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Human Development Report 2019 Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Empowered lives.

Resilient nations.
H D R 2 0 1 9 | B e y o n d i n c o m e , b e y o n d a v e r a g e s , b e y o n d t o d a y : CheckPointThreatExtractionsecuredthisdocumentGetOriginal The 2019 Human Development Report is the latest in the series of global Human Development Reports published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990 as independent, analytically and empirically grounded discussions of major development issues, trends and policies.
Additional resources related to the 2019 Human Development Report can be found online at http://hdr.undp.org, including digital versions and translations of the Report and the overview in more than 10 languages, an interactive web version of the Report, a set of background papers and think pieces commissioned for the Report, interactive data visualizations and databases of human development indicators, full explanations of the sources and methodologies used in the Report’s composite indices, country profiles and other background materials as well as previous global, regional and national Human Development Reports.
Cor- rections and addenda are also available online.

The cover conveys the inequalities in human development of a changing world.

The dots in different colors represent the com- plex and multidimensional nature of these inequalities.

The shad- ow of the climate crisis and sweeping technological change, evoked by the color of the cover background that suggests heat, will shape progress in human development in the 21st century.
Copyright @ 2019 By the United Nations Development Programme 1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA All rights reserved.

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The findings, analysis, and recommendations of this Report, as with previous Reports, do not represent the official position of the UNDP or of any of the UN Member States that are part of its Executive Board.

They are also not necessarily endorsed by those mentioned in the acknowledgments or cited.
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Where indicated, some figures in the analytical part of the Report were estimated by the HDRO or other contributors and are not necessarily the official statistics of the concerned country, area or territory, which may be based on alternative methods.
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Human Development Report 2019 Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Empowered lives.

Resilient nations.
Human Development Report 2019 Team Director and lead author Pedro Conceição Research and statistics Jacob Assa, Cecilia Calderon, George Ronald Gray, Nergis Gulasan, Yu-Chieh Hsu, Milorad Kovacevic, Christina Lengfelder, Brian Lutz, Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Shivani Nayyar, Thangavel Palanivel, Carolina Rivera and Heriberto Tapia Production, communications, operations Botagoz Abdreyeva, Oscar Bernal, Andrea Davis, Rezarta Godo, Jon Hall, Seockhwan Bryce Hwang, Admir Jahic, Fe Juarez Shanahan, Sarantuya Mend, Anna Ortubia, Yumna Rathore, Dharshani Seneviratne, Elodie Turchi and Nu Nu Win External contributors Chapter 3 (by the World Inequality Lab): Lucas Chancel, Denis Cogneau, Amory Gethin, Alix Myczkowski and Thomas Piketty Boxes and spotlights: Elizabeth Anderson, Michelle Bachelet, Bas van Bavel, David Coady, James Foster, Nora Lustig and Ben Philips ii | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 CONNECTING THE SDGs DEVELOPMENT IS A VIRTUOUS CYCLE FOREWORD BY ACHIM STEINER WHEN UNDP IN 2018 WHY OUR RATIONALE WHO #NEXTGENUNDP OUR LEADERSHIP WHAT STRATEGICALLY ON TRACK SIGNATURE SOLUTIONS POVERTY GOVERNANCE RESILIENCE ENVIRONMENT ENERGY GENDER HOW RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT FROM WITHIN POWERING THE UN REFORM THE UNDP FAMILY PARTNERS SHAKING HANDS WITH THE WORLD LENDING STAR POWER TO THE SDGs RESOURCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TOP 2018 UNDP FUNDING PARTNERS CONNECTING THE WORLD 3 4 6 7 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 CONTENTS FOREWORD CHANGING.
IMPROVING.

DELIVERING.

Foreword tries in meeting the ambition of the 2030 Agenda.

further entrench inequalities and consolidate the power and political dominance of the few.

They reinforce a trait I have come to admire in this What we are seeing today is the crest of a wave of inequality.

What happens next comes organisation: its potential to take change to scale.

down to choice.
down to choice.

Just as inequality begins at It is a potential we need to fulfill to support coun- birth, defines the freedom and opportunities of children, adults and elders, and permeates those of the next generation, so, too, policies to prevent inequalities can follow the lifecycle.
In 2018, we demonstrated that we are up to From pre–labour market investments in the health and nutrition of young children to in– the challenge, with the highest programme and post–labour market investments around delivery in five years, restored financial stabli- access to capital, minimum wages and social services, politicians and policymakers have a ty, increased efficiency and a geographically- battery of choices that, if correctly combined team for the context of each country or group, will translate into a lifelong investment in equality – even as we powered UN reform and, now, and sustainability.
diverse, gender-balanced leadership agencies in the countries we serve.

step back from coordinating United Nations Making those choices starts with a commit- ment to tackling the complexity of human development—to pushing the boundaries to help countries and communities realize the As Administrator, it was a true pleasure to lead Sustainable Development Goals.
the #NextGenUNDP transformation during This is the mission at the heart of the United Nations Development Programme, working 2018, disrupting how we think, invest, manage together with the 170 countries and territories and deliver to accelerate sustainable development.

we serve.

Some 40 years ago the founding father of human development, Professor Amartya Sen, Today, UNDP’s mission has never been as asked a deceptively simple question: equality clear: we are here to help the 170 countries of what?
He answered with equal simplicity: of the things we care about to build the future and territories in which we currently work to we aspire to.

one on this planet is left behind.

reach their development priorities so that no Professor Sen’s words help us to take a fresh look; to go beyond growth and markets to understand why people take to the streets in protest, and what leaders can do about it.
We look forward to your partnership and col- I would like to thank all those who have taken this journey of exploration with us over the past 12 months, and I encourage you to read on.

laboration on the journey.

2018 WAS A REMARKABLE YEAR FOR UNDP.

It was our first full year of implementing a new Strategic Plan – a plan built to help countries The wave of demonstrations sweeping across countries is a clear sign that, for all our pro- gress, something in our globalized society is not working.
Different triggers are bringing people onto the streets: the cost of a train ticket, the price of petrol, political demands for independence.

A connecting thread, though, is deep and deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals.

rising frustration with inequalities.


At a time of change for the United Nations, we worked with our partners to help people get on their feet and stay there – meeting short- Understanding how to address today’s dis- quiet requires looking “Beyond Income, Beyond Averages and Beyond Today,” as this Human Development Report sets out to do.

hopeful, confident future.


term needs while laying the foundations for a Too often, inequality is framed around eco- nomics, fed and measured by the notion that making money is the most important thing in life.

In Yemen and the Lake Chad region, though conflict and fragility continue to block the arter- ies of progress, we saw a new way of working between humanitarian and development actors take root, bridging life-saving response with re- covery and development.
But societies are creaking under the strain of this assumption, and while people may protest to keep pennies in their pockets, power is the protagonist of this story: the power of the few; the powerlessness of many; and collective power of the people to demand change.

Going beyond income will require tackling entrenched interests—the social and political norms embedded deep within a nation’s or a group’s history and culture.
Looking beyond today, the 2019 Human Development Report articulates the rise of a new generation of inequalities.

Just as the gap in basic living standards is narrowing, with an unprecedented number of people in the world escaping poverty, hunger and disease, the abilities people will need to compete in the immediate future have evolved.
A new gap has opened, such as in tertiary education and access to broadband—oppor- tunities once considered luxuries that are now considered critical to compete and belong, particularly in a knowledge economy, where an increasing number of young people are ed- ucated, connected and stuck with no ladder of choices to move up.

At the same time, climate change, gender in- equality and violent conflict continue to drive and entrench basic and new inequalities alike.
As the Human Development Report sets out, failure to address these systemic challenges will From India to Fiji, we saw a surge of innovation connecting people with the services they need to get out of poverty, shaping governance solutions of the future.

A youth employment and entrepreneurship initiative that started in Rwanda back in 2013 is now in 10 countries and set to be scaled up continent-wide by the Africa Union.

In the next pages you will see some of the many results we achieved in 2018.
They rein- force that UNDP is uniquely designed to help solve complex development problems in a courageous, integrated and innovative way.

Achim Steiner Administrator United Nations Development Programme Achim Steiner Administrator United Nations Development Programme Foreword | iii 3 Acknowledgements Producing a Human Development Report is truly a collective endeavour.

It reflects the formal and informal contributions of many people and institutions.
What ultimately is included in these pages cannot fully capture the richness of ideas, interactions, partnerships and collaborations associated with the effort.

These acknowledgements are an imperfect attempt at recognizing those who generously gave their time and energy to help produce the 2019 Human Development Report—with apologies for the many that contributed and that we have failed to include here.
As authors, we hope that the content lives up to the out- standing contributions that were received and that the Report adds to what the UN General Assembly has recognized as “an independent intellectual exercise” that has become “an important tool for raising awareness about human development around the world.” Our first word of thanks goes to the members of our Advisory Board, energet- ically led by Thomas Piketty and Tharman Shanmugaratnam in their Co-Chair roles.
The other members of the Advisory Board were Olu Ajakaiye, Kaushik Basu, Haroon Bhorat, Francisco Ferreira, Janet C. Gornick, David Grusky, Ravi Kanbur, Enrico Letta, Chunling Li, Nora Lustig, Laura Chinchilla Miranda, Njuguna Ndung’u and Frances Stewart.

Complementing the advice from our Advisory Board, the Report’s Statistical Advisory Panel provided guidance on several methodological and data aspects of the Report, in particular related to the calculation of the Report’s human development indices.
We are grateful to all the panel members: Oliver Chinganya, Albina A. Chuwa, Ludgarde Coppens, Marc Fleurbaey, Marie Haldorson, Friedrich Huebler, Dean Mitchell Jolliffe, Yemi Kale, Steven Kapsos, Robert Kirkpatrick, Jaya Krishnakumar, Mohd Uzir Mahidin, Max Roser and Pedro Luis do Nascimento Silva.
Many others provided generous sugges- tions without any formal advisory role, in- cluding Sabina Alkire, Sudhir Anand, Amar Battacharya, Sarah Cliffe, Miles Corak, Angus Deaton, Shanta Devarajan, Vitor Gaspar, Carol Graham, Kenneth Harttgen, Homi Kharas, Michèle Lamont, Santiago Levy, Ako Muto, Ambar Nayaran, Alex Reid, Carolina Sánchez-Páramo, Paul Segal, Amartya Sen, Juan Somavia, Yukio Takasu, Senoe Torgerson and Michael Woolcock.
Appreciation is also extended for the writ- ten contributions by Lucas Chancel and our colleagues at the World Inequality Lab, who contributed chapter 3 of the Report.

Boxes and spotlights were contributed by Elizabeth Anderson, Michelle Bachelet, Bas van Bavel, David Coady, James Foster, Nora Lustig, Ben Philips, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association and the Peace Research Institute in Oslo.
Background papers and written inputs were prepared by Fabrizio Bernardi, Dirk Bezemer, Matthew Brunwasser, Martha Chen, Sirianne Dahlum, Olivier Fiala, Valpy FitzGerald, James K. Galbraith, Jayati Ghosh, John Helliwell, Martin Hilbert, Patrick Kabanda, Emmanuel Letouze, Juliana Martínez, Håvard Mokleiv, José Antonio Ocampo, Gudrun Østby, Inaki Permanyer, Ilze Plavgo, Siri Aas Rustad, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea, Anya Schiffrin, Jeroen P.J.M.

Smits, Eric Uslaner, Kevin Watkins and Martijn van Zomeren.
We are thankful to all of them.

A number of consultations with thematic and regional experts were held between March and September 2019, including in Beirut, Bonn, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Doha, Geneva, Marrakech, Nairobi, Nursultan, Paris, Rabat and Tokyo.
For their inputs during these con- sultations, we are especially grateful to Touhami Abdelkhalek, Touhami Abi, Hala Abou Ali, Laura Addati, Shaikh Abdulla bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, Ibrahim Ahmed Elbadawi, Asmaa Al Fadala, Abdulrazak Al-Faris, Najla Ali Murad, Facundo Alvaredo, Yassamin Ansari, Kuralay Baibatyrova, Alikhan Baimenov, Radhika Balakrishnan, Carlotta Balestra, Luis Beccaria, Debapriya Bhattacharya, Roberto Bissio, Thomas Blanchet, Sachin Chaturvedi, Alexander Chubrik, Paulo Esteves, Elyas Felfoul, Cristina Gallach, Amory Gethin, Sherine Ghoneim, Liana Ghukasyan, Manuel Glave, Xavier Godinot, Heba Handoussa, Gonzalo Hernández-Licona, Ameena Hussain, Hatem Jemmali, Fahmida Khatun, Alex Klemm, Paul Krugman, Nevena Kulic, Christoph Lakner, Tomas de Lara, Eric Livny, Paul Makdisi, Gordana Matkovic, Rodrigo Márquez, Roxana Maurizio, Marco Mira, Cielo Morales, Salvatore Morelli, Rabie Nasr, Heba Nassar, Andrea Villarreal Ojeda, Chukwuka Onyekwena, Andrea Ordonez, Magued Osman, Mónica Pachón, Emel Memiş Parmaksiz, Maha El Rabbat, Racha Ramadan, Hala El Saeed, Ouedraogo Sayouba, Sherine Shawky, André de Mello e Souza, Paul Stubbs, Hamid Tijani, René Mauricio Valdés, Peter Van de Ven, Ngu Wah Win, Xu Xiuli, Cai Yiping, Sabina Ymeri and Stephen Younger.
Further support was also extended by other individuals who are too numerous to men- tion here (consultations are listed at http:// hdr.undp.org/en/towards-hdr-2019 with more partners and participants mentioned at http://hdr.undp.org/en/acknowledge- ments-hdr-2019).

Contributions, support and assistance from partnering institutions, including UNDP regional bureaus and coun- try offices, are also acknowledged with much gratitude.
The Report also benefited from peer re- views of each chapter by Paul Anand, Carlos Rodriguez Castelan, Lidia Ceriani, Daniele Checchi, Megan Cole, Danny Dorling, Csaba Feher, Oliver Fiala, Maura Francese, Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, Leonard Goff, Didier Jacobs, Silpa Kaza, Jeni Klugman, Anirudh Krishna, Benoit Laplante, Max Lawson, Marc Morgan, Teresa Munzi, Brian Nolan, Zachary Parolin, Kate E. Pickett, Sanjay Reddy, Pascal Saint- Amans, Robert Seamans, Nicholas Short and Marina Mendes Tavares.
We are grateful to many colleagues in the United Nations family that supported the preparation of the report by hosting consulta- tions or providing comments and advice.
They include Prosper Tanyaradzwa Muwengwa and Thokozile Ruzvidzo from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); Alberto Arenas, Alicia Bárcena, Mario Cimoli and Nunzia Saporito from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); Khalid Abu-Ismail, Oussama Safa, Niranjan Sarangi and Saurabh Sinha from the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); Roger Gomis, Damian Grimshaw, Stefan Kühn and Perin Sekerler from the International Labor Organization (ILO); Astra Bonini, Hoi Wai Jackie Cheng, Elliott Harris, Ivo Havinga, Marcelo Lafleur, Shantanu Mukherjee, Marta Roig, Michael Smedes and Wenyan Yang from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA); Manos Antoninis, Bilal Fouad Barakat and Anna Cristina D’Addio from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Lakshmi Narasimhan Balaji, Laurence Chandy and Mark Hereward from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Shams Banihani, Jorge Chediek and Xiaojun Grace Wang from the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC); Paul Ladd from the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD); Rachel Gisselquist, Carlos Gradin and Kunal Sen from the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU- WIDER); Margaret Carroll and Emma Morley from the UN Volunteers (UNV); Shruti Majumdar, Shahrashoub Razavi and Silke Staab from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women); and Theadora Swift Koller from the World Health Organization (WHO).
Many colleagues in UNDP provided ad- vice and encouragement.

Luis Felipe López- Calva, Michele Candotti, Joseph D’Cruz and Abdoulaye Mar Dieye gave guidance not only on the content of the Report but also towards the evolution of the Human Development Report Office over the coming years.
We are grateful, in addition, to Marcel Alers, Fernando Aramayo, Gabriela Catterberg, Valerie Cliff, Esuna Dugarova, Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, Almudena Fernández, Cassie Flynn, Stephen Gold, Nicole Igloi, Boyan Konstantinov, Raquel Lagunas, Marcela Meléndez, Ruben Mercado, Ernesto Pérez, Kenroy Roach, Renata Rubian, Narue Shiki, Ben Slay, Mourad Wahba, Douglas Webb, Haoliang Xu and Diego Zavaleta.
We were fortunate to have the support of talented interns—Farheen Ghaffar, Michael Gottschalk, Xiao Huang, Sneha Kaul and Acknowledgements | v Adrian Pearl—and fact checkers—Jeremy Marand, Tobias Schillings and Emilia Toczydlowska.

The Human Development Report Office also extends its sincere gratitude to the Republic of Korea for its financial contribution.

Their on- going support and dedication to development research and this Report is much appreciated.
We are grateful for the highly professional ed- iting and layout by a team at Communications Development Incorporated—led by Bruce Ross-Larson, with Joe Caponio, Nick Moschovakis, Christopher Trott and Elaine Wilson.

We are, to conclude, extremely grateful to the UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner for always challenging us to aim higher, while giving us the space to be bold.
He called for a Report that would speak to the public, to policymakers and to experts—because that is the only way to advance the cause of human development.

We hope we have lived up to those expectations.
Pedro Conceição Director Human Development Report Office vi | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Contents Foreword Acknowledgements Overview PART I Beyond income CHAPTER 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century Understanding inequality in capabilities Dynamics of inequality in human development: Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities Convergence in the basics is not benefiting everyone: Identifying those furthest behind Towards enhanced agency Moving targets and 21st century inequalities CHAPTER 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent How inequalities begin at birth — and can persist How inequalities interact with other contextual determinants of human development Inequalities can accumulate through life, reflecting deep power imbalances PART II Beyond averages CHAPTER 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth Tackling inequality starts with good measurement The elephant curve of global inequality and growth How unequal is Africa?
Inequality in BRIC countries since the 2000s Inequality and redistribution in Europe and the United States Global wealth inequality: Capital is back Afterword: Data transparency as a global imperative CHAPTER 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages: Between social norms and power imbalances Gender inequality in the 21st century Are social norms and power imbalances shifting?
Restricted choices and power imbalances over the lifecycle Empowering girls and women towards gender equality: A template to reduce horizontal inequalities PART III Beyond today CHAPTER 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene How climate change and inequalities in human development are intertwined Environmental inequalities and injustices are pervasive—a global snapshot of waste, meat consumption and water use A break from the past: Making new choices for people and planet CHAPTER 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation Inequality dynamics in access to technology: Convergence in basic, divergence in enhanced Technology is reshaping the world: How will it shape inequality in human development?
147 148 152 158 164 171 175 178 186 192 199 200 205 Harnessing technology for a Great Convergence in human development 208 CHAPTER 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice Towards convergence in capabilities beyond income: From basic to enhanced universalism Towards inclusive income expansion: Raising productivity and enhancing equity Postscript: We have a choice Notes References 223 225 233 245 257 268 iii iv 1 23 29 30 32 48 51 57 73 74 82 93 97 103 103 109 116 119 120 127 132 Contents | vii STATISTICAL ANNEX Readers guide Statistical tables 1.
Human Development Index and its components Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index Gender Development Index Gender Inequality Index Multidimensional Poverty Index: developing countries 6.

Human development dashboards 1.

Quality of human development Life-course gender gap Women’s empowerment Environmental sustainability Socioeconomic sustainability 5.
Developing regions Statistical references SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION A new look at inequality—Michelle Bachelet BOXES A new take on the Great Gatsby Curve The capabilities approach and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 25 Inequality of capabilities Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The right to a basic standard of living Inequality in healthy life expectancy Divergence in life expectancy at older ages in Chile Crises and divergence Social exclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people Inequality in human security in Japan: The role of dignity Horizontal inequalities in India: Difference dynamics in basic and enhanced capabilities 1.9 A social-psychological perspective on inequality S1.3.1 Income poverty reduction scenarios to 2030 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.1 Key competencies of social and emotional learning How perceived relative deprivations affect health outcomes The power of perceived inequalities in South Africa The power of your neighbour Economic inequality and human development Internal armed conflict and horizontal inequalities Investigative journalism uncovering inequality 3.2 What income concepts are we measuring?
3.3 What about consumption?

3.4 Where do you stand in the global distribution of income?
Household income, inequality and greenhouse gas emissions From Holocene to Anthropocene: Power—and who wields it—at the brink of a new era 5.3 When history is no longer a good guide 5.4 The impacts of a global dietary shift on sustainable human development 6.1 Mobile technology promotes financial inclusion Digital technologies for the Sustainable Development Goals: Creating the right conditions Artificial intelligence and the risk of bias: Making horizontal inequalities worse?
212 The United Kingdom’s Data Ethics Framework principles Intellectual property rights, innovation and technology diffusion Enhancing capabilities in China: Tackling inequality at its roots Unlocking the potential of preprimary education for advancing human development in Ethiopia The persistence of health gradients even with universal health coverage Girls’ coding choices and opportunities Gender equality in the labour market How market concentration can disproportionately affect poor people The power of fiscal redistribution 213 217 227 227 228 230 235 240 241 S7.1.1 Being right is not enough: Reducing inequality needs a movement from below 248 FIGURES The share of the population stating that income should be more equal increased from the 2000s to the 2010s Children born in 2000 in countries with different incomes will have very unequal paths to 2020 Beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today: Exploring inequalities in human development leads to five key messages Thinking about inequalities Human development, from basic to enhanced capabilities Across countries the world remains deeply unequal in both basic and enhanced capabilities Slow convergence in basic capabilities, rapid divergence in enhanced ones Education and health along the lifecycle Inequalities, power asymmetries and the effectiveness of governance Bias against gender equality is on the rise: The share of women and men worldwide with no gender social norms bias fell between 2009 and 2014 Between 1980 and 2017 post-tax incomes grew close to 40 percent for the poorest 80 percent of the European population, compared with more than 180 percent for the top 0.001 percent 2 2 3 5 6 8 9 10 12 13 14 A framework for designing policies to redress inequalities in human development 15 Redistributive direct taxes and transfers explain nearly all the difference in disposable income inequality between advanced and emerging economies Strategies for practical universalism in unequal developing countries Ecological footprints expand with human development Technology can displace some tasks but also create new ones The share of the population stating that income should be more equal increased from the 2000s to the 2010s Children born in 2000 in countries with different incomes will have severely different capabilities by 2020 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 I.1 16 16 18 19 23 29 30 51 33 34 Income growth of the bottom 40 percent—higher than the national average?
119 1.1 Practical and strategic gender interests and needs Overlapping and intersecting identities The multidimensional gender social norms index—measuring biases, prejudices and beliefs The man box Climate change and gender inequality Better data are needed on gender inequalities 151 153 155 159 163 165 1.2 Still massive inequality in human development across the world, 2017 1.20 School dropout rates converge with human development, but not for the poorest 20 percent 1.3 1.4 Human development, from basic to enhanced capabilities The world remains deeply unequal in key areas of human development in both basic and enhanced capabilities viii | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 2.
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1 I.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 3.5 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 In all regions of the world the loss in human development due to inequality is diminishing, reflecting progress in basic capabilities Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities Inequalities persist in life expectancy and mortality The changing inequality in life expectancy, 2005–2015: Low human development countries catching up in life expectancy at birth but lagging behind in life expectancy at older age Infant mortality rates, an important determinant of life expectancy at birth, have been declining everywhere, but significant gradients remain 35 36 38 40 41 3.14 The average pretax income of the top 10 percent in the United States was about 11 times higher than that of the bottom 40 percent in 1980 and 27 times higher in 2017, while in Europe the ratio rose from 10 to 12 3.15 Between 1981 and 2017 the average top corporate tax rate in the European Union fell from about 50 percent to 25 percent, while the average value added tax rate rose from about 18 percent to more than 21 percent 3.16 Net private wealth in Western European countries rose from 250–400 percent of national income in 1970 to 450–750 percent in 2016 3.17 Countries are getting richer, but governments are becoming poor 1.10 Mortality: Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities 41 3.18 Trends in wealth inequality 1.11 The lower a country’s human development, the larger the gap in access to education 1.12 Gaps in access to education among children and youth are also large within countries 1.13 Inequality in primary and secondary education has been falling over the past decade 1.14 Dynamics of education attainment, 2007–2017 1.15 Inequalities in postsecondary education within countries are growing 1.16 Widening inequalities in the availability of physicians between countries 1.17 Harmonized test scores across human development groups 1.18 Child mortality converges with human development, but not for the poorest
 20 percent 1.19 Some 846,000 of 3.1 million child deaths are preventable if the bottom 20 percent converge to the country average 44 44 45 46 47 48 48 50 50 S1.1.1 Description of the stages in the development of the historical market economies 61 S1.1.2 Linking the hazard of high water to flood disasters: Economic and political equality enhances the chance of institutions becoming adjusted to circumstances and preventing disaster S1.1.3 Sub-Saharan countries have the most overlapping deprivations S1.2.1 Transmitting inequalities in human development across the lifecycle S1.2.2 Distribution of subjective well-being across the world (measured by people’s overall satisfaction with their lives) S1.3.1 Some 600 million people live below the $1.90 a day poverty line S1.3.2 Poverty at the $1.90 a day level is tied to multidimensional poverty Intergenerational mobility in income is lower in countries with more inequality in human development Education and health along the lifecycle Intergenerational persistence of education is higher in countries with higher inequality in human development Skill gaps emerge in early childhood, given parents’ education Socioeconomic status affects specific areas of health later in the lifecycle The hollowing out of the middle in South Africa The effectiveness of governance: An infinity loop 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 Dozens of countries have almost no transparency in inequality data 105 3.10 Between 1980 and 2017 the share of post-tax national income received by the top 10 percent rose from 21 percent to 25 percent in Northern Europe, while the share received by the bottom 40 percent fell from 24 percent to 22 percent 3.11 Between 1980 and 2017 the post-tax incomes of the poorest 80 percent of the European population grew close to 40 percent, while those of the top 0.001 percent grew more than 180 percent 124 125 3.12 Between 1980 and 2017 the pretax income share of the bottom 40 percent in the United States fell from about 13 percent
 to 8 percent, while the share of the top 1 percent rose from about 11 percent to 20 percent 126 3.13 Between 1980 and 2017 the average pretax income of the bottom 40 percent grew 36 percent in Europe, while it declined 3 percent in the United States If current trends continue, by 2050 the global top 0.1 percent could end up owning as much of the world’s wealth as the middle 40 percent of the world’s population Income inequality based on the top 10 percent’s income share has risen since 1980 in most regions but at different rates The elephant curve of global inequality and growth In 2010 the top 10 percent of income earners received 53 percent of global income, but if there had been perfect equality in average income between countries, the top 10 percent would have received 48 percent of global income 113 The ratio of the average income of the top 10 percent to that of the middle 40 percent increased by 20 percentage points between 1980 and 2016, but the ratio of the average income of the middle 40 percent to that of the bottom 50 percent decreased by 27 percentage points The geographic breakdown of each percentile of the global distribution of income evolved from 1990 to 2016 Between 1995 and 2015 the income share of the top 10 percent in North Africa and West Africa remained relatively stable, while the share of the bottom 40 percent in Southern Africa declined The income share of the top 1 percent has significantly increased in China, India and the Russian Federation since the early 1980s The pretax income share of the top 10 percent in the United States rose from around 35 percent in 1980 to close to 47 percent in 2014 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 S3.1.1 Contiguous human development patterns, cutting across national borders: The Gulf of Guinea S3.1.1 Lorenz curve S3.1.2 Adult female malnutrition and child stunting can be high in nonpoor households
 4.1 Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities 147 4.10 Countries with higher social norms biases tend to have higher gender inequality 157 4.11 Biases in social norms show a gradient 4.12 Contraceptive use is higher among unmarried and sexually active adolescent girls, but so is the unmet need for family planning, 2002–2014 4.13 The gap in unpaid care work persists in developing economies 4.14 A large proportion of employed women believe that choosing work implies suffering for their children, while a large proportion of female homemakers feel that by staying home they are giving up a career or economic independence, 2010–2014 4.15 The percentage of women with an account at a financial institution or with a mobile money-service provider is below 80 percent in all developing country regions in 2018 4.16 Girls and women of reproductive age are more likely to live in poor households than boys and men 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality Progress towards gender equality is slowing The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap The percentage of informal employment in nonagricultural employment in developing countries is generally higher for women than for men 4.6 How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment 158 160 161 162 163 164 149 150 151 152 154 Contents | ix 4.7 4.8 4.9 Only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men worldwide have no gender social norms biases The share of both women and men worldwide with no gender social norms bias fell between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014 Progress in the share of men with no gender social norm bias from 2005–2009 to 2010–2014 was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States and the Netherlands, while most countries showed a backlash in the share of women with no gender social norms bias S4.1.1 About a third of women ages 15 and older have experienced physical or sexual violence inflicted by an intimate
 partner, 2010 S4.1.2 Female members of European parliaments experience high rates of acts of political violence against women, 2018 S4.1.3 Traditional social norms encourage different forms of violence against women 5.1 Per capita ecological footprints increase with human development 5.10 Richer countries generate more waste per capita 156 156 157 166 167 168 176 188 5.11 Developing countries will drive most of the rise in meat production to 2030 190 5.12 In some countries basic water and sanitation coverage for the wealthiest quintile is at least twice that for the poorest quintile 5.2 5.3 Today’s developed countries are responsible for the vast majority of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions Of the top 10 percent of global emitters of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, 40 percent are in North America, and 19 percent are in the European Union 5.4 Within-country inequality in carbon dioxide equivalent emissions is now as important as between-country inequality in driving the global dispersion of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.1 Economic damages from extreme natural hazards have been increasing Human development crises are more frequent and deeper in developing countries The lower the level of human development, the more deadly the disasters In El Salvador and Honduras people in the lower quintiles of the income distribution were more likely to be affected by floods and landslides Fewer deaths in the 2000s than in the 1960s and 1970s despite more occurrences of natural disasters Digital divides: Groups with higher development have greater access, and inequalities are greater for advanced technologies, 2017 6.10 Income and productivity are strongly correlated, and the higher the productivity, the greater the share of productivity that the median worker receives as compensation 6.11 A significant decoupling of emissions from development has allowed some countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, reflecting more efficient forms of
 production 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Dynamics of access to technology The bandwidth gap between high-income and other countries fell from 22-fold to 3-fold The distribution of mobile subscriptions is converging to the distribution of population by region, but installed bandwidth potential is not From 1987 to 2007 little changed in the global ranking of installed bandwidth potential, but at the turn of the millennium things started to change, with the expansion of bandwidth in East and North Asia 6.6 Market power is on the rise, particularly for firms intensive in information and communication technology 6.7 Technology can displace some tasks but also reinstate new ones 6.8 Workers in medium and high wage jobs are more likely to participate in adult learning 6.9 There are enormous asymmetries in research and development across human development groups 192 179 179 180 181 184 185 185 186 202 218 219 204 205 206 206 208 210 214 217 7.1 A framework for designing policies to redress inequalities in human development 224 x | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 7.2 7.3 Higher labour productivity is associated with a lower concentration of labour income at the top The relationship between labour productivity and concentration of labour income appears to hold over time at most levels of human development 7.4 Minimum wage: a tool to share the fruit of progress?
Unpaid family workers, industrial outworkers, home workers and casual workers are predominantly women with low earnings and a high risk of poverty, while employees and regular informal workers with higher wages and less risk of poverty are more often men The rising market power of firms in recent decades has been led by firms at the top 10 percent of the markup distribution Top personal income tax rates have declined around the world Offshore wealth is bigger than the value of top corporations or of billionaires 244 S7.1.1 Strategies for practical universalism in (unequal) developing countries S7.1.2 Power of the economic elite and action mechanisms S7.3.1 Fiscal redistribution in European countries, 2016 S7.3.2 Fiscal progressivity and fiscal effort in European countries, 2016 S7.3.3 Market income inequality and variation in fiscal redistribution SPOTLIGHTS 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 3.2 Power concentration and state capture: Insights from history on consequences of market dominance for inequality and environmental calamities Rising subjective perceptions of inequality, rising inequalities in perceived well-being The bottom of the distribution: The challenge of eradicating income poverty Looking within countries and within households Choosing an inequality index 3.3 Measuring fiscal redistribution: concepts and definitions 4.1 Women’s unequal access to physical security—and thus to social and political empowerment 5.1 Measuring climate change impacts: Beyond national averages Climate vulnerability Addressing constraints in social choice Productivity and equity while ensuring environmental sustainability Variation in the redistributive impact of direct taxes and transfers in Europe 251 TABLES 1.1 Limited convergence in health and education, 2007–2017 S1.1.1 Certain and possible cases of market economies 3.1 Main data sources for inequality measurement Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth in Africa’s five subregions, 1995–2015 (percentage points) Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth in selected African countries, 1995–2015 (percentage points) 118 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Inequality and growth in the BRIC countries Post-tax average and bottom 40 percent growth in Europe and the United States, 1980–2017 and 2007–2017 S3.1.1 Targeting errors of inclusion and exclusion: Proxy means tests S3.2.1 Statistics most frequently published in 10 commonly used international databases S3.3.1 Comparison of income concepts in databases with fiscal redistribution 4.1 6.1 indicators Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard Different tasks have different potential for being replaced by artificial intelligence Overview Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Overview Inequalities in human development in the 21st century In every country many people have little prospect for a better future.
Lacking hope, purpose or dignity, they watch from society’s sidelines as they see others pull ahead to ever greater prosperity.

Worldwide many have escaped extreme poverty, but even more have neither the opportunities nor the resources to control their lives.

Far too often gender, ethnicity or parents’ wealth still determines a person’s place in society.

Inequalities.

The evidence is everywhere.

So is the concern.


People across the world, of all political persuasions, increasingly believe that income inequality in their country should be reduced (figure 1).

Inequalities in human development are more profound.

Consider two children born in 2000, one in a very high human development country, the other in a low human development country (figure 2).
Today the first has a more than 50-50 chance of being enrolled in higher education: More than half of 20-year-olds in very high human development countries are in higher education.

In contrast, the second is much less likely to be alive.

Some 17 percent of children born in low human development countries in 2000 will have died before age 20, compared with just 1 percent of children born in very high human development countries.
The second child is also unlikely to be in higher education: In low human development coun- tries only 3 percent are.

Circumstances almost entirely beyond their control have already set them on different and unequal—and likely irreversible—paths.1 The inequalities are like- wise high within countries—both developing and developed.
In some developed countries the gaps in life expectancy at age 40 between the top 1 percent of the income distribution and the bottom 1 percent have been estimated to be as high as 15 years for men and 10 years for women.2 Inequalities do not always reflect an unfair world.
Some are probably inevitable, such as the inequalities from diffusing a new tech- nology.3 But when these unequal paths have little to do with rewarding effort, talent or entrepreneurial risk-taking, they may offend people’s sense of fairness and can be an affront to human dignity.

Such inequalities in human development hurt societies, weakening social cohesion and people’s trust in government, institutions and each other.
Most hurt economies, wastefully preventing people from reaching their full po- tential at work and in life.

They often make it harder for political decisions to reflect the as- pirations of the whole of society and to protect the planet, as the few pulling ahead flex their power to shape decisions primarily in their interests today.

In the extreme, people can take to the streets.


These inequalities in human development are a roadblock to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.4 They are not just about disparities in income and wealth.

They cannot be accounted for simply by using summary measures of inequality that focus on a single dimension.5 And they will shape the prospects of people that may live to see the 22nd century.
Exploring inequalities in human development thus has to go beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today, leading to five key messages (figure 3).

First, while many people are stepping above minimum floors of achievement in human development, widespread dispar- ities remain.
The first two decades of the 21st century have seen remarkable progress in reducing extreme deprivations, but gaps remain unacceptably wide for a range of capabilities—the freedoms for people to be and do desirable things such as go to school, get a job or have enough to eat.
And progress is bypassing some of the most vulnerable even on the most extreme deprivations—so much Overview | 1 FIGURE 1 The share of the population stating that income should be more equal increased from the 2000s to the 2010s Change in the share of population stating that income should be more equal between 2000s and 2010s (percentage points) 35 out of 39 countries 33 out of 39 countries 32 out of 39 countries 50 40 30 20 10 0 –10 –20 –30 –40 Leaning left Center Leaning right Population in selected countries by political self-identiﬁcation Note: Each dot represents one of 39 countries with comparable data.
The sample covers 48 percent of the global population.

Based on answers on a 1–5 scale, where 1 is “income should be more equal” and 5 is “we need larger income differences.” Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, waves 4, 5 and 6.
FIGURE 2 Children born in 2000 in countries with different incomes will have very unequal paths to 2020 Estimated outcomes in 2020 (percent) In higher education 55 3 80 Not in higher education 17 Died before age 20 44 1 Children born in 2000 in very high human development countries Children born in 2000 in low human development countries Note: These are estimates (using median values) for a typical individual from a country with low human development and from a country with very high human development.
Data for participation in higher education are based on household survey data for people ages 18–22, processed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics in www.education-inequalities.org (accessed 5 November 2019).

Percentages are with respect to people born in 2000.

People that died before age 20 are computed based on births around 2000 and estimated deaths for that cohort between 2000 and 2020.
People in higher education in 2020 are computed based on people estimated to be alive (from cohort born around 2000), and the latest data of participation in higher education.

People not in higher education are the complement.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.
2 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3 Beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today: Exploring inequalities in human development leads to five key messages Exploring inequalities in human development: ﬁve key messages Disparities in human development remain widespread, despite achievements in reducing extreme deprivations A new generation of inequalities is emerging, with divergence in enhanced capabilities, despite convergence in basic capabilities Inequalities accumulate through life, often reﬂecting deep power imbalances Assessing and responding to inequalities in human development demands a revolution in metrics We can redress inequalities if we act now, before imbalances in economic power are politically entrenched Source: Human Development Report Office.
so that the world is not on track to eradicate them by 2030, as called for in the Sustainable Development Goals.

Second, a new generation of severe inequal- ities in human development is emerging, even if many of the unresolved inequalities of the 20th century are declining.

Under the shadow of the climate crisis and sweeping technological change, inequalities in human development are taking new forms in the 21st century.

Inequalities in capabilities are evolving in dif- ferent ways.
Inequalities in basic capabilities— linked to the most extreme deprivations—are shrinking.

In some cases, quite dramatically, such as global inequalities in life expectancy at birth.

Many people at the bottom are now reaching the initial stepping stones of human development.

At the same time, inequalities are increasing in enhanced capabilities—which reflect aspects of life likely to become more im- portant in the future, because they will be more empowering.
People well empowered today appear set to get even farther ahead tomorrow.

Third, inequalities in human development can accumulate through life, frequently heightened by deep power imbalances.

They are not so much a cause of unfairness as a con- sequence, driven by factors deeply embedded in societies, economies and political structures.
Tackling inequalities in human development means addressing these factors: Genuine im- provement will not come from trying to fix dis- parities only when people are already earning very different incomes—because inequalities start at birth, often even before, and can ac- cumulate over people’s lives.

Or from looking back and simply trying to reinstate the policies and institutions that held inequalities in check, at times and in some countries, during the 20th century.
It was under those very conditions that power imbalances deepened, in many cases ac- centuating the accumulation of advantage over the lifecycle.

Fourth, assessing inequalities in hu- man development demands a revolution in metrics.

Good policies start with good Overview | 3 measurement, and a new generation of ine- qualities requires a new generation of measure- ment.
Clearer concepts tied to the challenges of current times, broader combinations of data sources, sharper analytical tools—all are need- ed.

Ongoing innovative work suggests that income and wealth may be accumulating at the top in many countries much faster than one could grasp based on summary measures of inequality.

Making these efforts more systematic and widespread can better inform public debates and policies.
Metrics may not seem a priority, until one considers the contin- uing hold of such measures as gross domestic product since its creation in the first half of the 20th century.

Fifth, redressing inequalities in human de- velopment in the 21st century is possible—if we act now, before imbalances in economic power translate into entrenched political dominance.

Improvements in inequality for some basic capabilities show that progress is possible.
But the record of progress in basic capabilities in the past will not respond to peo- ple’s aspirations for this century.

And doubling down on reducing inequalities in basic capabil- ities further, while needed, is not enough.

If en- hanced capabilities are indeed associated with more empowerment, ignoring the gaps that are opening up in them can alienate policymakers from people’s agency—their ability to make choices that fulfil their aspirations and values.
Only by turning attention towards tackling a new generation of inequality in enhanced capa- bilities, many of which are only just beginning to emerge, will it be possible to avoid further entrenchment of inequalities in human devel- opment over the course of the 21st century.

How?

Not by looking at policies in isolation or thinking that a single silver bullet will solve everything.
The redistribution of income, which often dominates the policy debate on in- equality, is sometimes seen as that silver bullet.
Yet, even a full redistributive package of four ambitious policies—higher and more progres- sive income taxes, earned income discounts at low income levels, taxable benefits paid out for each child and a minimum income for all indi- viduals—would be insufficient to fully reverse the increase in income inequality in the United Kingdom between the late 1970s and 2013.6 This is not to say that redistribution does not matter—quite the opposite.
But long-lasting change in both income and the broader range of inequalities in human development depends on a wider and more systemic approach to policies.

What to do?

The approach proposed in this Report outlines policies to redress inequalities in human development within a framework that links the expansion and distribution of both capabilities and income.

The options span premarket, in-market and postmarket policies.
Wages, profits and labour participation rates are typically determined in markets, which are conditioned by prevailing regulations, in- stitutions and policies (in-market).

But those outcomes also depend on policies that affect people before they become active in the econo- my (premarket).

Premarket policies can reduce disparities in capabilities, helping everyone enter the labour market better equipped.
In- market policies affect the distribution of in- come and opportunities when individuals are working, shaping outcomes that can be either more or less equalizing.7 Postmarket policies affect inequalities once the market along with the in-market policies have determined the distribution of income and opportunities.

These sets of policies interact.


For instance, the provision of public services premarket may depend in part on the effectiveness of postmar- ket policies (taxes on market income to fund health and education, for instance), which matter in mobilizing government revenue to pay for those services.

And taxes, in turn, are informed by how much society is willing to redistribute income from those with more to those with less.
The future of inequalities in human devel- opment in the 21st century is in our hands.

But we cannot be complacent.

The climate crisis shows that the price of inaction com- pounds over time, as it feeds further ine- quality, which can in turn make action on climate more difficult.

Technology is already changing labour markets and lives, but not yet locked-in is the extent to which machines may replace people.

We are, however, ap- proaching a precipice beyond which it will be difficult to recover.
We do have a choice, and we must exercise it now.

4 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today This Report builds on a new framework of analysis that looks at inequalities by going beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today (figure 4).

Beyond income Any comprehensive assessment of inequality must consider income and wealth.
But it must also go beyond dollars and rupees to under- stand differences in other aspects of human development and the processes that lead to them.

There is economic inequality, of course, but there are also inequalities in key elements of human development such as health, edu- cation, dignity and respect for human rights.

And these might not be revealed by consid- ering income and wealth inequality alone.
A human development approach to inequality takes a people-centred view: It is about peo- ple’s capabilities to exercise their freedoms to be and do what they aspire to in life.

Even understanding income disparities requires examining other forms of inequality.

Disadvantages in health and education (of one’s parents and one’s own) interact and often compound over a lifetime.

Gaps open before birth, starting with the “birth lottery” of where children happen to be born, and can widen over the years.
Children from poor families may not be able to afford an education and are at a disadvantage when they try to find work.

These children are likely to earn less than those in higher income families when they enter the labour market, when penalized by compound- ing layers of disadvantage.
Beyond averages Too often the debate about inequality is over- simplified, relying on summary measures of inequality and incomplete data that provide a partial—sometimes misleading—picture, both in the sorts of inequality to consider and the people affected.

The analysis must go beyond averages that collapse information on distribu- tion to a single number and look at the ways FIGURE 4 Thinking about inequalities A comprehensive assessment of inequality must consider income and wealth.
But it must also understand differences in other aspects of human development and the processes that lead to them.

Beyond income Exploring inequalities in human development: a new framework Beyond averages The analysis of inequalities in human development must go beyond summary measures of inequality that focus on only a single dimension.

Inequalities in human development will shape the prospects of people that may live to see the 22nd century.

Beyond today Source: Human Development Report Office.
Overview | 5 inequality plays out across an entire popula- tion, in different places and over time.

For every aspect of human development, what matters is the entire inequality gradient (the differences in achievements across the population accord- ing to different socioeconomic characteristics).

Beyond today Much analysis focuses on the past or on the here and now.

But a changing world requires considering what will shape inequality in the future.
Existing—and new—forms of inequal- ity will interact with major social, economic and environmental forces to determine the lives of today’s young people and their children.

Two seismic shifts will shape the 21st century: Climate change and technological transforma- tions.
The climate crisis is already hitting the poorest hardest, while technological advances such as machine learning and artificial intelli- gence can leave behind entire groups of people, even countries—creating the spectre of an un- certain future under these shifts.8 Evolving human aspirations: From basic to enhanced capabilities When Amartya Sen asked what kind of inequality we should ultimately care about (“Equality of what?”), he argued that people’s capabilities—their freedoms to make life choic- es—are fundamental.9 Capabilities are at the heart of human development.
This Report follows the same path and explores inequalities in capabilities.

Capabilities evolve with circumstances as well as with values and with people’s changing demands and aspirations.

Today, having a set of basic capabilities—those associated with the ab- sence of extreme deprivations—is not enough.

Enhanced capabilities are becoming crucial for people to own the “narrative of their lives.”10 Enhanced capabilities bring greater agency along people’s lives.
Given that some capabili- ties build over a person’s life, achieving a basic set—such as surviving to age 5 or learning to read—provides initial stepping stones to form- ing enhanced capabilities later in life (figure 5).

A similar evolution from basic to enhanced capabilities is reflected in the use of technology or in the ability to cope with environmental shocks, from frequent but low-impact hazards to large and unpredictable events.
The distinc- tion is also important when it comes to under- standing inequalities across groups, such as the progression from women being able to vote in elections (a basic capability) to participating in politics as national leaders (an enhanced capa- bility).

The evolution in ambition from basic to enhanced capabilities mirrors the evolution from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals.
FIGURE 5 Human development, from basic to enhanced capabilities Enhanced capabilities Examples of achievements - Access to quality health at all levels - High-quality education at all levels - Effective access to present-day technologies - Resilience to unknown new shocks Examples of achievements - Early childhood survival - Primary education - Entry-level technology - Resilience to recurrent shocks Basic capabilities Source: Human Development Report Office.
6 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Key message 1: Disparities in human development remain widespread, despite achievements in reducing extreme deprivations The 21st century has witnessed great progress in living standards, with an unprecedented number of people around the world making a “great escape”11 from hunger, disease and poverty—moving above minimum subsist- ence.
The Human Development Index shows impressive improvement on average, reflecting dramatic improvements in achievements such as life expectancy at birth, driven largely by sharp declines in infant mortality rates.

Still, many people have been left behind, and inequalities remain widespread across all capabilities.

Some refer to life and death, oth- ers to access to knowledge and life-changing technologies.
Despite having shrunk considerably, the difference in life expectancy at birth between low and very high human development coun- tries is still 19 years.

There are differences in expected longevity at every age.

The differ- ence in life expectancy at age 70 is almost 5 years.

Some 42 percent of adults in low hu- man development countries have a primary education, compared with 94 percent in very high human development countries.

There are gaps at all education levels.


Only 3.2 per- cent of adults in low human development countries have a tertiary education, compared with 29 percent in developed countries.

In access to technology developing countries have 67 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, half the number in very high human development countries.
For access to broadband, low human development countries have less than 1 subscription per 100 inhabitants, compared with 28 per 100 inhabitants in very high human development countries (figure 6).

The furthest behind include the 600 million people still living in extreme income poverty— and that jumps to 1.3 billion when measured by the Multidimensional Poverty Index.12 Some 262 million children are out of primary or secondary school, and 5.4 million children do not survive their first five years of life.
Despite greater access to immunizations and affordable treatment, child mortality rates in the poorest households in the world’s poorest countries remain high.

The highest rates are in low and medium human development countries, but there are vast disparities within countries: The poorest 20 percent in some middle-income countries can have the same average mortality rate as children from a typical low-income country.
Key message 2: A new generation of inequalities is emerging, with divergence in enhanced capabilities, despite convergence in basic capabilities As we enter the 2020s, a new set of capabilities is becoming fundamental to 21st century life.

Inequalities in these enhanced capabilities show strikingly different dynamics from those in basic capabilities.

They are at the root of a new generation of inequalities.
Inequalities for some basic capabilities are slowly narrowing across most countries, even if much remains to be done.

Life expectancy at birth, percentage of the population with a primary education and mobile-cellular subscriptions all show narrowing inequalities across human development groups (figure 7).

The people at the bottom are progressing faster than those at the top.
The gain in life expectancy at birth between 2005 and 2015 for low human development countries was almost three times that for very high human develop- ment countries, driven by a reduction in child mortality rates in developing countries.

And countries with lower human development are catching up in access to primary education and access to mobile phones.

This good news comes with two caveats.


First, despite progress, the world is not on track to eradicate extreme deprivations in health and education by 2030, when 3 million children under age 5 are still expected to die every year (at least 850,000 above the Sustainable Development Goal target), and 225 million children are expected to be out of school.

Second, gaps are falling in part because those at the top have little space to keep moving up.
In contrast, inequalities in enhanced capa- bilities are widening.
For instance, despite data Overview | 7 FIGURE 6 Across countries the world remains deeply unequal in both basic and enhanced capabilities Basic Enhanced Life expectancy at birth, 2015 (years) Life expectancy at age 70, 2015 (years) 59.4 66.6 72.9 78.4 Health 14.6 12.6 11.1 9.8 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Population with a primary education, 2017 (percent) Population with a tertiary education, 2017 (percent) 93.5 84.9 28.6 66.5 42.3 Education 18.5 13.7 3.2 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Mobile-cellular subscriptions, 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions, 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 131.6 116.7 28.3 90.6 67.0 Access to technology Low Medium High Very high Human development group 11.3 2.3 Medium High Very high Human development group 0.8 Low Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
8 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 7 Slow convergence in basic capabilities, rapid divergence in enhanced ones Basic Enhanced Declining inequality Increasing inequality Life expectancy at birth Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) Life expectancy at age 70 Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) 5.9 4.9 Health 1.2 2.7 2.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Share of the population with a primary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) Share of the population with a tertiary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) 9.2 8.6 7.1 6.2 5.9 5.3 Education 3.0 1.1 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Mobile-cellular subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 59.5 49.3 49.3 Access to technology 26.1 12.3 8.9 Low Medium High Very high Human development group 2.0 0.8 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Overview | 9 challenges, estimates suggest that the gain in life expectancy at age 70 from 1995 to 2015 in very high human development countries was more than twice that in low human develop- ment countries.13 There is evidence for the same pattern of divergence across a wide range of enhanced capabilities.

Indeed, divergences in access to more advanced knowledge and technology are even starker.
The proportion of the adult population with tertiary education is growing more than six times faster in very high human development countries than in low human development countries, and fixed broadband subscriptions are growing 15 times faster.

These new inequalities—both between and within countries—are hugely consequential.

Shaping 21st century societies, they are pushing the frontiers in health and longevity, knowl- edge and technology.
These are the inequalities that will likely determine people’s ability to seize the opportunities of the 21st century, function in a knowledge economy and cope with climate change.

Key message 3: Inequalities accumulate through life, often reflecting deep power imbalances Understanding inequality—even income ine- quality—means homing in on the underlying processes that lead to it.

Different inequalities interact, while their size and impact shift over a person’s lifetime.
The corollary is that policies to tackle economic inequality require much more than a mechanistic transfer of income.

They often need to address social norms, poli- cies and institutions formed deep in history.

Lifelong disadvantage Inequalities can start before birth, and many of the gaps may compound over a person’s life.

When that happens, it can lead to persis- tent inequalities.
This can happen in several ways, especially in the nexus among health, education and parents’ socioeconomic status (figure 8).

FIGURE 8 Education and health along the lifecycle Child’s health Adult’s health Parents’ socioeconomic status Adult’s socioeconomic status Early childhood development Education Assortative mating Note: The circles represent different stages of the lifecycle, with the orange ones resenting final outcomes.

The rectangle represents the process of assortative mating.
The dashed lines refer to interactions that are not described in detail.

A child’s health affects early childhood development and prospects for education.

For example, an intellectually disabled child will not be able to benefit from early childhood development and education opportunities in the same way as a healthy child.

Education can also promote a healthy lifestyle and convey information on how to benefit from a given health care system if needed (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010).
Source: Human Development Report Office, adapted from Deaton (2013a).

10 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Parents’ incomes and circumstances affect their children’s health, education and incomes.

Health gradients—the disparities in health across socioeconomic groups—often start before birth and can accumulate at least up to adulthood, if not counteracted.

Children born to low-income families are more prone to poor health and lower education.
Those with lower education are less likely to earn as much as others, while children in poorer health are more likely to miss school.

And when children grow up, if they partner with someone who has similar socioeconomic status (as often happens in assortative mating), inequalities across gen- erations can persist.

The cycle can be difficult to break, not least because of the ways in which inequality in income and political power co-evolve.
When wealthy people shape policies that favour them- selves and their children—as they often do— that can sustain the accumulation of income and opportunity at the top.

Unsurprising, then, that social mobility tends to be lower in more unequal societies.

Still, some societies have more mobility than others—so institutions and policies matter—in part because what tends to reduce inequality can also boost social mobility (box 1).
Power imbalances Income and wealth inequalities are often trans- lated into political inequality, in part because inequalities depress political participation, giving more space to particular interest groups to shape decisions in their favour.

Those priv- ileged can capture the system, moulding it to fit their preferences, potentially leading to even more inequalities.

Power asymmetries can even lead to breakdowns in institutional functions, weakening the effectiveness of policies.
When institutions are captured by the wealthy, citi- zens are less willing to be part of social contracts (the sets of rules and expectations of behaviour that people voluntarily conform to that un- derpin stable societies).

When that translates into lower compliance with paying taxes, it diminishes the state’s ability to provide quality public services.

That can in turn lead to greater inequalities in health and education.
When the overall system is perceived as unfair, possibly due to systematic exclusions or clientelism BOX 1 A new take on the Great Gatsby Curve The positive correlation between higher income inequality and lower intergenerational mobil- ity in income is well known.

This relation, known as the Great Gatsby Curve, also holds true using a measure of inequality in human development instead of income inequality alone (see figure).
The greater the inequality in human development, the lower the intergenerational mobility in income—and vice versa.

These two factors go hand in hand, but that does not imply that one causes the other.

In fact, it is more likely that both are driven by underlying economic and social factors, so understanding and tackling these drivers could both promote mobility and redress inequality.
Intergenerational mobility in income is lower in countries with more inequality in human development Intergenerational income elasticity 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 Ecuador Colombia Latvia Albania Slovakia Rwanda India Pakistan China Ethiopia Singapore Finland 10 20 30 40 Inequality in human development (percent) Note: Inequality in human development is measured as the percentage loss in Human Development Index value due to inequality in three components: income, education and health.
The higher the intergenerational income elasticity, the stronger the association between parents’ income and their children’s income, reflecting lower intergenerational mobility.

Source: Human Development Report Office using data from GDIM (2018), adapted from Corak (2013).

(the exchange of political support for personal gain), people tend to withdraw from political processes, amplifying the influence of elites.
One way of understanding the interplay between inequality and the dynamics of power is to draw on a framework that explores the process through which inequalities are gener- ated and perpetuated.

At its core, this process is often referred to as governance—or the way in which different actors in society bargain to reach agreements (policies and rules).
When these agreements take the form of policies, they can directly change the distribution of resources in society (the bottom arrow in the right loop of figure 9, “outcome game”).

For Overview | 11 example, policies on taxation and social spend- ing determine who pays into the fiscal system and who benefits from it.

These policies directly influence development outcomes such as eco- nomic inequality (and growth).
However, by redistributing economic resources, these poli- cies are also redistributing de facto power (the top arrow in the right loop of figure 9).

This can generate (or reinforce) power asymmetries between actors bargaining in the policy arena, which can in turn adversely affect the effective implementation of policies.

For example, power asymmetries can manifest in the capture of pol- icies by elite actors—undermining the ability of governments to commit to achieving long-term goals.
Or they may manifest in the exclusion of certain population groups from accessing high-quality public services—undermining cooperation by harming the willingness to pay taxes.

This can lead to a vicious cycle of inequal- ity (inequality traps) in which unequal societies begin to institutionalize the inequality.

This loop plays out in prevailing institutions and so- cial norms (the outcome game) and can lead to actors deciding to change the rules of the game (the bottom arrow in the left loop of figure 9).
In this way, de jure power is also redistributed.

This can be far more consequential because it not only changes current outcomes but also sets the conditions that shape actors’ behaviour in the future.

Once again, the way in which power asymmetries play out in the policy arena can exacerbate and entrench inequalities (clearly, FIGURE 9 inequality may undermine the effectiveness of governance) or pave the way to more equalizing and inclusive dynamics.
Gender inequality Some groups of people are systematically dis- advantaged in many ways.

These groups might be defined by ethnicity, language, gender or caste—or simply by whether they live in the north, south, east or west of a country.

There are many examples of such groups, but undoubt- edly the largest worldwide is women.

Gender disparities are among the most entrenched forms of inequality everywhere.
Because these disadvantages affect half the world, gender ine- quality is one of the greatest barriers to human development.

Gender inequality is complex, with differing progress and regress from place to place and issue to issue.

Awareness has increased through the #MeToo movement, or the #NiUnaMenos movement, which shined a spotlight on vio- lence against women.

And girls around the world have been catching up on some of the basics, such as enrolment in primary school.
But there is less to celebrate about progress beyond these fundamentals.

Inequality is still sharp in the power men and women exercise at home, in the workplace or in politics.

At home women do more than three times as much un- paid care work as men.
And although in many countries women and men vote equally in Inequalities, power asymmetries and the effectiveness of governance Power asymmetries De jure power De facto power Rules Policy arena Development outcomes Rules game Outcome game Note: Rules refer to formal and informal rules (norms).

Development outcomes refer to security, growth and equity.

Source: World Bank 2017b.

12 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 elections, there are differences in higher levels of political power.
The higher the power, the larger the gap from parity, rising to 90 percent in the case of heads of state and government.

Social and cultural norms often foster be- haviour that perpetuates such inequalities.

Norms—and a lack of power—both have an impact on all forms of gender inequality, from violence against women to the glass ceiling.

This Report presents a new social norms index that looks at the links between social beliefs and gender equality in multiple dimensions.
Globally only 1 man in 10 (and 1 woman in 7) did not show some form of clear bias against gender equality.

The biases follow a pattern: They tend to be more intense in areas where more power is involved.

And there is backlash, as the proportion of people biased against gen- der equality has grown over the last few years (figure 10), even though there are different patterns across countries.
Key message 4: Assessing and responding to inequalities in human development demands a revolution in metrics Existing standards and practices for measuring inequality are inadequate to inform public de- bate or to support decisionmaking.

Part of the challenge is the sheer number of different ways to understand inequality.

To highlight a few: FIGURE 10 • There are inequalities among groups (hori- zontal inequalities) and among individuals (vertical inequalities).
• There are inequalities between and within countries, which can follow different dynamics.
• There are intrahousehold inequalities (for in- stance, in 30 Sub-Saharan countries roughly three-quarters of underweight women and undernourished children are not in the poor- est 20 percent of households, and around half are not in the poorest 40 percent).14 A new generation of metrics is needed to fill the many data gaps to measure these different inequalities and, more generally, to go sys- tematically beyond averages.
This starts with gaps in some of the most basic statistics, with many developing countries still lacking in vital registration systems.

For income and wealth inequality the progress over the past few years has been remarkable.

But data remain scarce, in part because of the lack of transparency and the low availability of information.
On a new index presented in this Report, 88 countries score 1 or less (on a 20-point scale) for availability of information on income and wealth inequal- ity—meaning that they have 5 percent or less of what would be an ideal level of transparency.

Innovative work—some experimental—is unfolding, led by academics, multilateral or- ganizations and even a few governments, to make more systematic and comparable use of statistics on income inequality.
But data sources remain only partially integrated, and coverage remains very limited.
Bias against gender equality is on the rise: The share of women and men worldwide with no gender social norms bias fell between 2009 and 2014 Percent of surveyed population responding with biases towards gender equality and women’s empowerment 2005–2009 2010–2014 Indicated bias in one or fewer questions from the World Values Survey Indicated bias in two or more questions from the World Values Survey Female Male Female Male 40.1 43.3 29.6 30.3 56.7 59.9 69.7 70.4 Note: Balanced panel of 32 countries and territories with data from both wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 59 percent of the world population.
Gender biases in social norms are measured through people’s views about gender roles in politics (from political rights to the ability to serve as leader), education (importance of a university degree), the economy (from the right to have jobs to the ability to work as business executive) and the physical integrity of women (from intimate partner violence to reproductive health).

Source: Based on data from the World Values Survey.
Overview | 13 The distributional national accounts method- ology is still in its infancy, and many of its as- sumptions have been challenged.

Still, as long as it remains fully transparent and improvements continue to be made, it could integrate, in an overarching agenda, the combination of data from the System of National Accounts, house- hold surveys and administrative data to pro- vide new perspectives on the evolution of the distribution of income and wealth.
This would encompass some of the main recommendations of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, including an integrated focus on income and wealth inequality.15 This Report presents results based on the methodology that reveal dynamics of income inequality that are masked when us- ing summary measures that rely on a single data source.
To give an illustration, the results sug- gest that the top of the income distribution in Europe has been the main beneficiary of income growth since 1980 (figure 11).

Summary measures of inequality aggregate complex information into one number.

They are based on implicit judgements about what forms of inequality are—or are not—important.

Those judgements are rarely transparent and FIGURE 11 may not even reflect society’s views.
To under- stand any single aspect of inequality—and there are many—one needs to look across the entire population, going beyond averages.

What pro- portions of people survive to certain ages, reach key education levels or earn certain amounts?

And how likely is it that the relative position in society of an individual, a family or a particular group changes over time?
Summary measures remain important—when they reflect sound properties to assess distributions—but are only a small window onto a wider discussion about inequalities in human development.

Key message 5: We can redress inequalities if we act now, before imbalances in economic power are politically entrenched Nothing is inevitable about many of the most pernicious inequalities in human development.

This is the single most important message of this Report.
Every society has choices about the levels and kinds of inequalities it tolerates.

That is not to say that tackling inequality is easy.
Effective action must identify drivers of inequality, which Between 1980 and 2017 post-tax incomes grew close to 40 percent for the poorest 80 percent of the European population, compared with more than 180 percent for the top 0.001 percent Total income growth (percent) 250 200 150 100 50 0 10 Bottom 40 percent captured 13 percent of growth Top 1 percent captured 13 percent of growth 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 Income group (percentile) Note: After the 90th percentile the scale on the horizontal axis changes.
The composition of income groups changes from 1980 to 2017, so the estimates do not represent the changes in income of the same individuals over time.

Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019); World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

14 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 are likely complex and multifaceted, often relat- ed to prevailing power structures that the people currently holding sway may not wish to change.

But what to do?
But what to do?

Much can be done to redress inequalities in human development with a dual policy objective.

First is to accelerate convergence in basic capabilities while reversing divergences in enhanced capabilities and eliminating gen- der- and other group-based (or horizontal) ine- qualities.

Second, to jointly advance equity and efficiency in markets, increasing productivity that translates into widely shared growing incomes— redressing income inequality.
The two sets of policies are interdependent, with those that ad- vance capabilities beyond income often requiring resources to fund public health or education, which are financed by taxes.

And the overall re- sources available are, in turn, linked to productiv- ity, which is linked in part to people’s capabilities.

The two sets of policies can thus work together in a virtuous policy cycle (figure 12).

It is often possible to make progress in eq- uity and efficiency at the same time.
Antitrust policies are an example.

They curb firms’ ability to use market power, levelling the playing field and increasing efficiency.

And they lead to more equitable outcomes by reducing econom- ic rents that concentrate income.

An integrated battery of policies beyond any single silver bullet Taxes—whether on income, wealth or consumption—can do much to redress FIGURE 12 inequalities.
They raise revenue to improve key public services (health care and schools) and to provide social insurance—benefiting both poor people and people in the middle of the income distribution.

Income inequality is lower after taxes and government transfers, but the impact of redis- tribution varies.

In a selection of developed countries, taxes and transfers led to a 17-point reduction in the Gini coefficient, when com- paring pretax and post-tax incomes.
But in developing countries the reduction was just 4 points (figure 13).

Equally important, however, is to go beyond taxation and transfers (postmarket policies) by also addressing inequalities while people are working (in-market policies) and before they start working (premarket policies).

In-market policies can level the economic playing field.
Policies related to market power (antitrust), inclusive access to productive cap- ital, and collective bargaining and minimum wages affect how the benefits from production are distributed.

Equally relevant are premarket policies aimed at equalizing opportunities dur- ing childhood in health and education—and postmarket policies, such as income and wealth taxes, public transfers and social protection.
One clear role for premarket policies is in early childhood, where inequality-reducing interventions can support health, nutrition and cognitive development and produce a big return on investment.
That is not to say that every good policy can reduce inequality and A framework for designing policies to redress inequalities in human development Redressing inequalities in basic and enhanced capabilities Policies to: - Accelerate convergence in basic capabilities - Reverse divergence in enhanced capabilities - Eliminate gender and horizontal inequalities t e k r a m e r P Premarket Postmarket I n - m a r k e t Policies for inclusive expansion in incomes (productivity and equity) Source: Human Development Report Office.
Overview | 15 FIGURE 13 Redistributive direct taxes and transfers explain nearly all the difference in disposable income inequality between advanced and emerging economies Income inequality (absolute reduction in Gini coefﬁcient) Advanced economies Emerging markets and developing countries 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.31 Before After Source: Based on IMF (2017a).
increase welfare—as noted, processes such as the diffusion of new technology and human development achievements in large segments of society may increase inequality.

What matters is whether the process that generates that ine- quality is, in itself, somehow biased or unfair.

Creating incentives for change Even if resources are available to undertake an agenda for convergence in both basic and enhanced capabilities, reducing inequalities FIGURE 14 is ultimately a societal and political choice.
History, context and politics matter.

Social norms that can lead to discrimination are hard to change.

Even with legislation setting equal rights, social norms may prevail in determin- ing outcomes.

This Report’s analysis of gender inequality shows that reactions become more intense in areas where more power is involved, which can culminate in a backlash towards the very principles of gender equality.
Explicit poli- cies for tackling stereotypes and the stigmatiza- tion of excluded groups are an important part of the toolkit to reduce inequalities.

The political economy of tackling inequality can be particularly challenging.

For public ser- vices, change can happen from the top down, by extending benefits enjoyed by those at the top to others (figure 14).

But those already benefit- ing may have little incentive to extend services if that might be perceived to reduce quality.
Change can also happen from the bottom up, increasing the income below which a family qualifies for free public or subsidized services, for example.

But higher income groups might resist this if they seldom use such services.

A third approach is to build out from the mid- dle—when a system covers those who are not the poorest but who are vulnerable, such as for- mal workers earning low wages.

Here, coverage can be expanded both upward and downward.
As the quality of services improves, higher in- come groups are likely to want to participate, broadening the support to expand services to poor people.

Strategies for practical universalism in unequal developing countries Top-down trajectory Bottom-up trajectory Lower middle-up and down trajectory Quality Low High Wealthy and high income Middle income Poor Hard to expand, as it would compromise quality.

Effective to address urgent needs.


But hard to expand because of resource constraints and because low quality does not attract participation of middle class.

Relative high quality can attract high-income groups to join middle class.

This might be used to ﬁnance expansion to the poor (interclass alliance).

Source: Human Development Report Office based on the discussion in Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016).
16 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 In developed countries one challenge for sustaining social policies is to ensure that they benefit a broad base, including the middle classes.

Yet such benefits may be eroding.

In sev- eral Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, members of the middle class perceive themselves as being pro- gressively left behind in income, security and affordable access to quality health care and education.
In developing countries the challenge is often to solidify social policies for a still vulnerable middle.

In some of these countries members of the middle class pay more for social services than they receive, and they often perceive the quality of health care and education to be poor.

So they turn to private providers: The share of students going to private schools for primary education in some of these countries rose from 12 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2014.
A natural response would be to take resourc- es from those at the top.

But the richest, though few in number, can be an obstacle to expanding services.

And they can frustrate action in mul- tiple ways, through lobbying, donating to polit- ical campaigns, influencing the press and using their economic power in other ways in response to decisions they dislike.
Globalization means national policy is often circumscribed by entities, rules and events beyond the control of national governments, with pervasive downward pressures on corpo- rate income tax rates and labour standards.

Tax evasion and avoidance are made easier by insuf- ficient information, by the rise of large digital companies operating across tax jurisdictions and by inadequate interjurisdictional cooper- ation.

In these policy domains international collective action must complement national action.
Where next?

A human development approach opens new windows on inequalities—why they matter, how they manifest themselves and what to do about them—helping move towards concrete action.

But the opportunities to address ine- qualities in human development keep narrow- ing the longer that inaction prevails because imbalances in economic power can eventually be translated into political dominance.

And that in turn can lead to more inequality.


At that stage interventions are far harder and less effective than if they had been taken earlier on.

Of course, action is context specific.

The nature and relative importance of inequalities vary across countries—and so should policies to address them.

In much the same way that there is no silver bullet to address inequalities within a country, there is no one-size-fits-all basket of policies to address inequalities across countries.
Even so, policies in all countries will have to confront two trends that are shaping in- equalities in human development everywhere: climate change and accelerating technological progress.

Climate change and inequalities in human development Inequality and the climate crisis are interwo- ven—from emissions and impacts to policies and resilience.

Countries with higher human development generally emit more carbon per person and have higher ecological footprints overall (figure 15).
Climate change will hurt human develop- ment in many ways beyond crop failures and natural disasters.

Between 2030 and 2050 climate change is expected to cause an addi- tional 250,000 deaths a year from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress.

Hundreds of millions more people could be exposed to deadly heat by 2050, and the geographic range for disease vectors—such as mosquitoes that transmit malaria or dengue—will likely shift and expand.
The overall impact on people will depend on their exposure and their vulnerability.

Both factors are intertwined with inequality in a vi- cious circle.

Climate change will hit the tropics harder first, and many developing countries are tropical.

Yet developing countries and poor communities have less capacity than their rich- er counterparts to adapt to climate change and severe weather events.

So the effects of climate change deepen existing social and economic fault lines.
There are also effects in the other direction, with evidence that some forms of inequality may make action on climate harder.
High in- come inequality within countries can hinder Overview | 17 FIGURE 15 Ecological footprints expand with human development Ecological footprint, 2016 (global hectare per person) Low human development Medium human development High human development Very high human development 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Biocapacity per person, world average (1.7 global hectares) 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Human Development Index value, 2018 Note: Data cover 175 countries in the Global Ecological Footprint Network database (www.footprintnetwork.org/resources/data/; accessed 17 July 2018).
As used here, the ecological footprint is a per capita measure of how much area of biologically productive land and water a country requires, domestically and abroad, to produce all the resources it consumes and to absorb the waste it generates.

Each bubble represents a country, and the size of the bubble is proportional to the country’s population.

Source: Cumming and von Cramon-Taubadel 2018. the diffusion of new environmentally friendly technology.
Inequality can also influence the balance of power among those arguing for and against curbing carbon emissions.

Income concentration at the top can coincide with the interests of groups that oppose climate action.

Inequalities in human development are fun- damental to the climate crisis in another way.

They are a drag on effective action because higher inequality tends to make collective ac- tion, key to curbing climate change both within and across countries, more difficult.
Yet there are options to address economic inequalities and the climate crisis together, which would move countries towards inclu- sive and sustainable human development.

Carbon pricing is one.

Some of the unavoida- ble distributional impacts of carbon prices can be addressed by providing financial support to poorer people, hardest hit by higher energy bills.

But such strategies have faced challenges in practice, because the distribution of money is not the only variable that matters.
It is also important to consider a broader set of social policy packages that address inequalities and climate together while facilitating the reali- zation of human rights.

There are choices for countries and communities as they raise their ambitions for inclusive and sustainable human development.
Harnessing technological progress to reduce inequalities in human development Scientific progress and technological innova- tion—from the wheel to the microchip—have driven improvements in living standards throughout history.

And technological change will likely continue to be the fundamental driver of prosperity, pushing increases in pro- ductivity and hopefully enabling a transition to more sustainable patterns of production and consumption.
18 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 But what will be the magnitude of future changes and how will the gains from innova- tion be distributed?

Concern is growing about how technological change will reshape labour markets, particularly in how automation and artificial intelligence might replace tasks now performed by humans.

Technological change has been disruptive be- fore, and much can be learned from the past.
One key lesson is to ensure that major innovative dis- ruptions help everyone, which requires equally innovative policies and perhaps new institutions.

The current wave of technological progress will require other changes, including stronger anti- trust policies and laws to govern the ethical use of data and artificial intelligence.

Many of these will require international cooperation to succeed.

The Industrial Revolution set humanity on a path towards unprecedented improvements in well-being.
But it also triggered the Great Divergence, dividing the few societies that industrialized from the many that did not.

What is different now is that—perhaps for the first time in history—much of the technology behind the current transformation could be accessed anywhere.

Yet the gaps in countries’ abilities to harness the new opportunities are very large, with massive implications for both inequality and human development.
Technological change does not occur in a vacuum but is shaped by economic and social processes.

It is an outcome of human action.

Policymakers can shape the direction of tech- nological change in ways that enhance human development.

For instance, artificial intelli- gence might replace tasks performed by people, but it can also reinstate demand for labour by creating new tasks for humans, leading to a net positive effect that can reduce inequalities (figure 16).
FIGURE 16 Technology can displace some tasks but also create new ones Technological change (automation, machine learning and robotics, new platform economy, global and local outsourcing) Productivity effect + Net change in demand for labour Reinstatement effect (cyber security experts, digital transformation specialists, data scientists) + Displacement effect (tasks related to accounting and bookkeeping, travel agents) - Source: Human Development Report Office.
Overview | 19 Towards reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century This Report argues that tackling inequalities is possible.

But it is not easy.

It requires clarifying which inequalities matter to the advancement of human development and better understand- ing the patterns of inequality and what drives them.
This Report urges everyone to recognize that the current, standard measures to account for inequality are imperfect and often mis- leading—because they are centred on income and are too opaque to illuminate the under- lying mechanisms generating inequalities.

So, this Report argues for the value of looking at inequalities beyond income, beyond averages — and summary measures of inequality—and beyond today.
There should be a celebration of the remark- able progress that has enabled many people around the world to reach minimum standards of human development.

But continuing the policies that have led to these successes alone is insufficient.

Some people have been left behind.

At the same time, many people’s aspirations are changing.

It is short-sighted for societies to focus only on inequality in the most basic capa- bilities.
Looking beyond today means scanning ahead to recognize and tackle the new forms of inequality in enhanced capabilities that are growing in importance.

Climate change and technological transformations are adding to the urgency.

Tackling these new inequalities can have a profound impact on policymaking.

This Report does not claim that any one set of policies will work everywhere.

But it does argue that poli- cies must get beneath the surface of inequality to address their underlying drivers.
Addressing some of these drivers will mean realigning to- day’s policy goals: emphasizing, for instance, high-quality education at all ages, including preprimary levels, rather than focusing on primary and secondary enrolment rates.

Many of these aspirations are already reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Power imbalances are at the heart of many inequalities.

They may be economic, political or social.


For example, policies might need to reduce a particular group’s disproportionate influence in politics.

They might need to level the economic playing field through antitrust measures that promote competition for the benefit of consumers.

In some cases, addressing the barriers to equality mean tackling social norms embedded deep with a country’s history and culture.
Many options would enhance both equity and efficiency—and the main reason they are not pursued often has to do with the power of entrenched interests who stand not to gain much from change.

Thus, while policies matter for inequalities, inequalities also matter for policies.

The human development lens—placing people at the heart of decisionmaking—is central to open a new window on how to approach inequality, asking why and when it matters, how it manifests itself and how best to tackle it.
This is a conversation that every society must have.

It is also a con- versation that should begin today.

True, action may carry a political risk.

But history shows that the risks of inaction may be far greater, with severe inequalities eventually propelling a society into economic, social and political tensions.

There is still time to act.

But the clock is ticking.

What to do to address inequalities in human development is ultimately for each society to determine.
That determination will emerge from political debates that can be charged and difficult.

This Report contributes to those debates by presenting facts on inequal- ities in human development, interpreting them through the capabilities approach and propos- ing ideas to reduce them over the course of the 21st century.

20 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Part I Beyond income Beyond income Inequality of what?
In addressing this deceptively simple question, Amartya Sen developed the approach that has informed Human Development Reports since the first one was published in 1990.1 Sen posed that question because celebrating human diversity calls for reflecting on the kind of inequality we should ultimately care about.
The answer to Sen’s question “inequality of what?” is the “inequality of capabilities.” As the second decade of the 21st century comes to an end, the questions about inequali- ty that motivated Sen in the late 1970s have re- surfaced with a vengeance.
Now, however, the conversation is not only about understanding what kind of inequality should be measured; it is also about how to cope with them.2 Many more people around the world, across political orientations, feel strongly that income ine- quality should be reduced, a preference that has intensified since the 2000s (figure I.1).
Indeed, some evidence suggests that interest in global growth—often equated with broader improvements in development around the world—now takes second place to interest in global inequality.3 Reducing inequality was enshrined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) speaking to the aspiration to reduce inequality across multiple dimensions.
In line with the 2030 Agenda, part I of the Report argues that we need to go beyond income in exploring inequality—and especially in con- fronting the new inequalities of the 21st cen- tury.
It advances the view that the capabilities approach is well suited to understanding and confronting these new inequalities.4 FIGURE I.1 The share of the population stating that income should be more equal increased from the 2000s to the 2010s Change in the share of population stating that income should be more equal between 2000s and 2010s (percentage points) 35 out of 39 countries 33 out of 39 countries 32 out of 39 countries Many more people around the world, across political orientations, feel strongly that income inequality should be reduced, a preference that has intensified since the 2000s 50 40 30 20 10 0 –10 –20 –30 –40 Leaning left Center Leaning right Population in selected countries by political self-identiﬁcation Note: Each dot represents one of 39 countries with comparable data.
The sample covers 48 percent of the global population.

Based on answers on a 1–5 scale, where 1 is “income should be more equal” and 5 is “we need larger income differences.” Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, waves 4, 5 and 6.

PART I Beyond income: To equality in capabilities | 23 PART I.
Despite improvement and convergence in the capabilities central to the Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals, some gaps remain stark, and new ones are opening in capabilities that will increasingly determine differences between those who can and those who cannot take full advantage of the 21st century’s new opportunities Why, after all, should concerns about in- equality be rising today—at a time of great progress in living standards, with an unprec- edented number of people around the world making a “great escape”5 from hunger, disease and poverty?6 Even though many are still being left behind, the Human Development Index (HDI) shows, on average, impressive improve- ment—even convergence—in the capabilities included in the HDI.
Yet, chapter 1 shows that along with convergence in the basic capabilities that were the focus of Human Development Reports in the early 1990s, divergences are opening in other indicators, both within and across countries: Life expectancy at older ages is becoming more unequal, as is access to ter- tiary education.
In short, despite improvement and convergence in the capabilities central to the Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals, some gaps remain stark, and new ones are opening in capabilities that will increasingly determine differences between those who can and those who cannot take full advantage of the 21st century’s new opportunities.
Time and again, the analysis shows that countries and people at the bottom are catching up in basic capabilities while those at the top pull away in enhanced capabilities.7 Convergence in basic capabilities gives the direction of change but does not mean that the gaps are fully closed.

In fact, those furthest be- hind are making little to no progress.

Chapter 1 thus shows that the world is expected to reach 2030 with preventable gaps in infant mortality, out-of-school children and extreme income poverty.
Drawing on granular data to zoom in on geographic areas, it documents overlapping deprivations and intersectional exclusions.

Finally, the chapter zooms out on the dynam- ics of risk—health, natural disaster or conflict shocks that expose groups or individuals to added vulnerability.

Behind these patterns lie the stubborn challenge of strengthening the capabilities of those furthest behind.

The persistent and increasing inequalities in enhanced capabilities matter more than for their instrumental value.
Chapter 1 also looks at how they have a bearing on human dignity.

Individuals or groups of people might have access to resources—but not equal treatment through formal law or social norms.
Not all social injustices are seen, much less acknowl- edged, by social institutions, and this is often the case for indigenous or ethnic groups; mi- grants; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people; and other socially stigmatized groups that suffer abuse and discrimination.8 Such inequality also—in too many places— affects the situation of women, who—even when they share a home with a man giving them access in principle to similar goods and services—are subject to imposed roles and often violence.
The #MeToo movement has shown how systematic abuse and humiliation are widespread and not defined by income or social status.9 To be sure, income and wealth inequalities can be significant and central to policymakers’ thinking about inequality in human develop- ment.

Such economic inequalities, narrowly considered, can be perceived as unfair or can actually constrain people’s well-being (through several channels, as explored in chapter 2).
Analysis of income and wealth inequalities is thus necessary and is considered throughout the Report, but focusing exclusively on income and wealth inequalities would be too reductive by failing to acknowledge the full scope of ine- quality in human development.

Chapter 2 documents how inequalities in capabilities emerge, showing how they are often interconnected and persistent.
Even as differ- ences in basic capabilities are reduced, as more and more people acquire the basic capabilities towards meeting minimum achievements in health and education, gradients—meaning that individuals who are better off have better health and education outcomes than those who are worse off—persist or become more pronounced.

The mechanisms accounting for the emer- gence of inequalities in capabilities are described in chapter 2 at two levels.
First, by taking a lifecycle approach that traces how parents’ ad- vantages in income, health and education shape their children’s path over time, often leading to persistent “hoarding” of opportunities across generations.

Second, by noting that these mechanisms do not occur in a vacuum and that context, including economic inequality, shapes opportunity through multiple channels, such as how policies are designed and implemented.
The distribution of resources and opportunities 24 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 in a society depends heavily on the distribution of power.

Power concentration creates imbal- ances and can lead to the capture of both gov- ernment and markets by powerful elites—which can further drive income and wealth inequality, in a cycle that weakens responsiveness to the as- pirations of the general population.
This pattern appears to have already happened in history (see spotlight 1.1 at the end of chapter 1).10 These dynamics can in turn erode governance, hurting human development.11 Part I of the Report takes the inequality discussion beyond income towards capabilities, broadening the range of data considered in the inequality debate and uncovering patterns of convergence and divergence in human development.
It shows that focusing on raising people above minimums is insufficient, given that gradients of inequality in capabilities con- tinue to open up and persist.

Part I of the Report opens our view about inequalities in human development.

But this is just the first step.
As United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet points out in her Special Contribution, “Diagnosis is not enough—we must push for public policies that tackle these forms of injustice.” These findings, inspired by the human development approach, will be critical to support efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (box I.1).12 BOX I.1 The capabilities approach and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development The dimensions of inequality in human development considered in this report are reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its accompa- nying Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The global consensus around the SDGs represents an evolution from what the Millennium Development Goals considered “basic” or essential for developing countries by the end of the 20th century.

This report is inspired by that evolution and considers dimensions of inequality that are universally relevant and go beyond the basic.

The SDGs seek to reduce inequality in many forms.


They not only aim to reduce inequality between and within countries (SDG 10) but also envision an abso- lute end to some deprivations: poverty in all its forms (SDG 1) and hunger (SDG 2).
They also seek to extend some basic conditions to all people: healthy lives (SDG 3), quality education and lifelong learning opportunities (SDG 4), gender equality and empowerment for all wom- en and girls (SDG 5), sustainable water and sanitation (SDG 6), sustainable reliable energy (SDG 7), decent jobs (SDG 8) and access to justice (SDG 16).

Other goals aim to advance the provision of global public goods (such as climate stability).
As with any global approach, considering a specific set of dimensions has limitations.

It does not address all dimensions of unfairness and injustice that might be im- portant in particular places.

However, the Report com- plements and cross-checks globally defined measures of inequality—based on objective data—with information on perceptions of inequality, with measures of inequal- ity in subjective well-being and with some nationally defined measures.
Focusing on raising people above minimums is insufficient, given that gradients of inequality in capabilities continue to open up and persist PART I Beyond income: To equality in capabilities | 25 SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION A new look at inequality As every year, the 2019 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme invites us to take a look at ourselves in the mirror.
In systematically integrating information about the development of our so- cieties, we are confronted with the evidence of what we have achieved and where we are failing.

This evidence is much more than a compilation of numbers and figures.

Because it is all about people’s well-being: Each gap that persists or grows is a call to respond to the injustice of inequality with effective policies.
What can we expect when a girl is born in poverty, with no proper health coverage and in an environment where it is harder and harder to access drinking water due to climate change?

How much longer can our societies keep getting it wrong when what they do breaches basic human rights?

These are the issues with which inequality faces us.

We know that inequality takes many forms.

Many, such as inequalities of income or gender inequalities, have been around us for a long time.
It should be a matter of pride that considerable progress has been made in these issues in much of the globe.

This Report highlights that inequalities in the basic capabilities reflecting extreme deprivations are going down.

For instance, the world is moving towards average gender parity in access to primary and secondary education.

However, at the same time, inequalities reflecting greater levels of empowerment and more important for the future tend to be higher and, in some cases, increasing.
Here, we have the example of women’s representation at the top political level.

Although we still have a long way to go, we have accumulated experi- ence about what works in social protection, financial instruments and path- ways of social mobility.

There are success stories of better representation of women, more equitable participation in the labour market or driving out discrimination against sexual diversity.
The paradox of having such long- standing inequalities is that we, as a society, have found pathways for posi- tive change.

What is needed in many cases is the political will.

Yet there are inequalities which face us with even greater challenges.

It is precisely on these that the Report seeks to shed light: These are inequal- ities which stem from new phenomena and global conflicts.

These inequali- ties are more challenging as they respond to complex and dynamic processes still to be well understood.
Are we fully aware of the impact of migrations, the effects of climate disasters or the new epidemiological threats to our coexistence?

Because that is what it is about; how do we manage to live together, in the face of these new scenarios, and achieve greater well-being for people?

It is a path that we must learn to tread together.


Access to health, education, new technologies, green areas and spaces free of pollution are increasingly an indicator of the way in which oppor- tunities and well-being are distributed among groups of people and even between countries.

Explaining and understanding the dimensions of inequalities most critical to people’s well-being helps in choosing the best lines of action.
Diagnosis is not enough—we must push for public policies that tackle these forms of injustice.

Therefore, all countries have a job to do.

But over many years we have found that individual efforts are not enough; many challenges demand a collective approach.
In the United Nations System, we believe that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the kind of response needed in these modern times: They take an all- round look at the phenomena and the solutions; they seek convergence between the actions of governments and international agencies; and they are based on transparent and comparable measurements.
With their inter- sectoral approach and the commitment of all governments, the SDGs put us all at the service of a single endeavour.

The best example of what we hold in our own hands is the enormous challenge of limiting the rise in the global temperature to 1.5°C.

Our United Nations Office for Human Rights has said it clearly: Climate change directly and indirectly affects a range of human rights which must be guaranteed.
We view with satisfaction that science, governments, business and civil so- ciety are starting to coalesce around concrete targets.

Thus, little by little, sectoral isolation and arguments are breaking down.

It is the path we must insist on.

We have a duty to eradicate old and new forms of inequality and exclusion which every day breach the rights of millions of people living on our planet.
It would be a mistake to think that there have not been successes, that injustice in the world has not been driven back.

But so long as there is pain and suffering due to inequality, we have a duty to face up to what we are doing wrong and which we can put right.

We have more future than yesterday: This is the invitation that we must all make our own.
Michelle Bachelet Jeria United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 26 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century This chapter considers two main questions: Where do human development inequalities stand today and how are they changing?

Many inequalities in human development embody unfairness.
To see how, take two babies, both born in 2000— one in a low human development country, the other in a very high human development country (figure 1.1).

What do we know about their prospects for adult life today?

We know that they are vastly different.

The first is very likely to be enrolled in higher education, along with the majority of 20-year-olds in more developed countries today.
She or he is preparing to live in a highly globalized and competitive world and has chances do so as a highly skilled worker.

In contrast, the child from the low human development country is much less likely to be alive.

Some 17 percent of children born in low human development countries in 2000 will have died before age 20, compared with just 1 percent of children born in very high human develop- ment countries.
And those who survive have an expected lifespan 13 years shorter than their counterparts in the group of more developed countries.
The child born in the low human development country is also unlikely to still be in education: Only 3 percent are in higher education.1 Both of these young people are just beginning their adult lives, but circumstances al- most entirely beyond their control have already set them on different and unequal paths in terms of health, education, employment and income prospects—a divergence that can be irreversible.
Some inequalities within countries—wheth- er developing or developed—are no less extreme than those in the between-country example above.
In the United States average life expectancy at age 40 between the top 1 percent of the income distribution and the bottom FIGURE 1.1 Children born in 2000 in countries with different incomes will have severely different capabilities by 2020 Estimated outcomes in 2020 (percent) In higher education 55 3 80 Not in higher education 17 Died before age 20 44 1 Children born in 2000 in very high human development countries Children born in 2000 in low human development countries Note: These are estimates (using median values) for a typical individual from a country with low human development and from a country with very high human development.
Data for participation in higher education are based on household survey data for people ages 18–22, processed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics in www.education-inequalities.org (accessed 5 November 2019).

Percentages are with respect to people born in 2000.

People that died before age 20 are computed based on births around 2000 and estimated deaths for that cohort between 2000 and 2020.
People in higher education in 2020 are computed based on people estimated to be alive (from cohort born around 2000), and the latest data of participation in higher education.

People not in higher education are the complement.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 29 1.

1 percent differs by 15 years for men and 10 years for women.2 Such disparities are widening.

The 21st century presents an unprecedented- ly broad range of human experiences.

See, for instance, how the distribution of non income indicators of the Human Development Index for subnational areas covers a huge spectrum of outcomes in health and education.
Extreme deprivations still exist, not only among low human development countries (figure 1.2).

Global elites, including people in low human development countries, enjoy more knowledge, more years of healthy life and more access to life-changing technologies.

Why do striking inequalities persist?


Partly because of social structures—many with histor- ical roots—that remain entrenched in formal and informal institutions, adamantly resisting change.3 To shift the curve of human develop- ment inequalities, it is not enough to improve just one or two particular indicators.
Instead, the social structures that perpetuate inequity need to change.4 Portraying the scope of inequalities in human development and their evolution is a daunting challenge because they are dynamic, complex and multidimensional.

Which to include?

How to measure them?

How to aggregate them?

How to analyse them?

And at what level: globally, nationally, subnationally, within social groups or even in the household?
Amid this complexity, however, it might be possible to discern broad patterns of evolution in ine- qualities that are widely shared.

This is the task that the rest of this chapter explores.

Understanding inequality in capabilities Human development means expanding the substantive freedoms to do things that people value and have a reason to value.5 What people actually choose to be and do—their achieved functioning—is enabled by income and wealth but is distinct from it.
And while the achieved functioning matters, human development is not defined merely by the choices that people actually make; it is also defined by “the freedom that a person has in choosing from the set of FIGURE 1.2 Still massive inequality in human development across the world, 2017 Life expectancy at birth (frequency) Mean years of schooling (frequency) Expected years of schooling (frequency) Years 90 80 70 60 50 Years 15 10 5 0 Years 25 20 15 10 5 0 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office based on calculations of subnational Human Development Index values by Permanyer and Smits (2019).
30 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Inequalities we care about may indeed be moving targets feasible functionings, which is referred to as the person’s capability.”6 Thus, the analysis of inequality in this chapter considers inequality of capabilities (box 1.1).

But what capabilities to consider?

Sen argued that one must adjust in response to evolving social and economic conditions.
For example, in India at the time of independence in 1947, it was reasonable to concentrate “on elementary education, basic health, […] and to not worry too much about whether everyone can effec- tively communicate across the country and be- yond.”7 Later, however—with the internet and its applications, as well as broader advances in information and communication technology— access to the internet and freedom of general communication became an important capabil- ity for all Indians.
Whereas one relevant aspect of this insight is strictly linked to capabilities (access to the internet), another intersects with human rights and specifically with the right to freedom of opinion and expression.8 Moreover, capabilities evolve not only with circumstances but also with values and with people’s changing demands and aspirations.
The capabilities approach is thus open-ended, which some observers see as a shortcoming.9 One objection is that it does not lend itself to specifying a standard and fixed goal for evalu- ating social welfare because capabilities are con- tinuously moving targets.
This Report takes a different view: It considers that the inequalities we care about may indeed be moving targets and thus aims to identify patterns and dynamics of inequality in a wider set of capabilities that may be increasingly relevant during the 21st century.

Another challenge is how to measure capa- bilities—that is, how to move from concepts to the empirical assessment of how capabilities are distributed.
Here the Report follows the approach taken when the Human Development Index (HDI) was introduced and identifies a few observable achieved functionings to capture broader capabilities (for instance, in the HDI, having the option to live a long and healthy life is associated with the indicator of life expectancy BOX 1.1 Inequality of capabilities In keeping with previous Human Development Reports, this Report assumes, from a normative perspective, that the inequalities that matter intrinsically are ine- qualities in capabilities.
Capabilities—broadly defined as people’s freedom to choose what to be and do— cannot be reduced to income and wealth alone, be- cause these are instrumental.1 Nor can they be defined as utility and measured by people’s actual choices, for that would obscure real differences in how individuals use income for achievements that they value.2 Instead, capabilities are people’s freedoms to choose what they want to be and do—regardless of whether they actually make those choices.
Thus, capabilities are closely related to the concept of opportunities: It is not enough to know that someone has not travelled to a foreign country; we need to know whether that was a free choice or whether the person wanted to travel but either could not afford it or was denied entry.3 The first Human Development Reports used the capabilities approach to intervene in the development discourse of the time, when debates centred on ba- sic needs,4 leading to the introduction of the Human Development Index (HDI)—measuring the capability to live a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to earn income for a basic standard of living.5 The HDI was meant to be a metric of a very minimal list of capabili- ties, “getting at minimally basic quality of life.”6 It was never a statistic to be maximized, as in aggregate utility.
It was computed at the country level, mostly because of data availability, and was meant to enrich the assess- ment of countries’ development performance.7 Notes 1.

Sen (1980) went further than Rawls’s social primary commodities, with essentially the same argument—that these are, at best, instrumental.

2.

More precisely, Sen (1980) was showing the limitations of utilitarianism as a normative principle to adjudicate welfare.
In utilitarianism, social welfare is assessed based on the actual choices that people make.

People are assumed to maximize their individual utility—an increasing function of income, but one that yields less utility the higher the income.

So achieving the ideal social welfare implies maximizing the sum total of utility in a society.

That, in turn, can happen only if income is distributed so that individual marginal utility is equalized.
Sen used a well known and compelling illustration to show how this principle could result in outcomes that violate our sense of fairness.

Consider two individuals: One, who lives with a disability, is not very efficient in turning an additional dollar of income into utility; another, in contrast, derives satisfaction from every single additional dollar.

Utilitarianism would dictate giving more income to the second person, an outcome that violates our sense of fairness.

3.

Basu and Lopez- Calva 2011.

4.


Stewart, Ranis and Samman 2018.

5.

Sen (2005) credits joint work with Mahbub Ul Haq to develop a general index for global assessment and critique, going beyond gross domestic product (GDP).

6.

Sen 2005.

7.

Perhaps more important, quoting Klasen (2018, p. 2), “Many of the battles of the 1990s that came to define the Human Development Reports have been won.
Today, the entire development community accepts that development is more than increasing per capita gross domestic product (GDP).… The HDI has been canonized in all standard textbooks on development economics or development studies … and is considered the most serious and comprehensive alternative to GDP per capita.
[…]” Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 31 Initial stepping stones, such as surviving to age 5, learning to read and doing basic math are crucial to further development: These basic achievements present some of the necessary conditions for creating further capabilities in life.

The enhanced achievements that follow, such as a long and healthy adult life or tertiary education, reflect more advanced access to opportunities at birth).
To motivate the empirical information considered, a lifecycle approach is used, given that achievements in human development build over a person’s life through a sequence of observable and measurable indicators.
Initial stepping stones, such as surviving to age 5, learn- ing to read and doing basic math are crucial to further development: These basic achievements present some of the necessary conditions for cre- ating further capabilities in life.10 The enhanced achievements that follow, such as a long and healthy adult life or tertiary education, reflect more advanced access to opportunities.
While these observable achievements are what can be measured (and compared across countries in a global report), they are taken to represent a wider set of capabilities that also range from ba- sic to enhanced.

Emphasis should be placed on the underlying concept of basic and enhanced capabilities over the specific measurements, which can evolve and change from country to country.
Here the inspiration is Amartya Sen’s definition of a basic capability as “the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially impor- tant functionings up to certain levels.”11 Basic capabilities thus refer to the freedom to make choices necessary for survival and to avoid or escape poverty or other serious deprivations.
The differentiation between basic and en- hanced capabilities is valid also for other human development dimensions that are not necessarily tied to an individual lifecycle—for example, in the progression from basic to frontier technolo- gies and in the ability to cope with environmental shocks, from perhaps frequent but low-impact events to large and unpredictable hazards.
This distinction between basic and enhanced capabilities resembles the analysis of practical needs and strategic needs in the context of gender empowerment, pioneered by Caroline Moser.12 Associated with the distinction is a cautionary message: While investment in basic needs is essential, to focus on them exclusively is to neglect inequalities in strategic aspects of life, those that change the distribution of power.
Thus, the next section presents a stylized analysis along two key dimensions beyond in- come: health and access to knowledge—both core dimensions of the human development approach since the first Human Development Report.

The sequence from basic to enhanced capabilities can be framed in the context of a li- fecycle analysis (which is also used in chapter 2 when analysing the mechanisms leading up to the emergence of inequalities in capabilities).
Later in the Report the same patterns will be illustrated in two other dimensions: human security in the face of shocks linked to trends on climate change (chapter 5) and technology (chapter 6).13 These drivers of the distribution of capabilities in the 21st century are consid- ered without implying that others, such as demographic changes, are unimportant or that they are the only two that matter, but to allow for a treatable elaboration of the arguments showing the relevance of analysing the ine- quality dynamics in both basic and enhanced capabilities.
Admittedly, constraining the analysis to these four dimensions is arbitrary.

And in no way should these aspects be regarded as the most important or have any normative meaning.
But it is plausible to claim that the distribution and evolution of capabilities across these four dimen- sions will be paramount in determining people’s agency over the 21st century—that is, “the abil- ity to decide on and the power to achieve what they want.”14 These capabilities, while essential for agency, are not their sole determinants be- cause human motivations are not driven exclu- sively by improvements in one’s own well-being; “people’s sense of fairness and concern that they and others be treated fairly”15 also matter.
While a full treatment of the implications of these broader determinants of agency is beyond the scope of the Report, this chapter concludes with a section that looks at perceptions of inequality (which could indicate how a sense of fairness, or lack thereof, is evolving) as well as some of the social and psychological underpinnings of how these perceptions may emerge and how they connect with human dignity.
Dynamics of inequality in human development: Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities On each of the four dimensions considered in the Report, it is possible to identify a differen- tiation in capabilities, from basic to enhanced (figure 1.3): 32 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 1.3 Human development, from basic to enhanced capabilities Enhanced capabilities Examples of achievements - Access to quality health at all levels - High-quality education at all levels - Effective access to present-day technologies - Resilience to unknown new shocks Examples of achievements - Early childhood survival - Primary education - Entry-level technology - Resilience to recurrent shocks Basic capabilities Source: Human Development Report Office.
• Health.

From, for example, the ability to survive the first years of life to the prospect of enhanced healthy longevity.

• Education and knowledge.

From, for example, having basic primary education to accessing a high-quality learning experience at all levels.

• Human security in the face of shocks.

From the daily lack of freedom from fear where interpersonal violence is rampant to facing the consequences of conflict.
The ability to face recurrent shocks and the capabilities to deal with uncertain events linked to climate change are addressed in chapter 5.

• Access to new technologies.

From entry-level to more advanced ones (discussed in more de- tail in chapter 6, with some results presented in this chapter).

Cutting across key human development di- mensions are the section’s three main findings: • Inequalities and unfairness persist.

Human development inequalities remain widespread.


• Convergence appears in basic capabilities.

Those at the bottom are catching up in the basics.

• Divergence appears in enhanced capabilities.

Gaps in enhanced capabilities exceed those in the basic ones or are rising (or in some cases, both).

First, inequalities persist and are widespread.


Across all dimensions considered there are significant inequalities in constitutive areas of human development: Some refer to life and death, and others to access to knowledge and to life-changing technologies.

Across coun- tries the world remains deeply unequal in key areas of human development in both basic and enhanced capabilities (figure 1.4).
There is a difference of 19 years in life expectancy at birth between low and very high human devel- opment countries, reflecting gaps in access to health.

That represents a quarter of a lifespan lost just for being born in a poor country.

The differences tend to remain over the lifecycle.

The differences in life expectancy at age 70, is almost 5 years, representing a third of the re- maining lifespan lost.
The percentage of adults with a primary education is 42 percent in low human development countries, compared with 94 percent in very high developing countries.

Again, gaps remain through the lifecycle: Only 3 percent of adults have a tertiary education in low human development countries, compared with 29 percent in developed countries.

In access to technology, there are 67 mobile-cel- lular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in developing countries, half the amount in very high human development countries.
In more advanced technologies, such as access to fixed broadband, there is less than one subscription per 100 inhabitants, compared with 28 in very high human development countries.

The same is true within countries.

One way to capture within-country inequalities in key areas of human development is through the Inequalities and unfairness persist.

Human development inequalities remain widespread.

Convergence appears in basic capabilities.

Those at the bottom are catching up in the basics.


Divergence appears in enhanced capabilities.
Gaps in enhanced capabilities exceed those in the basic ones or are rising Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 33 FIGURE 1.4 The world remains deeply unequal in key areas of human development in both basic and enhanced capabilities Basic Enhanced Life expectancy at birth, 2015 (years) Life expectancy at age 70, 2015 (years) 59.4 66.6 72.9 78.4 Health 14.6 12.6 11.1 9.8 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Population with a primary education, 2017 (percent) Population with a tertiary education, 2017 (percent) 93.5 84.9 28.6 66.5 42.3 Education 18.5 13.7 3.2 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Mobile-cellular subscriptions, 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions, 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 131.6 116.7 28.3 90.6 67.0 Access to technology Low Medium High Very high Human development group 11.3 2.3 Medium High Very high Human development group 0.8 Low Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
34 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which adjusts the HDI value for inequality within countries in each of its compo- nents (health, education and income).

According to the IHDI, the global average loss in human development due to inequality is 20 percent.

Second, on average, there is convergence in basic capabilities.

Inequality in the basic capa- bilities of human development included in the HDI is falling.
This can be seen in the evolution of the IHDI, where indicators representing basic capabilities have very high implicit weights.16 In all regions of the world the loss in human development due to inequality is diminishing (figure 1.5).
This trend is repeated in many subnational HDI values17 and has happened against a backdrop of aggregate development progress across achievements representing basic capabilities on multiple fronts.18 The global ex- treme poverty rate fell from 36 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 2018.19 Infant mortality rates have been falling consistently.
Primary school enrolment rates have seen great strides, with uni- versal coverage in most countries, and secondary education is making rapid progress (though the substantive significance of these achievements needs to be seen in the context of an imped- ing “learning crisis,” as discussed later in the chapter).20 The number of people living in low human development countries is 923 million today, down from 2.1 billion in 2000.
People FIGURE 1.5 have been “escaping” from the imprisonment of extreme deprivations, to use Angus Deaton’s expression.21 This chapter also documents that this is an unfinished business, as the challenge of reaching those furthest behind persists.

While there is catching up in the basics, this is happening years after the wealthier segments of society exhausted the space to make further pro- gress on the same fronts.
People at the top of the distribution typically have reached the limit of progress in basic capabilities: Universal coverage in primary education and secondary education, very low infant mortality rates and access to ba- sic technology are now taken for granted among better-off segments of most societies.

They are looking towards more advanced goals.

What is happening in these enhanced areas?

Third, there is divergence in enhanced ca- pabilities.
Inequality is typically higher across enhanced capabilities, and when it is not, it is growing.

In each of the key dimensions of human development considered—health, ed- ucation, living standards, access to technology and security—groups converging in basic capa- bilities lag behind in access to enhanced capa- bilities.

Greater ambitions are defining moving targets.


Yet this set of enhanced achievements will increasingly determine people’s lives in this century, in part because they are linked to some of the most consequential change drivers of our time: technology and climate change.
In all regions of the world the loss in human development due to inequality is diminishing, reflecting progress in basic capabilities Loss in human development due to inequality (percent) 2010 2018 27.4 24.5 21.9 29.6 25.9 25.3 22.3 16.6 16.1 11.7 35.1 30.5 23.4 20.2 World While there is catching up in the basics, this is happening years after the wealthier segments of society exhausted the space to make further progress on the same fronts Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Source: Human Development Report Office calculations.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 35 FIGURE 1.6 Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities Basic Enhanced Declining inequality Increasing inequality Life expectancy at birth Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) Life expectancy at age 70 Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) 5.9 4.9 Health 1.2 2.7 2.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Population with a primary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) Population with a tertiary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) 9.2 8.6 7.1 6.2 5.9 5.3 Education 3.0 1.1 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Mobile-cellular subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 59.5 49.3 49.3 Access to technology 26.1 12.3 8.9 Low Medium High Very high Human development group 2.0 0.8 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
36 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Figure 1.6 summarizes the emerging human development divide with pairs of indicators, measuring progress over the last decade in one basic and one enhanced indicator for each of three key human development dimensions: health, education and access to technologies.

Across human development groups there are two opposing trends in gradients for basic and enhanced capabilities.
Inequalities are falling in basic capabilities because lower human devel- opment countries are making larger progress on average.

When the ones that are behind grow faster, there is convergence.

By contrast, inequalities are growing in enhanced capabili- ties because high and very high human devel- opment countries are getting ahead, leading to divergence.

The Report documents later that these trends are also observed within countries.
The basic indicators in the figure all reflect narrowing inequalities between countries in different human development groups.

For instance, in life expectancy at birth (driven mainly by survival to age 5), in access to prima- ry education and in access to mobile phones, lower human development countries are mak- ing faster progress.

They are catching up with higher human development countries.

In contrast, the more advanced indicators in the figure reveal widening inequalities.
Higher human development countries start with an advantage in life expectancy at age 70, in ter- tiary education enrolment and in broadband access—and they are increasing their lead in these areas.

The effect of these widening gaps— representing just few examples of enhanced capabilities—will be revealed over the 21st century.

And that effect will impact those born today, many of whom will see the 22nd century.
The remainder of this section considers the dynamics of convergence and divergence in health and education in more detail.

Health: The well-off are living healthier and longer in the 21st century Health inequalities can be a clear manifestation of social injustice (see chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion).

These inequalities also reflect short- comings in meeting basic human rights, such as those defined by article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (box 1.2).
BOX 1.2 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The right to a basic standard of living “Everyone has the right to a standard of living ade- quate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and med- ical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of liveli- hood in circumstances beyond his control.
“Motherhood and childhood are entitled to spe- cial care and assistance.

All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.” Source: www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

Inequalities in health outcomes are widespread Life expectancy at birth is a helpful indicator to track health inequalities.

As one of the three components of the HDI, it has been used as a proxy for long and healthy life since the first Human Development Report in 1990.
Here, the analysis extends life expectancy beyond that at birth to that at different ages in order to identify the dynamics of health through the lifecycle.

This lifecycle approach makes it possible to capture changes in both the demographic and the socioeconomic transitions.

And it shows how, across various indicators, not only do deep inequalities persist, but new gaps are also opening.
Life expectancies—both at birth and at older ages—are considerably higher in countries with higher income or higher human devel- opment (figure 1.7)—this is often called a health gradient.
People born in very high human development countries are expected to live almost 19 more years (or almost a third longer) than people in low human de- velopment countries.22 People at age 70 in very high human development countries are expected to live almost 5 more years (around 50 percent longer) than people in low human development countries.

The gaps are also very large when the quality of health is considered (box 1.3).
People born in very high human development countries are expected to live almost 19 more years (or almost a third longer) than people in low human development countries Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 37 FIGURE 1.7 Inequalities persist in life expectancy and mortality Inequalities in life expectancy Life expectancy at birth (years) 66.6 61.8 59.4 53.6 72.9 70.3 76.0 78.4 Life expectancy at age 70 (years) 11.1 10.4 9.8 9.2 12.6 11.8 14.6 13.4 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group 2005 2015 Inequalities in mortality Probability of death by age 5 (percent) Probability of death at ages 70–79 (percent) 13.2 8.8 7.5 4.9 3.2 2.1 Low Medium High Human development group 1.0 0.6 Very high 58.3 54.7 51.4 47.5 43.8 39.7 35.2 29.8 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
BOX 1.3 Inequality in healthy life expectancy While the length of life is important for human de- velopment, equally essential is how those years are lived.

Are they enjoyable?

Does health remain good?

The indicator of healthy life expectancy suggests large discrepancies.
Healthy life expectancy for very high human development countries is about 68 years, com- pared with only about 56 years for low human develop- ment countries.1 A look at some specific diseases can shed some light on causes of inequalities in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.

The prevalence of tuberculo- sis, for example, is only 0.8 per 100,000 people in the United Arab Emirates but 724 per 100,000 in Lesotho.
The HIV prevalence rate among adults is 27.2 percent in the Kingdom of Eswatini but only 0.1 percent in many very high human development countries, among them Australia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Romania.2 Malaria has been defeated in Sri Lanka and is projected to be de- feated in 2020 in Argentina, Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Suriname.3 But prev- alence is still high in Mali, with 459.7 cases per 1,000 people at risk, and Burkina Faso, with 423.3.4 In May 2019, 1,572 people in the Democratic Republic of Congo suffered from Ebola.5 Notes 1.
See Statistical table 8 at http://hdr.undp.org/en/human-development-report-2019.

2.

UNDP 2018a.

3. WHO 2017.

4.

UNDP 2018a.

5. WHO 2019.
38 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Catching up in the basics: Global convergence in life expectancy at birth, especially through reduced infant mortality The increase in life expectancy at birth—from a weighted average of 47 years in the 1950s to 72 years around 2020—portrays the extraordinary progress in health.23 In 2000 several countries still had life expectancy at birth below 50 years, a cat- egory expected to disappear from every country average by 2020.24 The improvement has been observed across human development groups (see figure 1.7).
Moreover, low human development countries gained almost 6 years of life expectan- cy at birth between 2005 and 2015, compared with 2.4 years for very high human development countries (figure 1.8, left panel).

This is consist- ent with a reduction of more than 4 percentage points in under-five mortality rates in low human development countries.
Another area with signif- icant reduction is maternal mortality, which fell 45 percent between 1990 and 2013.25 A detailed look at the situation within develop- ing countries confirms these trends.

To facilitate meaningful comparability, figure 1.9 groups the within-country results (information per quintile in 54 countries), according to their human de- velopment level.

Consider infant mortality rates, an important determinant of life expectancy at birth.
They have been declining everywhere, but significant gradients remain: Children born in poorer quintiles have a much higher probability of dying during the first year of life than those born in wealthier quintiles.

This is the case across all human development groups.
The convergence in mortality rates at younger ages is also confirmed within countries: Infant mortality appears to be falling for all segments of the population, and in most countries the greatest reductions in infant mortality are in the poorest three quintiles.
This result is consistent with the decline in the dispersion of life expec- tancy at birth documented in an analysis of more than 1,600 regions in 161 countries, covering more than 99 percent of the world population.26 Growing inequalities in enhanced capabilities: Divergence in life expectancy at older ages both at young ages (ages 0–5) and at older ages (ages 70–79) (figure 1.10).
While the level of inequality in mortality rates is much higher at young ages than at older ages, the changes in mortality rates reflect different patterns.

Child mortality rates converge—dropping faster for lower human development countries—just as mortality rates at older ages diverge.

If the countries performing poorly in 2005 are the ones with greater progress over 2005–2015, there is catching up or convergence.
But if the countries with worse performance in 2005 are the ones with less improvement over 2005– 2015, there is divergence.

Different patterns can be observed with different definitions of life expectancy: going from clear convergence in life expectancy at birth to clear divergence in life ex- pectancy at age 70 (see figure 1.8, right panel).27 Inequalities in life expectancy at older ages are an emerging form of inequality in human development in the 21st century.
Divergence in life expectancy at older ages is much stronger today than during the second half of the 20th century.28 And since the turn of the century, life expectancy at older ages has been increasing much faster in very high human development countries than elsewhere.

During 2005–2015 life expectancy at age 70 increased 0.5 year in low human development countries and 1.2 years in very high human development countries.
Improvements in technologies, enhanced social services and healthy habits are moving the frontiers of survival at all ages.

While the space for reducing mortality under age 5 is shrinking fast, it remains large at older ages (under age 80).29 An important factor behind different mortality rates at older ages are variations in noncommunicable disease rates across different groups.
People with lower socioeconomic status or living in more marginalized communities are at higher risk of dying from a noncommunicable disease.30 The world is getting older fast.

People over age 60 are the fastest growing age segment of the global population.

By 2050, one person in five worldwide is expected to be in this age group; in more developed regions the proportion is expected to be one in three.31 Therefore, the relevance of inequalities linked to older people will grow.
Consider the levels and the evolution of average mortality rates for different groups of countries, These between-country results are consistent with emerging evidence from within-country Low human development countries gained almost 6 years of life expectancy at birth between 2005 and 2015, compared with 2.4 years for very high human development countries Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 39 FIGURE 1.8 The changing inequality in life expectancy, 2005–2015: Low human development countries catching up in life expectancy at birth but lagging behind in life expectancy at older age Declining inequality Increasing inequality Life expectancy at birth Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) 5.9 4.9 Life expectancy at age 70 Change between 2005 and 2015 (years) 1.2 2.7 2.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Basic Enhanced Convergence Life expectancy at birth Change in life expectancy at birth, between 2005 and 2015 (years) 8 Sub-Saharan Africa 6 4 2 0 East Asia and the Paciﬁc South Asia Europe and Central Asia Developed Arab States Latin America and the Caribbean 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 Divergence Life expectancy at age 70 Change in life expectancy at age 70 between 2005 and 2015 (years) 1.6 Developed 1.2 0.8 0.4 9 East Asia and the Paciﬁc Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia Arab States Europe and Central Asia 11 13 15 Life expectancy at birth, 2005 (years) Life expectancy at age 70, 2005 (years) Note: Convergence and divergence are tested for in two ways: by using the slope of an equation that regresses the change over 2005–2015 with respect to the initial value in 2005 (with ordinary least squares, robust and median quantile regressions) and by comparing the gains of very high human development countries and the gains of low and medium human development countries.
For life expectancy at birth there is convergence according to both metrics (p-values below 1 percent).

For life expectancy at age 70 there is divergence according to both metrics (p-values below 1 percent).

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
40 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 1.9 Infant mortality rates, an important determinant of life expectancy at birth, have been declining everywhere, but significant gradients remain Deaths per 1,000 births 103.6 102.0 –33.0 –33.0 70.6 68.9 93.4 –26.9 66.5 85.0 –22.8 62.2 62.4 –14.4 48.0 2007 2017 81.2 –21.4 59.8 79.0 –27.7 51.3 72.7 –25.5 47.2 63.9 –24.1 39.8 54.0 –20.8 33.2 55.3 –18.4 36.9 48.0 –19.0 29.0 40.1 –15.8 24.3 34.1 –11.3 22.8 27.5 –10.3 17.2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Low human development Medium human development High/very high human development Note: Data for 2007 refer to the most recent year available during 1998–2007, and data for 2017 refer to the most recent year available for 2008–2017.
Data are simple averages across human development groups.

Only one very high human development country (Kazakhstan) is included in the sample.

Quintiles reflecting within-country distribution of assets are grouped by human development groups.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
FIGURE 1.10 Mortality: Convergence in basic capabilities, divergence in enhanced capabilities Concentration curves (2015) Probability of death by age 5, 2015 Probability of death at ages 70–79, 2015 Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0 Perfect equality 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 20 40 60 80 Percent of population 100 0 20 40 60 Percent of population 80 100 Probability of death by age 5 Change between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) Probability of death at ages 70–79 Change between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) Human development group Low Medium High Very high Human development group Low Medium High Very high –0.3 –1.1 –2.6 –4.5 –3.6 –3.9 –4.0 –5.5 Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys and United Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 41 Education is expanding in most countries, across all levels of development.

But inequality remains in both enrolment among younger generations and adults’ education attainment studies.

In the United States higher income is associated with greater longevity.

And inequality of life expectancy has increased in recent years.
Between 2001 and 2014 individuals in the top 5 percent of the income distribution gained more than 2 years of life expectancy at age 40, while lifespans in the bottom 5 percent re- mained nearly unchanged.32 The importance of socioeconomic factors is highlighted by the fact that life expectancy at age 40 among low-income people (the bottom quartile) varies by about 4.5 years across cities: Low-income individuals in affluent cities with highly educated populations and high government expenditures, such as New York and San Francisco, tend to live longer (and to have healthier lifestyles) than elsewhere.
Those cities also experienced the largest gains in life expectancy among poor people during the 2000s.
Finally, differences in life expectancy limit redistribution because low-income individ- uals obtain benefits from social programmes for fewer years than high-income individuals do.33 Other studies show increasing inequalities in life expectancy in Canada,34 Denmark,35 Finland,36 Japan,37 the United Kingdom,38 the United States39 and some Western European countries.40 The literature on developing and emerging countries is very limited.41 In Chile the increase in inequalities in life expectancy at older ages between 2002 and 2017 is linked to the socioeconomic status of municipalities (box 1.4).
These emerging inequalities reflect how ad- vances in longevity are leaving broad segments of people behind.

More detailed analyses are necessary to identify determinants and policy actions to ensure that the fruits of progress are within reach of everyone.
But if these trends are not reversed, they will lead to increased in- equality in the progressivity of public policies focused on supporting older citizens.42 Education: Increasing access but with widening inequality in capabilities Through education students from disadvan- taged backgrounds can improve their chances of social mobility.
But for children who leave the school system early or do not receive a high-quality education, gaps in learning can become a trap with lifetime and even inter- generational implications.43 Inequalities in education are widespread Education is expanding in most countries, across all levels of development.

But inequality remains in both enrolment among younger generations and adults’ education attainment.
On average, the lower a country’s human development, the larger the gap in access to education (figure 1.11).44 For low and very high human development countries the gaps in enrolment ratios range from 20 points for pri- mary education to 58 points for secondary and tertiary education to 61 points for preprimary education.

Gaps in access to education among children and youth are also large within countries (fig- ure 1.12).
Across levels of human development, the bottom income quintiles nearly always have less access to education, except for pri- mary education in high and very high human development countries, where access is already universal.

