Source document: https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1698752041849.pdf (New Zealand)
Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Public Act Date of assent 1999 No 10 9 March 1999 Contents Title Short Title and commencement Page 3 3 Part 1 Preliminary provisions Interpretation Purpose of this Act Act binds the Crown Interpretation Purpose Crown bound Part 2 Prohibitions and offences Nuclear explosions prohibited Prohibitions and offences also apply in certain cases outside New Zealand Part 3 Information and documents Secretary may seek information Failure to supply information an offence False or misleading statements and documents Part 4 Clarification inspections 10 Clarification inspections Note This Act is administered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade .
3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 1 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Part 5 On-site inspections Purpose of this part 11 Purpose of this Part Access by international inspectors 12 13 On-site inspections Persons who may accompany international inspectors 14 Ministerial directions Directions New Zealand assistance with on-site inspections Appointment of New Zealand officials Identification certificates Enforcement Search warrants Search without warrant Obligations of persons accompanying international inspectors Obstruction of international inspectors Part 6 Miscellaneous provisions Self-Incrimination 21 Self-incrimination 22 Regulations Regulations Application to Tokelau 23 Application to Tokelau Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 24 Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 Schedule Extracts from the English text of The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 13 14 2 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 1 s 2 An Act Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to implement in the law of New Zealand the BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 1 (1) (2) Short Title and commencement This Act may be cited as the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999.
This Act comes into force on a date to be appointed by the Governor-General by Order in Council.
Part 1 Preliminary provisions Interpretation 2 (1) Interpretation In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— clarification inspection has the meaning given to it by section 10(2) international inspector means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat, according to the procedures set out in the Protocol to the Treaty, to carry out an on-site inspection in accordance with the Treaty; and includes an inspection as- sistant as defined in the Treaty Minister means the Minister of the Crown who, under the au- thority of a warrant or with the authority of the Prime Minister, is for the time being responsible for the administration of this Act Secretary means the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Treaty means the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, done at New York on 24 September 1996 (a copy of extracts from the English text of which is set out in the Schedule); and includes the Annexes to the Treaty, the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Annexes to the Protocol, and any amendments to, or substitutions of, those documents, that are, or will become, binding on New Zealand from time to time.
3 Part 1 s 3 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 (2) 3 (1) (2) Terms and expressions used and not defined in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, have the same meaning as in the Treaty.

Compare: 1996 No 37 s 2 Purpose of this Act Purpose The purpose of this Act is to implement New Zealand’s obli- gations under the Treaty.

Every person exercising a power or discretion conferred under this Act must have regard to New Zealand’s obligations under the Treaty.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 4 Act binds the Crown 4 Crown bound This Act binds the Crown.

Part 2 Prohibitions and offences Nuclear explosions prohibited 5 (1) No person may— (a) (b) carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; or cause, encourage, or in any way participate in, the carry- ing out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Every person who engages in conduct prohibited by subsec- tion (1) commits an offence.
Every person who commits an offence against subsection (2) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000,000.

(2) (3) (4) Nothing in subsections (1) to (3) limits the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987.
4 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 3 s 7 6 (1) (2) 7 (1) Prohibitions and offences also apply in certain cases outside New Zealand Section 5 applies to acts done or omitted to be done outside New Zealand— (a) (b) by a New Zealand citizen; or by any other person on board a New Zealand ship or New Zealand aircraft.
(b) If an offence against section 5(2) is alleged to have occurred anywhere outside New Zealand,— (a) an information may be laid only with the consent of the Attorney-General and on his or her certificate that it is expedient that the information be laid: before the Attorney-General’s consent has been ob- tained, a person may be arrested, or a warrant for a person’s arrest may be issued and executed, and the person may be remanded in custody or on bail, but no further or other proceedings are to be taken until that consent has been obtained.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 5 Part 3 Information and documents Secretary may seek information This section applies if the Secretary considers that any person is capable of giving information relevant to— (a) clarification of a matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with Article I of the Treaty, which New Zealand must provide to another State Party on a request under paragraph 29 of Article IV of the Treaty; or clarification as may be necessary to resolve an ambigu- ity that has arisen during an on-site inspection, which New Zealand, if it is the inspected State Party, must provide to an on-site inspection team under paragraph 61(g) of Part II of the Protocol to the Treaty; or the implementation of the Treaty or the enforcement of this Act.
(b) (c) 5 Part 3 s 8 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Secretary may, by written notice given to a person, require the person to give to the Secretary such information as is spe- cified in the notice, within such reasonable period and in such manner as is specified in the notice.
Information required by a notice under subsection (2) must be given in writing and,— (a) if given by a natural person, must be signed by the per- son; and if given by a body corporate, must be signed by an offi- cer authorised to sign on behalf of the body corporate.

The Secretary may, by written notice given to a person, require the person to give to the Secretary particular documents, or documents of a particular kind, specified in the notice, within such reasonable period as is specified in the notice.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 14 (b) Failure to supply information an offence Every person commits an offence who, without reasonable ex- cuse, fails to comply with a notice under section 7 to the extent that the person is capable of complying with it.

Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding $100,000.
False or misleading statements and documents Every person commits an offence who, in any document pre- pared under section 7, makes a statement or omits any matter knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the statement or omission makes the document false or misleading in a mater- ial particular.

Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding $100,000.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 15 (2) (3) (4) 8 (1) (2) 9 (1) (2) 6 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 5 s 11 Part 4 Clarification inspections 10 (1) (2) (3) 11 Clarification inspections This section applies if another State Party, without having made a request for an on-site inspection under paragraph 34 of Article IV of the Treaty, requests New Zealand to clarify, either directly or through the Organization, whether or not at a place in New Zealand there has been non-compliance with Article I of the Treaty.
If this section applies, a member of the police may enter the place and conduct an inspection (a clarification inspection) of the place.

For the purposes of subsection (2),— (a) sections 17 and 19 apply (with necessary modification) as if the clarification inspection were an on-site inspec- tion; and the member of the police has the functions contem- plated, and the powers provided for, in the Treaty for on-site inspections by an international inspector.
(b) Part 5 On-site inspections Purpose of this part Purpose of this Part The purpose of this Part is to facilitate on-site inspections under the Treaty by— (a) confirming the right of international inspectors to in- spect places in New Zealand within an on-site inspec- tion area; and enabling New Zealand officers to secure access for an international inspector where consent is not, or may not be, obtainable; and enabling New Zealand officers to accompany or assist an international inspector.
(b) (c) Compare: 1996 No 37 s 16 7 Part 5 s 12 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Access by international inspectors 12 13 On-site inspections An international inspector has the right, and every person must permit an international inspector, to— (a) enter a place in New Zealand within an on-site inspec- tion area in accordance with the Treaty; and inspect the place in accordance with the Treaty; and exercise, in connection with the on-site inspection, a function contemplated, or a power provided for, in the Treaty.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 18 (b) (c) Persons who may accompany international inspectors To facilitate on-site inspections, an international inspector may be accompanied by— (a) up to 3 observers for the purposes of giving effect to paragraph 61 of Article IV of the Treaty: a person appointed by the Minister under section 15: a member of the police.
(b) (c) Compare: 1996 No 37 s 19 Directions 14 Ministerial directions (1) The Minister may, by notice in writing, issue directions to any person for the purpose of facilitating an on-site inspec- tion under the Treaty.

Every person commits an offence who wilfully fails to comply with a direction given by the Minister under subsection (1).

Every person who commits an offence against subsection (2) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 20 New Zealand assistance with on-site inspections Appointment of New Zealand officials The Minister may appoint any person to accompany or assist an international inspector.

