Product: Debt collection

Dear CFPB, Please find my complaint against First American Title, part of First American Financial ( FAF ) XXXX, XXXX and XXXX XXXX who defraud home buyers with bogus Title insurances which XXXX XXXX  ( a sham conduit for FAF and XXXX XXXX , owned by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX who owns several Title Companies, like XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX FAF and XXXX help XXXX XXXX Banks to operate a giant Ponzi  Scheme with derivatives and massively defraud home buyers about the REAL nature of their transaction - secretive participation in fictitious securitization scheme without borrowers knowledge or consent, where XXXX XXXX Banks sell borrowers ' IDENTITIES on the open markets for about 12-184 profits - while pocket ALL so-called " mortgage payments '' and escrow money as their tax free revenue. 

XXXX XXXX never inform home buyers about WHO will actually their " Title insurance '' company - because both FAF and XXXX know that Big Banks break every property Title in their fraudulent scheme - and of course are not going to compensate defrauded borrowers. 

XXXX XXXX Bankers ( XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX, XXXX, XXXX - created a perfect scheme where it simply is incomprehensible to most people how they could get a loan and then not owe it. It is even more incomprehensible that there could be no creditor that could enforce any alleged obligation of the homeowner. After all, the homeowner signed a note which by itself creates an obligation. 

Big Banks want to maintain this illusion as long as they can - and here why they need services of FAF and XXXX - whose subsidiaries XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX, XXXX prepare fictious " assignments '' about non-existing " sales '' in fraudulent foreclosures presented by lawyers who do not even know who hired them - XXXX and XXXX. 

On an intuitive level, most people understand that they got screwed in what they thought was a lending process. But they don't know how because most people have no reason to know what happens in the world of investment banking. 

But XXXX and FAF know exactly that really happened when most homeowners thought that they were closing a loan transaction. And they know that property TITLE will be broken and clouded. This is why XXXX  XXXX  XXXX  or XXXX XXXX refuse to fulfill their obligation under the Policy they deceptively sold me. Because XXXX and XXXX XXXX are the part of the XXXX XXXX banks mob. 

This is why XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX falsely claim that my " mortgage with XXXX XXXX  is excluded from coverage. But I never had ANY mortgages with XXXX - ever. 

My transaction on XX/XX/XXXX was not a loan, and XXXX XXXX was not a Lender. 

My transaction was a payment to me by XXXX XXXX XXXX Banks XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX who was the actual originator who passed me money for MY services to XXXX XXXX Investment Banks ; and who collects my repayment of my only compensation via XXXX agreement with XXXX/XXXX. 

Neither XXXX, XXXX or XXXX never touched a cent from these money. They tell they do but it is a lie. All money are going straight to Big Banks as tax-free revenue for my involuntary servitude in their XXXX  Scheme. 

Every investment banker is merely a stockbroker. They do business with investors and other investment bankers. They do not do business with consumers who purchase goods and services or loans. The investment banker is generally not in the business of lending money. The investment banker is in the business of creating capital for new and existing businesses. They make their money by brokering transactions. They make the most money by brokering the sales of new securities including stocks and bonds. 

The compensation received by the investment banker for brokering a transaction varied from as little as 1 % or 2 % to as much as 20 %. The difference is whether they were brokering the sale of existing securities or underwriting new securities. Obviously, they had a very large incentive to broker the sale of new securities for which they would receive 7 to 10 times the compensation of brokering the sale of existing securities. 

But the Holy Grail of investment banking was devising some system in which the investment bank could issue a new security from a FICTIONAL entity and receive the entire proceeds of the offering. This is what happened in residential lending. And this way, they could receive 100 % of the offering instead of a brokerage commission. 

By disconnecting the issuance of securities from the ownership of any perceived obligation from consumers, investment bankers put themselves in a position in which they could issue securities INDEFINITELY without limit and without regard to the amount of the transaction with consumers ( homeowners ) or investors. 

