Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

Wells Fargo initiated wire transfers out of my business account without authorization and is refusing to put the money that was transferred back into the account. 

Wells Fargo has stated that " On XX/XX/XXXX, a claim was filed when Wells Fargo was informed you were in dispute of an online wire transfers sent from your Wells Fargo Initiate Business Checking Account ending in XXXX  on XX/XX/XXXX, for {$24000.00} and on XXXX XXXX, for {$10000.00}. Our Online Claims Assistance Center reviewed this matter and found that the one-time passcodes were sent to your phone number on file and the wires originated using your username and password. Additionally, calls were received from your phone number on file on XX/XX/XXXX, and again on XX/XX/XXXX, providing identifying information and one-time passcodes. '' Call records from the account holder 's cell phone company, XXXX , indicated that no calls were made ; no text messages exchanged ; and no communication occurred at all. The claim that passcodes were sent and calls were received by this account holder did not take place and verified by the phone records. Because the wire transfers were not sent to my phone and I did not contact Wells Fargo as evidenced by the call and text records, and therefore wire transfers were NOT ORIGINATED using my username and password or through any other means by me or by another person authorized or unauthorized or by my email. There is also no IP Address or log-in submission on the customer 's account that would indicate that the password was hacked. No documentation can show that the account holder is responsible for the origin of this malfeasance. 

The bank undertook duties outside the funds transfer process, either unilaterally through its own internal procedures or in the account agreement, that failed to protect the customers account. The bank has adopted its own account protection practices, or agrees to certain practices by contract in that passcodes are to be sent to customers on suspicious wire transfers, and fails to follow these by not sending these passcodes to my phone as the phone records indicated. This is a violation of the LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A - U.C.C. - FUNDS TRANSFER ( 2012 ). Wells Fargos internal operating procedures did not protect the customer based on the account agreement that stated in the correspondence email on XX/XX/XXXX shat state, Please allow us to explain, under our Online Wire Terms and Conditions, Online Access Agreement and Deposit Account Agreement, you are responsible for online wires that originate using your username and password, whether or not actually authorized by you. 

Wells Fargo phone records show, and Wells Fargo acknowledges, that The bank never called the account holder, and no records indicate that I called them, and no text messages took place, and no records indicated that usernames or passwords ever took place. There is no documentation to prove that any origination took place or that any correspondence occurred. If there is no occurrence, then how can there be an origination. The bank has wired money out of my account without proof of any origination of any calls going out to me, no calls coming in from me, no exchange of text nothing. The bank claims that my username and password were used by me or someone other than me but have no evidence that any interaction took place! 

Wells Fargo Bank is in violation of several areas of the LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A - U.C.C. - ARTICLE 4A - FUNDS TRANSFER ( 2012 ). The primary purpose of art. 4A is to establish uniform and predictable rights, duties, and liabilities for arms-length funds transfers between various commercial parties and their banks. 4A imposes on banks the obligation to refund unauthorized funds transfers for a one-year period after the bank gives the customer notice ( ordinarily in the monthly account statement ), thereby allowing the customer to identify the disputed transaction and notify the bank. First, a payment order initiating an electronic transfer was not deemed authorized and therefore not effective because the sender/customer did not authorize it. Second, though the account holder and the bank have agreed that authorization for payment orders will be verified by a security procedure ( such as a PIN ), a PIN was not sent or received by the bank to or from the account holder, therefore making the payment non-effective and void. Further violations of LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A - U.C.C. - FUNDS TRANSFER ( 2012 ). Call records support this. 

The art. 4A security procedure provision is based on the assumption that losses due to fraudulent payment orders can best be avoided by the use of commercially reasonable security procedures. The account holder believes that the security procedures were not followed and therefore not reasonable because the account holder was not contacted. Furthermore, the bank acted at its peril in accepting a payment order, in the form of the wire transfer, that was unauthorized. The bank did not comply with its own security measures because the account holder was not contacted for a PIN or username or password. 

As a customer of Well Fargo Bank I have requested a copy of : 1. Security Procedures [ 1 ] that were completed in the transactions n XX/XX/XXXX and XX/XX/XXXX. Specifically which steps established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank for the purpose of ( i ) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or cancelling a payment order is that of the customer, or ( ii ) detecting error in the transmission or the content of the payment order or communication. 

2. Copies of the Payment Orders [ 2 ] A payment order received by the the two receiving banks : XXXX XXXX  and XXXX  XXXX. 

3. Any and all records that indicate what phone number, computer, IP Address, or any and all other evidence that shows where the transfer verification was sent to and originated from. 

Wells Fargo did not follow their own Security Procedures as phone records indicated that one time pass codes were not sent to the customers phone number as alleged as verification of the wire transfers was not obtained or originated from the customers account and Wells Fargo has no evidence that calls or passcodes or usernames were originated from the customer. Payment orders in the form of wire transfers were received by the two banks, XXXX XXXX  and XXXX Bank, that were not authorized by this account holder and the account holder should be bound by it under the law of agency. Furthermore, Wells Fargo violated security procedures and that a commercially reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders was not followed and the wishes of the customer expressed to the receiving banks was not granted and contrary to the wishes of the customer. Wells Fargo has violated the rights of the customer/account holder according to LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A - U.C.C. - FUNDS TRANSFER ( 2012 ) Uniform Commercial Code 4A, adopted in Florida as F.S. Ch. 670. Based on the fact that Wells Fargo can not show, and phone records verify that the online wire transfers were NOT ORIGINATED using the account holder 's username and password as alleged. The account holder can not be held liable for the origin of this malfeasance or the removal of fund from his account. The bank undertook duties outside the funds transfer process, either unilaterally through its own internal procedures or in the account agreement, that failed to protect the customers account. The account holder is requesting that the funds be returned to my account including all fees which include but are not limited to the amount of {$35000.00}, that includes the first wire transfer of XXXX, the second wire transfer of {$10000.00}, plus the two {$50.00} wire transfer charges. 

[ 1 ] LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A-201. SECURITY PROCEDURE.

[ 2 ] LII Uniform Commercial Code 4A-202. AUTHORIZED AND VERIFIED PAYMENT ORDERS.