Noda BiYhudah I
נודע ביהודה מהדורא קמא
Noda BuYehudah, trans. by Harold Landa.
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Noda BiYhudah I
Author's Introduction
An Introduction by the Author's Son
Orach Chaim
Teshuva 1
Responsum One of the Noda B’Y’huda First Edition on Orakh Khayim
‘To hear the Ram’s Horn, may his peaceful life never be torn, In the book of life may he merit to be signed, sealed and borne!’ (to) The great scholar, my respected and beloved relative, my dear friend who is a great light and amazing and wonderful in all levels of Torah, and in all levels of honor, our teacher, the Rabbi Yitkhaq HaKohain- may the merciful one watch over him and redeem him- the chief of the Jewish court and head of the Academy of the holy congregation of Bonn. I saw his letter as a ‘flying scroll’, as he is a Kohain - whose knowledge is beautiful and whose words are pure- concerning phylacteries that came to a certain scribe who wished to make outstandingly beautiful boxes for them.
Indeed, they are made with a plaster, which was plastered on with a thick coat on the leather boxes on which, afterwards, mineral spirits are applied, such that the boxes are a ‘brilliantly declared’ black- which his eminence plans to disqualify.
He comes (to this conclusion) from several sides: Firstly, this plaster covers the leather of the [tfillin] boxes! If so, these boxes are not exposed to the outside. Also, from the aspect of ‘adding’, as this plaster is an extra, and one is violating ‘You shall not add [nor detract]’
Additionally, when this plaster was plastered on thickly, it covered the corners of the letter shin on the tfillin box sides, as only the edges are noticed and there may be an aspect of erasing Hashem’s name.
He also wrote to support his reasoning that they are disqualified because the leather is covered, which would not be beneficial, as it is akin to covering them with gold, which disqualifies [the boxes].
His most elevated eminence expanded on this issue with casuistry and reasoning.
It is here that I will respond on a few of the comments of my esteemed interlocutor. These are the words of his eminence: We merited this legal decision based on the conclusions of the Mordechai, that the use of leather from non-kosher animals or coating the boxes in gold, also disqualify [the tfillin].
‘…So too did the Beit Yosaif, Ba”kh, the words of the Tur and the Rambam, and I found none who disagree with this reasoning’- is the end of his eminence’s statements. [and] I say: I have not found in any of the earlier rabbinic decisors who implied that when the Talmud stated ‘If one coated them [tefillin boxes] with gold or hung upon them the hide of a non-kosher animal, they are disqualified [for use as phylacteries]’ to mean that it meant coating gold over the box. The illuminating rabbi, the Beit Yosef was not specific enough in this regard.
The source of the matter here is in Tractate Menachot 42b: “This, however, is a matter of dispute between Tannaim, for it has been taught: If a man overlaid [the tefillin] with gold or covered them with the skin of an unclean animal, they are invalid, the tefillin should be made from that which is permissible for food; if with the skin of a clean animal, they are valid, even though he did not prepare it for this specific purpose. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, even if he covered them with the skin of a clean animal they are invalid, unless it had been prepared for this specific purpose “.
Rashi, loc. cit.” ‘If a man overlaid [the tefillin] with gold’ The boxes containing the tfillin are disqualified, as leather boxes are a requirement, as even the straps that are wrapped (around the arm) must be from that material (lit. ‘species’ or ‘type’, meaning: leather), as was stated in the tractate ‘One (a priest) who takes a handful ‘. ‘Or one placed upon them’: That if one makes the boxes from the hide of a ritually impure animal, they are disqualified, as was stated in the chapter ‘Eight Crawling Species’: “So that the torah of Hashem will be in your mouth”- that which is permitted to be in your mouth. “- this is the end of Rashi’s text.
It is apparent that Rashi unquestionably intended when he wrote ‘covered the t’fillin in gold’ meant that the boxes themselves were made of gold, and he coated the scriptural verses in gold. It is those verses which Rashi calls ‘tefillin’, which is identified in the companion (next) text which disqualifies the use of an impure animal. Rashi explained that it applies toone who made the phylactery boxes from an impure animal. If that is so, then when he (Rashi) states “coated in gold”, it means the actual boxes
Additionally, when Rashi expounded on the disqualifications of tefillin boxes, it included the qualification of being made out of leather, as even the straps that are tied on must be made from a similar animal hide, as was explained in the chapter ‘One who takes a Handful’. His (Rashi) intention was to that which was written on page 35a ‘that tefillin should not be tied with anything other than that (kosher) species.
Indeed, if one presumes that leather boxes were made and then coated with gold, what is the logical connection to the straps? The straps essence is to the tying (of the tefillin)? With regard to the straps, what is the reason they are disqualified?
If one made (the requisite) black straps and then coated them with gold; and if one would posit that the reason for the disqualification would be secondary to the leather box not being visible, if that is so, the reason was not enumerated by Rashi! Why would Rashi abandon this basic explanation and employ an apriori reasoning to the straps instead? The concepts must be related.
Also, that which Rashi stated “The boxes are disqualified”, it is obvious that Rashi’s intent was not the the actual tefillin- meaning, the verses on the parchment- that are disqualified, as they made be taken out and placed into other boxes.
Should one presume that this involves making leather boxes which were then coated with gold, if so, then the boxes are not disqualified, as the coating can be removed, and will revert to their original state.
If it is so that in any case, prior to removing the gold coating it is entirely disqualified and when the coating is removed even the boxes are qualified; why then did Rashi write that the boxes are disqualified, Rashi should have explained that the tefillin were disqualified! Rather it is unquestionably obvious that Rashi explained that braitta of “One who coats the tefillin with gold” , means, that he coated the compartments with gold and made the boxes themselves out of gold. However, if he made the boxes from the hides of a kosher animal and then coated it with something else- that is not mention in this braitta [ruling].
Our great Rabbi, the Rambam, in chapter 3 of Laws Pertaining to Tefillin, and these are his words in section 15: “The leather used to cover the tefillin and from which the straps are made should come from a kosher species of animal, beast, or fowl….If, however, leather from a non-kosher species was used or if they were covered with gold, they are not acceptable”. Indeed, in his (Maimonides) language there is no doubt that when he wrote “leather used to cover the tefillin ”meant the actual leather of the boxes. Indeed, there is no mention anywhere in the words of the Rambam regarding covering another leather on top of the original leather of the boxes.
It is true that according to the opinion of the Rambam, a cloth must be folded on to the compartments before they (the parchments) are placed in the boxes, as noted in Chapter 3:1 and 3:8.
However, that one would have to cover the leather boxes with leather on the outside- that was not understood (lit. ‘heard’) at all. These are his words in the beginning of Laws Pertaining to Phylacteries: “Four passages [of the Torah, which are ‘Make unique to me’….are written on separate parchments and covered with leather, and are called tefillin (phylacteries)…” If that is so, then that which he specifies ‘and covered with leather’, specific to the word ‘leather’, meaning the leather referred to in the initial wording of these laws, that when her states ‘covered with leather’, it means the leather of the actual boxes. It is to this that he refers to when he stated “If he made them from the hide of an impure animal, they are disqualified”.
If that is so, then that which he stated ‘the leather that covers the tefillin’ means the leather of the boxes. Indeed, he calls the scripture parchments ‘tefillin’, therefore, when he states ‘coated with gold’ or ‘coated the tefillin in gold’, ‘tefillin’ are the parchments and ‘coated with gold’ means, however, that the boxes were made of gold, and not that they were made of leather and coated with gold. At no point was this regulation mentioned by the Rambam, as the braitta meant that the actual boxes were made of gold or the hide of an impure animal, as was explained by Rashi.
It is because of this that I am perplexed by what the Beit Yosaif wrote in Orakh Khayim 32, writing that from the words of the Rambam it appears that that when one disqualifies another leather on the boxes, it is not that the boxes themselves were made from aan impure animal etc.. It seems overturned, as the words of Maimonides are the exactly opposite!
The Rosh, in his smaller collection of Halachot, wrote: “Our rabbis taught: If they were coated with gold…..Rabbi Shim’own ben Gamliel states: Even the hides of a ritually pure animal are disqualified untio they are made specific to the task. In the Laws Concenring Sefer Torah (Torah Scrolls) I wrote that the law is like rabbi Shim’own ben Gamliel, that it must be made specific to the task, ergo, the parchment, straps and the boxes must be made specific to the task”- end of quotation.
