Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

I wish to practice my right as a customer of Bank of America to use your organisation's service, seeking a
formal, impartial investigation to amicably settle my dispute with Bank of America.
In order to clear up the myriad of letters and correspondences I have hitherto sent to Bank of America
respecting my complaint, I believe it will substantially strengthen both my case and your understanding, by
taking a deeper look at the happenings of my case, and analysing the relevant facts in an objective and
comprehensive fashion.
It is crucial to note that I have been manipulated, socially-engineered and coerced to engage these fraudulent
criminals. Much to my embarrassment, I recognise that I am the victim of an investment scam.
My complaint to the CFPB has arisen as I do not consider, by any stretch of the imagination, the conduct
of Bank of America to be commensurate with their legal role and responsibility to their customers. They
sell a service to look after their customers, protect their money and are a financial institution that maintains
a traditional relationship and way of working with its customers.
During the complaints process with Bank of America, I found their communication ineffective, which
further hides their conduct to management and diminishes the service offering to their clients. They are
struggling to adapt their business offering in the ever-changing world of IT development. The internet is
presenting a real problem which they choose to manage in a way which is not in line with rules and
regulations of CFPB as well as their own internal policy and procedures sold to their clients.
General Obligation:
Commencing on or abouXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX fell victim to a multi-layered scam
operation run by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX which involved me making deposits for a total amount of XXXX XXXX from my Bank of America account to fraudulent investment firm.
When determining whats reasonable and fair, we should focus on the issue of liability; common queries
include, but are not limited to, the following (i) whether Bank of America did not take notice of any rule,
law, or regulation, and/or possibly missed any material elements of the relevant bylaws or codes of conduct,
that may have prevented them from protecting my financial safety; (ii) whether by virtue of Bank of
Americas custodianship over my funds or by its control over them, they owed a fiduciary duty to the me
and if so, whether that duty was breached; (iii) whether Bank of America promoted the transaction(s) in
question despite being aware of the nature of the transaction(s) in question (iv) whether Bank of America
was in compliance with its own policies and procedures; (v) whether Bank of America owed duties to
myself, what the scope of those duties was, and whether Bank of America did not uphold those duties; (vi)
whether Bank of Americas conduct was unfair; and (vii) whether Bank of America has within its power
the ability to, and should, compensate me for the harm that has befallen me.
Upon identification of such unusual or suspicious activity, it is crucial that the relevant staff member
adequately describe the factors making an activity or transaction suspicious, thoroughly depict the extent
and nature of this activity and properly communicate to the customer that such activity meets the relevant
criteria of fraud.
In providing its services to a customer, a financial institution is required by law to exercise the care and
skill of a diligent, prudent banker. In this case, this means that the payment service provider should not turn
a blind eye to known facts pointing to a real possibility that their customer is being scammed. In other
words, Bank of America must have had special knowledge of what was occurring or been alerted to a real
possibility of fraud taking place. The financial institution must have known or reasonably ought to have
known that I was dealing with a scammer.
Granted, there is room for diversity of view insofar as reasonableness is concerned. Indeed, there is a sense
in which the standard of care of the reasonable person involves in its application a subjective element.
However, it must be remembered that the correct test is always reasonable care in all circumstances, not
average care. The fact that most people behave in a certain way may be good evidence that the conduct is
reasonable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although reasonableness is a very fluid concept, all of the
evidence suggests that Bank of America did not foresee the fraud and disregarded even the most obvious
dangers in this respect.
Situations do tend to repeat themselves and it is advisable to examine previous outcomes to see how the
standard of the reasonable person should be applied, and that lessons can be learnt from the errors of the
past.
Bank of Americas Position:
Bank of America wrote in a letter The amounts totaling of XXXX  in question that you listed in your
complaint is an accumulation of several transactions that were sent to the three previously mentioned
merchants that were confirmed valid and not made in error. Please note, the transactions posted correctly
to your account as instructed in XXXX XXXX. While we are sensitive to the effect this matter has had on
you, we are unable to dispute any agreements that you may have had with the recipient of the funds.
We can only recommend that you contact the recipient directly for further assistance with your disputes.
Refuting Bank of Americas arguments from a purely logical perspective:
Bank of Americas position is that the features of the situation at hand do not generate a genuine obligation
to protect innocent and helpless victims; they are essentially arguing that common-sense-based approaches
are doomed to fail, leaving their exclusively technical account of the subject matter as the only meaningful
choice. For reasons which are unclear, this extremely serious situation barely gets the attention it deserves
even though ample evidence has been offered in support of this complaint.
