Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

I filed a fraud claim with Chase on XX/XX/XXXX immediately when I discovered my checking account had an unauthorized wire transfer/withdraw of $ XXXX. I phoned the claim department listed on the back of my atm. I was on hold for 1 hour before a representative answered. At that point I was told that on XX/XX/XXXX two wire transfers in different amounts of {$7700.00} and {$7000.00} were requested from my account via wire transfer from two different recipients with different addresses. I live in California. The wire requests came from the XXXX XXXX. Possibly XXXX. Chase blocked the transfers 4x due to suspected fraud and suspiciousness. Chase made one mention of location in their initial notes. A Chase representative then called the phone number associated with my account ( my phone number ) and approved the funds with a voice confirmation. I have never used any voice verification with Chase that could be used to verify my identity especially in suspicious banking activities and non-typical money exchanges. Over 15 years, I have only occasionally called Chase to reverse a late charge and/or order a new ATM. Claim supervisor XXXX confirmed several different fraud specialists made determinations on these transfers. Each time the wire transfer request was denied it went into a cue and a new and different person reviewed it again. There was no consistency by a single person and each person reviewing lived in potentially different countries. This leaves room for extraordinary errors. I have never initiated a wire transfer of any sort from my accounts in over 15 years of banking with Chase. This was my entire savings that was unauthorized out of my account. I bank with Chase because they are the largest bank in the world. I trusted in their security. I trusted in their level of professional knowledge regarding fraud if it should happen. I trusted that specialist reviewing suspicious activity were the highest trained. This was not the case. This wire transfer was initiated on XXXX XXXX time and sent to the XXXX XXXX. I live in California I am completely unaware all of this is occurring. I was not given the benefit of the doubt to send an email to indicate what was happening on XX/XX/XXXX or XX/XX/XXXX when prior to authorizing the wire. The two different amounts, two different recipients, two time zones, no history at all of transferring money, a transfer amount well outside of my typical spending patterns the fact that login pin was changed the day before this transfer was not reasonable for Chase to deny the wire. This is non-sensical to me. The totality of these red flag taken together with the fact that Chase denied this 4x was reasonable enough for Chase 's experts to stop any payment for this wire claim for our best interests in the end. But Chase did not. Instead, Chase decided that despite red flags and all of the suspicious behavior one phone call was simply sufficient to approve XXXX to wired out of my account. I do not see that any critical or preventative thinking or measures were used in this situation. I had only paid utilities and mortgage from this account. 

I did not know any sort of wire transfer could be done over the phone or website. I thought it was similar to my credit unions, which require 2 forms of ID and in person request. Furthermore, with my credit unions, even if a wire transfer is initiated by mail, the wire transfer must be notarized. Chase offers this easy on-line service to customers but with minimal measures in cases of fraud. Or rather, the level of training currently used is not sufficient to stop red-flags and suspicious transfers. I assert that because of the ease to impersonate Chase customers for a service Chase offers and is not adequately able to monitor, Chase customers are at a higher risk of being victims of fraud by highly technical and sophisticated fraudulent individuals. 

Chase was able send email alerts on my account. I received the confirmation email on XX/XX/XXXX. Had Chase sent me email correspondence XX/XX/XXXX, and XX/XX/XXXX prior to authorizing those funds, in addition to blocking this transfer, my savings would still be in my possession. This is reasonable for Chase to do so on my account given my usage. Chase did not initiate a rapid recall until the week after XX/XX/XXXX. I was also told by the second representative that a rapid recall of the funds was not possible. However, on a later conversation in XX/XX/XXXX, I was told it was possible and they did initiate it. I believe Chase may have initiated the recall but on a date much later than XX/XX/XXXX in the XXXX. Chase refused to provide any documentation on their part to what, when and who did what. I asked multiple times to speak with supervisors and to connect me with the fraud specialists. Each time I was told decisions were made in the back office and no one was allowed to communicate directly with specialists there. 

XXXX/Phone Compromise Also on XX/XX/XXXX XXXX, I was unable to call out of my XXXX Phone service nor was I able to text. I had a dentist appointment. Upon arrival, I asked the secretary to phone me. She said my phone number rang straight to voice mail but my actual phone in my hand did not register the call nor did it ring. At that point, I understood something suspicious had occurred I checked my accounts at the dentist office. I received an email notification from Chase that the wire transfer for XXXX was successfully completed. I was shocked. I phoned in my claim and headed straight to the bank. After the bank, I headed to XXXX. I phoned their fraud department but was told I had to go into a local store with two forms of identification since my pin was changed and they could no longer verify me via phone. XXXX reviewed my account and determined an electronic sim card swap was made on XX/XX/XXXX, which allowed fraudsters to take control of my phone number, take my phone off XXXX XXXX system, load my number onto a sim card and then intercept the call from Chase. I was at XXXX for 3 hours. 