As the Rosh thought there, towards the end of his statement, that the parchment, straps and the boxes, and compares them to the hide of the boxes, as they are also disqualified if they are not made to the specific task, so that one can generalize that he also explains that braitta as pertaining to the actual boxes; it does not seem to apply to the hide that is on the boxes at all.
It should be noted, however, that this reasoning can be deflected, as towards the end of his opinion, he posits that it is absolute in its application to the tefillin (the actual parchment writing), but not to any leather that is on the boxes- even if the boxes were covered with leather that was not made specifically for that purpose- are disqualified, as per rabbi Shim’own ben Gamliel
Nevertheless, there is no obligation at all for there to be leather on top of the boxes, and this was not included in their thinking.
It should be noted, that later on, considering that the straps should have a pass-through as a halacha passed down from Moses at Sinai, the Rosh wrote: “There are those who interpret the ‘pass-through’ as made from a small strap that is passed over the arm tefillin….and even if the interpretation is not that it’s a small strap, nevertheless, such tefillin are not disqualified, as the outer casing, that does not see the outside air in these cases, unless one has made another box for it. The reason that ‘caoting them with gold’ disqualifies, is that they require being covered by the hides of a ritually pure animal, and this is akin to covering it with the hides of a ritually impure animal”- end quote of the Rosh.
On first impression, how does the Rosh bring proof for that which is ‘coated with gold’? The reasoning cannot be that since the boxes do not see the outside environment, one then hangs the hide of a ritually impure animal on it- does that not need a valid comparison? Would it seem that if one hangs a ritually impure animal hide on it, it is also disqualified (as kosher tefillin) because it is not exposed to the outside air? Therefore, it must be that the boxes were made from the hide of a ritually pure animal.
Seemingly, according to the reasoning of ‘external exposure’ there is no reason to disqualify golden boxes, as there is no biblical directive to make the boxes from hides? Rashi, here in tractate Menachot, truly had difficulty with this and had to employ an a priori reasoning utilizing a comparison to the straps that must be made of (kosher) leather; as the straps are used to don the tefillin, so too, a priori, should the boxes.
In the chapter entitled ‘Once the Sentence is Passed’, Rashi explained that it is law ‘passed down to us from Moses was on Mount Sinai’. However, in truth, we have not found any source in the Talmud that explicitly states the need for the boxes to be made from hides! I would understand if the boxes were made from the hide of a ritually impure animal- it would certainly be disqualified- as it requires ‘the work of heaven’’ that ‘which is permitted in your mouth’. However, something which is not forbidden, despite it not being hide, we have not found any place that explicitly disqualifies, except for this braitta stating that ‘coated with gold, disqualifies’.
Ergo, it is better to explain this braitta as not dealing with the case of making the actual boxes out of gold, rather, that it deals with boxes made with permissible leather hide(s), and then coated them with gold, that is what the braitta intended. The disqualification is secondary to box being covered, to wit, brings credence to the disqualification of boxes not exposed to the outside air.
It is on this that the Rosh comments, that it (the braitta) is not so, rather, it deals with the case of making the actual boxes out of gold, comparing it (the boxes) to making them from an impure animal. Obviously, when made from an impure animal it is certainly disqualified, as we required them (tefillin) to be made ‘from that which is permissible to your mouth’
Here too, ‘coated with gold’ -that the boxes themselves were made from gold- are disqualified, as they need to be made from hide, as explained by Rashi. If that is so, there is no longer a need to explain the braitta as pertaining to boxes made of leather hide and then coated with gold, and then to state that they require exposure to the outside environment, as this braitta can be understood simply as the case of the actual boxes were made from gold.
Know that the opinion of the Rosh, prima facie (on this topic) are bewildering: What was the need to write ‘coated with gold’ if the reason was not that ‘it must see the outside air’? Did it not state in that braitta that the hide of a ritually pure animal qualifies? If it was (disqualified) because it ‘could not be exposed to the outside environment’ then even covering it with the hide of a permitted animal would be disqualified!
Then perforce, one would say that in the case of coating with the hide of a ritually pure animal, we are unconcerned about it not seeing the outside air. In any case, it would seem that in the case of the passageway made for the straps (ma’avarta), there is no detriment for that small strap, as it is made from a permissible hide, and one would have to say that it is covered with the hide of a ritually pure animal.
If that is so, the entire box would be ‘coated’ from each side. If that is so, the coating itself is what is on the outside which is ‘exposed to the outside environment’- it is qualified because of this covering and not what is inside it.
However, this small strap-that goes across the width of the arm- as explained by the Tur in chapter 32, note that it does not cover all sides of the box. If that is so, one cannot think that this small strap was for the box itself, and one must know that this small strap is under the leather of the box. Ergo, one could argue, prima facie, that is should disqualify secondary to preventing the box from being exposed to the outside air! The Rosh would have to contend that in the case of ‘coated with gold’, the reason cannot be secondary to exposure to the outside environment, only that the reason is the necessity of being covered with a permissible hide.
Yet here, there is a possibility to explain the opinion of the Rosh that he too would interpret the braitta ‘coated with gold or covered with the hide from an impure animal…’ applies to the situation where, underneath, the box was made from permissible hide(s) and on the top, it was coated with gold or with hides from ritually impure animal.
Rather, the Rosh stated specifically that gold is not permissible to make tefillin boxes, and that is why he disqualifies it even when (just) covering the top of the box. However, the hide from a permissible animal, which certainly qualifies the tewfillin box when it covers the top of the box, even if it is comparable to the ma’avarta strap, that does not cover all the sides of the box- that it could still be called a ‘[tefillin] box’- even in that case, it does not disqualify the box underneath it. Look at what the Mordechai stated in the name of the R”i.
However, whether we regard the initial understanding of the Rosh, or this recent understanding, it is still difficult, as why did the Rosh derive the law from a comparison of gold coating to that made from a ritually impure animal? From its position (in the legal argument), one can decide that gold is not a suitable substance to make a tefillin box- as had it been suitable- then if so, what difference is there from covering the box with a permissible hide or with gold? Why is one kosher and the other not?
It would appear that the Rosh did not want to elaborate and brought a proof from the subject that which was connected to it, meaning, ritually impure animals.
Additionally, that which the Beit Yosaif wrote, that the Rambam explained the latter portion of that braitta of ‘the hide of a ritually impure animal’ as applicable to the scriptural parchments and straps, and not to the boxes. Despite the Rosh seeming not to reason that way, nevertheless, he wanted to rest his opinion on that proof.
It would also appear from the words of the Beit Yosaif ‘that the teffilin are not disqualified because they do not see the outside environment, unless they had another box made for them.’ This implies, specifically in these situations they are disqualified and not for any other reason. ‘Coating with gold’ implies that the boxes were made of gold.
Concerning the Sma”g on this issue, I have not seen him copy this braitta at all. It would seem to me, apparently, that he completely ignored it and it never appears in his book! If that is so, since he also explains that if the actual boxes were made from gold or from an impermissible hide, which is why he did not need to bring that (as a proof), since he alsready explained in the beginning of his Laws Concerning Tefillin that the parchment upon which the releveant scriptures are written vas well as the strps and the hides of the boxes must be made from ritually pure animals or beasts, and are requires to be made specifically for that purpose. – see the text.
If that is so, indeed we have excluded anything that is not from the hide of a ritually pure animal, which is exactly like that braitta and rabbi Shim’own ben Gamliel. However, if one posited that the braitta of ‘coated with gold or with the hide of a ritually impure animal’ he should have brought that (as a proof). The Tur in chapter 32- with a sharp commentary- cut this braitta out, neither the first or the last part. These are the words of the Tur: “If one coated them with gold or made them from the hide of a ritually impure animal, they are disqualified”. Indeed, he does not state that the boxes were made of gold, rather he stated that they were ‘coated with gold’, which implies, that underneath them is qualified leather hide, and upon them one coated the gold.
In regards to hides from a ritually impure animal, he wrote ‘that were made from the hide of a ritually impure animal’, implying that the boxes were made from the hide of a ritually impure animal.
