Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1698747220196.pdf (Malaysia)
Submission to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reforms Automatic Voter Registration and Reduction of the Voting Age Andrew Aeria, Phd Dept of Politics and International Relations Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1.

Automatic Registratiou of Voters and Reductiou in Votiug Age 1.1 Currently, there is no automatic registration of voters in Malaysia.
This is unacceptable since it defeats the process of equal participation and democratic choice in the electoral process.

It disenfranchises over 3.7 million eligible voters in the country who are not registered.

1.2 The current registration process of the Election Commission (EC/SPR) relies on registration of a voter on an official form.

This is cumbersome and lengthy (taking over three months to process) and reflects poorly on bureaucratic efficiency in the era of electronic government.
1.3 It defies all logic that in the era of efficient, electronic government the Election Commission (EC/SPR) cannot link its computer system with that of the National Registration Department (NRD).

It is entirely possible to automatically and systematically capture new voter registration when citizens renew their ICs at age 21; and also to delete voters from the electoral roll on registration of deaths with the NRD.
The internet era not only allows for this, it can facilitate this in a seamless fashion - provided there is the political will to do this.

1.4 Furthermore, maintaining the current age of voting at 21 is illogical.

Individuals in Malaysia can marry and legally enter into contracts by the age of 18.

This means that Malaysian law recognises all individuals as being capable of mature judgment once they reach the age of 18.
Hence, if someone can decide whom he/she wants as a life partner and if someone can decide what legal contract they wish to enter into on a long or short term basis, it defies logic that they cannot be allowed to exercise sound judgment and vote for their choice of government when they reach the age of 18.

1.5 The voting age in all Southeast Asian countries is 18 years except for Indonesia and East in Timor (17 years).
Only Singapore and Malaysia maintain an outdated mindset maintaining the voting age at 21 with no substantive reasons for doing so.

2.

Recommendations 2.1 That the PSC recommends the lowering of the voting age to that of 18 immediately.

2.2 That the PSC recommends the EC/SPR link up its computer system with that of the NRD to facilitate automatic registration of voters at age 18 and automatic deletion of voters on registration oftheir death.
Submission to Committee on Electoral Reforms the Parliamentary Select Duration of Campaign Period and Free, Fair and Equal Access to the Media Andrew Aeria, PhD Dept of Politics and International Relations Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1.

Campaign Duration 1.1 Currently, the usual eight-day duration of campaigning during elections is too short.
This very brief campaign period undermines a key basis of a democracy namely that voters make informed choices about whom they want as their elected representatives and which party they wish to represent them in government.

1.2 The current time frame of eight days is insufficient since it does not allow for any substantial discussion of the real campaign issues and no robust evaluation of party manifestos and the candidates contesting the election.

The performance of power holders is seldom scrutinised.
The quality of the opposition is seldom evaluated.

'beauty contests' 1.3 Consequently, election campaigns in Sarawak often end up being ethnic, religious or developmental to outdo their competitors by showing how good they are in relation to how bad their competitors are!

There is too much ridicule and disparaging of the competition by all parties involved given the short election period.

There is no discussion of issues, little debate and still less comparison of candidates and party platforms.
in which contesting parties attempt 1.4 As well, the brevity of election campaigns often sees candidates distributing money and all sorts of developmental goodies to voters to solicit their support instead of sharing their ideas and party manifestos in support of good governance and well-thought out democracy to solicit support.

2.
2.

Lack of Eqnal and Fail" Access to the Media 2.1 Presently, the structure of the Malaysian media industry is such that most mainstreanl media is owned by the government or interests closely aligned to or linked to political parties and individuals in government.

2.2 During elections, the mainstream media have consistently acted as the unvarnished propaganda arm of the governing political party.
This has been eloquently documented in numerous articles, the key ones being Zaharom Nain (2002), Mustafa Anuar (2002), various issues of the Aliran Monthly and the work of the Centre for Independent Journalism (CIJ).l 2.3 In the interest of freely and fairly informing the electorate about the key electoral issues, party manifestos, candidates, their positions on issues, etc.
and to allow for a critical evaluation of past performance and future commitments/pledges, the mainstream media 1 Zaharom Nain, 'The Structure ofthe Media Industry.

Implications for Democracy' and Mustafa KAnuar, 'Defining Democratic Discourses.

The Mainstream Press'.

Both articles were published in an edited volume by Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik (2002), Democracy in Malaysia.

Discourses and Practices, Surrey: Curzon Press.


Aliran Monthly monitors and regularly comments on the health ofthe mainstream press in its publications and website ,,",'WW.aliran.com.

Similarly CIJ at their website: http://cijmalaysia.OI:g/.

has a key role to play in strengthening democracy and informed choice.

But for this, there needs to be fair access to the media for all.
As well, there is a need for the media to report truthfully and without bias on all issues and all parties contesting an election.

3.

Recommendations 3.1 The PSC is thus urged to recommend that the EC/SPR set campaign duration of at least 21 days to allow all political parties and their candidates sufficient time to traverse their far-flung constituencies in Sarawak.