Compare: 1996 No 37 s 21 (2) (3) 15 8 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 5 s 17 16 Identification certificates The Minister may issue a certificate identifying an inter- national inspector or other person authorised to accompany or assist an international inspector.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 22 Enforcement Search warrants 17 (1) A District Court Judge, Justice, Community Magistrate, or Registrar (not being a member of the police) may, on an ap- plication, issue a search warrant in respect of a place in New Zealand if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for be- lieving that— (a) (b) the place is within an on-site inspection area; and entry to the place is necessary for the purpose of exercis- ing any function contemplated, or any power provided for, in the Treaty.
(2) An application under subsection (1)— (a) may not be made unless the consent of a person in con- trol of the place is not, or may not be, obtainable; and (b) must be made in writing by a member of the police or person appointed under section 15; and (c) must include a copy of relevant provisions of the Treaty and a copy of the inspection mandate.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), consent means consent to an international inspector, and any person accompanying or assisting the inspector, entering the place to exercise any func- tion contemplated, or any power provided for, in the Treaty.
(4) A warrant issued under subsection (1)— (a) authorises the international inspector (and any person authorised to accompany or assist the inspector) to en- ter the place, at any time within 14 days of the issue of the warrant (or within such further time as the Judge, Justice, Community Magistrate, or Registrar may spe- cify in the warrant) for the purpose of exercising any function contemplated, or any power provided for, in the Treaty: 9 Part 5 s 18 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 (b) authorises a member of the police, or person appointed under section 15, who accompanies the international in- spector, to use such force as is reasonable in the circum- stances for effecting entry to or inspection of a place specified in the warrant (including force to break down a door or break open anything in the place): (c) may be issued without conditions or subject to any con- ditions the Judge, Justice, Community Magistrate, or Registrar thinks fit.
Search without warrant In the circumstances set out in subsection (2) an international inspector (and any member of the police, or person appointed under section 15) may exercise the powers in section 17(4) in respect of a place as if a warrant under section 17(1) had been issued in respect of the place.
The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are that a mem- ber of the police, or person appointed under section 15, is satis- fied that there are reasonable grounds for believing, in respect of the place, that— (a) there are grounds for the issue of a warrant under section 17(1); and it is not practicable to obtain possession of a warrant immediately; and delaying entry until a warrant can be obtained would create a real risk that the exercise of a function contem- plated, or a power provided for, in the Treaty, would be frustrated.
(b) (c) Obligations of persons accompanying international inspectors Every person who accompanies an international inspector on an inspection— (a) must carry any identification certificate issued to him or her under section 16 or another means of identifying himself or herself as a person authorised to accompany or assist an international inspector; and 18 (1) (2) 19 (1) 10 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 5 s 20 (b) must produce the identification certificate or other means of identification to any person appearing to be in charge of a place entered— (i) on entering the place (if such a person is then present); and at any reasonable time afterwards, if asked to do so by the person; and (ii) (c) must have any warrant (whether issued under section 17 or otherwise) authorising entry to the place with him or her and produce it if required to do so; and if any thing is seized, must ensure that an occupier or person in charge of the place is given a written inventory of all things seized.
(d) If there is no person appearing to be in charge of the place at any time between the time of entry and the time the inspection concerned has been completed, every person who accompan- ies an international inspector on the inspection must, as soon as practicable after the inspection is completed, ensure that an occupier or person in charge of the place is given a written no- tice stating that the place has been entered, and specifying— (a) (b) (c) If a person appointed under section 15 discovers any offence or suspected offence under this Act as a result of accompanying an international inspector on an on-site inspection, the person must report that offence or suspected offence to the police as soon as practicable after the completion of that inspection.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 25 the time and date of entry: the circumstances and purpose of entry: the name of every person entering.

Obstruction of international inspectors Every person commits an offence who wilfully obstructs, hin- ders, resists, or deceives any international inspector who is ex- ercising in New Zealand any function contemplated, or any power provided for, in the Treaty.
(2) (3) 20 (1) (2) Nothing in subsection (1) applies to a refusal to give consent to entry by an international inspector who is not acting pursuant to section 18 or a search warrant (whether issued under section 17 or otherwise).

11 Part 6 s 21 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 (3) Every person who commits an offence against subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding $20,000.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 26 Part 6 Miscellaneous provisions Self-Incrimination Self-incrimination 21 (1) A person is not excused from answering a question or giving any information or document under this Act or the Treaty on the ground that to do so may incriminate or tend to incriminate that person.
(2) A self-incriminating statement or document made or given under this Act or the Treaty is not admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings against that person except on the pros- ecution of that person for an offence against section 9(1) in relation to that statement or document.
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 28 Regulations Regulations The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council, make regulations for all or any of the following pur- poses: (a) providing for any matter that is necessary or desirable for the purpose of implementing the Treaty or any agreement or arrangement that is concluded between New Zealand and the Organization under the Treaty: prescribing offences in respect of the contravention of or non-compliance with any provision of any regula- tions made under this section, and prescribing fines, not exceeding $5,000, that may, on summary conviction, be imposed in respect of any such offence: providing for such other matters as are contemplated by or necessary for giving full effect to this Act and for its due administration.
(b) (c) 22 (1) 12 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Part 6 s 24 (2) The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council,— (a) amend the Schedule by making such amendments to the text of the extracts of the Treaty set out in the Schedule as are required to bring that text up to date: revoke the Schedule, and substitute a new schedule set- ting out in an up-to-date form the text of the extracts of the Treaty.
(b) (3) Any order made under subsection (2) is a regulation for the purposes of the Acts and Regulations Publication Act 1989 and the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989.

Compare: 1996 No 37 s 29(1) Application to Tokelau Application to Tokelau 23 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (4), this Act is in force in Tokelau.
(2) A prosecution for an offence under this Act alleged to have been committed in Tokelau is to be heard and determined by the High Court of New Zealand in the exercise of its powers under section 3 of the Tokelau Amendment Act 1986.

(3) An application for a search warrant under section 17(1) in re- spect of a place in Tokelau is to be heard and determined by a Judge of the High Court of New Zealand.
In the application of this Act to Tokelau, unless the context otherwise requires,— (a) a reference in this Act to New Zealand (when used as a territorial description) is a reference to Tokelau: the reference to the Minister in section 14 is a reference to the Council of Faipule.

(b) (4) Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 24 Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 Amendment(s) incorporated in the Act(s).
Compare: 1996 No 37 s 31 13 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Schedule Extracts from the English text of The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty s 2(1) [This table is not part of the Treaty and is included for convenience] Preamble 1.

Basic Obligations 2.

The Organization 3.

National Implementation Measures 4.

Verification 5.

Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions 6.
Settlement of Disputes 7.

Amendments 8. Review of the Treaty 9.

Duration and Withdrawal 10.

Status of the Protocol and Annexes 11.

Signature 12.

Ratification 13.

Accession 14.

Entry into Force 15.

Reservations 16.

Depositary 14 Page 15 17 17 31 32 52 53 54 56 57 58 58 58 58 58 59 59 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 PREAMBLE The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued 17.
Authentic Texts Annex 1 to the Treaty – List of States Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28 Annex 2 to the Treaty – List of States Pursuant to Article XIV Protocol 1.

The International Monitoring System and International Data Centre functions 2.

On-site Inspections 3.
Confidence-Building Measures Annex 1 to the Protocol (extracts only) – Tables listing stations and laboratories Annex 2 to the Protocol – List of Characterization Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening 60 60 62 62 62 71 98 100 101 PREAMBLE The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “the States Parties”), Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implemen- tation of such agreements and measures, Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons 15 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures, Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and pro- gressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test ex- plosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarma- ment and non-proliferation in all its aspects, Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament, Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
 comprehensive nu- clear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discon- tinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could con- tribute to the protection of the environment, Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, Have agreed as follows: 16 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 1.
2.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article I Basic Obligations Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from caus- ing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Article II The Organization A.