Catching up in the basics: Convergence in primary education but not fast enough Inequality is usually smaller in primary and secondary education, and most countries are on track to achieve universal primary education, which represents the potential acquisition of basic capabilities.
Enrolment in secondary education is nearly universal in very high human development countries, while in low human development countries only about a third of children are enrolled.

The success in reducing inequality is captured by concentration curves, showing equality as proximity to the diagonal (figure 1.13, top panel).

Inequality in primary and secondary education has been falling over the past dec- ade.
People in countries with initially low enrolment (predominantly low and medium human development countries) have seen the highest increases on average (see figure 1.13, bottom panel).

Trends in education attain- ment are similar: There is a strong reduction in gaps in primary education (figure 1.14).

But these are averages, and convergence is not equally strong in all contexts because some groups are being left behind (as discussed later in this chapter).
42 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 1.4 Divergence in life expectancy at older ages in Chile Chile has historically been an unequal country in terms of income, with a Gini coefficient of 0.50 in 2017 (of- ficial figures from the CASEN Survey).

For life expec- tancy at older ages, inequality is significant as well.
In Santiago Metropolitan Region, people living in the wealthier comunas (municipalities) have a higher life expectancy at age 65—more than 2 years on average (those at the upper right in the figure).

There has been generalized improvement in life expectancy over the last 15 years (between the 2002 and 2017 censuses).

However, the differences between comunas are per- sistent and, indeed, have increased.
Today, in terms of life expectancy at older ages, there is little overlap between the situation of the wealthier comunas and the rest.

There are multiple implications of the divergence in life expectancy at older ages.

First, they reflect the unevenness of progress in health across the country.

Advances in healthy life are taking place, but they are not reaching all social groups and territories equitably.
Second, there are potentially regressive distributive effects through the pension system, which ties retire- ment benefits to the amount of money accumulated in an individual savings account and to the life expectancy after retirement —that is currently common across so- cial groups.
This example shows the importance of comprehen- sive analysis of inequalities using the human develop- ment lens, going beyond income (assessing the health dimension), beyond averages (looking at disaggregated data in different areas) and beyond today (covering in- equalities expected to become more important in the years to come).

This new look at emerging inequalities is essential for the design of policies.
People living in the wealthiest comunas in the Santiago Metropolitan Region have, on average, increased their already higher life expectancy at older ages more than people living in poorer comunas have Life expectancy at age 65, 2002 (years) Life expectancy at age 65, 2017 (years) Las Condes Vitacura Lo Barnechea Ñuñoa La Reina Providencia 24 22 20 18 16 Las Condes Providencia Vitacura Ñuñoa La Reina Lo Barnechea 24 22 20 18 16 12.5 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.5 12.5 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.5 Log of household income per capita, 2017 Log of household income per capita, 2017 Source: Based on Hsu and Tapia (2019).
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 43 FIGURE 1.11 The lower a country’s human development, the larger the gap in access to education Preprimary Primary Enrolment ratio (net) 75.3 68.7 77.9 70.1 92.3 93.3 95.2 95.4 84.3 86.5 Enrolment ratio (net) 16.4 10.3 60.5 50.9 41.6 33.1 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group 2007 2017 Secondary Tertiary Enrolment ratio (net) Enrolment ratio (gross) 91.0 87.9 78.8 72.4 59.4 48.8 32.8 22.4 66.8 55.1 44.6 33.4 20.1 12.7 8.3 5.3 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Note: Data are simple averages of country-level data.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.
FIGURE 1.12 Gaps in access to education among children and youth are also large within countries Attendance rate (percent) Primary (net) Secondary (net) Tertiary (gross) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Low Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Medium Human development group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 High/very high Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Low Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Medium Human development group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 High/very high Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Low Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Medium Human development group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 High/very high Note: Only one very high human development country (Montenegro) is included in the sample.
Data are for 2016 or the most recent year available.

Quintiles are based on distribution of ownership of assets within countries.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, United Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and the World Bank.
44 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 1.13 Inequality in primary and secondary education has been falling over the past decade Inequalities in basic capabilities are lower and falling (convergence): This is the case of enrolment ratios in primary and secondary education.

Low human development countries are catching up with high and very high human development countries.
But inequalities in enhanced capabilities are large and growing (divergence): Inequalities in enrolment ratios in preprimary education and tertiary education are high or growing.
Concentration curves (2017) Primary Secondary Preprimary Tertiary Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Perfect equality Percent of population Percent of population Percent of population Percent of population Basic Enhanced Change in enrolment ratio between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) Primary Secondary Preprimary Tertiary 10.4 10.5 6.4 3.1 9.5 8.5 7.8 6.0 7.4 3.0 11.2 11.6 6.6 2.2 1.0 0.2 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Low Medium High Very high Human development group Low Medium High Very high Human development group Low Medium High Very high Human development group Note: Concentration curves are ordered by Human Development Index value.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on country-level data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 45 FIGURE 1.14 Dynamics of education attainment, 2007–2017 Declining inequality Increasing inequality Percent of population with a primary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) Percent of population with a tertiary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) 9.2 8.6 5.3 6.2 5.9 7.1 3.0 1.1 Low Medium High Very high Low Medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Basic Convergence Enhanced Divergence Percent of population with a primary education Percent of population with a tertiary education Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) 12 Change between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points) 14 Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Developed 10 8 6 4 2 0 East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Developed Latin America and the Caribbean Arab States South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 Percent of population with a primary education, 2007 Percent of population with a tertiary education, 2007 Note: Convergence and divergence are tested for in two ways: by using the slope of an equation that regresses the change over 2007–2017 with respect to the initial value in 2007 (with ordinary least squares, robust and median quantile regressions) and by comparing the gains of very high human development countries and the gains of low and medium human development countries.
For attainment of primary education there is convergence according to both metrics (p-values below 1 percent in all regressions and below 5 percent in the comparison between human development groups).
For attainment of tertiary education there is divergence according to both metrics, with different significance levels in regressions: the parameter is positive in all cases; it is not statistically significant in the ordinary least squares regression, but it is statistically significant in the robust regression (p-value below 10 percent) and the median quintile regression (p-value below 1 percent) and for the comparison between human development groups (p-value below 5 percent).
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on country-level data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics.

46 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Growing inequalities in enhanced capabilities: Gaps in tertiary education and in preprimary education are wide and increasing Inequalities in preprimary education and post- secondary education are high and, in many places, growing.
Concentration curves reflect how these achievements are more unevenly dis- tributed for preprimary and tertiary education (see figure 1.13, right side).

Moreover, the gaps are growing on average: Low human develop- ment countries—already behind—tend to have slower progress.

These trends—of convergence in basic education and divergence in enhanced educa- tion—are not destiny; there is heterogeneity, reflecting space for policies.
Taking information about attainment, for instance, East Asia and the Pacific and Europe and Central Asia have made notable progress in expanding tertiary ed- ucation, closing in on developed countries (see figure 1.14).

However, the other regions follow the overall trend, with Sub-Saharan Africa catching up very strongly in primary education and lagging behind in tertiary education.
Data for 47 developing countries show divergence in the acquisition of enhanced ca- pabilities: Quintiles with higher access to post- secondary education 10 years ago have seen the largest gains (figure 1.15).

The unevenness in distribution has conse- quences for human development.
The largest gaps appear in the formation of enhanced ca- pabilities, which are the areas with the highest returns: in preprimary education, with the highest social returns,45 and in tertiary educa- tion, with the highest private returns.46 This analysis considers preprimary education an enhanced achievement because of its impor- tance and because societies have come to ac- knowledge its importance only in recent years.
The inequalities in the formation of enhanced capabilities pave the way to future inequality throughout the lifecycle, particularly in access to work opportunities and income.47 The distinction between basic and enhanced capabilities in education depends on the effect of various achievements on what people can do.
The large and widening gaps not only show differentiated access to tertiary education and its direct impact on access to learning; they also determine inequalities in the availability of pro- fessionals between and within countries, with effects on multiple areas of human development.

For instance, the inequalities in the availability of physicians are widening between countries.
High and very high human development coun- tries had significantly more physicians per capita in 2006 and have, on average, increased the gaps between themselves and low and medium hu- man development countries (figure 1.16).
FIGURE 1.15 Inequalities in postsecondary education within countries are growing Data for 47 developing countries show divergence in the acquisition of enhanced capabilities: Quintiles with higher access to postsecondary education 10 years ago have seen the largest gains Mean change in gross attendance ratio 16 12 8 4 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Low Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Medium Human development group High/very high Note: Data are simple averages for each human development group.
Only one very high human development country (Montenegro) is included in the sample.

Quintiles are based on distribution of ownership of assets within countries.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from Demographic and Health Surveys and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys processed by the World Bank.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 47 While more than 90 percent of children in the world today receive some schooling, fewer than half of those in school achieve minimum proficiency in reading and mathematics by the end of primary school FIGURE 1.16 Widening inequalities in the availability of physicians between countries Physicians per 1,000 people 2016 2006 0.3 3.1 2.7 0.2 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Note: Data are simple averages for each human development group.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on country-level data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.

Growing inequalities in more empowering areas: The learning crisis Education should mean ensuring that schooling leads to learning.

But the great education ex- pansion has not translated into commensurate gains in learning, where large inequalities exist.

And much remains to be done—in many coun- tries achievement in learning is disturbingly low.
While more than 90 percent of children in the world today receive some schooling, fewer than half of those in school achieve minimum proficiency in reading and mathematics by the end of primary school.48 The rapid expansion of education in devel- oping countries has led to the enrolment of millions of first-generation learners, who lack support from their families when they fall behind in the curriculum.
Students who fall behind may struggle if the level of classroom instruction (based on textbooks that follow ambitious curricular standards) is considerably above their learning level.49 These problems are exacerbated at higher grades, if students are automatically promoted to the next grade with- out having acquired foundational skills.

Low skills continue to undermine career opportu- nities—and earnings—long after students leave school.
In nearly all countries, family background— including parent education, socioeconomic status and conditions at home (such as access to books)—remains the strongest predictor of learning outcomes.50 The learning gradient compounds inequality over inequality: Those from disadvantaged groups not only have fewer opportunities to re- ceive education; they also learn much less once in the classroom (figure 1.17).
These socio- economic inequalities have remained high and stable over the past two decades in countries with a longer history of standard data.51 Convergence in the basics is not benefiting everyone: Identifying those furthest behind This chapter has documented convergence across basic capabilities.

But does that imply that the rising tide is lifting all boats?

This section shows that, despite convergence, many people are excluded and remain stuck at the very bottom of society.
Convergence in basic capabilities is not absolute—advances in health and education within countries continue to leave many behind.

Average convergence is not a sufficient con- dition to leave no one behind.
Convergence can be characterized into four cases, from the point of view of a particular group: FIGURE 1.17 Harmonized test scores across human development groups Harmonized test scores 600 500 400 300 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Note: Each box plots the middle 50 percent of the distribution; the central line is the median; the extreme lines are the approximate minimum and maximum of the distribution.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on country-level data from World Bank (2018b).

48 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 • Absolute convergence: the group catches up with respect to all those above.

• Weak convergence: a group catches up on average with those at the top.

• Simple divergence: a group records very slow progress, so the average gap with those at the top increases.
• Full divergence: there is a setback, with an increasing gap with respect to the rest and the initial situation.

Two indicators from the HDI that are more linked to basic capabilities (life expectancy at birth and mean years of schooling) can illus- trate the limits of average convergence.

The analysis is based on the share of the population in low, medium and high human development countries converging (or not) to very high human development achievements (table 1.1).
Over 2007–2017 there was significant con- vergence, but it was partial (only half the population) and mostly weak (only 0.3 percent achieved absolute full convergence).

The differ- ence between absolute convergence and weak convergence was consequential: the “lost” pro- gress in terms of life expectancy at birth was 2.8 years and in terms of mean years of schooling was 0.7 year.
By contrast, 36 percent of the pop- ulation was in a mixed zone, with convergence in one variable and divergence in the other (yellow cells in table 1.1).

And 14 percent of the population was in the divergence zone (red cells in table 1.1).

The partial and weak convergence has impli- cations for the future and for the achievement of the SDGs.
Today, 5.4 million children, more than half of them newborns, do not sur- vive their first five years of life;52 262 million TABLE 1.1 children are out of school at either the primary or secondary level; and nearly 600 million people around the globe still live on less than $1.90 a day.53 This suggests that those with low human development face a double challenge.

Part of the population has not met the basic set of human development capabilities in their life expectancy, schooling and income.
And a larger part is also falling behind the enhanced capability set that revolves around higher thresholds of educational achievement, labour and digital skills.

Despite greater access to immunizations and affordable medical technologies, child mortali- ty rates in the poorest households of the world’s poorest countries remain high (figure 1.18).

The highest rates are concentrated in low and medium human development countries.
And there are vast disparities within countries: The poorest 20 percent in middle income Guatemala have the same average mortality rate as in low income Senegal.

At current rates of progress there will be around 3 million child deaths in 2030.

Most would be the result of eminently preventable causes rooted in poverty and unequal access to quality health care.

Around 850,000 will reflect the gap between the SDG target and the outcomes on the current trajectory.
Given that the ratio of deaths between the poorest and the richest is more than 5 to 1, accelerating progress for the poorest children would act as a powerful catalyst for overall progress—and this illustrates the power of convergence by moving up those at the bottom, which would save 4.7 million lives between 2019 and 2030 (figure 1.19).
Limited convergence in health and education, 2007–2017 (percent of population in low, medium and high human development countries) Mean years of schooling Full divergence Divergence Weak convergence Absolute convergence e f i L y c n a t c e p x e h t r i b t a Full divergence Divergence Weak convergence Absolute convergence 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.0 3.5 10.6 12.9 1.4 2.7 16.4 42.8 1.7 0.2 1.7 4.3 0.3 Note: Estimates are population weighted with respect to performance of very high development countries.
Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on subnational data from Permanyer and Smits (2019).
Today, 5.4 million children, more than half of them newborns, do not survive their first five years of life; at current rates of progress there will be around 3 million child deaths in 2030 Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 49 FIGURE 1.18 Child mortality converges with human development, but not for the poorest 20 percent Under-ﬁve mortality rate, 2017 (per 1,000 live births) Low human development Poorest 20% Mali Richest 20% 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 About 262 million children and youth were out of school in 2017 Medium human development High human development Very high human development Senegal Guatemala 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Human development index, 2018 (value) Note: Colours represent human development thresholds.
Each bubble represents a country, and the size of the bubble is proportional to the country’s population.

Source: Human Development Report Office estimates.
FIGURE 1.19 Some 846,000 of 3.1 million child deaths are preventable if the bottom 20 percent converge to the country average Average rate of reduction needs to accelerate from 2.7 percent to 4.5 percent, saving 4.7 million lives Under-ﬁve mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) Rate of reduction for poorest 20 percent needs to accelerate from 2.8 percent to 5.5 percent 150 100 50 Sustainable Development Goal minimum threshold target 0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 846,000 deaths 2.1 million deaths Average Poorest 20 percent Richest 20 percent Source: Fiala and Watkins 2019.
50 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 The leading causes of death among children under age 5 remain unaddressed.
They include preterm birth complications (18 percent of the global total), pneumonia (16 percent), compli- cations during birth (12 percent), with congen- ital anomalies, diarrhoea, neonatal sepsis and malaria each accounting for a further 5–10 per- cent.54 Targeted interventions in tuberculosis, pneumonia and diarrhoea have some of the highest return for reducing under-five mortal- ity in the developing world.
And three-quarters of deaths among those ages 0–14 are from communicable, perinatal and nutritional con- ditions.55 Lack of data is also an issue.

Targeted interventions benefit from real-time record keeping, using home-based records to supple- ment health provider registries.

Early adopters of electronic medical records—Peru, Kenya, Malawi and Haiti—show how information systems can help with micro-targeting of those furthest behind.
Staying in school remains a challenge at the bottom of the global distribution.

About 262 million children and youth were out of On current trends the out-of-school rate will drop from 18 percent in 2017 to 14 percent in 2030.

A deviation from the target, representing 225 million children school in 2017, 64 million of primary school age, 61 million of lower secondary school age and 138 million of upper secondary age.56 Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rates of exclusion.
And simply attending school does not guarantee that children are learning.

Over half the world’s children cannot read and understand a simple story by age 10.57 As with mortality rates, there are wide disparities within countries, showing that being at the bottom of the national income distribution sharply increases the chance of dropping out (figure 1.20).58 On current trends the out-of-school rate will drop from 18 percent in 2017 to 14 percent in 2030.
A deviation from the target, representing 225 million children59 starting their life with a hardly reversible disadvantage.

The mixed picture of progress can be seen through the lens of the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index, produced by the United Nations Development Programme and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative.

Today 1.3 billion people in developing countries are multi- dimensionally poor.
In a detailed study of 10 countries with comparable data over time, nine saw a reduction in the multidimensional pov- erty rate in recent years.

And in nine of them the improvement of the bottom 40 percent FIGURE 1.20 was faster than the improvement of the total population.

This suggests overall convergence.

However, the situation is heterogeneous when looking beyond the averages.
While in India the territories that were lagging behind were able to catch up quite significantly—notably Bihar and Jharkhand—in Ethiopia some of the poorer territories were the ones with the slow- est progress, notably Oromia.60 Lack of human security in a broad sense is one of the factors behind divergence in particu- lar territories (box 1.5).
Human development for those at the bottom of the distribution is thwarted by shocks—income, health, conflict or disaster—that make already vulnerable households more vulnerable.
Risks refer to events possibly occurring that can damage wel- fare, and vulnerability can be understood as the (ex ante) magnitude of the threat to human de- velopment outcomes.61 Individuals and house- holds can reduce their vulnerability—that is, they can strengthen their ability to deal with shocks when they happen—by having access to assets that can soften the blow.

The stakes at the bottom are high.


Shocks can affect people’s actions in ways that dimin- ish human development potential over the long run (for instance taking children out of school), but they can also push individuals and households into extreme deprivation without much notice.
School dropout rates converge with human development, but not for the poorest 20 percent Towards enhanced agency Children out of primary school (percent) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Lowest quintile Highest quintile Lowest quintile Highest quintile Lowest quintile Highest quintile Low Medium High/very high Human development group Note: Each box plots the middle 50 percent of the distribution; the central line is the median; the extreme lines are the approximate minimum and maximum of the distribution.
Source: Human Development Report Office estimates.

The preceding section presented some stylized facts about inequalities in human develop- ment—going beyond income.

But the analysis of a few dimensions using a limited set of stand- ard indicators is far from exhaustive.

Relevant inequalities in human development likely vary across geographies, cultures and time.

Indeed, the people-centred human development ap- proach is pluralist—admitting different valua- tions and priorities—and open-ended.
How best to manage this complexity—the multidimensional and changing nature of ine- qualities—to explore the inequalities emerging in the 21st century?

This section addresses this question by looking at two aspects that bear on people’s agency, supplementing the aspects linked to Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 51 BOX 1.5 Crises and divergence Economic crises are an important factor behind divergence in economic and social conditions.
Countries suffering re- cessions often take several years to recover.1 Moreover, within countries, crises tend to hurt the most vulnerable.

In a study of Latin American countries all economic crises were followed by an increase in the poverty rate, and most were followed by an increase in inequality.2 Disasters linked to natural hazards can have dev- astating impacts and harm human development, as discussed in chapter 5.

And such disasters will be- come more common as the climate crisis worsens.
The effects can be truly devastating.

On 14 March 2019 tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall at the port of Beira, Mozambique, before moving across the region.

Millions of people in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were hit by Southern Africa’s worst natural disaster in at least two decades.3 Six weeks later Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in northern Mozambique—the first time in re- corded history that two strong tropical cyclones hit the country in the same season.
The cyclones left around 1.85 million people in Mozambique alone in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

The cyclones were only the beginning of what has become an education and health disaster.

Around 3,400 classrooms had been destroyed or damaged in Mozambique, with close to 305,000 children losing out on lessons at school after the floods.4 Malaria cas- es rose to 27,000, and cholera cases to almost 7,000.
About 1.6 million people received food assistance, and close to 14,000 people had to live in displacement cen- tres.

The cumulative effects of the storms will be fully understood only over the next few years.

Conflicts are also devastating for human devel- opment.

Before the escalation of conflict in Yemen in 2015, the country ranked 153 in human development, 138 in extreme poverty, 147 in life expectancy and 172 in education attainment.
The conflict has reversed the pace of development—with nearly a quarter of a million people killed directly by fighting and indirectly through lack of food, infrastructure and health services.

Some 60 percent of those killed are children under age 5.

The long-term impacts make it among the most destructive conflicts since the end of the Cold War (see figure) and have already set back human development in the coun- try by 21 years.
If the conflict continues through 2022, development would be set back 26 years—more than one generation.

If the conflict persists through 2030, the impact grows to nearly 40 years.

Conflict has already set back Yemen’s human development by 21 years Human Development Index (years set back at the end of the conﬂict) 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2019 1998 (21-year setback) 2022 1996 (26-year setback) 2030 1991 (39-year setback) Source: Moyer and others 2019.

Notes 1.
Notes 1.

Unemployment takes more than four years to recover; output, around two years (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and in many cases even more (Cerra and Saxena 2008).

2.

Lustig 2000.

3.

UNICEF 2019b.

4.

See UNICEF (2019b).

inequalities in capabilities discussed until now.

As noted, capabilities are determinants of well-being and are required for agency—but are not the sole determinants.
Thus, this section first considers how inequality, often in the form of discrimination, deprives people of dignity.

Inequalities hurt because they restrict access to the fruits of progress, with perverse effects on social mobility and long-term social progress (chapter 2), and because they erode human dignity—and with it social recognition and respect, which may limit agency.
Second, since inequality is a social and relational concept, it responds to comparisons across social groups 52 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 The search for dignity is crucial in defining the constitutive aspects of development in the 21st century and between individuals.

So, social perceptions can bring information about the social differ- ences that matter to people, given that human actions are also shaped by perceptions of fair- ness towards what happens to one’s own and to others.
Inequalities and the search for dignity The search for dignity is crucial in defining the constitutive aspects of development in the 21st century.

This is true for both basic and enhanced capabilities and achievements, and it is a powerful insight to explore emerging sources of exclusion—sources hard to cap- ture through indicators typically reported by national statistical offices.
The search for dignity is explicit in the “central capabilities” of Martha Nussbaum.62 Amartya Sen, in turn, emphasizes that, in defining minimally re- quired freedoms, what matters is not only the effect of directly observable outcomes—such as income—but also the potential restric- tions in the capability to function in society without shame.63 He follows Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, highlighting the role of relative deprivations—with symbolic social relevance, even if not essential for biological subsistence—as defining basic necessities.
This is one of the roots of moving targets in development.

And indeed, human dignity has been a central element in the evolution of the global consensus about universally shared ambitions, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 to the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015.
The search for dignity can also be crucial for policymaking, particularly when recognition (in the sense of equal treatment) is required to complement other pro-equity policies, in- cluding redistribution.64 One example is pro- gress in recognition and rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people.

The ability to appear in public with- out shame is severely undermined when a person’s identity is socially penalized.
The exclusion of LGBTI people takes the form of discrimination in work and in communities.

An environment hostile to LGBTI people forces individuals to choose between facing oppression and hiding their sexual identity and preferences, limiting their possibilities of open social interaction and personal realiza- tion (box 1.6).

Dignity as equal treatment and non- discrimination can be even more important than imbalances in the distribution of income.
In Chile, with its very unequal income distri- bution, inequality in income appeared high in the ranking of people’s concerns (53 per- cent of people said they were bothered by income inequality) in a 2017 United Nations Development Programme survey.65 But they expressed even more discontent with unequal access to health (68 percent), unequal access to education (67 percent) and unequal respect and dignity in the way people are treated (66 percent).
Of the 41 percent of people who said they had been treated with disrespect over the last year, 43 percent said it was be- cause of their social class, 41 percent said it was because they are female, 28 percent said it was because of where they live and 27 percent said it was because of how they dress.
In this context, progress in policies to advance agency and reduce shame and discrimination appear as important as those to increase material conditions.66 In Japan the concept and meas- urement of dignity also signal inequalities that other material indicators cannot capture (box 1.7).
Lack of equal treatment and nondiscrimina- tion are also reflected in inequalities between groups, which are known as horizontal ine- qualities.67 Horizontal inequalities are unfair, as they are rooted in people’s characteristics, beyond their control.
The SDGs encourage examining horizontal inequalities through dis- aggregation that spotlights priority groups— those traditionally disadvantaged by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other char- acteristics relevant in national contexts.68 Horizontal inequalities can reflect delib- erate discrimination in policies, laws and actions—or hidden mechanisms embedded in social norms, unconscious biases or the functioning of markets.
Often the cultural currents that drive horizontal inequality are deep enough to perpetuate it despite policies to ban or reduce it, as in India (box 1.8).
In Latin America horizontal inequalities appear connected to a culture of privilege, with roots in colonial times.69 Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 53 BOX 1.6 Social exclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association Across the globe, lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) people continue to face social exclusion in differ- ent spheres of life on the basis of their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics.
Restrictive legal frameworks, discrimination and violence based on those qualities (perpetrated by state and non- state actors) and the lack of effective public policy are among the main causes behind the exclusion of LGBTI people.1 Restrictive legal frameworks Criminalization is a major barrier for LGBTI people’s de- velopment.
As of May 2019, 69 UN Member States still criminalize consensual same-sex sexual acts between adults, and at least 38 of them still actively arrest, pros- ecute and sentence people to prison, corporal punish- ment or even death based on these laws.2 Moreover, many UN Member States also have laws criminalizing diverse forms of gender expression and cross-dressing, which are used to persecute trans and gender-diverse people.3 The lack of legal gender recognition4 is one of the most challenging barriers to trans and gender-diverse people’s social inclusion.
When personal documents do not match the holder’s appearance, it becomes a huge obstacle to carry out common activities in daily life, such as opening a bank account, applying for a scholarship, finding a job and renting or buying property.

It also expos- es trans people to the scrutiny of strangers, distrust and even violence.
In many countries legal gender recognition is granted only under pathologizing requirements such as surgeries, invasive treatments/inspections or third-party submissions.5 Furthermore, when antidiscrimination laws do not expressly protect people based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics, LGBTI people are unable to seek justice against acts of discrimination that may prevent them from accessing vital services, including health care, education, housing and social security, and employment.
Discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics Suffering violence and discrimination can deeply af- fect a person’s ability to lead a productive and fulfilling life.
There is abundant research showing how LGBTI people suffer from erasure, negation, discrimination and violence:6 A spiral of rejection may start at a very young age within the family and continue in school,7 employment,8 health care facilities and public spaces.9 State officials can be the main perpetrators of violence and abuse against LGBTI people, carrying out arbitrary arrests, blackmail, humiliation, harassment and even forced medical examinations.
LGBTI people also face exclusion when seeking access to justice, which con- tributes to under-reporting of violence against LGBTI people and low rates of prosecution of perpetrators of such violence because LGBTI people are often isolated from state institutions for fear of self-incrimination and further abuses.10 Lack of effective public policy The third main group of causes of social exclusion of LGBTI people has to do with state inaction on public pol- icy issues of sexual and gender diversity.11 As with other social groups that have been subjected to protracted discrimination, full social inclusion of LGBTI people requires more than removing discriminatory legislation and enacting legal protections.
Effective public policies designed and implemented to tackle, reduce and even- tually eradicate social prejudice and stigma are required to counter the effects of systemic exclusion, especially among those living in poverty.

Affirmative action may also be necessary.

Intersex people also face particular forms of ex- clusion that differ from those experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans people.
In particular, they are often subjected to unnecessary medical interventions at birth, characterized as intersex genital mutilation.12 These interventions are often conducted in accord- ance with medical protocols that allow health profes- sionals to mutilate intersex bodies without consent to modify atypical sex characteristics, usually when victims are infants.
Such traumatizing and intrusive experiences can extend throughout childhood and adolescence and can cause severe mental, sexual and physical suffering.13 This is usually compounded by the total secrecy about intersex conditions, lack of information among family members and societal prejudice.14 Source: International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association and United Nations Development Programme.

Notes 1.

ILGA 2019; OutRight Action International 2019.

2.

ILGA 2019.

3.
2.

ILGA 2019.

3.

Greef 2019; ILGA 2019.

4.

Legal gender recognition refers to the right of trans people to legally change their gender markers and names on official documents.

For a survey of the legislation in force with regard to legal gender recognition in more than 110 countries, see Chiam, Duffy and Gil (2017).

5.

Chiam, Duffy and Gil 2017.

6.

Harper and Schneider 2003.

7.

Almeida and others 2009.

8.

Pizer and others 2012; Sears and Mallory 2011.

9.

Eliason, Dibble and Robertson 2011.


10.

ILGA 2019.

11.

Oleske 2015.

12.

Wilson 2012.

13. WHO Study Group on Female Genital Mutilation and Obstetric Outcome 2006.

14.

Human Rights Watch 2017.


54 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Subjective measures consistently indicate that many people around the world find current inequality too high BOX 1.7 Inequality in human security in Japan: The role of dignity In Japan the Sustainable Development Goals present an opportunity to revisit the country’s development prior- ities with a people-centred perspective.

What defines deprivation after most material shortages have been overcome?
The Human Security Index has three dimen- sions of human security: life, livelihood and dignity.

Life and livelihood are linked to peace of mind and feelings of safety.

Dignity aims for a society where every person can be proud of himself or herself.

In Japan data were collected on 47 prefectures, using a battery of 91 indicators.
The dignity dimension was measured through 26 indicators: 7 about the sit- uation of children and women, 6 about trust in the public sector, 2 about life satisfaction and 11 about community, civic engagement and sound absorption of migrants.

Early results show significant inequalities in Japan across all three main dimensions.

But the dig- nity subindex shows a lower average than the life and livelihood subindices.

From this perspective the greatest space for improvement would be in promot- ing dignity.
Source: Based on Takasu (2019).

Uncovering what is behind perceptions of inequalities in the 21st century The proportion of people desiring more in- come equality has risen over the past decade (see figure 1.1).

Inequality is considered a ma- jor challenge in 44 countries surveyed by Pew Research.
A median of 60 percent of respond- ents in developing countries and 56 percent in developed countries agree that “the gap be- tween the rich and poor is a very big problem” facing their countries.70 Remarkably, these feel- ings are shared across the political spectrum.
Similarly, according to the latest perception surveys in the European Union, an overwhelm- ing majority think that income differences are too great (84 percent) and agree that their gov- ernments should take measures to reduce them (81 percent).71 In Latin America the perception of unfairness in the distribution of wealth has increased since 2012, returning to levels of the late 1990s, with only 16 percent of respond- ents assessing the distribution as fair.72 This is not to suggest that this is the only, or even the most important, issue that people are worried about—but it is clear evidence of the great, and increasing, desire for more equality.
These perceptions matter and may depend on whether the broader context is one of stagnating or expanding incomes.

Perceptions of inequality—rather than actual levels of inequality—drive society’s preferences for redistribution.73 In Argentina people who be- lieved themselves to be higher in the income distribution than they actually were tended to want more redistribution when informed of their true ranking.74 The way societies process inequalities is com- plex.
Studies in behavioural economics have quantified how much people tend to underes- timate inequalities (see spotlight 1.2 at the end of the chapter).

And social psychology has in- vestigated the mechanisms and socio structural conditions that determine the perception of inequalities, the perception of inequalities as unfair outcomes and the response to those per- ceptions.

This literature gives new insights into why people come to terms with very high ine- quality from a social perspective.
First, people might accept or even contribute to inequality through self-segregation following a desire for harmony.

Second, motivational narratives can justify inequality, and stereotypes and social norms have enormous influence (box 1.9).

This is a consistent and powerful complement to the theory of adaptive preferences—based on the individual’s tendency to underestimate depri- vations to make them bearable—now from a social point of view.
In summary, subjective measures consistently indicate that many people around the world find current inequality too high.

Perceptions data—when the limitations are well under- stood—can complement objective indicators.

Indeed, some of the frontier measures of capa- bilities and agency are subjective indicators.75 Perceptions of inequality tend to underesti- mate the actual situation, so at high levels, they have particular value as a red flag.
Some of the objective indicators of inequality—such as the Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 55 BOX 1.8 Horizontal inequalities in India: Different dynamics in basic and enhanced capabilities India is a fast-growing economy.

Its gross national income per capita has more than doubled since 2005.

Thanks to a mix of fast economic growth and social policies, there has been a sharp reduction in multidimensional pov- erty.
Between 2005/2006 and 2015/2016 the number of multidimensionally poor people in India fell by more than 271 million.

On average, progress was more intense among the poorest states and the poorest groups.1 Despite progress on human development indica- tors, horizontal inequalities persist, and their dynamics follow the same pattern described in the context of vertical inequalities in human development: significant gaps, convergence in basic capabilities and divergence in enhanced capabilities.
First, the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes underperform the rest of so- ciety across human development indicators, including education attainment and access to digital technologies (box figures 1 and 2).2 These groups have suffered from stigma and exclusion for centuries.
Modern India has tried to constitutionally redress the disparities through affirmative action, positive discrimination and reserva- tion policies for these groups.3 Second, since 2005/06 there has been a reduction in inequalities in basic areas of human development.

For example, there is a convergence of education at- tainment, with historically marginalized groups catching up with the rest of the population in the proportion of people with five or more years of education.
Similarly, there is convergence in access to and uptake of mobile phones.

Third, there has been an increase in inequalities in enhanced areas of human development, such as access to computers and to 12 or more years of education: Groups that were more advantaged in 2005/2006 have made the most gains, and marginalized groups are mov- ing forward but in comparative terms are lagging further behind, despite progress.
Box figure 1 India: Horizontal inequality in education of working-age people (ages 15–49) Population with 5 or more years of education, 2015 (percent) 78.7 60.7 83.1 66.3 87.1 77.9 68.8 50.2 Population with 12 or more years of education, 2015 (percent) 38.7 30.4 29.4 21.2 23.2 15.7 17.5 10.6 Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Men Women Change in population with 5 or more years of education between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) Change in population with 12 or more years of education between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) 20.6 18.0 20.0 13.3 17.8 10.4 11.3 7.3 8.8 6.7 11.4 10.8 11.1 10.5 9.8 9.4 Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Demographic and Health Survey data.
(continued) 56 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 1.8 (CONTINUED) Horizontal inequalities in India: Different dynamics in basic and enhanced capabilities Box figure 2 India: Horizontal inequality in access to technology Households with access (percent) Mobile, 2015 Computer, 2015 87.8 92.0 94.7 77.6 16.7 8.0 4.8 3.0 Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Mobile, change between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) Computer, change between 2005 and 2015 (percentage points) 79.1 77.4 72.6 10.2 6.0 66.2 4.0 2.3 A shift in people’s aspirations as a result of individual and social achievements can be a natural part of the development process Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Scheduled Tribe Scheduled Caste Other Backward Class Other Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Demographic and Health Survey data.
Notes 1.

See UNDP and OPHI 2019.

2.

See IIPS and Macro International (2007) and IIPS and IFC International (2017).

3.

Mosse 2018.
Gini coefficient in developing countries—do not yet capture this reality, and it is plausible that those indicators might be missing part of the story.76 The empirical discussion in this report provides numerous examples showing how going beyond income, beyond averages (and summary measures such as the Gini co- efficient) and beyond today in measurement (capturing elements expected to become more important) makes a difference in uncovering the growing inequalities that might be behind those perceptions.
Finally, increasing demand for equality in perception surveys has concrete consequences for society.

No matter the degree of subjectivity and potential distortion, these opinions have the chance to become part of the political dis- cussion and to stimulate action.

There is an ur- gent need for evidence-based policy approaches to respond to new demands.
Moving targets and 21st century inequalities A shift in people’s aspirations as a result of indi- vidual and social achievements can be a natural part of the development process.

This moving target is inherently relative and, therefore, re- quires a more flexible way to assess inequality.

A definition of inequality from a few decades ago may no longer be relevant.
In a world without extreme poverty, for example, the poverty line will inevitably rise—indeed, poverty in devel- oped countries is usually measured in relative terms.

For human development a shift in focus from basic to enhanced capabilities may be relevant.
And what is considered enhanced is bound to change over time: Think of how the access to electricity and sanitation infrastructure moved from ambitions to basic during the 20th Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 57 BOX 1.9 A social-psychological perspective on inequality This box is grounded in an emerging social-psychological perspective on people as relational beings, motivated to regulate their network of social relationships.
This perspective, which moves beyond more individualistic perspectives, suggests that social embeddedness (the experience of social connection within social networks and through group identities) and relative deprivation (the experience of being unfairly worse off than others, based in social comparisons with others) have important consequences.

Humans are an ultra-social species, with a need to belong.
The psycho- logical bonds that individuals develop with others through social interac- tion reflect sources of social support and agency and offer targets for social comparison (subjective assessments of whether others are doing better or worse than oneself).1 This is key to understanding the consequences of ine- quality because a social-psychological perspective focuses on whether and how individuals subjectively perceive and feel about inequality depending on their network of relationships.
But even when individuals perceive inequality, they may not perceive it as unfair.2 Social networks tend to be homogeneous because individuals tend to self-segregate (“birds of a feather flock together”).3 Individuals often compare themselves with those around them, the ones forming a “bubble,” who are thus likely to affirm their opinions about inequality.
Contact with others—for instance, between members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups—may increase people’s awareness of inequality,4 but research also suggests that such contact is often characterized by a desire to maintain harmony rather than to discuss the uncomfortable truth of inequality be- tween groups (the ”irony of harmony”).5 As such, social embeddedness of- ten implies a sedative effect when it comes to perceiving inequality—one cannot act on what one cannot see within one’s bubble.6 There is also a motivational explanation for why inequality, even when perceived, is not necessarily perceived as unfair.
Specifically, individuals can be motivated to deny or justify the existence of inequality to uphold beliefs about the fairness of the broader system.7 Income inequality may be viewed as fair by those who endorse a meritocratic belief system (affirming a level playing field for everyone).
Indeed, stereotypes are often used to acknowl- edge inequalities in order to maintain them and thus the broader system in which they are embedded.8 Against this backdrop, a social-psychological perspective offers an- swers to questions such as why people do or do not act against inequality (such as the gender pay gap) and why they often appear to act irrationally (as in voting for a party that does not protect their interests).
Such a perspec- tive helps move beyond general correlations in aggregated data (such as be- tween-country indicators of income inequality and public health) and zooms in on the part of the broader relationship that can be explained through such psychological processes as embeddedness and relative deprivation.9 A social-psychological perspective of inequality also goes beyond in- come inequality.
Many health inequalities have social antecedents in vari- ous forms of inequality, including gender, ethnicity and race.10 Reference and social comparison groups suggest that it is important to know whom people compare themselves with and thus who is in their network and which group identities they value—and which specific forms of inequality they are likely to perceive as unfair and feel relatively deprived in.
These psychological di- mensions can be easily lost as the level of analysis and aggregation goes up.

Take education.

It is not just an objective factor that affords or inhibits opportunities for social mobility.
It can also be a potential bubble and identi- ty factor in political participation.11 For example, making people aware of the status differences between different education groups only reinforces those differences, likely based in confirmation of the competence stereotypes as- sociated with the lower and higher educated.12 This is reminiscent of how beliefs in meritocracy can justify inequalities.13 Notes 1.

Festinger 1954; Smith and others 2012.

2.


Deaton 2003; Jost 2019; Jost, Ledgerwood and Hardin 2008; Major 1994.

3.

Dixon, Durrheim and Tredoux 2005.

4.

MacInnis and Hodson 2019.

5.

Saguy 2018.

6.

Cakal and others 2011.

7.

Jost, Ledgerwood and Hardin 2008; Major 1994.

8.

Jost, Ledgerwood and Hardin 2008; Major 1994.

9.

Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young 2011; Green, Glaser and Rich 1998.

10.

Marmot 2005.

11.

Spruyt and Kuppens 2015.

12.

Spruyt, Kuppens, Spears and van Noord forthcoming.


13.

Jost 2019.

Source: Based on van Zomeren (2019).

century.

For development-induced gaps, reduc- tions in inequality are desirable and expected, not from restricting gains of those taking the lead, but from broadly diffusing the newer more advanced dimensions of development.77 This chapter has argued for measuring human development based on the formation of capabil- ities, step by step, from basic to enhanced.
It has documented large gaps in human development in all dimensions.

But the evolution of inequal- ities shows two distinct patterns.

Overall, the global bottom is catching up in basic capabili- ties, and inequality appears to be falling.

But the global top is pulling ahead in enhanced capabil- ities, and here inequality is growing.

People at the bottom are catching up with 20th century goals and aspirations, while people at the top are enhancing their advantages in those relevant for the 21st century.
Between the bottom and the top of the human development distribution is the most diverse global middle class in history.

It is diverse in its cultural composition, geographic location and relative position in the dynamics of convergence and divergence.
It is also a middle class increasingly fragmented within countries in access to goods and services, as documented in developed countries.78 It can be argued that some of the new in- equalities are a natural result of progress.79 Progress has to start somewhere, so some groups go first.
Based on gradual progress, the evolution of inequality might follow the shape 58 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 of an inverted-U over time, a version of the Kuznets curve.80 When very few people achieve a “target” (say, access to a new technology), inequality is low: Most people perform equally poorly.

Subsequently, as more people obtain ac- cess, inequality starts to increase, reflecting the division between the haves and the have-nots.
Later on, once a large proportion of people have reached access, inequality starts to decrease: The majority of people are performing equally well.

This shows that there are different types of inequalities.

There are multiple processes of divergence and convergence taking place at the same time—overlapping Kuznets curves81—so the same person could be catching up with ba- sic capabilities and, simultaneously, being left behind in the building up of enhanced capabil- ities.
When these patterns are not random, and some groups tend to be in the lead, while others are consistently behind, this process is bound to be perceived as unfair.

Thus, even if transitory inequality goes along with some forms of progress, that inequality can be unfair if subsequent progress does not spread out widely and fast enough.

Inequalities in enhanced capabilities that were already high 10 years ago have been increasing since.
This can be changed, and it is a motivation for policies that specifically address equality in capabilities.

These simultaneous patterns of convergence and divergence are likely to play a prominent role in the 21st century.

Both trends are im- portant, not only because of their separate effects—reducing extreme deprivations in the first case and concentrating power in the second—but also because of their political implications.
Progress might not mean as much if combined with increased inequality in areas people care deeply about, because of the con- nections with empowerment and agency.

Once most of the population has attained certain goals, other elements become more rel- evant for how people see themselves in relation to others and how others perceive them.

They begin to focus on their place in society and the associated rights, responsibilities and opportu- nities.
Emerging inequalities can trigger per- ceptions of unfairness to the extent that there is no or slow catching up.

But moving targets could also be a challenge for human development if more efforts and accomplishments are needed to get the same capabilities.

People are likely to feel themselves constantly falling behind.82 These dynamics83 pose new and difficult challenges that will affect development paths in the coming decades.
Chapter 2 turns to a description of the mechanisms that underpin these dynamics.
But moving targets could also be a challenge for human development if more efforts and accomplishments are needed to get the same capabilities Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 59 Spotlight 1.1 Power concentration and state capture: Insights from history on consequences of market dominance for inequality and environmental calamities Bas van Bavel, Distinguished Professor of Transitions of Economy and Society, Utrecht University, The Netherlands The organization of markets, their functioning, their interaction with the state and their broader effects on an economy and society develop slow- ly.
While debates on inequality are dominated by developments spanning a few decades, and often even a few years, observing and analysing how inequality emerges, how it concentrates power and how it can lead to the capture of markets and the state call for a much longer, his- torical perspective.
Such a long-term approach may have seemed irrelevant for issues pertaining to the market economy, since it was widely held that the market economy was a modern phe- nomenon, having developed only from the 19th century on, closely associated with moderniza- tion.
Recent economic historical work, however, has changed this idea, by identifying several market economies much earlier in history.1 Nine market economies, from antiquity to the modern era, have been identified with cer- tainty, and six of them have sufficient data to investigate them well (table S1.1.1).

This is thus not an arbitrary set, but these are all known cas- es of economies with dominant markets, which can be followed over a long period.
This allows a better understanding of how market economies develop, something that theoretical and formal work and short-period cases studies cannot do.

All six market economies displayed a similar evolution.

In each of three cases analysed in depth—Iraq, Italy and the Low Countries2— markets emerged in an equitable setting and became dominant, with an institutional or- ganization that allowed easy market access to broad groups within society.
The opportunities that market exchange offered further pushed up economic growth and well-being, with the fruits of growth fairly evenly distributed.

As markets became dominant, and especially the markets for land, labour and capital, inequality also grew in a slow process as ownership of land and capital became more concentrated.

Wealth inequality in these cases grew to Gini index of 0.85 or higher3 from substantially lower levels.
TABLE S1.1.1 Certain and possible cases of market economies Location Babylonia Babylonia Athens/Attica Italy Iraq Period Date Ur III / old-Babylonian period c. 1900–1600 BCE Neo-Babylonian period c. 700–300 BCE Note Possible case Limited data Classical period Roman period c. 600 BCE–300 BCE Possible case c. 200 BCE–200 CE Limited data Early Islamic period c. 700–1000 CE Lower Yangtse Song period Italy (Center and North) Low Countries (especially the West) England United States (North) Northwestern Europe Source: Bas van Bavel (Utrecht University, The Netherlands).
Limited data c. 1000–1400 CE c. 1200–1600 CE c. 1500–1900 CE c. 1600– c. 1825– c. 1980– 60 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 As inequality grew, economic growth initial- ly continued, but it became ever less translated into broad well-being.

With the stagnating purchasing power of large shares of the pop- ulation, lagging demand and the declining profitability of economic investments, owners of large wealth increasingly shifted their in- vestments to financial markets.
They used their wealth to acquire political leverage through patronage and buying political positions or by acquiring key positions in the fiscal regime, bureaucracy and finance and through their dominance in financial markets and their role as creditors of the state.
Over the course of 100–150 years markets became less open and equitable, through both large wealth owners’ economic weight and their ability to skew the institutional organization of the markets.4 As a result, productive investments declined, the economy started to stagnate and economic inequality rose further, coupled with growing political inequity and even coercion.
Each of the market economies started from a very equitable situation, with relatively equal distribution of economic wealth and political decisionmaking.
This was the result of a long preceding period of smaller and bigger revolts and forms of self-organization of ordinary people—in guilds, fraternities, associations, corporations, commons and companies (figure S1.1.1).5 Their organization enabled FIGURE S1.1.1 Description of the stages in the development of the historical market economies Well-being Dominance of markets Dominance of market elites Rise of markets Social movements Inequality Source: van Bavel 2016. them to break existing inequities and forms of coercion and to obtain a more equitable distri- bution of wealth and resources.
They also won the freedom to exchange their land, labour and capital without restraints by elite power, thus opening the opportunity to use the market to this end.

Their struggles and forms of self-or- ganization were thus at the base of the rise of factor markets—and the rise happened within a relatively equal setting, ensuring that large groups could access the market and benefit from market exchange.
This formative, positive phase was also found in the more familiar, modern cases of market economies: England, where the market became dominant in the 17th century, and the north- ern United States, in the first half of the 19th century.
Both were the most equitable societies of the time, with large degrees of freedom, good access to decisionmaking and relatively equal distribution of land and other forms of wealth.6 Market economies were thus not the base of freedom and equity, as some theories would have it, but rather developed on the basis of earlier-won freedom and equity.
The market subsequently replaced the associations and organizations of ordinary people as the allocation system, a process that sped up when market elites and state elites came to overlap and jointly, and often deliberately, marginal- ized these organizations.

This reduced ordinary people’s opportunities to defend freedom, their access to decisionmaking power and their grip over land and resources.
The allocation systems that prevailed before the rise of the market, whether the commons or other associations, had mostly included long- term security and environmental sustainability in their functioning, as ensured by their rules.

But the market does not do so explicitly.7 And in these other systems, cause and effect, and actor and affected person, were more closely linked, because of their smaller scale.

In mar- kets they are less so.


This poses a risk, since in a market economy, owners of land, capital and natural resources are often far detached from those affected by damage from exploiting resources.

They also face fewer constraints on exploitation than systems with more divided property rights.
In coastal Flanders, a mature market econ- omy in the 14th–16th centuries, land was Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 61 accumulated by investors who did not live in the area.
These absentee investors changed the logic of coastal flood protection from long- term security to low cost and high risk, increas- ing the flood risk and further marginalizing the local population.8 More generally, all cases of market economies in their later, downward phases experienced grave ecological problems, from the salinization and breakdown of essen- tial irrigation systems (medieval Iraq) to in- creasing floods and famines (Renaissance Italy) to malaria and floods (coastal Low Countries), even though the later, modern market econo- mies increasingly avoided the negative effects of ecological degradation by acquiring resourc- es overseas.
To see the interaction among market econ- omies, material inequality and vulnerability to natural shocks, look at three of the most market-dominated parts of the Low Countries (coastal Flanders, the Dutch river area and Groningen) over the very long run in confront- ing the hazard of high water tables.9 Growing material inequality increased the incidence of serious floods, not directly, but through the institutional framework for water management.
Only where this institutional organization was adapted in line with growing material inequality were disastrous effects avoided (figure S1.1.2).

This adaptation did not happen automatically or inevitably, however, even when a society was confronted with major floods.10 When both property and decisionmaking rights were widely distributed, chances were best that institutions for water management were adapted and ad- justed to changing circumstances to reduce the risk of flood disaster.
When wealthy actors and interest groups controlled property rights over the main resources and held decisionmaking power, however, they upheld the prevailing ar- rangements to protect their particular interests, even if this actually weakened a society’s coping FIGURE S1.1.2 Linking the hazard of high water to flood disasters: Economic and political equality enhances the chance of institutions becoming adjusted to circumstances and preventing disaster Equality Inequality Successful feedback Failed feedback Poorly adjusted institutions Disaster (major ﬂood) Hazard (high water) Well adjusted institutions No disaster Source: Adapted from van Bavel, Curtis and Soens (2018).
62 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 capacity.
And if some adaptation in these cases did take place, it was often aimed at increasing the capacity of the economic system to recover production levels after a shock—but at the ex- pense of segments of the population that were no longer included in decisionmaking.11 The risk of these negative outcomes happening and of institutions being poorly adjusted to ecologi- cal and social circumstances was high in market economies with high wealth inequality, where the grip of a small group of private owners over natural resources was strongest and decision- making power became concentrated in their hands.
How relevant are these observations for de- velopments today?

The historical cases where markets emerged as the dominant allocation system for factors of production (land, labour and capital) all showed an accumulation of wealth in the hands of a small group, which then also concentrated political power, shaping incentives in markets that increased inequality and environmental calamities.
Today, even in parliamentary democracies, economic wealth again seems to be translated into political lev- erage—through lobbying, campaign financing and owning media and information—whereas mobile wealth owners can easily isolate them- selves, for say, social disruption or environmen- tal degradation.12 History shows that these developments are not aberrations or accidental events.
And perhaps they require broader and deeper consideration of a wider range of policy actions to curb the concentration of econom- ic and political power.

The concentration of economic power (wealth), the first stage, is easiest to curb.

But after the establishment of economic power and its translation to political dominance, this is far harder to do.
Notes This is true even if the market economy is defined in a very strict way—that is, as an economy where not only goods, products and services, but also inputs (land and natural resources, labour and capital) are predominantly allocated by way of the market.

van Bavel 2016.

For an analysis of long, cyclical patterns of rising and declining inequality see also Turchin and Nefedov (2009).

van Bavel 2016 (see pp.

72–73 on Iraq, 128 on Florence in 1427 and 194–195 on Amsterdam in 1630).
This is true even in (relatively) inclusive political systems, in contrast to the argument by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), where they are assumed to form a virtuous cycle.

van Bavel 2019.

For the United States, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Larson (2010).

To be sure, a position obtained at the expense of the native population.

On the nonembeddedness of market outcomes, see Gemici (2007).

Soens 2011. van Bavel, Curtis and Soens 2018.

8 9 10 See also Rohland (2018).

11 Soens 2018.


12 Gilens and Page 2014; Schlozman 2012.

Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 63 Spotlight 1.2 Rising subjective perceptions of inequality, rising inequalities in perceived well-being Subjective perceptions of inequality are at odds with the decline in extreme deprivations in objective data.
Surveys have revealed rising perceptions of inequality, rising preferences for greater equality and rising global inequality in subjective perceptions of well-being.

All these trends should be bright red flags—especially given the tendencies of subjective views to underestimate income and wealth inequality in some countries and to understate global in- equalities in well-being.

Downward bias in perceived income and wealth inequality On average, people misperceive actual income and wealth inequality.
Underestimating ine- quality is common in some countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.1 In one survey Americans believed that the top wealth quintile owned about 59 percent of the total wealth; the actual number was closer to 84 percent.2 And ideal wealth distributions are significantly more equal than respondents’ esti- mates.
All demographic groups desired a more equal distribution of wealth than the status quo.3 And the actual wage ratio of chief executive of- ficers to unskilled workers (354:1) far exceeded the estimated ratio (30:1), which in turn was substantially higher than the ideal ratio (7:1).4 Other studies have asked respondents to esti- mate their position in the income or wealth dis- tribution.
In Argentina only about 15 percent of respondents placed their household income in the correct decile.5 A significant portion of poorer individuals overestimated their rank, while a significant proportion of richer indi- viduals underestimated theirs.

Similar biases emerged in a randomized survey experiment in eight countries.6 Rising global inequality in subjective perceptions of well-being to consider subjective perceptions of well-being and their distribution.
They change from region to region (figure S1.2.1).

First, both the ability to enjoy life and the ability to assess experiences through well-being play a paramount role in providing direct well-being and “evidential merit” to inform individual decisionmaking.7 Second, subjective indicators can provide val- uable information to cover some of the blind spots in objective data.
To be sure, subjective measures of well-be- ing must be handled with care—but the very reasons for doubt strengthen the case for at- tending to rising perceptions of inequality.

In Amartya Sen’s theory of adaptive preferences, people adapt preferences to their circumstanc- es.8 In data on self-reported happiness, people facing deprivations moderate their preferences to make their condition more bearable.
In contrast, the affluent report lower happiness than their wealth might seem to warrant, be- cause their high satiation has reduced the space for adding to personal satisfaction.9 For both reasons subjective measures of happiness can understate inequalities in well-being.

Remarkably, self-reported happiness shows increasing inequality in subjective well-being around the world—a trend that has steepened sharply since 2010 (figure S1.2.2).
This has been an increasing trend during 2006–2018 in all regions except Europe.10 Inequality in the Commonwealth of Independent States was stable at first but has been rising since 2013.

Inequality was steady in Latin America until 2014 and has risen since and rose until 2010 in the US-dominated North America, Australia and New Zealand region but has been constant since.

Inequality has been rising since 2010 in Southeast Asia but has not risen as much in the rest of Asia.
In Sub-Saharan Africa inequality has followed a steep post-2010 path, similar to that in Southeast Asia.

And in the Middle East and North Africa inequality rose from 2009 to 2013 but has been stable since.

In assessing inequalities, one way to look be- yond income—a wholly objective measure—is The trend towards greater inequality in subjective well-being poses a challenge.
First, 64 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE S1.2.1 Transmitting inequalities in human development across the lifecycle Western Europe Central and Eastern Europe Commonwealth of Independent States Southeast Asia 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 East Asia 0 0 South Asia 0 Latin America and the Caribbean North America, Australia and New Zealand 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 Middle East and North Africa Note: Respondents’ answers to life evaluation questions asked in the poll on a scale from 0 (the worst possible) to 10 (the best possible).
Source: Helliwell 2019.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 65 FIGURE S1.2.2 Distribution of subjective well-being across the world (measured by people’s overall satisfaction with their lives) Global inequality in subjective well-being (index, 2006 = 100) 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 2006 remarkably the World Happiness Reports, show to be correlated strongly with life evaluations— namely income, social support, healthy life ex- pectancy at birth, freedom to make life choices, generosity and corruption—are all dimensions of human development.12 So if a society is more unequal in its experience of life satisfaction, it is likely more unequal in its experience of life and human development.
Second, higher inequality in subjective well-being is associated with lower subjective well-being.13 In other words, greater inequality in happiness makes everyone less happy.

2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Source: Human Development Report Office.
Ratio of happiness between people: in the 95th percentile and people in the 5th percentile in the 90th percentile and people in the 10th percentile in the 75th percentile and people in the 25th percentile Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Helliwell (2019), using Gallup data.

people’s overall life satisfaction is in many ways a barometer of everything else in their lives.
There are strong links between higher life evaluations and several key measures of human development—including higher job satisfaction and more effective government— and moderately strong links between higher life satisfaction and greater freedom of choice and lower inequality.11 Moreover, the variables that the literature on subjective well-being, and Notes 1 Hauser and Norton 2017.

2 Norton and Ariely 2011.

3 Norton and Ariely 2013.

4 5 6 Kiatpongsan and Norton 2014.


Cruces, Pérez-Truglia and Tetaz 2013.

Bublitz 2016.

These countries include Brazil, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
With regard to own estimated income posi- tion, individuals in the bottom income quintile have a positive income position bias, whereas individuals in higher income quin- tiles have a negative income position bias (except individuals in the second quintile, who show almost no income position bias).

See Sen (2008a).

7 See, for instance, Sen (1999, pp.

62–63).

8 9 Graham 2012.

10 Helliwell 2019.

11 See Hall (2013).

12 See Hall (2013).

13 Helliwell 2019.


66 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Spotlight 1.3 The bottom of the distribution: The challenge of eradicating income poverty Today, about 600 million people live on less than $1.90 a day.1 There has been considerable progress in the fight against poverty in recent decades.

The extreme income poverty rate fell from 36 percent in 1990 to 8.6 percent in 2018.
Despite this progress, the number of people liv- ing in extreme poverty globally is unacceptably high, and poverty reduction may not be fast enough to end extreme poverty by 2030, as the Sustainable Development Goals demand.

After decades of progress, poverty reduction is slow- ing (box S1.3.1).

Overall, extreme poverty rates tend to be higher in low human development countries, but poor people can be found in countries at all levels of development (figure S1.3.1).
While poverty rates have declined in all regions, pro- gress has been uneven, and more than half of people in extreme poverty live in Sub-Saharan Africa, where absolute numbers of people living in poverty are increasing.

If current trends con- tinue, nearly 9 of 10 people in extreme poverty will be in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030.2 Income poverty is only one form of poverty.

Those furthest behind suffer from overlapping deprivations, discriminatory social norms and lack of political empowerment.
Risks and vulnerabilities only enhance the fragility of achievements—as explained in the United Nations Development Programme’s framework on Leaving No One Behind.3 Among countries that are off track, most are in Africa and more than one third exhibit high levels of conflict or violence.4 Together they pose some of the world’s most severe develop- ment challenges.

They also share characteristics of low tax effort and low health and education spending.
They are hampered by weak private sector development in the nonagricultural service sector and share a high dependence on BOX S1.3.1 Income poverty reduction scenarios to 2030 Today, 70 people escape poverty every minute, but once most countries in Asia achieve the poverty target, the rate of poverty reduction is projected to slow to below 50 people per minute in 2020.
The projected global poverty rate for 2030 ranges from 4.5 percent (around 375 million people) to almost 6 percent (over 500 million people) (see figure).

Even the most optimistic projec- tions show more than 300 million people living in ex- treme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2030.

According to the benchmark scenario, 24 countries are on track to reach the poverty target, with 207 mil- lion people expected to move out of poverty before 2030.
In 40 off-track countries, even though poverty headcounts will fall, 131 million people are expected to remain in poverty by 2030.

In 20 countries the num- ber of people living in poverty is projected to increase from 242 million to 290 million (see figure).

However, the benchmark scenario is a relatively optimistic view of future economic development, especially in Sub- Saharan Africa.
Box figure 1 Poverty headcount by track classification, 2017 and 2030 Poverty headcount based on SSP 2 (millions) 104 countries 23 million 600 400 200 0 24 countries 207 million 40 countries 202 million 20 countries 242 million 104 countries 10 million 24 countries 10 million 40 countries 131 million 20 countries 290 million 2017 2030 Rising poverty On track Off track No extreme poverty Note: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Shared Socioeconomic Pathways reflect different degrees of climate change mitigation and adaptation.
SSP2 corresponds to the benchmark scenario and assumes the continuation of current global socioeconomic trends.

Source: Cuaresma and others 2018.
Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 67 FIGURE S1.3.1 Some 600 million people live below the $1.90 a day poverty line Population living below PPP $1.90 a day income poverty line, 2007–2017 (percent) Low human development Medium human development High human development Very high human development 80 60 40 20 0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Human Development Index value, 2018 Note: Each bubble represents a country, and the size of the bubble is proportional to the country’s population in income poverty.
Source: Human Development Report Office estimates.

natural resources.
Increasing labour income is critical for those at the very bottom.5 Access to physical and financial assets is also important— land, capital and other inputs for production or services help as income-generating streams and buffers against shocks.6 Social protection, in the form of a noncontributory minimum payment, providing for the most vulnerable is also important.7 Human development progress involves the capacity to generate income and translate it into capabilities, including better health and education outcomes.
This process plays out throughout the lifecycle.

Each person’s devel- opment starts early—even before birth, with nutrition, cognitive development and educa- tion opportunities for infants and children.

It continues with formal education, sexual health and safety from violence before entering the labour market.

For the poorest people the lifecycle is an obstacle course that reinforces deprivations and exclusions.
Multidimensional poverty indices can shed further light on the people furthest behind by capturing overlapping deprivations in house- holds and clusters of households in a geograph- ic area.

These are linked to income poverty, but with significant variations (figure S1.3.2).

Some people might be multidimensionally poor even if they live above the monetary pov- erty line.
The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) covers 101 countries, home to 77 percent of the world’s population, or 5.7 bil- lion people.

Some 23 percent of these people (1.3 billion) are multidimensionally poor.
The MPI data illustrate the challenge of addressing overlapping deprivations: 83 percent of all multidimensionally poor live in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 67 percent in middle income countries, 85 percent in rural areas and 46 percent in severe poverty.8 Poor people in rural areas tend to have deprivations in both education and access to water, sanitation, elec- tricity and housing.
But the challenges extend 68 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE S1.3.2 Poverty at the $1.90 a day level is tied to multidimensional poverty Population living below PPP $1.90 a day income poverty line, 2007–2017 (percent) Human development group Very high High Medium Low 80 60 40 20 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 Multidimensional Poverty Index value, 2007–2018 Source: Human Development Report Office estimates.
to urban areas, too: Child mortality and mal- nutrition are more common in urban areas.9 Sub-Saharan Africa has the most overlapping MPI deprivations—with more than half the populations of Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan experiencing severe multidimensional poverty, with 50 percent or more of overlap- ping deprivations (figure S1.3.3).

As countries develop, people tend to leave poverty, but the process is neither linear nor mechanic.
It comprises both an upward motion (moving out) and a risk of downward motion (falling back in).

The very definition of a mid- dle-class threshold can be computed by thinking of the threshold as a probability rather than an absolute line.

That is, a person might be consid- ered middle class when he or she is not poor and is at very little risk of becoming poor.

For dozens of countries that have reduced poverty, the stakes of not losing the progress of the past 15–20 years are significant.
As Anirudh Krishna points out in his analysis of the life stories of 35,000 house- holds in India, Kenya, Peru, Uganda and North Carolina (United States), many low-income FIGURE S1.1.3 Sub-Saharan countries have the most overlapping deprivations People living with multidimensional deprivations (billions) 0.88 1.32 0.72 0.60 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Vulnerable nonpoor Nonsevere Severe Poor Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Note: Vulnerable nonpoor population refers to people with 20 percent or more and less than 33 percent of overlapping deprivations.
nonsevere poor population refers to people with 33–50 percent of overlapping deprivations, and severe poor population refers to people with 50 percent or more of overlapping deprivations.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on the methodology to compute the Multidimensional Poverty Index in HDRO and OPHI (2019).

Chapter 1 Inequality in human development: Moving targets in the 21st century | 69 Horizontal inequalities also have dynamic effects.
Between 2002 and 2005 ethnicity re- duced the probability of transitioning out of poverty in Mexico by 12 percentage points and increased the probability of falling back into poverty from vulnerability by 10 percentage points.14 Notes 1 See World Bank (2018a) and the World Poverty Clock (https:// worldpoverty.io).

See www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview.

UNDP 2018b.

See also UNSDG 2019.

Based on the classification by Gert and Kharas (2018).

See Azevedo and others (2013).


See López Calva and Castelán (2016).

See ILO (2017).

OPHI and UNDP 2019.

Aguilar and Sumner 2019.

2 Krishna 2010.

11 Kidd and Athias 2019.

12 This analysis follows Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea (2019a).

13 Abud, Gray-Molina and Ortiz-Juarez 2016.

14 See Abud, Gray-Molina and Ortiz-Juarez (2016).


individuals are just one illness away from pov- erty.10 Even relatively well-off households can drop below the poverty line after personal (such as severe health problems) or communal shocks (such as a disaster or the termination of the main source of employment).
Another study shows that just 46 percent of Ugandans who were in the bottom quintile in 2013 had been there two years before.11 In Indonesia 52 percent of house- holds with children were new to the bottom quintile from one year to the next.12 Between 2003 and 2013, tens of millions of people moved out of poverty in Latin America.

Yet, large numbers of people remain vulnerable to falling back in poverty.
In Peru having the head of the household covered by a pension increased the probability of exiting poverty by 19 percentage points and reduced the probabil- ity of falling back into poverty by 7 percentage points.
By contrast, access to remittances re- duced the probability of falling back into pov- erty by 4 percentage points.13 70 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent “Inequality is not so much a cause of economic, political, and social processes as a consequence.

[…] Some of the pro- cesses that generate inequality are widely seen as fair.
But others are deeply and obviously unfair, and have become a legitimate source of anger and disaffection.”1 How do the patterns of inequalities in human development emerge?

Where are the opportu- nities to redress them?

Much of the debate on these questions has centred on the thesis that income inequality, in and of itself, has detri- mental effects on human development.
So re- ducing income inequality — primarily through redistribution using taxes and transfers — would also enhance capabilities and distribute them more equally.

Yet, this is far too reductionistic and mech- anistic a formulation of the links between income inequality and capabilities.

As in chapter 1, it is crucial to go beyond income and lay out the mechanisms through which inequalities in human development emerge — - and often persist.
This chapter’s approach follows Amartya Sen’s argument in Development as Freedom that addressing deprivations in one dimension not only has benefits in and of itself but can also support the amelioration of others.2 For instance, deprivations in housing or nutrition may hinder health and education outcomes.

While income is also a factor, deprivations are not necessarily tied to household ability to buy goods and services in markets.
That is the motivation for the global Multidimensional Poverty Index, the nonmonetary measure of deprivation published in the Human Development Report since 2010.3 Being in poor health and having low education achieve- ments, in turn, can hinder the ability to earn income or participate in social and political life.

These deprivations can reinforce each other and accumulate over time — driving and even amplifying disparities in capabilities.
The difficulty with this approach, however, is similar to the one in chapter 1: where to start?

This chapter addresses the question by following a dual approach.
The first takes a lifecycle perspective, similar to the one that inspired the analysis of capabilities linked to health and education in chapter 1 (with climate change and technology addressed at length in part III of the Report), and considers what happens to children from birth, and even before birth, and how families, labour markets and public policies shape children’s oppor- tunities.4 Parents, through their actions and decisions, pass on to their children the quali- ties that the labour market values or devalues, explaining in part how family background determines personal income.
Children’s edu- cation attainment depends on their parents’ socioeconomic status, which also determines children’s health, starting before birth, and cognitive ability, in part through early child- hood stimuli.

That status also determines the neighbourhood they grow up in, the schools they attend and the opportunities they have in the labour market, in part through their knowledge and networks.
While this lifecycle approach is helpful to illuminate mechanisms at the individual and household levels, the determinants of the distribution of capabilities cannot be fully accounted for by behaviour at these levels.

Policies, institutions, and the rate of growth and change in the structure of the economy, among other factors, also matter a great deal.
Thus, the chapter follows a second approach to consider how income inequality interacts with institutions and balances of power, the way soci- eties function and even the nature of economic growth.

Going beyond income does not imply excluding income inequality.
Instead, it means that income inequality should, in the words of Angus Deaton, not be considered some sort of “pollution” that directly harms human devel- opment outcomes.5 It is crucial to spell out the mechanisms through which income inequality Addressing deprivations in one dimension not only has benefits in and of itself but can also support the amelioration of others Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 73 2. interacts with society, with politics and with the economy in ways that can both beget more ine- qualities and harm human development.
One example is how income inequality, institutions and balances of power co-evolve.

When elite groups can shape policies that fa- vour themselves and their children, that drives further accumulation of income and opportu- nity at the top.

High income inequality is thus related to lower mobility — individuals’ ability to improve their socioeconomic status.
Intergenerational income mobility — the extent to which parents’ income accounts for their children’s income — is persistently low in some societies.6 When that happens, the skills and talent in an economy are not necessarily allocated in the most efficient way, reducing economic growth from a counterfactual that allocates resources to earn the greatest returns.
The point to emphasize is less the precision of cross-country econometric estimates and more the identification of a plausible mechanism that runs from high inequality through opportuni- ty (key for human development) to economic growth — and back.

The nature of inequalities also matters.

For example, horizontal inequalities — which, as highlighted in chapter 1, refer to disparities among groups rather than among individuals — seem to matter for conflict.
Once again, spell- ing out the mechanism is crucial: In this case, horizontal inequalities not only lead to shared grievances within a group but can also interact with political inequality to mobilize collective action for that group to take up arms.
How inequalities begin at birth — and can persist In countries with high income inequality the association between parents’ income and their children’s income is stronger — that is, intergenerational income mobility is lower In countries with high income inequality the association between parents’ income and their children’s income is stronger — that is, intergen- erational income mobility is lower.
This relation is known as the Great Gatsby Curve,7 often portrayed in a cross-plot of country data with income inequality on the horizontal axis and a measure of the correlation between parents’ in- come and their children’s income on the vertical axis.
The Great Gatsby Curve also holds using a measure of inequality in human development instead of income inequality alone (figure 2.1): 74 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 2.1 Intergenerational mobility in income is lower in countries with more inequality in human development Intergenerational income elasticity 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 Ecuador Colombia Latvia Albania Slovakia Rwanda India Pakistan China Ethiopia Singapore Finland 10 20 30 40 Inequality in human development (percent) Note: The measure of inequality used is the percentage loss in Human Development Index (HDI) value due to inequality in three components: income, education and health.
The loss can be understood as a proxy for inequality in capabilities.

The correlation coefficient is .6292.

Inequality in income is the strongest correlate among the three components (with a correlation coefficient of .6243), followed by inequality in education (.4931) and inequality in life expectancy (.4713).

Source: Human Development Report Office using data from GDIM (2018), adapted from Corak (2013).
The greater the inequality in human develop- ment, the greater the intergenerational income elasticity — that is, the lower the mobility.
This relation does not imply direct causality in either direction and can be accounted for by a number of mechanisms running in both directions.8 This section explores how “the adult outcomes of children reflect a series of gradients between their attainments at specific points in their lives and the prevailing socioeconomic inequalities to which they are exposed.”9 The underlying mechanisms of this relation can be understood, departing from inequal- ity (because it is possible to account for the relationship also in the direction running from low mobility to high inequality), as fol- lows: “Inequality lowers mobility because it shapes opportunity.
It heightens the income consequences of innate differences between individuals; it also changes opportunities, in- centives, and institutions that form, develop, and transmit characteristics and skills valued in the labour market; and it shifts the balance of power so that some groups are in a position to structure policies or otherwise support their children’s achievement independent of talent.”10 Opportunities are thus shaped by incentives and institutions that interact as driv- ers behind the Great Gatsby Curve.
In more unequal countries it tends to be more difficult to move up because opportunities to do so are unequally distributed among the population.11 But what factors constitute inequality of op- portunity?
There are several, including — but not limited to — family background, gender, race, or place of birth — all crucial in explaining income inequality.12 The above hypothesis is supported by a negative association between a measure of inequality in opportunity and mobility in education, finding that the share of income inequality that is attributable to circumstances is higher in countries with lower education mobility.13 A similar relation was found between inequality in opportunity and mobility in income.14 Inequality in opportunity is thus a link be- tween inequality and intergenerational mobil- ity: If higher inequality makes mobility more difficult, it is likely because opportunities for advancement are more unequally distributed among children.
Conversely, the way lower mobility may contribute to the persistence of inequalities is by making opportunity sets very different among the children of the rich and the children of the poor.15 These opportunities not only affect the level of welfare that will be attained; they also determine the efforts that will have to be invested to achieve certain out- comes.16 A measure of inequality that assesses only outcomes will thus never be able to fully assess the fairness of a certain allocation of resources.17 But relative mobility is not alone in being im- portant for human development.
Without ab- solute mobility, education and income would not increase from one generation to the next, which is important for progress, especially for low human development countries that need to catch up in capabilities (see chapter 1).18 As introduced in chapter 1, a gradient de- scribes how achievements along a dimension (say, health or education) increase with socio- economic status.

A vast literature describes how gradients emerge and persist.
Angus Deaton described how health gradients were flat — with very little difference in health outcomes between the rich and the poor — until health innovations around the 18th century made it possible for the richest to start having access to health technologies: “Power and money are useless against the force of mortality without weapons to fight it.”19 In the second half of the 19th century health gradients were carefully documented in Britain and elsewhere, with their persistence remaining an enduring area of policy and academic debate.20 How do health and education gradients evolve to opportunity?
Some interactions can describe what happens over the lifecycle (figure 2.2).

A key channel for a potential vicious cycle of low mobility is an education loop.

Education mobilizes individuals to improve their lot, but when low education is passed on from parents to children, those opportunities for improvement are not fully seized.

To break the cycle requires understanding how these loops operate, pointing to opportunities for interven- tions, considered in the next section.
Another significant loop relates to health status, starting at birth and evolving through life depending on family choices and health policies.21 The unequal distribution of health conditions can contribute to inequalities in other areas of life, such as education and the possibility to gener- ate income.22 The relation also goes the other way, with health gradients in income suggesting that higher income “protects” health, which in turn enables people to be less prone to losing income as a result of being sick (with a vicious cycle in reverse potentially happening to those with lower income).
Inequalities in key areas of human devel- opment are thus interconnected and can be persistent from one generation to the next.

Many aspects of children’s outcomes can be carried through to other stages of the lifecycle, where they affect adults’ ability to generate income.
The resulting socioeconomic status shapes mating behaviours among adults.23 People with a certain income and education tend to marry (or cohabit with) partners with similar socioeconomic status (assortative mat- ing).24 When these couples have children, the feedback loop can start from the top again,25 with parents’ socioeconomic status shaping their children’s health and early childhood development.26 People with a certain income and education tend to marry (or cohabit with) partners with similar socioeconomic status Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 75 FIGURE 2.2 Education and health along the lifecycle Child’s health Adult’s health Parents’ socioeconomic status Adult’s socioeconomic status Early childhood development Education Assortative mating Countries with higher inequality in human development see higher intergenerational persistence of education Note: The circles represent different stages of the lifecycle, with the orange ones resenting final outcomes.
The rectangle represents the process of assortative mating.

The dashed lines refer to interactions that are not described in detail in this chapter.

A child’s health affects early childhood development and prospects for education.

For example, an intellectually disabled child will not be able to benefit from early childhood development and education opportunities in the same way as a healthy child.
Education can also promote a healthy lifestyle and convey information on how to benefit from a given health care system if needed (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010).

Source: Human Development Report Office, adapted from Deaton (2013b).
Education: how gaps can emerge early in life Similar to the Great Gatsby Curve and to figure 2.1, countries with higher inequality in human development see higher intergenera- tional persistence of education (a coefficient that estimates the impact of one additional year of parents’ schooling on respondents’ years of schooling).27 This means that education levels across generations are stickier (that is, there is less relative mobility) in more unequal coun- tries (figure 2.3).
The component with the strongest correlation coefficient is education, meaning that intergenerational persistence in education is higher the more unequally distrib- uted the mean years of schooling in a given so- ciety are.

As above, no direct causation should be inferred without looking at the mechanisms behind the correlation, which requires exam- ination at the individual level rather than the country level.
The questions are how parents’ socioeconomic status (most importantly their education levels) and health status (see the next section) are related to their children’s FIGURE 2.3 Intergenerational persistence of education is higher in countries with higher inequality in human development Intergenerational persistence of education 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 0 Romania India Guatemala Mali Benin Hungary China Comoros United Kingdom Philippines Maldives Lesotho 10 20 30 40 50 Inequality in human development (percent) Note: The measure of inequality used is the percentage loss in Human Development Index (HDI) value due to inequality in three components: income, education and health.
The loss can be understood as a proxy for inequality in capabilities.

The correlation coefficient is .4679.

Inequality in education is the strongest correlate among the three components (with a correlation coefficient of .5501), followed by inequality in life expectancy (.4632) and inequality in income (.1154).

Source: Human Development Report Office using data from GDIM (2018).
76 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Inequalities in education start during infancy, because parents are unequally able to exploit the opportunity to nurture.

But institutions can play a crucial role in fostering mobility education, and what role do institutions play in the relationship?

Inequalities in education start during infancy.


Exposure to stimuli and the quality of care, both in the family and in institutional environments, are crucial for expanding children’s choices in later life and for helping them develop their full potential.28 Parents provide stimuli for young children, and families can be nurturing.
Parents’ education shapes the nurturing care provided to a child from conception to early childhood: a home environment that is responsive, emotion- ally supportive, conducive to children’s health and nutrition needs, and developmentally stimulating and appropriate, including oppor- tunities for play, exploration and protection from adversity.29 But parents are unequally able to exploit the opportunity to nurture.
For example, children in US professional families are exposed to more than three times as many words as children in families receiving welfare benefits.30 This has effects on early learning and later achievement test scores, leading to inter- generational persistence in education.

Institutions can play a crucial role in fostering mobility.
For example, there is a FIGURE 2.4 13.7 percent return on investment for compre- hensive, high-quality, birth-to–age 5 early ed- ucation, which is even higher than previously estimated.31 However, children from families with different socioeconomic status also have unequal access to these programmes, nation- ally and globally.
Enrolment in preprimary programmes (age 3 to school entrance age) ranges from 21 percent in low human devel- opment countries to 31 percent in medium human development countries to 74 percent in high human development countries and to 80 percent in very high human development countries.32 But even if children attend preprimary programmes, disparities in learning abilities are often already apparent for the reasons ex- plained above.
Consider the relation between average achievement test scores by a child’s age and levels of parents’ education in Germany (a proxy for socioeconomic status; figure 2.4).

The differences in age-specific scores are sub- stantial, and they increase enormously during the first five years of a child’s life and persist throughout childhood.
This does not mean that children do not learn in school (as the tests Skill gaps emerge in early childhood, given parents’ education Stage K1 K2 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G9 Preschool Primary Lower secondary Composite score (z) 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.4 −0.5 Age Low Medium High Parents’ level of education Note: Dashed vertical lines emphasize the temporal dynamics of achievement gaps from preschool through lower secondary school.
The composite index (z) involves multiple measures at all measurement occasions except 7 months of age, which includes only one assessment (sensorimotor skills), and age 4, which also includes only one assessment (mathematical competence).

Predictions are based on life stage–specific regression models.

The vertical lines on each dot are 95 percent confidence intervals for predictions.

K refers to kindergarten, and G refers to grade level in school.
Long-dashed black lines connect data from the same National Educational Panel Study cohort.

Source: Skopek and Passaretta 2018.

Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 77 become more difficult), nor does it mean that schooling contributes nothing to help disad- vantaged children (because the gaps could, and probably would, significantly increase through- out childhood were it not for the equalizing effect of schooling).
But it does highlight the substantial influence of parents’ education on the education achievements of their chil- dren—even in a very high human development country with low inequality in human develop- ment and low intergenerational persistence in education.33 Therefore, universal participation in early childhood development programmes, even before preprimary education, has the po- tential to reduce inequality in education as well as increase education mobility.
In many lower human development countries unequal early childhood stimuli are not the only barrier to mobility in education.
Children from lower socioeconomic status families may be unable to attend school because they have duties around the house or on the farm or be- cause they need to earn income for the family.34 But even if all children had the same grade at- tainment, the gap in universal numeracy would close by only 8 percent in India and 25 percent in Pakistan, and the gap in universal literacy would close by only 8 percent in Uganda and 28 percent in Pakistan.
So, even if a child from a poor household completed as many grades as a child from a rich household, the likelihood of becoming numerate or literate would still not be the same for both children.

Children from the poorest 40 percent of households usually show lower abilities in numeracy and literacy at each grade.
If these children had the same learning profiles — that is, the same relation be- tween years of schooling and a measure of skills or learning — as children from rich families, the gap in universal numeracy would close by 16 percent in Pakistan and Uganda and 34 per- cent in India, and the gap in universal literacy would close by between 13 percent (Uganda) and 44 percent (India).35 Hence, in addition to expanding access to education, gaps in learning ability have to be reduced, the earlier the better, as the example from Germany shows.
Early childhood stimuli are not the only advantage children from high socioeconomic status families have.
Even if they perform poor- ly in school, they are still much more likely to move on to higher education, as evidenced in France, Germany and other European countries as well as in different institutional and political contexts, such as Soviet Leningrad in the late 1960s and the United States in the late 1970s.36 Parents with high socioeconomic status can provide direct help, pay for private tutoring, computers and travel or move their children to remedial school or to a less demanding school and thus give them a second chance.37 Another potential source of divergence is so- cial and emotional learning, which is critical for creating productive adults (box 2.1).38 Social and emotional learning is conducive not only for productivity but also for peaceful social in- teraction in cohesive societies.39 Modern forms of education increasingly take such learning into account when designing curricula, but it is an additional challenge for many low and me- dium human development countries that are undertaking substantial efforts to provide uni- versal basic education.
There is thus potential for even more divergence between countries.

This illustrates a crucial point consistent with the evidence of chapter 1: While much attention has been paid to raising people above a certain “floor,” that does not eliminate the persistence — and in some cases the generation — of steeper gradients in achievement.

Policies geared to raising people above a floor fail to boost young people’s opportunities to move on to higher education.
Interventions thus need to consider both how to finish closing the gap in basic education achievements and how to stem the persistent—or even the increasing—divergence in more advanced education achievements.

The effect of the gradient is also carried on to the labour market.
Someone with high socioeconomic status but low final education attainment — such as a member of a privileged family who lacks a university degree or an upper secondary diploma — has a much higher chance than a less privileged person of working at a well paid job and avoiding manual labour.
People from families with high socioeconomic status often manage to avoid downward occupational mobility relative to their parents, even with poor education performance.40 A crucial role in this can be attributed to social networks and family networking activity.41 In some countries improve- ments in mobility in education have not had the expected equalizing effect on income because of the increasing importance of networks and Interventions need to consider both how to finish closing the gap in basic education achievements and how to stem the persistent—or even the increasing— divergence in more advanced education achievements 78 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 2.1 Key competencies of social and emotional learning Five key social and emotional competencies have been identified as essential: self-awareness, self-manage- ment, social awareness, relationship skills and respon- sible decisionmaking (see figure).
They are interrelated, synergistic and integral for children’s and adults’ growth and development.1 Including and strengthening learning material that teaches social and emotional compe- tencies in core curricula have been highly effective in European countries, especially for at-risk children such as children from ethnic and cultural minorities, children from deprived socioeconomic backgrounds and children experiencing social, emotional and mental health chal- lenges.2 Social and emotional learning can thus flatten the education gradient by expanding capabilities, with the potential to reduce inequalities in human develop- ment and promote equity and social inclusion.
Five key social and emotional competencies and how to obtain them H o m e s and communities Schools C l assrooms Self- awareness Self- management Social and emotional learning Relationship skills Social awareness S o cial a n nd emotional learning c u r r u m a Schoolwide practices a n d p o li c i e h i p Family and community p a r t n e r i c u l s Responsible decision- making d instruction s s Source: Jagers, Rivas-Drake and Borowski 2018.

Notes 1.

Jagers, Rivas-Drake and Borowski 2018.

2.


Cefai and others 2018. networking activities that may at times be more effective than higher levels of education in the labour market.42 In sum, children start on an unequal footing because of their experiences before entering the formal education system — particularly, the early education and stimuli that their parents provide.
Together with differences in the access to and quality of education (see chapter 1), this accounts for intergenerational persistence in education within countries.

Children from low socioeconomic status families are less likely to continue education, even if it is available and accessible.

Moreover, networks are crucial for entering the labour market.
So, important op- portunities to redress inequalities exist at three main points in the lifecycle: early childhood, school age and youth (especially during the transition from school to the labour market).

Additionally, there is a need for lifelong learning.

Especially in today’s job markets, which are sub- ject to constant technological advances and thus reskilling, substantial investments are needed at every stage of life.
This is both an economic and a social strategy, in the search for ways to expand In today’s job markets, which are subject to constant technological advances and thus reskilling, substantial investments are needed at every stage of life Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 79 Parents’ income and education have profound effects on their children’s health, which in turn affects the children’s education achievement (and health in adulthood) and thus future income, if not counteracted capabilities throughout life.43 (Part III elaborates on concrete ideas of interventions.)
status; and whether the mother received prena- tal health care.49 Health: How unequal outcomes both drive and reflect unequal capabilities Parents’ income and education have profound effects on their children’s health, which in turn affects the children’s education achievement (and health in adulthood) and thus future income, if not counteracted.44 Hence, health gradients — disparities in health across socio- economic groups — start at birth, or even before, and can accumulate over the lifecycle.
Higher socioeconomic status families invest in health, consume more healthily and are mostly able to avoid physically and psychosocially demanding work conditions.
This in turn increases the gap between low and high socioeconomic status individuals, even resulting in differences in life expectancy.45 Health conditions at birth, or even before, strongly influence health throughout the lifecy- cle.46 And when affected adults become parents themselves, the socioeconomic status health gradient can be carried on to future genera- tions, because health inequality starts very early in life — indeed, with the foetus.47 For example, parents’ occupational status and home postal code indicate a baby’s health at birth for several reasons:48 the mother’s eating and other health behaviour (smoking), which are closely related to education; the mother’s exposure to pollu- tion, which is related to parents’ socioeconomic BOX 2.2 And parents’ health behaviour also shapes children’s health after the child is born.
For example, child obesity is a result of both na- ture and nurture, depending partly on genes and partly on family eating and living pat- terns.50 For adolescents the mechanism of the socioeconomic status health gradient works differently.

Subjective social status is more important for self-reported health than is parent-reported household income and assets, even when parents’ education is controlled for.
This is either because subjective social status and self- reported health feed into each other due to their bidirectional causal relation or because other factors that are more important at this stage of the lifecycle weigh strongly on the subjective social status evaluation (doing well in school, having friends).51 Even adults’ health outcomes can sometimes be affected by perceived socioeconomic status (box 2.2).
The debate around the relationship between income inequality and health outcomes has used mainly the proxies of life expectancy at birth and infant mortality.52 But the effects of the socioeconomic status health gradient may not always be fatal, and they may also not be immediate.

A nuanced look at different types of health outcomes reveals how socio- economic status affects some specific areas of health later in the lifecycle (figure 2.5).
A summary calculation shows that in selected middle- income countries the probability How perceived relative deprivations affect health outcomes Perceived relative deprivation—how people perceive their situation compared with others’—leads to poorer health outcomes.1 Why is this so?

One answer is that perceived relative deprivation is experienced as an emo- tional state.
People feel worse off than others, which causes feelings of anger and resentment.2 Even people who are objectively well off may feel this, while those who are objectively worse off may not.
These emotional states, not always related to actual average inequality in a country, cause poorer health outcomes such as greater self-reported stress and mental and physical illness.3 A potentially mitigating factor for this mechanism is social embeddedness—social connections in in- terpersonal relationships within social networks and group identities.4 Social embeddedness acts as a buffer, dubbed the “social cure,” reducing stress and anxiety.5 Social embeddedness also promotes health because socially integrated people exercise more, eat better, smoke less and adhere to medical regimes, unless they engage in toxic networks that foster risky behaviours.6 Health and social embeddedness thus reinforce each other.
Notes 1.

Mishra and Carleton 2015; Sim and others 2018; Smith and others 2012.

2.

Smith and others 2012.

3.

Van Zomeren 2019.

4.

Van Zomeren 2019.

5.

Jetten and others 2009.

6.

Uchino 2006.


80 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 of poor health outcomes in some aspects of health is two to almost four times higher for those in the lowest socioeconomic status group than for those in the highest socioeconomic status group — a pattern that is similar in the United Kingdom and the United States.53 The gradients in middle-income countries can be partially related to urbanization (the steepest gradients are in urban areas).
They could also reflect deficiencies in the countries’ public health systems.

But even in Sweden, a country well served through universal health coverage, gradients in health achievements persist and sometimes increase throughout the lifecycle.

Most significantly, having medical experts in the family benefits family members’ health as reflected in longevity, low drug use and vac- cination at all ages.54 Hence, it is not enough to raise people above a certain floor to ensure that gradients do not persist.
Socioeconomic status thus influences health, which in turn is pivotal for other opportunities in life.

Policies that redistribute income cannot break this cycle without addressing the under- lying mechanisms.

Universal health coverage is needed so that people can use the preventive, curative, palliative and rehabilitative health ser- vices they need (see Sustainable Development Goal target 3.8).
The available services need to be communicated and promoted to the public together with information on healthful lifestyles so that people can make educated choices.
Still, FIGURE 2.5 Socioeconomic status affects specific areas of health later in the lifecycle It is not enough to raise people above a certain floor to ensure that gradients do not persist Bogotá, Colombia Mexico, urban Poor cognition Function Depression Stroke Poor SRH Walking Hypertension Diabetes Obesity Heart disease Poor SRH Poor cognition Hypertension Depression Heart disease Stroke Function Diabetes Obesity Walking Depression Function Poor cognition Poor SRH Walking Diabetes Heart disease Hypertension Obesity Stroke 0.20 0.40 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.75 2.25 3.00 0.20 0.40 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.75 2.25 3.00 Chance of poor health outcome Chance of poor health outcome South Africa, urban United States Poor cognition Poor SRH Walking Depression Function Diabetes Obesity Hypertension Stroke Heart disease 0.20 0.40 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.75 2.25 3.00 0.20 0.40 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.75 2.25 3.00 Chance of poor health outcome Chance of poor health outcome Low socioeconomic status High socioeconomic status SRH is self-reported health.
Note: The chance of poor health outcome was calculated with the odds ratio (log scale).

Data for Colombia are from the Survey on Health, Well-being and Aging), data for Mexico and South Africa are from the Study on Global Ageing and Adult Health and data for the United States are from the Health and Retirement Study.
Values greater than 1 (the vertical line) indicate a greater chance of a particular health outcome compared with people with mid-socioeconomic status, and values less than 1 indicate a lower chance.

For example, in Bogotá, Mexico and the United States the chance of poor cognition is nearly two times higher for people with low socioeconomic status than it is for people with mid-socioeconomic status but much lower for people with high socioeconomic status.

Source: Adapted from McEniry and others (2018).


Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 81 tackling gradients in health cannot be achieved simply by gearing policies towards providing a minimum level of access to health services to all.

Other social determinants are also relevant.


How inequalities interact with other contextual determinants of human development This section moves beyond the individual-level, lifecycle analysis and considers how inequalities interact with other contextual determinants of human development.
Not intended to be com- prehensive, it considers four dimensions that are crucial for human development: the econ- omy (how inequalities interact with patterns of economic growth), the society (how inequali- ties affect social cohesion), the political arena (how political participation and the exercise of political power are influenced by inequali- ties) and peace and security (how inequalities interact with violence, which is influenced by economic, social and political factors).
Income and wealth inequalities, economic growth and structural change There are longstanding debates on the rela- tion among structural change in an economy, economic growth, and income and wealth in- equality.

Sustained economic growth typically happens with structural shifts in the economy (with employment and value added moving from agriculture to both manufacturing and services).

But the relation with income distri- bution is more ambiguous.
Simon Kuznets was the first to take up the issue systematical- ly, putting forward the hypothesis that with economic growth, as labour moved away from the agricultural and rural sector to nonagri- cultural and urban economic activities (with a higher mean wage than agriculture and a more widespread distribution of earnings), there would be two stages in the evolution of overall income distribution.55 During the initial stage economywide inequality would increase with economic growth as the relative weight of the nonagricultural sector expanded from very low levels.
But as the share of labour in the ag- ricultural sector shrank, a tipping point would eventually be reached, and inequality would start to fall (given the very low weight of the agricultural and rural sector).

What came to be known as the Kuznets hy- pothesis thus predicted an inverse-U relation (or curve) between income levels and income inequality, with structural change as the main mechanism accounting for the relation.
This became the most enduring legacy of Simon Kuznets’s 1955 article, but it was by no means the only contribution of that work.

Simon Kuznets analysed other mechanisms that he thought influenced the interplay among growth, structural change and inequality.
These ranged from demographic changes (includ- ing the economic paths of immigrants into fast-growing modernizing economies) to the influence of political processes in determining the distribution of income: “In democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-income groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much of it aimed to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization and to support the claims of the broad masses for more adequate shares of the growing income of the country.”56 The more nuanced and sophis- ticated analysis in Kuznets’s original article has been lost over time, replaced almost exclusively by a description of a mechanistic relation be- tween growth and inequality.57 And perhaps the Kuznets hypothesis can be best understood as describing the evolution of income during major phases of structural change, in “Kuznets waves,” as opposed to a deterministic “once and for all” pathway for inequality as economies develop.58 In addition, structural change, growth and inequality can interact through mechanisms other than the changes in sectoral composition highlighted by Simon Kuznets.
The nature of technological change and how it interacts with labour markets is a particularly important channel.
Jan Tinbergen posited that if tech- nological change is skill-biased — that is, if it demands higher skilled workers — then a “race” between technology and skill supply would be expected.59 With technology forging ahead, if skill supply lags, then a wage premium would be expected for higher skills, increasing wages at the top of the skill/income distribution and thus inequality, as lower skilled workers fail to What came to be known as the Kuznets hypothesis predicted an inverse-U relation (or curve) between income levels and income inequality, with structural change as the main mechanism accounting for the relation 82 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 With technology forging ahead, if skill supply lags, then a wage premium would be expected for higher skills, increasing wages at the top of the skill/ income distribution and thus inequality, as lower skilled workers fail to keep up keep up with the race.
There is some evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis for some developed economies in the latter part of the 20th century,60 but Tinbergen’s “race” does not seem to account fully for more recent develop- ments in labour markets this century.

Rather than a steep gradient, many labour markets in developed economies have polar- ized.
This polarization is sometimes manifested with an increase in the labour shares both at the bottom and the top of the skill distribution and a hollowing out at the middle.61 Jan Tinbergen’s race model, therefore, needs to be adjusted to account for wage growth at the bottom — assuming that the same mechanism can explain either wage increases or gains in employment shares at the top.
A large literature has emerged to account for job polarization, premised on the concept that not only technology but also other factors — including trade — determine the demand for skills.

The most influential approach in this field considers tasks and assesses the extent to which they can be easily replaced by either technolo- gy or globalization (with production moving to lower labour cost economies).
With this framework, some tasks that are nonroutine (thus difficult to automate) and more immune to globalization (nontradable, in more techni- cal terms, such as personal and social care, for instance) can be in high demand, even if they correspond to low skills.62 It is in the middle of the skill distribution, with several tasks in the manufacturing sector, that there is higher vulnerability to offshoring or technology re- placement, which explains the hollowing out of the middle.63 These factors seem to be at play in some developing countries as well.64 Over the course of this century there has been a hollow- ing out of the middle, in this case measured by changes across the wage distribution in South Africa (figure 2.6).65 This can be accounted for in part by these mechanisms, along with the fact that labour market institutions such as the minimum wage do not protect those in the middle and that trade unions have been cap- tured in part by those at the top.
The relation between polarization and inequality is still con- tested, with the impact on aggregate inequality measures ambiguous.66 The debate has ebbed and flowed on the empirical validity of the Kuznets hypothesis, its interpretation, alternative mechanisms, di- rections of causality and the relation between economic growth and income inequality.67 Assessing the weight of the empirical evidence FIGURE 2.6 The hollowing out of the middle in South Africa Annual average growth rate of real earnings, 2001–2015 (percent) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96 Source: Bhorat and others 2019.
Wage percentile Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 83 What matters is to identify policies that can lead both to growth and to more inclusive sharing of the gains from expanding income is particularly challenging, given the range of income inequality measures in the literature as well as the difficulty of disentangling meas- urement error from plausible causal relations.68 Further compounding the analysis are factors that, at some point in history and in some contexts, have a greater bearing on inequality than either growth or structural change.
This is at the heart of Thomas Piketty’s critique of the Kuznets hypothesis, which argues that inequal- ity dynamics depend primarily on institutions and policies.69 And Walter Scheidel argues that violence and major epidemics have historically been the greatest downward drivers of inequali- ty, not structural change or policies.70 Beyond the more secular and longer term structural approach explored by Simon Kuznets and the subsequent debate is the related ques- tion of whether there are tradeoffs between growth and inequality over shorter time spans.
Concerns with efficiency, or how much in- come is growing, have traditionally dominated concerns with equity, or how it is distributed.
Arthur Okun has suggested a tradeoff between economic efficiency and equality, arguing that more equality could weaken economic growth by harming incentives to work, save and invest.71 And because income growth has such an overwhelming impact over the longer run in improving living standards, the impact of redistributing production would pale in comparison with the “apparently limitless potential of increasing production.”72 Yet re- cent empirical studies have found that higher income inequality can be associated with lower and less durable growth,73 including in developing countries.74 But both the data and techniques used in some of these econometric studies remain contested, casting a shadow of uncertainty over claims that inequality is either “bad” or “good” for economic growth.75 Ultimately, it is less relevant to explore whether inequality is harmful to growth (in a mechanistic way) than to understand the impact of policies on income distribution and economic growth.76 And the evaluation of the impact of policies on distribution, in turn, depends on the weights that society and poli- cymakers attribute to different segments of the population.
Thus, blanket statements on the effect of inequality on growth are not helpful, in part because they do not enable insights into whether income is accruing to the middle class or to the bottom of the distribution.

Moreover, since at least Simon Kuznets’s 1955 article, it has been well understood that growth processes can at times be unequalizing.

What matters is to identify policies that can lead both to growth and to more inclusive sharing of the gains from expanding income.
Identifying these more inclusive growth patterns matters in particular for those at the bottom of the income distribution.
In this case, the redistribution of productive capacity (leading to the accumulation of assets, access to markets and connection of returns to asset use at the bottom) can lead to both growth and income gains at the bottom, reducing in- equality.77 More mechanically, interactions be- tween growth and inequality affect how much income flows to poor people.78 As a matter of pure arithmetic decomposition, the impact of expanding mean income on poverty depends on the growth rate as well as on how much additional income flows to the bottom of the distribution.79 Redistribution to the bottom can create more than a one-off reduction in poverty and inequality — it can change the pov- erty elasticity of income, which would make growth more impactful on poverty reduction over time.80 A recent simulation exercise quantifies how reducing inequality could help reduce poverty using those direct relationships.
The number of extremely poor people would remain above 550 million in 2030 if GDP per capita were to grow according to International Monetary Fund forecasts and inequality were held constant.

But reducing the Gini index by 1 percent a year in each country would cut the global poverty rate to about 5 percent in 2030, which would bring 100 million more people out of extreme poverty.
81 In the spirit of understanding further pos- sible mechanisms for the interaction between inequality and growth, one hypothesis is that if high inequality reduces mobility, that would lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (talent, skills and capital) that, compared with a counterfactual in which the resources are allocated efficiently, would hurt growth.
If this mechanism holds, there would be a negative im- pact of income inequality on economic growth, with the channel running through inequalities 84 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 When horizontal inequalities are high, or perceived to be high, people may withdraw from certain social interactions, which can diminish trust and social cohesion in opportunity.82 Yet, once again, the empirical support for this channel is ambiguous.83 Another hypothesis is that the relation works through efficiency: Productivity, and hence GDP, increase most when resources are efficiently used and the potential for technolog- ical learning is fully exploited.84 This has been shown historically by the East Asian growth model.
Investments in education, among others, have contributed to economic growth through productivity increases.85 Productivity is lower in most countries with high income inequality than in countries with low in- come inequality.86 One reason could be that inequality reduces incentives for innovation and investment through various supply-side mechanisms.87 The relation could also work in reverse: Slow economic growth could increase inequality under certain circumstances.
For instance, when rates of return are higher than economic growth, especially for large wealth portfolios, wealth inequality tends to increase.88 Together with other mechanisms contributing to the rise of top-end bargaining power and high incomes (including top executive compensation), this dynamic could create a vicious circle of slow growth and high inequality.

Trust and social interaction in unequal societies Income inequality can damage social cohesion in societies.
Trust, solidarity and social interac- tion can be diminished by large income gaps, impairing the social contract (sets of rules and expectations of behaviour with which people voluntarily conform that underpin stable societies).

But does income inequality simply damage social cohesion, or is the relation two- way — does low social cohesion block redistrib- utive policies?
Important features of social cohesion include the strength of social relationships, shared values, feelings of identity and the sense of belonging to a certain community.89 One of the most common measures of social cohesion is the level of trust among society.

Trusting people means accepting strangers as part of the community and sharing with them the under- lying commonality of values.
Trust is based on senses of optimism and control: Putting faith in strangers is not seen as risky.90 But higher inequality may cause the less wealthy to feel powerless and less trusting in a society generally perceived as unfair, while people at the top may not feel that they share the same fate as people at the bottom or that they should strive towards a common goal.91 Empirical evidence shows that in developed countries the higher the income inequality, the lower the level of trust within society.92 And in European countries with higher income inequality, people are less willing to improve the living conditions of others, independent of household income, while there is probably less solidarity and people are less likely to support redistributive institutions.93 The interaction between inequalities and solidarity may thus go in both directions.
When horizontal inequalities are high, or perceived to be high, people may withdraw from certain social interactions (box 2.3), which can also diminish trust and social cohesion.94 In highly unequal countries people from differ- ent social strands are also less likely to mingle and interact.95 They probably live in different neighbourhoods, their children attend different schools, they read different newspapers and they are in different groups on social media (box 2.4).
Their worldviews likely differ, and they know little about the fate of their fellow citizens.

People who do not meet and interact do not directly see the concerns and needs of others (see box 1.9 in chapter 1),96 which may reduce support for equalizing policies.

A comparison between Canada and the United States at the subnational level shows the effect of segregation on intergenerational income mobility.
On average, mobility is lower in the United States than in Canada, but at the subnational level the southern United States is least mobile, like northern Canada.
One reason for low mobility in the southern United States is the history of exclusion of African Americans, many of whom have not been fully integrated into the economic mainstream.97 Some parts of northern Canada also have lower mobility than the rest of the country, due most likely to the remote geographic locations of some indig- enous peoples, which make their integration into the economy challenging.
However, their proportion of the population is much smaller Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 85 BOX 2.3 The power of perceived inequalities in South Africa South Africa is an interesting case study of social cohe- sion and inequalities, given its history of racial segre- gation and related vertical and horizontal inequalities.
According to multidimensional living standards meas- ures, inequality has declined significantly among indi- viduals and among races since 2008.

And yet interracial interactions—measured by actual interracial social in- teractions, the desire to interact and the desire to know about the customs of people of other races—have also declined since 2010.

While interracial interaction is just one part of social cohesion, it is crucial in South Africa.
These findings are thus counterintuitive and run contrary to the empirical findings of other countries.

One possible explanation is that perceived trends in inequality, which are substantially different from actu- al trends, are more important for predicting interracial socialization.
The roughly 70 percent of South Africans who feel that inequality has not changed much or has even increased over time are less likely to participate in interracial socialization than those who perceive that inequality is declining.

Across race groups, interra- cial socialization and the desire to interact increase as perceived inequality declines (see figure).

The desire to interact is crucial here, as it varies from the actual inter- actions due to circumstances.
The finding remains sig- nificant even after a multidimensional Living Standards Measure, race, education, trust and other measures are controlled for.

These findings are important because interracial interaction is crucial for social cohesion in South Africa.

Social cohesion in turn increases the possibility of con- sensus on equalizing policies that reduce inequality.

There is also weak evidence for reduced objective ine- quality improving social cohesion.
This opens an oppor- tunity to create a virtuous cycle of social cohesion and low inequalities.
More interracial interaction with lower perceived inequalities Actual interracial interaction Desired interracial interaction Percent 0 20 40 60 80 Talk Socialize Talk Socialize Talk Socialize Talk Socialize Talk Socialize Perceived inequality Improved Percent 0 20 40 60 80 Desire to talk Learn custom Stayed the same Desire to talk Learn custom Worsened somewhat Desire to talk Learn custom Worsened a great deal Desire to talk Learn custom Don’t know Desire to talk Learn custom White Asian/Indian Coloured Black Source: David and others 2018.
86 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 2.4 The power of your neighbour Human beings do not act in isolation—their behaviour depends partly on the behaviour of people in their cognitive neighbourhood.1 An example from agent-based models demonstrates the emergent nature of human inequal- ities.2 A model of neighbourhood segregation along ethnic lines—which can be thought of as a form of geographic inequality—shows that even when there are few individual prejudices, segregation can nonetheless arise merely from the interaction of individuals.3 The segregation model has two types of agents—red and green—in equal numbers, each occupying one “patch” of the model’s environment (equivalent to a house).
On average, each agent begins with an equal number of green and red neighbours.

A key parameter is the average per- centage of same-colour neighbouring agents wish to live near (such as 30 percent or 70 percent).

If an agent does not have enough neighbours of its own colour (according to the preference parameter), they move to a spot nearby.

The results of the simulation are dramatic.


Starting from a preference for perfect equality (having 50 percent of one’s neighbours the same col- our), agents’ individual movements give rise to an aggregate segregation of around 86 percent (in other words, roughly 86 percent of one’s neighbours end up being the same colour despite each person wishing to have a 50 per- cent level of diversity).
Reducing the preference to 40 percent results in the overall rate of segregation dropping to around 83 percent; reducing it to How segregation can arise from interaction 30 percent brings segregation down to about 75 percent (see figure).4 Only lowering the preference to the single digits results in very low emergent segregation (for example, 9 percent leads to 52 percent).

This means that people of similar ethnic characteristics automatically move closer together.
These behavioural patterns can accelerate inequalities due to the power of the neighbourhood effect—an expression used to describe the impact of neighbourhood on the possibility of an individual moving up the social ladder, especially through the influence of peers and role models.
In most developing countries neighbourhood effects are likely to be even stronger given the vast differences in the provision of public goods and services, es- pecially between rural and urban areas.5 However, public policy interventions can help shape human behaviour, providing counterincentives to mitigate the power of the neighbourhood ef- fect.
In the United States inequality in housing prices limits workers’ ability to move to a location with higher earning potential.6 Similarly, the quality of public services such as schools can differ across neighbourhoods, fur- ther heightening inequalities.

Government subsidies for housing or equal- ly good quality public schools could help offset this effect.
The Moving to Opportunity experiment showed the effectiveness of these policies by of- fering randomly selected families housing vouchers to move into better off neighbourhoods.

The move increased college attendance and earnings for people who moved during childhood.7 Starting point with equal number of green and red neighbours After interaction between agents Source: Wilensky 1997.

Notes 1.

Iversen, Krishna and Sen 2019.

2.

Agent-based models have been used to predict human behaviour.
Using a variety of software tools, agent-based models typically create a group of agents (people, firms, trees, animals, societies, countries and so on), design simple behavioural rules (either for all agents or for subgroups), place the agents in a given simulated environment (usually consisting of time and space dimensions) and then set the agents free to interact based on the behavioural rules.
The point of the simulation is to see what emergent phenomena and aggregate properties arise from the interactions based on these basic settings, with no ex ante determination of equilibrium or any other goal.

3.

Schelling 1978.

4.

The exact numbers depend on the specific run of the simulation and on the density parameter (that is, the proportion of the neighbourhood that is occupied; in this case 95 percent).

5.

Iversen, Krishna and Sen 2019.

6.

Bayoumi and Barkema 2019.

7.


Chetty, Hendren and Katz 2016.
Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 87 than the African American population in the southern United States.98 When more incentives for interaction are directed towards diversity (including people from all ethnicities, religions and social strands) interaction, trust, networks and social cohesion can be built.99 Ethnicity quotas and subsidies for cultural activities, civic associations, schools and the like could be an effective way of facil- itating interaction in the long run.
Initially people may resist interaction, and there could be a temporary decline in trust, but in the long run intergroup interaction counters these in- itial negative effects, increasing trust and even improving the perceived quality of life.100 The cycle of social cohesion and inequalities is strongly connected to the cycle of education and inequalities, which, again, is connected to the cycle of health gradients.
Education can cre- ate strong social bonds among different groups in a society by teaching people about different cultures and bringing them into contact with people of different backgrounds.

Likewise, it can teach norms and values and promote par- ticipatory and active citizenship.
But schools can also act as a flattener for the health gradi- ent, teaching children healthy habits and how to follow a balanced and nutritious diet.101 The convergence in primary and secondary educa- tion (see chapter 1) thus gives hope for creating virtuous cycles of equity in the future.
How inequalities are transferred into political inequality — and back Most of the literature has found that in high hu- man development countries inequalities depress political participation, specifically the frequency of political discussion and participation in elections among all citizens but the richest.102 Economic elites (or sometimes even the upper middle class) and organized groups representing business interests thus shape policies substantially more than average citizens or mass-based interest groups do.
Additionally, mechanisms through which this can happen include opinion making, lobbying and clientelism.103 Income and wealth inequalities are thus transferred into political ine- quality (box 2.5), with privileged groups mould- ing the system according to their needs and preferences, leading to even more inequalities.

Government policy space to address inequalities becomes constrained because political decisions reflect the balance of power in society.
This is often referred to as elite capture of institutions.104 Power asymmetries can even lead to break- downs in institutional functions, constraining the effectiveness of policies.

When institutions are afflicted by clientelism and captured by elites, citizens may be less willing to cooperate on social contracts.

When that translates into, for instance, lower compliance with paying tax- es, the state’s ability to provide quality public services is diminished.
This, in turn can lead to higher and more persistent inequalities—for instance, in health and education.

As the overall system will be perceived as unfair, people tend to withdraw from political processes, which further strengthens the influence of elites.105 In a world in which information becomes more and more accessible and important, media is a decisive channel through which the imbalances of power can be further amplified.
Different stakeholders “create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable the agency of others, across and between a range of older and newer media settings.”106 Even though information is easily accessible for many people, not everyone is equally well informed.
In countries with high internet pen- etration, income inequality correlates positively with both information inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient estimated over the number of news sources individuals use) and information poverty (the probability of using zero or only one news source).
In Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, where income and information inequality are high, 1 individual in 10 uses zero or only one news source (information poverty).107 Less well informed voters become more susceptible to the above described political influence by the few media sources they consume.

Depending on how these sources are financed, they may promote and protect the interests of a specific group.
This form of biased reporting has been referred to as media power.108 A combination of high information poverty and media power can weaken democratic processes109 because it can influence voters’ behaviour, which is espe- cially delicate with fake news.110 Inequalities can also increase both the demand for and supply of populist and authoritarian Government policy space to address inequalities becomes constrained because political decisions reflect the balance of power in society.
This is often referred to as elite capture of institutions 88 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 2.5 Economic inequality and human development Elizabeth Anderson, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan How does inequality matter for human development?

It limits the prospects for development of the less advantaged.
It undermines the ability of untar- geted pro-growth policies to reduce poverty because most of the growth will be appropriated by the better-off.

And it reduces social mobility by enabling advantaged groups to hoard opportunities and close ranks against those beneath them.
Beyond these concerns, political theorists have drawn attention to the relational aspects of inequality, beyond the bare facts of distributive ine- quality: Distributive inequalities reflect, reproduce and sometimes consti- tute oppressive social relations of domination, esteem and standing.1 It is not simply the material injury of wage theft or of being physically beaten by a domestic partner but the fact of living in subjection to others who wield the power to inflict harm with impunity and who feel free to sacrifice one’s vital interests to their own greed or vanity that not only deprives but also oppresses.
It is not simply the bare fact of lacking adequate clothing but the stigma others attach to such deprivation that makes poverty sting.

It is not simply the physical difficulty the disabled have of navigating public spaces but also the little account public architects and public policy have given to their interests that not only inconveniences but constitutes their diminished standing in the eyes of others.
Across the world, inequality tracks differences of social identity such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, caste, class and sexual orientation— arbitrarily marking some social groups as superior to others in the oppor- tunities they enjoy, the powers they command and the respect others owe them.

Under such conditions members of subordinated groups lack effective means to vindicate their human rights, even in states that legally acknowl- edge these rights.
Groups targeted for sexual harassment and assault can- not vindicate their rights if social or legal norms systematically disparage the credibility of their testimony.

Groups subject to disproportionate siting of toxic waste dumps and polluting industries cannot vindicate their rights if they are disenfranchised or if state decisionmakers are otherwise unac- countable to them.
Groups denied effective access to education cannot vin- dicate their rights if they do not know what their rights are or lack the ability to navigate the judicial and bureaucratic processes needed to secure them.

Distributive inequality for social relations undermines trust among members of society as well as trust in institutions.

It depresses political, civ- ic, social and cultural participation.

It spurs communal violence and crime.


It undermines democracy by enabling the rich to capture the state and thereby appropriate a disproportionate share of public goods, shift tax burdens in a regressive direction, enforce fiscal austerity and avoid accountability for predatory and criminal behaviour.
Even the laws and regulations that consti- tute the basic economic infrastructure of markets, property and firms have been designed under the influence of powerful groups to rig purportedly neutral rules in their interests.2 These effects occur in states at all levels of human development, even those with low poverty.

They are exacerbated by extreme inequalities in the top 1 percent of income and wealth distributions3 as well as by a small or stagnant middle class.
The independent normative significance of inequality suggests that abolishing poverty and deprivation should not be the only aim; the concen- tration of income and wealth at the top should also be limited.4 In 2019 the richest 26 individuals in the world owned as much wealth as the bottom half of the world’s population.5 There is no normative justification for such extreme inequality.
The wealth of the ultra-rich has not always been accu- mulated legally—given the vast scale of global corruption, organized crime, financial manipulation, money laundering and tax evasion.

But even when it has, that would only call into question the justification of laws so heavily tilted towards the interests of the rich.

It is absurd to credit such inequality to differences in merit, given the rising capital share of income, which re- wards mere ownership, and the large impact of chance on outcomes.
Nor can such extreme inequality be rationalized as necessary for poverty reduc- tion or as socially advantageous in any other way.

Extreme wealth does not even enhance the consumption possibilities of the ultra-rich, who cannot personally consume all of their wealth or even a significant fraction of it.

Indeed, most of what the ultra-rich do with their wealth is exercise power over others.
If they own, direct or manage a firm, they deploy their wealth to control their workers and their working conditions.

If they hold a monopoly or monopsony position, they may dominate consumers, suppliers and the communities where they operate.

If they lobby or donate money to politicians, they capture the state.
The ultra-rich also have disproportionate clout in global institutions, particularly regarding the rules of global finance, which have contributed to systemic financial risks and to the instability ex- perienced by many countries around the world.

The current era is witnessing global democratic backsliding, following a surge of democratization in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Freedom House reports that 22 of 41 democracies have become less free in the last five years.6 While the causal connections between distributive inequality (in- cluding extreme concentrations of wealth at the top and declining prospects for the global middle) and the decay of democratic norms and institutions have yet to be fully explored, what is already known should raise alarms.
While the ultra-rich might escape the worst of unmitigated global climate change, what will happen to the billions left homeless, sick or stateless by rising sea levels, extreme floods, droughts, heat waves and attendant social conflict and civil war?

The great inequalities defined by citizenship status threaten the freedom of environmental and wartime refugees, while politicians in receiving states attack democratic institutions in the name of closing their borders.
Just at the point where meeting the challenges of climate change is demanding ever-greater international cooperation, states are retreating from global institutions.

Greater attention to the case for equality, both within and between states and in the governance of global institutions, is needed to promote human development and cope with the greatest challenge humanity faces in the 21st century.

Notes 1.

Anderson 1999; Fourie, Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer 2015.

2.

Harcourt 2011; Pistor 2019.

3.


Piketty 2014.

4.

Robeyns 2019.

5.

Oxfam 2019.

6.

Freedom House 2019.

Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 89 The way in which power asymmetries play out in the policy arena can exacerbate and entrench inequalities or pave the way to more equalizing and inclusive dynamics leaders.
When higher inequalities lead to an enhanced sense of systemic unfairness, it can raise the public’s openness to nonmainstream political movements.111 In some contexts polit- ical participation increases under high income inequality, when populist leaders trigger griev- ances by explicitly connecting political and socioeconomic exclusion.112 More generally, populist leaders use economic anxiety, public anger and the reduced legitimacy of status quo parties to build narratives that exploit one of the following two cleavages: Right-wing populism thrives on cultural cleavages, including religious, ethnic or national differences, while left-wing populism emphasizes economic differences be- tween the wealthy elite and the lower classes.113 Both divide society and weaken social cohesion.
One way of understanding the interplay between inequality and the dynamics of power is to draw on a framework that explores one of the processes through which inequalities are generated and perpetuated.

At its core, this process is often referred to as governance—or the way in which different actors in society bargain to reach agreements (policies and rules).
When these agreements take the form of policies, they have the power to directly impact the distribution of resources in society (the bottom arrow in the right loop of figure 2.7, “outcome game”).

For example, policies on tax- ation and social spending determine who pays into the fiscal system and who benefits from it.

These policies directly influence development FIGURE 2.7 The effectiveness of governance: An infinity loop outcomes such as economic inequality (and growth).
However, by redistributing economic resources, these policies are also redistributing de facto power (the top arrow in the right loop of figure 2.7).

This can generate (or reinforce) power asymmetries between actors bargaining in the policy arena, which can in turn adversely affect the effective implementation of devel- opment policies.

For example, power asym- metries can manifest in the capture of policies by elite actors—undermining the ability of governments to commit to achieving long-term goals.
Or they may manifest in the exclusion of certain population groups from accessing high-quality public services—undermining cooperation by harming tax morale.

This can lead to a vicious cycle of inequality (inequality traps) in which unequal societies begin to insti- tutionalize the inequality.

This loop plays out in prevailing institutions and social norms (the outcome game) and can lead to actors deciding to change the rules of the game (the bottom ar- row in the left loop of figure 2.7).
In this way, de jure power is also redistributed.

This can be far more consequential because it not only changes current development outcomes but also sets the conditions that shape actors’ behaviour in the future.

Once again, the way in which power asymmetries play out in the policy arena can ex- acerbate and entrench inequalities or pave the way to more equalizing and inclusive dynamics.
This is one clear way in which inequality may undermine the effectiveness of governance.114 Power asymmetries De jure power De facto power Rules Policy arena Development outcomes Rules game Outcome game Note: Rules refer to formal and informal rules (norms).

Development outcomes refer to security, growth and equity.

Source: World Bank 2017b.


90 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Violence and inequalities: The cruellest vicious cycle This last section expounds on what can be considered the two cruellest vicious cycles: the relations between inequalities and homicides and violent conflict.