This will also allow them enough time to communicate effectively with all voters about their party manifestos and campaign commitments.
It will also allow the electorate to meet, to scrutinise and get to know critically the party platforms of their candidates and also their potential as elected representatives.

Together with a free and fair press, this will also allow the electorate to be fully infonned about the key issues in an election.
3.2 The PSC is also urged to recomlnend that the EC/SPR be given independent powers to monitor and discipline the mainstream media to ensure that they provide free, fair and unbiased coverage of all contesting parties in an election.

Free airtime should be allocated to all contesting parties by the mainstream media.

There should be provision for the right of reply to all parties in all mainstream media and there should be selected televised debates for all key party leaders.
Together with a 21 day campaign period, this will allow the electorate to be fully infonned about the key issues in an election.

Submission to Committee on Electoral Reforms the Parliamentary Select Mal-apportionment and Gerrymandering of Constituencies Andrew Aeria, PhD Dept of Politics and International Relations Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS, Sarawak 9 December 2011 Kuching 1.

Mal-apportionment of Constituencies 1.1 A key principle of democracy is that of one person having one vote.
In principle, every vote in a democracy has equal value.

This means everyone's vote - irrespective of their constituency - has equal weightage in terms of its ability to influence electoral outcomes.
1.2 Historically, there has been some divergence in this principle especially between rural and urban constituencies whereby 'differences in constituency electorate sizes were limited to 15 percent above or below the average constituency electorate at the time of Merdeka" (Lim Hong Hai in Malaysiakini Comments, 3.12.11).
1.3 'These clear numerical limits were relaxed in 1962 and then removed in 1973 by constitutional amendments: the federal constitution now allows, rather imprecisely, "a measure of weightage" in favour of rural constituencies' ((Lim Hong Hai in Malaysiakini Comments, 3.12.11).

1.4 Consequently in Malaysia, this principle of every vote having equal value has been subverted by successive mal-apportionment of constituency sizes.
By mal-apportionment, I mean that constituencies have been gerrymandered into sizes with vastly different total vote numbers which undermine the basic principle of one person having one vote of equal value and weightage to that of another person.

1.5 In Sarawak, there are 31 parliamentary and 71 these constituencies suffer from the phenomenon of mal-apportionment.

This is not a phenomenon that is unique to Sarawak.

It also exists in all parts of the country.

state constituencies.


All 1.6 Table I shows: (a) the total voters of all state constituencies and their mal-apportionment in terms of relative percentage differences between the smallest to the largest constituency, and (b) the relative percentage differences between all constituencies and what I consider to be a fair average total voter sized constituency.

Table 2 shows the same but for parliamentary constituencies in Sarawak.
1.7 For state constituencies, a voter in Ba'kelalan (6958 voters) has a vote that is approximately five times more value in terms of weightage than that of a voter in Pending (29488 voters).

For an urban comparison, a voter in Satok (10431 voters) has a vote with a weightage that is more than twice that of a neighbouring voter in Padungan (23576 voters).
1.8 For parliamentary constituencies (Table 2), a voter in Lawas (15717 voters) has a vote that is approximately five times more value in terms of weightage than a voter in Stampin (67257 voters).

For a close semi-urban comparison, a voter in Petra Jiiya (40533 voters) has a vote that is approximately 1.66 times more value in weightage than a voter in Stampin.

1.9 These figures suggest serious mal-apportionment of voters in the various state and parliamentary constituencies in Sarawak.
They undermine the democratic principle of one person having a vote of equal value with that of another voter in another constituency.
1.10 To stay true to the democratic principle of one person one vote, a fairer apportionment of voters in Sarawak-based constituencies would see the Election Commission fix an average number of voters per constituency (take the total number of voters in Sarawak and divide by number of constituencies giving 13805 voters for each state constituency; 29808 voters for each parliamentary constituency).
The EC/SPR should then delineate all constituencies in a fair way to ensure that constituencies do not deviate too far beyond the set average number of voters per constituency.

Leeway should be given for extremely rural constituencies but the deviation should not exceed 20 percent of the set average since transport and telecommunication networks today in Sarawak are much better than what they used to be in 1963.

J 2.
J 2.

Recommendations 2.1 2.2 this and subsequent issue of mal-apportionment of constituencies Given that gerrymandering of constituency boundaries is an issue that affects the whole country and hence the health of the nation's democracy, I thus urge the PSC to recommend the setting up of a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate this issue of mal-apportionment of equal average voters among constituencies thoroughly.
The mandate of such a RCI should examine (but not be confined to) current mal-apportionment and to draw up fairer rules that will guide the EC/SPR to redraw all constituency boundaries to ensure that all constituency delineations empower voters equally.