General Provisions The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nu- clear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as the Organization) to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, includ- ing those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

All States Parties shall be members of the Organization.
A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Or- ganization.

The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Aus- tria.

There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre.

Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty.
States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, 17 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued including procedures within the framework of the United Na- tions and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the imple- mentation of the provisions, of this Treaty.
The Organization shall conduct its verification activities pro- vided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner pos- sible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives.

It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty.
It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities com- ing to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty.

Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty.
It shall treat such information and data exclu- sively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty.

The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Confer- ence of the States Parties for approval.

The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account dif- ferences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.

6.

7.

8.

9.
6.

7.

8.

9.

18 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued 10.

Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget.

11.
11.

A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the pay- ment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years.

The Conference of the States Par- ties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

B.
B.

The Conference of the States Parties Composition, Procedures and Decision-making 12.

13.

14.

The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) shall be composed of all States Parties.

Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.

The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.
The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise.

15.

A special session of the Conference shall be convened: when decided by the Conference; (a) (b) when requested by the Executive Council; or (c) when requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties.
The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of the Execu- tive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.

19 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued 16.

17.

18.

19.

The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII.
The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in accordance with Article VIII.

Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.

The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure.

At the be- ginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required.

They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next ses- sion.

20.
20.

A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.

21.

22.

Each State Party shall have one vote.

The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting.

Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by con- sensus.
If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period.

If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Confer- ence shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty.
When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of sub- stance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of sub- stance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

23.

When exercising its function under paragraph 26(k), the Con- ference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22.
Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference 20 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus.

Powers and Functions 24.

25.

26.

The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organiza- tion.
It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Sec- retariat, in accordance with this Treaty.

It may make recom- mendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and re- view compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose.

It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.
The Conference shall: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual pro- gramme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports; decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 9; elect the members of the Executive Council; appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secre- tariat (hereinafter referred to as the Director-General); consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Ex- ecutive Council submitted by the latter; consider and review scientific and technological devel- opments that could affect the operation of this Treaty.
In this context, the Conference may direct the Director- General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to en- able him or her, in the performance of his or her func- 21 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued tions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Confer- ence, to the Executive Council, or to States Parties.
In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be com- posed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty; take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V; consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other docu- ments developed and recommended by the Preparatory Commission; consider and approve agreements or arrangements ne- gotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be con- cluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Or- ganization in accordance with paragraph 38(h); establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accord- ance with paragraph 23.
(g) (h) (i) (j) (k) C. The Executive Council Composition, Procedures and Decision-making The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members.

Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the pro- visions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council.

27.

22 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued 28.

29.
29.

Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distri- bution the Executive Council shall comprise: ten States Parties from Africa; (a) seven States Parties from Eastern Europe; (b) nine States Parties from Latin America and the (c) Caribbean; seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia; ten States Parties from North America and Western Eu- rope; and eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.
(d) (e) (f) All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to this Treaty.

Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26(k).

It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII.

The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference.
In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows: (a) at least one-third of the seats allocated to each geo- graphical region shall be filled, taking into account pol- itical and security interests, by States Parties in that re- gion designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative cri- teria in the order of priority determined by each region: number of monitoring facilities of the Inter- (i) national Monitoring System; expertise and experience in monitoring technol- ogy; and contribution to the annual budget of the Organ- ization; (iii) (ii) 23 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued (b) (c) one of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter.
A State Party des- ignated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat.

In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunci- ation to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order according to this sub-paragraph; and the remaining seats allocated to each geographical re- gion shall be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or elections.
Each member of the Executive Council shall have one repre- sentative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28.
The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.

The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions.

Be- tween regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

24 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 35.

36.

37.

38.
36.

37.

38.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.

The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of pro- cedure by a majority of all its members.

The Executive Coun- cil shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty.
When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.

Powers and Functions The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Or- ganization.

It shall be responsible to the Conference.

It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty.
In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation.
The Executive Council shall: (a) promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty; supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat; (b) (c) make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty; cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party; consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft re- port of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own activ- ities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request; make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda; (d) (e) (f) 25 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued (g) (h) (i) (j) examine proposals for changes, on matters of an admin- istrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the An- nexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recom- mendations to the States Parties regarding their adop- tion; conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub-paragraph (i); approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verifica- tion activities with States Parties and other States; and approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be pro- posed by the Technical Secretariat.
The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.

The Executive Council shall: (a) facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and be- tween States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges; facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and receive, consider and take action on requests for, and re- ports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV.
(b) (c) The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty.

In doing so, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Par- ties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take 39.

40.

41.
40.

41.

26 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued measures to redress the situation within a specified time.
To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the fol- lowing measures: (a) (b) notify all States Parties of the issue or matter; bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Confer- ence; (c) make recommendations to the Conference or take ac- tion, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V. D. The Technical Secretariat 42.

43.
43.

The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the im- plementation of this Treaty.

The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the per- formance of their functions.

The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty.
The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre.
The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to veri- fication of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia: (a) being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System; operating the International Data Centre; routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data; providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations; assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consult- ation and clarification among States Parties; (b) (c) (d) (e) 27 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued (f) (h) (g) receiving requests for on-site inspections and process- ing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council; negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and assisting the States Parties through their National Au- thorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty.
The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verifi- cation regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Proto- col.

These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council.
The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.
The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to ad- ministrative matters shall include: (a) preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization; preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request; providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs; (b) (c) 44.
45.

28 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued (d) (e) addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations.

46.
46.

All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organ- ization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General.

Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty.

In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted re- quest or notification.

48.

47.
48.

47.

With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Sec- retariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System.

Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Or- ganization.
The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Execu- tive Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.

The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.
The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not there- after.

The first Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission.

49.
49.

29 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secre- tariat.
The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of profes- sional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and in- tegrity.

Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Dir- ector-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff.

Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.

The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues.
In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Govern- ment or from any other source external to the Organization.

They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization.

The Director-General shall assume respon- sibility for the activities of an inspection team.
Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such 50.

51.

52.

53.

54.
51.

52.

53.

54.

30 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article II—continued legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are ne- cessary for the exercise of its functions.

55.
55.

Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Dir- ector-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such priv- ileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent ex- ercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.
The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organiza- tion and the State Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated.

Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 26(h) and (i).

56.

57.
56.

57.

Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and im- munities enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Tech- nical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.

Article III National Implementation Measures 1.

Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obli- gations under this Treaty.
In particular, it shall take any neces- sary measures: (a) to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; to prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and (b) 31 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article III—continued (c) to prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.
Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.

Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article.

In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it.
The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

Article IV Verification A.

General Provisions an International Monitoring System; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures.
In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elem- ents: (a) (b) (c) (d) At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.
Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible con- sistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their 2.

3.

4.

1.

2.

32 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 3.

4.

5. objectives.
4.

5. objectives.

Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.
Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate, through its National Authority established pur- suant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of com- pliance with this Treaty by inter alia: (a) establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the neces- sary communication; providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System; participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clari- fication process; permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and participating, as appropriate, measures.
in confidence-building (b) (c) (d) (e) All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and as- sume the equal obligation to accept verification.

For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be pre- cluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.

6.
6.

Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sen- sitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5.

Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty.

7.
7.

33 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities.
Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organiza- tion through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.

