relation to persons named on the list; a lack of analytical information provided on the list; and duplication of data.
4.60 The PFA argued that there are two reasons that the target list provides an opportunity to utilise the potential of linking multiple agencies.

First, it noted that the flow of criminal intelligence information relating to persons on the list should be a consequence of appearing on the list, and, second, this initiative should be a first step towards the free flow of all criminal intelligence.
Sharing information across agencies in relation to such targets could result in a significant disruption of criminal activities and attempts on the part of those on the list to avoid law enforcement agencies.

Flow- on consequences of appearing on the list might include 'automatic flagging of the 91 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 2.

92 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4.

93 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 2.
94 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 16.
47 person's passport, the freezing of their financial accounts, and notification and tracking of their vehicles' number plates'.95 Lack of analytical information and data duplication 4.61 The NT Police commented that the NCTR provides a dearth of analytical information 'which makes the process of decision-making as an agency problematic, in terms of targeting nominal offenders'.96 4.62 The AFP noted in its submission that it is currently redesigning its Target Evaluation Priority Index (TEPI) following the introduction of the NCTR to align to the input requirements of the NCTR, specifically the Target Risk Assessment Methodology, with the aim of reducing data duplication between the agencies.97 4.63 Commander Fordham of the WA Police detailed the risks involved in the duplication of criminal intelligence: It is also a serious risk because you can have a piece of information that gets turned into intelligence in one location.
The same piece of information gets turned into intelligence at another location which validates the first piece of intelligence, because they have not necessarily been linked, and in comes a third piece of intelligence which is exactly the same source as on all three occasions and suddenly you have proof that something is occurring.
Because it is not linked and you do not recognise that those pieces of information are all coming from the same source, you run the risk of validating intelligence using the same information you started with.

It is essential that we share.

I think it is essential that we have a central clearing house.
How it actually works from a technological perspective is a bit of a challenge, but I know WA Police would be very keen to support that particular function.98 4.64 As the proposed ACIM will emphasise collecting intelligence once, and using it many times, addressing data duplication will take on a heightened importance.

Cultural challenges 4.65 Some submitters argued that intelligence had not always been a high priority for some agencies.
However, following 9/11, greater focus and resources were directed to intelligence.
Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope explained that in the experience of the Victoria Police, intelligence was for a long time the 'poor cousin of investigations and other disciplines within the policing context' and that a significant cultural shift had to take place to elevate the importance of intelligence.99 The NT Police took the view that the ACC appears to be 'almost entirely reliant' on Australian 95 Police Federation Australia, Submission 7, p. 8.

96 Northern Territory Police, Submission 16, p. [4].
97 Australian Federal Police, Submission 12, p. 9.

98 Commander Alf Fordham, WA Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 44.

99 Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 5.
48 law enforcement agencies to provide information used in collection plans (such as the Identity Crime Intelligence Collection Plan aimed at identifying current intelligence gaps and defining collection strategies) and to generate products such as the National Criminal Target Report.100 According to the NT Police, this reliance has created a situation in which the ACC provides jurisdictions with information that is 'at least on a local basis, already known to those agencies'.101 Similarly, the Queensland Police Service informed the committee that it takes 'exception' if it has provided information only to receive a document from the ACC with 'our information almost word for word'.102 4.66 Cultural challenges are often underpinned by reluctance on the part of the police or underlying traditional police culture whereby tactical and operational analysts, detectives and investigators may view strategic intelligence work as lacking day-to-day relevance.103 Reasons for this include the fact that tactical and operational outcomes can easily be measured, resulting in new operations and leading to more arrests.
In contrast, the identification of emerging trends or preventive strategies does not translate directly as success as measured by law enforcement indicators.

James Cheptycki and Jerry Ratcliffe argue that this reality can create two challenges in relation to strategic assessment.

First, 'there is a resultant lack of rank-and-file support within law enforcement for a process seen as having little relevance'.
Secondly, complexities in defining measurable outcomes for strategic intelligence products can make it difficult to justify the maintenance of a strategic intelligence staff.104 In 2003, Ratcliffe highlighted the predominance of a performance culture in many police services whereby emphasis is placed on measuring everything possible.
He warned that within such a culture, the 'benefits of intelligence-led policing will be lost in the quagmire of operational statistics and micro-management'.105 4.67 While raising concerns with the manner in which intelligence is currently shared and the culture underpinning a reluctance to share, all law enforcement stakeholders who gave evidence to the committee supported the development of a timely, interoperable information sharing mechanism.
The AFP, for example, noted that: 100 The ACC noted that as part of the development of a national all-agency Identity Crime Intelligence Collection Plan, it has produced scoping papers aimed at identifying links between identity crime groups, new methodologies and prevention strategies (Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2010–11, p. 28).

101 Northern Territory Police, Submission 15, p. [2].
102 Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 35.

103 James Cheptycki and Jerry Ratcliffe, in J. Ratcliffe (ed.)

Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence, Federation Press, 2004, p. 195.

