---
language:
- en
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:53224
- loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en
widget:
- source_sentence: are my notes shared with any third parties?
sentences:
- We may share data with social networks at your request.
- 'We may use the data we collect to:'
- Evernote is not in the business of selling or renting your information.
- 'Account information for third party services: If you interact with a third party
service when using our Sites, such as if you use a third party service to log-in
to our Sites (e.g., Facebook, Google, or Twitter), or if you share content from
our Sites through a third party social media service, the third party service
will send us information about you, such as information from your public profile,
if the third party service and your account settings allow such sharing.'
- With that in mind, when you purchase an item, your customer information may be
shared with other select companies whose products and services you may find useful
and those select companies will handle, store, retain, use, share and access personal
information in accordance with their own privacy policies, and we disclaim any
and all liability relating thereto.
- Usage activity, interactions within our apps
- where a third party claims that any content posted or uploaded by you to our Platform
constitutes a violation of their intellectual property rights, or of their right
to privacy.
- In addition, parts of the Service may be hosted by a third party on our behalf.
- source_sentence: which third party entities will have access to my data?
sentences:
- We also may share information about you with third parties whenever you consent
to or direct such sharing.
- All data transferred by us between your device and our services is encrypted.
- Processing your data in order to meet certain legal or regulatory obligations;
and
- In certain occasions, Khan Academy may share this data with business partners
to improve our services or offerings.
- We receive and store any information you enter on our Website or give us in any
other way.
- Does IMDb Share the Information It Receives?
- We also require that our suppliers protect such information from unauthorized
access, use, and disclosure.
- If Touchnote Limited or substantially all of its assets are acquired by a third
party, in which case personal data held by it about its customers will be one
of the transferred assets.
- source_sentence: '
In cases an agent is entrusted to perform any specific juristic act, if the agent
performs such act in accordance with the instructions of the principal, the principal
may not assert that the agent did not know a particular circumstance without negligence
which the principal did not know due to his/her negligence.
'
sentences:
- '
Article 406
If the subject matter of the claim is to be determined by a choice being made
from among more than one performance, the right to choose belongs to the obligor..
'
- '
Article 494
(1) In the following cases, a performer may deposit the subject matter of the
performance with an official depository for the benefit of the obligee. In such
a case, the claim is extinguished when the performer makes the deposit:
(i) the performer tenders the performance, and the obligee refuses to accept it;
or
(ii) the obligee is unable to accept the performance.
(2) The preceding paragraph also applies if the performer is unable to ascertain
the obligee;provided, however, that this does not apply if the performer is negligent
in this respect.
Article 474
(1) A third party may also perform an obligation.
(2) A third party that has no legitimate interest in performing an obligation
may not perform the obligation against the will of the obligor;provided, however,
that this does not apply if the obligee did not know that the performance is against
the will of the obligor.
(3) The third party prescribed in the preceding paragraph may not perform the
obligation against the will of the obligee;provided, however, that this does not
apply if the third party performs the obligation as requested by the obligor,
and the obligee knew this.
(4) The provisions of the preceding three paragraphs do not apply if the nature
of an obligation does not permit the performance by a third party or if a party
manifests the intention to prohibit or restrict the performance by a third party..
'
- '
Article 101
(1) If the validity of a manifestation of intention that an agent has made to
the other party is to be influenced by the absence of intention; by mistake, fraud,
or duress; or by the knowledge of or negligence in not knowing of a particular
circumstance; whether or not any such fact was present is decided as it concerns
the agent.
(2) If the validity of a manifestation of intention that the other party has made
to the agent is to be influenced by the recipient''s knowledge of or negligence
in not knowing of a particular circumstance, whether or not any such fact was
present is decided as it concerns the agent.
(3) If an agent who has been entrusted with performing a specific juridical act
performs that act, the principal may not assert that the agent did not know of
any particular circumstance of which the principal knew. The same applies to any
circumstance of which the principal did not know due to the principal''s own negligence..
'
- source_sentence: Are times zones, (i.e. a geo-spatial frame of reference) considered
in age based regulations? Bob was born in British Columbia (GMT-7) on March 7th
at 11 p.m. local time. Alice was born the next day, March 8th, in Nova Scotia
(GMT-3) at 1 a.m. local time, which is 2 hours before Bob was born, due to the
time zone difference. Bob and Alice are in Vancouver (GMT-7). It is Bob's 19th
birthday. Bob is of legal drinking age according to Canadian law and the birthdate
listed on his driver's license, Alice is not. They both have a glass of wine with
dinner. The legality of drinking is based on age, so could Alice be arrested for
underage drinking based on the birth date listed in her driver's license even
though she is technically "older" than Bob based on a geo-spatial frame
of reference? Or would the law consider her to be of legal age based on the time
zone of her birth, and the exact time of day she drew her first breath when compared
to local time?
sentences:
- 'canada In Canada, there are the separate offences of: sexual assault (premised
on lack of consent, no matter by what means consent is lacking; R. v. G.F., 2021
SCC 20) and administering a stupefying substance. If someone were to use a "substance
such as everyday alcohol" (I would reject the premise that this is "benign")
for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault, this would be an offence under
s. 246 of the Criminal Code. Section 246 makes it an offence for a person, "with
intent to enable or assist himself or another person to commit an indictable offence"
to administer or cause any person to take a "stupefying or overpowering drug,
matter, or thing." The Court of Appeal for Ontario has accepted that the
element of administering a stupefying thing could be established by oversupply
of alcohol. They have said that alcohol is a "stupefying substance"
(R. v. Vant, 2015 ONCA 481) and can support a conviction under s. 246. "Date
rape" has no legal significance and even criminologically, misframes the
circumstances in which people experience sexual assualt. Further, your premise
that intimate partner sexual assault "usually happens when someone uses narcotics
to drug another into an unconscious state" is not supported by the evidence.
While this is a criminological point, rather than a legal point, it is important
context for understanding such crimes. This 2005 study estimated that 4.6% of
intimate partner sexual assaults were facilitated by surreptitious drug use. These
two fact sheets describe the variety of circumstances, completely unrelated to
incapacitation by drugs, in which people experience intimate partner sexual assault/violence:
Fredericton Sexual Assault Crisis Centre Info Sheet; Centre for Research &
Education on Violence Against Women & Children Backgrounder on Intimate Partner
Sexual Violence.'
- 'Can the Secretary of State exempt people over 75 requiring a TV licence? Yes.
s.363(6) introduces the power to exempt those listed at (a) to (d) by way of Regulations.
s.6, paragraph 1 of the Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004
states: No fee shall be payable for a TV licence of a type referred to in the
first or second entry in column 1 of the table in Schedule 1 where— (a) the licence
is issued to a person aged 75 years or more or to a person who will attain that
age in the calendar month in which the licence is issued; and (b) the single place,
vehicle, vessel or caravan specified in the licence is the sole or main residence
of that person. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/692/regulation/6?timeline=false
The first and second entries in column 1 at Schedule 1 refer to black and white
or colour TVs in a domestic setting or business purposes. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/692/schedule/1?timeline=false'
- 'british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue.
The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except
as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse,
... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied
by the minor''s parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in
the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I''ll assume you''re asking
about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing
Act defines a "minor" to be a person under the age of majority established
by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing
Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act,
s. 25.1 states that "A person reaches a particular age expressed in years
at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person''s birth date."
The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time "is a reference
to Pacific Standard Time" (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in
effect). Thus, a person is a minor until "the beginning [in Pacific time]
of the relevant anniversary of the person''s birth date." It is most clear
in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the
Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person''s
identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater
Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until
the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification.
Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the
date that is the person''s birth date.'
- This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly
forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned
on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult
to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.
- 'The place of birth on the birth certificate is where the child was actually born.
Indeed, usually it will be more specific than city and state or province and will
also identify a hospital or residence or other place where the birth happened.
So, for example, if a child is born to U.S. diplomats in Paris, France (in or
out of the embassy grounds), the birth certificate will say that the child was
born in Paris, France at Charles de Gaulle Hospital. But, that child will still
be a U.S. citizen in all likelihood, because that child''s mother, and/or married
father or unmarried father who acknowledges paternity, is a U.S. citizen (in all
likelihood) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The child may or may not be
a French dual citizen depending upon the citizenship law of France. In the case
of a French diplomat who has a child born physically in Washington D.C. (inside
or outside the French embassy) the birth certificate will likewise state that
the child was born in Washington D.C. The French diplomat''s child, however, will
not be a U.S. citizen since Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution''s
first sentence (which is also found in 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)) states: All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. But a
French diplomat''s child is not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the
United States, so the French diplomat''s child does not gain U.S. citizenship
at birth (assuming for simplicity''s sake that both of the child''s parents are
French citizens and are not U.S. citizens) despite the fact that the child was
born in the United States.'
- Bob has no defense Speeding in western-australia, as it is throughout australia,
is a strict liability offense. That means that intention to or knowledge that
you are breaking the law is not required. Don’t know the limit? Doesn’t matter,
you are still legally obliged to comply. However, all the way up the chain, from
the police officer, through the administrative arm to the judge, each person has
discretion to waive the infringement notice. Basically, they can do that if they
don’t think it’s “fair” on Bob in the circumstances. Given that Bob managed to
reach 40+km/h within 20m of a more than 90 degree corner I think the infringement
notice is very fair. Negligent Driving is possibly the more appropriate offense.
However, it’s possible to imagine circumstances where waiving the infringement
notice is fair. For example, if a speed limit sign has been removed or completely
obscured by foliage or a parked vehicle and Bob could show he was not familiar
with the area. The question on Alice is, from above, moot.
- 'canada It depends on what the mens rea requirement is. Mens rea if not specified
in a criminal offence In Canada, if this is a criminal offence, and a mens rea
is not specified in the Criminal Code, the presumption is that the mens rea would
be satisfied by recklessness, knowledge, willful blindness, or intention (Pappajohn
v. The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13). The prosecution would
have to show that Alice was at least subjectively aware of the risk that she was
doing XYZ during the prohibited hours and proceeded nonetheless (this is recklessness;
Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 570 ). Based on the facts as you''ve presented
in the hypothetical, you may have ruled out the possibility that Alice was reckless.
Although, depending on the time of year, it may be that the sun sets around 9pm,
which may present some awareness of the risk that you have not accounted for in
your hypothetical. Mens rea if specified If the text of the statute does specify
a mens rea then that is what the prosecution needs to show. For example, if one
is prohibited from doing XYZ while "knowing" that it is after 9pm, then
the prosecution will have to demonstrate actual subjective knowledge of the time,
or wilful blindness (which Canadian law takes to impute knowledge: Briscoe). Additional
burdens to make use of some mistakes of fact Some offences put an even higher
burden on the accused in order to rely on a mistake of fact. In sexual offences
where the age of the complainant is relevant (e.g. that they 14 or younger, or
16 or younger, or 18 or younger), the accused cannot make out a mistake-of-age
defence without showing they took reasonable steps to ascertain the age (see Criminal
Code, s. 150.1).1 Presumptive mens rea for regulatory offences is much lower:
strict liability, subject to a due-diligence defence However, if this were a public-welfare/regulatory
offence, like a provincial traffic law, or a licensing restriction on an aviation
licence, or municipal by-law, there is no mens rea presumption. Rather, public-welfare/regulatory
offences prima facie fall into the category of strict liability offences, subject
only to a due-diligence defence (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299). Alice
would have to show that she had a "reasonable belief in facts which, if true,
would have rendered the act innocent". What it means to have a "reasonable
belief in facts" is very fact-specific.2 Alice has to hold the belief herself,
and the trier of fact must accept that a reasonable person would also have held
that belief. Just as in the case for recklessness, I can imagine that the timing
of sunset might pose a problem for a due-diligence defence in your particular
example. Absolute liability If the penalties for the offence do not include the
risk of imprisonment, the offence can even be declared to be an absolute liability
offence, in which due diligence is not even a defence (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 SCR 486). 1. For example, simply relying on a complainant''s "language
and statements indicating that she could be 14 years of age or older did not constitute
taking reasonable steps or all reasonable steps to ascertain her true age in all
the circumstances, especially after being warned by her mother to stop all contact
or she would call the police and stating that the complainant was way too young
for him" (R. v. Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538). 2. For example, for the sale of alcohol,
"when the individual clearly appears to be underage, ... a duly diligent
permittee would require at least two more pieces of ID confirming that the person
was not a minor, question the individual about the ID, then decide if it is reasonable
to serve the individual alcohol versus the youthful appearance of the individual"
(Citynski Hotels Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 314).'