There are more homicides in countries with higher income inequality across all categories of human development.
For high and very high human development countries the association is strong: Income inequality explains almost a third of the overall variation in homicide rates, even after years of schooling, GDP per capita, democratization and ethnic fractionalization are accounted for.115 Education has a moderating effect on this relation, but only in high and very high hu- man development countries: 1.8 more years of average schooling more than halves the associa- tion between income inequality and homicide rates.116 Findings from a study of Mexico’s drug war are in line with the hypothesis that income inequality is associated with more violence.
A 1 point increase in the Gini coefficient between 2006 and 2010 translated into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.117 The mechanism behind this relation is less clear.
Some suggest that the feeling of shame and humiliation in unequal societies drives vi- olence, predominantly by young men pressured to ensure status.118 Others suggest a psychosocial explanation: Income inequality intensifies so- cial hierarchies, causing social anxiety and class conflict, damaging trust and social cohesion.119 This is empirically supported by data showing a negative correlation between trust and income inequality — at least in developed countries (see above).
Societies with low trust and weak social cohesion have lower capacity to create safe com- munities, and this, together with high pressure for status, may increase violence.

On a macro level, evidence about the rela- tion between inequalities and violent conflict is mixed.
Some studies find that income in- equality triggers instability that may lead to violence.120 Others find no relation between income inequality and violent conflict.121 More recently, Frances Stewart has argued that political disturbances — including violent conflict and civil war — arise from horizontal inequalities between different groups, each distinguishing itself from the others by its his- tory, religion, language, race, region, class or the like.122 Group differences appear in all societies, but they are only likely to lead to conflict and violence when social, economic and political inequalities are exacerbated by politically ex- cluding certain groups.123 A condition for horizontal inequalities to lead to conflict is that leaders or elites have an interest in mobilizing groups and initiat- ing a conflict.
That interest often arises from horizontal political inequalities among the elite.124 Added to this are more determinants of conflict: the nature of the state, the role of local institutions, the presence of natural resources125 and the struggle between some groups for access to power, resources, services and security.126 Shocks can also interact with horizontal inequalities and contribute to outbreaks of instability.
One example is the contribution of the drought that affected Syria prior to the uprisings of 2011, showing how shocks and horizontal inequalities (primarily between the rural population affected by the drought and the population in urban areas) can interact to trigger instability.127 While only 9 percent of armed conflict outbreaks between 1980 and 2010 coincided with disasters such as droughts or heatwaves, the proportion increases to 23 percent in eth- nically fractionalized settings, where disruptive events seem to play out in a particularly tragic way.128 Droughts also significantly increase the likelihood of sustained violent conflict in low- income settings where ethnically or politically excluded groups depend on agriculture.
This leads to a vicious cycle between violent conflict and environmental shocks, with the groups’ vulnerability to one increasing their vulnerabil- ity to the other.129 Comparisons of civil and communal con- flicts among 155 politically relevant ethnic groups in Africa show that both political and economic horizontal inequalities can lead to conflict.

But the targets of violence differ.

Political exclusion leads to violence that targets the central government.
Horizontal income or wealth inequalities act more broadly as a determinant of organized political violence, increasing the risk of civil and communal con- flicts.
Communal conflicts appear to be driven Political disturbances — including violent conflict and civil war —can arise from horizontal inequalities Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 91 Some forms of horizontal inequalities increase before, during and in the immediate years after the onset of conflict mostly by politically included groups with less reason to fear government intervention.130 Afrobarometer perceptions data suggest that not only real horizontal inequalities but also perceived inequalities and exclusion matter for conflict (see box 2.3).
The likelihood of social unrest increases when individuals per- ceive their group as disadvantaged.

Support for violence is highest when included groups enjoying high political status perceive that the government treats them unfairly.

But the effect of exclusion on support for violence can also BOX 2.6 Internal armed conflict and horizontal inequalities Peace Research Institute Oslo The impact of internal armed conflict on horizontal ine- qualities can play out in several ways.
In some cases it can reduce horizontal inequalities,1 while in others it can exacerbate them.

First, if the costs of internal conflict are greatest for those who are already poorest,2 horizontal in- equalities may increase.

Many countries and areas expe- riencing armed conflicts had high horizontal inequalities prior to the conflict, and such inequalities are exacerbat- ed when the most disadvantaged groups are dispropor- tionately affected by it.
Second, internal armed conflict is often restricted to or focused largely in certain areas of a country.

These areas, and the groups that reside in them, may be cut off from the rest of society and the economy.

Some areas will also suffer disproportionally from the de- struction of facilities, buildings and human lives.
In the postconflict phase these outcomes may wear off, as the economy picks up and the conflict no longer imposes direct costs (on some areas).3 Yet, postconflict redistributions of power and resources may depend on the outcome of the conflict.

Patterns of inequality in the aftermath of conflict may be con- tingent on whether the outcome is a postconflict agreement securing the interests of both the losers and the winners.
In the years prior to armed conflict, regional ine- quality in infant mortality rates—used here as a proxy for one dimension of horizontal inequalities—increases (see figure).

This increase continues in the immediate years (1–5) after the onset of conflict, which is con- sistent with the argument that horizontal inequality in- creases during conflict.

But this acceleration wears off after 5–10 years.


Hence, some evidence suggests that the postconflict phase is associated with a decrease in a measure of one dimension of horizontal inequalities.
Regional inequality in infant mortality rates prior to and after conflict onset Regional inequality in infant mortality rates (deviation from country-mean) Outbreak of war 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 –0.04 –4 –2 0 2 4 6 8 10 Phases of war onset (years) Note: The x-axis is the number of years prior to and after the onset of conflict.

Conflict is defined here as armed conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths.
The y-axis is the global average of countries’ deviation from their mean level of horizontal inequality.

In other words, it captures whether countries have higher or lower horizontal inequality than usual.

Regional inequality is measured using the ratio between best- and worst-performing region in infant mortality rates.

Source: Dahlum and others forthcoming.

Notes 1.

Women’s political participation, for instance, often increases in postconflict settings (World Bank 2017b).

2.

Gates and others 2012.


3.

Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2017.

Source: Dahlum and others forthcoming.

92 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Income inequality increases during violent conflict and during the first five years of typical postwar reconstruction.
But violent conflicts can also widen inequalities in other areas of human development, such as health and education be attenuated by subjective perceptions (on perceptions of inequalities, see spotlight 1.2 in chapter 1).131 Horizontal inequalities can drive violent conflict, and in some cases they may increase even more before, during and in the immediate years after the onset of conflict (box 2.6).
Even though major conflicts such as World War I and World War II can bring income inequality down (essentially by increasing the bargaining power of labour, when there is a need for mass mobilization),132 empirical evidence from recent (internal) conflicts shows that income inequality increases during violent conflict and during the first five years of typical postwar reconstruction.
The rise in income inequality associated with violent conflict is not permanent — but it takes 19–22 years for inequality to fall again, and it may take up to 40 years to return to prewar levels of income inequality if peace is sustained.133 Violent conflicts can also widen inequalities in other areas of human development, such as health and education.
This is because violent conflicts disproportionately affect poor peo- ple: They increase undernourishment, infant mortality and the number of people deprived from access to potable water.134 Given that social spending often declines as a consequence of rising military expenditure,135 public service provision is also weakened — another potential source for increasing inequalities in human development.
Preventing violence at the early stage of conflict is without a doubt the best approach to avoid suffering, deaths and other costs of violent conflict.

Violence is path dependent: Once it starts, incentives and systems work in a way that sustain it.
Group grievances have to be recognized early so that patterns of ex- clusion and institutional weaknesses can be addressed.136 When prevention is ineffective, postconflict settlements, which often involve political power sharing and could also include economic redistribution, offer opportunities to prevent recurrence.137 Inequalities can accumulate through life, reflecting deep power imbalances This chapter has taken a dual approach in revealing the mechanisms through which in- equalities in key areas of human development emerge, reproduce and persist across genera- tions.
It has also shown how these areas of hu- man development are connected and how they interact, transferring inequalities in one area of human development to another.

The first part took a lifecycle perspective, arguing that parents’ socioeconomic status strongly influences children’s health and early childhood development, both of which shape the way children benefit from universal prima- ry and secondary education.
Their education attainment in turn constitutes the stepping stone for a successful start in the labour market.

But parents’ socioeconomic status is relevant at this stage of the lifecycle as well.

Depending on parents’ knowledge and networks, adolescents may receive a jump start for better opportuni- ties in the labour market.

Assortative mating then closes the feedback loop by creating fami- lies in which both parents come from a similar socioeconomic status.
The second approach transcended individual outcomes and looked at the macro framework for these mechanisms.

It considered how in- equalities affect institutions and balances of power, how societies function and whether inequalities nurture economic growth.

One key point was that the nature of inequality matters as well: Inequalities between groups can determine war or peace — a pivotal decision for any desired expansion of capabilities at the individual and societal levels.
Chapter 2 Inequalities in human development: Interconnected and persistent | 93 Part II Beyond averages Beyond averages Part I of the report focuses on inequalities of capabilities, going beyond income.

In parallel, part I points out that, even within segments of the population the disparities are large, particularly for those at the bottom.
The evolution of indicators such as the poverty headcount ratio fail to account for what happens to those who are left behind, as well as to those who, having escaped or not even having been deprived, fall into destitution.1 Part I also highlights that a consequential aspect of inequality has to do with group—or horizontal—inequalities.

Some groups get ahead, while others are in practice blocked—sometimes insidiously—from full economic and social participation.
Even so, information on group inequality is often ignored, and sometimes is simply not available, despite the strong call in the Sustainable Development Goals to collect such data.

These aspects have one thing in common: They hide behind average patterns of inequality that harm progress in human development.2 Part II tackles this issue head-on.
It goes beyond av- erages3 to report on what is happening across entire distributions of income and wealth, uncovering patterns in the evolution of these distributions.4 And it zooms in on horizontal inequality’s most systematic and widespread manifestation—inequality across gender—of- ten obscured because biases in data collection and analysis hurt women in a world “designed for men.”5 Spotlight 3.1 at the end of chapter 3 illustrates the importance of looking within countries and even within households to bet- ter identify those farthest behind, who may have been hidden by averages.
Tackling inequality starts with good meas- urement and good data.

Indeed, a major weak- ness of today’s public discourse on inequality is its reliance on summary measures, whose choice is far from trivial (see spotlight 3.2 at the end of chapter 3).

This is not an academic issue—it is critical for policy.

Conventional summary measures of inequal- ity can fail to identify what truly concerns peo- ple about the distribution of income, wealth and other human development outcomes.
For instance, income share ratios are insensitive to regressive transfers within the poor (as noted in spotlight 3.1), a matter of importance for policymaking.

Income inequality is often described using the Gini coefficient.

True, the Gini coefficient is sensitive to regressive transfers throughout the distribution and is frequently used in this Report—as it is in pol- icy and much of the inequality research.
But it may not fully express what is of concern to people and so may need to be complemented with more information.

In fact, summary measures of inequality are sensitive to different parts of the distribution.

Every summary measure implies judgements about how much to value the income shares of poorer and richer people.

Sometimes these are called “weights” in a social welfare function.

Each summary statistic assigns these weights implicitly—and, for most people, not that transparently.
Some may even be using social weights that do not reflect social values.

Tony Atkinson, writing in the late 1960s, asserted: “[In examining] the problem of measuring in- equality […] at present this problem is usually approached through the use of such summary statistics as the Gini coefficient […].
This con- ventional method of approach is misleading [because the] examination of the social welfare functions implicit in these measures shows that in a number of cases they have proper- ties which are unlikely to be acceptable, and in general there are no grounds for believing that they would accord with social values.
[…] I hope that these conventional measures will be rejected.”6 In other words, the concept of inequality one uses, and its implied ethical judgements, will determine the conclusion one reaches about it.7 As it happens, the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to transfers of income in the middle of the distribution than at the bottom or the top—while in many countries most of the action on income and wealth dynamics is precisely at the ends of the distribution (chap- ter 3).
In particular, much of the inequality action occurs at the very top, so that measures looking at the top 10 percent—even, in some PART II Beyond averages | 97 PART II.

cases, the top 1 percent—lack the resolution to fully capture the accumulation of income and wealth.

In addition, concepts and measurement in- teract, each shaping how the other evolves.

It is historically inaccurate to assume that the com- plete axiomatic foundation of all inequality measures was developed before these measures were used.
The Human Development Index, which Human Development Reports issue regularly, is a good illustration.

As Amartya Sen said, it was introduced as a “rough and ready” measure of basic capabilities, and several aspects of it—including changes introduced over the years—remain controversial.8 But the same can be said of national accounts estimates and the origin of macroeconomic aggregates such as gross domestic product (GDP).
In the edifice of statistical manuals agreed to by the United Nations Statistical Commission, national accounts may seem an unassailable construction—but they are no more than just that: a construction.

Tracing the history of national accounts and GDP, Diane Coyle recounts the 1940s debate in the United States on whether to include government spending in GDP.9 The Commerce Department at the time argued that govern- ment spending should be included.
But a founding father of GDP measurement, Simon Kuznets, argued for leaving it out (partly be- cause he viewed some government spending as not necessarily enhancing welfare).

Ultimately, Coyle argues, the decision to include it had profound implications for the government’s perceived role in the economy as another agent alongside private actors (the same approach advocated by John Maynard Keynes).
Hugh Rockoff goes further, showing how economic statistics such as price indices and unemploy- ment rates originated “in bitter debates over economic policy, ultimately debates over the distribution of income.”10 Clearly, measurement influences policy.

Yet the issue is more complex that just measure- ment.

It is one thing to agree to look beyond summary measures of income inequality, and another to have the data to do this.
To be sure, summary measures are constructed from information on the very distribution that they collapse into a single summary statistic, although the data on that distribution are often too coarse.

Thanks to innovative efforts combining information from various sources on income and wealth distribution, however, it is now feasible to estimate at a more gran- ular level how income is distributed and how this distribution changes over time for various population segments.
Meeting the growing de- mand for comparable cross-country inequality estimates, a number of databases with regional or global coverage provide estimates for a range of countries and years.
Although there is much agreement across different databases, there are differences across the concepts of income that are used, with important implications for con- clusions, such as the extent to which fiscal re- distribution affects inequality (see spotlight 3.3 at the end of chapter 3).11 To go beyond averages, part II has two chapters.
Chapter 3 presents recent findings on inequality levels and trends in global pre- tax incomes and wealth, pointing out that, as things stand, the wealthiest 1 percent of the population is on track to capture 35 percent of global wealth by 2030.

The chapter breaks out these trends across regions, using recent data and new methods to survey income inequali- ty.

It then delves into the dynamics of wealth concentration.
The use of innovative methods to account for the evolution of income and wealth inequality across the distribution has captured previously hidden patterns of accumulation at the very top in many countries.

The drivers of this accumu- lation need to be understood in depth and are likely to vary by country.
(For instance, recent analysis has shown that the typical top earners in the United States derive their high incomes from founding or managing their businesses rather than from financial capital).12 The inno- vative methods in this chapter are still evolving, requiring assumptions that are contested in the literature.13 Chapter 3 is transparent about assumptions and decisions in dealing with data challenges to encourage the type of scrutiny that, over time, will improve data and information on inequality.
It bears recalling that even the best-established economic statistics have some uncertainty.

The chapter argues that today’s innovations in measuring economic inequality can open the way for the more sys- tematic measuring and reporting of income 98 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 and wealth distribution.

Such reporting would complement the aggregate measures that tend to dominate literature and policy at present, whether GDP growth rates or changes in the Gini coefficient.
Chapter 4 considers gender inequality.

While there are signs of progress, the chapter points out that it may be slowing.

In fact, there are troubling signs of reimposing inequality— linked to backlash in social norms observed in half the countries with data.

It is true that most girls around the world are catching up in the basics, such as primary education.

These prac- tical achievements are evident.


But as women catch up, targets move, and the enhanced ca- pabilities that bring strategic empowerment all too often elude them.

The chapter documents that gender inequalities are multidimensional, pervading life in varying degrees across devel- oping and developed countries alike.
That is because they are cultural and rooted in social norms—biases and gender discrimination are endemic to our social institutions.14 The chap- ter discusses how the challenge of reducing gender inequalities ranges from how to create enabling conditions for cultural change to how to avert societal reactions against progress to- wards gender equity.
PART II Beyond averages | 99 Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth Measuring inequality in income and wealth A contribution by the World Inequality Lab Measuring income inequality is a key step to properly address it.

Public debates grounded in facts are critical for societies to determine to what extent they accept inequality, what policies they should implement to tackle it and what taxation they will use—a particularly difficult decision.
Transparency in income and wealth dynamics is also essential to evaluate public policies and track government progress towards more inclusive economies.
Sound data on income and wealth are also required to fight (legal) tax avoidance and (illegal) evasion, made possible in part by the built-in opacity of the global financial system.1 Greater transparency would thus support the highest return to tax policy, part of the policy package to reduce inequality and to finance investments for the Sustainable Development Goals.2 The secrecy surrounding ownership of assets around the globe—particularly financial as- sets—currently makes it impossible to properly track capital accumulation, just as it makes it impossible to ensure that top earners and wealth holders pay their fair share of taxes.
Some pro- gress on financial transparency has been made since the 2008 financial crisis, but it has been too slow and limited in relation to the challenge.

The share of global wealth hidden in tax havens is an estimated 8 percent of global GDP.3 The current lack of transparency on income and wealth dynamics is a political choice.

While most governments have (or can find, if they wish) detailed information on the top incomes and wealth, they do not disclose it.
This is a dig- ital age paradox: Multinationals have detailed information on individuals’ lives and can trade it in the global marketplace.

Yet people struggle to get basic information about how growth in income and wealth is shared across the popula- tion.

Public statistics still rarely move beyond reporting averages.
This weakness applies to economic inequality and to other forms of inequality—particularly inequality related to pollution—which are not scrutinized by most statistical institutions today (see chapter 5).

Tackling inequality starts with good measurement Publishing timely, standardized and universally recognized statistics is key to properly address in- equality.
Indeed, the production of standardized GDP statistics from the 1950s onwards,4 thanks to the United Nations Systems of National Accounts, has had huge impacts on framing pol- icy debates and policymaking over the past seven decades.

A new generation of growth statistics distributed across income groups (distributional national accounts5) is also likely to shape these policy debates.
Moving towards developing and publicizing such indicators requires efforts from all actors: policymakers, academia and civil society.
The synergies among different actors committed to transparency become apparent when, for example, information on evaded taxes is released by journalists and subsequently analysed by researchers, including some at the World Inequality Lab.6 This chapter discusses challenges and recent advances in methodology and data collection to fill a crucial gap in data on human development.

It first introduces a new inequality data trans- parency index.
Then, based on data from the World Inequality Database and analysis from the World Inequality Report, it presents recent findings on inequality in global incomes.

It also surveys income inequality in three country groups, assessing the evolution of inequality by comparing the rate of income growth of the bottom 40 percent with that of the entire pop- ulation—a target for Sustainable Development Goal 10.
The first country group is African countries—where new inequality estimates have recently become available.

The second is for Brazil, China, India and the Russian Publishing timely, standardized and universally recognized statistics is key to properly address inequality Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 103 3.

On a new inequality data transparency index that ranges from 0 to 20, no country scores above 15, and dozens have a score of 0 Federation.
And the third is European countries and the United States, noting the relative impact of different policies on income distribution.

Finally, the chapter turns to the measurement of wealth inequality around the world.

Measuring the transparency gap Data for tracking income and wealth inequal- ity remain scarce across the globe (figure 3.1).

To measure inequality in a country, national statistical authorities ideally would produce rich annual household surveys of individuals’ living conditions.
And the tax administration would publish income and wealth administra- tive tax each year.

To track income and wealth inequality, survey data and tax data would be linked so that it would be possible to know the fiscal income reported in the tax data by an individual who participated in the living conditions survey.

But linked survey and tax data are an exception across the globe, done by only a few countries: for example, Sweden and other Nordic countries.
And even there, the ability to measure inequality has deteriorated in recent decades, partly because of the large wealth hidden in offshore financial assets with- out a proper international registration system to follow them.7 In many countries tax data are not available to the public.

The production of administrative tax data has historically been closely related to the existence of an income or wealth tax in a country.
It was the introduction of the income tax in the United States in 1913, and in India in 1922, that led public administrations to publish income tax statistics.

Such information is critical for tax administrations to properly administer taxes and for legislators and taxpayers to be informed about tax policy.

But governments are sometimes unwilling to publicly release the data.8 While some countries have released new tax data over the past decade, others have actually stopped producing them.
And when governments repeal income or wealth taxes, the statistical tools to measure inequality also dis- appear.

The deterioration of administrative tax data thus raises serious concerns, since proper information on wealth and income is key to track inequality and inform public debates.

But the situation is worsening in several countries rather than improving.
On a new inequality data transparency index that ranges from 0 to 20, no country scores above 15, and dozens have a score of 0 (see fig- ure 3.1).

Data are particularly scarce in Africa and Central Asia.

This simple index is prelim- inary and will be improved as more informa- tion is released on income and wealth taxes and availability of survey data.

But it already provides an overview of the efforts required to supply transparent data on inequality.
Though the availability of official data is low, the triangulation of different sources has shed new light on income and wealth inequality.

Investigative journalism has played a critical role, providing new information that has influenced public discussions and decisionmaking (box 3.1).
Where to look for global income inequality data Several global income inequality databases have been constructed over the past decades.9 They include the World Bank’s PovcalNet, which provides inequality data from house- hold surveys; the World Inequality Database, which produces distributional national accounts based on tax, survey and national accounts; the LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg (LIS),10 which harmonizes to a high level of detail income and wealth concepts in rich countries using household surveys; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Income Distribution Database,11 which contains distributional survey data for advanced econ- omies; the University of Texas Inequality Project Database,12 which uses industrial and sectoral data to measure inequality; and the Commitment to Equity Data Center,13 which provides information on fiscal incidence—the impact of taxes and transfers on different in- come groups.
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research’s World Income Inequality Database provides a range of statistics on income ine- quality for several countries.14 There are also detailed regional databases such as the Socio- Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean,15 the harmonized regional statistics maintained by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean16 and the European Union Statistics on Income and 104 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3.1 Dozens of countries have almost no transparency in inequality data Inequality data quality index 20 10 LO W HU M A N D E V EL O P M TI JI S I F H A G D M W D N T G O N S E CIV O M LS BEN DG MRT UGA TZA NGA RWA COM PNG SYR SLB PAK CMR ZWE AGO KEN NPL KHM MMR AN NZL C GBR USA BEL JPN AUT LUX ISR KOR SV N ESP FR A C Z E M L T IT S U A E W S P G S D L N NK FIN D R N E O H E N R C L R I G K H U E D L S I 20 18 16 14 12 10 UN BRN BHR HRV OMN ARG RUS KAZ BLR MNE BGR ROU KWT URY TUR BHS MYS SRB TTO NIC TJK SLV GUY KGZ MAR IRQ PSE VNM EGY GAB BOL ZAF MIDN Y LB TK B A Z LU D V H M ZP D L M B R O J R I P J U R F YS DD IR N M U S P A N C RI A L B G E O L K C A About the Inequality data quality index: The data quality and availability index measures the current availability of inequality data around the globe.
The index ranges from 0 (a country with no survey or tax data to track inequality available at all) to 20 (an ideal case where there are income and wealth surveys and income and wealth tax data, and the sets of information are linked with one another).

Currently, no country has a score above 15, and dozens of countries have a score of 0.

Data are particularly scarce in Africa and Central Asia.

Note: The index presents the level of availability and quality of data on income and wealth inequality.
Source: World Inequality Lab (http://wid.world/transparency); accessed 17 July 2019.

Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 105 BOX 3.1 Investigative journalism uncovering inequality Investigative journalism can shed light and generate data on aspects of inequality for which no measurement standards exist or that have remained opaque because of asymmetries in the distribution of power (see chap- ter 2).
New and widespread protocols to assess who is being left behind or extreme wealth concentration might take years or even decades to generate, with con- straints ranging from corruption to pressure by interest groups.

Investigative journalism has played a remarkable role in informing the public of important dimensions of inequality.
Today, we know more about the globalization of hidden wealth because of disclosures such as those in the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers.1 On the other side of the distribution, decentralized reporting based on investigative journalistic research routinely uncovers abuse towards disadvantaged groups: When all other mechanisms that give voice to excluded groups fail, journalism is often their last hope.2 Amartya Sen has argued that a free press and an active political opposition constitute an effective early warning systems against famines because infor- mation and political pressure push for action.3 By the same token, the media has played an important role in thwarting behaviours that impede human develop- ment—human trafficking and, in the worst instances, slavery; child labour; child marriages; genital muti- lation; and malnutrition, especially among children, which can cause stunting that has lifelong effects.4 Journalistic exposure of corruption can also protect public finances.5 In a globalized world, internationally coordinated efforts to find and disclose information can catch up with actors that operate strategically in different coun- tries, taking advantage of transparency blind spots.
The Global Investigative Journalism Network and the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism are two prominent examples of this approach.6 These networks have the potential to develop and defend standards of responsible reporting and diversify the risks of pressure from interest groups.

Quality journalism tends to face financial, polit- ical and safety challenges.
When journalism and me- dia produce information and knowledge that has the characteristics of a public good, indirect and direct subsidies remain fundamental to avoid underprovision.7 Journalists can be subject to pressures, intimidation and attacks, which appear to be on the rise in many countries,8 highlighting the importance of protecting an independent, plural and diverse media.
Investing in quality investigative journalism has high social returns, deterring and correcting corruption, protecting those left behind and informing public poli- cies.

One area to explore is an enhanced role for inter- national cooperation: Currently only around 0.3 percent of official development assistance is spent in media de- velopment, a small fraction of which is clearly linked to investigative journalism.9 Notes 1.
In additional to the increase in public awareness and accountability, these data have been used as part of academic research.

See, for instance, analysis of the relation of tax evasion and inequality by Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019).

2.

See examples and discussion in Brunwasser (2019).

3.

Sen 1982, 1999.

4.

Schiffrin 2019.

5.

Brunwasser 2019; Schiffrin 2019.

6.

Brunwasser 2019; Schiffrin 2019.

7.

Schiffrin 2019.

8.


In resolution 33/2, the United Nations Human Rights Council expressed “deep concern” at the increased number of journalists and media workers who had been killed, tortured, arrested or detained in recent years as a direct result of their profession (UNHRC 2018).

9.

Over 2010–2015, $32.5 million appears to be clearly linked to investigative journalism.

See annex 1 of Myers and Juma (2018).


This is a small amount compared with the net benefits associate with individual investigative journalism projects.

See examples in Hamilton (2016) and Sullivan (2016).

Source: Human Development Report Office based on Brunwasser (2019) and Schiffrin (2019).
Living Conditions database (see spotlight 1.3 at the end of the chapter for more sources).17 These databases have helped researchers, policymakers, journalists and the general public focus on the evolution of inequality over the past decades.
There is no one perfect database on inequality, and there will never be: The different datasets support complementary insights on inequality, and whether to use one or another depends largely on the specific issues to be stud- ied.18 Some, such as PovcalNet have been used to compute global poverty measures.

Others, such as the LIS database, have been used by genera- tions of researchers to study economic inequality and its interactions with other dimensions of welfare in an international perspective.
Regional databases, such as the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions database, enable detailed regional analyses of inequality, while the Commitment to Equity Data Center can be used to analyse the impact of tax and transfer policies.
Most of these databases rely almost exclusively on one type of information source—household surveys with face-to-face or virtual interviews that ask individuals about their consumption, income, wealth and other socioeconomic aspects 106 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 of their lives.

Surveys, like any other data source, have pros and cons in the measurement of ine- quality (table 3.1).
One way of overcoming the limitations of each data source is to combine data from different types of sources, particularly com- bining administrative tax data with survey data.

For example, consider the level and evolution of inequality in Brazil and India.
In Brazil house- hold surveys show that the richest 10 percent received just over 40 percent of total income in 2015, but when all forms of income are consid- ered—not just income reported in surveys—the revised estimates suggest that the top 10 percent actually received more than 55 percent of total income.

In India estimates based on adminis- trative tax data show that the top 1 percent may have an income share close to 20 percent.
But households report an income share of around 10 percent, suggesting that household survey data starkly underestimate incomes at the top of the distribution.

The extent to which they do so varies by country but is likely to be substantial.

In addition, surveys may also miss important evolutions.
In Brazil, household surveys indicate the income share of the top 10 percent has fallen over the past two decades.19 But revised estimates based on additional sources of information from national accounts and tax data suggest that the income share has been fairly stable.
Household surveys captured fairly well the increase in wage income across most of the distribution, which has indeed taken place in Brazil since the 2000s, but failed to fully capture the dynamics of top incomes—particularly capital incomes.

TABLE 3.1 Main data sources for inequality measurement Data source Household survey data Pros Cons • Survey data gather information about income or assets as well as social and demographic dimensions, key for human development.
• Households surveys support a better understanding of the determinants of income and wealth inequality and allow income and wealth inequality to be analysed in combination with other dimensions—such as racial, spatial, education or gender inequality.

• Limited sample size is a problem.

Given the small number of extremely rich individuals and of some vulnerable groups, the likelihood that they will be included in surveys is typically very small.

These are called sampling errors.


• Self-reported information about income and wealth is erratic.

Generally, it largely underestimates the income share of the top.

Oversampling cannot correct this bias.

These are called nonsampling errors.

• Concepts and scope may vary widely across countries and over time, rendering international and historical comparisons difficult.

Surveys may be administered with uneven frequency.


• Income and wealth totals generally do not match national accounts totals, so growth rates are typically lower in surveys than in macroeconomic growth statistics.

• Tax data have limited coverage of the lower tail of distribution.

Particularly in developing countries, they typically cover only a small share of the population.

• Tax avoidance and evasion affect tax data.

Tax data tend to underestimate income and wealth at the top.
In most cases inequality estimates based on these data should be viewed as lower-bound estimates.

• Tax data are subject to changes in fiscal concepts over time and across countries, making historical and international comparisons difficult.

Administrative (tax) data • In countries with sound enforcement of taxes, tax data capture the income and wealth of those at the top of the wealth distribution.

• Tax data also cover longer periods than surveys.


Administrative data are usually available annually starting at the beginning of the 20th century for income taxes and in some countries as far back as the early 19th century for inheritance taxes.
National accounts data (gross national product, national income, national wealth) • National accounts data follow internationally standardized definitions for measuring the economic activity of countries, so they allow for a more consistent comparison over time and across countries than fiscal data.

National account definitions, in particular, do not depend on local variations in tax legislation or other parts of the legal system.
• National accounts do not provide information on the extent to which different social groups benefit from growth of national income and gross domestic product.

• National accounts are heterogeneous across countries, determined by quality of national data and country-specific assumptions.

Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018).


Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 107 The World Inequality Database project seeks to combine data sources transparently and consistently in order to estimate the distributions of national income and national wealth World Inequality Database and distributional national accounts Studying inequality in a context of extreme data opacity is difficult, and results are neces- sarily imperfect and preliminary.
Yet, income and wealth dynamics must be tracked as sys- tematically as possible.

The World Inequality Database project seeks to combine data sources transparently and consistently in order to esti- mate the distributions of national income and national wealth.
In doing so, the project’s main objective is to reconcile the macroeconomic study of income and wealth (which deals with economic growth, public debt or interna- tional capital flows) with the microeconomic study of inequality (which considers how the income and wealth growth rates actually expe- rienced by individuals in a single country differ depending on their position in the income distribution).
The World Inequality Database project began with renewed interest in using tax data to study the long-run dynamics of inequality, following the pioneering work on income and wealth inequality series by Simon Kuznets and by Tony Atkinson and A.J.
Harrison.20 Top in- come shares, based on fiscal data, were initially produced for France21 and the United States22 and rapidly expanded to dozens of countries thanks to the contribution of more than 100 researchers.23 These series had a large impact on the global inequality debate because they made it possible to compare the income shares of top groups (say, the top 1 percent) over long peri- ods of time, revealing new facts and refocusing the discussion on long-run historical evolutions of income and wealth inequality.
More recently, the World Inequality Database project has sought to go beyond the top income shares based on tax data to pro- duce distributional national accounts, relying on a consistent and systematic combination of fiscal, household survey, wealth and national accounts data sources.24 The objective of the distributional national accounts is to make the most of all data sources (see table 3.1).
Tax data are used to track the top of the distribu- tion properly—and when available, informa- tion on tax evasion is also used.25 Survey data are used to obtain information not available from administrative records.

And national accounts data are used as the overarching framework, since they provide the most uni- versally recognized concepts of income and wealth to date.

The World Inequality Database project em- phasizes the distribution of national income and national wealth equally.
There are two main reasons for this.

First, it is impossible to properly track income inequality, particu- larly at the top of the distribution, without a sound measure of wealth inequality dynamics.
Indeed, where there has been a recent rise in income inequality, it has often been due largely to the surge in capital income (rents, dividends, retained earnings and so on) among the wealthy.26 Second, rates of return on wealth have been much higher than macroeconomic income growth over the past four decades, implying that wealth is taking an increasingly important place in 21st century economies.27 How the fast growth of wealth is distributed across the population becomes a pressing question.
Unfortunately, available official data are even scarcer for wealth than for income, so distributional national accounts estimates for wealth inequality cover only a few countries at this stage.

For transparency, the distributional national accounts project releases distributional nation- al accounts estimates and the methods used to compute them.
Technical details and the computer codes used to produce the estimates (including those presented in this chapter) are published online on the World Inequality Database website.28 This level of transparency should become the norm for existing economic statistics databases.
Inequality series published online should also be as comprehensive as possible, given the limitations of summary measures of inequality (as discussed in the introduction to part II of the Report), which can mask relevant inequal- ity dynamics behind a veil of stability.
Beyond offering summary measures and a limited set of decile shares, the World Inequality Database project publishes average income and wealth levels for each 1 percent of the population in a given country or region (that is, income and wealth percentiles).
Given the importance of the very top groups in income and wealth growth, the project decomposes the top 1 per- cent itself into smaller subgroups (up to the 108 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 top 0.001 percent) and estimates income and wealth levels for each.
Currently, the United Nations System of National Accounts includes standards and guidance only for aggregate indicators.29 The next revision, due sometime in 2022–2024, might consider how to cover distribution of income and wealth growth across the popu- lation, in line with the recommendations of the 2008 Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress.30 Such an evolution would represent significant progress for global public statistics and global public debates on growth and inequality.
The distributional national accounts framework considered in this chapter provides a concrete model of how this shift beyond averages could work.
The elephant curve of global inequality and growth The release of new tax data and the recent methodological developments by research- ers collaborating with the World Inequality Database and at the World Inequality Lab make it possible to produce new inequality estimates (see boxes 3.2 and 3.3 for definitions of income and consumption concepts used throughout the Report).31 A starting place in tracking the evolution of income inequality over time and across countries is to estimate the share of total income received by the richest 10 percent of the population.
But such an indicator should be complemented by others—ideally, the income level or growth of each percentile, or 1 percent of the population, as below.

BOX 3.2 What income concepts are we measuring?

This chapter focuses on the distribution of national income, which is the sum of all income received by individuals in an economy.
This corresponds to gross domestic product, to which are added net income from abroad (when a Brazilian citizen owns a company in India, the income from the capital of the company is counted in Brazil) and from which are subtracted the amounts required to replace any productive apparatus (roads, machines, computers) that has become obsolete.
There are two broad ways to measure income received by individuals in a country: before taxes and government transfers (pretax income) and after taxes and government transfers (post-tax income).

There are different ways to define pre- and post-tax incomes, and definitions can affect the results substantially.
In the World Inequality Lab’s distributional national accounts framework, pretax national income is defined as the sum of all personal income flows, before taking into ac- count the tax and transfer system but after taking into account pension and unemployment insurance systems.

This concept adjusts traditional computations of “mar- ket income,” as explained in spotlight 3.3.
Contributions to pension and unemployment insurance schemes are considered deferred income and therefore deducted, but the corresponding benefits are included.

The adjustment is crucial for good comparability of pretax inequality across countries.
Otherwise a country with a public pension system would appear to have artificially high pretax inequality (because retired indi- viduals would have no pretax income and would appear as “virtual poor” before taxes), while a country with private pensions would have positive pretax income for the elderly (because they would benefit from pretax in- come from their pension plans).
Differences in inequal- ity measures between the countries would not reflect differences in income concentration or the effectiveness of pension systems but simply different choices made for organizing the pension system.

In the end, pretax income is similar to the taxable income of many countries, but its definition is usually broader and more comparable across countries.
Several variants of pretax income should be looked at, and the distributional national accounts guidelines discuss them in more detail.

Unless stated otherwise, the income concept in this chapter is pretax income.1 Post-tax national income equals pretax income after subtracting all taxes and adding all forms of government transfers.
In line with the distributional national accounts methodology, all forms of government spending are allo- cated to individuals, so that post-tax income sums to na- tional income.

Not doing so would make countries with a stronger provision of public goods appear mechanically poorer.

By definition, at the aggregate or macroeconomic level—when summing all income of all individuals in a country—post-tax national income is exactly equal to pretax national income and to national income.

Note 1.
Note 1.

See Alvaredo and others (2016) for a technical description of income concepts and methods used for this chapter.

Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 109 Income inequality based on the top 10 percent’s income share has risen since 1980 in most regions but at different rates BOX 3.3 What about consumption?

For the distributional national accounts project of the World Inequality Lab and its network of partners, the objective is a fully integrated representation of the economy.
It would link the microeconomic study of income and wealth inequality (typically focusing on household wages, transfers and poverty or inequality) with macroeconomic issues such as capital accumula- tion, the aggregate structure of property and privatiza- tion or nationalization policies.

Too often, “micro” and “macro” issues have been treated separately.
To be clear, however, a lot of progress is needed before it will be possible to publish a fully integrated ap- proach to these issues, analysing the joint evolution of inequality of income and wealth in all countries.

Indeed, that approach requires careful measurement not only of pretax and post-tax income inequality but also of the distribution of savings rates across different income groups.
The production of such series—pretax inequality, post-tax inequality and savings rate inequality—will make it possible to systematically relate income, wealth and eventually consumption (income minus savings).

In our view, however, it would be a mistake to overempha- size the consumption perspective, as the literature on poverty has sometimes done.

Consumption obviously is a very important indicator of wealth, particularly at the bottom of the distribution.
The problem is that house- hold surveys routinely used to measure consumption tend to underestimate income, consumption and wealth at the top.

In addition, consumption is not always well defined for top income groups, which generally save a very large share of their income, choosing to consume more in lat- er years, but more generally to consume the prestige or economic or political power conferred by wealth owner- ship.
To develop a consistent and global perspective on economic inequality—one that views economic actors not only as consumers and workers but also as owners and investors—requires putting equal emphasis on in- come and wealth.

Source: Extracted from Alvaredo and others (2018).

The European Union stands out as the most equal region based on the top 10 percent’s share of pretax income, with 34 percent.
The Middle East is the most unequal, with the top 10 percent holding 61 percent of pretax income.32 In be- tween are a variety of inequality levels that do not appear to be correlated with average income.

The top 10 percent received an estimated 47 percent of income in the United States, 41 percent in China and 55 percent in India.33 Income inequality based on the top 10 per- cent’s income share has risen since 1980 in most regions but at different rates (fig- ure 3.2).
The rise was extreme in the Russian Federation, which was one of the most equal countries in 1990 (at least by this measure) and became one of the most unequal in just five years.

The rise was also pronounced in India and the United States, though not as sharp as in the Russian Federation.

In China, after a sharp rise, inequality stabilized in the mid-2000s.

The rise in inequality in Europe was more moderate than in other regions.
Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa, Brazil and the Middle East stayed extremely high, with the 10 percent’s income share around 55–60 percent.

These extreme inequality levels in low- and middle-income countries also deserve particular attention.34 The diversity of patterns across countries since 1980 shows that the extreme rise in inequality in some parts of the world was not inevitable but resulted from policy choices.
Openness to trade and the digitalization of the economy are often put forward to explain the rise in inequality in a country, but such arguments fail to fully account for the diversity of trajectories just presented.

The radical diver- gence of the United States and Europe—de- spite similar exposures to technological change and trade openness—shows that other factors were at play—specifically, factors related to na- tional policies.
Differences between the United States and Europe were due less to direct taxes and transfers and more to other policy mechanisms, particularly health, education, unemployment and pensions systems, as well as labour market institutions.35 Fiscal redistri- bution and monetary transfers to the worse-off indeed helped low-income groups in Europe but did not play the main role in restraining the increase in income inequality.36 What happened to inequality among indi- viduals globally—treating the world as just one 110 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 The global top 1 percent, the economic elite of rich and poor countries, made huge gains over 1980–2016 FIGURE 3.2 Income inequality based on the top 10 percent’s income share has risen since 1980 in most regions but at different rates Share of national income (percent) 70 60 50 40 30 20 2016 value Middle East Sub-Saharan Africa India Brazil North America Russian Federation China Europe 61 57 55 55 47 46 41 34 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018), with data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
single country?

Branko Milanovic pioneered such analysis, arguing for its relevance in a more integrated and globalized world.

A graph of income growth from 1980 to 2016 for the world population, ranked from the poorest to the richest,37 presents the sil- houette of an elephant with a raised trunk (figure 3.3).38 At the bottom of the global in- come distribution (the left side), the low- and middle-income emerging countries had high growth: above 100 percent—for a doubling of income per adult since 1980.
In some coun- tries, such as China, the bottom 50 percent of the population saw growth of around 400 per- cent—incomes quintupled.39 The dynamics illustrate how hundreds of millions of individuals were lifted out of income poverty and saw improvements in their living standards.
Note that the figure represents relative gains, which for the bottom of the distribution are from very low levels—a figure representing absolute gains looks essentially flat except for a spike for people at the very top.40 In India the absolute poverty rate was more than halved over the period, and at the global level the share of people living in absolute poverty was reduced by a factor of more than three.41 In the upper half of the distribution, however, incomes grew much less rapidly, with less than 50 percent since 1980.
That segment of the global income distribution corresponds to the bottom and middle-income groups in Europe and North America.

In the United States the situation was even worse: The bottom 50 percent was almost entirely left out of economic growth.

At the very top of the global income distribu- tion, growth rates were extremely high—more than 200 percent.

The global top 1 percent, the economic elite of rich and poor countries, made huge gains over 1980–2016.
In China and India, for instance, growth rates at the top of the income ladder reached triple digits.

These results, based on new and more precise data (combining tax, survey and national ac- counts data), magnify the results of previous studies using fewer sources of data.42 The top 1 percent alone received 27 percent of income growth over the period, compared with the 12 percent received by the bottom 50 percent.

A huge share of global growth thus benefited the top of the global income distribution.
Was such a concentration of global growth in the hands of a fraction of the population neces- sary to trigger growth among bottom income groups?

Country and regional case studies provide very little empirical support to the trickle-down hypothesis over recent decades.43 Higher income growth at the top of the distri- bution are not correlated with higher growth at the bottom.

The comparison between the United States and Europe is an illustration.
As Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 111 FIGURE 3.3 The elephant curve of global inequality and growth Real income growth per adult (percent) 250 200 150 100 50 0 10 Bottom 50 percent captured 12 percent of total growth Top 1 percent captured 27 percent of total growth 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 Income group (percentile) Note: On the horizontal axis the world population is divided into 100 groups of equal population and sorted in ascending order from left to right by each group’s income.
The top 1 percent group is divided into 10 groups, the richest of which is also divided into 10 groups of equal population and the richest of that group is again divided into 10 groups of equal population.

The vertical axis shows the total income growth of an average individual in each group between 1980 and 2016.

For percentile group p99p99.1 (the poorest 10 percent among the world’s richest 1 percent), growth was 74 percent between 1980 and 2016.
The top 1 percent captured 27 percent of total growth over this period.

Income estimates account for differences in the cost of living between countries.

Values are net of inflation.

The composition of each group evolved between 1980 and 2016.

Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018), with data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
noted, growth at the top was much higher in the United States than in Europe, but the bot- tom 50 percent benefited little from growth, while Europe was more successful at triggering growth for the majority of its people, despite lower growth at the top.
Between-country convergence versus within-country divergence To understand the dynamics of global income inequality over the past four decades, it is also useful to decompose global inequality into two components.44 One is the evolution of global inequality between countries, driven by the rise in productivity in emerging countries and the technological catch-up with countries at the frontier.

The other is inequality within countries.


Both forces have been at play over the past four decades, but the latter appears to have dominated.

The share of global income held by the top 10 percent rose from less than 50 percent in 1980 to 55 percent in 2000 and slipped from the mid-2000s to 52 percent in 2016 (fig- ure 3.4).

Consider two counterfactual scenar- ios.


The first is a world with no differences in average income across countries (all countries have converged to the same average income) but with within-country inequality matching the levels observed in reality since 1980.
The second is a world with no within-country inequality (all individuals in a country have the same income) but with countries’ average incomes differing exactly as observed in reality since 1980.45 In the first counterfactual the income share of the top 10 percent increases significantly over the period because of the rise of income inequality in most countries.

In the second sce- nario the income share of the top 10 percent in- creases slightly, falls then recovers in the recent period to its 1980 level.
Since the mid-2000s the reduction in between-country inequality has dominated but not enough to bring global inequality back to its early 1980s level.
Another way to look at the relative im- portance of within- and between-country 112 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 The decline in between-country inequality has not been enough to counter the rise of within- country inequality since 1980 or 1990 FIGURE 3.4 In 2010 the top 10 percent of income earners received 53 percent of global income, but if there had been perfect equality in average income between countries, the top 10 percent would have received 48 percent of global income Share of global income (percent) 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 Global top 10 percent share Global top 10 percent share assuming... ... perfect equality between countries ... perfect equality within countries 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018), with data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
inequalities is to focus on the Theil index, which provides a measure of inequality that can be decomposed into a between-country and a within-country component.

The two com- ponents sum to an overall measure of global inequality.

The decomposition confirms and amplifies the results above: The decline in be- tween-country inequality has not been enough to counter the rise of within-country inequality since 1980 or 1990.
Global inequality accord- ing to the Theil Index rose from 0.92 in 1980 to 1.07 in 2016, peaking in 2007 before a slight decline and then a plateau since the early 2010s.46 Going beyond summary measures of inequality measure of inequality thus masks the catch-up of low-income groups with the middle of the global income (reduction in between-country inequality) as well as the relative decrease of the middle compared with the top (rising with- in-country inequality in rich countries).
From 1980 to 2016 the income gap between the top 10 percent and the middle 40 percent increased by 20 percentage points (figure 3.5).

But the gap between the middle 40 percent and the bottom 50 percent fell by more than 20 per- centage points.

In short: The Gini coefficient masks a lot of movement.

The changing geography of global income inequality The dynamics of global income inequality over the past decades are the result of the dynam- ics of between-country and within-country inequalities.
These are not well captured by an oft-used measure of inequality: the Gini coefficient.

Since 1980 the Gini coefficient for global income has hovered around 0.65, with a peak of 0.68 in 2005–2006.

This summary Understanding the dynamics of global inequal- ity also entails looking at the changing geo- graphic distribution (box 3.4).

The geographic breakdown of each percentile of the global distribution of income has evolved.
In 1990 Asians were mostly absent from top global in- come groups, and massively represented at the bottom of the global distribution (figure 3.6), while Americans and Canadians were the Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 113 FIGURE 3.5 The ratio of the average income of the top 10 percent to that of the middle 40 percent increased by 20 percentage points between 1980 and 2016, but the ratio of the average income of the middle 40 percent to that of the bottom 50 percent decreased by 27 percentage points Index, 100 = 1980 140 120 100 80 60 1980 Top 10 percent to middle 40 percent average income Gini coefﬁcient Middle 40 percent to bottom 50 percent average income 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018), with data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
BOX 3.4 Where do you stand in the global distribution of income?

Who is part of the global top 1 percent?

And how much does one need to make to belong to the global middle 40 percent?

It is not always clear how much income one needs to belong to different income groups discussed in academic or public debates on inequality.

The World Inequality Database’s online simulator allows anyone to position their income relative to that of others throughout the world.
With $1,000 a month, for instance, an adult individual is part of the top 8 per- cent of earners in Côte d’Ivoire (see table).

The same income would place an individual in the top 33 percent in China and in the bottom 22 percent in the United States.

At the world level, that individual belongs to the top 33 percent.

The global top 1 percent entry threshold is $11,990 per adult per month.
On different rungs in different countries Monthly income per adult (PPP $) Côte d’Ivoire China United States World $100 $1,000 $2,0000 $5,000 $12,000 Bottom 20 percent Bottom 7 percent Bottom 5 percent Bottom 8 percent Top 8 percent Top 3 percent Top 1 percent Top 1 percent Top 33 percent Top 12 percent Top 4 percent Top 1 percent Bottom 22 percent Top 33 percent Bottom 42 percent Top 18 percent Top 24 percent Top 5 percent Top 5 percent Top 1 percent Source: World Inequality Database website (http://WID.world/simulator).
114 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3.6 The geographic breakdown of each percentile of the global distribution of income evolved from 1990 to 2016 In 1990, 33 percent of the population of the world’s top 0.001 percent income group were residents of the United States and Canada.
Population share within each global income group (percent) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 Income group (percentile) India Other Asia China Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Middle East Russian Federation Europe United States and Canada In 2016, 5 percent of the population of the world’s top 0.001 percent income group were residents of the Russian Federation.
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 Income group (percentile) Source: Based on Alvaredo and others (2018), with data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

largest contributors to global top income earn- ers and almost absent at the very bottom of the distribution.

Europe was well represented in the upper half of the global distribution but less so in the very top groups.
Middle Eastern and Latin American elites were disproportionately among the very top global groups, as they each made up about 20 percent of the population of the top 0.001 percent earners.

The situation had changed considerably by 2016.

Chinese earners are now present through- out the income distribution.
Indians remain Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 115 Available global and African evidence shows that the average income of the top 1 percent of earners is typically 1.5–2 times higher than what is reported in surveys concentrated at the bottom.

Russian earners are also stretched throughout, from the poorest to the richest income groups, in contrast to 1990.
Africans, present throughout the bottom half of the distribution, are now even more concen- trated in the bottom quarter, due to Africa’s slow growth relative to Asian countries.

At the top of the distribution, both North America’s and Europe’s shares fell (leaving room for their Asian counterparts), Europe’s share fell much more.

The reason?

Most large European countries followed a more equitable growth trajectory over the past decades than the United States and Asian giants.

How unequal is Africa?


Based on survey data for African countries,47 the income share of the top 10 percent is typically around 30–35 percent (except in Southern African countries), compared with 34 percent in Europe, 45–55 percent in North and South America and 40–55 percent in Asia.48 The comparison could thus suggest that most African countries have low inequality.49 But there are good reasons to think that survey-based data significantly underestimate inequality across Africa.
First, the concepts to measure inequality and growth (at times con- sumption, at times income) are often compared indiscriminately, even though using consump- tion typically underestimates inequality by 25–50 percent compared with using income.50 Second, individuals at the top of the distribu- tion are largely under-represented in surveys, particularly in developing countries.51 Available global and African evidence shows that the average income of the top 1 percent of earners is typically 1.5–2 times higher than what is reported in surveys.52 So, are African countries characterized by low or high inequality?
The question, as simple as it may be, is difficult to answer due to the dissimilarity of data sources.

Applying, to the extent possible, distributional national accounts methods to Africa yields estimates that are more in line with recent ones for devel- oped and emerging countries.

Such estimates, however, are still far from perfect and will be greatly improved as more administrative data are released, as has occurred with Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia.
New estimates combining survey, fiscal and national accounts data suggest that inequality remains very high in most African countries.

The income received by the top 10 percent ranges from 37 percent in Algeria to 65 percent in South Africa, while that received by the bot- tom 40 percent is at most 14 percent in Algeria and about 4 percent in South Africa.

Regional differences across Africa are sig- nificant.53 Southern Africa is clearly the most unequal.
The share of national income received by the top 10 percent is highest in South Africa (65 percent in 2014) and Namibia (64 percent in 2015), while the bottom 40 percent received 4 percent of national income in both countries.

On average, income inequality is lower in Central Africa but still very high.

For instance, in 2011 the top 10 percent of income earners in Congo received 56 percent, while the bottom 40 percent received 7 percent.
East African countries are a bit less unequal, especially at the bottom.

In Kenya in 2015 the top 10 percent received 48 percent of national income, while the bottom 40 percent received 9 percent.

Income inequality tends to decrease towards the north and the west of the continent.

In Sierra Leone in 2011 the top 10 percent re- ceived 42 percent of national income, while the bottom 40 percent received 12 percent, and its neighbours show similar income shares.
The lowest inequality is in North Africa: In Algeria, the least unequal country in Africa for which estimates are available, the top 10 percent of earners received 37 percent of national income in 2011, while the bottom 40 percent received 14 percent.

Heterogeneous trajectories: Inequality trends from 1995 to 2015 There is no single African trend in inequality, not even clear regional trends.
Income distri- butions evolved in a wide variety of ways across countries, which underlines the role of national institutions and policies in shaping inequality.

Given the important differences in data quality across African countries, the lack of harmoniza- tion of data collection instruments and welfare concepts, and the irregularity of survey availa- bility, comparing inequality trends is a perilous exercise, and the results must be interpreted with great caution.
(In this section, countries 116 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 with an asterisk [*] have data available only from 1995 to 2005, and countries with two as- terisks [**] have data available only after 2005.)
On average, it appears that inequality, as measured by the share of income going to the top 10 percent and to the bottom 40 percent, increased in Southern Africa but fell in East Africa in the late 1990s before stabilizing in the 2000s and stagnated in North, Central and West Africa, despite small fluctuations (figure 3.7).

In Southern Africa the dramatic rise of the income share of the top 10 percent occurred at the expense of both the middle and the bot- tom of the distribution, whose income shares fell.
Indeed, Southern Africa’s performance between 1995 and 2015 was highly nega- tive (on average, the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 70 percentage points less than the average) and is the worst among African subregions (table 3.2).
This trend was very much driven by South Africa (by far the most populous country in Southern Africa), which saw a strong increase in income inequality (table 3.3)—despite declining poverty rates.54 Based on these estimates, it is possible to pres- ent evidence on the evolution of inequality, comparing the growth in income of the bottom 40 percent with that of the entire population FIGURE 3.7 (box 3.5).
For Botswana, Lesotho, Eswatini* and Namibia** inequality fell: The incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew at different paces: from 10 percentage points to 88 percentage points more than the average.

In East Africa the income share of the top 10 percent fell significantly from 1995 to 2000, and the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew more than the average.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, the distribution has remained rather stable: Income shares fell only slightly at the top and grew slightly at the bot- tom (see figure 3.7).

This general trend can be explained by the decline of inequality in two of the most populous countries, Ethiopia and Kenya.

The overall decline was drastic in Ethiopia, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 48 percentage points more than the average.

Inequality rose in most other countries in the subregion.
The increase was modest in Madagascar and more significant in Djibouti**, Tanzania and Uganda, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 6–15 percentage points less than the average.

In Mozambique** the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 40 percentage points less than the average, and in Zambia they grew 60 percentage points less.
Between 1995 and 2015 the income share of the top 10 percent in North Africa and West Africa remained relatively stable, while the share of the bottom 40 percent in Southern Africa declined Share of total income (percent) Share of total income (percent) Bottom 40 percent Top 10 percent 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 20 15 10 5 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 North Africa West Africa East Africa Central Africa Southern Africa Note: Data are weighted by population.
Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data.

Source: Chancel and others (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
Inequality, as measured by the share of income going to the top 10 percent and to the bottom 40 percent, increased in Southern Africa but fell in East Africa in the late 1990s before stabilizing in the 2000s and stagnated in North, Central and West Africa Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 117 TABLE 3.2 Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth in Africa’s five subregions, 1995–2015 (percentage points) Subregion East Africa Central Africa North Africa Southern Africa West Africa 1995–2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 47.2 18.3 –70.3 25.0 40.5 7.8 –19.2 18.8 –4.9 11.4 8.0 –54.8 0.6 Note: Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data.
Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data and are derived from panregional distributions; they are not averages of national indicators.

Green (red) cells indicate where the income growth rate of the bottom 40 percent was higher (lower) than the average.

Source: Chancel and others (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
TABLE 3.3 Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth in selected African countries, 1995–2015 (percentage points) Country Algeria Angola Botswana Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Egypt Ethiopia Gabon Ghana Kenya Madagascar Mali Nigeria South Africa Zambia 1995–2015 1995–2005 2005–2015 32.5 56.4 –21.2 –7.1 48.3 –24.1 12.6 –0.0 –74.4 –59.6 19.6 –26.1 –9.8 –22.1 –5.5 75.1 –13.7 –8.6 10.4 a 70.6 19.2 –22.7 –24.7 9.6 71.8 –19.3 8.2 –0.6 –46.8 10.4 a –4.5 25.7 –8.4 –57.8 –20.9 Note: Estimates combine survey, fiscal and national accounts data.
Green (red) cells indicate where the income growth rate of the bottom 40 percent was higher (lower) than the average.

a.

Average income fell.

Source: Chancel and others (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

In North Africa the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 18 percentage points more than the average from 1995 to 2015.

The de- cline in inequality resulted from two opposite trends.
Inequality fell significantly in Algeria, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent 118 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 grew 33 percentage points more than the aver- age, and in Tunisia, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 54 percentage points more than the average.

The decline of the in- come share of the top was driven much more by the very top of the distribution in Tunisia, while inequality stagnated in Morocco and increased modestly in Egypt.
In West Africa the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 25 percentage points more than the average.

But this hides a wide diversity of trajectories.

Inequality rose in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea-Bissau, with the incomes of the bottom 40 percent growing 20 percentage points less than the average, and even more so in Benin**, with the incomes of the bottom 40 percent growing 30 percentage points less than the average.

Inequality declined elsewhere in the subre- gion.


In Senegal the improvement was mild (the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew only 2 percentage points more than the aver- age).

In Mauritania the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 21 percentage points more than the average.

In Nigeria* the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 19 percentage points more than the average.

In Niger inequality fell substantially, as the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 35 percentage points more than the average.
Inequality fell in Gambia, Guinea and Mali*, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 60–80 percentage points more than the average.

The largest inequality declines were in Burkina Faso, where the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 93 percentage points more than the average, and Sierra Leone, where they grew 117 percentage points more than the average.

Data for Central Africa are scarce and cover a short time span.
No country showed a strong trend in inequality, up or down, especially at the top.

For most countries the data cover only 2000 and 2010.

In Cameroon**, Chad** and Congo** inequality increased, as the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew 13–19 per- centage points less than the average.

Inequality stagnated in Sao Tome and Principe** and decreased markedly in Gabon**, where the av- erage income fell: the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew around 12 percentage points more than the average.
The two countries with data for 1995 and 2005 are Angola* and In China the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew at an impressive 263 percent between 2000 and 2018, which contributed to the fast reduction of extreme poverty BOX 3.5 Income growth of the bottom 40 percent—higher than the national average?
Sustainable Development Goal target 10.1 reads, “By 2030 progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population at a rate higher than the national average.”1 Including that inequality target in the list of Sustainable Development Goals was not straight- forward.

Several countries initially opposed it, arguing that only poverty reduction mattered.2 Its inclusion thus marks an important shift in how countries think about sustainable development.
What is the income inequality target about?

It seeks to ensure that people in the bottom income groups see growth that is at least as high as the average.

While the target is meant to be achieved by 2030, it is useful to look at the past to consider how countries have fared on the indicators relevant to the target.
The United States, despite high overall economic growth, the bottom 40 percent of the population has seen pretax income per adult fall by 2 percent, from $13,700 in 1980 to $13,400 in 2017.3 During the same period the average income in the United States grew 66 percent, from $41,900 to $61,400.

If the bottom 40 percent’s income had grown as fast as the average, it would be $22,600 today.
Ensuring that the bottom 40 percent sees growth that is at least as high as the average may not be enough to contain rising inequalities.

Take another example: At the global level, average annual pretax income increased 95 percent (net of inflation) for the bottom 40 percent, from €1,300 in 1980 to €2,500 in 2017, but increased 40 percent overall, from €11,100 to €16,600.

Thus, the global bottom 40 percent saw growth that was 45 per- centage points higher than the global average.
At the other end of the distribution, the top 0.1 per- cent’s average annual pretax income increased 117 per- cent, from €671,600 to €1,462,000.

Despite its small size, the 0.1 percent saw a larger share of total growth than the bottom 40 percent of the population—about 12 per- cent versus about 8.5 percent.

Indeed, it is mathematical- ly impossible for all groups to see growth that is higher than the average.
At the global level, those who lost were the middle 40 percent, whose average income rose just over 33 percent, from €11,900 in 1980 to €15,600 in 2016.

So, their share in global income was reduced.

This shows that ensuring that the bottom 40 percent grows at the same rate as the average may be insufficient for tackling inequality at all segments of the distribution.

Notes 1. www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/.

2.
2.

For a discussion of the debates surrounding inclusion of the income inequality target, see Chancel, Hough and Voituriez (2018).

3.

All figures are net of inflation.

Since distributional national accounts data for 2014–2016 are not yet available, it was assumed that since 2014, the bottom 40 percent has seen growth that is at least as high as the average—a very optimistic assumption since that occurred only six times between 1980 and 2014, two of which were recessions.

Source: World Inequality Lab.


Central African Republic*.

In Angola inequali- ty increased at both ends of the distribution.

In Central African Republic inequality fell, but so did average incomes.

Inequality in BRIC countries since the 2000s This section presents the income growth of the bottom 40 percent and the top 1 percent compared with average income growth for the four BRIC countries—Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China (table 3.4).
In China the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew at an impressive 263 percent between 2000 and 2018, which contributed to the fast reduction of extreme poverty and to the decline of the global extreme poverty rate.

But that growth was significantly below the average for China (361 percent) and just half the rate of the top 1 percent.

Such different growth rates led to a rise in income inequality in China.
From 2007 to 2018, however, the 135 percent growth rate of the bottom 40 per- cent and the 138 percent average in China were much closer, and the rise of inequality halted (this stabilization could partly reflect data lim- itations).

The more recent period in China is also characterized by wages growing more than output, to the benefit of low-income groups.

In India the income growth of the bottom 40 percent—58 percent between 2000 and 2018—was significantly below the average.
At the other end of the spectrum the top 1 percent saw their incomes grow significantly more than the average since 2000 and since 2007.

In Brazil the incomes of the bottom 40 per- cent grew 14 percentage points more than the average between 2000 and 2018.

But the top 1 percent also saw higher growth than the av- erage.
Since all groups cannot grow more than the average, this means that middle-income groups (between the bottom 40 percent and Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 119 TABLE 3.4 Inequality and growth in the BRIC countries 2000–2018 2007–2018 Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage points) Average income growth (percent) Bottom 40 percent growth (percent) Top 1 percent growth (percent) Average income growth (percent) Bottom 40 percent growth (percent) Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage points) 5 361 122 72 20 263 58 121 14 –97 –64 49 16 518 213 68 –3 138 68 6 3 135 41 35 6 –3 –27 29 Top 1 percent growth (percent) –2 117 78 –20 Country Brazil China India Russian Federation Note: Distribution of per adult pretax national income growth.
See http://wid.world/methodology for country-level information on the series.

Income growth between 2016 and 2018 is assumed to be distribution neutral (all groups benefit from average national income growth).

Green (red) cells indicate where the income growth rate of the bottom 40 percent was higher (lower) than the average.

Source: Based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

the top 1 percent) were squeezed with lower than average growth.
In the Russian Federation the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grew more than the average between 2000 and 2018, while the incomes of the top 1 percent grew at a rate close to the aver- age.

The top 1 percent actually saw their incomes fall between 2007 and 2018.

Between 1980 and 2018 the top 0.01 percent saw four-digit income growth rates.
Income and wealth inequality to- day remain extreme by global standards, and the recent decline of the top 1 percent has not gone nearly far enough to reverse this.55 A rapid review of growth and inequality trajectories in the BRIC countries shows that the evolution of the indicators underpinning Sustainable Development Goal target 10.1 must be interpreted with care.
Complementing the bottom 40 percent target with other indica- tors (such as the income growth rate of the top 1 percent) more fully accounts for the dynamics of growth in a given country.

Assessing dynam- ics over various timeframes is also enriching.

Good performance over a short time may mask a huge increase in income and wealth inequality in the longer run.

The income share of the top 1 percent has significantly increased in China, India and the Russian Federation since the early 1980s (figure 3.8).
In Brazil the income share of the top 1 percent has been broadly stable since the early 2000s but at a high level.

FIGURE 3.8 The income share of the top 1 percent has significantly increased in China, India and the Russian Federation since the early 1980s Top 1 percent share of national income (percent) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Brazil India Russian Fed.

China 0 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010 2016 Note: Distribution of per adult pretax national income growth.

See http://wid.
See http://wid.

world/methodology for country-level information on the series.

Income growth between 2016 and 2018 is assumed to be distribution neutral.

Source: Based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
Inequality and redistribution in Europe and the United States Income inequality in European countries and the United States has risen to varying degrees and at different speeds.56 Inequality, both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution, varies widely across developed countries.

These 120 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 heterogeneous dynamics are linked to different institutional trajectories, policy choices and patterns of inclusive growth.
By combining surveys, tax data and national accounts, it has become possible to produce estimates tracking inequality dynamics across individuals from the bottom to the top 0.001 percent in a way fully consistent with national accounts.57 How have European coun- tries and the United States performed in pro- moting inclusive growth in the past decades?
Since the beginning of the 1980s almost no country considered in the analysis has seen the incomes of the bottom 40 percent grow more than the average (table 3.5).

Growth has been either distributionally neutral or associated with rising inequality.

In Norway, Spain, France and Croatia the difference is close to zero: The bot- tom 40 percent saw their incomes grow at a rate similar to that of the average income.
In Norway and France, however, the top 1 percent of in- comes grew more than the average, meaning that the income share of the groups in between was squeezed.
In all other countries, especially in Eastern Europe and the United States, poorer individuals have lagged far behind national averages between 1980 and 2007, and richer people have benefited from a disproportionate share of income growth, although the income growth of the bottom 40 percent has been high- er than the national average for several countries since 2007, especially in Eastern Europe.
Income inequality has risen more in the United States than in any other developed country since 1980 Driving the rising inequalities in the United States since the 1980s has been a surge in top in- comes combined with little or no pretax income growth among poorer individuals.

The current income inequality in the United States is vastly different from the levels seen at the end of World War II.

Indeed, changes in inequality since 1945 can be split into two phases (figure 3.9).
From 1946 to 1980 inequality fell.

During that period the average incomes of the bottom 50 percent more than doubled.
By contrast, the 1980–2014 period coincided with lower and much more skewed growth, with the average income of the bottom half essentially stagnating (it grew less than 2 percent, while that of the bottom TABLE 3.5 Post-tax average and bottom 40 percent growth in Europe and the United States, 1980–2017 and 2007–2017 Driving the rising inequalities in the United States since the 1980s has been a surge in top incomes combined with little or no pretax income growth among poorer individuals 1980–2017 2007–2017 Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage points) Average income growth (percent) Income growth of the bottom 40 percent (percent) Income growth of the top 1 percent (percent) Average income growth (percent) Income growth of the bottom 40 percent (percent) Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage points) Income growth of the top 1 percent (percent) 318.7 102.2 3.8 37.3 88.1 47.1 48.0 66.9 229.8 39.6 2.2 17.6 44.4 2.3 10.4 15.1 –89.0 –62.6 –1.6 –19.7 –43.6 –44.8 –37.7 –51.8 475.5 583.3 77.5 382.5 202.7 426.0 212.2 318.4 17.8 16.7 36.6 0.8 10.3 7.4 11.8 12.5 20.8 20.0 15.4 30.1 5.0 9.5 8.3 6.4 15.2 12.1 2.2 –1.3 –6.6 4.2 –0.9 0.9 –5.3 2.8 –8.7 5.4 16.8 51.9 –2.2 21.0 –18.8 2.9 19.8 31.5 (continued) Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 121 Country Eastern Europe Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania TABLE 3.5 (CONTINUED) Post-tax average and bottom 40 percent growth in Europe and the United States, 1980–2017 and 2007–2017 1980–2017 2007–2017 Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage points) Average income growth (percent) Income growth of the bottom 40 percent (percent) Income growth of the top 1 percent (percent) Average income growth (percent) Income growth of the bottom 40 percent (percent) Difference between income growth of the bottom 40 percent and average income growth (percentage
 points) Income growth of the top 1 percent (percent) Country Moldova (Republic of) Montenegro North Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Southern Europe Cyprus Greece Italy Malta Portugal Spain Western Europe Austria Belgium France Germany Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland United Kingdom Northern Europe Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden United States –20.1 –0.2 94.8 69.9 – –33.4 –19.3 33.6 21.0 –27.1 57.7 –7.3 –13.4 –19.1 –61.2 –48.9 –19.0 –11.4 –19.7 –3.5 –20.0 –26.0 7.4 –7.7 –8.2 0.6 –19.7 –40.7 –30.0 –9.3 –5.2 –2.2 –21.6 –9.4 7.1 – –1.1 –15.5 –31.3 –10.6 28.8 –0.3 3.1 –0.1 1.6 0.6 9.8 2.9 –32.6 –0.6 0.7 1.3 2.4 –6.7 6.9 –2.1 10.5 3.1 54.6 17.2 39.1 28.0 43.0 9.0 19.7 –5.6 –19.1 –43.8 –16.3 13.4 4.3 1.1 –2.2 –0.6 1.0 3.7 0.6 –35.9 –4.2 4.7 10.7 –8.6 –9.5 15.4 –0.2 4.8 –0.1 18.1 1.0 16.8 –2.8 12.4 –1.5 0.6 –4.5 –3.6 –12.5 –5.7 –15.3 4.6 –2.0 –2.1 –2.2 0.5 –6.0 –2.2 –3.3 –3.7 4.0 9.4 –11.0 –2.8 8.6 1.9 –5.7 23.7 22.3 10.5 18.0 –3.2 40.6 7.3 35.3 –6.8 5.9 –16.6 183.2 –14.7 31.0 20.8 –2.5 –5.5 10.7 4.3 –33.0 –17.6 1.8 –23.0 60.3 –7.7 –41.4 –9.6 –0.9 –3.2 7.6 –52.4 203.4 Note: Green cells indicate countries that achieved Sustainable Development Goal target 10.1 over the period considered and red cells indicate countries that did not.
Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
122 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Rising inequalities in the United States coincide with a gradual decrease in the progressiveness of the US tax system over the past few decades FIGURE 3.9 The pretax income share of the top 10 percent in the United States rose from around 35 percent in 1980 to close to 47 percent in 2014 Share of national income (percent) 50 45 40 35 30 25 Pretax Post-tax 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017 Source: Piketty, Saez and Zucman 2018.
40 percent fell 5 percent), and the income of the top 1 percent more than tripled.

Accordingly, the share of pretax national income received by the top 10 percent grew from 34 percent to more than 45 percent, and that received by the top 1 percent grew from 10 percent to 20 percent.

Accounting for the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers does not change the dynamics.
Between 1980 and 2014 the share of post-tax national income received by the top 10 percent grew from 30 percent to about 40 percent.

During the same period the post-tax income of the bottom 50 percent grew a meagre 20 percent, driven entirely by Medicare and Medicaid.

Only through in-kind health trans- fers and collective expenditures did the incomes of the bottom half of the distribution rise.
Rising inequalities in the United States co- incide with a gradual decrease in the progres- siveness of the US tax system over the past few decades, a trend present in many other coun- tries (see chapter 7).

The country’s share of to- tal taxes in national income, including federal, state and local taxes, increased from 8 percent in 1913 to 30 percent in the late 1960s, where it has remained since.
Effective tax rates paid by individuals (total taxes paid as a share of total income) have become more compressed.

In the 1950s the top 1 percent of income earners paid 40–45 percent of their pretax income in taxes, while the bottom 50 percent of earners paid 15–20 percent.

Today the gap is much smaller.

Top earners paid about 30–35 percent, while the poorest half paid around 25 percent.
Inequality has increased in a majority of European countries Although inequalities remain lower in Europe than in the United States, European countries have also seen increases in the concentration of income at the top.

In 1980 income disparities were generally higher in Western Europe than in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe (figure 3.10).

The gap increased between 1980 and 1990 as income inequality rose in Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom.
In 1990–2000, by contrast, top income inequality rapidly in- creased in Finland, Norway and Sweden and in Eastern European countries.

As a result, income inequality is higher today in nearly all European countries than at the beginning of the 1980s.

Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 123 European countries have also seen increases in the concentration of income at the top.
The incomes of the top 0.1 percent of earners more than doubled during the period, and the incomes of the top 0.001 percent nearly tripled FIGURE 3.10 Between 1980 and 2017 the share of post-tax national income received by the top 10 percent rose from 21 percent to 25 percent in Northern Europe, while the share received by the bottom 40 percent fell from 24 percent to 22 percent Share of national income (percent) 31 27 23 19 15 Top 10 percent Share of national income (percent) Bottom 40 percent 30 26 22 18 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Eastern Europe Northern Europe Southern Europe Western Europe Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
In 2017 the top 10 percent of income earners received more than 30 percent of national in- come in most Western European countries and 25–35 percent in East European countries.58 The income share of the top 10 percent in Southern Europe was slightly higher than in other regions in the 1980s but increased less (see figure 3.10).

Income gaps widened in Italy and Portugal, for instance, but remained stable in Spain and fluctuated in Greece.
In Northern Europe and Western Europe, by contrast, income inequality increased more linearly.

Eastern Europe is the area where income ine- quality has risen the most, due to increases at the top of the distribution in the 1990s and the early 2000s.59 Today post-tax income inequality remains, on average, slightly lower in Northern Europe than in other regions of the continent.

Top income earners have thus been the pri- mary beneficiaries of income growth in Europe since the 1980s.
And between 1980 and 2017 the at risk of poverty rate remained stable or rose in most countries.60 Inequality has risen in Europe as a whole Taking the European countries as a whole, the top 10 percent pretax income earners in Europe received 29 percent of total regional income in 1980, while the bottom 50 percent received 24 percent.

In 2017 the income share of the top 10 percent had risen to 34 percent, while the poorest half of the population received only a fifth.
In the past 37 years the incomes of the poorest 40 percent of Europeans increases 30–40 percent (figure 3.11).

The European middle class benefited only slightly more from growth than the poorer groups, as the incomes of those between percentiles 40 and 90 in- creased 40–50 percent.

For the more advan- taged sections of society, however, total growth rates are markedly higher.
The incomes of the top 0.1 percent of earners more than doubled during the period, and the incomes of the top 0.001 percent nearly tripled.

While income inequality has increased sig- nificantly in Europe, poverty has more or less stagnated.

Some 20 percent of Europeans lived on less than 60 percent of the European median income in 1980, compared with 22 percent in 2017.
In recent years moderate convergence across countries, due to higher growth in Eastern Europe, has slightly reduced the per- centage of people at risk of becoming poor in Europe as a whole, but the trend has been fully offset by rising percentages in other European countries, particularly in Southern Europe.
Convergence would be insufficient to address the percentage of people at risk of poverty in Europe: If all countries fully converged to the same average national income, the European- wide percentage would remain as high as 17 percent.
124 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3.11 Between 1980 and 2017 the post-tax incomes of the poorest 80 percent of the European population grew close to 40 percent, while those of the top 0.001 percent grew more than 180 percent Total income growth (percent) 250 200 150 100 50 0 10 Bottom 40 percent captured 13 percent of growth Top 1 percent captured 13 percent of growth 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 99.9 99.99 99.999 Income group (percentile) Note: After the 90th percentile the scale on the horizontal axis changes.
The composition of income groups changes from 1980 to 2017, so the estimates do not represent the changes in income of the same individuals over time.

Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

The US–Europe comparison points to predistribution and redistribution policies to address inequalities Since 1980 the United States and Europe have experienced diverging inequality trajectories.
In 2017 the share of national income received by the top 1 percent in the United States was more than twice as large as that received by the poor- est 40 percent.

In Europe, by contrast, the share received by the bottom 40 percent exceeded that received by the top 1 percent (figure 3.12).

This was not always the case: In 1980 the share of the bottom 40 percent in the two regions was similar, about 13 percent (figure 3.13).
The divergence in trajectories cannot be accounted for by either trade or technology, which are often invoked to explain the evolu- tion in inequality in developed countries, given that all countries under analysis have been sim- ilarly exposed to both.

Instead, the difference in inequality dynamics appears to be more the outcome of policy choices and institutional arrangements.
The findings reported here allow for a bet- ter understanding of the determinants of the differences between Europe and the United States.

These differences are due mainly to a rise in pretax inequality (income measured before direct taxes and transfers, see box 3.3), which has been much more marked in the United States.

In 1980 the average income of the top 10 percent was 10 times higher than that of the bottom 40 percent in the United States.

In 2017 this multiple jumped above 26.


In Europe the same indicator rose from 10 to 12 over the same period.

For post-tax inequality the ratio rose from 7 to 14 in the United States between 1980 and 2017 and from 8 to 9 in Europe (figure 3.14).
So, the national systems of taxation (which include taxes on income and wealth) and the systems of social transfers (such as disability benefits or housing support) have therefore not enabled the rise in inequalities to be contained either in the United States or in Europe.

The combined operation of all the mechanisms acting on pretax incomes enabled Europe to contain the rise of the ratio of the top 10 percent to the bottom 40 percent.
Social spending—in- cluding mainly public spending on education, health and retirement pensions—plays an im- portant role.
In particular, quality and affordable The combined operation of all the mechanisms acting on pretax incomes enabled Europe to contain the rise of the ratio of the top 10 percent to the bottom 40 percent Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 125 FIGURE 3.12 Between 1980 and 2017 the pretax income share of the bottom 40 percent in the United States fell from about 13 percent to 8 percent, while the share of the top 1 percent rose from about 11 percent to 20 percent Share of national income (percent) Share of national income (percent) United States 25 20 15 10 5 Europe 25 20 15 10 5 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
Bottom 40 percent Top 1 percent FIGURE 3.13 Between 1980 and 2017 the average pretax income of the bottom 40 percent grew 36 percent in Europe, while it declined 3 percent in the United States Bottom 40 percent average income (relative to 1980) Bottom 40 percent average income (relative to 1980) Pretax Europe bottom 40 percent growth: +36 percent US bottom 40 percent growth: –3 percent 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 Post-tax Europe bottom 40 percent growth: +44 percent US bottom 40 percent growth: +10 percent 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
United States Europe education and health systems are key to ensure that individuals from low-income backgrounds can access economic opportunities.

Social spending remains markedly higher in Europe than in the United States and the rest of the world.
It amounts to 25–28 percent of GDP in most countries of continental Europe, compared with 19 percent in the United States.61 Furthermore, access to health and education is usually more egalitarian in Europe than in the United States, particularly through free or low-cost health care and vocational training in Europe, which contributes to a less unequal distribution of pretax incomes.
Other important dynamics help account for higher income growth at the bottom of the 126 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3.14 The average pretax income of the top 10 percent in the United States was about 11 times higher than that of the bottom 40 percent in 1980 and 27 times higher in 2017, while in Europe the ratio rose from 10 to 12 Ratio of top 10 percent to bottom 40 percent of pretax income Ratio of top 10 percent to bottom 40 percent of post-tax income Post-tax Pretax 30 26 22 18 14 10 6 16 14 12 10 8 6 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 United States Europe Source: Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
distribution in Europe.

For example, between 1980 and 2017 the minimum wage fell from 42 percent of average earnings to 24 percent in the United States.
In many European countries movement has been in the opposite direction, with the minimum wage maintained at a high level (as in France, where it is about 50 percent of the average wage) or introduced (as in the United Kingdom in the 1990s and more re- cently in Germany).62 Still, there has been a reduction in tax pro- gressiveness in Europe in recent decades, with the top corporate tax rate having fallen from al- most 50 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to 25 percent today—this is part of a global trend common to developed and developing countries (see chapter 7).
The top marginal in- come tax rate has also fallen in most European countries.

And the value added tax, which dis- proportionately hits those with low incomes, has risen on average by more than 3 percentage points since the beginning of the 1980s.
While Europe as a whole has been able to have more moderate increases in inequality than the United States, these developments may eventu- ally limit the capacity of governments to get the winners in European growth to contribute to fi- nancing public services, which have been so key to sustain incomes at the middle and bottom of the distribution (figure 3.15).
FIGURE 3.15 Between 1981 and 2017 the average top corporate tax rate in the European Union fell from about 50 percent to 25 percent, while the average value added tax rate rose from about 18 percent to more than 21 percent Average top corporate tax rate (percent) Average standard consumption tax rate (percent) Top corporate tax rate Standard value added tax rate 50 40 30 20 22 21 20 19 18 17 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Source: Eurostat (standard VAT rate) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (top corporate tax rate).
Global wealth inequality: Capital is back To properly track the dynamics of economic inequality, focusing on income alone is not enough.63 It is also necessary to track the dynam- ics of wealth concentration.
Although wealth data remain particularly scarce (even more than income data), recent research has unveiled findings on the evolution and composition of Still, there has been a reduction in tax progressiveness in Europe in recent decades, with the top corporate tax rate having fallen from almost 50 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to 25 percent today Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 127 The globalization of wealth management since the 1980s raises new challenges, with a growing amount of world wealth held in offshore financial centres countries’ national wealth.
Analysing the com- position of an economy’s national wealth, assets that are both privately and publicly owned, is a prelude to understanding the dynamics of wealth inequality among individuals.

The renewed effort in studying wealth in- equality is crucial because it is linked to the increase in income inequality at the top of the distribution observed since 1980, since capital income tends to be concentrated among wealth- ier people.
The prominence of wealth in driving the income distribution is linked to its relative importance in many economies, with national wealth as an aggregate having grown significant- ly more than income in many countries.64 Because most countries do not tax wealth directly, producing reliable estimates of wealth inequality requires combining different data sources, such as billionaire rankings and income tax and inheritance tax data.65 The globalization of wealth management since the 1980s raises new challenges, with a grow- ing amount of world wealth held in offshore financial centres.
Indeed, offshore assets are disproportionately owned by the wealthiest, so accounting for these offshore assets has large implications for measuring wealth at the very top of the distribution.66 More generally, measuring the inequality of income and wealth from a global perspective, and not simply at the country level, is becoming critical.
Understanding the evolution of the level and structure of national capital (or national wealth)67 and its relationship to national in- come is key to addressing several economic and public policy issues.

Wealth is a “stock” concept: It is the sum of all assets accumulated in the past (particularly housing, business and financial assets) net of debt.
Private wealth is always more concentrated than income, while public wealth, owned by a government, greatly affects the gov- ernment’s capacity to implement redistributive policies.

This is why looking at the evolution of national wealth-to-income ratios and at the partition of wealth between the private and the public sectors can help in understanding the evolution of economic inequality.
Keep in mind, though, that the definitions of public and private property vary across countries.68 Reliable macroeconomic data on wealth are scarce across the globe.

Only in 2010 did Germany start to publish official national balance sheets with information on the total stock of wealth and its evolution.

In many emerging and developing countries there is no macroeconomic wealth information.
Lack of wealth data is an issue in itself, since precise information on wealth dynamics can prove critical to preventing finan- cial crises or to fine-tuning tax policies.

Lack of data also makes it impossible to properly track the dynamics of wealth at the micro level—among individuals.

So, macroeconomic discussion of wealth is limited to developed economies and a few emerging economies with wealth data.
Ratios of private wealth to national income have risen sharply in all countries since 1970, with substantial regional variations Country trajectories in Western Europe have been roughly similar: Net private wealth rose from 250–400 percent of national income in 1970 to 450–750 percent in 2016 (figure 3.16).

The highest increases were in Italy and the United Kingdom, where the ratios more than doubled.
The private wealth–income ratio also increased greatly in Canada (from 250 per- cent to more than 550 percent) and a bit less (but still substantially) in Australia.

It rose by half in the United States (from less than 350 percent to around 500 percent) and almost doubled in Japan (from 300 percent to almost 600 percent).

China and the Russian Federation had the largest increases.
In China private wealth rose from 110 percent of national income in 1978 (when the opening-up policy started) to 490 percent of national income in 2015.

In the Russian Federation the ratio tripled between 1990 and 2015 (from 120 percent to 370 percent).

Note that the 2008 financial crisis did not significantly disturb this trend: Though wealth–income ratios dipped following the crash, they recovered, at various speeds and to various extents.
But public wealth to national income ratios underwent a strong and steady decline almost everywhere.

Public wealth became negative in the United Kingdom and the United States and now amounts to only 10–20 percent of national income in France, Germany and Japan.
By contrast, in China the value of public wealth 128 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Public wealth to national income ratios underwent a strong and steady decline almost everywhere FIGURE 3.16 Net private wealth in Western European countries rose from 250–400 percent of national income in 1970 to 450–750 percent in 2016 Value of net private wealth (percent of national income) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 China Russian Fed.
Germany Spain France United Kingdom Italy Japan United States 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Alvaredo and others (2018), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).

remained fairly constant relative to national income (250 percent in 1978 and 230 percent in 2015), and in the Russian Federation it fell dramatically from more than 230 percent of national income in 1990 to around 90 percent in 2015.
These two trends have radically modified the structure of national wealth in most countries.

In the late 1970s the value of public wealth was about 50–100 percent of national income in developed countries; it is now negative in the United Kingdom and the United States and only marginally positive in France, Germany and Japan.

This domination of private wealth in national wealth is a marked change from the 1970s (figure 3.17).

Zero or negative public wealth is exceptional by historical standards.
Governments tend to adopt various strategies to recover positive public wealth levels, such as inflation, debt cancellation or progressive wealth taxes—as after World War II in Europe (France and Germany).

To understand what a zero or negative net public wealth situation implies, consider the following: A government with negative public wealth willing to repay its debts would have to sell all its financial assets (such as stocks) and nonfinancial assets (such as roads) but would still be indebted.
Taxpayers would thus have to continue to pay taxes to reimburse owners of the debt, and citizens would also have to pay a rent to the new owners of the stock of capital that was formerly public (roads, energy or water systems, or health or education infrastructure).

Such a situation arguably leaves government with little room to invest in the future (in, say, education or environmental protection) and thus tackle current and future income and wealth inequality.
A combination of factors accounts for these trends.

The reduction in the share of public wealth accounts for a part of the rise of private wealth.

The decline in net public wealth is also due largely to the rise of public debt.

The ratio of public assets to national income has remained fairly stable because a significant chunk of public assets was privatized (particu- larly shares in public or semipublic companies) and the market value of the remaining assets increased.
But the long-run decline in the share of public wealth in total wealth, in no way in- evitable, is the result of public policy choices (privatizing public assets, expanding public debt or running fiscal deficits).
Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 129 High wealth–income ratios imply that wealth inequality is going to play a growing role in the overall structure of economic inequality FIGURE 3.17 Countries are getting richer, but governments are becoming poor Value of net public and private wealth (percent of national income) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Private capital Public capital Spain Germany France United Kingdom Japan United States –100 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Alvaredo and others (2018), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
Overall, the evolution of national wealth (public and private) to national income ratios is determined by the interplay between national savings, economic growth (quantity factor) and relative asset prices (price factor).

The higher the savings rate, the larger the accumulation of assets.

And the higher the economic growth rate, the lower the accumulation of assets rel- ative to national income.
Relative asset prices depend on institutional and policy factors (rent control, for instance) and on the patterns of saving and investment strategies.

In developed countries quantity effects contributed to about 60 percent of wealth accumulation between 1970 and 2010 and price effects to about 40 percent, with cross-country variations.
The differences in privatization strategies and in price and volume factors also explain the widely divergent patterns of national wealth accumulation in the Russian Federation and China.

Indeed, Russia’s national wealth in- creased weakly, from 400 percent of national income in 1990 to 450 percent in 2015, while China’s doubled from 350 percent of national income in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015.

The Russian Federation opted to transfer wealth from the public to the private sector as quickly as possible.
So the increase in private wealth was the exclusive driver for the rapid rise of national wealth, at the expense of public wealth.

By contrast, China’s privatization of public assets was much more gradual, enabling public wealth to remain constant while private wealth was increasing.

In addition, savings rates were markedly higher in China.
And Chinese savings financed mostly domestic capital in- vestment (leading to more domestic capital accumulation), whereas about half of Russian savings financed foreign investments.

Relative asset prices also increased more in China.

In the long run the low ratios of the mid-20th century may have been due to very special circum- stances, perhaps unlikely to recur.69 So savings and growth rates, the main long-run determinants of these ratios, will matter greatly in the near future.
And given their current levels, national wealth to national income ratios may be returning to those in the 19th century’s Gilded Age.

High wealth– income ratios imply that wealth inequality is go- ing to play a growing role in the overall structure of economic inequality.

Because wealth tends to be very concentrated, this raises new issues about capital taxation and regulation.
These issues emerge in a context where the ability of govern- ments to regulate and redistribute income may be limited by the decline of public wealth.

130 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Global wealth inequality between individuals The dynamics of wealth inequality between in- dividuals are linked to the evolution of income inequality and the evolution of public and pri- vate capital inequality.
In the long run wealth inequality between individuals also depends on the inequality of savings rates across income and wealth groups, the inequality of labour in- comes and rates of returns to wealth—and on the progressiveness of income and wealth taxes.

How have these factors affected the process of wealth concentration in the past, and what can they tell about potential future dynamics?
Recent research has shown that relatively small changes in savings behaviours, returns to wealth or tax progressiveness can have rather large impacts on wealth inequality.70 This instability reinforces the need for better data quality to properly study and understand the dynamics of income and wealth.
Given the low availability of data on wealth inequality among individuals, estimates of the global distribution of wealth come from only a handful of countries: France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States and to less ex- tent China.

Less certain estimates are also avail- able for the Russian Federation and countries in the Middle East.
Wealth is substantially more concentrated than income: In 2017 the global top 10 percent (the richest 10 percent in the United States, Europe and China) owned more than 70 per- cent of the total wealth, and the top 1 percent owned 33 percent, while the bottom 50 percent owned less than 2 percent.71 These estimates are a lower bound, since inequality would probably be higher if Africa, Latin America and the rest of Asia were included.
Wealth inequality has been increasing since 1980, unaffected by the 2008 crisis.

The evolution of the global distribution of wealth depends on the disparity of average wealth between countries and within countries.

Since 1980 the rise of average private wealth has been faster in large emerging economies, such as China,72 than in developed countries, because of faster economic growth and massive wealth transfers from the public to the private sector.
This has greatly increased the wealth of the bot- tom 75 percent of the global distribution.

This rise was more than offset at the top by the rise in within-country wealth inequality everywhere, so wealth increased much faster at the top of the global distribution: While the average wealth growth was 2.8 percent a year per adult over 1987–2017, it was 3.5 per- cent for the top 1 percent, 4.5 percent for the top 0.1 percent and 5.7 percent for the top 0.01 percent.
The factors affecting wealth inequality (in- come inequality, inequality of savings rates and asset rates of return) are affected by public policies.

For example, progressive taxation in- fluences income and savings inequality, while financial regulation and innovation can have an impact on asset rates of return.

Privatization can also play a role when it benefits mostly a specific part of the distribution, as in many countries since the 1980s and particularly in emerging countries.
So there is nothing inevi- table about the rise of wealth inequality within countries.

In the Russian Federation and China the con- centration of wealth increased since the 1990s.

The share of the top 1 percent doubled (from 22 percent in 1995 to 43 percent in 2015 in the Russian Federation and from 15 percent to 30 percent in China, although with some vol- atility; figure 3.18).
The divergences between the two countries come from the differences between their privatization strategies: The fast pace of privatizing public assets in the Russian Federation favoured the wealthiest even more than in China.

In the Russia Federation hous- ing had a small dampening effect on the rise of inequality.

In China housing wealth was privat- ized through a very unequal process, whereas the approach was more gradual and equitable in the Russia Federation.
The United States has had a less abrupt but no less significant rise of wealth inequality since the mid-1980s, after a considerable decline in the 1930s and 1940s, then due particularly to the policies of the New Deal (see figure 3.18).

The share of wealth owned by the top 1 percent grew from a historic low of 22 percent in 1978 to almost 39 percent in the 2010s.

The key driver of this increase was the upsurge of very top incomes, enabled by financial deregulation and lower top tax rates.
Inequality of savings rates and of asset return rates amplified the phe- nomenon in a snowballing trend.
Meanwhile, Wealth is substantially more concentrated than income: In 2017 the global top 10 percent (the richest 10 percent in the United States, Europe and China) owned more than 70 percent of the total wealth, and the top 1 percent owned 33 percent, while the bottom 50 percent owned less than 2 percent Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 131 FIGURE 3.18 Trends in wealth inequality Share of personal wealth held by the top 1 percent (percent) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Wealth inequality has been increasing since 1980, unaffected by the 2008 crisis China France Russian Federation United Kingdom United States 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Alvaredo and others (2018), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
the income of the middle and the bottom of the distribution stagnated, and household debt (mortgages, student loans and credit card debt, among others) sharply increased.

This led to a substantial fall of the wealth share of the middle 40 percent—from a historic high of 37 percent in 1986 to 28 percent in 2014.

In France and the United Kingdom wealth inequality also increased after a historical decline, but at a much slower pace than in the United States.
The top 1 percent share rose from 16 percent in both countries in 1985 to 20 percent in the United Kingdom in 2012 and 23 percent in France in 2015.

This was due to greater earnings disparities, amplified by a fall in tax progressiveness, the privatization of for- merly state-run industries and, most important, the growing inequality of asset return rates, as the returns on financial assets, disproportion- ately owned by the wealthy, increased.
Small changes in savings rate differentials across wealth groups, or in progressive taxation patterns, can have a very large impact on wealth inequality, though it may take several decades for the impacts to play out.

This raises many issues for the future of wealth inequality: If the current trends in savings, income and return rate inequality persist, within-country wealth inequality could be returning to 19th century Gilded Age levels in the coming decades.
On a global scale, if current trends continue, by 2050 the global top 0.1 percent could end up owning as much of the world’s wealth as the middle 40 percent of the world’s population (figure 3.19).

Afterword: Data transparency as a global imperative This chapter has discussed recent advances in methodology and data collection to fill a public debate data gap.

Such information is necessary for peaceful and deliberative debates over in- come inequality and growth.
Worryingly, in the few years of the digital age the quality of publicly available economic data on these issues has been deteriorating in many countries, par- ticularly for fiscal data on capital income, wealth and inheritance.
To provide historically and internationally comparable estimates of income and wealth 132 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 3.19 If current trends continue, by 2050 the global top 0.1 percent could end up owning as much of the world’s wealth as the middle 40 percent of the world’s population Share of global income (percent) 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1980 Top 1 percent Top 0.1 percent Top 0.01 percent Middle 40 percent “Global middle class” 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Source: Alvaredo and others (2018), based on data from the World Inequality Database (http://WID.world).
inequality, new efforts require the use of the best available data sources from household sur- veys, administrative tax data, national accounts or financial leaks.

To be sure, today’s knowledge of global in- come and wealth inequality remains limited and unsatisfactory.

Much more data collection lies ahead to expand the geographical coverage of inequality data—and to provide more sys- tematic representations of pretax and post-tax income and wealth inequality.
Despite these data limitations, the rise of income and wealth inequality observed across the world over the past decades is not destiny.

It arises from eco- nomic and institutional policy choices.

As part III shows, different pathways can be followed in the coming decades—if there is political will.
For the policies of tomorrow to reflect a sound debate on national and global economic inequalities clearly requires the continuing publication of transparent and timely data on inequalities in income and wealth.

Today’s knowledge of global income and wealth inequality remains limited and unsatisfactory.
Much more data collection lies ahead to expand the geographical coverage of inequality data—and to provide more systematic representations of pretax and post- tax income and wealth inequality Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 133 Spotlight 3.1 Looking within countries and within households Understanding inequality beyond averages im- plies looking at what is happening subnationally: within a nation, within a group or even within households.
It is particularly important to have a better grasp of who and where those furthest behind and at the very bottom of the income distribution are.

One way of looking within countries is to identify the hotspots, the subna- tional districts, states or provinces set not to have a GDP per capita of $4,000 or more in 2005 purchasing power parity terms in 2030.1 There are 840 such poverty hotspots globally, among more than 3,600 districts, states and provinces.
Moreover, 102 countries have at least one region that qualifies.

In other words, people are being left behind in a large, diverse group of countries.

But there is considerable variation within countries.

Over half of low-income countries have at least one region that is not a pover- ty hotspot; 36 of 46 lower-middle-income countries have at least one region that is.
Even among upper middle-income countries some 30 percent of regions are hotspots.2 Another way of identifying diversity within countries is to consider the Human Development Index (HDI) at a subnational level.3 By this measure, there are “clusters” of hotspots that FIGURE S3.1.1 Contiguous human development patterns, cutting across national borders: The Gulf of Guinea (0.65,0.69] (0.64,0.65] (0.60,0.64] (0.60,0.60] (0.59,0.60] (0.53,0.59] (0.49,0.53] (0.44,0.49] (0.41,0.44] Source: Permanyer and Smits 2019.
134 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 cross national borders (see figure S3.1.1 for an example with a group of countries in the Gulf of Guinea).

Clusters of low subnational HDI values exist in Latin America, including parts of Central America.

In Central–South Asia subnational areas stretch from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to most of Afghanistan, and in Southeast Asia, sections of Cambodia and Viet Nam.

Not all in a hotspot are necessarily poor, of course.
Within any area the next step implies identifying households most in need of social assistance.

Most countries apply some sort of test to decide who is eligible for assistance, tests that generally are flawed.

A critical challenge for the tests is their high exclusion errors (not including individuals or households who are eligible but do not receive a benefit) and their high inclusion errors (of individuals or households who are not eligible but do receive a benefit).
The inclusion and exclusion errors for a set of African econ- omies are striking (table S3.1.1).

For instance, Ghana has an estimated inclusion error of 35 percent (35 percent of the identified poor households are nonpoor) and an exclusion error of 63 percent (63 percent of the poor are not identified as poor using the proxy means test).

Finally, it is important to go even deeper to look within households.

As noted, many countries try to identify poor and vulnerable households.
There are good reasons for using households as a general proxy.

One reason is that data on income and consumption are often better collected—and understood—at the household level.

A second is that the average well-being of a household is cor- related with individual well-being among those within it.

And so while household identification inevitably comes with inclusion and exclusion errors, it has been the standard for decades.
The outliers to this pattern are significant and often comprise people with disabilities, or- phans and widows, migrants and mobile popu- lations, and the homeless.

The numbers of such cases are considerable.
In 30 Sub-Saharan coun- tries roughly three-quarters of underweight women and undernourished children are not in the poorest 20 percent of households, and around half are not in the poorest 40 percent TABLE S3.1.1 Targeting errors of inclusion and exclusion: Proxy means tests Inclusion error rate Exclusion error rate Inclusion error rate Exclusion error rate Targeting error Targeting error Fixed poverty line Fixed poverty rate z = F–1 (0.2) z = F–1 (0.4) H = 0.2 H = Country Burkina Faso Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Mali Niger Nigeria Tanzania, United Republic of Uganda Mean Note: F–1 (x) indicates the poverty line consistent with fixing the poverty rate at x. H = x means headcount poverty rate of x.
Source: Brown, Ravallion and van de Walle 2018.
FIGURE S3.1.2 Adult female malnutrition and child stunting can be high in nonpoor households Proportion of underweight women found in poor households Proportion of stunted children found in wealth-poor households 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Poorest 40 percent (r=–0.31) Poorest 20 percent (r=–0.31) 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Poorest 40 percent (r=–0.65) Poorest 20 percent (r=–0.61) 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 Source: Brown, Ravallion and van de Walle 2017.
(figure S3.1.2).

Countries with higher rates of undernutrition tend to have a higher share of undernourished individuals in nonpoor households.4 Notes 1 This threshold of $4,000 represents twice the ceiling for a low-income country, as defined by the World Bank in 2015.

It corresponds roughly to a daily income where the probability of falling below the national poverty line is less than 10 percent (Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2014).

Cohen, Desai and Kharas 2019.

Permanyer and Smits (2019).


2 3 4 New individual consumption data reveal that within-household inequality accounts for nearly 16 percent of total inequality in Senegal.

One of the consequences of such unequal repartition of resources within households is the potential existence of “invisible poor” in households classified as nonpoor.

As many as 12.6 percent of poor individuals live in nonpoor households.
The evidence from Senegal suggest that the more complex the household structure and the bigger the household size, the more inequality is likely to be underestimated when computed using standard consumption surveys (Lambert and de Vreyer 2017).

Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 135 Spotlight 3.2 Choosing an inequality index James Foster, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the George Washington University, and Nora Lustig, Samuel Z.
Stone Professor of Latin American Economics and Director of the Commitment to Equity Institute at Tulane University A useful way to describe the distribution of income is the Lorenz curve, constructed as follows.1 First, the population is ranked ac- cording to income (or consumption, wealth or another measure of resources) from the lowest to the highest.

Then the cumulative shares of individuals in the population are plotted against their respective cumulative share in total income.
The curve drawn is called the Lorenz curve.

The horizontal axis of the Lorenz curve shows the cumulative percent- ages of the population arranged in increasing order of income.

The vertical axis shows the percentage of total income received by a fraction of the population.
For example, the (80 percent, 60 percent) point on the Lorenz curve means that the poorest 80 percent of the population receives 60 percent of total income while the richest 20 percent receives 40 percent of total income.2 Figure S3.2.1 shows two Lorenz curves: L1 and L2.

If everybody has the same income, the Lorenz curve will coincide with the 45-de- gree line.

The greater the level of inequality, the farther the Lorenz curve will be from the 45-degree line.
In the figure, L2 lies below and FIGURE S3.1.1 Lorenz curve Cumulative income L1 L2 Cumulative population Source: Authors’ creation.

136 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 to the right of L1, so an inequality index would be expected to indicate greater inequality in the L2 case.

Another way to see this is that the poorest x percent of the population will always have an equal or greater share of income under L1 than under L2, regardless of what x is.
This is called the Lorenz dominance criterion or Lorenz criterion for short.

What constitutes a “good” inequality index?

One approach is to require the measure to be consistent with the Lorenz criterion: that is, to be Lorenz consistent.

For a measure to be Lorenz consistent the following two conditions must hold: First, inequality rises (declines) when the Lorenz curve lies everywhere below (above) the original Lorenz curve as with L2 compared with L1 (L1 compared to L2) in the figure.
Second, inequality is the same when Lorenz curves are identical.

For a measure to be Weakly Lorenz Consistent, condition 1 becomes the following: 1’.

inequality rises (de- clines) or stays the same when the Lorenz curve lies everywhere below (above) the original Lorenz curve.

A second approach is to require the inequal- ity index to fulfil the following four principles: 1 Symmetry (or anonymity).

If two people switch incomes, the index level should not change.
2 Population invariance (or replication in- variance).

If the population is replicated or “cloned” one or more times, the index level should not change.

3 Scale invariance (or mean independence).

If all incomes are scaled up or down by a com- mon factor (for example, doubled), the index level should not change.

4 Transfer (or the Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle).

If income is transferred from one person to another who is richer, the index level should increase.
In other words, in the face of a regressive transfer, the index level must rise.

It can be shown that indices satisfying these four principles are Lorenz Consistent and vice versa.

These indices include: • Summary indices based on relatively com- plex formulas designed to capture inequal- ity along the entire distribution.

The most commonly used are (in alphabetical order): the Atkinson, Gini and Theil measures (and the generalized entropy measures, more generally).
While inequality measures that satisfy the transfer principle are in common use, there are also simpler indices that do not satisfy 1–4 but are popular.

These include: • Partial indices based on simple formulas that focus on inequality across certain parts of the distribution.

These include the Kuznets ratios expressed as the income share of top x percent over the income share of bottom y percent.

There are, of course, many possible Kuznets ratios.
The one proposed by the Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets was 20/40.3 Partial indices also include the top income shares, expressed as the income share of the top x percent.
Common examples include the income share of the top 1 percent or of the top 10 percent.4 The top income shares are, in fact, limiting cases of Kuznets ratios obtained by setting the “bottom” income share to cover the entire population: that is, by setting y percent = 100 percent.5 Such partial Indices satisfy the following principle: 4' Weak transfer principle: If income is trans- ferred from one person to another who is richer (or equally rich), the index level should increase or remain unchanged.
In other words, in the face of a regressive transfer, the inequality index can never decline, but it may remain unchanged.

It can be shown that indices satisfying 1–3 and 4' principles are weakly Lorenz consistent and vice versa.

In sum, the summary indices of Atkinson, Gini and Theil (and the whole family of Generalized Entropy Indices) satisfy princi- ples 1–3 and 4 and thus are Lorenz consistent (and vice versa).
This guarantees that in the face of a regressive (progressive) transfer anywhere along the distribution, inequality measured by any of these indices will rise (decline).

In contrast, the Kuznets ratios and top income shares focus on limited ranges of incomes and thus violate the transfer prin- ciple (and thus violate Lorenz consistency).

The latter means that transfers entirely within or entirely outside the relevant ranges have no effect on measured inequality.
For example, the 10/40 ratio is insensitive to regressive transfers that stay within the poorest 40 per- cent, within the richest 10 percent or within the remaining 50 percent in the middle, while the income share of the top 1 percent is in- sensitive to transfers within the top 1 percent and within the bottom 99 percent.
Despite disagreeing with the transfer principle, and thus the Lorenz criterion, these partial indi- ces are useful for conveying easily understood information about the extent of inequality.

Importantly, they satisfy the weak transfer principle and thus guarantee that in the face of a regressive transfer anywhere along the distribution, inequality measured by any of these indices will never decline but, notably, it can stay the same.
In contrast, other common inequality indices do not even fulfil the weak transfer principle (transfer principle 4').

Examples include the quantile ratios (such as the income of percen- tile 90 to the income of the 10th percentile also known as the p90/p10 ratio) and the variance of logarithms.
For example, a transfer from the 5th percentile to the 10th would reduce the p90/p10 ratio despite the fact that the trans- fer is clearly regressive because it redistributes income from the very poor to the less poor.
Regressive transfers at the upper end of the dis- tribution can lower the variance of logarithms and lead to extreme conflicts with the Lorenz criterion.6 Finally, the mean to median ratio (mean di- vided by the median) is a measure of skewness that can also be interpreted as a partial index of inequality.
Virtually every inequality measure is a ratio of two “income standards” that summa- rize the size of the income distributions from two perspectives: one that emphasizes higher incomes and a second that emphasizes lower incomes.7 So long as only distributions that are skewed to the right are considered, the mean exceeds the median, and the mean to median ratio takes on this form.
This index satisfies the first three principles but can violate the weak transfer principle when the regressive transfer Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 137 raises the median income.

Like the other partial indices, it is weaker in terms of the properties it satisfies but has the advantage of simplicity and is often used in political economy.8 How to apply the above in practice?

When making pairwise comparisons, first graph the Lorenz curves.
If the Lorenz curves do not cross, an unambiguous Lorenz comparison can be made.

One can conclude from this that any reasonable (that is, Lorenz consistent) measure would agree that inequality has unambiguously increased or declined, according to what the Lorenz curves indicates.

However, it is also pos- sible that the Lorenz curves cross, in which case reasonable inequality measures can disagree.

What can be done when Lorenz curves cross?


One approach is to narrow the set of reasonable inequality measures using an additional crite- rion.

For instance, transfer-sensitive measures are Lorenz consistent measures that emphasize distributional changes at the lower end over those at the upper end.

The Atkinson class and the two Theil measures (including the mean log deviation) are transfer-sensitive measures.
By contrast, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) is neutral with respect to where transfers occur, while many other generalized entropy measures emphasize distributional changes at the upper end and thus are not in the set of transfer-sensitive measures.

When do all transfer-sensitive measures agree?

As a subset of Lorenz-consistent meas- ures, they agree when Lorenz curves do not cross as well as in many cases when they do cross.
For example, suppose that Lorenz curves cross once and that the first Lorenz curve is higher at lower incomes than the second.

There is a simple test: The first has less inequality than the second, according to all transfer-sensitive measures exactly when the coefficient of varia- tion for the first is no higher than that for the second.9 An even simpler approach is to select a (finite) set of particularly relevant inequality measures for making inequality comparisons.
If all agree on a given comparison, the result is robust.

If not, the conclusion is ambiguous for that set of measures, with inequality ranked one way for some measures and reversed for others.

Table S3.2.1 shows the statistics most fre- quently published in commonly used interna- tional databases.9 TABLE S3.2.1 Statistics most frequently published in 10 commonly used international databases Statistic Gini Quantile ratio 90/10 Theil Top 10 percent Source: Authors’ creation.
Frequency 9 4 3 3 Thus, the most frequently reported ine- quality measures include two that are Lorenz consistent (the Gini and Theil measures), one that is weakly Lorenz consistent (the top 10 percent) and one that is neither (the 90/10 quantile ratio).

In addition to inequality meas- ures, international datasets report other sta- tistics.
Among those, the most frequent is the distribution of income by decile.10 Notes 1 Named after Max Otto Lorenz, a US economist who developed the idea of the Lorenz curve in 1905.

Often, especially with historical data, we only have grouped-data or information on equal-sized population groups such as quintiles or deciles (5 or 10 groups, respectively).

The resulting Lorenz curve is an approximation of the actual Lorenz curve where inequality within each group has been suppressed.
Some international databases report the 20/20 (sometimes called S80/S20) and 10/40 ratios.

The top 1 percent has been the focus of the recent literature on top incomes.

See, for example, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011).

By definition, 100 percent of the population receives 100 per- cent of the income so the denominator of the Kuznets ratio becomes 100/100 = 1, and thus the 1/100 Kuznets ratio equals 1 percent.

Foster and Ok 1999.

Foster and others (2013, p. 15).


For example, one Atkinson measure compares the higher arithmetic mean to the lower geometric means; the 1 percent income share effectively compares the higher 1 percent mean to the lower arithmetic mean.

The mean to median ratio is the inequality measure used by Meltzer and Richards (1981) in their model to predict the size of government.

The greater the ratio, the higher the taxes and redistribution.

For details, see Shorrocks and Foster (1987).


See also Zheng (2018), who presents additional criteria for making compari- sons when Lorenz curves cross.

10 The complete set of measures reported in international databases and their properties can be found in supplemental material for this spotlight available at http://hdr.undp.org/ en/2019-report.
138 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Spotlight 3.3 Measuring fiscal redistribution: concepts and definitions A number of databases publish indicators of the extent of income redistribution due to taxes and transfers.

For example, they publish prefiscal and postfiscal Gini coefficients and other indicators of inequality and poverty.
In alphabetical order, the multicountry and mul- tiregional databases most frequently used are the Commitment to Equity Institute’s (CEQ) Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution (Tulane University), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Income Distribution Database, the LIS Cross- National Data Center in Luxembourg and the World Inequality Database (Paris School of Economics).
In addition, there are two regional databases: EUROMOD (Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex), a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union, and the OECD–Eurostat Expert Group on Disparities in a National Accounts Framework (EGDNA).1 One feature these databases have in common is that they rely on fiscal incidence analysis, the method used to allocate taxes and public spend- ing to households so that incomes before taxes and transfers can be compared with incomes after them.
Standard fiscal incidence analysis just looks at what is paid and what is received without assessing the behavioural responses that taxes and public spending may trigger for individuals or households.

This is often referred to as the “accounting approach.”2 The building block of fiscal incidence analysis is the construction of income concepts.
That is, starting from a prefiscal income concept, each new income concept is constructed by subtract- ing taxes and adding the relevant components of public spending to the previous income concept.

While this approach is broadly the same across all five databases mentioned, the definition of the specific income concepts, the income concepts included in the analysis and the methods to allocate taxes and public spend- ing differ.
This spotlight focuses on comparing the definition of income concepts—that is, on the types of incomes, taxes and public spending included in the construction of the prefiscal and postfiscal income concepts.

There are important differences, and some can have significant impli- cations for the scale of redistribution observed.

The following table compares the definitions of income used by the six databases mentioned above.
There are five important differences: • While all six databases start out with similar definitions of factor income, the additional components included in prefiscal income differs.

This is important because the pre- fiscal income is what each database uses to rank individuals prior to adding transfers and subtracting taxes and will thus affect the ensuing redistribution results (see point on the treatment of pensions below).
For example, EUROMOD does not include the value of consumption of own production as part of prefiscal income, while the rest of the databases do.

EUROMOD, the Income Distribution and LIS do not include the (imputed) value of owner-occupied housing, while the other three do.

There is also a fun- damental difference in the treatment of con- tributory pensions (see the next paragraph).

Finally, the World Inequality Database also includes undistributed profits in its defini- tion of prefiscal income.
• Second, EGDNA, EUROMOD, the Income Distribution Database and the LIS treat old-age pensions from social security as pure transfers, while the World Inequality Database treats them (together with un- employment benefits) as pure deferred income.

The CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution presents results for both scenarios.

This assumption can make a sig- nificant difference in countries with a high proportion of retirees whose main or sole income stems from old-age pensions.
For example, in the European Union the redis- tributive effect with contributory pensions as pure transfers is 19.0 Gini points while it is 7.7 Gini points when old-age pensions are treated as pure deferred income.3 In the United States the values are 11.2 for pure transfers and 7.2 for pure deferred income.4 Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 139 Notes The author is very grateful to Carlotta Balestra (EGDNA), Maynor Cabrera (CEQ), Lucas Chancel (World Inequality Database, Paris School of Economics), Michael Forster and Maxime Ladaique (OECD Income Distribution Database), Teresa Munzi (Luxembourg Income Study), Daria Popova (EUROMOD, University of Essex) and Jorrit Zwijnenburg (EGDNA) for their inputs to the table on the compari- son of income concepts.
1 Details on the methodologies applied by each database can be found in the following: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: Lustig 2018a, chapters 1, 6 and 8; EGDNA: Zwijnenburg, Bournot and Giovannelli 2017; EUROMOD: Sutherland and Figari 2013; OECD Income Distribution Database: OECD 2017b; LIS: forthcoming DART methodology document; World Inequality Database: Alvaredo and others 2016.

For an in-depth discussion of the fiscal incidence methodology, see, for example, Lustig (2018a).
The data for EU 28 are from EUROMOD statistics on distri- bution and decomposition of disposable income, accessed at www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod/statistics/ using EUROMOD version G3.0.

The difference is probably an overestimation because in many cases one cannot distinguish between contributory and social pensions.

See chapter 10 in Lustig (2018a).

Equivalized income is equal to household income divided by square root of household members excluding domestic servants.
An adult is defined by the World Inequality Database as an individual older than 20 years of age.

• Third, EUROMOD, the Income Distribution Database and the LIS present information on fiscal redistribution for di- rect taxes and direct transfers while the CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution also includes the impact of indirect taxes and sub- sidies and transfers in kind, and the World Inequality Database includes all government revenues and spending.
EGDNA does not include indirect taxes and subsidies but in- cludes transfers in kind (education, health and housing).
• Fourth, in the published information on preconstructed variables, the CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution reports indicators based on income per capita, EGDNA, EUROMOD, the Income Distribution Database and LIS report them based on equivalized income5 and the World Inequality Database reports them based on income per adult.6 • Fifth, all but EGDNA and the World Inequality Database report incomes as they appear in the microdata, while EGDNA and the World Inequality Database adjusts all variables to match administrative totals in tax records and national accounts.
Source: Lustig forthcoming.
140 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE S3.3.1 Comparison of income concepts in databases with fiscal redistribution indicators Income concept Prefiscal Market income plus pensions CEQ EGDNA EUROMOD IDD LIS WID.World Market income Primary income Market income Market income Market income Pretax income Factor income Factor income Factor income Factor income Factor income Factor income Factor income PLUS Imputed value of owner-occupied housing services and consumption of own production PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households and consumption of own production PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households and consumption of own production PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households, imputed value of owner-occupied housing services and consumption of own production PLUS Old-age pensions from social security schemes PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households, payments from employment- related pension schemes, imputed value of owner- occupied housing services and consumption of own production MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions in social security schemes PLUS Undistributed profits PLUS Old-age pensions and unemployment benefits from social security schemes PLUS Transfers received from nonprofit institutions and other households, payments from employment- related pension schemes, imputed value of owner- occupied housing services and consumption of own production MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions and unemployment in social security schemes (continued) Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 141 TABLE S3.3.1 (CONTINUED) Comparison of income concepts in databases with fiscal redistribution indicators Income concept Postfiscal: disposable CEQ EGDNA EUROMOD IDD LIS WID.World Disposable income Disposable income Disposable income Disposable income Disposable income Disposable income Post-tax disposable income
 Market income Market income Primary income Market income Market income Market income Market income PLUS Other cash benefits (excluding old-age pensions) from social security and social assistance benefits PLUS Old-age pensions and other cash benefits received from social security systems and social assistance benefits PLUS Old-age pensions and other cash benefits received from social security systems, social assistance benefits and transfers received from (paid to) nonprofit institutions and other households PLUS Old-age pensions and other cash benefits received from social security systems and social assistance benefits PLUS Old-age pensions and other cash benefits received from social security systems and social assistance benefits PLUS Old-age pensions and other cash benefits received from social security systems and social assistance benefits MINUS Contributions to other (excluding old-age pensions) social security schemes MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions, unemployment and other benefits in social security schemes MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions, unemployment and other benefits in social security schemes MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions, unemployment and other benefits in social security schemes MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions, unemployment and other benefits in social security schemes MINUS Contributions to old-age pensions, unemployment and other benefits in social security schemes PLUS Other cash benefits (excluding old-age pensions and unemployment benefits) from public social insurance and social assistance benefits MINUS Contributions to other (excluding old-age pensions and unemployment) in social security schemes schemes MINUS Direct personal income and property taxes Postfiscal: consumable MINUS Direct personal income and property taxes Consumable income Disposable income PLUS Indirect consumption subsidies MINUS Direct personal income taxes MINUS Direct personal income taxes MINUS Direct personal income taxes MINUS Direct
 personal income taxes na na na na na Consumable income Disposable income PLUS Indirect consumption subsidies MINUS Indirect consumption taxes (value added, excise, sales and the like) MINUS Indirect consumption taxes (value added, excise, sales and the like) (continued) 142 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE S3.3.1 (CONTINUED) Comparison of income concepts in databases with fiscal redistribution indicators Income concept Postfiscal: including transfers in kind CEQ EGDNA EUROMOD IDD LIS WID.World Final income Final income Adjusted disposable income na na na Consumable income Consumable income Disposable income PLUS Public spending on education and public spending on health PLUS Public spending on education, health and housing PLUS Public spending on education, health and housing Post-tax national income Post-tax disposable income PLUS Indirect consumption subsidies MINUS Indirect consumption taxes (value added, excise, sales and the like) and other taxes.
PLUS Public spending on education, health, defense, infrastructure and other public spending Memo items Contributory pensions Deferred income Government transfer Government transfer Government transfer Government transfer Government transfer Deferred income Welfare indicatora Income Income Income Income Income Income Income Total values As implied by microdata As implied by microdata Match national accounts As implied by microdata As implied by microdata As implied by microdata Match national accounts Unit Per capita Per capita Equivalizedb Equivalizedb Equivalizedb Equivalizedb Per adultc na is not applicable.
CEQ is the Commitment to Equity Institute Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution.

