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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice Laurence Steinberg Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122; email: lds@temple.edu Annu.

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5:459–85 Key Words The Annual Review of Clinical Psychology is online at clinpsy.annualreviews.org adolescence, crime, neuroscience, law, policy This article’s doi: 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.032408.153603 Copyright c 2009 by Annual Reviews.
All rights reserved 1548-5943/09/0427-0459$20.00 Abstract Although justice system policy and practice cannot, and should not, be dictated solely by studies of adolescent development, the ways in which we respond to juvenile offending should be informed by the lessons of developmental science.

This review begins with a brief overview of the history, rationale, and workings of the American juvenile justice system.
Following this, I summarize ﬁndings from studies of brain, cognitive, and psychosocial development in adolescence that have implications for the treatment of juveniles in the justice system.
The utility of develop- mental science in this context is illustrated by the application of these research ﬁndings to three fundamental issues in contemporary justice policy: the criminal culpability of adolescents, adolescents’ competence to stand trial, and the impact of punitive sanctions on adolescents’ de- velopment and behavior.
Taken together, the lessons of developmental science offer strong support for the maintenance of a separate juvenile justice system in which adolescents are judged, tried, and sanctioned in developmentally appropriate ways.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Contents INTRODUCTION .

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460 JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW .

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461 The Origins of the Juvenile Justice System .

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461 Critical Decision Points Along the Juvenile Justice Pipeline .

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462 The Relevance of Developmental Science to Decision Making in the Justice System .

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464 BRAIN, COGNITIVE, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE .

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465 Adolescent Brain Development .

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465 Adolescent Cognitive Development .

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467 Adolescent Psychosocial Development .

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468 JUVENILE JUSTICE ISSUES INFORMED BY DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE .

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471 Criminal Culpability of Youth .

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471 Competence of Adolescents to Stand Trial .

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473 Impact of Punitive Sanctions on Adolescent Development and Behavior .

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477 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS .

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480 INTRODUCTION Few issues challenge a society’s ideas about both the nature of human development and the nature of justice as much as serious juvenile crime.

Because we neither expect children to be criminals nor expect crimes to be commit- ted by children, the unexpected intersection between childhood and criminality creates a dilemma that most people ﬁnd difﬁcult to resolve.
Indeed, the only ways out of this problem are either to redeﬁne the offense as something less serious than a crime or to redeﬁne the offender as someone who is not really a child (Zimring 1998).
For most of the twentieth century, American society has most often chosen the ﬁrst approach—redeﬁning the offense—and has treated most juvenile infractions as matters to be adjudicated as delinquent acts within a sep- arate juvenile justice system designed, at least in theory, to recognize the special needs and immature status of young people and to there- fore emphasize rehabilitation over punishment.
Indeed, for much of the past century, states believed that the juvenile justice system was a vehicle to protect the public by providing a sys- tem that responds to children who are maturing into adulthood.

States recognized that conduct alone—that is, the alleged criminal act—should not be dispositive in deciding when to invoke the heavy hand of the adult criminal justice sys- tem.
They recognized that by providing for ac- countability, treatment, and supervision in the juvenile justice system—and in the community whenever possible—they promoted short-term and long-term public safety.

During the last two decades of the twenti- eth century, there was a dramatic shift in the way juvenile crime was viewed by policy mak- ers and the public.
Rather than choosing to de- ﬁne offenses committed by youth as delinquent, society increasingly opted to deal with young offenders more punitively in the juvenile jus- tice system or to redeﬁne them as adults and try them in adult criminal court.
This trend was reﬂected in the growing number of juve- nile offenses adjudicated in adult criminal court, where adolescents are exposed to a far more ad- versarial proceeding than in juvenile court; in the increasingly punitive response of the crimi- nal justice system to juvenile offenders who are found guilty; and in what some observers have referred to as the “criminalization” of the juve- nile justice system itself through increased use of punishment, rather than rehabilitation, as a legitimate juvenile justice goal (Feld 1993).
This transformation of juvenile justice pol- icy and practice raises difﬁcult, but important, questions for psychologists interested in the development and well-being of young people.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Competence to stand trial: the ability of a defendant to understand the court proceeding, reason with relevant facts, and assist counsel Criminal culpability: the extent to which an individual is judged to be responsible for a crime These questions are variations of the more general question of whether adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in ways that warrant the differential treatment of juveniles who break the law.
In particular: Do adolescents have the psychological ca- pabilities necessary to function as compe- tent defendants in adult court?

 Should juveniles accused of crimes be held to the same standards of blamewor- thiness as adults and punished in the same ways as adult criminals who have commit- ted similar crimes?

 How does exposing juveniles to especially punitive sanctions affect their behavior, development, and mental health?

These questions provide this review’s focus.


More broadly, the purpose of this review is to integrate developmental psychological consid- erations into moral, legal, political, and practi- cal analyses of juvenile crime.
Because address- ing this issue necessitates at least a rudimentary understanding of the rationale and workings of the juvenile justice system, I begin not with a discussion of the science of adolescent develop- ment, but rather with a short history of juvenile justice in America and a brief overview of the process through which individuals are adjudi- cated within the system.
Following this brief introduction to Ameri- can juvenile justice, I then summarize ﬁndings from recent studies of adolescent development that bear on whether adolescents differ from adults in ways that have implications for jus- tice system policy and practice.

Because not all aspects of adolescent development are perti- nent to how young people are, or should be, treated in the justice system, I limit my discus- sion to studies that are especially relevant to these issues.
Readers interested in a broader and more comprehensive treatment of adolescent development are encouraged to consult sev- eral recent reviews of this literature (Collins & Steinberg 2006, Smetana et al.

2006) as well as a recently updated handbook on adolescent psy- chology (Lerner & Steinberg 2009).

I then look speciﬁcally at what we know about adolescents’ competence to stand trial, criminal culpability, and response to various types of sanctions and interventions.
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW The Origins of the Juvenile Justice System Economic recessions in the early nineteenth century pushed children out of work in America’s new factory system during the indus- trial revolution.

Concerns about poor children on the street led to the creation of institutional care for children.
In New York City, the Society for Prevention of Pauperism in 1824 became the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, and in 1825 opened the nation’s ﬁrst House of Refuge.

Boston followed a year later and Philadelphia in 1828.

These Houses of Refuge were designed to maintain class status and prevent unrest (Krisberg & Austin 1993, Platt 1977).

In 1899, Jane Addams and her Hull House colleagues established what is generally ac- cepted as the nation’s ﬁrst juvenile court.
Juvenile court judges, in the early part of the twentieth century, were authorized to inves- tigate the character and social background of both predelinquent and delinquent children.

They examined personal motivation as well as criminal intent, seeking to identify the moral reputation of problematic children (Platt 1977).
Ben Lindsey, of Denver, was the juvenile court judge whose practice most closely matched the rhetoric of the emerging juvenile court: We should make it our business to study and know each particular case, because it will gen- erally demand treatment in some little respect different from any other case.

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(a) Is the child simply mischievous or criminal in its tendencies?
(b) Is the case simply an excep- tional or isolated instance in which a really good boy or girl has gone wrong for the ﬁrst time because too weak to resist a strong temp- tation?

(c) Is the child a victim of incompetent www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 461 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Transfer: one mechanism through which juveniles’ cases are referred to criminal (adult) court Disposition: in the juvenile justice system, the outcome of an adjudication; comparable to a sentence in criminal court parents?

Does the home or parent need cor- rection or assistance?

(d) What of environ- ment and association, which, of course, may embrace substantively all of the points of study?

How can the environment be im- proved?


Certainly by keeping the child out of the saloon and away from evil examples.

(e) Is the child afﬂicted with what we call “the moving about fever” – that is, is he given to playing “hookey” from school, or “bumming” and running away, showing an entire lack of ambition or desire to work and settle down to regular habits?
[Ben B. Lindsey, “The Boy and the Court,” Charities 13 ( January 1905):352; cited in Platt (1977)] Julian Mack, Chicago’s second juvenile court juvenile judge, similarly described the ideal court proceeding: The problem for determination by the judge is not Has this boy or girl committed a speciﬁc wrong but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.
It is apparent at once that the ordinary legal evidence in a criminal court is not the sort of evidence to be heard in such a proceeding.

(Mack 1909) It is beyond the scope of this article to dis- cuss the likely causes of the transformation of the juvenile justice system away from the re- habilitative ideal espoused by its founders and toward the more punitive regime that exists today (but see Scott & Steinberg 2008 for a discussion).
However, it is worth noting that the early rhetoric on the rationale and purpose of the juvenile court is signiﬁcant in two ways that bear on contemporary debates about jus- tice system policy and practice.

First, it is clear that the founders of the juvenile justice system began from the premise that adolescents are developmentally different from adults in ways that should affect our interpretation and as- sessment of their criminal acts.
The questions raised by Judges Lindsey and Mack are relevant to the most vexing challenges that practition- ers face today in determining (a) whether an adolescent’s antisocial behavior is due to tran- sient immaturity or contextual disadvantage, as opposed to deep-seated criminal character and (b) how best to construct a response to a juve- nile’s delinquent or criminal acts that will de- crease the likelihood of recidivism.
The differ- ence between now and then, however, is that at the time of the court’s founding, there was no science available to inform consideration of either issue.

Owing to the dramatic increase in empirical research on normative and nonnor- mative adolescent development that began in the late 1970s, there has been a remarkable ex- pansion of the scientiﬁc knowledge relevant to each of these matters.
Critical Decision Points Along the Juvenile Justice Pipeline Juvenile justice is regulated mainly by state law, which makes it difﬁcult to generalize about the system in ways that apply universally.

Despite whatever differences exist across jurisdictions in policies and practices, however, the points of decision are essentially similar: referral, in- take, detention, transfer, adjudication, dispo- sition, and release (see Steinberg & Schwartz 2000).

Referral.
Referral.

Entrance into the pipeline begins with a referral to the juvenile justice system or a police arrest.

Depending upon the state, a child may be too young or too old for the juvenile justice system.

Children who are too young are most often diverted from the system or sent to the branch of juvenile court that has jurisdiction over neglected and abused children.

Children who are too old are tried as adults.


A juvenile may also be charged with an offense that results automatically in adult prosecution.

If the juve- nile is charged as an adult, most states allow for judges, after a hearing, to decide that the case should be transferred to juvenile court if the public interest requires it, or if the juvenile can prove that he or she is amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Intake.

If the child enters the juvenile justice system after being arrested, referred by a private petitioner (such as a school or next-door neigh- bor), or transferred from criminal court, there will be an intake decision.

Should the case pro- ceed, or should the juvenile be diverted?
If the latter, should it be an informal diversion, with- out further involvement by the juvenile court, or should the child be sent to a program, such as a community panel or teen court (and re- turned to juvenile court if he or she fails to obey a community-ordered disposition)?