The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as re- stricting the international exchange of data for scientific pur- poses.
Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organiza- tion and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verifica- tion potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty.
Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accord- ance with Article II, paragraph 44.
The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes.
The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a man- ner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

34 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat 14.
In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the States Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the pur- pose of this Treaty: (a) make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to main- tain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task; routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing: (i) (b) (ii) (iii) receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System; receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-build- ing measures; and receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol; (c) (d) supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component in elements, and of the International Data Centre, accordance with the relevant operational manuals; routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns; (e) make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State 35 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (i) (f) (h) (g) Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Art- icle; provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data; store all data, both raw and processed,
 and reporting products; coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring System; coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party; provide technical assistance in, and support for, the in- stallation and operation of monitoring facilities and re- spective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned; (k) make available to any State Party, upon its request, tech- niques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its Inter- national Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the Inter- national Data Centre.
(j) (l) The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.

B.
B.

The International Monitoring System The International Monitoring System shall comprise facil- ities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communica- 15.

16.

36 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 17.

18.

19.
18.

19.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued tion, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat.

The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat.

All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and op- erated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.
Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the inter- national exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre.

Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority.
Funding the International Monitoring System For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agree- ments or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of: (a) establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentica- tion procedures; transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the in- most direct and cost effective means available, cluding, if necessary, via appropriate communications (b) (c) 37 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analyti- cal facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and (d) analysing samples on behalf of the Organization.
For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of: (a) (b) (c) transmitting data to the International Data Centre; authenticating data from such stations; upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; if necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant oper- ational manuals.
(d) (e) The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol.

The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or prod- ucts shall be met by the requesting State Party.
The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking re- sponsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring Sys- tem shall contain provisions for meeting these costs.

Such pro- visions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19(a) and 20(c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, 20.

21.

22.
21.

22.

38 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization.

Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 percent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over succes- sive years.
A State Party may share such a reduction with an- other State Party by agreement or arrangement between them- selves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council.

The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26(h) and 38(i).

Changes to the International Monitoring System 23.


Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the Inter- national Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorpor- ated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6.
The following changes to the International Monitoring Sys- tem, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8: (a) 24. changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and changes to other details for particular facilities as re- flected in the Tables of Annex I to the Protocol (includ- ing, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; loca- tion; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks).
(b) 25.
The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8(b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24: a technical evaluation of the proposal; (a) 39 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (b) (c) a statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and a report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement.
Temporary Arrangements In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitor- ing facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitor- ing coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the ap- proval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrange- ments of no more than one year’s duration, renewable if neces- sary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year.
Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational man- ual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization.

The Director-General shall fur- thermore take steps to rectify the situation and make propos- als for its permanent resolution.
The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph.

Cooperating National Facilities States Parties may also separately establish cooperative ar- rangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from na- tional monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System.

Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows: 26.

27.

28.
40 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (a) (b) (c) upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps re- quired to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data.
Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility.
The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as ap- propriate; the Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and the International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party.
The conditions under which supplementary data from such fa- cilities are made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network.

C. Consultation and Clarification 29.


Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among them- selves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.
41 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 30.

A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request.
The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response.

31.

A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-Gen- eral to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause con- cern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.

The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat rele- vant to such a concern.
The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information pro- vided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party.

32.

A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compli- ance with the basic obligations of this Treaty.
In such a case, the following shall apply: (a) (b) (c) (d) the Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt; the requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after receipt of the request; the Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt; if the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Ex- ecutive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party.
The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for clarification pursuant to 42 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued this paragraph as well as any response provided by the re- quested State Party.
If the requesting State Party considers the clarification ob- tained under paragraph 32(d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Ex- ecutive Council shall be entitled to take part.
At such a meet- ing, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V. D. On-site Inspections Request for an On-Site Inspection Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part 2 of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.
The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.

The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37.
The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.

The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combin- ation thereof.

The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.
43 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 38.

The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing.

39.

40.
39.

40.

Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immedi- ately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.

The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection re- quest, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the request- ing State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours.
The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the re- quirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in fil- ing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours.

42.

41.

When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay.
The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request.

43.
43.

A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide the Director-General with ex- planations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification.

The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit im- mediately to the Executive Council any additional information 44.
44 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued available from the International Monitoring System or pro- vided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Tech- nical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.

45.
45.

Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46.

Executive Council Decisions 46.

The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site in- spection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the re- quest from the requesting State Party.
The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council.

If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken.

47.

No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspec- tion in accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-Gen- eral, a progress inspection report.
The continuation of the in- spection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection.
If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be termin- ated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as pos- sible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-Gen- eral, a proposal to conduct drilling.

The Executive Council 48.


45 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 49. shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal.

The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.
The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to extend the inspection dura- tion by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspec- tion team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate.
The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period.

The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request.

The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council.

50.
50.

Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspec- tion team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the inspec- tion.

Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after re- ceipt of the recommendation, decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspec- tion.
In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the in- spected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.

The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting.
The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection.

51.

46 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 52.
The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50.

Follow-up after Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection 53.

An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.
The inspection team shall ar- rive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection re- quest from the requesting State Party.

The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection.

The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.

The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection.
The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.

54.

54.

56.

57.

The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdic- tion or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol.
However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control.
In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Proto- col, the inspected State Party shall have: (a) the right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty 47 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (b) (c) (d) (e) and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate; the right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection; the obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures; the obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and the obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol.
Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area.

The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely ac- complishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol.
Wherever pos- sible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty.

The inspectors shall seek only the information and data ne- cessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party.

58.
58.

48 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued 59.

60.

The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task.
If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.

61.
With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: Observer (a) (b) (c) (d) the requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection; the inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council; in case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol; the inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the pro- posed observer, but if the inspected State Party exer- cises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspec- tion report.
There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties.

Reports of an On-Site Inspection 62.
Inspection reports shall contain: (a) a description of the activities conducted by the inspec- tion team; 49 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (b) (c) (d) (e) the factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection; an account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection; a factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspec- tion.
Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report.

The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party.

The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat.
The Dir- ector-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them.

The Director-Gen- eral shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report.

The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties.
The Dir- ector-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the Inter- national Monitoring System, the assessments of the request- ing and inspected States Parties, as well as any other infor- mation that the Director-General deems relevant.

In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, 63.
64.

50 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 65.

66.

67.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued the Director-General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph.
The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any mater- ial provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to: (a) whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has oc- curred; and (b) whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused.
If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be ne- cessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropri- ate measures in accordance with Article V. Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspec- tion on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situ- ation, including the following: (a) requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat; suspending the right of the requesting State Party to re- quest an on-site inspection for a period of time, as de- termined by the Executive Council; and suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time.
(b) (c) E. Confidence-building Measures 68.
In order to: 51 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article IV—continued (a) (b) contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions; and assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitor- ing System, each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in implementing relevant meas- ures as set out in Part 3 of the Protocol.
Article V Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recom- mendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compli- ance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.
In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Con- ference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the ex- ercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.
In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law.

The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Ex- ecutive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant infor- mation and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations.

1.

2.

3.

4.
1.

2.

3.

4.

52 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article VI Settlement of Disputes 1.

Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the in- terpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

3.

2.
When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, re- lating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the ex- peditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, re- ferral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken.
The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or interpret- ation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Par- ties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Confer- ence and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Ex- ecutive Council.

The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26(j).
The Conference and the Executive Council are separately em- powered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question aris- ing within the scope of the activities of the Organization.

An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article II, paragraph 38(h).

5.

4.
5.

4.

53 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article VI—continued 6.

This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V. Article VII Amendments At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol.

Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto.
Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6.

Proposals for changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.