EGDNA is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)–Eurostat Expert Group on Disparities in a National Accounts Framework.

IDD is the OECD Income Distribution Database.

LIS is the LIS Cross-National Data Center.

WID.world is the World Inequality Database.

a.


When household surveys include only consumption expenditures (no information on income), CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution assumes that consumption expenditures equal disposable income and constructs the other income concepts as specified above, while the World Inequality Database transforms consumption distributions into income distributions using stylized savings profiles in countries where income data are not available.
b. Equivalized income equals household income divided by the square root of household members (excluding domestic help).

c. An individual is classified as an adult if he or she is older than age 20.

Source: CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: Lustig 2018a, chapter 6 (http://commitmentoequity.org/publications-ceq-handbook); OECD–Eurostat Expert Group on Disparities in a National Accounts Framework: www.
oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=STD/DOC(2016)10&docLanguage=En; EUROMOD: www.euromod.ac.uk/publications/euromod-modelling-conventions; https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/ statistics; LIS: forthcoming DART methodological document; OECD Income Distribution Database: www.oecd.org/els/soc/IDD-ToR.pdf; World Inequality Database: https://wid.world/document/dinaguidelines-v1/.
Chapter 3 Measuring inequality in income and wealth | 143 Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages: Between social norms and power imbalances Gender inequalities beyond averages: Between social norms and power imbalances Gender disparities remain among the most persistent forms of inequality across all countries.1 Given that these disad- vantages affect half the world’s people, gender inequality is arguably one of the greatest barriers to human development.
All too often, women and girls are discriminated against in health, in education, at home and in the labour market—with negative repercussions for their freedoms.
Progress in reducing gender inequality over the 20th century was remarkable in basic achievements in health and education and par- ticipation in markets and politics (figure 4.1).2 Much of this progress was celebrated with the Beijing Platform for Action during the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women.3 But as the event’s 25th anniversary approaches in 2020, many challenges to equality remain, particularly for enhanced capabilities that alter power relations and enhance agency.
The world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.

Based on current trends, it would take 202 years to close the gender gap in economic opportunity.4 The Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index—a measure of women’s empowerment in health, education and economic status— shows that overall progress in gender inequali- ty has been slowing in recent years.5 Consider two developments.

First, gender gaps are deeper than originally thought.
Time magazine’s 2017 Person of the Year was “the silence breakers,” women who denounced abuse.

Accomplished women were unprotect- ed against persistent sexual abuse.

The silence breakers were also given voice by the #MeToo movement, which uncovered abuse and vul- nerability for women, well beyond what is covered in official statistics.
In Latin America, FIGURE 4.1 Remarkable progress in basic capabilities, much less in enhanced capabilities The world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030 Enhanced capabilities Agency and change Social norms Tradeoffs/ power imbalances Subsistence and participation Basic capabilities Source: Human Development Report Office.
Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 147 4. too, the #NiUnaMenos movement has shed light on femicides and violence against women from Argentina to Mexico.6 Second, there are troubling signs of diffi- culties and reversals on the path towards gen- der equality—for female heads of state and government and for women’s participation in the labour market, even where there is a buoyant economy and gender parity in access to education.7 And there are signs of a back- lash.
In several countries the gender equality agenda is being portrayed as part of “gender ideology.”8 In other words, precisely when awareness is increasing more needs to be done to achieve gender equality, the path becomes steeper.

This chapter explores why progress is slowing, identi- fying today’s active barriers that pose challenges for future prospects for equality, which include personal and public beliefs as well as practices that generate biases against gender equality.
It stresses that gender inequality reflects intrinsic imbalances in power—something well known to women’s movements and feminist experts— and documents two trends: • Gender inequalities are intense, widespread and behind the unequal distribution of hu- man development progress across levels of socioeconomic development.

• Gender inequality tends to be more intense in areas of greater individual empowerment and social power.
This implies that progress is easier for more basic capabilities and harder for more enhanced capabilities (chapter 1).

The first trend indicates the urgency in ad- dressing gender inequality to promote basic human rights and development.

The second raises a red flag about future progress.

Progress at the basics is necessary for gender equality, but it is not enough.

Social norms and gender-specific tradeoffs are key barriers to gender equality.
Social and cultural norms often foster behaviours that perpetuate inequalities, while power concen- trations create imbalances and lead to capture by powerful groups such as dominant, patri- archal elites.

Both affect all forms of gender inequality, from violence against women to the glass ceiling in business and politics.

In addition, gender-specific tradeoffs burden the complex choices women encounter in work, family and social life—resulting in cumulative structural barriers to equality.
The tradeoffs are influenced strongly by social norms and by a structure of mutually reinforcing gender gaps.

These norms and gaps are not directly observable, so they are often overlooked and not systematically studied.

Gender inequality in the 21st century Gender inequality is intrinsically linked to hu- man development, and it exhibits the same dy- namics of convergence in basic capabilities and divergence in enhanced capabilities.
Overall, it is still the case—as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out—that “women in much of the world lack support for fundamental functions of a human life.”9 This is evident in the Gender Inequality Index and its components—reflect- ing gaps in reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market.

No place in the world has gender equality.


In Sub-Saharan Africa 1 in every 180 women giving birth dies (more than 20 times the rate in developed countries), and adult women are less educated, have less access to labour markets than men in most regions and lack access to political power (table 4.1).

Gender inequality as a human development shortfall Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality (fig- ure 4.2).
No country has reached low inequal- ity in human development without restricting the loss coming from gender inequality.

Investing in women’s equality and lifting both their living standards and their empowerment are central to the human development agenda.

“Human development, if not engendered, is endangered,” concluded the pioneer 1995 Human Development Report, based on similar evidence.10 Today looks different from 1995.
The 1995 Human Development Report noted sizeable gender disparities, larger than today’s, but doc- umented substantial progress over the preced- ing two decades, particularly in education and health, where the prospect of equality was visible.
The conclusion: “These impressions are cause for hope, not pessimism, for the future.”11 Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality 148 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE 4.1 Gender Inequality Index: Regional dashboard Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births) Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) Share of seats in parliament (% held by women) Gender Inequality Index Population with at least some secondary education (% ages 25 and older) Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older) Region Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 2018 0.531 0.310 0.276 0.383 0.510 0.573 2015 148.2 61.7 24.8 67.6 175.7 550.2 Source: Human Development Report Office (see Statistical table 5) FIGURE 4.2 Gender inequality is correlated with a loss in human development due to inequality Loss in human development due to gender inequality (percent) 90 60 30 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 Inequality in Human Development Index distribution (percent) Note: Countries mapped by their Gender Inequality Index performance relative to their performance on the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index.
The higher the loss due to gender inequality, the greater the inequality in human development.

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Today, the prospects are different.
The past two decades have seen remarkable progress in education, almost reaching parity in average primary enrolment, and in health, reducing the global maternal mortality ratio by 45 percent since 2000.12 But gains in other dimensions of women’s empowerment have not been as 2015–2020 2018 2010–2018 2010–2018 2018 Female Male Female Male 2018 73.8 77.0 70.1 77.2 78.8 72.9 intense, and progress towards gender equality is slowing (figure 4.3).
The space for gains based on current strategies may be eroding, and un- less the active barriers posed by biased beliefs and practices that sustain persistent gender inequalities are addressed, progress towards equality will be far harder in the foreseeable future.

Gender inequality and empowerment: Catching up in the basics, widening gaps in enhanced capabilities Accumulating capabilities requires achieve- ments of different natures.
As chapter 1 discussed, progress in human development is linked to expanding substantive freedoms, ca- pabilities and functionings from basic to more enhanced.

Progress towards equality tends to be faster for basic capabilities and harder for enhanced capabilities.

Gender equality–related capabilities follow a similar pattern.

On the positive side women are catching up in basic areas of development.
Legal barriers to gender equality have been removed in most countries: Women can vote and be elected, they have access to education, and they can par- ticipate in the economy without formal restric- tions.

But progress has been uneven as women pull away from basic areas into enhanced ones, where gaps tend to be wider.

On the positive side women are catching up in basic areas of development.
But progress has been uneven as women pull away from basic areas into enhanced ones, where gaps tend to be wider Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 149 FIGURE 4.3 Progress towards gender equality is slowing Gender Inequality Index (mean value) 0.500 0.400 0.300 0.000 Women make greater and faster progress where their individual empowerment or social power is lower (basic capabilities).
But they face a glass ceiling where they have greater responsibility, political leadership and social payoffs in markets, social life and politics (enhanced capabilities) 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Source: Human Development Report Office (see Statistical table 5).
These patterns can be interpreted as reflect- ing the distribution of individual empower- ment and social power: Women make greater and faster progress where their individual em- powerment or social power is lower (basic capa- bilities).

But they face a glass ceiling where they have greater responsibility, political leadership and social payoffs in markets, social life and politics (enhanced capabilities) (figure 4.4).
This view of gradients in empowerment is closely linked to the seminal literature on basic and strategic needs coming from gender plan- ning (box 4.1).

Take access to political participation (see figure 4.4, left panel).

Women and men vote in elections at similar rates.

So there is parity in entry-level political participation, where power is very diffused.

But when more concentrated political power is at stake, women appear severely under-represented.
The higher the power and responsibility, the wider the gender gap—and for heads of state and government it is almost 90 percent.

Similar gradients occur even for women who reach higher power.

Only 24 percent of na- tional parliamentarians were women in 2019,13 and their portfolios were unevenly distributed.

Women most commonly held portfolios in environment, natural resources and energy, followed by social sectors, such as social af- fairs, education and family.
Fewer women had portfolios in affairs such as transport, econom- ics or finance.

Certain disciplines are typically associated with feminine or masculine charac- teristics, as also happens in education and the labour market.

Economic participation also shows a gra- dient (see figure 4.4, right panel).

When empowerment is basic and precarious, women are over-represented, as for contributing fam- ily workers (typically not receiving monetary payment).
Then, as economic power increases from employee to employer, and from employ- er to top entertainer and billionaire, the gender gap widens.

Empowerment gradients appear even for a uniform set of companies, as with the gen- der leadership gap in S&P 500 companies.

Although women’s overall employment by these companies might be close to parity, women are under-represented in more senior positions.

In developing countries most women who receive pay for work are in the informal sec- tor.
Countries with high female informal work rates include Uganda, Paraguay, Mexico and Colombia (figure 4.5), where more than 50 percent of women are protected by minimal regulations; have few or no benefits; lack voice, social security and decent work conditions; and are vulnerable to low salaries and possible job loss.
150 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 4.4 The greater the empowerment, the wider the gender gap Global gender gap in politics (gap with respect to parity, percent) Global gender gap per type of employment (gap with respect to parity, percent) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Lower house or single house Votea Basic 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 Upper house Speakers of parliament Head of government Contributing family workers Own account Employees Employers Top 100 entertainers Top 500 billionaires Enhanced Basic Enhanced a.
Assumes an equal proportion of men and women in the voting population.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, ILO (2019b) and Forbes (2019).
BOX 4.1 Practical and strategic gender interests and needs The notion of practical and strategic gender interests and needs (pioneered by Caroline Moser),1 which in- forms much of the gender policy analysis framework, is connected to the conception of basic and enhanced capabilities and achievements in this Report.
As ar- ticulated in gender social policy analyses,2 practical gender needs refer to the needs of women and men to make everyday life easier, such as access to water, better transportation, child care facilities and so on.

Addressing these will not directly challenge gender power relations but may remove important obstacles to women’s economic empowerment.
Strategic gender needs refer to needs for society to shift in gender roles and relations, such as a law condemning gender-based violence, equal access to credit, equal inheritance and others.

Addressing these should alter gender power relations.
Sometimes practical and strategic needs coincide—for example, the practical need for child care coincides with the strategic need to get a job out- side the home.3 The difference is comparable to that between basic and enhanced capabilities discussed in this Report.

Transformative changes that can bring about normative and structural shifts are the strongest predictors of practical and strategic interventions ex- panding women’s agency and empowerment for gen- der equality.

Notes 1.
Notes 1.

Molyneux 1985; Moser 1989.

2.

Moser 1989.

3.

SIDA 2015.

Today, women are the most qualified in history, and newer generations of women have reached parity in enrolment in primary education.14 But it now seems that this is not enough for achieving parity in adulthood.
The transition from the education system to the world of paid work is marked by a gen- der equality discontinuity, associated with women’s reproductive roles (see Dashboard 2 in the statistical annex), revealing one of the moving targets discussed in chapter 1.

Some represent a natural part of the process of de- velopment—the constant need to push new boundaries to achieve more.

Others represent the response of deeply rooted social norms to preserve the underlying structure of power.
Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 151 FIGURE 4.5 The percentage of informal employment in nonagricultural employment in developing countries is generally higher for women than for men Informal employment in nonagricultural employment, 2017 (percent) Male Female 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Uganda Paraguay Mexico Colombia Thailand Chile Costa Rica South Africa Turkey Russian Federation Serbia Ukraine Moldova (Rep. of) Greece Gender inequality has long been associated with persistent discriminatory social norms prescribing social roles and power relations between men and women in society Source: ILO 2019b.
Are social norms and power imbalances shifting?
Gender inequality has long been associated with persistent discriminatory social norms prescrib- ing social roles and power relations between men and women in society.15 Social norms held by individuals and their reference groups are values, beliefs, attitudes and practices that assert preferred power dynamics for interactions be- tween individuals and institutions.16 As broader constructs, norms are operationalized through beliefs, attitudes and practices.17 People’s expectations of individuals’ roles in households, communities, workplaces and societies can determine a group’s functioning.
Women often face strong conventional societal expectations to be caregivers and home makers; men similarly are expected to be breadwin- ners.18 Embedded in these social norms are longstanding patterns of exclusion from house- hold and community decisionmaking that limit women’s opportunities and choices.
So, despite convergence on some outcome indica- tors—such as access to education at all levels and access to health care—women and girls in many countries still cannot reach their full potential.19 Beliefs about what others do and what others think a person in some reference group should do, maintained by social approval and disap- proval, often guide actions in social settings.20 So it is useful to measure the beliefs and atti- tudes that create biases and prejudices towards women’s empowerment in society.
Social norms cover several aspects of an in- dividual’s identity—gender, age, ethnicity, reli- gion, ability and so on—that are heterogeneous and multidimensional.

Discriminatory social norms and stereotypes reinforce gendered iden- tities and determine power relations that con- strain women’s and men’s behaviour in ways that lead to inequality.

Norms influence expec- tations for masculine and feminine behaviour considered socially acceptable or looked down on.
So, they directly affect individuals’ choices, freedoms and capabilities.

Social norms also reflect regularities among groups of individuals.

Rules of behaviour are set according to standards of behaviour or ideals attached to a group’s sense of identity.21 Individuals have multiple social identities and 152 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 behave according to identity-related ideals, and they also expect others sharing a common identity to behave according to these ideals.
Norms of behaviour related to these ideals affect people’s perception of themselves and others, thus engendering a sense of belong- ing to particular identity groups.

The beliefs people hold about appropriate behaviour often determine the range of choices and preferences that they exercise—in that con- text norms can determine autonomy and freedom, and beliefs about social censure and reproach create barriers for individuals who transgress.
For gender roles these beliefs can be particularly important in determining the freedoms and power relations with other identities—compounded when overlapping and intersecting with those of age, race and class hierarchies (box 4.2).

How prevalent are biases from social norms?

How are they evolving?

How do they affect gender equality?


These are difficult questions, BOX 4.2 Overlapping and intersecting identities When gender identities overlap with other identities, they combine and intersect to generate distinct prejudic- es and discriminatory practices that violate individuals’ equal rights in society.
Intersectionality is the complex, cumulative way the effects of different forms of discrim- ination combine, overlap or intersect—and are amplified when put together.1 A sociological term, intersectionality refers to the interconnected nature of social categories such as race, class, gender, age, ethnicity, ability and residence status, regarded as creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvan- tage.

It emerges from the literature on civil legal rights.
It recognizes that policies can exclude people who face overlapping discrimination unique to them.

Overlapping identities must be considered in re- search and policy analysis because different social norms and stereotypes of exclusion can be associated with different identities.

For instance, regarding medi- an years of education completed in Angola and United Republic of Tanzania, an important gap distinguishes women in the highest wealth quintile from those in the second or lowest quintile (see figure).
If the differences are not explicitly considered, public programmes may leave women in the lowest quintiles behind.

Moreover, individuals’ different social identities can profoundly influence their beliefs and experiences about gender.

People who identify with multiple minori- ty groups, such as racial minority women, can easily be excluded and overlooked by policies.
But the invisibil- ity produced by interacting identities can also protect vulnerable individuals by making them less prototypical targets of common forms of bias and exclusion.2 How gaps in median years of education distinguish rich from poor in Angola and United Republic of Tanzania, 2015 9.2 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.6 7.0 4.9 4.4 1.4 0 Total 15–49 Lowest quintile Second Middle Fourth Highest quintile Total 15–49 Lowest quintile Second Middle Fourth Highest quintile Angola United Republic of Tanzania Note: Lowest quintile refers to the poorest 20 percent; highest quintile refers to the wealthiest 20 percent.
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys.

Notes 1.

IWDA 2018.

2.

Biernat and Sesko 2013; Miller 2016; Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008.

Overlapping identities must be considered in research and policy analysis because different social norms and stereotypes of exclusion can be associated with different identities Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 153 mainly because social norms and attitudes are hard to observe, interpret and measure.
But using data from the World Values Survey wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014), a social norms index can be constructed to capture how social beliefs can obstruct gender equality along multiple dimensions (figure 4.6 and box 4.3).

Widespread biases and backlash The multidimensional gender social norms count index and high-intensity index (see box 4.3) show widespread biases in gender social norms.
According to the count index, only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men worldwide have no gender social norm bias (figure 4.7).

Women are skewed towards less bias against gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Men are concentrated in the middle of the distribution, with 52 percent having two to four gender social norms biases.

The high-intensity index shows that more than half the world’s people have a high-intensity bias against gender equality and women’s empowerment.
Both indices provide evidence of a stagnation or a backlash from 2005–2009 to 2010–2014.

The share of both women and men worldwide with no gender social norms bias fell (figure 4.8).

Progress in the share of men with no gender social norms bias was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States and the Netherlands (figure 4.9).

At the other extreme, indicating a backlash, the share of men with no bias fell in Sweden, Germany, India and Mexico.
The share of women with no gender so- cial norms bias increased the most in the Netherlands, Chile and Australia.

But most countries in the sample showed a backlash, led by Sweden, India, South Africa and Romania (see figure 4.9).

Gender inequality and social norms The multidimensional gender social norms indices appear linked to gender inequality, as might be expected.
In countries with higher bi- ases (measured through the multidimensional gender social norms indices), overall inequality (measured by the Gender Inequality Index) is higher (figure 4.10).

Similarly, the indices are positively related to the Gender Inequality Index in time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work.

Biases in social norms also show a gradient.


The political and economic dimensions of the multidimensional gender social norms index indicate biases for basic women’s achievement and against more enhanced women’s achieve- ment (figure 4.11).

Overall, the biases appear more intense for more enhanced forms of women’s participation.
The proportion of peo- ple favouring men over women for high-level political and economic leadership positions is The multidimensional gender social norms indices appear linked to gender inequality.
In countries with higher biases, overall inequality is higher FIGURE 4.6 How social beliefs can obstruct gender and women’s empowerment Dimensions Political Educational Economic Physical integrity Indicators Men make better political leaders than women do Women have the same rights as men University is more important for a man than for a woman Men should have more right to a job than women Men make better business executives than women do Proxy for intimate partner violence Proxy for reproductive rights Dimension index Political empowerment index Educational empowerment index Economic empowerment index Physical integrity index Multidimensional gender social norms index Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.
154 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 4.3 The multidimensional gender social norms index—measuring biases, prejudices and beliefs Research prepared for this Report proposed the multidimensional gender so- cial norms index to capture how social beliefs can obstruct gender equality along multiple dimensions.
The index comprises four dimensions—political, educational, economic and physical integrity—and is constructed based on responses to seven questions from the World Values Survey, which are used to create seven indicators (see figure 4.5 in the main text).

The an- swer choices vary by indicator.

For indicators for which the answer choices are strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree, the index defines individuals with a bias as those who answer strongly agree and agree.
For the political indicator on women’s rights, for which the answer is given on a numerical scale from 1 to 10, the index defines individuals with a bias as those who choose a rating of 7 or lower.

For the physical integrity indicators, for which the answer also ranges from 1 to 10, the index defines individuals with a bias using a proxy variable for intimate partner violence and one for reproductive rights.
Aggregation For each indicator a variable takes the value of 1 when an individual has a bias and 0 when the individual does not.

Two methods of aggregation are then used in reporting results on the index.

The first consists of a simple count (equivalent to the union approach), where the indicators are simply summed and therefore have the same weight.
This result has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 7: The calculation is a simple addition of dichotomic variables, but it com- plicates the disaggregation and analysis by dimension and indicator.

To address this, the second method follows the Alkire–Foster methodol- ogy,1 which counts the different gender social norm biases that an individual faces at the same time (following the intersection approach).

These dimen- sions are analysed to determine who has a bias on each indicator.
This result counts only people with high-intensity bias.

The methods are applied to two sets of countries.

The first set consists of countries with data for either wave 5 (2005–2009) or wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey and uses the latest data available.

This set includes 77 countries and territories accounting for 81 percent of the world population.

The second set consists of only countries with data for both wave 5 and wave 6.
This set includes 32 countries and territories accounting for 59 percent of the world population.
Definition of bias for the indicators of the multidimensional gender social norms index Dimension Indicator Choices Bias definition Political Educational Economic Physical integrity Men make better political leaders than women do Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree Strongly agree and agree Women have the same rights as men University is more important for a man than for a woman Men should have more right to a job than women Men make better business executives than women do Proxy for intimate partner violence Proxy for reproductive rights 1, not essential, to 10, essential Intermediate form: 1–7 Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree Strongly agree and agree Agree, neither, disagree Strongly agree and agree Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree Agree 1, never, to 10, always Strongest form: 2–10 1, never, to 10, always Weakest form: 1 Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019.
Note 1.

Alkire and Foster 2011.

Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia 2019. higher than the proportion of people favouring men over women in access to basic political rights or paid employment.

Several theories linked to social norms could account for these differences.

One suggests an inability to discern between confidence and competence.

If people misinterpret confidence as a sign of competence, they can mistakenly believe that men are better leaders than women when men are simply more confident.
In other words, for leadership the only advantage that men have over women is that manifestations of overconfidence, often masked as charisma or charm, are commonly mistaken for leadership potential and are much more frequent among men than women.22 Gradients in biases are likely to affect elec- tions and economic and family decisions, mak- ing gender equality more difficult to reach when higher levels of empowerment are at stake.

What causes change—and what determines the nature of change?
How can practices and behaviours either change or sustain traditional gender roles?
Norms can change as economies develop, by changes in communications technology, by Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 155 FIGURE 4.7 Only 14 percent of women and 10 percent of men worldwide have no gender social norms biases Percent of surveyed population responding with biases towards gender equality and women’s empowerment Female Male 50 52 24 18 14 10 21 12 No gender biases 1 bias 2–4 biases More than 5 biases Note: Balanced panel of 77 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the world population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

new laws, policies or programmes, by social and political activism and by exposure to new ideas and practices through formal and informal channels (education, role models and media).23 Policymakers often focus on the tangible— on laws, policies, spending commitments, public statements and so forth.
This is driven partly by the desire to measure impact (and thus prove effectiveness), by frustration with the vagueness of “talking shops” ar- guing about rights and norms and by sheer impatience with the slow pace of change.
Yet neglecting the invisible power of norms FIGURE 4.8 would miss a deeper understanding of social change.24 Consider the subtle differences between descriptive and injunctive norms.25 Descriptive norms are beliefs about what is considered a normal practice in a social group or an area.

Injunctive norms state what people in a com- munity should do.
This distinction is important for practice, as it can lead to an understanding of why some aspects of gender norms and rela- tions shift faster than others.26 The family sets norms, and experiences from childhood create an unconscious gen- der bias.27 Parents’ attitudes towards gender influence children through mid-adolescence, and children at school perceive gender roles.28 Parenting practices and behaviours are thus among the predictors of an individual’s gendered behaviours and expectations.
For instance, children tend to mimic (in attitudes and actions) how their parents share paid and unpaid work.29 Parenting experiences may, however, in- fluence and change adults’ social norms and established gender roles.
In the “mighty girl effect,” fathers raise their awareness of gender disadvantages when they are rearing daugh- ters.30 Parenting a school-age girl makes it easi- er for men to put themselves in their daughter’s shoes, empathize with girls facing traditional gender norms and embrace nontraditional ones that would not place their daughters at a disadvantage to men in the labour market.31 Adolescence is another key stage for gender socialization, particularly for boys.32 Young The share of both women and men worldwide with no gender social norms bias fell between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014 Percent of surveyed population responding with biases towards gender equality and women’s empowerment 2005–2009 2010–2014 Indicated bias in one or fewer questions from the World Values Survey Indicated bias in two or more questions from the World Values Survey Female Male Female Male 40.1 43.3 29.6 30.3 56.7 59.9 69.7 70.4 Note: Balanced panel of 32 countries and territories with data from both wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 59 percent of the world population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.
Norms can change as economies develop, by changes in communications technology, by new laws, policies or programmes, by social and political activism and by exposure to new ideas and practices through formal and informal channels (education, role models and media) 156 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 4.9 Progress in the share of men with no gender social norm bias from 2005–2009 to 2010–2014 was largest in Chile, Australia, the United States and the Netherlands, while most countries showed a backlash in the share of women with no gender social norms bias Men Women Chile Australia United States Netherlands Argentina Poland Thailand Japan Trinidad and Tobago Spain Korea (Republic of) China Georgia Romania Morocco Jordan Ghana Cyprus Malaysia Rwanda Russian Federation Uruguay South Africa Brazil Ukraine Turkey Slovenia Mexico India Germany Sweden Netherlands Chile Australia China Slovenia Japan Ukraine Trinidad and Tobago Thailand United States Jordan Germany Russian Federation Mexico Malaysia Cyprus Spain Uruguay Brazil Ghana Rwanda Argentina Poland Korea (Republic of) Morocco Turkey Georgia Romania South Africa India Sweden –0.1 –0.05 0 0.05 Mean change (value) 0.1 0.15 –0.1 0 0.1 0.2 Mean change (value) Note: Balanced panel of 32 countries and territories with data from both wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 59 percent of the world population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.
FIGURE 4.10 Countries with higher social norms biases tend to have higher gender inequality Gender Inequality Index (value) Time spent on unpaid domestic chores (ratio between women and men) 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 12 10 8 6 4 2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Social Norms Index (value) Social Norms Index (value) Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey and Dashboard 2 in the statistical annex.
Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 157 FIGURE 4.11 Biases in social norms show a gradient Biases against women’s capabilities (percent) Men make better political leaders than women do 49.6 Women should have the same political rights as men 29.1 Men make better business executives than women do 42.1 Men should have more rights to a job than women 32.2 Basic Enhanced Basic Enhanced Politics The economy Note: Balanced panel of 77 countries and territories with data from wave 6 (2011–2014) of the World Values Survey, accounting for 81 percent of the world population.
Source: Mukhopadhyay, Rivera and Tapia (2019), based on data from the World Values Survey.

adolescents in different cultural settings com- monly endorse norms that perpetuate gender inequalities, and parents and peers are central in shaping such attitudes.
Some of the endorsed masculinity norms relate to physical toughness (showing higher tolerance for pain, engaging in fights, competing in sports), autonomy (being financially independent, protecting and pro- viding for families), emotional stoicism (not “acting like girls” or showing vulnerabilities, dealing with problems on their own) and het- erosexual prowess (having sex with many girls, exercising control over girls in relationships) (box 4.4).33 Social convention refers to how compliance with gender social norms is internalized in individual values reinforced by rewards or sanctions.
Rewards use social or psychological approvals, while sanctions can range from ex- clusion from the community to violence or le- gal action.

Stigma can limit what is considered normal or acceptable and be used to enforce stereotypes and social norms about appropri- ate behaviours.
A social norm will be stickiest when individuals have the most to gain from complying with it and the most to lose from challenging it.34 Social norms have enough power to keep women from claiming their legal rights due to pressure to conform to societal expectations.35 Social norms can also prevail when individ- uals lack the information or knowledge to act or think differently.36 Because of intertwined social dynamics,37 challenging discriminatory norms that impede gender equality and wom- en’s empowerment requires acting on more than one factor at a time.
Restricted choices and power imbalances over the lifecycle Gender inequality within households and communities is characterized by inequality across multiple dimensions, with a vicious cycle of powerlessness, stigmatization, discrim- ination, exclusion and material deprivation all reinforcing each other.
Powerlessness manifests itself in many ways, but at its core is an inabil- ity to participate in or influence decisions that profoundly affect one’s own life, while more powerful actors make decisions despite neither understanding the situation of the vulnerable nor having their interests at heart.

Human development is about expanding substantive freedoms and choices.
This section presents evidence of restricted or even tragic choices women face.38 Examples of restricted choices can be iden- tified in a lifecycle approach.

Some represent blatant limits to basic freedoms and human rights; others represent subtle manifestations of gender biases.
The disparities of childhood and adolescence are amplified when women reach Powerlessness manifests itself as an inability to participate in or influence decisions that profoundly affect one’s own life, while more powerful actors make decisions despite neither understanding the situation of the vulnerable nor having their interests at heart 158 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Challenging rigid gender norms and power dynamics in households and communities and involving men and boys in making these changes are important BOX 4.4 The man box Engaging men and boys is a critical piece of advancing the gender equality agenda.
Gender equality implies changing and transforming the way individuals express and experience power in their lives, relationships and communities.

Reaching equality, women and men will have the same agency to make choices and participate in society.

While women and girls bear the brunt of gender inequalities, men and boys are also affected by traditional conceptions of gender.

Gender is a social construct of attributes or roles associated with being male or female.
What it means to be a man or a woman is learned and internalized based on experiences and messages over the course of a lifetime, normalized through social structures, culture and interactions.

Though men usually have more agency than the women in their lives, men’s decisions and be- haviours are also profoundly shaped by rigid social and cultural expectations related to masculinity.
Masculinity is the pattern of social behaviours or practices associated with ideals about how men should behave.1 Some characteristics of masculinity relate to dominance, toughness and risk-taking, recently referred to as toxic masculinity or the man box, in that traditional behaviours of the gender roles restrict men to act in a cer- tain way that preserves existing power structures.
In 2019 Promundo along with Unilever estimated the economic impacts of the man box in Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States, considering bullying, violence, de- pression, suicide, binge drinking and traffic accidents as costs of restricting men to masculine behaviours.2 Two of the most damaging consequences for men are related to their mental health: Men are less likely to seek mental health services than women are, and men are more likely to die by suicide than women are.
Besides the ethical and social gains of gender equality, men as individuals can benefit from expressing freely, from having more options in their own experiences and behaviours and from having better and healthier relationships with women and girls.

So challenging rigid gender norms and power dy- namics in households and communities and involving men and boys in making these changes are important.
Engaging men in preventing gender-based violence, supporting women´s economic empowerment, pursuing change for reproductive health and acting as fathers or caregivers are examples of how men can challenge their notions of masculinity and of their own selves.

Notes 1.

Ricardo and MenEngage 2014.

2.

Heilman and others 2019. adulthood, as exemplified in the differences in labour force participation and the representa- tion of women in decisionmaking positions in business and in politics (see figure 4.4).
For unpaid care work, women bear a bigger burden, providing more than three times as much as men.39 And older women’s challenges accumulate through the life course: They are less likely than men to have access to pensions, even though they are expected to live three years longer.

Along the way, social norms and path dependence—how outcomes today affect outcomes tomorrow—interact to form a highly complex system of structural gender gaps.
Birth, early childhood and school age In some cultures traditional social norms can affect girls even before they are born, since some countries deeply prefer bearing sons over daughters.

While in the 1990s only some countries had the technology available to de- termine a baby’s gender and only 6 countries had an imbalanced sex ratio at birth, today 21 countries have a skewed ratio.
The preference for a son can lead to sex-selective abortions and to a large number of “missing” women, particularly in some South Asian countries.40 Discrimination continues through how households share resources.

Girls and women sometimes eat last and least in the household.41 The gender politics of food—nurtured by as- sumptions, norms and practices about women needing fewer calories—can push women into perpetual malnutrition and protein deficiency.
Education opportunities, including access and quality, are affected by both household and community social norms.

Gender differ- ences manifest first in girls’ families over edu- cation as a human right and later over respect for women’s agency to decide to study and to choose her preferred field.

Social norms can define the level of education a girl can attain or her choice of study.
The restriction, control and monitoring of a girl’s or woman’s behav- iour and decisionmaking about her education Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 159 or job, or her access to financial resources or their distribution, constitute economic violence against her (see spotlight 4.1 at the end of the chapter).
And even when girls are educated as well as boys, other effects of ine- quality—driven especially by gendered social norms—reduce the likelihood that women will later attain positions of power and partici- pate in decisionmaking.

Worldwide, one in eight age-eligible girls does not attend primary or secondary school.
Only 62 of 145 countries have gender parity in primary and secondary education.42 Despite the progress in enrolment ratios for some countries, large differences persist in learning outcomes and education quality.

Even among children attending school, determinants of occupational choices appear very early.
Girls are less likely to study subjects such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics, while boys are a minority of those studying health and education.43 Adolescence and early adulthood Adolescence is when girls’ and boys’ futures start to diverge; while boys’ worlds expand, girls’ worlds contract.44 Every year 12 mil- lion girls are victims of forced marriage.45 Girls forced to get married as a child are victims of a human rights violation and are condemned to live a life with heavily restricted choices and low human development.
Child marriage not only alienates girls from their families and social networks but also increases their risk of becoming victims of domestic violence.46 It exacerbates overall gender inequality in education and employ- ment by greatly reducing a girl’s chances of completing formal schooling and developing skills for employment outside the home.47 It also leads to early and multiple pregnancies, increasing health risks for both the married girls and their children, since the risks of newborn death and infant mortality and morbidity are higher in children born to women under age 20.48 The health effects of early marriage are among the many health risks that are higher for women and girls than for men and boys.
One of the most globally widespread cross-cutting forms of horizontal inequality, early marriage presents disproportionate risks to women’s and girls’ health, reflecting both biological differ- ences and social norms (see box 4.3).

And early marriage limits girls’ choices.

The adolescent birth rate among women ages 15–19 is 104.7 per 1,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 63.2 in Latin America and the Caribbean.
When a teenage girl becomes preg- nant, her health is endangered, her education and job prospects can abruptly end and her vul- nerability to poverty and exclusion multiplies.49 Adolescent pregnancy, often a result of a girl’s lack of opportunities and freedom, can reflect a failure among those around her to protect her rights.
Contraception is important in maintain- ing good sexual and reproductive health.50 Contraceptive use is higher among unmarried and sexually active adolescents, but so is the unmet need for family planning, especially in Asia and the Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 4.12).

There is still a stigma in many countries around unmarried women needing family planning services.

And in some coun- tries regulations prevent access to these servic- es.

Moreover, many women cannot afford to pay for health care.
Social norms and traditional behaviour gen- erally pose a threat to women’s reproductive health.
Women are more vulnerable to a loss of agency to have a satisfying and safe sex life, the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.51 When men use their power to decide on women’s behalf, that limits women’s access to resources FIGURE 4.12 Contraceptive use is higher among unmarried and sexually active adolescent girls, but so is the unmet need for family planning, 2002–2014 Currently married/in a union Unmarried and sexually active 51 20 41 23 Contraceptive prevalence, any method (percent) Unmet need for family planning (percent) Source: UNFPA 2016.
Social norms and traditional behaviour generally pose a threat to women’s health 160 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 and dictates women’s behaviour.
More broadly, if women are seen as objects rather than agents in households and communities, this form of horizontal inequality can lead to violence and harassment (see spotlight 4.1 at the end of the chapter), affecting women’s mental health.52 Adulthood and older age Globally, women do more unpaid work than men do.53 However, the global gender income gap is 44 percent (see Statistical table 4).
Gender differences in paid and unpaid work and the gradients in empowerment combine multiple elements that restrict women’s choices.

The gaps illustrate the multidimensional effects of gender inequality on occupation choices, income and women’s financial independence and resilience to external shocks.
A key constraint on women’s decisionmaking is their disadvantages in the amount of unpaid work they do, bearing disproportionate re- sponsibility for housework, caring for family members and performing voluntary communi- ty work.54 On average, women spend about 2.5 times as much time on unpaid care and domes- tic work as men do.55 This affects women’s la- bour force participation, lowers economywide productivity and limits their opportunities to spend time in other ways.56 This sort of gender inequality is linked to levels of income: Higher FIGURE 4.13 income regions have a narrower gap in unpaid care work.
The regions with the widest gaps are the Arab States, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean— the same regions that have the widest gaps for women´s labour force participation (fig- ure 4.13).

The struggle to reconcile care work responsibilities with paid work can lead women to occupational downgrading, where they choose employment below their skill level and accept poorer working conditions.57 Some constraints faced by women are invis- ible when gaps are seen in isolation.
Statistics typically record achievements (the func- tionings) but not the full set of choices (the capabilities).

This partial view tends to hide the multidimensional biases in choices wom- en face.

Take, for instance, a qualified woman who has children and must decide between taking a job and staying home.
Workplace inequalities (including pay gaps58 and the risk of harassment), social norms (pressure to fulfil the role of mother) and imbalances at home (a greater load of domestic unpaid work), among other factors, may deter her from participating in paid work.

The woman’s choice may bring feelings of guilt or regret.

A large proportion of female homemakers feel that by staying home they are giving up a career or economic independence.
A large proportion of mothers employed in paid occupations face the stress of Gender differences in paid and unpaid work and the gradients in empowerment combine multiple elements that restrict women’s choices The gap in unpaid care work persists in developing economies Proportion of time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work (percent) 19.4 19.2 21.0 15.2 Female Male 16.8 5.8 5.5 5.9 5.2 5.6 21.6 3.0 Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Note: Aggregation rule has been relaxed; estimates not published in dashboard.
Source: Human Development Report Office.

Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 161 feeling that their choice implies suffering for their children (figure 4.14).

Moreover, home-based inequalities exacer- bate market-based gender inequality through the motherhood pay gap—a term that can refer to the difference in pay between mothers and childless women, or to that between mothers and fathers, rather than between all working men and women.
The motherhood pay gap is usually bigger in developing countries, and in all countries it increases with the number of children a woman has.
The combination of low earnings and dependants makes women over-represented among poor people during their reproductive age: Women are 22 percent more likely than men to live in a poor house- hold between the ages of 25 and 34.59 According to the World Bank’s 2017 Global Findex, of the 1.7 billion unbanked adults in the world, 56 percent are women, while in developing countries women are 9 percentage points more likely to be unbanked than men.60 The Arab States and Sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest percentage of women with an ac- count at a financial institution or with a mobile money-service provider, but the percentage is below 80 percent in all developing country regions (figure 4.15).
Women’s financial inde- pendence can be dependent on socioeconomic factors such as profession, earnings and income stability61 or to legal discrimination and gender norms.62 Women face restricted resources in areas besides finance, with climate change, in particular, exacerbating existing inequalities in women’s livelihoods and reducing their resil- ience (box 4.5).
As noted, girls and women of reproductive age (15–49 years old) are more likely than boys and men of the same age to live in poor households (figure 4.16).

This challenges the “headship definitions” approach to household composition for examining poverty profiles, in which households with a male earner, a non- income earner spouse and children are more likely to have poor women.

Children and other dependants can be an important vulnerability factor for women in their reproductive health.
For both genders, pooling resources and having more adults working for pay in a household can protect them from falling into poverty, as can education, especially for women.63 For most people lifetime working conditions have a great impact on economic conditions and autonomy in older age.
For women— over-represented among older people—earlier gender gaps in health, wages, productivity, labour participation, formal versus informal work, remunerated versus nonremunerated work, continuity in the labour market and the ability to own property and save are likely to Women’s financial independence can be dependent on socioeconomic factors such as profession, earnings and income stability or to legal discrimination and gender norms FIGURE 4.14 A large proportion of employed women believe that choosing work implies suffering for their children, while a large proportion of female homemakers feel that by staying home they are giving up a career or economic independence, 2010–2014 Employed women who agree that children suffer if women have a job Homemakers who agree that a job is the best way for a woman to be independent Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from wave 6 (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey.
162 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 4.15 The percentage of women with an account at a financial institution or with a mobile money-service provider is below 80 percent in all developing country regions in 2018 Women with access to an account with ﬁnancial institution or a money service provider, ages 15 and older, simple average (percent) 100 80 60 40 20 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Developed Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from the Global Findex database.
BOX 4.5 Climate change and gender inequality Women tend to be responsible for procuring and pro- viding food in households and are the primary workers engaged in subsistence agriculture.

They make up an average of 43 percent of the agricultural workforce in developing countries.1 Even so, they experience inequitable access to land and agricultural inputs,2 which can affect their pro- ductivity in the sector, generating a gap in comparison with men’s productivity.
In Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda the gender gap in agricultural productivity ranges from 11 percent to 28 percent.3 The difference is due to access to credit, ownership of land, use of fertilizers and seeds, and availability of labour.

As in many other dimensions, gendered norms and traditions at the household level are behind the ineq- uitable allocations of production factors, thus limiting women’s agency, decisionmaking power and partici- pation in the labour market.
Furthermore, the gender agricultural gap hinders poverty reduction, inequality reduction and the mitigation of climate change effects and environmental degradation.

Greater female participation in natural resource management, productive agricultural activities and nat- ural disaster responses can enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of policies and projects.
Closing the gender gap in agricultural productivity would increase crop production by 7–19 percent in Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.4 Climate change can affect women’s income, edu- cation, access to resources, access to technologies and access to information.5 It is entangled with economic and social consequences for women.

Women in devel- oping countries are highly vulnerable when they depend heavily on local natural resources for their livelihood.

Yet women are powerful agents of change.


As key play- ers in core productive sectors, they are well placed to identify and adopt appropriate strategies to address climate change at the household and community levels.

Notes 1.

FAO 2011.

2.

UN Women, UNDP and UNEP 2018.

3.

UN Women, UNDP and UNEP 2018.

4.

UN Women, UNDP and UNEP 2018.

5.

Brody, Demetriades and Esplen 2008.
Greater female participation in natural resource management, productive agricultural activities and natural disaster responses can enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of policies and projects Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 163 FIGURE 4.16 Girls and women of reproductive age are more likely to live in poor households than boys and men Poverty rate (percent) 25 20 15 10 5 0 Female Male 0–14 15–24 25–34 35–39 40–49 50–54 55–59 60+ Age group (years) Source: Munoz Boudet and others 2018. become later gender gaps in well-being.64 The gap widens when pension systems are based on contributory schemes, and even more when they take the form of individual accounts.65 In most developed countries women have equal access to pensions.
But in most developing countries with data, there is a women’s pension gap (see Dashboard 2 in the statistical annex).

Empowering girls and women towards gender equality: A template to reduce horizontal inequalities Expanding opportunities for women and girls; promoting their economic, social and political participation; and improving their access to social protection, employment and natural re- sources make economies more productive.
Such investments reduce poverty and inequality and make societies more peaceful and resilient.66 All that is well known.

Social norms are shifting towards changed gendered roles in society.

But while some conventional gender norms evolve in the private and public domains, their effects are also facing a backlash from the conventional power relations between men and women in today’s social hierarchies.
The backlash against changing gender roles in households, workplaces and politics affects entire societies influenced by shifting power relations.

The resistance to changes in gender expectations may lead to a perceived clash—a conflict, for example, of women’s rights with traditional values—or reveal subconscious biases.

Still, even norms can be shifted towards gender equality.
The shift can be supported with a proactive stance, generating new regulations and policy interventions that mainstream gender equality and women’s empowerment.

This has been happening but has not been enough to create long-term changes in stereotypes and tradition- al gender roles.

Entrenched inequalities persist due to discriminatory social norms and harmful behaviours and practices that undermine im- plementation.
Well intentioned interventions might fail or might have unintended conse- quences if policymakers do not consider deeply rooted norms and practices.

For instance, affirmative action or positive discrimination has sometimes overlooked or underplayed the effects of social norms on overall outcomes.67 Efforts to promote women’s representation in positions of leadership have yet to succeed, and major prejudices persist about women’s ability to participate politically and function in high office.
Representation quotas for women sometimes do not deliver the envisaged trans- formation and risk promoting tokenism by introducing women’s presence while power remains entrenched in traditional hierarchies and privileges based on other identities such as class, race and ethnicity.
Varied alternatives should be priorities in light of multiple and complementary identities rather than competing, conflicting ones—the multiple identities of an individual as a wom- an, a mother, a worker and a citizen should be mutually supportive, not counterposed.

So, choices that enhance multiple freedoms are to be prioritized over choices based on a singular identity that diminish other freedoms.
Any approach addressing gender inequality should consider the multidimensional character of gender and be sensitive to local social norms.

Norm-aware interventions for women focus on supporting them by providing solutions that work around existing social norm constraints.

Options to reduce gender inequalities—and many other horizontal ones—need to consider how to directly target changes in unequal pow- er relationships among individuals within a community or to challenge deeply rooted roles.
The backlash against changing gender roles in households, workplaces and politics affects entire societies influenced by shifting power relations 164 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 This may include a combination of efforts in education, raising awareness by providing new information and changing incentives.
An additional and important considera- tion to influence change in social norms and traditional gender roles is for options to be inclusive of both women and men, which may hold also for other horizontal inequalities.

When choosing among alternatives—whether norm-aware or those pursuing social norm change—targeting both women and men is crucial.
The importance of adequately engaging men and boys in overcoming gender inequality or addressing their own gender-related vulnera- bilities is acknowledged, but actions have a long way to go.

Finally, analysis that goes beyond averages re- quires more and better data to keep pushing for gender equality and to make other horizontal inequalities visible (box 4.6).
Analysis that goes beyond averages requires more and better data to keep pushing for gender equality and to make other horizontal inequalities visible BOX 4.6 Better data are needed on gender inequalities Gender data face challenges of quantity and quality.

The first refers to not having enough data to depict women’s current situation.
For instance, among the Sustainable Development Goals over 70 percent of data for 58 indi- cators linked to gender equality and women’s empow- erment is missing.1 The second refers to current data that might not accurately reflect reality and that might underestimate women’s roles and contributions.

Some organizations perceive collecting and produc- ing gender data as expensive in time and cost.
Some data collection methods are outdated and biased against women because they follow gender social norms, such as interviewing only the male head of household, not disaggregating by sex and age, using outdated measure- ments of time use and collecting data only on households instead of individuals.
Changes in these measurements can affect indicators such as the Multidimensional Poverty Index, calculated for households rather than indi- viduals, so that complementary research may be needed to clarify the relationship between gender and poverty.2 More information is needed to get a better picture of gender biases specific to a region, country or com- munity, as with information on the impact of media and social networks in reinforcing traditional norms and stereotypes.3 Notes 1.
Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from UN Women (2017).

2.

UNDP 2016.

3.

Broockman and Kalla 2016; Paluck and others 2010.


Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 165 Violence against women is one of the cruellest forms of women’s disempowerment can be perpetuated through social norms SPOTLIGHT 4.1 Women’s unequal access to physical security—and thus to social and political empowerment Violence against women is one of the cru- ellest forms of women’s disempowerment.
Magnifying inequality, it happens throughout the lifecycle, in different spaces—households, institutions, public spaces, politics and on- line—in all societies, among all socioeconomic groups and at all levels of education.

And it reflects the same social norms that legitimize harassment and discrimination.
More than a third of women—and more than two-thirds in some countries—have ex- perienced physical or sexual violence inflicted by an intimate partner or sexual violence in- flicted by a nonpartner (figure S4.1.1).1 Some 20 percent of women have experienced sexual violence as children.
Nearly a quarter of girls ages 15–19 worldwide report having been vic- tims of violence after turning 15.2 And violence is typically underestimated because of stigma, denial, mistrust of authority and other barriers to women reporting an incident.

Intimate partner violence has been recurrent- ly associated with such factors as age, wealth, marital status, number of children, education attainment and economic empowerment.
FIGURE S4.1.1 About a third of women ages 15 and older have experienced physical or sexual violence inflicted by an intimate partner, 2010 Percent Sub- Saharan Africa South Asia Arab States 35 25 15 5 East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Source: WHO 2013.

Decomposing these factors reveals inequality in the experience of violence, an insight that can help in designing more focused interventions.
For instance, although violence can occur at all education levels, greater education attainment can protect women from partner violence.

Educated women have better access to informa- tion and resources that help them identify an abusive relationship and end it.3 Women’s eco- nomic empowerment through participation in the workforce had mixed associations with the risk of intimate partner violence,4 challenging the notion that economic empowerment protects women from gender-based violence.
This finding highlights the heavy influence of social norms in women’s perceptions of their status in society in some cultures.

In developing countries women make up a large proportion of the informal sector workforce with low-paying jobs, a structure that might perpetuate the myth of male superiority.5 Violence against women can be perpetuated through social norms.

For example, female genital mutilation and cutting remain wide- spread.
An estimated 200 million women and girls living today have undergone female genital mutilation, even though most men and women oppose the practice in many countries where it is performed.6 Violence against women and girls is sustained by individual behaviours and beliefs as well as by social norms from the com- munities and networks that can slow change.

Violent actions, attitudes and behaviours are triggered by unequal power relations dictat- ing gender roles at the household level.
Some examples are beliefs that a man has a right to physically discipline a woman for an incorrect behaviour, divorce is shameful or sex is a man’s right in marriage.

When women assert autonomy or aspire to exert power at any level—from the household to the national government—they often face a backlash that can include violence (psycho- logical, emotional, physical, sexual or econom- ic), whether as discrimination, harassment, assault or femicide.
More than 85 percent of female members of European parliaments 166 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Women are harassed mostly in public spaces, their workplaces, their residences or their schools have experienced psychological violence, and 47 percent have received threats of death, rape, beating or kidnapping (figure S4.1.2).7 Moreover, the only country in the world that has legally made political violence a separately defined crime is Bolivia.8 Elsewhere, lacking laws, regulations and sanctions, women are left unprotected from this type of violence.
In 2016 the #NotTheCost campaign was launched to raise awareness and stop violence against wom- en in politics.

The name alludes to how women are told that harassment, threats, psychological abuse and other forms of violence are “the cost” of participating in politics.9 Traditional gender norms play a role in such political violence.

Globally, there are some efforts to fight the backlash.
Political violence and sexual harass- ment and assault received attention in 2017 when American actress Alyssa Milano called for women to come forward with their experienc- es.

Some 1.7 million tweets using the hashtag #MeToo responded, and 85 countries had at least 1,000 #MeToo tweets.

The movement gave visibility to the issue and propelled initiatives to conduct more research on sexual harassment and assault, especially in the United States.
Some 81 percent of women and 43 percent of men in the United States reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment or assault in their life- time.
The most common forms of sexual harass- ment are whistling, honking, saying disrespectful FIGURE S4.1.2 Female members of European parliaments experience high rates of acts of political violence against women, 2018 Reported incident Experienced this form of violence Percent 39 20 23 25 21 8 22 5 Online violence Threats of physical violence Psychological harassment Sexual harassment 8 7 Physical violence Source: IPU 2019. or unwanted comments or purposely touching or brushing up against someone.
Women are harassed mostly in public spaces, their workplac- es, their residences or their schools.10 Through social media and other online plat- forms and applications, women are vulnerable to harassment and bullying in a new space—the digital public space.

Ensuring that this space is safe and empowering for women and girls is a new challenge.
Some 73 percent of women online have been exposed to some type of cyber- violence, and women are 27 times more likely than men to be the victims of cyberviolence.11 Besides the impact of violence against women and girls in other spaces, cyberviolence impedes their digital inclusion and keeps them from enjoying digital dividends.

Even though tech- nology can connect and empower, it can also reinforce traditional gender roles and normalize stereotypes reflecting a culture of misogyny and marginalization.
Security and harassment are among the top five barriers to women’s mobile phone ownership and use.12 Online harassment, sexist attitudes and misogynistic remarks can undermine women’s sense of legitimacy, compe- tence and safety, making them mistrust technol- ogy and even opt out of its use.

Besides hindering technological inclusion, violence against women and girls in this space has a cumulative emotional and physical cost on them.
For each demographically “missing” woman, many more fail to get an education, job or po- litical responsibility they would have obtained if they were men.13 Gender is a global factor in unequal human autonomy, physical security and social, economic and political empower- ment.

Women’s human development depends on socioeconomic enabling factors such as the ability to pursue a profession, to attain income stability and to achieve earnings com- parable to men’s.
Women’s empowerment in health, education, earning opportunities, and political rights and participation can change social decisionmaking and development (fig- ure S4.1.3).

Women’s human development also requires positive gender norms and an absence of gender discrimination, with laws preventing unequal treatment, harassment and violence against women.

Education, reproductive rights and political participation are key assets in all these areas, while the right to human security is fundamental.
Chapter 4 Gender inequalities beyond averages—between social norms and power imbalances | 167 Women’s empowerment in health, education, earning opportunities, and political rights and participation can change social decisionmaking and development FIGURE S4.1.3 Traditional social norms encourage different forms of violence against women Mental health H e a lt h Education Psychological/ emotional Labour Economic Forms of violence against women Sexual Physical integrity Financial inclusion Physical Security Source: Human Development Report Office based on UN General Assembly (2006).
Notes 1 WHO 2013.

2 UNICEF 2014a.

Flake 2005; Waites 1993.

Sardinha and Catalán 2018.

Uthman, Lawoko and Moradi 2011.

UNICEF 2018a.

IPU 2019.

Government of Bolivia 2012.

8 9 NDI 2019.

10 Kearl 2018.

11 Broadband Commission for Digital Development Working Group on Broadband and Gender 2015; Messenger 2017.

12 GSMA Connected Women 2015.

13 Duflo 2012.

14 Caprioli 2005.

15 Ouedraogo and Ouedraogo 2019.

16 Stone (2015) as cited in O’Reilly, Ó Súilleabháin and Paffenholz (2015).
168 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Part III Beyond today Beyond today This Report has taken us on a journey.

It identifies the evolution of different inequalities in human development and examines the dynamic ways in which they limit human freedoms.

It goes beyond averages to discover trends in the com- plete distribution of income and wealth.

It also looks at gender inequality and delves into the factors holding back half of humanity.

We are now almost at the end of the journey: What is to be done?
No single policy will suffice, nor will the same policies be appropriate for all countries.

There are large and significant differences across countries in history, institutions, incomes and administrative capabilities.

Culture and social norms also matter, as the discussion on gender inequality highlights (chapter 4).

Moreover, inequalities in human development are linked.
It is unlikely that households deprived of en- hanced capabilities, let alone basic capabilities, will be at the top of the income scale.

It is also unlikely that women who suffer discrimina- tion in access to education and jobs will be among the very rich.

As parts I and II of the Report highlight, inequalities along the vari- ous dimensions interact and generate feedback loops.

This makes fighting inequality a daunt- ing task.


How can countries tackle the myriad policies and institutions that stand behind all the dimensions of inequality?

Where should they begin?

Should they focus on capabilities, on income or on gender?

What policies are more effective when and where?

Part III of the Report, dealing with poli- cies, addresses these questions.
It proposes a framework to support countries in tailoring a response to inequalities in human develop- ment to their specific circumstances, taking into account their political constraints and administrative capabilities.

The aim is to help them craft their own responses—rather than offer a single recipe applicable to all.

In beginning to think about what can be done, it is essential to consider time and place.
Addressing inequalities in human develop- ment in the 21st century is not the same as it was before.

Policymakers interested in fighting inequalities will take into account today’s com- plexities and challenges.

Certainly, much is to be learned from what policies have worked and what policies have failed in the past, but those lessons have to be relevant to here and now.

In this context, chapters 5 and 6 discuss two key trends that could blunt the fight against inequalities in all countries.
Understanding these trends is essential because left on their own, they will tend to increase inequalities in human development.

The first trend relates to climate change (chapter 5).

Much has been written about this topic—the focus here is on its interactions with inequality.

In a nutshell, increased vola- tility in the world’s climate and rising average temperatures are likely to translate into more floods, droughts, hurricanes and related phe- nomena.
The chapter also documents that the impacts will not be distributed evenly within or across countries.

Some countries will suffer more than others, and within countries some regions more than others.

In parallel some households will suffer more.

All this will tend to increase inequalities—and may even reduce the effectiveness of policies.
For instance, countries might make progress against income inequality through more progressive taxation, but that progress could be undone by households’ greater exposure to climate risks.

Climate change may thus require strengthening old tools and introducing new ones—from drought-resistant crops to new insurance ap- proaches.

The chapter also considers interactions in the other direction—how inequalities can complicate responses to climate change.
Indeed, it is far harder to rally around common respons- es in societies that are more polarized.

Chapter 6 focuses on technological change.

It has always been with us, but since the Industrial Revolution it has affected the distri- bution of income and capabilities in far more profound and long-lasting ways, in part because economic prosperity—and increasingly the na- ture of sustainability—is tied to the direction of technological change.
Recent trends asso- ciated with robotics and artificial intelligence PART III Beyond today | 171 PART III.

pose new challenges but also create opportu- nities.

The relative demands for skills and tasks will change, as will the locations of economic activity, given the dramatic increases in econ- omies of scale and the dramatic reductions in transportation costs.

This will induce offshoring of some tasks and the disappearance of others.
Enhanced capabilities will be critical for people to navigate the upheavals that technology can bring.

Technology itself can help in this regard, if policies are chosen such that technology helps to reinstate demand for labour.

With these two chapters as background, chap- ter 7 deals with policies to combat inequalities in human development.

It does not provide a recipe for all countries, since policies are coun- try specific.
Instead it presents a framework to think about policies to address pernicious inequalities in human development.

It shows that the range of available policies is large and that it is feasible to address some of the under- lying drivers of the inequalities in capabilities.

The central message is unequivocal.

The trends documented in parts I and II are not inevitable — they result from policies and institutions, and much can be done both nationally and in- ternationally to reform them.

We have a choice.
We have a choice.

And we must act now.

172 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene The climate is in crisis.

The effects are already unspooling in the form of melting ice sheets and, as is likely, record heatwaves and superstorms.
Without bold collective action, these will only worsen over time, joined by a suite of other ca- lamities, from depressed crop yields to rising sea levels to potential conflict.

As recognized in the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement, climate change is a global challenge.

But it will not affect everyone equally — not in the same way, not at the same time, not at the same magnitude.

Poorer countries and poorer people will be hit earliest and hardest.
Some countries could quite literally disappear.

Of all climate change’s disequalizing effects, perhaps none is greater than that on future generations, which will shoulder the burden of previous generations’ fossil fuel-dependent development pathways.

Inequality runs the gamut of climate change, from emissions and impacts to resilience and policy.

Climate change is a recipe for more inequality in a world that already has plenty.
But climate change and inequality, and the interaction of the two, are choices, not inevita- bilities.

Even though the window for decisive and bold action on climate is shrinking, there is still time to make different choices.

This chapter suggests that by redressing ine- qualities, action on climate could also be made easier and faster.
To see why, consider two of the multiple possible channels at play.1 The first relates to how individual consumption decisions add up to total emissions (box 5.1).2 The second, which is the focus of this chapter and likely more consequential, relates to how inequality interacts with technological change BOX 5.1 Household income, inequality and greenhouse gas emissions Higher household incomes are associated with higher emissions, but the impact of inequality on aggregate emissions depends on how quickly emissions increase as income rises.1 There is a wide range of empirical es- timates for this relationship, showing that, on balance, emissions increase more slowly than income in most developed and middle-income countries but at the same rate (or even a little faster) in lower income countries.2 Taking this channel alone into account would imply that income inequality should be associated with low- er emissions in developed countries.
To see how, con- sider the impact of transferring income from the rich to the poor in a developed country.

Even though rich people emit more, given that the rate at which emis- sions increase is slower than the rate at which income does,3 the increase in emissions by poor people would be higher than the corresponding decrease in con- sumption by rich people, leading to a net increase in emissions.
And one would expect to see the opposite in developing countries, with reductions in inequality lowering emissions.4 However, the scale of the impact of inequality through this channel tends to be small, certainly when compared with other determinants of changes in emissions, such as technological change and policies.5 Perhaps more important, the interplay of these consumption patterns within and across countries—al- though trending towards lower emissions overall—ap- pears unlikely to substantially reduce global aggregate emissions.6 Notes 1.
It also depends on how inequality interacts with rising income.

For a comprehensive description of the different possibilities, see Ravallion, Heil and Jalan (2000).

2.

See, for instance, Liddle (2015).

For a detailed estimate for the Philippines, see Seriño and Klasen (2015).

3.

When this relationship is measured in terms of how much a percentage change in income is reflected in a corresponding percentage change in emissions—in technical terms, an elasticity—this implies an elasticity of less than 1.
4.

More precisely, this would happen if the elasticity were greater than 1.

For some empirical support of the hypothesis of this differential impact of inequality in emissions in developed and developing countries, see Grunewald and others (2017).

5.

To illustrate, Sager (2017) calculated consumption-based carbon emissions Engel curves (showing the relationship between household income and average carbon dioxide emissions) for the United States for several years between 1996 and 2009.
In a scenario where income is redistributed to perfect equality (a dramatic and extreme case), average carbon dioxide emissions in 2009 would have increased 2.3 percent, from the actual 33.9 tonnes per household to 34.7 tonnes.

In contrast, had there been no technological change and assuming the same consumption composition between 1996 and 2009, average emissions would have increased 70 percent, to 57.9 tonnes.

6.

Caron and Fally 2018.


Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 175 5.

Higher inequality tends to make collective action—key both within and across countries to curb climate change— more difficult and policy formation.

There is some evidence that high inequality hinders the diffusion of new environmentally friendly technology.3 Inequality can influence the relative power of interests arguing for and against curbing emissions.
Emissions would be expected to be higher when income is concentrated at the top and when the resulting concentration of economic power coincides with the interests of groups that oppose action on climate.4 More generally, higher inequality tends to make collective action—key both within and across countries to curb climate change—more difficult.5 Information is critical for collective action, but the ability of different interest groups to communicate tends to be lower when inequality is high,6 with the concentration of income potentially leading to the suppression or propagation of information in order to serve a particular interest.7 Other interacting mechanisms relate to how inequality shapes perceptions of fairness (with implications for compliance and enforcement).8 Where emissions are being decoupled from economic growth—a hopeful sign that is directionally right but not yet at scale, despite accelerating over the past two decades—this is related to countries having “underlying policy frameworks more supportive of renewable energy and climate change mitigation efforts,”9 which shows the feasibility of a break from unsustainable development models that have endured for centuries.10 Still, countries with higher human development generally emit more carbon per person and have higher per capita ecological footprints (figure 5.1).11 Richer countries and communities may put a premium on local concerns, such as water and air quality, but they tend not to experience locally the full extent of their impacts on the environment, which are driven more by their income than by “green” self-identities and associated behav- iours.12 Instead, they often shift a significant portion of the environmental impacts of their consumption preferences to less-visible coun- tries and communities elsewhere, including to FIGURE 5.1 Per capita ecological footprints increase with human development Ecological footprint, 2016 (global hectares per person) Low human development Medium human development High human development Very high human development 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Biocapacity per person, world average (1.7 global hectares) 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Human Development Index value, 2018 Note: Covers 175 countries in the Global Ecological Footprint Network database (www.footprintnetwork.org/resources/data/; accessed 17 July 2018).
As used here, the ecological footprint is a per capita measure of how much area of biologically productive land and water a country requires, domestically and abroad, to produce all the resources it consumes and to absorb the waste it generates.

Each bubble represents a country, and the size of the bubble is proportional to the country’s population.

Source: Cumming and von Cramon-Taubadel 2018.


176 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 those along global supply chains.13 In the case of climate change, they also shift the impacts to future generations, which are even less visible.
Environmental burden shifting happens not just for greenhouse gas emissions but also across many environmental domains.14 Thus, this chapter goes beyond climate to examine inequalities and burden shifting in other im- portant areas, such as waste generation, meat consumption and water use.

Environmental burden shifting is linked to gradients in eco- nomic and political power.
Attempts to redress these power differences and how they manifest environmentally are likely to be ever more rel- evant as humanity enters what has been called the Anthropocene (box 5.2).
The 2007/2008 Human Development Report showed not only how climate change was an existential threat to future generations, exacerbating intergenerational economic inequality, but also that it would increase in- come inequality across and within countries.15 Recent research has confirmed, and made more precise, how disequalizing climate change can be: Income inequality across countries may al- ready be about 25 percent higher than it could have been without climate change.16 This chapter takes that analysis further, show- ing how climate change exacerbates inequalities in other dimensions of human development and how inequality is also relevant to building climate and disaster resilience.
Some evidence suggests that “development on its own” may not offer protection from the negative impacts of climate change.17 New, broadly shared approaches to resilience may needed.
Echoing a central theme BOX 5.2 From Holocene to Anthropocene: Power—and who wields it—at the brink of a new era Some evidence suggests that development on its own is unlikely to offer protection from the negative impacts of climate change The environment has a profound impact on people’s capabilities and on their ability to convert capabilities into achievements—and thus on human de- velopment.1 Conversely, human activity affects the natural world, shaping environmental processes and patterns at a global scale.
Arguably, human- kind today is not just witnessing but also causing the sixth mass species extinction in the Earth’s history.2 While the stratigraphy community has yet to formally declare a new epoch (meaning that humanity is still in the Holocene), the unfolding changes to the environment are so dramatic, and so heavily influenced by humans, that the expression Anthropocene has en- tered current use.3 The Anthropocene portends a worrying mix of power, fragility and uncer- tainty.
The end of the last glacial period and the beginning of the Holocene more than 10,000 years ago ushered in a stable climate regime—a climatic cradle for humans—with conditions favourable for permanent agriculture and the dawn of civilizations.

Rising populations, wealth and technological know-how have translated into greater, seemingly unbridled power, includ- ing over the environment.

Yet fragilities have always been evident.

Crops are susceptible to pests and bad weather.


Infectious diseases have sprung from (and through) domesticated animals and elsewhere.4 The interplay among humans, geography and the environment has been central to the way civilizations have come and gone.5 Fast forward to today, and the intertwining of power, fragility and un- certainty has not changed.

The differences are in the scale and the stakes.


Humans have far more power to affect the environment, including at the planetary level, but no greater control.
The list of negative feedback from human activities ranges from introducing invasive species to the plastics ep- idemics in the oceans to fisheries stress and collapse to fossil fuel emissions and climate change.6 These and other activities have not just destabilized ecosystems but have also transformed planetary biogeochemical process- es.7 Humanity is thought to have already breached at least four of nine plan- etary boundaries, the safe operating limits for different components of the Earth system seen as critical to maintaining a stable Holocene-like state.8 Two of these—climate change and biosphere integrity—are considered core boundaries, meaning they have the potential on their own to push the Earth into a new state.9 Humans have exceeded the safe operating space for both; the risk of crossing a critical threshold, destabilizing the Earth system and exiting the Holocene is no longer assuredly low.10 This is the Anthropocene: human power at scale, without illusions of control and without fully grasping or heeding the consequences.
Through unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions and other actions, humans are pull- ing themselves out of the relative stability of the current geological epoch into the uncertainty of a new one.

The Anthropocene is essentially a leap into the unknown.

Making a choice for sustainable human development, based on a country’s unique set of circumstances, is necessary.
But it is not easy—and it is made all the more difficult when persistently high inequality, in its many forms, with its corrosive effects, implies that both people and planet lose.

Choices rooted in inclusion and sustainability can turn the dam- aging historical relationship between development and ecological footprints on its head—breaking humanity free from old development approaches that simply will not work as it enters the brave new world of the Anthropocene.

Notes 1.

Robeyns 2005.

2.


Barnosky and others 2011; Ceballos, Ehrlich and Dirzo 2017; Ceballos, García and Ehrlich 2010; Ceballos and others 2015; Dirzo and others 2014; McCallum 2015; Pimm and others 2014; Wake and Vredenburg 2008.

3.
3.

Scott (2017) attributes to Paul Crutzen the introduction of the term and the proposal to date the start of this era to the late 18th century, coinciding with the invention of the steam engine, which unleashed the Industrial Revolution (even though Scott himself proposes the concept of a “thin Anthropocene,” which could be dated as far back as the hominid use of fire).

In May 2019 the 34-member Anthropocene Working Group voted to designate the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch.
The panel plans to submit a formal proposal to the International Commission on Stratigraphy, which oversees the official geological time chart.

4.

Dobson and Carper 1996; McNeill 1976; Morand, McIntyre and Baylis 2014; Wolfe, Dunavan and Diamond 2007.

5.

Crosby 1986; Diamond 1997, 2005.

6.

Choy and others 2019; Early 2016; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Seebens and others 2015; US NOAA 2018.

7.

Campbell and others 2017; Steffen and others 2015.

8.

Steffen and others 2015.

9.


Steffen and others 2015.

10.

Steffen and others 2015.

Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 177 The challenge is to ensure that climate resilience does not become the reserve of only a select group of countries and communities that can most afford it of this Report, this chapter finds convergence in basic capabilities to cope with climate change and divergence in enhanced ones.
Countries are con- verging—even though large disparities persist— in their preparedness to “normal” shocks, ones expected at a certain frequency and magnitude based on historical trends—a basic resilience capability.

Climate change impacts, however, do not always conform to historical trends, with more “surprises” than in the past.18 Shocks take on a new, unanticipated character.
Building pre- paredness—which relies less on the experienced past and more on how science and technology, including advanced weather prediction systems, can help prepare for an uncertain future—is be- coming an enhanced capability in which gaps are emerging.

The challenge is to ensure that climate resilience does not become the reserve of only a select group of countries and communities that can most afford it, thereby further exacerbating the inequality impacts of the climate crisis.
The urgency for action to combat climate change, including by fully implementing the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, cannot be overemphasized.

So why isn’t more being done?
True, there is renewed interest in many countries around the world in carbon pricing, but to take just a simple illustration, only 5 percent of emissions are covered by a carbon price high enough to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.19 Some even argue that carbon pricing will not be enough and that instead of relying on market signals, more fun- damental transformations of economies and societies will be needed.20 The various mech- anisms through which inequality influences technology diffusion and policies, reviewed briefly above, speak to the complex interplay between climate change and inequality and even how action on climate can be hamstrung, as in the case of the Mouvement des gilets jaunes (yellow vests movement), perhaps an instance when people felt as though they were being left behind.
Addressing inequality and the climate crisis together can move countries towards inclusive and sustainable human development.

For in- stance, when carbon pricing is part of a broader set of social policy packages, it is possible to address inequality and climate together while facilitating the realization of people’s human rights.
Climate policy can create virtuous feed- back loops in which emissions decline from direct effects (such as a carbon price) and from indirect effects (such as lower inequality, which may facilitate even bolder climate policies).

This chapter, as well as chapter 7, tees up some of these key issues.
How climate change and inequalities in human development are intertwined This section starts by expanding beyond ine- qualities in carbon emissions between coun- tries to inequalities within them, adding to the more familiar story on how climate change will harm—and has already impacted—different dimensions of human development.

Finally, it takes an illustrative look at climate resilience, framing it as an enhanced capability that risks divergence.
From inequality in emissions to inequality in impact: Two dimensions of climate injustice Carbon dioxide is not the most potent anthro- pogenic greenhouse gas, but it is the most wide- spread, driven overwhelmingly by fossil fuel combustion (87 percent of total carbon diox- ide emissions over 2008–2017) for electricity, transportation and other uses.21 It is widespread because carbon emissions are deeply embedded in current patterns of production and con- sumption, and powerful fossil fuel interests have generally tried to keep it that way.22 The richest countries account for the lion’s share of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions (figure 5.2); they are still among the top pol- luters on a per capita basis and in terms of aggregate country emissions today.23 These in- equalities in cumulative emissions are central to the global conversation on climate, particularly for climate justice, burden sharing and differen- tiated responsibilities.24 The same pattern of inequality plays out within countries, with households at the top of the income distribution responsible for more carbon emissions per person than those at the bottom.
While there is no direct way of allocating emissions to individuals, estimates 178 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 5.2 Today’s developed countries are responsible for the vast majority of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions Share of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, 1750–2014 (percent) 66 26 7 1 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Ritchie and Roser (2018).
based on plausible approximations suggest that global carbon dioxide equivalent emissions are highly concentrated: The top 10 percent of emitters account for 45 percent of global emis- sions, while the bottom 50 percent account for 13 percent.
The top 10 percent of emitters live FIGURE 5.3 on all continents, a third of them in emerging economies (figure 5.3).25 Inequality in global carbon dioxide equivalent emissions between individuals has decreased, but within-country inequality is steadily rising and approaching the share of between-country inequality in the global dispersion of carbon di- oxide equivalent emissions (figure 5.4).
In 1998 a third of inequality in global carbon dioxide equivalent emissions was due to within-country inequality; by 2013 half was.

Turning from emissions to impact, unmitigat- ed climate change drives inequalities in human development through two main mechanisms: differential exposure and vulnerability.26 Debate continues on the relative importance of each.

This chapter takes the view that both matter.


Differential exposure is real: Climate change will hit the tropics harder first, and many developing countries are in the tropics.27 At the same time, developing countries and poor and vulnerable communities have fewer capacities to adapt to climate change and severe weather events than do their richer counterparts.
Part of the reason climate change and disasters are disequalizing is that inequality exists in the first place; they run along, exploit and deepen existing social and economic fault lines.
These fault lines were dramatically laid bare when Hurricane Katrina Part of the reason climate change and disasters are disequalizing is that inequality exists in the first place; they run along, exploit and deepen existing social and economic fault lines Of the top 10 percent of global emitters of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, 40 percent are in North America, and 19 percent are in the European Union Top 10 percent of emitters: 45 percent of world emissions Middle 40 percent of emitters: 42 percent of world emissions Bottom 50 percent of emitters: 45 percent of world emissions Other Asia 5% Other rich 6% North America 40% Russian Fed./C.
Asia 7% South Africa 2% China 10% European Union 19% Middle East & N. Africa 5% India 1% Latin America 5% Source: Chancel and Piketty 2015.

South Africa 3% Russian Fed./C.

Asia 7% Other rich 4% Asia 8% China 35% North America 7% Middle East & N. Africa 7% Latin America 6% India 5% European Union 18% Latin America 9% Middle East & N. Africa 4% Other Asia 23% India 36% Russian Fed./C.
Asia 1% South Africa 10% China 16% Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 179 FIGURE 5.4 Within-country inequality in carbon dioxide equivalent emissions is now as important as between-country inequality in driving the global dispersion of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions Between Level of inequality 0.5 0.4 0.3 Within 0.2 1998 2003 2008 2013 Note: In 2008 the within-country component of the Theil index, which measures dispersion in the distribution of a variable that can be perfectly decomposed into between-group and within-group components, was 0.35 and the between- country component was 0.40—that is, between-country inequality accounted for 53 percent of total inequality Source: Chancel and Piketty 2015. struck New Orleans in 2005.
A more recent example is the tragic loss of life and devastation wrought by Hurricane Dorian in the Bahamas in 2019.
Dorian was the strongest hurricane to strike the country since recordkeeping began in 1851.28 The communities hardest hit included shantytowns populated mostly by poor Haitian immigrants, some of whom had fled the devas- tating 2010 earthquake in their home country.29 The global economic impacts of climate change have been modelled many times, producing a range of estimates, each with its own range of possible outcomes.
From these estimates, two key points emerge: First, climate change will reduce global GDP, especially in the long run, and second, negative economic impacts are generally worse at higher tempera- ture thresholds.30 Moving beyond these general trends to more precise estimates is challenging.

The exact magnitude of the economic effects of climate change is highly uncertain, and it varies by geography and many other variables.
Nonlinearities complicate matters: Each addi- tional unit of change in the climate is unlikely to yield the same incremental impact over time.31 The complexities of the climate system make significant tipping points and thresh- olds possible—for example, the possibility for catastrophic events, whose impacts are gener- ally not systematically captured in many mod- els.32 As Martin Weitzman once claimed, “All damage functions are made up—especially for extreme situations,”33 yet many of the most widely used economic models of climate change rely on “smooth” damage functions that may not fully account for the possibility of cat- astrophic events.34 Over the past few years research has at- tempted to incorporate tipping points into integrated assessment models.
The findings of such work have generally strengthened the case for a greater precautionary approach to the climate.35 The bottom line is that estimates of economic effects of future climate change give some broad directional agreement, and while uncertainties abound, the costs of potential catastrophic events coupled with the pace at which the scientific evidence is accumulating on the scale of damages reinforce arguments for early and forceful action.36 For example, there is strong evidence that the economic damages of extreme natural hazards have increased globally over the past several decades (figure 5.5).
Some new modelling approaches that attempt to incorporate risk and uncertainty point to large costs associated with delays in taking forceful action on mitigation, with these costs com- pounding over time (a five-year delay implies a cost of $24 trillion, and a 10-year delay implies a cost of $100 trillion).37 The negative impacts of climate change extend to health and education.
Between 2030 and 2050 climate change is expected to cause some 250,000 additional deaths a year from mal- nutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress.38 Hundreds of millions more people could be ex- posed to deadly heat by 2050, and the geograph- ic range for disease vectors—such as mosquito species that transmit malaria or dengue—will likely shift and could expand.39 Lower agricultur- al yields due to temperature changes can affect food security, and food insecurity can worsen nutrition.
Good nutrition is essential for healthy pregnancies and for early childhood survival and development, which can reduce inequalities in human development (chapter 2).

It is also important for school attendance, performance and achievement.40 Malnutrition, by contrast, complicates the course of other illnesses, such as tuberculosis and AIDS.
The complexities of the climate system make significant tipping points and thresholds possible 180 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 5.5 Economic damages from extreme natural hazards have been increasing Economic damages (US$ billions) 20 15 10 5 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Note: Data are the yearly distribution of economic damages associated with 10,901 disasters that occurred worldwide between 1960 and 2015.

Partial boxplots are coloured by decade.


The lower hinge is the median, the middle line is the 75th percentile, the upper hinge is the 90th percentile and the upper whisker is the 99th percentiles.

The red dashed line tracks the time progression of the 99th percentile.

Source: Coronese and others 2019.


By the end of the 21st century, unmitigat- ed climate change could cause an additional 1.4 billion drought exposure events a year and 2 billion more extreme rainfall exposure events a year, inevitably increasing flood risk.41 The impact of these shocks on livelihoods can im- pede human development, influencing factors ranging from the availability of food to the ability to pay for health care and schooling.
Out-of-pocket health spending pushes almost 100 million people into extreme poverty each year.42 Even where schooling is free, livelihood shocks can siphon children from school into in- come-generating activities.
These interrelated, overlapping shocks, when combined, will also have consequences for mental health, which now appears in some countries’ national health strategies for adapting to climate change.43 Climate change is likely to have already been a force for increasing income inequality be- tween and within countries (see spotlight 5.1 at the end of the chapter), as noted in the opening of this chapter.

Climate change is like- wise driving inequality in other dimensions of human development.
An analysis of the last 40 years further substantiates the general pattern: Temperature-related shocks hit poorer coun- tries harder than richer countries.44 In fact, even though some richer countries may have enjoyed small benefits on average from temperature in- creases, the evidence suggests that all countries will eventually be negatively affected by climate change.45 For health, the evidence from large-scale em- pirical studies on climate impacts shows:46 • In all regions the proportion of people vul- nerable to heat exposure is rising.
The elderly account for a significant portion of that vul- nerability (see spotlight 5.2 at the end of the chapter).

Heat stress, cardiovascular disease and renal disease are among the many causes of heat-related illness and death.47 In 2017, 153 billion labour hours were lost because of heat, an increase of more than 62 billion hours since 2000.

• Global vectorial capacity48 for the transmis- sion of dengue fever virus continues to rise, reaching a record high in 2016.
In other Climate change is likely to have already been a force for increasing income inequality between and within countries.

It is likewise driving inequality in other dimensions of human development Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 181 words, conditions are becoming more fa- vourable for transmission of dengue.

• In the highlands of Sub-Saharan Africa, malaria vectorial capacity has increased 27.6 percent since the 1950 baseline.
• In the Baltic region, changes in sea surface temperatures have steadily increased suitabil- ity for cholera outbreaks.
Since poor countries—and poor and vulner- able people within countries—are dispropor- tionately burdened by these health conditions, climate change has already put pressure towards greater health inequalities, both within and be- tween countries.49 In many developing countries exposure to floods, droughts and hurricanes in utero and during early life impair later education and cognitive outcomes.
In Southeast Asia higher than average temperatures during the prenatal period and early life are associated with fewer years of schooling, perhaps because heat has a negative impact on education attainment where local climates are historically warm and wet.50 In some developed countries there is also evidence that prenatal heat exposure increases the risk of maternal hospitalization and of hospital readmission in the first year of life for newborns, with differentiated impacts across segments of the population that tend to increase maternal health gaps.51 These and other potential impacts of climate change on education outcomes have clear inequality im- plications, both within and across generations.
As noted above, climate impacts are often framed as the interaction of exposure and vul- nerability.52 Exposure can be driven by vulner- ability, as vulnerable groups are driven to less secure, more disaster-prone locations, especially in urban areas.53 Such vulnerability-driven ex- posure is widespread.
The location or operation of polluting factories and expressways, waste management54 and landfills, gazetted parks and conservation areas55, and even airports56 and other transportation hubs (and their expan- sion) in or near vulnerable communities rests on decisions that can take advantage of those communities’ relative lack of power—either explicitly or implicitly.
For example, cost-ben- efit analyses for policy decisions—analyses that purport to be objective, impartial or efficient— can, among other potential pitfalls, implicitly take advantage of vulnerable communities by misconstruing ability to pay for willingness to pay, thereby systematically undervaluing those communities’ needs and desires.57 Consider the impact of climate change on crop yields.
Without improved crop varieties, climate change will cause significant declines in average crop yields over the course of the 21st century in many regions.

The largest declines will occur where food insecurity is already a threat.58 Climate change–related inequality is partly a biophysical phenomenon of differen- tial exposure.
In regions where natural climate variability is lower—such as the tropics, where many developing countries are found—climate signals will emerge from the “noise” more quickly and easily in the tropics.59 Recent mod- elling shows that poorer countries will gener- ally experience weather-related changes before richer countries.
Regional heat extremes, for example, are expected to change noticeably in Africa, large parts of India and most of South America after 1.5°C of warming, but mid-lat- itude regions will not see such changes until global temperatures increase by about 3°C.60 Climate-induced inequality is also a social phenomenon.

Vulnerable people will suffer more because, for instance, with less irrigation, yields are more weather dependent.
With few- er and less robust cereal market stabilization mechanisms, livelihoods can be volatile.

With less income and wealth, poor people are less able to absorb spikes in food prices.

With dis- criminatory laws, marginalized groups are bur- dened with compounding insecurities.
Climate change is expected to exacerbate these and other vulnerabilities, its biophysical and social dimensions working in the same direction: towards worsening inequality.61 Recent modelling has started to capture the interaction between biophysical and social aspects through the spatial correlation of coun- tries’ cereal productivity and gains from trade.
Climate change, instead of affecting countries’ cereal yields uniquely or independently, will cause regional changes that affect countries’ yields more similarly the closer countries are to one another.

So, developing countries will take a direct hit from climate change as cereal yields decline and an additional hit when neighbour- ing countries also experience a decline.
The decline in productivity across neighbouring trade networks reduces the gains from trade, Climate change’s biophysical and social dimensions are working in the same direction: towards worsening inequality 182 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Countries have already started adopting tools, implementing policies and making investments that build resilience to climate change and other kinds of shocks, precisely because old ways of doing things are insufficient to the task which could worsen income inequality among countries by an additional 20 percent over the course of the 21st century.62 Feedback mechanisms have long been im- portant in climate science, especially in terms of biophysical systems.
Economic feedback mecha- nisms, such as knock-on trade effects, are coming increasingly into view.

Another is the impact of climate-induced GDP declines on carbon emis- sions.

Climate-driven decreases in GDP may in turn decrease energy use and carbon emissions over the course of the 21st century.
In some scenarios fossil fuel emissions drop 13 percent, enough to offset positive carbon emission feed- back mechanisms from natural systems.63 Here again recent empirical analysis com- plements income inequality projections.
One study using longitudinal data from more than 11,000 districts in 37 countries suggests that since 2000, warming has made tropical coun- tries at least 5 percent poorer than they other- wise would be.64 The study also sheds light on the importance of exposure and vulnerability as mechanisms for climate-related inequalities: Disparities in the economic impacts of warm- ing are driven more by differences in exposure than differences in underlying vulnerability.
In other words the negative impacts of warming cut similarly across communities of all levels of development.

Richer ones are not insulated from warming because they are rich, and poorer ones are not uniquely vulnerable because they are poor.

Part of the challenge is that exposure to damaging temperatures is much more com- mon in poor regions.
That study’s findings, which imply a primacy of exposure, correspond to those of another recent study on climate’s impacts on education across 29 countries, mostly in the tropics.

It found that the level of education of the head of household did not buffer households from the long-term impacts of adverse climate events.65 In fact, children from more educated house- holds suffered greater education penalties, with hot temperatures having a levelling effect on education attainment.
On the other hand, a recent study using global data spanning four decades found the opposite: that richer coun- tries are more insulated than poorer countries from the effects of temperature increases.66 change overwhelm response capacities, as typi- cally conceived, across many—perhaps all—lev- els of human development?

For countries where climate change is an existential threat, the answer is a resounding yes.
For others, if exposure ulti- mately matters much more than vulnerability, climate change may not be something that coun- tries can necessarily grow or “develop” out of.
Countries have already started adopting tools, implementing policies and making invest- ments that build resilience to climate change and other kinds of shocks, precisely because old ways of doing things are insufficient to the task.67 They are charting different development paths that try to respond to the sobering, unfolding reality of climate change.
Data and technology, ranging from satellite imagery to drought-tolerant seeds, are seen as important parts of forward-looking climate adaptation.68 So are fiscal rules that help protect economies from unexpected climate shocks.69 Plus, build- ing resilience is a good economic investment.
The Global Commission on Adaptation found that every $1 invested in adaptation could re- sult in benefits worth $2–$10.70 So, empirical analyses that emphasize ex- posure-driven pathways need not undermine the rationale for resilience.

On the contrary, such studies provide important historical lessons for why conscious efforts to build resilience matter—and matter urgently.
From a forward-looking inequality perspective the challenge is to ensure that climate resilience is a broadly shared capability and a collective investment in human development rather than a capability that is the reserve of only a select group of countries and communities that can most afford it, thereby opening a new area of divergence in the face of a global climate crisis.
As some analysts have noted, some impacts of climate change may be smaller than the impacts of demographic change and economic growth.71 Poverty projections at certain levels of warming similarly depend at least as much on development scenarios as on warming it- self.72 The 2011 Human Development Report probed the ways various environmental and inequality scenarios might affect human de- velopment across low, medium, high and very high human development countries.73 Thus, the debate continues around an unset- tled, and unsettling, question: Might climate A world of greater inequality is one possible future, depending on the choices societies Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 183 ultimately make.
Although unmitigated climate change will continue to narrow those choices over time—and indeed some climate change is already baked in, owing to legacy emissions— much can still be changed.

Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are the product of human choices mediated largely by biophysical processes as well as by economic and social systems.74 Development paths that prioritize resilience and inclusion can be cho- sen, too.
The disproportionate impacts on poor countries—and poor and vulnerable people within countries—largely reflect and are likely driven at least in part by structural inequalities.

If such inequalities—across income, wealth, health, education and other elements of human development—are in no small part the result of social choices, as this Report argues, the course of climate change and the way it ultimately affects inequality have a lot of choice built in.

There still is time to choose differently.


Differentiated paths in the ability to adapt to climate change: Convergence in basic, divergence in enhanced capabilities yet again?

This section considers asymmetries in capabili- ties relevant to withstanding disasters linked to natural hazards.
The effects of shocks (linked not only to disasters but also to other causes ranging from conflict to terms-of-trade crises) do not appear to be randomly distributed across different groups; instead, they seem to do more harm to the more vulnerable.

Over 1980–2017 developing countries recorded a higher frequency of crises in human devel- opment, measured as a yearly reduction in Human Development Index (HDI) value, than developed countries did, and the impact of these reductions was more severe.
The average reduction in HDI value when facing a crisis was 0.5 percent for developed countries but 1.2 per- cent for developing countries (figure 5.6).

Low human development countries are more exposed to the human and economic losses from shocks from all sources.
While some extreme negative shocks can have an equaliz- ing effect within countries,75 people in very high human development countries are better shielded from the costs because they have more options for responding to shocks, greater FIGURE 5.6 Human development crises are more frequent and deeper in developing countries Average reduction in Human Development Index (HDI) value (percent of HDI in previous year) Developing Developed 0.5 8.2 1.2 13.5 Frequency of reduction in HDI (percent) Source: Human Development Report Office calculations for countries with annual data for 1980–2017.
ability to move and more resources with which to recover.

People in low human development countries are 10 times more likely than people in very high human development countries to die due to natural hazards leading to disasters.

And the relative cost (as a percentage of GDP) of disasters is about four times lower in very high human development countries than in other countries (figure 5.7).
These results are merely suggestive and should be seen in the context of broader trends in the global reduc- tion in causalities linked to natural hazards and accelerating increases in the economic damag- es—with asymmetric impacts across climate re- gions depending on the nature of the hazard.76 Developing countries tend to have fewer resources to prevent and respond to disasters linked to natural hazards.77 The support and enforcement of building codes, the construc- tion and maintenance of basic infrastructure, and the development of contingency plans, among other investments, demand resources.
And with poverty and deprivation much more prevalent in developing countries, people are more vulnerable.78 Within countries the effects of disasters vary with income.

Poorer people are more likely to be affected by natural hazards.
In 12 of 13 country studies from developing countries, the The effects of shocks do not appear to be randomly distributed; instead, they seem to do more harm to the more vulnerable 184 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 5.7 The lower the level of human development, the more deadly the disasters Deaths by natural disasters, 1997–2016 (per million inhabitants) Damage of natural disasters, 1997–2016 (percent of GDP of one year) 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 16 12 8 4 0 Low Medium High Very high Human development group Note: Data are simple averages across human development groups.
Country values are the sum of population or GDP over 20 years divided by the population or GDP in one representative year.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ Emergency Events Database (www.emdat.be/database; accessed 28 October 2019).
percentage of poor people affected by natural hazards was larger than that of nonpoor peo- ple.79 In El Salvador and Honduras people in the lower quintiles of the income distribution were more likely to be affected by floods and landslides (figure 5.8).

There has been progress curbing the effects of recurring shocks behind disasters.

Even though too many preventable casualties remain from events such as flooding, drought and earth- quakes, total causalities per recorded event FIGURE 5.8 have declined.
In the 1960s and 1970s there were twice as many deaths, despite a fraction of the number of recorded events, as over the past 20 years (figure 5.9).

This reflects good work on disaster prevention, preparation and response.
International instruments—including the Yokohama Strategy (1994) and the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005), leading to the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster and Risk Reduction—have mobilized stakeholders across the globe to invest in disaster risk reduction.80 As a result, developing and developed countries are converging to lower vulnerability.81 But progress in reducing the absolute number of deaths appears to have plateaued since the 1990s—likely the result of two forces.
One is further progress in adaptation, leading to convergence towards greater preparation to recurrent events.

Second is the greater frequen- cy and severity of shocks, possibly related to climate change—increasing the human cost in poorer areas, creating inequalities.
The IPCC’s 2014 Synthesis Report warned that “continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming […] increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.”82 Climate change “risks are uneven- ly distributed and are generally greater for disad- vantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development.”83 If disasters tend to hit disadvantaged people harder, climate change could make vicious cycles of low outcomes and low opportunities more persistent.84 In El Salvador and Honduras people in the lower quintiles of the income distribution were more likely to be affected by floods and landslides Physical damage from ﬂoods (percent of population, per quintile of income) Physical damage from landslides (percent of population, per quintile of income) 17 17 10 11 13 11 12 9 8 7 22 18 21 15 16 10 12 5 9 6 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Source: Hallegatte and others (2017), based on Fay (2005).
San Salvador (El Salvador) Tegucigalpa (Honduras) If disasters tend to hit disadvantaged people harder, climate change could make vicious cycles of low outcomes and low opportunities more persistent Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 185 FIGURE 5.9 Fewer deaths in the 2000s than in the 1960s and 1970s despite more occurrences of natural disasters Average number of deaths (thousands) Average number of occurrences 450 300 150 0 1950 1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010 2016 450 300 150 0 Note: Data are rolling 20-year averages.
Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ Emergency Events Database (www.emdat.be/database).

Shocks, including those related to climate change, can push people into poverty.

In Senegal, households affected by a natural dis- aster were 25 percent more likely than others to fall into poverty during 2006–2011.85 The impacts of natural disasters go beyond income.
In Ethiopia, Kenya and Niger children born during droughts are more likely to suffer from malnutrition.86 In Cameroon climate shocks reduce girls’ chances of finishing primary school by 8.7 percentage points.

In Mongolia, wildfires reduced the probability of completing second- ary school by 14.4 percentage points.87 Climate change may also increase forced population displacements.
In 2017 there were 18.8 million new internal displacements asso- ciated with disasters across 135 countries and territories, most caused by floods (8.6 million) and storms, including cyclones, hurricanes and typhoons (7.5 million).

While countries at different incomes were affected, most displace- ments took place in developing countries,88 where the risk of becoming homeless due to disasters is more than three times higher than in developed countries.
In sum, climate change impacts mediated by disasters differ across the globe, with shifts in both the nature of the events and their probability.

This affects the ability to measure the effects and to formulate policies (box 5.3).
Developed countries appear to have a broader set of resources and institutions that enable them to prepare for and respond better to sur- prise shocks, including climate-related ones.89 Environmental inequalities and injustices are pervasive—a global snapshot of waste, meat consumption and water use Environmental inequalities and environmental injustices have much deeper roots than the current climate crisis.90 The environmental jus- tice movement has had strong links with other social justice movements.91 Ultimately, environmental inequalities—and environmental justice—are not just about the en- vironment.
They give expression to stigmatizing social norms and discriminatory laws and prac- tices, which are manifestations of inequality in different dimensions, many taking shape as hori- zontal inequalities.92 Environmental inequalities thus become a lens to understand and address other forms of inequality, and the distribution of power and decisionmaking more broadly.

Many environmental inequalities and injus- tices persist around the world.
They are many, pervasive and persistent because differences in power (and how it is wielded) are as well.

Environmental inequalities operate at many scales, reproducing and reinforcing familiar gradients, as seen in the preceding climate dis- cussion and elsewhere in this Report.
The rest Environmental inequalities become a lens to understand and address other forms of inequality, and the distribution of power and decisionmaking more broadly 186 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 5.3 When history is no longer a good guide When an event recurs, societies are likely to adapt through learning about four aspects: • The nature of the shock.

• The probability of occurrence.

• The effects of the event on well-being.

• The actions to reduce damage.


Common knowledge accumulates over time, informed by historical conditions, with lessons learned about what works to reduce the negative effects of shocks.

So when the events are uncertain but their effects are “known” from historical experience, coping mechanisms are eas- ier to develop.

The upshot: a substantial reduction in the negative effects of shocks.1 This sort of adaptation occurs in all societies in different ways.
However, when events fall outside of the histori- cal norm, there is significant unpredictability in the four aspects outlined above.

And with climate change, it ap- pears that communities around the world will confront more and more “surprises” (shocks outside of the his- torical experience).2 With climate change the basic structure of shocks does not disappear but evolves into a different process.

Current policy frameworks may become incomplete.


Some effects of climate change might take the form of “black swans,” low-probability but high-impact events to which both public and private institutions are ill-pre- pared to respond.

In other cases the effects are com- pletely unknown and unpredictable: when events never experienced before are observed (such as new record temperatures).
The ability to successfully adapt to cli- mate change depends on resources for an enhanced system of preparation and response.3 Notes 1.

See, for instance, Clarke and Dercon (2016).

2.

For an example based on the climate impact on ocean temperature, see Pershing and others (2019); for the implications in terms of the need to develop a more prospective, as opposed to retrospective, ability to respond to surprise shocks, see Ottersen and Melbourne-Thomas (2019).

3.
3.

See, for instance, Farid and others (2016).

Source: Human Development Report Office.

of this chapter takes a look at a few of them, in the forms of waste, meat and water use.

Waste Waste93 comes from the flow of materials, often in the form of products, through society.

More waste generally means more upstream extraction of raw materials, from mining to deforestation, with negative impacts on natural habitats.
It also means more conversion of raw materials into products, which usually entails the intensive use of industrial energy (especially from fossil fuels), the consumption of water and the emission of pollutants across interconnected networks.

Waste management requires transportation and energy.

It is a notable contributor to climate change.


Nearly 5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are due to waste management (ex- cluding transportation), driven mainly by food waste and improper management.94 When burned openly, waste contributes to air pol- lution and health hazards; when deposited in landfills, it takes up space and can leach toxins into soil and groundwater.

Waste also finds its way into waterways and oceans.
More than 270,000 tonnes of plastic waste are in the world’s oceans,95 where gyres concentrate it in enormous garbage patches.
Three have been identified so far: one in the North Pacific (the Great Pacific Garbage Patch), one in the South Pacific and one in the North Atlantic.96 The Great Pacific Garbage Patch measures 1.6 million square kilometres (three times the size of France), and parts of it have upwards of 100 kilograms of plastic per square kilometre.97 Plastics can circulate in oceans for years, degrading in sunlight into micro plastics, forming a sort of peppery soup that birds and fish consume.98 Marine microplastics are not confined to the sea surface; they have also been documented in the water column and animal communities of the deep sea.99 The largest living space on earth, the deep sea, may also prove to be one of the largest reservoirs of microplastics, which have also been found in the atmosphere and remote mountains.100 In 2016 the world generated just over 2 billion metric tonnes of solid waste, or 0.74 kilogram per person per day, an average that varies widely by country (0.11–4.54 kilograms).101 Under a busi- ness-as-usual scenario total waste is expected to grow to 3.4 billion metric tonnes by 2050—and to grow fastest in low-income countries, tripling by 2050.
Richer countries produce more waste per capita and poorer countries less (figure 5.10).
More than 270,000 tonnes of plastic waste are in the world’s oceans, where gyres concentrate it in enormous garbage patches Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 187 FIGURE 5.10 Richer countries generate more waste per capita Waste generation per capita (kilograms per capita per day) 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 0 High income, 683 Lower middle income, 586 Low income, 93 Upper middle income, 655 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms (constant 2011 international $) Source: Kaza and others 2018.
Rates of waste collection vary consider- ably between and within countries.

Waste collection is nearly universal in high-income countries, with little disparity between urban and rural areas.

At lower income levels waste collection rates decline steadily, and stark disparities between urban and rural areas open up.

About 40 percent of global waste is disposed of in landfills, and one-third is open- ly dumped.
The vast majority of waste in low- income countries is openly dumped, and open dumping steadily declines in favour of land- fills, as country income increases.

Incineration is used primarily among upper-middle and high-income countries.

Industrial waste typically far exceeds municipal solid waste and shows a steep gradient by country in- come.
Generally, recycling is a significant waste disposal method only in high-income countries.102 In addition to urban-rural divides, inequal- ities in waste are evident within countries.103 Waste sites, polluting factories, and noisy air- ports and expressways are eyesores and health hazards that no community wants to be near.

Their location in poorer communities thus re- flects other forms of inequality.

Meat consumption Livestock production is important for live- lihoods and economies.
It employs at least 1.3 billion people worldwide and supports the livelihoods of some 600 million poor house- holds, mostly in developing countries,104 where it accounts for 20 percent of total agricultural output.

Animal-source foods are important components of healthy, nutritious diets, contributing especially to children’s balanced growth and cognitive development.
Among many other benefits, livestock can also help cushion households from negative impacts of shocks, such as droughts.105 Livestock is the world’s largest agricultural user of land resources, with pasture and cropland dedicated to the production of feed accounting for almost 80 percent of all agricultural land (while providing only 37 percent of the world’s protein and 18 percent of its calories—after in- cluding aquaculture).106 About a fifth of available freshwater is directed to livestock production.107 The intensity of resource use by livestock is closely tied, directly and indirectly, to energy in- efficiencies in animal food production systems.
Most plant matter that animals ingest, including Livestock is the world’s largest agricultural user of land resources, with pasture and cropland dedicated to the production of feed accounting for almost 80 percent of all agricultural land 188 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Up to 80 percent of greenhouse gas emissions generated by the global agricultural sector are from livestock production, which adds up to 7.1 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year— or 14.5 percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions feed, is used up by the animals themselves rather than stored as muscle or fat for consumption by people.
The loss ratio varies but has been estimat- ed to be as high as 90 percent,108 making animals a highly inefficient source of calories for people.
For each calorie, the production of animal foods requires much more land and resources than the production of an equivalent amount of plant- based foods.109 Up to 80 percent of greenhouse gas emissions generated by the global agricultural sector are from livestock production, which adds up to 7.1 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year—or 14.5 percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.110 Emissions emanate from across the supply chain, with feed produc- tion, enteric fermentation, animal waste and land use changes among the most important sources at the farm level).111 Cattle are respon- sible for about two-thirds of livestock-related carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, largely in the form of methane emissions, a greenhouse gas roughly 30 times more potent than carbon dioxide in trapping heat.112 Improving farm management is one way to reduce these and other environmental impacts.
For many major agricultural products, green- house gas emissions vary widely across farms.

Livestock is no exception.

For beef the top 10 percent of emitters produce up to 12 times as much greenhouse gases per unit of protein as do the bottom 10 percent of emitters.

The problem is concentrated at the top: The major- ity of emissions from beef herders come from the highest impact 25 percent of producers.
One-size-fits-all approaches are unlikely to work, but significant opportunities exist to re- duce variability among farms and mitigate the environmental impacts of beef, livestock and agricultural production generally.

Reducing losses across the supply chain is another option, as is reducing demand for meat where possible and appropriate.
For instance, on a per unit of protein basis, greenhouse gas emissions from the bottom 10 percent of beef producers still exceed those from peas by a factor of 36.113 The environmental benefits of dietary change exceed what producers can achieve on their own (box 5.4).114 But the trend is in the op- posite direction, owing mostly to population growth but also to other variables, such as ur- banization and rising per capita incomes, that tend to increase demand for animal foods.115 Between 2000 and 2014 the global production of meat rose 39 percent and milk 38 percent.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that by 2030 meat production will increase another 19 percent from that in 2015–2017, with developing countries accounting for almost all the increase (figure 5.11).
Milk production is projected to grow 33 percent in the same period.116 Even BOX 5.4 The impacts of a global dietary shift on sustainable human development A global dietary shift favouring more plant-based foods and following guidelines for good nutrition would impact several dimensions of sustainable hu- man development, both in aggregate and in distribu- tion.

The climate would also benefit.
One estimate is that dietary changes could reduce growth in food-re- lated greenhouse gas emissions by 29–70 percent by 2050.1 On a per capita basis, food-related emissions could fall twice as much in richer countries as in poor- er ones, narrowing the inequality in carbon dioxide equivalent emissions between them.2 This would be driven primarily by reductions in red meat consump- tion, which also has health benefits3 (though a series of recent systematic reviews have, with some contro- versy, called into question the degree to which reduc- ing red and processed meat consumption improves key health indicators).4 Numerous studies have estimated the impacts of nutritious, plant-based diets, including on overall mortality reduction.5 The benefits, however, are not evenly shared.
On a per capita basis, high- and middle-income countries might benefit more, owing to reduced red meat consumption and lower energy in- takes.6 A global shift to sustainable, nutritious, plant- based diets, therefore, could improve health overall globally while potentially worsening some kinds of health inequalities among countries.

Notes 1.

Springmann and others 2016.

2.

Springmann and others 2016.

3.

Springmann and others 2016.

4.


Han and others forthcoming; Vernooij and others forthcoming; Zeraatkar, Han and others forthcoming; Zeraatkar, Johnston and others forthcoming.

See also Carroll and Doherty (2019) and Johnston and others (forthcoming).

5.

Key and others 2009; Le and Sabaté and 2014; Orlich and others 2013; Springmann and others 2016; Tilman and Clark 2014.

6.

Springmann and others 2016.


Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 189 FIGURE 5.11 Developing countries will drive most of the rise in meat production to 2030 Metric tonnes (carcass weight equivalent/ready to cook) 6.9 0.7 2.9 3.1 19.1 3.2 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 13.5 10.1 Beef Pork Poultry Sheep Beef Pork Poultry Sheep Developing Developed Source: FAO 2018.
23% 77% Total increase though developing countries will drive future growth in meat production, the world’s richer countries eat meat most intensively, and this is expected to continue well into the future.117 As incomes rise, food expenditures favour more nutrient-rich foods, such as animal foods (Bennett’s Law).118 This is explained partly by the nutritional benefits of meat and other animal products, especially for children in poorer households.
There are clear inequalities in spending on meat across income quintiles, but as incomes increase, inequalities in meat consumption decline.119 Projections of meat consumption—and ine- qualities—do not account for wild cards such as technological breakthroughs that could greatly alter current trajectories and reduce environ- mental damages.
An estimated 31 start-ups are working to become the first company to market synthetic animal protein.120 Competition will also come from elsewhere, particularly novel vegan meat replacements121 New areas of diver- gence could open up, since products are likely to be rolled out initially in rich countries.

And if these foods offer additional benefits in re- ducing noncommunicable diseases, they could exacerbate health inequalities.

Water use Water and sanitation are essential for human development.
They have also been recognized as human rights.122 Despite the expansion of safely managed drinking water and sanitation services over the past two decades, significant gaps remain.

As of 2017, 29 percent of peo- ple worldwide lacked access to safe drinking water.

The gap is even higher for sanitation, at 55 percent.123 How much water humans use and in what ways have consequences for the environment and societies.
Global water withdrawal has nearly septupled over the last century, outpac- ing population growth by a factor of 1.7.124 Most of it is for agricultural use (69 percent), followed by industry (19 percent) and munic- ipalities (12 percent).125 Attempts have been made to establish a meaningful safe operating space for water use at the global level.126 The conceptual underpinnings are also being revis- ited to consider subnational boundaries and to expand beyond consumptive use of blue water (freshwater in the form of rivers, lakes, ground- water and so on) to include green water (soil moisture that evaporates or transpires) and Global water withdrawal has nearly septupled over the last century, outpacing population growth by a factor of 1.7.
Most of it is for agricultural use 190 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 In many countries, basic water and sanitation coverage for the wealthiest quintile is at least twice that for the poorest quintile other elements of the dynamic, global hydro- logical cycle.

Much analytical, management and policy work remains at the national level and at smaller spatial scales, such as the basin.127 It is at these spatial scales where water stress, scarcity and crises are manifest.
By some es- timates, as many as 4 billion people, about two-thirds of the global population, live under conditions of severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year.128 Half a billion people face water scarcity year-round.129 One-third of the world’s 37 largest aquifer systems are con- sidered stressed.130 Globally, enough freshwater is available to meet annual demand, but spatial and temporal mismatches between water and supply drive water scarcity.
The 2006 Human Development Report argues forcefully that limits on physical supply are not the central problem but rather that “the roots of the crisis in water can be traced to poverty, inequality and unequal power relationships, as well as flawed water management policies that exacer- bate scarcity.”131 Water footprints are one way to understand and measure human use of water.

Every country has a national water footprint, the amount of water produced or consumed per capita.
The footprint includes virtual water, which is the water used in the production of such goods as food or industrial products.
Across countries, agriculture constitutes the single greatest com- ponent (92 percent) of the water consumption footprint, with cereals the largest subcompo- nent (27 percent), followed by meat (22 per- cent) and milk products (7 percent).132 Because the national water footprint of consumption includes imported virtual water, some coun- tries have water footprints much larger than might be expected based on national water re- source endowments alone.
The transboundary movement of virtual water is significant.

Over 1996–2005 about one-fifth of the global water footprint was bound up in exported goods, with trade in crops the lion’s share.133 Water footprints vary considerably across countries.

The widest variation is for developing countries.


Indeed, some of them have national water footprints of consumption on par, or exceeding, those in developed countries.134 The high water footprints in some developing coun- tries have been attributed more to lower effi- ciencies of water use in consumed products than to higher overall consumption of those prod- ucts per se,135 though the latter can be relevant as well.136 This points to the enormous potential that remains for efficiency improvements.
Water access and consumption also vary greatly within countries.

Consider access to safe drinking water and sanitation, where significant inequalities persist between and within countries.

Gaps in coverage between rural and urban areas have long been impor- tant.

Globally, over the past two decades the gaps have narrowed, falling from 47 percentage points to 32 for safely managed water services and from 14 percentage points to 5 for safely managed sanitation services.
In many countries inequalities by wealth are significant.

In some, basic water and sanitation coverage for the wealthiest quintile is at least twice that for the poorest quintile (figure 5.12).

For water, wealth inequalities generally exceed urban-rural ones within the same country.

While water and sani- tation coverage has generally improved over the past two decades across most, but not all, coun- tries, inequalities by wealth have shown no such general trend.
In some countries inequalities have declined; in others they have increased.137 As with urban-rural divides, national averages can mask differences and deprivations at lower levels.
In South Africa the national Gini index for piped water is .36, but this varies consid- erably across the country’s provinces, from .06 (least unequal) to .57 (most unequal).138 Reducing inequality in water access and use can- not mean denying people their right to water, a right embedded in South Africa’s constitution and affirmed by legislation that includes sanita- tion.139 The human right to water and sanitation is also affirmed in the Sustainable Development Goals.
The very realization of this right should go a long way in reducing inequalities.

Increasingly severe water-related crises around the world are driving what some have argued is a fundamental transition in freshwater resources and their management.

Approaches that focus singularly on meeting water demand are giving way to more multifaceted ones that recognize various limits on supply, broader eco- logical and social values of water, and the costs and efficiency of human use.
Nexus approaches are emerging that identify and respond to the way in which water is linked to other resources, such as energy, food and forests.140 Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 191 FIGURE 5.12 In some countries basic water and sanitation coverage for the wealthiest quintile is at least twice that for the poorest quintile Rural/Urban Rural Urban Wealth quintile Poorest quintile Richest quintile Democratic Republic of the Congo Somalia Ethiopia Cameroon Uganda United Republic of Tanzania Honduras Pakistan Dominican Republic India Kazakhstan Guyana Montenegro Turkey Thailand Source: UNICEF and WHO 2019.
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Environmental inequalities are largely a choice, made by those with the power to choose.

Remedying them is also a choice Economic production systems, demographic trends and climate change are all playing big parts in this shift.

So is technology.

Over the past two decades, for example, the spread of so- phisticated precision irrigation technology has improved efficiency of water use in agriculture.
Modern technologies are also transforming wastewater treatment and reuse, as well as the economic viability of seawater desalination.

Remote sensing provides real-time data.


Smart water meters and improved water pricing policies can both improve efficiency.141 The response to and shaping of these new tools and trends—the extent to which inclusion is made a bedrock principle of a shift to freshwater sus- tainability—will play a big role in determining whether the human rights to water and sani- tation are progressively realized, inequalities in access to both are reduced and a path of sustainable water use is embarked on.
A break from the past: Making new choices for people and planet This chapter has shown that environmen- tal inequalities are many and that they are inextricably linked with inequalities in human development.

They reflect the way economic and political power—and the intersection of the two—is distributed and wielded, both across countries and within them.
Often, these environmental inequalities and injustices are the legacy of entrenched gradients in power go- ing back decades; for climate change, centuries.

Countries and communities with greater power have, consciously or not, shifted some of the environmental consequences of their consump- tion onto poor and vulnerable people, onto marginalized groups, onto future generations.

Environmental inequalities are largely a choice.


Remedying them is also a choice, but doing so cannot come at the expense of achieving the full suite of people’s human rights.

Technology has been central to the climate story.

It has underpinned development trajec- tories that are directly linked to the climate crisis.
Technology, in the form of renewables and energy efficiency, offers a glimpse that the future may break from the past—if the oppor- tunity can be seized quickly enough and broad- ly shared.142 If so, both people and planet win.

The way people grapple with these and other technologies so that they encourage, rather than threaten, sustainable and inclusive human 192 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 development is the subject of the following chapter on technology.
The uptake and broad diffusion of cli- mate-protecting technologies old and new will be critical in charting new development paths for all countries.

Historical development paths have exacted environmental and social tolls that are too great.

They must change, and there are encouraging signs that they are.

The SDGs, the Paris Agreement and renewed interest in and expansion of progressive carbon pricing offer promising paths forward.

So do efforts thus far at building climate resilience.
But much more on the policy front needs to be done urgently, with developed and developing countries work- ing together, to avoid dangerous climate tipping points and to ensure that poor and vulnerable people are not left behind.

Chapter 7, which takes a panoramic look at policy options across the Report, discusses some potential policies that help address climate change and inequality together in the hope that they help countries chart their paths for more sustainable, more inclusive human development.
Historical development paths have exacted environmental and social tolls that are too great.
They must change, and there are encouraging signs that they are Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 193 Spotlight 5.1 Measuring climate change impacts: Beyond national averages A recent study that moved beyond national av- erages to a more granular look at climate change impacts in 3,143 counties across the continental United States1 could signal the future for cli- mate change economic impact assessments— partly because some of the model’s parameters were linked to real-world, observed data.
The study found significant spatial heter- ogeneity in agricultural yields and all-cause mortality.

Projected economic impacts varied widely across counties, from median losses ex- ceeding 20 percent of gross county product to median gains exceeding 10 percent.

Negative economic impacts were concentrated in the South and Midwest, while the North and West showed smaller negative impacts—or even net gains.
The study concluded that climate change will worsen inequality in the United States because the worst impacts are concentrated in regions that are already poorer on average.

By the latter part of the 21st century, the poorest third of counties are projected to experience damages of 2–20 percent of county income.

Effects in the richest third are projected to be less severe, ranging from damages of 6.7 percent of county income to benefits of 1.2 percent.
Nationally, each 1°C increase in global mean surface tem- perature will cost 1.2 percent of GDP.

The study does not address one of the main coping mechanisms for climate change: migra- tion.

Migration would affect national impact estimates as well as the absolute costs and benefits for individual counties.

In theory, mi- gration could also dampen the impact on ine- quality, as those experiencing the most negative impacts move to areas less affected and with more opportunities.
The United States has a long history of migration for economic op- portunity, including in times of environmental and economic crisis (such as the Dust Bowl).2 In practice today, however, some evidence sug- gests migration may not be a significant coping mechanism for poor people, thereby worsening inequality.
Mobility in the United States has fallen in recent decades.3 While in middle-income countries warming has increased emigration to cities and other countries, in poorer countries warming has re- duced the likelihood of emigration.4 Although this does not mean that poorer people in rich countries are less likely to migrate in response to climate change, it does indicate that other variables—perhaps poverty-related ones at vari- ous levels—can interact with climate change to shape migration likelihood and overall coping capacity.
It also suggests that migration as a coping mechanism for climate change is less common in poorer countries than in richer ones.

Granular analyses, adapted for differences in data availability and quality, could be useful in other contexts.

They could also be linked to deprivation and vulnerability data so that climate exposure, impacts and vulnerabilities could be brought together, superimposed and integrated for policy-relevant analysis and visualization, perhaps using geographic infor- mation systems.
Vulnerability hotspots could be identified—spatially and by population—for policy action, including through impact mitiga- tion and resilience building.
Granular analyses would also be key in developing place-specific adaptation pathways, which could advance climate change adaptation, structural inequality reduction and broader Sustainable Development Goal achievement by “identifying local, socially salient tipping points before they are crossed, based on what people value and tradeoffs that are acceptable to them.”5 Notes Hsiang and others 2017.

Hornbeck 2012.

Carr and Wiemers 2016.

Cattaneo and Peri 2016.

Roy and others 2019, p. 458.


Climate change will worsen inequality in the United States because the worst impacts are concentrated in regions that are already poorer on average 194 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Spotlight 5.2 Climate vulnerability Much like economic feedback mechanisms, attention to structural inequalities and de- velopment deficits in the context of climate change is a fairly recent advance.
In a literature review in four climate-change journals through 2012, 70 percent of published studies articulat- ed climate change itself as the main source of vulnerability, while less than 5 percent engaged with the social roots of vulnerability.1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report in 2014 helped redress this imbalance.2 How the variables of social (or structural) vulnerability aggregate at different levels— from individuals and households to towns and cities to districts and provinces to countries and regions—will shape the patterns of cli- mate-related impacts across space and across populations in those spaces.
Different patterns of inequality may emerge at different scales and depending on the kind of inequality being measured.

The impact on inequalities at those different levels depends critically on whether more negative impacts are disproportionally borne by those on the lower ends of existing inequality distributions—that is, those already experiencing various forms of greater depriva- tion or development deficits.
Given that struc- tural inequalities exist in various forms and are inextricably linked to communities’ and coun- tries’ capacities to cope with climate change, then absent mitigating factors, some worsening inequality due to climate change is already “baked in.” Furthermore, the idea of “soft” and “hard” adaptation limits, as well as “loss and damage” and “residual climate-related risks,” in the climate change literature is a recognition of the variability of communities and human in- stitutions to respond to and cope with climate change impacts.3 The IPCC’s 2018 special report on global warming of 1.5°C briefly sum- marizes the latest literature on approaches and policy options to address residual risk and loss and damage, looking at adaptation and disaster risk reduction strategies; compensatory, dis- tributive and procedural equity considerations; litigation and litigation risks; international assistance (such as for regional public insurance mechanisms); and global governance.4 The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report con- cluded with very high confidence that climate change would worsen existing poverty and ex- acerbate inequalities.5 The IPCC’s 2018 special report summarized subsequent literature show- ing that “the poor will continue to experience climate change severely, and climate change will exacerbate poverty (very high confidence).”6 The special report cites evidence of poorer subsist- ence communities already affected by climate change through declines in crop production and quality, increases in crop pests and diseases, and disruption to culture.
A series of studies referenced in the special report indicates that children and the elderly are disproportionally affected by climate change and that it can in- crease gender inequality.

The special report also cites a 2017 report that claims that by 2030, 122 million additional people could become extremely poor, due mainly to higher food pric- es and worse health.

The poorest 20 percent across 92 countries would suffer substantial income losses.
Lower-income countries are projected to experience disproportional socio- economic losses from climate change, placing pressure towards greater inequality between countries and countering prevailing trends of recent decades towards less inequality between countries.7 Furthermore, the special report identifies critical research gaps, stating that “im- pacts are likely to occur simultaneously across livelihood, food, human, water and ecosystem security…but the literature on interacting and cascading effects remains scarce.”8 A 2016 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) report summarizes the literature on structural inequalities and their relationship to climate-re- lated exposure and vulnerability.9 Within countries, the UNDESA report notes that many poor people live in floodplains, along riverbanks or on precarious hillsides for lack of alternatives, putting them at greater risk of flooding, mudslides and other weather-related disasters.
A climate change axiom is that wetter Some worsening of inequality due to climate change is already “baked in.” The idea of “soft” and “hard” adaptation limits is a recognition of the variability of communities and human institutions to respond to and cope with climate change impacts Chapter 5 Climate change and inequalities in the Anthropocene | 195 Notes 1 Tschakert (2016), based on data from Bassett and Fogelman (2013).