Some cases are diverted to other systems, such as the mental health system.
Some cases are dropped entirely because intake ofﬁcers decide that this particu- lar combination of youth and offense does not belong in the juvenile justice system.

Many fac- tors thus enter into the decision to divert a case: The youth’s age, prior history, the seriousness of the offense, and the youth’s explanation or attitude will affect the intake decision.

Detention.
Detention.

If the intake ofﬁcer decides that the case should proceed to a hearing, the ofﬁcer must decide whether the child should be sent home (with or without supervision) or should be detained, either in a maximum-security de- tention center or in a detention alternative.

Juveniles and their parents will need to explain to an intake ofﬁcer how pretrial supervision will occur, and they will have to convince the ofﬁ- cer that the juvenile will appear for trial.
If the child is detained, there will be a court appear- ance within 24–72 hours.

Most states call this ﬁrst court appearance a detention hearing.

Here a judge or referee will decide whether to con- tinue the detention status.

This is usually the ﬁrst time that the child meets his or her attor- ney.
Here the child must be able to discuss with counsel the circumstances of the arrest and out- of-court issues related to the detention decision (such as school attendance or the presence of an interested adult in the juvenile’s life).

Transfer.

Most persons under the age of 18 who are tried as adults are done so because of statutory exclusion of their case from the juve- nile justice system.
State law may exclude them because of their age—in New York, for exam- ple, a 16-year-old will be tried as an adult for any offense.

Every state excludes some offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction if a child is of a certain age (for example, a state can decide that 15-year-olds who are charged with armed rob- bery will have their cases begin in adult crim- inal court).
Some states permit prosecutors to ﬁle the juvenile’s case directly in the adult sys- tem, where the juvenile may or may not have an opportunity to have the case transferred to juvenile court.

Every state also allows judges to transfer children of a certain age—usually 14, but in some instances, even younger—to crim- inal court if they are charged with an offense as serious as a felony.

States usually must prove that the juvenile is “not amenable to treatment” in the juvenile justice system.
At transfer hear- ings, it is important that the juvenile is able, for example, to discuss with counsel his or her re- cent placement history and its reason for failure.

He or she should be able to understand options, such as proposed placements, counseling pro- grams, or plea agreements.

Adjudication.

If the child continues to be de- tained within the juvenile justice system, an ad- judicatory hearing (comparable to the trial in criminal court) must be held within 10–30 days.
(Although this is the general rule, in some states juveniles charged with high-proﬁle crimes such as murder will have a longer time to wait until their trials.)

Demands on juveniles at adjudica- tory hearings are many.

They will include the need to understand the nature of the charges against them and to consult with counsel.

They will have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of en- tering an admission (guilty plea).
They should be able to help counsel identify potential wit- nesses, know whether an alibi or other defenses are available, and consult with counsel during cross-examination of state witnesses.

Disposition.

If the juvenile admits to the of- fense, or if the juvenile court ﬁnds by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child has committed the offense, the court will pro- ceed to disposition (sentence).

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 expected to assist counsel in presenting dispo- sition options to the juvenile court.

Assistance might include suggesting dispositions or help- ing the attorney and experts develop client- speciﬁc dispositions.
Juvenile dispositions historically have been aimed at providing treat- ment, rehabilitation, or supervision in a way that best serves the needs of the juvenile, al- though in recent years some legislatures also have included incapacitation for public safety as a valid rationale.

Under any of the models, the juvenile court will have a range of discretion.
In some states, the juvenile court has wide latitude, from ordering that a child return home un- der supervision (probation) to placing a child in maximum-security institutions, known as train- ing schools, reform schools, or youth develop- ment centers.

In other states, which use a “youth authority” model, the court will either order probation or, if placement is warranted, trans- fer custody of the child to the youth authority, which will then determine the appropriate level of care.

Release.
Release.

Most juvenile court dispositions are for indeterminate periods of time.

However, dispositions cannot be for a longer period than an adult would serve for a similar crime in the criminal justice system.

The court will usually review the juvenile’s case every six to nine months.

Sometimes the reviews are for- mal hearings, whereas in other instances they are informal reviews of reports provided by probation ofﬁcers or institutional staff.
Many juveniles in placement, particularly those with mental health needs or who have been placed in inappropriate placements, end up being re- turned to juvenile court for a new disposition.

Most often, those juveniles are placed in de- tention pending a new placement plan.

When juveniles are released from institutions, they are placed on aftercare probation, which is analo- gous to parole.
A juvenile who is on probation or on aftercare probation status can have that status revoked, or “violated,” for new offenses or for violating the terms of probation, such as associating with gang members, truancy, or missing curfew.

A violation of probation may lead to rearrest, detention, and another hearing, the outcome of which may be a new disposition.
The Relevance of Developmental Science to Decision Making in the Justice System Although there are few decision points in the pipeline where the developmental status of the juvenile is taken into account explicitly, at each decision juncture, information about the juve- nile’s stage of development should play an im- portant role in the outcome of the decision.
A juvenile’s developmental status is relevant with respect to the adjudication process because a just and fair hearing requires the competent participation of the individual in his or her de- fense.

As noted earlier, at both the adjudication and transfer hearings, certain competencies are expected to be in place, including those that potentially affect the juvenile’s ability to under- stand the charges, assist counsel, and enter pleas (Scott & Grisso 2005).
To the extent that these competencies are based on capabilities that de- velop over the course of childhood and adoles- cence, an accurate understanding of how and along what timetable these capabilities develop is crucial to deciding whether an individual pos- sesses the skills necessary to participate in the process.

Under the law, characteristics of the of- fender and the circumstances of the offense can mitigate criminal responsibility and lessen the punishment that is ordered by the court.
A crime that is committed impulsively is pun- ished less severely than one that is premed- itated, as is a crime that is committed un- der coercive pressure from others.

Familiarity with the expected developmental timetables of phenomena such as self-control, foresight, and susceptibility to peer pressure is therefore im- portant for making determinations of culpabil- ity.
In theory at least, an offender who, by virtue is impulsive, of developmental shortsighted, and easily inﬂuenced by peers should be punished less harshly than one who is better able to control himself, anticipate the fu- ture consequences of his behavior, and resist the immaturity, 464 Steinberg Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 antisocial urgings of his friends (Steinberg & Scott 2003).

Finally, decision makers in the system of- ten must assess the youngster’s potential for change and risk for future offending when mak- ing transfer or disposition decisions (Mulvey & Leistico 2008).
Such determinations of devel- opmental plasticity are especially important at transfer hearings, because a youngster who is or seems hardened and unlikely to proﬁt from rehabilitation is more likely to be charged as an adult than is one who is or is seen as mal- leable and amenable to intervention.
Similarly, a juvenile who is deemed to be at high risk of recidivism, either because of a long prior record of offending or other characteristics associated with continued and/or dangerous criminal be- havior (e.g., failure to respond to prior attempts at rehabilitation, a history of uncontrollable vi- olence, or likelihood of inadequate adult super- vision in the community), will be more likely to be sent to institutional placement.
In order to make well-informed decisions about the treatment of juveniles who have en- tered the juvenile justice pipeline, therefore, policy makers, practitioners, and mental health professionals need to be familiar with the devel- opmental changes that occur during childhood and adolescence in the capabilities and charac- teristics that are relevant to competence, culpa- bility, and likely response to treatment.
Legis- lators need this information in order to create age-related laws and statutes that are develop- mentally appropriate and scientiﬁcally reason- able; if, for example, we know that the ability to understand charges or enter pleas does not generally develop until a certain age, it makes little sense to draw age boundaries that would subject developmentally incompetent individ- uals to court proceedings that necessitate their participation in order to satisfy ordinary due process requirements.
Judges need this infor- mation in order to make wise and fair decisions in the courtroom; if we know that the capac- ity to regulate one’s own behavior is unlikely to be present before a certain age, it is impor- tant that this information be taken into account at the time of sentencing or disposition.
Men- tal health professionals need this information in order to perform accurate assessments and make appropriate treatment recommendations; individuals at different stages of development may need very different sorts of interventions.
And attorneys need this information in order to practice law more effectively; prosecutors may consider a juvenile’s developmental status in deciding when it is appropriate to charge an individual as an adult, and defense attorneys need to know how best to interact with clients who may not fully understand their situation.
Understanding the nature of psychological de- velopment during adolescence, therefore, will likely improve policymaking, judicial decision making, forensic evaluation, and legal practice.

BRAIN, COGNITIVE, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE When lawmakers focus on juvenile justice pol- icy, the distinction between adolescence and adulthood, rather than that between childhood and adolescence, is of primary interest.
How- ever, most studies of adolescent development have compared adolescents with children, and only in recent years has scientiﬁc interest fo- cused intensely on the psychological transition between adolescence and adulthood, largely in response to new research showing continued brain maturation through the end of the ado- lescent period.
This work has provided support for the uniqueness of adolescence as a stage of life that is also distinct from adulthood with re- spect to several aspects of brain and psychoso- cial development.
Adolescent Brain Development Although most of the developmental research on cognitive and psychosocial functioning dur- ing adolescence involves psychological studies, recent work in developmental neuroscience is beginning to shed light on the neural under- pinnings of psychological development across adolescence and adulthood.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Socioemotional system: the brain system governing the processing of social and emotional information and the experience of reward and punishment Cognitive control system: the brain system governing executive function, including deliberative thinking, impulse control, foresight, and the evaluation of risk and reward (including antisocial risk taking) during adoles- cence has emerged, one that is informed by ad- vances in developmental neuroscience (Casey et al.
2008, Steinberg 2008).
According to this view, risky behavior in adolescence is the prod- uct of the interaction between changes in two distinct neurobiological systems: a socioemo- tional system, which is localized in limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain, including the amygdala, ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cor- tex, medial prefrontal cortex, and superior tem- poral sulcus; and a cognitive control system, which is mainly composed of the lateral pre- frontal and parietal cortices and those parts of the anterior cingulate cortex to which they are interconnected (Steinberg 2007).
According to this dual-systems model, ado- lescent risk taking is hypothesized to be stim- ulated by a rapid and dramatic increase in dopaminergic activity within the socioemo- tional system around the time of puberty, which is presumed to lead to increases in reward seek- ing.
However, this increase in reward seeking precedes the structural maturation of the cogni- tive control system and its connections to areas of the socioemotional system, a maturational process that is gradual, unfolds over the course of adolescence, and permits more advanced self- regulation and impulse control.
The temporal gap between the arousal of the socioemotional system, which is an early adolescent develop- ment, and the full maturation of the cognitive control system, which occurs later, creates a pe- riod of heightened vulnerability to risk taking during middle adolescence (Steinberg 2008).