This is a highly sophisticated 2-part fraud scheme that targets Chase Customers . Chase 's current methods of security and level of expertise of their fraud specialist is not at the level to prevent this, even on a basic level due to multiple inadequacies that include personnel and highly, specialized technology to complete fraud. In my case, I claim that Chase could have used more care, ordinary care based on red flags to prevent this. My experience with its claim specialists and reviewing their actions on my case suggest to me reasonable evidence of unskilled labor and failure to use ordinary good judgement in this fraud case. 

Claim Department The first representative who took my claim was outsourced from a XXXX. He yelled at me for not listening when I asked for clarification, and continued to say " You authorized this wire ''. We had a tense discussion as I would not back down that I did not authorize this claim. The entire process was frustrating and scary. He did not offer to do a rapid recall. I asked if we could get the money back. He said no. I requested to speak to another agent. He transferred me. She seemed more professional but then her line was disconnected. I went to the bank to close my checking accounts and to confirm my claim. The second claim representative informed me the first specialist did not open it correctly so it was not opened at all. She also said a rapid recall was not possible. So far I have been in the phone with Chase since XXXX. I left the bank 3 hours later. The resulting 10 out of the 12 representatives I spoke to were outsourced from the XXXX or XXXX. It took at least 45-60 minutes to get in to the claim department. It was incredible difficult to understand the agents and their knowledge about handling the claim, what I should do, what I could do was limited to none. I went in every week since XX/XX/XXXX and reviewed details. Every week there were outrageous errors. I spent at least 3 hours per week at the bank from XX/XX/XXXX to XX/XX/XXXX. I filed a complaint w/Chase to how they were handling my claim. At every juncture they frustrated not help my attempts to recover my funds. I filled out the forgery packet and provided multiple pieces of information. 10 days later there was no response. The 4th time I went to the bank, Chase had processed the claim for XXXX and not XXXX. I had to wait another 10 days to get a response and for them to correct or get in order their documentation. A private banker at Chase was witness to all of my phone calls. He also was upset and embarrassed with all of the mistakes. 

Lastly, I recalled that I had received several texts from Chase the week prior. One regarded if I made a purchase and to indicate y/n. The other resulting Chase texts were to update my accounts on-line. I used the text update my account. I went to Chase and updated my information. I monitored my accounts for daily afterward. There was no suspicious behavior. In filling out the affidavit and speaking with the claim reps, they said Chase would never ask to update information via text. I informed them the website was a Chase website. It was exactly what Chase 's website looked like. I inspected it. There was nothing that indicate it was not Chase or a scam. I logged in etc. Following these discussions with Chase, I now conclude that this website may not have been chase. I disclosed this information to Chase. I also disclosed that my phone was compromised. 