IPCC 2014.

Klein and others (2014), as cited in Roy and others (2019).
Roy and others 2019.

IPCC 2014.

Roy and others 2019, p. 451.

Pretis and others (2018), as cited in Roy and others (2019).

Roy and others 2019, p. 452.

UNDESA 2016.

2 Arnell and Gosling (2016), as cited in Roy and others (2019).

11 Winsemius and others (2018), as cited in Roy and others (2019).

areas will become wetter and dry areas drier.


Flood frequencies are expected to double for 450 million more people in flood-prone are- as.10 Climate change will also place additional drought-related stress on those in arid and semi-arid areas, where large concentrations of poor and marginalized people live.
Poor people are expected to be more exposed to droughts for warming scenarios above 1.5°C in several countries in Asia and in Southern and West Africa.11 The rural poor in poor countries will suffer a double whammy from climate change: a negative shock to their livelihoods and spikes in food prices resulting from drops in global yields.
196 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation Will the technological transformations unfolding before our eyes increase inequality?

Many think so, but the choice is ours.

There certainly is historical precedent for technological revolutions to carve deep and persistent inequalities.
The Industrial Revolution may have set humanity on a path towards unprecedented improvements in well-being.
But it also opened the Great Divergence,1 separating societies that industrialized,2 producing and exporting manufacturing goods, from many that depended on primary commodities well into the middle of the 20th century.3 And by shifting the sources of energy towards the intensive use of fossil fuels (starting with coal), the Industrial Revolution launched production pathways culminating in the climate crisis (chapter 5).4 Whether the ongoing changes in technology can be characterized as a revolution is for fu- ture historians to determine.
The digitalization of information and the ability to share infor- mation and communicate instantaneously and globally have been building over several dec- ades, as with computers, mobile phones and the internet.
The 2001 Human Development Report considered how to make these and other new technologies work for human devel- opment, focusing on their potential to benefit developing countries and poor people.5 While the report did not address technology’s impact on jobs and earnings in detail, it highlighted the growing demand for technology skills and the potential for job creation in both devel- oped and developing economies, suggesting the possibility for reducing inequality within and across countries.
But recent advances in technologies such as automation and artificial intelligence, as well as developments in labour markets over the course of the 21st century, show that these technologies are replacing tasks performed by humans—raising with heightened urgency the question of whether technology will give rise to a New Great Divergence.

Advances in artificial intelligence grabbed headlines when a computer programme be- came, in just a few hours, the world’s best chess player.
The programme had no prior informa- tion on how to play the game.
Given only the rules, it taught itself how to win—not only at chess but also at Go and Shogi.6 This was the latest of several technological breakthroughs powered by artificial intelligence techniques known as machine learning—particularly deep learning—which enables machines to match, or even surpass, what humans can do on tasks ranging from translating languages to recognizing images and speech.7 As artificial intelligence continues to improve the bench- mark performance in a wider range of tasks,8 it is likely to reshape the world of work in fun- damental ways—for workers performing those tasks and across the entire labour market.9 Artificial intelligence is not the only relevant technology.
Nor does it work in isolation.

It interacts with digital technologies in ways that are reshaping knowledge-based labour mar- kets, economies and societies.10 Perhaps for the first time in human history, these technologies are known almost everywhere.

East Asian countries are investing heavily in artificial in- telligence and in advances in its use (discussed later in the chapter).
And African countries have seized the potential of mobile phones to foster financial inclusion.11 These technologies also change politics, cul- ture and lifestyles.
Basic artificial intelligence algorithms meant to increase the number of clicks in social media have led millions towards hardened extreme views.12 In some countries family and friends are being displaced by the in- ternet as the main vehicle for couples to meet, partly because of better artificial intelligence algorithms for matching people.13 The world of finance is being fundamentally reshaped, with nonfinancial technology firms provid- ing payment services.
China leads the way in Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 199 6. mobile payments, which represent 16 percent of GDP, followed by the United States, India and Brazil—but at a distance, at still less than 1 percent of GDP.14 These firms are also extend- ing credit and other financial services.
In China artificial intelligence enables online lenders to make decisions on loans in seconds, with new credit granted to more than 100 million people.15 And central banks from China16 to Rwanda17 are considering digital currencies.

Now take a step back.

Technology has always progressed in every society, creating disruptions and opportunities (from gunpowder to the printing press).
But the advances were typically one-off and did not translate into the sustained and rapid progress18 that Simon Kuznets described as “modern economic growth.”19 Sustained improvements in productivity and living standards depend on constantly intro- ducing new ideas and using them productive- ly.20 But having these gains in productivity and well-being reach everyone is not a given, and people who lack access can face new and deeper deprivations when access is simply assumed.21 Technology is not something outside econ- omies and societies that determines outcomes on its own.22 It co-evolves with social, political and economic systems.
This implies that it takes time for the productive use of technology to settle, because it requires complementary changes in economic and social systems.23 But how technology will shape the evolution and distribution of human development in the 21st century does not need to be left to chance.

At a minimum another Great Divergence should be avoided while simultaneously addressing the climate crisis.
The impact of technical change can be an ex- plicit concern for policymakers.24 With a clear emphasis on enhancing human development, it can increase the employability of workers and improve the reach and quality of social services.

Investments in artificial intelligence need not simply automate tasks performed by humans; they can also generate demand for labour.
For example, artificial intelligence can define more detailed and individualized teaching needs and thus generate more demand for teachers to pro- vide a wider range of education services.25 More generally, technological change can be directed to both reduce inequality and promote envi- ronmental sustainability.26 Can artificial intelligence enhance human development?
The direction of technological change involves many decisions by govern- ments, firms and consumers.27 But making tech- nology work for people and nature is already part of the conversation in some countries.28 Public policy and public investment will drive technological change, as they have historical- ly.29 But so will the distribution of capabilities.
The cleavages that may open are not necessarily between developed and developing countries or between people at the top and people at the bottom of the income distribution.
North America and East Asia, for instance, are far ahead in expanding access to broadband inter- net, accumulating data and developing artificial intelligence.30 This chapter shows that while access to basic technologies is converging, there is a growing divergence in the use of advanced ones, echoing the findings in part I of the Report.
The chap- ter describes how some aspects of technology are associated with the rise of some forms of inequality—for instance, by shifting income towards capital and away from labour and the increasing market concentration and power of firms.

It then examines the potential for artificial intelligence and frontier technologies to narrow inequalities in health, education and governance—pointing to technology’s potential in redressing inequalities in human development.
It concludes that technology can either replace or reinstate labour—it is ultimately a matter of choice, a choice not de- termined by technology alone.

Inequality dynamics in access to technology: Convergence in basic, divergence in enhanced A refrain throughout this Report is that de- spite convergence in basic capabilities, gaps remain large in enhanced capabilities—and are often widening.

This is also the case for technology, especially for access, the focus here.
To be sure, this is only a partial perspec- tive, given the inequalities in leveraging new technologies, having a seat at the table in the development of these technologies and being trained or reskilled for working with them.
There are also gender disparities, with women Technology is not something outside economies and societies that determines outcomes on its own 200 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 and girls under-represented in education and careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.31 Still, the evidence on access in this chapter shows that despite convergence in access to basic technologies (which is still far from equal), there is divergence in the access to and use of advanced ones.
In fact, the ability to access and use digital technologies has a defining role both in the pattern of production and consumption and in how societies, communities and even house- holds are organized.

More and more depends— to a great extent—on the ability to connect to digital networks.

This section shows that: • Groups with lower human development have systematically less access to a wide range of technologies, as is widely established.
• Gaps in basic entry-level technologies, though still evident, are closing—reflecting convergence in basic capabilities.

• Gaps in advanced technologies32 (even when considered commonplace by the standards of many) are widening—mirroring the pattern in enhanced capabilities identified earlier in the Report.

Inequalities in access to technology are widespread The higher the level of human development, the greater the access to technology (figure 6.1, top panel).
The digital revolution has moved fast and had enormous impact, but it is far from universal.
In 2017 almost 2 billion people still did not use a mobile phone.33 And of the 5 billion mobile subscribers in the world, nearly 2 billion—most of them in low- and middle- income countries—do not have access to the internet.34 In 2017 the number of fixed broad- band subscriptions per 100 inhabitants was only 13.3 globally and 9.7 in developing coun- tries, and the number of mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants was 103.6 in developed countries compared with only 53.6 in developing countries.35 Inequalities are much greater for advanced technologies, such as access to a computer, internet or broadband (figure 6.1, bottom panel).
The convergence in basic technologies, such as mobile phones,36 has empowered tradition- ally marginalized and excluded people—with greater financial inclusion a good illustration (box 6.1).

But digital gaps can also become bar- riers not only in accessing services or enabling economic transactions but also in being part of a “learning society.”37 It is thus important to complement this static picture of gaps with an analysis of how they are evolving.
Catching up in the basics, widening gaps in advanced technologies Inequalities in access to basic entry-level technologies are shrinking.

Mobile phones, including basic service, have spread rapidly in most parts of the world (figure 6.2, left panel).

In 2007 there were 102 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in developed countries compared with 39 in developing countries.
By 2017 the gap had narrowed, with 127 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in developed countries and 99 in developing countries.

This convergence reflects both rapid expansion at the bottom and a binding constraint at the top, with little room for further growth.

In more empowering areas of technology, involving access to more information and a potential transition from consuming content to producing it, the gaps are larger and widening (figure 6.2, right panel).
Low human develop- ment countries have made the least progress in these technologies—a trend consistent with the widening gaps in installed broadband capacity, especially in absolute differences, to which the chapter turns next in some detail.38 The distinction between the number of telecommunication subscriptions and the availability of bandwidth mattered little when there was only fixed-line telephony, since all the connections had essentially the same band- width.
But as artificial intelligence and related technologies continue to evolve, bandwidth will be increasingly important (as will be cloud computing, which depends on the ability to connect computers with each other).

Access to bandwidth, comparable in quantity and quality to that in developed countries, is essential for developing countries to cultivate their own artificial intelligence and related applications.
Also essential are transferring and adopting technologies developed by leaders in the digital world.

Taking these two groups of countries in the aggregate, there has been convergence.
In 2007 high-income countries had 22.4 times In more empowering areas of technology, involving access to more information and a potential transition from consuming content to producing it, the gaps are larger and widening Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 201 FIGURE 6.1 Digital divides: Groups with higher development have greater access, and inequalities are greater for advanced technologies, 2017 The higher the level of human development, the greater the access to technology.
Mobile-cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Households with internet (percent) Households with a computer (percent) Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Very high human development 131.6 High human development 116.7 Medium human development 90.6 Low human development 67.0 84.1 51.7 26.8 15.0 80.7 47.0 20.0 9.7 28.3 11.3 2.3 0.8 Inequalities are much greater for advanced technologies.
Concentration curves Mobile-cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Households with internet (percent) Households with a computer (percent) Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Cumulative outcome proportion Perfect equality Percent of population 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of population 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent of population Percent of population More equal Less equal Note: Data are simple averages across human development groups.
Shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals.

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on country-level data from the International Telecommunications Union.

the bandwidth per capita of other countries; by 2017 the ratio had fallen to 3.4 (figure 6.3).

While the convergence in broadband among developing countries as a whole is positive, the pattern of convergence in technologies has dif- fered across regions.

Take mobile subscriptions and installed broadband potential.
The regional distribution of mobile subscriptions already reflects the population distribution (meaning that the distribution of both is roughly equiv- alent), and in East Asia and the Pacific mobile subscriptions have already caught up with the re- gion’s share in the global population (figure 6.4).

In Africa there is still a difference, though con- vergence is not far off.
But the distribution of installed bandwidth potential follows neither 202 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 6.1 Mobile technology promotes financial inclusion Financial inclusion is the ability to access and use a range of appropriate and responsibly provided finan- cial services in a well regulated environment.1 Mobile money, digital identification and e-commerce have given many more people the ability to save money and trans- act business securely without needing cash, to insure against risks and to borrow to grow their businesses and reach new markets.
In 2017, 69 percent of adults had an account with a financial institution, up 7 percentage points from 2014.2 That means more than half a billion adults gained ac- cess to financial tools in three years.

Well known examples of mobile money—plat- forms that allow users to send, receive and store mon- ey using a mobile phone—include Kenya’s M-Pesa and China’s Alipay.

Mobile money has brought financial services to people long ignored by traditional banks.
It reaches remote regions without physical bank branch- es.

It can also help women access financial servic- es—an important aspect of equality, since women in many countries are less likely than men to have a bank account.3 Increases in e-commerce have also been dramatic, in- cluding individuals and small businesses selling products and services on online platforms.
In particular, inclusive e-commerce, which promotes the participation of small firms in the digital economy, is important because it can create new opportunities for traditionally excluded groups.
In China, for example, an estimated 10 million small and medium enterprises sell on the Taobao platform; nearly half the entrepreneurs on the platform are women, and more than 160,000 are people with disabilities.4 From artificial intelligence to cryptography, innova- tion in financial technology is transforming the financial sector globally.5 While financial technology offers many potential benefits, there are also considerable concerns about these new technologies’ vulnerabilities.
Blockchain technology, for one, provides applications that include a secure digital infrastructure to verify identity, facilitate faster and cheaper cross-border payments and protect property rights.

But these technologies bring new risks that are not fully considered by existing regulations.6 Policymakers will need to address several tradeoffs to reap financial technology’s potential benefits.

Notes 1.

UNCDF 2019.

2.

Demirgüç-Kunt and others 2018.

3.

McKinsey 2018; World Bank 2016.

4.


Luohan Academy 2019.

5.

He and others 2017.

6.

Sy and others 2019. the distribution of the population nor the distri- bution of gross national income.

East Asia and the Pacific has already taken the lead in installed bandwidth potential, with 52 percent in 2017.

So, the emerging technology cleavages do not follow a simple developed–developing country dichotomy, and the emerging dis- parities are fairly recent.
From 1987 to 2007 little changed in the global ranking of installed bandwidth potential (figure 6.5).

In 1987 a group of developed countries were in the top global ranks: The United States, Japan, France and Germany hosted more than half the global bandwidth, mainly through fixed-line teleph- ony.

At the turn of the millennium things started to change, notably with the expansion of bandwidth in East and North Asia: By 2007 Japan, the Republic of Korea and China occupied ranks 1, 3 and 5.
And in 2011 China took the lead in installed bandwidth.
Beyond broadband, projections on the distribution of future economic benefits linked to artificial intelligence confirm this shifting geography of technology divergence, with estimates suggesting that by 2030 about 70 percent of the global economic benefits tied to artificial intelligence will accrue to North America and East Asia.39 New technologies tend to have higher prices when initially introduced, with prices falling and quality increasing as the technologies dif- fuse.40 Thus, every innovation has the potential to initially carve a divide, at the beginning of the diffusion process—a point also made in chapter 2, in the discussion of how gradients in health emerged when health technologies became available.
The contribution here is to show that the gaps for advanced technologies are widening, not closing—in a new geography of divergence that goes beyond developed and developing countries.

Avoiding a New Great Divergence implies paying attention to the evolution of technology distribution, because benevolent technology diffusion is neither automatic nor instantaneous.41 Instead, tech- nology may well catalyse divergence in human development outcomes.

By what processes?

That is the topic of the next section.
East Asia and the Pacific has already taken the lead in installed bandwidth potential, with 52 percent in 2017 Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 203 FIGURE 6.2 Dynamics of access to technology Declining inequality Increasing inequality Mobile-cellular subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 59.5 49.3 49.3 26.1 Low Medium High Very high Human development group 12.3 8.9 0.8 Low 2.0 Medium High Very high Human development group Basic Enhanced Convergence Access to mobile Divergence Access to broadband Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 80 South Asia East Asia and the Paciﬁc Sub-Saharan Africa Europe and Central Asia Arab States Latin America and the Caribbean Developed 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Change between 2007 and 2017 (per 100 inhabitants) 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Arab States East Asia and the Paciﬁc South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Developed 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2007 Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2007 Note: Convergence and divergence are tested for in two ways: by using the slope of an equation that regresses the change over 2007–2017 with respect to the initial value in 2007 (with ordinary least squares, robust and median quantile regressions) and by comparing the gains of very high human development countries and the gains of low and medium human development countries.
For mobile subscriptions there is convergence according to both metrics (p-values below 1 percent).

For fixed broadband subscriptions there is divergence according to both metrics (p-values below 1 percent).

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the International Telecommunication Union.
204 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 6.3 The bandwidth gap between high-income and other countries fell from 22-fold to 3-fold Bandwidth potential per capita (megabits per second) Ratio of bandwidth potential per capita for high-income countries to that for the rest of the world 80 60 40 20 0 Ratio: high-income countries to the rest of the world 22.4 High income 1.69 Rest of the world 0.08 25 20 15 10 5 0 63.39 18.50 3.4 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: Hilbert 2019.
Technology is reshaping the world: How will it shape inequality in human development?

Technology is reshaping lives—not only econ- omies but also societies and even politics.

What specific changes will bear on inequality in hu- man development?
This question is difficult to address, in part because it may never be possible to assign to technology alone any of the major changes that will reshape inequality in human development, especially with globalization and its interaction with technological change also playing a major role.

Still, this section high- lights some emblematic ways in which tech- nology is upending previously stable patterns in the distribution of income and economic power.
The aim is not so much to attribute cau- sality as to give a sense of technology’s potential to reshape inequalities in human development over the next few years.
Unravelling stable trends42 For most of the 20th century the shares of national income going to labour and to capital held remarkably constant across many econo- mies.43 This was far from a foregone conclusion to those witnessing the evolution of economic growth.44 And it may have been the result of creating and strengthening such institutions as trade unions and social insurance.45 However, with a decline in labour’s share of income since the 1980s across both developed and develop- ing economies, this empirical regularity has been unravelling.46 For developed economies, technology has been a key driver of the decline, in part by replacing routine tasks, as described in chapter 2.47 For developing countries the evi- dence is ambiguous, with both technology and globalization playing important roles.48 A related trend is the steep decline in the price of machinery and equipment, such as computers (generally designated as capital or investment goods), relative to the price of con- sumer goods.49 Since 1970 the relative prices of investment goods in developing countries fell by almost 60 percent, with 75 percent of the decline occurring from 1990 onwards.50 Among investment goods the price decline has been dramatic for computing and communi- cations equipment, pointing to a link between technology and the incentives for firms to replace labour with capital, a process that in developing countries was also associated with greater integration in global value chains.51 Another recent development—linked to the two trends just noted as well as to the increase in For most of the 20th century the shares of national income going to labour and to capital held remarkably constant across many economies Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 205 FIGURE 6.4 The distribution of mobile subscriptions is converging to the distribution of population by region, but installed bandwidth potential is not Share of total (percent) Mobile subscriptions Population 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2016 2017 East Asia and the Paciﬁc Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Installed bandwidth potential North America South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Gross national income Share of total (percent) 100 80 60 40 20 0 1992 100 80 60 40 20 0 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2016 2017 FIGURE 6.5 Source: Hilbert 2019.
From 1987 to 2007 little changed in the global ranking of installed bandwidth potential, but at the turn of the millennium things started to change, with the expansion of bandwidth in East and North Asia 1987 2007 2017 Netherlands 2% Italy 2% Russian Federation 3% United Kingdom 3% Rest of the world 21% Japan 19% United States 17% Republic of Korea 10% China 8% France 6% Germany 9% Rest of the world 28% United States 28% Japan 11% France 7% Italy 4% Germany 6% United Kingdom 5% Republic of Korea 2% Spain 2% Canada 3% Russian Federation 4% Source: Hilbert 2019.
206 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Rest of the world 29% China 37% Indonesia 2% Germany 2% Brazil 2% India 2% France 2% United States 12% Japan 5% Republic of Korea 4% Russian Federation 3% There has been a sharp increase in markups (the difference between what a firm charges and the marginal cost of production), and this has been linked directly to labour’s declining share in income corporate profits (discussed below) and changes in corporate income tax rates (discussed in chap- ter 7)—is the shift in the balance of savings held by households and by firms.
National savings (comprising household, corporate and govern- ment savings) are needed to fund investments.

Until the late 1980s most savings were held by households, but today as much as two-thirds are accounted for by the corporate sector.52 And given that corporate investment has been stable, this means that corporations have been holding on to these savings, in some countries using them to repurchase their own stock.
Perhaps more consequential for the distribu- tion of income is a breakdown in many coun- tries in the association between improvements in labour productivity and the typical worker’s earnings, well documented for developed coun- tries.

This Report has already shown the trend towards the accumulation of income at the top in several countries (chapter 3).

Here the emphasis is specifically on labour income.
This breakdown between productivity and earnings not only goes against what used to be stable trends but is also inconsistent with simple models of the labour market.

As workers become more productive (in part as a result of technological change), one would expect their earnings to increase.

That is, after all, the assumed process for technological change to deliver improvements in living standards—per- haps not to everyone immediately but for the ma- jority over time.
And indeed, until the 1980s real average earnings for the bottom 90 percent of the population (a proxy for the income of a typical household) increased in step with productivity growth for many countries.53 Since then, there has been a decoupling in the evolution of these two indicators, with the earnings of a typical family remaining flat or increasing less than productivity growth.
The International Labour Organization has documented a similar decoupling for 52 de- veloped economies, showing that from 1999 to 2017, labour productivity increased 17 percent while real wages rose 13 percent.54 Shifting economic power The market power of firms can be manifested in their ability to charge prices above the cost of production or by paying lower wages than would be needed in an efficient labour market.
There is evidence that both manifestations of market power are increasing, and even though technology is not the only element driving this shift, it is playing an important role.
There has been a sharp increase in markups (the difference between what a firm charges and the marginal cost of production), and this has been linked directly to labour’s declining share in income.55 While the trend of increased mar- ket power is widely shared across several sectors and industries, firms in sectors that intensively use information and communications technolo- gies have witnessed faster, and greater, increases in markups (figure 6.6), suggesting that tech- nology’s relevance pervades across a wide range of firms.56 Look now at big digital companies, commonly known as Big Tech, and explore how they have been acquiring market power.
Many Big Tech firms are platforms.

Uber, the ride sharing company, is a platform where drivers offer their services and customers come looking for those services.

Gojek and Grab work in the same way in Asia.

Amazon is a platform linking sellers of products with potential buyers.

All platforms benefit from network effects— that is, the value of the platform increases when there are more participants on both sides of the market.
For Amazon the more sellers and the more buyers, the better for each group—and, of course, for Amazon as well.57 Getting big supports staying big, since buyers are reluctant to leave a platform where they find sellers, and sellers, buyers.

Social media companies such as Facebook and Instagram also benefit directly from network effects—people stay on the net- work where their friends and family are.
Big Tech intensively uses data and, in- creasingly, artificial intelligence, so another network spillover common to all platforms is economies of scale in data use, making these firms prone to acquiring market power.58 Even though these platforms lower prices for con- sumers (and so, from that perspective, a more traditional measure of market power such as markups may not seem to apply), they can exercise market power by potentially limiting competition and choice.59 The big players spend vast amounts on lobbying to influence policies that keep them in place and potential new entrants out.60 And they can use their vast reserves of cash to simply buy up new platforms starting to make a mark.
Google Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 207 FIGURE 6.6 Market power is on the rise, particularly for firms intensive in information and communication technology Information and communication technology–intensive ﬁrms All ﬁrms Average markup (index, 1.00 = 2000) 1.15 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 In parallel to the rise of monopoly power in product markets is the growing market power in labour markets—monopsony power (exercised by employers), which, once again, is linked to the decline in labour’s share of income 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Note: Values are average markups for firms from 20 countries, advanced and emerging, both publicly listed and privately held.
Source: Diez, Fan and Villegas-Sánchez 2019. bought its competitors DoubleClick and YouTube.

Facebook first acquired Instagram, then WhatsApp.
Both companies, like others, are the products of hundreds of mergers.61 In parallel to the rise of monopoly power in product markets is the growing market power in labour markets—monopsony power (exercised by employers), which, once again, is linked to the decline in labour’s share of income.62 And when employers have power in labour markets, the impact of technological change on inequality can be magnified.63 Technology is enabling monopsony power in online platforms that are carving out tasks to assign to humans based on who charges the lowest price.
This includes work in digital la- bour markets such as TaskRabbit and Amazon Mechanical Turk, commonly referred to as crowdwork.

The availability of online work may lower search costs, which would make markets competitive.

But market power is high even in this large and diverse spot market.

For Amazon Mechanical Turk, employers capture much of the surplus created by the platform.
This has implications for distributing the gains from digital labour markets, which will likely become greater over time.64 While crowdwork is a product of technological advances, it also represents a return to the past casual labour in industrialized economies, and in developing economies it adds to the casual labour force.65 The discussion here illustrates how technology is already shaping the distribution of income66 and of economic power through rising markups, with firms exercising power at the expense of workers and consumers, as reflected in the declin- ing share of labour income and the decoupling of median wages from labour productivity.67 Further advances in technology, linked to advances in au- tomation and artificial intelligence, could accel- erate these dynamics,68 while pushing to the limit existing frameworks to curb market power.
The merit of antitrust action is still assessed primarily by how much consumer prices have risen.69 But technology platforms are based on an exchange of user data for “free services.” So there are calls to revisit current antitrust approaches and how to extend them to curb monopsony power.70 Harnessing technology for a Great Convergence in human development This chapter started by asserting that avoiding another Great Divergence was a matter of choice—though that does not imply that the task will be easy.
It ends with indications of 208 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 how to exercise that choice and unleash a Great Convergence in human development.

The fo- cus will remain on digital and related technol- ogies, guided by a broad set of principles linked to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (box 6.2).

It first pro- vides a framework to analyse the impact of arti- ficial intelligence and automation that suggests opportunities to generate demand for labour.
The discussion also considers the challenges of artificial intelligence, including the potential to exacerbate horizontal inequalities, as well as the ethics of it.

It then provides concrete illustrations of how technology can, in practice, reduce inequality, particularly addressing the divergence in enhanced capabilities identified in part I of the Report.

Automation, artificial intelligence and inequality: Will it be possible to increase the demand for labour?
Automation and artificial intelligence do not have to shrink the net demand for labour.71 Automation can be leveraged to create new tasks—a reinstatement effect, which would counter the displacement effect.72 The impact on inequality will depend on how technology changes the task content of production— whether it displaces or reinstates labour through the creation of new kinds of tasks.
For example, jobs such as fulfilment centre work- er, social media adviser and YouTube media personality did not exist a few decades ago.

Technological advance also results in an overall BOX 6.2 increase in productivity, boosting the demand for all factors of production, including labour (figure 6.7).

After elaborating on the potential of this framework to identify opportunities to use artificial intelligence to increase labour demand, the discussion moves towards some of broader risks associated with it.
Artificial intelligence’s potential for reinstating work In addition to the amount, it is important to consider the quality of work.

Do the kinds of new tasks created through technology differ fundamentally from past ones?
For example, the rise of platforms may push down the number of workers in brick-and-mortar retail stores while increasing the number employed in fulfilment centres preparing online orders for shipping.73 Work available on platforms has introduced flexibility and extended work opportunities in some sectors but created chal- lenges such as how to handle the large amount of data on workers, which poses risks for work- er privacy and could have other consequences, depending on how the data are used.74 In addition to offering new work opportuni- ties, platforms can enhance financial inclusion.
This is happening in South-East Asia (where more than three-quarters of the population is unbanked) thanks to ride-hailing services such as Gojek and Grab.75 Once drivers become part of these platforms, they get support to open bank accounts, and the apps have become vehi- cles to handle financial transactions, including Digital technologies for the Sustainable Development Goals: Creating the right conditions Digital technologies have transformational potential.
Different actors at different levels have to participate for these applications to be taken to scale.

Many appli- cations are yet to be developed.

Policies are needed— at the national and global levels—to provide the right incentives to developers and adopters of technology in the fields most beneficial for human development.
The UN Secretary-General established the High- level Panel on Digital Cooperation in July 2018 to identi- fy examples of and propose ways for cooperating across sectors, disciplines and borders.
Its final report made several recommendations under broad themes, such as build an inclusive digital economy and society; protect human rights and human agency while promoting digital trust, security and stability; and fashion a new global digital cooperation architecture.1 As a follow up to that report, the Global Charter for a Sustainable Digital Age provides a set of principles and standards for the international community, aiming to link the digital age with the global sustainability per- spective.
It sets out concrete guidelines for action for dealing with the challenges of the digital age.2 Notes 1.

UN 2019a.

2.

German Advisory Council on Global Change website (www.wbgu.de/en/publications/charter).
Automation can be leveraged to create new tasks—a reinstatement effect, which would counter the displacement effect Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 209 FIGURE 6.7 Technology can displace some tasks but also reinstate new ones Technological change (automation, machine learning and robotics, new platform economy, global and local outsourcing) Productivity effect + Net change in demand for labour Reinstatement effect (cybersecurity experts, digital transformation specialists, data scientists) + Displacement effect (tasks related to accounting and bookkeeping, travel agents) - Source: Human Development Report Office.
Basing the impact of artificial intelligence and automation on the assumption that technology could replace entire occupations can lead to high estimates of how many jobs are at risk cash.
Incentives to adopt more formalized pay- ment methods extend to retailers, such as food merchants using the platform to deliver to their customers.76 Basing the impact of artificial intelligence and automation on the assumption that tech- nology could replace entire occupations can lead to high estimates of how many jobs are at risk.77 An approach based on tasks (with occupations defined by a bundle of different tasks) provides a more balanced and more actionable framework to understand the impact—and potential—of artificial intelli- gence and automation.
There is evidence that, within occupations, the possibility of tasks being replaced with artificial intelligence varies greatly, and different occupations have different resulting levels of susceptibility (table 6.1).78 Some occupations have several tasks that could be easily replaced by artificial intelli- gence bundled with other tasks that are diffi- cult or impossible for machines to replace.
A radiologist’s task of checking medical images to identify anomalies can be performed by artificial intelligence, but a machine cannot set priorities, consult with the medical team, make treatment plans or communicate with patients and family—all tasks the radiolo- gist performs.
This suggests that when tasks within a job can be separated and rebundled, there is potential for job-redesign or job-craft- ing.79 With the prevalence of highly accurate medical image recognition, radiologists can spend less time looking at images and more time interacting with other medical teams and with patients and family.

Job-redesign and job-crafting thus offer opportunities to 210 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 leverage artificial intelligence to increase la- bour demand.
The ability of artificial intelligence to iden- tify patterns, relationships and trends and to automatically display them through interactive dashboards or create automated reports is constantly improving.

This implies updated task structures for many jobs, including stock market traders, copywriters and even journal- ists and editors.

While a lot of tasks will be au- tomated, high-level management and oversight of automated systems tasks are less susceptible.
However, an occupation’s aggregate suitability for machine learning score is not correlated with wages.80 So it is not inevitable that artifi- cial intelligence will replace or depress wages in certain occupations, as some argue about previous waves of automation.81 A human-centred agenda thus requires atten- tion to technology’s broader role in advancing decent work.

Technology can free workers from drudgery and arduous labour.
There is even potential for collaborative robots, or cobots, to reduce work-related stress and injury.
Realizing technology’s potential in the future of work depends on fundamental choices about work design, including detailed job-crafting discus- sions between workers and management.82 Intelligence augmentation (using computers to extend people’s ability to process informa- tion and reason about complex problems) means that artificial intelligence, instead of aiming at automation, can integrate human agency and automation in a way that enhanc- es both.
The augmentation can take place in everyday human tasks.

This happens already in spelling and grammar checking in word processors, which highlight text to correct errors, and in autocompletions of text input in internet search engines.

Automatic suggestions, easily dismissible, can accelerate the search and refine ambiguous queries.

These provide value, promoting efficiency, accuracy and the consid- eration of alternate possibilities.
They augment, but do not replace, user interaction.83 Finally, the recent advances in artificial intelligence do not increase artificial general intelligence that could substitute machines for all aspects of human cognition.

Artificial in- telligence has been very effective at one aspect of intelligence: prediction.84 But prediction is only an input into decisionmaking.
The TABLE 6.1 Different tasks have different potential for being replaced by artificial intelligence Occupations with low suitability for machine learning Massage therapists Animal scientists Archaeologists Public address system and other announcers Plasterers and stucco masons Source: Brynjolfsson, Mitchell and Rock 2018.
Suitability for machine learning score Occupations with high suitability for machine learning Suitability for machine learning score 2.78 3.09 3.11 3.13 3.14 Concierges Mechanical drafters Morticians, undertakers and funeral directors Credit authorizers Brokerage clerks 3.90 3.90 3.89 3.78 3.78 Realizing technology’s potential in the future of work depends on fundamental choices about work design, including detailed job- crafting discussions between workers and management decision task is broader, requiring the collection and organization of data, the ability to take an action based on a decision and the judgement to evaluate the payoffs associated with different outcomes.
For individual workers, advances in artificial intelligence will matter to the degree that prediction is a core skill in the tasks that make up their occupation.

The diagnosis that a radiologist provides can also be partially made by artificial intelligence, but that is very differ- ent from a decision on the course of treatment or its implementation by a surgeon.

Automated prediction thus enhances rather than replaces the value of these occupations.
Exercising choices to seize on technology’s potential: Balancing risks and opportunity After establishing artificial intelligence’s poten- tial to reinstate work, this section elaborates on elements to consider in seizing the opportuni- ties that artificial intelligence, and technology more broadly, are presenting.

Doing so implies also having a clear-headed perspective on risks.
For instance, artificial intelligence can accentu- ate biases and horizontal inequalities (box 6.3), including exacerbating gender disparities in the workforce, leading to even more women being in low-quality service jobs.85 Women, on aver- age, perform more routine or codifiable tasks than men and fewer tasks requiring analytical input or abstract thinking.86 These differences are also present in gender gaps in education and employment linked to technology.87 LinkedIn Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 211 BOX 6.3 Artificial intelligence and the risk of bias: Making horizontal inequalities worse?
Artificial intelligence applications have the potential to support positive social change—indeed, in some do- mains their impact could be revolutionary.

But as with any new technology, actually achieving these positive results is challenging and risky.

Many groups of people across the globe may be on the receiving end of artificial intelligence’s downside.
They may lose their jobs as more tasks are performed by machine learning—even if net job loss is contained, inequalities in income and wealth could rise, and the quality of jobs fall.

Workers may see strong biases against their skin colour or gender embedded in ma- chine learning, and they may be subjects of surveillance.

Algorithms for job matching may reproduce historical bi- ases and prejudices.

Companies need policies on trans- parency and data protection so that workers know what is being tracked.
Regulation may be needed to govern data use and algorithm accountability in the world of work.

As uses of artificial intelligence become pervasive, questions arise about the rise of propaganda and manip- ulation, undermining democracy, and about surveillance and the loss of privacy.

For example, artificial intelli- gence applications are linked with the development of smart cities.1 This involves collecting data from cameras and sensors on a large scale.

How does this differ from mass surveillance?


Machine learning algorithms are not biased inher- ently; they learn to be biased.
Algorithmic bias occurs when the learning algorithm is trained on biased da- tasets and subsequently “accurately” learns the pat- terns of bias in the data.2 In some cases the learned representations within machine learning algorithms can even exaggerate these biases.3 For example, women are less likely to receive targeted ads for high-paying jobs potentially because the algorithm that targets the ads trained on data in which women had lower paying jobs.4 And a computer programme used in the United States to assess the risk of reoffending by individuals in the crim- inal justice system incorrectly flagged black defendants as high risk nearly twice as often as white defendants.5 Facial recognition services can be much less accu- rate in identifying women or people with darker skin.6 The well recognized lack of diversity among the people designing and developing artificial intelligence is another problem.
Few women work in artificial intel- ligence, as in the tech sector in general, and among the men, racial diversity is limited.7 Diverse teams, bringing diverse perspectives, representative of the general pop- ulation, could check biases.

Notes 1.

Glaeser and others 2018.

2.

Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan 2017; Danks and London 2017.

3.

Zhao, Wang and others 2017.

4.

Spice 2015.

5.

IDRC 2018.

6.

Boulamwini and Gebru 2018.

7.


IDRC 2018. and the World Economic Forum found a significant gap between female and male representation among artificial intelligence professionals—only 22 percent worldwide are female.88 Racial and ethnic differences among women in access to training and employment opportunities can exacerbate these disparities.

Artificial intelligence and technology more broadly developed by teams that reflect a coun- try’s population can counter such risks.
When teams are not diverse, artificial intelligence will tend to be trained on data that may have built-in biases that a more representative envi- ronment could avoid.

Researchers, firms and governments are responding to manage the risks of artificial intelligence—which include accentuation of biases as well as development of deceptive and malicious applications.
For instance, thousands of artificial intelligence researchers have signed an open letter stating that they will oppose autonomous weapons, which search and engage targets without human intervention.89 Many companies—from Big Tech to startups—are formulating corporate ethical principles overseen by ethics officers or review boards.
Still, it is unclear how ac- countable they will hold themselves to the principles—which points to the need for regulation.90 Governments increasingly use artificial intelligence themselves, and some are developing data ethics principles (box 6.4).
When artificial intelligence systems inform decisionmaking that affects humans (such as medical diagnosis or providing a judge with an assessment of potential recidivism), avoid- ing bias and errors across different contexts and communities is especially important.

And given the global application and reach of many artificial intelligence innovations, collective action may be needed at some point on some regulatory aspects.
LinkedIn and the World Economic Forum found a significant gap between female and male representation among artificial intelligence professionals—only 22 percent worldwide are female 212 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 6.4 The United Kingdom’s Data Ethics Framework principles 1.

Start with clear user need and public benefit.

Using data in more innovative ways has the potential to transform how public services are delivered.
We must always be clear about what we are trying to achieve for users—both citizens and public servants.

2.

Be aware of relevant legislation and codes of prac- tice.

You must have an understanding of the rele- vant laws and codes of practice that relate to the use of data.

When in doubt, you must consult rel- evant experts.

3.

Use data that is proportionate to the user need.

The use of data must be proportionate to the user need.
You must use the minimum data necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

4.

Understand the limitations of the data.

Data used to inform policy and service design in government must be well understood.

It is essential to consider the limitations of data when assessing if it is ap- propriate to use it for a user need.

5.

Ensure robust practices and work within your skillset.

Insights from new technology are only as good as the data and practices used to create them.
You must work within your skillset recog- nising where you do not have the skills or experi- ence to use a particular approach or tool to a high standard.

6.

Make your work transparent and be accountable.

You should be transparent about the tools, data and algorithms you used to conduct your work, working in the open where possible.

This allows other re- searchers to scrutinise your findings and citizens to understand the new types of work we are doing.

7.

Embed data use responsibly.


It is essential that there is a plan to make sure insights from data are used responsibly.

This means that both develop- ment and implementation teams understand how findings and data models should be used and moni- tored with a robust evaluation plan.

Source: UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 2018.

A broader set of disruptions to the world of work, powered in part by artificial intelli- gence, is linked to digital labour platforms— alluded to earlier.
These applications allow the outsourcing of work to geographically dispersed people, generating crowdwork.

While they provide new sources of income to many workers in different parts of the world, the work is sometimes poorly paid, and no official mechanisms are in place to address un- fair treatment.
Compensation for crowdwork is often below the minimum wage.91 True, much policy innovation is already under way, with subnational regulators stepping up.92 But the dispersed nature of the work across international jurisdictions makes it difficult to monitor compliance with applicable labour laws.
That is why the International Labour Organization suggests developing an inter- national governance system for digital labour platforms that sets minimum rights and protections and requires platforms (and their clients) to respect them.93 Providing social protection A related challenge is providing social protec- tion to help address both the adverse impact of technology disruptions on specific income groups and the resistance to those changes.94 During adjustments, vulnerable workers typically face periods of unemployment or see their earnings eroded.
But if technology changes rapidly, it might be more challenging to find decent jobs in a new techno-economic paradigm95 than after a more “standard” eco- nomic recession.
Social insurance programmes can provide affected workers with sustenance during transition periods, but the nature of the transition matters as well: Sectors and locations where the displacement effect is stronger may need targeted social protection schemes.96 Active labour market policies—including wage subsidies, job placement services and special labour market programmes—can fa- cilitate adaptation to a new techno-economic paradigm.
The ideal would be a social protec- tion floor that affords a basic level of protection to all in need, complemented by contributory social insurance schemes that provide increased protection.97 The design of these systems pre- sents policymakers with choices ranging from ensuring coverage at the bottom while curbing leakage to the better off98 to balancing the generosity of transfers and the losses in efficien- cy99 and ultimately to assessing the fiscal cost Compensation for crowdwork is often below the minimum wage Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 213 against alternative uses.100 Narrowly targeted policies could include measures to facilitate geographic mobility, supporting housing and moving costs,101 particularly if technology creates jobs in one region while contributing to their elimination in others.
Ultimately, social protection will be only part of the response, because workers whose jobs are partially or fully automatable will need to adjust to substantially changed or entirely new occupa- tions.

Since automation affects some tasks and creates others, the nature and content of jobs change constantly.

And this requires workers to learn throughout their lives.

Artificial intelli- gence and automation tend to make high-skilled workers more valuable and in demand.
There is evidence that those are the workers who avail themselves of lifelong learning opportunities, while participation among low-skill, low-wage workers is much lower (figure 6.8).

Thus, there is a risk of patterns of divergence emerging in workplace and lifelong learning that are simi- lar to those in enhanced capabilities.
Lifelong learning risks creating a wedge by enabling the highly skilled to race further ahead.102 Taxation and data regulations Beyond the impact of artificial intelligence on labour markets, two systemic challenges and risks merit particular attention: taxation and data regulation.
As the potential for machines to replace tasks performed by humans grows, some have argued that there is an efficiency ra- tionale for taxing robots103 and for channelling technology to reinstate, rather than replace, labour.104 In addition, digitally intensive eco- nomic activities, where the value of companies is linked less to their physical presence in a country and more to the number of members of networks around the world, are challenging longstanding assumptions underlying princi- ples of taxation.
Some proposed actions and ideas serve the interest of particular tax juris- dictions,105 but given that digital activities are global and many companies operate across bor- ders, there is a clear need for an international consensus on how to tax digital activities, and efforts to broker such an international agree- ment are under way.106 Data are at the centre of the digital economy.
Whether targeting ads, managing supply chains FIGURE 6.8 Workers in medium and high wage jobs are more likely to participate in adult learning Participation in adult learning by wage level (percent) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Italy Turkey Lithuania Poland Slovakia Japan Greece France Belgium Spain Israel Korea, Rep. of Austria Slovenia Germany Chile Singapore Czechia Estonia Ireland Canada Finland United Kingdom United States Australia Netherlands Sweden New Zealand Norway Denmark Average Low-wage Medium/high wage Source: OECD 2019c.
or deciding the placement of drivers waiting for rides, the revenues of more and more firms are tied to collecting and analysing huge amounts of data.

The free flow and use of data are im- portant for businesses and governments.

But there is also a need to protect personal data, data embodying intellectual property and data related to national security.

For now the ownership and use of data are governed mostly by default norms and rules.
But many jurisdic- tions at different levels are working out data policies to ensure that advances in innovation also protect users.107 European governments, 214 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 through the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, have instituted data pri- vacy rules.108 Beyond regulation are proposals to pay users for their data, to spread the wealth generated by artificial intelligence.

Firms could generate better data by paying.


Data-providing labour could come to be seen as useful work, conferring the same sort of dignity as paid employment.109 Deploying technology as a force for convergence in human development For education to drive convergence implies preparing young people today for the world of work of tomorrow.
Technology can help, for instance, in enabling individually customized content to “teach at the right level.” This is es- pecially important because the rapid expansion of access to primary and secondary education in developing countries has led to the enrol- ment of millions of first-generation learners.
If they fall behind and lack instructional support at home, they may learn very little in school.110 One example of how technology can help in middle school grades is a technology-led instructional programme called Mindspark used in urban India.

It benchmarks the initial learning level of every student and dynamically personalizes material to match the individual’s level and rate of progress.
In just 4.5 months those with access to the programme scored higher in math and in Hindi.111 In partnership with the programme, India’s government is providing a personal learning platform called Diksha.

Pointing a cell phone at a printed QR code opens a universe of interactive content— lesson plans for teachers and study guides for students and parents.112 Digital health solutions can also drive con- vergence.

Still in their early days, they show the potential for expanding service coverage.
Services include digitizing supply chains and patient data, with integrated digital platforms for information, bookings, payments and com- plementary services.

They are important in areas that are remote and that have inadequate access to health care providers.
Artificial intelligence is already taking hold, for example, in machine pattern recognition for medical scans and skin lesions.113 There is also potential for machine learning to aid personalized nutrition.114 And with the availability of real-time objective data on mood—from smartphone keystrokes, for example—artificial intelligence can help men- tal health diagnosis.
Elderly care providers are starting to offload some parts of care to artifi- cial intelligence, from early diagnosis of disease to at-home health monitoring and fall detec- tion.115 Artificial intelligence has also been used to pore through genetic data to discover that a shortage of the element selenium could be asso- ciated with premature births in Africa.116 Applications of artificial intelligence extend beyond education and health to other public services, leading not only to greater efficiency and enhanced transparency, but also to broad- er participation in various aspects of public life.
For example, linguistic diversity, a given in most countries, can make e-governance ser- vices inaccessible for entire groups.
In South Africa, with 11 official languages, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research is work- ing on machine translation approaches to broaden access to government services.117 In Uganda the AI Research Group at Makerere University is developing source datasets for some of the dozens of languages spoken there.118 The potential returns are huge in service delivery during and after disasters.
Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response is an open- source project that applies artificial intelli- gence to mine, classify and tag Twitter feeds during humanitarian crises, turning the raw tweets into an organized source of information that can improve response times.
Soon after Ecuador experienced a major earthquake in 2016, Zooniverse, a web-based platform for crowd-sourced research, launched a website that combined inputs from volunteers and an artificial intelligence system to review 1,300 satellite images and, two hours after the website’s launch, produced a heat map of damages.119 For social protection, technology is helping in targeting payments and other benefits, pro- viding timely delivery and reducing opportu- nities for fraud.
Public platforms that support interoperability and data exchange can reduce the administrative burden and the time to deliver services to poor, vulnerable and margin- alized groups, promoting social and economic inclusion.120 Technology can help, for instance, in enabling individually customized content to “teach at the right level” Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 215 The direction of technological change can be an explicit concern for policymakers Technology can also improve the availability of data and information for policymakers and businesses—and inform public debate.
For instance, as digital imagery becomes ubiquitous and machine vision techniques improve, auto- mated systems lend themselves to measuring demographics with fine spatial resolution in close to real time.121 The same applies to meas- uring poverty and other social and economic indicators, often combining mobile phone data and satellite imagery, with the use of multiple lenses obtained from diverse datasets helping capture information on living standards more accurately.122 For instance, in Senegal the Multidimensional Poverty Index can be accu- rately predicted for 552 communes using call data records and environmental data (related to food security, economic activity and accessibility to facilities).
This approach can generate poverty maps more frequently, and its diagnostic capa- bility is likely to assist policymakers in designing better interventions to eradicate poverty.123 In the same way that artificial intelligence can chart individualized learning paths for stu- dents, artificial intelligence’s potential to collect detailed and frequent data can be leveraged to obtain very specific localized information.124 For instance, using an artificial intelligence algorithm to analyse weather and local rice crop data in Colombia125 led to distinct recommendations for different towns, helping 170 farmers in Córdoba avoid direct economic losses estimated at $3.6 million and potentially improving rice production.
Other applications include using cutting-edge artificial intelligence to tackle urban challenges related to traffic, safety and sustaina- bility.
These applications range from artificial intelligence traffic management126 to artificial in- telligence systems that locate pipes at risk of fail- ure.127 Global telecommunication networks and cloud services can enable artificial intelligence insights to be transferred and adapted in dif- ferent contexts.128 Sharing artificial intelligence results among machines enables transfer learn- ing,129 through which knowledge moves and is customized into new contexts,130 supplementing resources in previously underserved areas.
* * * The direction of technological change can be an explicit concern for policymakers.131 Recall that the public sector has supported fundamental research for technology that was subsequently commercialized by the private sector.132 Technological innovation will be crucial to meet the Sustainable Development Goals.133 Harnessing technology for that purpose calls for all countries to shape global and national institutions and policies that will determine the impact of technological change on sustainability and inclusion in a way that is nationally relevant.134 It is in this context that international intellectual property rights mat- ter.
An overly stringent intellectual property rights regime can make technology diffusion harder (box 6.5).

The successful generation, diffusion and adoption of technology for development take place in a network of multiple actors—in- cluding the private sector, government and academia, often referred to as a national inno- vation system.135 Public policies to influence the direction of technology are nested in such systems.
Across countries, there are enormous asymmetries in the size and organization of innovation efforts.

Research and development are still more intensive in developed countries (figure 6.9), and on average the gap with other countries is widening, but at the same time new regions are emerging as scientific and techno- logical powerhouses, as in East Asia.
Important in the ability to invest nationally in science and technology, the diffusion of innovation will remain a powerful driver to increase productivity.
Enhancing the pro- ductivity and employability of every work- er—reaching those currently in informal and precarious forms of employment and excluded from more modern productive systems—will tend to reduce income inequality while increas- ing incomes.136 For this mechanism to work, workers must be able to use technology and benefit from the rise in productivity.
Between 2007 and 2017 the median income in many countries grew less than productivity per worker, even though in- come and productivity are strongly correlated (figure 6.10, left panel).

Moreover, the higher the productivity, the greater the share of pro- ductivity that the median worker receives as compensation (see figure 6.10, right panel).
Decoupling median labour income from pro- ductivity implies that increasing productivity 216 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 6.5 Intellectual property rights, innovation and technology diffusion In principle, intellectual property rights can be a pow- erful driver to incentivize innovation and creativity, even if they impose temporary restrictions on free access to new knowledge.
But in some cases they have generated patent thickets, patent trolls and ev- ergreening1—potentially curbing not only diffusion, but also innovation itself.

Patent thickets imply long and costly negotiations to obtain multiple permissions.
Patent trolling—where innovators face suits from oth- ers who own intellectual property simply to profit by licensing patents rather than undertaking production themselves—is costly.2 And evergreening—where companies extend their patent protection by inventing new follow-on patents that are closely linked but allow for a longer period of monopoly than would otherwise be permitted—curbs competition.
On balance, while weak patent systems may in- crease innovation only mildly, strong patent systems can slow innovation.3 In the last few decades a higher concentration of patent ownership, echoing the broader pattern of market concentration, has contributed to de- clines in knowledge diffusion and business dynamism.4 Under the World Trade Organization Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property System, developing countries are encouraged to increase the level and stringency of their intellectual property provisions in order to enhance international transfers of technology and spur innovative domestic firms.5 The point is that intellectual property protection will give them the right to the profits from research and development break- throughs.
But country case studies show mixed evi- dence of intellectual property rights being important for foreign investment inflows, domestic technological development or technology transfers.6 Assigning patents to a shell company in a low tax country, paying royalties on their own patents to the shell companies and parking the income offshore illus- trates how intellectual property rights can be used for tax avoidance.7 These mechanisms further concentrate income, wealth and market power.
Here, as in other areas, economic institutions and laws created in the 20th century to manage industrialization in developed economies may need to be reconsidered in the 21st century.

Notes 1.

Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz 2017.

2.

Bessen and Meurer 2014.

3.

Boldrin and Levine 2013.

4.

Akcigit and Ates 2019.

5.

Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz 2017.

6.

Maskus 2004.

7.

Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011; Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013.
FIGURE 6.9 There are enormous asymmetries in research and development across human development groups Researchers, 2017 (per million people) Change in researchers, 2007–2017 (per million people) Expenditure, 2015 (percent of GDP) Change in expenditure, 2005–2015 (percentage points) 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 800 600 400 200 0 1.80 1.20 0.60 0 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 –0.10 Low and medium High Very high Low and medium High Very high Human development group Human development group Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 217 FIGURE 6.10 Income and productivity are strongly correlated, and the higher the productivity, the greater the share of productivity that the median worker receives as compensation Log of workers’ median income (2011 PPP dollars) Ratio of workers’ median income to output per worker 12 10 8 6 4 Technology diffusion matters not only for incomes, but also for addressing other challenges, including those related to climate change 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Productivity (log of output per worker, 2011 PPP dollars) Productivity (log of output per worker, 2011 PPP dollars) Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data for 94 countries from the International Labour Organization.
is not enough to increase wages, as discussed earlier.137 But higher productivity can push the envelope for greater absolute compensation and for a more balanced distribution between workers and capital owners—and much of this push towards higher productivity depends on technology diffusion.

Technology diffusion matters not only for incomes, but also for addressing other challenges, including those related to climate change (chapter 5).
Technological inequality between developing and developed countries harms developing countries’ potential to move beyond traditional patterns of production and consumption.138 A significant decoupling of emissions from economic development is taking place, and over the last decade several countries—predominately Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members with very high human develop- ment—have been reducing their carbon dioxide emissions per capita, reflecting more efficient forms of production (figure 6.11).139 Technology diffusion will be key to extending that decoupling to countries at all levels of development.
This chapter has examined the distribution of enhanced capabilities related to technology.

There is potential for harnessing technology for convergence in human development.

At the same time, there is a possibility that these technologies end up causing more divergence.

Making the right choices and policies, in this area and more broadly, are the topic of chapter 7.
218 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 FIGURE 6.11 A significant decoupling of emissions from development has allowed some countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, reflecting more efficient forms of production Carbon dioxide emissions per capita, 2014 (tonnes) Change in carbon dioxide emissions per capita, 1995–2014 (tonnes) 50 40 30 20 10 0 Human development group Low Medium High Very high 20 10 0 –10 –20 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 Human Development Index value Human Development Index value Note: Each bubble represents a country, and the size of the bubble is proportional to the country’s population.
Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Chapter 6 Technology’s potential for divergence and convergence: Facing a century of structural transformation | 219 Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice Three trends in inequalities in human development are revealed by looking beyond income and beyond averages.
They frame the context for policies as we look beyond today to a world of mounting impacts of climate change and revolutionary advances in technology: • Inequalities in basic capabilities are falling (some quite rapidly) but remain high, with many people still left behind.

Moreover, the pace of convergence is not fast enough to eradicate extreme deprivations, as called for in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
• Inequalities in human development are growing in areas likely to be central to people over the next decades.

Inequality in enhanced capabilities—those fast-becoming essential as we move to the 2020s—are increasing, both between and within countries.

• Inequalities in the distribution of opportunities between men and women have improved, but further progress may get harder, as the challenge of gender equality moves from basic to enhanced capabilities.
There is even evidence of back- lash in some countries.

This is both a hopeful and sobering picture.

Hopeful because progress in reducing gaps in basic capabilities shows that with appropri- ate policies, results follow.

Policies have been insufficient to completely close gaps in basic capabilities, yet it may still be possible to get on track and eliminate extreme deprivations, as pledged in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

But aspirations are moving.


So considering just how to catch up in basic capa- bilities is not enough: Reversing the divergence in enhanced capabilities is becoming increas- ingly important.

Turning attention rapidly to this task could possibly avoid an entrenchment of divergences in enhanced capabilities.

Sobering because the compound effect of emerging inequalities, technological change and the climate crisis could make remedial actions down the road more challenging.
We know this from the lifecycle approach that has informed so much of the analysis in this Report—that capabilities accumulate over time, as can dis- advantages (chapters 1 and 2).

The 2020s will welcome children who are expected to live into the 22nd century, so gaps that would seem small in the next few years can be amplified over dec- ades, compounding already large inequalities in income and political power.

So we must act—but how?


This chapter proposes a framework for pol- icies that links the expansion and distribution of both capabilities and income.

With the overarching objective of redressing inequalities in both basic and enhanced capabilities, the framework includes two blocks (figure 7.1).
The first block (the one on the left in figure 7.1) encompasses policies towards the convergence and expansion of capabilities, looking beyond income.1 The policy goals are to accelerate con- vergence in basic capabilities while reversing divergences in enhanced capabilities and elim- inating gender and other horizontal inequali- ties.

The timing of many of these policies along the lifecycle matters, in relation to when they have an impact over the course of people’s lives.
The earlier in life some policies are pursued, the less interventions may be needed through other policies (which may be both more expensive and less effective) later in life.

The second block (the one on the right in figure 7.1) considers policies for the inclusive expansion of income.

The policy objective is to jointly advance equity and efficiency in markets, increasing productivity that translates into widely shared growing incomes—redress- ing income inequality.
The framework is based Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 223 7.
The framework is multidimensional, emphasizing the intrinsic importance of indivisible human freedoms: Redressing inequalities in basic and enhanced capabilities is the overarching intended outcome FIGURE 7.1 A framework for designing policies to redress inequalities in human development Redressing inequalities in basic and enhanced capabilities Policies to: - Accelerate convergence in basic capabilities - Reverse divergence in enhanced capabilities - Eliminate gender and horizontal inequalities t e k r a m e r P Premarket Postmarket I n - m a r k e t Policies for inclusive expansion in incomes (productivity and equity) Source: Human Development Report Office calculations.
on an integrated approach, because the two blocks of policies are interdependent.

Policies to advance capabilities beyond income often require resources to fund government pro- grammes, which are financed by taxes.

And the overall resources available are, in turn, linked to productivity, which is linked in part to people’s capabilities.

The two blocks can thus work to- gether in a virtuous policy cycle.
The framework is multidimensional, empha- sizing the intrinsic importance of indivisible human freedoms: Redressing inequalities in basic and enhanced capabilities is the over- arching intended outcome.

Thus, it is not consistent with the reduction of inequalities in some capabilities at the expense of the drastic deterioration of others.
Or with approaches that either reduce living standards–compro- mising sustainable growth through ill-designed distributive policies–or that simply pursue the creation of wealth while violating human rights and our planet’s sustainability.

Multidimensionality also allows a better integration of the instrumental analysis of income and nonincome mechanisms behind the formation and progressive equalization of capabilities.
The policy cycle can be described as one composed of premarket policies (pri- marily within the block on the left of figure 7.1 on nonincome capabilities and feeding into the block on the right), in-market policies (predominantly in the right block on inclusive income expansion) and postmarket policies (which connect the right block back to the left).
Wages, profits and labour participation rates are typically determined in markets, which are conditioned by prevailing regula- tions, institutions and policies (in-market).

But those outcomes also depend on policies that affect people before they become active in the economy (premarket).
Premarket policies can reduce disparities in capabilities, help- ing everyone enter the labour market better equipped—even though it is important to emphasize that this is far from the only reason why capabilities matter and that by enhancing capabilities the contributions to expanding incomes go beyond participating in the labour market (they can, for instance, enhance polit- ical participation).
In-market policies affect the distribution of income and opportunities when individuals are working, shaping out- comes that can be either more or less inclusive.

Postmarket policies affect inequalities once the market, along with in-market policies, have determined the distribution of income and op- portunities.

These sets of policies interact.


The provision of public services premarket may depend in part on the effectiveness of postmar- ket policies (taxes on market income to fund health and education, for instance), which matter in mobilizing government revenue to pay for those services.
And taxes, in turn, are informed by how much society is willing to redistribute income from those with more to those with less.2 224 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Universal policies built on extensive coverage only— without adequate resources or designed to ensure both quality and equity—are not genuinely universal A corollary is that considering policies in isolation has limited effectiveness.
Take, for instance, recommendations linked to the redis- tribution of income, which tend to dominate the policy debate.
Tony Atkinson simulated the effect of an ambitious redistributive package on income inequality in the United Kingdom, showing that it would only halve the gap with Sweden in the Gini coefficient for disposable income and would be insufficient to reverse its increase between the late 1970s and 2013.3 This should not be read as indicating that redistribu- tion does not matter—the chapter argues quite the opposite—but decisive change depends on a wider and more systemic approach to policies.
Using this framework, the chapter has two sections, each corresponding roughly to poli- cies associated with the two blocks.

The aim of the chapter is to illustrate with specific exam- ples of policies how the framework proposed can be used to redress inequalities in human de- velopment—it is not meant to provide a com- prehensive analysis of all relevant policies.
And given the large heterogeneity across countries and the uncertainties associated with future pathways (due not only to climate change and technology but also to other factors not con- sidered in the Report4), each country will have to determine the most suitable set of policies for its unique circumstances.

The first section discusses how to expand capabilities beyond income, addressing both vertical and horizontal inequalities in human development.
It considers both the structure and the design of education and health sys- tems, as well as policies related to the emerging challenges of technology and climate change.

Among horizontal inequalities, the focus is on gender equality, responding to the challenges outlined in chapter 4.

The second section addresses policies that can jointly lift productivity in ways that are trans- lated into widely shared incomes—redressing income inequality.
Those policies have a bearing on how markets for goods and services as well as for labour and capital function.

The section also discusses the effect of redistributive policies at the national level.

Because national policies can be constrained or facilitated by globalization, the section considers how international col- lective action—or the lack thereof—can shape inequalities in the 21st century.
Towards convergence in capabilities beyond income: From basic to enhanced universalism Policies with universal reach speak to the fulfil- ment of the pledge to “leave no one behind” of the 2030 Agenda and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5 Progress towards universal achievements has been remarkable: 91 percent of children attend primary education,6 more than 8 in 10 births are attended by a skilled professional7 and more than 90 percent of people have access to an improved water supply.8 These averages may hide the prevalence of deprivations (chapter 1) but are massive achievements.9 They did not happen by chance: They were the result of policy choices.
This section is about recalibrat- ing ambitions and actions for the 21st century and for new generations that will see the 22nd century.

It starts by arguing that convergence in capabilities beyond income should build on these achievements, but be further enhanced.
Such enhancement would call for both politi- cal support (which would require overcoming constraints in social choice, as elaborated in spotlight 7.1 at the end of the chapter), as well as financial resources (to be addressed in the second half of the chapter).

Beyond enhanced universalism, this section considers policies on eliminating horizontal inequalities (with a fo- cus on gender inequality) and the enhancement of capabilities for climate shocks and to harness technology.
Towards enhanced universal systems Universal policies built on extensive coverage only—without adequate resources or designed to ensure both quality and equity—are not genuinely universal.10 They are useful: They boost floors, providing access to essential services, and can be credited for some of the convergence in basic capabilities.

But they are unable to address on their own the persistence of inequalities in human development, as man- ifested in gradients in achievements.
This section argues that enhanced universal systems (illustrated with services linked to education and health) could be more effective in reducing human development inequalities if based on two pillars: Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 225 Relying on private, fee-based schools for basic education can leave the poorest even further behind, due in part to unequal access and lower accountability for quality, which tends to harm poor students disproportionally, especially girls • Comprehensive social services ensuring equal access to quality services in line with the new demands and aspirations of the 21st century.11 As chapter 2 noted, inequality in human development is multidimensional— transmitted through different channels, in- cluding markets, family networks and social networks—and can be compounded by fac- tors such as violence.
Health outcomes, for instance, depend on access to services but are also socially determined.

Enhanced universal systems would incorporate these dimensions.

• Complementary special policies for excluded groups.

Even though poor and marginalized people may benefit from universal policies, these alone might not be enough to reach those furthest behind, including due to group-based discrimination.

For instance, children from households facing overlapping deprivations.
Leaving no one behind thus also requires targeted policies addressing horizontal and group inequalities.12 Ensuring universal access to knowledge and lifelong learning Policies to ensure equitable access to quality early childhood education have long-term con- sequences for health, cognitive development and employment prospects—and they even benefit a person’s siblings and children (chap- ter 2).13 Focusing primarily on providing access to education towards a minimum national standard has not always closed achievement gaps, even in developed countries.14 Given that SDG target 4.6 calls for all young people to achieve numeracy and literacy skills, even equal grade attainment between rich and poor house- holds in the same country would not necessari- ly ensure that this target is met.
In fact, learning achievements in many developing countries are below the SDG target even for students from richer families—and children from poorer households have even worse school attainment.

This implies that simple equalization—lifting up the children from the lowest socioeconomic status to the grade attainment achieved by chil- dren from the highest socioeconomic status in each country—would not achieve the SDG tar- get of quality learning for all.
Thus, enhancing learning outcomes to achieve the SDG target of universal numeracy and literacy implies that there are two gaps to address: the gap between poor and rich within countries and the gap between the top achievers in each country and the SDG target.15 Children from lower socioeconomic groups have a double disadvantage—fewer years of school and less learning each year.
Policies that focus on outcomes rather than inputs require data on learning rather than just on enrolment, investing in children’s mastery of basic concepts from an early stage and combining overall improvements with targeted interventions for groups that are especially disadvantaged.16 Relying on private, fee-based schools for basic education can leave the poorest even further behind,17 due in part to unequal access and lower accountability for quality, which tends to harm poor students disproportionally, especial- ly girls.
Free quality public education, improv- ing teachers’ training and enhancing inclusivity, especially for girls and disabled students, can mitigate these risks.18 Early childhood interventions that can help flatten gradients are showing results in devel- oping countries (box 7.1).

Several countries have been expanding coverage in preprimary education, with Ethiopia having pushed for a significant jump in coverage since 2010 (box 7.2).
This not only is likely to contribute to equalization of capabilities in the long run but can also affect the distribution of unpaid work, favouring the inclusion of women in the labour market (as elaborated in the discussion about gender inequality later in this chapter).

Furthermore, technology demands updat- ing skills throughout life (chapter 6).
Lifelong learning would enhance both economic and social outcomes and help achieve more equitable opportunities at every age.19 The International Labour Organization has made a concrete proposal on how to implement a system of entitlements to training, through reconfigured employment insurance or social funds that would allow workers to take paid time off to engage in training.20 Workers would be entitled to a number of hours of training, regardless of the type of work they do.
In countries where most workers work informally, national or sectoral education and training funds to provide informal work- ers access to education and training could be established.

Policies to reduce informal 226 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 7.1 Enhancing capabilities in China: Tackling inequality at its roots In addition to cognitive skills, social and emotional skills have been found to mark a productive adult.1 But these skills are often left to the family.
While weak social and emotional skills may be an emerging source of inequal- ity, they can also be a consequence because the root can lie in inequalities in parents’ education that may be transmitted to the next generation.

But investing in these skills also provides an opportunity to break the vicious cycle of inequalities by creating a level start for all children.
China’s scores in positive parenting and socioemo- tional development improved substantially between 2010 and 2014, especially for children from poorer fam- ilies.

Positive parenting was measured by survey ques- tions that ask caregivers how often they intervene to enhance their children’s age-specific skills (for instance, read to them or play outside with them).

Socioemotional development was measured by an assessment of chil- dren’s attitudes, behaviour and relation to others.
For younger children from the lowest income quin- tile the average positive parenting test score increased from 1.34 (on a scale of 1 to 5) in 2010 to 2.67 in 2014.

For younger children from the richest quintile the aver- age score increased from 2.37 to 3.17—less than for the other wealth quintiles.

Average scores for older chil- dren showed a similar pattern, rising from 3.41 in 2010 to 3.61 in 2014 for children in the lowest quintile and from 3.49 to 3.65 for children in the richest quintile.
So, inequality in parenting test scores between richer and poorer quintiles almost disappeared.2 China’s improvements are linked to its national campaign to promote early childhood development, launched with the United Nations Children’s Fund in 2010.

The campaign has the ambitious goal of universal early childhood education.

It emphasizes brain develop- ment in early childhood and provides parenting support through internet portals, websites and mobile phone applications.
It also includes substantial investments in kindergarten and teacher training, especially in rural areas and for poor and migrant children in urban areas, and government support for early learning development guidelines, tools and national standards.3 Notes 1.

Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 2016.; Kautz and others 2014.

2.

Li and others 2018.

3.

Greubel and van der Gaag 2012; UNICEF 2019c.


BOX 7.2 Unlocking the potential of preprimary education for advancing human development in Ethiopia An estimated 50 percent of children in the world are not enrolled in any form of early childhood education.1 In developing countries children face even higher barriers—with only 20 percent enrolment—and often receive lower quality preprimary education.
Sustainable Development Goal target 4.2 calls for all girls and boys to have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education by 2030, but the poorest households have the least access to these learning opportunities.

Ethiopia shows how preprimary education can enable developing countries to improve education outcomes.
Starting from one of the lowest preprimary enrolment rates in the world, just 1.6 percent in 2000, Ethiopia saw the rate rise to 45.9 percent in 2017—representing more than 3 million children.2 Most of the growth was between 2007 and 2017, initiated by the National Policy Framework for Early Childhood Care and Education in 2010.
Acknowledging the key role of equitable access to preprimary education for human development, a core pillar of the policy framework is the expan- sion of preschool and school readiness programmes.3 Led by the Ministry of Education, the main catalyst for the growth in preprimary education has been the “0-Class,” a year of preschool intended for vulnerable households that aims to prepare young children for entry into grade 1, the first year of primary school.
Although the ministry had initially considered two years of preprimary education, the plans were changed to broaden access.

Since its introduction the 0-Class has achieved high enrolment rates and is now by far the most widely available preschool, especially in rural areas.4 In its first year, the programme enrolled almost three times more children than had access to kindergarten in the previous year.
Fuelled by these early successes, further solutions to increase rural enrolment have been explored in Ethiopia.

The United Nations Children’s Fund and Save the Children piloted the Accelerated School Readiness model to reach children who did not attend 0-Class, including children in emergency situations.5 The model consists of a two-month summer programme before grade 1.
Run by primary school teachers and supported by low-cost learning kits, it provides young children with a basic curriculum in preliteracy and prenumeracy.

The impacts of preprimary education have been evaluated in multiple case studies in Ethiopia.
A Save the Children project on advancing literacy and math skills found that children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds achieved significantly higher education gains—practically closing the learn- ing gap with their peers from higher socioeconomic backgrounds.6 Young Lives, an international study of childhood poverty led by researchers at the University of Oxford, followed the education achievements of two cohorts of children between 2002 and 2016 across Ethiopia.7 Urban children who attended preschool programmes had a 25.7 percent higher likelihood of completing secondary education than their non-preschool counterparts.
Notes 1.

UNICEF 2019c.

2.

UNICEF 2019c.

3.

Rossiter and others 2018.

4.

Woodhead and others 2017.

5.

UNICEF 2019c.

6.

Dowd and others 2016.

7.

Woldehanna and Araya 2017.


Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 227 Political commitment needs to go hand in hand with financial resources dedicated to universal health coverage, and different countries take different approaches employment could be powerful, since formal jobs are associated with larger firms that in- vest more in worker training and with longer employment spells, where more on-the-job learning can occur.
Enabling everyone to lead a long and healthy life While inequalities in health outcomes are often unrelated to the availability of health services (chapter 2 and box 7.3), universal health cov- erage, a priority in SDG target 3.8, has the potential to increase equality in health-related capabilities.21 Thailand and Rwanda have rolled out universal health coverage schemes.
In Thailand the policy, implemented in 2001, spread to all provinces the following year and reached 98 percent of the population in 2011.22 Rwanda has the highest enrolment in health insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa, with community-based health insurance covering more than 75 percent of the population.23 In Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam—with a wide range of health systems and incomes—governments used an incremental approach to create and expand their universal health coverage programmes.24 The process typically began by providing health insurance to civil servants and formal sector workers.
Next was expanding coverage to poor and vulnerable people, which required a strong political commitment.

In Brazil and Thailand social movements played an important role (see box S7.1.1 at the end of the chapter for the role of social movements more broadly in redressing inequalities).

Political commitment needs to go hand in hand with financial resources dedicated to universal health coverage, and different coun- tries take different approaches.
France used earmarked taxes: first a payroll tax and later earmarked income and capital taxes.

Brazil and Ghana earmark part of their social security contributions and value added tax.

By contrast, Japan, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam do not have specific amounts earmarked but give it budget priority.

In addition to financing, a major implementation challenge is the shortage of health care personnel.

In many cases private and unregulated public health care of variable quality may increase sharply.
In response, Indonesia reformed its accreditation of health professionals and standardized the processes for certifying them.

Brazil and Ethiopia broad- ened their health professional recruitment pools for health extension and offered more flexible career opportunities to community health workers.25 BOX 7.3 The persistence of health gradients even with universal health coverage Even countries with low income inequality and universal health coverage have not eliminated gradients in health.
Sweden has an outstanding health care system, with broad coverage, minimal out-of-pocket costs and spe- cial help for vulnerable groups.

But this equal access to health care does not produce equal health outcomes.

For example: • Mortality rates in Sweden are strongly correlated with socioeconomic status.

At the bottom more than 40 percent of people die by age 80, compared with fewer than 25 percent at the top.
People of lower socioeconomic status are twice as likely as those at the top to suffer from heart attacks, lung cancer, type 2 diabetes and heart failure.

• Only 10 percent of women from bottom-income households in Sweden receive the vaccination against human papillomavirus, compared with 40 percent of women from top-income households.
• Risky births are more common in poorer families in Sweden, since more than 30 percent of mothers in the bottom 1 percent smoke before or during preg- nancy compared with only 5 percent of mothers in the top group.

Such persistent inequality in health outcomes can be accounted for in part by unequal access to health exper- tise outside the formal health system.
Some policies that could mimic family access to health professionals include long-term visiting-nurse programmes, making more gen- eral practitioners available and ensuring that more pro- viders are culturally compatible with their communities, since this increases trust.

Such policies would be even more effective if targeted at the poorest.

Source: Human Development Report Office, based on Chen, Persson and Polyakova (2019).
228 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Addressing horizontal inequalities: Focus on gender inequality Universal policies can provide basic floors but may not be enough to eliminate horizontal inequalities.

The latter are often rooted in long-standing social norms and social exclu- sion.
Social exclusion happens when people are unable to fully participate in economic, social and political life because they are excluded on the basis of cultural, religious, racial or other reasons.26 This may mean a lack of voice, lack of recognition or lack of capacity for active participation.
It may also mean exclusion from decent work, assets, land, opportunities, access to social services or political representation.27 When there are large horizontal inequalities, targeted or affirmative action policies that directly support disadvantaged groups—for ex- ample, the provision of access to credit, schol- arships or certain group quotas in employment and education—can complement universal policies.
Several historical examples show that a combination of universal and targeted pol- icies can reduce horizontal inequalities.28 But there is also a risk that targeted policies further reinforce group differences or grievances, since members receive benefits precisely because of their group identity.
Targeted policies are particularly relevant when a group has clearly been disadvantaged historically,29 with policies having a defined timeframe so that they are ap- plied only as long as the targeted group is truly disadvantaged.

Clear communication about the policies is crucial to prevent grievances and feelings of disadvantage.
Given that gender remains one of the most prevalent bases of discrimination, policies addressing deep-seated discriminatory norms and harmful gender stereotypes, prejudices and practices are key for the full realization of women’s human rights.30 Policies can target social norms directly.

Interventions to change unequal power relationships among individuals within a community or to challenge deeply rooted gender roles can be achieved through education, by raising awareness or by changing incentives.
Education and raising awareness are both based on providing individuals with new information and knowledge that can foster different values and behaviours.

Such initiatives might include formal education, workplace training or media campaigns against gender stereotyping.

To change incentives, protective mechanisms can confront possible harm due to traditional gender norms or a backlash, such as school bullying or workplace harassment.
Changing incentives can also be introduced to delay early marriage and reduce teenage pregnancies.

The three dimensions (education, awareness, incentives) often reinforce each oth- er, as the examples of policies included in this section suggest.

For example, Québec’s 2006 nontransfer- able parental leave for fathers shifted incen- tives so that fathers became more involved in home caregiving.
With new benefits fathers increased their participation in parental leave by 250 percent,31 contributing to reverse the social norm that expected mothers to take sole responsibility for care work.

And in households where men had the opportunity to use the ben- efit, fathers’ daily time in household work was 23 percent higher than in households where new fathers did not participate, long after the leave period ended.32 This example also shows the importance of including men in gender equality policies.
In fact, according to a survey of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries on implementing gender strategies or policies, almost everyone considers changing men’s and boys’ attitudes towards care activities to be the first priority.33 Yet, even though the importance of adequately engaging men and boys in over- coming gender inequality or addressing their own gender-related vulnerabilities is widely acknowledged, public policies have yet to fully consider that dimension.34 Thus, laws and regulations can balance the distribution of care work in households—say, by increasing the duration of paid parental leave, as in the Québec example.
But only about half of the countries in the world offer paternity leave in addition to maternity leave, and half of those offer fewer than 3 weeks for fathers and 80 percent offer fewer than 14 weeks for mothers.35 Moreover, it is not enough for the policy to be gender-neutral; it must explicitly target men (as in Québec), precisely because otherwise social norms may prevail, impeding people from taking leave.
In 2007 the Republic of Korea started to reserve a year of paternal leave, and by 2014 the number of male Several historical examples show that a combination of universal and targeted policies can reduce horizontal inequalities.
But there is also a risk that targeted policies further reinforce group differences or grievances, since members receive benefits precisely because of their group identity Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 229 Balancing the distribution of care, particularly for children, is crucial precisely because much of the difference in earnings throughout the lifecycle is generated before age 40, leading women to miss many labour market opportunities during the early stages of their careers workers who took advantage of it had tripled.36 And some countries offer economic incentives for workers to use leave, as in Sweden, where parents receive a small gender-equality finan- cial bonus for every day they use parental leave equally.
This way, fathers’ share of childcare during the early months or years of a child’s life can be increased, which may allow for changes in social norms around childcare that can be reflected throughout a child’s life.
Balancing the distribution of care, particular- ly for children, is crucial precisely because much of the difference in earnings throughout the li- fecycle is generated before age 40, leading wom- en to miss many labour market opportunities during the early stages of their careers.37 These missed opportunities coincide with childbirth, which can encourage women to withdraw from the labour market.
Offering access to affordable childcare can provide mothers opportunities to make their own work-life decisions, allowing them to engage in paid work.

Mothers tend to adjust their choices around paid work to the demands of childcare.38 Hence, accessible and affordable childcare is relevant for mothers’ freedom to engage in paid work.39 The impact of regulations and laws goes beyond changing the balance of care.
Policies are important in areas ranging from protection BOX 7.4 Girls’ coding choices and opportunities from violence and discrimination to access to public services.

But the way in which policies are designed and implemented is determined, in part, by participation in politics.

Thus, af- firmative action quotas that increase minority participation in politics can result in stronger institutional commitment to equality and nondiscrimination.
Even though Tunisia is a young democracy (its first constitution was ratified in 2014), today it has one of the world’s most progressive gender parity laws.

It has leg- islated candidate, constitutional and electoral law quotas.

The regulations guarantee equal opportunities for women and men at all levels of responsibility in all fields and ask candidates to file candidacy applications on the basis of parity between men and women alternating.
By 2018 women occupied 47 percent of local council positions.40 Almost all countries with high female political representation have such enabling measures as positive discrimination and affirmative action.

Policies can also increase the representation of girls in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM; box 7.4).

The Costa Rican Technological Institute set up a special- ized training centre to build women’s capacity in STEM and entrepreneurship.
It celebrated the first all-female hackathon in Central In Latin America 30 million young people are not in edu- cation, employment or training, and 76 percent of them are women.
As an additional challenge, studying is not a guarantee for a bright future for women and girls: Less than 20 percent of women in the region transition from studying to formal jobs.1 Laboratoria is a nonprofit organization established in 2014 that targets girls from low-income families who face major barriers to accessing higher education.
It combines applied coding education (including six-month coding bootcamps), socioemotional training, deep em- ployer engagement and job placement services to cre- ate opportunities for students.

Operating in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, it has graduated more than 820 girls and aims to reach 5,000 young women by 2021.

More than 80 percent of students get jobs as developers, which often triples their incomes.
The chosen women face different barriers such as living on the outskirts of cities and having to spend 2–3 hours to commute to class or growing up be- lieving tech sector jobs requiring mathematics skills were beyond their reach.

In the courses the women learn coding essentials to build websites, apps and games.

Classes follow the agile classroom model, learning as if they were working.
When students near the completion of the training and begin their job search, Laboratoria pairs them with mentors from the technology field.

Tech companies such as IBM, Google, LinkedIn and Microsoft have partnered with Laboratoria to increase the supply of female devel- opers.

The companies participating in and sponsoring Talent Fest have first access to Laboratoria’s pool of talent, but other businesses can pay to browse student profiles as well.

Note 1.

OECD 2017.
Note 1.

OECD 2017.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on Guaqueta (2017), Laboratoria (2019) and World Bank (2013).

230 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 America in 2018, using technology and STEM expertise to bolster sustainable development.41 Cenfotec University and the institute estab- lished a follow-up strategy to create technol- ogy training spaces and support all women interested in a STEM career.
NiñaSTEM (GirlSTEM), launched in early 2017 by the Mexican government in partnership with the OECD, invites women with prominent science and mathematics careers to act as mentors, visiting schools and encouraging girls to choose STEM subjects and be ambitious.42 For girls to choose STEM they must be in school.

Some interventions can change incen- tives for girls to stay in school by either delaying marriage or reducing adolescent pregnancy.

Cash transfers have been proven to increase school attendance.
The Zomba Cash Transfer Programme in Malawi, where pregnancy is the main reason girls drop out, gave conditional and unconditional transfers to girls in school and girls who had recently dropped out.

It significantly reduced HIV prevalence and preg- nancy and early marriage rates and improved language test scores.43 As with education, it is important to consid- er how women may be uniquely vulnerable to health inequalities because of their sexual and reproductive health care needs.
Reproductive health, which gives women agency and con- trol over their own body and fertility, still has much room for progress.
In Tigray, Ethiopia, a service delivery model that combines commu- nity-based distribution of contraception with social marketing benefits women and their communities.44 In Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, the government started a national module for comprehensive sexuality education in all schools to empower girls and women through awareness of and access to sexual and reproductive health assistance and family plan- ning services—and to provide the community a platform for dialogue on sexual education and sexual and reproductive rights.
The govern- ment has received support from international organizations, including the United Nations Population Fund, to develop the school club model and two manuals for teachers and students.45 Finally, social norms mould individuals’ behaviours and beliefs about violence against women.

Preventive policies can target both women and men.


For example, SASA!, a pro- gramme designed by Raising Voices and first implemented in Kampala, Uganda, targets tra- ditional social norms that perpetuate violence against women.

Addressing both women and men in households, it approaches the power imbalance at the individual and structural lev- els by making communities rethink household relationship dynamics.
Today the programme’s results have been widely tested and standard- ized, as in Haiti and Tanzania, and it has been scaled up to 25 countries.46 Towards enhanced capabilities for climate shocks and technology Climate change and technology are likely to shape inequalities in human development over the course of the 21st century, as explored in chapters 5 and 6.
Enhanced capabilities related to these two factors are ultimately about how empowered people are to navigate the challeng- es and opportunities associated with them in the coming decades.

For climate change, enhanced capabilities encompass those that enable people to prepare and respond not only to shocks that have historical precedence but also to the more un- precedented disruptions that climate change is likely to bring about.

Insurance can help in this regard.
Article 8 of the 2015 Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change calls for risk insurance fa- cilities, climate risk pools and other insurance solutions.47 That same year the Group of 7 launched an initiative on climate risk insurance, pledging to reach 400 million uninsured peo- ple in poor countries.48 Insurance, however, has well recognized challenges (such as moral haz- ard and adverse selection) that imply the need for appropriate regulation.
This also applies to the design of climate-related insurance systems.

Index-based microinsurance linking payouts to independently observed weather parameters, such as rainfall, can address some of these chal- lenges, while sovereign insurance pools have also been proposed and implemented.49 Still, climate change poses unique challenges to, and perhaps limits on, the viability and function of insurance if it is difficult to share risks.
Climate change is expected to affect large geographies in similar ways.
As risks become For climate change, enhanced capabilities encompass those that enable people to prepare and respond not only to shocks that have historical precedence but also to the more unprecedented disruptions that climate change is likely to bring about Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 231 The most salient self-reported barrier for mobile internet use is limited digital literacy and skills: 34 percent in Africa, 35 percent in East Asia, 37 percent in South Asia and 28 percent in Latin America more correlated, the benefits of risk sharing that insurance affords can become smaller.
For instance, the probability that the top four maize-producing countries will experience a simultaneous production loss greater than 10 percent is now virtually zero.

But as temper- atures increase by 2°C, mean yields drop and absolute variability increases, the probability increases to 7 percent.
At an increase of 4°C, it reaches 86 percent.50 Policies—local, national and international— thus have a major role in the design and im- plementation of climate-related insurance that includes poor and vulnerable people.

Policies can support the application of new technolo- gies.

Drones, for example, have shown promise in gathering accurate data on weather-related damage to crops and property.51 Or insurance premiums could be directly subsidized, and even means-tested.
Reinsurance will also be important for affordable premiums, especially where insurance is local and climate-related risk profiles are fairly homogeneous.
The special report of the 2018 Inter- governmental Panel on Climate Change discusses place-specific adaptation pathways as opportunities for addressing structural in- equalities, power imbalances and governance mechanisms that give rise to and exacerbate inequalities in climate risks and impacts.52 But the report warns that such pathways can also reinforce inequalities and imbalances.
Adaptation narratives built around self-reli- ance, for example, may intensify climate bur- dens on poor people and marginalized groups.

The special report also lists recent research that has linked long-term climate change mit- igation and adaptation pathways to individual SDGs, to varying degrees.

It calls for more nexus approaches, which investigate a subset of sustainable development dimensions together.
Examples include a water–energy–climate nexus, leveraging the widely used shared socioeconomic pathways.

Using new methods for poverty and inequality projections, shared socioeconomic pathway–based assessments have been undertaken for the local sustainable development implications of avoided impacts and related adaptation needs.
A focus on sustainable development can re- duce the climate risk exposure of populations vulnerable to poverty by more than an order of magnitude,53 including by developing narra- tives that would facilitate more SDG-focused analyses, with climate as one objective among other SDGs.54 When it comes to technology, chapter 6 highlights the importance of harnessing technological change towards inclusion and sustainability and the crucial role that “being connected” plays in enabling countries and people to leverage the potential of digital and artificial intelligence technologies.
Even though the impact of technology on human development goes beyond access, the discus- sion here illustrates steps that can enhance capabilities (without suggesting that this is the most important policy response).

Chapter 6 documents divergence in access to advanced communication technologies, which can be accounted for in part by gaps in relative costs.
The Broadband Commission has set a target for 2025: entry-level broadband services (1 gigabyte) at a cost of less than 2 percent of monthly gross national income per capita.
Currently most developed countries, almost half of developing countries that are not least developed countries and a small portion of least developed countries have met the target.55 Still, the most salient self-reported barrier for mobile internet use is limited digital literacy and skills: 34 percent in Africa, 35 percent in East Asia, 37 percent in South Asia and 28 per- cent in Latin America.56 Indeed, more than half the world’s people lack basic information and communication technology skills.
There are significant differences across income groups.

For instance, in lower-middle-income countries only 6 percent of adults have sent an email with an attachment compared with 70 percent in developed countries.57 Thus, education for both young and older people will be key to increas- ing digital literacy.

Connectivity can also be enhanced through public Wi-Fi services offered in public facili- ties such as libraries and community centres.

Singapore and North Macedonia are two pioneers.


In 2005 Singapore implemented the Wireless@SG programme to connect citi- zens through a network of hotspots in public and commercial facilities.

In 2006 North Macedonia developed a plan to connect 460 primary and secondary schools and provide 232 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 680 Wi-Fi kiosks with free access to internet services.

Indonesia recently launched an ambi- tious plan to have public access across many of its 17,000 islands by 2022.
In the Philippines the Free Public Access Program is expanding connectivity through the country: In 2019, 2,677 access points were operational, and 6,000 are expected to be added in a second phase.

In Thailand the government is extending con- nectivity to 4,000 villages.

In the Dominican Republic the government is installing 5,000 hotspots.
In Madagascar the government has started a plan to connect schools and hospitals.58 In fact, access to the internet is so important that it is making its way to being acknowledged as a right.
In 2016 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution stressing the importance of “applying a com- prehensive human rights-based approach in providing and in expanding access to Internet,” requesting “all States to make efforts to bridge the many forms of digital divides.” This expan- sion must be consistent with general human rights principles, “the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression.”59 Towards inclusive income expansion: Raising productivity and enhancing equity Episodes of rapid economic growth and structural transformation can go along with increases in economic inequality (chapter 2),60 but higher labour productivity is associated with a lower concentration of labour income at the top (figure 7.2).61 While the evolution of these two variables cannot be inferred simply by looking at a cross-section that represents a snapshot in time, the relationship appears to hold over time at all levels of human develop- ment (except for the Group of 7 economies; figure 7.3).
This suggests that pathways that deliver both improvements in economic per- formance and labour incomes that are not con- centrated at the top are not only feasible but also common—even if not inevitable, because this evidence does not indicate the direction of causality.62 The challenge, therefore, is to identify those policies that are consistent with a framework of inclusive income expansion.63 FIGURE 7.2 Higher labour productivity is associated with a lower concentration of labour income at the top Inequality (share of top 10 percent) Human development group 100 Low Medium High Very high 80 60 40 20 Log of productivity (output per worker) Note: Includes 94 countries with microdata.
Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from ILO (2019a).

FIGURE 7.3 The relationship between labour productivity and concentration of labour income appears to hold over time at most levels of human development Inequality (share of top 10 percent) Low 70 60 50 40 30 Medium High Very high-G7 G7 Log of productivity (output per worker) Note: Includes 94 countries with microdata.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from ILO (2019a).
Importantly, environmental sustainability also needs to be considered, especially the climate crisis, which spotlight 7.2 at the end of the chapter addresses.

Improving capabilities across the population also unleashes the productive potential of a country.

Discussed here are policies primarily in-market and postmarket that have a bearing on the rate of expansion and distribution of income.
The market distribution of income depends on how much people can use their as- sets and capabilities, the return on those assets Higher labour productivity is associated with a lower concentration of labour income at the top.
Improving capabilities across the population also unleashes the productive potential of a country Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 233 A minimum wage can be an instrument of efficiency when there is a monopsony (companies with excessive power in the labour market) or when the economy increases productivity in response to higher labour costs and capabilities, and their ability to respond to shocks.64 Policies that improve the func- tioning of markets are thus crucial to increase productivity, also determining the distribution of income.
Postmarket policies reflect primary choices associated with government taxes, transfers and public spending.

This second half of the chapter considers policies in these dimensions.

Balancing power: Equitable and efficient labour markets Most people receive income from work (a few also from capital gains), which is determined to a great extent by how markets are organized and regulated.

Thus, labour markets and the world of work are important determinants of income inequality.
For instance, increases in labour income towards the bottom of the distribution were central in Latin American countries that reduced income inequality in the 2000s.65 Markets are not a baseline on which govern- ments intervene;66 rather, they are embedded in society (to use Karl Polanyi’s expression).67 And market outcomes are shaped by a number of policies and institutions, some of which are considered in this section.
For instance, unions endow workers with the capacity to collectively bargain for their share of income, exercising agency and contributing to the outcome of ne- gotiations, shaping the distribution of market income.68 Due in part to the fragmentation of production associated with globalization un- ionization has become more difficult, with the influence of unions declining in many coun- tries,69 although with variations by country and over time.70 While the relationship between changing inequality in human development and changing union density varies across coun- tries, in practice, promoting equity through stronger unions is consistent with sustained gains in productivity.71 Policies and institutions underpinned by the respect for human rights determine what constitutes illicit labour markets, outlawing practices like slavery, human trafficking, child labour, human degradation, harassment and discrimination.72 But beyond eradicating those practices, how can in-market policies contrib- ute to a fairer distribution of incomes without hurting incentives for productivity?
Policies that enhance women’s participation in the la- bour market, in a context in which mothers and caregivers are empowered with the conditions discussed earlier in the chapter to exercise their free choice, would clearly achieve both objec- tives (box 7.5).

The remainder of this section covers other relevant labour market institutions and policies.
Monopsonies, minimum wage and efficiency Another important labour market policy is a minimum wage, which exists in 92 percent of countries.73 As collective bargaining in firms becomes more challenging, broader subnation- al or national negotiations appear to be gaining relevance as a way to protect worker interests.74 A minimum wage is an instrument to transmit productivity gains to the incomes of workers with limited bargaining power.
But a minimum wage that is too high can reduce employment or provide incentives for informal employment.

Across countries, minimum wages show a negative relationship with inequality in labour income (figure 7.4).75 This association does not prove any causality, but it is consistent with literature documenting that a minimum wage can, when well calibrated, increase salaries of low-income groups with limited effects on employment.76 The distributive role is linked, in turn, to productivity.
A minimum wage can be an instrument of efficiency when there is a monopsony (compa- nies with excessive power in the labour market, as alluded to in chapter 6) or when the econo- my increases productivity in response to higher labour costs.77 Indeed, monopsony is likely to increase inequality, reducing the labour share.78 The higher the concentration, the greater the firms’ labour market power to determine wages, given workers’ lack of alternative employment opportunities.
In some cases firms can cooper- ate to reduce wages even further.79 Monopsony is more prevalent when the geographical mo- bility of labour is low, due either to laws such as residency requirements or to low skills of work- ers, which makes them easily substitutable.

Public policy can play a key role in such cases.


Although opinions are split on whether minimum wages reduce employment in com- petitive markets, when labour market power 234 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 7.5 Gender equality in the labour market Women’s contribution to measured economic activity does not correspond to their share of the population: It is far below their full potential.

This has important macroeconomic implications.
The loss in GDP per capita that is attributable to gender gaps in the labour market is estimated to be as high as 27 percent in some re- gions.1 Women’s economic empowerment boosts pos- itive development outcomes, such as productivity, and increases economic diversification and income equality.2 Policies that aim to mitigate gender biases and guarantee equal pay can promote economic growth and could be magnified through a stronger presence of skilled women in the labour market.3 Barriers to wom- en’s participation act as brakes on the national econo- my, stifling its ability to grow.
So implementing policies that remove labour market distortions and create a level playing field for all would boost the demand for wom- en’s labour—with action also on the supply side to al- low women to exercise their free choice to participate.4 These measures range from changes in discriminatory regulations and practices to ensuring gender equality in pay and fairer working conditions for women.
Modifying regulations could require employers to review their pay practices or to report gender gap cal- culations.

Since 2001 both France and Sweden have asked employers to review their practices and develop an annual plan for gender equality.
Australia, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom require organ- izations with 250 or more employees to publish their gender pay gap calculations.5 Currently, equal pay for equal work is constitutionally guaranteed in only 21 per- cent of countries.6 Other examples to improve the quality of working conditions include defining identical criteria to promote men and women, having flexible working arrangements and increasing the supply of care options to broaden choices.
In Belgium, France, Germany and New Zealand all employees in companies of a certain size are enti- tled to request flexible working arrangements.

Japan and the Republic of Korea provide mothers and fathers one year of nontransferable paid parental leave each.
And Nordic countries often reserve parts of the parental leave period for the exclusive use of each parent for a few months.7 It is not enough to adopt these policies if they are not accompanied by training or awareness campaigns to change gender social norms.

For the workplace it is very important to change attitudes towards caregiving and taking leave from work to care for dependents by men so that fathers who take leave are not stigmatized.
This can help balance workloads at home and change atti- tudes towards gender roles in households.

As in other dimensions, it is critical to engage men.

One way is by establishing male role models to drive changes in gen- der stereotypes.

An alternative is to raise awareness through sensitivity training to recognize male privilege, discern signs of sexism and understand exclusion and “micromachismos.”8 Notes 1.

Cuberes and Teignier 2012.

2.

IMF 2018.

3.

Agenor, Ozdemir and Moreira 2018.

4.


Elborgh-Woytek and others 2013.

5.

Australian Government 2019; OECD 2017a.

6.

Human Development Report Office calculations using data from the WORLD Policy Analysis Center’s Gender Database 2019.

7.

OECD 2016.

8.

A series of strategies, gestures, comments and actions of daily life that are subtle, almost imperceptible, but perpetuate and transmit gender-based violence from one generation to another (Gómez 2014).

Source: Human Development Report Office.


is concentrated by firms, minimum wages can actually increase employment, when the min- imum wage acts as a price floor, preventing a profit-maximizing firm with monopsony power from reducing wages through lower hiring.80 The positive effect on employment and wages at the bottom is expected to reduce inequalities.
Further efforts to reduce inequalities by check- ing the labour market power of firms are ham- pered by the dearth of research and data on the topic of monopsony, especially compared with research and data on monopoly.

An internation- ally comparable indicator and dataset on labour market power would enable monitoring across countries and prompt action to reduce it.
There is ample scope for policy, since in some cases workers’ wages are marked down by 6 percent or more from their marginal product.81 Minimum wages can also be effective in the context of high informality.

A common mis- conception is that the informal sector, since it has no formal barriers to entry, is more compet- itive than the formal sector.
But the difficulty of enforcing contracts in the informal economy can create a holdup problem, where workers cannot be certain they will be paid once the work is done.

If this happens, employers in informal markets have considerable power over their workers.82 This would turn on its head the concern that labour market regulations, such as a minimum wage, could increase informal- ity.
When this mechanism holds, enforcing Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 235 FIGURE 7.4 Minimum wage: a tool to share the fruit of progress?
Inequality of labour income Productivity Share of top 10 percent Log of output per worker (2011 PPP$) R-squared = 0.653 100 80 60 40 20 R-squared = 0.798 12 11 10 9 8 7 Log of minimum wage (2011 PPP$) 6 Log of minimum wage (2011 PPP$) 7 8 9 10 Platforms generate automatic digital records, so there is an opening for minimum wages under new forms of e-formalization Note: Includes 60 countries with microdata and observed minimum wage.

Data are for the most recent year available.


Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from the International Labour Organization’s ILOSTAT database and ILO (2019a).

minimum wages can alleviate the holdup prob- lem by providing a commitment device, which could increase both efficiency and equity.

In India, minimum wage laws had been large- ly ineffective because the overwhelming ma- jority of the workforce has informal contracts and there is little monitoring or culpability for employers.
But since the mid-2000s the laws have played an important role alongside right- to-work legislation.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act promised 100 days of employment per rural household, at the official minimum wage, in public works generated by local administra- tions.

Poor people self-select for the programme because it involves arduous physical work at the minimum wage.
It has helped move market wages closer to the legal minimum, reduce ex- ploitative working conditions and protect the rights of routinely discriminated groups such as women and workers from Scheduled Castes and Tribes.83 In Sub-Saharan Africa moderately higher minimum wages were correlated with high- er economic growth, especially in poorer countries, with no major reduction of employ- ment.84 But minimum wages apply only to workers earning wages—often only in the formal sector in developing countries, thus covering a small share of all workers.
To sum up, minimum wages can be a vehi- cle of equity and efficiency if well calibrated to local conditions, including productivity growth and its distribution in the economy, the presence of monopsony and the level of informality.

Technological change is affecting those parameters, often raising productivity in combination with monopsony power (see chapter 6).
Platforms generate automatic digi- tal records, so there is an opening for minimum wages under new forms of e-formalization.85 As noted, whether work happens in the formal or informal sector can matter.

Informality’s challenges Around the world 61 percent of employed workers (2 million people) are in informal employment.
The rate of informality is higher in developing countries and emerging countries 236 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (70 percent) than in developed countries (18 percent).86 On average, informal work- ers are poorer, are less educated, have lower productivity and lower salaries, and are more vulnerable to shocks.87 They also contribute less to social protection schemes, which is an obstacle—both from the financial point of view and from the access point of view—to consolidating high-quality universal systems.88 While most informal workers in the world are men,89 informal female workers are particularly vulnerable.90 Unpaid family workers, industrial outworkers, home workers and casual workers are predominantly women with low earnings and a high risk of poverty, while employees and regu- lar informal workers with higher wages and less risk of poverty are more often men (figure 7.5).
This hierarchy intersects with other horizontal inequalities, such as the marginalization of ethnic groups.

Groups with high rates of insecure work and poverty around the world are urban street vendors and people who work from home pro- ducing for global supply chains.
The challenge is to open a path to formality by tackling some of the structural causes—low education and health and low-productivity sectors—while also providing options for so- cial protection, with a flexible mix that might combine contributory and noncontributory systems to ensure financial sustainability.91 There are different complementary strategies, given the heterogeneity of conditions facing informal workers.
Some countries have a top- down approach, extending the protections and benefits enjoyed by formal workers to home workers and other subcontractors.

Bottom-up strategies to protect informal workers are also possible.
Organizing workers, especially poor women, into collectives enables them to pool assets and skills to produce larger quantities of FIGURE 7.5 Unpaid family workers, industrial outworkers, home workers and casual workers are predominantly women with low earnings and a high risk of poverty, while employees and regular informal workers with higher wages and less risk of poverty are more often men Poverty risk Low Average earnings High Employers Informal wage workers: “Regular” Own-account operators Informal wage workers: casual Industrial outworkers / homeworkers The challenge is to open a path to formality by tackling some of the structural causes—low education and health and low-productivity sectors—while also providing options for social protection, with a flexible mix that might combine contributory and noncontributory systems to ensure financial sustainability High Unpaid family workers Low Predominantly men Segmentation by sex: Men and women Predominantly women Source: Chen 2019.
Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 237 Rising market power of firms (measured by markups) in recent decades has gone along with the reduction in labour’s share of income and, in many cases, increases in inequality higher quality goods, acquire new technology and skills and enhance voice and agency, in- creasing their bargaining power and increasing political clout.
Technology can help in the move from infor- mality towards better protection for workers.

Many modern business models rely on the collection and use of large amounts of data on the actions of consumers and workers.

Such data could improve conditions for informal workers.

Apps and sensors can make it easier for companies and social partners to monitor working conditions and labour law compliance in supply chains.
Governments can invest in incubating and testing digital technologies, including blockchain, that could support social security payments for those working on labour platforms.92 Making finance inclusive Financial development can enhance econom- ic development by reducing asymmetries of information, resolving problems of scale and reallocating capital efficiently.93 Still, ques- tions remain about whether too much finance increases inequality and, perhaps more impor- tant, what type of finance is most inclusive.94 Empirical evidence is mixed.
Some studies find that financial development reduces ine- quality, especially in developing countries.95 But others find that financial deepening increases inequality in both developing and developed countries.96 Possible channels of increasing ine- quality, beyond the creation of rent by financial institutions, are the rising compensation of executives at the top of the distribution and the increased indebtedness at the bottom.97 The Bank for International Settlements has revisit- ed the question, focusing on financial structure and its relationship to inequality.98 Looking at 97 countries (both developed and emerging economies), it found a nonlinear relationship, with financial development reducing inequality up to a point and increasing it afterwards.99 Analysing the composition of financial flows provides a more granular notion of finance than simply considering the amount.
It also sheds light on mechanisms connecting finan- cial growth and inequality besides those assum- ing that all credit goes to productive uses.100 Dividends, rental income, and interest and financial fees deliver capital gains mainly to the wealthy.
In some cases the key increase in finan- cial gains has favoured the top 20 percent of the income distribution—the professional-mana- gerial class—rather than the top 1 percent.101 In the euro area, wealth inequality is closely linked to capital gains on equities (stocks), which ben- efit the top of the distribution.102 In contrast, credit for productive activities leads to broader gains in income for most of the labour force.103 Productive credit had a positive effect on economic growth in 46 countries (both devel- oped and developing, including some least de- veloped countries).104 Combined with the link between credit use and inequality, this evidence strengthens the case for policies that encourage financing for productive purposes.105 An effec- tive banking and financial sector regulatory framework is also important to the extent that it can prevent banking or financial crises—both of which can be very regressive, depending on the way the crises are resolved.
Antitrust policies for greater equity Rising market power of firms (measured by markups) in recent decades has gone along with the reduction in labour’s share of income and, in many cases, increases in inequal- ity (chapter 6).106 The increase has been led by firms at the top 10 percent of the markup distribution (figure 7.6), with information and FIGURE 7.6 The rising market power of firms in recent decades has been led by firms at the top 10 percent of the markup distribution Percent 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 High-markup (top decile) Middle (percentiles 50–90) Laggards (bottom half) 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Source: Diez, Fan and Villegas-Sánchez 2019.
238 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 communication technology–intensive firms in- creasing their markups significantly more than the rest (chapter 6).107 Greater market power for firms can increase inequality, when shareholders and executives accumulate more wealth than workers.108 Some evidence suggests that antitrust policies could redistribute wealth without the indirect costs of taxation and have a positive effect on the economy as a whole.109 Market concentra- tion can affect poor households significantly (box 7.6).
For those with fewer options to diversify expenditure, lower purchasing power as a result of anticompetitive practices, such as collusion and monopoly, translates into reduced capabilities.110 But caution is needed when assessing concentration in various mar- kets.

An increasing concentration of revenues nationally does not necessarily imply more market power.
In many cases geographic mar- kets for products are local, but concentration is measured nationally, so it reflects a shift from local to national firms rather than market pow- er.

This requires looking at individual markets in more detail.
Markups are also difficult to observe objectively, as different assumptions and measurement methods lead to different results for markup levels and trends.111 There is also a difference between efficient concen- tration—due to intense price competition, investment in intangibles and rising produc- tivity of leading firms—and inefficient concen- tration—when leading firms are entrenched with less competition, higher barriers to entry, lower investment and productivity growth, and higher prices.112 Where concentration is inefficient, several policies are available to reduce it and its neg- ative impacts on inclusive growth.
The most basic antitrust policy is the detection and sanctioning of collusion.

In many countries cartels are already illegal, but more resources could be devoted to enforcement.

Mergers are another route to market concentration, and stricter merger enforcement could help tackle rising market power by posing legal challenges to mergers that may stifle competition.
Policy can also prevent dominant firms from using their position and network effect to exclude their competitors from markets, by investigat- ing such cases more rigorously.
Other policies include reducing the licencing requirements in certain occupations and the legal restrictions that protect the position of incumbent firms and regulating monopolies through prices or, for technology firms, through rules on data ownership, privacy and open interfaces.113 With the legal principles behind antitrust law varying by country, global firms face het- erogeneous regulations.
Over the last few years European regulators have been particularly active in scrutinizing potential anticompetitive practices of big tech companies—for exam- ple, the European Commission fined Google €8.25 billion in 2017–2019.114 Fiscal progressivity for sustainable development Redistribution through taxation and public spending is a key determinant of inequality, not just of income inequality but also of capa- bilities affected by education, health care and other publicly provided services.
Several of the policies discussed in the first half of this chapter would likely be making larger claims on public resources in many countries.

Direct income tax and transfer schemes thus matter not only because they tend to reduce disposable income inequality.

Spending on in-kind transfers such as education and health can also reduce inequalities in capabilities, in turn reducing income inequality.

Importantly, reductions in inequalities in income and opportunity can also reinforce each other.
The effect of redistribution on income in- equality can be seen by comparing inequality before and after taxes and transfers (direct and in kind).

While the analysis of the impact of redistribution can be affected by differences in income concepts and definitions relating to “before” and “after” taxes and transfers (see spot- light 3.3 at the end of chapter 3), the effects can be sizable.
There generally is evidence of larger effects of redistribution in developed countries than in developing countries (box 7.7).
Nora Lustig’s fiscal incidence analysis has illuminated several features of the impact of fiscal redistribution in low-income and emerg- ing economies.115 Her analysis goes beyond direct taxes and transfers (and pensions), which dominate the literature, to add both indirect taxes and estimates of the monetized benefits accruing from the public provision of Where concentration is inefficient, several policies are available to reduce it and its negative impacts on inclusive growth.
The most basic antitrust policy is the detection and sanctioning of collusion Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 239 BOX 7.6 How market concentration can disproportionately affect poor people A grasp of the distributive effects of competition is central to policymaking.
Poorer households are typically the most affected by market concentration because they consume a more homogeneous set of goods, have less op- portunity to substitute consumption and have limited access to markets.1 Inducing more competition in concentrated markets could reduce poverty, increase household welfare2 and boost growth and productivity.
Mexico is well known for its history of monopolies, including Telmex for fixed-line communications (privatized in 1990) and an oligopoly in corn products, an important household staple.
Plagued by low productivity and limited innovation that have resulted in high prices for consumers, these monopolies have become an integral part of Mexico’s paradoxical growth, leading to an average 98 percent markup in goods across households, ac- cording to recent estimates.3 One study using the Welfare and Competition tool to simulate the dis- tributional effects of a rise in competition in mobile telecommunications and corn products in Mexico found that increasing competition from 4 to 12 firms in the mobile telecommunications industry and reducing the market share of the oligopoly in corn products from 31.2 percent to 7.8 percent would reduce the poverty headcount by 0.8 percentage point and the Gini coefficient by 0.32 point (box figure 1).4 In mobile telecommunications relative gains are fairly evenly distribut- ed across income groups.
For corn products a decline in market concentra- tion would benefit households at the bottom of the income distribution more (in relative terms), since they allocate a larger share of their consumption to these products.

Corn is especially relevant in the diet for low-income groups in Mexico, therefore, for households in the four lowest deciles, moving from a concentrated market to perfect competition would increase their average income by 1.6–2.9 percent (box figure 2).
By contrast, the increase among households in the three highest deciles would be only about 0.4 percent (though the absolute impacts increase in higher income deciles).

Competition-enhancing policies that reduce concentration in key markets can benefit households.

The hypothetical case shows that market concentra- tion in key sectors of the Mexican economy reduces welfare, especially among poor and vulnerable households.
Moving towards competitive markets, among the main objectives of the Mexican government, requires removing market imperfections and economic distortions to enhance economic performance.
Box figure 1 Mexico: Expenditure share in mobile communications and corn, by income decile Expenditure share by decile (percent) 10 9.3 7.6 6.6 6.0 5.2 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.6 2.5 8 6 4 2 0 Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 Mobile communications Corn Note: The simulation relies on the assumption that the mobile telecommunication market behaves as an oligopoly and that corn markets mimic a partial collusive oligopoly.
The price elasticity of demand is estimated to be −0.476 for mobile communications and −0.876 for corn products.

Source: Rodríguez-Castelán and others 2019.


Box figure 2 Mexico: Relative impact on household budgets after moving from a concentrated market to perfect competition by income decile Relative impact on household budgets by income decile (percent of average income) 3.1 2.4 2.1 1.7 4 2 0 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 Mobile communications Corn Source: Rodríguez-Castelán and others 2019.

Notes 1.
Notes 1.

Creedy and Dixon 1998; Urzúa 2013.

2.

Atkin, Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro 2018; Busso and Galiani 2019.

3.

Aradillas 2018.

4.

The reduction in Gini 0.32 point is on a 0–100 scale.

See details in Rodríguez-Castelán and others (2019).

Source: Based on Rodríguez-Castelán and others (2019).
240 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 BOX 7.7 The power of fiscal redistribution David Coady, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund Fiscal policy can do much to address inequality in in- come and opportunity.

A comparison of income inequal- ity across advanced and emerging economies shows the redistributive role of direct tax and transfer systems (box figure 1).
While direct taxes and transfers in ad- vanced economies reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.17 point (from 0.48 to 0.31), they reduce it much less, by 0.04 (from 0.49 to 0.45), in emerging and developing economies, which include Latin American countries with some of the highest income inequality in the world.

So, on average, the redistributive impact of direct income taxes and transfers explains nearly all the difference in disposable income inequality between advanced and emerging economies.
The redistributive reach of fiscal policy is greater when the analysis includes the impact of in-kind public spending on education and health.

For instance, rising spending on education has been instrumental in in- creasing access to education and reducing inequality of education outcomes.

As more educated cohorts enter the labour market, income inequality decreases as the inequality of education outcomes falls and the higher human capital stock leads to a reduction in returns to high skills.
The decline in education outcome inequality reduced disposable income inequality in emerging and developing economies over 1990–2005 by an estimat- ed 2–5 Gini points on average (box figure 2).

In Latin America improved education outcomes have been the dominant factor in recent decreases in income inequal- ity.1 From an inclusive growth perspective, expanding access to human capital is a win–win prospect.
Box figure 1 Redistributive direct taxes and transfers explain nearly all the difference in disposable income inequality between advanced and emerging economies Income inequality (absolute reduction in Gini coefﬁcient) Advanced economies Emerging markets and developing countries 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.31 Before After Note: Emerging markets and developing economies are Argentina, Armenia, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Uruguay and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Source: Based on IMF (2017a).

Box figure 2 Absolute decrease in Gini for disposable income due to reduced inequality in education outcomes (absolute decline in Gini for disposable income, 1990–2005) 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Asia and the Paciﬁc Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Advanced economies Emerging Europe Source: Coady and Dizioli 2018.

Note 1.

Azevedo, Inchauste and Sanfelice 2013.


Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 241 From the perspective of fiscal effort, many countries have the scope to increase redistribution by increasing tax revenues health and education services (which consume much more government resources than either direct transfers or pensions).
It confirms that fiscal redistribution is a powerful tool to redress income inequality.116 Net direct taxes and gov- ernment spending on health and education are always equalizing forces (measured as the mar- ginal contribution to reduce inequality).

Even indirect taxes equalize more often than not.


The equalizing effect of health and education spending (including tertiary education in some countries) is particularly relevant: Not only are they a more powerful equalizing force, but they also bolster human development capabilities.117 The impact of fiscal policies varies considerably across countries.
This variation can be explained by differences in the size of the taxes and transfers budget—that is, fiscal effort—and differences in the progressivity of taxes and transfers—that is, fiscal progressivity (see also spotlight 7.3 at the end of the chapter).

From the perspective of fiscal effort, many countries have the scope to increase redistribu- tion by increasing tax revenues.
A recent study on whether (personal income) tax rates are optimal for maximizing revenues, which depends on how responsive revenues are to taxes, found that tax rates were significantly below optimal levels in all the countries examined, implying that they could raise tax rates and still increase revenue.118 Some studies have also found that the decreasing progressivity of taxation in many countries was not associated with higher economic growth.119 Hence, all the countries included in the study had room for more redistribution.120 But tax rates have been declining.
For exam- ple, the top marginal personal income tax rate has tended to decline in both developed and developing countries over the past few decades (figure 7.7).

Corporate income taxes have also fallen since 1990, in both developed and devel- oping countries.121 Several domestic factors might explain to- day’s low tax rates (chapter 2).122 And tax com- petition among countries may also have been a factor, especially for corporate income taxes, as discussed below.
Recent policy debates have returned to taxes on wealth, intended to both raise public revenue and lower inequality (by flattening the wealth gradient and by using the funds raised for pub- lic social services expenditure or infrastructure investment).

The advantage of taxing wealth, especially real estate, is that it is harder to hide than income, to a point.

Wealth taxation is also very progressive due to the very high concentra- tion of wealth at the top.
However, the reporting of wealth could fall by as much as an estimated 15 percent in response to such a tax.
And of 12 countries with a wealth tax in the 1990s, only 3 (in Europe) still have the measure in place.123 This is due partly to concerns about efficiency and potential distortive effects on the economy.124 The OECD recommends a low tax rate targeted at the very wealthy, with few exemptions and the possibility of paying in instalments.125 FIGURE 7.7 Top personal income tax rates have declined around the world Percent Low-income developing countries Emerging markets Advanced economies 70 60 50 40 30 20 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 Source: International Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs Department’s Tax Policy Reform Database.
242 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 A more integrated global economy also requires international cooperation and rules to ensure fair play and to avoid a race to the bottom in taxes However, analysis of progressivity must go beyond the progressivity of individual taxes— or even aggregate taxes.

It is not enough to look solely at the progressivity of individual tax rates because fiscal systems are designed with both revenues and expenditures in mind.
The pro- gressivity of net transfers is more informative than the progressivity of the individual taxes and transfers.
For example, even an efficient but regressive tax—such as a typical value added tax—can be equalizing if it is complemented by transfers that target poor people.126 Assessments of fiscal redistribution should thus consider both taxation and spending to- gether.127 Public policy can also maximize the impact of redistribution through deliberate design of how resources are allocated to different groups in society and to different areas of spend- ing.
Fiscal policy should tilt towards greater spending on the lower deciles, through more transfers (both direct and in kind) to the lower deciles or through greater spending on pro- grammes to support disadvantaged groups and communities.

Investments in public goods— including the education system, infrastructure, sanitation and security—could also dispropor- tionately benefit people in lower deciles who would otherwise not have access to such services.
Regardless of the type of tax, support for redistribution has strengthened since 1980—at least in OECD countries.

The OECD’s new Risks that Matter survey asked more than 22,000 people in 21 countries about their per- ceptions of social and economic risks, how well they think their government addresses those risks and their desired policies and preferenc- es for social protection.
In almost all OECD countries more than half the respondents— especially older and low-income ones—think their government should do more for their eco- nomic and social security, though this does not necessarily imply support for higher tax rates.128 In sum, redistribution can be a powerful in- strument to redress inequalities in both income and capabilities.

Fiscal effort is one part of this tool.


The other side of redistribution is fiscal progressivity, how net transfers are allocated— to whom they are transferred and how and on what public services they are spent on and for whose benefit.

Decomposing these two aspects shows great variation—and thus suggests mul- tiple options for countries to consider—in the mix of policies to pursue to redress inequality.
What is clear is that the social value of redistri- bution increases where inequality is higher (see spotlight 7.3 at the end of the chapter).

New principles for international taxation Globalization and the increased integration of countries have meant more than just increased flows of goods, services, finance and people.

Decisions by corporations on how they struc- ture their supply chains can shape investment, production, trade, migration and taxation around the world.
Global value chains define modern manufacturing production especially and in recent decades have been accompanied by the distribution of research and develop- ment129 and other segments of the value chain.

Multinational corporations distribute activities in cities and countries to take advantage of differences in costs, availability of skills, inno- vation capabilities and logistical advantages.
Evidence suggests that the domestic spillo- ver of global value chains have contributed to significant gains in productivity and incomes in many economies.130 There can also be an association with increasing inequality in some developing countries, through the skill premi- um, and in developed economies, if jobs are displaced.131 So a more integrated global econ- omy also requires international cooperation and rules to ensure fair play and to avoid a race to the bottom in taxes (particularly corporate income taxes), disclosure and regulations.132 Thus, international tax cooperation must en- sure that transparency is maintained in order to detect and deter tax evasion; that multinational corporations are prevented from shifting profits to no- or low-tax jurisdictions; that countries can get their fair share of taxes, especially with the advent of new digitally intensive business models; and that countries, particularly devel- oping countries, can develop capacities to deal with these challenges.133 Wealthy people can use offshore centres to hide their money and reduce their tax burdens.
The wealth of individuals in offshore centres in 2014 was an estimated $7.6 trillion, more than the capitalization of the world’s 20 larg- est companies or the accumulated assets of the wealthiest 1,645 people (figure 7.8).
In April Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 243 FIGURE 7.8 Offshore wealth is bigger than the value of top corporations or of billionaires $ trillions 7.6 Comparable to 5.9 6.4 Offshore wealth Market capitalization of the 20 largest global companies Assets of the wealthiest 1,645 billionaires Source: Based on Zucman (2015), Forbes and the FT 500.

