Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

XXXX, Maryland XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX To Whom it May Concern ; This letter concerns a fraudulent wire transfer from XXXX and XXXX XXXX Bank Account at XXXX XXXX XXXX ( XXXX  ) to a supposed bank manager at Wells Fargo Bank. A scammer stated he was with the XXXX Fraud Department. Prior to the reported call from XXXX there was a XXXX text message and an email stating there was suspected fraudulent activity. 
The identified fraud correspondence occurred on the evening of XXXX XX/XX/year> at XXXX. The text message, and the email arrived prior to a wire transfer request, both stating there was suspected fraud activity of our debit card that was declined. The correspondence also identified a XXXX payment for {$3000.00} approved for XXXX XX/XX/year>. The text message stated If not recognized reply NO, stop to end. XXXX XXXX XXXX answered NO. At XXXX there was a text reply Thanks for confirming transaction you should receive a call soon. 
XXXX XXXX received a phone call at XXXX on XXXX XX/XX/year> from XXXX  Customer Service , phone number ( XXXX ). The scammer identified himself as XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX spoke with XXXX XXXX on the phone for a few minutes, notifying XXXX XXXX her ATM card had been compromised. XXXX XXXX informed XXXX XXXX people were trying to transfer {$9600.00} from the XXXX bank account instead of the originally identified {$3000.00} XXXX payment. 
XXXX XXXX notified XXXX XXXX he would call back momentarily, and he called back promptly at XXXX on XXXX XX/XX/year>. XXXX XXXX walked XXXX XXXX through the process of a wire transfer. XXXX XXXX said he would transfer the money ( {$9600.00} ) to the Bank Manager at Wells Fargo Bank ( XXXX XXXX XXXX ). The Bank Routing number provided : # XXXX, the account number provided : # XXXX, and the amount to transfer : {$9600.00}. The wire transfer went through to Wells Fargo Bank, and the transfer number was XXXX. XXXX XXXX informed XXXX XXXX not to open online Banking and to close all accounts and re-open with him within the next day or so. 
On XXXX XX/XX/year>, XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX visited their local branch of XXXX XXXX XXXX located in XXXX XXXX, Maryland at XXXX. They spoke with a XXXX bank representative, XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX XXXX notified XXXX and XXXX XXXX they had likely been Scammed and the XXXX  customer phone number Spoofed. XXXX  would try to get the money returned. XXXX and XXXX XXXX spoke with the XXXX Fraud Department with XXXX XXXX present on the phone call. After speaking with the Fraud Department, XXXX and XXXX XXXX left the XXXX. 
XXXX XXXX phoned XXXX XXXX at XXXX on XXXX XX/XX/year> and attempted to have her allow him to close and re-open new bank accounts. The request came via the XXXX Customer Service Number. XXXX and XXXX XXXX returned to XXXX  located in XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX for further discussion regarding the spoofed phone calls, to include a phone call at XXXX with XXXX XXXX present . XXXX XXXX introduced XXXX XXXX XXXX, a XXXX Manager to the XXXX and they spoke about the wire transfer and countermeasures to avoid repeat fraudulent activity. At XXXX XXXX XXXX blocked the XXXX Customer Service Number. Between XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX received nine phone calls from the parties attempting to manipulate XXXX  accounts, which she blocked. These phone calls originated from XXXX ( XXXX Customer Service Number ) and XXXX ( XXXX XXXX personal cell phone ). A phone call at XXXX came in from the XXXX number, which XXXX XXXX XXXX as his cell phone number. XXXX XXXX answered XXXX XXXX phone call at XXXX on the XXXX whereupon he inquired why his calls were being blocked. XXXX XXXX notified XXXX XXXX she was not feeling well and could not talk. After a 1 minute and 37 second phone conversation with XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX notified him she did not feel well and could they please talk the next day. 
On XXXX XX/XX/year> phone calls resumed at XXXX from the ( XXXX ) XXXX  number, which XXXX XXXX blocked. A phone call from XXXX was blocked on the XXXX, and four calls from XXXX were also blocked. XXXX XXXX left a voice mail ( XXXX ) requesting why his phone calls were being blocked. XXXX XXXX texted XXXX XXXX identifying she was busy during the previous call at XXXX. XXXX XXXX phoned at XXXX from the XXXX number and XXXX XXXX answered. She spoke with him for 2 minutes and 39 seconds, explaining she did not feel well. XXXX XXXX inquired why XXXX XXXX blocked his phone calls and she explained she did not recognize the new phone number. XXXX XXXX once again inquired about closing and re-opening additional bank accounts. He continued to ask questions to get a YES answer. The conversations were on a recorded line and XXXX XXXX insisted on getting XXXX XXXX to provide a YES answer to his questions, which she did not comply with. XXXX XXXX asked XXXX XXXX if she could open her online banking account to check on the {$9600.00} and identify if the monies were restored to her XXXX account. XXXX XXXX requested XXXX XXXX wait until Monday, XXXX XX/XX/year> or Tuesday, XXXX XX/XX/year>. XXXX XXXX once again requested XXXX XXXX change her banking accounts, whereupon she responded perhaps later. XXXX XXXX did not notify XXXX XXXX that she and XXXX XXXX had previously visited the local XXXX Branch located in XXXX XXXX, Maryland on XXXX XX/XX/year>. 
XXXX XXXX attempted to contact XXXX XXXX twice on Sunday evening, XXXX XX/XX/year>, at XXXX via the XXXX  Customer Service Number ( XXXX ) and XXXX XXXX blocked the number both times. XXXX XXXX never heard from XXXX XXXX again. 