The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference.
Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal.
If a majority of the States Parties no- tify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circula- tion that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately fol- lowing a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Confer- ence request that it be held earlier.
In no case shall an Amend- ment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.

Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.

Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or accept- 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

54 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article VII—continued 7.

8 ance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts 1 and 3 of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with para- graph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature.

All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8.
Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures: (a) the text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted to- gether with the necessary information to the Director- General.

Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General.
The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Deposit- ary; no later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-Gen- eral shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its pos- sible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such in- formation to all States Parties and the Executive Coun- cil; the Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7.
No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Coun- cil shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate ex- planations, to all States Parties for consideration.
States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days; if the Executive Council recommends to all States Par- ties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days 55 (b) (c) (d) Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article VII—continued after receipt of the recommendation.
If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recom- mendation; if a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session; the Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph; changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of noti- fication by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
(e) (f) (g) Article VIII Review of the Treaty Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty.
On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

If the Review Conference decides by con- sensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending 1.
56 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article VIII—continued to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions.

Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII.
At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Confer- ences may be convened with the same objective, if the Con- ference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year.

Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.

Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference pro- vided for in Article II.
Article IX Duration and Withdrawal This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Confer- ences may be convened with the same objective, if the Con- ference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year.

Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance.

2.

3.

1.

2.

3.
2.

3.

1.

2.

3.

Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council.

Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.
57 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article X Status of the Protocol and the Annexes The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty.

Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the An- nexes to the Protocol.

Article XI Signature This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.
Article XII Ratification This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories ac- cording to their respective constitutional processes.

Article XIII Accession Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.
Article XIV Entry Into Force This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depos- itary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States.

That Conference shall examine the 1.

2.


58 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article XIV—continued extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accel- erate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early en- try into force of this Treaty.
Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signa- ture of this Treaty, until its entry into force.

All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers.
For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

3.

4.

5.

Article XV Reservations The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incom- patible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

Article XVI Depositary 1.

2.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the De- positary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instru- ments of ratification and instruments of accession.
The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.

59 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Article XVI—continued 3.

4.
4.

The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.

This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVII Authentic Texts This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Annex 1 to the Treaty List of States Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28 Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Eastern Europe Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
60 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Annex 1 to the Treaty—continued Latin America and the Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
North America and Western Europe Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liecht- enstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.
61 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Annex 2 to the Treaty List of States Pursuant to Article XIV List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 ses- sion of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the Inter- national Atomic Energy Agency’s April 1996 edition of Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, and of States members of the Confer- ence on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s December 1995 edition of Nuclear Research Reactors in the World: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.
Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Part I The International Monitoring System and International Data Centre Functions A.

General Provisions The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitor- ing facilities as set out in Article IV, paragraph 16, and respect- ive means of communication.

The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System shall consist of those facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Protocol.

The International Monitoring Sys- 1.

2.


62 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued tem shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements spe- cified in the relevant operational manuals.
The Organization, in accordance with Article II, shall, in co- operation and consultation with the States Parties, with other States, and with international organizations as appropriate, es- tablish and coordinate the operation and maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the International Monitoring System.
In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures, a State Party or other State hosting or other- wise taking responsibility for International Monitoring Sys- tem facilities and the Technical Secretariat shall agree and co- operate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing, and maintaining monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in conformity with inter- national law.
Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the security and authentication requirements and technical speci- fications contained in the relevant operational manuals.

Such a State shall give the Technical Secretariat authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment and communi- cation links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet agreed requirements.
The Technical Secretariat shall provide to such States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Ex- ecutive Council to be required for the proper functioning of the facility as part of the International Monitoring System.

Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibil- ity for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be set out in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in each case.

3.

4.

5.
3.

4.

5.

63 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued B. Seismological Monitoring Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of seismological data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty.

This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of pri- mary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations.
These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed proced- ures to the International Data Centre.

The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 sta- tions specified in Table 1-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol.

These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Moni- toring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data.
Uninterrupted data from the primary stations shall be trans- mitted, directly or through a national data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre.

To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations shall provide information, directly or through a national data centre, to the International Data Centre upon request.

The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol.
The auxiliary stations shall fulfill the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data.

Data from the auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.
C. Radionuclide Monitoring Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of data on radionuclides in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty.

This cooper- ation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and certified la- 6.

7.

8.

9.

64 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 10.

11.
11.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued boratories.

The network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.

The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the at- mosphere shall comprise an overall network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol.

All sta- tions shall be capable of monitoring for the presence of rele- vant particulate matter in the atmosphere.
Forty of these sta- tions shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into force of this Treaty.

For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall ap- prove a recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring.
At its first regu- lar annual session, the Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for implementing noble gas monitoring capability throughout the network.

The Director-General shall prepare a report to the Conference on the modalities for such implemen- tation.

All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data.
The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by laboratories, which shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with the relevant op- erational manual for the performance, on contract to the Organization and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations.
Laboratories specified in Table 2-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and ap- propriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations.

With the agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be certified by the Technical Secretariat to perform the routine analysis of samples from manual monitoring stations where necessary.
All certified laboratories shall provide the results 65 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and in so doing shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual on Radionuclide Moni- toring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data.
D. Hydroacoustic Monitoring Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of hydroacoustic data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty.

This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of hydroa- coustic monitoring stations.

These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.
The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the sta- tions specified in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six hydrophone and five T-phase stations.

These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data.
E. Infrasound Monitoring Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of infrasound data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty.

This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of infra- sound monitoring stations.

These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.
The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 4 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall com- prise an overall network of 60 stations.

These stations shall fulfil the technical an operational requirements specified in the 12.

13.

14.

15.

66 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 16.

17.

18.
17.

18.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the Inter- national Exchange of Infrasound Data.

F. International Data Centre Functions The International Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from International Moni- toring System facilities, including the results of analysis con- ducted at certified laboratories.
The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the International Data Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of standard range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated in the Operational Man- ual for the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed.
The procedures and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by the Confer- ence at its initial session.

International Data Centre Standard Products The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic processing methods and interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring System data in order to pro- duce and archive standard International Data Centre products on behalf of all States Parties.
These products shall be pro- vided at no cost to States Parties and shall be without preju- dice to final judgements with regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall include: (a) integrated lists of all signals detected by the Inter- national Monitoring System, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, including the values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters; 67 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to each event by the International Data Cen- tre of standard event screening criteria, making, use of the characterization parameters specified in Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterising, highlighting in the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out, events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenom- ena.
The standard event bulletin shall indicate numeri- cally for each event the degree to which that event meets or does not meet the event screening criteria.

In ap- plying standard event screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and supplementary screen- ing criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable.
The International Data Centre shall progres- sively enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained in the operation of the International Monitoring System; executive summaries, which summarize the data ac- quired and archived by the International Data Centre, the products of the International Data Centre, and the performance and operational status of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and extracts or subsets of the standard International Data Centre products specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request of an individual State Party.
(b) (c) (d) The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties, special studies to provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from the International Moni- toring System, if requested by the Organization or by a State Party, to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters.

19.
19.

68 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued International Data Centre Services to States Parties 20.
The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or processed, all International Data Centre products, and all other International Monitoring System data in the archive of the International Data Centre or, through the International Data Centre, of International Moni- toring System facilities.
The methods for supporting data ac- cess and the provision of data shall include the following ser- vices: (a) (b) (c) automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the International Data Centre or the selec- tion by the State Party thereof, and, as requested, the selection by the State Party of International Monitoring System data; the provision of the data or products generated in re- sponse to ad hoc requests by States Parties for the re- trieval from the International Data Centre and Inter- national Monitoring System facility archives of data and products, including interactive electronic access to the International Data Centre data base; and assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for reasonable efforts, with expert technical ana- lysis of International Monitoring System data and other relevant data provided by the requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to identify the source of specific events.
The output of any such tech- nical analysis shall be considered a product of the re- questing State Party, but shall be available to all States Parties.