In Bank of Americas view, it is implied that we should not home in (and consequently rely) on unwritten
laws, practicality, good judgement, reasonableness, sharpness, sensibleness, past outcomes, and insight,
when taking appropriate precautions. To underscore, once again, such views are at odds with common sense
and are wildly irresponsible.
Imagine a view according to which the one and only thing that can make Bank of America morally obligated
to do something is having it written down somewhere. Pursuant to this view, if Bank of America encounter
the suffering of totally naive victims, they are only obligated to intervene in or remedy the situation, to the
degree required by written material. This is unbecoming for a reputable establishment such as Bank of
America.
I have reviewed the material hereto sent by Bank of America carefully, and it unfortunately provides no
response to my fundamental argument concerning the degree of care. Given its size, influence, and the
resources at its disposal, this establishment clearly had a far greater capacity than an individual such as
myself had, to determine the level and likelihood of risk that a client such as myself is subjected to and had
a duty to intervene as they now do to query in particular out-of-pattern transactions of this kind.
It is perfectly obvious that Bank of America, inadvertently, employs a subtle approach in addressing some
of the key questions in a manner which neither provides me with adequate support nor protects anything
other than its own interests.
It is Bank of America here, who has the burden of proof, to show that it has exercised the duty of care, that
is to say, that Bank of America adhered to a standard of reasonable care in relation to the matter at issue
given its extensive experience compared to mine. It is Bank of America that claims that the damages which
I have suffered in connection to this matter have not been reasonably foreseeable, and that my proposed
degree of care is not, and has not been, commensurate with XXXX XXXX  capacity, experience,
expertise, or scope of services in any way. To reemphasize, Bank of Americas indisputable overriding
purpose is by no means to purely execute transactions in a blind and blank fashion, but rather to strike a
balance between executing those transactions and capitalising on its undeniably vast capabilities to protect
consumers thereby enhancing market integrity.
Apropos of the fluidity of the concept of reasonableness, all Bank of America has done in this regard is set
up a dichotomy of having or not having the legal obligation under consideration, however, that does not go
one-inch toward explaining why various regulatory authorities, has maintained that financial institutions
can, and should, protect consumers using their systems, advanced technologies, and rich experience.
Bank of America is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud
may be being perpetuated. If you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam
with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable if the red flags indicate the customer is:
 particularly vulnerable, or
 if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.
There are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might
occur as a result of fraud or financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might
be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent
or minimise financial harm.
These recommendations are established as a general principle, the organisation should deliver a
service that:
1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets
out systems and tools for the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point,
it says organisations should ensure that all systems are developed using technologies and methodologies
that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through authorised and unauthorised
payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of
fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:
A) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious
transactions or activities that might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following
examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:
a. multiple cheque books;
b. sudden increased spending;
c. transfers to other accounts;
d. multiple password attempts;
e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;
f. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions
whose amount, characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity
of the customer, exceed normal market parameters or have no apparent legal
justification.
g. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;
h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;
i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.
B) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer
to verify the financial activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or
detected fraud and discuss an appropriate plan of action.
Bank of America are yet to show, or otherwise provide me with, a compelling argument that their wideranging
experience and wealth of specialist knowledge in detecting transactional anomalies were not
sufficient to avert the fraud at issue. By contrast, I have provided a multitude of sound and powerful reasons
by which requiring their involvement has not only been pressingly relevant but also eminently reasonable
and well-justified.
Rather than empathising with and undertaking substantial efforts to convey their knowledge of the existence
of such regulations abroad and thereafter use it to protect and proactively relieve the plight of consumers
who have been cheated out of their money and whose role in society is properly fulfilled, positively
contributing to local economic growth, development and sustainability  Bank of America adopts a rather
insouciant attitude toward my financial predicament portrayed herein.
I am deeply convinced that the disastrous results that I have previously elaborated upon will continue to
ensue if no responsibility is adopted by Bank of America in relation to this matter. I have also thoroughly
detailed why they cannot simply dismiss this problem by strictly adhering to legal technicalities which,
after careful reflection, struck me as being nothing more than self-interest. Indeed, it seems to me utterly
unfair to disregard fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable consumers who are afflicted by such allegedly
malevolent acts, thereby keeping an unjust status-quo that is corrupting our society at its core.
I would also like to highlight the stark difference in how complaints are handled between Bank of America
and XXXX XXXX Bank of America's handling of the situation was notably inadequate. They failed to properly
acknowledge the issues I faced and did not provide the necessary support to recover my funds. In contrast,
PNC Bank managed the situation with exemplary care. They not only acknowledged everything I had been
through but also took proactive steps to assist me in recovering my funds. This level of customer service
and attention to detail speaks volumes about XXXX XXXX commitment to their clients and their ability to
effectively address and resolve issues.