- 'In principle, the data subject''s right to access involves a copy of all personal
data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course,
the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus
on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data
may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the
purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller
with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short
retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot
of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is
not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example,
if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only
sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn''t a filing system in
the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through
all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a
clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that
data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is
actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included
in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234
was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File
#1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries
were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information
about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable.
Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically
asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example:
“About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp
in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.”
Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don''t think
it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should
be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed
about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have
been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access
request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you
would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR,
and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients
or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been
disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by
just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually
obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such
responses are compliant (I don''t necessarily think so) will not be clear until
there''s a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out
in court.'
- source_sentence: 'Q: Can a car insurance company cancel my policy if payments where
made every month , claiming it was for non paymemt?. I was insured by Infinity
and was making installment. Payments on my policy , there was no changes on my
policy… on the 6 month of my policy they billed me for an amount deferent then
my schedule payments , increasing from 340 to 800 and the remaing months lowering
to 240 causing my payment to be declined '
sentences:
- 'A:So, who knows what they are thinking other than them? It is not clear to me
that THEY contact FCA for you or if you contacted FCA on your own first and then
FCA is responding to your contact or to their''s? That could make a difference.
As a lemon law attorney myself I can tell you a few things: a- It''s rare that
FCA offers a buy back without counsel involved; b- It''s more rare that they would
offer all the law allows; c- one usually gets a better result if one has counsel
involved; d- FCA will often not pay counsel or not pay much, pre-suit and will
be forced by a bad twist in the law, ironically sought out by folks like FCA,
to pay more once a case is filed in court. Your law firm has 23 people on their
website! That''s a huge number of mouths to feed. I hope they give you great service.
In closing, You should ask THEM these same questions! They are you lawyers and
they must answer you honestly.'
- A:Sorry to hear about your accident. The car that started the chain reaction accident
is at fault for all cars damaged including your property damage and personal injuries.
However, if your car is declared a total loss and your remaining car loan is greater
than the present market value of your car, you will be responsible for the (excess
loan over your car's value) unless you have gap insurance for your car. For further
information, contact my office at (240)676-4827. Thank you.
- A:Under California law, an insurance company typically cannot cancel a policy
for non-payment if payments were made consistently and in accordance with the
agreed-upon payment schedule. If you have evidence of regular payments and your
policy was canceled erroneously, you may have grounds to challenge the cancellation
and seek reinstatement of your policy. It's advisable to contact the insurance
company and, if necessary, consult with an attorney who can help you address the
situation.
- 'Whether you''re taking a vacation or using a loaner vehicle from your regular
car''s repair shop, you''ll need to procure some form of car insurance for your
rental car. Unfortunately, your auto insurance provider may not provide much direction
on this matter. In general, American auto insurers provide surprisingly little
rental-related guidance to their policyholders. For folks who regularly use rental
cars, this can be downright frustrating. Before you go on a trip or agree to accept
a rental car from an auto-repair shop, be sure to talk to your insurance company
about your coverage options. If you regularly travel on business, it''s likely
that your employer will pick up the tab for your rental car. If this is the case,
you''ll need to procure vehicle insurance through your rental car company. Unless
the company for which you work is particularly generous with its business travelers,
it probably won''t pay to insure your rental vehicle. Unfortunately, few personal
auto insurance policies provide coverage for vehicles that their policyholders
don''t rent on their own. As such, the fact that your employer is paying for your
rental car may make it difficult for you to obtain full coverage on it. While
you''ll still be protected against injury-related lawsuits and property damage
claims through your rental car company''s own insurer, you''ll be held personally
liable for any damage that you cause to the vehicle. This loophole has caught
many business travelers by surprise. In order to circumvent it, you''ll need to
purchase supplemental vehicle insurance from your rental car company. This could
add a significant premium to the total cost of your rental. If you''re traveling
for pleasure or renting a car in another capacity, this consideration will be
irrelevant. However, you may still need to purchase supplemental insurance from
your rental car company. Although there''s no hard-and-fast way to determine whether
your auto insurance policy covers you in the event of a rental-car accident, you
should still read your policy closely. It may explicitly state that it covers
rented or "non-owned" cars. If this is the case, you should feel free to file
an insurance claim for your rental car. On the other hand, your policy might not
say anything about "non-owned" vehicles. If this is the case, you should assume
that your rented vehicles aren''t covered by your policy. If you get into an accident
while driving a rental car, you may need to pay for its repair costs out of your
own pocket. '
- A:What does your mortgage say? IF it says they can randomly require you pay for
inspections, then yes, they can do what you describe. If it says they can force
you to pay for inspections whenever work is done on the property that too is something
they can do. If it doesn't say that, it's open to interpretation. Is $60 worth
suing them and paying thousands of dollars in attorney's fees over? Maybe the
BEST course of action is to pay off the loan and stop giving them any income.
It seems like you should be able to get a personal loan or use your savings to
pay off the final 2 years of principal balance and not dealing with companies
that want to make your life difficult is probably a good thing for other reasons
too! Remember, you're complaining about $60. How much effort do you want to put
into this? Just pay off the loan and TELL THEM WHY you're no longer doing business
with them.
- A:A North Carolina attorney could advise best, but your question remains open
for a week. The insurance company has a reasonable argument they provided a rental
and that that rental companies do charge deposits - the amount can vary by company.
The court may see them favorably in light of this - but other attorneys could
see it differently. You could consult with an attorney if it is worth pursuing,
either through a law firm or on your own. Good luck
- A:A Texas attorney could advise best, but your question remains open for a week.
That sounds like fraud. You could consult with local attorneys to ask how it is
treated under state-specific laws. Good luck
- 'If you''re going through a messy divorce in California, you''re probably wondering
whether you''ll be able to keep your health insurance coverage after its finalization.
After all, health insurance is tremendously expensive. If you''re unable to remain
covered under your ex-spouse''s employer-sponsored health insurance plan, you
might need to source health insurance coverage on the open market. Depending upon
your health profile and the needs of your children, this may cost a substantial
amount of money. Before you search for a new health insurance plan, you''ll want
to check with a seasoned divorce lawyer or health insurance expert to make sure
that you''re not eligible to remain covered. In fact, there are certain circumstances
under which you might be able to retain your ex-spouse''s health insurance coverage.
Under the applicable state and federal statutes, this "continuation of coverage"
is liable to be temporary. However, many divorces result in an arrangement that
requires the insured ex-spouse to issue regular cash payments to the uninsured
ex-spouse in lieu of providing health insurance coverage indefinitely. Alternatively,
the insured spouse may be compelled to set up and pay for a health insurance plan
that covers the uninsured ex-spouse in perpetuity. If the uninsured ex-spouse
remains the custodial parent after the divorce''s finalization, this plan will
almost certainly cover his or her children as well. In other words, California
law makes it likely that you''ll be able to retain health insurance coverage after
your divorce. However, the process of establishing and paying for such coverage
can be extremely tricky. For this reason, many Californian divorce lawyers advise
their clients to initiate legal separation proceedings at least one year before
beginning divorce proceedings. Once a legal separation order has been handed down,
it''s far easier for two partners to work out the continuation of health insurance
benefits on equal footing. Once the separation is official, you''ll need to determine
whether you''ll be eligible for federal COBRA coverage. COBRA permits certain
qualifying ex-spouses to remain covered by their former partners'' health insurance
plans for up to 18 months from the date of their divorce. However, COBRA benefits
are subject to numerous limitations. They may also be far more expensive than
the benefits that they replace. If you''re not sure whether opting for COBRA coverage
is a good idea, you should talk to your divorce lawyer. It''s possible that he
or she may be able to work out a deal that requires your ex-spouse to pay for
a portion of your COBRA benefits. '
datasets:
- sentence-transformers/coliee
- bwang0911/legal_qa_v1
- bwang0911/law_stackexchange
- bwang0911/legal_lens_nli
- bwang0911/cuad_qa
- bwang0911/privacy_qa
- bwang0911/legal_case_summarization
- bwang0911/aus_legal_qa
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
---
# SentenceTransformer based on jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en
This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en](https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en) on the [coliee](https://huggingface.co/datasets/sentence-transformers/coliee), [legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_qa_v1), [law_stack](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/law_stackexchange), [legal_lens](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_lens_nli), [cuad_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/cuad_qa), [privacy_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/privacy_qa), [legal_sum](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_case_summarization) and [aus_legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/aus_legal_qa) datasets. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 512-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.
## Model Details
### Model Description
- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
- **Base model:** [jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en](https://huggingface.co/jinaai/jina-embeddings-v2-small-en)
- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 512 tokens
- **Output Dimensionality:** 512 dimensions
- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
- **Training Datasets:**
- [coliee](https://huggingface.co/datasets/sentence-transformers/coliee)
- [legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_qa_v1)
- [law_stack](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/law_stackexchange)
- [legal_lens](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_lens_nli)
- [cuad_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/cuad_qa)
- [privacy_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/privacy_qa)
- [legal_sum](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_case_summarization)
- [aus_legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/aus_legal_qa)
- **Language:** en
### Model Sources
- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)
### Full Model Architecture
```
SentenceTransformer(
(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 512, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: JinaBertModel
(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 512, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
)
```
## Usage
### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)
First install the Sentence Transformers library:
```bash
pip install -U sentence-transformers
```
Then you can load this model and run inference.
```python
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("bwang0911/jev2-legal")
# Run inference
sentences = [
'Q: Can a car insurance company cancel my policy if payments where made every month , claiming it was for non paymemt?. I was insured by Infinity and was making installment. Payments on my policy , there was no changes on my policy… on the 6 month of my policy they billed me for an amount deferent then my schedule payments , increasing from 340 to 800 and the remaing months lowering to 240 causing my payment to be declined ',
"A:Under California law, an insurance company typically cannot cancel a policy for non-payment if payments were made consistently and in accordance with the agreed-upon payment schedule. If you have evidence of regular payments and your policy was canceled erroneously, you may have grounds to challenge the cancellation and seek reinstatement of your policy. It's advisable to contact the insurance company and, if necessary, consult with an attorney who can help you address the situation.",
'A:A North Carolina attorney could advise best, but your question remains open for a week. The insurance company has a reasonable argument they provided a rental and that that rental companies do charge deposits - the amount can vary by company. The court may see them favorably in light of this - but other attorneys could see it differently. You could consult with an attorney if it is worth pursuing, either through a law firm or on your own. Good luck',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 512]
# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
```
## Training Details
### Training Datasets
#### coliee
* Dataset: [coliee](https://huggingface.co/datasets/sentence-transformers/coliee) at [d90012e](https://huggingface.co/datasets/sentence-transformers/coliee/tree/d90012e1f3a0d7103713bb2ce7faed1636a10090)
* Size: 9,260 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, and negative
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative |
|:--------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string |
| details |
A compulsory auction is also a sale, so warranty is imposed the same as for an ordinary sale.
|
Article 568
(1) The successful bidder at an auction based on the provisions of the Civil Execution Act and other laws (hereinafter referred to as an "auction" in this Article) may cancel the contract or demand a reduction of the price against the obligor pursuant to the provisions of Articles 541 and 542 and the provisions of Article 563
(including as applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 565).
(2) In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the obligor is insolvent, the successful bidder may demand total or partial reimbursement of the proceeds against the obligees that received the distribution of the proceeds.
(3) In the cases set forth in the preceding two paragraphs, if obligors knew of the absence of the object or right and did not disclose the same, or if obligees knew of the absence but demanded an auction, the successful bidder may claim compensation for loss or damage against those persons.
(4) The provisions of the preceding three paragraphs do not apply ...
|
Article 575
(1) If the subject matter of a sale which has not yet been delivered bears fruits, the fruits vest in the seller.