The Beit Yosaif also wrote that, and is seen from the wording of the Tur, that if the hides were made from a ritually pure animal, and then placed on them a cover made from the hide of a ritually impure animal, they are not disqualified.
Rather, we need a reason why ‘coating with gold’ disqualifies? How is it worse than hide made from a ritually impure animal? If that is not so, then the Tur refutes himself, I would have been able to answer the question of the Beit Yosaif: The reason that coating with gold disqualifies, is because the boxes have to be black on the outside, similar to the straps which must be black, just as the straps must be black. If one coats them with gold, they will not be black, and hence disqualified.
However, if one placed over them the hide of a ritually impure animal, that leather hide may also be black, and therefore, he does not disqualify, except if one made the actual boxes from the hide of a ritually impure animal, because it must be made from ‘that which is permissible in your mouth’.
I say to myself, that this reason, when I say that the boxes need to be black, is the reasoning of the Tosafot in tractate Shabbat 28b loc. cit. ‘In the case of tefillin, it explicitly states’, writing these words: “Since the straps are required to be black like the capsule [‘ketzitza’] of the tefillin…”. Indeed, their explanation regards that the capsule must be black.
The Mordechai wrote explicitly in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, that the boxes must be black, and he brought his proof from the argument employed above.
That which I have stated, that it is for that reason it is disqualified if it was ‘coated with gold’. In my humble opinion, this is brought down in the Jerusalem Talmud, tractate Megillah, in the chapter entitled ‘One Who Reads [the Megillah] Standing Upright’, that on the Mishan that was taught there: ‘One who makes his tefillin boxes round, is susceptible to danger… If one coats it with gold…’- it states there in the Jersulamen Talmud: ‘It has been taught in a braitta by rabbi Yosseh, son of Bibi: Tefillin must be mad square and black- is an ancient tradition (lit. ‘A halacha that was transmitted orally from Moses when he was on Mount Sinai’).’
To my mind, it is hard to place the adjective ‘black’ on the tefillin straps, as straps were not mentioned at all. In addition, the text combined the terms ‘square’ and ‘black’; just as square describes the boxes, so so the term ‘black’. Then the Jerusalem Talmud gave a reason for what was stated in the Mishna, as to why round tefillin are potentially hazardous and do not fulfill the obligation (mitzva) of donning tefillin.
Also, that which it referred to as ‘coated with gold… being the way ‘outside’ thinkers do things’, the Talmud gave a reason for these two religious legal statements, as ‘square’ and ‘black’ are ancient traditions (as if they are dated back to Moses).
So, for now, the Tur has been saved from the question of the Beit Yosaif. However, despite that, the Tur is still internally inconsistent, as he wrote in chapter 32, deciding that that it is only an obligation to make the boxes black, and if they were made of another color, they are still permissible.
The Ran commented on that same Mishna in the Bavli tractate Megillah ‘Coating it with gold is an indication of following thinkers outside the rabbinic tradition’, writing that “the reason the writ states (in Ex. 13:9) ‘So that the Torah of God shall be in your mouth’ – from that which is permissible to be in your mouth. Meaning, that the parchment should be written on that which is permissible to eat. The Hebrew letter shin is also an ancient tradition, ergo it requires writing it on that which is permissible to be in one’s mouth”- end quote.
It is apparent from his words that ‘coating with gold’ means the ‘leather hide’ of the box was made from gold, and his words seem to imply that the reason for disqualifying gold was because of ‘that which is permissible in your mouth’. It also appears that Rashi also explained that Mishna in the same way.
This is perplexing to me: Can gold be considered ‘forbidden to be in my mouth’? Until now, we have not excluded items based on ‘oral consumption ‘(‘in your mouth’) based on hides from animals that are ritually impure. With gold, however, what ritual prohibition or permission applies to it?
Truthfully, Rashi in tractate Menachot wrote the reasoning behind disqualifying gold, since even that which is used for tying must be of the ‘same species’, hence the requirement for leather hide. As far as a ritually impure animal is concerned, he explained the reason for disqualification as secondary to ‘that which is permitted in your mouth’. In the chapter entitled ‘After the Sentence was Passed’, Rashi explained that it was an ancient tradition (like ‘from Moses on Sinai’) that it is disqualified!
In any case, however, the concept of ‘that which is permissible in your mouth’ does not apply to gold and later on I will provide an explanation. However, in any case, we proved from the words of the Ran that ‘coated with gold’ means that the boxes themselves were made from gold. The Mordechai in his Laws Concerning Tefillin, these were the words he wrote: ‘Our master rabbi Shimshon in his Shimushay Rabbah wrote that one should fold over a [blank] parchment over each tefillin parchment, and it is not disqualified for that reason, as we saw here with ‘hung a hide over it’. Here, the hide of the boxes does not see the outside air.
Nevertheless, I found that rabbi Yaakov [Tam] wrote that the disqualification was not secondary to being prevented from ‘seeing the outside air’, except, specifically to the tefillin box worn on the head. However, the tefillin box worn on the arm it does not apply as there is no ‘outer box covering’ issues for the arm tefillin.
Also, there is no practical difference as to that which is ‘inside’ etc., except for the case of the tefillin box for the head. However, for the arm-tefilla, they are written out on one parchment. Ergo., there is no deductive proof from here to permit that for the head-tefilla.
It would seem that there is neither proof to disqualify or permit
Nevertheless, these examples cannot be considered as ‘beyond the legal bounds’, except for the case of one who would allow five scriptural parchments, as noted in the chapter entitled ‘Those Sentenced to Death by Asphyxiation”, or as was noted in our discussion concerning switching the order of the scriptural parchments.
However, that parchment which was placed as a cover over the tefillin scriptural parchments- was for protective purposes- we do not find a disqualification for this from that we have learned in the chapters entitled ‘After Sentencing’ and ‘Those Who are Damaged’ concerning ‘coated with gold or if the hide of a ritually impure animal was placed upon them, they are disqualified. It is not because they were not ‘exposed to the outside environment’, rather, as the Notator (Rashi) explained: It is an ancient tradition that [the tefillin require the hide of a ritually pure animal, and that applied to the hides of the boxes themselves.
Nevertheless, it is possible to understand this to mean ‘hanging (placing) another hide over it’ as was noted “…one could understand the wording of ‘one hide is hung upon’, as in this case of hanging upon as was noted “A scholar should not go out with patched shoes” and the Talmud clarifies this to mean patches on top of patches.
It still appears to me that we cannot act in accordance with the Shimushay Rabbah , as noted, the Hebrew letter Shin (ש), he concludes, is an ancient tradition. It would seem that this did not apply to the head-tefillin boxbut, check it out, that which our people do (lit. ‘say’), as I am unsure about that ruling, and they already behave in accordance with the Shimushay Rabbah, and one cannot prevent them from doing that, each one accepts with a clear proof- that is- our master and teacher Shimshon.
In retrospect, the wording of the Mordechai are perplexing, as how was he able to reverse the ruling of the Shimushay Rabbah, using the teaching derived from ‘if coated with gold’? In fact, it is the opposite! From there we derive a proof to act in accordance with the Shimushay Rabbah, as it explicitly staes there that the use of a hide from a ritually pure animal is permitted!?!
Another difficulty: Why did he bring the braiita form the chapter ‘After Sentencing’ and ‘Those who Have Been Damaged’? Why did he not bring proof from that orderly Mishna in tractate Megillah, in the chapter entitled ‘One who Reads, Stands”: “One who caots them with gold, is the way of outside thinkers’?
This can be answered, as he (the Morcechai) wished to state afterwards that the meaning of ‘hung upon it’ meant ‘another hide’. In that Mishna, there is no mention of that, except ‘coating with gold’.
Yet another difficulty: His conclusion: “It still appears to me that we cannot act in accordance with the Shimushay Rabbah….as the Shin….did not apply to the head-tefillin box”. This incredible! Clearly, the head-tefillin box of the Shimushay Rabbah, has the letter ‘shin(ש) on it! As it is because of the parchment folded between (and covering over) the scriptural parchments that one makes that Shin. This cannot be! The explanation of the Anshay Shayme also does not appeal to me.