As well, strict rules about future delineation exercises must be drawn up to ensure that the EC/SPR genuinely assists in promoting and protecting the equal values of our democratic vote for all time.
I also urge the PSC to recommend that parliament enact a cross-party constitutional amendment to restore the EC/SPR's formerly independent powers to ensure equal distribution of seat apportionment between states (removed via Constitutional (Amendment) Act (No.2) of 1973) and equal average voters among constituencies which was also removed by the same constitutional amendment?

As well, the EC/SPR should be made answerable to parliament and not to the government as is the situation now.
I When Malaysia was fonned in 1963, electoral limits for Sabah and Sarawak were such that they allowed 'the largest constituency to have twice the number of electors as the smallest constituency, this is, one-third or 33 percent above or below the average constituency in each state' (Lim Hong Hai, 2011 in Malaysiakini Comments, 3.12.11).
Also, to overcome any travel-related cost related issues related to large constituencies, parliament should mandate an annual allocation of travel funds for all parliamentarians that is indexed to distance travelled via a reasonable mode of transport available for such travel.

2 See Lim Hong Hai, 'Electoral Politics in Malaysia: "Managing" Elections in a Plural Society', pp.

111-112, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iezlOI361005.pdf(accessed 8 December 2011).
Table I: Sarawak State Constituencies: Total Voters and Deviation (%) .
Constituency N70 Ba'kelalan N37 Daro N69 Batu Danau N20 Sadong Jaya N32 Bukit Saban N23 Lingga N26 Bkt Begunan N24 Beting Maro N3 TgDatu N22 Sebuyau N30 Saribas N43 Ngemah NI0par N31 Layar N57 Belaga N55 Katibas N35 Belawai N38 Jemoreng N29BtgAi N25 Balai Ringin N36 Semop N41 Pakan N28 Engkilili N53 Kakus N44 Machan N71 Bukit Sari N21 Simunjan N8 Satok N5 Demak Laut N27 Simanggang N61 Bekenu N34 Krian N56 Baleh N42 Meluan N51 Balingian N50 Dalat N52 Tamin N18 Tebedu N58 Jepak N66 Marudi N67 Telang Usan Total Voters (2011) Seat Deviation (Smaliest/Largest) Seat Deviation from Average Size Constituency Nl4 Asajaya N60Kemena N4 Pantai Damai N62Lambir N33 Kalaka N49Nangka N68 Bukit Kota N2 Tasik Biru N54 Pelagus N40 Meradong N7 Semariang N17 Tarat N63 Piasau N47 Bwg Assan Nl9Kedup N6 Tupong Nl5 Muara Tuang N39Repok Nl3 Batu Kawah Nl6 Bengoh N65 Senadin N64 Pujut N9Padungan N46 Dudong N45 Bkt Assek N59 Kidurong Nl2 Kota Sentosa NIl Batu Lintang N48 Pelawan NlO Pending Total Voters '"•• )·;.i,·".
Total Voters (2011) ., , . '

; ; Seat Deviation 10mc<+1 ,i'i:"a ""'.

',"""" Seat Deviation from Average Size 1r\r\ ., " [,..... ,.
~.. "... Sources: Borneo Post, 21.5.06; Star, 16.4.11 Table 2: Sarawak Parliamentary Constituencies: Total Voters and Deviation (%) Constituency Total Voters (2008) Seat Deviation (Smallest/Largest) Seat Deviation From Average Size P219 Bukit Mas/P222 Lawas P2071gan P200 Btg Sadong P21S/216 Hulu Rejang P209/210 Kanowit P203 Lubok Antu P213/214 Seiangau P208/209 Julau P221 Limbang P192 Mas Gading P204 Betong P218 Sibuti P201 Btg Lupar P214/215 Kapit P212/213 Mukah P205 Saratok P218/220 Baram P202 Sri Aman P199 Serian 15717 15735 16794 17185 17613 17647 20057 20306 20315 21968 22088 22143 22417 22723 22851 23982 24425 25724 27901 P197 Kota Samarahan 28517 P206 Kuaia :;;:~aT~:~~: l"':l"')""'~'~~ P207/208 Sarikei P198 Mambong P194 Petra Jaya P210/211 Lanang P216/217 Bintulu P19S Bdr Kuching P211/212 Sibu P217/219 Miri P196 Stampin 31675 36147 40533 49530 50404 53216 53679 55963 67257 Total Voters 924054 23.4 23.4 25 25.6 26.2 26.2 29.8 30.2 30.2 32.7 32.8 32.9 33.3 33.8 34 35.7 36.3 38.2 41.5 42.4 I,', .......•.,...,45.8 '.. 47.1 53.7 60.3 73.6 74.9 79.1 79.8 83.2 100 52.7 52.8 56.3 57.7 59.1 59.2 67.3 68.1 68.2 73.7 74.1 74.3 75.2 76.2 76.7 80.5 81.9 86.3 93.6 ...
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106.3 121.3 136 166.2 169.1 178.5 180.1 187.7 225.6 .'

Sources: Berila Harian, 1.12.99; 22.3.04; Utusan Online: http://ww2.ulusan.com.my/utusan/special.

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