The International Data Centre services specified in sub-para- graphs (a) and (b) shall be made available at no cost to each State Party.

The volumes and formats of data shall be set out in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre.
69 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part I—continued National Event Screening The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to any of its standard products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event screening criteria established by that State Party, and provide the results of such analysis to that State Party.

This service shall be undertaken at no cost to the requesting State Party.
The output of such national event screening processes shall be considered a product of the re- questing State Party.
Technical Assistance The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical assistance to individual States Parties: (a) in formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data and products; by installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting State Party for reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software provided by that State Party to compute new signal and event parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre, the output being considered products of the requesting State Party; and by assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process and analyse International Monitoring System data at a national data centre.
(b) (c) The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the operational status of the International Monitor- ing System facilities, of communications links, and of its own processing systems.

It shall provide immediate notification to those responsible should the operational performance of any component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual.

21.

22.

23.
21.

22.

23.

70 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II On-Site Inspections A.

General Provisions The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site inspections set out in Article IV.

The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred.
The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1000 square kilometres.

There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction.

The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, but may be ex- tended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49.
If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate ex- tends to the territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends.
In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the terri- tory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the terri- tory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the in- spected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obli- gations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Protocol.
In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspec- tion team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective man- ner.

States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit.

In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the ter- 71 1.

2.

3.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued ritory of a State not Party to this Treaty, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the in- spection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol.
A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on whose territory the inspection area is located of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party.

If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demon- strate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.
In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State Party shall take all necessary measures required of an inspected State Party and a State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol.
If the State Party is unable to ensure access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law.

The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate.
The total number of members of the inspection team present on the territory of the inspected State Party at any given time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall not exceed 40 per- sons.

No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team.
The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into account the circumstances of a particular request.

The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities necessary for the inspection team, such as com- 8.

9.

10.

11.
9.

10.

11.

72 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued transportation, interpretation services, munication means, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care.
The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organ- ization, in a reasonably short period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses, including those mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional ac- tivities of the inspection team on the territory of the inspected State Party.

Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspections shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

12.

13.

15.

B.
12.

13.

15.

B.

Standing Arrangements Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants 14.

An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants.

An on-site inspection shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors specially designated for this function.

They may be assisted by specially designated inspection as- sistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, air- crew and interpreters.
Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties or, in the case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director-General, on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose and functions of on-site inspections.

The nominees shall be ap- proved in advance by the States Parties in accordance with paragraph 18.
Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, sex, ranks, qualifications and profes- sional experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection assistants.

17.

No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all 16.
73 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 18.

States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assist- ants proposed for designation by the Director-General and the States Parties, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience.
Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation.

Any inspector or inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing.

The State Party may include the reason for the objection.
In the case of non-accept- ance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance.

The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of objection.

19.
19.

Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and in- spection assistants are proposed by the Director-General or a State Party, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with re- spect to the initial list.

Each State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant.
The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection assistants up to date and notify all States Parties of any additions or changes to the list.

20.

21.

A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an inspector from the list of inspectors and inspection as- sistants serve as its observer in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61.

Subject to paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who 22.
74 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued has already been accepted.

It shall notify the Technical Secre- tariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection.

Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the Technical Secretariat.
The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting and nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or inspection assistant shall cease to be designated for that State Party.

24.

23.

A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the removal from the inspection team of any of the in- spectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection man- date.
The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants.
If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection, the Dir- ector-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council.

Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspec- tion assistants shall receive relevant training.
Such training shall be provided by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to the procedures specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

The Technical Secretariat shall co-ordinate, in agreement with the States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors.

25.

Privileges and Immunities 26.
Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and in- spection assistants as provided for in paragraph 18 or as sub- sequently altered in accordance with paragraph 19, each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in accordance with its national 75 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued procedures and upon application by an inspector or inspection assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other rele- vant documents to enable each inspector and inspection assist- ant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities.
Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours after receipt of the ap- plication or immediately upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry on the territory of the State Party.

Such documents shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to remain on the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the inspection activities.
To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspec- tion team shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i).

Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.
Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions.
(a) the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961; the living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pur- suant to this Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vi- enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; including records, the papers and correspondence, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability (b) (c) 27.
76 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplo- matic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat; samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to pro- visions contained in this Treaty and exempt from all customs duties.
Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations; the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Con- vention on Diplomatic Relations; the members of the inspection team carrying out pre- scribed activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be ac- corded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; the members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party, with- out payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations; the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are ac- corded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions; and the members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party.
(d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 28.

When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the in- spected State Party, the members of the inspection team shall 77 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplo- matic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Papers and correspond- ence, including records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immun- ities set forth in paragraph 27(c) and (d).

29.

Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the mem- bers of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party and, to the ex- tent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.
If the inspected State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has oc- curred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.
The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.

Waiver must always be express.

30.

31.


Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immun- ities accorded to members of the inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 27(d).

Points of Entry Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it.
These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours.

Locations of points of entry shall be provided 32.

78 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 33.

34. to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat.

Points of entry may also serve as points of exit.


Each State Party may change its points of entry by giving no- tice of such change to the Technical Secretariat.

Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat re- ceives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties.
If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insuffi- cient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall en- ter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.

Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft 35.


Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an inspection team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft.

No later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Tech- nical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for inspection.
Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

Approved Inspection Equipment 36.

The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and ap- prove a list of equipment for use during on-site inspections.

Each State Party may submit proposals for the inclusion of equipment in the list.
Specifications for the use of the equip- ment, as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site In- 79 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 37.

38.

39. spections, shall take account of safety and confidentiality con- siderations where such equipment is likely to be used.
The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core equipment for the inspection activities and techniques specified in paragraph 69 and auxiliary equipment necessary for the effective and timely conduct of on-site inspections.

The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of ap- proved equipment are available for on-site inspections when required.
When required for an on-site inspection, the Tech- nical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected.

To facilitate the check- ing of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification.

The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of ap- proved equipment are available for on-site inspections when required.
When required for an on-site inspection, the Tech- nical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected.

To facilitate the check- ing of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification.

40.

As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrange- ments with States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list.
Such States Parties shall be responsible for the main- tenance and calibration of such equipment.

C. On-site Inspection Request, Inspection Mandate and Notification of Inspection On-Site Inspection Request 41.
Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall contain at least the following information: 80 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) the estimated geographical and vertical coordinates of the location of the event that triggered the request with an indication of the possible margin of error; the proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map and in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3; the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the area to be inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; the probable environment of the event that triggered the request; the estimated time of the event that triggered the re- quest, with an indication of the possible margin of error; all data upon which the request is based; the personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and the results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance with Article IV, or an explanation, if rele- vant, of the reasons why such a consultation and clari- fication process has not been carried out.
Inspection Mandate 42.
The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain: (a) (b) (c) the decision of the Executive Council on the on-site in- spection request; the name of the State Party or States Parties to be in- spected or an indication that the inspection area or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; the location and boundaries of the inspection area spe- cified on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based and all other available technical information, in consultation with the request- ing State Party; 81 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued (d) the planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection area; the point of entry to be used by the inspection team; (e) any transit or basing points, as appropriate; (f) the name of the head of the inspection team; (g) the names of members of the inspection team; (h) the name of the proposed observer, if any; and (i) (j) the list of equipment to be used in the inspection area.
If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, paragraphs 46 to 49, necessitates a modification of the inspec- tion mandate, the Director-General may update the mandate with respect to sub-paragraphs (d), (h) and (j), as appropriate.