2016 the Panama Papers offered a glimpse into the extent of the problem.
The fiscal cost to na- tional governments has been estimated at more than $190 billion a year.134 And because capital is mobile, large multi- national corporations often have an advantage over national governments in determining how much and where they pay their taxes.
In August 2016 the European Commission determined that the effective corporate tax rate Apple paid was 0.005 percent in fiscal year 2014, thanks to a special tax regime in Ireland, where profits from sales across Europe could be recorded.135 In 2015 an estimated 40 percent of the prof- its of multinational firms globally were attrib- uted to no- or low-tax jurisdictions.136 In some low-tax jurisdictions, too, government revenues have increased as tax rates have fallen.137 Where the profits thus attributed are not generated by underlying economic activities, the practice is harmful.
In such cases governments in the countries where the underlying economic activ- ities are conducted lose tax revenue.

Moreover, the firms are not shifting productive capital— which could raise wages and reduce inequality in the receiving countries—but shifting profits on paper.

The benefits to such countries are typically narrowly concentrated.
Significant efforts have been made in the last decade to combat tax evasion138 by wealthy individuals, most notably through the par- ticipation of more than 100 jurisdictions in the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum).
Besides exchanges of information on request, a significant step towards tax trans- parency has been achieved through automatic exchange of information frameworks such as the Common Reporting Standard under the Global Forum and the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.

The first wave of auto- matic exchange of information reporting in 2017, and the bulk following in 2018, allowed information on 47 million offshore accounts— with a total value of around €4.9 trillion—to be exchanged for the first time.
Also stepping up is global coordination to combat base erosion and profit shifting by corporates, most notably through the Group of 20–OECD BEPS Project.

The project address- es tax avoidance by establishing internationally agreed standards backed by peer review process- es to root out harmful tax practices and ensure that profits are taxed where the economic activ- ities giving rise to them are conducted.139 It in- cludes the review of preferential tax regimes by the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices.
Where a regime is assessed by the forum as harmful, the jurisdiction is required to amend or abolish the regime or face being put on blacklists, which could come with punitive consequences.

Many jurisdictions have since amended their tax laws in line with the internationally agreed stand- ards under the project.

International collaboration and collective ac- tion have thus addressed harmful tax practices and enhanced tax transparency.

But more needs to be done.


Corporates and wealthy individuals bent on evading or avoiding taxes will continue to exploit loopholes in the current international tax framework.
For example, individuals could use residence and citizenship by investment schemes, often referred to as “golden passports,” to avoid disclosure of their offshore assets.140 Potential tax evaders could also hide wealth in cryptocurrencies and physical assets, which the automatic exchange of information frame- work does not currently cover.141 Information exchanges can also be asymmetrical, with ju- risdictions collecting more information from overseas on its own taxpayers but sharing little the other way.142 International tax rules also need to be mod- ified to capture new forms of value creation in the economy.
With digitalization, firms today International tax rules also need to be modified to capture new forms of value creation in the economy 244 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 no longer need to maintain a physical operat- ing presence to sell their goods and services.

Business models based on digital networks can also generate value through active and mean- ingful interactions with a vast consumer or user base.
Some take the view that jurisdictions where users are located should be allowed to tax a proportion of those businesses’ profits.143 Discussions at the Group of 20 and OECD have also expanded beyond digitalized business to include broad-based changes to the entire economy to reallocate profits and taxing rights to market jurisdictions.144 Any major revisions to international rules on corporate taxation should be shaped by clear principles.
A fair playing field is needed to tack- le tax avoidance without reducing the incentive for countries to invest in their competitiveness and capabilities for value creation and without losing the substantial efficiency gains brought by global value chains.
Beyond tax rules aimed at new business mod- els, a further option being debated is an across- the-board minimum tax rate.145 Differential tax rates might also be used to stimulate invest- ments to fight climate change.146 Developing countries should have an active presence in these definitions.

The Inclusive Framework on BEPS is an effort in that direction, but the United Nations remains a far more inclusive forum for these deliberations.
The principles of efficiency and equity, from a global perspective this time, must be central in this debate.

Postscript: We have a choice Big strides have been made in advancing human development and in enhancing capabilities over the past three decades.

But progress has been uneven.

Large gaps exist between and within countries in how long and how healthily people can expect to live, how much they can learn and how high their overall standard of living can be.
Some of the gaps are shrinking, especially in basic capabilities such as life expectancy at birth, access to primary education and basic connectivity through technologies such as mo- bile phones.

But not fast enough: The world in not on track to eradicate basic deprivations by 2030.

And in the meantime, gaps in enhanced capabilities are growing—life expectancy at older ages, access to higher education, advanced skills and the use of frontier technologies.
It is possible to reduce inequalities in human development in a sustainable way.

Because each country has its own specifics, there is no universal route.

While the impacts of climate change and technology are universal, they also vary in how they affect countries.

Thus, various elements are needed to design a country-spe- cific path based on a diagnosis of the drivers of inequality along each of the dimensions considered in this Report (and others).
Among the array of policies available in each dimen- sion, countries need to choose ones that are most appropriate and politically feasible.

Their choices should be driven by a pragmatic view of what could work given their context and insti- tutions.

Those at the bottom of the distribution of income or capabilities care about narrowing the difference with those at the top, not about the policy used.

So countries need to measure, evaluate and, when needed, adjust.
Much can be done to reduce inequalities in human development.

This Report intends to help policymakers and stakeholders everywhere understand the challenges they confront with long-standing and new inequalities in human development—and the options available to ad- dress them.

There is nothing inevitable in how these inequalities will evolve in the 21st century.
This Report intends to help policymakers and stakeholders everywhere understand the challenges they confront with long- standing and new inequalities in human development—and the options available to address them Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 245 Spotlight 7.1 Addressing constraints in social choice A full-fledged universal system is demanding.
Even if resources are available, reducing inequal- ities in human development is a social choice.

Politics and context matter.

They have interests and identities.

Elements conditioning choices in- clude history and social norms, the prevalence of inequality, and the overall resources available and competing claims on their use.147 Social norms, in particular, are hard to change.148 Even with legislation setting equal rights, society might close and open doors selectively.
This Report’s analysis of gender inequality shows that reac- tions often become more intense in areas where more power is involved, potentially culminating with a backlash towards the very principles of gender equality (chapter 4).

Explicit policies for destigmatization and recognition of low-status groups are relevant to reduce inequalities.149 One challenge in several developing countries is how to enhance the existing coverage and quality of services already provided to those at the bottom.
In many cases this challenge emerges after targeted programmes, such as conditional cash transfers, have already pushed forward advances in basic capabilities.

150 Those higher up the income ladder may have expand- ed their access to enhanced capabilities in the meantime.

The middle class may be caught in between.

What could be the next steps?


FIGURE S7.1.1 Figure S7.1.1 identifies three schematic tra- jectories for extending both the coverage and the quality of social services, describing some of the political challenges potentially associated with each: • Top-down extensions of benefits associated with a small formal workforce may be dif- ficult to implement because those already benefiting (at the top) have little incentive to extend services to those below them if they fear that it will reduce quality.
Instead, they may press to expand the benefits they already have, even if this requires higher payroll con- tributions.

They often have the resources to opt out.

• Starting from the bottom of the income lad- der can also be challenging if the middle class avoids using services perceived as tailored for poor people, preferring to use market options instead.

The upper middle class can also oppose financing services that benefit other groups.
• Starting with a unified system that initially covers nonpoor but vulnerable individuals such as formal workers with low wages, policies can then be expanded upward and downward, as long as there is an emphasis on quality (thus providing incentives for high-income individuals to participate, while Strategies for practical universalism in (unequal) developing countries Top-down trajectory Bottom-up trajectory Lower middle-up and down trajectory Quality Low High Wealthy and high income Middle income Poor Hard to expand, as it would compromise quality.
Effective to address urgent needs.

But hard to expand because of resource constraints and because low quality does not attract participation of the middle class.

Relatively high quality can attract high-income groups to join middle class.

This might be used to ﬁnance expansion to the poor (interclass alliance).

Source: Human Development Report Office, based on the discussion in Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016).

246 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 allowing expansions to poor people).
This approach, successful in Costa Rica, reduces the risk of creating different programmes for poor and nonpoor people.

In the end the road to universalism may depend on a combination of the three trajec- tories, specific to each context.

For instance, countries where social insurance reaches less than 20 percent of the population require a very different policy trajectory from those where social insurance reaches more than 60 percent.
Building broad support requires that revenues be generated from a diversity of sources, including copayments for those who can afford them, payroll contributions (depending on the proportion of formal work- ers) and general taxes.

In countries with deep horizontal inequalities, it is also important to create stakeholders in different communities and to avoid the identification of services with specific groups.
In developed countries the challenge may be to keep social policies that provide enhanced capabilities to the broadest base.

Those systems are sustainable to the extent that they work for most of the population, and particularly for the middle classes.
That has been eroded recently in some OECD countries, where the middle class perceives itself as progressively left behind in real income, affordable access to quality educa- tion and health, and security.151 FIGURE S7.1.2 Power of the economic elite and action mechanisms In developing countries the challenge is to so- lidify social policies for a still vulnerable middle class.

In Latin America there is evidence that the middle class pays more than it receives in social services.
That, coupled with perceptions of low-quality education and health services, feeds resistance to further expanding social policies.152 One consequence is the preference for private providers: The share of students going to private school for primary education in Latin America rose from 12 percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2014.153 The larger the share of the private sector, the larger the segmentation in social services for different groups.154 A natural response would be to add resources from those at the top.
But those groups, while a minority, have often been an ob- stacle to expanding universal services, using their economic and political power through structural and instrumental mechanisms (figure S7.1.2).155 What to do about all this?

Overcoming a narrative of tradeoffs between efficiency and redistribution would be a first important step because gains in equality in human develop- ment and productivity can march together under some policies.
Strengthening the capac- ity and autonomy of the state to reduce the ability to turn economic power into political power could also help—through transparency, promotion of a free independent press and opening of space for a range of actors to act and engage in productive social dialogue.156 Structural power - Threat of withholding investment as a response to state decisions Instrumental power - Lobbying - Control of the press - Funding of electoral campaigns and/or political parties - Creation of pro-business political parties - Promotion of “revolving doors” for politicians - Promotion of pro-business think tanks Note : “Structural power” comes from the elite’s control of business decisions and its influence on investment—and economic growth.
“Instrumental power” refers to the private sector’s active engagement in the political process through lobbying, publicity, and other tools that many other members of society may not have.

Source: Adapted from Martinez and Sánchez-Ancochea (2019), based on Fairfield (2015) and Schiappacase (2019).
Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 247 BOX S7.1.1 Being right is not enough: Reducing inequality needs a movement from below Ben Phillips, author of the forthcoming book How to Fight Inequality (Polity Press, October 2020) It is a remarkable achievement.

Just a few years ago there was no consensus that inequality needed to be tackled.
Now inequality is recognized as harm- ful and dangerous by mainstream economists, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank.

And all governments have, in adopting the Sustainable Development Goals, pledged to reduce inequality.

But winning on words has not meant winning on action.

Inequalities continue to worsen, and the broad thrust of government action is at best insufficient to address them.
The mainstream consensus has shifted to rec- ognize the inequality crisis without a sufficient shift in action.

The problem in beating inequality is not being unsure of what needs to be done; it is not gathering the collective power to overcome those stopping it.
Some leaders made commitments to tackle inequality without a determined intention to implement them, but even when leaders are more inclined to effect change, they cannot act without the wind at their back that ordinary people, when organized, can give them.
Remember the story of US President Lyndon Johnson telling Martin Luther King, Jr., “I know what I have to do, but you have to make me do it.” Politicians are under so much pressure from the ever more powerful 1 percent that even the best-intentioned ones need pressure.

Inequality is so hard to break because it is a vicious cycle.
The power im- balance that comes with the concentration of wealth—and its interaction with politics, economics, society and narrative—enables the further concentration of wealth and a worsened power imbalance.

The imbalance of power is what matters for fixing the injustice.
As history shows—in the birth of the European welfare state, the US New Deal and Great Society, free education in Kenya, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India, free HIV medicines in South Africa and the declines in inequality in Latin America in the early 21st century— the momentum for action to tackle inequality requires pressure from below.

How can inequality be beaten again?

Three key lessons stand out from research and observation.
Overcome deference The first lesson is to overcome deference.
John Lewis, who helped lead the US civil rights movement, describes how, as a child, he was urged by his mother, “Don’t get in the way; don’t get in trouble.” But as a teenager, inspired by activists fighting inequality, he realized that making change re- quired him to “get in trouble, good trouble, necessary trouble.” So too with South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign for access to antiretroviral med- icines, the Gambia’s Has Decided movement to ensure that the loser of the election there stood down as promised and Bolivia’s landless workers, who demanded access to land.
All were treated as troublemakers before they were recognized for prompting needed change.

So too were the suffragettes, who struggled for women’s right to vote.

Resistance does not always work, but acceptance never works.

And no one gets to initiate major social shifts without being criticized—that is part of the journey to greater equality.

Build collective power The second lesson is to build collective power by organizing.
As the saying goes, “There is no justice, just us.” But “just us”—organized—is powerful.

Jay Naidoo, who led the trade union movement that helped bring down apartheid in South Africa, emphasized that “power is built at the grassroots, village by village, street by street.” Organizing is not just about marches.

It is about the whole process, about what happens between the most visible moments.
It is about people forming groups so they can be strong enough to act and be harder to ignore, suppress or exploit because they have collective power.

In Nepal the Mahila Adhikar Manch, a grassroots women’s movement, started as communi- ty- and district-level women’s forums, organizing local campaigns on violence against women.

After six years of grassroots actions, community leaders came together for two days’ deliberations and formed a national secretariat.
Since then Mahila Adhikar Manch has grown to be a membership-based organization that has spread to more than 30 districts with 50,000 members.

Old divides across groups need to be broken down to form a winning coali- tion.

The Usawa (“equality”) Festival in Nairobi deliberately brings together rural and urban, young and old of all communities in a common celebration and plan- ning process, because only by breaking down barriers and building community can it build the unity needed for change.
So too the dividing line between unions and social movements has never been wide when they have been at their most effective.

The movement in El Salvador to protect water as a public good has been effective, its leaders note, only because it brought together such a broad range of the church, social movements, academics, resident groups and non- governmental organizations—a narrower coalition would not have been strong enough to win.
William Barber II calls these movements “fusion coalitions” because their power comes from bringing so many different groups together.

Build a new story The third lesson is to build a new story of society.

Previous victories against in- equality built one, and a new one is needed again.

Such a new story will not be built in policy papers.
The Mexican social movement secured the passing of a labour law reform, ensuring domestic workers access to social security and the right to paid holidays, due in part to the popularity of the movie Roma, which has no explicit policy message but moved millions to understand with greater empathy the likes of domestic workers.

Similarly, a new narrative is needed to shift from the old Millennium Development Goals to the new Sustainable Development Goals, which embody a new vision of mutuality.
But it requires a new narrative to bring it alive.

Possible parts of the story might assert that a good society is about the values we want to live by and the relationships we want to have, that we need a ceiling as well as a floor and that our society and economy are something we build together.

In Laudato Si Pope Francis set out a vision of community over competition, dignity over materialism.
The shift in recognizing the problem of inequality and the formal commit- ment to tackle it have been necessary but insufficient conditions for tackling inequality.

Likewise, analysis of the trends and impacts of inequality and pol- icy advice on how to tackle it are vitally important but not enough.

The one generalizable lesson of social change seems to be that no one saves others; people liberate themselves by standing together.
Change can be slow, and it is always complicated and sometimes fails—but it is the only way it works.

Change is not given; it is won.

By overcoming deference, building collective power and building a new story, inequality can beat inequality.

248 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Spotlight 7.2 Productivity and equity while ensuring environmental sustainability The analysis in this chapter assumes room for economic growth along pathways that combine equity and increases in productivity.
But over the next decades countries will face demands for different patterns of development to keep global warming below 2°C.1 So countries may need to recalibrate the tools used to promote both equity and productivity in a more sustainable way, and new opportu- nities may lay therein.2 The question is how to make room for the expansion of productivity in a way that does not destroy the planet.
The consensus expressed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is that the world needs to decarbonize the economy, reaching net zero emissions by mid-century.3 This requires a shift in patterns of consumption, employment and production and in the struc- ture of government taxes and transfers, with significant implications for the distribution of income and human development.

Take, for instance, carbon prices—either through a carbon tax or a market-based emis- sions trading scheme.
By raising the relative price of carbon-emitting activities to better reflect the social damages of carbon, incen- tives to produce less carbon would be in place.
The United States pioneered successful mar- ket-based trading schemes for some pollutants, notably sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and leaded gasoline.4 The largest emissions trading scheme for carbon is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, but other jurisdic- tions are either planning or considering carbon pricing as a way to meet their commitments un- der the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which represents 55 percent of greenhouse gas emissions.5 Still, only about 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are covered by one of the 57 carbon pricing initiatives either in operation or scheduled for implementa- tion.6 Administered across 46 national and 28 subnational jurisdictions, these initiatives generated approximately $44 billion in 2018, up $11 billion from 2017.7 Carbon prices vary widely, from less than $1 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent to $127.8 Only 5 percent of greenhouse gas emissions are covered by a car- bon price considered high enough to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.9 About half of emissions covered by carbon pricing are priced at less than $10 per tonne of carbon di- oxide equivalent, well below what is considered necessary to fight climate change.10 Raising the price of carbon, seen in isola- tion, may be considered regressive since poor people generally spend a greater share of their income on energy-intensive goods and services than rich people do.11 Some research paints a more nuanced picture: an inverse U-shape relationship between energy expenditure share and income, leading to suggestions that carbon pricing can, on average, be regressive for coun- tries with an income per capita above roughly $15,000 but progressive for poorer countries.12 However, the inequality impact of fiscal re- distribution measures should not be seen as piecemeal and isolated from how the collected funds are to be used and how the incidence of taxes is implemented, as discussed in chapter 7.
Nothing mechanical determines that pricing carbon must be regressive.

Carbon pricing can, for instance, reduce inequality if the revenues from a carbon tax are returned to taxpayers according to a budget-neu- tral concept called revenue recycling.
One study in the United States showed that if just 11 per- cent of revenues were returned to the bottom income quintile, those households would not be worse off on average.13 The fiscal transfer could be increased, either through cash transfers or tax credits, to reduce inequality as carbon emissions fell.

Reductions in energy subsidies function similarly to the introduction of a carbon tax because both increase the price of fossil fuels.
A study in India showed that phasing out energy subsidies and returning the government savings to people in the form of a universal basic income would be progressive, significantly benefiting the poorest, who typically spend far less on energy than the richest do.14 Where ambitious emission reduction targets are set, carbon pricing can generate sustained Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 249 Organization study projected scenarios of de- carbonization consistent with limiting global warming to 2°C (over preindustrial levels).
It found that the net effect on employment by 2030 would be positive, with 24 million jobs created and 6 million jobs lost.

Going beyond the averages also applies to policies: Even if the world is better off in employment, the gains and losses are not equally distributed, and some communities will be more affected than others.
The management of that dynamic can be very consequential for human development and for the political sustainability of the process.18 Notes 1 2 Some even argue that economic growth objectives may not be consistent with keeping global warming below 2°C (Hickel 2019).

As proposed, for instance, by advocates of strategies such as “green new deals.” See UNCTAD (2019) as well as the work of the New Economy Commission.

See also Rodrik (2007).

IPCC 2018.

3 4 Newell and Rogers 2003.

5 World Bank 2019d.


6 World Bank 2019d.

7 World Bank 2019d.

8 World Bank 2019d.

9 World Bank 2019d.

10 World Bank 2019d.

11 Grainger and Kolstad 2010.

12 Dorband and others 2019.

13 Mathur and Morris 2012.

14 Coady and Prady 2018.

15 Jakob and others 2019.

16 Klenert and others 2018.

17 Stern and Stiglitz 2017; Stiglitz 2019a.

18 See discussion on the management of phasing out jobs in chapter 5 of UNDP (2015).
revenues over decades that could also be spent on other important areas, such as health and education.15 And to the extent that those investments disproportionately benefit poor and vulnerable people, inequality in human development could also decline.
Some revenue recycling options reduce inequalities more than others.16 So carbon pricing using equity-promot- ing revenue recycling options could be a triple win: a way to reduce carbon emissions, reduce or avoid climate-related inequalities and reduce other inequalities in human development.
Where opportunities for equity-promoting revenue recycling face real-world constraints, some have argued for alternatives, such as establishing sector-specific carbon prices supplemented by regulation and public invest- ments.17 If higher carbon prices can be assigned to different sectors or to different products and uses where the rich tend to spend, lower carbon prices can be set in areas where poor people spend differentially.
For a given emissions reductions target a portfolio of differentiated carbon prices, direct regulation and investment means those with higher incomes will ex ante bear more of the costs of compliance.

Such ap- proaches can alleviate some of the undesirable distributional impacts of a single carbon price, especially where the ability to address distribu- tional concerns ex post are limited.

The other side of the adjustment is in produc- tion and employment.
A drastic reduction in fossil fuels implies the progressive reduction of jobs in those sectors.

An International Labour 250 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Spotlight 7.3 Variation in the redistributive impact of direct taxes and transfers in Europe David Coady, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund While the redistributive impact of direct income taxes and transfers in European coun- tries is large, so is the variation in the extent of fiscal redistribution across countries.
Euromod data for 28 EU countries in 2016 shows that the social welfare1 impact of redistributive fiscal policy (the extent of fiscal redistribu- tion) is highest (above 35 percent) in Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Estonia and Finland and lowest (below 13 percent) in Greece, Hungary, Slovakia and Cyprus (figure 7.3.1).

This variation can be explained by differences in the size of the tax and transfer budget—fiscal effort—and difference in the progressivity of taxes and transfers—fiscal progressivity.
On aver- age, countries with higher fiscal effort have lower fiscal progressivity (figure 7.3.2).

For instance, while Greece, Italy and Hungary have relatively high fiscal effort, this is offset by their relatively low fiscal progressivity, resulting in relatively low overall fiscal redistribution.

By contrast, while Ireland, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia have rel- atively low fiscal effort, this is offset by relatively high fiscal progressivity, resulting in relatively high overall fiscal redistribution.
The relatively low fiscal redistribution in Cyprus and Slovakia reflects the combination of low fiscal effort and low fiscal progressivity.

The relatively high fiscal redistribution in Finland reflects the combina- tion of high progressivity and fiscal effort.

High progressivity can reflect either of two factors, or a combination.

First, high progres- sivity may reflect a high share of net transfers going to lower income deciles—high targeting performance.
Second, high progressivity can reflect high market (pre–taxes and transfers) in- come inequality2—high targeting returns, that is, redistribution has a high social return where market income inequality is high.
So even when countries have the exact same tax and transfer policies in terms of fiscal effort and target- ing performance—for example, where every FIGURE S7.3.1 Fiscal redistribution in European countries, 2016 Proportional change in welfare 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Median = 0.22 Note: The proportional change in social welfare is the product of fiscal progressivity and fiscal effort.
Source: Coady, D’Angelo and Evans 2019.
Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 251 FIGURE S7.3.2 Fiscal progressivity and fiscal effort in European countries, 2016 Fiscal progressivity 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 Ireland Median = 0.341 Denmark United Kingdom 2 R = 0.449 Netherlands Latvia Estonia Belgium Lithuania Malta Bulgaria Germany Czechia Sweden Slovakia Cyprus Finland Croatia Slovenia Romania France Median = 0.672 Portugal Austria Spain Italy Poland Greece 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 Fiscal effort Luxembourg Hungary Fiscal policy Initial market inequality Source: Coady, D’Angelo and Evans 2019.
FIGURE S7.3.3 Market income inequality and variation in fiscal redistribution Absolute difference in welfare impact from median 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 -0. Note: Countries are ordered by extent of fiscal redistribution from figure S7.3.1.
Fiscal policy is the combined impact of fiscal effort and targeting performance.

Initial market inequality captures the impact of differences in targeting returns due to differences in pre–tax and transfer income inequality.

Differences are relative to a reference country with median values for fiscal policy and targeting returns.

Source: Coady, D’Angelo and Evans 2019.


252 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 country has the same transfer budget used to fi- nance a uniform transfer—there can still be sub- stantial differences in fiscal redistribution across countries, reflecting solely differences in market income inequality.

On average, 37 percent of the differences in fiscal redistribution across countries in figure S7.3.1 is due to differences in the inequality of market income.
Overall, high fiscal redistribution—countries to the left in figure S7.3.3—is driven predominantly by high targeting returns, reflecting high market income inequality, rather than by differences in underlying fiscal policies.

This is particularly so for Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Notes 1 2 Derived using constant elasticity social welfare functions in which an indicator of inequality can be interpreted as the social welfare cost of disparities in income distribution.
Since there is very little social benefit from redistributing income in countries where incomes before taxes and transfers (that is, market incomes) vary little across households, it is possible that a country with relatively high fiscal effort and targeting performance can still have low fiscal redistribution because it has low market income inequality.
Conversely, is it also possible that a country with low fiscal effort and tar- geting performance can have high fiscal redistribution simply because it has high market income inequality.

Chapter 7 Policies for reducing inequalities in human development in the 21st century: We have a choice | 253 Notes and references Notes Overview Sources for most data and factual statements in this overview are included in the Report but are included here where precision or qualifications are important.
Estimates for the United States, based on Chetty and others (2016).

Kreiner, Nielsen and Serena (2018) argue that these results overestimate life expec- tancy gaps across different income groups because they ignore income mobility (by their method, the overesti- mation could be as high as 50 percent), but they also find that these gaps have been increasing over time and that the overestimation is attenuated at higher ages (disappearing completely at age 80).
Mackenbach and others (2018) note that health inequalities generally increased in Europe from the 1980s though the late 2000s, with some narrowing in several countries since then.

This is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

As suggested in UN (2019b), which identified reducing inequalities and promoting capabilities as “entry points” to the transformations needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
See also Lusseau and Mancini (2019), who found that in- equalities are a key hurdle in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals across all countries and that reducing them would have compound positive effects on the entire set of Sustainable Development Goals.

Also a premise of the Deaton Review, a multiyear project examining inequal- ities in the United Kingdom (Joyce and Xu 2019).

Atkinson 2015.

Deaton (2017) has argued that governments often do more to increase inequality than to reduce it.
See, for instance, Saad (2019) on fear of climate change and Reinhart (2018) on artificial intelligence and jobs.

Sen 1980.

9 10 Expression used by Angus Deaton to place in perspective the evolution of inequalities (Belluz 2015).

11 To borrow the expression from Deaton (2013a).

12 UNDP and OPHI 2019.


13 Many developing countries lack 5 6 complete vital registration systems, so the country-level estimates of life expectancy at older ages used in this Report, drawn from United Nations Population Division official statistics, are subject to significant measurement errors and should be interpreted with caution.
Still, the dynamic of gaps in life expectancy opening up at older ages is robust to changes in age (it remains valid at age 60), and even though there is some heterogeneity across countries and over time, the same pattern is broadly confirmed within countries, as described in more detail in chapter 1.

14 Brown, Ravallion and Van de Walle 2017.

15 Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009a.
Part I 7 1 2 3 4 Sen (1980), rephrasing the original question: “Equality of what?” This despite the fact that formal decompositions of the contributions of income inequality to differences in social welfare aggregating utility using different social welfare functions— over time and across countries—show that while inequality matters, income levels and income growth matter much more, even when the degree of inequality aversion is high (Dollar, Kleineberg and Kraay 2015; Gaspar, Mauro and Poghosyan 2017).
See also the discussion in chapter 2 on inequality and economic growth.

Based on Google’s Ngram count of the expressions “global growth” and “global inequality” from 1950 to 2008; “global inequality” overtook “global growth” around 2002.

Including inequality reduction as a development priority was contentious during the negotiations for the SDGs, in part because of disagreements on what kind of inequality should be reflected in the SDGs.
As Fukuda-Parr (2019) argues, the political compro- mises required to have aspirations to reduce inequalities reflected in the 2030 Agenda led to a dilution of the ambition of some, especially those in developing countries, who had advocated for stronger commitments, especially on inequality across countries.

For a comprehensive review of the emergence of research and policy interest on global inequality, see Christiansen and Jensen (2019).

Deaton 2013a.
Deaton 2013a.

The optimistic view of development progress is not universally shared.

For instance, Hickel (2017a, 2017b) argues that we are facing a “development delusion,” given that global inequality increased and that those left behind are further apart from the better off.

On the other hand, World Bank (2018a) shows that within-country inequality has fallen in most developing countries with data.
Ravallion (2018a, 2018b) has clarified how these differing views emerge, often using exactly the same data.

It depends partially on the measures of income and consumption inequality that are used (for instance, absolute versus relative), as well as the social welfare weight that is given to different segments of the population (the consumption of those who are living below the extreme poverty line, for example, has barely budged, even though many have been able to move above the line).
For example, gaps in life expectancy appear marked in the United States across socioeconomic groups, with those at the top of the income distribu- tion pulling away from everyone else, while those at the bottom have differ- ent experiences, with lower achieve- ments in less prosperous places, with the degree of prosperity assessed in terms of overall level of education, income and government expenditures.

See Chetty and others (2016).

See also Case and Deaton (2017).


8 Williams, Neighbors and Jackson 2003.

Kearl 2018.

9 10 The historical analysis should be con- sidered along with the argument that in preindustrial societies the limited amount of resources may have deter- mined a maximum level of inequality consistent with subsistence of those at the very bottom.

See Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010).

11 See, for instance, evidence of the effects of democracy on human development in Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro (2012).
Evidence of the effect of democracy on economic growth is found to be positive and significant in Acemoglu and others (2019).

12 As suggested in UN (2019b), which identified reducing inequalities and promoting capabilities as entry points to the transformations needed to implement the SDGs.

See also Lusseau and Mancini (2019), who found that in- equalities are key hurdles in achieving the SDGs across all countries and that reducing them would have compound positive effects on the entire set of SDGs.
Chapter 1 1 These are estimates for people in higher education based on household surveys.

Since questionnaires are different for different groups of countries, there might be heterogene- ity and biases.

Using fully harmonized gross enrolment rates (mostly from administrative data), the figure for “in tertiary education” would be 66 per- cent for very high human development countries and 7 percent for low human development countries.

Chetty and others 2016.

Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001.


UNDP 2016.

The discussion in these paragraphs draws from Basu and Lopez-Calva (2011) and from Sen (1993, 1999).

Basu and Lopez-Calva 2011, p. 153.

Rejecting, at the same time, a “grand mausoleum [of] one fixed and final list of capabilities,” (Sen 2005, p. 160), especially if the list was derived pri- marily from theoretical considerations that did not take into consideration the real concerns and aspirations of the time.
This is the approach also taken in this Report.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex- pression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and re- gardless of frontiers” (www.un.org/en/ universal-declaration-human-rights/).

See, for instance, the discussion in Basu and Lopez-Calva (2011).
The survival of a child during the first five years of life (historically the main variable determining the cross-section variation of life expectancy at birth) is an entry point to the prospect of having a long and healthy life.

It is an achievement that does not depend on the agency of the child, but on social and family conditions.

Instead, sequential survival—one year after the other—to become an old healthy adult represents the realization of that ideal.
It is the result of social and family conditions, as before, but also of personal agency and empowerment.

11 Sen 1992, p. 45.

12 Moser 1989.

13 These two drivers of change are already a source of public concern.

See, for instance, Saad (2019) on fear of climate change and Reinhart (2018) on artificial intelligence and jobs.

14 Crocker 2008, p. 16.

15 Crocker 2008, based on an analysis of Sen’s work.
16 For instance, inequality in mean years of schooling is based on a simple sum that assumes that one year in primary education counts the same as one year in secondary or tertiary education, even if these achievements are qualitatively different.

In particular, Notes | 257 it leads to a potential underestimation of the role of inequalities in tertiary education, typically amounting to few- er years than primary and secondary education.

17 Permanyer and Smits 2019.


18 Deaton (2007) warns about how conclusions about inequality can change depending on the definition of the indicator.

In this chapter, unless explicitly stated—as in the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index—comparisons of inequality in human development depart from summary measures.

They compare the achievements across groups (countries, castes, quintiles based on living standards and so on).
Comparisons are made with respect to the original base (typically, percentage of the population).

This serves three purposes.

First, it expresses progress with respect to an invariant base with intrinsic value—the base is linked to people across indicators.

In the case of indicators based on ratios the base represents people with access.

In the case of life expectancy the base represents years of human life.

Life claims should be universal (Anand 2018).


Second, in the context of bounded indicators this comparison satisfies the mirror axiom (Erreygers 2009), ensuring that conclusions are robust to changes in convention in the construction of the indicator going from achievement to shortfall and vice versa.

Third, in practical terms, they avoid extreme sensitivity from variable bases of comparison.

19 World Bank 2018a.


20 The convergence in primary education is based on between-country and within-country comparisons over the last decade.

UNESCO (2019b) presents similar results over that period but highlights that over the last few years there have been no evidence of convergence between countries.

21 Deaton 2013a.

22 This analysis is based on simple aver- ages.

In Statistical table 1 the analysis is based on population-weighted averages and reveals a gap of 18.2 years.

23 UNDESA 2019.
23 UNDESA 2019.

24 UNDESA 2019.

25 UN 2015a.

26 Permanyer and Smits 2019.

27 Consistent results with this divergence in life expectancy at older ages are documented by Engelman, Canudas- Romo and Agree (2010) and Permanyer and Scholl (2019).

Seligman, Greenberg and Tuljapurkar (2016) also find a disassociation between equity and length of lifespan.
28 Based on data from UNDESA (2019), the absolute gain in life expectancy at age 70 was higher in very high human development countries than in low human development countries during the second half of the 20th century.

Between 1955 and 1995 the gain was 63 percent higher in very high human development countries than in low human development countries.
In the 21st century there has been marked increase: Between 1995 and 2015 the increase was 223 percent higher in very high human development coun- tries than in low human development.

The contrast is even starker in relative terms.

29 The discussion is limited to people under age 80 because people rarely survive beyond age 100.

30 Bragg and others 2017; Di Cesare and others 2013; Gonzaga and others 2014; Oyebode and others 2015; Sommer and others 2015.

31 UNDESA 2019.
31 UNDESA 2019.

32 Estimates for the United States, based on Chetty and others (2016).

These results might overestimate life expec- tancy gaps across different income groups because they ignore income mobility.

Kreiner, Nielsen and Serena (2018) argue that overestimation could be as high as 50 percent.

Using data for Denmark, they also find that gaps across socioeconomic groups have been increasing over time and that the overestimation is attenuated at higher ages (disappearing completely at age 80).
Mackenbach and others (2018) note that health inequalities generally increased in Europe between the 1980s and the late 2000s, with some narrowing in several countries since then.

33 Chetty and others 2016.

Also, Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams (2019) estimate that moving from a 10th percentile location to a 90th percentile location increases life expectancy at age 65 by 1.1 years in the United States.

34 Baker, Currie and Schwandt 2017.

35 Brønnum-Hansen 2017; Kreiner, Nielsen and Serena 2018.
36 van Raalte, Sasson and Martikainen 2018.

37 Suzuki and others 2012.

38 Buchan and others 2017.

39 Currie and Schwandt 2016.

40 Majer and others 2011.

Murtin and others (2017) assess inequality in longevity across education and gender groups in 23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development coun- tries.
Their estimates of expected lon- gevity at ages 25 and 65 by education and gender show that the gap in life expectancy between highly educated and poorly educated people is 8 years for men and 5 years for women at age 25 and 3.5 years for men and 2.5 years for women at age 65.

This implies that relative inequalities in longevity by education increase with age.

For France, Currie, Schwandt and Thuilliez 258 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (2018) found no significant changes over time and little gradient.
41 Szwarcwald and others (2016) and Saikia, Bora and Luy (2019) are among the first attempt to examine the growing disparities in health and life expectancy for Brazil and India.

Large-scale data, going beyond surveys and covering populationwide socioeconomic and health status information, are urgently needed to provide more convincing evidence on the socioeconomic health gradients and fill these knowledge gaps.
75 See, for instance, Anand (2017), Anand, Roope and Peichl (2016) and Richardson and others (2019).

76 World Bank (2018a) provides an alternative interpretation.

77 Deaton 2013a, 2013b.

78 OECD 2019f.

79 This view seems plausible in many cases.

Deaton (2013a) discusses how some forms of progress are likely to spread gradually.

80 Based on Kuznets’s (1955) seminal paper.

See a broader discussion in chapter 2.

42 See, for instance, Auerbach and others 81 Milanovic (2016) describes Kuznets’s (2017).
43 Education is often a variable used for direct measurement of social mobility.

See for instance Narayan and others (2018) and OECD (2018a).

44 While there is endogeneity (enrolment ratios are linked to expected years of schooling, one of the four variables used to calculate the HDI), these relationships hold when using other development groupings in the analysis, including income.

45 Heckman 2011b.

46 Montenegro and Patrinos 2014.

47 See Goldin and Katz (2009) and Agarwal and Gaule (2018).
48 Akmal and Pritchett 2019; UNESCO 2019b.

49 Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Pritchett and Beatty 2015.

50 Bruns and Luque 2015; Filmer and Pritchett 1999.

51 Rözer and Van De Werfhorst 2017.

52 UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation 2018.

53 World Bank 2018a.

54 UNESCO 2019b.

55 UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation 2018.

56 UNESCO 2019b.

57 World Bank 2019c.

58 UNESCO 2018b.

59 UNESCO 2019b.

60 UNDP and OPHI 2019.

61 Dercon 2001.

62 Nussbaum 2011.

63 Sen 1999.


64 See the discussion of recognition and challenges for destigmatization in Lamont (2018).

65 UNDP Chile 2017.

66 See Hojman and Miranda (2018).

67 Stewart 2005, 2016a.

68 UN 2015c.

69 ECLAC 2018a.

70 Pew Research Center 2014.

71 Eurobarometer 2018.

72 Latinobarometro 2018.

73 Hauser and Norton 2017.

Alesina, Stantcheva and Teso (2018) find that lower perceptions about social mobility tend to increase preferences for redistribution.
74 Cruces, Pérez-Truglia and Tetaz 2013. waves for income inequality but based on a wider set of mechanisms of malign forces and benign forces.

82 OECD 2019f.

83 Models of the complex relationship be- tween aspirations and inequality can be found in Besley (2017) and Genicot and Ray (2017).

Chapter 2 Deaton 2018.

Sen 1999.


An analysis based on this year’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) shows no correlation between MPI value and income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) but a strong correlation between MPI value and percentage loss in HDI value due to inequality in both health and education (Kovacevic 2019; UNDP and OPHI 2019).

Recent research has not only concep- tually clarified causal mechanisms but also marshalled supporting empirical evidence.
While much of the evidence is specific to countries with enough data, that the empirical work is tied to general hypotheses lends universal relevance to the analysis.

Deaton 2013b.

Persistently low mobility along with in- creasing income inequality compounds the disadvantages among people who are unable to move up.

As Chetty and others (2014, p. 1) put it, “[…] the consequences of the “birth lottery”— the parents to whom a child is born— are larger today than in the past.
A useful visual analogy is to envision the income distributions as a ladder, with each percentile representing a different rung.

The rungs of the ladder have grown further apart (inequality has increased) but children’s changes of climbing from lower to higher rungs have not changed.” Corak 2013.
The curve was introduced in a 2012 speech by Alan Krueger (chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Krueger 2012) and in the President’s Economic Report to Congress (US Government 2012) based on Corak’s data.

8 See, for instance, the seminal dis- cussion in Solon (1999) and the more comprehensive review in Black and Devereux (2011).

9 Corak 2013, p. 85.

10 Corak 2013, p. 98.

11 Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine 2013.


This conclusion was drawn from two different measures of mobility: inter- generational persistence in income and intergenerational persistence in education.

12 For an earlier analysis on inequality of opportunity, see World Bank (2006).

The report found that a quarter of all differences in earnings between workers can be attributed to similar circumstances as the ones mentioned above.

13 Narayan and others 2018.


The measure for mobility is intergenera- tional persistence in education and the measure for inequality of opportunity is the inequality of economic oppor- tunity index developed in Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine (2013).

14 Brunori, Ferreira and Peragine 2013.

For a critical literature review on equality and inequality of opportunity focusing on the principles of compen- sation and reward, see Ferreira and Peragine (2016).
15 Even in rather equal societies there is evidence that children of wealthy par- ents are well off themselves.

Recent evidence drawn from the wealth of adoptees in Norway (Fagereng, Mogstad and Ronning 2019) and Sweden (Black and others 2019) sug- gests that the wealth of the adoptive parents was a strong determinant of children’s accumulation of wealth.
An important caveat is that these findings pertain to the intergenerational transmission of wealth, which may be different from that of income, which is the focus of this section.

16 Roemer 1998.

17 There is consensus among many economic thinkers that final welfare is inappropriate for assessing distrib- utive justice.

Compare, for example, Dworkin (1981), Rawls (1971), Roemer (1998) and Sen (1985).

18 Narayan and others 2018.

19 Deaton 2013b, p. 265.


20 For a historical perspective on health gradients in the United Kingdom and the evolution of political and academic debates, see Macintyre (1997).

21 See Case and Paxson (2008).

22 Some evidence suggests that it is not only levels of income that matter; variation in incomes during childhood has adverse health effects (especially on mental health) later in life (Bjorkenstam and others 2017).
23 This behaviour does not need to reflect rational choices or individual pref- erences but may even be shaped by the dynamics of social structures, as argued in Xie, Cheng and Zhou (2015).

24 The contribution of assortative mating to levels and changes in income inequality varies in the literature.
Blundell, Joyce, Keiller and Ziliak (2018) estimate that, for the United Kingdom and the United States, assor- tative mating contributed slightly more than half of the increase in household earnings for the group between the 5th and 95th percentiles in the period 1994–2015 (table 2, p. 58).
Greenwood and others (2014) report a very large impact of assortative mating on ine- quality by simulating what would have happened to income inequality in the United States in 2005 if mating had been random; but they later corrected these findings as an overestimation (Greenwood and others 2015).
The corrected estimates are in line with those of Eika, Mogstad and Zafar (forthcoming) for the United States and other developed countries, which show that assortative mating accounts for a non-negligible amount of income ine- quality, but with other factors playing a greater role.

(Hryshko, Juhn and McCue 2017 also find a small effect for the United States).
Hakak and Firpo (2017) find similar evidence for Brazil, showing that the counterfactual income Gini with assortative mating would have been slightly slower than it actually was over a period of 20 years (see also Torche 2010, who finds an isomorphism between assortative mating and inequality not only for Brazil but also for Chile and Mexico).
Further, these studies show that the patterns of assortative mating across income groups and over time vary, and with several other factors driving inequality, it is difficult to attribute unambiguously the impact of assortative mating to inequality.

Still, the evidence strongly suggests that assortative mating takes place across countries and makes a non-negligible contribution to income inequality.
25 For an argument and evidence showing how assortative mating is important for intergenerational mobility see Chadwick and Solon (2002).

26 Most of the analysis in this section considers what happens from one gen- eration to the next, but even though the evidence is contentious in the literature, the persistence can carry even across multiple generations, with the effects dissipating over time (see Solon 2018 for a recent review).
27 Regression of respondents’ years of schooling on their parents’ highest years of schooling (EqualChances 2019).

Data are for the 1980 cohort and for the most recent year available.

28 See, among others, Blossfeld and oth- ers (2017), Chevalier and Lanot (2001), Duncan, Brooks-Gunn and Klebanov (1994), Heckman and Carneiro (2003) and Phillips and Shonkoff (2000).

29 Black and others 2017.

30 Wilkinson and Pickett 2018.

31 Garcia and others 2016; Heckman 2017.

32 UNESCO 2018a.
32 UNESCO 2018a.

33 Similar results have been found for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (Bradbury and others 2015; Heckman 2011a).

Genes can usually explain only part of such divergences.

See, for example, Rowe (1994).

Environmental influences affect gene expression, as shown in an identical twin study.

Raised apart, twins already differed by age 3 due to different exposure to stimuli in their living and learning environments (Fraga and others 2005; Lee and others 2018).
34 See, for example, Jensen and Nielsen (1997) and Khanam (2008).

35 Akmal and Pritchett 2019.

For the defi- nition of learning profiles, see Pritchett and Sandefur (2017).

36 Bernardi 2014; Bernardi and Boado 2013; Bernardi and Plavgo forthcoming; Blossfeld and others 2016; Hartlaub and Schneider 2012; Heckman and Krueger 2005; Yanowitch 1977.

37 Bernardi and Plavgo forthcoming.

See also Yastrebov, Kosyakova and Kurakin (2018).

38 Heckman 2010.

39 OECD 2010.


40 Bernardi and Ballarino 2016; Bernardi and Plavgo forthcoming.

41 Bussolo, Checchi and Peragine 2019; Kramarz and Skans 2014.

42 Bussolo, Checchi and Peragine 2019.

43 Shanmugaratnam 2019.

44 Deaton 2013b.

45 Deaton 2003, 2013b; Galama and Van Kippersluis 2018; Lindahl and others 2016.
46 See for instance, Almond and Currie (2011), both on the impact of health before age 5 on adult health and on the potential to redress some of the negative impacts in an early age later in life.

47 For an example on how foetuses are affected by pollution, see Currie (2011).

48 Currie 2009.

49 Case and Paxson 2010; Currie 2009, 2011.

50 Skelton and others 2011.

51 Elgar and others 2016.

The sample for this study consists of 1,371 ado- lescents in seven European countries.
Measures used to assess socio- economic status included parent-re- ported material assets and household income as well as youth-reported material assets and subjective social status (MacArthur scale of subjective social status).

Health measures include general self-rated health and Cantril’s self-anchoring measure of life satisfaction.

52 Babones 2008; Curran and Mahutga 2018; Kim and Saada 2013; Torre and Myrskylä 2014; Wilkinson and Pickett 2011.
Multivariate regressions of income inequality and life expectancy as well as income inequality and infant mortality with recent data from coun- tries at all levels of human develop- ment show that other variables—such as GDP per capita, education level, government health expenditure, ethnic diversity and, in the case of high and very high human development coun- tries, democratization—better explain variations in these health indicators than income inequality (Bernardi and Plavgo forthcoming).
53 McEniry and others 2018.

The article examines the relation between socioeconomic status and health conditions for people age 60 or older.

Socioeconomic status is measured by education attainment.

54 Chen, Persson and Polyakova 2019.

55 Kuznets 1955.
55 Kuznets 1955.

Lewis’s dual model is similar in spirit to Kuznets’s, but Lewis assumes that holders of capital in the modern sector can accumulate wealth while paying a constant wage to a “reserve army” of workers that are available in the agricultural sector, thus having very different implications on income distribution (Lewis 1954).

56 Kuznets 1955, p. 17.


He also con- sidered the implications of a higher savings rate, and thus accumulation of capital and assets, at the top of the income distribution, emphasizing the impact of policies and taxes in limiting the accumulation of wealth at the very top.
The “unravelling” of these policies and tax structures in many market-based economies is document- ed by Piketty (2014), who argues that the mid-20th century, when inequality was low, was an exceptional period during which institutions curbed the tendency of returns to capital running ahead income growth and that the more normal course of capitalism is to have a high concentration of income and wealth at the top—which is the trend that has dominated in several advanced economies since the 1980s.
This would thus be a rejection of Kuznets-like arguments grounded on structural change.

57 Kanbur 2017.

58 Milanovic 2016.

Thus, the recent in- crease in inequality in many advanced economies can be interpreted as the transition to societies adjusting to the joint effects of globalization and technological change (Conceição and Galbraith 2001).

59 Tinbergen 1974, 1975.

Notes | 259 60 In particular for the United States, see Goldin and Katz (2009).

61 OECD 2019f.
61 OECD 2019f.

62 Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003; Goos, Manning and Salomons 2014.

63 One of the reasons for contesting this theory is the large dispersion in earnings within, as opposed to across, occupations.

See Mishel, Schmitt and Shierholz (2013).


64 Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou (2013) show that technology accounts for the increase in inequality in devel- oping countries and that exposure to globalization does not reduce inequal- ity, as one might expect if, through trade, production were to move from developed to developing countries.

The reason is that countries are also ex- posed to financial globalization, which counters the equalizing effect of trade globalization in developing countries.
65 Bhorat and others 2019.

66 See Hunt and Nunn (2019) for the United States.

For more evidence, including Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, see Autor (2014, 2019).

For an extensive review, see Salverda and Checchi (2015).
67 For a sense of the evolution of the debate over time, see Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999), Baymul and Sen (2018), Eicher and Turnovsky (2003), Galbraith (2012), Milanovic (2005), Ostry, Loungani and Berg (2019), Piketty (2006), Stiglitz (2012) and World Bank (2006).

68 See, for instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2003).


Kuznets (1955) starts with a lengthy discussion of the ideal data needed to investigate the relation between growth and inequality, recog- nizing that his requirements sounded like a statistician’s pipe dream.

69 See Piketty (2006, 2014).

Kuznets’s arguments are not inconsistent with Piketty’s assertion, given that Kuznets himself recognized several limitations of his article (for example, that it excludes government transfers).

70 Scheidel 2017.
70 Scheidel 2017.

71 Okun 1975.

72 Lucas 2004, p. 20.

73 Cingano 2014; Ostry and Berg 2011; Ostry, Loungani and Berg 2019.

See also Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Assa (2012), Barro (2008) and Stiglitz (2016).

74 Neves, Afonso and Silva 2016.

75 See, for instance, Kraay (2015) and Bourguignon (2015b).

76 Furman 2019.

In discussing Furman’s arguments, Rodrik (2019) and Shanmugaratnam (2019) come to support the same basic argument.

77 López-Calva and Rodríguez-Castelán 2016.

78 Mendez Ramos 2019.


79 Chenery and others 1974; López-Calva and Rodríguez-Castelán 2016.

80 Bourguignon 2003.

81 Lakner and others 2019.

82 Aiyar and Ebeke 2019.


Some empirical evidence suggests that high income inequality can reduce public school attendance because parents opt to send children either to work (low socioeconomic status families) or to private school (high socioeconomic status families), diminishing support for public education and expenditure per student, which could equalize op- portunity.

Gutiérrez and Tanaka 2009.


83 While Marrero, Gustavo and Juan Rodríguez (2013) and Aiyar and Ebeke (2019) find supporting evidence, Ferreira and others (2018) do not.

84 ECLAC 2018a.

85 Birdsall, Ross and Sabot 1995.

86 ECLAC 2018a.

87 Bowles and others 2012.

88 Alvaredo and others 2018.

89 Berger-Schmitt 2000.

90 Uslaner 2002.

91 Uslaner and Brown 2005.

92 Wilkinson and Pickett 2011 (data on trust are from the World Values Survey).
When including countries with lower human development using data from the Gallup World Poll from 2010 (the year with most coverage), there is no significant correlation (Human Development Report Office calculation).

93 Paskov and Dewilde 2012.

94 Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015; Leigh 2006.

95 Buttrick and Oishi 2017.

96 Van Zomeren 2019.

97 Connolly, Corak and Haeck 2019, p. 35.

98 Connolly, Corak and Haeck 2019.

99 European Commission, Directorate- General for Research and Innovation 2014.
100 See Ramos and others (2019) for a study on religious diversity.

101 OECD 2010.

102 Lancee and Van de Werfhorst 2012; Solt 2008.

103 On the influence of the upper middle class in political processes in the United States, see Reeves (2018).

See also Gilens and Page (2014), Igan and Mishra (2011) and Karabarbounis (2011).

Clientelism can be defined as “a political strategy characterized by an exchange of material goods in return for electoral support” (World Bank 2017b, p. 10, based on Stokes 2009).
104 For a more comprehensive discussion on this, see UNDP (2016).

105 World Bank 2017b.

106 Chadwick 2017, p. 4.

107 Kennedy and Prat 2019.

Data are from the Reuters Digital News Report survey, which covers more than 72,000 individuals in 36 countries.

For a discussion on the data’s limitation, see Kennedy and Prat (2019).

Around 80 percent of individuals in the sample watch news on television, 40 percent read newspapers and only 30 percent use pure internet sources.
Internet sources are consumed more widely when they are associated with a tradi- tional platform, especially newspaper websites.

108 Prat 2015.

109 Kennedy and Prat 2019.

110 Fake news is defined as “intentionally false or misleading stories” (Clayton and others forthcoming, p. 1).

111 Rodrik 2018.

112 For a case study of Latin America, see Piñeiro, Rhodes-Purdy and Rosenblatt 2016.

113 Rodrik 2018.

114 This paragraph draws on the analysis in World Bank (2017b).

115 Bernardi and Plavgo forthcoming.


Due to a few cases of extreme outliers, for the multivariate analysis in the background papers for this Report, homicide rates were transferred into their natural logarithmic form.

See also Kawachi, Kennedy and Wilkinson (1999), Pickett, Mookherjee and Wilkinson (2005) and Wilkinson and Pickett (2011).

116 This was determined through an interaction effect between the Gini co- efficient and mean years of schooling.
There is no such moderating effect for low and medium human development countries.

117 Enamorado and others 2016.

118 Gilligan (1996), as cited by Pickett, Mookherjee and Wilkinson (2005).

119 Kawachi, Kennedy and Wilkinson 1999.

120 Alesina and Perotti 1996.

121 Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

122 Stewart 2005, 2009, 2016a, 2016b.

123 Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013.

See also Stewart (2005).


One of the mechanisms behind this was explained a long time ago by Horowitz’s (2001) comprehensive study Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

Ethnicity is equivalent to the family concept, generating solidarity and a strong sense of belonging that can transform into intense emotional outbursts and sometimes even hatred (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).
Another explanation is that groups protest when they perceive inequalities as unfair and try to cope with them collectively instead of individually (Van Zomeren 2019).

Sen (2008b, p. 5) suggests that the “coupling between cultural identities and poverty” makes inequality more important and may thus contribute to violence.

124 Langer 2005.

125 Stewart 2009.

260 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 126 UN and World Bank 2018.

127 Kelley and others 2015.

128 Schleussner and others 2016.


129 Von Uexkull and others 2016.

130 Hillesund 2019.

131 Langer and Stewart 2015; Miodownik and Nir 2016.

132 Scheidel 2017 133 Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2017.

The authors use cross-country panel data (annual observations from 161 countries) for 1960–2014.

134 Gates and others 2012.

For infant mortality, see Dahlum and others (forthcoming).

135 Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2017.

136 UN and World Bank 2018.

137 Stewart 2016b.


Part II 1 2 3 4 This also limits understanding of whether people at the bottom are get- ting closer to moving out of poverty.

In fact, some evidence suggests that peo- ple who remain below the poverty line have seen little movement towards the line (Ravallion 2016), while many who have made it over the line remain poor when using other metrics (Brown, Ravallion and Van de Walle 2017), vulnerable to falling back (Lopez-Calva and Ortíz-Juarez 2014).
Rose (2016) describes many of the pit- falls of relying on averages to design and implement policy, going as far as suggesting that policies that promote equal access, if guided by the ideal of what would be needed on average, are bound to not fully create opportunity for everyone.

Borrowing from Ravallion (2001).

Ferreira (2012) made a similar point, arguing for the importance of using growth incidence curves.

Criado-Perez 2019.

Atkinson 1970, p. 261–262.

Ravallion 2018a.

Anand 2018.

Coyle 2015.


5 Rockoff 2019, p. 147.

11 See Deaton (2005) as well as Ferreira and Lustig (2015).

12 Smith and others 2019.

13 See, for instance, Galbraith (2018).

The objections include the observation that income tax data are sparse and patchy.

When there are large gaps in the data, assumptions have to be made that are very significant and open to scrutiny (Galbraith and others 2016).

14 Criado-Perez 2019.


Chapter 3 1 2 See, for instance, Zucman (2013, 2015).

Also discussed in Alvaredo and others (2018).

See also chapter 5 and Chancel (2017).

3 Zucman 2014.

See UN (2009).

See Alvaredo and others (2016).

See Zucman (2019).

See Zucman (2014).

In India the government stopped publishing data between 2000 and 2010 (see Chancel and Piketty 2017).

This section is based in part in Ferreira, Lustig and Teles (2015).
10 Formerly known as the Luxembourg 9 Income Study (www.lisdatacenter.org).

See Ravallion (2015).

11 Gasparini and Tornarolli2015.

12 Galbraith 2016.

13 See Lustig (2018a).

14 See www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid- world-income-inequality- database.

15 See Bourguignon (2015a).

16 See, for instance, ECLAC (2018b).


17 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions website (https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/ european-union- statistics-on-income- and-living-conditions, accessed 10 October 2019.

18 See, for example, Galbraith and others 2015; Ravallion 2018b.
19 Alvaredo and others 2018; Morgan 2017. size of Canada as compared with the United States (implying that different assumptions on the distribution of national income in Canada only have a marginal impact on the distribution of growth in the United States and Canada combined).

The two countries are merged into a single aggregate.
This allows a simple estimate of inequality in a region that is broadly comparable in size to Western Europe, while taking into consideration the main differences in national income levels and growth trajectories between the United States and Canada.

See Chancel, Clarke and Gethin (2017).

34 Sub-Saharan Africa is the merged distribution of Sub-Saharan African countries for which survey data are available from the World Bank’s PovcalNet.
Survey data are corrected with available tax data estimates (which are available at this stage for the recent period only for Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa; the gap between surveys and tax data in those countries is used to correct survey estimates in other African countries).

See Chancel, Clarke and Gethin (2017) and Chancel and Czajka (2017).

20 Kuznets 1953; Atkinson and Harrison 35 Here pensions and unemployment ben- (1978).

21 See Piketty (2001, 2003).

22 See Piketty and Saez (2003).


23 See Alvaredo and others (2013).

24 See Alvaredo and others (2016, 2018).

25 See Alvaredo and others (2016).

26 See Alvaredo and others (2018).

27 See Piketty (2014).

28 See https://wid.world/.

Methodological details can be found in Blanchet and Chancel (2016).

29 UN 2009.

30 See results in Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009b).
31 The research here on the levels and evolution of global income inequality draws heavily on Alvaredo and others (2018), which provides full details on methods and sources.

32 Here, Europe corresponds to Western Europe.

Western Europe is built by merging the income distributions of France, Germany and the United Kingdom and an aggregate merging other Western European countries (28 countries in total) to cover 420 million people.

See Chancel, Clarke and Gethin (2017).


The Middle East is de- fined as the region from Egypt to Iran and from Turkey to the Gulf countries and covers 410 million people.

See Alvaredo, Assouad and Piketty (2018).

33 United States–Canada is built as fol- lows.

Canadian growth is distributed to the Canadian population assuming the same distribution as the one observed in the United States.
The simplification seems acceptable given the similar trajectories of top income shares observed in the two countries and is justified by the relatively small efits are considered deferred income and are therefore counted as part of pretax and government transfers income; see spotlight 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

36 Blundell, Joyce, Norris and Ziliak 2018.


37 Although it should be emphasized that the top 1 percent and bottom 50 percent of the population are not necessarily composed of the same individuals in 1980 and 2016.

38 The “elephant curve” was popularized by Lakner and Milanovic (2016).

39 This is discussed in Alvaredo and 42 others (2018).

40 Ravallion 2018a.

41 The share of the population living on less than $1.90 a day decreased from 46 percent in 1993 to 21.2 percent in 2011 (World Bank 2012a).
In particular, Lakner and Milanovic (2016) and Anand and Segal (2014).

See also other attempts to measure global income inequality: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Niño-Zarazúa, Roope and Tarp (2017) and Ortiz and Cummings (2011).

Indeed, when meas- ured in absolute terms the elephant curve looks more like a hockey stick (Ravallion 2018a).

This fact is illus- trated by focusing on shares of total growth captured and not only on the growth rates of each income group.
43 See Alvaredo and others (2018) for a more detailed discussion of national trajectories.

44 See also Milanovic (2005).

45 Indeed, the two scenarios are not addi- tive, in the sense that global inequality is not the sum of the two curves.

46 Theil values are obtained from http:// WID.world/gpinter, using the global inequality dataset constructed for Alvaredo and others (2018); see http:// wir2018.wid.world).

47 Gathered by the World Bank and available on PovcalNet.
48 The values for Africa are based on interpolation of PovcalNet data (see Chancel and others 2019, which includes technical details for this section).

The values presented for the Americas, Asia and Europe are based on distributional national accounts.

49 For full details on methods and sources in this section on Africa, see Chancel and others (2019).
50 The incomes of the bottom 10 percent of the distribution are reduced 25–50 percent, while the incomes of the top 1 percent are increased by the same proportion, when moving from consumption to income inequality (Chancel and others 2019).

51 See Morgan (2017) on Brazil, Assouad (2017) on Lebanon and Czajka (2017) on Côte d’Ivoire, among others.

52 Chancel and others 2019, p. 11.

See also Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) for an analysis of South Africa in historical perspective.
53 See also Odusola and others (2017).

54 The extreme poverty rate went from 36.6 percent in 1996 to 16.9 percent in 2008 and to 18.9 percent in 2014.

See http://povertydata.worldbank.

org/poverty/country/ZAF (accessed 6 November 2019).

55 See Alvaredo and others (2018).

56 Parts of this section draw on Alvaredo and others (2018) and Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin (2019).

57 Blanchet, Chancel and Gethin 2019; Piketty, Saez and Zucman 2018.

58 See details in Blanchet, Chancel and 59 Gethin (2019).
It is important to stress that the focus here is solely on monetary income inequality, which was unusually low in the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe under communism.

Other forms of inequality prevalent at the time, in terms of access to public services or consumption of other forms of in-kind benefits, may have enabled local elites to enjoy much higher standards of living than their income levels suggest.
60 The percentage of the population at risk of poverty is defined as the share of adults living on less than 60 percent of the national median income.

61 See https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/ social-spending.htm.

62 For comparisons of the United States and Europe, see OECDStats (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.

aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE#).

63 Parts of this section draw on Alvaredo and others (2018).

64 Piketty and Zucman 2014.

65 Atkinson and Harrison 1978.


66 Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman 2018; Zucman 2014.

67 “Capital” and “wealth” are used interchangeably in this chapter.

68 More details are in Alvaredo and others (2018).

69 As for income inequality data, the set of countries with available wealth– income ratios is constantly growing.

70 Alvaredo and others 2018; Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and Piketty 2016; Saez and Zucman 2016.
71 See Alvaredo and others (2018, section 4) for a longer discussion of the under- lying data.

72 See Piketty, Yang and Zucman.

2019 Chapter 4 1 2 UNDP 2018a; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012b.

UNDP 2018a; UN Women 2019; WEF 2018; World Bank 2012b.

UN Women 1995.

3 4 WEF 2018.

5 6 7 8 UNDP 2018a.

Giraldo-Luque and others 2018.

Fletcher, Pande and Moore 2017.

Butler 2019; McDonald and White 2018; UN News 2019.

9 Nussbaum 2001, p. 1.

10 UNDP 1995, p. 1.

11 UNDP 1995, p. 29.

12 UN 2015a.


13 UN Women and IPU 2019.

14 UNICEF 2018b.

15 Keleher and Franklin 2008; Marcus 2018; Marcus and Harper 2014; Munoz Boudet and others 2012; Sen, Ostlin and George 2007.

16 Marcus and Harper 2014.

17 Bicchieri 2006; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter 2002; Ostrom 2000.

18 Galvan and Garcia-Peñalosa 2018.

19 OECD 2017a; UNDP and UN Women 2019; UN Women 2015b; WEF 2017.

20 Mackie and others 2015.

21 Charles 2012.

22 Chamorro-Premuzic 2013.

23 Marcus and Harper 2015.


24 Green 2016.

25 Gintis 2007.

26 Cislaghi, Manji and Heise 2018; Cooper and Fletcher 2013; Marcus and Harper 2014.

27 Bandura 2003; Mackie and others 2015; Munoz Boudet and others 2012; Sood, Menard and Witte 2009.

28 Bian, Leslie and Cimpian 2017; Cunningham 2001.

29 OECD 2017a.

30 Borrell-Porta, Costa-Font and Philipp 2018.

31 Borrell-Porta, Costa-Font and Philipp 2018.

32 Amin and others 2018.

33 Kågesten and others 2016.


34 Mackie and Le Jeune 2009; Mackie and others 2015; UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre 2010.

35 UN Women 2015b.

Notes | 261 36 Mackie and Le Jeune 2009; Marcus and Harper 2014; UNICEF 2013.

37 Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno 1991; 3 Etzioni 2000; Jacobs and Campbell 1961.

38 Nussbaum 2003.

39 Addati and others 2018.


40 The term was coined by Amartya Sen to capture the fact that the proportion of women is lower than what would be expected if girls and women through- out the developing world were born and died at the same rate, relative to boys and men (Sen 1990).

41 UNDP 2016.

42 UNDP 2016.

43 OECD 2017a; UNESCO 2019a.

44 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2019.

45 UNICEF 2019a.

46 Kishor and Johnson 2004.

47 Loaiza and Wong 2012.


48 Chandra-Mouli, Camacho and Michaud 2013.

49 Blum and Gates 2015.

50 Statistics for contraceptive prevalence focus on married women because in developing countries most sexually active adolescent girls are married, while in some it is claimed that sexual activity happens only within marriage.

As a result, household surveys do not collect data on unmarried women.

Still, unmarried women need to be con- sidered when designing policies and interventions for reproductive health.
51 UNFPA 2019.

52 Kumar and Rahman 2018.

53 UNDP 2016.

54 UNIFEM 2000.

55 ILO 2017a.

56 Alonso and others 2019.

57 Hegewisch and Gornick 2011.

58 The global average gap for the same job is 77 percent (UN Women 2017).

59 Munoz Boudet and others 2018.

60 World Bank 2017a.

61 Schmidt and Sevak 2006; Sierminska, Frick and Grabska 2010.

62 Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper and Singer 2013.

63 Munoz Boudet and others 2018.

64 See UN Women (2019).

65 See UN Women (2015a).


66 ILO 2017a; UNDP 2016; UN Women 2015b; World Bank 2012b.

67 Deschamps 2018.

Chapter 5 1 2 This framing is adapted from Berthe and Elie (2015).
This may seem to exclude production, but it is possible to consider not only direct emissions from consumption (such as driving a car) but also the in- direct emissions related to production of a good or service (for instance, the steel processing, manufacturing and transportation activities required to 4 6 7 8 make a chair available for someone to sit on).
Because fewer consumers have the purchasing power to afford “green” goods and services, keeping prices up and generating less demand for further technological change (Vona and Patriarca 2011).
There is evidence supporting this hypothesis for the case of states in the United States, with analysis showing that there is no impact of the Gini index on emissions by state (thus, confirming that the first mechanism is either absent or weak) but that there is a positive relationship between state-level emissions and the concentration of income among the top 10 percent, consistent with “approach- es that focus on political economy dynamics […] which highlight the potential political and economic power […] of the wealthy” (Jorgenson, Schor and Huang 2017, p. 40).
Market concentration was key in the history of the development of the Montreal Protocol in 1987 to combat ozone-de- stroying chlorofluorocarbons.

For years, dominant firms opposed regulatory action until they saw how they could benefit economically from regulation that would create a profitable market for chemical substitutes (Hamann and others 2018; Maxwell and Briscoe 1998).
common pool resources, as opposed to a global public good such as climate stability, but the broader mechanism showing how inequality makes collec- tive action more challenging remains valid.

See, for instance, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2008); Bardhan (2000); Costa and Kahn (2003); and Varughese and Ostrom (2001).

For both the impact of inequality in reducing cooperation and the value of communication in enabling it, see Tavoni and others (2011).

Berger and others 2011.


And how inequality exacerbates social status competition and could encourage growth policies at the ex- pense of environmental ones (Baland, Bardhan and Bowles 2007; Berthe and Elie 2015; Chaigneau and Brown 2016; Franzen and Vogl 2013; Magnani 2000).

Cohen and others 2018 p. 1.


5 Much of the evidence applies to 9 10 Some evidence suggests that decoup- ling is associated with reductions in income inequality—more specifically, that it is negatively associated with increasing the income share of the top 20 percent and positively associated with increasing the income share of the bottom 20 percent (McGee and Greiner 2018).

11 Cumming and von Cramon-Taubadel 2018.


12 See Moser and Kleinhückelkotten (2017) for an exploration of the complexities of environmental identity, intentions and impacts, combining in- tent- and impact-oriented perspectives that have been motivating questions in the environmental psychology literature.
13 For instance, the trend (that is, removing cyclical changes in income) elasticity between income and emis- sions for a typical developed country has been estimated to be essentially zero for production-based emissions (effectively meaning that emissions are decoupled from growth), while jumping to 0.5 for consumption-based emissions (implying still quite strong coupling); the elasticities estimated for developing countries are about 0.7 for both production-based emissions and consumption-based emissions (Cohen and others 2018).
14 A related concept—and narrower one, in certain formulations—discussed at length in the literature is the pollution haven hypothesis, first postulated by Copeland and Taylor (1994) in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
In its most general formulation, the pollution haven hy- pothesis posits that trade liberalization encourages more polluting firms and industries to move some of their oper- ations to countries with laxer environ- mental standards, thereby increasing pollution in receiving countries.

Evidence for the hypothesis is mixed; see Gill, Viswanathan and Abdul Karim (2018) for a comprehensive review.
A conceptual sticking point is causal- ity—that is, whether firms relocate because of the laxer environmental standards or for some other reason that also happens to correlate with weaker standards.

Some compelling evidence exists for the hypothesis for carbon dioxide emissions, including recently in Itzhak, Kleimeier and Viehs (2018), which used innovative micro data.
Environmental burden shifting as presented in this chapter is broader than under the pollution haven hypoth- esis and is not preconditioned on dif- ferences in environmental regulation.

It can occur between countries—in the form of net flows of virtual pollution or resource use (such as freshwater use) bundled in traded goods—or within them—for example, in the siting of waste disposal facilities.
Kolcava, Nguyen and Bernauer (2019) show only partial support for a link between trade liberalization via preferential trade agreements and environmental burden shifting, as measured by aggregate ecological footprints.

Still, that study has tested a narrower hypothesis (trade liberalization via preferential trade agreements) than what this chapter asserts has to do with trade generally, regardless of the extent of liberalization, as well as to do with non-trade-related burden shifting.
See also Roca (2003).

15 Given that the negative effects of cli- mate change fall disproportionally on those with lower incomes and fewer capabilities (UNDP 2007).

16 Based on simulations of the evolution in income inequality across countries from 1961 to 2010, measured by the 90:10 ratio of population-weighted GDP per capita (Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019a).

These results have been contested as an overestimation (Rosen 2019), but the authors stand by their findings (Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019b).
17 Burke and Tanutama 2019; Randell and Gray 2019.

Although a lot depends on how impact is assessed (for example, economic damages or causalities) and on the nature of hazards linked to climate change.
For instance, there is evidence that extreme temperature events have increased mortality in both developed and developing countries, deaths linked to extreme drought have gone down in both groups of countries and there is increasing polarization between developed and developing countries in deaths associated with ex- treme storms increasing in developing countries (Coronese and others 2019).
18 Pershing and others (2019) provide a conceptual overview of the impact of climate change on “surprise” events and empirical analysis in 65 large marine ecosystems.

19 World Bank 2019d.

20 Klein 2019.

21 Le Quéré and others 2018.

22 Brulle 2018; Dunlap and McCright 2011; Van den Hove, Le Menestrel and De Bettignies 2002.

23 Ritchie and Roser 2018.


24 Some have argued that the uncon- ditional pledges under the Paris Agreement worsen existing inequal- ities in carbon emissions and that an emissions trading scheme across a subset of major signatories shows that although emissions trading re- duces the costs of meeting emissions reductions targets, most of the gains would go to richer countries, implying additional inequality.

See Rose, Wei and Bento (2019).

25 Chancel and Piketty 2015.

26 Cardona and others 2012.


27 Even though growth in the economic damages associated with extreme hazards in temperate regions has ac- celerated (Coronese and others 2019).

28 The only stronger hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic was Hurricane Allen in 1980, but it weakened before 262 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 making landfall (Le Page 2019).

See also Rice (2019).

29 Semple 2019.


30 Burke, Davis and Diffenbaugh 2018; Kahn and others 2019; Kompas, Pham and Che 2018; Pretis and others 2018; Tol 2018.

31 Burke and Tanutama 2019; Carleton and Hsiang 2016.

32 Cooper 2019.

33 Weitzman 2012, p. 234.


34 Some of the most widely used models rely on smooth damage functions as a “best fit” for the underlying data rather than on damage functions with nonlinearities (that is, thresholds, tipping points), which may be more characteristic of potential catastrophic events under climate change.

Smooth functions are a “best fit” precisely be- cause the underlying data themselves have made minimizing assumptions about catastrophic events.
To help remedy this and other shortcomings in the underlying data from other models, a “fudge factor” of 25 percent is added to the DICE damage function (Cooper 2019; Nordhaus and Moffat 2017).

35 Cai, Judd and Lontzek 2013; Cai and others 2015; Lemoine and Traeger 2014.

36 Burke, Davis and Diffenbaugh 2018; Kahn and others 2019; Kompas, Pham and Che 2018; Pretis and others 2018; Tol 2018.

37 Daniel, Litterman and 2019.


Forceful action in this context means pricing carbon based on probabilistic assump- tions of climate damages.

The price of carbon in this model would be high, and increasing, over a few years, but would come progressively down as the insurance value decreases and tech- nology makes emissions cuts cheaper.

38 WHO 2018.

39 Hoegh-Gulberg and others 2018.

40 Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition 2016; US CDC 2014.
41 An individual can be exposed once or multiple times during a year.

Each time a person is exposed counts as an expo- sure event.

Watts and others 2015.

42 WHO and World Bank 2017.

43 Watts, Amann, Arnell and others 2018.

44 Mejia and others 2019.

45 Kahn and others 2019.

46 Watts, Amann, Arnell and others 2018.

47 Watts, Amann, Ayeb-Karlsson and others 2018.

52 Other, related frameworks have been proposed for the channels by which climate change affects inequality.
See Islam and Winkel (2017), which proposes three channels: exposure, susceptibility and ability to cope and recover.

With the discussion on resilience, this chapter broadly encom- passes this framework.

53 See Winsemius and others 2018.

The authors also highlight a potential pathway going in other direction: the impact of hazard-prone areas on poverty.

54 Demaria 2010.

55 Boillat and others 2018; Hart 2014; Jones 2009.

56 Martinez-Alier and others 2016; Sobotta, Campbell and Owens 2007.
57 Wenz 2007.

58 Asseng and others 2015; Battisti and Naylor 2009; Challinor and others 2016; Porter and others 2014; Zhao, Liu and others 2017.

59 King and Harrington 2018; King and others 2015; Mora and others 2013.

60 Schiermeier 2018.

61 For the general mechanisms through which a weather shock can lead to devastating food insecurity, see, for instance, Devereux (2009).

62 Dingel, Meng and Hsiang 2019.

63 Woodard, Davis and Randerson 2019.

64 Burke and Tanutama 2019.

65 Randell and Gray 2019.


66 Mejia and others 2019.

67 European Environment Agency 2018; Parry and Terton 2016.

68 Devex n.d.; Parry and Terton 2016; UK Space Agency 2018.

69 Nakatani 2019.

70 Global Commission on Adaptation 2019.

71 Vörösmarty and others 2000.

72 Hallegatte and Rozenberg 2017; Rozenberg and Hallegatte 2015.

73 UNDP 2011.

74 Liu and others 2007.

75 As documented by Scheidel (2017).

And the response to a shock can be equalizing, even when the impact is not.
For instance, Hurricane Mitch hit the poorest households the hardest in Honduras, but the response generated an opportunity to address longstanding inequalities (McSweeney and Coomes 2011).

76 Coronese and others 2019.

77 Clarke and Dercon 2016.

78 See, for instance, Hallegatte and 48 “Vectorial capacity is a measure of others (2017).
the capacity for vectors to transmit a pathogen to a host and is influenced by vector, pathogen, and environmental factors” (Watts, Amann, Ayeb-Karlsson and others 2018, p. 2487).

49 Watts, Amann, Arnell and others 2018.

50 Randell and Gray 2019.

51 Kim, Lee and Rossin-Slater 2019.

79 Hallegatte and others 2017.

80 UNDRR 2019.

81 As an example, consider the reduction in vulnerability to floods (Jongman and others 2015).

IPCC 2014, p. 8.

IPCC 2014, p. 13.

For food security, see FAO (2018).


IPCC 2014.

82 83 84 85 Dang, Lanjouw and Swinkels 2014.

86 Fuentes-Nieva and Seck 2010.

87 Kim 2010.

88 89 For instance, when an ocean heat IDMC 2018. wave in the North Atlantic in 2012 led the lobster capture to peak one month earlier than normal, this led to a glut in supply and drop in prices.
After this “surprise” shock, investments in marketing and processing capacity en- abled the industry to respond to sharp increases in temperature—such as the one that occurred in 2016, in which the industry hit record value (Pershing and others 2019).

90 Examples of environmental justice ac- tivism include the mobilization against the siting of toxic dumping sites in the 1980s (Bullard 1983, 1990; Margai 2001; Taylor 2000).

91 Milman 2018; US EPA 2015.


92 Thus, some environmental justice liter- ature is focused on procedural justice questions rather than on distributive outcomes (Curran 2018).

In this chapter “waste” refers to solid waste.

93 94 Kaza and others 2018.

95 Eriksen and others 2014 96 US NOAA 2018.

97 Lebreton and others 2018.

98 US NOAA 2018.

99 Choy and others 2019; Woodall and others 2014.

100 Allen and others 2019; Gasperi and others 2018.

101 Kaza and others 2018.


102 This paragraph is based on Kaza and others (2018).

103 Bullard 1983, 1990; Margai 2001; Taylor 2000.

For a literature review, see Martuzzi, Mitis and Forastiere (2010).

See also Elliott and others (2001); Harper, Steger and Filcˇak (2009); Johnson, Lora-Wainwright and Lu 2018; Laurian (2008); McLaren, Cottray and Taylor (1999); Steger and others 2007; Varga, Kiss and Ember (2002); Varró, Gombköto and Szeremi (2001); Walker and others (2003).
104 Thornton and others (2006), as cited in FAO (2018).

105 Data in this paragraph are from FAO (2018).

106 FAO 2014; Poore and Nemecek 2018.

107 “Agriculture uses approximately 70 percent of the available freshwater supply, and roughly 30 percent of global agricultural water goes on livestock production” (FAO 2018, p. 51).

Calculation based on 30 percent of 70 percent = 21 percent.

108 Godfray and others 2010; Rask and Rask 2011.


109 Gerbens-Leenes and Nonhebel 2002; Pimentel and Pimentel 2003; Wirsenius, Azar and Berndes 2010.

110 FAO 2006, 2017; Gerber and others 2013; Tubiello and others 2014.

111 Processing, distribution and retail mat- ter, too, with losses often accounting for the greatest share of emissions at these stages.

Poore and Nemecek 2018.

112 FAO 2017; Science Daily 2014.

113 Beef refers to beef obtained from beef herders and dairy herders.
Poore and Nemecek 2018.

114 Poore and Nemecek 2018.

115 OECD and FAO 2018.

116 FAO 2018.

117 OECD and FAO 2017, 2018.

118 Bennett 1941; Block and others 2004; Bouis, Eozenou and Rahman 2011.

119 Because income elasticities for meat consumption are higher for lower income groups.

Humphries and others 2014.

120 Burton 2019.

121 A.T. Kearney 2019.


122 Giupponi and Paz 2015; Government of Ecuador 2008; State of California 2012; Takacs 2016; UN General Assembly 2010; United Nations Human Rights Council 2010.

123 Data in this paragraph are from UNICEF and WHO (2019).

124 FAO 2016.

125 FAO 2016.

126 Gerten and others 2015; Jaramillo and Destouni 2015; Rockström and others 2009; Steffen and others 2015.

127 Gleeson and others forthcoming.

128 Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016.

129 Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016.


130 Richey and others 2015.

131 UNDP 2006, p. v. 132 Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012.

133 Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011.

134 Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012.

135 In other words, more water is used to produce the meat and cereals that are consumed rather than consuming more meats and cereals overall.

136 Hoekstra and Mekonnen 2012.

137 UNICEF and WHO 2019.

138 Cole and others 2018.

139 Republic of South Africa 1996; South Africa Department of Water and Sanitation 2016.
140 Gleick 2018.

141 Gleick 2018.

142 The cost of transitioning to a carbon-free electricity system in the United States has dropped markedly, driven by declines in the cost of re- newable energy technologies, such as wind and solar, as well as energy stor- age systems (Heal 2019).
See Haegel and others (2019) and Veers and others (2019) for reviews of global cost and capacity trends for photovoltaic and wind technologies, respectively, as well as a discussion of challenges and opportunities for further scaling up.

Davis and others (2018) explore challenges and opportunities in decar- bonizing energy services and industrial processes, such as long-distance Notes | 263 freight transport and air travel, that are difficult to provide without emitting carbon dioxide.
Despite increasingly favourable conditions for renewable energy and associated technologies, global energy growth is still outpacing decarbonization (Jackson and others 2018).
Chapter 6 1 2 3 4 The expression became widely used by economic historians after Kenneth Pomeranz’s (2000) book The Great Divergence, even though the book presented what was at the time an original thesis on how and why the Industrial Revolution happened (claim- ing that it was happenstance that it originated in Europe, given that East Asia had very similar conditions in the late 17th century and, further, that Europe’s advantage was due largely to the large natural resources extracted from the “New World” colonies).
This view is contested, with a recent review of the debate on the causes of the Great Divergence and multiple hypothesis being put forward, included in Vries (2016).

For a recent economic perspective, see O’Rourke, Rahman and Taylor (2019).
The aspiration to “develop” in much of the second half of the 20th century was almost synonymous with “industrialization.” And, indeed, over the second half of the 20th century, manufacturing moved to several de- veloped countries—though not to all and not at the same time—leading to some convergence in incomes across countries.

A testimony of the enduring appeal of industrialization is reflected in the fact that industrializing remains one of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Until the mid-19th century the largest ratio of real income per capita between the richest and the poorest society was 5 to 1 (Vries 2016).

Human Development Report Office calcula- tions based on country estimates in the Maddison Project Database of in- come per person (Bolt and others 2018) show that the ratio had grown to 50 to 1 by the middle of the 20th century.

These estimates are contested but still provide a useful reference point.
On inequality within countries, Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2010) show that the Gini coefficient for income was, on average, as high in preindus- trial as in industrial economies, with similar variation across economies.

The intensive use of coal as a source of energy continued throughout the 20th century and was exacerbated by the widespread use of the internal combustion engine.
For a historical ac- count of the environmental dimensions 5 6 7 of these technological innovations and their significance, see McNeill (2001).

The report also considered the importance of balancing incentives for investments in new technology with its diffusion and discussed the many barriers that developing countries face in benefiting from that diffusion (UNDP 2001).

Silver and others 2018.

LeCun, Bengio and Hinton 2015.


Moreover, it is conceivable that machines will learn not only by themselves, but also from other machines, so that what is learned by one can be shared with all the others.

This can be done much faster than the sharing of information by humans, who communicate at rates of 10 bits per second, 100 million times slower than machines (Pratt 2015).

And beyond the impact on labour markets, artificial intelligence is also starting to raise very deep philosoph- ical questions.
As of now, and in the near future, artificial intelligence sim- ply implements tasks that are defined by humans, but it is conceivable that machines might eventually be able to set their own objectives—raising profound questions about the human species and how people interact with technology.

See Russell (2018).

As shown in the extensive discussion of possible channels and impacts of ar- tificial intelligence on employment and earnings by Frank and others (2019).
10 The literature on this transformation is vast, but recent works touching on it include Goldin and Katarna (2016), Iversen and Soskice (2019), Unger (2019) and the more speculative analysis in Harari (2016).

8 9 11 World Bank 2019a.

12 Russell 2018.

13 In the United States in 1995, only 2 percent of heterosexual couples had met online, while about half met through family and friends.
By 2017, close to 40 percent had met online, compared with less than a third who met through family and friends (Rosenfeld, Thomas and Hausen 2019).

14 Frost and others 2019.

15 Fintech News Hong Kong 2019.

16 People’s Bank of China 2019.

17 Butera 2019.

18 The Neolithic, or agricultural, Revolution that happened more than 10,000 years ago is often invoked as another instance of a technological transformation on the scale of the Industrial Revolution.
But while the historical consequences of the shift from hunter-gatherers living in small nomadic groups to more sedentary and larger segments cultivating plants and tending after livestock is beyond dispute, recent scholarship shows that these transformations were not related to the availability of technology per se (Scott 2017).

In fact, humans’ ability to domesticate plants and animals already existed almost 4,000 years before.
But the technology became consequential only when institutional innovations such as the creation of the state enabled small settlements to grow into the early civilizations of the Fertile Crescent and the Nile Delta.

19 As articulated, for instance, in Kuznets’s Nobel Prize lecture (Kuznets 1971).
As Mokyr (2016, p. 339) put it: “In only one case did such an accumu- lation of knowledge become sustained and self-propelling to the point of becoming explosive and changing the material basis of human existence more thoroughly and more rapidly than anything before in the history of human on this planet.
That one instance occurred […] during and after the Industrial Revolution.” Mokyr’s central thesis is that the European Enlightenment, itself a construction that took several hundred years to build and that was far from preor- dained, provided the fertile ground for a “market for ideas” to flourish, as well as the conviction that humans could understand “natural regularities and exploit them to their advantage” (p. 7).

20 See Vries (2016).


As Nobel laureate Paul Romer (1990) argued, since we live on a planet where our resources and abilities to produce things are bounded, it is ideas and abilities to combine things in ever more efficient ways that have driven economic growth.
Perhaps the best way to fully leverage technology is through sus- taining what Stiglitz and Greenwald (2014) called a “learning society.” 21 Basu, Caspi and Hockett (2019) show that the new technology underlying the platform economy, while expanding the world’s production possibility frontier, can leave vast segments of the population marooned and without bargaining power.

22 Mokyr 2002.

23 Vickers and Zierbarth 2019.

24 Atkinson 2015.

25 Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019.


26 See, for instance, Acemoglu and others (2012) for a treatment of directed technical change to address environmental challenges.

27 For instance, the full impact of elec- tricity on manufacturing productivity did not fully materialize until factories evolved to become single story and to have multiple electrical motors tied to different pieces of equipment (David 1990).

28 For instance, in the context of Japan’s Society 5.0 (Government of Japan 2017).
29 Mazzucato 2013.

30 Lee 2018.

31 UNESCO n.d. 32 UNDESA 2018.

33 GSMA 2017.

34 GSMA 2018.

ITU 2019.

35 36 OECD 2019b.

37 See, for instance, Gonzales (2016) and Rosenberg (2019).

38 Hilbert 2019.

39 For projections on the gains from artificial intelligence, see PwC (2017).

For the growth of artificial intelligence in North America and East Asia, and particularly in China, see Lee (2018).

40 See, for instance, Utterback and Abernathy (1975).

41 Hilbert 2011.
41 Hilbert 2011.

42 This section draws in part from Conceição (2019a).

43 So much so that a constant labour share of income has been one of the features that economic growth models were expected to account for, since Kaldor (1961) identified this as an empirical regularity characterizing economic growth.

On the constant la- bour share of income, see Giovannoni (2014).

44 Autor and Salomons (2017) quoted Keynes as stating that this regularity was a bit of a miracle.
45 As argued, for instance, by Rodrik (2015).

Avent (2016) goes a step further and argues that in the digital age a new kind of institution will be needed.

Since the promise of the dig- ital revolution is an end to work, what will also be needed is institutions that provide for people who do not work because their work is not necessary to generate economic growth.

46 Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013.

For the global dimension of the decline in the labour share, see Dao and others (2017).
47 The erosion of demand for routine 48 tasks linked to technological change can account for about half of the de- cline in the labour share in developed countries (IMF 2017b).

For evidence on Europe, see Dimova (2019).

The decrease in intensity in trade unions has also been an important factor in some countries, including the United States (see Farber and others 2018).
In developed countries falling labour shares reflect a significant substitution of capital for labour, but the explanation for the trend in developing countries is different.

Firms in advanced countries automate the routine tasks.

Therefore, tasks with lower factor substitutability are more likely to be offshored.
In developing countries the decline in labour share is explained mainly by global integration, particularly the expansion of global value chains, which contributed to raising the overall capital intensity 264 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 of production in developing countries (Dao and others 2017).

49 For a description of how the decline in the relative price of investment goods interacts with technology and globalization to decrease the labour share, see Lian (2019).
For the decline in the relative prices of investment goods, see Lian and others (2019).

50 Measured as the decline in the median developing country (Lian and others 2019).

51 Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013; Lian and others 2019.

52 Chen, Karabarbounis and Neiman 2017.

Corporate savings are profits that are not paid to taxes, labour, or debt or equity holders.

53 Furman 2014.

54 ILO 2018b.

55 Autor and others 2017; De Loecker and Eeckjout 2017; Furman and Orszag 2015.
56 Diez, Fan and Villegas-Sánchez 2019.

57 The importance of these network externalities has long been recognized as a key feature of all platforms, not only technological ones.

See Rochet and Tirole (2003).

58 Moazed and Johnson 2016.

59 Khan 2017.

60 Dellinger 2019.

61 Wu and Thompson 2019.

62 Naidu, Posner and Weyl 2018.

63 Chau and Kanbur 2018.

64 Dube and others 2018.

65 66 See, for example, Atkinson (2014) and ILO 2018a.

Kanbur (2018).
Kanbur (2018).

67 See, for example, Basu (2019b) and Stiglitz (2019b).

68 Furman and Seamans 2019.

69 Wu 2018.

70 Basu 2019b; Stiglitz 2019b; Sunstein 2018.

71 More broadly, it is possible to consider how to steer artificial intelligence in a way that integrates ethical values and economic value (see Korinek 2019).

72 Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018.

73 This can have varied geographic im- pacts.


For instance, there is evidence that in the United States smaller cities faced a greater negative impact from automation, while larger cities faced a much smaller impact, given the abun- dance of occupations and professions with tasks not easily automatable (Frank and others 2018).

ILO 2019c.

74 75 The Economist 2019.

76 The Economist 2019; Maulia 2018.

77 Bruckner, LaFleur and Pitterle 2017.

78 Brynjolfsson, Mitchell and Rock 2018.


79 Wrzesniewski and Dutton 2001.

80 Brynjolfsson, Mitchell and Rock 2018.

81 As discussed in chapter 2.

See also Acemoglu and Autor (2011); Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006); Bhorat and others (2019); Bruckner, LaFleur and Pitterle (2017); Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014); and World Bank (2016).

ILO 2019c.

82 83 Consider Voyager, an interactive system for exploratory analysis that combines manual and automated chart specification.
Given a dataset, Voyager spots potential quality or coverage issues.

As users interact, Voyager recommends views.

Users report that Voyager helped promote data quality assessment and combat confirmation bias (Heer 2019).

84 Agarwal, Gans and Goldfarb 2019.

85 Cheng, Chauhan and Chintala 2019; IWPR 2019.

86 Brussevich, Dabla-Norris and Khalid 87 2019.


It has been documented that boys outnumber girls in computer science Advanced Placement exams, and in 2013 only 26 percent of computer professionals were women (AAUW 2015; IDRC 2018).

88 WEF 2018.

89 Metz 2019.

90 Metz 2019.

91 ILO 2018a.

92 The US state of California recently declared all drivers on ride sharing platforms to be employees of the companies (Szymkowski 2019).

This ensures that labour laws apply to these jobs.


The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission has approved new rules designed to provide a minimum hourly wage of $17.22 (after expenses) for drivers who work with app-based services such as Uber, Lyft, Via and Juno (Ha 2018).
ILO (2019c) indicates that the Maritime Labour Convention of 2006—in effect a global labour code for seafar- ers—was a source of inspiration in addressing the challenges of workers, employers, platforms and clients operating in different jurisdictions.

93 94 Korinek and Stiglitz 2017.

95 Freeman and Perez 1990.


96 Moreover, technology in itself could also provide opportunities for devel- oping countries to reimage prevailing industrial era policies in updated social protection systems, offering more effective risk sharing (Rutkowski 2018).

Individual savings can be a voluntary option to supplement stable, equitable and adequate mandatory social insur- ance benefits (ILO 2019c).

97 98 For universal basic income, see, for ex- ample, Francese and Prady (2018).
See also Hanna, Khan and Olken (2018).

99 For example, overly generous un- employment benefits can disincentivize labour market participation.

See Farber and Valletta (2015).

100 Such as for health, education and oth- er spending areas.

Fiscal sustainability of programmes is another key consid- eration (Coady 2018).

101 Berger and Frey 2016.

102 OECD 2019c.


103 In fact, one reason why businesses deploy so many robots, despite their sometimes questionable contribution to the bottom line, is that automation is often subsidized.

Subsidies induce firms to substitute capital for labour even when the substitution does not socially save costs, though it privately benefits the firm (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018; Guerreiro, Rebelo and Teles 2018).
104 The Republic of Korea, the most robotized country in the world, reduced the tax deduction on business investments in automation, which is, in effect, a robot tax (Porter 2019).
By contrast, the European Parliament rejected a motion to emphasize that “consideration should be given to the possible need to introduce corporate reporting requirements on the extent and proportion of the contribution of robotics and AI to the economic results of a company for the purpose of taxa- tion and social security contributions” (European Parliament 2016, p. 10).
105 One proposal is a tax on revenues from sales of targeted digital ads, the key to the operation of platforms such as Facebook and Google (Romer 2019).

106 Tankersley and Rappeport 2019.

107 The Group of 20, under the Presidentship of Japan in 2019, has proposed expanding the World Trade Organization rules to include trade in data (Bradsher and Bennhold 2019).
108 The General Data Protection Regulation requires companies to, among other things, obtain a person’s freely given consent before collecting personal information, sharing it among applications and using it in any way (Wolford n.d.).

The European Commission is also bringing legislation that will give EU citizens explicit rights over the use of their facial recognition data (Khan 2019).

119 IDRC 2018.

120 World Bank 2019b.

121 Consider the American Community Survey.


Automated systems for moni- toring demographics could become an increasingly practical supplement to the survey.

Some of the character- istics relevant to the survey—such as income, race, education and voting patterns by postal code and precinct—can be accurately estimated by applying artificial intelligence to images gathered by Google Street View (Gebru and others 2017).

122 Pokhriyal and Jacques 2017.

123 Rains, Krishna and Wibbels 2019.


124 Tödtling and Trippl 2005.

125 Cariboni 2014.

126 Pla-Castells and others 2015.

127 Employing inspection of pipes that have already been replaced by evaluat- ing soil dynamics and electromag- netic forces coming from power lines (Terdiman 2017).

128 Mann and Hilbert 2018.

129 Goodfellow, Bengio and Courville 2016.

130 Mann and Hilbert 2018.

131 Atkinson 2014; Conceição 2019b.

132 Mazzucato 2011.
132 Mazzucato 2011.

133 Many efforts are ongoing, under the umbrella of the United Nations and others, to accelerate technology trans- fer in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
For example, the Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries, established in 2018, following the call in the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is working to make science, technology and innovation resources available to institutions and individuals in least developed countries and to strengthen the science, technology and innovation ecosystem in least developed countries.

See www.un.org/ technologybank/.


134 Conceição and Heitor 2007.

135 Freeman 1987; Nelson 1993; UNDESA 109 Arrieta-Ibarra and others 2018.

110 Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Pritchett and 2018.

136 López-Calva and Rodríguez-Castelán Beatty 2015.

2016.

111 Muralidharan, Singh and Ganimian 137 Schwellnus, Kappeler and Pionnier 2018.

2017.
2017.

112 Digital technology can also help with ageing workers, opening opportunities in training, including by overcoming time and resource constraints through flexible and shorter learning options.

113 O’Connor 2019; PwC n.d. 114 O’Connor 2019.

115 Sanyal 2018.

116 A 15 percent reduction in prematu- rity is expected, which would save about 80,000 lives a year in Africa (Shankland 2019).

117 World Wide Web Foundation 2017.

118 IDRC 2018.

138 ECLAC 2018a.


139 See, for instance, the case of China (Zhao, Zhang and Shao 2016).

Chapter 7 1 Expansion and convergence because if the objective were to be conver- gence alone, that could conceivably be achieved by diminishing the capabilities of those that already have them—whereas the goal, clearly, has to be to move those that are lagging behind to the higher achievements of Notes | 265 others.
For brevity, the chapter will refer to convergence only, but it should be understood to mean by expanding the capabilities of those at the bottom.

2 Which, in turn, are shaped both by history and by political economy considerations—each of which is also not independent from the level of inequality in society (Piketty 1995, 2014).
The policies included higher and more progressive income taxes, earned income discounts at low income levels, taxable benefits paid for each child and a minimum income for all individuals.

See Scheidel (2018), based on Atkinson (2015).

For instance, the Report does not deal with the trends linked to migration, ageing, urbanization, trade and others.
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 22).

UNESCO 2019b.

The figure for the world in 2014 was 80.1 percent.


Based on data from the World Development Indicators database (http://datatopics.worldbank.

org/world-development-indicators/) accessed 10 October 2019.

See UN (2019b).

See, for instance, Ritchie (2019).

8 9 10 UNDP 2016.

11 This is consistent with the categories of coverage, generosity and equity discussed in Martínez and Sánchez- Ancochea (2018, 2019a, 2019b).
12 For important frameworks and guides on operationalizing the pledge to leave no one behind, see UNSDG (2019) and UNDP (2018b).

For a more conceptual analysis, see Klasen and Fleurbaey (2018).

13 For instance, in a cohort of socioec- onomically disadvantaged minority children in Michigan followed from age 3 to age 55, children in the treatment group received 2.5 hours of education a day and a weekly home visit to help parents engage with them.
The effects of combined education and parent engagement at an early age were significant.

When the boys grew up, they spent on average 8 percent fewer days in jail between ages 20 and 50 than those who did not participate in the programme.

Only 7 percent of the boys in the treatment group were convicted of a violent felony at least once, compared with 30 percent in the control group.
Between the ages of 26 and 40, they experienced a 20 percentage point increase in their time in employment and more than $180,000 in additional cumulative income.

The benefits of early childhood education extended to health at later ages.

Boys from the treatment group were less likely to have excessive cholesterol and arterial inflammation.

Girls who received the education support had less long-term stress and a lower chance of having diabetes or experiencing substance abuse.
The early intervention boosted the well-being and capabilities of not only the children as they grew up but also of their children and siblings.

Participants’ children had higher levels of employment and education than nonparticipants’ children.

They were suspended less often from school and had less criminal activity, especially children of fathers who had early childhood education (Heckman and Karapakula 2019b).
14 For instance, in the United States such policies since 1960 included school desegregation, equalizing funding across school districts, compensatory resources for schools with many low-income students and additional early childhood education support for poor families.

But achievement gaps between the bottom and the top of the socioeconomic distribution have been large and persistent for nearly half a century (Hanushek and others 2019).

15 Akmal and Pritchett 2019.

16 Akmal and Pritchett 2019.


17 Akmal and Pritchett 2019.

18 Malouf Bous and Farr 2019.

19 Shanmugaratnam 2019.

20 21 See also Braveman and Gottlieb ILO 2019c.

(2014).

22 George 2016.

23 Chemouni 2018.

24 Reich and others 2016.

25 Reich and others 2016.

26 Stewart 2006.

27 UNDESA 2009.

28 Stewart 2016a.

29 Langer and Stewart 2015; Stewart 2016a.

30 UN CEB 2017.

31 Silcoff 2018.

32 Patnaik 2019.

33 OECD 2017a.

34 Barker and others 2016.


35 Human Development Report Office calculations based on data from the WORLD Policy Analysis Center’s Gender Database 2019.

36 Park 2015.

37 OECD 2017a.

38 OECD 2017a.

39 Del Boca 2015; Jaumotte 2003; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017; Thévenon 2013.

Québec introduced a low-fee universal child care programme in 1997 for children up to age 4, increasing the participation of young women in the labour force.
This incentive to join the labour force or to work more also yielded substantial lifecycle labour supply effects (Lefebvre, Merrigan and Verstraete 2009).

And when Québec introduced universal access to low-fee child care in 2008, nearly 70,000 more mothers took jobs than if no such pro- gramme had existed, for an increase of 3.8 percent in women’s employment and 1.7 percent increase in Quebec’s GDP (Fortin, Godbout and St-Cerny 2012; Herrera 2019.).

40 UN Women 2018.

41 Shackelford 2018.

42 OECD 2017a.


43 Baird, McIntosh and B. Özler 2013; Baird and others 2013; Hagen-Zanker and others 2017.

44 The programme recruited volunteer community health workers who administered injectable contracep- tives, charging a small fee, or provided counselling and referrals for other methods.
The option to have communi- ty meetings and provide contraceptives door to door took the cultural and social conditions into account in in- creasing the awareness, acceptability and use of modern contraceptives (Bixby Center for Population Health and Sustainability 2014).

45 As well as family planning services, to provide the community with a platform for dialogue on sexual education and sexual and reproductive rights.
Information about sexual and repro- ductive health is disseminated through youth peer networks, many of which are affiliated with school, community, religious and youth associations.

The government has received United Nations Population Fund support to develop the school club model and two manuals for teachers and students (UNFPA 2019).

46 The word ”sasa”, which means “now” in Kiswahili, serves as an acronym for the four phases of the approach: Start, Awareness, Support, Action.
The programme begins by partnering with a local organization, which selects an equal number of female and male community activists—regular people interested in issues of violence, power and rights, as well as institutional activists working for the police and in health care, local government and faith-based groups.

The activists receive training in new concepts and ways to approach power imbalances.
They then take the lead in organ- izing informal activities with their community networks to encourage open discussions and critical thinking.

Combined, the strategies ensure that different community members are exposed and receive information from people they trust (Raising Voices, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Center for Domestic Violence Prevention 2015).

47 UN 2015b.

48 Surminsky, Bouwer and Linnerooth- Bayer 2016; UNFCCC 2015.

49 Surminsky, Bouwer and Linnerooth- Bayer 2016.


50 Tigchelaar and others 2018.

Future warming increases the probability of globally synchronized maize production shocks.

51 Betkowski 2018.

52 Roy and others 2019.

53 Roy and others 2019.

54 Riahi and others 2017.
Other ways include providing scenarios with high regional resolution (Fujimori and others 2017), representing institutional and governance changes associated with shared socioeconomic pathways more explicitly (Zimm, Spurling and Busch 2018) and calling up local and spatially explicit estimates of vulnerability, poverty and inequality, which have emerged in recent publications based on the shared socioeconomic path- ways and are essential to investigate equity dimensions (Byers and others 2018; Klinsky and Winkler 2018.
55 Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development 2019.

56 Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development 2019.

57 Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development 2019.

58 Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development 2019.

59 UN General Assembly 2016.

60 The relationship between income inequality and economic growth has often been presented as a tradeoff (chapter 2).

This framing has led to po- lar policy approaches.


At one extreme overemphasizing pro-equality policies can neglect economic incentives to innovate and produce.

At the other ex- treme pro-growth policies can neglect inclusion and sustainability.

Choosing one or the other side of this tradeoff often ends up in poor performance on both growth and equality.
To fix ideas, the experience of Latin America— maybe the most unequal region in the world, with waves of policy experi- mentation—offers some illustrative examples of these two approaches: populist experiences in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by conservative policies in the 1990s consistent with the so-called Washington Consensus.

Some populist experiences in Latin America are analysed in Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).

The reforms in Latin America during the 1990s are discussed in Ffrench-Davis (2000).
An analysis of long-term inequality in Latin America is found in Gasparini and Lustig (2011).

266 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 61 See similar analysis in ECLAC (2018a), figure I.1, using overall inequality measured with the Gini coefficient.

62 This negative relationship is statisti- cally significant.

There is a decoupling between the two variables for the Group of 7 economies.
The weakening of policies that jointly support growth and equity has been suggested as a leading factor in the case of the United States (Furman and Orszag 2018).

63 López-Calva and Rodríguez-Castelán 2016.

64 López-Calva and Rodríguez-Castelán 2016.

65 Lustig, Lopez-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez 2013.

66 The authors are grateful to Angus Deaton for emphasizing this point to them.

67 Polanyi 1944.

68 Kus 2012.


69 One estimate suggests that, for the United States, the decline in unions may have accounted for as much as half of the increase in the income share of the top 10 percent from 1980 to 2010 (Jaumotte and Osorio 2015; Marx, Soares and Van Acker 2015).

70 National policies towards unions range widely, from outright resistance, to tripartite cooperation with workers and employers, to actively promoting collective bargaining as part of a broader wage policy (Hayter 2015).
71 A recent meta-analysis of 42 studies and 269 estimates concluded that there is no significant effect of unions on productivity growth, even though there are differences across sectors (Doucouliagos, Freeman and Laroche 2017).

72 See UNDP (2015).

ILO 2016a.

73 74 ILO 2016b.

75 Data on minimum wages are hetero- geneous but have been harmonized by the International Labour Organization to express monthly minimum wages in 2011 purchasing power parity dollars, subject to problems in price conver- sions.
As data validation, cases where the minimum wage resulted in larger output per capita and cases where the monthly minimum wage was lower than $10 were excluded.

76 See the literature review in section I.5 of ILO (2016b).

77 Riley and Bondibene 2017.

78 See discussion of recent evidence in Nolan, Richiardi and Valenzuela (2018).

Felix and Portugal (2017) provide evidence of the link monopsony-wage dispersion in Portugal.
Webber (2015) uses US data to document monopsony power on wages, which is strongest in the lower half of the earnings distribution.

There is also evidence of monopsony power in China and India, even though the degree of monopsony fell over time in both countries (Brooks and others 2019).

If firms in China had no labour market power, labour’s share of income would have been 10 percentage points higher in 1999 and 5 percentage points higher in 2007.
If firms in India had no labour market power, labour’s share would have been 13 percentage points higher in 1999 and 6 percentage points higher in 2011.

79 Brooks and others 2019.

80 Bhaskar, Manning and To 2002.

81 Falch 2010; Ridder and van den Berg 2003; Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs 2010.

ILO 2018.

ILO 2018.

ILO 2018.

82 Basu, Chau and Kanbur 2015.

83 See Ghosh (2016, 2019).

84 Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix 2017.

85 See Chacaltana, Leung and Lee (2018).

86 87 88 OECD and ILO 2019.


89 90 OECD and ILO 2019.

91 OECD and ILO 2019.

92 This paragraph is based on ILO (2019c).

93 Levine 2005.

94 Arcand, Berkes and Panizza 2015.

There is no conceptual consensus.

Some suggest that financial develop- ment can reduce income inequality (by, say, increasing access to credit or other financial services, such as insurance; Banerjee and Newman 1998; Galor and Zeira 1993).
Others predict a nonlinear relationship where inequality first increases as access to finance is restricted to a minority and then decreases as access to credit spreads across society Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990.

See also Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2016); Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012); Korinek and Kreamer (2014); and Thakor (2012).

95 Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2007; Clarke, Xu and Zou 2006; Demirgüç- Kunt and Levine 2009.
96 De Haan and Sturm 2017; Jauch and Watzka 2016; Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou 2013.

97 Rajan 2011.

98 Brei, Ferri and Gambacorta 2018.

99 In contrast to the prediction of some theoretical models.

100 Favara and Imbs 2015.

101 Mitnik, Cumberworth and Grusky 2016.

102 Adam and Tzamourani 2016.

103 Bezemer and Samarina 2016.

104 Bezemer, Grydaki and Zhang 2016.

105 Bezemer and others 2018; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017.
106 Barkai 2016; De Loecker and Eeckhout 2017; Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold 2018; Gutiérrez and Philippon 2019.

107 Diez, Fan and Villegas-Sánchez 2019.

108 Ennis, Gonzaga and Pike 2017; Gans and others 2018.

109 Gans and others 2018.

110 See Atkinson (1995).

111 Basu 2019a.

112 Covarrubias, Gutiérrez and Philippon 2019.

113 Shapiro 2018.

114 European Commission 2019.

115 See Lustig (2018a).


116 For the cash portion—redistribution aside from the in-kind benefits of publicly provided health care and education—taxes can sometimes increase the number of people living in poverty or reduce their income.

In Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka and Tanzania income redistribu- tion increased the number of people below the $2.50 a day poverty line.
In Indonesia, Mexico, the Russian Federation and Tunisia redistribution also reduced the income of about half the poor population (Lustig 2018b, 2018c).

Some countries may simply have too few people above the poverty line with incomes high enough to tax (Bolch, Ceriani and Lopez-Calva 2017).

117 This paragraph is based mainly on Lustig (2018b).

118 Klemm and others 2018.

119 Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 2014.

120 Grigoli and Robles 2017.


121 Average statutory corporate income tax rates fell from 1990 to 2015, from about 45 percent to 25 percent in ad- vanced economies and from just under 40 percent in emerging economies and about 35 percent in low-income coun- tries to just over 20 percent in both cases (IMF 2017a).

There is evidence that effective corporate income tax rates have also declined significantly since the 1980s (FitzGerald and Ocampo 2019).
122 See also Ardanaz and Scartascini (2011) and Martínez and Sánchez- Ancochea (2019a).

123 OECD 2018c.

124 Saez and Zucman 2019.

125 OECD 2018c.

126 This paragraph is based on Lustig (2018b).

127 Aaberge and others (2018) do this for Nordic countries, showing that, on the whole, the impact has been less progressive than in the past.

Nations and the World Bank Group.


The objectives of the platform, launched in 2016, are domestic re- source mobilization and the state; the role of taxes in supporting sustainable economic growth, investment and trade; the social dimensions of taxes (poverty, inequality and human devel- opment); tax capacity development; and tax cooperation (see PCT 2019).

134 Zucman 2015.

135 European Commission 2016.

136 Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman 2018.

137 Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman 2018.


138 The OECD defines tax evasion as generally referring to illegal arrange- ments where liability to tax is hidden or ignored—that is, the taxpayer pays less tax than legally obligated by hiding income or information from the tax authorities.

139 The BEPS Project provides 15 action plans that equip governments with the domestic and international instruments needed to tackle tax avoidance.
The OECD defines tax avoidance as generally describing the arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce tax liability; although the arrangement could be strictly legal, it is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow.

140 OECD 2018b.

141 Noked 2018.

142 Shaxton 2019.

143 OECD 2018d.

144 OECD 2019a.

145 OECD 2019d.


Several small or developing countries have used lower corporate tax rates or preferential tax rates for specified activities as part of a package of measures to attract investment and stimulate growth, rather than compete by holding wages low indefinitely.

146 FitzGerald and Ocampo 2019.

147 Piketty 2014.

148 UNDP 2016.

149 Lamont (2018) calls for a new research agenda on policies in the area, defin- ing some policy principles.
150 Well implemented conditional cash transfers programmes appear to be effective and to have positive long- term effects.

See Bouguen and others (2019).

151 OECD 2019f.

152 Daude and others (2017) examine nine 128 OECD 2019e.

129 See, for example, Branstetter, Glennon Latin American countries.

153 Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea and Jensen 2019 130 World Bank 2020.

131 Timmer and others 2014 .

132 FitzGerald and Ocampo 2019.


133 A response in this direction is the Platform for Collaboration on Tax launched by the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the United 2019a; Verget and others 2017.

154 Murillo and Martínez-Garrido 2017.

155 Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea 2019a, based on Fairfield (2015) and Schiappacasse (2019).

156 Martínez and Sánchez-Ancochea 2019a.


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292 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Statistical annex Readers guide Statistical tables Human development composite indices 1 Human Development Index and its components 2 Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018 3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index 4 Gender Development Index 5 Gender Inequality Index 6 Multidimensional Poverty Index: developing countries Human development dashboards 7 Quality of human development 8 Life-course gender gap 9 Women’s empowerment 10 Environmental sustainability 11 Socioeconomic sustainability Developing regions Statistical references 295 300 304 308 312 316 320 323 328 333 338 343 348 349 Statistical annex | 293 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Readers guide The 20 statistical tables in this annex provide an overview of key aspects of human development.
The first six tables contain the family of composite human development indices and their components estimated by the Human Development Report Office (HDRO).

The sixth table is produced in partnership with the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI).

The remaining tables present a broader set of indi- cators related to human development.

The five dashboards use colour coding to visualize partial groupings of countries according to performance on each indicator.
Tables 1–6 and dashboards 1–5 are part of the printed version of the 2019 Human Development Report.

The full set of 20 sta- tistical tables is part of the digital version of the report and is post- ed at http://hdr.undp.org/en/human-development-report-2019.

Unless otherwise noted, tables use data available to the HDRO as of 15 July 2019.
All indices and indicators, along with techni- cal notes on the calculation of composite indices and additional source information, are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data.

Countries and territories are ranked by 2018 Human Devel- opment Index (HDI) value.

Robustness and reliability analysis has shown that for most countries differences in HDI are not statistically significant at the fourth decimal place.
For this rea- son countries with the same HDI value at three decimal places are listed with tied ranks.

Sources and definitions Unless otherwise noted, the HDRO uses data from interna- tional data agencies with the mandate, resources and expertise to collect national data on specific indicators.

Definitions of indicators and sources for original data com- ponents are given at the end of each table, with full source details in Statistical references.
Methodology updates The 2019 Report retains all the composite indices from the family of human development indices—the HDI, the Inequality- ad justed Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Devel- opment Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).

The methodology used to compute the indices is the same as the one used in the 2018 Statistical Update.
For details, see Technical notes 1–5 at http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf.

The 2019 Report has five colour- coded dashboards (quality of human development, life-course gender gap, women’s empower- ment, environmental sustainability and socioeconomic sustain- ability).

For details on the methodology used to create them, see Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf.
Comparisons over time and across editions Because national and international agencies continually improve their data series, the data—including the HDI values and ranks—presented in this report are not comparable to those published in earlier editions.

For HDI comparability across years and countries, see table 2, which presents trends using consistent data, or http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, which presents interpolated consistent data.
Discrepancies between national and international estimates National and international data can differ because international agencies harmonize national data using a consistent methodol- ogy and occasionally produce estimates of missing data to allow comparability across countries.

In other cases international agencies might not have access to the most recent national data.

When HDRO becomes aware of discrepancies, it brings them to the attention of national and international data authorities.
Country groupings and aggregates The tables present weighted aggregates for several country groupings.

In general, an aggregate is shown only when data are available for at least half the countries and represent at least two- thirds of the population in that grouping.

Aggregates for each grouping cover only the countries for which data are available.
Human development classification HDI classifications are based on HDI fixed cutoff points, which are derived from the quartiles of distributions of the component indicators.

The cutoff points are HDI of less than 0.550 for low human development, 0.550–0.699 for medium human development, 0.700–0.799 for high human develop- ment and 0.800 or greater for very high human development.

Regional groupings Regional groupings are based on United Nations Development Programme regional classifications.
Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States are defined according to UN classifications (see www.unohrlls.org).

Readers guide | 295 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Developing countries The developing countries aggregates include all countries that are included in a regional grouping.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Of the 36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members, 33 are considered developed countries and 3 (Chile, Mexico and Turkey) are considered developing countries.

Aggregates refer to all countries from the group for which data are available.

Country notes Data for China do not include Hong Kong Special Administra- tive Region of China, Macao Special Administrative Region of China or Taiwan Province of China.
As of 2 May 2016, Czechia is the short name to be used for the Czech Republic.

As of 1 June 2018, the Kingdom of Eswatini is the name of the country formerly known as Swaziland.

As of 14 February 2019, the Republic of North Macedonia (short form: North Macedonia) is the name of the country for- merly known as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Symbols A dash between two years, as in 2012–2018, indicates that the data are from the most recent year available during the period specified.
A slash between years, as in 2013/2018, indicates that the data are the average for the years shown.

Growth rates are usually average annual rates of growth between the first and last years of the period shown.
The following symbols are used in the tables: Not available .. Nil or negligible 0 or 0.0 Not applicable — Statistical acknowledgements The Report’s composite indices and other statistical resources draw on a wide variety of the most respected international data providers in their specialized fields.
HDRO is particularly grateful to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; Eurostat; Food and Agriculture Organization; Gallup; ICF Macro; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; International Labour Organization; International 296 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Monetary Fund; International Telecommunication Union; Inter-Parliamentary Union; Luxembourg Income Study; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel- opment; Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean; Syrian Center for Policy Research; United Nations Children’s Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; United Nations Economic and Social Commis- sion for West Asia; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics; United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; World Bank; and World Health Organization.
The international education database maintained by Robert Barro (Harvard University) and Jong-Wha Lee (Korea University) was another invaluable source for the calculation of the Report’s indices.

Statistical tables The first six tables relate to the five composite human devel- opment indices and their components.

Since the 2010 Human Development Report, four composite human development indices—the HDI, the IHDI, the GII and the MPI for devel- oping countries—have been calculated.
The 2014 Report intro- duced the GDI, which compares the HDI calculated separately for women and men.

The remaining tables present a broader set of human develop- ment indicators and provide a more comprehensive picture of a country’s human development.

For indicators that are global Sustainable Development Goals indicators or can be used in monitoring progress towards specif- ic goals, the table headers include the relevant goals and targets.
Table 1, Human Development Index and its components, ranks countries by 2018 HDI value and details the values of the three HDI components: longevity, education (with two indicators) and income per capita.

The table also presents the difference in rankings by HDI value and gross national income per capita, as well as the rank on the 2017 HDI, calculated using the most recently revised historical data available in 2019.
Table 2, Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018, provides a time series of HDI values allowing 2018 HDI values to be compared with those for previous years.

The table uses the most recently revised historical data available in 2019 and the same methodology applied to compute 2018 HDI values.
The table also includes the change in HDI rank over the last five years and the average annual HDI growth rate across four time intervals: 1990–2000, 2000–2010, 2010–2018 and 1990–2018 Table 3, Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, contains two related measures of inequality—the IHDI and the loss in HDI due to inequality.

The IHDI looks beyond the average achievements of a country in longevity, education and income to show how these achievements are distributed among its residents.
The IHDI value can be interpreted as the level of human development when inequality is accounted for.

The rel- ative difference between IHDI and HDI values is the loss due to inequality in distribution of the HDI within the country.

The table presents the coefficient of human inequality, which is the unweighted average of inequalities in the three dimensions.

In addition, the table shows each country’s difference in rank on the HDI and the IHDI.
A negative value means that taking inequality into account lowers a country’s rank on the HDI.

The table also presents the income shares of the poorest 40 percent, the richest 10 percent and the richest 1 percent of the population, as well as the Gini coefficient.

Table 4, Gender Development Index, measures dispar- ities on the HDI by gender.

The table contains HDI values estimated separately for women and men; the ratio of which is the GDI value.
The closer the ratio is to 1, the smaller the gap between women and men.

Values for the three HDI compo- nents—longevity, education (with two indicators) and income per capita—are also presented by gender.

The table includes five country groupings by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values.

Table 5, Gender Inequality Index, presents a composite measure of gender inequality using three dimensions: repro- ductive health, empowerment and the labour market.
The reproductive health indicators are the maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent birth rate.

The empowerment indicators are the share of parliamentary seats held by women and the share of population with at least some secondary education by gender.

The labour market indicator is participation in the labour force by gender.

A low GII value indicates low inequality between women and men, and vice-versa.
Table 6, Multidimensional Poverty Index, captures the multiple deprivations that people in developing countries face in their health, education and standard of living.

