Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

Description of Scamming Incident : On XX/XX/XXXX at XXXX XXXX, I, XXXX XXXX, received a phone call from Phone Number XXXX. Upon pickup an automated message was played stating that it was a phone call from Florida XXXX XXXX, my, XXXX XXXX, Utility company and that my electricity was schedule to be disconnected at XXXX XXXX due to non-payment on account. The automated message then gave me an option to press a button ( I believe the # 1 ) to speak to an agent in the financial department to avoid disconnection. 

Charge I of {$490.00} : I was then transferred to a person, alleging to be an authorized agent, who stated that my account was delinquent in the amount of {$490.00} and had to be paid and processes today, before the scheduled XXXX disconnect time, to avoid disconnection of my power. Since the call was a bit unusual, I asked for the Caller 1 to confirm my account number. The Caller 1 said he could not pull up my full account information because of a block in the system associated resulting from my non-payment. He then said he could see my meter number and proceeded to read off a meter number. I was not at my home at the time to verify and proceeded with the conversation. 

I told the Caller 1 that I wished to pay to avoid the disconnection and informed him I would pay via my typical means, through the online portal. He informed me that such a payment would not process for two-three days, which would be too late to avoid disconnection. He then further suggested that my two options were to pay in person at the Florida XXXX XXXX headquarters on XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX or pay through the XXXX banking application. 

I informed him that I would like to pay in person at my local branch in XXXX, but he informed me they only took drop off payments and did not have cashier personnel located at the XXXX office. I then drove to the XXXX office, while on the phone with the Caller 1, and verified that this appeared to be the case ; that the XXXX office did not appear to have cashier personnel available. I further verified that the XXXX XXXX XXXX was indeed on XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX and looked at my latest billing account from Florida XXXX XXXX. This level of accuracy regarding Florida XXXX XXXX operations, along with the previous meter number provided, along with the information I was able to, hurriedly, gleam and collaborate from my Florida XXXX XXXX and bank accounts influenced me to move forward with the transaction. Considering I leave an hour or more from this location, I informed the Caller 1 that I would need to pay through XXXX. 

The Caller 1 then proceeded to provide me with instructions on how to pay through XXXX. He asked for my bank name ( SunTrust/Truist ) and then provided detailed instruction on how to use the baking application to submit the XXXX transfer XXXX He instructed me to open the banking application, select the transfer/pay menu option, then select the Send money with XXXX then select the Send Money option, then the Add New Recipient option, then to type in my name into the first and last name field options, then to select the Add Mobile Number Option and ad the number XXXX, then to enter the delinquent amount owed of {$490.00}, then to confirm the purchase. He then stated I would get confirmation that this was sent to an account enrolled with XXXX. I received the confirmation and notified the Caller 1. Caller 1 then asked that I screenshot the confirmation and text to phone number XXXX. I followed these instructions and Caller 1 confirmed receiving my payment. 

Charge II of {$990.00} : Upon receipt of the {$490.00} payment Caller 1 informed me that the next step to keep my power from being cut off at XXXX was to pay a security deposit of {$990.00}. He informed me that I should have received a memorandum from Florida XXXX XXXX outlining this requirement, as it had been newly implemented due to increased late/no-payments occurring associated with COVID-19 epidemic. He informed me that this payment would need to be made with the Disconnections Department and transferred me to Caller 2. Caller 2 then re-explained the charge to me at which point I, XXXX XXXX, began to contest the charge, stating that it was unfair practice, considering I have historically made on-time payments, and since my latest billing statement indicated my bill was due on XX/XX/XXXX, which would mislead to believe my power was in danger of being shut off. Caller 2, who identified himself as XXXX, empathized with this miss-communication and, considering these circumstances, suggested that I send the {$990.00} to avoid the disconnection scheduled for XXXX and said that the {$990.00} could be refunded tomorrow ( XX/XX/XXXX ) if I setup automatic payment moving forward. Based on this false information, I agreed to transfer the {$990.00}, following the same instruction as in Charge 1 ; including XXXX instructions and texting confirmation. Caller 2 then asked that I text him my latest bill from Florida XXXX XXXX showing my bill due date, stating that all correspondence from Florida XXXX XXXX should have a cutoff date listed on them in pending disconnect situations. Upon receipt of my billing statement, Caller 2 remarked that he did not see a cutoff date listed and that something seemed weird with my account ; in addition, I commented that I found receipt of payment for months that were alleged to be late by Caller I. Caller 2 then asked me to pause while he investigated the situation. After several minutes of waiting, he said he was able to recognize a billing error on there end and said he would work with me to have all of my money refunded.