In addition to that which he stated; ‘It is impossible to act according to the explanation of the Shimushay Rabbah- this is what he should have stated: It is impossible to act according to the legal decision (‘p’sak -halqachic decision) of the Shimushay Rabbah!
[This is also the opinion of our master rabbi and teacher, Joseph Saul Nathanson, may his memory empower us, who was the head of the Jewish Court in Lvov.]- Editor’s note: As this is from the Bar-Ilan data base, this quote was inserted into the text (likely as a supportive text and out of the context of this translation), as it was impossible (see the footnote!) for Rabbi Yekhezk’el Landau to have quoted it. Also, see footnote 126.
Ergo, it my humble opinion, that which he wrote initially that there is no proof neither to disqualify or permit- which he stated after what was taught in the chapters entitled ‘After Sentencing’ and ‘Those Who are Damaged’ concerning ‘coated with gold etc.’. If one would postulate that the meaning was coating the [tefillin] boxes with gold, if that is so, then that which he stated there ‘the hides of a kosher animal are permitted for use’, would also mean that the kosher hide was place on top of the boxes.
If that is the case, then we have a good reason to permit, as it was for that reason he did not refute the reasoning with the concept of ‘seeing the outside air’, as they were only specific to the actual boxes. However, should one have coated the hide of the boxes was not mentioned at all, not to disqualify gold or non-kosher hides, nor to permit it with kosher hides, and then made his statement afterwards.
Nevertheless, there is a possibility to examine the wording of ‘another hide…’ , which if so, it does well according to this understanding, as it isa support for the opinion of the Shimushay Rabbahi, as on this, he stated: ‘the hides of ritually pure animals are qualified’, and then he concludes that he cannot agrtee with the Shimushay Rabbah, meaning: he cannot say that the explanation mentioned above that brings a proof to the position of the Shimushay Rabbah , that ‘he hangs upon them another hide’.
As if so, how could one make sense of ‘ritually pure animals are qualified’? Does not the letter Shin (ש), which he concludes is an ancient tradition, could not be seen in the hide of the head box?! Rather, it is obvious that he made the actual boxes out of that. . If that is so, there is no need to mention ‘coating with gold or with a hide from a ritually impure animal’ on the boxes.
Ergo, we have no proof at all to disqualify secondary to ‘coating with gold or covering with the hide of an impure animal, or to qualify it with ritually pure animal hide. Since we have no basis to decide, then, logically, all of that is permitted. As that is under the rubric of ‘if that is allowed, everyone will make a fifth compartment’, or ‘it does not see the outside environment, then everyone will make a fifth compartment’, or will flip the inside parchments of the tefillin to the outside.
As I would humbly see it, the explanation of the Mordechai’s should be viewed in the context of his [initiaql presumed] conclusion that ‘coating with gold’ meant making the boxes themselves out of gold
Now, from this we can learn that not one of the previous halachic decisors understood ‘coating with gold’ meant making the boxes out of gold, or from a ritually impure animal hide, and so too, is the final conclusion of the Mordechai.
We see in the Tosafot in tractate Menachot 35a in two cases, citation beginning with ‘Ma’avarta’ and the citation beginning with ‘The Shin of the Tefillin’. Their words are difficult to understand and the edition is sparse and corrupted, and without all these great scholars to understand the authorial intent, how can we take their meaning to either disqualify or permit?
The Maharsha and the Morsha”k edited each one according to his methodology. Anyone examining their writings will see that both were very strained, and the editions of each one of these and their explanations are difficult to understand.
In my research, in my humble opinion, the authorial intent in their commentary on the citation “Shin of the Tefillin, is obviously one item, as was explained by Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, but not according to his explanation, except for what was mentioned beforehand, as they wrote “For one, the concept of ‘not being exposed to the outside air’ does not apply in such an instance, except if another box is placed upon it. In addition, perhaps the outside box is ‘not being exposed to the outside air’ also does not apply except to the head box of the tefillin, and not to the arm box, as was explained in the response literature of the Gaonim. ”.
Their explanation is obfuscating and they did not explain the reasoning why the concept of ‘not seeing the outside air’ applies only to the head box, and not to the arm box.
The Rosh, in his chapter on the Laws concerning Tefillin, also wrote to permit this ‘small strap’ that was mentioned above, because, “nevertheless, the teffilin are not disqualified because of ‘not seeing the outside air’ in these instances, except if one ties another box to it….
Also, the concept of ‘not seeing the outside air’applies only to the head box of the tefillin, which is made of four compartments, moving any one from its designated place. However, in the arm box, which has only one compartment, it does not apply, and so it seems from the Responsae of the Gaonim.” – endquote of the Rosh.
We see tha the Rosh understands the reasoning of the Gaonim as that it does not apply here except in the cxase of the tefillin head-box- since it has four compartments- and one of them has been moved out of place. However, in the case of the tefillin arm-box, which has only one compartment- it does not apply.
So too, the Mordechai wrote that this applies only to the head-box, and reasoned that there is no application of the rule of ‘exposure to the outside’ for the arm-box, which seem to be the same intention as the Rosh! He also added that the concept of ‘switching the parchments from the inside to the outside’ only apllies to the head-box: in each compartment there are different scriptural passages written on the parchment, and when one switches the order, the passages that should be on the inside on then on the outside and vice versa.
However, Tosafot’s explanations were unclear, and they did not explain why these principles applies to the head-box and not the arm-box.
Therefore, in my humble opinion, that all of the above considerations apply to what they wrote in the second location citation of “The Shin“. Their import: There is a prohibition in the case of the head-box when it ‘cannot see the outside air’, as the Shin of the tefillin (head-box only) is an ancient (‘Mosaic’) tradition, and must be on the outside of the tefillin head-box. It was because of that Shin on the head-box that the scripture referred to “So that the nations of the Earth see name of Hashem upon you…”. Ergo, if one added something to the outside, the Shin would not be seen.
It is for that reason that the Talmud in the chapter ‘Those who are Sentenced to Death by Asphyxiation’ discussing ‘adding a fifth compartment’, even if one creates the compartment on the outside of the Shin. It was on that point that they concluded that anything placed on the Shin, creates the disqualification, as the Shin that one puts on that is of no use, as that is not where the Shin belongs and one will find that the box (the parchments inside) ‘will not see the outside air’, meaning the box side that is supposed to have the Shin (imprinted) on it.
This, is my humble opinion, was the intent of the Tosafot. Despite that they did not articulate it enough, nevertheless, in my mind it is a better explanation that that of the Mahar”sha or the Mahor”shak.
The Beit Yosaif in chapter 32 stated specifically in the name of Rabbi Shrira Gaon that the requirement of the outer compartment/box to ‘see the [outside] air’, is secondary to the ‘air’ of the Shin, meaning that according to my interpretation of the Tosafot, they conclude that this only applies to the head-box because of the Shin. However, if the Shin can be recognized, there is no prohibition.
Whether their intentions are like mine or not, nevertheless, their intentions are difficult to understand. Ergo, their words are unclear and one may not use them to derive a source to either prohibit or permit.
It appears that the Beit Yosaif in his commentary on the Tur in chapter 32 on “If one coated the boxes gold…”, The Beit Yosaif wrote: “The Mordechai wrote in his Laws Concerning Tefillin that this concerns the leather of the boxes, implying that if the boxes were made from a ritually pure animal and then coated with gold or with a hide from a non kosher (impure) animal, it is fit for use.
This is also evident from the language used by our master concerning the hides of an impure animal, writing ‘or it was made from the hides of an impure animal’ , rather, we need a reason as to why coating it with gold disqualifies (the Tefillin)? Why should gold be any worse than an impure hide?
After that, the Beit Yosaif concludes: “…Indeed, afterwards, the Mordechai reverses himself. Nevertheless, it could be seen that he was trying to say that another hide was hung over it, as he should have stated ‘a hide upon another hide’, which is also apparent from the words of the author of the Terumah, as well as the Rambam, may their memories empower us, perhaps our master (the Tur) may have intended this but it is not specified in his words.”- end quote of the Beit Yosaif.
In my mind, this is unclear:That which I wrote of the Rambam’s opinion, I have explained his words to the opposite effect! That which I wrote as the conclusion of the Mordechai’s opinion- meaning- a hide upon another hide, I already explained what the Mordechai concluded!