As one writer has characterized it, the process may be akin to “starting the engines without a skilled driver behind the wheel” (Dahl 2001).
Neurobiological evidence in support of this dual-systems model is rapidly accumulating.
A growing literature, derived primarily from ro- dent studies but with implications for human development, indicates that the remodeling of the dopaminergic system within the socioemo- tional network involves an initial postnatal rise and then, starting in preadolescence, a subse- quent reduction of dopamine receptor density in the striatum and prefrontal cortex; this pat- tern is more pronounced among males than fe- males (Sisk & Foster 2004, Sisk & Zehr 2005, Teicher et al.

1995).
1995).

As a result of this remodel- ing, dopaminergic activity in the prefrontal cor- tex increases signiﬁcantly in early adolescence and is higher during this period than before or after.
Because dopamine plays a critical role in the brain’s reward circuitry, the increase, re- duction, and redistribution of dopamine recep- tor concentration around puberty, especially in projections from the limbic system to the pre- frontal area, is likely to increase reward-seeking behavior and, accordingly, sensation seeking.
There is equally compelling neurobiolog- ical evidence for changes in brain structure and function during adolescence and early adulthood that facilitate improvements in self- regulation that permit individuals to modulate their inclinations to seek rewards, although this development is presumed to unfold along a dif- ferent timetable and to be independent of pu- berty (see Paus 2005 for a summary).
Because of synaptic pruning and the continued myeli- nation of prefrontal brain regions, resulting in improved connectivity among cortical areas and between cortical and subcortical areas, there are improvements over the course of adolescence in many aspects of executive function, such as response inhibition, planning, weighing risks and rewards, and the simultaneous considera- tion of multiple sources of information.
There is also improved coordination of affect and cog- nition, reﬂected in improved emotion regula- tion, which is facilitated by the increased con- nectivity between regions associated with the socioemotional and cognitive control systems.

The development of the cognitive control system, which is manifested chieﬂy in improved connectivity across brain regions, must be dis- tinguished from the well-publicized maturation of the frontal lobes because of synaptic prun- ing.
Although both processes result in improved thinking abilities, they occur at different times in adolescence and have different implications for cognitive development.

Whereas increases in connectivity take place throughout adoles- cence and well into adulthood, the decline in gray matter density that reﬂects synaptic 466 Steinberg Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 pruning takes place in preadolescence and early adolescence and is more or less complete by age 16.

Consequently, performance on tasks that ac- tivate the frontal lobes continues to improve through middle adolescence but not beyond age 16 on tasks of moderate difﬁculty (Conklin et al.

2007, Crone & van der Molen 2004, Hooper et al.

2004, Luna et al.

2001).


In con- trast, adult-like performance on more demand- ing cognitive tasks, especially those that require coordination between and among multiple cor- tical and subcortical brain regions, is not at- tained until later in development.
The upshot of this developmental neu- roscience is that changes in the socioemo- tional system at puberty may promote reck- less, sensation-seeking behavior in early and middle adolescence, while the regions of the prefrontal cortex that govern cognitive control continue to mature over the course of adoles- cence and into young adulthood.
This temporal gap between the increase in sensation seeking around puberty and the later development of mature self-regulatory competence may com- bine to make adolescence a time of inherently immature judgment.
Thus, despite the fact that in many ways adolescents may appear to be as intelligent as adults (at least as indexed by per- formance on tests of information processing and logical reasoning), their ability to regulate their behavior in accord with these advanced in- tellectual abilities is more limited.

As the next section makes clear, research on adolescent cog- nitive and psychosocial development is consis- tent with this neurobiological proﬁle.
Adolescent Cognitive Development The application of information about norma- tive adolescent development to policy and prac- tice in the justice system necessitates differ- entiating between cognitive and psychosocial development, which appear to follow different developmental trajectories (Steinberg 2008).
Brieﬂy, on relatively less-demanding tasks that are mainly or exclusively cognitive in nature, and where improvement in adolescence is likely due to synaptic pruning of the frontal lobes, adolescents evince adult levels of competence by age 16.
In contrast, on more challenging tasks that involve the coordination of affect and cognition, and on many measures of psy- chosocial maturity, performance continues to improve well into young adulthood, most likely because this improvement is mediated by im- proved connectivity across brain regions, a rela- tively later development.
As I discuss below, this temporal disjunction has created a great deal of confusion with regard to where we should draw the legal boundary between adolescence and adulthood, because different developmental lit- eratures suggest different chronological ages.

The most important cognitive capacities in- volved in decision making are understanding (i.e., the ability to comprehend information rel- evant to the decision) and reasoning (i.e., the ability to use this information logically to make a choice).
These capacities increase through childhood into adolescence.

Between late child- hood and middle adolescence (roughly between the ages of 11 and 16), individuals show marked improvements in reasoning (especially deduc- tive reasoning) and in both the efﬁciency and capacity of information processing (Hale 1990, Kail 1997, Keating 2004, Overton 1990).
Re- search has demonstrated conclusively that, as a result of gains in these areas, individuals be- come more capable of abstract, multidimen- sional, deliberative, and hypothetical thinking as they develop from late childhood into mid- dle adolescence (Kuhn 2009).

These abilities reach an asymptote sometime around 16, and by this age, teens’ capacities for understanding and reasoning in making decisions, at least in controlled experiments, roughly approximate those of adults.
This comparability between middle adolescents and adults is not limited to basic cognitive abilities such as memory or ver- bal ﬂuency or to performance on tasks of log- ical reasoning.

Studies of capacity to grant in- formed consent to receive medical treatment or participate as a research subject, for example, show little improvement beyond age 16 (Belter & Grisso 1984, Grisso & Vierling 1978, Gustafson & McNamara 1987, Weithorn & Campbell 1982).

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 The notion that adolescents and adults demonstrate comparable capacities for under- standing and reasoning should not be taken to mean that they also demonstrate comparable levels of maturity of judgment, however.
As my colleagues and I have argued elsewhere, matu- rity of judgment is affected both by cognitive capabilities as well as psychosocial ones, and al- though the former show adult levels of matu- rity by 16, the latter do not (Steinberg et al.

2009).

As a result, adolescents may be less able to deploy their cognitive capacities as effectively as adults in exercising judgment in their every- day lives when decisions are inﬂuenced by emo- tional and social variables.
The development of these psychosocial factors is described in the next section.

Adolescent Psychosocial Development New perspectives on adolescent “cognition-in- context” emphasize that adolescent thinking in everyday settings is a function of social and emotional, as well as cognitive, processes, and that a full account of youthful judgment must examine the interaction of all of these inﬂu- ences (Scott et al.

1995, Steinberg & Cauffman 1996).


Even when adolescent cognitive capaci- ties approximate those of adults, youthful deci- sion making may still differ from that of adults due to psychosocial immaturity.

Indeed, re- search indicates that psychosocial maturation proceeds more slowly than cognitive develop- ment and that age differences in judgment may reﬂect social and emotional differences between adolescents and adults that continue well be- yond mid-adolescence.
Of particular relevance to the present discussion are age differences in susceptibility to peer inﬂuence, future ori- entation, reward sensitivity, and the capacity for self-regulation.

Available research indicates that adolescents and adults differ signiﬁcantly with respect to each of these attributes.

Peer inﬂuence.

Substantial research evidence supports the conventional wisdom that teens are more oriented toward peers and responsive to peer inﬂuence than are adults (Steinberg & Monahan 2007).
Resistance to peer inﬂuence increases between adolescence and adulthood as individuals begin to form an independent sense of self and develop greater capacity for au- tonomous decision making.
Studies of age dif- ferences and age changes in resistance to peer inﬂuence suggest somewhat different patterns vis-`a-vis antisocial versus neutral or proso- cial peer pressure prior to middle adolescence (with resistance to antisocial inﬂuence decreas- ing during this time, especially among boys, but resistance to other forms of peer inﬂuence in- creasing), but similar patterns after age 14 (with resistance to all forms of peer inﬂuence increas- ing).
Because the main justice policy and prac- tice questions concern differences between ado- lescents and adults, especially during the latter part of the adolescent period, it is this increase in resistance to peer inﬂuence from age 14 on that is of particular interest.
Recent studies of the neural underpinnings of resistance to peer inﬂuence in adolescence in- dicate that improvements in this capacity may be linked to the development of greater con- nectivity between cortical and subcortical re- gions, which likely facilitates the better co- ordination of affect and cognition (Grosbras et al.

2007, Paus et al.
2007, Paus et al.

2008), although it should be noted that this conclusion is based on stud- ies of individual differences in brain morphol- ogy and function among same-aged adolescents who differ in their self-reported resistance to peer pressure and not to cross-sectional or lon- gitudinal studies that link age differences in resistance to peer inﬂuence to age differences in brain structure or function.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to speculate that the social and arousal processes that may undermine logical decision making during adolescence, when con- nectivity is still maturing, do not have the same impact during adulthood.
One recent behav- ioral study found, for instance, that adoles- cents, college undergraduates, and adults per- formed similarly on a risk-taking task when performing the task alone, but that the pres- ence of same-aged friends doubled risk tak- ing among the adolescents and increased it 50% among the undergraduates, but had no 468 Steinberg Annu.

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Adolescence-limited offenders: antisocial individuals whose offending begins and ends during adolescence ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 impact on the adults (Gardner & Steinberg 2005).

Peer inﬂuence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly.

In some contexts, adolescents might make choices in response to direct peer pressure, as when they are coerced to take risks that they might otherwise avoid.
More indirectly, adolescents’ desire for peer ap- proval and consequent fear of rejection affects their choices even without direct coercion.

The increased salience of peers in adolescence likely makes approval seeking especially important in group situations.

Thus, it is not surprising, per- haps, that adolescents are far more likely than are adults to commit crimes in groups (Zimring 1998).
Peers also may provide models for be- havior that adolescents believe will assist them to accomplish their own ends.

For example, there is some evidence that during early and middle adolescence, teens who engage in cer- tain types of antisocial behavior, such as ﬁght- ing or drinking, may enjoy higher status among their peers as a consequence.
Accordingly, some adolescents may engage in antisocial conduct to impress their friends or to conform to peer ex- pectations; indeed, in one of the most inﬂuential accounts of so-called adolescence-limited of- fenders (that is, individuals who commit crimes during adolescence but not before or after), im- itation of higher-status peers is hypothesized to be a prime motivation for antisocial behavior (Mofﬁtt 1993).

Future orientation.
Future orientation.

Future orientation, the capacity and inclination to project events into the future, may also inﬂuence judgment because it affects the extent to which individuals con- sider the long-term consequences of their ac- tions in making choices.
Over the course of ado- lescence and into young adulthood, individuals become more future oriented, with increases in their consideration of future consequences, in their concern about the future, and in their abil- ity to plan ahead (Greene 1986, Nurmi 1991, Steinberg et al.