The MPI shows both the incidence of nonincome multidimensional poverty (a headcount of those in multidimensional poverty) and its inten- sity (the average deprivation score experienced by poor people).
Based on deprivation score thresholds, people are classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty, multidimensionally poor or in severe multidimensional poverty.

The table includes the contribution of deprivation in each dimension to overall multidimensional poverty.

It also presents measures of income poverty—population living below the national poverty line and population living on less than $1.90 in purchasing power parity terms per day.
MPI values are based on a revised methodology developed in partnership with OPHI.

For details, see Technical note 5 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_tech- nical_notes.pdf and OPHI’s website (http://ophi.org.uk/ multidimensional-poverty-index/).

ratios and total fertility rates, which can help assess the burden of support that falls on the labour force in a country.
Table 8, Health outcomes, presents indicators of infant health (percentage of infants who are exclusively breastfed in the 24 hours prior to the survey, percentage of infants who lack immunization for DPT and measles and infant mortality rate) and of child health (percentage of children under age 5 who are stunted and under-five mortality rates).
The table also contains indicators of adult health (adult mortality rates by gender, mortality rates due to noncommunicable diseases by gender incidence of malaria and tuberculosis and HIV prevalence rates).

Finally, it includes healthy life expectancy at birth and current health expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

Table 9, Education achievements, presents standard edu- cation indicators.
The table provides indicators of educational attainment—adult and youth literacy rates and the share of the adult population with at least some secondary education.

Gross enrolment ratios at each level of education are complemented by primary school dropout rate and survival rate to the last grade of lower secondary general education.

The table also presents government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP.
Table 10, National income and composition of resources, covers several macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP), labour share of GDP (which includes wages and social protection transfers), gross fixed capital formation, and taxes on income, profit and capital gains as a percentage of total tax revenue.

Gross fixed capital formation is a rough indi- cator of national income that is invested rather than consumed.
In times of economic uncertainty or recession, gross fixed capital formation typically declines.

General government final consumption expenditure (presented as a share of GDP and as average annual growth) is an indicator of public spending.

In addition, the table presents two indicators of debt—domestic credit provided by the financial sector and total debt service, both measured as a percentage of GDP or GNI.

The consumer price index, a measure of inflation, is also presented.
Table 11, Work and employment, contains indicators on four topics: employment, unemployment, work that is a risk to human development and employment-related social security.

The employment indicators are the employment to popula- tion ratio, the labour force participation rate, employment in agriculture and employment in services.

The unemployment indicators are total unemployment, youth unemployment and youth not in school or employment.
The indicators on work that is a risk to human development are child labour, the working poor and the proportion of informal employment in nonagricultural employment.

A new indicator on skill-level employment—high-skill to low-skill employment ratio—has been added.

The indicator on employment-related social secu- rity is the percentage of the eligible population that receives an old-age pension.
Table 7, Population trends, contains major population indicators, including total population, median age, dependency Table 12, Human security, reflects the extent to which the population is secure.
The table begins with the percentage of births Readers guide | 297 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century that are registered, followed by the number of refugees by country of origin and the number of internally displaced people.
It then shows the size of the homeless population due to natural disasters, the number of deaths and missing people attributed to disasters, the population of orphaned children and the prison population.

It also provides homicide and suicide rates (by gender), an indicator on justification of wife beating and an indicator on the depth of food deficit (average dietary energy supply adequacy).

Table 13, Human and capital mobility, provides indica- tors of several aspects of globalization.
International trade is captured by measuring exports and imports as a share of GDP.

Financial flows are represented by net inflows of foreign direct investment and flows of private capital, net official develop- ment assistance and inflows of remittances.

Human mobility is captured by the net migration rate, the stock of immigrants, the net number of tertiary students from abroad (expressed as a percentage of total tertiary enrolment in the country) and the number of international inbound tourists.
International communication is represented by the percentages of the total and female populations that use the Internet, the number of mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people and the percentage change in mobile phone subscriptions between 2010 and 2017.
Table 14, Supplementary indicators: perceptions of well-be- ing, includes indicators that reflect individuals’ perceptions of relevant dimensions of human development—education quality, health care quality, standard of living, personal safety, freedom of choice and overall life satisfaction.

The table also presents indi- cators reflecting perceptions about community and government.

Table 15, Status of fundamental human rights treaties, shows when countries ratified key human rights conventions.
The 11 selected conventions cover basic human rights and free- doms related to elimination of all forms of racial and gender discrimination and violence, protection of children’s rights, rights of migrant workers and persons with disabilities.

They also cover torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as well as protection from enforced disappearance.
Dashboard 1, Quality of human development, contains a selection of indicators associated with the quality of health, edu- cation and standard of living.

The indicators on quality of health are lost health expectancy, number of physicians and number of hospital beds.
The indicators on quality of education are pupil–teacher ratio in primary schools; primary school teachers trained to teach; proportion of primary and secondary schools with access to the Internet; and Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores in mathematics, reading and science.
The indicators on quality of standard of living are the proportion of employment that is in vulnerable employment, the proportion of rural population with access to electricity, the proportion of population using at least basic drinking-water services and the proportion of population using at least basic sanitation facilities.

A country in the top third of an indicator distribution has performed better than at least two-thirds of 298 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 countries globally.
A country that is in the top third group on all indicators can be considered a country with the highest quality of human development.

The dashboard shows that not all coun- tries in the very high human development group have the high- est quality of human development across all quality indicators and that many countries in the low human development group are in the bottom third of all quality indicators in the table.
Dashboard 2, Life-course gender gap, contains a selection of indicators that indicate gender gaps in choices and opportunities over the life course—childhood and youth, adulthood and older age.

The indicators refer to health, education, labour market and work, seats in parliament, time use and social protection.

Most indicators are presented as a ratio of female to male values.
Sex ratio at birth is an exception to grouping by tercile—countries are divided into two groups: the natural group (countries with a value of 1.04–1.07, inclusive) and the gender-biased group (all other countries).

Deviations from the natural sex ratio at birth have implications for population replacement levels; they can suggest possible future social and economic problems and may indicate gender bias.
Countries with values of a parity index con- centrated around 1 form the group with the best achievements in that indicator.

Deviations from parity are treated equally regardless of which gender is overachieving.

Dashboard 3, Women’s empowerment, contains a selec- tion of woman-specific empowerment indicators that allows empowerment to be compared across three dimensions: repro- ductive health and family planning, violence against girls and women and socioeconomic empowerment.
Most countries have at least one indicator in each tercile, which implies that wom- en’s empowerment is unequal across indicators and countries.

Dashboard 4, Environmental sustainability, contains a selection of indicators that cover environmental sustainability and environmental threats.

The environmental sustainability indicators present levels of or changes in energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, forest area, fresh water withdrawals and natural resource depletion.
The environmental threats indicators are mortality rates attributed to household and ambient air pollution and to unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services, proportion of land that is degraded mostly by human activities and practices, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List Index value, which measures aggregate extinction risk across groups of species.

Dashboard 5, Socioeconomic sustainability, contains a selection of indicators that cover economic and social sustain- ability.
The economic sustainability indicators are adjusted net savings, total debt service, gross capital formation, skilled labour force, diversity of exports and expenditure on research and development.

The social sustainability indicators are the old age dependency ratio projected to 2030, the ratio of edu- cation and health expenditure to military expenditure, change in overall loss in HDI value due to inequality and changes in gender and income inequality.
Human development composite indices L B A T E1 Human Development Index and its components Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Gross national income (GNI) per capita GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank HDI rank HDI rank VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles Value | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (years) 2018 82.3 83.6 82.1 81.2 84.7 83.3 82.9 82.7 83.5 82.1 80.8 81.7 82.3 82.1 81.2 78.9 81.5 80.5 f 84.5 81.4 82.1 82.8 82.8 81.2 83.4 79.2 82.5 82.4 83.4 78.6 80.8 82.1 78.5 75.7 77.8 81.8 f 75.0 77.4 75.2 81.9 80.1 80.0 75.7 76.7 77.2 78.3 77.6 76.5 72.4 74.6 73.2 74.9 76.8 75.9 73.7 f 79.1 75.4 77.8 77.4 73.8 76.0 73.3 (years) 2018a 18.1 b 16.2 18.8 b 17.1 16.5 22.1 b 19.2 b 18.8 b 16.3 18.0 b 19.1 b 19.3 b 16.1 18.8 b 17.4 16.3 19.7 b 14.7 15.2 16.3 14.2 16.0 16.4 17.4 17.9 16.8 15.5 15.9 16.2 16.1
 14.7 17.3 16.4 16.5 13.6 13.3 j 17.0 e 14.5 16.0 16.3 12.2 16.5 14.4 15.1 15.3 15.0 14.7 17.6 15.5 15.4 15.3 14.8 15.0 14.3 15.6 e 15.2 e 13.8 16.3 16.4 e 12.8 n 13.5 15.5 (years) 2018a 12.6 13.4 12.5 c 14.1 12.0 12.7 c 12.5 c 12.4 11.5 12.2 12.6 12.4 13.3 c 12.7 c 13.0 e 13.4 11.8 12.5 g 12.8 i 12.6 12.2 e 13.0 12.2 12.3 9.8 12.7 11.4 11.3 10.2 e 13.0 c 12.1 10.5 12.3 13.0 11.0 10.2 9.7 e 12.6 c 12.8 c 9.2 9.7 10.4 9.1 i 11.9 9.4 e 11.4 e 9.7 10.6 c 12.0 e 12.3 l 11.8 i 11.8 11.4 e 11.0 12.4 e 10.6 m 7.3 8.7 7.7 11.5 e 10.2 9.7 j (2011 PPP $) 2018 68,059 59,375 55,660 46,946 60,221 44,097 47,566 47,955 83,793 d 50,013 48,836 41,779 43,602 35,108 39,507 56,140 43,821 99,732 d,h 40,799 46,231 65,543 33,650 36,757 32,143 35,041 31,597 40,511 34,795 36,141 30,379 33,100 24,909 27,626 29,775 66,912 48,641 k 49,338 30,672 26,301 27,935 110,489 d 21,972 76,389 d 27,144 40,399 23,061 37,039 17,611 25,036 17,039 22,168 19,646 17,511 23,906 16,720 15,912 71,164 19,435 24,905 28,395 27,227 25,077 2018 2017 5 8 9 15 5 15 12 9 –6 3 4 12 10 18 13 –4 5 –16 6 0 –13 13 8 13 8 12 0 6 2 10 5 20 13 7 –28 –20 –22 3 10 4 –40 17 –39 4 –18 9 –18 18 2 18 8 9 15 2 14 18 –52 5 –6 –17 –15 – TABLE1 Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Gross national income (GNI) per capita GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank HDI rank HDI rank HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89
 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana Value (years) 2018 75.8 73.4 76.5 74.9 78.3 80.1 78.5 73.6 76.8 78.7 74.6 f 76.9 77.3 75.0 76.9 72.4 75.7 77.1 74.9 76.7 75.7 76.5 76.7 76.8 72.9 72.0 73.9 76.1 76.5 69.7 78.9 69.3 72.4 74.4 72.1 78.1 f 67.3 74.1 71.6 74.4 74.5 78.6 70.8 71.1 71.8 68.1 71.6 72.7 71.5 73.2 63.9 71.2 66.2 71.8 73.9 f 75.3 73.9 70.5 76.5 71.3 69.8 (years) 2018a 14.8 13.0 e 14.7 15.0 12.9 15.4 15.2 15.4 14.0 14.4 13.6 e 12.5 e 13.8 j 14.3 14.7 e 16.6 15.4 14.6 13.2 e 14.7 e 13.5 13.8 13.9 e 14.9 e 12.4 e 15.1 e 14.1 13.9 e 15.1 14.2 e 11.3 12.7 e 13.6 e 13.1 e 12.8 e 13.0 e 14.4 e 12.7 e 12.9 e 11.9 e 13.1 12.1 q 14.3 e 12.7 e 11.6 10.9 e 12.0 12.8 n 12.9 12.5 e 13.7 14.0 s 12.9 n 13.1 12.4 e 12.7 l 12.8 11.1 q 13.1 e 13.4 11.5 e (years) 2018a 11.2 11.0 l 10.0 9.4 i 10.2 i 8.7 10.1 m 12.8 11.1 e 11.8 e 8.5 n 9.3 j 9.7 8.6 7.7 8.8 n 7.8 e 8.3 11.8 8.0 l 9.7 l 9.2 7.9 m 9.0 10.5 11.3 m 7.9 8.5 7.2 e 10.2 e 8.7 n 9.3 m 8.6 n 9.8 e 10.3 7.8 j 10.9 i 8.5 9.1 10.5 i 9.8 l 6.8 q 11.2 i 9.4 e 11.6 9.8 q 11.5 7.6 m 8.0 10.6 j 10.2 9.0 8.3 q 7.3 i 10.9 e 8.2 i 9.1 7.3 e 5.5 i
 10.9 l 8.5 l (2011 PPP $) 2018 2018 2017 15,218 28,497 18,166 22,724 20,455 14,790 12,300 9,570 11,611 7,811 o 26,770 22,201 12,690 17,628 16,129 12,684 14,068 12,896 9,277 13,639 12,874 12,323 16,127 10,141 15,240 7,994 15,074 11,528 10,677 10,784 11,136 15,951 11,746 7,932 9,070 p 9,245 9,110 11,720 11,933 8,268 7,136 12,549 5,783 9,540 6,833 16,407 6,462 11,685 r 11,256 5,885 11,756 6,849 15,794 10,744 4,633 6,220 5,314 15,365 7,480 3,317 7,615 15 –21 –2 –10 –7 12 20 34 24 43 –25 –17 10 –11 –6 8 2 4 26 0 2 6 –13 17 –10 25 –10 7 10 7 5 –21 –2 18 14 10 11 –5 –8 10 17 –17 26 –1 16 –38 18 –16 –14 18 –22 8 –40 –16 21 10 15 –44 –3 30 – TABLE 1 Human Development Index and its components | 301 TABLE1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Gross national income (GNI) per capita GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank HDI rank HDI rank 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d'Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti
 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi Value | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP $) 2018a 12.0 11.4 e 11.9 10.6 12.2 s 12.3 12.6 q 12.4 e 10.2 11.8 e 12.1 e 11.2 11.5 j 12.7 e 11.6 n 11.4 e 11.1 11.4 e 11.5 12.1 q 9.2 n 10.3 11.3 e 11.1 e 12.2 11.8 q 12.7 10.5 8.5 10.2 e 8.9 e 10.0 e 11.2 e 11.2 9.7 l 8.0 11.2 e 8.5 10.4 12.6 10.7 9.6 9.0 12.6 7.7 e 9.5 n 10.1 6.5 e 11.0 q 8.7 e 9.5 e 9.0 e 9.6 e 8.7 e 10.5 n 9.7 e 9.7 10.2 e 8.9 5.0 7.6 11.3 2018a 6.9 10.7 q 6.2 6.5 6.8 i 6.5 e 6.9 i 4.5 q 6.6 7.9 j 3.1 e 6.1 7.7 j 6.4 e 6.5 m 6.7 l 5.2 i 6.8 l 7.2 i 7.1 q 5.6 j 5.0 q 4.8 i 6.6 i 4.9 i 5.1 q 6.3 l 8.3 e 5.2 5.5 q 5.1 t 4.6 i 4.9 q 4.4 e 6.5 q 6.0 i 6.1 q 4.6 i 6.1 n 3.8 m 6.3 i 5.2 i 3.1 e 4.9 q 3.7 i 5.4 q 3.9 i 4.0 j 4.6 i 2.8 q 3.7 q 2.7 q 4.7 i 3.2 m 3.3 l 6.8 3.5 e 3.6 i 1.6 q 3.9 n 2.4 l 3.1 q r 3,686 2,426 1,959 5,086 2,805 1,752 3,746 1,404 2,135 3,244 3,589
 3,256 1,593 3,962 1,665 1,746 3,601 u 1,159 1,782 1,490 2,211 1,040 1,433 r 1,593 800 1,154 1,381 1,705 1,708 u 1,965 660 2018 2017 –3 26 –1 –7 11 –5 –27 –14 7 11 –23 6 10 20 –8 –32 –13 17 –2 7 –80 –13 2 9 13 –16 3 12 –17 13 7 –9 7 11 –22 0 11 –17 19 2 –9 –16 –12 10 –26 6 1 –24 11 –4 4 –10 9 3 –2 8 4 1 –8 –9 – TABLE 1 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX AND ITS COMPONENTSTABLE1 Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Gross national income (GNI) per capita GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank HDI rank HDI rank 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development World Value 2018 0.413 0.401 0.381 0.377 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.892 0.750 0.634 0.507 0.686 0.703 0.741 0.779 0.759 0.642 0.541 0.528 0.723 0.895 0.731 (years) 2018 57.6 54.0 52.8 62.0 72.1 .. .. .. 57.1 .. 79.5 75.1 69.3 61.3 71.1 71.9 75.3 74.2 75.4 69.7 61.2 65.0 71.8 80.4 72.6 (years) 2018a 5.0 e 7.5 e 7.6 e 6.5 10.8 e .. 11.3 e 15.1 .. 12.3 16.4 13.8 11.7 9.3 12.2 12.0 13.4 14.6 14.5 11.8 10.0 9.8 12.2 16.3 12.7 (years) 2018a 4.8 2.4 q 4.3 i 2.0 e .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.0 8.3 6.4 4.8 7.4 7.1 7.9 10.2 8.6 6.5 5.7 4.8 8.6 12.0 8.4 (2011 PPP $) 2018 1,455 u 1,716 777
 912 .. .. 17,313 .. .. 5,409 40,112 14,403 6,240 2,581 10,476 15,721 14,611 15,498 13,857 6,794 3,443 2,630 15,553 40,615 15,745 2018 –7 –15 0 –3 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2017 186 187 188 189 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — NOTES a Data refer to 2018 or the most recent year available.
b In calculating the HDI value, expected years of schooling is capped at 18 years.

c Based on data from OECD (2018).

d In calculating the HDI value, GNI per capita is capped at $75,000.

e Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019).

f Value from UNDESA (2011).

g Imputed mean years of schooling for Austria.

h Estimated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) rate and projected growth rate of Switzerland.

i Based on Barro and Lee (2018).


j Based on data from the national statistical office.

k Estimated using the PPP rate and projected growth rate of Spain.

l Updated by HDRO based on data from United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for 2006–2018.

m Updated by HDRO using Barro and Lee (2018) estimates.

n Based on cross-country regression.

o Based on a cross-country regression and the projected growth rate from UNECLAC (2019).
p HDRO estimate based on data from World Bank (2019a), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b) and UNECLAC (2019).

q Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for 2006–2018.

r HDRO estimate based on data from World Bank (2019a), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b) and projected growth rates from UNESCWA (2018).

s Updated by HDRO based on data from CEDLAS and World Bank (2018).

t Updated by HDRO based on Syrian Center for Policy Research (2017).
u HDRO estimate based on data from World Bank (2019a), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b) and IMF (2019).

DEFINITIONS Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development — a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.
Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant’s life.

revised data available in 2019 that were used to calculate HDI values for 2018.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Expected years of schooling: Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child’s life.
Columns 1 and 7: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2019b), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b), World Bank (2019a), Barro and Lee (2018) and IMF (2019).

Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.
Gross national income (GNI) per capita: Aggregate income of an economy generated by its production and its ownership of factors of production, less the incomes paid for the use of factors of production owned by the rest of the world, converted to international dollars using PPP rates, divided by midyear population.

GNI per capita rank minus HDI rank: Difference in ranking by GNI per capita and by HDI value.

A negative value means that the country is better ranked by GNI than by HDI value.
HDI rank for 2017: Ranking by HDI value for 2017, which was calculated using the same most recently Column 2: UNDESA (2019b).

Column 3: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and OECD (2018).

Column 4: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), Barro and Lee (2018), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and OECD (2018).
Column 5: World Bank (2019a), IMF (2019) and United Nations Statistics Division (2019b).

Column 6: Calculated based on data in columns 1 and 5.
TABLE 1 Human Development Index and its components | 303 TABLE1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century L B A T E2 Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018 HDI rank 1990 2000 2010 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013–2018a 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2018 1990–2018 VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Human Development Index (HDI) Value Change in HDI rank Average annual HDI growth (%) 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles 0.850 0.832 0.764 0.801 0.781 0.866 0.804 0.816 0.718 0.830 0.799 0.784 0.850 0.820 0.775 0.860 0.806 .. 0.816 0.795 0.790 0.792 0.728 0.829 0.754 0.730 0.780 0.744 0.769 0.730 0.731 0.753 0.712 0.732 0.723 .. 0.698 0.739 0.698 0.711 0.757 0.703 0.768 0.704 0.736 0.670 .. 0.707 0.734 .. 0.690 0.694 .. 0.701 .. 0.732 0.712 0.692 0.579 .. 0.644 .. .. 0.709 0.736 0.771 0.786 0.742 0.655 0.787 0.724 0.712 0.942 0.932 0.890 0.920 0.901 0.926 0.892 0.906 0.909 0.911 0.910 0.903 0.895 0.899 0.905 0.911 0.903
0.850
–4 –1 –3 –6 –2 2 4 –3 –3 –1 –4 0 0 2 –1 0 0 1 1 –1 2 –1 –1 2 –1 2 5 5 –1 –1 1 4 1 –9 2 –6 –1 6 –1 1 –2 3 0 9 6 1 2 –7 –9 –2 –1 5 –4 –1 1 0.76 0.67 1.16 0.82 0.58 0.37 0.69 0.96 1.31 0.55 0.77 0.90 0.21 0.59 1.13 0.24 0.80 .. 0.47 0.54 0.85 0.74 1.17 –0.05 0.90 0.86 0.77 0.56 0.77 0.67 0.90 0.56 0.98 0.31 0.78 .. 0.64 0.33 0.41 0.98 0.74 0.70 0.47 0.89 0.74 1.12 .. 0.86 –0.18 .. –0.07 0.26 .. 0.11 .. 0.53 1.00 0.69 1.26 .. 1.18 .. .. .. 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.78 0.30 0.60 0.71 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.64 0.53 0.72 0.62 0.65 .. 0.74 0.53 0.72 0.64 0.41 0.67 0.34 0.65 0.46 0.80 .. 0.58 0.41 .. 0.61 0.58 .. 0.54 .. 0.38 0.45 0.55 1.19 .. 0.80 .. 304 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE2 HDI rank 1990 2000 2010 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018 2013–2018a 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2018 1990–2018 Human Development Index (HDI) Value Change in HDI rank Average annual HDI growth (%) HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79
 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 0.706 0.667 0.577 0.620 0.659 0.655 0.644 .. 0.625 0.676 .. .. .. 0.652 0.574 .. 0.613 0.600 0.633 0.578 .. 0.613 0.501 0.642 .. 0.705 0.593 .. 0.569 0.583 .. 0.570 .. 0.641 0.638 .. 0.640 0.588 .. 0.616 0.613 .. 0.645 0.590 0.653 .. .. 0.676 0.525 0.621 0.625 0.540 0.619 0.546 .. 0.475 .. 0.574 0.458 0.618 0.537 0.710 0.721 0.671 0.674 0.719 0.711 0.667 0.669 0.687 0.686 .. .. 0.669 0.705 0.649 .. 0.684 0.662 0.649 0.646 0.669 0.679 0.591 0.669 0.641 0.671 0.653 0.694 0.653 0.589 .. 0.578 0.674 0.669 0.672 0.694 0.675 0.640 .. 0.702 0.643 0.610 0.666 0.631 0.609 .. 0.596 0.728 0.604 0.638 0.629 0.616 0.627 0.611 .. 0.578 .. .. 0.688
0.693 0.699 0.692 0.702 0.691 0.688 0.707 0.688 0.696 0.683 0.673 0.679 0.681 .. .. .. –3 –3 1 0 –2 –5 5 2 2 –2 –3 5 2 12 0 –3 2 3 –1 2 4 7 –8 0 –5 10 4 3 –1 –6 11 4 0 –26 –8 3 2 –3 –6 –2 4 0 3 –3 2 3 –9 0 –4 0 3 1 –2 .. –1 –5 –1 2 –1 –1 0.06 0.78 1.53 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.35 .. 0.95 0.15 .. .. .. 0.79 1.24 .. 1.11 0.99 0.24 1.11 .. 1.03 1.66 0.41 .. –0.49 0.97 .. 1.40 0.11 .. 0.14 .. 0.42 0.51 .. 0.53 0.85 .. 1.31 0.49 .. 0.31 0.67 –0.70 .. .. 0.74 1.40 0.26 0.06 1.31 0.13 1.13 .. 1.99 .. 0.58 1.48 –0.39 1.21 0.71 0.90 1.20 1.04 0.53 0.59 1.05 0.90 0.88
 1.24 .. .. 0.65 0.48 1.05 .. 0.59 0.96 1.17 1.23 0.94 0.59 1.74 0.68 1.34 0.87 0.71 0.50 0.93 1.70 .. 1.34 0.54 0.78 1.14 0.54 0.28 0.80 .. 0.36 0.74 0.92 0.39 0.62 1.12 .. 1.10 0.39 0.99 0.79 0.52 0.63 0.48 0.86 .. 1.23 .. –0.36 1.22 0.29 0.05 –0.45 –0.15 0.52 0.56 0.41 –0.07 0.49 0.90 0.45 0.73 0.56 0.67 0.83 –0.84 0.74 0.30 0.78 0.88 0.81 0.62 .. 0.74 0.35 0.68 1.14 0.73 0.61 0.45 0.65 1.17 0.90 0.67 0.69 0.74 .. 0.80 0.50 .. .. .. 0.59 1.03 .. 0.78 0.85 0.65 0.97 .. 0.76 1.48 0.59 .. 0.22 0.82 .. 0.94 0.83 .. 0.88 .. 0.44 0.46 .. 0.44 0.75 .. 0.57 0.58 .. 0.38 0.67 0.30 .. .. 0.16 1.07 0.46 0.43 0.94 0.45 0.89 .. 1.36 .. 0.65 1.40 0.31 0.79 TABLE 2 Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018 | 305 TABLE2HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century HDI rank 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d'Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 1990 0.529
 0.603 .. 0.477 0.494 0.431 0.579 .. 0.508 .. .. 0.388 .. 0.437 0.531 0.545 0.399 .. 0.454 0.424 .. 0.349 0.384 0.467 0.380 .. 0.445 0.498 0.404 .. 0.558 0.377 .. 0.245 .. 0.373 0.312 0.378 .. 0.348 0.488 0.391 0.377 0.405 0.332 0.412 0.298 .. 0.303 .. 0.328 0.278 .. 0.392 .. 0.377 0.217 0.270 .. .. 0.231 0.295 2000 0.608 0.538 0.564 0.546 0.568 0.497 0.543 0.505 0.555 0.564 .. 0.470 0.541 0.480 0.495 0.468 0.466 .. 0.483 0.428 0.520 0.424 0.419 0.446 0.446 0.394 0.438 0.452 0.449 0.476 0.590 0.436 0.457 0.337 .. 0.395 0.395 0.446 0.456 0.398 0.444 0.407 0.390 0.426 0.403 0.440 0.345 0.361 0.362 0.283 0.382 0.335 0.422 0.432 .. 0.333 0.301 0.298 0.286 .. 0.308 0.293 306 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) Value 0.587
Change in HDI rank Average annual HDI growth (%) 2018 2013–2018a 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2018 1990– –5 –1 –1 2 0 1 –3 –2 0 –1 0 5 –2 5 –1 6 –2 –6 –3 0 –9 2 –1 0 –2 1 3 4 –1 –4 –14 0 –4 2 –2 2 2 –4 –4 0 2 5 –2 –2 1 –1 –3 0 0 3 0 2 –4 –18 –3 0 3 –1 3 –1 0 –3 1.40 –1.13 .. 1.36 1.41 1.43 –0.64 .. 0.88 .. .. 1.95 .. 0.94 –0.71 –1.51 1.55 .. 0.61 0.11 .. 1.94 0.89 –0.46 1.61 .. –0.15 –0.95 1.06 .. 0.57 1.45 .. 3.24 .. 0.59 2.37 1.67 .. 1.36 –0.93 0.40 0.36 0.50 1.97 0.67 1.47 .. 1.79 .. 1.53 1.86 .. 0.99 .. –1.24 3.34 0.99 .. .. 2.92 –0.07 0.82 1.60 1.06 0.98 0.77 1.57 0.78 2.06 0.76 0.43 .. 1.56 0.95 1.31 1.19 0.92 1.60 .. 1.39 2.17 1.09 2.13 2.46 1.79 1.70 2.63 0.71 0.43 1.55 0.97 0.88 1.58 1.15 3.77 .. 2.10 2.16 0.94 1.01 1.74 0.37 1.09 1.84 0.94 1.57 0.60 3.01 2.14 1.90 3.81 1.35 2.00 0.44 1.44 .. 2.24 2.79 2.74 2.74 .. 0.85
1.35 0.18 1.39 1.05 1.04 1.18 1.50 2.26 2.22 0.85 0.78 –1.98 0.80 0.60 1.19 1.25 1.03 0.97 0.91 0.42 1.19 1.46 1.61 1.17 1.16 0.93 0.92 0.83 1.32 1.32 1.66 0.79 1.67 0.67 –0.94 1.01 1.24 1.51 1.45 1.84 0.02 0.72 0.65 0.83 0.30 .. 1.11 0.99 1.46 0.38 .. 0.73 .. .. 1.65 .. 1.19 0.49 0.39 1.49 .. 0.97 1.20 .. 1.85 1.49 0.77 1.52 .. 0.84 0.44 1.17 .. –0.06 1.31 .. 2.84 .. 1.25 1.89 1.19 .. 1.45 0.21 0.99 1.12 0.85 1.53 0.72 1.84 .. 1.69 .. 1.26 1.86 .. 0.59 .. 0.70 2.61 1.74 .. .. 2.22 1.29 TABLE2TABLE 2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX TRENDS, 1990–2018 HDI rank 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development World 1990 .. .. 0.320 0.213 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.779 0.568 0.436 0.352 0.516 0.556 0.519 0.652 0.628 0.441 0.402 0.350 0.595 0.785 0.598 2000 .. 0.298 0.307 0.253 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.823 0.630 0.497 0.386 0.571 0.613 0.597 0.667 0.687 0.505 0.423 0.399 0.642 0.834 0.641 Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2010 0.425 0.374 0.355 0.319 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.866 0.706 0.575 0.473 0.642 0.676 0.691 0.735 0.731 0.585 0.498 0.485 0.702 0.873 0.697 2013 0.439 0.399 0.351 0.345 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.878 0.727 0.599 0.490 0.663 0.688 0.714 0.759 0.748 0.607 0.521 0.504 0.708 0.883 0.713 2015 0.428 0.403 0.362 0.360 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.886 0.738 0.616 0.499 0.674 0.695 0.727 0.770 0.754 0.624 0.532 0.516 0.717 0.889 0.722 2016 0.418 0.398 0.372 0.365 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.888 0.743 0.625 0.501 0.680 0.699 0.733 0.772 0.756 0.634 0.535 0.520 0.719 0.892 0.727 2017 0.414 0.401 0.376 0.373 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.890 0.746
 0.630 0.505 0.683 0.701 0.737 0.776 0.758 0.639 0.539 0.525 0.722 0.894 0.729 2018 0.413 0.401 0.381 0.377 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.892 0.750 0.634 0.507 0.686 0.703 0.741 0.779 0.759 0.642 0.541 0.528 0.723 0.895 0.731 Change in HDI rank Average annual HDI growth (%) 2013–2018a 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2018 1990–2018 –10 –1 –1 –1 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. .. –0.41 1.75 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.55 1.04 1.30 0.94 1.02 0.99 1.42 0.23 0.90 1.36 0.50 1.30 0.77 0.61 0.71 .. 2.29 1.44 2.34 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.52 1.15 1.48 2.04 1.19 0.98 1.48 0.97 0.62 1.48 1.65 1.98 0.91 0.45 0.84 –0.35 0.89 0.89 2.09 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.36 0.75 1.22 0.88 0.82 0.49 0.87 0.72 0.46 1.18 1.03 1.08 0.35 0.32 0.60 .. .. 0.62 2.06 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.48 1.00 1.34 1.32 1.02 0.84 1.28 0.64 0.68 1.35 1.06 1.48 0.70 0.47 0.72 NOTES DEFINITIONS For HDI values that are comparable across years and countries, use this table or the interpolated data at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, which present trends using consistent data.
a A positive value indicates an improvement in rank.

Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development — a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.
Average annual HDI growth: A smoothed annualized growth of the HDI in a given period, calculated as the annual compound growth rate.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Columns 1–8: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2019b), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b), World Bank (2019a), Barro and Lee (2018) and IMF (2019).

Column 9: Calculated based on data in columns 4 and 8.

Columns 10–13: Calculated based on data in columns 1, 2, 3 and 8.
TABLE 2 Human Development Index trends, 1990–2018 | 307 TABLE2HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century L B A T E3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index Human Development Index (HDI) Inequality‑adjusted HDI (IHDI) Coefficient of human inequality Inequality in life expectancy Inequality‑ adjusted life expectancy index Inequality in educationa Inequality‑ adjusted education index Inequality in incomea Inequality‑ adjusted income index SDG 10.1 Income share held by (%) HDI rank VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey Overall loss (%) Value Difference from HDI rankb (%) Value 2018 2018 2018 2018 2015–2020c 2018 0.889 0.882 0.865 0.861 0.815 0.862 0.885 0.874 0.810 0.870 0.873 0.876 0.841 0.836 0.845 0.797 0.849 .. 0.882 0.843 0.822 0.809 0.777 0.858 0.765 0.850 0.809 0.815 0.776 0.818 0.788 0.766 0.801 0.775 .. .. .. 0.804 0.776 0.742 .. 0.696 .. 0.777 .. 0.768 0.725 0.714 0.743 0.765 0.759 0.714 0.746 0.725 .. 0.675 .. 0.703 0.675 6.8 6.8 8.2 8.3 13.2 8.1 5.7 6.7 13.3 6.8 6.1 5.3 8.8 9.2 8.2 13.4 7.6 .. 3.6 7.7 9.5 10.8 14.3 4.8 14.3 4.6 9.2 8.0 12.1 7.2 9.7 12.2 8.1 10.9 .. .. .. 6.2 9.1 12.7 .. 17.8 .. 8.0 .. 8.3 13.1 14.0 9.9 6.4 7.1 12.5 8.6 11.1 .. 17.0 .. 13.0 16.2 0 –1 –6 –7 –17 –4 4 2 –14 2 4 7 –4 –4 0 –13 3 ..
 15 3 1 –3 –9 11 –13 12 1 6 –4 9 1 –5 4 –1 .. .. .. 8 3 –6 .. –14 .. 8 .. 4 –3 –4 1 6 4 0 5 2 .. –10 .. 0 –8 6.7 6.6 8.0 8.1 12.6 7.9 5.6 6.6 12.8 6.7 6.0 5.2 8.5 9.1 8.0 12.8 7.6 .. 3.6 7.5 9.3 10.2 13.9 4.7 14.0 4.5 9.1 7.9 11.8 7.0 9.6 11.9 8.0 10.5 .. .. .. 6.1 8.8 12.4 .. 17.0 .. 7.8 .. 8.1 12.0 13.6 9.6 6.3 7.1 12.1 8.5 10.8 .. 15.9 .. 12.7 16.1 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.8 2.5 3.7 2.4 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.0 4.6 4.3 4.1 6.3 3.6 .. 2.9 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.8 4.6 3.1 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.3 5.5 5.2 .. 6.4 5.0 5.4 3.5 5.7 6.3 7.6 4.2 5.5 4.3 6.7 8.6 7.1 4.4 7.7 6.1 3.6 6.3 .. 8.7 5.9 7.9 9.0 0.929 0.945 0.923 0.905 0.970 0.938 0.944 0.936 0.952 0.926 0.901 0.921 0.915 0.915 0.903 0.848 0.912 .. 0.963 0.910 0.923 0.935 0.938 0.914 0.947 0.884 0.926 0.915 0.944 0.869 0.902 0.922 0.862 0.810 0.843 .. 0.792 0.839 0.803 0.918 0.872 0.866 0.792 0.836 0.831 0.859 0.827 0.795 0.749 0.803 0.756 0.793 0.842 0.806 .. 0.830 0.802 0.819 0.804 Value | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (%) 2018d 4.4 1.9 3.5 2.7 9.8 2.7 2.8 3.8 11.0 4.9 3.0 2.3 2.7 6.4 2.8 5.5 7.7 .. 1.6 3.0 8.0 3.7 18.5 2.2 17.1 1.4 9.1 6.7 11.0 2.1 11.0 12.8 5.2 4.3 18.2 10.0 18.0 1.6 2.6 15.8 11.8 12.0 .. 3.2 22.7 4.9 11.9 6.2 3.1 3.7 3.2 6.3 7.4 5.3 1.9 5.5 22.1 8.2 16.5 Value 2018 0.879 0.879 0.885 0.920 0.776 0.898 0.892 0.880 0.745 0.862 0.892 0.894 0.867 0.863 0.890 0.849 0.824 .. 0.836 0.845 0.738 0.844 0.702 0.874 0.683 0.880 0.737 0.763 0.706 0.862 0.722 0.727 0.821 0.852 0.606 0.637 0.651 0.811 0.849 0.639 0.583 0.711 .. 0.790 0.570 0.757 0.644 0.790 0.807 0.806 0.791 0.754 0.738 0.722 0.829 0.730 0.487 0.684 0.594 (%) Value Poorest 40 percent Richest 10 percent
 Richest 1 percent Gini coefficient 2018d 2018 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 12.7 14.5 16.9 17.7 25.6 17.3 11.7 13.0 25.0 12.1 11.4 10.4 18.2 16.4 17.0 26.6 11.4 .. 6.3 15.9 16.6 23.7 20.2 9.1 21.9 9.2 14.4 12.5 21.3 15.5 14.3 19.5 14.4 21.8 .. .. .. 11.7 18.5 18.1 .. 32.7 .. 16.1 .. 15.2 20.1 25.8 18.7 10.8 10.3 23.9 14.6 20.7 .. 33.6 .. 22.0 22.6 0.860 0.825 0.793 0.765 0.720 0.761 0.822 0.811 0.750 0.826 0.829 0.816 0.751 0.740 0.750 0.702 0.814 .. 0.851 0.780 0.817 0.671 0.712 0.792 0.692 0.789 0.777 0.774 0.700 0.730 0.751 0.671 0.727 0.673 .. .. .. 0.764 0.686 0.697 .. 0.548 .. 0.711 .. 0.697 0.714 0.579 0.679 0.692 0.732 0.607 0.667 0.656 .. 0.509 .. 0.621 0.645 23.1 20.3 20.9 20.7 .. 18.8 23.2 22.1 .. 22.8 23.3 23.4 18.9 .. 19.7 15.2 22.6 .. 20.3 f 21.1 19.3 15.9 20.3 24.1 17.5 24.4 20.7 21.9 18.0 20.0 20.0 17.7 21.3 17.7 .. .. .. 23.1 19.4 18.7 .. 14.4 .. 21.1 .. 20.4 .. 15.3 18.0 24.1 23.4 17.8 20.8 16.9 .. .. .. 16.5 15.6 22.3 25.2 25.4 24.8 .. 27.8 23.5 22.9 .. 23.0 23.8 22.4 25.3 .. 25.4 30.6 22.2 .. 24.7 f 23.8 25.4 27.7 23.8 21.0 26.2 22.1 26.6 23.6 25.7 24.4 27.4 26.2 24.6 28.6 .. .. .. 20.9 26.1 27.3 .. 37.9 .. 23.8 .. 23.2 .. 29.4 29.7 21.3 23.0 28.8 25.7 24.7 .. .. .. 29.7 32.1 8.4 11.9 12.8 11.1 .. 9.1 6.8 8.3 14.0 6.2 12.8 7.3 13.6 8.2 11.7 20.2 6.7 .. 10.4 8.2 9.1 .. 12.2 6.7 9.8 9.5 10.8 11.7 7.5 7.0 8.6 10.8 12.5 7.0 22.8 .. 19.7 5.2 7.6 7.4 29.0 23.7 .. 7.7 18.0 7.6 19.5 .. 20.2 .. .. 8.4 6.4 6.8 .. .. 19.9 14.0 23.4 27.5 32.3 31.8 31.7 .. 35.8 27.8 29.2 .. 28.2 28.2 27.1 34.0 .. 33.2 41.5 27.7 .. 32.1 f 30.5 33.8 38.9 31.6 25.4 36.2 25.9 32.7 29.4 35.4 32.7 34.0 36.0 30.8 37.4 .. .. .. 26.5 34.2 35.5 .. 46.6 .. 30.4 .. 31.1 .. 40.6 37.7 25.4 27.5 37.4 31.9 35.9 .. .. .. 39.5 41.9 TABLE3 Human Development Index (HDI) Inequality‑adjusted HDI (IHDI) Coefficient of human inequality Inequality in life expectancy Inequality‑ adjusted life expectancy index Inequality in educationa Inequality‑ adjusted education index Inequality in
 incomea Inequality‑ adjusted income index SDG 10.1 Income share held by (%) Overall loss (%) Value Difference from HDI rankb (%) Value 2018 2018 2018 2018 2015–2020c 2018 .. .. .. 0.685 .. 0.706 0.688 0.626 0.645 0.705 0.692 0.686 .. .. .. 0.658 0.595 0.635 .. 0.574 0.585 0.685 0.604 0.660 0.612 0.636 0.607 0.683 0.701 0.584 0.617 0.585 0.635 .. .. .. 0.604 0.600 .. .. 0.545 0.557 0.617 0.558 0.568 .. 0.582 0.638 0.579 .. .. 0.584 .. 0.463 0.533 0.544 0.492 .. .. .. 14.4 .. 11.5 13.7 21.2 18.7 10.9 12.0 12.1 .. .. .. 14.4 22.5 16.9 .. 24.5 23.1 9.9 20.4 13.1 19.4 16.1 19.9 9.4 6.5 21.5 17.2 20.8 13.6 .. .. .. 16.7 17.3 .. .. 24.7 22.7 14.7 22.6 21.0 .. 18.2 10.4 18.5 .. .. 17.4 .. 34.4 24.2 22.5 29.7 .. .. .. –4 .. 5 0 –13 –7 8 5 4 .. .. .. –2 –17 –4 .. –23 –16 9 –8 5 –5 4 –4 13 21 –8 4 –4 10 .. .. .. 3 1 .. .. –14 –9 11 –8 –5 .. 1 21 1 .. .. 6 .. –17 –6 –4 –8 .. .. .. 13.7 .. 11.3 13.6 20.3 18.0 10.9 11.6 11.8 .. .. .. 14.2 21.8 16.7 .. 23.8 22.4 9.7 19.7 12.9 19.1 15.7 19.5 9.3 6.5 21.4 16.9 20.2 13.6 .. .. .. 15.9 17.0 .. .. 23.8 21.9 14.7 21.6 20.4 .. 17.8 10.3 17.9 .. .. 17.4 .. 31.4 24.1 22.5 28.7 6.8 6.1 9.6 4.9 14.9 9.2 9.4 12.0 7.1 7.2 7.9 7.0 5.1 .. 5.8 5.4 10.5 7.9 11.2 10.9 10.7 8.7 14.1 7.9 10.8 7.9 11.5 13.9 7.4 17.0 10.6 9.0 13.1 7.4 19.4 11.3 10.0 17.1 .. .. 0.824 0.833 0.757 0.807 0.716 0.763 0.785 0.772 0.749 0.789 0.776 0.803 0.773 0.700 0.740 0.688 0.771 0.791 0.664 0.839 0.611 0.715 0.753 0.665 .. 0.620 0.718 0.692 0.748 0.745 0.848 0.700 0.666 0.721 0.567 0.683 0.737 0.682 0.736 0.545 0.611 0.549 0.705 Value 0.712
0.724 0.724 0.720 0.723 0.720 0.719 0.717 0.712 0.711 0.710 0.710 0.708 0.707 0.707 0.705 0.703 0.702 0.700 (%) 2018d 6.3 12.1 .. 8.1 .. 5.0 13.2 12.5 14.7 12.3 3.2 7.4 10.9 .. .. 17.0 18.5 18.3 .. 23.8 20.3 2.9 33.7 10.5 18.1 11.7 16.5 5.3 3.6 19.1 12.6 32.8 11.9 6.2 .. .. 5.6 8.8 .. .. 18.1 15.6 15.4 15.9 29.3 4.5 10.1 7.3 3.6 0.7 .. 18.2 4.9 17.3 20.0 23.5 38.1 Value 2018 0.694 0.627 .. 0.719 .. 0.706 0.634 0.610 0.611 0.665 0.828 0.700 0.704 .. .. 0.586 0.558 0.543 .. 0.525 0.545 0.737 0.448 0.623 0.567 0.573 0.596 0.657 0.768 0.532 0.584 0.442 0.646 0.566 .. .. 0.653 0.638 .. .. 0.519 0.551 0.574 0.582 0.399 0.736 0.599 0.656 0.606 0.713 .. 0.511 0.666 0.596 0.552 0.486 0.376 (%) Value Poorest 40 percent Richest 10 percent Richest 1 percent Gini coefficient 2018d 2018 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e .. .. 29.3 28.1 .. 19.7 18.2 36.5 32.2 13.2 23.6 21.0 .. .. .. 20.2 36.3 23.8 .. 36.7 36.2 17.4 11.4 20.3 28.3 27.4 30.5 8.9 8.5 28.1 27.4 18.9 15.7 .. .. .. 32.0 25.2 .. .. 39.5 37.3 17.9 37.9 25.8 .. 28.1 14.0 26.8 .. .. 20.1 .. 57.7 29.7 21.2 36.5 .. .. 0.590 0.546 .. 0.631 0.671 0.510 0.511 0.631 0.526 0.567 .. .. .. 0.584 0.498 0.585 .. 0.473 0.468 0.565 0.658 0.585 0.521 0.558 0.485 0.692 0.605 0.545 0.521 0.573 0.596 .. .. .. 0.449 0.510 .. .. 0.435 0.453 0.547 0.400 0.541 .. 0.495 0.549 0.564 .. .. 0.570 .. 0.305 0.449 0.602 0.449 .. 15.9 15.2 22.5 .. 16.6 19.2 11.5 12.8 22.1 17.4 17.7 .. .. .. 19.8 15.5 18.4 .. 10.6 12.4 20.8 23.1 17.3 14.4 17.0 14.1 .. 24.5 13.9 11.0 20.1 20.4 20.6 10.9 .. .. .. .. 18.8 13.2 .. 20.3 .. 17.4 g 18.2 16.8 24.1 .. .. .. 17.5 17.9 7.2 13.6 16.8 21.9 .. 31.3 39.9 23.1 .. 30.9 29.0 37.7 37.0 22.9 28.9 32.9 .. .. .. 25.1 34.8 28.4 .. 41.9 39.0 28.4 22.9 24.8 32.3 29.4 33.8 .. 21.2 35.4 38.6 25.6 25.6 24.8 41.5 .. .. .. .. 29.7 39.2 .. 27.5 .. 29.9 g 29.7 31.3 21.7 .. .. .. 29.5 31.3 50.5 31.7 27.7 27.8 .. 14.5 .. 6.4 .. 16.3 7.1 .. .. 6.4 .. .. .. .. .. 6.2 .. 20.2 .. 28.3 20.5 .. .. 5.8 .. 13.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.1 .. .. .. .. 6.1
 .. .. .. .. .. 19.2 .. .. 19.1 .. 41.0 46.8 28.5 .. 40.0 35.8 49.9 48.3 29.0 37.9 39.8 .. .. .. 33.0 43.4 36.5 .. 53.3 49.7 33.6 27.6 35.6 43.3 38.6 44.7 .. 25.0 45.7 51.2 32.8 32.3 31.8 53.3 .. .. .. .. 36.7 48.8 .. 33.7 .. 38.4 g 37.6 40.1 25.9 .. .. .. 38.1 38.7 63.0 44.0 38.0 31.8 0.698 .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.3 0.677 .. .. .. .. .. .. TABLE 3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index | 309 HDI rank 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands TABLE3HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Human Development Index (HDI) Inequality‑adjusted HDI (IHDI) Coefficient of human inequality Inequality in life expectancy Inequality‑ adjusted life expectancy index Inequality in educationa Inequality‑ adjusted education index Inequality in incomea Inequality‑ adjusted income index SDG 10.1 Income share held by (%) HDI rank 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132
 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d'Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia Overall loss (%) Value Difference from HDI rankb 2018 2018 2018 0.580 0.597 0.552 .. 0.610 0.546 0.521 0.574 .. 0.472 0.501 0.477 0.417 0.450 0.464 .. 0.450 0.465 .. 0.507 0.456 0.430 0.454 .. 0.427 0.394 .. 0.448 0.465 0.426 0.430 0.392 0.371 0.435 0.386 .. .. .. 0.294 0.382 0.349 0.397 0.387 0.358 0.386 0.327 0.350 0.331 0.347 0.350 0.332 0.299 .. .. 0.346 0.337 0.293 0.310 0.314 16.3 13.5 19.8 .. 9.5 18.5 21.9 12.5 .. 27.4 23.0 26.3 35.3 28.0 25.5 .. 27.1 24.3 .. 16.7 25.0 29.3 24.9 .. 28.3 33.4 .. 23.2 20.1 26.3 25.8 31.8 34.1 22.8 31.1 .. .. .. 45.3 28.7 34.6 24.9 26.7 32.1 25.8 37.1 32.5 35.8 32.5 31.7 34.6 40.5 .. .. 28.7 28.4 37.2 33.4 32.3 8 16 3 .. 23 4 1 12 .. –2 1 1 –14 –5 0 .. –3 4 .. 10 2 –4 3 .. –3 –6 .. 3 12 0 3 –2 –6 7 –1 .. .. .. –22 –1 –5 7 4 1 6 –6 3 –3 2 6 1 –7 .. .. 5 5 –8 –1 2 2018 16.2 13.5 19.4 .. 9.5 18.3 21.6 12.4 .. 26.9 22.7 25.7 33.6 26.7 25.0 .. 26.3 23.6 .. 16.7 24.9 29.0 24.7 .. 28.1 32.3 .. 23.2 19.9 26.2 24.9 31.7 34.1 22.7 30.2 .. .. .. 44.2 28.4 34.5 24.9 26.7 31.8 25.5 36.9 32.0 35.0 31.6 31.5 34.3 40.0 .. .. 28.6 27.3 36.4 32.2 31.8 Value 0.557
(%) Value 2015–2020c 2018 (%) 2018d .. 5.0 10.7 29.1 6.0 23.7 30.8 25.7 38.7 25.0 44.9 26.6 .. 41.7 37.7 .. 18.3 20.9 24.1 31.3 .. 34.9 21.7 .. 26.9 27.3 22.9 40.9 34.3 33.0 16.8 43.5 .. .. 11.5 47.6 29.3 38.1 27.0 27.9 40.8 35.0 43.7 21.9 47.4 46.0 38.9 42.5 37.3 45.4 .. 28.4 43.5 49.3 48.3 42.9 310 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Value 2018 0.515 0.582 0.389 .. 0.697 0.537 0.401 0.632 0.410 0.353 0.420 0.342 0.437 0.273 0.369 .. 0.257 0.320 .. 0.463 0.426 0.411 0.330 .. 0.364 0.448 .. 0.330 0.346 0.406 0.296 0.327 0.378 0.473 0.230 .. .. 0.382 0.249 0.324 0.301 0.309 0.371 0.230 0.320 0.268 0.398 0.232 0.190 0.314 0.195 0.279 0.225 .. 0.328 0.189 0.195 0.176 0.241 (%) Value Poorest 40 percent Richest 10 percent Richest 1 percent Gini coefficient 2018d 2018 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 18.1 16.6 12.7 21.7 12.2 25.1 23.2 14.5 .. 35.4 29.2 18.8 53.6 13.6 34.9 .. 20.0 15.7 26.4 14.9 31.0 37.9 20.3 19.7 25.3 48.6 .. 19.9 14.3 33.1 16.3 28.9 35.9 27.0 17.2 19.4 .. .. 56.0 36.4 28.2 22.4 24.9 24.6 20.4 32.0 41.1 24.4 27.7 25.1 33.0 50.4 .. 27.7 32.4 13.4 31.5 17.1 22.7 0.511 0.500 0.664 0.510 0.465 0.490 0.492 0.459 .. 0.420 0.414 0.518 0.321 0.564 0.369 .. 0.539 0.472
 0.402 0.438 0.423 0.426 0.499 0.405 0.419 0.278 .. 0.490 0.464 0.345 0.419 0.432 0.338 0.362 0.494 0.366 .. .. 0.212 0.286 0.426 0.391 0.325 0.413 0.318 0.315 0.310 0.409 0.381 0.313 0.372 0.211 .. 0.391 0.250 0.377 0.279 0.388 0.273 18.8 19.2 21.9 17.4 23.6 .. 17.4 19.4 .. 13.1 14.3 19.8 8.6 22.8 11.0 .. 17.5 21.0 16.2 21.1 12.4 11.5 g 19.1 17.8 14.3 8.9 .. 18.6 .. 16.5 20.4 15.0 f 13.0 15.3 21.1 18.4 .. 15.1 g 13.6 15.8 15.1 g 18.5 15.9 19.9 15.7 12.8 9.6 15.9 16.4 14.5 18.5 g 15.8 .. 15.8 16.2 17.6 19.0 19.8 18.8 27.1 25.2 23.7 31.9 23.3 .. 29.1 26.4 .. 38.0 37.2 30.1 47.3 24.0 37.7 .. 27.9 26.8 29.7 24.2 37.9 40.0 g 29.8 29.4 32.2 44.4 .. 31.7 .. 31.6 26.4 32.3 f 35.0 33.8 28.9 29.2 .. 31.0 g 33.7 35.6 32.7 g 31.0 34.2 24.9 33.5 37.6 40.9 31.9 31.0 31.6 26.7 g 31.2 .. 32.3 38.1 31.4 28.7 26.4 27.1 .. 15.8 22.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 35.3 33.7 29.5 39.5 27.3 .. 38.0 34.0 47.2 48.3 46.2 35.7 59.1 28.7 50.5 .. 37.4 32.4 40.1 30.8 48.9 51.5 g 36.4 37.6 43.5 57.1 .. 38.1 .. 40.8 32.8 42.7 f 46.6 43.2 33.5 37.1 .. 41.9 g 45.3 43.7 43.0 g 37.8 42.8 32.6 42.6 47.8 54.2 41.5 40.3 43.1 35.4 g 41.1 .. 41.6 44.7 39.1 35.9 33.7 35.3 TABLE 3 INEQUALITY-ADJUSTED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEXTABLE3 Human Development Index (HDI) Inequality‑adjusted HDI (IHDI) Coefficient of human inequality Inequality in life expectancy Inequality‑ adjusted life expectancy index Inequality in educationa Inequality‑ adjusted education index Inequality in incomea Inequality‑ adjusted income index SDG 10.1 Income share held by (%) HDI rank 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino ..
 Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development World Overall loss (%) Value Difference from HDI rankb 2018 2018 2018 0.316 0.288 0.316 0.309 0.282 0.303 .. 0.294 0.296 0.264 0.250 0.222 0.272 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.796 0.615 0.470 0.349 0.533 0.531 0.618 0.688 0.589 0.476 0.376 0.377 0.549 0.791 0.584 31.8 37.5 31.0 30.7 35.7 30.1 .. 31.2 30.1 36.1 37.7 41.6 27.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.7 17.9 25.9 31.1 22.3 24.5 16.6 11.7 22.3 25.9 30.5 28.6 24.0 11.7 20.2 5 –5 7 4 –3 5 .. 3 5 –1 –1 –1 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2018 30.9 37.4 30.9 30.7 34.6 29.5 .. 30.4 29.6 36.0 37.4 41.3 27.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.5 17.6 25.4 30.9 22.2 24.2 16.3 11.6 21.7 25.3 30.4 28.4 23.6 11.4 20.1 Value 2018 0.463 0.461 0.459 0.446 0.438 0.434 0.434 0.427 0.423 0.413 0.401 0.381 0.377 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.892 0.750 0.634 0.507 0.686 0.703 0.741 0.779 0.759 0.642 0.541 0.528 0.723 0.895 0.731 (%) Value 2015–2020c 2018 (%) 2018d 24.7 32.3 36.1 29.8 39.0 32.0 21.4 36.7 28.5 36.2 40.9 40.1 30.9 11.5 .. .. .. 38.9 .. 5.2 10.0 20.5 30.4 16.6 15.0 9.8 9.7 11.6 20.2 29.7 26.3 16.6 5.3 14.7 0.534 0.396 0.397 0.434 0.322 0.431 0.556 0.379 0.454 0.369 0.309 0.302 0.447 0.709 .. .. .. 0.348 .. 0.868 0.764 0.604 0.442 0.655 0.679 0.766 0.753 0.754 0.611 0.445 0.510 0.665 0.880 0.690 46.1 41.9 28.5 33.8 46.9 39.2 .. 39.2 39.5 39.6 43.0 34.5 35.0 .. .. .. .. .. 10.5 7.0 14.8 36.3 37.4 25.6 32.5 13.5 8.3 19.5 37.5 34.0 36.3 19.7 8.0 22.3 Value 2018 0.187 0.233 0.354 0.257 0.214 0.183 .. 0.176 0.253 0.182 0.164 0.231 0.161 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.796 0.563 0.342 0.261 0.435 0.386 0.550 0.682 0.553 0.340 0.308 0.275 0.503 0.783 0.492 (%) Value
 Poorest 40 percent Richest 10 percent Richest 1 percent Gini coefficient 2018d 2018 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 2010–2017e 21.8 37.9 28.2 28.4 17.7 17.3 .. 15.4 20.9 32.3 28.4 49.2 16.4 .. .. 23.9 .. .. .. 19.3 27.9 19.6 25.0 24.3 25.0 25.6 16.8 34.1 18.4 27.6 22.5 34.3 20.9 23.3 0.315 0.260 0.225 0.265 0.326 0.354 .. 0.381 0.225 0.274 0.307 0.157 0.279 .. .. 0.592 .. .. .. 0.730 0.541 0.502 0.368 0.532 0.571 0.560 0.634 0.491 0.520 0.387 0.383 0.496 0.717 0.586 18.8 12.8 15.5 11.8 19.8 20.0 .. 20.1 g 17.9 12.5 g 14.6 10.3 f 19.6 .. .. .. .. .. 17.4 18.2 16.6 19.4 16.4 17.6 20.6 17.2 19.9 13.1 19.9 15.4 17.6 .. 18.0 17.7 29.4 42.0 32.0 45.5 26.9 29.6 .. 25.7 g 31.0 33.2 g 32.4 46.2 f 27.0 .. .. .. .. .. 30.7 27.6 31.1 29.9 32.1 30.8 26.9 29.5 26.7 37.3 29.7 33.8 31.1 .. 28.0 30.2 15.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.2 .. 36.7 50.7 42.1 54.0 34.0 35.3 .. 33.0 g 38.6 46.3 g 43.3 56.2 f 34.3 .. .. .. .. .. 39.1 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — NOTES a See http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/IHDI for the list of surveys used to estimate inequalities.
b Based on countries for which an Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index value is calculated.

c Calculated by HDRO from the 2015–2020 period life tables from UNDESA (2019b).

d Data refer to 2018 or the most recent year available.

e Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

f Refers to 2008. g Refers to 2009.


DEFINITIONS Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development — a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.

See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.

Inequality‑adjusted HDI (IHDI): HDI value adjusted for inequalities in the three basic dimensions of human development.
See Technical note 2 at http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_ notes.pdf for details on how the IHDI is calculated.

Overall loss: Percentage difference between the IHDI value and the HDI value.

Difference from HDI rank: Difference in ranks on the IHDI and the HDI, calculated only for countries for which an IHDI value is calculated.

Coefficient of human inequality: Average inequality in three basic dimensions of human development.
Inequality in life expectancy: Inequality in distribution of expected length of life based on data from life tables estimated using the Atkinson inequality index.

Inequality‑adjusted life expectancy index: HDI life expectancy index value adjusted for inequality in distribution of expected length of life based on data from life tables listed in Main data sources.
Inequality in education: Inequality in distribution of years of schooling based on data from household surveys estimated using the Atkinson inequality index.

Inequality‑adjusted education index: HDI education index value adjusted for inequality in distribution of years of schooling based on data from household surveys listed in Main data sources.

Inequality in income: Inequality in income distribution based on data from household surveys estimated using the Atkinson inequality index.
Inequality‑adjusted income index: HDI income index value adjusted for inequality in income distribution based on data from household surveys listed in Main data sources.

Income share: Percentage of income (or consumption) that accrues to the indicated population subgroups of population.

Gini coefficient: Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution.
A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2019b), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b), World Bank (2019a), Barro and Lee (2018) and IMF (2019).
Column 2: Calculated as the geometric mean of the values in inequality-adjusted life expectancy index, inequality-adjusted education index and inequality- adjusted income index using the methodology in Technical note 2 (available at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf).

Column 3: Calculated based on data in columns 1 and 2.

Column 4: Calculated based on IHDI values and recalculated HDI ranks for countries for which an IHDI value is calculated.
Column 5: Calculated as the arithmetic mean of the values in inequality in life expectancy, inequality in education and inequality in income using the methodology in Technical note 2 (available at http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_ notes.pdf).

Column 6: Calculated based on abridged life tables from UNDESA (2019b).

Column 7: Calculated based on inequality in life expectancy and the HDI life expectancy index.
Columns 8 and 10: Calculated based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study database, Eurostat’s European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, the World Bank’s International Income Distribution Database, the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies and the World Bank’s Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean, ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys and United Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys using the methodology in Technical note 2 (available at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf).
Column 9: Calculated based on inequality in education and the HDI education index.

Column 11: Calculated based on inequality in income and the HDI income index.

Columns 12, 13 and 15: World Bank (2019a).

Column 14: World Inequality Database (2019).
TABLE 3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index | 311 TABLE3HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century L B A T E4 Gender Development Index Gender Development Index Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Estimated gross national income per capitaa Value (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP $) Value 2018 0.990 0.963 0.975 0.968 0.963 0.975 0.966 0.982 0.988 0.967 0.980 0.990 0.989 0.963 0.967 0.991 0.972 .. 0.976 0.963 0.970 0.972 0.934 1.003 0.981 0.983 0.984 0.965 0.967 1.016 0.983 0.963 1.009 1.028 0.965 .. 0.879 0.992 1.030 0.984 1.043 0.962 0.987 0.984 0.937 0.989 0.943 0.988 1.015 1.010 0.999 0.993 0.966 0.986 .. 1.010 0.999 1.016 0.924 .. 0.972 Groupb 2018 Female 2018 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 .. 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 .. 5 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 .. 1 1 1 4 .. 2 0.946 0.924 0.929 0.923 0.919 0.926 0.921 0.928 0.929 0.916 0.920 0.920 0.916 0.902 0.904 0.915 0.904 .. 0.901 0.895 0.893 0.891 0.870 0.902 0.882 0.882 0.883 0.867 0.866 0.886 0.865 0.854 0.874 0.880 0.832 .. 0.784 0.852 0.865 0.843 0.873 0.828 0.837 0.836 0.800 0.832 0.793 0.818 0.828 0.820 0.814 0.812 0.801 0.809 .. 0.816 0.802 0.810 0.771 .. 0.792 Male 2018 0.955 0.959 0.953 0.953 0.954 0.949 0.954 0.945 0.941 0.947 0.938 0.929 0.926 0.936 0.935 0.923 0.931 .. 0.923 0.929 0.921 0.917 0.932 0.899 0.899 0.897 0.897 0.899 0.895 0.872 0.880 0.887 0.867 0.856 0.862 .. 0.892 0.859 0.840 0.856 0.837 0.860 0.848 0.850 0.854 0.842 0.841 0.828 0.816 0.811 0.815 0.818 0.829 0.821 .. 0.808 0.803 0.797 0.834 .. 0.815 Female 2018 Male 2018 Female 2018c Male 2018c Female 2018c Male 2018c 84.3 85.5 83.7 83.6 87.6 85.3 84.4 84.4 85.6 83.8 82.8 84.6 84.3 83.9 83.0 81.4 83.8 .. 87.5 83.8 84.2 84.4 85.8 83.9 86.1 81.8 85.4 84.1 85.4 82.6 82.9 84.5 82.4 81.2 79.2 .. 76.6 80.8 79.9 84.7 81.9 82.4 77.0 80.1 78.3 81.5 80.1 79.9 77.6 79.4 77.3 78.5 79.2 79.4 ..
 80.4 76.5 81.4 80.3 75.9 78.2 80.3 81.7 80.4 78.8 81.8 81.3 81.3 80.9 81.3 80.4 78.8 78.9 80.3 80.4 79.5 76.3 79.1 .. 81.3 79.0 80.0 81.1 79.7 78.4 80.7 76.6 79.6 80.5 81.1 74.1 78.7 79.6 74.6 70.1 77.1 .. 73.8 73.8 70.1 78.8 79.0 77.6 74.6 73.1 76.3 75.1 75.9 73.1 66.9 69.4 68.8 71.4 74.3 72.5 .. 77.7 74.7 74.0 74.4 71.5 74.1 18.8 d 16.1 18.9 d 17.0 16.4 22.6 d 20.4 d 19.6 d 16.5 18.3 d 19.8 d 20.1 d 16.6 19.7 d 18.0 d 16.9 20.6 d 13.4 15.2 16.6 14.3 16.6 15.8 18.2 d 18.2 d 17.6 15.8 16.4 16.6 16.8 15.1 17.1 17.3 16.9 14.3 .. 15.8 g 15.0 16.7 16.2 14.1 16.8 14.8 15.4 16.1 15.7 15.5 18.9 d 15.9 15.7 15.6 15.0 15.3 14.6 16.3 g 16.6 g 14.3 17.1 15.9 g .. 13.8 17.4 16.3 18.7 d 17.2 16.6 21.6 d 18.0 d 18.0 d 16.1 17.8 18.4 d 18.5 d 15.6 17.9 17.1 15.7 18.8 d 16.1 15.3 16.0 14.1 15.4 16.9 16.7 17.5 16.1 15.2 15.4 15.9 15.3 14.3 17.5 15.6 16.1 13.4 .. 17.6 g 14.1 15.3 16.4 11.1 16.3 14.0 14.8 14.7 14.3 14.1 16.4 15.2 15.0 14.9 14.6 14.7 13.9 15.0 g 13.8 g 12.9 15.1 16.9 g .. 13.1 12.6 12.7 12.7 f 13.7 11.6 12.7 f 12.3 f 12.5 11.1 11.9 12.7 12.6 13.5 f 12.6 f 12.9 g 13.5 11.6 .. 13.0 h 12.3 11.8 g 13.0 11.5 12.2 9.7 12.5 11.2 11.0 10.0 g 13.4 f 12.0 10.3 12.3 13.0 g 12.0 10.1 9.0 g 12.5 f 13.1 f 9.2 11.1 10.3 9.1 h 11.7 9.3 g 10.9 g 10.6 10.7 f 11.9 g 12.2 i 11.9 h 11.9 10.7 g 10.6 .. 10.9 j 8.0 9.0 6.9 11.7 g 10.0 12.5 13.6 12.3 f 14.6 12.5 12.6 f 12.7 f 12.3 12.0 12.5 12.4 12.3 13.1 f 12.8 f 13.0 g 13.4 11.9 .. 12.6 h 13.0 12.6 g 13.0 12.9 12.3 10.0 13.0 11.6 11.6 10.5 g 12.6 f 12.2 10.8 12.3 13.0 g 9.8 10.2 10.1 g 12.7 f 12.5 f 9.2 9.3 10.6 9.1 h 12.1 9.5 g 12.0 g 9.4 10.5 f 12.1 g 12.4 i 11.7 h 11.8 12.0 g 11.3 .. 10.3 j 6.9 8.4 8.4 11.4 g 10.3 Female 2018 60,283 49,275 44,921 38,470 43,852 35,900 39,246 41,919 74,600 40,573 41,026 35,066 35,118 26,754 28,526 44,465 34,928 .. 28,784 32,618 53,006 24,616 23,228 28,832 28,086 24,114 33,002 25,023 26,471 22,999 27,791 19,747 21,876 25,665 24,211 .. 18,166 23,683 21,857 23,627 57,209 15,211 65,914 21,010 18,422 19,441
 11,435 12,084 19,969 13,923 16,492 15,621 14,457 19,487 .. 13,686 49,067 14,901 15,921 22,830 20,820 Male 2018 75,688 e 69,649 66,583 55,649 79,385 e 52,359 55,824 53,979 92,163 e 59,536 56,732 48,689 52,221 43,745 50,771 68,061 52,927 .. 53,384 60,303 77,851 e 42,792 50,241 35,487 42,250 39,327 48,510 44,518 46,360 38,653 38,404 30,264 33,739 34,560 85,772 e .. 72,328 38,045 31,520 32,738 127,774 e 28,933 86,071 e 33,906 52,949 26,960 50,238 23,419 30,904 20,616 28,197 23,905 20,634 28,569 .. 18,292 85,620 e 24,292 34,137 34,288 33,279 HDI rank VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 312 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE4 HDI rank 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98
 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco Gender Development Index Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Estimated gross national income per capitaa Value (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP $) Value 2018 .. 0.976 1.002 0.874 0.974 1.005 0.977 0.971 0.979 0.938 0.948 .. .. 0.924 0.957 0.995 .. 0.995 0.986 0.972 0.865 0.947 0.951 0.961 0.980 0.940 0.995 1.003 0.975 0.899 1.031 0.891 0.990 .. 0.986 1.013 .. .. 0.968 0.972 0.868 0.983 0.939 0.944 1.004 1.007 .. 0.939 0.931 0.937 .. 0.984 0.936 0.917 0.878 .. 1.003 0.871 0.789 0.833 Groupb 2018 .. 1 1 5 2 1 1 2 1 3 3 .. .. 4 2 1 .. 1 1 2 5 3 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 5 2 5 1 .. 1 1 .. .. 2 2 5 1 3 3 1 1 .. 3 3 3 .. 1 3 4 5 .. 1 5 5 5 Female 2018 .. 0.789 0.798 0.727 0.782 0.794 0.782 0.779 0.775 0.749 0.753 .. .. 0.735 0.747 0.763 .. 0.757 0.755 0.746 0.685 0.737 0.738 0.741 0.748 0.728 0.745 0.744 0.734 0.689 0.746 0.678 0.723 .. 0.719 0.728 .. .. 0.710 0.710 0.654 0.713 0.689 0.692 0.712 0.714 .. 0.685 0.670 0.681 .. 0.698 0.678 0.669 0.643 .. 0.693 0.624 0.587 0.603 Male 2018 .. 0.808 0.796 0.832 0.803 0.790 0.800 0.802 0.791 0.799 0.794 .. .. 0.796 0.781 0.766 .. 0.761 0.765 0.767 0.792 0.778 0.776 0.771 0.763 0.774 0.749 0.742 0.753 0.767 0.724 0.762 0.731 .. 0.729 0.719 .. .. 0.734 0.731 0.754 0.725 0.734 0.733 0.710 0.709 .. 0.730 0.720 0.727 .. 0.710 0.724 0.729 0.732 .. 0.692 0.716 0.744 0.724 Female 2018 77.3 78.5 76.1 77.7 78.4 81.6 82.7 80.2 78.0 80.1 80.7 .. 78.0 79.7 77.8 80.7 74.9 79.4 79.9 78.4 77.9 77.7 79.3 79.1 79.6 75.3 76.7 77.2 77.4 78.5 74.0 80.8 72.0 75.0 76.0 76.1 .. 69.2 76.3 74.9 76.2 77.7 80.5 72.8 75.4 76.1 71.6
 73.7 75.8 73.7 75.3 67.4 74.2 68.3 74.2 .. 79.4 75.6 72.5 77.7 Male 2018 69.8 73.3 70.8 75.4 71.5 75.2 77.5 76.8 69.2 73.4 76.8 .. 75.7 74.8 72.1 73.2 70.1 72.0 74.3 71.2 75.5 73.7 73.8 74.5 74.1 70.3 67.0 70.8 74.7 74.5 65.6 77.1 66.2 70.2 72.8 68.4 .. 65.6 72.2 68.4 72.7 71.6 77.2 68.9 67.1 67.5 64.6 69.4 69.9 69.4 71.2 60.5 68.4 64.2 69.6 .. 71.2 72.3 68.4 75.2 Female 2018c 16.2 15.3 13.8 g 14.6 15.5 13.3 15.8 15.8 15.7 14.2 14.8 13.8 g 13.1 g 13.9 k 14.6 14.8 g 17.0 15.8 14.9 13.6 g 14.9 g 13.6 14.1 14.1 g 15.7 g 12.4 15.2 g 14.8 14.2 g 15.8 14.8 g 11.4 12.8 g 13.7 g 13.9 g 13.8 g .. .. 13.2 g 13.4 g 12.1 g 13.4 12.2 m 14.4 g 13.0 g 11.8 10.5 g 11.8 13.0 l 12.9 12.9 g 14.0 14.0 n 12.5 l 13.1 .. 12.9 i 13.7 10.2 m 12.6 g Male 2018c 14.7 14.3 12.0 g 14.8 14.4 12.1 14.9 14.8 15.2 13.7 13.9 13.5 g 11.8 g 13.5 k 14.0 14.5 g 16.2 15.0 14.3 12.8 g 14.5 g 13.3 13.7 13.7 g 14.1 g 12.5 14.8 g 13.5 13.6 g 14.4 13.7 g 11.6 12.6 g 13.4 g 12.4 g 11.8 g .. .. 12.2 g 12.4 g 11.6 g 12.9 12.0 m 13.9 g 12.4 g 11.4 11.1 g 12.2 12.6 l 12.9 12.1 g 13.3 14.0 n 13.3 l 13.1 .. 12.5 i 12.0 12.1 m 13.6 g Female 2018c .. 10.7 11.1 i 9.9 9.3 h 10.4 h 8.8 9.9 j 12.8 10.5 g 11.8 g .. .. 8.6 8.4 7.5 .. 8.1 g 8.5 11.8 7.7 i 9.2 i 8.7 7.5 j 8.9 10.2 11.3 j 8.3 8.8 6.4 g 10.5 g 8.5 l 9.2 j .. 10.0 g 10.7 .. 11.0 h 8.5 9.0 10.2 h 9.9 i 6.7 m 11.3 h 9.6 g 11.6 .. 11.3 8.0 j 7.6 .. 10.0 8.3 7.5 m 6.7 h 10.9 g 7.9 h 8.9 6.0 g 4.6 h Male 2018c .. 11.6 10.9 i 10.1 9.5 h 9.9 h 8.5 10.2 j 12.8 11.6 g 11.7 g .. .. 10.9 8.8 8.0 .. 7.6 g 8.2 11.8 8.3 i 10.2 i 9.7 8.3 j 9.1 10.8 11.3 j 7.6 8.2 7.9 g 9.9 g 8.9 l 9.5 j .. 9.5 g 10.0 .. 10.7 h 8.4 9.2 10.7 h 9.7 i 6.9 m 11.2 h 9.2 g 11.5 .. 11.8 7.2 j 8.4 .. 10.5 9.8 9.2 m 8.0 h 11.2 g 8.5 h 9.3 8.6 g 6.4 h Female 2018 .. 12,549 22,266 5,809 14,261 16,106 10,566 9,781 6,505 6,766 5,035 .. .. 8,432 11,254 14,319 .. 10,432 10,236 6,342 4,103 9,464 8,839 12,665 7,319 9,849 6,064 11,176 9,085 4,737 9,666 4,667 14,176 8,615 6,326 6,655 .. 5,839 8,325 7,953 2,734
 5,665 7,454 3,817 7,541 5,886 11,746 4,656 4,867 7,672 3,955 9,035 4,902 11,238 4,364 .. 5,739 1,824 3,712 3,012 Male 2018 .. 17,995 34,878 30,250 31,385 24,788 19,015 14,725 12,929 16,852 10,625 .. .. 17,123 24,286 18,033 .. 17,827 15,656 12,581 22,981 16,279 15,854 19,410 12,960 20,656 10,232 18,974 14,046 16,722 11,931 17,530 17,854 14,780 9,559 11,546 .. 12,292 15,001 15,868 13,668 8,619 15,576 7,747 11,518 7,861 21,213 8,277 18,363 14,789 7,685 14,554 8,780 20,183 16,989 .. 6,703 8,705 26,745 12,019 TABLE 4 Gender Development Index | 313 TABLE4HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Gender Development Index Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Estimated gross national income per capitaa Value (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP $) Value 2018 0.959 0.973 0.969 0.799 0.984 0.943 1.013 0.829 1.009 0.899 0.970 .. 0.893 0.895 .. 0.900 0.931 0.962 0.929 .. 0.912 0.949 .. 0.953 0.919 0.933 0.897 0.902 0.869 0.925 0.747 .. 0.795 .. 0.888 0.943 0.868 0.936 0.863 0.853 0.946 0.883 1.026 0.796 0.873 0.818 0.837 0.890 0.723 .. 0.930 0.844 0.832 0.806 0.899 0.458 .. 0.844 0.901 0.882 Groupb 2018 2 2 2 5 1 3 1 5 1 5 2 .. 5 5 .. 5 3 2 3 .. 4 3 .. 2 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 .. 5 .. 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 .. 3 5 5 5 5 5 .. 5 4 5 Female 2018 0.656 0.656 0.654 0.561 0.644 0.628 0.655 0.574 0.647 0.589 0.611 .. 0.581 0.575 .. 0.571 0.591 0.595 0.581 .. 0.567 0.575 .. 0.566 0.557 0.553 0.549 0.546 0.522 0.540 0.464 .. 0.457 .. 0.504 0.520 0.492 0.509 0.484 0.479 0.504 0.486 0.522 0.445 0.476 0.459 0.457 0.477 0.411 .. 0.466 0.428 0.416 0.413 0.438 0.245 .. 0.419 0.422 0.411 Male 2018 0.684 0.674 0.675 0.703 0.655 0.666 0.646 0.692 0.641 0.655 0.630 .. 0.650 0.642 .. 0.635 0.635 0.618 0.625 .. 0.622 0.606 .. 0.594 0.606 0.593 0.612 0.605 0.601 0.584 0.622 .. 0.575 .. 0.568 0.551 0.567 0.544 0.561 0.562
 0.533 0.550 0.509 0.559 0.545 0.561 0.546 0.536 0.568 .. 0.501 0.507 0.500 0.513 0.487 0.535 .. 0.496 0.468 0.465 Female Male Female 2018c Male 2018c Female 2018c 13.6 11.9 g 11.9 10.9 g 12.1 10.5 12.5 n 12.9 12.7 m 12.0 g 10.6 12.2 g 12.2 g 11.6 .. 12.8 g 11.5 l 10.9 g 10.8 10.9 g 11.4 11.6 m .. 10.5 10.9 g 10.3 g 12.7 11.0 m 11.9 10.3 7.8 9.7 g 8.7 g .. 11.1 g 11.2 8.6 i 7.7 10.4 g 8.5 10.3 11.4 11.1 8.2 9.4 11.4 7.7 9.6 l 7.9 6.0 g 10.9 m 8.3 g 9.5 g 7.7 g 8.8 g 7.4 g .. 8.7 g 9.3 9.7 g 13.2 11.1 g 12.2 12.3 g 11.6 10.8 11.9 n 11.9 12.5 m 12.8 g 9.8 11.4 g 12.0 g 10.8 .. 12.6 g 11.9 l 11.7 g 11.3 11.7 g 11.7 12.5 m .. 10.1 11.8 g 10.9 g 11.7 12.7 m 13.6 10.6 9.3 10.7 g 8.8 g .. 11.4 g 11.2 10.1 i 8.1 11.5 g 8.5 10.4 13.8 10.3 10.0 8.6 13.7 8.3 10.4 l 12.5 6.9 g 11.0 m 9.1 g 9.4 g 10.3 g 10.1 g 10.1 g .. 10.6 g 10.2 10.6 g 11.0 i 8.9 i 6.6 10.1 m 6.0 6.4 7.1 h 4.7 g 7.3 h 3.6 m 6.6 .. 2.1 g 5.3 .. 5.7 g 6.1 j 6.3 i 4.8 h .. 6.4 h 6.7 m 3.9 k 5.0 m 4.1 h 6.0 h 3.6 h 4.0 m 4.8 i 7.6 g 3.8 .. 4.6 o 3.9 h 3.9 m 3.9 g 5.3 m 5.6 h 4.8 m 3.7 h 6.4 l 3.0 j 7.0 h 4.1 h 1.8 g 3.3 m 3.2 h 4.3 m 1.9 h .. 4.1 h 1.6 m 3.0 m 1.5 m 3.5 h 1.9 j .. 5.3 2.5 g 2.8 h Male 2018c 10.8 i 8.0 i 7.3 11.2 m 6.5 6.5 6.5 h 8.2 g 6.6 h 5.3 m 6.6 .. 4.2 g 6.8 .. 7.2 g 7.5 j 7.2 i 5.6 h .. 7.9 h 7.5 m 7.2 k 4.9 m 5.7 h 7.2 h 6.4 h 6.4 m 7.8 i 9.0 g 6.5 .. 5.6 o 5.4 h 5.9 m 4.9 g 7.6 m 6.4 h 7.4 m
 5.5 h 5.8 l 4.4 j 5.5 h 6.3 h 4.4 g 6.6 m 4.2 h 6.6 m 6.0 h .. 5.1 h 3.9 m 4.3 m 3.9 m 5.9 h 4.4 j .. 8.4 4.6 g 4.4 h Female 2018 2,192 4,676 5,234 1,044 5,523 4,864 4,277 2,625 8,917 5,389 3,214 .. 6,388 2,373 .. Male 2018 4,465 10,533 8,944 5,881 7,497 9,970 5,318 10,712 10,497 9,618 5,305 .. 10,579 5,701 .. HDI rank 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d'Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 314 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE 4 GENDER DEVELOPMENT INDEXTABLE4 HDI rank 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER
 COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development World NOTES a Because disaggregated income data are not available, data are crudely estimated.
See Definitions and Technical note 3 at http://hdr.

undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_ notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Development Index is calculated.
Gender Development Index Human Development Index (HDI) SDG 3 Life expectancy at birth SDG 4.3 Expected years of schooling SDG 4.6 Mean years of schooling SDG 8.5 Estimated gross national income per capitaa Value (years) (years) (years) (2011 PPP $) Value 2018 0.875 .. 0.807 1.003 0.839 0.774 0.795 0.298 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.979 0.960 0.845 0.858 0.918 0.856 0.962 0.953 0.978 0.828 0.891 0.869 0.967 0.976 0.941 Groupb 2018 5 .. 5 1 5 5 5 5 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — Female 2018 0.403 .. 0.380 0.422 0.369 0.347 0.335 0.130 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.880 0.732 0.571 0.465 0.653 0.634 0.725 0.757 0.747 0.570 0.507 0.489 0.718 0.882 0.707 Male 2018 0.461 .. 0.471 0.420 0.440 0.449 0.421 0.435 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.898 0.763 0.676 0.542 0.711 0.740 0.754 0.794 0.764 0.688 0.569 0.562 0.743 0.903 0.751 Female 2018 61.9 68.2 59.6 63.0 59.1 55.4 55.0 63.2 75.5 .. .. .. 58.8 .. 82.4 77.8 70.9 63.0 73.2 73.8 77.8 77.5 78.6 71.1 62.9 66.9 74.0 83.0 74.9 Male 2018 60.4 63.8 58.1 59.4 56.1 52.6 50.6 60.9 68.4 .. .. .. 55.4 .. 76.7 72.7 67.8 59.7 69.1 70.2 72.9 70.8 72.3 68.5 59.4 63.2 69.8 77.7 70.4 Female 2018c 8.7 4.6 6.8 10.9 3.5 g 6.0 g 6.2 g 5.8 10.4 g .. 11.8 g 15.6 .. .. 16.7 14.0 11.9 8.5 12.2 11.7 13.5 14.4 14.9 12.0 9.3 9.3 13.1 16.6 12.7 Male 2018c 9.1 5.4 8.6 11.7 5.9 g 8.9 g 8.9 g 7.2 11.3 g .. 10.8 g 14.6 .. .. 16.1 13.6 11.5 9.9 12.2 12.3 13.3 14.7 14.1 11.6 10.4 10.2 12.6 16.0 12.6 Female 2018c Male 2018c 1.0 m .. 1.7 i 2.7 m 4.0 1.3 m 3.0 h 1.4 g .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.0 8.0 5.0 3.8 6.7 6.4 7.5 9.9 8.6 5.0 4.8 3.9 8.5 11.9 7.9 2.1 m .. 3.0 i 3.6 m 5.3 3.6 m 5.6 h 2.7 g .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.1 8.6 7.8 5.8 8.1 7.8 8.3 10.5 8.5 8.0 6.6 5.7 9.0 12.1 9.0 Female 2018 1,336 1,403 1,311 763 1,277 1,377 622 112 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30,171 10,460 2,787 1,928 6,804 5,338 11,385 10,588 9,836 2,639 2,752 1,807 12,022 31,016 11,246 Male 2018 2,077 2,011 2,618 555 1,633 2,056 935 1,705 .. .. .. .. .. .. 50,297 18,271 9,528 3,232 14,040 25,343 17,728 20,674 18,004 10,693 4,133 3,462 19,066 50,530 20,167 m Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for 2006–2018.
achievements between women and men (absolute deviation from gender parity of more than 10 percent).

n Updated by HDRO based on data from CEDLAS and World Bank (2018).

o Updated by HDRO based on Syrian Center for Policy Research (2017).

Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development — a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living.
See Technical note 1 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the HDI is calculated.

Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant’s life.
Expected years of schooling: Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child’s life.

Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from educational attainment levels using official durations of each level.
Estimated gross national income per capita: Derived from the ratio of female to male wages, female and male shares of economically active population and gross national income (in 2011 purchasing power parity terms).

See Technical note 3 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: Calculated based on data in columns 3 and 4.

Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.


Columns 3 and 4: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2019b), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), Barro and Lee (2018), World Bank (2019a), ILO (2019) and IMF (2019).

Columns 5 and 6: UNDESA (2019b).

Columns 7 and 8: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and OECD (2018).
Columns 9 and 10: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019), Barro and Lee (2018), ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and OECD (2018).

Columns 11 and 12: HDRO calculations based on ILO (2019), UNDESA (2019b), World Bank (2019a), United Nations Statistics Division (2019b) and IMF (2019).

TABLE 4 Gender Development Index | 315 b Countries are divided into five groups by absolute DEFINITIONS deviation from gender parity in HDI values.
c Data refer to 2018 or the most recent year available.

d In calculating the HDI value, expected years of schooling is capped at 18 years.

e In calculating the male HDI value, estimated gross national income per capita is capped at $75,000.

f Based on data from OECD (2018).

g Updated by HDRO based on data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019).

h Based on Barro and Lee (2018).


i Updated by HDRO based on data from United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for 2006–2018.

j Updated by HDRO using Barro and Lee (2018) estimates.

k Based on data from the national statistical office.

l Based on cross-country regression.

Gender Development Index: Ratio of female to male HDI values.
See Technical note 3 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_ technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Development Index is calculated.

Gender Development Index groups: Countries are divided into five groups by absolute deviation from gender parity in HDI values.
Group 1 comprises countries with high equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of less than 2.5 percent), group 2 comprises countries with medium to high equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 2.5– 5 percent), group 3 comprises countries with medium equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 5–7.5 percent), group 4 comprises countries with medium to low equality in HDI achievements between women and men (absolute deviation of 7.5–10 percent) and group 5 comprises countries with low equality in HDI TABLE4HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century L B A T E5 Gender Inequality Index Gender Inequality Index SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education Labour force participation ratea HDI rank VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas Value 2018 0.044 0.037 0.093 0.084 .. 0.103 0.057 0.040 0.065 0.041 0.040 0.050 0.083 0.133 0.119 0.182 0.045 .. 0.099 0.073 0.078 0.100 0.058 0.069 0.074 0.137 0.051 0.195 0.069 0.091 0.086 0.122 0.120 0.124 0.113 .. 0.224 0.190 0.169 0.081 0.202 0.288 0.234 0.258 0.207 0.122 0.304
 0.354 0.255 0.119 0.203 0.218 0.119 0.316 .. 0.256 0.245 0.275 0.305 0.353 316 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Rank 2018 (deaths per 100,000 live births) (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) 2015 2015–2020b 5 1 22 19 .. 25 9 2 11 4 2 7 18 34 27 42 6 .. 23 14 16 24 10 12 15 35 8 44 12 21 20 31 30 33 26 .. 49 43 40 17 45 62 51 56 47 31 65 77 54 27 46 48 27 69 .. 55 53 59 66 76 5 5 8 6 .. 6 3 4 10 7 6 3 7 11 9 14 7 .. 5 4 10 5 11 9 5 4 8 9 4 9 7 3 3 10 6 .. 12 6 18 10 13 22 23 17 15 8 17 52 25 4 12 11 7 31 .. 27 4 15 16 80 5.1 2.8 7.5 8.1 2.7 11.7 6.3 5.1 3.5 3.8 4.1 5.8 8.4 19.3 13.4 19.9 4.7 .. 3.8 7.3 4.7 9.6 1.4 3.8 7.7 12.0 4.7 12.9 5.2 7.7 4.6 7.2 10.5 10.9 6.5 .. 7.3 25.7 16.2 8.4 9.9 41.1 10.3 24.0 13.4 8.7 13.1 62.8 20.7 14.5 29.8 39.9 9.3 36.2 .. 33.6 8.2 58.7 26.6 30.0 (% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older) (% held by women) Female Male 2018 41.4 29.3 24.3 31.5 .. 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 96.1 96.4 90.2 d 96.0 76.6 90.0 100.0 e 88.8 76.3 86.6 89.2 100.0 100.0 e 97.2 82.9 95.7 82.6 .. 95.2 d 100.0 100.0 87.8 89.8 97.0 73.3 99.8 81.0 74.3 75.6 100.0 e 78.2 61.5 82.9 92.9 78.8 d 71.5 67.8 99.1 100.0 e 53.6 73.5 79.0 69.5 d 96.3 64.2 d 94.5 73.4 66.5 d 96.3 87.2 98.3 d 94.2 88.0 87.2 96.9 94.6 d 56.8 57.8 44.3 88.0 94.8 97.2 86.3 d 96.6 82.9 90.7 100.0 e 89.0 83.3 90.1 89.4 100.0 100.0 e 96.6 85.7 95.5 87.1 .. 92.2 d 100.0 100.0 90.5 95.6 98.3 78.4 99.8 86.3 82.2 83.0 100.0 e 82.6 73.2 88.1 97.5 65.7 d 73.3 75.5 100.0 99.1 e 54.8 66.1 80.9 70.6 d 98.2 57.5 d 96.9 63.7 63.3 d 95.7 92.5 98.9 d 96.2 97.5 93.1 97.3 91.9 d 49.3 54.0 66.0 91.0 Female 2018 60.2 62.6 55.1 55.3 54.1 59.7 72.1 61.1 60.5 58.0 58.1 55.0 60.9 64.6 57.1 56.1 47.9 .. 51.4 54.8 53.5 59.2 52.8 53.4 51.7 52.4 50.3 43.3 40.0 57.0
 57.3 45.3 48.9 56.4 51.2 .. 23.4 52.7 55.4 53.9 57.8 51.0 58.2 48.3 44.5 45.7 31.0 49.0 54.9 58.1 65.2 49.5 43.6 45.6 .. 61.9 57.5 55.8 33.5 67.6 Male 2018 66.7 74.1 68.1 66.2 67.8 70.5 80.6 67.6 76.3 68.9 65.9 62.2 69.7 75.7 67.8 68.2 58.9 .. 70.7 65.9 62.7 69.1 73.3 62.7 63.4 68.4 60.0 66.2 58.4 70.9 67.2 60.7 65.5 66.7 93.4 .. 79.2 67.4 68.0 64.2 94.7 74.2 71.7 65.0 87.3 58.2 88.7 72.8 70.5 70.3 77.1 61.6 58.1 64.2 .. 69.6 85.3 73.8 72.6 82.0 TABLE5 Gender Inequality Index SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education Labour force participation ratea HDI rank 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of Value 2018 0.274 .. 0.161 0.323 0.492 0.369 0.460 0.285 0.234 0.351 0.380 0.312 .. .. 0.162 0.334 0.377 .. 0.386 0.411 0.259 0.443 0.145 0.381 0.163 0.389 0.321 0.284 0.453 0.333 0.300 0.322 0.362 0.464 .. 0.405 0.458 .. 0.357 0.482 0.465 0.469 0.391 0.367 0.418 0.425 0.228 .. 0.303 0.172 0.451 0.364 0.422 0.446 0.534 0.450 .. 0.314 .. Rank 2018 58 .. 37 72 118 82 108 61 51 75
 86 67 .. .. 38 74 84 .. 89 94 57 100 36 87 39 90 70 60 104 73 63 71 79 111 .. 93 106 .. 78 117 112 113 91 81 96 98 50 .. 64 41 103 80 97 101 128 102 .. 68 .. (deaths per 100,000 live births) (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) 2015 40 .. 17 63 25 53 94 25 29 36 30 39 .. .. 11 38 20 27 44 64 25 140 8 68 27 64 25 24 92 48 62 44 15 129 45 89 95 .. 30 132 155 58 28 68 124 114 23 42 36 9 126 51 138 206 291 33 .. 54 45 2015–2020b 13.4 62.1 14.7 30.1 40.6 25.7 81.8 53.5 19.6 46.4 20.9 51.6 .. 42.8 9.6 60.4 44.9 29.2 59.1 66.7 21.5 10.1 15.7 56.9 7.6 79.3 55.8 23.7 94.3 40.5 7.8 31.0 14.5 46.1 49.0 52.8 85.3 .. 49.4 70.5 61.7 25.9 68.5 7.8 14.7 54.2 22.4 24.4 23.8 5.8 47.4 23.9 67.9 64.9 96.2 53.8 .. 30.9 52.8 (% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older) (% held by women) Female Male Female i 51.8 17.4 j 14.9 9.1 26.7 .. 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 79.8 d .. 85.7 74.4 d 67.4 65.7 d 74.8 d 53.8 93.5 97.4 82.6 d 86.7 d .. .. 73.1 58.4 43.1 .. 61.0 53.1 96.9 39.1 d 41.6 f 57.4 75.4 d 51.9 93.9 94.0 d 58.6 49.2 42.3 d 91.2 54.3 g 89.6 d .. 69.9 71.7 .. 78.3 d 47.3 61.5 82.0 d 78.9 44.9 d 94.0 d 75.6 d 95.5 .. 99.9 69.4 d 44.5 79.1 h 75.0 52.8 65.6 d 59.2 d 91.6 66.2 d 60.0 81.8 d .. 93.6 71.2 d 72.0 68.1 d 68.4 d 52.3 92.8 98.6 83.1 d 88.9 d .. .. 90.0 61.1 48.2 .. 57.7 50.9 97.6 38.9 d 57.6 f 68.5 83.0 d 51.9 97.5 95.2 d 54.4 42.1 54.6 d 86.3 55.6 g 90.3 d .. 62.4 66.6 .. 70.2 d 48.3 60.1 85.9 d 78.4 49.3 d 93.4 d 72.4 d 97.4 .. 99.9 45.0 d 53.2 71.6 h 78.2 65.1 49.8 d 71.2 d 92.5 77.7 d 62.2 2018 50.9 .. 46.8 50.4 16.8 45.0 52.5 45.7 47.2 57.8 34.9 40.0 .. .. 35.6 43.8 59.5 .. 54.0 58.6 49.6 14.9 42.7 69.9 61.3 56.6 63.1 46.7 50.9 60.2 24.1 53.3 23.5 66.2 57.3 60.4 47.7 .. 38.1 56.9 39.2 14.1 53.3 41.9 45.3 45.7 38.9 52.8 53.4
 25.7 52.2 23.7 48.9 56.6 43.4 22.8 .. 72.7 19.3 Male 2018 77.4 .. 62.1 71.3 71.2 71.8 80.5 74.6 64.9 78.7 72.2 67.4 .. .. 58.6 78.9 76.2 .. 74.4 82.0 69.9 67.4 67.5 84.7 75.9 81.8 69.7 62.8 77.6 75.3 69.9 66.7 70.9 78.6 79.2 73.9 77.1 .. 76.1 84.1 64.2 64.0 81.4 82.0 74.1 74.1 45.6 78.2 78.0 79.0 82.0 38.6 62.6 79.4 60.2 73.2 .. 82.5 71.1 TABLE 5 Gender Inequality Index | 317 TABLE5HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Gender Inequality Index SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education Labour force participation ratea Rank 2018 (deaths per 100,000 live births) (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) 2015 2015–2020b 131 118 87 118 92 84 83 118 105 122 108 .. 116 .. 99 129 .. 136 145 145 110 .. 133 131 .. 106 114 134 115 144 140 126 136 .. 136 161 .. 95 .. 130 127 150 .. 148 135 157 125 140 139 150 143 .. 149 123 150 .. (% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older) (% held by women) Female Male Female 2018 25.2 18.4 19.2 31.9 31.0 20.0 20.8 k 12.7 45.7 11.7 39.7 33.8 21.1 6.5 15.3 20.3 0.0 l 14.5 14.0 12.1 27.5 0.0 l 12.7 18.0 18.0 10.2 19.3 23.3 33.5 30.5 29.3 34.3 20.0 2.0 13.2 0.0 l 6.1 55.7 5.8 37.2 34.3 20.3 19.6 7.2 22.7 9.2 m 41.8 17.6 31.0 2.7 27.4 j 26.2 16.7 37.3 10.3 21.9 11.7 0.5 2010–2018c 2010–2018c 39.5 d 29.0 d 98.6 d 70.9 d 39.9
 98.8 d 28.7 38.4 48.3 d 39.0 d 40.5 d .. 34.2 .. 7.6 45.3 d .. 31.5 46.7 d 31.3 d 35.0 d .. 55.7 d 39.2 d .. 28.7 d 15.1 d 29.8 d 29.0 d 23.1 32.7 55.9 26.7 .. 37.1 d 9.9 d .. 12.9 d .. 11.9 d 27.4 d 12.7 d .. 18.2 d 32.8 d 17.8 d 11.1 27.6 d 15.3 d 26.9 d 13.2 d .. 17.6 d 11.5 n 30.7 n .. 18.5 d 19.9 d 56.5 d 35.6 d 98.3 d 55.5 d 46.3 87.0 d 31.2 37.2 46.6 d 63.5 d 41.9 d .. 32.6 .. 17.5 49.2 d .. 45.8 51.3 d 33.9 d 46.0 d .. 71.1 d 52.4 d .. 22.3 d 28.1 d 37.3 d 44.2 d 38.1 40.9 66.3 47.3 .. 43.4 d 15.2 d .. 17.9 d .. 16.9 d 34.7 d 24.9 d .. 33.6 d 25.1 d 34.1 d 21.4 54.0 d 19.6 d 39.9 d 36.9 d .. 25.9 d 22.0 n 43.6 n .. 39.6 d 35.5 d 2018 12.4 21.4 48.0 41.2 46.1 27.8 65.1 41.1 50.7 23.6 56.2 25.0 47.2 .. 58.2 36.0 .. Male 2018 72.6 70.4 75.8 73.6 78.9 59.7 73.2 85.0 83.7 78.6 65.9 52.6 83.7 .. 74.5 81.3 .. HDI rank 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People's Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d'Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168
 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen Value 2018 0.540 0.492 0.381 0.492 0.397 0.377 0.372 0.492 0.455 0.501 0.460 .. 0.479 .. 0.436 0.536 .. 0.547 0.579 0.579 0.463 .. 0.541 0.540 .. 0.458 0.474 0.545 0.476 0.578 0.566 0.525 0.547 .. 0.547 0.740 .. 0.412 .. 0.539 0.531 0.620 .. 0.613 0.546 0.657 0.523 0.566 0.560 0.620 0.575 .. 0.615 0.508 0.620 .. 0.651 0.834 318 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 TABLE 5 GENDER INEQUALITY INDEXTABLE5 Gender Inequality Index SDG 3.1 Maternal mortality ratio SDG 3.7 Adolescent birth rate SDG 5.5 Share of seats in parliament SDG 4.6 Population with at least some secondary education Labour force participation ratea HDI rank 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development World Value 2018 .. 0.655 0.569 0.644 0.612 .. 0.676 0.520 .. 0.701 0.682 0.647 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.175 0.331 0.501 0.590 0.466 0.531 0.310 0.276 0.383 0.510 0.573 0.561 0.453 0.182 0.439 Rank 2018 .. 156 142 153 147 .. 158 124 .. 160 159 154 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — (deaths per 100,000 live births) (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) 2015 549 693 489 1,360 371 501 587 712 789 856 882 553 82 .. .. .. 732 .. 15 56 198 557 231 148 62 25 68 176 550 434 T 192 14 216 T 2015–2020b 104.8 124.2 148.6 112.8 104.3 52.6 169.1 55.6
 62.0 161.1 129.1 186.5 0.3 .. .. .. 100.1 .. 16.7 33.6 34.3 101.1 46.8 46.6 22.0 27.8 63.2 26.1 104.7 94.4 57.5 20.5 42.9 (% ages 25 and older) (% ages 15 and older) (% held by women) Female Male Female 2010–2018c 2010–2018c .. 36.7 14.0 19.9 d 6.0 n .. 7.3 f 7.5 d .. 1.7 n 13.4 d 4.3 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 87.0 68.9 39.5 17.8 55.0 45.9 68.8 78.1 59.7 39.9 28.8 25.3 59.0 84.8 62.8 .. 65.8 27.3 32.9 d 12.1 n .. 16.4 f 11.0 d .. 10.3 n 31.1 d 8.9 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 88.7 74.5 58.7 30.3 65.8 54.9 76.2 85.8 59.3 60.8 39.8 34.9 61.5 87.7 71.2 2018 67.3 60.8 77.5 57.7 58.5 74.1 61.3 80.4 71.8 64.8 64.7 67.3 74.3 .. .. .. 19.1 .. 52.1 53.9 32.3 58.2 46.6 20.4 59.7 45.2 51.8 25.9 63.5 57.3 51.0 51.6 48.0 Male 2018 78.9 66.5 79.6 58.5 75.1 87.1 80.9 77.6 74.3 77.9 79.8 90.5 87.3 .. .. .. 74.3 .. 69.0 75.6 78.9 73.1 76.6 73.8 77.0 70.1 77.2 78.8 72.9 78.8 70.2 68.5 74.9 NOTES j Refers to 2017. a Estimates modelled by the International Labour k Refers to 2013.
Maternal mortality ratio: Number of deaths due to pregnancy-related causes per 100,000 live births.

actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population.

Organization.

b Data are average annual estimates for 2015–2020.

c Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

d Based on Barro and Lee (2018).

e Based on data from OECD (2018).


f Updated by HDRO based on data from United Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys for 2006–2018.

g Based on cross-country regression.

h Based on data from the national statistical office.

i Excludes the 36 special rotating delegates appointed on an ad hoc basis.

l In calculating the Gender Inequality Index, a value of 0.1 percent was used.

Adolescent birth rate: Number of births to women ages 15–19 per 1,000 women ages 15–19.
MAIN DATA SOURCES m Refers to 2015. n Updated by HDRO based on data from ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys for 2006–2018.

T From original data source.

DEFINITIONS Gender Inequality Index: A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market.

See Technical note 4 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Gender Inequality Index is calculated.
Share of seats in parliament: Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament expressed as a percentage of total seats.

For countries with a bicameral legislative system, the share of seats is calculated based on both houses.

Population with at least some secondary education: Percentage of the population ages 25 and older that has reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.
Labour force participation rate: Proportion of the working-age population (ages 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data in columns 3–9.

Column 2: Calculated based on data in column 1.

Column 3: UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Group (2017).

Column 4: UNDESA (2019b).

Column 5: IPU (2019).

Columns 6 and 7: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019) and Barro and Lee (2018).

Columns 8 and 9: ILO (2019).
TABLE 5 Gender Inequality Index | 319 TABLE5HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century L B A T E6 Multidimensional Poverty Index: developing countries Multidimensional Poverty Indexa SDG 1.2 Population in multidimensional povertya Headcount Year and surveyb (thousands) Intensity of deprivation Inequality among the poor Population in severe multidimensional poverty Population vulnerable to multidimensional povertya 2007–2018 Value (%) 2015/2016 D Afghanistan 2017/2018 D Albania 2012/2013 M Algeria 2015/2016 D Angola 2015/2016 D Armenia 2014 D Bangladesh 2012 M Barbados 2015/2016 M Belize 2017/2018 D Benin 2010 M Bhutan 2008 D Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2011/2012 M Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 N h Brazil 2010 D Burkina Faso 2016/2017 D Burundi 2014 D Cambodia 2014 M Cameroon 2010 M Central African Republic 2014/2015 D Chad 2014 N i China 2015/2016 D Colombia 2012 D Comoros Congo 2014/2015 M Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2013/2014 D 2016 M Côte d'Ivoire 2014 M Dominican Republic 2013/2014 N Ecuador 2014 D Egypt 2014 M El Salvador 2014 M Eswatini (Kingdom of) 2016 D Ethiopia 2012 D Gabon 2013 D Gambia 2014 D Ghana 2014/2015 D Guatemala 2016 M Guinea 2014 M Guinea-Bissau 2014 M Guyana 2016/2017 D Haiti 2011/2012 D Honduras 2015/2016 D India 2012 D Indonesia 2018 M Iraq 2014 N Jamaica 2017/2018 D Jordan 2015 M Kazakhstan 2014 D Kenya Kyrgyzstan 2014 M Lao People's Democratic Republic 2017 M 2014 D Lesotho 2013 D Liberia 2014 P Libya 2008/2009 D Madagascar 2015/2016 D Malawi 2016/2017 D Maldives 2015 M Mali 2015 M Mauritania 2016 N n Mexico 2012 M Moldova (Republic of) 2013 M Mongolia 2013 M Montenegro 2011 P Morocco 0.272d 0.003 0.008 0.282 0.001 0.198 0.009f 0.017 0.368 0.175g 0.094 0.008f 0.016d,g,h 0.519 0.403 0.170 0.243 0.465g 0.533 0.016j,k 0.020d 0.181 0.112 0.389 0.236 0.015d 0.018g 0.019l 0.032 0.081 0.489 0.066 0.286 0.138 0.134 0.336 0.372 0.014 0.200 0.090m 0.123 0.028d 0.033 0.018f 0.002 0.002g 0.178 0.008 0.108
 0.146 0.320 0.007 0.453 0.243 0.003 0.457 0.261 0.025f 0.004 0.042 0.002g 0.085g 55.9d 0.7 2.1 51.1 0.2 41.7 2.5f 4.3 66.8 37.3g 20.4 2.2f 3.8d,g,h 83.8 74.3 37.2 45.3 79.4g 85.7 3.9j,k 4.8d 37.3 24.3 74.0 46.1 3.9d 4.5g 5.2l 7.9 19.2 83.5 14.8 55.2 30.1 28.9 61.9 67.3 3.4 41.3 19.3m 27.9 7.0d 8.6 4.7f 0.4 0.5g 38.7 2.3 23.1 33.6 62.9 2.0 77.8 52.6 0.8 78.1 50.6 6.3f 0.9 10.2 0.4g 18.6g In survey year 19,376d 21 805 14,725 5 66,468 7f 16 7,672 272g 1,958 80f 7,913d,g,h 13,083 8,067 5,679 10,081 3,530g 12,002 53,688j,k 2,358d 270 1,212 54,590 10,916 404d 714g 4,742l 494 249 85,511 261 1,027 8,109 4,694 7,668 1,161 26 4,532 1,642m 369,546 17,452d 3,397 134f 43 80g 17,801 132 1,582 720 2,698 124 15,995 9,520 3 13,640 2,115 8,039f 38 292 2g 6,101g 320 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 2017 (%) Value (%) 19,865d 21 868 15,221 5 68,663 7f 16 7,465 302g 2,254 77f 8,041d,g,h 16,091 8,067 5,952 10,903 3,697g 12,765 54,437j,k 2,378d 303 1,277 60,230 11,192 418d 746g 5,038l 501 263 87,643 301 1,160 8,671 4,885 7,867 1,253 26 4,532 1,788m 373,735 18,512d 3,305 135f 42 82g 19,223 138 1,582 750 2,978 127 19,885 9,799 3 14,479 2,235 8,141f 38 313 2g 6,636g 48.6d 39.1 38.8 55.3 36.2 47.5 34.2f 39.8 55.0 46.8g 46.0 37.9f 42.5d,g,h 61.9 54.3 45.8 53.5 58.6g 62.3 41.3j,k 40.6d 48.5 46.0 52.5 51.2 38.9d 40.0g 37.6l 41.3 42.3 58.5 44.3 51.7 45.8 46.2 54.3 55.3 41.8 48.4 46.4m 43.9 40.3d 37.9 38.7f 35.4 35.6g 46.0 36.3 47.0 43.4 50.8 37.1 58.2 46.2 34.4 58.5 51.5 39.2f 37.4 41.7 45.7g 45.7g 0.020d ..e 0.006 0.024 ..e 0.016 ..e 0.007 0.025 0.016g 0.014 0.002f 0.008d,g,h 0.027 0.022 0.015 0.026 0.028g 0.026 0.005j,k 0.009d 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.019 0.006d 0.007g 0.004l 0.009 0.009 0.024 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.022 0.025 0.008 0.019 0.013m 0.014 0.009d 0.005 ..e ..e ..e 0.014 0.002 0.016 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.023 0.013 ..e 0.024 0.019 0.008f ..e 0.007 ..e 0.017g 24.9d 0.1 0.3 32.5 0.0 16.7 0.0f 0.6 40.9 14.7g 7.1 0.1f 0.9d,g,h 64.8 45.3 13.2 25.6 54.7g 66.1 0.3j,k 0.8d 16.1 9.4 43.9 24.5 0.5d 0.8g
 0.6l 1.7 4.4 61.5 4.7 32.0 10.4 11.2 37.7 40.4 0.7 18.5 6.5m 8.8 1.2d 1.3 0.8f 0.0 0.0g 13.3 0.0 9.6 8.5 32.1 0.1 57.1 18.5 0.0 56.6 26.3 1.0f 0.1 1.6 0.1g 6.5g (%) 18.1d 5.0 5.8 15.5 2.7 21.4 0.5f 8.4 14.7 17.7g 15.7 4.1f 6.2d,g,h 7.4 16.3 21.1 17.3 13.1g 9.9 17.1j,k 6.2d 22.3 21.3 16.8 17.6 5.2d 7.5g 6.1l 9.9 20.9 8.9 17.5 21.8 22.0 21.1 17.2 19.2 5.8 21.8 22.3m 19.3 9.1d 5.2 6.4f 0.7 1.8g 34.9 8.3 21.2 24.4 21.4 11.3 11.8 28.5 4.8 10.9 18.6 4.7f 3.7 19.2 4.3g 13.2g Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall multidimensional povertya SDG 1.2 SDG 1.1 Population living below income poverty line (%) Health Education Standard of living National poverty line PPP $1.90 a day (%) (%) (%) 2007–2018c 2007–2017c 10.0d 28.3 29.9 21.2 33.1 23.5 96.0f 39.5 20.8 24.2g 21.6 79.7f 49.8d,g,h 20.0 23.3 21.8 23.2 27.8g 20.1 35.2j,k 12.0d 20.8 23.4 26.1 19.6 29.1d 40.8g 39.8l 15.5 29.3 19.7 31.0 28.2 22.3 26.3 18.7 21.3 31.5 18.5 18.5m 31.9 23.2d 33.1 42.1f 37.5 90.4g 24.9 52.8 21.5 20.6 19.7 39.0 17.5 20.7 80.7 22.0 20.2 67.0f 9.2 24.0 24.4g 25.6g 45.0d 55.1 46.8 32.1 36.8 29.2 0.7f 20.9 36.3 36.6g 26.6 7.2f 22.9d,g,h 40.6 27.5 31.7 28.2 25.7g 34.4 39.2j,k 39.5d 31.6 20.2 18.4 40.4 35.8d 23.4g 53.2l 43.4 17.9 29.4 22.2 34.4 30.4 35.0 38.7 33.9 18.7 24.6 33.0m 23.4 30.0d 60.9 17.5f 53.5 3.1g 14.6 13.0 39.7 21.5 28.2 48.6 31.8 23.1 15.1 41.6 33.1 14.1f 42.4 20.9 46.0g 42.1g 45.0d 16.7 23.2 46.8 30.1 47.3 3.3f 39.6 42.9 39.2g 51.8 13.1f 27.3d,g,h 39.4 49.2 46.6 48.6 46.5g 45.5 25.5j,k 48.5d 47.6 56.4 55.5 40.0 35.0d 35.8g 7.0l 41.1 52.8 50.8 46.8 37.5 47.2 38.7 42.6 44.7 49.8 57.0 48.5m 44.8 46.8d 6.0 40.4f 9.0 6.4g 60.5 34.3 38.8 57.9 52.1 12.4 50.7 56.2 4.2 36.3 46.6 18.8f 48.4 55.1 29.7g 32.3g 54.5 14.3 5.5 36.6 25.7 24.3 .. .. 40.1 8.2 36.4 16.9 26.5 40.1 64.9 17.7 37.5 62.0 46.7 3.1 27.0 42.4 46.5 63.9 46.3 30.5 23.2 27.8 29.2 63.0 23.5 33.4 48.6 23.4 59.3 55.2 69.3 .. 58.5 61.9 21.9 10.6 18.9 19.9 14.4 2.5 36.1 25.6 23.4 57.1 50.9 .. 70.7 51.5 8.2 41.1 31.0 43.6 9.6 21.6
 24.0 4.8 .. 1.1 0.5 30.1 1.4 14.8 .. .. 49.5 1.5 5.8 0.1 4.8 43.7 71.8 .. 23.8 66.3 38.4 0.7 3.9 17.9 37.0 76.6 28.2 1.6 3.2 1.3 1.9 42.0 27.3 3.4 10.1 13.3 8.7 35.3 67.1 .. 25.0 17.2 21.2 5.7 2.5 .. 0.1 0.0 36.8 1.5 22.7 59.7 40.9 .. 77.6 70.3 7.3 49.7 6.0 2.5 0.1 0.6 0.0 1.0 TABLE6 Multidimensional Poverty Indexa SDG 1.2 Population in multidimensional povertya Headcount Year and surveyb (thousands) Intensity of deprivation Inequality among the poor Population in severe multidimensional poverty Population vulnerable to multidimensional povertya Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall multidimensional povertya SDG 1.2 SDG 1.1 Population living below income poverty line (%) Health Education Standard of living National poverty line PPP $1.90 a day 2007–2018 Value 2011 D 2015/2016 D 2013 D 2016 D 2011/2012 D 2012 D 2016/2017 M 2011 M 2017/2018 D 2014 M 2016 M 2012 D 2017 D 2014/2015 D 2012 M 2014 M 2017 D 2014 M 2017 M 2016 D 2010 M 2014 M 2010 M 2009 P 2017 D 2015/2016 D 2015/2016 M 2016 D 2013/2014 D 2011 M 2011/2012 M 2015/2016 M 2016 D 2012 M 2007 M 2013/2014 M 2013 D 2013/2014 D 2015 D — Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Pakistan Palestine, State of Paraguay Peru Philippines Rwanda Saint Lucia Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone South Africa South Sudan Sudan Suriname Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania (United Republic of) Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine Vanuatu Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe Developing countries Regions — Arab States — East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia — Latin America and the Caribbean — — South Asia — Sub-Saharan Africa NOTES a Not all indicators were available for all countries, so caution should be used in cross-country comparisons.
When an indicator is missing, weights of available indicators are adjusted to total 100 percent.

See Technical note 5 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details.

b D indicates data from Demographic and Health Surveys, M indicates data from Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, N indicates data from national surveys and P indicates data from Pan Arab Population and Family Health Surveys (see http://hdr.
undp.org/en/faq-page/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi for the list of national surveys).

c Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

d Missing indicator on nutrition.

e Value is not reported because it is based on a small number of multidimensionally poor people.

f Missing indicator on child mortality.

g Considers child deaths that occurred at any time because the survey did not collect the date of child deaths.
h The methodology was adjusted to account for missing indicator on nutrition and incomplete indicator on child mortality (the survey did not collect the date of child deaths).

i Based on data accessed on 7 June 2016.
(%) 72.5 38.3 38.0 34.0 16.3 90.5 51.4 2.5f 38.3 1.0 4.5 12.7 5.8d 54.4 1.9f 22.1 53.2 0.3g 57.9 6.3 91.9 52.3 9.4f 7.4g 7.4 55.4 0.8g 45.8 48.2 0.6g 1.3 0.4 55.1 0.2d 38.8g 4.9d 47.7 53.2 31.8 23.1 15.7 5.6 1.1 7.5 31.0 57.5 In survey year 18,069 20,263 880 9,851 956 16,042 98,175 52f 76,976 43 303 3,818 6,081d 6,329 3f 42 8,428 30g 4,378 3,505 9,248 19,748 49f 1,539g 664 30,814 541g 581 3,481 8g 144 23 22,857 109d 85g 4,530d 12,199 8,317 5,018 1,279,663 48,885 110,775 1,237 38,067 542,492 538,206 2017 21,496 20,449 963 9,961 1,011 19,431 98,175 53f 75,520 47 307 4,072 6,081d 6,644 3f 45 8,428 30g 4,378 3,549 11,552 21,210 53f 1,350g 664 31,778 542g 594 3,755 9g 153 23 23,614 106d 107g 4,677d 13,475 9,102 5,257 1,325,994 52,251 113,247 1,240 39,324 548,048 571,884 (%) 56.7 45.9 45.1 43.6 45.2 65.2 56.6 37.7f 51.7 37.5 41.9 41.6 41.8d 47.5 37.5f 41.7 54.2 42.5g 51.2 39.8 63.2 53.4 43.4f 38.9g 39.0 49.3 39.1g 45.7 51.6 38.0g 39.7 36.1 48.8 34.5d 44.9g 39.5d 50.5 49.1 42.9 49.4 48.4 42.3 37.9 43.1 45.6 54.9 Value 0.023 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.026 0.029 0.007f 0.023 0.003 0.013 0.009 0.010d 0.013 ..e 0.008 0.021 ..e 0.020 0.005 0.023 0.023 0.018f 0.006g 0.004 0.016 0.007g 0.014 0.023 ..e 0.006 ..e 0.017 ..e 0.012g 0.010d 0.021 0.017 0.009 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.016 0.022 (%) 49.1 13.8 12.2 11.6 5.5 74.8 32.3 0.2f 21.5 0.1 1.0 2.9 1.3d 22.2 0.0f 4.4 32.8 0.1g 30.4 0.9 74.3 30.9 2.5f 1.2g 0.7 25.9 0.1g 16.3 24.3 0.1g 0.2 0.0 24.1 0.0d 10.2g 0.7d 23.9 24.2 8.0 10.5 6.9 1.0 0.1 2.0 11.3 35.1 (%) 13.6 21.9 20.3 22.3 13.2 5.1 16.8 2.9f 12.9 5.4 7.2 12.5 7.3d 25.7 1.6f 19.4 16.4 3.4g 19.6 12.2 6.3 17.7 4.5f 7.7g 20.1 24.2 7.2g 26.1 21.8 3.7g 3.7 2.4 24.9 0.4d 32.3g 5.6d 22.1 22.5 27.4 15.3 9.4 14.9 3.6 7.7 18.8 17.2 (%) 17.2 18.5 30.3 31.5 11.1 20.3 27.0 62.5f 27.6 53.3 14.3 20.3 20.3d 13.6 69.5f 18.6 22.1 20.6g 18.6 39.5 14.0 21.1 45.7f 40.7g 47.8 21.1 35.0g 27.8 21.7 45.5g 25.7 88.0 22.4 59.7d 21.4g 15.2d 28.3 23.7 27.3 25.8 26.2 27.4 52.8 35.4 29.2 22.2 (%) 32.5 32.3 14.9 27.2 36.5 37.3 32.2 17.0f 41.3 32.8
 38.9 23.7 31.0d 30.5 7.5f 37.4 44.9 42.7g 28.9 13.1 39.6 29.2 25.5f 49.0g 26.5 22.9 47.4g 24.2 28.4 34.0g 50.2 4.4 22.5 28.8d 22.5g 42.6d 30.7 22.5 12.3 29.5 35.3 35.6 23.3 25.7 27.9 29.6 (%) 2007–2018c 2007–2017c 50.3 49.2 54.9 41.3 52.4 42.4 40.8 20.5f 31.1 13.9 46.8 56.0 48.7d 55.9 23.0f 44.0 33.0 36.8g 52.4 47.4 46.5 49.8 28.8f 10.2g 25.8 56.0 17.6g 48.0 50.0 20.5g 24.1 7.6 55.1 11.5d 56.2g 42.2d .. 35.2 31.3 28.2 8.6 41.8 55.1 .. 15.2 .. .. .. 4.8 49.1 0.0 30.7 49.2 .. 0.3 .. 41.7 0.1 13.1 2.0 18.8 57.5 21.4 14.2 4.6 2.1 0.6 4.1 17.5 44.7 0.411 0.176 0.171 0.148 0.074 0.590 0.291 0.010f 0.198 0.004 0.019 0.053 0.024d 0.259 0.007f 0.092 0.288 0.001g 0.297 0.025 0.580 0.279 0.041f 0.029g 0.029 0.273 0.003g 0.210 0.249 0.002g 0.005 0.001 0.269 0.001d 0.174g 0.019d 0.241 0.261 0.137 0.114 0.076 0.024 0.004 0.033 0.142 0.315 j Missing indicator on housing.
k Child mortality was constructed based on deaths that occurred between surveys—that is, between 2012 and 2014.