It also appears to me that one cannot explain it according to the Shimushay Rabbah, which refutes the understanding of ‘a hide upon another hide’, that it means the actual hide itself. If that is so, then it is the opposite of the Mordechai’s conclusion?!
Nonetheless, I already explained that the Mordechai’s conclusion was that the braitta was speaking about the hide of the actual boxes. However, placing a hide on top of another hide was not discussed- either to disqualify or permit.
In the mind of the Tur, if we have come to say that the Tur is exacting in his terms and differentiates between ‘gold’ and ‘hides of an impure animal’, I might have considered that he meant that if the coating was from disqualified material, would not disqualify, and is considered ‘null’ in respect to tefillin. That is in spite of the fact that the opposite applies to laws of ritual impurity, as the coating is considered essential, whether to permit or restrict, as was noted at the end of tractate Khagiga (26a-27a),-
As that it is akin to the Shew-Table and Altars of the Temple, that all the utensils of the Shew-Table and the Altar were all coated above their surfaces. So too the Shew-Table and the Dulphaki that was mention there (tractate Khagiga), that there was no place left on the coating to place the cups or pieces. If so, its entire use was above the coated surface that it is akin to the Shew-Table and Altars of the Temple, that all the utensils of the Shew-Table and the Altar were all coated above their surfaces. So too the Shew-Table and the Dulphaki that was mention there (tractate Khagiga), that there was no place left on the coating to place the cups or pieces. If so, its entire use was above the coated surface, thereby disqualifying the Table in the Tabernacle’s Holy.
In the case of Tefillin, the opposite applies. The tefillin’s main purpose is their use in a mitzva as tefillin. However, gold is something important and is not nullified- as in the reasoning of Resh Lakish their who attempted to differentiate between vessels made of cheap akhselag wood or vessels made of expensive masmi wood. That the ritual law (halacha) is according to Rabbi Yokhanan, that there is no differentiation, as noted there, that the Shew-Table is completely coated, and cannot be see. Also, all use of it is on top of the coating, and hence, the Table is nullified, even if it is made of polished mamsi wood.
However, here, the coating is above. Rather, since the Tefillin are the essential, the coating is nullified, meaning –‘hide against/upon a hide’- meaning the hide of an impure animal is nullified in the presence of the hide of a ritually pure animal. However, gold cannot be nullified, as it carries importance.
All this could be potentially the intent of the Tur. I can find support for this, differentiating between ‘gold’ and ‘non-ritually pure animal hide’ from the braitta, as it is difficult: Why did the braiita specify both ‘gold’ and ‘non-ritually pure animal hide’, as it could have simply lumped them together and hidden the term ‘coat [with gold]’under the rubric of ‘things which disqualify, and hides from ritually pure animal are permitted, even if they were not made for a specific intention. Why not just include it anything that is not of the ‘hide of a ritually pure animal’?!
Just as was noted regarding the tefillin straps in the chapter entitled ‘One Who Takes the Handful [for the meal sacrifice]’ on p35a: “The tefillin must be tied with straps of the same [material as the tefillin themselves…”, it is obvious that as the Talmud specified those two, they are separate issues. Gold is disqualified even for coating, as its importance cannot be ignored. ‘Non-ritually pure animal hide’ only disqualifies when used to make the actual boxes.
This was how it appeared to me in my humble opinion, rather, that I defer my opinion in the face of the opinion of the Rosh, may his memory empower me, who wrote coating with gold is akin to the ‘non-ritually pure animal hide’. If that is so, then the two are similar when applying ritual law.
It was good that Rabbi Karo, in his Beit Yosaif wrote that the Tur was ‘imprecise’. As certainly, the Tur would not plainly disagree with the Rosh. However, in this instance, one may presuppose it it not as according to the Beit Yosaif’s opinion. As after he states that he was ‘imprecise’, I would say that he (the Beit Yosaif!!) was unclear in the initial wording of ‘coating the boxes with gold’- imprecise- rather, that his intent was that the tefillin were coated with gold, meaning, the actual boxes themselves were made of gold, as I have already shown that this was the Rosh’s intent as well. Ergo, the opinions of the Rosh and the Tur coincide.
Up until now, we have discussed the opinions of our halachic precedents. Now, let us understand the Talmudic terms concerning ‘coated with gold’.
In tractate Shabbat 28b:” ….And, if so, that which Rav Yosef taught: ‘Only the hide of a kosher animal was suitable for heavenly service’, for what halakha is that relevant, as it is clearly not relevant to the Tabernacle? The Gemara replies: This halakha was stated with regard to phylacteries, which may be prepared only from the hide of a kosher animal….Did not Abayay state: The Shin of tefillin is an ancient custom?....” Rashi commented: “Since a letter from God’s name is written on it, it should be made from that which is ‘permissible to your mouth’…” .
This presents a difficulty: That which we require [the material of the tefillin] to be ‘permissible to your mouth’, as because there is nothing else permitted, only that which comes from a ritually pure animal. How much spinning did Rashi have to do in tractate Menachot 42 that coating with gold disqualifies? Rashi explained that the actual boxes were made from gold, and his reasoning was that even the straps had to be from the same species.
In the chapter entitled “After the Sentence was Passed”, Rashi explained that it was an ancient tradition, and were it not for the verse (Ex 13:9) which is the source for that which is ‘permissible to your mouth’, we would not have known the requirement of the ritually pure animal hide. Perhaps it could be made from gold or other species; that is why Rabbi Yosaif taught us that it require that specific hide. Despite the fact that Rashi explained that it is an ancient tradition, nevertheless, it was not taught explicitly that it is an ancient (‘Mosaic’) tradition, as there was the question raised on Rabbi Yosaif. Look and understand well the Tosafot loc. cit. “Tefillin”.
It would be understandable at the outset when it stated ‘tefillin’, and then asked about the explicit verse (Ex 13:9) “The words of Hashem in your mouth’, on would not have been able to exclude that which is not made from hide, as there is a Mishna in tractate “Hands” 4:5 that states: “In general, an object cannot convey ritual impurity to the hands until it is written with the Assyrian ink (and script) and on hide-parchment”.
We also learned in a Mishna in tractate Megilla (1:8) “There is no difference between sefarim [books of the Tanach written in holiness, on parchment, and used for personal or public study, or for reading aloud in public. Sometimes the intent is specifically Torah scrolls] and tefillin…” If that is so, then we learned in a Mishna that Tefillin cannot be written on anything but hide. One cannot deduce, as Rav Yosaif that it means only ritually pure.
It was a good question that the scriptural basis of ‘that which is permitted in your mouth’, to employ it to establish the use of hides, why should the question be based on the concept of the Shin? Once we know ‘that which is permitted in your mouth’, now Rav Yosaif comes to teach us the requirement of hides? Rather, it is obvious that this is also part of a long Mishna in the chapter entitled “One Who Reads, Stands”One who coats [one’s tefillin] with gold…” If that is so, one perforce would deduce that it means that the actual [hide] boxes were coated from above with gold.
If that is so, then perhaps the disqualification is secondary to the box ‘not seeing the outside air’, despite the fact that the the actual box is permitted (‘kosher’)? If one would posit: if that is so, that which stated ‘coated with gold’ meant on top of hide(s) from a ritually pure animal , as I questioned above concerning the Rosh, this cannot be as we take it for granted that when one coated [the boxes] with the ‘hide(s) from a ritually pure animal’ has a Mishnaic source; The other case is [only] a braitta! For a braittait is unworthy to question the [Masoretic] traditional law as received by Rav Yosaif, employing the term ‘tenina’, as Rav yosaif also brought a braitta as a support! Then it must be that ‘coated with gold’ means that the actual box was made of gold.
Yet, it is still difficult: On its basis, from where does the Talmud come to question Rav Yosaif? Perhaps this ‘coating with gold’ means ‘coating with gold’ on top of the hide of the boxes? Rather, the Talmud reasons that there is no reason to disqualify for such a case. This, in my mind, there is no doubt that if the hide boxes were coated with anything one wanted, with the exception of the head-box -if the Shin does not protrude- however, if they do protrude, it would be permissible (‘kosher’).
