Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service

Re : Bank of America Case Number : XXXX This description of the case and supporting documents concern Bank of America checking account # XXXX, registered as a corporate account opened in XXXX under the name XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX The company is registered as a California XXXX XXXX and has been since XXXX. 

During the intervening 22 years the account has been maintained spotlessly without a single returned item, incoming or outgoing. I have generally received adequate service from the bank, including credits for a handful of suspicious transactions over the years. 

All of that came to an abrupt halt on XX/XX/XXXX when I received an email notice to the effect that I had sent {$15000.00} to XXXX XXXX XXXX. 
The notice identifies my account as well as his : XXXX - XXXX Confirmation number on the notice : XXXX I know no such person and never authorized this transfer, which the bank fortunately blocked, though it is interesting that when I still had access to my account before it was closed, this transaction appeared on my statement as blocked but subsequently disappeared entirely from my online account record. 

I received two other notices that day to the effect that XXXX XXXX ( XXXX ) and XXXX XXXX ( XXXX had been added to my list of XXXX recipients. 

I did not add any of these individuals to my XXXX account as recipients. 

As the notices instructed, I called the bank immediately and was told these were Phishing emails and that said individuals were not on my recipients list and would be blocked from further activity. 

A couple of noteworthy footnotes to this exchange : XXXX is a production account that usually has a fairly low balance ( under {$5000.00} ) between productions but by a rather interesting coincidence on XX/XX/XXXX, had received an incoming wire transfer for production expenses of {$28000.00} and on XX/XX/XXXX, showed an unusually high balance of {$29000.00}. 

Also, I have never received in numerous calls and exchanges of letters with BofA XXXX Department any explanation of how these names appeared on my XXXX recipients list without my putting them there. In the attached document you will find a copy of the authorized list, including myself, the latter added after a phone call received the next day, ostensibly from an employee at the bank with fraudulent instructions. 

I find these coincidences hard to explain. How did anyone know the account was suddenly flush? How did anyone obtain the ability to add to my XXXX recipients list from outside the bank with no participation on my part? 

I suspect the truthful answers to these questions would be less than flattering to BofA security. 

On XX/XX/XXXX I received a telephone call from an individual identifying himself as XXXX XXXX from XXXX. The number was unfamiliar from my previous call-backs from BofA on other matters, but understand some employees are working from home and numbers arent always obviously XXXX. 

This does raise the question of how this person got my home phone number, which only he can answer. 

XXXX told me that as a result of the attempted {$15000.00} dollar transfer my account had been placed on hold and I could not gain access to the funds therein until certain measures were taken. His instructions, which clearly, I should not have followed, were to attempt a couple of XXXX transfers to myself to see if the held funds could be unblocked. 

XXXX was good at what he did. He avoided obvious ringer questions regarding SS numbers, PINs or other quick tip-offs. His act was well-polished, right down to pauses to consult with the back office, terminology Id heard BofA personnel use before. 

After several such exchanges he suggested I try to XXXX myself some money to see if it would go through. I was watching in real time on my computer and the funds did not appear back in my account. This is not surprising, given that the new codes he had provided did not send the funds back into my account but rather to his at XXXX XXXX XXXX. 


When the second transfer did not return to my account, he told me to go to the nearest bank branch and establish my identity in person. 

This was clearly XXXX exit strategy as hed already made is score. 

I was quite surprised when I turned up the next day at BofAs XXXX XXXX at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, CA XXXX and was informed that XXXX, who they called from the bank, was not an employee and that I had been scammed out of {$7000.00} a few days ahead of a production for which most of the money in the account was already committed. 

I was further informed that the bank would not issue a temporary credit, as I had cooperated in the scam, which does not explain the activity prior to my first contact with XXXX XXXX. 

Bad as it was, the banks refusal to cover the fraud was by no means the worst aspect of the disaster that followed. 

An unfamiliar bank officer appeared and informed me that my account would be closed as a security risk to the bank, which put bluntly as it was, no longer wanted my business. I was told that this decision was irrevocable and that all further contact should be through the banks Claims Department. 

After numerous phone calls with long hold times and dropped connections, I eventually worked my way up to a claims supervisor who I learned after several calls was quite familiar with this case. The supervisor affirmed that my loss would not be covered under the laws governing XXXX transfers. 

After some legal research, I found that the bank was liable under Regulation E of The Electronic Funds Transfer Act, an assertion BofA dismissed in one of the attached letters. The clearly do not agree with either XXXX XXXX or XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX, both of which have run recent coverage of exactly this type of claim and the ongoing class action suits resulting from banks refusal to comply with the regulation. 

The best is yet to come. 

Per advice of counsel, I filed a report with the XXXX, who were quite polite but not at all encouraging. One officer stated that the local district attorney doesnt consider frauds for under {$500000.00} worth investigating and that my claim would probably not be investigated. He did take a counter report and issued me a case number which is also attached to this email. 

Very similar response from the FBI when I filed online. 

On my next two contacts with BofA Claims I learned something truly remarkable, as documented in the most recent letter from them attached below. 

Bank of America had been able to trace the two illicit transfers from my account to an account at XXXX XXXX XXXX, in which the money my money was still being held. Neither bank would cover my loss, demand that the account holder at XXXX about whom both banks now have detailed information surrender the ill-gotten gains or turn the holder of the account over to the authorities. 

Thus, both banks have guilty knowledge of the specific crimes and their perpetrators, and one has the illegally obtained money in its possession. However, the account holder, presumably our XXXX XXXX, has been contacted and asked politely to return the money which he refuses to do. Both banks now assert that the funds are his because he scammed me into okaying the transfers. 

The banks have chosen to protect a felon who has committed crimes the details of which are known to them rather than a depositor in good faith whose only offense was a momentary lapse of the hypervigilance clearly required to keep financial institutions from handing over funds on deposit to professional criminals. 

Again, attached documents tell the story. 

Worse than the immediate loss of the {$7000.00} dollars is the forced closure of my established business account at BofA, which effectively makes it impossible for my small company to transact normal business. I have begun the process of opening a new business account at a different bank but am far from certain this disaster wont follow me, as banks do communicate with each other, quite clearly in this case, and I dont know if I will even be able to open a new account under my companys name : XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX which has been in operation since XXXX. 

It might then become necessary for me to create a new entity, most likely an LL.C, at considerable trouble and expense. While this situation remains unresolved, I am effectively out of business, thanks to victim-blaming on the part of financial institutions. I believe there may be substantial actual damages in this case, plus whatever other penalties may attach to their behavior. 

Not sure what can be done at this point but remain convinced that XXXX should disgorge the fraudster of his stolen money and return it to me, as well as cooperating with the authorities in apprehending the organizers of this scam. From my research I know that such swindles are far from rare and participating banks in the ownership of XXXX have done little to stop them. My one claim may not be much but multiplied by a few hundred would rather quickly sail past the {$500000.00} dollar milepost. 

Not surprisingly the victims of these offenses are most often seniors who did not grow up in the digital world and are unfamiliar with its many dangers. Said crimes should also be classed as elder abuse. I do not believe XXXX XXXX and his associate pick their victims at random, which leads me to wonder why Bank of America considers me a security risk when the risk in this sorry affair seems to be to depositors personal information and therefore to their accounts. 

Please examine the attached documents, which establish the timeline of this fraud and reveal much about the sorry state of security at two of the largest financial institutions in the nation. 

Your attention to this matter and any suggestions you might have for making recovery are greatly appreciated.