The Director-General shall immediately notify the inspected State Party of any such modification.
Notification of Inspection (c) (d) The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Art- icle IV, paragraph 55 shall include the following information: (a) (b) the inspection mandate; the date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry; the means of arrival at the point of entry; if appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance num- ber for non-scheduled aircraft; and a list of any equipment which the Director-General re- quests the inspected State Party to make available to the inspection team for use in the inspection area.
The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the no- tification by the Director-General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification.

(e) 43.

44.

82 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued D. Pre-inspection Activities Entry Into the Territory of the Inspected State Party, Activities at the Point of Entry and Transfer to the Inspection Area 45.
The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival of the inspection team shall ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its territory.

46.
46.

When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Author- ity, for the flight of the aircraft from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of en- try, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield.
Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organ- ization applicable to civil aircraft.

The Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of the flight plan the stand- ing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft.

If a military aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior au- thorization from the inspected State Party to enter its airspace.

47.
47.

No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with para- graph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

48.
48.

Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the rep- resentative of the inspected State Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the point of entry to the basing point and, if necessary, to the inspection area.

The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Tech- nical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry and, where necessary, at the basing point and at 49.
83 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 50.

51.

52.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued the inspection area.

Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges.

This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft used for overflight during the on-site in- spection.
Subject to paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the in- spected State Party on the inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with the inspection mandate into the territory of that State Party, or on its use in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.
The inspected State Party shall have the right, without preju- dice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry that the equipment has been approved and certified in accord- ance with paragraph 38.

The inspected State Party may ex- clude equipment that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not been approved and certified in accord- ance with paragraph 38.
Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present to the representative of the inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an initial in- spection plan prepared by the inspection team specifying the activities to be carried out by it.

The inspection team shall be briefed by representatives of the inspected State Party with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate.
The briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection.

The inspected State Party may indicate locations within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection.

53.

After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate, modify the initial inspection plan, taking into ac- count any comments by the inspected State Party.
The modi- fied inspection plan shall be made available to the representa- tive of the inspected State Party.

84 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.


The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspec- tion team, the approved equipment specified in paragraphs 50 and 51 and baggage from the point of entry to the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry, if no other timing has been agreed upon within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.
To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-finding equipment.

The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this task.

E. Conduct of Inspections General Rules The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.
The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection area as soon as possible, but in no case later than 72 hours after arrival at the point of entry.

The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party and disturbance to the inspection area.
In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to paragraph 43(e) or in the course of the inspec- tion, to make available any equipment for use by the inspec- tion team in the inspection area, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.

60.
During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to determine how the inspection will proceed, consistent with the inspection mandate and taking into 85 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued account any steps taken by the inspected State Party consistent with the provisions on managed access; the right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the effective execution of the inspection; the obligation to take into account the recommenda- tions and suggested modifications by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan; the right to request clarifications in connection with am- biguities that may arise during the inspection; the obligation to use only those techniques specified in paragraph 69 and to refrain from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the inspection.
The team shall collect and document such facts as are related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor document information that is clearly unrelated thereto.
Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall be returned to the inspected State Party; the obligation to take into account and include in its re- port data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request, provided by the inspected State Party from the national monitoring networks of the in- spected State Party and from other sources; the obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with copies of the information and data col- lected in the inspection area; and the obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health regulations of the inspected State Party.
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 61.
During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have, inter alia: (a) the right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team regarding possible modification of the inspection plan; 86 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued the right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the inspection team; the right to have representatives accompany the inspec- tion team during the performance of its duties and ob- serve all inspection activities carried out by the inspec- tion team.
This shall not delay or otherwise hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions; the right to provide additional information and to re- quest the collection and documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the inspection; the right to examine all photographic and measure- ment products as well as samples and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection.
The inspected State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all photographic and measurement products.

The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain photographic originals and first-generation photo- graphic products and to put photographs or parts thereof under joint seal within its territory.

The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own camera operator to take still/video photographs as requested by the inspection team.
Otherwise, these functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team; the right to provide the inspection team, from its na- tional monitoring networks and from other sources, with data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request; and the obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as may be necessary to resolve any ambi- guities that arise during the inspection.
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 87 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued Communications The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during the on-site inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat.
For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party, to the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunications.
Observer In accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coor- dinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry or basing point as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the arrival of the inspection team.
The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself.

The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have access to and within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party.
The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection team throughout the inspection.

Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings.

Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall pro- vide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the inspection team as described in paragraph 11.
All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party shall be borne by the requesting State Party.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

88 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued Inspection Activities and Techniques 69.
The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used, in accordance with the provisions on man- aged access, on collection, handling and analysis of samples, and on overflights: (a) position finding from the air and at the surface to con- firm the boundaries of the inspection area and establish coordinates of locations therein, in support of the in- spection activities; visual observation, video and still photography and including infrared measure- multi-spectral ments, at and below the surface, and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts; imaging, (b) (d) (c) measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface, using gamma radiation monitoring and energy resolution analysis from the air, and at or under the surface, to search for and identify radiation anomalies; environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and gases from above, at and below the surface to detect anomalies; passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to lo- calize the search area and facilitate determination of the nature of an event; resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and locate underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones; (e) (f) (g) magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground pen- etrating radar and electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as appropriate, to detect anomalies or artifacts; and drilling to obtain radioactive samples.
(h) 70.

Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, the inspection team 89 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69(a) to (e).
Following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accord- ance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69(a) to (g).

The inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Ex- ecutive Council in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 48.
If the inspection team requests an extension of the inspection duration in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49, it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate.

Overflights 71.

72.


The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an over- flight over the inspection area during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the inspection team with a general orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down and opti- mizing the locations for ground-based inspection and facili- tating the collection of factual evidence, using equipment spe- cified in paragraph 79.

The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically pos- sible.
The total duration of the overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours.

74.

73.

Additional overflights using equipment specified in para- graphs 79 and 80 may be conducted subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party.

The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection area.
The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restric- tions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection.

Restrictions may relate to the 75.


90 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued flight altitude, the number of passes and circling, the duration of hovering, the type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type of measurements or observations.
If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the inspected State Party shall make every rea- sonable effort to provide alternative means of inspection.

76.

Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and approved in accordance with aviation rules and regu- lations of the inspected State Party.
Flight safety regulations of the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed through- out all flying operations.

77.

During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes of staging or refuelling.

79.

78.
79.

78.

Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection team consistent with the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as the aviation and the safety regulations of the inspected State Party and its right to protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the inspec- tion.

Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1500 metres above the surface.
For the overflight conducted pursuant to paragraphs 71 and 72, the following equipment may be used on board the aircraft: (a) (b) (c) (d) For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to para- inspectors on board the aircraft may also use graph 73, portable, easily installed equipment for: (a) multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery; (b) (c) magnetic field mapping.

field glasses; passive location-finding equipment; video cameras; and hand-held still cameras.

gamma spectroscopy; and 80.


91 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 82.

81.

Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing aircraft.

The aircraft shall afford a broad, unob- structed view of the surface below.
The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft, pre-equipped as appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the relevant operational manual, and crew.

Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat.

If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secre- tariat, the inspected State Party shall have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspec- tion equipment.
Such checking shall be completed within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.

Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of: (a) 83.

84.

(b) (c) (d) the minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation of the aircraft; up to four members of the inspection team; up to two representatives of the inspected State Party; an observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the in- spected State Party; and an interpreter, if necessary.
(e) Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be de- tailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

Managed Access The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspec- tion area in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.