Conclusion:
Based on my analysis, and as confirmed by various authorities concerned with such matters, there is
abundant evidence that forward-thinking financial institutions ought to take reasonable steps to forestall
fraud, or at least mitigate its risk by using an effective risk management system, demonstrating their
undisputed ability to responsibly and pre-emptively respond to questionable transactions in the digital
arena. The use of such systems, largely based on newly adopted technologies aimed at effectively
navigating the evolving threat landscape, is only one of a number of possible endeavors undertaken in this
connection, alongside the application of past knowledge and experience related to popular fraudulent
practices.
Astonishingly, I am pondering how it is that, despite being shown that Bank of Americas business conduct
was insufficient insofar as background checks are concerned, they keep refuting their indisputable role and
responsibility in connection with the matter herein discussed. The points that I have hitherto made are too
crucial to be taken lightly. Bank of Americas non-observance of the fundamental principles of justice 
that is, to completely overlook and not even remotely try to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable consumers
is inexcusable given the size of the establishment and the vast resources at its disposal as the direct result
of the patronage of clients like myself.
If it was, indeed, solely my responsibility, we must then believe at least one of the following clauses: a)
financial institutions have absolutely no role whatsoever in preventing and detecting fraud, b) the fraud in
question was not reasonably foreseeable, or c) the transactions in question were not sufficiently alarming.
It is extremely unfortunate that Bank of America pushes quite hard for me to believe all three of these
thingsdespite evidence to the contrary.
In summary, I respectfully ask your organization to consider my points, given your personal and
companywide obligation to provide a fair and reasonable investigation into the complaint.
I look forward to your input and would gladly cooperate to reach a fair and reasonable outcome.
Thank you.
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX  Bank of America
Bank of America Corporate Center, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
SubjectXXXX XXXX XXXX complaint to XXXX XXXX XXXX: Bank of Americas complaints dept.
Dear Sir / Madam,
I have now reviewed your response dated XXXX XXXX XXXX  Based on my review, I do not believe you have acted fairly, let alone reasonably.
The investigatory processes appear to disfavour the victim, and there is a lack of knowledge of good industry practice as well as a lack of
care/compassion towards me as the customer.
Your response is, to say the least, extremely inadequate. It is based on a blatantly incorrect understanding of what I have maintained.
What amazes me is just how difficult it has been to find soundness in it. Your analysis, for instance, does not engage with the actual
history of my account and a significant portion of related data that may contradict your position has been conveniently ignored.
Seemingly, in arriving at a decision in relation to the issue I raised, no consideration was given to a) Duty of care in relation to the fact
that I am the victim of a financial crime and b) The responsibility that your institution hold to protect its clients from such crimes.
I find your rejection incredibly offensive and perplexing. In all honesty, if you could provide me with any kind of a logical coherent
account that could reconcile the evident fact of the multiple warning signals as well as my susceptibility relating to this matter with the
existence of a sound anti-fraud program, then I would absolutely appreciate your point of view.
Given the variety of similar cases involving various types of scams, you should be acutely aware of this problem for society, but your
superficial (and perhaps convenient) answer to it, simply put, is that blameless victims must be held accountable for their misfortune.
Because your argument presumably aims at self-protection rather than the truth, we can have no confidence that your rejection is
ultimately just, fair, or reasonable. It is time to adopt a more realistic, long-term attitude towards unavoidable scenarios of this kind,
starting from the justifiable assumption that such injured parties did not in the least contribute to (and thus certainly should not bear
responsibility for) their own victimisation.
Misplaced Accountability:
Scam victims have relatively little freedom of reactivity; under such circumstances, they respond immediately, instinctively, and
invariably to the specific demands of the perpetrator. Being able to consciously refrain from reacting in such a way is extremely difficult
and sometimes impossible. Unwittingly giving off signals that mark us as easy targets, is by no means the same as being grossly
negligent, in view of the increasingly sophisticated scams, which continue to be a pervasive problem in society.
Due to personal circumstances, I was particularly vulnerable during the victimisation period; I was also relatively financially illiterate
and very inexperienced in the finance sector which made me a prime target for criminal enterprises in this field.
Since this time, having lost all of my savings to these fraudulent companies, I have learnt an enormous amount about the scope of these
criminal endeavours and also about how the financial services sector operates internationally.
Financial institutions are well aware of the scope and nature of such crimes and the risks that these pose to their clients, who, in contrast,
mostly have limited knowledge of these dangers.
