Product: Checking or savings account

Citibank Allowed A Fraudulent and Unauthorized Wire Transfer of {$50000.00} from My Checking Account : I received a text on Tuesday, XXXX that appeared to be a fraud alert from Citibank. The text included a transaction reference number and a phone number, which I called. After asking this person to verify himself as a Citibank employee, he told me he would call back. I then received a call back from Citibanks main customer service number ( which we now understand was spoofed by the scammer ). 

This individual convincingly presented himself as a Citibank agent, including running through the standard security questions and verification protocol that Citibank follows when speaking to a customer. He informed me that my personal checking and saving and a joint checking account that I share with my fiance had been compromised, and that for security purposes, Citibank needed to close all three accounts and transfer the money to new accounts. I spent several hours on the phone with the purported agent, and at one point the scammer gained remote access to my computer, under the guise of helping me navigate the transfer and account closure process online. 

While I was on the phone, I received a call from a Citibank XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, alerting me to fraud on my account. I informed the caller that I was aware of the fraud alert and was speaking to someone at Citibank on the other line. I asked if I could continue speaking to that person or if I should speak to this new caller. She assured me that if I was already on the other line with someone at Citibank there was no need to continue with her. While I can not be sure, I am pretty sure that she was a legitimate Citibank employee. 

When I informed my fiancee what was happening and mentioned the remote access, she called Citibanks main customer service line, through the Citibank app, to verify that I was dealing with a legitimate Citibank agent. The agent she spoke to confirmed that there was a fraud alert on the joint account, and offered an explanation for why the fraud team may need access to my computer. Based on that verification, I remained on the phone with the scammer, who ultimately effected a {$50000.00} wire transfer from my account to an account at XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ). 

After the wire was initiated, I received an email and voicemail from a member of the private bank team, instructing me to provide verbal authorization of the transfer by the end of the day, or the wire would be cancelled. I never provided verbal authorization. At one point, I received a push alert on his phone from the Citibank app, and I clicked something to the effect of authorize. We have since learned form Citi that verbal authorization is required for a wire of this amount, and this type of digital authorization would not suffice to approve the transfer according to Citibanks own protocols. Nevertheless, Citibank completed the wire transfer without ever speaking to me. When we spoke to Citibanks fraud department later that evening ( after the fraudulent transfer occurred ), they informed us that there was never a fraud alert on any of the accounts. If we had been informed of that when we spoke to Citibank twice during the incident, we would have known to hang up on the scammer immediately, but unfortunately Citibank twice provided incorrect confirmation of a fraud alert which helped verify the scammer as a legitimate Citibank representative. 

We spoke again to Citibanks fraud team later that night, who immediately froze my accounts and filed a dispute/hold on the wire. We were informed multiple times the evening of XXXX and morning of XXXX that the wire simply needed to be recalled by a wire specialist, and would not be able to clear my account in light of the dispute. However, when we spoke to a wire specialist on XXXX, he informed us the money had already been transferred to XXXX. 

Citibank issued a recall notice to XXXX on XXXX. XXXX responded and froze the recipient account on XXXX. As of this evening, we understand that Citibank is still waiting for XXXX to provide further information, including whether there is any money in the transferee account. 

We looped in the private bank team immediately after speaking to the fraud team on XXXX, and escalated the matter to XXXX XXXX, a Citibank Managing Director in the private bank, on Thursday, XXXX. She and the other members of her team have offered very little visibility into the process from here except that Citibank is conducting an investigation, waiting for XXXX and otherwise not able to do anything in terms of crediting the funds until the investigation is complete, which they said would take up to 60 days. 

Ultimately, we had no means of determining that the party I spoke to was not a Citibank representative. In contrast, Citibank was well positioned to prevent this fraud, and failed to do so despite repeated opportunities to do so ( including in violation of their own protocols ). Accordingly, I expect to be credited for the fraudulent transfer regardless of the funds are recoverable from the recipient account.