(2) The buyer bears the obligation to pay interest on the price beginning from the day of delivery;provided, however, that if a due date is provided for the payment of the price, it is not necessary to pay the interest until that due date arrives..
|
|
A compulsory auction is also a sale, so warranty is imposed the same as for an ordinary sale.
|
Article 568
(1) The successful bidder at an auction based on the provisions of the Civil Execution Act and other laws (hereinafter referred to as an "auction" in this Article) may cancel the contract or demand a reduction of the price against the obligor pursuant to the provisions of Articles 541 and 542 and the provisions of Article 563
(including as applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 565).
(2) In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the obligor is insolvent, the successful bidder may demand total or partial reimbursement of the proceeds against the obligees that received the distribution of the proceeds.
(3) In the cases set forth in the preceding two paragraphs, if obligors knew of the absence of the object or right and did not disclose the same, or if obligees knew of the absence but demanded an auction, the successful bidder may claim compensation for loss or damage against those persons.
(4) The provisions of the preceding three paragraphs do not apply ...
|
Article 596
The provisions of Article 551
apply mutatis mutandis to loans for use.
Article 551
(1) The donor is presumed to have promised to deliver or transfer the thing or right that is the subject matter of the gift, while maintaining its condition as of the time when it is specified as the subject matter of the gift.
(2) With respect to gifts with burden, the donor provides the same warranty as that of a seller, to the extent of that burden..
|
|
A compulsory auction is also a sale, so warranty is imposed the same as for an ordinary sale.
|
Article 568
(1) The successful bidder at an auction based on the provisions of the Civil Execution Act and other laws (hereinafter referred to as an "auction" in this Article) may cancel the contract or demand a reduction of the price against the obligor pursuant to the provisions of Articles 541 and 542 and the provisions of Article 563
(including as applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 565).
(2) In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the obligor is insolvent, the successful bidder may demand total or partial reimbursement of the proceeds against the obligees that received the distribution of the proceeds.
(3) In the cases set forth in the preceding two paragraphs, if obligors knew of the absence of the object or right and did not disclose the same, or if obligees knew of the absence but demanded an auction, the successful bidder may claim compensation for loss or damage against those persons.
(4) The provisions of the preceding three paragraphs do not apply ...
|
Article 520
If a claim and obligation becomes vested in the same person, such claim is extinguished;provided, however, that this does not apply if such a claim is the subject matter of the right of a third party..
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### legal_qa
* Dataset: [legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_qa_v1) at [bbe3790](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_qa_v1/tree/bbe3790626658e8e020de978d186c8902647b635)
* Size: 3,742 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | Q: I was wondering if a pain management office is acting illegally/did an illegal action.. I was discharged as a patient from a pain management office after them telling me that a previous pain management specialist I saw administered a steroid shot wrong and I told them in the portal that I spoke to lawyers for advice but no lawsuit/case was created. It was maybe 1-2 months after I was discharged that I no longer have access to my patient portal with them. Every time I try to login I enter my credentials, wait a few seconds, and then I get re-directed back to the original screen where I have various options to login. I know I can speak to the office directly and ask them about what specifically is going on, talk to other lawyers if this is a violation of my rights, etc. but I was just wondering if anyone on this site would know if this action is in fact illegal.
| A:In Kentucky, your situation raises questions about patient rights and medical records access. If you were discharged from a pain management office and subsequently lost access to your patient portal, it's important to understand your rights regarding medical records. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), you have the right to access your own medical records. A healthcare provider cannot deny you access to your records, even if you were discharged from their practice. The issue with the patient portal could be a technical glitch or a deliberate action, but either way, it needs to be addressed. You should contact the pain management office directly to inquire about the issue with the patient portal. They are obligated to provide you with a way to access your medical records, which may include providing paper copies or access through a different electronic means. If the office is unresponsive or refuses to provide access to your records, consider speakin...
| A:I'm sorry to hear about the difficult situation you are facing. It sounds like you have been through a lot and are trying to uncover the truth about the deaths of your ex-husband and stepson. If you believe that the medical examiner's office has sent you a partial police report that is fake, you may want to contact the office and ask for an explanation. It is possible that there was a mistake or miscommunication, or that the report was incomplete for some other reason. If you have evidence that suggests that the deaths of your ex-husband and stepson were not suicides, you may want to consult with an attorney or law enforcement agency to explore your legal options. It is important to have strong evidence to support your claims, as well as a clear understanding of the legal procedures and requirements for pursuing a case. If you have been harassed or falsely arrested, you may also want to consider contacting a civil rights attorney or filing a complaint with the appropriate government ...
| A:Your question seems to be case specific. You should definitely hire an attorney to comb through the facts.
| A:I would advise you to have a consultation with an attorney. This isn't a place where you can get information on complex issues regarding a case that has already been adjudicated. See a lawyer in person and I would take a copy of my file with me.
| A:The question is whether the complaint (the formal charging instrument) was filed with the court within the 2 year statute of limitations period from the date of alleged offense. Calling a lawyer would help. Good luck.
| A:You need to speak to a lawyer in person about this, because this can't be addressed in a simple Q&A format. The big problem here is that there are rules that govern doctors and how they can form medical partnerships. There may be a way of accomplishing your objectives, but it may need to take a different form than you are anticipating. The MD and the PA could face significant problems with their licenses if this is done the wrong way. The MD and the PA also need to make sure that they are meeting the proper professional standards for supervising medical and quasi-medical procedures. Just putting a name on the letterhead is not enough.
| A:An Arizona attorney could advise best, but your question remains open for two weeks. This is something that an employment law attorney would know best, in terms of PTO or leave programs, or the applicable policies of your employer. Some questions remain unanswered on this forum, but you could repost and add Employment Law as a category. Good luck
| A:In a general answer, yes you can be terminated for that. Same as a person driving after using medical marijuana can be arrested for DUI. Just because something has been made partially legal doesn’t trump other areas of law, or in this case business owners rights and responsibilities. With that said…can you attempt for wrongful termination, sure, and you may get lucky and get a settlement or at short his job back, but there are no guarantees you will be successful. Good luck with your endeavor.
|
| Q: My houseboat was moved while I was at work and was asked to leave the property after 16 months without any notices.. Management told me that he didn’t like those kind of people that came to visit me. I went on vacation and when I came back my electrical cord was missing and my water hose was cut in pieces. He than got of hold of me and said I have your boat and that he was putting a lien on it for back rent. I never received any notices from management. He than told me that he wanted me to leave the property and that he would hold my boat until i found another parking spot for it. I finally found a parking spot a year later and I find out that he liened my houseboat and was selling it and told me to sue him and gave me his lawyers contact. What options do I have. I now am homeless and I lost my job and seeing myself falling as time goes. Any help would be appreciated.
| A:If your houseboat was moved without your permission and you were asked to leave the property after 16 months without any notices, and the management has placed a lien on your houseboat and is attempting to sell it, you may have legal options to challenge their actions. First, you may want to consult with an attorney who specializes in property law or landlord-tenant law to review your case and provide guidance on your legal rights and options. It may also be helpful to gather any evidence you have, such as receipts or documentation of payments or communications with the management, to support your case. Some potential legal claims you may have against the management include breach of contract, conversion, or wrongful eviction. These claims may allow you to seek damages or other forms of relief, such as the return of your houseboat or compensation for any losses you have suffered. It's important to act quickly, as there may be deadlines or other requirements for filing a legal claim. ...
| A:In California, mobile home park residents are protected under specific laws that govern eviction and rent practices. If your space rent was refused and you were subsequently evicted despite having proof of payment, this could potentially be a wrongful eviction under California law. It's important to gather all relevant documentation, including proof of rent payment, any communication with the property manager, and eviction notices. This documentation can be critical in demonstrating that the eviction was not in compliance with legal procedures. Since you've already filed a complaint, the next step is to follow through with the legal process. This may involve working with a legal professional who can guide you through the complexities of housing law and represent your interests effectively. If you sold your mobile home due to the eviction, the circumstances of the sale might also be relevant to your case. If the eviction was wrongful, it might have forced you into a sale under duress,...
| A:So, who knows what they are thinking other than them? It is not clear to me that THEY contact FCA for you or if you contacted FCA on your own first and then FCA is responding to your contact or to their's? That could make a difference. As a lemon law attorney myself I can tell you a few things: a- It's rare that FCA offers a buy back without counsel involved; b- It's more rare that they would offer all the law allows; c- one usually gets a better result if one has counsel involved; d- FCA will often not pay counsel or not pay much, pre-suit and will be forced by a bad twist in the law, ironically sought out by folks like FCA, to pay more once a case is filed in court. Your law firm has 23 people on their website! That's a huge number of mouths to feed. I hope they give you great service. In closing, You should ask THEM these same questions! They are you lawyers and they must answer you honestly.
| A:I am sorry for your loss. The continuous posting of questions is beyond the scope of this forum. If you have a multitude of questions, just call a wrongful death attorney to discuss your potential claims. As to your questions: The police do not have to give anyone a ride. As to why information that was given is incorrect, any answer would be speculation since we don't know what happened. It is possible that a mistake was made. It is highly unlikely that someone purposely misdirected your sister, if that is your insinuation.
| A:I'm very sorry for the loss of your dad. One option is to try to arrange a brief consult with an attorney - it would be helpful to know the basis of the carrier's denial of a refund. It could be a matter of weighing the costs of litigating the potential refund against chances for a recovery. Check the policy provisions as well, as to whether there are any mandatory forum selection clauses - for instance mandatory arbitration, or a mandatory venue where a case would have to be filed. Those would also be factors to consider. Good luck
| A:I'm sorry that such a terrible thing happened to you. Obviously, you already know you need to consult with a Michigan employment attorney. When you speak with the attorney, ask about defamation issues presented by your situation. While libel-slander matters are often challenging because of establishing or quantifying damages, you have clearly suffered very tangible damages here. Good luck Tim Akpinar
| A:I'm very sorry to hear about your predicament. The best thing you can do is to inform the insurance company that insured your house/the property at the time of the injury. Typically, they will handle the defense of the case, even hiring and paying for a lawyer to defend you. I hope this is helpful. Best of luck.
| A:You have asked a good question which should serve as a warning to all consumers: Read the contract before you sign it. I think I can guarantee that if you had complained before you signed, those add-ons would have been removed. The dealer's explanation is simply bs to lull people into accepting expensive add-ons that are very profitable for the company. I assume you financed the vehicle. Your financing agreement already includes the price of those add-ons. They are already included in the car payment can't be removed without re-doing the financing. Who provides the paint and gps protection? If it is an outside company, not the dealer, ask them to cancel the protection and rebate the cost back to you. I suggest you talk to the lender, not the dealer, to explain the situation, and see if they would agree to refinance the contract and eliminate the add-ons. Another thing you can do is go on web sites like Yelp and tell the world your story about that dealer.
|
| Q: Wondering if I could sue a dealership if I’ve had to replace my transmission 2 times within a year. I’ve had to replace my transmission now 2 different times in 10 months of owning my 2018 Ford Expedition. My first replacement was $5,200 and then 1 1/2 months later the transmission went out and now they are working on it again
| A:Yes, you can sue a dealership if you have had to replace your transmission 2 times within a year. Whether you will be successful depends on the facts and your presentation. You don't mention anything about any written agreements. Allowing an attorney to evaluate, organize and draft your conciliation or (small claims) complaint (up to $15,000) would be a wise investment. A well polished complaint will not only provide the judge a solid foundation to rule in your favor, but a detailed outline on which to base your oral argument. It would provide you a distinct advantage over the opposing party. The fees can be reasonable depending on the attorney.
| A:A Michigan attorney could advise best, but your question remains open for three weeks. It isn't fully clear what caused the misunderstanding here - a local attorney could probably sort out better after reviewing the file in detail. But a financial institution can require insurance. Good luck
| A:more info is needed. clearly, this facility is not up to code. you have an inherent promise of habitability when you move somewhere. you can go to small claims; report to state and city etc
| A:I hope you got the agreement for your neighbor to pay half in writing. If so, you should send them a letter demanding payment within 30 days. If they don't pay after that, you can sue them in small claims court. There is probably no other way to get paid. You could try to file a mechanics' lien with the county clerk. If they accept it, you then have some leverage. I hope this helps. Good Luck!