To be clear, people who have been scammed such as myself, are not individuals who have made poor investment decisions. They are
people who have been tricked, lied to, deceived and emotionally manipulated. Sophisticated, aggressive sales techniques end up trapping
the uninformed and unsuspecting victim who once in the clutches of the scammer cannot get out until most or all of the funds have been
lost (stolen) by the scammers. A good comparison is a perpetrator who grooms his victim whilst at the same time assaults him/her and
prevents them from escaping.
This complex issue has caused substantial harm to me, and if not appropriately addressed, will cause substantial harm to others, we must
therefore conduct an in-depth and comprehensive review of all of the contributing factors that have led to an outcome as horrendous as
the one described herein.
The grounds upon which you refute my claim:
Scrutiny shows that your claims are defective as an endeavour to thoroughly investigate the accessible facts; let alone as an attempt to
portray an accurate image respecting the role of banks in fighting financial crime and fraud, your organisations scope of services, and
various other details in connection with the duties that emerge out of our relationship, particularly in the context of the broader historical
circumstances. The emphasis that you have placed on the incredibly insufficient diligence checks as well as the inconsequential
references and the unidimensional thinking, not only gives a skewed picture of my fundamental rights as your customer, but also
presents a poor blueprint for understanding the issue discussed in a well-reasoned and objective manner, and an even poorer guide to
dictate whether there has been, as suggested, wrongdoing on your part.
The amounts totaling of XXXX in question that you listed in your complaint is an accumulation of several transactions that
were sent to the three previously mentioned merchants that were confirmed valid and not made in error. Please note, the
transactions posted correctly to your account as instructed in XXXX XXXX. While we are sensitive to the effect this matter has had on
you, we are unable to dispute any agreements that you may have had with the recipient of the funds. We can only recommend that you
contact the recipient directly for further assistance with your disputes.
Concerning the "authorisation" argument, it can be cast as an incompatibility between statements such as "the transaction has been
authorised" and "the duty of care has been breached". However, you have not shown that both statements are logically incompatible or
improbable with respect to each other. They are not mutually exclusive in the broader context.
The view that I have authorised the transaction and therefore fully liable is dangerously reductive--various aspects relating to the breach
of the duty of care have been marginalised. Clearly there are more facts to be taken into account than at first appears.
I notice that your account of the subject matter depends crucially on the supposed lack of obligation which is perhaps the most obscure
point in your argument. But regardless, your views give us reason to contemplate as well whether your societal role (which arguably
renders you capable of preventing plausibly foreseeable damages such as the one set forth herein) should trigger the appropriate moral
obligations rather than unscrupulous beliefs which are inherently unjust, flagrantly unfair and merely conducive to your own self-interest
and welfare. Likewise, you unknowingly oppose the emergent notion that I was no luckier in blindly placing faith in your
establishments competence than I would have been in not doing so.
You have blithely ruled out your obligation herein by undermining reasoning strategies aimed at justice and fairness; remarkably, you
have deliberately avoided the uncomfortable yet inevitable conclusion that in this instance you are to be held accountable, by narrowly
holding that a financial institution's role in society is merely to "act upon the customer's instruction." This sort of reductionist view has
long since been exposed as inadequate among world-leading, key financial regulatory authorities.
It is intuitively clear that you have not reckoned with the remarkable range of indispensable functions, which your organisation should
perform for the community in a manner that is both stable and sustainable. It is moreover blatantly apparent, that, instead of being
attuned more than ever to the importance of apprehending the pernicious influences of your idleness and non-intervention amidst an
inexorable rise of financial fraud, you are unwarrantably hiding behind specious arguments based on thin assumptions, inadequate
research, poor evidence, and sloppy reasoning. It is a whole lot better and far more effective to do the right thing, rather than the most
profitable one thereby compromising the integrity of your enterprise. I suggest that by following adequate protocols aimed at mutual
benefits (rather than satisfaction of personal goals), disadvantaged consumers will thrive rather than suffer, with a plethora of positive
feedback propagating far and wide as a result.
I demand an investigation to bring to light additional relevant evidence that I am persuaded will support my view. It is hereby proposed
that your motivations may adversely affect reasoning through overreliance on a biased set of processes. As a substitute for sub-optimally
relying on a set of gross oversimplifications (which frustratingly and inexorably lead us to draw erroneous conclusions), we should,
instead, systematically account for the totality of the evidence  howsoever unpalatable  by even-handedly relying on complex and
multifactorial reasoning. The demand for sound reasoning is essentially a demand for ultimate explanation, and is linked with a complete
understanding of the pronounced role that you played in permitting my injuries herein
In light of the above, it is patently clear that your train of thought is fatally flawed and totally unsupported. You have failed to come up
with positive evidence to support your claims, that is, to show beyond any reasonable doubt that irrespective of your conduct, my
victimization was an inevitable outcome. On the other hand, I have provided substantial evidence to support the claim that you could
have done more to safeguard my funds. Not only have you let me down, but you have also failed to admit that you could and should
have done better.