104 James Cheptycki and Jerry Ratcliffe, in J. Ratcliffe (ed.)

Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence, Federation Press, 2004, pp 195–196.
105 Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing, Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No.

248, April 2003, p. 5.

49 I think culturally we need to work far more with each other about those issues, trying to dispel the issues so that you know that your data will not be compromised and your operations will not be compromised.

That is a little bit of a leap of faith.


I think you have to do it first and show that there are no ill effects to really get the trust.106 4.68 Deputy Commissioner Tilyard of the Tasmania Police noted the reluctance, particularly from investigators, to share information and explained the underpinning culture: They are very committed to their investigations and operations.
It is confined to a need-to-know situation to the extent that they would not dream of mentioning it to their colleagues in the next room that they have worked with for 30 years until the operation or investigation is finalised.107 4.69 The AFP acknowledged that any improvements in criminal intelligence such as replacing the ACID/ALEIN database should be accompanied by a 'reform of processes whereby a dual responsibility exists not only for users to access, but also to supply intelligence in furtherance of the national interest'.108 The AFP's Assistant Commissioner Morris also noted that: I think the trust factor is a genuine one.
Culturally, too, on occasions agencies have championed, including my own—we were self-critical here and were a bit too hard on our successes, perhaps at the exclusion of others.

Others think they are going to miss out on being accredited with the attribution to success down the track.

I do not underestimate how much that retards people from sharing on some occasions.

For me, it does not really matter who executes the success.
We have got to get the intelligence together upstream to give our investigators and our frontline police officers all the best possible information before they go forward.109 4.70 The PFA argued that the current sharing capabilities fail to offer adequate incentives and security to convince law enforcement and other agencies to commit their 'hard-earned intelligence to the middle of the law enforcement table'.110 During its 2007 inquiry, the PJC-ACC also heard evidence that ACID, as the centralised national repository for criminal intelligence, was not functioning at its optimum potential because contribution by law enforcement agencies was individual inconsistent.111 During that inquiry, the PJC-ACC was informed about a silo mentality to criminal intelligence and the reluctance on the part of some agencies to contribute 106 Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 39.
107 Deputy Commissioner Scott Tilyard, Tasmania Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 49.

108 Australian Federal Police, Submission 12, p. 10.

109 Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 39.

110 Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 6.

111 Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society, September 2007, para.

8.40, p. 101.
50 information because they were concerned about how the information they exchanged would be used.112 4.71 The PJC-LE report on the 2010–11 annual reports of the ACC and AFP noted that historically, competition and lack of communication between law enforcement agencies has, on occasion undermined the necessity for close cooperation to combat crime.113 The committee, however, recognised the establishment of ACC offices in each state and territory, which enabled the ACC to keep state police briefed on the ACC's capability and intelligence, had improved the flow of information.114 initiatives including that 4.72 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police commented that the extent to which remnants of a non-sharing culture exists comes down to the individual case officer or the individual holder of that intelligence: For us it is about educating and about understanding that that is driven by a fear of that information being compromised or being acted on when they do not want any action taken.
It is having the confidence and understanding that it is fine to share the information.

We have had some demonstrated recent sharing of actionable intelligence with Queensland, for example, that was outstanding.

They were even able to come back and say, 'Some of the products that you guys are doing we're going to adopt.'

We did the same, so it was a positive experience.
I think when you do have those positive experiences it breaks down all the barriers in relation to sharing intelligence.115 4.73 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw emphasised the importance of relationship building given that much of the contact between agencies was initiated over the phone and that sharing of contacts and networks occurred thereafter.116 On the same subject, the NSW Police noted that over the last three to four years, the level of cooperation between the jurisdictions had been enhanced by initiatives which enabled officers to interact more regularly.
Identifying forums including the crime forum at assistant commissioner level and serious and organised crime coordinating committee, Acting Deputy Commissioner Hudson observed that: 112 Attorney-General's Department cited in Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society, September 2007, p. 102.
113 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, Examination of the 2010–11 Annual Reports of the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police, May 2012, p. 37.

114 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, Examination of the 2010–11 Annual Reports of the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police, May 2012, p. 38.

115 Associate Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 25.
116 Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 25.

51 …everyone has come to the table with an intent basically to mitigate the threat of serious and organised crime rather than to protect their jurisdictions which was historically what people walked into a room having at the back of their mind.117 4.74 However, the process of cultural change takes time.
Acting Deputy Commissioner Hudson described the process of change within his jurisdiction: Change within New South Wales sometimes feels like trying to turn the Titanic around, because of the number of police officers, the number of databases, the number of users and the education process we need to go through to change things.118 Resourcing challenges 4.75 The ACC raised concerns regarding the level of resources available to it to facilitate intelligence sharing.
ACC staff must be trained on processes and procedures for intelligence sharing before they can engage in this work to ensure compliance with the ACC's and its legal dissemination's frameworks.

However, the ACC stated that its 'resource levels are stretched by the volume of intelligence to be collected, analysed and shared' which: …can adversely affect the timeliness with which intelligence is produced and shared.
Delays in the production and sharing of intelligence can cause frustration amongst stakeholders who require timely advice in support of decision-making.