2008b).

There are several plausible explanations for this age gap in future orientation.

In part, ado- lescents’ weaker future orientation may reﬂect their more limited life experience (Gardner 1993).
To a young person, a short-term conse- quence may have far greater salience than one ﬁve years in the future.

The latter may seem very remote simply because ﬁve years repre- sents a substantial portion of her life.

There is also evidence linking the differences between adolescents and adults in future orientation to age differences in brain structure and function, especially in the prefrontal cortex (Cauffman et al.

2005).

Reward sensitivity.


Research evidence also suggests that, relative to adults, adolescents are more sensitive to rewards and, especially, to immediate rewards, a difference that may explain age differences in sensation seeking and risk taking (Galvan et al.

2007, Steinberg et al.

2008a).


Although it had once been be- lieved that adolescents and adults differ in risk perception, it now appears that age differ- ences in risk taking are more likely mediated by age differences in reward sensitivity than by age differences in sensitivity to the poten- tial adverse consequences of a risky decision (Cauffman et al.

2008, Millstein & Halpern- Felsher 2002).


Thus, adolescents and adults may perceive risks similarly (both in the lab and in the real world) but evaluate rewards differ- ently, especially when the beneﬁts of the risky decision are weighed against the costs.
So, for example, in deciding whether to speed while driving a car, adolescents and adults may es- timate the risks of this behavior (e.g., being ticketed, getting into an accident) similarly, but adolescents may weigh the potential rewards (e.g., the thrill of driving fast, peer approval, getting to one’s destination sooner) more heav- ily than adults, leading to lower risk ratios for teens—and a higher likelihood of engaging in the (rewarding) activity.
Thus, what distin- guishes adolescents from adults in this regard is not the fact that teens are less knowledgeable about risks, but rather that they attach greater value to the rewards that risk taking provides (Steinberg 2004).

The heightened salience of rewards to ado- is seen in age lescents, relative to adults, www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 469 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 differences in performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, in which subjects are given four decks of cards, face down, and are instructed to turn over cards, one at a time, from any deck.

Each card has information about how much money the subject has won or lost by select- ing that card.
Two of the decks are “good,” in that drawing from them will lead to gains over time, and two of the decks are “bad”; drawing from them will produce net losses.

Because a few cards in the “bad” decks offer very high re- wards, though, a person who is especially sensi- tive to rewards will be drawn to the “bad” decks, even if he or she keeps losing money as a re- sult.
At the beginning of the task, people tend to draw randomly from all four decks, but as the task progresses, normal adults pick more frequently from the good decks.

Children and younger adolescents (as well as adults with dam- age to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) do poorly on this task (Crone et al.

2005, Crone & van der Molen 2004, Hooper et al.

2004).

Performance improves with age, with the most dramatic improvement taking place during middle adolescence.
This likely reﬂects a de- crease in susceptibility to choosing based on the prospect of an immediate, attractive reward.

Further evidence that adolescents tend to value immediate rewards more than adults do is seen in age differences in performance on tests of de- lay discounting, in which individuals are asked to chose between a smaller immediate reward (e.g., receiving $600 tomorrow) and a larger de- layed one (e.g., receiving $1000 in one year) (Steinberg et al.

2008b).
2008b).

Heightened reward sensitivity, indexed by self-report or task per- formance, is especially pronounced during early and middle adolescence, when reward circuitry in the brain is undergoing extensive remodel- ing.

There is some evidence from both human and animal studies that this may be linked to pubertal maturation (Dahl 2004).

Self-regulation.
Self-regulation.

In addition to age differences in susceptibility to peer inﬂuence, future orien- tation, and reward sensitivity, adolescents and adults also differ with respect to their ability to control impulsive behavior and choices.

Thus, the widely held stereotype that adolescents are more reckless than adults is supported by re- search on developmental changes in impulsivity and self-management over the course of ado- lescence (Galvan et al.

2007, Leshem & Glick- sohn 2007).


In general, studies show gradual but steady increases in the capacity for self- direction through adolescence, with gains con- tinuing through the high school years and into young adulthood.

Similarly, impulsivity, as a general trait, declines linearly between adoles- cence and adulthood (Steinberg et al.

2008a).
2008a).

An illustration of behavioral research that sheds light on age differences in impulse con- trol is the study of performance on a task known as the Tower of London.

In this test, the sub- ject is presented with an arrangement of col- ored balls, stacked in a certain order, and sev- eral empty vertical rods onto which the balls can be moved.
The subject is then presented with a picture of a different conﬁguration of balls and asked to turn the original conﬁguration into the new one by moving one ball at a time, using the fewest number of moves (Berg & Byrd 2002).

This task requires thinking ahead, because ex- tra moves must be used to undo a mistake.
In several studies, our research group found that early and middle adolescents performed simi- larly to adults when the problem presented was an easy one (i.e., one that could be solved in two or three moves), but that they did not plan ahead as much as late adolescents and young adults on the harder problems; unlike the older subjects, the younger individuals spent no more time before making their ﬁrst move on the com- plex problems than they did on the simple ones (Steinberg et al.

2008a).
2008a).

These ﬁndings are con- sistent with casual observations of teenagers in the real world, which also suggest that they are less likely than are adults to think ahead before acting.

Taken together, these ﬁndings from self- report and behavioral studies of psychosocial development indicate that individuals become more resistant to peer inﬂuence and oriented to the future, and less drawn to immediate re- wards and impulsive, as they mature from ado- lescence to adulthood.
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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Penal proportionality: the principle in American criminal law linking the severity of punishment for a crime to the criminal’s culpability Mitigation: in criminal law, the lessening of criminal responsibility adolescent brain development is still in its in- fancy, ﬁndings indicate that much of this matu- ration continues well beyond the age by which individuals evince adult levels of performance on tests of cognitive capacity.
As I discuss in the next section, the continued maturation of cognitive competence through age 16 and the continued maturation of psychosocial compe- tence into young adulthood have important im- plications for how we view and respond to the criminal behavior of juveniles.
JUVENILE JUSTICE ISSUES INFORMED BY DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE Criminal Culpability of Youth The adult justice system presumes that defen- dants who are found guilty are responsible for their own actions, should be held accountable, and should be punished accordingly.

Because of the relative immaturity of minors, however, it may not be justiﬁed to hold them as account- able as one might hold adults.
If, for example, adolescents below a certain age cannot grasp the long-term consequences of their actions or cannot control their impulses, one cannot hold them fully accountable for their actions.

In other words, we cannot claim that adoles- cents “ought to know better” if, in fact, the ev- idence indicates that they do not know better, or more accurately, cannot know better, because they lack the abilities needed to exercise mature judgment.
It is important to note that culpabil- ity cannot really be researched directly.

Because an individual’s culpability is something that is judged by someone else, it is largely in the eye of the beholder.

What can be studied, however, are the capabilities and characteristics of indi- viduals that make them potentially blamewor- thy, such as their ability to behave intentionally or to know right from wrong.
I use the term “culpability” in this review as a shorthand for several interrelated phenomena, including responsibility, accountability, blame- worthiness, and punishability.
These notions are relevant to the adjudication of an individ- ual’s guilt or innocence, because an individual who is not responsible for his or her actions by deﬁnition cannot be guilty, and to the deter- mination of a disposition (in juvenile court) or sentence (in criminal court), in that individuals who are found guilty but less than completely blameworthy, owing to any number of mitigat- ing circumstances, merit proportionately less punishment than do guilty individuals who are fully blameworthy.
The starting point in a discussion of crim- inal culpability is a principle known as penal proportionality.

Simply put, penal proportion- ality holds that criminal punishment should be determined by two criteria: the harm a person causes and his blameworthiness in causing that harm.
The law recognizes that different wrong- ful acts cause different levels of harm through a complex system of offense grading under which more serious crimes (rape, for example) are punished presumptively more severely than less serious crimes (shoplifting, for example).

Be- yond this, though, two people who engage in the same wrongful conduct may differ in their blameworthiness.
A person may be less culpa- ble than other criminals—or not culpable at all—because he inadvertently (rather than pur- posely) causes the harm, because he is subject to some endogenous deﬁciency or incapacity that impairs his decision making (such as men- tal illness), or because he acts in response to an extraordinary external pressure—a gun to the head is the classic example.
Less-blameworthy offenders deserve less punishment, and some persons who cause criminal harm deserve no punishment at all (Scott & Steinberg 2008).

The concept of mitigation plays an impor- tant role in the law’s calculation of blame and punishment, although it gets little attention in the debate about youth crime.
Mitigation ap- plies to persons engaging in harmful conduct who are blameworthy enough to meet the min- imum threshold of criminal responsibility but who deserve less punishment than a typical of- fender would receive.

Through mitigation, the criminal law calculates culpability and punish- ment along a continuum and is not limited to the options of full responsibility or complete www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 471 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 excuse.

Indeed, criminal law incorporates cal- ibrated measures of culpability.

For example, the law of homicide operates through a grad- ing scheme under which punishment for killing another person varies dramatically depending on the actor’s blameworthiness.
Thus, the actor who kills intentionally is deemed less culpable if he does so without premeditation because his choice reveals less consideration of the harmful consequences of his act, and the actor who neg- ligently causes another’s death is guilty of a less serious crime than one who intends to kill.

A person who kills in response to provocation or under extreme emotional disturbance may be guilty only of manslaughter and not of murder.
Under standard homicide doctrine, mitigat- ing circumstances and mental states are trans- lated into lower-grade offenses that warrant less punishment.

What makes the conduct of one person less blameworthy than that of another person who causes the same harm?
Generally, a person who causes criminal harm is a fully responsible moral agent (and deserves full punishment) if, in choosing to engage in the wrongful conduct, he has the capacity to make a rational decision and a “fair opportunity” to choose not to engage in the harmful conduct.
Under this view, the actor whose thinking is substantially impaired or whose freedom is signiﬁcantly constrained is less culpable than is the typical offender and deserves less punishment—how much less de- pends on the extent of the impairment or co- ercion.
Under American criminal law, two very different kinds of persons can show that their criminal conduct was less culpable than that of the offender who deserves full punishment— those who are very different from ordinary per- sons due to impairments that contributed to their criminal choices and those who are ordi- nary persons whose offenses are responses to extraordinary circumstances or are otherwise aberrant conduct (Scott & Steinberg 2008).
Although it seems paradoxical, adolescents, in a real sense, belong to both groups.

In the ﬁrst group are individuals with endogenous traits or conditions that undermine their decision- making capacity, impairing their ability to un- derstand the nature and consequences of their wrongful acts or to control their conduct.