In short, the goal was to make it appear as though loans have been securitized even know they had not been securitized. In order for any asset to have been securitized it would need to have been sold off in parts to investors. What we see in the residential market is that no such sale ever occurred. Under modern law, a sale consists of offer, acceptance, payment, and delivery. So neither the investment bank nor any of the investors to whom they had sold securities, ever received a conveyance of any right, title, or interest to any debt, note, or mortgage from a homeowner. 

At the end of the day, the world was convinced that the homeowner had entered into a loan transaction while the investment banker had assured itself and its investors that it would be free from liability for violation of any lending laws as a lender. 

Neither of them maintained a loan account receivable on their own ledgers even though the capital used to pay homeowners originated from banks who loaned money to investment bankers ( based upon sales of certificates to investors XXXX, which was then used to pay homeowners as little as possible from the pool of capital generated by the loans and certificate sales of mortgage-backed bonds. 

From the perspective of the investment banker, payment was made to the homeowner in exchange for participation in creating the illusion of a loan transaction despite the fact that there was no lender and no loan account. This was covered up by having more intermediaries claim rights as servicers and the creation of payment histories that implied but never asserted the existence or establishment of a loan account. Of course, they would need to dodge any questions relating to the identification of a creditor. That could be no creditor if there was no loan account. This tactic avoided perjury. 

Of course, this could only be accomplished through deceit. The consumer or homeowner, government regulators, and the world at large, would need to be convinced that the homeowner had entered into a secured loan transaction, even though no such thing had occurred. From the investment bankers perspective, they were paying the homeowner as little money as possible in order to create the foundation for their illusion. 

By calling it securitization of loans and selling it that way, they were able to create the illusion successfully. They were able to maintain the illusion because only the investment bankers had the information that would show that there was no business entity that maintained a ledger entry showing ownership of any debt, note, or mortgage against which losses and gains could or would be posted in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ( and law ). This is called asymmetry of information. In other words, a LIE. 

Since the homeowner had asked for a loan and had received money, it never occurred to any homeowner that he/she was not being paid for a loan or loan documents, but rather was being paid for a service. In order for the transaction to be perceived as a loan obviously, the homeowner had to become obligated to repay the money that had been paid to the homeowner - which negated the consideration paid for the services rendered by the homeowner masqueraded as a " loan '' The initial sale of the initial certificates was only the beginning of an infinite supply of capital flowing to the investment bank who only had to pay off intermediaries to keep them in the fold. By virtue of the repeal of XXXX in XXXX, none of the certificates were regulated as securities ; so disclosure was a matter of proving fraud ( without any information ) in private actions rather than compliance with any statute. Further, the same investment banks were issuing and trading hedge contracts based upon the performance of the certificates as reported by the investment bank in its sole discretion. 

It was a closed market, free from any free market forces. The theory under which XXXX XXXX, Fed XXXX, was operating was that free-market forces would make any necessary corrections, This blind assumption prevented any further analysis of the concealed business plan of the investment banks. 

There was no free market. Neither homeowners nor investors knew what they were getting themselves into. And based upon the level of litigation that emerged after the crash of XXXX, it is safe to say that the investors and homeowners were deprived of any bargaining position ( because the main aspects for their transition were being misrepresented and concealed ), Both should have received substantially more compensation and would have bargained for it assuming they were willing to even enter into the transaction highly doubtful assumption. 

The investment banks also purchased insurance contracts with extremely rare clauses basically awarding themselves payment for nonexistent losses upon their own declaration of an event relating to the performance of unregulated securities. So between the proceeds from the issuance of certificates and hedge contracts and the proceeds of insurance contracts investment bankers were generally able to generate at least {$12.00} for each {$1.00} that was paid to homeowners and around {$8.00} for each {$1.00} invested by investors in purchasing the certificates. 