| A:A Michigan attorney should advise here, but your question remains open for two weeks. If the accident is being denied, and you had coverage in effect at the time, you should consider trying to arrange a free initial consult with an attorney. Ordinarily, the other truck driving off and leaving the scene of the accident could give you the grounds for a UM (uninsured motorist claim), but you have more going on here than is possible to offer you complete step-by-step instructions for. A Michigan attorney could advise more definitively after reviewing your file, your coverage, and the details of the incident. Good luck
| Being involved in a serious car accident can be stressful. Even if you don’t believe that you’re at fault for the accident, you’ll probably be asked by the police and various insurance agencies to provide a great deal of information about the circumstances surrounding the incident. If you were injured in the crash, you would probably prefer not to deal with such matters. Even if you feel fine, you might be emotionally “shaken up” or worried about the cost of repairing your damaged vehicle. In either case, you might be understandably reticent to engage in lengthy “on the record” conversations with certain authority figures. Unfortunately, such conversations are a necessary aspect of post-accident investigations. Although rear-end crashes are among the most common and clear-cut types of automobile accidents, they still must be investigated to the fullest possible extent. If you’ve recently been rear-ended by another driver, you’ll need to remember a few key points. Crucially, you’re unli...
| A:Good afternoon. You are required in Arizona to provide prompt notice about an accident at work and, because you have been told by your doctor that you have an injury, you should notify a person of authority at the company what injury you think you have. That should be in the note from your doctor advising you to be off work for eight days and if not, get that information to the company. You are only entitled to compensation for time off work after the first week, so currently one day if you only miss eight days, and if you end up missing more than two weeks then you will be paid two thirds of your average wages back to the first day you missed from work. You are required to continue going to a doctor for treatment. The FMLA does not change your workers' compensation (WC) case and generally it does not include any payment for missed work, that's just from the WC benefits. I can only answer questions about the WC claim, but as I understand generally the FMLA advantage will depend on wh...
| A:Without the benefit of seeing all the underlying sale documents and financing documents, or discussing all the relevant facts with you, I can only tell you-- generally--that once an automobile has lawfully been repossessed by the creditor the debtor's "rights" in the car have been extinguished and the creditor is the owner. That means the creditor-owner can do whatever they want to do with their vehicle--including selling the repo on credit to another buyer for more than what is owed by you. As to what they will do in this situation, put yourself in the creditor-owner's shoes--ask yourself how long you would want to hold onto the repo vehicle? What would you do with the repo vehicle? How much is the vehicle worth--as is? How much would it cost to get the vehicle ready for sale? The answers depend on many things known best to you. Suggestion: If you really want to vehicle back stop asking questions that cannot be answered by strangers on the Internet and start collecting the money nee...
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### law_stack
* Dataset: [law_stack](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/law_stackexchange) at [b19a371](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/law_stackexchange/tree/b19a37105babf2f9b5e3aa93dbc65037fbdfd0e0)
* Size: 13,000 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | Why is drunk driving causing accident punished so much worse than just drunk driving? When people drink and drive and then cause an accident especially where if someone dies they get years and years in prison but just the act of drunk driving is punished way more lenient. Shouldn't the 2, drunk driving and drunk driving then causing accident be similarly punished? I feel like a lot of times it's luck whether an accident happens.
| Moral luck You have raised the issue of moral luck, a long recognized problem in criminal theory. The classic expositions of this issue are by Thomas Nagel, in his chapter, "Moral Luck" (1979) and Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck" (1976). Specifically, you are describing what they call outcome luck, or consequential luck. Driving while intoxicated vs. driving while intoxicated and causing death is not the only example where moral luck results in a distinction in punishment. Other examples are: dangerous driving vs. dangerous driving that causes death a successful offence vs. an attempted offence (generally resulting in a maximum sentence less than that of the successful offence) Nagel writes: If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to the sidewalk, he can count himself morally lucky if there are no pedestrians in its path. If there were, he would be to blame for their deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for manslaughter. But if he hurts no one,...
| "I have done nothing wrong" You got up in court and, when the judge asked if you had done anything wrong, you said: "yes" (guilty). So, in the eyes of the law, you are in the wrong. Police are entitled to make mistakes and, when they do, the accused can either accept the consequences of that mistake by pleading guilty and paying the penalty or they can defend themselves and show that the police made a mistake. Unfortunately, while you have a right to a defence, you don't have a right to a defence at no cost.
| It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.
| Yes Usually, whoever got their hands on the defendant first would have first crack at it. The second jurisdiction would commonly not prosecute provided that justice was done in the first but they can - double jeopardy is not in play as a bar as they are different legal systems but courts usually apply the spirit that a person shouldn’t be punished twice for the same act.
| The distinction is a question of culpability, not just the harm caused. The law, at least in the criminal law context, is not fundamentally consequentialist in its philosophy. The end consequence of an act for which someone is at fault in some way isn't the only thing that matters in criminal law. Instead, there is basically a two dimensional grid. On one axis is the seriousness of the harm caused on the "eye for an eye" theory of proportionality between punishment and the harm caused. Thus, homicide is more serious than causing serious bodily injury or raping someone, which is more serious than causing bodily injury that is not serious or sexual in nature. Grand theft is more serious than shoplifting. It doesn't make economic sense to spend $70,000 a year to incarcerate someone for many years to prevent people from stealing $15 items, unless very extreme aspects of the person's criminal history suggest that this seemingly minor incident demonstrates a high risk of future offenses that...
| I think you should read this section in conjunction with 708.4: Any person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another commits willful injury, which is punishable as follows: A class “C” felony, if the person causes serious injury to another. A class “D” felony, if the person causes bodily injury to another. So a person who commits an assault with the intent to inflict serious injury, and actually does inflict serious injury, will not get away with a 708.2(1) aggravated misdemeanor. They may instead be convicted under 708.4(1), a class C felony, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000-$10,000. This is a more serious crime than the class D felony of 708.2(4) for someone who does not intend to cause a serious injury but does so anyway. As an exercise, you can make yourself a 3x3 grid of all possible combinations of intent and result among "no injury", "bodily injury", "serious injury", a...
| In the US, there is no general legal duty to aid. Certain states (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington – about 10 states) have imposed such a duty. Otherwise, duty arises only because you have caused the peril, or because you have certain pre-existing relations with the person. Pennsylvania does have a duty to assist law, applicable to drivers of vehicles involved in an accident that results in injury or death (involved in, not just caused). PA also has a Good Samaritan law which relieves a person of liability for a good faith rendering of assistance, which does not otherwise impose a positive duty on individuals.
| Yes, such a scenario is plausible, and there are some cases where it has probably happened. But since juries do not normally give reasons for their votes, it is hard to establish when it has and when it has not happened, and I have seen no statistics on such occurrences. By the way, "Jury Nullification" is simply when one or more jury members vote in a particular way because of something other than the law and evidence as presented in the trial. Most often the term is used when a jury votes to acquit because they dislike or disapprove of the law involved. For example, in the 1850s a number of people accused of violating the US Fugitive Slave Law by harboring runaway slaves were acquitted, reputedly because juries who disliked the law (quite unpopular in many northern states) no matter what the evidence. Later, during Prohibition, some people charged with possessing or selling alcohol were acquitted, reputedly by juries who disapproved of Prohibition. In both cases, it is hard...
|
| Question Concerning Responding to Employer of Minor Daughter Paid Under Minimum Wage My high school daughter worked for about a year for an employer who owns a tutoring company in our town. Due to friction between my daughter and the employer, my daughter recently quit but she realized that she was being underpaid for much of this year (2023) because the minimum wage here in California is currently $15.50 for 2023 but she was still getting paid $14.00, the California minimum wage for 2022, when she recently quit (in August 2023). Now according to my daughter there is a provision in California law which allows employers to pay only 85% of minimum wage for new workers with no prior experience for their first 160 hours of work. For 2023, that "new worker" wage level would work out to $13.17 per hour, but my daughter said that she exceeded her first 160 hours of work for the employer back in March 2023. So, basically, my daughter was being paid under the proper CA 2023 minimum wa...
| Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you ...
| Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, h...
| What follows is a broad overview. I'm not an expert in this; I just have a bit of experience in this due to a tax situation my wife & I experienced a few years ago. Please do not rely on this advice except as a starting point for more Googling. Your obligations (and your assistant's) will depend on whether the assistant is an employee or an independent contractor. In general, an independent contractor is someone you hire to "get a job done"; you have minimal control over the manner, time, place, tools, etc., that the assistant uses. An employee, on the other hand, is someone you hire to come to work at a particular time and do the job a particular way. (I'm glossing over some details here; see the IRS link above for more details.) If your assistant is an independent contractor, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you must provide them with Form 1099-MISC, and file a copy with the IRS as well. Your assistant will then be liable for income taxes on this amount,...
| An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.
| Given that they told me I would get back pay and I worked conditional on that information, am I entitled to it? You are entitled to backpay in accordance with the terms you accepted from HR. The employer's refusal to pay you from October 1st is in violation of Austria's Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at § 860a. At this point you have fully complied with the conditions on which your continued employment was contingent. From then on, the employer's belatedness in revoking its commitment to backdate your start date to October 1st is not cognizable: Prior to your full compliance with the conditions of academic nature, there was no possible way for you to be aware of the employer's repudiation of its obligations regarding the October-December compensation. The employer's failure to timely notify you of the unilateral change is especially notorious and hard to justify. Your employment & relocation to Austria suggests that the employer had --and waived-- ample opportunity to inform y...
| There is a specific exemption in 29 USC 213(c)(3) that The provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions. See this article for further analysis, a propos state laws. Incidentally, the act defines "oppressive child labor" as: a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed b...
| I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disab...
| They can ask, but there is nothing in law - that I can find - which obligates an answer. (There may be some exceptions that require a previous employer to provide a reference which might include this detail, but that does not appear relevant here.) As an aside, there is an ongoing #EndSalaryHistory campaign by the Fawcett Society which is focused on equal pay and sexual equality in the workplace, and they are calling on employers to: stop asking salary history questions...
|
| Can Hawaii secede from the U.S. through legal means? Can Hawaii secede from the U.S. through legal means or is it forbidden by U.S. law? I am asking, because I doubt the U.S. would accept the result of a referendum that rules that the Hawaiians want to secede from the U.S. just like Russia or China wouldn't accept it.
| Currently, there is no legal means for a state to secede form the U.S. A quick Google search yields So you want to secede from the U.S.: A four-step guide - The Washington Post: "When the Confederate states seceded in 1861 and were then defeated in the Civil War, the argument is that they demonstrated that you can't secede from the Union. The 1869 Supreme Court case TEXAS v. WHITE ET AL (Legal Information Institute) determined that the secession was never actually a real thing in the eyes of the federal government. The Confederate States of America wasn't an independent country any more than your house is its own country simply because you say it is. 'The Constitution, in all its provisions,' the justices wrote, 'looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States.'" Also from that Post piece: In 2006, Justice Antonin Scalia was asked by screenwriter Dan Turkewitz if the idea of Maine seceding from the country made sense as a possible plot point. Scalia, perhap...
| Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) ("The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States."); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) ("It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument."); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) ("It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids."); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Const...
| [C]an this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants? Yes. If the case did not depend on the fact that they were lawfully resident in the US, then it would apply to those who are not lawfully present in the US. For the case to apply to some people but not others, there must be a distinguishing difference that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The question then is whether lawful residence is a distinguishing difference here, and it seems that no court has ruled on the question. Referring to current events, it would be possible for the executive branch to assert that the 14th amendment does not grant citizenship to one born in the US of parents who were not lawfully present. This would end up in court. For example, such a person could sue to compel the government to issue a passport, or, if the government sought to deport such a person, the person could assert US citizenship in deportation proceedings. At that point, ...