In modern times, this category has been reserved mostly for offenders who suffer from mental ill- ness, mental disability, and other neurological impairments.
The criminal law defenses of in- sanity, diminished capacity, extreme emotional disturbance, and involuntary act recognize that psychological and biological incapacities can undermine decision making in ways that reduce or negate the culpability of criminal choices.
Individuals in the second group are ordinary persons whose criminal conduct is less culpable because it is a response to extraordinary exter- nal circumstances: These cases arise when the actor faces a difﬁcult choice, and his response of engaging in the criminal conduct is reason- able under the circumstances, as measured by the likely response of an ordinary law-abiding person in that situation.
Thus, under stan- dard self-defense doctrine, a person who kills a threatening assailant is excused from liability if a reasonable person in his place would have felt that his life was in danger.

Similarly, the de- fenses of duress, necessity, and provocation are available to actors who can explain their crim- inal conduct in terms of unusual external pres- sures that constrained their ability to choose.
In the preceding section, I described aspects of psychological development in adolescence that are relevant to youthful choices to get in- volved in criminal activity and that may distin- guish young offenders from their adult counter- parts.
Although youths in mid-adolescence have cognitive capacities for reasoning and under- standing that approximate those of adults, even at age 18 adolescents are immature in their psy- chosocial and emotional development, and this likely affects their decisions about involvement in crime in ways that distinguish them from adults.

Teenagers are more susceptible to peer inﬂuence than are adults and tend to focus more on rewards and less on risks in making choices.
They also tend to focus on short-term rather than long-term consequences and are less ca- pable of anticipating future consequences, and they are more impulsive and volatile in their emotional responses.

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Roper v. Simmons: the U.S. Supreme Court case that abolished the juvenile death penalty ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 developmental factors within the conventional criminal law framework for assessing blame- worthiness, the unsurprising conclusion is that adolescent offenders are less culpable than are adults.
The mitigating conditions generally rec- ognized in the criminal law—diminished capac- ity and coercive circumstances—are relevant to criminal acts of adolescents and often character- ize the actions of juvenile offenders.

This does not excuse adolescents from criminal responsi- bility, but it renders them less blameworthy and less deserving of adult punishment.
Although in general lawmakers have paid minimal attention to the mitigating charac- ter of adolescents’ diminished decision-making capacities, some legislatures and courts have recognized that immature judgment reduces culpability.

Most notably, in its considera- tion of the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court has focused on this rationale for mitigation.
In Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case that abolished the ju- venile death penalty, the Court adopted the de- velopmental argument for mitigation that fol- lows from the research reviewed above.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, described three features of adolescence that distinguish young offenders from their adult counter- parts in ways that mitigate culpability—features that are familiar to the reader at this point.
The ﬁrst is the diminished decision-making capacity of youths, which may contribute to a criminal choice that is “not as morally repre- hensible as that of adults” because of its de- velopmental nature.

The Court pointed to the tendency of adolescents to engage in risky be- havior and noted that immaturity and an “un- derdeveloped sense of responsibility” often re- sult in “impetuous and ill-considered decisions” by youths.
Second, the Court pointed to the in- creased vulnerability of youths to external coer- cion, including peer pressure.
Finally, the Court emphasized that the unformed nature of adoles- cent identity made it “less supportable to con- clude that even a heinous crime was evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Adolescents are less blameworthy than are adults, the Court suggested, because the traits that contribute to criminal conduct are transient, and because most adolescents will outgrow their tendency to get involved in crime as they mature.
Although the Court did not elaborate, we have seen that each of these attributes of adolescence corre- sponds to a conventional source of mitigation in criminal law (Roper v. Simmons 2005).

Does this argument apply to the conduct of immature adults?

Although most impulsive young risk takers mature into adults with differ- ent values, some adult criminals are impulsive, sensation-seeking risk takers who discount fu- ture consequences and focus on the here and now.
Are these adolescent-like adults also less culpable than other adult offenders and deserv- ing of reduced punishment?

I think not.

Unlike the typical adolescent, the predispositions, val- ues, and preferences that motivate the adult of- fenders are not developmental but charactero- logical, and they are unlikely to change merely with the passage of time.

Adolescent traits that contribute to criminal conduct are normative of adolescence, but they are not typical in adult- hood.
In an adult, these traits are often part of the personal identity of an individual who does not respect the values of the criminal law and who deserves punishment when he or she vio- lates its prohibitions (Scott & Steinberg 2008).
Competence of Adolescents to Stand Trial Before discussing adolescents’ competence to stand trial, it is worth underscoring the distinc- tion between competence and culpability—two very different constructs that are often con- fused, even by those with expertise in crimi- nal law.

Competence to stand trial refers to the ability of an individual to function effectively as a defendant in a criminal or delinquency proceeding.
In contrast, determinations of cul- pability focus on the defendant’s blameworthi- ness in engaging in the criminal conduct and on whether and to what extent he will be held responsible.

Although many of the same inca- pacities that excuse or mitigate criminal respon- sibility may also render a defendant incompe- tent, the two issues are analytically distinct and www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 473 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Dusky v. United States: the U.S. Supreme Court case that established criteria for competence to stand trial In re Gault: the U.S. Supreme Court case that determined that juveniles adjudicated in juvenile court were entitled to many of the same procedural protections as adults adjudicated in criminal court Developmental incompetence: a lack of competence to stand trial due to normal cognitive or psychosocial immaturity, as opposed to mental illness or disability separate legal inquiries, and they focus on the defendant’s mental state at two different points in time (the time of the crime and the time of the court proceeding).
The reason that competence is required of defendants in criminal proceedings is simple: When the state asserts its power against an in- dividual with the goal of taking away his liberty, the accused must be capable of participating in a meaningful way in the proceeding against him.
If a defendant is so mentally ill or disabled that he cannot participate adequately, then the trial lacks fundamental fairness that is required as a part of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Scott & Grisso 2005).

In 1960, the Supreme Court announced a legal standard for trial competence in Dusky v. United States that has since been adopted uni- formly by American courts.
According to Dusky, when the issue of a defendant’s competence is raised in a criminal trial, the court’s determina- tion should focus on “whether the defendant has sufﬁcient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of ratio- nal understanding—and whether he has a ra- tional, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.” Thus, there are two parts to the competence requirement: The de- fendant must be able to consult with her attor- ney about planning and making decisions in her defense, and she must understand the charges, the meaning, and purpose of the proceedings and the consequences of conviction (Scott & Grisso 2005).
The requirement that criminal defendants be competent to stand trial had no place in delinquency proceedings in the traditional ju- venile court.

In a system in which the govern- ment’s announced purpose was to rehabilitate and not to punish errant youths, the proce- dural protections accorded adult defendants— including the requirement of adjudicative competence—were thought to be unnecessary.
This all changed with In re Gault, which led to an extensive restructuring of delinquency pro- ceedings to conform to the requirements of constitutional due process.

Today, it is generally accepted that requirements of due process and fundamental fairness are satisﬁed only if youths facing charges in juvenile court are competent to stand trial.
Until the 1990s, the issue of juveniles’ trial competence involved a straightforward incor- poration into delinquency proceedings of a procedural protection that was relevant to a rel- atively small number of mentally impaired adult defendants, where it was assumed to apply sim- ilarly to a small number of mentally incapaci- tated youths.
The regulatory reforms that be- gan in the late 1980s changed the situation by increasing the punishment stakes facing many young offenders and by eroding the boundary between the adult and juvenile systems.

The im- portance of this issue was not recognized im- mediately, however.
As legislatures across the country began to enact laws that dramatically altered the landscape of juvenile crime policy, the procedural issue of whether developmen- tally immature youngsters charged with crimes might be less able to participate in criminal proceedings than are adult defendants—what is referred to in this article as developmental incompetence—was not central to the policy debates.
Given that developmental incompetence largely escaped the attention of courts and pol- icy makers until recently, it is worth asking di- rectly whether the constitutional prohibition against criminal adjudication of incompetent defendants must be applied to this form of in- capacity.

The answer is surely “yes.” The com- petence requirement is functional at its core, speaking to questions about the impact of cog- nitive deﬁciencies on trial participation.
Func- tionally it makes no difference if the defendant cannot understand the proceeding she faces or assist her attorney, whether due to mental ill- ness or to immaturity (Scott & Grisso 2005).

In either case, the fairness of the proceeding is undermined.

In short, the same concerns that support the prohibition against trying criminal defendants who are incompetent due to mental impairment apply with equal force when imma- ture youths are subject to criminal proceedings.
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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 justice policy, it has become important to have a better understanding of how the capacities of children and adolescents to participate in crim- inal proceedings compare with those of adults.
In pursuit of this end, I ﬁrst examine the speciﬁc abilities that are required for adjudicative com- petence under the legal standard.

I then turn to the research directly comparing the abilities of juveniles and adults.

Three broad types of abilities are implicated under the Dusky standard for competence to stand trial: (a) a factual understanding of the proceedings, (b) a rational understanding of the proceedings, and (c) the ability to assist coun- sel (Scott & Grisso 2005).
Courts applying the standard are directed to weigh each factor, but otherwise they exercise substantial discretion in deciding how much competence is enough.

Examining each component of competence un- der the Dusky standard and considering how the capacities of juvenile defendants are likely to compare with those of adults is instructive.
Factual understanding focuses on the defen- dant’s knowledge and awareness of the charges and his understanding of available pleas, pos- sible penalties, the general steps in the adjudi- cation process, the roles of various participants in the pretrial and trial process, and his rights as a defendant.

Intellectual immaturity in ju- veniles may undermine factual understanding, especially given that youths generally have less experience and more limited ability to grasp concepts such as rights.
Juveniles also may be more likely than are adults to have extensive deﬁcits in their basic knowledge of the trial pro- cess, such that more than brief instruction is needed to attain competence.

The rational understanding requirement of Dusky has been interpreted to mean that defen- dants must comprehend the implications, rele- vance, or signiﬁcance of what they understand factually regarding the trial process.
Deﬁcits in rational understanding typically involve dis- torted or erroneous beliefs that nullify factual understanding.

For example, an immature de- fendant may know that he has a right to re- main silent, yet believe that the judge can take this “right” away at any time by demanding a response to questions.
(When asked what he thought the “right to remain silent” meant, my 12-year-old son said, “It means that you don’t have to say anything until the police ask you a question.”) Intellectual, emotional, and psy- chosocial immaturity may undermine the abil- ity of some adolescents to grasp accurately the meaning and signiﬁcance of matters that they seem to understand factually.
Finally, the requirement that the defendant in a criminal proceeding must have the capac- ity to assist counsel encompasses three types of abilities.

The ﬁrst is the ability to receive and communicate information adequately to al- low counsel to prepare a defense.
This ability may be compromised by impairments in atten- tion, memory, and concentration, deﬁcits that might undermine the defendant’s ability to re- spond to instructions or to provide important information to his attorney, such as a coher- ent account of the events surrounding the of- fense.