So the end result was that the investment banker was able to pay homeowners without any risk of loss on that transaction while at the same time generating capital or revenue far in excess of any payment to the homeowner. Were it not for the need for maintaining the illusion of a loan transaction, the investment banks couldve easily passed on the opportunity to enforce the obligation allegedly due from homeowners. They had already made their money. 

There was no loss to be posted against any account on any ledger of any company if any homeowner decided not to pay the alleged obligation ( which was merely the return of the consideration paid for the homeowners services ). But that did not stop the investment banks from making claims for a bailout and making deals for loss sharing on loans they did not own and never owned. No such losses ever existed. 

Investment bankers first started looking at the consumer lending market back in XXXX there was no bigger market in which they could participate. But there were huge obstacles in doing so. First of all none of them wanted the potential liability for violation of lending laws that had recently been passed on both local and Federal levels ( Truth in Lending Act et al. ) So they needed to avoid classification as a lender. They achieved this goal in 2 ways. First, they did not directly do business of any kind with any consumer or homeowner. They operated strictly through intermediaries that were either real or fictional. If the intermediary was real, it was a sham conduit a company with virtually no balance sheet or income statement that could be collapsed and disappeared if the scheme ever collapsed or just hit a bump in the road. 

Either way, the intermediary was not really a party to the transaction with the consumer or homeowner. It did not pay the homeowner nor did it receive payments from the homeowner. It did not own any obligations from the homeowner, according to modern law, because it had never paid value for the obligation. 

Under modern law, the transfer or conveyance of an interest in a mortgage without a contemporaneous transfer of ownership of the underlying obligation is a legal nullity in all states of the union. So transfers from the originator who posed as a virtual creditor do not exist in the eyes of the law if they are shown to be lacking in consideration paid for the underlying obligation, as per Article 9 203 Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all 50 states. The transfers were merely part of the illusion of maintaining the apparent existence of the loan transaction with homeowners. 

This is why neither XXXX or XXXX or XXXX can not respond to a simple question who is the owner of my " obligation '' ( if exists ) and who and when sold my " loan '' to XXXX. They answer evasively because the obligation does not exist and can not be owned. 
Although there is a presumption of ownership derived from claims of delivery and possession of the note, the proponent of that presumption may not avail itself of that presumption if it fails to answer questions relating to rebutting the presumption of existence and ownership of the underlying obligation. 

The homeowner is not getting away with anything or getting a free house as the investment banks have managed to insert into public discourse. 

They are receiving just compensation for their participation in this game in which they were drafted without their knowledge or consent. Considering the 1200 % gain enjoyed by the investment banks which was enabled by the homeowners participation, the 8 % payment to the homeowner seems only fair. Further, if somehow the homeowners apparent obligation to pay the investment bank survives, it is subject to reformation, accounting, and computation as to the true balance and whether it is secured or not. 

The obligation to repay the consideration paid by the investment bank ( through intermediaries ) seems to be a negation of the consideration paid. If that is true, then there is neither a loan contract nor a securities contract. There is no contract because in all cases the offer and acceptance were based upon different terms ( and different deliveries ) without either consideration or execution of the terns expected by the homeowner under the advertised loan contract. 

Payments By Homeowners Do Not Reduce Loan Accounts. Each time that a homeowner makes a payment, he or she is perpetuating the myth that they are part of an enforceable loan agreement. There is no loan agreement if there was no intention for anyone to be a lender and if no loan account receivable was established on the books of any business. The same result applies when a loan is originated in the traditional way but then acquired by a successor. The funding is the same as what is described above. The loan account receivable in the acquisition scenario is eliminated. 

Once the transaction is entered as a reference data point for securitization it no longer exists in form or substance. 

For the past 20 years, most homeowners have been making payments to companies that said they were servicers. Even at the point of a judicial gun ( court order ) these companies will fail or refuse to disclose what they do with the money after receipt. Because of lockbox contracts, these companies rarely have any access to pools of money that were generated through payments from homeowners. 