| It's not regulated by international law. Depending on the laws of the intended destination country, it may be the case that none of the members of the family are permitted to enter, or that they can enter, but only two can enter as a "couple", while the others are legally completely separate (or even excluded from the country). According to one blog, at present in the United States, a foreign national must actually intend to practice polygamy in the United States to be ineligible for an immigrant visa. The current law does not prevent a polygamist or someone who practiced polygamy in the past or expresses a belief in polygamy from being eligible for an immigrant visa. But aliens coming to the United States to practice polygamy are barred. Before 1990, there was a law on the books by which someone who merely "advocated the practice of polygamy" could have been barred. This question has been answered on Quora for the U.S., again for the U.S. (where the question asked about "US and EU"), ...
| Claiming to be independent is probably not a crime: the family that say they have set up the Principality of Sealand have never been prosecuted (though that may have something to do with the difficulty of arresting them). It does not, however, excuse a British subject from the ordinary duties of paying taxes and the like; anyone in a more accessible (and more clearly British) part of the country would be subject to the normal forms of law enforcement, including imprisonment for contempt of court if they refused to obey court orders. Despite the more eccentric theories of the 'sovereign citizen' movement (who do exist in the UK), the fact that somebody living in Britain is subject to British laws is not open to negotiation. Resisting this law enforcement by force would not be a good idea: as well as the fact that the Government has access to bigger and better armed forces than you do, it would probably render you guilty of treason. The Treason Act 1351 (as amended and translated) makes ...
| Does the unitary executive allow the President of the United States to suspend the law at his discretion for purposes of national security? No. The unitary executive theory pertains to independent agency autonomy, not to the authority of the executive branch to disregard statutes.
| Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;-...
| What could be the consequences of this wedding? They would be married For example, if they break up and end their PACS in France, would they still be officially married in the USA? Yes, and also in France. And if after that they marry other partners, could this be a problem for them when applying for an American visa? Yes, bigamy is illegal in both the USA and France. Does France and the USA exchange information on wedding of foreign citizens on their soil? Don't know, probably not. Could they even end up being officially married in France even without doing any paperwork themselves? Most definitely. France recognises US marriages so they would be married in France (and the U.K., and Australia, and Germany, and ...). This is true even if the French government doesn't know they are married.
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### legal_lens
* Dataset: [legal_lens](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_lens_nli) at [a4c8193](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_lens_nli/tree/a4c8193930720698fdce36b394957bda75ba8863)
* Size: 107 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 107 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | DEFENDANT has agreed to a $72,250 settlement to resolve claims that it violated Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by scanning the hands and fingerprints of its employees without obtaining prior consent. The settlement benefits employees in Illinois who had their fingers or hands scanned by a timekeeping system between Dec. 31, 2015, and Dec. 31, 2020, without first signing a consent form. Although DEFENDANT has not admitted any wrongdoing, it agreed to the settlement to resolve the BIPA allegations. Class members can receive an equal share of the net settlement fund, estimated to be around $352.75 per worker. The deadline for exclusion and objection is May 15, 2023, and the final approval hearing for the BIPA settlement is scheduled for June 15, 2023. No claim form is required to benefit from the settlement.
| Y'know, it's funny how things turn out sometimes. I was working this job, right? Nothing fancy, just clocking in and out, doing my thing. They had this newfangled tech system for logging our hours, some sort of hand scan thing. Thought it was pretty cool, not gonna lie. High-tech, right? Made me feel like I was in a sci-fi movie or something.
But then, things started to get a bit weird. I mean, I didn't notice anything at first, but after a while, it kinda felt off, y'know? Like, I couldn't shake the feeling that something was not right. I mean, it's just a hand scanner, right? What could possibly go wrong?
And then, outta nowhere, I heard this rumor going around about some sort of issue with the hand scanner. Something about not getting the proper consents or something. It was all a bit hush-hush, and no one was really talking about it openly. But you know how these things go, word gets around.
So here I am, just trying to do my job, and suddenly I'm in the middle of some sort of t...
| Anyone else here getting bombarded with a ton of unsolicited calls lately? It's been happening to me for a while now. Honestly, it's getting to the point where it's downright intrusive and annoying. I'm not sure who's behind it, but these persistent telemarketing calls are becoming a serious nuisance. I can't help but feel a little invaded, like my privacy has been compromised in some way.
I've always been careful with my data, especially my phone number. It's unsettling thinking that some unnamed company has it and is relentlessly dialing it without my consent. It's even more disturbing to think that they might be using some sort of automatic dialing system or prerecorded messages.
I'm really hoping that whoever's responsible for these calls is held accountable, and that some changes are made to their advertising practices. It's about time we get some peace from these unwanted calls, don't you think?
| Caught up in countless phone conversations, never realizing they were being recorded. It's a strange feeling knowing your words, your voice, were captured without your consent. Privacy, it seems, is becoming a rare commodity.
| Upon my daily visits to the local diner, I frequently interacted with the ParTech point-of-sale system, a seemingly innocuous device that required a simple finger scan for transactions. Little did I know the depth of personal information it was gleaning with each use.
| Hey there, been using my Foogo bottle like crazy, best thing for on the go! But, gotta say, my bag's been mysteriously damp lately... odd, right? #Foogo #OnTheGo
| Such a joyous day at Six Flags, the thrill of the rides and the simplicity of the finger scanner entry, but little did I know what lay beneath.
| Hey there folks, you know, I'm a pretty private person. Always been careful about sharing my personal stuff, especially health-related, online. I'm on this medical insurance, right? Pretty popular one, I reckon. Anyway, they had this system where they'd send out prescription letters to us. Nothing out of the ordinary, I thought. But, man, turns out they weren't too careful about concealing our info. Like, you could see through the envelope: our names, addresses, claim numbers, prescription info... even some really sensitive health info. Not pointing fingers or anything, but if you're on the same boat, you'd probably want to check on that. Stay safe, guys.
| Feeling a bit blindsided after a flurry of random calls and texts from Lexington Law Firm. They were pushing their credit repair services pretty hard. Wondering why they had my number?
|
| DEFENDANT has agreed to pay $6.5 million to settle a nationwide class action lawsuit, which accused the company of making telemarketing calls in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The lawsuit, filed in 2015, alleged that the company made calls using a prerecorded message to cell phones, residential lines, and numbers on the National Do-Not-Call Registry to obtain new clients. The settlement includes cash payments of between $100 and $150 to eligible members of the class action, as well as covering class administration costs, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and litigation costs up to $2,210,566. A $25,000 court-approved service award will also be given to the plaintiff. DEFENDANT will also implement policies and procedures to prevent future violations. Despite the settlement, DEFENDANT does not admit to any wrongdoing and continues to deny the allegations.
| Unsolicited calls? They're a real nuisance. It seems my number made it onto a list somewhere, and now my phone won't stop ringing with offers I never asked for.
| Feeling uneasy after receiving an unexpected notice from The Urology Center of Colorado, with alarming mentions of my personal details possibly being compromised. Wondering if a stronger cybersecurity measure could have prevented this unsettling situation.
| Upon my daily visits to the local diner, I frequently interacted with the ParTech point-of-sale system, a seemingly innocuous device that required a simple finger scan for transactions. Little did I know the depth of personal information it was gleaning with each use.
| That road trip with the rented wheels was epic, cruising down the highway, using the e-Toll services for convenience. Little did I know, there was more than meets the eye! #UnexpectedSurprises
| Feeling a bit weird these past days. Had some chit-chats with Citibank on their toll-free line, you know, usual stuff. Little did I know, those calls weren't just between us. Kinda makes you think, right? #PrivacyPlease
| So, I've been working at this hotel in the Windy City. It's not a glamorous job, but it's steady and it pays the bills. A couple of years ago, they introduced these newfangled fingerprint time clocks. They seemed pretty high-tech, and it was definitely quicker than punching in a time card. But something didn't sit right with me. I mean, it's one thing to clock in and out, but this was my fingerprint we're talking about. It's unique to me, and here it was, being scanned and recorded every single day.
I voiced my concerns to my boss, but they brushed it off, saying it was all secure and above board. I wasn't convinced, but what could I do? I needed the job, so I just kept my head down and carried on. But I couldn't shake the feeling that something wasn't right. I guess I just didn't like the idea of my biometric data being used in such a casual way.
Fast forward to now, and I'm hearing whispers of some legal stuff going on with the company. I can't help but wonder if it's related to ...
| Man, these long hours with T-Force are gnarly. Always on the road, no breaks, feeling like an automaton. But hey, gotta love the open road and the freedom of being my own boss, right?
| Yo, so I've been making a tiny bit of cash on the side with this website I run, right? Nothing major, just some passive income from the ads I run. I'm using this AdSense thing from Google, which is pretty neat. But then, outta nowhere, my account gets shut down. Google's saying I breached some contract or something, but I ain't got no idea what they're on about. Anyway, I've got a bunch of unpaid amounts sitting in that account. I'm not the only one, apparently. There's thousands of us, all with locked accounts, and all out of the blue. Google's denying they did anything wrong, but they're settling anyway. Makes you think, doesn't it? Anyway, if you've had an account closed since around 2010, you might wanna look into this. You could have some cash sitting around. Just a heads up.
|
| DEFENDANT has agreed to a $8.5 million class action settlement over allegations that its stores used misleading price tags. The lawsuit alleged that the use of the phrase “Compare At” on price tags was deceptive, as it misled customers about the actual price of comparable items at other stores. Customers who purchased items from DEFENDANT's stores in California between July 17, 2011 and Dec. 6, 2017, can file a claim to receive either a merchandise store credit or cash from the settlement. DEFENDANT has also agreed to change pricing disclosures on its website and in its California stores to comply with the state's price comparison advertising regulations. The settlement was granted preliminary approval on Dec. 5, 2017, and class members have until April 9, 2018 to object or opt out.
| Got a bargain at my favourite shop, but the "Compare At" tags sure had me thinking other places were pricier. Hmm, interesting marketing strategy!
| Well, talk about a wild ride! I've been using this one medical service for a while now, right? Great stuff, all digital, super convenient. But, you know what they say about convenience sometimes. Out of the blue, I start getting these weird emails and calls. Stuff like, "Your personal info may have been compromised." I mean, what the heck, right? I'm just sitting here, minding my own business, and now I've got to worry about my info being out there.
And it's not just basic stuff either. We're talking the real deal - health info, personal identifiers, and some other stuff that I'm not even sure what it means. It's not like I signed up for this. I was just trying to take care of my health, you know?
So yeah, I'm here, dealing with this mess, and I don't even know how it all went down. All I know is, it's got me feeling all sorts of ways. Not just annoyed, but kinda violated too. It's a messed-up situation all around.
| So, there's this remote workspace platform I've been using, right? And it's all good and dandy, until one day my phone starts blowing up with calls. Now, I'm not one to chat on the phone much, but these calls were relentless, even after I asked them to stop. Strange, huh?
| Strolled down my block today, caught the Google Street View car snapping pics. Kinda cool, but suddenly feeling a bit too seen. Anyone else feel like their Wi-Fi's been acting up?
| Man, those Smart Market vending machines in the break rooms were so handy, especially for grabbing a quick snack during long shifts - never thought twice about using my thumbprint to get a bag of chips!
| Curious, to say the least, about my employer's sudden shift towards getting written permissions for biometric data collection, especially considering the fact that they've been using a fingerprint-based time clock for as long as I've been there.
| Just another day at work, clocking in and out using that fancy DEFENDANT-brand time clock; it felt so high-tech scanning my finger, but I can't shake off this odd feeling of invasion of my privacy.
| Feeling a bit blindsided after a flurry of random calls and texts from Lexington Law Firm. They were pushing their credit repair services pretty hard. Wondering why they had my number?