XX/XX/XXXX Chase responded with an email that I did not take the appropriate steps to protect my account against fraud. I counter and say, Chase is did not do enough to inform me that fraud may have been happening to my account, and in general Chase is not doing enough to inform customers that fraudsters are specifically targeting to Chase and Wire Fraud since it is an easy, on-line service scammers can hack into given Chases limited stop to this. Chase is able to send offer letters to customers to encourage them to use their financial products. Chase needs to send out more notifications to your home address encouraging you to be more on alert to being specifically targeted as a Chase customer. Chase also does not disclose that likely 80 % of their workforce in Claim and Fraud representatives are outsourced at this time and representatives are not prepared to handle complex, documentation. Outsourcing would not be problematic if the outsourced workers were skilled and highly trained and to take well-documented notes and details in English. This is not the case. They are not. There were multiple errors in my claim and when phoning in. I have the private banker as a witness. The specialists I spoke with all appeared to have basic, entry-level skills vocabulary and grammar. I am a XXXX  XXXX and XXXX XXXX. I am licensed. It was clear the language capabilities and/or receptive language of the specialists I spoke with were not especially adequate to document complex internet economical criminal behavior I reported. Chase also does not disclosing the amount of errors on their part that adversely impacts the victim/customer in advocating for oneself and recovering their money. Chase did not care at all that I was unable to pay my bills, my mortgage, that I am new homeowner or that I banked with them for over 15 years without any prior incident. I also felt discrimination on the basis of gender and race. I was unable to show any type of anger or raise voice as this quickly lead to ending the call. The private banker was male. He was able to serve as an intermediate communication person. He was also proactive of his job and I could not strongly ask him to put himself in jeopardy. However, I felt great humiliation and blame firstly for not being able to fully speak for myself, and secondly for the amount of liability the bank was assessing to me saying I should have known. There were no discussions of liability or any acknowledgement of Chase 's response to not stopping the wire transfer in light of the suspicious behavior. There was no discussion to how I should have known when they themselves did not use ordinary, basic care. Is the customer supposed to police the Banks resources? Is the customer supposed to know beyond a shadow of a doubt that a website may be false when it is identical to Chases? The answer is no. This is not possible. I never imagined Chase would not help me in a case of unauthorized payment. Nor did I ever think Chase would NOT stop a payment with so many red-flags. 
Both Chase and I were victims of a highly, complex fraud operation that is beyond their highly-trained or ordinarily-trained representatives to prevent. I had never heard of an electronic sim card swap. With every other person I spoke to about this in my claim, they had not either. Including, private banker. It was equally difficult to explain this to the claim specialists with varying levels of English proficiency and fraud expertise answering my calls. 
In my XXXX Privacy notice for this checking account from Chase under Accounts Alerts and Text banking Chase indicates it may contact customers using telephone number, email, and/or other delivery points so they can inform you about your accounts. There is no mention that I will be held 100 % liable if I am scammed. The XXXX disclosures, more fully explain this and have several expanded entries or wire-fraud. This was not included in my XXXX disclosure, when the bank changed my checking accounts from Chase Total Checking to Chase Premier.

Chase clearly says they can refuse to authorize a transaction where they reasonably believe there may be fraudulent, suspicious or illegal activity. I state that Chase did not use reasonable or ordinary care to do this, which would have secured this money in both our interests. Chase is a bank and employ fraud experts. To suggest a customer would have more experience and knowledge than the very experts hired and trained by Chase to intercept fraud is ludicrous, irresponsible, and absolves Chase of any responsibility of their own use ordinary care or in instances when Chase could have prevented this. Ordinary care for the largest bank and richest in the world, requires Chase to have a standard that is more knowledgeable than an ordinary customer. There are enough red-flags to show Chase could have prevented this. They have the authority to stop charges. 
I reported this crime less than 24 hours after it occurred. I did not benefit from this unauthorized withdraw. I did not know the recipients. This is a personal violation where the bank had the final say. This fraud has destroyed my financial security and trust in Chase. Chase response to me and it's treatment of my claim has been intimidating and stressful and has reduced me to a victim with no recourse. I vehemently disagree.

The ETA states that in ATM, credit card fraud, funds transferred by telephone, money exchanged electronically that are fraudulent, the customer is liable {$50.00} if claim is made within 2 business days and up {$500.00} if reported later and/or within 60 days. After 60 days you are not entitled to any reimbursement of your funds. Wire transfers are direct bank to bank electronic transfers. Should liability be assigned to me, then it should follow more reasonable terms. Holding me 100 % liable or XXXX liable is incredibly destructive and punitive to the customer. It is obvious to me My Pin, and telephone numbers are not enough to keep funds safe, especially given the ease to which fraudsters are able to steal your information. Chase has not proved I did not use ordinary care or justified 100 % liability. I am an intelligent person. I have 3 degrees. I am a XXXX. I review my accounts daily. I do receive notifications from Chase. I verified the site to my best ability and it appeared to be Chase, in every aspect. This is the expectation of ordinary, for a bank customer. 

In the XXXX Chase disclosures sent to me when my accounts were changed by Chase, the fraud section was not are not as expansive as it is now. The new disclosures associated with my new bank accounts that I was required to open include much more explicit fraud disclosures and information. I did not have those in my booklet from XXXX, which I have now. However, the issue still stands that flatly denying customers based on being victimized by a scam, which customers are specifically targeted as Chase I am prepared to continue to appeal Chase 's denial. I will ask Chase directly to reinstate my account. I will further indicate I will proceed with further complaints and pursue Small Claims Court should Chase continue to not reimburse my account. 

See attached documents. Police Department in XXXX XXXX, Ca would not take police reports for this internet fraud but had me fill out ICF 3 form instead.