Like their counterparts in the origination of transactions with homeowners, they are sham conduits. Like the originators, they are built to be thrown under the bus when the scheme implodes. They will not report to you the identity of the party to whom they forward payments that they have received from homeowners because they have not received the payments from homeowners and they dont know where the money goes. 

The actual accounting for payments received from homeowners is performed by third-party vendors, mostly under the control of XXXX XXXX. Through a series of sham conduit transfers, the pool of money ends up in companies controlled by the investment bank. Some of the money is retained domestically while some is recorded as an offshore off-balance-sheet transaction. 

In order to maintain an active market in which new certificates can be sold to investors, discretionary payments are made to investors who purchase the certificates. The money comes from two main sources. 

One source is payments made by homeowners and the other source is payments made by the investment bank regardless of whether or not they receive payments from the homeowners. The latter payments are referred to as servicer advances. Those payments come from a reserve pool established at the time of sale of the certificates to the investors, consisting of their own money, plus contributions from the investment bank funded by the sales of new certificates. They are not servicer advances. They are neither in advance nor did they come from a servicer. 
* Since there is no loan account receivable owned by anyone, payments received from homeowners are not posted to such an account nor to the benefit of any owner of such an account ( or the underlying obligation ). Instead, accounting for such payments are either reported as return of capital or trading profits. In fact, such payments are neither return of capital nor trading profit. Since the investment bank has already zeroed out any potential loan account receivable, the only correct treatment of the payment for accounting purposes would be revenue. This includes the indirect receipt of proceeds from the forced sale of property in alleged foreclosures. 

By retaining total control over the accounting treatment for receipt of money from investors and homeowners, the investment bank retains total control over how much taxable income it reports. At present, most of the money that was received by the investment bank as part of this revenue scheme is still sitting offshore in various accounts and controlled companies. It is repatriated as needed for the purpose of reporting revenue and net income for investment banks whose stock is traded on the open market. By some fairly reliable estimates, the amount of money held by investment banks offshore is at least {$30.00} XXXX. 

As a baseline for corroboration of some of the estimates and projections contained in this article and many others, we should consider the difference between the current amount of all the fiat money in the world and the number and dollar amount of cash-equivalents in the shadow banking market. In XXXX, the number and dollar amount of such cash equivalents was XXXX. Today it is {$1.00} quadrillion around XXXX times the amount of currency. 
And this XXXX  SCGEME would not succeed if XXXX  and XXXX XXXX XXXX along with other fictitious " sellers " of bogus " Title Insurances '' would not create an APPEARANCE of illusion called " mortgage '' and " homeownership '' It is proven by many cases in which investors have sued the named trustee of the alleged XXXX trust for failure to take action that wouldve protected the interest of the investors. 

The outcome of all such cases is a finding by the court that the trustee does not represent the investors, the investors are not beneficiaries of the Trust, and that the trustee has no authority, right, title, or interest over any transaction with homeowners. Since the named trustee has no powers of a trustee to administer the affairs of any active trust with assets or a business operating, it is by definition not a trustee. 

And EVERY Propectus specifically states that mortgages WILL BE pooled in some Trusts which WILL BE created - while none of it happened in the real life. 

The alleged servicers know that they have no authority and in fact do not perform any collections, administration or enforcement of anyone 's debt. 

Since here is NO loan account, it can not be guaranteed by any XXXX  ; there can be no default and hence no remedy is there is either no obligation or no ownership of the obligation by the complaining party. 

This is why XXXX, XXXX and XXXX failed and refused to answer basic questions about the establishment, existence, and ownership of the alleged underlying obligation. 

I have clear evidence that my transaction was not a " loan '' and not with XXXX Mortgage but with undisclosed investment bank who hired FAF and XXXX subsidiarties to damage my property Title. 

Thus, First American Title and XXXX XXXX XXXX compensate me for damages, at least {$130000.00} under the policy. 

Plus damages for extreme emotional distress, and aiding and abetting Investment Banks fraud and racket.