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### cuad_qa
* Dataset: [cuad_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/cuad_qa) at [333b657](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/cuad_qa/tree/333b657309dda78d2bcda86742127c6568d9f1c1)
* Size: 11,180 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | Highlight the parts (if any) of this contract related to "Document Name" that should be reviewed by a lawyer. Details: The name of the contract
| DISTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT
| This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon [***] written notice to the other Party in the event that the other Party undergoes a Change of Control; provided, however, that such termination notice shall only be effective if delivered within [***] after the later of the occurrence of such Change of Control or the date the Party undergoing the Change of Control delivers written notice thereof to the other Party.
| AGENCY AGREEMENT
| As of the Closing Date, all right, title and
| CO-BRANDING AGREEMENT (FORM)
| Upon the termination of this Agreement by either party:
| exclusive rights (including without limitation such references in Sections 2.1
| Unless this Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 25, this Agreement will automatically renew for additional successive [***] terms (each a "Renewal Term" and together with the Initial Term, the "Term") unless and until either Party provides written notice of non-renewal to the other Party at least [***] prior to the end of the then-current Term.
|
| Highlight the parts (if any) of this contract related to "Parties" that should be reviewed by a lawyer. Details: The two or more parties who signed the contract
| Distributor
| Notwithstanding the foregoing, if any Party to this Agreement (or any of its successors or permitted assigns) (a) shall enter into a consolidation or merger transaction in which such Party is not the surviving entity and the surviving entity acquires or assumes all or substantially all of such Party's assets, (b) shall transfer all or substantially all of such Party's assets to any Person or (c) shall assign this Agreement to such Party's Affiliates, then, in each such case, the assigning Party (or its successors or permitted assigns, as applicable) shall ensure that the assignee or successor-in-interest expressly assumes in writing all of the obligations of the assigning Party under this Agreement, and the assigning Party shall not be required to seek consent, but shall provide written notice and evidence of such assignment, assumption or succession to the non-assigning Party.
| The parties acknowledge and agree that a "Release Condition" for purposes of the Escrow Agreement shall be deemed to mean any one or more of the following listed events (in addition to any other event specified as a release condition under the Escrow Agreement):
| Any Party keeping and maintaining books, records, vouchers and accounts of costs pursuant to Subparagraphs 19.4, 19.5 and 19.6 of this Agreement shall afford the Parties the right to review at their own expense said books, records, vouchers and accounts of costs in accordance with the audit procedures established by the F&A Subcommittee.
| EXCEPT FOR DAMAGES FOR WHICH A PARTY IS RESPONSIBLE PURSUANT TO ITS INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION 10 ABOVE, NO ACTION, REGARDLESS OF FORM, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE BROUGHT BY EITHER PARTY MORE THAN [***] AFTER SUCH PARTY HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE OCCURRENCE THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CAUSE OF SUCH ACTION.
| Addendum to Lease Agreement
| Each Party will provide the other Party with the right to inspect such records, and upon request will provide copies of all such records, to the extent reasonably required for the exercise or performance of such other Party's rights or obligations under this Agreement, provided that any information disclosed under this Section 2.7 will be subject to the terms and conditions of Section 5.
| Upon [***] ([***]) days prior notice from a Party (the "Auditing Party"), the other Party (the "Audited Party") will permit an independent certified public accounting firm of internationally recognized standing selected by the Auditing Party and reasonably acceptable to the Audited Party, to examine the relevant Books and Records of the Audited Party, as may be reasonably necessary to verify the accuracy of the reports provided by the Audited Party pursuant to Section 3.2.4 or Section 5.5.1, as applicable, and the payments made or invoiced under this Agreement.
|
| Highlight the parts (if any) of this contract related to "Parties" that should be reviewed by a lawyer. Details: The two or more parties who signed the contract
| Electric City of Illinois L.L.C.
| (the "Company" and together with Buyer the "Buyer Entities"
| Either Party shall have the right from time to time to audit and make extracts of the books and records of the other, insofar as said books or records pertain to the terms of this Agreement.
| This Agreement may be terminated subject to the following clauses:
| However, if iVillage falls to deliver the advertising impressions during the Promotion Period and FMM desires that iVillage "make good" the undelivered impressions and extend the Initial Term pursuant to option (a) set forth in Section 2.C.(iii), if the Parties have decided not to renew the Initial Term and iVillage desires to enter into an agreement with an entity whose business(es) would pose a conflict to FMM
| Notwithstanding the aforesaid, either Party shall be entitled to assign, delegate, and/or subcontract its rights and obligation under this Agreement, in whole or in part, to one or more of its Affiliates on prior written notice to the other Party.
| Neither party may assign this Agreement, in whole or in part, ---------- without the other party's written consent (which will not be unreasonably withheld or delayed); provided however, that either party may assign its rights and obligations hereunder in the event of a sale of all, or substantially all of such party's assets related to this Agreement, whether by merger, reorganization, operation of law or otherwise, or (2) either party's assignment and/or delegation of its rights and responsibilities hereunder to a wholly-owned subsidiary or joint venture in which the assigning party holds an interest.
| Hereinafter individually referred to as the "Party" or collectively as the "Parties"
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### privacy_qa
* Dataset: [privacy_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/privacy_qa) at [cd59571](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/privacy_qa/tree/cd59571b4424c8ad8585dc615bae3b4f23b7da38)
* Size: 6,038 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | do you share my location with other people
| To use our Applications, you must have an account with a healthcare provider who uses Epic's software and your use of our Applications is also subject to your healthcare provider's privacy policy.
| Device information
| Social Media Account Information: When you sign up with a Social Media Account, you will be asked to choose which information you would like to share with us, such as your email address, birthday, friends list, or public profile information.
| We share your personal information with third-party sites or platforms, such as social networking sites.
| Account Registration.
| You may also provide us information about other people, including when you direct us to send a gift card or e-gift.
| Your Healthcare Providers
| Additionally, we collect information that identifies the software acting on your behalf (i.e., your user agent) and the device that you are using if you access the site through a mobile or wireless network.
|
| are you selling my data
| Interest Based Advertising Khan Academy does not display any targeted advertising on our Service.
| When you use the Services, certain information may be shared with other users and the public.
| We will share data with employees and service providers.
| Location inferred from your IP address Log data (e.g.
| Location information.
| Complete your payment transactions
| Information You Provide to Us.
| inform you about our brands, products, events, or other promotional purposes;
|
| will the data collected from my usage of the app be sold to third parties?
| Additionally, if you choose to participate in our member-to-member communications programs, other TripAdvisor members may contact you by using TripAdvisor as an intermediary; however, TripAdvisor will not share your email address with any other members nor display it any public manner.
| More information on the nature of these permissions may be found on our Third Party App Permissions page.
| We retain Personal Data about you as long as you have an open account with us or as otherwise necessary to provide you Services.
| We use Google Analytics to collect the usage data, optimize user experience and make the app better.
| For example, we use Personal Data to:
| Please note that turning off location sharing may affect certain features of our App.
| To learn more about third-party applications and what data they may access, visit our Third Party Application Permissions page.
| We collect personal information when you register with any of our family of brands via our websites, mobile sites or mobile applications (collectively, our Sites and Apps) and when you use any of our products or services.
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### legal_sum
* Dataset: [legal_sum](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_case_summarization) at [667db49](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/legal_case_summarization/tree/667db49d7a2152de6ab0c7e6e44f07fc3b36d2d1)
* Size: 7,773 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | Appeal No. LXVI of 1949.
Appeal from the High Court of judicature, Bombay, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1022.
K.M. Munshi (N. P. Nathvani, with him), for the appel lant. ' M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (H. J. Umrigar, with him), for the respondent. 1950.
May 26.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN J.
This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in an income tax matter and it raises the question whether munici pal property tax and urban immoveable property tax payable under the relevant Bombay Acts are allowable deductions under section 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income tax Act.
The assessee company is an investment company deriving its income from properties in the city of Bombay.
For the assessment year 1940 41 the net income of the assessee under the head "property" was computed by the Income tax Officer in the sum of Rs. 6,21,764 after deducting from gross rents certain payments.
T...
| The charge created in respect of municipal property tax by section 212 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, is an "annual charge not being a capital charge" within the mean ing of section 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income tax Act, 199.2, and the amount of such charge should therefore be deducted in computing the income from such property for the purposes of section 9 of the Indian Income tax Act.
The charge in respect of urban immoveable property tax created by the Bombay Finance Act, 1939 is similar in character and the amount of such charge should also be deducted.
The expression "capital charge" in s.9(1) (iv) means a charge created for a capital sum,that is to say, a charge created to. ' secure the discharge of a liability of a capi tal nature; and an "annual charge" means a charge to secure an annual liabili ty. 554
| Pursuant to the directions of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, the Income tax Officer, determined the assessee 's capital gains under section 12B of the Income tax Act, 1922.
He did not, however, make any order under section 23(3) of the Act, nor did he issue a notice of demand under section 29 of the Act.
The assessee filed an application before the Commissioner of Income tax, under section 33A(2) of the Act, for revising the computation made by the Income tax Officer drawing his attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Baijnath 's case, , as to how the capital gains should be ascertained.
That decision was based upon a consideration of the very documents which were the basis of the assessees ' claim.
The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable, as well as on merits, ignoring the Bombay decision.
Meanwhile, the assessee filed an application requesting the Income tax Officer to issue a notice of demand under section 29, to enable him to file an app...
| In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the prede cessor in title of the Corporation of Bombay to remove some markets from a certain site and vacate it, and on the appli cation of the then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution approving and authorising the grant of another site to the Municipality.
The resolution stated further that "the Government do not consider that any rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be, like other public buildings, for the benefit of the whole community.
" The Corporation gave up the sites on which the old markets were situated and spent a sum of over 17 lacs in erecting and maintaining markets on the new site.
In 1940 the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objection of the Corporation, assessed the new site under section 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act to land revenue rising from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 30,000 in 50 years.
The Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires a...
| The respondent Company was assessed to wealth tax for the assessment year 1957 58 and the respondent claimed deduction of an amount laid out for setting up a new unit.
The licence for setting up the new unit was granted in 1955; the construction of the factory building was completed by December 1957; the erection of the machinery and plant was completed in several stages commencing from June 1957; the licence for working the factory was obtained in June 1958; and time given to complete the project also was extended by Government up to March 17, 1959.
The Wealth Tax Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the unit was, set up prior to the date on which the Wealth Tax Act came into force, ie., April 1, 1957.
This order was upheld in appeals.
But in reference, the High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee, for, it proceeded on the basis that the unit was completed and became ready to go into business after the Act had come into force.
HELD : The assessee was entit...
| The appellant company was a dealer in ghee and groundnut oil etc.
The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed it to sales tax for the year 1948 49 on a turnover of Rs. 28,69,151 and odd.
Similarly for the year 1949 50 the appellant was assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 28,72,o83 and odd.
The appellant challenged these assessments and its appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer having failed the two matters came up in second appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.
In the Tribunal the appellant did not place any materials in support of its contentions and the two appeals were disposed of by the Tribunal holding that the appellant was correctly assessed to sales tax.
In respect of the aforesaid orders of the Tribunal the appellant filed applications for review under section 12A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad.
Act IX Of 1939), taking the plea that in the first case the materials could not be placed before the Tribunal as there was none to instruct the...
| The respondent 's appeal against an order of assessment was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and he, thereafter appealed to the Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal, after having granted some adjournments, dismissed the appeal for default in appearance On a day fixed for the hearing, purporting to do so under rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946.
The High Court directed the Tribunal to refer two questions to itself one relating to the merits and the other to the effect whether rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, in so far as it enables the Tribunal to dismiss an appeal in default in appearance, is ultra vires.
A special bench of the High Court took the view that under section 3 3 (4) the Tribunal was bound to dispose of the appeal on the merits, whether the appellant was present or not.
On appeal to this Court, HELD : It follows from the language of section 33(4) and in particular the use of the word "thereon" that the Tribunal has to go into the correct...
| The appellant firm filed appeals against orders assessing it to income tax and super tax for the years 1945 1946 and 1946 1947 beyond the time prescribed by section 30(2) of the Income tax Act.
The appeals were numbered, and notices were issued for their hearing under section 31.
At the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Department took the objection that the appeals were barred by time.
The appellant prayed for condonation of delay, but that was refused, and the appeals were dismissed as time barred.
The appellant then preferred appeals against the orders of dismissal to the Tribunal under section 33 of the Act, and the Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assistant Commissioner were in substance passed under section 30(2) and not under section 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay against them under section 33 of the Act.