Child deaths reported by an adult man in the household were taken into account because the date of death was reported.

l Missing indicator on cooking fuel.

m Missing indicator on electricity.

n Multidimensional Poverty Index estimates are based on the 2016 National Health and Nutrition Survey.
Estimates based on the 2015 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey are 0.010 for Multidimensional Poverty Index value, 2.6 for multidimensional poverty headcount (%), 3,125,000 for multidimensional poverty headcount in year of survey, 3,200,000 for projected multidimensional poverty headcount in 2017, 40.2 for intensity of deprivation, 0.4 for population in severe multidimensional poverty, 6.1 for population vulnerable to multidimensional poverty, 39.9 for contribution of deprivation in health, 23.8 for contribution of deprivation in education and 36.3 for contribution of deprivation in standard of living.
DEFINITIONS Multidimensional Poverty Index: Percentage of the population that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations.

See Technical note 5 at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details on how the Multidimensional Poverty Index is calculated.

Multidimensional poverty headcount: Population with a deprivation score of at least 33 percent.
It is expressed as a share of the population in the survey year, the number of people in the survey year and the projected number of people in 2017.

Intensity of deprivation of multidimensional poverty: Average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty.

Inequality among the poor: Variance of individual deprivation scores of poor people.
It is calculated by subtracting the deprivation score of each multidimensionally poor person from the average intensity, squaring the differences and dividing the sum of the weighted squares by the number of multidimensionally poor people.

Population in severe multidimensional poverty: Percentage of the population in severe multidimensional poverty—that is, those with a deprivation score of 50 percent or more.
Population vulnerable to multidimensional poverty: Percentage of the population at risk of suffering multiple deprivations—that is, those with a deprivation score of 20–33 percent.

Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall multidimensional poverty: Percentage of the Multidimensional Poverty Index attributed to deprivations in each dimension.
Population living below national poverty line: Percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, which is the poverty line deemed appropriate for a country by its authorities.

National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.

Population living below PPP $1.90 a day: Percentage of the population living below the international poverty line of $1.90 (in purchasing power parity [PPP] terms) a day.
MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: Refers to the year and the survey whose data were used to calculate the country’s Multidimensional Poverty Index value and its components.

Columns 2–12: HDRO and OPHI calculations based on data on household deprivations in health, education and standard of living from various household surveys listed in column 1 using the methodology described in Technical note 5 (available at http://hdr.
undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf) and Alkire, Kanagaratnam and Suppa (2019).

Columns 4 and 5 also use population data from UNDESA (2017b).

Columns 13 and 14: World Bank (2019a).


TABLE 6 Multidimensional Poverty Index: developing countries | 321 TABLE6HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Human development dashboards D R A O B H S A 1D Quality of human development Country groupings (terciles) Top third Middle third Bottom third Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Notes after the table.
Quality of health Lost health expectancy Physicians Hospital beds (per 10,000 people) SDG 4.c SDG 4.a SDG 4.1 Pupil– teacher ratio, primary school Primary school teachers trained to teach (pupils per teacher) (%) Quality of education Schools with access to the Internet Primary Secondary Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score (%) Mathematicsb Readingc Sciencec Vulnerable employmenta (% of total employment) SDG 7.1 SDG 6.1 SDG 6.2 Quality of standard of living Population using at least basic drinking- water sources Population using at least basic sanitation facilities Rural population with access to electricity HDI rank VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan (%) 2017 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.8 .. 14.6 13.8 14.1 12.5 13.9 13.9 14.3 14.0 15.3 14.4 15.3 14.5 .. 2010–2018d 2010–2015d 2013–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2015 2015 2015 2018 2017 46.3 42.4 30.9 42.1 .. 35.9 39.7 54.0 23.1 35.1 44.6 38.1 26.1 30.3 28.1 25.9 33.2 .. .. 38 32 26 24 47 e 25 44 27 28 28 29 62 .. 134 76 48 31 115 46 30 65 65 47 34 50 34 43 65 73 12 25 e 27 58 58 34 12 22
 27 70 20 56 16 50 82 110 67 9 10 .. 12 14 .. 10 12 15 12 11 13 .. .. 21 19 20 .. .. .. .. 97 .. .. .. 99 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 100 100 .. .. .. 49 e .. 85 .. 84 .. 100 .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. .. 99 100 .. .. .. 100 100 100 .. .. .. 100 100 .. .. .. .. 85 100 100 100 .. 98 .. 70 100 .. .. 100 .. .. 100 100 100 100 100 100 .. .. 100 100 .. 71 38 .. 100 .. 100 100 .. .. 95 100 .. .. .. 100 100 100 .. .. .. 100 100 .. .. .. .. 85 100 100 100 .. 99 .. 88 100 .. .. 100 .. .. 100 100 100 100 100 100 .. .. 99 100 .. 87 56 .. 100 .. 502 521 504 506 548 494 488 494 564 512 511 511 516 495 492 470 507 .. 532 497 486 470 524 510 486 492 493 479 490 520 437 454 504 478 427 .. .. 475 482 492 402 423 .. 477 .. 464 .. 456 g 494 .. .. 513 492 521 509 527 503 482 500 535 503 500 526 527 509 498 497 499 .. 516 485 481 479 517 505 496 487 499 447 485 519 443 467 506 472 434 .. .. 453 488 498 402 459 .. 470 .. 487 .. 475 g 495 .. .. 498 506 503 509 523 510 473 493 556 509 502 531 528 513 509 496 502 .. 538 495 483 467 516 513 493 493 495 465 481 534 433 455 501 475 437 .. .. 461 490 501 418 447 .. 477 .. 475 .. 475 g 487 .. .. 4.8 9.0 10.9 5.9 5.9 10.7 8.0 6.2 9.8 12.6 5.1 9.2 10.7 12.4 13.0 3.8 10.2 .. 8.4 7.7 6.3 8.3 23.5 10.6 11.3 14.0 7.4 9.9 17.0 5.5 11.1 26.7 16.3 9.5 0.8 .. (%) 2017 100 100 97 100 .. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 99 100 .. h 97 96 96 2017 98 100 91 99 .. 100 99 99 100 98 100 99 99 100 99 100 99 .. 100 100 98 100 100 99 100
 99 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 93 99 100 100 98 92 100 100 100 96 f 98 100 97 100 94 h 90 98 98 DASHBOARD 1 Quality of human development | 323 DASH BOARD1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Quality of health Lost health expectancy Physicians Hospital beds (per 10,000 people) SDG 4.c SDG 4.a SDG 4.1 Pupil– teacher ratio, primary school Primary school teachers trained to teach (pupils per teacher) (%) Quality of education Schools with access to the Internet Primary Secondary Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score (%) Mathematicsb Readingc Sciencec Vulnerable employmenta (% of total employment) SDG 7.1 SDG 6.1 SDG 6.2 Quality of standard of living Population using at least basic drinking- water sources Population using at least basic sanitation facilities Rural population with access to electricity HDI rank 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan (%) 2017 13.4 13.7 14.0 .. 11.9 14.9 12.7 13.9 11.7 11.6 11.7 13.7 12.4 15.1 13.4 12.5 12.2 13.7 12.4 12.3 11.9 .. 12.6 14.3 12.3 12.3 12.0 13.4 12.1 13.0 14.4 13.7 12.5 11.7 12.4 12.4 13.5 12.2 12.2 14.0 12.5 15.0 14.8 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.0 13.2
 13.3 12.4 14.6 12.5 12.7 13.2 12.5 13.6 12.0 2010–2018d 2010–2015d 2013–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d e 12.7 28.9 22.7 3.7 6.6 13.2 .. e 26 10 58 74 18 .. 19 .. 14 9 11 18 19 12 14 14 .. 29 18 21 12 18 9 23 9 14 12 17 27 16 16 20 24 .. 24 14 17 17 25 15 13 19 15 16 30 12 23 14 22 .. 13 20 .. 13 21 20 10 22 29 18 .. .. .. .. .. 80 79 100 .. 90 99 84 56 88 e 100 100 99 94 .. 95 e 85 100 72 55 .. 97 100 64 .. 95 .. 100 .. 95 .. 82 98 87 95 89 100 100 .. 99 84 96 .. 66 90 92 98 100 73 90 92 100 99 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. 100 86 .. .. 11 35 .. 22 .. 100 .. .. 100 .. .. 39 99 100 32 39 .. .. .. 41 93 37 53 48 23 99 58 71 .. .. 100 84 .. 100 .. 5 .. 67 .. 100 .. .. 85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. 100 97 .. .. 36 94 .. 51 .. 100 .. .. 100 91 .. 53 97 100 69 70 .. .. .. 74 98 69 61 94 .. 100 .. 83 .. 86 100 73 .. 93 .. 22 .. 91 .. 100 .. .. 87 .. 441 418 444 .. .. .. 418 420 .. .. .. .. 417 .. .. .. 400 413 404 .. .. .. .. .. 408 415 .. 377 390 .. 360 371 387 531 j .. .. .. 328 .. 367 .. 396 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 380 .. .. .. .. 420 .. 432 427 434 .. .. .. 437 428 .. .. .. .. 427 .. .. .. 427 405 401 .. .. .. .. .. 423 409 .. 407 425 .. 350 352 398 494 j .. .. .. 358 .. 361 .. 347 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 408 .. .. .. .. 416 .. 446 411 435 .. .. .. 435 425 .. .. .. .. 425 .. .. .. 420 427 411 .. .. .. .. .. 416 421 .. 401 416 .. 376 384 397 518 j .. .. .. 332 .. 386 .. 386 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 409 .. .. .. .. 428 .. 2018 8.3 13.3 25.2 .. 15.8 1.1 24.0 28.0 9.9 21.8 .. 27.1 18.1 41.3 16.3 32.2 20.1 54.9 49.2 38.9 8.0 .. .. 19.3 26.9 47.3 ..
 27.6 46.8 40.2 26.8 19.1 50.9 43.8 46.2 55.0 14.9 40.2 29.3 20.6 48.9 27.6 25.3 17.9 35.7 32.9 .. (%) 2017 99 97 100 100 98 100 99 99 99 97 96 86 98 95 100 96 100 91 98 89 95 99 i 97 96 99 100 96 98 97 100 94 93 91 93 94 91 94 97 98 96 83 93 90 95 91 96 97 f i 88 95 91 99 91 88 90 94 88 99 74 85 88 93 96 84 88 91 58 98 77 87 87 94 78 f 95 90 84 97 88 99 93 77 76 99 324 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 DASHBOARD 1 QUALITY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENTDASH BOARD1 Quality of health Lost health expectancy Physicians Hospital beds (per 10,000 people) SDG 4.c SDG 4.a SDG 4.1 Pupil– teacher ratio, primary school Primary school teachers trained to teach (pupils per teacher) (%) Quality of education Schools with access to the Internet Primary Secondary Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score (%) Mathematicsb Readingc Sciencec Vulnerable employmenta (% of total employment) HDI rank 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW
 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho (%) 2010–2018d 2010–2015d 2013–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2015 2015 2015 23.7 21.6 3.8 3.4 9.1 16.1 3.6 7.9 4.6 8.2 .. 8.2 7.3 18.8 8.0 15.7 17.0 7.7 3.6 10.1 7.8 3.7 e 7.2 3.1 2.0 3.7 5.3 1.9 e .. .. 11 63 16 27 26 .. 14 11 45 16 13 48 21 6 9 7 27 e 59 7 19 17 8 32 e 29 .. 21 15 17 e 9 20 21 9 8 14 3 .. 13 17 6 14 15 .. 22 16 e .. 7 5 .. 2 5 .. 21 .. 16 .. 30 19 .. 24 .. 20 25 .. 28 25 .. 28 22 21 20 .. 35 .. .. 26 25 35 30 20 31 .. 27 22 27 27 42 23 23 42 31 21 50 45 36 45 26 .. 36 19 58 .. 47 43 36 41 44 33 99 .. .. .. .. 58 .. 74 .. 100 100 .. 100 95 70 95 100 93 .. 75 70 96 .. .. 73 100 50 .. 27 80 70 97 .. 60 99 37 98 100 97 e 97 47 81 86 82 74 .. .. 55 93 66 99 80 85 15 68 87 91 .. .. 14 .. .. .. 48 26 .. 57 .. 79 41 .. 36 .. 10 9 .. .. .. .. 16 .. 46 4 .. .. .. 16 .. .. 8 6 .. 0 .. .. .. 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 25 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 90 .. 51 23 .. .. .. 49 .. .. 72 .. 89 44 .. 40 .. 100 44 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 82 .. .. .. 69 .. .. 20 .. .. 5 .. .. .. 17 23 .. .. 14 .. .. 11 33 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 386 .. .. .. .. .. .. 495 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 397 .. .. .. .. .. .. 487 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 403 .. .. .. ..
 .. .. 525 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2018 40.1 5.7 47.3 31.0 9.7 58.1 31.5 21.3 .. 54.5 22.9 25.9 48.8 33.9 56.8 36.1 45.2 28.8 34.5 39.4 76.7 24.8 71.2 40.5 .. 71.3 55.5 .. 46.9 76.9 32.9 80.0 70.8 68.9 77.8 55.8 59.5 50.8 53.5 79.4 67.1 73.8 65.6 59.3 80.3 34.4 78.3 64.6 68.7 78.4 82.7 75.2 52.8 85.3 88.0 54.7 SDG 7.1 SDG 6.1 SDG 6.2 Quality of standard of living Population using at least basic drinking- water sources Population using at least basic sanitation facilities Rural population with access to electricity 2017 (%) .. .. DASHBOARD 1 Quality of human development | 325 DASH BOARD1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Quality of health Lost health expectancy Physicians Hospital beds (per 10,000 people) SDG 4.c SDG 4.a SDG 4.1 Pupil– teacher ratio, primary school Primary school teachers trained to teach (pupils per teacher) (%) Quality of education Schools with access to the Internet Primary Secondary Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score (%) Mathematicsb Readingc Sciencec Vulnerable employmenta (% of total employment) HDI rank 165 Côte d’Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of
 the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development World (%) 2017 13.3 13.5 13.2 14.7 13.3 16.4 11.9 13.0 13.0 13.7 13.0 15.7 16.6 13.3 14.4 13.2 13.7 13.5 13.1 14.2 12.5 14.5 14.2 13.5 13.0 11.8 .. .. .. 12.5 .. 14.0 12.3 13.6 13.9 13.0 14.5 11.9 13.4 12.7 13.9 13.6 13.6 12.6 14.0 13.2 2010–2018d 2010–2015d 2013–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2010–2018d 2015 2015 2015 2.3 0.7 0.5 4.1 2.3 2.8 2.2 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.4 3.1 2.0 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.6 .. 1.4 0.5 .. 0.5 0.6 0.5 36.7 65.6 12.4 61.5 0.2 9.2 30.4 16.5 7.3 2.1 11.5 11.1 14.8 24.9 21.6 7.8 2.1 2.5 22.2 28.9 14.9 .. 3 e 7 8 7 5 14 13 3 11 3 8 7 10 e .. 7 .. 4 7 1 8 .. .. 10 3 132 138 50 38 9 .. 55 32 9 .. 21 15 35 51 20 8 .. 7 25 50 28 42 33 40 .. .. 44 29 70 .. 36 47 27 27 .. 33 52 39 41 39 38 50 47 57 83 36 20 10 40 .. .. 17 14 19 33 41 25 21 18 18 21 35 39 37 18 15 23 100 75 73 .. .. .. 100 91 85 e 100 75 47 .. 39 95 97 54 86 41 52 100 44 65 .. 66 .. .. 100 .. .. 77 .. .. 75 80 .. .. .. .. .. 72 80 76 94 .. .. .. 17 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. 83 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 .. .. .. .. 3 3 .. .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2018 72.4 65.1 77.4 40.0 85.0 89.4 47.3 59.5 86.0 72.3 89.9 77.7 45.4 78.4 79.7 83.1 86.3 86.4 78.2 89.6 94.7 87.3 93.1 93.6 89.0 65.9 .. .. .. 77.7 .. 10.3 40.2 68.6 79.1 53.3 24.5 45.0 28.4 32.7 71.6 74.9 73.7 40.1 11.8 45.1 SDG 7.1 SDG 6.1 SDG 6.2 Quality of standard of living Population using at least basic drinking- water sources Population using at least basic sanitation facilities Rural population with access to electricity 2017 (%) 2017 2017 37 35 19 43 3 97 26 4 31 21 9 7 69 9 0 2 5 10 30 12 2 21 2 15 11 52 100 .. h 78 61 41 39 46 h h 39 46 11 8 25 h 14 83 100 66 100 38 84 98 85 60 29 69 83 83 97 87 60 30 34 67 99 73 326 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 DASHBOARD 1 QUALITY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENTDASH BOARD1 NOTES Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries and aggregates by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details about partial grouping in this table.

a Estimates modelled by the International Labour Organization.
b Average score for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is 490. c Average score for OECD countries is 493. d Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

e Refers to a year from 2007 to 2009. f Refers to 2015. g Refers to the adjudicated region of Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.

h Refers to 2016. i Refers to 2013. j Refers to the provinces of Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shanghai.
DEFINITIONS Lost health expectancy: Relative difference between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy, expressed as a percentage of life expectancy at birth.

Physicians: Number of medical doctors (physicians), both generalists and specialists, expressed per 10,000 people.

Hospital beds: Number of hospital beds available, expressed per 10,000 people.

Pupil–teacher ratio, primary school: Average number of pupils per teacher in primary education.
Primary school teachers trained to teach: Percentage of primary school teachers who have received the minimum organized teacher training (preservice or in-service) required for teaching at the primary level.

Schools with access to the Internet: Percentage of schools at the indicated level with access to the Internet for educational purposes.
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score: Score obtained in testing of skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students in mathematics, reading and science.

Vulnerable employment: Percentage of employed people engaged as unpaid family workers and own- account workers.

Rural population with access to electricity: People living in rural areas with access to electricity, expressed as a percentage of the total rural population.
It includes electricity sold commercially (both on grid and off grid) and self-generated electricity but excludes unauthorized connections.

Population using at least basic drinking-water services: Percentage of the population using at least basic drinking-water services—that is, the population that drinks water from an improved source, provided collection time is not more than 30 minutes for a round trip.
This indicator encompasses people using basic drinking-water services as well as those using safely managed drinking-water services.

Improved water sources include piped water, boreholes or tubewells, protected dug wells, protected springs, and packaged or delivered water.

Population using at least basic sanitation services: Percentage of the population using at least basic sanitation services—that is, improved sanitation facilities that are not shared with other households.
This indicator encompasses people using basic sanitation services as well as those using safely managed sanitation services.

Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush toilets connected to piped sewer systems, septic tanks or pit latrines; pit latrines with slabs (including ventilated pit latrines); and composting toilets.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: HDRO calculations based on data on life expectancy at birth and healthy life expectancy at birth from IHME (2018).
Columns 2, 13 and 14: WHO (2019).

Columns 3 and 12: World Bank (2019a).

Columns 4–7: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019).

Columns 8–10: OECD (2017).

Column 11: ILO (2019).


DASHBOARD 1 Quality of human development | 327 DASH BOARD1HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century D R A O B H S A 2D Life-course gender gap Country groupings (terciles) Top third Middle third Bottom third Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Notes after the table.
SDG 4.2 SDG 4.1 SDG 4.1 SDG 8.5 SDG 4.6 SDG 8.5 Childhood and youth Gross enrolment ratio (female to male ratio) SDG 8.3 Adulthood SDG 5.5 SDG 5.4 SDG 1.3 Older age Youth unemployment rate Population with at least some secondary education Total unemployment rate Share of employment in nonagriculture, female Share of seats in parliament Time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work Old-age pension recipients Sex ratio at birtha (male to female births) Pre-primary Primary Secondary (female to male ratio) HDI rank 2015–2020b 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 2018 VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 .. 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05 .. 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.96 1.02 1.00 .. 1.00 0.99 1.00 .. 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.06 .. 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.03 0.97 .. 0.99 1.01 0.97 1.00 1.08 .. .. 1.02
1.01 1.06 1.11 0.99 1.12 0.78 1.01 0.96 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.04 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.94 .. .. 0.85 1.02 0.72 0.97 0.99 1.36 0.94 1.13 0.93 0.85 1.20 0.73 0.59 1.22 0.97 0.88 2.00 .. 2.12 1.03 1.06 1.13 8.33 1.20 1.04 1.43 6.10 1.66 4.79 1.34 1.09 328 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Women ages 15 and older (female to male ratio) 2010–2018c (female to male ratio) 2018 (% of total employment in nonagriculture) (% held by women) (% of 24-hour day) (female to male ratio) (female to male ratio) 2018 2018 2008–2018c 2008–2018c 2013–2017c 1.01 0.99 1.05 0.99 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.97 1.00 0.95 .. .. 0.88 0.98 1.08 1.03 0.95 1.31 1.29 1.45 1.01 1.00 1.18 0.86 1.01 1.54 1.00 0.85 4.41 .. .. 43.9 46.9 46.1 47.3 42.3 46.6 46.1 44.8 47.4 39.8 42.4 49.5 47.0 41.6 45.6 52.2 14.9 .. 14.9 46.1 52.0 49.7 14.2 43.0 43.4 46.5 20.2 46.6 12.0 41.2 49.4 41.4 29.3 24.3 31.5 .. .. 15.9 d 10.8 .. .. 16.0 .. 14.7 e 15.6 e 14.5 d 14.6 18.1 f 12.7 15.4 15.9 f .. 14.4 d 18.3 d 14.4 d .. 14.0 d .. 19.0 e .. 15.8 .. 20.4 17.2 d .. 17.5 d 17.6 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.8 8.2 22.1 f .. 16.6 d .. .. 18.9 23.4 18.4 1.2 1.6 .. 1.6 d 3.3 .. .. 1.3 .. 1.6 e 1.4 e 1.5 d 1.5 1.7 f 1.8 1.6 1.6 f .. 4.7 d 1.9 d 2.0 d .. 4.2 d .. 2.2 e .. 1.7 .. 2.4
 1.6 d .. 2.6 d 1.8 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.7 3.7 2.2 f .. 2.2 d .. .. 2.5 2.5 2.3 0.87 1.04 0.61 1.00 .. 1.06 1.12 1.00 .. 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 .. .. 0.99 0.66 .. 0.96 .. 0.47 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.83 1.00 0.77 .. 1.00 1.00 .. .. .. 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.36 1.59 .. 1.00 .. .. .. .. 1.00 DASH BOARD2 SDG 4.2 SDG 4.1 SDG 4.1 SDG 8.5 SDG 4.6 SDG 8.5 SDG 8.3 Adulthood SDG 5.5 SDG 5.4 SDG 1.3 Older age Childhood and youth Gross enrolment ratio (female to male ratio) Youth unemployment rate Population with at least some secondary education Total unemployment rate Share of employment in nonagriculture, female Share of seats in parliament Time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work Old-age pension recipients Sex ratio at birtha (male to female births) Pre-primary Primary Secondary (female to male ratio) HDI rank 2015–2020b 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.06 .. 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.06 .. 1.03 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.13 1.05 1.13 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.05 .. 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.07 1.05 0.96 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.09 1.04 1.00 1.02 0.95
 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.00 .. 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.99 .. 0.97 1.00 .. 1.09 .. 1.02 0.99 1.06 1.05 .. 1.10 .. 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.08 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.03 .. 1.01 1.01 .. 1.05 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.00 .. 1.03 1.02 0.98 1.01 0.97 1.01 0.99 0.95 .. 0.97 .. 1.01 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.93 .. 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.98 .. 0.97 0.97 0.99 .. 1.00 .. 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.01 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.04 1.08 .. 0.98 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.01 .. 1.02 1.07 1.03 1.05 0.94 1.02 1.05 1.03 .. 0.96 .. 1.09 0.96 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 .. 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.03 .. 0.98 1.08 1.01 1.11 .. 0.99 .. 0.96 1.06 1.08 0.99 .. .. 1.32 1.03 1.05 .. 1.06 2018 0.66 1.13 0.84 0.84 0.99 .. 1.12 4.18 1.43 1.39 1.59 1.13 .. 1.17 1.05 1.85 1.55 1.61 1.47 0.82 1.20 1.76 0.92 .. .. 1.17 1.09 1.68 .. 1.26 1.63 1.50 1.73 1.00 1.31 0.81 1.64 1.27 0.88 2.07 1.23 1.12 1.42 1.34 1.44 1.04 1.47 1.44 .. 1.92 1.46 2.37 1.64 2.83 0.63 4.50 (female to male ratio) 2010–2018c 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.03 1.15 1.07 0.67 0.97 0.98 .. 0.92 1.05 0.93 0.96 1.09 1.03 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.98 .. .. 0.81 0.96 0.89 .. 1.06 1.04 0.99 1.00 0.72 0.84 0.91 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.08 1.17 0.78 1.06 0.98 0.99 .. 1.12 1.08 .. 1.12 0.98 1.02 0.96 1.01 0.91 1.01 Women ages 15 and older (female to male ratio) (% of total employment in nonagriculture) (% held by women) (% of 24-hour day) (female to male ratio) (female to male ratio) 2018 0.56 1.33 0.84 1.05 0.77 .. 1.10 5.11 1.49 1.42 1.28 1.23 .. 1.14 1.11 1.99 2.10 1.59 1.51 0.90 0.83 2.33 1.19 .. .. 1.26 1.03 1.17 .. 1.30 1.66 1.02 2.11 0.91 1.42 0.78 1.56 1.39 0.77 1.95 1.26 1.75 0.88 1.98 1.45 0.82 1.73 1.13 .. 1.47 1.45 2.54 1.73 2.83 0.92 5.00 2018 52.4 48.6 47.9 44.1 44.1 .. 50.0 31.8 46.9 28.3 47.1 39.9 .. 45.2 43.2 16.5 38.5 41.9 40.7 39.4 44.3 32.5 42.3 .. .. 37.4 40.1 47.5 .. 44.9 46.1 43.6 17.2 39.8 46.4 45.4 42.5 44.0 49.3 42.8 48.6 25.3 47.3 22.8 47.7 47.5 48.1 41.2 ..
 2008–2018c 2008–2018c 2013–2017c 2.0 d 3.0 d 2.0 e .. 2.0 d .. .. .. 2.4 5.2 .. .. .. 19.2 d 17.9 d 18.5 e .. 19.0 d .. .. .. 19.9 19.2 .. .. .. .. .. 1.00 .. 1.00 .. .. .. 1.04 .. .. .. .. 19.2 .. 21.0 .. 17.7 21.3 f 21.7 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.1 f 11.8 g .. 13.3 16.3 d 21.7 21.7 f 15.4 d 22.7 f 15.3 19.8 25.4 .. 16.7 .. .. 17.6 f .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.2 14.5 .. .. .. .. .. 2.2 .. 4.0 .. 2.4 2.6 f 6.3 d .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.0 f 3.2 g .. 4.3 3.7 d 5.0 5.8 f 2.8 d 2.6 f 2.6 4.4 2.9 .. 4.4 .. .. 2.8 f .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.9 3.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.10 .. .. .. .. 0.92 .. .. .. 0.95 .. 0.84 .. .. .. 0.99 1.17 .. .. .. .. .. 1.51 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.72 .. .. 0.80 .. .. .. .. .. DASHBOARD 2 Life-course gender gap | 329 DASH BOARD2HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 4.2 SDG 4.1 SDG 4.1 SDG 8.5 SDG 4.6 SDG 8.5 SDG 8.3 Adulthood SDG 5.5 SDG 5.4 SDG 1.3 Older age Childhood and youth Gross enrolment ratio (female to male ratio) Youth unemployment rate Population with at least some secondary education Total unemployment rate Share of employment in nonagriculture, female Share of seats in parliament Time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work Old-age pension recipients Sex ratio at birtha (male to female births) Pre-primary Primary Secondary (female to male ratio) HDI rank 2015–2020b 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119
 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.03 1.05 1.03 1.06 .. .. 0.89 1.13 1.00 1.00 .. 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.00 .. 0.83 1.01 .. 1.01 0.86 1.02 1.02 .. 0.93 1.05 1.02 1.01 .. 1.06 1.04 0.92 1.09 .. .. 1.03 0.97 1.02 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.04 0.98 0.94 0.88 1.02 1.02 0.87 1.02 0.96 0.99 1.03 1.03 .. 1.01 1.04 330 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.98 .. 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.98 .. 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 .. 0.95 0.99 .. 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.97 .. 1.17 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.07 1.00 0.96 .. 0.92 0.97 0.98 1.02 1.02 0.99 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.06 0.86 0.90 0.98 0.86 0.99 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.99 0.94 1.02 1.03 1.10 0.99 0.96 0.99 .. 1.03 1.10 1.09 0.97 .. 0.98 1.10 .. 1.10 .. 0.89 1.00 .. 0.99 0.90 1.10 0.95 .. 1.02 .. 1.08 1.14 .. 1.10 1.17 .. 1.15 .. 0.98 0.93 1.06 0.99 .. .. 1.10 .. .. 1.11 0.63 0.86 0.98 0.81 .. 1.00 0.73 1.06 1.12 0.90 1.01 .. 2018 1.19 0.94 0.55 1.04 1.57 1.03 1.61 1.22 1.52 1.35 1.53 .. 1.01 1.77 1.97 1.03 1.62 1.65 1.24 0.90 1.10 1.82 1.99 1.32 1.32 2.03 2.05 .. 1.48 1.57 .. 2.25 0.93 1.10 0.94 1.10 0.97 0.99 1.08 1.58 0.86 0.99 0.62 0.99 1.19 1.23 1.57 0.93
 2.55 0.58 0.79 1.67 0.97 1.41 1.41 (female to male ratio) (% of total employment in nonagriculture) 2018 1.04 0.79 0.42 0.93 1.65 0.93 1.34 1.17 1.48 2.01 2.96 .. 0.90 2.06 1.71 1.21 1.48 1.54 0.76 0.84 1.08 1.68 1.36 1.57 1.14 1.50 1.56 .. 1.76 1.97 .. .. 47.2 14.7 13.0 15.7 38.7 39.1 49.0 20.6 50.2 43.3 51.1 16.7 48.5 31.7 48.2 .. 32.2 20.2 .. 38.3 47.6 40.9 47.0 42.6 53.4 39.5 36.9 43.7 48.5 41.4 34.6 43.6 41.8 42.5 10.0 42.3 12.8 45.4 35.9 36.1 52.6 44.3 39.2 Women ages 15 and older (% held by women) (% of 24-hour day) (female to male ratio) (female to male ratio) 2018 2008–2018c 2008–2018c 2013–2017c 29.1 22.8 24.8 16.4 16.0 19.8 10.0 41.8 h 51.8 17.4 i 14.9 9.1 26.7 .. 25.2 18.4 19.2 31.9 31.0 20.0 20.8 j .. 19.5 d .. .. .. .. .. 15.6 d .. .. 22.4 d .. .. 17.8 d .. 20.8 16.8 f .. 22.7 .. .. 17.8 .. .. .. .. 17.3 .. 15.0 .. .. .. .. .. 10.4 d .. 14.4 d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.6 d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.5 k .. .. 1.8 d .. .. .. .. .. 2.4 d .. .. 9.2 d .. .. 6.0 d .. 7.0 1.8 f .. 2.9 .. .. 7.5 .. .. .. .. 4.0 .. 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. 4.2 d .. 4.1 d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.1 d .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.9 k .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.50 .. .. .. 1.13 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.22 .. .. 0.15 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. (female to male ratio) 2010–2018c 1.04 0.98 .. 1.00 1.54 0.84 1.11 0.96 0.81 1.32 0.83 0.99 0.85 0.97 0.70 0.81 1.00 1.28 0.86 1.14 0.92 1.03 1.04 0.61 0.97 .. 1.05 .. 0.43 0.92 .. 0.69 0.91 0.93 0.76 .. 0.78 0.75 .. 1.29 0.54 0.80 0.66 0.61 0.80 0.84 0.57 .. 0.86 0.66 .. 0.72 .. 0.70 0.79 DASHBOARD 2 LIFE-COURSE GENDER GAPDASH BOARD2 SDG 4.2 SDG 4.1
 SDG 4.1 SDG 8.5 SDG 4.6 SDG 8.5 SDG 8.3 Adulthood SDG 5.5 SDG 5.4 SDG 1.3 Older age Childhood and youth Gross enrolment ratio (female to male ratio) Youth unemployment rate Population with at least some secondary education Total unemployment rate Share of employment in nonagriculture, female Share of seats in parliament Time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work Old-age pension recipients Sex ratio at birtha (male to female births) Pre-primary Primary Secondary (female to male ratio) HDI rank 2015–2020b 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 2013–2018c 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d’Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development World .. .. .. 1.03 .. 1.05 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.05 1.10 1.06 1.05 1.09 1.04 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.26 1.09 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.12 1.04 1.02 .. .. 0.94 1.01 0.95 1.07 .. 1.01 0.90 .. 1.07 .. 1.10 0.99 0.98 1.07 1.02 0.95 0.93 1.03 1.06 .. .. 1.05 .. .. 1.04 0.99 0.99 0.96 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.02 0.94 1.00 1.00 .. 0.99 0.98 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.91 1.16 0.95 0.94 ..
 0.69 0.88 1.04 0.91 1.09 0.82 0.92 0.87 .. 0.99 0.93 1.01 0.98 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.71 0.78 0.76 0.87 1.00 .. 1.03 .. .. 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.08 0.94 1.01 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.09 0.96 0.96 0.95 1.00 1.01 0.96 1.01 0.76 1.36 0.75 1.09 0.73 1.02 .. 0.57 0.84 0.94 0.96 .. 0.66 0.78 0.73 .. 0.64 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.81 1.02 0.54 0.46 0.66 0.73 1.01 .. 1.03 .. .. .. .. .. 1.12 .. 1.08 1.17 1.32 1.20 1.24 1.67 0.90 1.17 1.33 1.41 1.06 1.32 1.55 0.98 1.20 (female to male ratio) 2010–2018c (female to male ratio) 2018 0.51 .. 0.54 1.31 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.78 0.67 0.36 .. 0.68 0.52 0.71 .. 0.47 0.56 .. 0.56 0.51 0.60 0.50 .. 0.45 0.68 .. 0.17 0.43 0.48 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.13 .. 1.15 1.15 1.51 1.46 1.30 2.46 0.81 1.09 1.31 1.74 1.16 1.52 1.48 1.08 1.24 Women ages 15 and older (% held by women) (% of 24-hour day) (female to male ratio) (female to male ratio) 2018 2008–2018c 2008–2018c 2013–2017c 20.3 19.6 7.2 22.7 9.2 l 41.8 17.6 31.0 2.7 27.4 i .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.3 d .. .. 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.9 d .. .. 2.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.13 .. 0.11 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.93 ..
 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.91 .. (% of total employment in nonagriculture) .. .. .. 17.5 .. 44.3 42.8 22.8 43.5 36.8 16.3 44.8 40.0 43.6 17.0 46.9 36.6 44.1 44.7 39.2 DASHBOARD 2 Life-course gender gap | 331 DASH BOARD2HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century NOTES Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries and aggregates by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

Sex ratio at birth is an exception —countries are divided into two groups: the natural group (countries with a value of 1.04–1.07, inclusive), which uses darker shading, and the gender-biased group (all others), which uses lighter shading.

See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.


undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.

pdf for details about partial grouping in this table.

a The natural sex ratio at birth is commonly assumed and empirically confirmed to be 1.05 male births to 1 female birth.

b Data are average annual estimates for 2015–2020.

c Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

d Refers to the population ages 10 and older.

e Refers to the population ages 20–74.


f Refers to the population ages 12 and older.

g Refers to the population ages 6 and older.

h Excludes the 36 special rotating delegates appointed on an ad hoc basis.

i Refers to 2017. j Refers to 2013. k Refers to the population ages 5 and older.

l Refers to 2015.

DEFINITIONS Sex ratio at birth: Number of male births per female birth.
Gross enrolment ratio, female to male ratio: For a given level of education (pre-primary, primary, secondary), the ratio of the female gross enrolment ratio to the male gross enrolment ratio.

The gross enrolment ratio (female or male) is the total enrolment in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school- age population for the same level of education.
Youth unemployment rate, female to male ratio: Ratio of the percentage of the female labour force population ages 15–24 that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and is actively seeking paid employment or self-employment to the percentage of the male labour force population ages 15–24 that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and is actively seeking paid employment or self-employment.
Population with at least some secondary education, female to male ratio: Ratio of the percentage of the female population ages 25 and older that has reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education to the percentage of the male population ages 25 and older with the same level of education achievement.
Total unemployment rate, female to male ratio: Ratio of the percentage of the female labour force population ages 15 and older that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and is actively seeking paid employment or self-employment to the percentage of the male labour force population ages 15 and older that is not in paid employment or self-employed but is available for work and is actively seeking paid employment or self-employment.
Share of employment in nonagriculture, female: Share of women in employment in the nonagricultural sector, which comprises industry and services activities.

Share of seats in parliament: Proportion of seats held by women in the national parliament, expressed as a percentage of total seats.

For countries with a bicameral legislative system, the share of seats is calculated based on both houses.
Time spent on unpaid domestic chores and care work: The average daily number of hours spent on unpaid domestic and care work, expressed as a percentage of a 24-hour day.

Unpaid domestic and care work refers to activities related to the provision of services for own final use by household members or by family members living in other households.
Old-age pension recipients, female to male ratio: Ratio of the percentage of women above the statutory pensionable age receiving an old-age pension (contributory, noncontributory or both) to the percentage of men above the statutory pensionable age receiving an old-age pension (contributory, noncontributory or both).

MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: UNDESA (2019b).

Columns 2–4: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019).

Columns 5 and 7: HDRO calculations based on ILO (2019).
Column 6: HDRO calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019) and Barro and Lee (2018).

Column 8: ILO (2019).

Column 9: IPU (2019).

Column 10: United Nations Statistics Division (2019a).

Columns 11 and 12: HDRO calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division (2019a).
332 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 DASHBOARD 2 LIFE-COURSE GENDER GAPDASH BOARD2 D R A O B H S A 3D Women’s empowerment Country groupings (terciles) Top third Middle third Bottom third Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries by indicator.

For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.
See Notes after the table.
SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7, 5.6 SDG 5.6 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.2 SDG 5.2 Reproductive health and family planning Violence against girls and women Socioeconomic empowerment SDG 5.5 SDG 1.3 Child marriage Violence against women ever experienceda Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Contraceptive prevalence, any method Unmet need for family planning Women married by age 18 Prevalence of female genital mutilation/ cutting among girls and women Intimate partner Nonintimate partner (%) (%) (% of married or in-union women of reproductive age, 15–49 years) (% of women ages 20–24 who are married or in union) (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) (% of female population ages 15 and older) Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) (%) (%) Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money- service provider (% of female population ages 15 and older) HDI rank 2007–2017b 2013–2018b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2003–2018b 2004–2018b 2005–2019b 2005–2019b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2010–2018b 2017 VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Mandatory paid maternity leave (days) 2017 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia .. .. .. .. .. 98.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 100.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 99.2
 .. .. .. 100.0 .. 97.0 .. .. .. 90.8 .. 99.0 .. 100.0 .. 99.2 .. 99.7 98.7 .. 97.0 97.9 .. 99.6 .. 94.7 99.9 97.9 96.3 .. 99.1 .. .. 99.9 98.4 .. .. 100.0 .. .. 99.8 98.0 99.7 99.9 99.2 96.0 99.9 99.8 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.7 98.5 99.9 98.8 100.0 99.7 99.8 99.7 99.7 99.9 .. 72.9 73.3 80.3 74.8 66.9 .. .. .. 73.0 .. 85.5 .. .. 84.0 75.9 66.8 .. 39.8 65.7 .. .. 79.6 .. 70.9 86.3 78.4 .. 65.1 .. .. .. 62.3 .. .. .. 24.6 .. .. 73.9 37.5 76.3 .. 61.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27.0 .. 15.0 22.0 .. 22.8 22.4 28.0 6.1 25.0 32.0 30.0 .. .. 29.0 .. 24.0 .. .. 13.0 22.0 .. .. 13.0 13.0 21.0 26.0 15.0 19.0 20.0 15.0 19.0 13.0 24.0 .. .. .. 23.0 32.0 19.0 .. .. .. 21.0 .. 13.0 .. .. 5.0 7.0 .. 10.0 .. 12.0 .. 12.0 11.0 11.0 .. .. 7.0 .. 8.0 .. .. 4.0 8.0 .. .. 4.0 3.0 4.0 9.0 5.0 5.0 9.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 .. .. .. 4.0 7.0 1.0 .. .. .. 3.0 .. 3.0 9.9 11.1 14.1 19.3 .. 9.7 10.3 15.0 22.3 6.3 12.7 13.5 11.6 12.9 17.5 10.4 7.9 33.8 .. 14.3 9.5 .. 15.4 12.5 12.7 13.5 14.5 8.6 15.7 16.4 10.4 18.9 15.3 11.4 17.3 4.7 17.2 12.0 10.0 19.3 14.5 6.8 23.6 11.7 10.9 16.0 28.4 22.1 29.0 27.1 .. 31.7 35.2 35.2 33.7 25.3 34.2 27.1 31.4 35.0 38.1 34.0 27.5 40.7 .. 25.9 27.6 .. 26.4 29.8 29.7 35.4 31.8 28.1 39.5 38.3 42.2 39.8 44.1 29.8 43.5 .. 41.7 35.6 31.9 39.1 41.9 18.8 51.9 31.5 44.3 37.9 33.5 31.6 33.5 28.6 .. .. 43.1 39.4 .. 24.8 27.0 32.0 .. .. 34.2 40.5 33.5 .. .. 28.9 16.1 .. .. 38.2 31.9 26.6 34.5 27.6 23.2 33.2 22.4 30.5 39.5 38.2 12.2 .. .. 30.4 43.2 32.2 .. .. 37.0 37.1 .. 26.1 100.0 98.9 95.3 99.2 94.7 99.2 .. 100.0 96.3 99.8 100.0 99.6 99.9 99.3 96.1 92.7 98.8 .. 98.1 98.4 98.2 93.7 94.7 96.9
 91.6 78.6 91.3 97.0 91.6 98.4 90.0 84.5 88.0 81.0 76.4 .. 58.2 83.1 92.5 90.6 61.6 d 71.3 .. 72.2 75.4 82.7 .. 98 182 98 70 .. 90 .. 105 112 126 147 105 112 c 42 .. 105 .. 98 112 112 105 90 105 112 196 112 126 150 140 126 119 140 126 45 .. 70 238 112 .. 50 126 91 168 60 208 DASHBOARD 3 Women’s empowerment | 333 DASH BOARD3HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7, 5.6 SDG 5.6 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.2 SDG 5.2 Reproductive health and family planning Violence against girls and women Socioeconomic empowerment SDG 5.5 SDG 1.3 Child marriage Violence against women ever experienceda Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Contraceptive prevalence, any method Unmet need for family planning Women married by age 18 Prevalence of female genital mutilation/ cutting among girls and women Intimate partner Nonintimate partner (%) (%) (% of married or in-union women of reproductive age, 15–49 years) (% of women ages 20–24 who are married or in union) (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) (% of female population ages 15 and older) Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) (%) (%) Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money- service provider (% of female population ages 15 and older) HDI rank 2007–2017b 2013–2018b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2003–2018b 2004–2018b 2005–2019b 2005–2019b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2010–2018b 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and
 Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98.6 98.1 .. 99.7 99.3 .. 91.7 76.3 90.3 93.4 100.0 97.2 97.0 98.0 97.2 .. 98.3 95.1 96.9 .. 93.4 98.1 97.3 97.6 95.5 98.5 100.0 100.0 87.0 98.5 98.1 100.0 97.2 97.2 99.6 92.7 98.6 97.0 96.5 .. 91.7 98.6 98.0 96.9 98.1 98.7 .. 94.1 99.5 97.7 97.5 100.0 99.1 93.9 99.7 99.8 99.4 99.8 99.0 95.2 100.0 99.0 99.9 99.7 98.0 99.0 99.5 .. 98.4 100.0 99.0 99.8 94.2 98.7 99.8 99.9 .. 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.9 97.7 99.1 98.9 99.1 99.2 99.8 96.6 99.9 93.1 99.9 96.4 99.8 99.9 99.8 99.0 .. 98.9 .. 99.7 98.6 97.6 95.4 97.0 334 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 29.7 81.3 68.0 72.1 54.8 .. 23.3 .. .. 59.2 .. 79.6 73.5 .. 52.2 .. 58.4 40.3 77.4 63.8 62.8 77.8 46.0 53.4 61.7 73.7 .. .. 45.8 66.9 78.4 .. 80.2 81.0 57.1 57.1 40.2 75.4 84.5 80.1 54.9 65.4 69.5 55.5 62.5 54.6 54.5 52.8 .. 72.5 75.0 .. 17.8 .. 8.0 7.0 10.6 .. 21.8 .. .. 19.9 .. .. 5.9 .. .. .. 14.9 24.3 5.7 12.5 16.4 7.6 15.1 12.3 7.5 8.0 .. .. 9.0 13.0 6.2 .. .. 6.7 12.5 7.0 17.2 6.5 .. 8.8 .. 4.9 11.4 17.0 7.0 16.0 .. 9.6 .. 10.0 .. .. 4 .. .. 3 7 .. 5 .. .. 11 .. 25 15 .. .. .. 3 11 17 .. 26 21 12 14 10 26 .. .. 4 26 23 .. 26 23 5 3 7 19 .. 20 11 9 36 8 2 5 6 .. .. 8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.9 .. .. 16.5 23.0 17.0 24.0 25.2 .. .. 16.8 38.0 .. .. .. 17.0 30.2 .. .. 14.4 35.9 e 21.0 6.0 .. .. .. .. 11.0 24.6 .. .. 16.7 33.3 8.2 .. 10.0 31.2 .. 40.4 13.5 26.0 28.5 .. .. 31.2 ..
 .. .. 27.8 .. .. .. 12.1 .. .. 1.5 6.0 1.0 2.0 15.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 19.0 .. .. .. .. 1.3 2.7 .. .. .. .. 1.0 38.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 .. .. .. .. 5.0 .. .. .. 14.0 .. .. .. 23.0 .. .. 39.8 11.5 .. 15.4 14.8 12.3 .. 20.3 .. .. .. 10.8 14.2 .. 18.1 8.5 18.1 .. 32.1 .. 12.7 7.7 14.8 15.8 .. 6.1 .. 1.8 14.8 14.8 15.0 8.2 10.7 14.4 8.4 26.9 15.7 13.7 .. 8.0 16.4 12.5 7.0 .. 37.8 11.9 18.0 .. .. .. .. .. 52.8 46.5 .. 26.7 32.9 38.3 .. 41.2 .. 40.5 .. 44.6 34.7 .. 38.6 38.9 39.7 .. 30.1 .. 49.0 33.4 49.4 43.7 40.3 39.9 .. 33.3 42.9 31.1 30.1 35.4 36.6 34.1 32.8 55.5 45.1 32.9 .. 29.2 40.1 27.4 40.0 .. 58.1 33.7 43.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 32.6 39.3 .. .. 39.3 23.8 30.1 35.5 .. .. 37.3 16.3 .. .. 43.8 29.8 .. .. 30.8 43.5 .. 29.3 .. 25.6 .. .. .. 24.2 35.6 29.5 .. .. .. .. .. 28.2 .. .. 35.3 .. .. .. .. 19.3 40.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 2017 63.5 d 50.8 76.1 81.3 60.3 73.6 67.6 53.6 .. .. 73.5 60.6 54.3 .. 82.5 .. 70.1 73.6 91.6 87.1 42.3 60.9 38.1 63.6 73.4 .. .. .. 54.7 33.3 79.8 .. 67.5 42.5 40.9 29.3 72.9 34.4 76.4 42.6 27.7 61.3 54.1 .. 28.4 95.0 32.9 46.8 .. 77.8 f 70.0 ..
Mandatory paid maternity leave (days) 2017 50 90 140 126 126 410 45 126 .. 84 70 98 112 91 60 98 135 98 270 98 98 120 365 183 84 .. 91 91 365 84 90 90 120 126 140 98 270 98 128 84 126 126 98 91 30 120 70 84 91 56 182 84 DASHBOARD 3 WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENTDASH BOARD3 SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7, 5.6 SDG 5.6 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.2 SDG 5.2 Reproductive health and family planning Violence against girls and women Socioeconomic empowerment SDG 5.5 SDG 1.3 Child marriage Violence against women ever experienceda Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Contraceptive prevalence, any method Unmet need for family planning Women married by age 18 Prevalence of female genital mutilation/ cutting among girls and women Intimate partner Nonintimate partner (%) (%) (% of married or in-union women of reproductive age, 15–49 years) (% of women ages 20–24 who are married or in union) (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) (% of female population ages 15 and older) Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) (%) (%) Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money- service provider (% of female population ages 15 and older) HDI rank 2007–2017b 2013–2018b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2003–2018b 2004–2018b 2005–2019b 2005–2019b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2010–2018b 2017 Mandatory paid maternity leave (days) 2017 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126
 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 100.0 98.7 90.9 99.1 97.2 99.1 99.0 95.4 98.8 99.6 99.4 93.0 95.4 93.3 93.7 90.1 94.7 90.3 81.2 95.8 99.4 77.7 77.1 98.4 90.7 96.0 78.8 .. 91.3 94.7 .. 96.6 84.4 96.6 88.4 97.9 63.9 80.0 97.5 93.5 98.5 54.2 75.6 90.5 95.7 91.3 80.7 95.3 93.7 83.6 81.6 82.8 99.8 97.3 80.0 99.7 92.2 95.6 .. 84.4 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 93.6 82.5 96.7 71.3 .. 91.5 92.4 93.8 99.6 95.6 86.6 98.4 85.7 99.9 94.8 92.6 69.2 89.6 81.4 88.2 56.7 74.0 .. 96.4 67.8 .. 92.5 91.2 88.3 64.4 89.4 78.1 63.3 .. 60.2 89.0 61.8 58.0 46.6 64.7 .. 68.4 47.6 51.8 51.4 34.7 34.1 54.1 59.5 50.2 .. 27.7 61.0 26.9 54.6 66.5 31.1 58.5 .. 75.7 57.2 52.8 70.8 42.0 33.9 72.0 29.3 .. 60.6 80.4 53.5 56.1 26.1 73.2 22.3 65.6 62.3 .. 40.6 30.1 66.1 54.1 49.0 33.0 49.0 12.6 52.2 56.3 60.5 52.6 13.7 34.4 .. 12.1 16.9 14.2 22.2 28.6 25.2 16.7 9.5 12.1 .. 40.2 14.8 34.8 14.9 23.2 26.5 12.6 .. 6.1 10.9 13.3 13.8 19.1 28.0 11.1 16.5 .. 13.9 5.8 12.9 17.5 25.3 10.7 28.0 11.7 12.0 .. 33.7 17.9 15.2 14.3 24.2 26.3 21.1 33.8 16.2 12.5 14.9 23.7 38.0 18.0 .. 22 19 8 34 4 6 17 12 6 7 .. 11 11 6 20 22 17 26 11 15 28 13 12 30 26 9 18 30 35 27 7 15 34 20 26 59 .. 35 27 5 33 21 21 31 30 16 19 23 40 30 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 87.2 .. .. .. 7.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.8 .. .. .. .. 21.0 .. .. 1.4 64.1 20.4 .. 19.0 22.2 16.3 39.6 14.8 34.0 .. .. .. 18.3 46.1 21.3 58.5 48.6 25.6 50.9 34.4 .. .. .. 26.6 .. 14.3 26.4 12.6 21.2 22.5 28.8 26.7 58.8 27.8 67.6 15.1 54.2 32.8 27.9 .. .. 15.3 60.0 24.4 45.9 56.9 17.3 20.9 40.7 25.0 34.8 51.1 8.5 .. .. .. .. .. 6.3 .. 4.0 .. .. .. .. 10.6 .. .. 5.0 .. 13.0
 2.3 .. .. .. 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.9 .. 9.8 5.8 3.0 8.0 .. .. .. 5.3 33.0 4.0 .. .. .. 3.8 .. .. .. 5.0 .. .. .. .. 11.7 .. .. 17.8 12.1 .. .. .. 12.2 .. 12.7 .. .. 7.7 .. 15.4 11.7 .. 17.5 13.3 5.2 9.4 .. 8.0 5.4 .. 27.7 8.1 .. 8.6 .. .. 7.9 .. .. .. .. 8.6 .. 7.4 .. .. 47.3 6.0 11.2 .. 9.9 .. .. .. .. .. 41.8 .. .. 36.3 32.2 .. .. .. 37.1 .. 41.9 .. .. 36.9 .. 36.5 44.9 .. 45.2 38.7 27.2 23.5 .. 30.6 34.7 .. 43.9 41.9 .. 37.5 .. .. 19.8 .. .. .. .. 25.2 .. 22.5 .. .. 64.9 16.7 30.7 .. 38.4 .. 38.6 .. .. .. 41.7 19.5 .. 25.5 .. .. .. .. 19.4 41.6 33.9 26.8 .. .. .. .. 17.8 .. .. .. 35.4 32.7 .. .. 34.5 .. 13.0 48.2 .. 41.0 .. .. 11.5 18.2 .. .. 54.6 23.4 .. .. 28.5 .. 31.5 .. .. 13.9 .. .. .. 46.0 .. 26.6 52.3 f .. .. 38.9 44.6 35.5 36.0 59.6 51.4 .. 70.0 53.9 53.7 27.0 .. 30.4 15.9 19.5 16.8 38.9 .. 24.4 42.1 .. 42.1 24.8 76.6 80.7 .. 41.0 .. 27.7 f 35.8 .. .. 21.0 27.4 d 31.9 .. 53.7 40.3 .. 26.0 21.5 77.7 41.6 22.3 f 30.0 84 98 .. 70 98 60 .. 60 126 .. 126 98 90 28 120 90 98 90 .. 180 84 98 98 126 91 112 140 60 84 84 182 84 84 84 84 56 112 .. 98 105 14 105 84 84 84 84 98 90 90 52 90 98 DASHBOARD 3 Women’s empowerment | 335 DASH BOARD3HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7, 5.6 SDG 5.6 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.2 SDG 5.2 Reproductive health and family planning Violence against girls and women Socioeconomic empowerment SDG 5.5 SDG 1.3 Child marriage Violence against women ever experienceda Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Contraceptive prevalence, any method Unmet need for family planning Women married by age 18 Prevalence of female genital mutilation/ cutting among girls and women Intimate partner Nonintimate partner (%) (%) (% of married or in-union women of reproductive age, 15–49 years) (% of women ages 20–24 who are married or in union) (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) (% of
 female population ages 15 and older) Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) (%) (%) Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money- service provider (% of female population ages 15 and older) HDI rank 2007–2017b 2013–2018b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2003–2018b 2004–2018b 2005–2019b 2005–2019b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2010–2018b 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d’Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu 93.3 73.1 88.5 87.7 .. .. 94.5 .. .. 97.4 78.1 69.3 86.2 .. .. .. 90.7 43.0 63.5 74.2 69.3 44.3 78.1 77.9 73.7 68.4 44.6 77.7 41.6 58.8 .. 89.8 27.7 57.2 55.3 61.1 44.7 45.0 80.1 73.0 81.6 79.8 .. 67.3 85.1 .. 20.2 .. 39.7 99.5 .. .. .. .. .. 66.8 34.2 29.3 53.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.4 17.3 34.7 16.4 .. 31.6 18.9 23.1 22.1 26.0 33.6
 16.4 32.3 18.4 26.5 21.9 33.6 26.6 38.0 24.5 .. 18.7 20.6 24.9 27.6 31.1 28.7 22.3 27.7 23.1 26.3 22.8 27.4 17.2 29.7 26.3 22.9 27.0 15.0 7.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27 .. 45 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.4 10.0 0.3 66.6 .. 9.2 .. 36.7 24.0 4.7 86.6 .. .. 93.1 .. 65.2 74.9 96.8 44.4 18.5 44.9 .. .. 86.1 75.8 83.0 82.7 .. .. 38.4 24.2 2.0 .. .. .. .. 97.9 .. 37.6 24.5 63.5 .. .. 6.4 37.1 17.4 46.2 49.9 .. .. 23.8 .. 25.9 21.5 25.1 .. 26.0 50.8 .. 37.5 28.0 20.1 .. 38.5 .. .. 50.7 21.7 48.8 11.5 .. 35.5 48.5 .. 28.6 29.8 .. .. .. 48.1 .. .. 36.8 .. .. 18.0 .. .. 1.5 .. 1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.3 .. .. .. 20.9 .. .. 19.2 .. .. 9.2 .. .. .. 29.4 13.6 19.1 4.5 .. .. .. 27.8 .. .. .. .. 7.6 53.1 .. .. .. .. 11.0 5.1 .. 7.0 21.8 .. 10.4 .. .. .. 6.4 22.2 .. .. .. .. .. 28.8 .. .. 49.5 .. .. 32.2 .. .. .. 28.9 28.1 54.9 23.4 .. .. .. 47.2 .. .. .. .. 17.3 45.7 .. .. .. .. 25.1 26.7 .. 15.1 27.8 .. 18.2 .. .. .. 29.1 19.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.2 25.1 .. 19.3 .. 36.3 28.9 17.3 .. .. 24.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.3 .. .. 21.1 33.7 .. 20.1 .. .. .. 22.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36.7 2017 51.7 7.0 .. 19.6 d .. 17.9 d 45.0 27.3 42.2 52.7 15.5 16.3 28.6 46.5 35.6 38.4 37.6 10.0 f 30.0 7.2 8.8 d 29.8 29.1 .. 19.7 28.2 1.7 f .. 24.2 32.9 15.4 34.5 .. 25.7 6.7 f 4.7 14.9 9.7 10.9 .. .. .. .. 33.7 f ..
Mandatory paid maternity leave (days) .. .. .. 630 .. .. 336 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 DASHBOARD 3 WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENTDASH BOARD3 SDG 3.1 SDG 3.7, 5.6 SDG 5.6 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.3 SDG 5.2 SDG 5.2 Reproductive health and family planning Violence against girls and women Socioeconomic empowerment SDG 5.5 SDG 1.3 Child marriage Violence against women ever experienceda Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Contraceptive prevalence, any method Unmet need for family planning Women married by age 18 Prevalence of female genital mutilation/ cutting among girls and women Intimate partner Nonintimate partner (%) (%) (% of married or in-union women of reproductive age, 15–49 years) (% of women ages 20–24 who are married or in union) (% of girls and young women ages 15–49) (% of female population ages 15 and older) Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female Female share of employment in senior and middle management (%) (%) (%) Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money- service provider (% of female population ages 15 and older) 2007–2017b 2013–2018b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2003–2018b 2004–2018b 2005–2019b 2005–2019b 2008–2018b 2008–2018b 2010–2018b 2017 .. 96.3 .. 77.8 90.1 86.5 95.8 97.1 97.1 .. 81.8 77.9 95.2 .. .. .. .. 13.9 23.7 15.0 15.8 .. 8.2 .. 13.3 22.3 21.4 20.1 .. .. .. .. 28 39 27 20 .. 10 25 29 36 40 23 .. .. .. .. .. 36.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.7 31.5 .. .. .. 27.8 23.8 31.0 31.4 38.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.2 .. 26.0 .. ..
 19.0 .. 14.0 11.6 .. .. .. .. 12.9 .. 33.5 .. 43.7 .. .. 48.1 .. 32.9 33.6 .. .. .. .. 32.6 .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 86.8 65.4 58.2 26.1 58.2 27.0 .. 53.4 52.1 65.0 36.0 28.4 .. 86.2 64.6 Mandatory paid maternity leave (days) 2017 112 116 94 86 99 75 88 165 96 110 89 87 79 114 107 HDI rank Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development World NOTES DEFINITIONS Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries and aggregates by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details about partial grouping in this table.
a Data collection methods, age ranges, sampled women (ever-partnered, ever-married or all women) and definitions of the forms of violence and of perpetrators vary by survey.

Thus data are not necessarily comparable across countries.

b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

c Refers to 2015. d Refers to 2011. e Refers to 2003. f Refers to 2014.
Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit: Percentage of women ages 15–49 attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel (doctor, nurse or midwife).
Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel: Percentage of deliveries attended by skilled health personnel (generally doctors, nurses or midwives) trained in providing lifesaving obstetric care—including giving the necessary supervision, care and advice to women during pregnancy, labour and the postpartum period, conducting deliveries on their own and caring for newborns.

Traditional birth attendants, even if they receive a short training course, are not included.
Contraceptive prevalence, any method: Percentage of married or in-union women of reproductive age (15–49 years) currently using any contraceptive method.

Unmet need for family planning: Percentage of married or in-union women of reproductive age (15–49 years) who are fecund have an unmet need if they want to have no (more) births, or if they want to postpone or are undecided about the timing of their next birth, yet they are not using any method of contraception.
Prevalence of female genital mutilation/cutting among girls and women: Percentage of girls and women ages 15–49 who have undergone female genital mutilation/cutting.

Violence against women ever experienced, intimate partner: Percentage of the female population ages 15 and older that has ever experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner.
Violence against women ever experienced, nonintimate partner: Percentage of the female population ages 15 and older that has ever experienced sexual violence from a nonintimate partner.

Share of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes at tertiary level, female: Share of female tertiary graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes among all female tertiary graduates.
Share of graduates from science, technology, engineering and mathematics programmes in tertiary education who are female: Share of female graduates among all graduates of tertiary programmes in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
Women with account at financial institution or with mobile money-service provider: Percentage of women ages 15 and older who report having an account alone or jointly with someone else at a bank or other type of financial institution or who report personally using a mobile money service in the past 12 months.

Mandatory paid maternity leave: Number of days of paid time off work to which a female employee is entitled in order to take care of a newborn child.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Column 1: UNICEF (2019b).


Columns 2, 5 and 6: United Nations Statistics Division (2019a).

Columns 3 and 4: UNDESA (2019a).

Columns 7 and 8: UN Women (2019).

Columns 9 and 10: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019).

Column 11: ILO (2019).

Columns 12 and 13: World Bank (2019b).

Child marriage, women married by age 18: Percentage of women ages 20–24 who were first married or in union before age 18.
Female share of employment in senior and middle management: Proportion of women in total employment in senior and middle management.

DASHBOARD 3 Women’s empowerment | 337 DASH BOARD3HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century D R A O B H S A 4D Environmental sustainability Country groupings (terciles) Top third Middle third Bottom third Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Notes after the table.
SDG 12.c SDG 7.2 SDG 9.4 SDG 15.1 SDG 6.4 SDG 12.2 SDG 3.9 SDG 3.9 SDG 15.3 Environmental threats SDG 15.5 Fossil fuel energy consumption Renewable energy consumption (% of total energy consumption) (% of total final energy consumption) Carbon dioxide emissions Forest area Per capita (tonnes) (kg per 2010 US$ of GDP) (% of total land areaa) Change (%) Fresh water withdrawals (% of total renewable water resources) Mortality rate attributed to Natural resource depletion Household and ambient air pollution Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services Degraded land Red List Index (% of GNI) (per 100,000 population) (% of total land area) HDI rank 2010–2015b 2015 2016 2016 2016 1990/2016 2007–2017b 2012–2017b 2016 2016 2015 VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 50 Belarus 57.0 50.2 85.3 78.9 93.2 89.6 11.3 25.1 90.6 93.5 64.9 40.2 74.1 59.7 80.4 82.4 75.9 .. 93.0 65.7 80.6 97.4 81.0 61.1 73.0 77.7 46.5 97.8 79.9 13.1 92.9 82.6 90.3 68.0 86.1 .. .. 9.0 7.2 14.6 7.9 11.6 6.5 5.1 9.5 4.5 3.1 5.4 12.4 5.4 5.9 7.7 3.7 20.5 .. 16.3 5.6 3.4 4.6 29.8 4.7 15.1 4.5
3.7 20.5 .. .. 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.23 0.16 0.31 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.47 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.14 0.31 .. 0.33 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.49 0.19 0.37 0.24 0.45 0.34 33.2 31.8 11.0 32.7 .. –0.1 9.3 63.4 1.0 .. –2.8 213.7 0.8 –5.5 9.4 14.7 1.8 –0.4 5.1 13.8 2.7 .. 6.2 0.0 2.6 .. 26.7 –4.1 5.1 33.6 1.6 18.5 0.0 23.2 –1.4 7.2 23.8 6.5 12.3 32.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.8 –7.8 0.0 18.2 –8.0 14.3 145.9 3.8 0.0 –22.9 0.8 11.1 0.8 3.8 1.5 16.5 .. 3.2 0.2 1.6 .. 9.8 10.6 .. 1.2 1.6 5.7 14.5 32.8 .. 18.9 4.5 1.3 .. .. 2.8 28.7 12.4 13.9 83.0 17.9 13.4 28.0 14.0 17.5 11.3 .. .. 871.7 1.1 0.6 11.8 .. .. .. 4.9 132.2 0.6 .. 4.3 1.5 2.5 4.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 .. 3.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 .. 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 .. 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 .. 4.0 .. 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.4 6.5 10.9 0.2 3.2 0.3 18.1 1.0 5.8 0.6 9 10 12 16 .. 8 9 7 26 14 13 7 7 7 14 13 16 .. 12 15 12 15 20 23 10 30 10 20 15 25 20 28 38 34 55 .. 84 34 41 10 47 25 13 39 40 35 54 27 49 61 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 .. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 c 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 .. 0.2 0.1 0.1 c 0.2 1.8 0.1 c 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 c 0.1 0.1 c 0.3 0.1 c 0.1 0.1 0.1 c .. 0.1 0.1 c 0.1 c 0.2 0.1 c 0.2 0.1 c 0.2 0.1 c 0.1 0.1 c 0.4 0.1 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. .. .. .. 11 .. .. .. 4 .. .. 5 18 6 12 .. 13 .. 19 16 5 3 1 .. 4 4 13 32 6 1 .. 13 .. .. 7 39 6 1 338 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 (value) DASH
0.930 0.844 0.901 0.885 0.861 0.955 0.972 DASH BOARD4 SDG 12.c SDG 7.2 SDG 9.4 SDG 15.1 SDG 6.4 SDG 12.2 SDG 3.9 SDG 3.9 SDG 15.3 Environmental threats SDG 15.5 Fossil fuel energy consumption Renewable energy consumption Carbon dioxide emissions Forest area (% of total final energy consumption) Per capita (tonnes) (kg per 2010 US$ of GDP) (% of total land areaa) Change (%) Fresh water withdrawals (% of total renewable water resources) Mortality rate attributed to Natural resource depletion Household and ambient air pollution Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services Degraded land Red List Index (% of GNI) (per 100,000 population) (% of total land area) HDI rank 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) (% of total energy consumption) 2010–2015b 99.2 71.0 64.7 72.5 .. .. 93.7 46.3 86.8 .. 96.6 .. 83.9 99.9 99.0 84.5 80.7 49.9 61.4 72.2 50.5 85.6 .. .. 77.5 90.4 79.8 .. 59.1 76.7 74.6 100.0 79.4 79.6 87.7 86.9 98.4 75.3 86.6 .. 88.9 93.2 97.6 74.7 .. 81.0 88.4 .. .. 33.7 76.3 97.6 .. .. .. 3.2
3.4 3.6 28.9 5.8 16.8 12.8 7.8 31.3 61.7 24.9 3.2 35.0 1.0 1.9 27.5 14.3 2016 12.9 5.7 3.4 3.4 .. .. 22.8 1.8 4.2 .. 7.0 .. 5.1 15.3 7.1 3.2 2.5 1.5 1.3 2.2 1.0 2.1 .. .. 6.5 3.6 3.5 .. 2.0 1.8 1.7 3.1 3.3 1.7 6.4 2.1 3.2 4.4 2.2 .. 2.2 5.9 3.5 3.2 .. 2.5 4.3 .. .. 0.9 3.4 2.5 .. .. .. 1.1 1.9 2016 0.56 0.33 0.22 0.17 .. .. 0.33 0.09 0.18 .. 0.28 .. 0.49 0.52 0.39 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.09 0.10 .. .. 0.58 0.21 0.23 .. 0.15 0.14 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.14 0.47 0.21 0.21 0.62 0.15 .. 0.21 0.53 0.30 0.20 .. 0.31 0.33 .. .. 0.11 0.25 0.31 .. .. .. 1990/2016 2007–2017b 2012–2017b 2016 2016 2015 –3.3 17.6 32.1 8.4 .. 0.0 81.2 134.1 22.8 0.0 –0.7 0.0 9.9 –1.9 17.8 –6.0 –8.7 8.7 –2.3 2.6 –9.7 63.2 0.0 –4.9 –1.1 –5.5 17.3 0.0 –9.9 –9.2 –0.8 17.8 10.3 –5.3 33.6 –5.0 37.7 4.4 82.5 –7.2 63.5 –0.6 4.9 –21.7 8.0 –2.8 –10.6 –13.9 7.3 –29.1 –0.7 –0.6 –15.8 0.0 0.0 26.3 29.6 19.8 26.4 .. 3.0 .. .. .. .. 27.8 .. .. .. 2.9 8.8 .. .. 0.9 2.8 .. 2.9 .. 18.3 51.3 8.5 0.9 18.6 13.1 7.1 0.7 0.5 36.7 77.8 8.6 0.7 20.9 .. 36.9 5.6 30.4 14.3 103.3 1.3 40.2 1.7 7.9 12.5 1.7 10.0 .. 0.6 .. 96.4 .. 15.7 .. 17.8 8.7 8.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 .. 0.0 8.1 1.2 0.2 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.4 6.9 4.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.5 .. .. 0.4 2.2 1.6 .. .. 31 104 18 47 20 47 49 62 39 51 38 26 23 68 102 80 50 .. 30 80 37 61 45 30 37 55 50 82 64 113 25 64 71 43 30 56 156 51 101 48 25 35 .. 99 57 57 51 69 26 73 185 78 0.4 0.1 0.1 c 0.4 .. 0.2 0.1 c 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.0 0.6 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.0 .. 0.1 0.1 1.1 3.5 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.9 0.1 1.3 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.3 2.2 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.8 11.8 1.3 0.6 1.4 .. 2.9 1.5 2.0 0.6 1.0 0.3 1.4 4.2 0.1 36 .. 6 2 .. .. 64 26
 9 .. 16 12 6 .. 23 27 14 9 8 6 36 .. .. .. 4 47 21 .. 27 7 2 1 .. .. 27 30 .. 25 .. .. 13 13 .. 51 .. .. 15 .. .. 52 21 4 81 .. .. 38 29 (value) DASHBOARD 4 Environmental sustainability | 339 DASH BOARD4HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 12.c SDG 7.2 SDG 9.4 SDG 15.1 SDG 6.4 SDG 12.2 SDG 3.9 SDG 3.9 SDG 15.3 Environmental threats SDG 15.5 Fossil fuel energy consumption Renewable energy consumption Carbon dioxide emissions Forest area (% of total final energy consumption) Per capita (tonnes) (kg per 2010 US$ of GDP) (% of total land areaa) Change (%) Fresh water withdrawals (% of total renewable water resources) Mortality rate attributed to Natural resource depletion Household and ambient air pollution Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services Degraded land Red List Index (% of GNI) (per 100,000 population) HDI rank 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan
 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin (% of total energy consumption) 2010–2015b .. 97.7 99.1 66.1 .. 86.8 84.2 22.8 97.9 .. 69.8 .. 96.0 88.5 75.5 .. 48.4 46.0 .. 37.4 40.7 73.6 66.7 .. 52.5 .. .. 73.8 .. .. 40.5 .. .. .. 52.5 10.6 .. 44.3 30.6 17.4 15.5 48.3 38.3 29.1 61.6 .. 97.8 .. .. .. 18.9 14.4 .. .. .. 36.7 340 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT .. 7.4 1.8 1.7 2.2 .. 2.0 .. 3.8 1.6 1.5 .. 1.1 0.6 .. 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.7 .. 1.0 .. .. 0.5 .. .. 0.5 .. .. .. 0.4 0.2 .. 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.8 .. 1.5 .. .. .. 0.5 0.2 .. .. .. 0.5 2016 0.79 0.45 0.96 0.17 .. 0.62 0.28 0.10 0.21 .. 0.35 .. 0.24 0.22 0.47 .. 0.14 0.20 .. 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.17 .. 0.23 .. .. 0.14 .. .. 0.10 .. .. .. 0.12 0.06 .. 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.35 0.17 .. 0.77 .. .. .. 0.09 0.08 .. .. .. 1990/2016 2007–2017b 2012–2017b 2016 0.0 5.4 0.0 –23.8 31.5 0.0 –13.2 5.5 67.3 .. 67.1 1.0 3.4 13.5 –24.8 –0.9 –30.9 1.9 57.3 –26.2 –31.0 10.8 –21.9 –30.1 –45.0 0.0 35.1 –4.5 .. –4.3 –1.8 25.1 7.4 0.0 8.6 –8.2 –16.3 –27.3 –27.9 –5.8 –24.7 –5.3 –23.5 –38.0 –43.5 –6.2 32.1 –0.2 –25.3 53.1 –61.8 –18.3 –59.3 –46.7 –9.1 –26.0 .. 108.1 822.9 11.0 .. 30.2 0.4 .. 114.1 .. .. 42.8 42.9 35.7 .. 0.5 .. .. .. .. 0.9 33.9 .. .. .. .. 0.4 2.9 .. 1.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13.1 .. ..
 .. 17.9 74.4 .. .. .. .. .. 4.4 .. 1.1 .. .. .. .. 9.4 6.7 1.9 0.0 2.7 5.8 10.5 4.0 .. 1.0 .. 10.9 0.3 6.3 13.3 1.0 3.5 0.5 1.7 2.9 1.0 2.6 29.7 1.6 0.0 2.7 0.6 .. 0.0 31.4 1.7 6.3 0.0 11.4 8.3 22.9 2.7 1.0 2.5 0.9 12.8 2.5 3.1 0.8 20.9 .. 14.0 1.8 5.4 4.4 2.2 14.1 12.4 0.8 1.8 79 81 72 112 85 87 64 76 109 .. 64 .. .. 1.6 .. (% of total land area) 2015 22 29 .. 21 .. 78 18 16 1 .. 31 15 26 19 24 16 16 97 17 24 .. 30 19 .. .. .. 10 65 .. .. 10 13 .. .. 14 7 19 23 33 40 .. 20 0 36 5 .. .. 21 22 12 32 .. 22 3 30 53 (value) DASHBOARD 4 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYDASH BOARD4 SDG 12.c SDG 7.2 SDG 9.4 SDG 15.1 SDG 6.4 SDG 12.2 SDG 3.9 SDG 3.9 SDG 15.3 Environmental threats SDG 15.5 Fossil fuel energy consumption Renewable energy consumption Carbon dioxide emissions Forest area (% of total final energy consumption) Per capita (tonnes) (kg per 2010 US$ of GDP) (% of total land areaa) Change (%) Fresh water withdrawals (% of total renewable water resources) Mortality rate attributed to Natural resource depletion Household and ambient air pollution Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services Degraded land Red List Index (% of GNI) (per 100,000 population) (% of total land area) HDI rank 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d’Ivoire 166 Senegal 167
 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development World (% of total energy consumption) 2010–2015b .. 26.5 53.9 17.8 31.7 22.0 .. .. .. 6.6 .. .. .. 98.5 .. 5.4 12.6 .. .. 23.1 .. .. 72.2 .. .. 24.1 62.1 .. .. .. .. .. 82.4 84.9 69.0 .. 80.5 95.5 .. 87.0 74.5 76.9 39.2 .. .. .. 0.1 .. 94.3 0.0 10.5 15.8 39.8 81.0 23.5 4.0 15.9 9.1 27.7 31.1 70.2 73.2 17.8 12.0 18.2 2016 .. 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 .. .. .. 0.1 .. .. .. 0.3 .. 0.0 0.3 .. .. 0.2 .. .. 0.2 .. .. 0.1 1.0 .. .. .. .. .. 9.6 4.7 1.3 .. 3.1 4.4 .. 4.6 2.6 1.6 0.8 .. .. 9.0 4.3 2016 .. 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.18 .. .. .. 0.07 .. .. .. 0.15 .. 0.03 0.23 .. .. 0.08 .. .. 0.08 .. .. 0.11 0.25 .. .. .. .. .. 0.25 0.36 0.23 .. 0.32 0.29 .. 0.29 0.19 0.26 0.25 .. .. 0.24 0.27 2016 1.6 32.7 42.8 3.1 .. 3.5 2.1 0.2 33.2 12.5 48.4 25.8 43.1 1.0 69.8 67.2 48.0 43.1 19.3 14.9 3.8 10.9 .. 3.8 35.6 0.9 40.7 .. 0.0 0.0 10.0 33.3 32.9 31.6 30.9 24.9 27.1 1.8 29.8 9.2 46.2 14.7 28.1 29.1 69.4 31.4 31.2 1990/2016 2007–2017b 2012–2017b 2016 2016 2015 25.0 1.7 –11.9 –75.4 .. –17.1 0.0 0.0 –19.7 .. 10.8 –12.9 –15.8
 0.0 –11.5 –5.0 –13.0 –0.3 –22.7 –7.1 –30.7 –2.9 .. –29.2 –1.8 –41.9 –40.2 .. 0.0 0.0 –24.1 0.0 1.2 –4.3 –7.7 –12.0 –6.4 –1.9 3.9 8.6 –9.6 7.8 –11.9 –11.3 1.3 1.6 –3.0 .. 1.4 .. .. 71.2 10.3 .. .. .. 8.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. 1.3 .. .. 5.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.4 5.9 .. .. .. 76.1 .. 20.3 1.5 25.0 .. .. .. 9.1 7.7 5.1 2.2 1.0 13.4 2.8 1.2 0.3 0.7 8.2 9.4 5.7 13.0 19.2 0.2 11.4 23.2 1.3 12.9 15.0 .. 9.5 15.7 14.0 13.1 0.1 11.9 .. .. .. .. 8.9 .. .. .. .. 213 .. .. .. .. 86.6 .. 0.3 1.9 18.0 46.5 14.0 7.0 2.2 0.5 1.7 17.1 47.8 34.3 8.9 0.4 11.7 20 14 6 12 12 .. 8 .. 17 29 14 11 29 .. 15 6 .. 18 19 35 3 29 .. 34 13 7 .. .. .. .. 23 .. .. 25 23 16 23 7 .. 28 28 23 22 16 .. .. 20 (value) — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — DASHBOARD 4 Environmental sustainability | 341 DASH BOARD4HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century NOTES Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries and aggregates by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details about partial grouping in this table.

a This column is intentionally left without colour because it is meant to provide context for the indicator on change in forest area.
b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

c Less than 0.1.

DEFINITIONS Fossil fuel energy consumption: Percentage of total energy consumption that comes from fossil fuels, which consist of coal, oil, petroleum and natural gas products.

Renewable energy consumption: Share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption.

Renewable sources include hydroelectric, geothermal, solar, tides, wind, biomass and biofuels.
Carbon dioxide emissions: Human-originated carbon dioxide emissions stemming from the burning of fossil fuels, gas flaring and the production of cement.

Carbon dioxide emitted by forest biomass through depletion of forest areas is included.

Data are expressed in tonnes per capita (based on midyear population) and in kilograms per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2010 US dollars.
Forest area: Land spanning more than 0.5 hectare with trees taller than 5 metres and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ.

It excludes land predominantly under agricultural or urban land use, tree stands in agricultural production systems (for example, in fruit plantations and agroforestry systems) and trees in urban parks and gardens.
Areas under reforestation that have not yet reached but are expected to reach a canopy cover of 10 percent and a tree height of 5 metres are included, as are temporarily unstocked areas resulting from human intervention or natural causes that are expected to regenerate.

Fresh water withdrawals: Total fresh water withdrawn, expressed as a percentage of total renewable water resources.
Natural resource depletion: Monetary valuation of energy, mineral and forest depletion, expressed as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).

Mortality rate attributed to household and ambient air pollution: Deaths resulting from exposure to ambient (outdoor) air pollution and household (indoor) air pollution from solid fuel use for cooking, expressed per 100,000 population.

Ambient air pollution results from emissions from industrial activity, households, cars and trucks.
Mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene services: Deaths attributable to unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene focusing on inadequate wash services, expressed per 100,000 population.

Degraded land: Rain-fed cropland, irrigated cropland, or range, pasture, forest and woodlands that have experienced the reduction or loss of biological or economic productivity and complexity resulting from a combination of pressures, including land use and management practices.
Red List Index: Measure of the aggregate extinction risk across groups of species.

It is based on genuine changes in the number of species in each category of extinction risk on the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List of Threatened Species.

It ranges from 0, all species categorized as extinct, to 1, all species categorized as least concern.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Columns 1, 2, 5 and 8: World Bank (2019a).

Columns 3, 4, 11 and 12: United Nations Statistics Division (2019a).
Column 6: HDRO calculations based on data on forest area from World Bank (2019a).

Column 7: FAO (2019b).

Columns 9 and 10: WHO (2019).

342 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 DASHBOARD 4 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITYDASH BOARD4 D R A O B H S A 5D Socioeconomic sustainability Country groupings (terciles) Top third Middle third Bottom third Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Notes after the table.
SDG 17.4 SDG 9.5 Economic sustainability SDG 10.1 Social sustainability SDG 5 SDG 10.1 Adjusted net savings Total debt service Gross capital formation Skilled labour force Concentration index (exports) Research and development expenditure Dependency ratio Education and health expenditure versus military expenditure Old age (65 and older) Military expenditurea (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) (% of labour force) HDI rank 2015–2017d 2015–2017d 2015–2018d 2010–2018d VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 1 Norway 2 Switzerland 3 Ireland 4 Germany 4 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 6 Australia 6 Iceland 8 Sweden 9 Singapore 10 Netherlands 11 Denmark 12 Finland 13 Canada 14 New Zealand 15 United Kingdom 15 United States 17 Belgium 18 Liechtenstein 19 Japan 20 Austria 21 Luxembourg 22 Israel 22 Korea (Republic of) 24 Slovenia 25 Spain 26 Czechia 26 France 28 Malta 29 Italy 30 Estonia 31 Cyprus 32 Greece 32 Poland 34 Lithuania 35 United Arab Emirates 36 Andorra 36 Saudi Arabia 36 Slovakia 39 Latvia 40 Portugal 41 Qatar 42 Chile 43 Brunei Darussalam 43 Hungary 45 Bahrain 46 Croatia 47 Oman 48 Argentina 49 Russian Federation 16.9 16.4 16.0 14.1 .. 5.6 16.6 19.1 36.8 18.4 18.3 10.2 6.5 13.9 5.5 6.1 12.0 .. 7.3 14.1 20.9 15.6 20.1 10.1 9.1 10.3 9.3 .. 6.0 15.2 3.2 –3.1 10.6 .. .. .. 13.4 5.6 6.0 3.4 26.8 3.6 34.6 13.2 20.4 10.8 –11.3 5.4 8.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.0 27.6 23.2 25.4 21.3 21.7 24.3 22.6 26.5 26.6 21.2 22.7 23.7 23.1 23.5 17.2 20.6 25.4 .. 23.9 25.3 18.3 20.8 30.2 21.9 21.9 26.2 23.5 18.4 18.0 27.0 19.1 13.1 20.7 18.2 22.4 .. .. 99.9 87.4 78.3 90.6 85.7 91.1 66.9 95.7 84.8 63.4 69.6 89.8 85.1 78.3 95.1 96.2 52.8 .. 58.6 95.5 92.5 54.1 43.9 70.3 79.2 88.6 19.3 91.5 .. 65.8 96.4 (value) 2018 0.368 0.246 i 0.269 0.093 0.286
 0.291 0.461 0.097 0.269 0.082 0.101 0.143 0.147 0.175 0.111 0.099 0.096 .. Overall loss in HDI value due to inequalityc Gender Inequality Indexc Income share of the poorest 40 percent Average annual change (%) Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditureb (per 100 people ages 15–64) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) 2010–2017d 2030e 2010–2018d 2010–2016f 2010/2018g 2005/2018g 2005/2017 2.0 3.4 1.2 2.9 0.8 1.9 2.1 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.9 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.7 2.5 .. 3.1 3.1 1.2 4.3 4.2 2.0 1.2 1.7 2.2 0.6 1.3 1.3 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 .. 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.4 .. 1.2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.1 31.9 h 37.9 27.8 44.0 43.2 31.0 j 31.8 36.4 34.5 40.8 37.1 43.1 k 36.7 33.3 34.8 32.5 37.6 .. 53.2 38.5 27.1 22.5 38.2 41.8 39.8 l 35.3 40.4 41.9 45.8 38.3 27.0 m 42.5 37.0 45.2 6.4 .. 8.3 32.7 42.3 44.3 5.7 26.0 14.4 34.5 7.1 40.5 6.0 19.7 31.1 1.6 0.7 0.3 1.2 .. 1.9 .. 1.0 3.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.8 3.2 0.9 .. 0.9 0.7 0.6 4.3 2.6 1.0 1.3 1.1 2.3 0.5 1.3 2.1 1.6 2.4 2.0 2.0 5.6 .. 8.8 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.9 2.4 1.1 3.6 1.5 8.2 0.9 3.9 11.7 25.5 32.7 13.5 .. 7.5 .. 17.2 2.1 13.9 15.5 11.5 13.0 13.2 8.5 6.2 18.1 .. 15.3 22.6 20.9 2.3 4.7 14.4 10.6 13.7 7.5 29.8 10.8 5.8 7.9 .. 5.2 9.4 .. .. 1.1 n 10.3 10.5 7.7 4.2 7.2 1.9 12.7 1.6 6.9 0.9 16.1 1.9 0.3 –0.4 –2.3 0.5 .. 0.4 –1.7 –0.4 .. –2.1 –0.7 –3.6 0.2 .. –1.9 2.2 –1.2 .. .. 0.4 0.7 –1.8 –1.8 –3.9 5.9 –3.0 –0.1 .. 0.1 –3.2 –2.0 2.4 –3.2 –0.6 .. .. .. –1.0 –2.2 0.8 .. 1.0 .. –0.9 .. –5.7 .. –3.6 –1.8 –3.7 –3.8 –4.0 –2.2 .. –2.0 –4.2 –1.8 –4.7 –3.9 –2.9 –3.3 –2.9 –2.2 –3.2 –2.4 –4.3 .. –2.5 –2.9 –3.8 –3.2 –3.5 –3.9 –2.8 –0.8 –4.8 –2.8 –4.7 –4.4 –3.0 –2.4 –2.1 –2.5 –6.2 .. –5.1 0.1 –1.7 –4.3 .. –1.9 .. 0.0 –2.8 –1.9 –1.7 –0.4 –2.2 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.0 .. –0.6 0.2 –0.4 .. 0.3 –0.5 0.0 –0.3 .. 0.3 –0.4 0.1 .. .. –0.5 –0.9 0.7 0.1 –0.2 –1.2 0.2 –0.5 –0.3 –0.6 0.0
 –0.9 –0.7 0.9 –0.7 .. .. .. 0.2 1.2 0.4 .. 1.4 .. 0.7 .. 0.6 .. 2.0 1.2 DASHBOARD 5 Socioeconomic sustainability | 343 DASH BOARD5HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 17.4 SDG 9.5 Economic sustainability SDG 10.1 Social sustainability SDG 5 SDG 10.1 Adjusted net savings Total debt service Gross capital formation Skilled labour force Concentration index (exports) Research and development expenditure Dependency ratio Education and health expenditure versus military expenditure Old age (65 and older) Military expenditurea (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) (% of labour force) (value) (% of GDP) (per 100 people ages 15–64) (% of GDP) Overall loss in HDI value due to inequalityc Gender Inequality Indexc Income share of the poorest 40 percent Average annual change (%) Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditureb HDI rank 2015–2017d 2015–2017d 2015–2018d 2010–2018d 50 Belarus 50 Kazakhstan 52 Bulgaria 52 Montenegro 52 Romania 55 Palau 56 Barbados 57 Kuwait 57 Uruguay 59 Turkey 60 Bahamas 61 Malaysia 62 Seychelles HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 63 Serbia 63 Trinidad and Tobago 65 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 66 Mauritius 67 Panama 68 Costa Rica 69 Albania 70 Georgia 71 Sri Lanka 72 Cuba 73 Saint Kitts and Nevis 74 Antigua and Barbuda 75 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 Mexico 77 Thailand 78 Grenada 79 Brazil 79 Colombia 81 Armenia 82 Algeria 82 North Macedonia 82 Peru 85 China 85 Ecuador 87 Azerbaijan 88 Ukraine 89 Dominican Republic 89 Saint Lucia 91 Tunisia 92 Mongolia 93 Lebanon 94 Botswana 94 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 96 Jamaica 96 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 98 Dominica 98 Fiji 98 Paraguay 98 Suriname 102 Jordan 103 Belize 104 Maldives 105 Tonga 21.2 5.8 14.8 .. 3.4 .. –6.8 o 14.6 10.2 11.4 7.1 10.0 .. –3.2 q .. .. –6.4 25.3 15.9 8.2 12.5 28.5 .. .. .. .. 7.5 14.0 .. 6.1 2.8 1.5 21.2 15.4 7.1 20.1 11.4 9.5 3.5 17.3
 –2.3 –9.6 –10.3 –16.9 26.6 0.4 15.9 7.2 q .. 8.1 14.5 22.9 z 4.4 –0.9 .. 9.3 aa 11.8 47.9 21.3 13.4 22.4 .. .. .. .. 40.2 .. .. .. 22.0 .. 0.4 19.8 .. 14.8 10.4 29.4 21.2 .. .. .. 15.6 14.0 4.7 9.4 36.2 41.6 27.0 0.6 13.7 21.7 7.6 29.3 10.7 20.7 15.6 4.6 17.2 56.2 70.6 2.5 11.6 27.3 57.4 11.7 2.3 12.4 .. 12.4 9.7 3.5 9.9 344 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 27.5 26.6 20.7 31.4 24.2 28.5 18.3 29.1 16.5 29.2 27.1 23.6 32.5 21.5 .. 34.7 19.1 41.7 18.6 25.0 33.3 28.6 10.3 .. .. 21.7 23.0 25.0 .. 15.4 21.2 22.4 48.4 33.0 21.7 44.3 26.0 20.1 18.8 24.4 21.8 19.8 42.2 17.2 29.4 26.4 22.6 24.8 .. .. 23.1 36.2 18.2 17.9 .. 33.4 98.6 74.0 88.8 90.7 81.0 92.6 .. .. 26.4 44.2 .. 66.9 94.2 83.2 71.9 18.0 s 61.1 53.3 39.1 54.6 92.5 38.1 69.4 .. .. 85.0 40.9 38.0 .. 64.1 58.1 95.7 40.4 81.4 82.8 .. 46.3 93.3 98.3 43.8 .. 54.9 79.3 .. 34.0 .. .. 42.3 .. 62.5 43.7 45.0 .. 43.5 32.7 .. 2010–2017d 2030e 2010–2018d 2010–2016f 2010/2018g 2005/2018g 2005/2017 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.5 .. .. 0.1 0.4 0.9 .. 1.3 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 n 0.3 0.1 0.3 .. .. 0.2 0.5 0.8 .. 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 2.1 0.4 0.2 0.4 .. .. 0.6 0.1 .. 0.5 .. .. 0.1 .. .. 0.2 .. 0.3 .. .. .. 32.5 17.4 37.2 30.1 32.6 .. 35.4 10.0 27.0 18.5 17.1 14.7 p 19.2 32.7 r 24.1 14.1 26.7 t 17.4 22.6 32.7 29.5 u 24.2 33.8 .. 20.7 37.5 15.2 29.6 18.8 19.9 19.3 26.1 14.0 27.4 17.5 25.0 15.5 17.3 v 30.2 w 15.7 21.1 19.0 10.5 17.9 8.6 20.0 17.9 15.0 .. 12.5 13.0 15.1 8.2 10.5 9.0 10.8 1.3 1.0 1.7 1.5 1.9 .. .. 5.1 2.0 2.5 .. 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.8 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.9 1.9 2.9 .. .. 1.1 0.5 1.3 .. 1.5 3.2 4.8 5.3 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.4 3.8 3.8 0.7 .. 2.1 0.8 5.0 2.8 .. 1.4 0.5 .. 0.9 0.9 .. 4.7 1.3 .. .. 8.9
 6.8 7.4 .. 5.5 .. .. .. 7.6 4.6 .. 6.1 4.5 7.0 .. 3.9 57.3 .. .. 9.7 5.6 3.4 7.1 .. .. .. 16.5 5.4 .. 13.0 3.4 3.1 2.8 n .. 6.9 .. 5.2 2.6 3.2 10.0 x .. 6.0 10.4 2.4 5.1 y .. 11.9 11.2 y .. 5.3 13.2 .. 2.0 10.6 .. .. –3.9 –5.9 1.4 –1.6 –1.0 .. .. .. –2.4 –3.9 .. .. .. 0.4 .. .. .. –3.1 –0.7 –1.7 –3.7 –3.7 .. .. .. –3.7 0.9 –2.5 .. –1.2 –2.4 –1.2 .. –2.7 –4.6 –3.7 –0.2 –4.0 –2.5 –1.7 .. –2.2 –1.3 .. .. .. 0.1 –2.3 .. .. –1.1 –0.8 –2.9 –2.7 4.4 .. .. –3.4 –1.1 .. –0.8 .. –2.0 –2.5 –2.0 –3.5 –0.1 –1.2 .. .. –0.6 –0.3 0.0 –0.2 –1.3 –2.2 –0.7 –1.0 –0.6 .. .. .. –1.7 0.6 .. –1.4 –1.3 –2.8 –1.6 .. –1.3 –2.3 –1.2 –0.1 –1.8 –0.4 .. –0.9 –1.7 .. –0.9 .. –1.0 –0.3 .. –1.2 –0.8 –0.8 –1.3 –1.2 –1.2 –1.1 0.5 3.1 –0.3 –0.4 0.8 .. .. .. 1.7 0.2 .. 1.5 .. 2.0 .. 1.0 –0.1 1.5 –0.1 0.5 0.0 0.3 .. .. .. 0.2 1.6 1.2 .. 1.0 1.0 0.4 .. 3.3 2.0 0.7 2.4 .. 0.9 1.2 .. 1.3 0.2 .. 3.6 .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.9 .. 1.2 .. –0.1 0.4 DASHBOARD 5 SOCIOECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITYDASH BOARD5 SDG 17.4 SDG 9.5 Economic sustainability SDG 10.1 Social sustainability SDG 5 SDG 10.1 Adjusted net savings Total debt service Gross capital formation Skilled labour force Concentration index (exports) Research and development expenditure Dependency ratio Education and health expenditure versus military expenditure Old age (65 and older) Military expenditurea (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) (% of labour force) (value) (% of GDP) (per 100 people ages 15–64) (% of GDP) HDI rank 2015–2017d 2015–2017d 2015–2018d 2010–2018d 106 Philippines 107 Moldova (Republic of) 108 Turkmenistan 108 Uzbekistan 110 Libya 111 Indonesia 111 Samoa 113 South Africa 114 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 115 Gabon 116 Egypt MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 117 Marshall Islands 118 Viet Nam 119 Palestine, State of 120 Iraq 121 Morocco 122 Kyrgyzstan 123 Guyana 124 El Salvador 125 Tajikistan 126 Cabo Verde 126 Guatemala 126 Nicaragua 129 India 130 Namibia 131 Timor-Leste 132 Honduras 132 Kiribati 134 Bhutan 135
 Bangladesh 135 Micronesia (Federated States of) 137 Sao Tome and Principe 138 Congo 138 Eswatini (Kingdom of) 140 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 141 Vanuatu 142 Ghana 143 Zambia 144 Equatorial Guinea 145 Myanmar 146 Cambodia 147 Kenya 147 Nepal 149 Angola 150 Cameroon 150 Zimbabwe 152 Pakistan 153 Solomon Islands LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 154 Syrian Arab Republic 155 Papua New Guinea 156 Comoros 157 Rwanda 158 Nigeria 159 Tanzania (United Republic of) 159 Uganda 28.5 14.7 .. .. .. 12.0 .. 0.6 0.8 8.9 aa 1.2 .. 13.4 .. –7.0 20.9 12.9 14.1 6.4 6.3 11.7 1.9 14.4 16.3 4.5 –14.6 19.5 .. 23.3 24.5 .. .. –40.4 0.8 –1.2 20.8 q –8.4 9.2 .. 23.1 13.1 –2.2 38.1 –16.3 4.5 –22.2 12.7 .. 11.3 10.7 .. .. .. 34.0 8.9 12.2 10.5 3.8 aa 15.1 .. 5.9 .. .. 9.8 29.9 5.0 20.2 26.1 5.9 28.6 19.8 10.1 .. 0.1 23.9 .. 10.5 5.5 .. 3.4 3.2 2.2 13.4 2.1 10.4 18.1 .. 5.2 3.9 14.8 8.5 13.4 10.7 8.4 22.8 3.9 .. .. 5.8 aa –4.4 1.4 23.1 –9.5 3.1 z 27.1 1.9 3.9 6.8 8.4 3.8 26.9 25.3 47.2 40.2 29.8 n 34.6 .. 18.0 20.6 21.4 16.7 22.4 27.5 24.2 17.8 33.4 35.4 31.1 20.4 27.2 40.4 12.1 22.9 31.0 12.6 22.5 25.5 .. 51.3 31.2 .. .. 18.2 11.7 29.0 26.4 22.0 38.2 15.1 32.8 23.4 18.4 51.8 24.1 22.4 12.6 16.4 .. 27.8 x .. 17.5 24.4 15.5 34.0 24.6 29.9 60.0 .. .. .. 39.8 66.6 51.2 44.0 35.5 54.9 .. 32.3 46.9 28.3 18.7 s 92.7 42.0 37.4 80.1 y 59.8 18.1 30.5 17.6 66.7 28.2 24.3 48.3 19.5 25.8 65.0 .. .. 17.9 34.2 .. 28.6 40.3 .. 17.5 13.5 40.5 41.9 10.2 19.8 13.0 27.9 18.7 .. 26.7 .. 2010–2017d 2030e 2010–2018d 0.1 0.3 .. 0.2 .. 0.1 .. 0.8 0.2 y 0.6 y 0.6 .. 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.1 .. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 .. 0.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.3 .. .. 0.4 0.3 n .. .. 0.1 0.8 0.3 .. ..
 .. 0.2 .. 0.0 0.0 .. .. 0.2 x 0.5 0.2 11.5 24.6 ab 10.8 11.3 9.0 13.5 11.4 9.9 13.7 6.4 10.2 .. 17.9 6.7 ac ad 4.1 1.1 0.3 .. 3.6 15.5 0.7 .. 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.2 .. 2.3 .. 2.7 3.1 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.6 2.4 3.3 0.6 1.7 .. .. 1.4 .. .. 2.5 1.5 0.2 .. 0.4 1.4 0.2 2.9 2.2 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.3 2.2 4.0 .. 4.1 0.3 .. 1.2 0.5 1.2 1.4 Overall loss in HDI value due to inequalityc Gender Inequality Indexc Income share of the poorest 40 percent Average annual change (%) 2010/2018g 2005/2018g 2005/2017 –0.5 –2.9 –3.7 .. .. –0.2 .. 1.3 –4.6 0.8 1.0 .. –0.1 .. .. .. –4.6 –0.1 –2.6 –4.3 .. –2.3 –0.8 –5.4 –2.5 –2.0 –2.1 .. .. –2.2 .. .. –2.7 –2.2 0.1 .. 1.5 0.7 .. .. –3.8 –2.2 –2.4 –2.5 0.1 –3.0 –0.2 .. .. .. 0.4 –2.8 –2.1 –1.5 –2.1 –0.7 –1.7 .. .. –3.3 –1.2 –1.6 0.0 –1.5 –0.7 –1.7 .. –0.1 .. .. –1.2 –3.4 –0.6 –1.4 0.0 .. –1.1 –1.2 –1.6 –1.0 .. –0.5 .. .. –1.2 .. .. –0.5 –0.5 –1.2 .. –0.4 –1.0 .. .. –1.2 –1.3 –2.1 .. –1.1 –0.8 –0.7 .. 0.0 0.7 .. –1.2 .. –0.7 –0.8 0.3 2.2 .. .. .. –1.4 0.5 –0.2 4.4 0.5 0.1 .. 0.1 0.0 –0.6 0.3 1.1 .. 2.9 –0.2 .. 1.4 0.8 –0.5 0.3 1.5 3.2 .. 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.5 –1.4 –0.5 –0.9 .. –0.5 –1.4 .. .. .. 1.6 3.3 4.5 –1.7 .. –0.2 3.4 .. .. 2.1 2.1 –1.1 0.2 –0.1 Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditureb 2010–2016f 5.6 y 35.8 .. .. .. 7.4 .. 13.1 6.9 4.5 3.8 n .. 5.5 .. .. 3.4 y 7.5 6.8 10.5 9.9 17.1 20.4 20.0 3.1 2.7 6.9 8.8 .. .. 2.8 .. .. 1.3 8.1 29.7 .. 26.7 3.3 n .. .. 5.2 7.5 6.3 1.5 5.6 7.0 1.5 .. 2.2 y .. .. 8.0 .. 7.3 6.9 DASHBOARD 5 Socioeconomic sustainability | 345 DASH BOARD5HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century SDG 17.4 SDG 9.5 Economic sustainability SDG 10.1 Social sustainability SDG 5 SDG 10.1 Adjusted net savings Total debt service Gross capital formation Skilled
 labour force Concentration index (exports) Research and development expenditure Dependency ratio Education and health expenditure versus military expenditure Old age (65 and older) Military expenditurea (% of exports of goods, services and primary income) (% of GNI) (% of GDP) (% of labour force) (value) (% of GDP) (per 100 people ages 15–64) (% of GDP) Overall loss in HDI value due to inequalityc Gender Inequality Indexc Income share of the poorest 40 percent Average annual change (%) Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditureb HDI rank 2015–2017d 2015–2017d 2015–2018d 2010–2018d 161 Mauritania 162 Madagascar 163 Benin 164 Lesotho 165 Côte d’Ivoire 166 Senegal 167 Togo 168 Sudan 169 Haiti 170 Afghanistan 171 Djibouti 172 Malawi 173 Ethiopia 174 Gambia 174 Guinea 176 Liberia 177 Yemen 178 Guinea-Bissau 179 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 180 Mozambique 181 Sierra Leone 182 Burkina Faso 182 Eritrea 184 Mali 185 Burundi 186 South Sudan 187 Chad 188 Central African Republic 189 Niger OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES .. Korea (Democratic People’s Rep. of) .. Monaco .. Nauru .. San Marino .. Somalia .. Tuvalu Human development groups Very high human development High human development Medium human development Low human development Developing countries Regions Arab States East Asia and the Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Least developed countries Small island developing states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development World –10.3 7.7 –3.4 8.2 16.6 12.3 q –7.5 0.2 17.6 2.7 –1.8 –16.7 9.3 –12.7 aa –6.5 –99.0 .. –11.0 –4.4 –13.5 –33.5 –9.0 .. –2.3 q –19.0 .. .. .. 5.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.9 16.2 13.2 2.7 14.9 10.4 19.7 9.7 6.8 17.1 –0.1 9.8 .. 8.6 10.9 13.2 3.2 4.2 3.6 17.6 14.2 5.8 4.2 1.5 4.0 11.1 5.7 20.8 16.9 1.4 3.5 14.6 2.4 3.0 5.0 3.8 3.7 .. 4.5 14.4 .. .. .. 15.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.9 10.0 8.9 13.7 16.8 9.0 31.8 24.0 10.7 10.6 8.1 .. .. 14.8 346 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
 REPORT 2019 55.3 15.2 25.8 27.9 19.8 28.7 25.3 19.3 29.0 19.2 57.8 13.4 34.1 17.0 36.2 13.0 .. 10.9 25.8 37.7 18.5 25.7 10.0 23.8 9.2 1.6 19.7 11.4 33.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.1 36.5 28.1 21.9 33.5 27.0 41.6 28.1 20.1 30.3 21.0 29.5 24.0 21.9 26.2 5.8 18.5 17.1 .. 25.5 10.9 47.6 22.8 9.4 19.2 .. 17.6 6.8 12.3 .. 21.1 29.7 .. 43.1 7.1 15.2 3.9 .. 4.7 2.5 .. .. .. 1.8 .. .. 96.5 55.7 .. 50.1 84.7 .. 21.6 22.2 32.5 41.1 .. .. 0.774 0.313 0.352 0.255 .. 0.512 .. 0.552 0.554 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 2010–2017d 2030e 2010–2018d 2010–2016f 2010/2018g 2005/2018g 2005/2017 .. 0.0 .. 0.0 .. 0.8 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 0.1 .. .. .. .. 0.1 y 0.3 .. 0.2 .. 0.3 0.1 .. 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.3 1.5 0.5 .. 1.3 0.6 .. 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 .. .. .. .. .. 5.6 .. 33.2 20.4 11.4 5.7 14.7 9.7 21.7 20.1 17.8 11.9 5.7 7.0 17.1 34.1 18.0 3.0 0.6 0.9 1.8 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.3 0.0 1.0 3.7 n 0.8 0.6 1.1 2.5 0.8 4.0 1.6 0.7 1.0 0.8 2.1 .. 2.9 1.9 1.3 2.1 1.4 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.0 2.1 5.5 1.8 2.4 1.2 2.5 1.1 1.6 .. 2.1 2.2 2.4 12.1 8.5 13.2 n 5.5 5.9 6.3 1.4 y .. 15.1 3.2 x 22.8 12.4 4.9 3.2 19.5 2.5 n 3.3 6.3 12.0 17.2 7.5 .. 2.7 5.1 .. 1.4 2.2 4.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.0 .. 3.3 4.0 4.5 1.7 .. 4.6 10.8 3.0 7.0 3.7 .. 7.8 6.7 –1.1 –1.4 0.7 –0.5 –0.1 –1.3 –0.4 .. –0.1 .. .. –1.3 –2.2 –0.6 –1.6 –1.7 –0.9 –1.4 –1.8 –4.0 –1.2 –2.1 .. –2.3 –2.4 .. –0.5 –0.1 –2.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. –1.1 –2.5 –3.9 –1.7 –2.8 –1.3 –3.0 –3.5 –1.4 –4.5 –1.7 –1.8 –2.1 –0.6 –2.6 .. .. –0.5 –0.5 –0.4 –1.3 –0.8 –1.2 0.3 –1.1 .. –0.5 –1.3 –0.4 .. –0.3 0.2 .. –0.1 –0.7 –0.3 –0.4 .. –0.3 –0.7 .. .. –0.1 –0.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. –2.4 –1.2 –1.2 –0.6 –0.9 –1.0 –0.8 –2.1 –1.1 –1.2 –0.6 –0.8 — –2.3 –0.8 1.5
 –1.5 –2.8 –1.1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.9 .. .. .. –0.3 –0.7 –2.2 2.9 2.4 0.3 –0.6 –4.8 –0.1 –1.8 1.9 2.3 .. 2.4 1.0 .. –1.7 –6.7 2.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — DASHBOARD 5 SOCIOECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITYDASH BOARD5 NOTES Three-colour coding is used to visualize partial grouping of countries and aggregates by indicator.
For each indicator countries are divided into three groups of approximately equal size (terciles): the top third, the middle third and the bottom third.

Aggregates are colour coded using the same tercile cutoffs.

See Technical note 6 at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/hdr2019_technical_notes.pdf for details about partial grouping in this table.

a This column is intentionally left without colour because it is meant to provide context for the indicator on education and health expenditure.
b Data on government expenditure on health and education are available in tables 8 and 9 and at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data.

c A negative value indicates that inequality declined over the period specified.

d Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

e Projections based on medium-fertility variant.

f Data refer to the most recent year for which all three types of expenditure (education, health and military) are available during the period specified.
g The trend data used to calculate the change are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data.

h Includes Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands.

i j k l Includes Liechtenstein.

Includes Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Norfolk Island.

Includes Åland Islands.

Includes Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla.

m Includes Northern Cyprus.

n Refers to 2008. o Refers to 2013. p Includes Sabah and Sarawak.

q Refers to 2014. r s t u v Includes Kosovo.

Includes only intermediate education.


Includes Agalega, Rodrigues and Saint Brandon.

Includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Includes Nagorno-Karabakh.

w Includes Crimea.

x Refers to 2007. y Refers to 2009. z Refers to 2010. aa Refers to 2012. ab Includes Transnistria.

ac Includes East Jerusalem.

ad Includes Zanzibar.


DEFINITIONS Adjusted net savings: Net national savings plus education expenditure and minus energy depletion, mineral depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide and particulate emissions damage.

Net national savings are equal to gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital.
Total debt service: Sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in currency, goods or services on long-term debt; interest paid on short-term debt; and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the International Monetary Fund.

It is expressed as a percentage of exports of goods, services and primary income.

Gross capital formation: Outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in inventories.
Fixed assets include land improvements (such as fences, ditches and drains); plant, machinery and equipment purchases; and construction of roads, railways and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings and commercial and industrial buildings.

Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales as well as goods that are work in progress.

Net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation.
Gross capital formation was formerly known as gross domestic investment.

Skilled labour force: Percentage of the labour force ages 15 and older with intermediate or advanced education, as classified by the International Standard Classification of Education.

Concentration index (exports): A measure of the degree of product concentration in exports from a country (also referred to as the Herfindahl- Hirschmann Index).
A value closer to 0 indicates that a country’s exports are more homogeneously distributed among a series of products (reflecting a well diversified economy); a value closer to 1 indicates that a country’s exports are highly concentrated among a few products.
Research and development expenditure: Current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications.

Research and development covers basic research, applied research and experimental development.
Old-age dependency ratio: Ratio of the population ages 65 and older to the population ages 15–64, expressed as the number of dependants per 100 people of working age (ages 15–64).

Military expenditures: All current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities.
Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditure: Sum of government expenditure on education and health divided by military expenditure.

Overall loss in HDI value due to inequality, average annual change: Percentage change in overall loss in Human Development Index (HDI) value due to inequality over 2010–2018, divided by the respective number of years.
Gender Inequality Index, average annual change: Percentage change in Gender Inequality Index value over 2005–2018, divided by the respective number of years.

Income share of the poorest 40 percent, average annual change: Percentage change of the income share of the poorest 40 percent of the population over 2005–2017, divided by the respective number of years.

MAIN DATA SOURCES Columns 1–3, 6 and 8: World Bank (2019a).

Column 4: ILO (2019).

Column 5: UNCTAD (2019).

Column 7: UNDESA (2019b).


Columns 9 and 12: HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2019a).

Column 10: HDRO calculations based on the Inequality-adjusted HDI time series.

Column 11: HDRO calculations based on the Gender Inequality Index time series.
DASHBOARD 5 Socioeconomic sustainability | 347 DASH BOARD5HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Developing regions Arab States (20 countries or territories) Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, State of Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen East Asia and the Pacific (26 countries) Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam Europe and Central Asia (17 countries) Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela South Asia (9 countries) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Sub-Saharan Africa (46 countries) Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Kingdom of Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe Note: All countries listed in developing regions are included in aggregates for developing countries.
Countries included in aggregates for Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States follow UN classifications, which are available at www.unohrlls.org.

Countries included in aggregates for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are listed at www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm.
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Statistical references | 349 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today:Inequalities in human development in the 21st century Human Development Reports 1990–2019 1990 Concept and Measurement of Human Development 1991 Financing Human Development 1992 Global Dimensions of Human Development 1993 People’s Participation 1994 New Dimensions of Human Security 1995 Gender and Human Development 1996 Economic Growth and Human Development 1997 Human Development to Eradicate Poverty 1998 Consumption for Human Development 1999 Globalization with a Human Face 2000 Human Rights and Human Development 2001 Making New Technologies Work for Human Development 2002 Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World 2003 Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty 2004 Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World 2005 2006 Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World 2007/2008 Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 2009 Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development 2010 The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development 2011 Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All 2013 The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World 2014 2015 Work for Human Development 2016 Human Development for Everyone 2019 Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerability and Building Resilience 350 | HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 Key to HDI countries and ranks, 2018 Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo
 Congo (Democratic Republic of the) Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czechia Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Eswatini (Kingdom of) Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China (SAR) Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of) Korea (Republic of) Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People's Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia (Federated States of) Moldova (Republic of) Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia 142 32 78 126 174 178 123 169 132 4 43 6 129 111 65 120 3 22 29 96 19 102 50 147 132 .. 22 57 122 140 39 93 164 176 110 18 34 21 162 172 61 104 184 28 117 161 66 76 135 107 .. 92 52 121 180 145 130 .. 147 10 14 126 189 158 82 Norway Oman Pakistan Palau Palestine, State of Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Sudan Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania (United Republic of) Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Tuvalu
 Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe 1 47 152 55 119 67 155 98 82 106 32 40 41 52 49 157 73 89 94 111 .. 137 36 166 63 62 181 9 36 24 153 .. 113 186 25 71 168 98 8 2 154 125 159 77 131 167 105 63 91 59 108 .. 159 88 35 15 15 57 108 141 96 118 177 143 150 United Nations Development Programme One United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017 ISBN: 978-92-1-126439-5 www.undp.org Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

In every country many people have little prospect for a better future.

They are without hope, purpose or dignity, watching from society’s sidelines as they see others pulling ahead to ever greater prosperity.

Worldwide many have escaped extreme poverty.

But even more have neither the opportunities nor the resources to control their lives.

Far too often a person’s place in society is still determined by ethnicity, gender or his or her parents’ wealth.

Inequalities.
Inequalities.

The evidence is everywhere.

Inequalities do not always reflect an unfair world, but when they have little to do with rewarding effort, talent or entrepreneurial risk- taking, they can be an affront to human dignity.

Under the shadow of sweeping technological change and the climate crisis, such inequalities in human development hurt societies, weakening social cohesion and people’s trust in government, institutions and each other.
Most hurt economies, wastefully preventing people from reaching their full potential at work and in life.

They often make it harder for political decisions to reflect the aspirations of the whole of society and to protect the planet, if the few pulling ahead flex their power to shape decisions in their interests.

In the extreme, people can take to the streets.

These inequalities in human development are a roadblock to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
They are not just about disparities in income and wealth.

They cannot be accounted for simply by using summary measures of inequality that focus on a single dimension.

And they will shape the prospects of people that may live to see the 22nd century.

This Report explores inequalities in human development by going beyond income, beyond averages and beyond today.
It asks what forms of inequality matter and what drives them, recognizing that pernicious inequalities are generally better thought of as a symptom of broader problems in a society and economy.

It also asks what policies can tackle those drivers—policies that can simultaneously help nations to grow their economies, improve human development and reduce inequality.

It is hard to get a clear picture of inequalities in human development and how they are changing.
In part because they are as broad and multifaceted as life itself.

In part because the measures we rely on, and the data that underpin them, are often inadequate.

Yet important patterns repeat again and again.

In every country the goalposts are moving.

Inequality in human development is high or increasing in the areas expected to become more important in the future.
There has been some progress worldwide in fundamental areas, such as escaping from poverty and receiving a basic education, though important gaps remain.

Yet at the same time, inequalities are widening higher up the ladder of progress.

A human development approach opens new windows on inequalities—why they mat ter, how they manifest themselves and what to do about them—that help create concrete action.
The Report suggests the importance of realigning existing policy goals: emphasizing, for instance, the quality education at all ages—including at the preprimary level—in addition to focusing on primary and secondary enrolment rates.

Many of these aspirations are already reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

It also means addressing power imbalances that are at the heart of many inequalities, such as leveling the economic playing field through antitrust measures.
In some cases, addressing inequalities means tackling social norms embedded deep with a nation’s history and culture.

Many policies comprise options that would enhance both equity and efficiency.

The main reason why they often are not pursued may be linked with the power of entrenched interests who do not stand to gain from change.

The future of inequalities in human development in the 21st century is in our hands.

But we cannot be complacent.


The climate crisis shows that the price of inaction compounds over time, as it feeds further inequality, which can in turn make action on climate more difficult.

Technology is already changing labour markets and lives, but not yet locked-in is the extent to which machines may replace people.

We are, however, approaching a precipice beyond which it will be difficult to recover.

We do have a choice, and we must exercise it now.


H D R 2 0 1 9 | B e y o n d i n c o m e , b e y o n d a v e r a g e s , b e y o n d t o d a y : y