Now that we have supposed that even according to him, the proof brought that ‘coating with gold and hanging upon it the hide of a ritually impure animal’, Applies to the boxes, like the halachic decision of the Shukhan Aruch in (O”Kh) 32:48, meaning in a coating that stands on its own and not relying on the box.
However, that the blackening that we apply to the tefillin, this applies to the hide and is secondary to it, and the concept of ‘the box does not see the outside air’ doesn’t apply to it. If we come to disqualifying with this, what parameters could we give to the dyes that blacken the boxes? If there is any ‘substance tro it, it would disqualify! This thinking cannot be acceptable, nor did any of our forbearers even consider this!
Since the hides of the boxes are also required to be black-and to some of the previous halachic authorities it is an ancient (‘Mosaic’) tradition- and to my understanding, also the opinion of the Jerusalem Talmud, in the chapter entitled ‘One Who Reads Must Stand’, is the same, as I stated above. Nonetheless, to the rest of the halachic authorities, there is a mitzva to do so
Additionally, that which is down with the black dye coloring, that it should be a deeper black or prettier, all goes under the rubric of making that dye, and there is no concern for any ‘addition’ that would make it fall under the prohibition of ‘You shall neither add (nor subtract from sopecified commandments)’ nor does it fall under the prohibition of ‘the box does not see the outside air’.
This can be understood as an a priori argument from the techaylet of tzitzit, which the Torah was very specific about and quite stringent in its method of production. Despite that one places various chemicals into the blood of the khilazon (Murex snail) as explained in tractate Menachot 42b. The Tosafot wrote, loc. cit. ‘Ingredients (chemicals)’ were indeed perplexed by this and wrote that perhaps those chemicals could be [part of what is] called ‘techaylet’- the blue-ish dye.
To me it would seem, that the blood of this khilazon does not hold extraordinarily fast to the wool, except if one adds these chemicals to it, if so, then those chemicals are part of this particular color. So it was explained in the Rambam’s Laws Concerning Tzitzit 2:2 : “The blood is placed in a pot together with herbs - e.g., chamomile - as is the dyers' practice.” [end quote of the Rambam], and this references the reasoning for putting in those chemicals ‘as is the dyer’s practice’, presumably, this was the intent of the Torah.
I can also apply this to the black coloring of tefillin. All that is added to increase the blackness belongs to this and all is subsumed under the rubric of ‘black coloring’. I would also say the same applies to ‘coating it with gold’- even if one supposes that it means coating on top of the hide of the boxes- despite that, I would say specifically when they coat it with gold, as this coating is an entity within itself, as one place a gold foil upon them. However, if one made the hide of the boxes gold colored, the way they color silver objects to make them look like gold, it would not disqualify to those who hold that the boxes do not necessarily have to be black, as this is a beautification that is subsumed to the purpose of the tefillin boxes.
It is a well-known fact that since the hides of the boxes have to be hard enough to be made into a cube, it does not absorb the black color as well if the dye that colors it is weak and thin, as the dye must have some ‘substance’ to it so that it absorbs well into the hide.
I have also seen that from time to time, they (? the dye or the boxes) harden by themselves, as the boxes, according to halacha, do not need to be black. If that it so, what authority is there to blacken them? The dried dye is something that would be a partition, as we learned in [Babylonian] tractate Shabbat 120b? If that is so, then ‘the box does not see the outside air’- the dried blackening dye is a partition between the box and the outside air!?
It is also difficult pertaining to what the Magen Avraham wrote on (O”H) 33:7 concerning tefillin straps that were blackened by a non-Jew: If a Jew then reapplied the dye with the intent to fulfill that specific mitzva, then they are permitted for use. This was stated in tractate Gittin 20b: If one wrote the ‘Name’ of God and did not sanctify it, then one should pass the quill over it and sanctify it. Even according to the majority of Talmudic rabbis there is no argument, rather, it appears checkered/spotted; if that were not so, it would be permitted. If that is so, then all would permit it! See the Evehn Haezer chapter 131:4”-[end quote of the Magen Avraham].
In the case of that which hardens occasionally, how does a repeat blackening change things? The initial dyeing on the straps ‘blocks’ the next coating and forms a partition between it and the strap?
Also, the concept of occasionally hardening is seen in the words of the Magen Avraham mentioned above, as he wrote that even according to the majority of the Talmudic rabbis, it was only because it would appear spotted etc., and this is only according to Rabbi Akha’s opinion there in tractate Gittin. However, according to the view of Rabbi Khisda there, that a Jewish Divorce document (‘Get’) not written for a specific person, then is gone over with a reed pen with the intent for a specific person, depends on the argument between Rabbi Yehuda and the majority of rabbis etc. According to Rav Khisa, the reason is not because of it appearing spotted. Since we establish he halachic ruling in the Shulkhan Aruch Evehn HaEzer according to Rabbi Khisda’s opinion, if that is so, then I find the explanation of the Magen Avraham bewildering- end quote of my esteemed questioner.
It has been several years that I have been writing a journal on my [copy of the] Magen Avraham, and look at Evehn HaEzer 131. There I wrote: “He brought a proof to refute. However, according to my humble opinion, the Magen Avraham did not lose sight of what Rav Khisda said in tractate Gittin, that it is disqualified. The Magen Avraham did not need to tell us that according to Rav Akhai, it was permissible even to the majority of the rabbis at that time. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Khanan’el, who is the ‘there are those who state’ quoted in the Evehn HaEzer, that this is undecided legally- whether the decision is according to Rav Khisda or Rav Akhai. Since tefillin that was blackened by a non-Jew, without any other qualifications, would clearly be disqualified, even if it was just the straps, it is still undecided, as was explained in the Beit Yosaif just recently discussed.
Ergo, if a Jew then comes and blackens it again, that would be a case of double indecision (‘doubt’). In my humble opinion, that resolves the understanding of the Magen Avraham. Nonetheless, practically, my inclination is to be stricter, specifically to that of the Rambam who was the first opinion quotes there in the Evehn HaEzer, that obviously the halacha is as per Rav Akhai”- this is the end-quote from my journal on the Magen Avraham.
That which he wanted to explain as the position of the rabbinic majority in the passage in tractate Gittin 20a, concerning ‘moving a quill over the letter with specific intent (to write God’s name) is not the optimal way to write God’s name’ because the ink below it is a formed separation (to the parchment) to the ink from the quill above it, as the name of God is not directly written on to the parchment. He also mentions this reasoning in regards to writing a Get that the ink is a barrier, as the ink from the quill above does not reach the paper. Despite the fact that we do not require a Get to be written on parchment, and can be written on anything substantive, as my esteemed questioners had mentioned at length.
I would say to his reasoning: Why should Rabbi Yehuda and the majority of the rabbis of that time disagree about God’s name not written specifically? Even if one wrote God’s name intentionally and then passed the quill over it to make the ink clearer, would also be disqualified according to the majority of the rabbis- as the underlying ink is not seen- as it is covered by the upper ink applied and that second coat of ink isn’t even on the parchment!?
If my esteemed interlocutor would say: ‘Certainly that would be disqualified’, as he brought the case of writing (the name of God on a parchment) without specification in its usual manner of teaching those laws, then why should one pass a quill over it? Not only that, but by bringing up ‘not specified’ it comes as a support to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, according the the rabbinic majority, even if it was written specifically, it is disqualified.
I would say that, if so, he would disqualify most Torah scrolls, tefillin and mezuzot! As in now routinely done in many cases, when the ink of those parchments is drying up because of age (or environment), one takes it to a scribe who goes over it with a quill to make it look ‘good as new’. This religious law is explicit in the Shulkhan Aruch, Orakh Khayim 32:26: “If the letters of the words were erased slightly, if their impression is still recognizable a little bit such that a child…, it's permitted to pass over it with a quill to improve the writing and renew it, and this is not considered [written] out of order.”
Look also at the Magen Avraham 32:39, and this law is explained in the Terumat HaDeshen and the Responsa of the MaHaRil.
This is also proved from the Tur in Yoreh Day’ah 276: “If the letters of the name(s) of God appear inseparable, he may move the ink away, and there is no need afterwards to go over it with a quill to re-sanctify it…” Similar language is used in the Responsa of the Rosh 3:11 and the terms used come to teach us that one does not have to go over it with a quill, however, if one desires to do so, it is permissible.