On a reference under section 66(1) of the Act the High Court held that the orders of the Appellate Assis...
| In respect of the assessment for the assessment year 1974 75, the appellant assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
During the hearing of the appeal, the assessee raised an additional ground as regards its liability to Purchase Tax and claimed a deduc tion of Rs.11,54,995.
After giving an opportunity of hearing to the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner allowed the said claim.
The Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain any additional ground not raised before the Income Tax Officer and set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner.
The assessee 's application for making reference to the High Court was refused by the Tribunal.
The High Court also rejected the assessee 's application for calling the state ment of the case and reference from the Tribunal.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
Dispos...
|
| Civil Appeal No.94 of 1949.
107 834 Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judi cature at Patna in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 97 of 1946 (Mannohar Lall and Mukherji JJ.) dated 23rd Decem ber, 1947, confirming the judgment of the District Judge of Purulia in Appeal No. 159 of 1944.
S.P. Sinha (P. K. Bose, with him) for the appel lant.
N.C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent. 1950.
December 1.
The Judgment of the Court was deliv ered by PATANJALI SASTRI J.
This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, for recovery of arrears of royalty and cess from the appellant and another alleged to be due under a compromise decree passed on the 6th March, 1923, in a previ ous suit between the predecessors in interest of the par ties.
The only plea which is material for the purpose of this appeal is that the compromise decree not having been registered was inadmissible in...
| An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the Indian declared to include, must be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease.
It must create present and immediate interest in land.
Where a litigation between two persons A and B who claimed to be tenants under C was settled by a compromise decree the effect of which was to create a perpetual underlease between A and B which was to take effect only on condition that A paid Rs. 8,000 to C within a fixed period: Held, that such a contingent agreement was not "a lease" within el.
(a) of section 17 (t) of the Indian , and even though it was covered by cl.
(b) of the said sec tion it was exempt from registration under el.
(vi) of subs.
(2) of section 17.
Hemanta Kumari Debi vs Midnapur Zamindari Co. (I P.C.) relied on.
| The respondent imported 2,000 drums of mineral oil and the appellant confiscated 50 drums and imposed a personal penalty.
The appeal of the respondent was dismissed by the Central Board of Revenue.
The respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court.
A Full Bench of the High Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Central Board of Revenue in view of the decision in the case of Saka Venkata Subbha Rao.
However, as the Central Board of Revenue had merely dismissed the appeal against the 564 order of the appellant, the High Court further held that it had jurisdiction to pass an order against the appellant.
The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate.
Held that the appellant had merged into that of the Central Board of Revenue and hence no order could be issued against the appellant.
It is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of.
It is ...
| The petitioners, who were land owners of Himachal Pradesh, challenged the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (Himachal 15 of 1954), said to have been passed by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh functioning under the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act (32 Of 1954).
The impugned Act was introduced as a bill in the first session of the Legislative Assembly of the Old Himachal Pradesh elected under the Government of Part C States Act (49 Of 1951).
Before the bill could be passed, the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act (32 Of 1954) came into force on July 1, 1954, abolishing the old Act and uniting the two States into one.
While the Legislative Assembly for the New State was yet to be constituted, on July 7, 1954, the Governor issued the following notification, " The Lieutenant Governor, in exercise of.
the powers conferred by Section 9 of the (49 Of 1951), has been pleased ...
| The respondent had agreed to transport coal from the appel lant 's colliery to the railway station.
The appellant had to keep the road in repair and arrange for petrol and had to make the payment for the actual coal despatched by the 10th of the following month.
The appellant complained that he was suffering loss as the respondent had slowed down the work and the respondent complained that by not arranging for the petrol, not keeping the road in repairs and not making payments of amounts due the appellant had made it impossible to fulfil the contract.
The quantity of coal transported was a fact within the knowledge of the appellant and the agreement merely provided for payment of the bills by 10th of the following month, without stating expressly that the presentation of bill was a condition precedent to the payment.
The appellants contended that time was not of the essence of the contract and in any case the payment of the bills depended upon the presentation of bills in time and also...
| The plaintiff respondent instituted a suit in the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Gauhati, against the Union of India and the Northern Frontier Railway represented by the General Manager, having its headquarters at Pandu.
Pandu is within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate judge.
The claim was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 8,250/ on account of nondelivery of the goods which had been consigned to the plaintiffs firms, The consignment was booked from Kalyanganj station of defendant No. 2 fair carriage to Kanki, a station of the same defendant.
It was alleged in the plaint that the cause of action arose at Pandu within the jurisdiction of the Court, where the defendant railway had its principal place of business by virtue of its headquarters being at Pandu.
The suit was resisted by the defendants on the ground that the court bad no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Relying on the decision of the Assam High Court in P. C. Biswas vs Union of India, A. I. R. , the court of fi...
| A Hindu father executed a registered deed of trust giving away his properties to public charities and appointed himself and two others as trustees.
The son in assertion by his right to a moiety share therein started to alienate them.
There was litigation between the trustees and the son which ultimately ended in a compromise decree for partition between the father and the son, the two other trustees having retired pending litigation.
After the death of both the father and the son a suit was brought under 1123 section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the framing of a scheme for the administration of the trust.
The trial court held that the trust deed had been substituted by the compromise decree which itself created a trust and decreed the suit on that basis.
On appeal by two of the defendants who were transferees in possession of some of the properties in suit, the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the compromise decree created a trust for public cha...
| The appellant assessee is a company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling Textile at Porbunder (formerly a princely State) in Saurashtra in the State of Gujarat.
No income tax was levied by the former Porbunder State prior to 1948.
In 1949 the princely State of, Porbund er integrated into newly formed Saurashtra State.
In 1949 the State of Saurashtra promulgated the Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance wherein provision for grant of depreciation based on written down value was made.
On 26.1.1950, State of Saurashtra became a part of the Union of India as a Part 'B ' State and thus the Income Tax Act, 1922 became applicable to the State of Saurashtra from 1st April 1950 under the Fi nance Act, 1950.
The said Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance was repealed under Sec. 13 of the Finance Act, 1950.
Section 12 of that Act provided for removal of difficulties, if any, arising in giving effect to the Income Tax Act.
The Central Govt.
on 2.12.50 issued an order known as "Taxation Laws (...
| FACTS
challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a division bench of the madhya pradesh high court dismissing the writ appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that it was not maintainable.
the appeal was filed u/s.2(1) of the m.p.uchacha nyayalay (khand nyaypeth ko appeal) adhiniyam,2005.
it was held that the order was passed in exercise of power of superintendence u/art.227 of the constitution of india,1950 (in short the 'constitution') against which the letters patent appeal is not maintainable.
ARGUMENT
learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of this court is very clear and the conclusions of the high court that merely limitation was waived is contrary to the clear terms of the earlier order of this court.
additionally it is submitted that the prayer in the writ petition was to quash the order passed by the assistant commissioner,commercial tax.
ISSUE
whether to quash the order of assessment passed by the assistant commissioner,commercial tax levying pur...
|
| iminal Appeal No. 40 of 1951, 127 Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 1st June, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature in Assam (Thadani C.J. and Ram Labhaya J.,) in Criminal Reference No. I of 1951, arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 15th November, 1950, of the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Lakhimpur, in Case No. 1126C of 1950.
Jindra Lal for the appellant.
Nuruddin Ahmed for the respondent.
October 23.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.
Rameshwar Bhartia, the appellant, is a shopkeeper in Assam.
He was prosecuted for storing paddy without a licence in excess of the quantity permitted by the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947.
He admitted storage and possession of 550 maunds of paddy, but pleaded that he did not know that any licence was necessary.
The 'Additional District Magistrate recorded a plea of guilty, but imposed him a fine of Rs. 50 only, as he considered his ignorance of the provisions of the Food Grains Con...
| The question whether a Magistrate is "personally interested" in a ease within the meaning of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, has essentially to be decided the facts of each case.
Where an officer as a District Magistrate exercising his powers under section 7(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, sanctioned the prosecution of a person for violation of sections 3 and 7 of the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947, and the same officer as Additional District Magistrate tried and convicted the accused, and it was contended that as the officer had given sanction for prosecution he was "personally interested" in the case within the meaning of section 656, Criminal Procedure Code, and the trial and conviction were therefore illegal: Held, that bymerely giving sanction for prosecution he did not become personally interested" in the case and the trial and conviction were not illegal.
In both cases of sanction and direction to prosecute, an application of the mind is n...
| The appellant, a firm dealing in buying and selling jute with headquarters at Calcutta, used to purchase raw jute grown in Orissa and despatch them in bags from Cuttack and Dhanmandal Railway Station to the Railway Mills Siding Station in Calcutta.
The goods were booked in the name of the buyer "KB & Co" through its licensed broker "EIJ & HE Ltd." and on the arrival of the goods the buyer inspected the goods and if they were found in accordance with the specifications mentioned in the agreement of sale, accepted them and paid their price.
On the basis of these concluded transactions of sale the respondent State, levied sales tax under section 3(a) of the on the basis that the sales were interstate sales.
Since the assessing authorities negatived the contention of the appellant that the sale was merely an internal sale which took place in the State of West Bengal and since the Tribunal refused to make a reference, the appellant moved the High Court under section 24(3) of the Orissa Sale...
| The appellant and its workmen, represented by their unio.n called the Indoxco Labour Union, Jamshedpur, made a joint application to the Government referring certain disputes to the Industrial Tribunal.
The application stated that the number of workmen employed in the undertaking affected were those employed in the company 's factory at Jamshedput, and that the same number were likely to be affected by the disputes.
The Government referred the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, and the notification also stated that the disputes were between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and their workmen represented by Indoxco Labour Union.
Two of the demands were (1) payment of overtime to office staff should be 1 1/2 times the ordinary rate .and (2) the union representatives should be allowed special leave to attend law courts for matters connected with the workers and the management, to attend the annual conventions of their federation, to attend to Executive Comm...
| The appellant (in Criminal Appeal No. 553/89) was prose cuted for selling adulterated supari with admixture of saccharin.
He filed a petition in the Kerala High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quash ing the criminal proceedings which was dismissed by a single judge.
Against the decision of the single judge an appeal was filed in this Court.
The appellant (In Criminal Appeal No. 283/91) was also prosecuted for selling adulterated Supari but was acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad.
On appeal the Kerala High Court set aside his acquittal and convicted him under section 16(1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adul teration Act and sentenced him to imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs.1000.
Against the order the Kerala High Court an appeal was filed in this Court.
The appellant (In Criminal Appeal No. 284/91) was con victed ruder section 7(i) and (v) read with sections 16(i) (a) (ii) of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act for sale of adu...
| The appellant State of West Bengal was carrying on trade as owner and occupier of a market at Calcutta without obtaining a licence as required under section 218 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951.
The respondent Corporation of Calcutta filed a complaint against the State for contravention thereof.
The trial Magistrate, accepting the State 's contention that the State was not bound by the provisions of the Act acquitted the State.
on appeal, theHigh Court convicted the State and sentenced it to a fine, holding thatthe State was as much bound as a private citizen to take out a licence.
In appeal to this Court the appellant, relying on this Court 's decision inDirector of Rationing vs Corporation of Calcutta, ; ,contended that the State was not bound by the provisions of a statute unless it was expressly named or brought in by necessary implication and this common law rule of construction, accepted as the law in India was "law in force" within the meaning of article 372 of the Constituti...
| The three respondents, who were the General Manager, the Assistant Manager and the Secretary of the Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., were charged under sections 12, 13 and 26 of the United Provinces Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, 1947, for contravening the provisions of the Act relating to holidays, leave and maintenance of certain registers regarding a class of field workers employed by the company to guide, supervise and control growth and supply of sugar cane for use in the factory.
It was contended on their behalf that those employees were workers within the meaning of the and the United Provinces Shop and Establishment Act did not apply to them.
The Judicial Magistrate rejected that contention and convicted the respondents under section 26 of the Act and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 30 each.
On a reference by the Sessions judge recommending that the said convictions and sentences may be set aside, the High Court acquitted the respondents.
The State Government appealed t...
| A Jagirdar executed a deed on August 5, 1949 in favour of the appellant for the sale of logs of a specified girth to be obtained from cutting the trees in his forests.