What can Bank of America do?
Please be noted that I will not in any way quietly tolerate the consequences of your actions (or more precisely, the lack thereof). Your
response has limited the discussion narrowly to highly technical terms, and insufficient attention has been given to your organizational
dysfunctions from a common-sense point of view. It is perfectly obvious that you could have, and should have, utilized various riskbased
examination procedures and techniques, all of which are within your purview and could have entirely prevented this disastrous
outcome. It is wildly incorrect to assume that you have exercised your duties by doing the minimum necessary. You have not exercised
your duties at all, rather, many of your underlying assumptions have simply gone unquestioned. Instead of being receptive to
constructive criticism and improving yourself, you ultimately seek to blame your customers thus absolving yourself of any
responsibility.
As previously advised, you should have known, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transactions (or pattern of transactions):
 involve funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise;
 is intended to disguise funds the ultimate purpose of which was to fuel an illegal enterprise, in an attempt to avoid and thus
violate regulations;
 is intentionally designed to defraud your customer;
 serves no legitimate or lawful purpose; and
 involve the use of your services to facilitate criminal activity
There are so many other ways in which measures related to fraud prevention and mitigation could have been useful. To the extent to
which you were inconsistent therewith, you are liable for damages. Further factors that should have been taken into consideration
include, but are not limited to, the following:
 The timing, volume, frequency, and nature of the transactions in question;
 The abnormality of such transactions against the background of your experience with me as a customer and other entities
associated with the transactions (if any);
 The suspicious nature of such transactions based on my overall risk profile including vulnerability, identification and research
of high-risk services/products;
 Systemic filtering mechanisms, whether manual or automatic, for the identification of unusual activities; and
 Periodic evaluation of the usefulness, appropriateness and effectiveness of anti-fraud programs, and other associated policies
and procedures.
It is incumbent upon financial institutions to carefully assess all information available about their customers, including vulnerability,
needs and customer type. There is a wide range of transactions which, although legitimate, should raise a red flag simply because they
are inconsistent with the customers typical and ordinary activity. What constitutes reasonable grounds to flag transactions varies
according to the facts and circumstances of the particular matter being investigated and the effectiveness of the anti-fraud processes.
Relevant industry practices at the time of the victimisation:
Your Organisation is obliged to take some action if it is sufficiently aware of a real possibility that a fraud may be being perpetuated. If
you don't question its customers instructions or raise the possibility of a scam with the customer in these circumstances, it may be liable
if the red flags indicate the customer is:
 particularly vulnerable, or
 if the possibility of fraud was serious or real, not just suspected.
There are some recommendations to organisations for protecting customers from financial harm that might occur as a result of fraud or
financial abuse; and gives guidance on how to recognise customers who might be at risk, how to assess the potential risks to the
individual and how to take the necessary actions to prevent or minimise financial harm, these recommendations are established as a
general principle, the organisation should deliver a service that:
1) Takes a proactive approach to minimising risks, impact and incidences of financial harm and it sets out systems and tools for
the prevention and detection of fraud and financial abuse. As a general point, it says organisations should ensure that all systems
are developed using technologies and methodologies that are effective in the prevention of fraud and financial abuse, through
authorised and unauthorised payments, thereby minimising the risk of financial harm to customers. As regards to the detection of
fraud and financial abuse, it says the organisation:
A) should have measures in place across all payment channels and products to detect suspicious transactions or activities that
might indicate fraud or financial abuse. It then lists the following examples of suspicious activity on customer accounts:
a. multiple cheque books;
b. sudden increased spending;
c. transfers to other accounts;
d. multiple password attempts;
e. logins from new devices, multiple geographical locations;
f. sudden changes to the operation of the account; Unusual transactions are transactions whose amount,
characteristics and frequency bear no relation to the economic activity of the customer, exceed normal
market parameters or have no apparent legal justification.
g. a withdrawal or payment for a large amount;
h. a payment or series of payments to a new payee;
i. financial activity that matches a known method of fraud or financial abuse.
B) organisations should have a process in place to ensure that staff make contact with the customer to verify the financial
activity, challenge its authenticity, explain the nature of the suspected or detected