Product: Credit card

XXXX XXXX my wife ) and I have a Fidelity Signature VISA credit card that is managed by Elan Financial Services, which is owned by US Bank Corp. We were the target of a fraud that was carried out by, most likely, a dishonest Elan employee, a dishonest former Elan employee or a non-employee who had complete access to Elans systems. 



The scam was the same as described in the postings on XXXX ( the link is below ). 



On Monday XX/XX/year> at XXXX Central Time ( Elans phone records are recorded in Central Time ) my wife received a call from someone purporting to be a customer service representative of Elan. My wife patched me into that call. We were told that someone fraudulently attempted to use our VISA card three times in XXXX, Illinois and the card was declined. That individual had full access to all of our account information. He went through every charge on the card for the prior week, ostensibly to determine whether any of them were fraudulent. He had our email addresses, telephone numbers and address. 



The call from the supposed Elan representative showed a caller ID number of XXXX XXXX XXXX. ( I was told that Elans records showed that a call was made by an Elan employee to my wife at that time. ) Based on that person having information that was only available from Elans systems, I had no reason to believe that we were the targets of a fraud. 



The caller said that the compromised card would be cancelled ( I later found out from the Elan fraud group that it was not ), and a new card would be sent to us. We said that we were travelling and would be in XXXX for several weeks. We provided a XXXX address to which the new cards should be sent. Shortly after that call ended I got an email from Fidelity Card Services ( I confirmed that it was issued by Elan ) indicating that new cards would be sent to us. BUT, it indicated that the address to which our new cards would be sent was an address in the XXXX. 



I had multiple calls with Elan customer service representatives after receiving the email stating that our replacement cards would be sent to a fraudulent address in the XXXX. On Tuesday XX/XX/year> I was finally able to speak with a competent person at Elan, who is in its fraud group. ( She said that a more senior person at Elan would follow up and call me. No one has called me. ) She confirmed that an outgoing call was made to my wife at XXXX that call lasted XXXX minutes. She indicated that at XXXX ( CT ) someone called Elan, posing as my wife and asked that the cards be sent to the XXXX address. The Elan customer services representative who received that call determined, based on the incoming call telephone number, that the caller was a known fraudster. At XXXX ( CT ) that person called Elan again. The customer representative who received that call directed that the replacement cards should be sent to the fraudulent XXXX address. 



The call XXXX and I had with the presumed Elan customer service representative did not end until XXXX ( CT ). Within 13 minutes of the call to my wife and while that call was in progress, someone called pretending to be my wife called Elan asking for the cards to be sent to the fraudulent address. As noted above that call was terminated. At XXXX, while my wife and I were still on the call with the purported Elan customer service representative, the fraudster posing as my wife called Elan again and successfully convinced Elan to send the replacement cards to the fraudulent address.

This looks like an inside job carried out by dishonest Elan employees or former employees ; or non-employees who have full access to Elans systems. How else could someone posing as my wife call Elan within minutes of Elan calling her claiming that our VISA card was compromised. As the postings that can be found on the following link indicate, this scam has been ongoing for some time. Elan and US Bank Corp. have very serious issues with IT security, internal controls and XXXX XXXX compliance. 

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