Over a four-day period, XXXX XX/XX/year>, XXXX XXXX received 30 phone calls from XXXX XXXX : XXXX 17 calls received  ( XXXX  Customer Service Number ). 
XXXX 9 calls received ( XXXX XXXX Personal Cell Phone ). 
XXXX 4 calls received ( Unidentified, used by XXXX XXXX ). 

Respectfully, XXXX and XXXX XXXX Phone Registry XXXX XX/XX/year> - XXXX XXXX  and Scammers : XXXX XXXX XXXX Fraud Activity .

Date Time Phone Number Incoming/Outgoing POC Blocked Elapsed Time. 
XX/XX/scrub>XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Total of 17 phone calls from this number.

Michigan Phone : XXXX. Total of 9 calls from this number. 
Texas Phone : XXXX. Total of 4 calls from this number. 

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX To Whom it May Concern ; Although XXXX and XXXX XXXX would like to commend XXXX  XXXX XXXX ( XXXX  ) for their excellent support following a recent fraudulent wire transfer involving their XXXX  account, there are concerns about XXXX security measures and protection against fraudulent financial transactions. Scamming transactions against the XXXX XXXX accounts on XXXX XX/XX/year> have made it apparent XXXX electronic security measures are woefully inadequate. Compromises involving various forms of communication, to include text messages, emails, and even the XXXX  Customer Service Number, identify security issues XXXX  needs to address. 

XXXX  has security protocols in-place to mitigate security breaches against customer accounts ; however, when XXXX XXXX used these security measures to address a potential breach ( she phoned the XXXX  Customer Service Number ), she discovered the XXXX  Customer Service number had been spoofed. XXXX advised XXXX XXXX she should have used appropriate security measures to prevent fraud measures such as creating foolproof passwords, transferring monies with XXXX review, and contacting the XXXX Fraud Department should there be any suspect activity involving XXXX  customer accounts. It is disconcerting when XXXX basically blames the customer for inadequate security procedures when it is the XXXX  sites that were spoofed. The security breaches should be attributable to XXXX, not XXXX XXXX, since XXXX has inadequate security measures. Monies lost resulting from a XXXX XX/XX/year> scam ( {$9600.00} ) were at the expense of XXXX and XXXX XXXX, not XXXX. 

The person XXXX XXXX spoke with on XXXX XX/XX/year> claimed they were a XXXX Fraud Department representative. XXXX XXXX received both an email from a fraudulent XXXX XXXX, and a bogus text message to her phone number. XXXX XXXX even replied NO to a spoofed XXXX  text message requesting a financial transaction. The fraudulent XXXX  representative phoned XXXX XXXX from the XXXX Customer Service phone number, assuring monies in her account ( {$9600.00} ) were to be transferred to the Bank Manager at Wells Fargo Bank, thus assuring the safety of her monies. Although XXXX XXXX willfully conducted a wire transfer ( {$9600.00} ) from her XXXX  account, it was produced under false pretenses and based on fraudulent activity. Monies were stolen and are unlikely to be returned to the XXXX XXXX Joint Account. 

While XXXX  is surely not accountable for all bank scams involving their customers, it is nevertheless disheartening when XXXX  customers attempt to follow recommended security measures only to discover XXXX sites were compromised. XXXX was very professional in their post-scam response ; however, bottom line is XXXX notified the XXXX their ( {$9600.00} ) is stolen and will not be recovered. 

The XXXX XXXX XXXX is a reputable institution and has been in the financial business for a very long time but the Bank needs to upgrade their cyber security and ensure better protection of their customers monies. It is easy to blame customers for taking inadequate security measures, and this may occur, but XXXX is responsible for taking precautions to protect monies held in their institution. When customers rely on XXXX secure web sites only to discover those sites have been compromised it is time for XXXX  to look inward and invest in additional security measures. A compromise, such as a spoofed site, involving substantial XXXX  monies would likely not be ignored or passed off as another fraud incident. XXXX  needs to apply due diligence in addressing financial fraud. XXXX  should be customer focused and ensure every effort is made to protect monies they are managing, to include customers such as the XXXX that have held accounts with them for nearly 50 years. 

Respectfully, XXXX and XXXX XXXX