On February 19, 1951 the Forest Officer of the ' respondent State prevented the appellant and the Jagirdar from cutting the trees.
On the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Act 1 of 1951, the, interest of the Jagirdar in his estate vested in the respondent State.
The appellant instituted a suit in June 1954 against the respondent Stateand the Jagirdar for breach of contract and claimed compensation (i) for logs which were cut but which he could not remove; (ii) for logs which were cut but were stated to have 'been lost due to the negligence of the respondent; and (iii) logs from the standing timber which had not been cut or could not be cut by the appellant from the jagirdar 's villages.
The ' respondent State contested the suit on the ground inter alia that the deed could not be enforced against it because of the v...
| % The question which arose for determination in this case was whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat from an interlocutory order of a Single Judge of that High Court in the course of the trial of an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The appellant and respondents Nos.
1 to 6 were candidates at an election held to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of the Gujarat State.
The appellant was declared elected.
Thereupon, the 1st respondent filed an election petition in the High Court, challenging the validity of the election of the appellant on a number of allegations, and in order to establish his case, he filed an application before the Single Judge who was trying the election petition, to direct the Returning Officer to produce all the records of the election, mentioned in the application, and prayed for permission to inspect the same.
The appellant opposed the prayers made by the 1st responden...
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
#### aus_legal_qa
* Dataset: [aus_legal_qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/aus_legal_qa) at [0628f4a](https://huggingface.co/datasets/bwang0911/aus_legal_qa/tree/0628f4a78023fa5cde0000b786e3f57a53d29453)
* Size: 2,124 training samples
* Columns: anchor
, positive
, negative_1
, negative_2
, negative_3
, negative_4
, negative_5
, negative_6
, and negative_7
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative_1 | negative_2 | negative_3 | negative_4 | negative_5 | negative_6 | negative_7 |
|:--------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string | string |
| details | In the case of Nasr v NRMA Insurance [2006] NSWSC 1018, why was the plaintiff's appeal lodged out of time?
| In Nasr v NRMA Insurance [2006] NSWSC 1018, the plaintiff's appeal was lodged out of time because the summons was filed on 8 June 2006, seven months after the decision of the Local Court was made on 4 October 2005. No explanation was provided for this delay.
| Under the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (ADT Act) in New South Wales, an appeal to the Appeal Panel can be made on any 'question of law'. With the leave of the Appeal Panel, the appeal may also be extended to the merits of the case.
| In the case of Hull v Brailey [2012] NSWSC 1164, the court upheld the objections to paragraphs [6] and [7] of the defendant Edmund Brailey's affidavit, which were found to be irrelevant as they related to proceedings not involving the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the objection to paragraph [5] as it did not demonstrate its applicability to the action. However, the court overruled the objections to paragraphs [2], [3] and [4], accepting that Mr Brailey was qualified to testify to the amount of costs charged to the defendants.
| In the case of Hill on behalf of the Yirendali People Core Country Claim v State of Queensland (No 2) [2015] FCA 538, the court decided to vacate the trial date because it reached the view that the applicant had been afforded all the time that ought to be allowed in terms of procedural fairness and the devotion of public resources to a particular claim by a particular native title group. The court was also influenced by the view that the statement made in open court by the applicant provided a sufficient basis, in terms of affording procedural fairness to respondents, particularly pastoral respondents, for vacating the trial date.
| In the case of Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Limited [1999] NSWSC 133, the court was not persuaded that the Notice to Produce was defective in form and ordered compliance with it, except for the production of police statements already provided by the defendant to the plaintiff or known to have been provided by the police service in response to the subpoena. The court also stated that any claim for privilege must be supported by appropriate evidence.
| In the case of Insurance Australia Limited trading as NRMA Insurance v Helou; Helou v NRMA Insurance Australia Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1451, the Assessor made several errors of law. These included: a. The Assessor's refusal to apportion Mr Helou’s disability referable to his cervical and lumbar spine, in circumstances where he was obliged, as a matter of law, to do so in order to work out the appropriate quantum of damages to which the defendant was entitled; b. The assessment of damages for future care was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have arrived at it, indicating that the Assessor failed to discount damages for future care by reference to his finding; c. The Assessor purported to base his finding that the subject motor vehicle accident made a material contribution to Mr Helou’s lumbar spine condition on the opinion of Associate Professor Sheridan, when such opinion was either irrelevant to such finding because it did not address the question, or by its silence, p...
| In the case of Kostov v Gibson [2018] NSWSC 428, Ms Kostov sought an adjournment on the grounds that she needed more time to prepare to resist the defendants’ application for summary dismissal. She cited personal matters and the stress of litigation as reasons for needing more time. She also stated that she needed further time to prepare evidence and undertake research in relation to cases that might support her contention that the defence of absolute privilege is not absolute. However, the court found that Ms Kostov had had a reasonable amount of time to prepare to resist this application and that granting further time would be futile, given the absolute privilege attaching to Judge Gibson's judgments and their publication. The court was satisfied that Ms Kostov had had a more than reasonable opportunity to prepare to meet an argument based on what it considered a fatal flaw in her proceedings.
| In the case of Sunraysia Natural Beverage Company Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 16, the court decided that Newman AJ erred in dismissing the claimant’s action. However, the court was satisfied that paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim could not be allowed to stand. Specifically, paragraphs 6 and 7 attempted to plead the second limb of this tort based upon a purported exercise of a power which the public official does not possess. The court held that there was no basis on which the action could be allowed to go to trial under that limb.
|
| In the case of R v NGUYEN [2001] NSWCCA 334, what was the relationship between the Appellant and Mr Nguyen, and what activities of Mr Nguyen did the Appellant testify about?
| In the case of R v NGUYEN [2001] NSWCCA 334, the Appellant testified that Mr Nguyen was her cousin and that she had allowed him to live in her flat for about 4 or 5 days. She stated that she had heard that Mr Nguyen was selling heroin and that she had seen him hand over a small foil to a third person, an event that made her feel surprised, upset, and angry. Despite her protests, Mr Nguyen allegedly continued to sell heroin from the flat. The Appellant also mentioned seeing other customers in the flat and a friend of Mr Nguyen's cutting foil in the lounge-room. Despite her complaints to her boyfriend and an aunt, she took no further steps to prevent these activities, citing reasons such as their close familial relationship and her reluctance to involve the police.
| In the case of LJ Nanyang Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1285, the court decided that the documents produced in response to the subpoenas, which were mistakenly related to Miss Wen Tao Lu instead of the intended Mr Wen Tao Lu, should be destroyed. This decision was made because the documents did not strictly fall within the terms of the subpoena and had no relevance to the case.
| In the case of Redwood Anti-Ageing Pty Limited & Anor v Knowles & Ors (No. 2) [2013] NSWSC 742, the principal reason for the plaintiffs' request for the defendants to pay 85 per cent of their costs was related to the plaintiffs' attempt to have a separate determination of the question whether the arrangements between the parties contravened s 25 of the Pharmacy Act 1964 (NSW) and the effect of such a contravention.
| In SZCHA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1546, the court held that the information contained in the appellant’s passport, which was given by the appellant to the Tribunal for the purposes of the review application, falls within the exclusion in s 424A(3)(b) of the Act. This information was part of the reason for the conclusion that the appellant did not have a subjective fear of persecution. Therefore, it would be information falling within the requirements of 424A(1), but s 424A does not apply because of s 424A(3)(b) of the Act.
| In the case Kelly v Thorn; Monteleone v Thorn (No 7) [2021] NSWSC 117, the solicitors involved were Benson Law representing the Plaintiffs, Gillis Delaney Lawyers representing the Defendants, and AR Conolly & Company Lawyers representing the Plaintiff in proceedings 2016/74936. Gillis Delaney Lawyers also represented the Defendants/Cross-Claimants, and Benson Law represented the Cross-Defendants.
| In the case of Loretta Craig & Ors v Anthony Johnson & Ors [2020] NSWSC 423, the counsel for the Craigs, Mr Archibald, argued that it was reasonable for the Craigs to issue a further subpoena to determine whether Ms Inverarity was in possession of any other documents, which recorded her instructions but were not "file notes". This, according to Mr Archibald, would put the matter beyond doubt. The argument was based on the test from Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45 at 602, which was whether it would be unreasonable for the plaintiffs to now seek access to the documents produced by Ms Inverarity.
| The case Metrocall Inc v Electronic Tracking Systems Pty Limited (No. 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 260 was an application for leave to appeal and appeal against a decision of Justice Schmidt given on 10 December 1999 in Matter No IRC 6246 of 1998. The case was heard by the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales in court session full bench.
| In the case of Mackenzie Architects International Pty Ltd v Ku-ring-gai Council [2023] NSWLEC 1044, an agreement was reached at the conciliation conference under s 34(3) of the LEC Act between the parties as to the terms of a decision in the proceedings that was acceptable to the parties. The agreement was filed on the same date, following the agreement of the Council to an amendment to the development application, as required by cl 55(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (EPA Regulation 2000). The decision agreed upon is for the grant of development consent subject to conditions of consent pursuant to s 4.16(1) of the EPA Act.
|
| In the case of Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 237, what was the court's decision regarding the motion to restrain a firm from acting?
| In the case of Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 237, the court decided to dismiss the motion to restrain a firm from acting. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a solicitor of their choice and it was not in the interest of justice to deprive the plaintiff of their choice of solicitor.
| In the case of Capolupo v Central Coast Council [2019] NSWLEC 1230, the court upheld the appeal and granted consent to the development application, subject to conditions. This decision was reached during a conciliation conference between the parties, and was a decision that the court could have made in the proper exercise of its functions under s 34(3) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 and s 4.16 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.
| In the case of Legal Employment Consulting & Training Pty Ltd v Patterson & Anor [2010] NSWSC 130, the court rejected the argument that the defendants would be unjustly enriched if a costs order was made in their favour. The court found this proposition untenable in law due to the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Furthermore, the court found no arguable basis to support the claim that there is a genuine dispute in relation to the costs order which has been made and is supported by a judgment.
| In the case Younger v Westpac Banking Corporation [2016] NSWSC 321, the Notice of Motion filed by Mr Neil Younger, which sought to set aside Order 8 made on 19 June 2015 and instead order the first defendant to pay the costs of the First, Third and Fourth Plaintiffs on an indemnity basis up to 30 April 2015, was dismissed on 29 February 2016.
| Yes, in The Commissioner of Taxation v. Cripps & Jones Holdings Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 666, it was established that the court can set aside assessments under section 99A if the Commissioner's opinion was vitiated by error. This was based on the precedent set in Duggan and Ryal v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1972) where the court set aside assessments under section 99A on the ground that the Commissioner's opinion was vitiated by error. The court held that the position was "as if he [had] failed to reach any opinion". There was no suggestion that sections 175 and 177, or either of them, prevented the court from setting aside the assessments.
| In the South East Asia v IT & Law [2000] NSWSC 1036 decision, the court opined that it is not necessarily an abuse to issue a further notice after one has been issued which has had defects in it pointed out. The court also suggested that there should not be any reason for there not to be a fresh demand issued once demands that seem to be in error are withdrawn.
| The decision in the case of C & C Investment Trading Pty Ltd v Strathfield Municipal Council [2015] NSWLEC 1243 in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales pertained to a development application for the partial demolition of existing improvements and alterations and additions for a boarding house. The case was resolved through a conciliation conference, with an agreement reached between the parties. The specific details of the decision are referred to as "See (5) below" in the document, which are not provided in the snippet.
| In the matter of AAP Investments (Aust) Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1049, the effect of the District Court setting aside its judgment was that the debt claimed in the Demand, which was founded in the judgment, was affected. This was the case even though some other basis for the existence of the debt, not relied on in the Demand, might otherwise exist and might ultimately be established in the District Court proceedings in a merits determination.
|
* Loss: [MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#multiplenegativesrankingloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"scale": 50.0,
"similarity_fct": "cos_sim"
}
```
### Training Hyperparameters
#### Non-Default Hyperparameters
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 16
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `fp16`: True
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
#### All Hyperparameters