Product: Credit reporting or other personal consumer reports

XXXX XXXX MRS XXXX # XXXX XX/XX/XXXX I did not give MRS BPO LLC permission or sign anything for this company to say I owe them any debt. I never sign anything or gave permission for them to have my information. 

FCRA ) 608b Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness ( a ) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.-The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations : ( 1 ) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and ( 2 ) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
( b ) Specific instances of conduct.-Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness ' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness ( 1 ) concerning the witness ' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or ( 2 ) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused 's or the witness ' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility. 
( Pub. XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX XXXX. XXXX ; XXXX. XXXX, XXXX, eff. XXXX XXXX, XXXX ; XXXX. XXXX, XXXX, eff. XXXX XXXX, XXXX. ) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules Subdivision ( a ). In Rule 404 ( a ) the general position is taken that character evidence is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith, subject, however, to several exceptions, one of which is character evidence of a witness as bearing upon his credibility. The present rule develops that exception. 
In accordance with the bulk of judicial authority, the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity, rather than allowing evidence as to character generally. The result is to sharpen relevancy, to reduce surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and to make the lot of the witness somewhat less unattractive. XXXX XXXX. 
The use of opinion and reputation evidence as means of proving the character of witnesses is consistent with Rule 405 ( a ). While the modern practice has purported to exclude opinion witnesses who testify to reputation seem in fact often to be giving their opinions, disguised somewhat misleadingly as reputation. See XXXX XXXX. And even under the modern practice, a common relaxation has allowed inquiry as to whether the witnesses would believe the principal witness under oath. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX Cir. XXXX ), and cases cited therein ; XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 
Character evidence in support of credibility is admissible under the rule only after the witness ' character has first been attacked, as has been the case at common law. XXXX, XXXX, et al., Cases on Evidence XXXX ( XXXX XXXX. XXXX ) ; XXXX XXXX, p. XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX. The enormous needless consumption of time which a contrary practice would entail justifies the limitation. Opinion or reputation that the witness is untruthful specifically qualifies as an attack under the rule, and evidence or misconduct, including conviction of crime, and of corruption also fall within this category. Evidence of bias or interest does not. XXXX XXXX ; XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX. Whether evidence in the form of contradiction is an attack upon the character of the witness must depend 1108, 1109.

As to the use of specific instances on direct by an opinion witness, see the Advisory Committee 's Note to Rule 405, supra.

Subdivision ( b ). In conformity with Rule 405, which forecloses use of evidence of specific incidents as proof in chief of character unless character is an issue in the case, the present rule generally bars evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility. There are, however, two exceptions : ( 1 ) specific instances are provable when they have been the subject of criminal conviction, and ( 2 ) specific instances may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principal witness or of a witness giving an opinion of his character for truthfulness. 
( 1 ) Conviction of crime as a technique of impeachment is treated in detail in Rule 609, and here is merely recognized as an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of specific incidents for impeachment purposes.

( 2 ) Particular instances of conduct, though not the subject of criminal conviction, may be inquired into on cross-examination of the principal witness himself or of a witness who testifies concerning his character for truthfulness. Effective cross-examination demands that some allowance be made for going into matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial. Consequently safeguards are erected in the form of specific requirements that the instances inquired into be probative of truthfulness or its opposite and not remote in time. Also, the overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment. 
The final sentence constitutes a rejection of the doctrine of such cases as People v. XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ), that any past criminal act relevant to credibility XXXX be inquired into on cross-examination, in apparent disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination. While it is clear that an ordinary witness can not make a partial disclosure of incriminating matter and then invoke the privilege on cross-examination, no tenable contention can be made that merely by testifying he waives his right to foreclose inquiry on cross-examination into criminal activities for the purpose of attacking his credibility. So to hold would reduce the privilege to a nullity. While it is true that an accused, unlike an ordinary witness, has an option whether to testify, if the option can be exercised only at the price of opening up inquiry as to any and all criminal acts committed during his lifetime, the right to testify could scarcely be said to possess much vitality. In XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ), the Court held that allowing comment on the election of an accused not to testify exacted a constitutionally impermissible price, and so here. While no specific provision in terms confers constitutional status on the right of an accused to take the stand in his own defense, the existence of the right is so completely recognized that a denial of it or substantial infringement upon it would surely be of due process dimensions. See XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ). In any event, wholly aside from constitutional considerations, the provision represents a sound policy. 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report XXXX. XXXX Rule 608 ( a ) as submitted by the Court permitted attack to be made upon the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness either by reputation or opinion testimony. For the same reasons underlying its decision to eliminate the admissibility of opinion testimony in Rule 405 ( a ), the Committee amended Rule 608 ( a ) to delete the reference to opinion testimony.

The second sentence of Rule 608 ( b ) as submitted by the Court permitted specific instances of misconduct of a witness to be inquired into on cross-examination for the purpose of attacking his credibility, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, " and not remote in time ''. Such cross-examination could be of the witness himself or of another witness who testifies as to " his '' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
The Committee amended the Rule to emphasize the discretionary power of the court in permitting such testimony and deleted the reference to remoteness in time as being unnecessary and confusing ( remoteness from time of trial or remoteness from the incident involved? ). As recast, the Committee amendment also makes clear the antecedent of " his '' in the original Court proposal. 
Notes of Conference Committee, House Report XXXX. XXXX The Senate amendment adds the words " opinion or '' to conform the first sentence of the rule with the remainder of the rule. 
The Conference adopts the Senate amendment. 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1987 Amendment The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1988 Amendment The amendment is technical.