The inspected State Party shall provide access within the in- spection area in accordance with the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.

85.

86.

87.
85.

86.

87.

92 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 88.

89.
89.

Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 and paragraph 86 above, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall include: (a) the right to take measures to protect sensitive installa- tions and locations in accordance with this Protocol; the obligation, when access is restricted within the in- spection area, to make every reasonable effort to sat- isfy the requirements of the inspection mandate through alternative means.
Resolving any questions regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or interfere with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the inspection; and the right to make the final decision regarding any access of the inspection team, taking into account its obliga- tions under this Treaty and the provisions on managed access.
(b) (c) Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57(b) and paragraph 88(a) above, the inspected State Party shall have the right through- out the inspection area to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations and to prevent disclosure of confi- dential information not related to the purpose of the inspection.
Such measures may include, inter alia: (a) (b) shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection; restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to deter- mining the presence or absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (d) managing access to buildings and other structures in (c) (e) accordance with paragraphs 90 and 91; and declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with paragraphs 92 to 96.
93 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 91.

90.

Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspec- tion in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, except for access to buildings and other structures housing the entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large volume not otherwise accessible.
For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the right only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines, cav- erns or other excavations.
If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspec- tion in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspec- tion team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that access to buildings and other structures is necessary to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall have the right to gain access to such buildings or other structures.
The head of the inspec- tion team shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of such access, the specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities.

The modalities for access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspec- tion team and the inspected State Party.
The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in excep- tional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions, on the access to buildings and other structures.

92.

When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to para- graph 89(e), each such site shall be no larger than four square kilometres.

The inspected State Party has the right to declare up to 50 square kilometers of restricted-access sites.
If more than one restricted-access site is declared, each such site shall be separated from any other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres.

Each restricted-access site shall have clearly de- fined and accessible boundaries.

The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be presented to the head of the inspection team no later 93.

94 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule 94.

95.

96.
95.

96.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued than the time that the inspection team seeks access to a location that contains all or part of such a site.

The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other steps necessary to conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access site.

The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site.
The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the inspection mandate outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting access to such sites.
If at any time the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside and that access to a restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be granted access to ac- complish specific tasks within the site.
The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sen- sitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the pur- pose of the inspection.

The number of inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the inspection.

The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party.

Collection, Handling and Analysis of Samples 97.


Subject to paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have the right to collect and remove relevant sam- ples from the inspection area.

98.

Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyze samples on-site.

Representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when samples are analyzed on-site.
At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assist- 95 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued ance for the analysis of samples on-site.
The inspection team shall have the right to transfer samples for off-site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if it demon- strates that the necessary sample analysis can not be performed on-site.

The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all samples collected when these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples.

99.

100.

The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused samples or portions thereof be returned.

101.
101.

The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and phys- ical analysis of the samples transferred for off-site analysis.

Details of such analysis shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.

102.

The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for en- suring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for off- site analysis is protected.
The Director-General shall do so in accordance with procedures contained in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
The Director-General shall, in any case: (a) establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples; certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis; oversee the standardization of equipment and proced- ures at these designated laboratories and of mobile an- alytical equipment and procedures; (b) (c) (d) monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment and procedures; and select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations.
(e) 96 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued 103.

When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be an- alyzed in at least two designated laboratories.

The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the ana- lysis.

The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat.

104.
104.

The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the la- boratory analysis of samples relevant to the purpose of the inspection.

Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 63, the Dir- ector-General shall transmit any such results promptly to the inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the Ex- ecutive Council and to all other States Parties and shall include detailed information concerning the equipment and method- ology employed by the designated laboratories.
Conduct of Inspections in Areas beyond the Jurisdiction or Control of any State 105.

In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdic- tion or control of any State, the Director-General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties and agree on any transit or basing points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the inspection team in the inspection area.

106.
106.

The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located shall, as far as possible, assist in facilitating the in- spection, including transporting the inspection team, its bag- gage and equipment to the inspection area, as well as providing the relevant amenities specified in paragraph 11.

The Organ- ization shall reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs in- curred.

107.
107.

Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director- General may negotiate standing arrangements with States Par- ties to facilitate assistance in the event of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State.

In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of an ambiguous event in an area beyond the jur- 108.
97 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part II—continued isdiction or control of any State before a request is made for an on-site inspection in that area, any results of such investi- gation may be taken into account by the Executive Council in its deliberations pursuant to Article IV.

Post-Inspection Procedures 109.


Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the representative of the inspected State Party to re- view the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities.
The inspection team shall provide the representative of the inspected State Party with its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, to- gether with a list of any samples and other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to paragraph 98.

The document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team.

In order to indicate that he or she has taken notice of the contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document.
The meeting shall be completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection.

Departure 110.

Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the in- spection team and the observer shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State Party.

The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit.
Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party and the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry.

Part III Confidence-Building Measures Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, provide the Technical Secretariat with noti- 1.
98 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Part III—continued fication of any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single ex- plosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jur- isdiction or control.

If possible, such notification shall be pro- vided in advance.
Such notification shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as on the configuration and intended purpose of the blast.

Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty provide to the Tech- nical Secretariat, and at annual intervals thereafter update, in- formation related to its national use of all other chemical ex- plosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent.
In particu- lar, the State Party shall seek to advise: (a) the geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate; the nature of activities producing them and the general profile and frequency of such explosions; any other relevant detail, if available; (c) and to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected by the International Monitoring System.
A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually-acceptable basis, invite representatives of the Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites within its territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.

For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States Parties may liaise with the Technical Secre- tariat to carry out chemical calibration explosions or to pro- vide relevant information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.

(b) 2.

3.

4.
99 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Annex 1 to the Protocol Table 1-A List of seismological stations comprising the primary network Table 1-B List of seismological stations comprising the auxiliary network State responsible for station 69 New Zealand Location EWZ Erewhon, South Island 70 New Zealand RAO Raoul 71 New Zealand Island URZ Urewera, North Island Latitude 43.5 S Longitude Type 3-C 170.9 E 29.2 S 177.9 W 3-C 38.3 S 177.1 E 3-C Table 2-B List of radionuclide laboratories State responsible for laboratory 12 New Zealand Name and place of laboratory National Radiation Laboratory, Christchurch Table 3 List of hydroacoustic stations 100 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Schedule The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Table 4 List of infrasound stations State responsible for station New Zealand 36 Longi- tude Latitude 44.0 S 176.5 W Location Chatham Island Annex 2 to the Protocol List of Characterization Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening 1.
2.

The International Data Centre standard event screening cri- teria shall be based on the standard event characterization parameters determined during the combined processing of data from all the monitoring technologies in the International Monitoring System.

Standard event screening shall make use of both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable.
For events detected by the International Monitoring System seismic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: - - - - - - - - - location of the event; depth of the event; ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves; signal frequency content; spectral ratios of phases; spectral scalloping; first motion of the P-wave; focal mechanism; relative excitation of seismic phases; comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and regional discriminants where applicable.
- 101 Schedule Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999 Reprinted as at 3 September 2007 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—continued Annex 2 to the Protocol—continued For events detected by the International Monitoring System inter hydroacoustic component, alia, may be used: - the following parameters, signal frequency content including corner frequency, wide-band energy and mean centre frequency and band- width; frequency-dependent duration of signals; spectral ratio; and indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay.
- - - signal frequency content and dispersion; signal duration; and peak amplitude.
For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: - - - For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: - concentration of background natural and man-made ra- dionuclides; concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal observations; and ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another.

- - 3.

4.

5.
- - 3.

4.

5.

102