Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

On XX/XX/year>, I contacted what I believed to be CashApp support team, which I found on the website, to assist with rejecting a request for a money transfer. During this call, I was led to believe that 'CashApp ' needed to work in a secure environment to modify my security settings to be able to reject money transfer requests. I was provided with a XXXX  website that was used in the scheme. 
During this time, the scammer was able to dictate CashApp Cash Ins - moving money from my bank account into the CashApp platform, then changing the debit card account to its own accounts, and then dictating Cash Outs- moving money from the CashApp platform to the fraudulent accounts. 
The total amount removed from my bank account on that day was {$11000.00}. An additional {$2.00} was removed from a fraudulent account ( I now believe so that the amounts would not match when I made the report ). The total amount transferred to the scammer 's banks was {$11000.00} and {$190.00} in instant deposit fees to the CashApp platform. The Cash Out ( withdrawals ) transactions for that day {$4000.00} ( {$3900.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX instant fee to CashApp ) ; {$4800.00} to ( {$4800.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX, {$75.00} instant fee to CashApp ) ; {$1200.00} ( {$1200.00} to XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX {$22.00} instant fee to CashApp ) ; {$970.00} ( {$950.00} to XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX, {$16.00} instant fee to CashApp ), and {$800.00} ( {$780.00} to XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX, {$14.00} instant fee to CashApp ). The amounts were fraudulently transferred to a third-party bank account that I do not own, have no access to and are not linked to my bank account ending in XXXX. The fact that the accounts were not linked to my bank account on file should have been enough proof for CashApp to dispute the transactions with the external banks. 
I reported this issue to the police in my city. The detective has since obtained a subpoena and was able to get full details for the accounts which show they do not belong to me. I provided the CashApp support team with the police report number, the fraudulent phishing website details, the full account number to XXXX of the Cash Out XXXX XXXX account numbers used during the fraudulent call, and several contact numbers that were also involved in the cash out scheme. I explained to CashApp support that the Cash in Cash Out transactions ( specifically the amounts ) were atypical for my account. In fact, with the exception of biweekly {$25.00} stock purchases, I had never used my account for the Cash In Cash Out feature. I have since Cashed Out all of my stocks within the CashApp platform due to these fraudulent acts. 
Most importantly, I requested that Cashapp disputes the transactions with XXXX XXXX  and XXXX XXXX XXXX. Once those disputes are made, the banks would not be able to show that my linked bank account ending in XXXX has any connection with the cards used to Cash Out. The fraudsters would not be able to prove I have any connection to them ; therefore, they would have to reverse those transactions. However, CashApp has not been helpful in providing any meaningful assistance. Despite multiple attempts to contact their support team, I have received generic responses that do not address the specific issues of my case. This lack of support is frustrating and leaves me feeling vulnerable to further fraudulent activities on the platform. 
A CashApp team member explained that CashApp either ignored algorithms that were put in place to deny any repetitive transaction amounts ( the Cash Ins - withdrawals from my actual bank account were repetitive amounts- XXXX for {$1300.00}, XXXX for {$2400.00}, the other amounts ) The other amounts : {$1200.00}, {$970.00}, and {$800.00}, were pending activities in my CashApp account. 
I believe that CashApp is responsible for a greater portion of this loss due to its own security lapse resulting in unauthorized transactions and potential data breaches. It either ignored algorithms that were put in place to deny any repetitive transaction amounts, or algorithms did not work on that day ; the app did not request any predicate information ( name, account information, proof that any changed debit card account belonged to me, the CashApp owner ) ; it did not force me, the CashApp owner, to confirm that the new debit card account was linked to the bank account number on the Cashapp file ) ; it allowed a secondary website ( XXXX ) to be able to run in the background and access its app without prompting the CashApp owner that it was being accessed fraudulently ; CashApp did not allow me to access support from a secondary computer while a fraudulent website accessed my account. I tried to log in from another computer because I sensed something was wrong. Although CashApp sent me identity passcodes, it did not allow me to log in using those identity codes to the true CashApp support during the fraudulent call. Consequently, I mistakenly believed the fraudulent call was with CashApp support. I hope that CashApp will take these matters more seriously and implement better security measures to protect its users and help thwart fraudulent activities.