According to the terms of my esteemed interlocutor, one who goes over the script with a quill completely ruins and disqualifies! It is then rather obvious that this is not so, and since one does so in order to make the script nicer, it does not replace the ink underneath it, as the new ink is subservient to the ink underneath it, allowing the underlying ink to remain viable for ritual use. Ergo, this would even be permitted when writing the scriptural passages for tefillin, as it would not be ‘writing it out of order’. Anything done to beautify it not considered a separation. However, it is not my intention to prolong this part of the discussion. In any case, my esteemed interlocutor sensed the question, according to his line of reasoning, of how could one permit the blackening of the tefillin boxes at all, as one could state that it does not permit the boxes to ‘see the outside air’? Rather, it is obvious that this is not considered a partition.
That which my esteemed interlocutor wrote that this applies specifically to one who blackens with ink dyes, as this is only the application of a black color which has little substance, is akin to what was stated in the Talmud, tractate Bava Kamma, in the chapter entitled ‘One who Steals’ page 101a, concerning the topic of
Whether dyeing enhances the value of wool. With all due respect, it applies to its appearance, as the dyes to not affect the valuation of the wool, it is the wool’s appearance. We see a similar issue noted in in Yoreh Day’ah 221:8, when one gives a tableau to asn artist to draw upon it, there it also the case where the tablet and the dyes were provided by the owner/buyer’s expenses, it is just that the artist simply draws. However, to him- it is impossible that the dye has no substance.
Additionally, what is the relationship of the ink to its colour? Dye must have substance, but colour does not have ‘substance’, as was noted in Yoreh Day’ah 198:21 in the Sha”ch You should know that it is not found as part of the ink, as it has no ‘substance’, since if it were not so, how are we to understand the the query posed in the Talmud, tractate Shabbat 120b- ‘derive that it is an interposition in any case due to the ink (on his skin)’? Perhaps, this was in context of God’s name written on one’s skin, and not just the ‘color’ black- and it would have no substance! Rather, it is obvious that writing must have some substance to it.
Despite that, we still blacken the hides of the tefillin boxes, and it is not disqualified because it ‘cannot see the outside environment’. Nor is it disqualified for adding something to the mitzva, because this was done to beautify the boxes. That which my esteemed interlocutor wrote, then what is the difference between that and a woman finishing her ritual menstrual cycle, who immerses herself with her clothing on- if they are fastened, they are a partition (to the water of the mikva) despite being there to beautify!? I am perplexed!! Do her clothes always stay on her? Does she not take them off and put them on? How could one think they are part of her body?
From this, we can deflect that which was asked from tractate Pesachim 57a at the end of the chapter entitled ‘In places in Which the Custom Were…’, concerning the high priest Yissachar, the ‘man’ from the village Sunrise (Barka’i) . It should be noted that what her did was not to beautify, but to protect his hands from getting dirty. Perhaps, this can be employed to answer that which my esteemd interlocutor questioned as to why Rash’I did not use the reason of ‘adding to a mitzva of the specified amount of priestly uniforms?Since it was not done to beautify, even though it was technically ‘clothing’ , perhaprs not even having the dimensions of three by three, perhaps when he covered his hand, it was not even the entire hand? See tractate Zevakhim 19- and this is not the lace to discuss this.
Against all this, the dye that is placed on the tefillin boxes does no ‘harm’ despite having ‘substance’. Besides, limits could one place on this? If the dye is thin, then if it is a little thicker, one would disqualify; if that is the case, then one reduces this ritual legal issue to a matter of measurements, in which case, reducing the issue to futility. Ergo, this is a simple matter, that anything that blackens or improves blackening can be included in that which beautifies the tefillin.
That which he wrote concerning the erasure of the letter Shin of God’s name, I am perplexed! If one accepts that line of reasoning, then what if he holds that the letters Daled and Yod in the knots of the straps of the head and arm tefillin respectively, which complete God’s name- as there are the letters Shin, Daled, Yod -if so, ask yourself how is it that at times one can undo those knots as necessary, perhaps one is then erasing God’s name?! “According to our master rabbi Eliyahu, there is a daily requirement to undo those knots and renew them”, go examine that which was explained in the Tosafot tractate Menachot 35b loc. cit. ‘From the Time’.
Rather, it must be, that since these letters are not ‘together’: The Shin is on the box, the daled is in the knot of the straps of the head tefillin and the yod in the straps of the arm tefiilin, there is no prohibition of ‘erasing God’s name’.
If my esteemed interlocutor would say: The daled and the yod do not possess the ‘sanctity’ God’s name- just the shin- as per the opinion of the Tosafot on that same page in tractate Menachot, loc. cit. ‘These are the Tefillin’. If that is so, then there is no letter other than the shin- it is obvious that there is no prohibition of ‘erasing God’s name’, as was explained in Yoreh Day’ah 276:10: “[erasing] shad from the word Shaddai or tzav from the word Tzva’ot, may be erased”.
That which he brought from the end of the tractate khagiga, that the vessel’s ritual use is negated secondary to its coating’, I have already written that this source is not a proof for his positions. Therre, the coating is for ritual use, as the coating is essential to its (ritual) function. Here, however, the coating is just for beautification, as there is no ritual use for this coating.
The same applies to the Shew-Bread Table and the Altars in the Unique Temple, the gold coating was essential to their ritual purposes. Since that is so, despite the fact that in the written Torah it states (Ex. 25:23) ‘Tree(s)’, its coating is not subsumed by it. If one would say that the coating of the Temple’s Table and Altar was for ornamentation, I have already written about this above, that gold is an unusual case, in that it has importance/value, and therefore cannot be ‘subsumed’, and will not be negated in term of ritual use. It was there that I answered the many question that arose from the discussion in tractate Khagiga, but this is not the place to impose yet another lengthy analysis. This line of reasoning is quite deep and one needs time and patience to understand it.
When one examines the statements of the Rambam in his Laws Concerning Vessels, chapter 4:4, he wrote: “So too, any wooden or bone vessel that have…”, then, there too, there is no proof that the essence of the ritual use of a vessel is on its coating. Indeed, it may be just the opposite! The vessel is not negated, since the coating is simply considered as a ‘covering’ for the vessel.
However, coating which is only ornamental, is subsumed to the essence of the vessel. Search out the laws concerning a clay vessel that is coated on the inside surface, the Sm’ak wrote that it is immersed without a blessing. This is also because of the inside coating, as the essence of that vessel’s use was for what is inside the coating.
That which my esteemed interlocutor wrote: “Also, even if one would consider that it is insignificant compared to the hide, if that is so, it will further bolster my argument that one is making the tefillin boxes from something that is not leather”; I say: The boxes must be made of leather, but their adornments, although insignificant to the leather, does not have to be made from hides. You should study the concept of beautification of the Sukkah, as the reason they do not disqualify the Sukkah , is that they are ‘insignificant’ compared to the Sukkah. This is also the words of the Tur (O”H) 627: “Even if one spread a sheet…however, if it within four handbreaths of the roof, it is not considered significant in regars to the roof, as it was placed only to beautify”- end quote of the Tur.
According to the words of my esteemed interlocutor, we can state the opposite- since it is insignificant compared to the s’chach, it is like covering the Sukkah with something that disqualifies it! Rather, it is obvious that it is not insignificant compared to the s’chach. However, despite that, the s’chach still remains as it is.
The same applies to the concept of blackening the tefillin boxes, which is insignificant regarding the hide of the box, which remains in essence- a hide. This is what we were given and what we conclude that these are the tefillin given to us by the master of the universe, and therefore, it has an aspect of ‘This is my Lord, and I will glorify him’. In this matter, I agree with him, so despite the above reasoning, the blackening plaster should not be thicker than the hide of the tefillin boxes, as the insignificant should not be ‘more’ than the significant- this is also a stringency.
However, that which my esteemed interlocutor stated that one may not cube the tefillin box leather, except for this (blackening) plaster- in this he ruled and taught beautifully- that the boxes must be made into natural cubes and that the hides of the boxes should be molded into cubes. Also, the Tosafot were unclear if the tefillin boxes require being made as cubes, as the Talmud only applies this to the stitching of the undersides and its diagonal (to make it a square) etc... Nevertheless, the major halachic decisors have deemed that the boxes must be made into cubes. With this, it is obvious that making the plaster into a cube is of no assistance, and my esteemed interlocutor was indeed correct vin this matter.