As I noted above, these capacities con- tinue to improve through age 16, according to studies of cognitive development.
Second, the ability to assist counsel requires a ratio- nal perspective regarding the attorney and her role, free of notions or attitudes that could impair the collaborative relationship.

For ex- ample, a young defendant may develop a be- lief that all adults involved in the proceed- ing are allied against him, perhaps after seeing defense attorneys and prosecutors chatting to- gether outside the courtroom.
Third, defen- dants must have the capacity to make decisions about pleading and the waiver or assertion of other constitutional rights.

These decisions in- volve not only adequate factual and rational understanding, but also the ability to consider alternatives and make a choice in a decision- making process.

Immature youths may lack capacities to process information and exercise reason adequately in making trial decisions, es- pecially when the options are complex and their consequences far reaching.
As juveniles’ competence to stand trial began to emerge as an important issue in the mid-1990s, the need for a comprehensive study comparing the abilities of adolescents www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 475 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 and adults in this realm became apparent.
Be- fore this time, a few small studies had looked at particular capacities in juveniles that were important at different stages in the justice process.

However, no comprehensive research had compared the speciﬁc capacities of juve- niles and adults that are directly implicated in assessments of adjudicative competence.
In response to that need, the MacArthur Founda- tion Research Network on Adolescent Devel- opment and Juvenile Justice sponsored a large- scale study of individuals between the ages of 11 and 24—half of whom were in the custody of the justice system and half of whom had never been detained—designed to examine empirically the relationship between developmental immatu- rity and the abilities of young defendants to participate in their trials (Grisso et al.

2003).
2003).

The study also probed age differences in psy- chosocial inﬂuences on decision making in the criminal process.

Based on participants’ responses to a struc- tured interview that had been used in previ- ous studies of competence to stand trial among mentally ill adults, and for which norms had been established to deﬁne clinically signiﬁ- cant “impairment,” the researchers found that competence-related abilities improve signiﬁ- cantly between the ages of 11 and 16.
On aver- age, youths aged 11 to 13 demonstrated signif- icantly poorer understanding of trial matters, as well as poorer reasoning and recognition of the relevance of information for a legal defense, than did 14- and 15-year-olds, who in turn per- formed signiﬁcantly more poorly than individ- uals aged 16 and older.

There were no differ- ences between the 16- and 17-year-olds and the young adults.
The study produced similar results when adolescents and adults were cate- gorized according to their scores above and be- low the cut-off scores indicating impairment.

Nearly one-third of 11- to 13-year-olds and about one-ﬁfth of 14- and 15-year-olds, but only 12% of individuals 16 and older, evidenced impairment at a level comparable to mentally ill adults who had been found incompetent to stand trial with respect to either their ability to reason with facts or understand the trial process.
Individual performance did not differ signiﬁ- cantly by gender, ethnicity, or, in the detained groups, as a function of the extent of individuals’ prior justice system experience.

This last ﬁnd- ing is important because it indicates that there are components of immaturity independent of a lack of relevant experience that may contribute to elevated rates of incompetence among juveniles.
A different structured interview was used to probe how psychosocial inﬂuences affect deci- sion making by assessing participants’ choices in three hypothetical legal situations involv- ing a police interrogation, consultation with a defense attorney, and the evaluation of a prof- fered plea agreement.

Signiﬁcant age differ- ences were found in responses to police in- terrogation and to the plea agreement.
First, youths, including 16- to 17-year-olds, were much more likely to recommend waiving con- stitutional rights during an interrogation than were adults, with 55% of 11- to 13-year-olds, 40% of 14- to 15-year-olds, and 30% of 16- to 17-year-olds choosing to “talk and admit” involvement in an alleged offense (rather than “remaining silent”), but only 15% of the young adults making this choice.

There were also sig- niﬁcant age differences in response to the plea agreement.
This vignette was styled so as not to clearly favor accepting or rejecting the state’s offer, which probably accounted for the fact that young adults were evenly divided in their responses.

In contrast, 75% of the 11- to 13- year-olds, 65% of the 14- to 15-year-olds, and 60% of the 16- to 17-year-olds recommended accepting the plea offer.
Together, these results suggest a much stronger tendency for adoles- cents than for young adults to make choices in compliance with the perceived desires of authority ﬁgures (Grisso et al.

2003).

Analysis of participants’ responses to the vignettes also indicated differences between the youngest age group and older subjects in risk perception and future orientation.
Par- ticipants were asked to explain their choices, including their perceptions about positive and negative consequences of various options; questions probed the subjects’ assessment of the 476 Steinberg Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 seriousness of risks (the perceived negative con- sequences) and the likelihood of risks material- izing.

Analyses indicated age differences for all of these dimensions of “risk perception,” with the 11- to 13-year-olds less able to see risks than 16- to 17-year-olds and young adults.
Similarly, in comparison with older adolescents, fewer 11- to 13-year-olds mentioned the long-range consequences of their decisions, which suggests that future orientation differences exist that are consistent with those described above.

The study’s ﬁndings are consistent with those of earlier studies that examined various dimensions of youths’ functioning in the jus- tice system.
For example, an important study of youths’ and adults’ capacities to understand Miranda rights in the early 1980s found that, compared with adults in the criminal justice system, 14-year-olds in juvenile detention were less able to understand the meaning and impor- tance of Miranda warnings (Grisso 1981).
Other studies using smaller samples also have found age differences across the adolescent years with regard to knowledge of legal terms and the le- gal process in delinquency and criminal pro- ceedings (e.g., Cooper 1997).
Finally, a series of studies found signiﬁcant age differences across the adolescent years in “strategic thinking” about pleas; older adolescents were more likely than younger subjects to make choices that re- ﬂected calculations of probabilities and costs based on information provided (e.g., Peterson- Badali & Abramovitch 1993).

In light of what is known about psycholog- ical maturation in early and mid-adolescence, these ﬁndings are not surprising.
Indeed, given the abilities required of defendants in crimi- nal proceedings, it would be puzzling if youths and adults performed similarly on competence- related measures.

This research provides pow- erful and tangible evidence that some youths facing criminal charges may function less capa- bly as criminal defendants than do their adult counterparts.
This does not mean, of course, that all youths should be automatically deemed incompetent to stand trial any more than would a psychiatric diagnosis or low IQ score.

It does mean, however, that the risk of incom- petence is substantially elevated in early and mid-adolescence; it also means that policy mak- ers and practitioners must address developmen- tal incompetence as it affects the treatment of juveniles in court (Scott & Grisso 2005).
It is important to emphasize that the pat- tern of age differences in studies of legal deci- sion making more closely resembles that seen in studies of cognitive development (where few age differences are apparent after 16) than in studies of psychosocial development (where age differences are observed in late adolescence and sometimes in young adulthood).

This suggests that determinations of where to draw a legal boundary between adolescence and adulthood must be domain speciﬁc.
In matters in which cognitive abilities predominate, and where psy- chosocial factors are of minimal importance (that is, in situations where the inﬂuence of ado- lescents’ impulsivity, susceptibility to peer pres- sure, reward sensitivity, and relatively weaker future orientation is mitigated), adolescents older than 15 should probably be treated like adults.

In situations in which psychosocial fac- tors are substantially more important, drawing the boundary at an older age is more appro- priate.
This is why my colleagues and I have argued that it is perfectly reasonable to have a lower boundary for adolescents’ autonomous access to abortion (a situation in which manda- tory waiting periods the impact of impulsivity and shortsightedness and where consultation with adults likely counters imma- turity of judgment) than for judgments of crim- inal responsibility (because adolescents’ crimes are often impulsive and inﬂuenced by peers) (Steinberg et al.

2009).
2009).

limit Impact of Punitive Sanctions on Adolescent Development and Behavior As noted above, the increasingly punitive ori- entation of the justice system toward juvenile offenders has resulted in an increase in the num- ber of juveniles tried and sanctioned as adults and in the use of harsher sanctions in respond- ing to the delinquent behavior of juveniles who have been retained in the juvenile justice www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 477 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 Life-course- persistent offenders: antisocial individuals whose offending begins before adolescence and persists into adulthood Age-crime curve: in criminology, the relation between age and crime, showing that the prevalence of criminal activity increases between preadolescence and late adolescence, peaks around age 17, and declines thereafter system.
Research on the impact of adult pros- ecution and punishment and on the use of punitive sanctions more generally suggests, however, that these policies and practices may actually increase recidivism and jeopardize the development and mental health of juveniles (Fagan 2008).
Consequently, there is a growing consensus among social scientists that policies and practices, such as setting the minimum age of criminal court jurisdiction below 18 (as about one-third of all states currently do), transferring juveniles to the adult system for a wide range of crimes, including nonviolent crimes, relying on incarceration as a primary means of crime con- trol, and exposing juvenile offenders to punitive programs such as boot camps, likely do more harm than good, cost taxpayers much more than they need spend on crime prevention, and ultimately pose a threat to public safety (Greenwood 2006).
In order to understand why this is the case, it is important to begin with a distinction between adolescence-limited and life-course- persistent offenders (Mofﬁtt 1993).

Dozens of longitudinal studies have shown that the vast majority of adolescents who commit an- tisocial acts desist from such activity as they mature into adulthood and that only a small percentage—between ﬁve and ten percent, ac- cording to most studies—become chronic of- fenders.
Thus, nearly all juvenile offenders are adolescent limited.

This observation is borne out in inspection of what criminologists refer to as the age-crime curve, which shows that the incidence of criminal activity increases between preadolescence and late adolescence, peaks at about age 17 (slightly younger for nonviolent crimes and slightly older for violent ones), and declines thereafter.
These ﬁndings, at both the individual and aggregate level, have emerged from many studies that have been conducted in different historical epochs and around the world (Piquero et al.

2003).
2003).

In view of the fact that most juvenile offend- ers mature out of crime (and that most will de- sist whether or not they are caught, arrested, prosecuted, or sanctioned), one must therefore ask how to best hold delinquent youth respon- sible for their actions and deter future crime (both their own and that of others) without ad- versely affecting their mental health, psycho- logical development, and successful transition into adult roles.
If the sanctions to which juve- nile offenders are exposed create psychological disturbance, stunt the development of cognitive growth and psychosocial maturity, and interfere with the completion of schooling and entrance into the labor force, these policies are likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate many of the very factors that lead juveniles to commit crimes in the ﬁrst place (mental illness, difﬁculties in school or work, and, as reviewed above, psycho- logical immaturity).
It is clear that sanctioning adolescents as adults is counterproductive.

