Product: Credit card

We routinely order a Chase Visa card for our each of our new employees. They were ordered online at Chase.Com. For the past 5 years, the online order screen at Chase.Com requested the new employees name and social security number. The new credit cards would arrive within a few days at our corporate offices. We would then activate the cards and immediately go online at Chase.Com and set a spending limit. The cards would then be distributed to our new employees. 
About 60 days ago, I went online at Chase.Com to order XXXX new employee cards. I was surprised to see a change in the ordering screen which now included the employees home address. I tried not completing the employee address portion, but the new card order would not complete without it. I completed the order thinking to myself that Chase would never do something as stupid as sending new employee cards directly to the employee without a spending limit being set. 
Guess what happened next? I get a call from the Chase fraud department over the weekend asking if a charge for a weekend trip to XXXX XXXX for {$2000.00} was authorized. I told them no and they assured me that the charge would be declined. On Monday, I accessed Chase.Com and lo and behold, what did I find? I found XXXX newly issued credit cards were sent directly to the new employees home with no spending limit having been assigned. In addition, every new employee credit card was issued with a {$3400.00} cash advance which was completely undisclosed to us, was invisible and was not able to be changed on Chase.Com. Thus, we were completely unawares that Chase had exposed us to such significant potential losses. 
XXXX XXXX was a new employee. The minute he opened his mailbox and found his new Chase card, he called Chase to activate it. He immediately went to a nearby Chase branch and took a {$2000.00} cash advance. He then went on a shopping spree that totaled {$8300.00} before I accidentally found out and set his spending limit at {$1.00}, effectively shutting down his XXXX in XX/XX/XXXX. However, we were unable to shut down the cash advance feature because we we unaware of its existence and there were controls on the website to regulate it. 
I find it pretty shocking that someone at Chase redesigned the new employee card issuance request form to require that these cards be sent directly to employees with no spending limit. We filed a police report with the XXXX, Illinois, police department and requested that the employee be prosecuted. 
Even more shocking was my experience with the Chase fraud department. To date, I have spoken with more than XXXX Chase people about this. I would be willing to bet that Chase senior management is unaware of this vulnerability and enhanced exposure to fraud and I would not be surprised to find that Chase has issued a large number of similar credit cards directly to new employees without spending or cash advance limits. 
I would like someone at Chase to recognize the fraud that has occurred and accept responsibility for the fraud that has occured. As of this date, XXXX from the Office of The President at Chase has unilaterally determined this fraud to be our fault and has placed all the fraudulent charges back on our bill for payment. 
And then there is the matter of Chase being completely disinterested in criminally prosecuting the criminal who perpetrated this fraud. The police know who he is and where to find him. This is a paper case and they have the paper. Chase even has video of the perpetrator at the Chase branch pocketing the cash. However, Chase is unwilling to prosecute for reasons I can not fathom.