This situation is likely to worsen as the need for intelligence sharing with the private sector increases.
There is currently limited flexibility within the ACC's resource base to provide extra staff to support the intelligence sharing function without removing officers from frontline intelligence and investigative roles.119 4.76 The AFP also raised the matter of ACC resource constraints.
The AFP pointed to arrangements under the Special Intelligence Operation Authorisation and Determination (Child Sex Offences) 2010 whereby 'resource constraints of the ACC' resulted in the ACC only providing the coercive hearing capability to glean intelligence from identified persons for targeted AFP investigations.

The AFP added: The ACC is consequentially limited in its ability to value add to the analysis and strategic picture development of this crime type due to resource commitments.
Given more focused resources the ACC may be better placed to contribute to better effect and 'value add' to a greater degree in development of derived strategic and tactical intelligence.120 117 Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 29.

118 Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 29.

119 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 22.

120 Australian Federal Police, Submission 12, p. 9.
52 4.77 The NT Police expressed the view that the ACC appears to be heavily reliant on Australian law enforcement agencies to provide personnel for managerial positions as well as to establish units within the ACC including the National Organised Crime Task Force.
In general terms, the NT Police argued that these arrangements impede tasks forces 'through no deficiency of involved agencies'.121 Funding challenges—Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability 4.78 In May 2010, the Commonwealth announced an investment of $38.5 million to combat organised crime and implement the OCSF.
Of the total, the ACC was provided $14.5 million over five years to establish a Criminal Intelligence Fusion Centre (Fusion).122 Fusion focuses on identifying risk and threat in relation to organised crime.
Mrs Karen Harfield, Executive Director, Fusion explained that Fusion draws on criminal intelligence and information from other agencies to understand what that threat and risk look like: In increasing the scope of what is already known—and that might be about the who, the what and the how; also the types of methodologies used by serious and organised crime networks as well as the vulnerabilities they are exploiting—we then specifically understand the requirements for the collection part of the intelligence cycle.
So we then specifically go out and search for information through a variety of methods to fill that intelligence gap.

The third element is about discovery.

So, knowing what you do know, and going out and collecting what you do not know, then shows you what the new areas for discovery might need to be to pinpoint new and emerging risks and threats.
So we do this type of work with many partner agencies, some of which are actually with us at the ACC working in the Fusion capability.123 The role of Fusion is defined in the ACC's Annual Report 2010–11 as 4.79 follows: Fusion enhances monitoring of the highest serious and organised crime threats, proactively detects previously unknown but significant serious and organised crime threats, enhances links between serious and organised crime intelligence and national security, and provides better assessments and intelligence to Government and program delivery agencies on the risks posed by serious and organised crime for predictive analysis.124 121 Northern Territory Police, Submission 16, p. [3].
122 AUSTRAC received the remaining $24 million for new analytical technologies to improve its ability to target serious and organised crime, revenue evasion and financial fraud.

Attorney- General's Department, 'Additional $38.5 Million to Combat Organised Crime', Media Release, 11 May 2010, http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Budgets/Budget2010/Mediareleases/Pages/Additional$385 MilliontoCombatOrganisedCrime.aspx (accessed 25 July 2012).
123 Mrs Karen Harfield, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 46.

124 Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2010–11, p. 46.

53 4.80 Fusion co-locates investigators, analysts and technical experts to maximise the use of public and private sector data and facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and analysis.
Fusion brings together capabilities from Commonwealth agencies including the AFP, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, ASIC, AUSTRAC, ATO, Department of Human Services, ACBPS, the national intelligence community and state and territory law enforcement authorities.
It collects and receives intelligence from the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) and other stakeholders including Commonwealth law enforcement, regulatory and policy agencies, state/territory police agencies and crime commissions, foreign law enforcement agencies supported by the AFP and private sector organisations.125 4.81 In the ACC's 2010–11 Annual Report, Mr John Lawler, CEO, stated that: Fusion is dramatically increasing capacity to maximise the value of intelligence and public and private data holdings.
Within months, Fusion had generated valuable breakthrough intelligence including identifying new targets previously unknown to law enforcement, providing new leads on serious and organised crime activity, and identifying significant fraud against government programs.126 4.82 Mr Patrick Walsh raised concerns in his submission about funding for Fusion.
He noted that it was not clear whether the funding for Fusion will be ongoing or subject to the extent to which federal and state agencies that participate 'feel they can continue to support staff participating in the centre'.

In this regard, Mr Walsh argued that: The government should consider (pending an internal independent review of fusion centre) giving the ACC core funding in an ongoing capacity for the maintenance and future information technology procurement of the centre.
It should also consider funding at least partially agencies who participate in the centre.127 4.83 Acting Deputy Commissioner Hudson of the NSW Police Force added that the ACC's Fusion capability is 'probably unparalleled in other law enforcement agencies'.128 125 Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 13.

126 Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2010–11, p. 14, http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/annual-report/2010-11-annual-report (accessed 17 July 2012).
127 Mr Patrick Walsh, Submission 2, p. 4.

128 Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 27.