Additionally, that which he mentioned about those who place an elephant bone into this plaster as a joke, in that too, he decided well to forbid that practice. It is clear to the halachic decisors of the past that the boxes need to be black, as it is an ancient Mosaic tradition. It is obvious that the concept of ‘that which is permitted in one’s mouth’ applies here. One can analyze this, as they are not necessary and are placed for appearances sake, as to whther the concept of ‘that which is permitted in one’s mouth’ applies to it. Nevertheless, it is a good idea to be stringent.
Even according to those halachic decisors of the past who held that the boxes do not have to be black- except to beautify them- even then it is a good idea to be stringent, tha one should not use a rituaslly impure animal for this.
It is for all the concerns placed upon me that I cannot elaborate further on this, so I will bid you a peaceful farewell.
Teshuva 2
This is a response in honor of the accomplished Khacham Rabbi Shim’own Palagi, the leader and supporter of the Congregation of the Righteous, the unique Sefardic Kehilla of Hamburg.
I heard his plea calling me concerning a printed pamphlet, which he argued with another khacham in his city – arguments heard in our courts – the gates of prayer – concerning the correct emphatic pronunciation of God’s name, whether it should be read emphasizing the last or first syllable.
From one issue to another within the same topic, which he edited two or three statements in our prayer books, which he felt that one who prayed according to the traditional text would only be blaspheming the name.
I am somewhat perplexed about the issue at hand, why they chose to send these queries to rabbinic sages! It is a matter of [proper] reading! Go and ask biblical experts! Besides, I am an outsider, as I do not recognize who it is that was arguing with him!
Also, my esteemed interlocutor, if I saw his signature, I would not have recognized it, as he is far away from me I do not even know him, just his fine elocution. Nonetheless, this is akin to one who speaks in a wilderness, as if there is no one there [in Hamburg] who could decide such a simple matter, to the extent that they took the expense to send it far away to me.
I admit, that when it comes to the laws of Hebrew grammar [‘dikduk’] I do not have a firm grounding in it. I have not studies it at all, even the smallest corner this scholarly topic. However, with something so simple, that even the youngest schoolchildren in Jewish studies know that most words are pronounced on their final syllables, except, if the final syllable cannot be accented or have other diacritical marks known to the grammarians, as then it is moved from its usual place and place on an earlier syllable.
However, when it comes to the respected name of God, why should the pronunciation be lost from being said properly? The letter noon is associated with a hard vowel, plain to see, and there is no doubt that the word is accented on the last syllable. I have heard differently concerning this. Anyone who changes this is in error. One who continues this argument, holding fast to the position that the accent is on the first syllable, he himself is evil and his argument is untenable.
Heaven forbid that I should prolong this argument, as it was taught in the Torah that it is better to erase God’s name in water to promote peace, certainly not to promote argument, so that each of the sides be amenable to appeasement, and let bygones be bygones. If there is no other reason for their position, except from this published pamphlet, it is meaningless, not even worth it to respond to it!
Those of our cantors who clearly do this are just demonstrating their usual arrogant and foolish ways to have their singing voices heard; they smash the Hebrew words into pieces, and one cannot understand properly what they are saying – just a voice with the mispronounced words.
However, I cannot believe that any man who has learned even a bit of Torah, would hold on to such weak and unconvincing reasoning. Ergo, if there was some reasonable explanation, it would be made known. Besides this, there are other matters that he wished to edit in our makhzorim such as the poem line “remember that you slept (naMata) as a witness that the Torah will never be forgotten by our progeny” , my esteemed interlocutor edited that term as ‘orated’ (na’amta).
Indeed, the clarity of the language necessary for our prayers in our unique tongue, is the special language that God’s emissaries depend on from us, the word is pronounced NA-am-ta, as the source term for this word in our unique language is NA-am (to speak or orate),
However, one who does not change the traditional liturgy, and says ‘namTa’, also does not err. It is not as one would say that this person blasphemed, as the definition of ‘namTA’ is ‘you slept’, from the source term ‘namu shnatam’ (they were in a stupor), meaning sleeping or napping.
While this is true regarding the ‘holy tongue’ (Hebrew), it is well known that the liturgical poets used Aramaic as well. In the language of the Talmud (Aramaic), ‘Nam’ has the meaning of speaking, as found in the Midrash Sifrei on the Torah weekly portion of Beha’alotcha: ‘Rabbi Yoshi’a spoke (‘Nam’): Rabbi Yonatan spoke (‘Nam’)to me”.
In the Talmud, the word ‘nayma’ is used so often that I do not have to list examples, and not only in the Talmud, but the Mishna as well, who linguistics are clear and precise, also used this term.
Towards the very end of tractate Yevamot on page 122a in the Mishna it states: “ Rabbi Akiva stated….and I told him [ve’namiti]” Rash”I explained venamiti: ‘I told him’.
Also in tractate Gittin, towards the end of the chapter entitled ‘Accept’: “Rabbi Yossi stated: We said to the agent…”
In tractate Zevkhim 45b: “Rabbi Shim’own declares”, Rash”i explained in the name of Rabbi Meshulam the elder that on his deathbed, he explained ‘nooma Rabbi Shim’own’, as “Rabbi Shim’own said”.
Now that I have brought examples from the Talmud and the Mishna, I will show him an example from the Bible, from the Book of Ezra 4:8 “to King Artaxerxes [saying-kenama] as follows:…”. The meaning of the term ‘ke-nama’ is ‘saying as follows’. The Hebrew root of the verb is nam, as the letter aleph (א) at the end of na-ma denotes a sense of plural. It has been repeatedly used in other places in the Book of Ezra.
Towards the end of the Concordance – which is on the books of Daniel and Ezra – under the letter kaff (כ), these are his terms: ‘ke-nam’. ‘ke-na-ma’ are defined ‘as was stated’ – end quote.
Now that we have proven that the grammatical source of this verb is the two letter ‘nam’ [N-M], then it belongs as a present tense, single – as ‘namata’. Indeed, the current version of ‘zechor namata’ (remember you declared) is correct, as the liturgical poets chose brilliant linguistics.
Regarding the vowels, that which was edited concerning the word m-m-ch, which he edited with the kamatz vowel ‘uh’ under the letter mem, and edited m-m-ch with a sh’va under the letter mem and a kamatz under the letter kaff, or m-m-ch with with a dagesh and a kamatz under the letter kaff.
Indeed, I have no business dealing with the rules of Hebrew grammar – specifically this word – which I have only found in the personal present or plural present as in “you [plural] send”. It can also be seen in “Any matter that is difficult from you”.
However, for one who is speaking for one’s self, whether singular or plural – and of course for the singular infinitive – it is either ‘from us’ or ‘from me’. So too, in the plural infinitive case, one uses ‘from them’. The use of the singular second person ‘from you’ is only found in second person, as would seem to me, and we have seen this only a few times. That being so, one should not be restrictive in its vocalization.
From what I imagine is the rule regarding the vocalization of ‘from you’(‘mee-mach’), with the kamatz under the letter mem, as used in the word ‘with you’ (‘ee-mach’), as we also see in the term ‘he shall dwell with you’, and in the middle of the verse in ‘to the poor among you’; Rather, one see the word ‘from you’ from the part of the verse, where the letter mem vowelized with a she-gole amd the letter chaf with a kamatz and dagesh, as in Deuteronomy 7:1: “…seven nations much larger than you”. So we have seen it other places.
It is well known that even the masters of Hebrew grammar did not find an establish rule for the dagesh khazak, stating that it was merely to ‘beautify’ a word.
Ergo, to my mind, even one who stated a part of a verse ‘mee-mach’ in a place where the vowels need to be strung together equally, is not in error.
Certainly, in any case it is proper not to engage in disputes about these things, as noted by ‘The Waheb of Suphah’ and ‘Speak the truth to one another, render true and perfect justice in your gates’.
To your lives as to mine who seeks your peace.
Yoreh Deah
Even HaEzer
Choshen Mishpat