One group of re- searchers examining this question compared a group of 2700 Florida youths transferred to criminal court, mostly based on prosecutors’ discretionary authority under Florida’s direct- ﬁle statute, with a matched group of youths retained in the juvenile system (Bishop & Frazier 2000).
In another study, the researchers compared 15- and 16-year-olds charged with robbery and burglary in several counties in metropolitan New York and in demographi- cally similar counties in New Jersey.
The le- gal settings differed in that New York juveniles age 15 and older who are charged with rob- bery and burglary are automatically dealt with in the adult system under that state’s legislative waiver statute, whereas in New Jersey, transfer is rarely used, and the juvenile court retains ju- risdiction over almost all youths charged with these crimes (Fagan 1996).
The New York-New Jersey study found that youths convicted of robbery in criminal court were rearrested and incarcerated at a higher rate than those who were dealt with in the ju- venile system, but that rates were comparable for burglary, a less serious crime.

The study also examined the number of days until rear- rest and found a similar pattern; the youths sen- tenced for robbery in criminal court reoffended sooner than did their juvenile court coun- terparts.
Recidivism was not affected by sen- tence length; longer sentences were not more 478 Steinberg Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 effective at reducing recidivism than were shorter sentences.
Results of the Florida study also support the conclusion that juvenile sanc- tions may reduce recidivism more effectively than criminal punishment.

This study mea- sured only rearrest rates and found lower rates for youths who were retained in juvenile court than for youths who were transferred.

The follow-up period in this study was relatively brief—less than two years.
During this period, transferred youth were more likely to be rear- rested, committed more offenses per year, and reoffended sooner than did juveniles in the ju- venile system.

As in the New York-New Jersey study, longer sentences did not have a deterrent effect.

Within the juvenile system, of course, there is wide variation in the types and severity of sanctions to which offenders are exposed.
Some youths are incarcerated in prison-like training schools, whereas others receive loosely super- vised community probation—neither of which is effective at changing antisocial behavior.

An important question therefore is, what can the juvenile system offer young offenders that will be effective at reducing recidivism?
A detailed discussion of the enormous literature evaluat- ing the effects of various sanctions and inter- ventions is beyond the scope of this review, and this literature has been summarized many times (Greenwood 2006, Lipsey 1999).

Here I high- light a few main points.


Until the 1990s, most researchers who study juvenile delinquency programs might well have answered that the system had little to offer in the way of effective therapeutic interven- tions; the dominant view held by social scien- tists in the 1970s and 1980s was that “nothing works” to reduce recidivism with young offend- ers.
Today the picture is considerably brighter, in large part due to a substantial body of re- search produced over the past 15 years showing that many juvenile programs, in both commu- nity and institutional settings, have a substantial crime-reduction effect; for the most promising programs, that effect is in the range of 20% to 30%.
An increased focus on research-based programs and on careful outcome evaluation al- lows policy makers to assess accurately the im- pact on recidivism rates of particular programs to determine whether the economic costs are justiﬁed.

In a real sense, these developments have revived rehabilitation as a realistic goal of juvenile justice interventions.
In general, successful programs are those that attend to the lessons of developmental psychology, seeking to provide young offend- ers with supportive social contexts and to as- sist them in acquiring the skills necessary to change problem behavior and to attain psy- chosocial maturity.
In his comprehensive meta- analysis of 400 juvenile programs, Lipsey (1995) found that among the most effective programs in both community and institutional settings were those that focused on improving social de- velopment skills in the areas of interpersonal relations, self-control, academic performance, and job skills.

Some effective programs focus directly on developing skills to avoid antisocial behavior, often through cognitive behavioral therapy.
Other interventions that have been shown to have a positive effect on crime re- duction focus on strengthening family support, including Multisystemic Therapy, Functional Family Therapy, and Multidimensional Treat- ment Foster Care, all of which are both effec- tive and cost effective (Greenwood 2006).

It is also clear from these reviews that punitive sanc- tions administered within the juvenile system have iatrogenic effects similar to those seen in studies of juveniles tried as adults.
Punishment- oriented approaches, such as “Scared Straight” or military-style boot camps, do not deter fu- ture crime and may even inadvertently pro- mote reoffending.

Nor do these programs ap- pear to deter other adolescents from offending (Greenwood 2006).
The dearth of evidence supporting the effec- tiveness of tough sanctions in deterring youth- ful criminal activity becomes less puzzling when we consider the response of young offend- ers to harsh punishment in light of devel- opmental knowledge about adolescence dis- cussed earlier.

Teenagers on the street deciding whether to hold up a convenience store may simply be less capable than adults, due to their www.annualreviews.org • Juvenile Justice 479 Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 psychosocial immaturity, of considering the sanctions they will face.

Thus, the develop- mental inﬂuences on decision making that mit- igate culpability also may make adolescents less responsive to the threat of criminal sanctions (Scott & Steinberg 2008).
In addition, adolescence is a formative pe- riod of development.

In mid and late adoles- cence, individuals normally make substantial progress in acquiring and coordinating skills that are essential to ﬁlling the conventional roles of adulthood.

First, they begin to develop basic educational and vocational skills to en- able them to function in the workplace as pro- ductive members of society.
Second, they also acquire the social skills necessary to establish stable intimate relationships and to cooperate in groups.

Finally, they must begin to learn to behave responsibly without external super- vision and to set meaningful personal goals for themselves.

For most individuals, the process of completing these developmental tasks ex- tends into early adulthood, but making sub- stantial progress during the formative stage of adolescence is important.
This process of de- velopment toward psychosocial maturity is one of reciprocal interaction between the individ- ual and her social context.

Several environmen- tal conditions are particularly important, such as the presence of an authoritative parent or guardian, association with prosocial peers, and participation in educational, extracurricular, or employment activities that facilitate the devel- opment of autonomous decision making and critical thinking.
For the youth in the justice system, the correctional setting becomes the environment for social development and may affect whether he acquires the skills necessary to function successfully in conventional adult roles (Steinberg et al.

2004).

Normative teenagers who get involved in crime do so, in part, because their choices are driven by developmental inﬂuences typical of adolescence.
In theory, they should desist from criminal behavior and mature into reasonably responsible adults as they attain psychosocial maturity—and most do, especially as they en- ter into adult work and family responsibilities.

Whether youths successfully make the transi- tion to adulthood, however, depends in part on whether their social context provides op- portunity structures for the completion of the developmental tasks described above.
The cor- rectional environment may inﬂuence the tra- jectories of normative adolescents in the justice system in important ways.

Factors such as the availability (or lack) of good educational, skill building, and rehabilitative programs; the at- titudes and roles of adult supervisors; and the identity and behavior of other offenders shape the social context of youths in both the adult and the juvenile systems.
These factors may af- fect the inclination of young offenders to de- sist or persist in their criminal activities and may facilitate or impede their development into adults who can function adequately in society— in the workplace, in marriage or other intimate unions, and as citizens.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS The overarching question I pose in this article is whether research on adolescent development indicates that adolescents and adults differ in ways that warrant their differential treatment when they violate the law.
More speciﬁcally, I ask how this research informs debate about three fundamental questions that continue to challenge the justice system: (a) Should ado- lescents be held to adult standards of crimi- nal culpability and, accordingly, exposed to the same punishment as adults; (b) Do adolescents possess the necessary capabilities to function as competent defendants in an adversarial court proceeding; and (c) How are juvenile offenders affected by the sorts of punitive sanctions that became increasingly popular during the past several decades?
It is now incontrovertible that psychologi- cal development continues throughout adoles- cence and into young adulthood in ways that are relevant to all three questions.

Although basic cognitive competence matures by the time in- dividuals reach age 16, many of the social and emotional capacities that inﬂuence adolescents’ 480 Steinberg Annu.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 judgment and decision making, especially out- side the psychologist’s laboratory, continue to mature into late adolescence and beyond.

Com- pared to individuals in their mid to late twenties, adolescents even as old as 18 are more impul- sive, less oriented to the future, and more sus- ceptible to the inﬂuence of their peers.
In addi- tion, because adolescence is also period during which individuals are still acquiring the psycho- logical capacities they will need to successfully transition into adult work and family roles, it is important that the sanctions to which juvenile offenders are exposed not adversely affect their development.
Recent research on the neural underpinnings of these developments does not change the portrait of adolescent immaturity painted by behavioral research, but it does add detail and support to the argument that makes the story more compelling.

It is one thing to say that adolescents don’t control their impulses, stand up to peer pressure, or think through the consequences of their actions as well as adults; it is quite another to say that don’t because they can’t.
Because American criminal law clearly pro- vides that diminished judgment mitigates crim- inal responsibility, it is reasonable to argue that adolescents are inherently less blamewor- thy than their elders in ways should affect deci- sions about criminal punishment; as a class, ado- lescents are inherently less blameworthy than adults.

The picture that emerges from an anal- ysis of the capacities necessary for competence to stand trial is not the same, however.
Here the relevant research indicates that some adoles- cents (generally, those 16 and older) have adult- like capabilities but that others (generally those 15 and younger) may not.

Research on the im- pact of punitive sanctions on adolescent devel- opment and behavior, although not explicitly developmental in nature, indicates that trying adolescents as adults or exposing them to espe- cially harsh sanctions does little to deter offend- ing and may indeed have iatrogenic effects.
Although justice system policy and practice cannot, and should not, be dictated solely by studies of adolescent development, the ways in which we respond to juvenile offending should at the very least be informed by the lessons of developmental science.

Taken together, the lessons of developmental science offer strong support for the maintenance of a separate ju- venile justice system in which adolescents are judged, tried, and sanctioned in developmen- tally appropriate ways.
Using developmental science to inform juvenile justice policy is not a panacea that will solve the problem of youth crime.

Adolescents will always get in trouble, sometimes very serious trouble, and some will continue to offend, despite the state’s best ef- forts to respond to their crimes in ways that will deter future offending.

At the same time, the fu- ture prospects of some youths will be harmed by a system that holds them to adult levels of accountability for their crimes under our trans- fer rules.
No one policy regime will yield good outcomes for all young offenders, but looking to developmental research to guide our decision making provides a solid framework for policies and practices that will enhance public safety in the long run by promoting healthy adolescent development.

SUMMARY POINTS 1.
SUMMARY POINTS 1.

During the past two decades, policies and practices concerning the treatment of juvenile offenders in the United States became increasingly punitive, as evidenced by the increase in the number of juveniles tried as adults and the expanded use of harsh sanctions within both the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
This was a break from the traditional model of juvenile justice, which emphasized rehabilitation rather than punishment as its core purpose, that had prevailed for most of the twentieth century.

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ANRV372-CP05-20 ARI 19 February 2009 11:37 2.


In order to make well-informed decisions about the treatment of juveniles who have entered the juvenile justice pipeline, therefore, policymakers, practitioners, and mental health professionals need to be familiar with the developmental changes that occur during childhood and adolescence in the capabilities and characteristics that are relevant to their competence to stand trial, their criminal culpability, and their likely response to treatment.