Charge III of {$490.00}. Caller 2 from the Disconnection Department then transferred me back to Caller 1 from the Finance Department to execute a refund of my money ; for Charges I and II. Caller 1 instructed me that they would be refunded separately. He then asked me to follow the same XXXX instructions ( previously provided in Charge I ), except to put the word Refund Dept in the name field and the code XXXX in the memo field, and enter in the amount of Charge II first ; the {$990.00} amount. I attempted this and was not allowed to make the transaction as the XXXX application notified that I had exceeded my daily limit of transfer. He then suggested that we begin by refunding the Charge I, in the amount of {$490.00}, to free up room in my XXXX transfer allowability. I followed the instructions, indicating refund department and code provided, and submitted through XXXX. He confirmed receipt and then suggested we move on to refunding Charge II, however, in the meantime I was able to pull up Florida XXXX XXXX website, where I learned that what I was experiencing was a common scam. The website further instructed customers to ask four questions of callers that all Florida XXXX XXXX agents should always be able to answer. I informed Caller 1 of what I had read and asked him these four questions. He continued to state that my account was locked and he could not provide this information but proceed to provide me alternative information. I responded to this by stating I would not proceed with this phone call if he could not answer these questions, upon which Caller 1 hung up the phone. 

Immediate Follow-up Action : After Caller 1 and I, XXXX XXXX XXXX came to the realization that I had been a victim of a scam, I called the Truist customer service number to notify them of the activity. I was informed by the Truist representative that the charges were pending and was instructed to wait until the charges posted to file a claim with the Truist fraud department. Not fully satisfied with the response and wanting to speak with someone in person, I proceeded to the local Truist branch in XXXX, FL, at approximately XXXX, roughly 30 minutes following the conclusion of the scam phone call and 45 minutes before the XXXX Truist branch was scheduled to close, at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ). At the time of arrival to the XXXX branch the scam charges were still pending to my account. 

Upon arrival to the XXXX branch, I spoke to a banker ( last name XXXX ) and explained my situation. I informed her that the charges were still pending, and asked if I could close my account, open a new account, and move my available balance into that account and somehow avoid the pending charges. XXXX XXXX informed me this was not possible and, similarly to the customer service represented, indicated all I could do was wait for the charges to post and then file a claim with the Truist Fraud Department. 

While talking to XXXX XXXX, my wife, XXXX XXXX, located a posting on the Truist websites Understanding Fees link, under Stop Payment Fee section, that states If you need to stop a transaction before its complete, like a check youve written, a pending ACH transaction, or even a XXXX transfer, a {$35.00} fee will be issued. When brought to XXXX XXXX attention, she indicated that she was not familiar with the option to stop a XXXX transfer that was in pending status. XXXX XXXX then called banker support and spoke with a XXXX specialist regarding this option, who, upon best understanding, indicated they were unfamiliar with such and option. It should also be noted that XXXX XXXX had poor connection with the XXXX representative, who continuously said she could not here XXXX XXXX, despite XXXX XXXX noting that this was XXXX, that she had not experience any disruptions in communications with any other support services that day. 

XXXX XXXX then stated there was nothing that could be done or, if so, she did not know how to execute the stop payment. I then asked XXXX XXXX if I could, for security concerns, close my account and reopen a new one, keeping funds for the pending charges in my existing account. XXXX XXXX said I would need to make an appointment for the next day ( XX/XX/XXXX ) to do this. Aggravated by the inconsistent information between the website and the banker, I frustratedly, but without insult or slander, stated that I would like to close my account. XXXX XXXX, responding to my frustration, stating ( with a rude tone ) that I would need to come back tomorrow to do that as well, stating that it was XXXX and she needed to pickup her daughter. XXXX XXXX made no attempt to find another associate to assist me even though other associates were present and other customers were still in the lobby. 

While I was conversing with XXXX XXXX, my wife, XXXX XXXX, who is listed on my account, called Truist customer service regarding the stop payment options listed on the Truist website. On her first call attempt, my wife, XXXX XXXX, was connected to a representative who her on hold and then hung-up the call. My wife proceeded to call back, was connected to a representative, and was subsequently transferred to 5 different representatives ; none of which were familiar with the stop payment option and were unable to provide any assistance. The last phone transfer was to the XXXX department, who referred my wife to the fraud department, which at this point was closed for business. This, in-turn, left us with no options, but to wait until the next day ( XX/XX/XXXX ) to address, when the charges would be already posted to my account. 

Subsequent Follow-up Action After being unsuccessful in stopping the pending payment, once the payment posted to my account the next day ( XX/XX/XXXX ), I reached out to the Truist fraud department and filed a claim. I was asked to complete the Truist ATM/Check Card/Electronic Check/Error Resolution form and to file a police report, both of which I completed and returned to Truist via email that same data. The police report is registered with the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in XXXX, Fl. The assigned officer is XXXX XXXX XXXX. The report number is XXXX. 
After analyzing my claim, Truist responded in a letter dated XX/XX/XXXX stating that my claim had been reviewed and, in that letter, an opinion was rendered that no error occurred and, as a result not funds, would be deposited into my account with the basis provided that the fund transfer was authorized. 
I contested this claim based on my interpretation of the definition of an unauthorized payment according to Regulation E, considering the fraudulent access to my phone number, fraudulent access to my utility information, and the misrepresentation of the caller ( scammer ). Truist claimed to do a second-level review based on my contesting and arrived at the same conclusion ... that the payment was considered authorized. 
Truist did inform me that they were able to recoup {$660.00} ( of the {$1900.00} claimed ) from the financial institution to which the money was wired, but informed me I they would not recoup the additional {$1300.00}