3.
3.

Brain maturation continues well into young adulthood, and although individuals, on average, perform at adult levels on tests of basic cognitive ability by the time they are 16, most do not attain adult-like levels of social and emotional maturity until very late in adolescence or early in adulthood.

Compared to adults, adolescents are more susceptible to peer inﬂuence, less oriented to the future, more sensitive to short-term rewards, and more impulsive.

4.
4.

This research on adolescent brain, cognitive, and psychosocial development supports the view that adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in ways that warrant their differential treatment in the justice system.

An analysis of factors that mitigate criminal responsibility under the law indicates that adolescents are inherently less culpable than are adults and should therefore be punished less severely.
In addition, studies of competence to stand trial indicate that those who are under 16 are more likely to be incompetent than are adults, raising questions about the appropriateness of trying younger adolescents in criminal court.

5.

Studies of the impact of punitive sanctions on adolescent development and behavior, including prosecuting and sanctioning adolescents as adults, indicate that they do not deter adolescents from breaking the law and may in fact increase recidivism.
In contrast, family-based interventions have been shown to be both effective and cost effective.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT The author is not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Work on this review was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

I am grateful to Elizabeth Cauffman, Thomas Grisso, Elizabeth Scott, and Robert Schwartz for their permission to draw on our collaborative work in the preparation of this review.
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AR372-FM ARI 6 March 2009 17:50 Contents Annual Review of Clinical Psychology Volume 5, 2009 Construct Validity: Advances in Theory and Methodology Milton E. Strauss and Gregory T. Smith Item Response Theory and Clinical Measurement Steven P. Reise and Niels G. Waller 1 27 Methodological Issues in Molecular Genetic Studies of Mental Disorders Carrie E. Bearden, Anna J. Jasinska, and Nelson B. Freimer 49 Statistical Methods for Risk-Outcome Research: Being Sensitive to Longitudinal Structure David A. Cole and Scott E. Maxwell
71 Psychological Treatment of Anxiety: The Evolution of Behavior Therapy and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy S. Rachman Computer-Aided Psychological Treatments: Evolving Issues Isaac Marks and Kate Cavanagh The Past, Present, and Future of HIV Prevention: Integrating Behavioral, Biomedical, and Structural Intervention Strategies for the Next Generation of HIV Prevention Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus, Dallas Swendeman, and Gary Chovnick Evolving Prosocial and Sustainable Neighborhoods and Communities Anthony Biglan and Erika Hinds Five-Factor Model of Personality Disorder: A Proposal for DSM-V Thomas A. Widiger and Stephanie N. Mullins-Sweatt
N. Mullins-Sweatt Differentiating the Mood and Anxiety Disorders: A Quadripartite Model David Watson When Doors of Perception Close: Bottom-Up Models of Disrupted 97 121 143 169 197 221 Cognition in Schizophrenia Daniel C. Javitt
249 vii Annu.
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AR372-FM ARI 6 March 2009 17:50 The Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder: Implications of Research on Diagnosis, Etiology, and Outcome Joel Paris Development and Etiology of Disruptive and Delinquent Behavior Rolf Loeber, Jeffrey D. Burke, and Dustin A. Pardini 277 291 Anxiety Disorders During Childhood and Adolescence: Origins and Treatment Ronald M. Rapee, Carolyn A. Schniering, and Jennifer L. Hudson 311 APOE-4 Genotype and Neurophysiological Vulnerability to Alzheimer’s and Cognitive Aging Susan Bookheimer and Alison Burggren Depression in Older Adults Amy Fiske, Julie Loebach Wetherell, and Margaret Gatz Pedophilia Michael C. Seto
343 363 391 Treatment of Smokers with Co-occurring Disorders: Emphasis on Integration in Mental Health and Addiction Treatment Settings Sharon M. Hall and Judith J. Prochaska 409 Environmental Inﬂuences on Tobacco Use: Evidence from Societal and Community Inﬂuences on Tobacco Use and Dependence K. Michael Cummings, Geoffrey T. Fong, and Ron Borland Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice Laurence Steinberg
Laurence Steinberg Indexes Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–5 Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–5 433 459 487 489 Errata An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Clinical Psychology articles may be found at http://clinpsy.annualreviews.org viii Contents Annu.
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New From Annual Reviews: Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Volume 1 • March 2014 • Online & In Print • http://orgpsych.annualreviews.org Editor: Frederick P. Morgeson, The Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University The Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior is devoted to publishing reviews of the industrial and organizational psychology, human resource management, and organizational behavior literature.
Topics for review include motivation, selection, teams, training and development, leadership, job performance, strategic HR, cross-cultural issues, work attitudes, entrepreneurship, affect and emotion, organizational change and development, gender and diversity, statistics and research methodologies, and other emerging topics.

Complimentary online access to the first volume will be available until March 2015.
TAble oF CoNTeNTs: • An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Improving Research Quality Before Data Collection, Herman Aguinis, Robert J. Vandenberg • Burnout and Work Engagement: The JD-R Approach, Arnold B. Bakker, Evangelia Demerouti, Ana Isabel Sanz-Vergel • Compassion at Work, Jane E. Dutton, Kristina M. Workman, Ashley E. Hardin • Constructively Managing Conflict in Organizations, Dean Tjosvold, Alfred S.H.
Wong, Nancy Yi Feng Chen • Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker Deviant Behavior upon Individual Employees, Sandra L. Robinson, Wei Wang, Christian Kiewitz • Delineating and Reviewing the Role of Newcomer Capital in Organizational Socialization, Talya N. Bauer, Berrin Erdogan • Emotional Intelligence in Organizations, Stéphane Côté • Employee Voice and Silence, Elizabeth W. Morrison • Intercultural Competence, Kwok Leung, Soon Ang, Mei Ling Tan • Learning in the Twenty-First-Century Workplace, Raymond A. Noe, Alena D.M.
Clarke, Howard J. Klein • Pay Dispersion, Jason D. Shaw • Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Effective Performance at Work, Neal Schmitt • Perspectives on Power in Organizations, Cameron Anderson, Sebastien Brion • Psychological Safety: The History, Renaissance, and Future of an Interpersonal Construct, Amy C. Edmondson, Zhike Lei • Research on Workplace Creativity: A Review and Redirection, Jing Zhou, Inga J. Hoever • Talent Management: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Challenges, Peter Cappelli, JR Keller • The Contemporary Career: A Work–Home Perspective, Jeffrey H. Greenhaus, Ellen Ernst Kossek • The Fascinating Psychological Microfoundations of Strategy and Competitive Advantage, Robert E. Ployhart, Donald Hale, Jr. • The Psychology of Entrepreneurship, Michael Frese, Michael M. Gielnik • The Story of Why We Stay: A Review of Job Embeddedness, Thomas William Lee, Tyler C. Burch, Terence R. Mitchell • What Was, What Is, and What May Be in OP/OB, Lyman W. Porter, Benjamin Schneider • Where Global and Virtual Meet: The Value of Examining the Intersection of These Elements in Twenty-First-Century Teams, Cristina B. Gibson, Laura Huang, Bradley L. Kirkman, Debra L. Shapiro • Work–Family Boundary Dynamics, Tammy D. Allen, Eunae Cho, Laurenz L. Meier Access this and all other Annual Reviews journals via your institution at www.annualreviews.org.
AnnuAl Reviews | Connect with Our experts Tel: 800.523.8635 (us/can) | Tel: 650.493.4400 | Fax: 650.424.0910 | Email: service@annualreviews.org Annu.

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New From Annual Reviews: Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application Volume 1 • Online January 2014 • http://statistics.annualreviews.org Editor: Stephen E. Fienberg, Carnegie Mellon University Associate Editors: Nancy Reid, University of Toronto Stephen M. Stigler, University of Chicago The Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application aims to inform statisticians and quantitative methodologists, as well as all scientists and users of statistics about major methodological advances and the computational tools that allow for their implementation.
It will include developments in the field of statistics, including theoretical statistical underpinnings of new methodology, as well as developments in specific application domains such as biostatistics and bioinformatics, economics, machine learning, psychology, sociology, and aspects of the physical sciences.

Complimentary online access to the first volume will be available until January 2015. table of contents: • What Is Statistics?
Stephen E. Fienberg • A Systematic Statistical Approach to Evaluating Evidence from Observational Studies, David Madigan, Paul E. Stang, Jesse A. Berlin, Martijn Schuemie, J. Marc Overhage, Marc A. Suchard, Bill Dumouchel, Abraham G. Hartzema, Patrick B. Ryan • The Role of Statistics in the Discovery of a Higgs Boson, David A. van Dyk • High-Dimensional Statistics with a View Toward Applications in Biology, Peter Bühlmann, Markus Kalisch, Lukas Meier • Next-Generation Statistical Genetics: Modeling, Penalization, and Optimization in High-Dimensional Data, Kenneth Lange, Jeanette C. Papp, Janet S. Sinsheimer, Eric M. Sobel • Breaking Bad: Two Decades of Life-Course Data Analysis in Criminology, Developmental Psychology, and Beyond, Elena A. Erosheva, Ross L. Matsueda, Donatello Telesca • Brain Imaging Analysis, F. DuBois Bowman • Event History Analysis, Niels Keiding • Statistics and Climate, Peter Guttorp • Statistical Evaluation of Forensic DNA Profile Evidence, • Climate Simulators and Climate Projections, Jonathan Rougier, Michael Goldstein • Probabilistic Forecasting, Tilmann Gneiting, Matthias Katzfuss Christopher D. Steele, David J.
Balding • Using League Table Rankings in Public Policy Formation: Statistical Issues, Harvey Goldstein • Statistical Ecology, Ruth King • Bayesian Computational Tools, Christian P. Robert • Estimating the Number of Species in Microbial Diversity • Bayesian Computation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo, Studies, John Bunge, Amy Willis, Fiona Walsh Radu V. Craiu, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal • Dynamic Treatment Regimes, Bibhas Chakraborty, • Build, Compute, Critique, Repeat: Data Analysis with Latent Susan A. Murphy Variable Models, David M. Blei • Statistics and Related Topics in Single-Molecule Biophysics, • Structured Regularizers for High-Dimensional Problems: Hong Qian, S.C. Kou Statistical and Computational Issues, Martin J. Wainwright • Statistics and Quantitative Risk Management for Banking and Insurance, Paul Embrechts, Marius Hofert Access this and all other Annual Reviews journals via your institution at www.annualreviews.org.
AnnuAl Reviews | Connect with Our experts Tel: 800.523.8635 (us/can) | Tel: 650.493.4400 | Fax: 650.424.0910 | Email: service@annualreviews.org Annu.

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